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The Vietnam War in Perspective

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The Authors



ELDER



TAYLOR




KORTEN

Joseph Elder is a Professor of Indian Studies and Sociology at the University of Wisconsin. Elder visited Hanoi twice in 1969 as a representative of the American Friends Service Committee. . . . Jean Taylor received her master's degree in Indonesian History from Melbourne University in Australia. Presently working toward her PhD in Southeast Asian History, Taylor lived in Indonesia for four months in 1968. She will be teaching a course entitled "International Women's Movements" in the University Extension beginning second semester. . . . Patrick Korten is one of the founders of the Badger Herald newspaper, and a long time member of the conservative Young Americans for Freedom (YAF). Korten is on the news staff of WISM radio.



MCLEAN



PROXMIRE



GOLDBERG


Thomas C. McLean, currently studying Languages at the University of Wisconsin-Whitewater, was stationed with the 173rd Airborne Brigade near Bien Hoa during 1966, and the 82nd Airborne Division on Dragon Mountain near Pleiku in 1967. A free lance writer, McLean has written dozens of short stories and hundreds of articles for newspapers and magazines. . . . William Proxmire is a United States Senator from Wisconsin. He is Chairman of the Joint Economic Committee and an outspoken critic of military spending policies. Proxmire was first elected in a special U.S. Senate election in 1957, replacing the just-deceased, controversial Senator Joseph McCarthy. . . . Harvey Goldberg is a Professor of History at the University of Wisconsin. The author of *French Colonialism: Progress or Poverty?*, and several other books, Goldberg specializes in French History. He spent the 1962-63 academic year lecturing in 15 foreign countries for the International University program.



ULEVICH



BOARDMAN



MCMILLIN

Neal Ulevich, a former night editor for the *Daily Cardinal*, received his BA in journalism from the University of Wisconsin in 1968. A native of Milwaukee, Ulevich worked as a photojournalist for the Associated Press in Indochina. . . . Betty Boardman sailed with eight American Quakers in March of 1967 to Haiphong, North Vietnam, to deliver medical supplies. An outspoken critic of the United States' Vietnam policies, Boardman ran for the United States Senate in Wisconsin in 1970, as a member of the Wisconsin Alliance. . . . Miles McMillin is the Editor and Publisher of the *Capital Times* newspaper. A frequent opponent of U.S. government policies, McMillin has opposed the American involvement in Southeast Asia since the war's early years.

Other contributors to this issue are Miles Mogulescu, a local activist and antiwar organizer. . . . the Departments of State and Defense; the former for the Children's History Document, and the latter for the Nixon administration's statement on the war. . . . Daniel Schwartz, Cardinal staff member, and draft number 46. . . . Lorne Taichman, graduate student in Genetics at the University of Wisconsin, and member of Science for Vietnam. . . . Rennie Davis, a long-time antiwar organizers, and a leader of last spring's May Day protests. . . . Eric Graf, a student at the University of Wisconsin, and Chairman of Students for McGovern in Madison. . . . Melvin D. Cohen, National Commander of the David Kink Peace Post. . . . Jeff Karrow, Cardinal staff member.

Editors of "The Vietnam War in Perspective" are Dan Biggs, Patrick McGilligan and Jonathan Wolman.

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Into the Air Nixon's Indochina War

By Prof. Joseph Elder

U.S. troops are withdrawing from Southeast Asia. U.S. air sorties in South Vietnam are down 30 per cent from what they were in 1968. The weekly toll of U.S. dead has reached an all-time low. White House statements repeat to the American people that the war is "winding down." The media underscore the message, adding that the war may well be a non-issue before the 1972 presidential campaign.

But is the war really "winding down"? Through the welter of optimistic press releases, occasional relatively reliable facts, and rare revelations of clandestine activities, the following picture seems to emerge:

1. The territory actually controlled by American or Allied forces in Indochina continues to be largely confined to the urban centers. In May, 1971, the Royal Lao Army and the CIA-directed Armee Clandestine lost the Bolvens Plateau, reducing the territory they now control in Laos to little more than the major towns. In Cambodia, Lon Nol's troops are estimated to control no more than 30 to 40 per cent of the country. In South Vietnam, as U.S. ground forces have pulled out, Saigon has lost effective control of increasing portions of the South Vietnamese countryside (including 54 posts in the "pacified" Mekong Delta during the first four months of 1971). President Nixon's "Vietnamization" policy acknowledges that expansion of American or Allied territorial control in Southeast Asia is out of the question.

2. The bomb tonnage the U.S. drops in Indochina continues at a rate comparable to the years of heaviest bombing in North Vietnam. In February, 1971, President Nixon stated, "I will not place any limits on the use of air power." His record supports his statement. At present rates, sometime before March, 1972 the bombing tonnage he has authorized in Indochina will exceed that authorized by Lyndon Johnson (3.2 million tons). By way of comparison, all bombs dropped during World War II and the Korean War totaled 2.9 million tons.

A look at the table shows that such highly-publicized statements as President Johnson's 1968 announcement that he was stopping the bombing in North Vietnam had little impact on the tonnage rates. The U.S. merely redirected its planes into South Vietnam and Laos. Following the invasion of Cambodia in May, 1969, U.S. planes could roam the skies of Cambodia as well. During the past year, the U.S. has resumed bombing North Vietnam, sending in planes an average of twice a week on "protective reaction" strikes.

According to the Kennedy Subcommittee on Refugees (*New York Times*, April 3, 1979) "In this year, 1971, more civilians are being killed and wounded in the three countries of Indochina, and more made refugees, than at any time in history. Most of the casualties are caused and people made refugees by American and Allied military activity."

The monthly civilian toll (killed, wounded, and refugee) while Lyndon Johnson was president has been estimated at 95,000. The monthly civilian toll while Richard Nixon has been president is estimated at 130,000.

3. U.S. electronic data-gathering sensors, computers, and aerial-delivered weapons systems

are replacing conventional ground forces. If the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Southeast Asia automatically meant the collapse of America's allies in South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, President Nixon would almost certainly not withdraw U.S. troops. The bombing tonnages reflect his choice to shift the war to the air.

During recent years, U.S. technology has developed an arsenal of aerial weapons bordering on science fiction. One of the least imaginative—but deadliest—is the CBU (Cluster Bomb Unit) that sprays the air for thousands of square feet with lethal pellets. The U.S. has scattered tens of thousands of "Dragontooths" (that look like claws) and "Gravel" (shaped like light-green tea bags) anti-personnel mines that injure anyone stepping on them or picking them up.

U.S. planes are dropping hundreds of seismic and sound electronic sensors that hang from trees or bury themselves in the ground and transmit impulses of anything moving nearby. Each sensor emits its own code, which allows the monitoring systems to spot precisely where anything is moving—machine or man. These sensors can guide such planes as the AC-130 "flying destroyer" to areas where people are moving, while on-board computers aim and shoot the plane's cannons.



Even more efficient are the U.S. electronic monitoring centers. Safely located in places such as the Udorn air base in Thailand, the IBM 360-65 computers receive impulses from the ground sensors, identify on large maps where ground movements are taking place, determine the nature of those movements, select which weapons to use, and direct airborne U.S. gunships and fighters to coded coordinates. On "the most boring of all combat missions. . ." the planes fly to the coordinates, where their weapons are released by computers.

The U.S. is now using 2,000-pound bombs that can hit "impossible" targets (such as cave entrances or bridge spans) through laser-beam guidance from supporting planes. Other "smart bombs" include the E-O (Electrical-Optical) bomb with a TV camera in the nose that "pilots" the bomb directly to its pre-selected target.

The weapons systems required for an automated war are not cheap. But if they permit the withdrawal of conventional U.S. ground forces and reduce weekly U.S. war dead to virtually zero, aerial automation may be the cheapest way for the U.S. to wage the war.

Where the intent of President Johnson's war was to destroy the guerrilla fish as they moved among the sea of people, the intent of President Nixon's war is to destroy the guerrilla fish by draining the sea. Those civilians whom the U.S. air war does not main or kill must remain close to the shelter of their caves and trenches or flee from the countryside into the cities that continue to be controlled by America and her Allies.

There is ample evidence the war is not being "wound down" in Southeast Asia. It has been lifted into the air, where President Nixon plans to keep it "for the indefinite future." Since the air war takes so few U.S. lives, President Nixon seems to believe (perhaps correctly) such a war is acceptable to the American people.



NEW YORK TIMES' CHARTS indicate total tonnage of bombs dropped by U.S. planes as compared with other wars, and a breakdown of tonnage dropped on specific areas. (*New York Times*, Nov. 21, 1971)

Women's Movement Affects Slow Changes in Southeast Asia

By Jean Taylor

Feminism developed in Southeast Asia alongside nationalist movements to overthrow colonial rule in the twenties and thirties. Most parties had a section for women only, formed partly to solve the problem of mixing in societies that traditionally separated men and women.

The main goals of feminists were reform of marriage and divorce laws, and equal pay and access to jobs. The titles they chose for their organizations reflect the way these women saw themselves: "Enlightened Wives" and "Union of Awakened Mothers." Most demanded an education for women that would allow them to extend their roles of nourisher and sustainer beyond the home to service of the country.

They wanted also to overcome traditional outlooks that linked women with traffic with evil spirits and depicted them as seducers and dangerously passionate people. They wanted to modify the stereotypes that allotted authority to men, and which were transmitted through institutions and through proverbs such as the Thai: "A woman is the hind legs of an elephant," and the Vietnamese: "An officer is one who commands soldiers; a husband is one who commands his wife." Early feminists were for the first time stepping outside the physical as well as mental confines of their father's and husband's house compound to attend meetings, run marriage and vocational guidance bureaus, and to edit magazines.

A FEW DID THINK in terms of ending sex-based roles. Writing in 1912 to a Dutch commission of enquiry on "native welfare" in their colony, Dewi Sartike said there was no reason why Indonesian women should not receive the same education as men, and be self-supporting through a similar range of activities. She founded a series of schools for girls that she called "Women's Accomplishment." The great majority of women in

Southeast Asia are rice farmers, vendors in the markets, artisans, factory workers and wage laborers, doing heavy work like lower-class women in all human societies. They control their own profits, divorce frequently and easily in societies that stress compatibility of personalities, and have their most enduring ties with female relatives. They have a monopoly over the low-paying, low-ranking jobs.

Traditionally, formal education was denied Southeast Asian women, while only extreme poverty prevented their brothers from attending the village Buddhist school, or the classes given by the local Muslim teacher. All administrative posts were therefore held exclusively by men, in the village and in the higher levels of government. Women's power of decision-making was confined to the informal, if formidable, influence in the home or behind the scenes in a ruler's court.

Formal education of women came only with the establishment of secular school systems by the colonial regimes in their "benevolent, enlightened" phase early this century, or in areas where missions had opened schools.

TOP JOBS ARE still held almost exclusively by men, although a far larger proportion of women in Southeast Asian countries are represented in parliaments and on foreign delegations than in the United States or in Western Europe. With modern education systems was reproduced in the region western notions of the appropriate division of labor. So women are air hostesses, men are pilots; and professional women are concentrated heavily in teaching and public health. In the Philippines, which has the longest tradition of formal female education (the first school was opened to girls in 1594 in Manila), women dominate pharmacy and dentistry, and many are lawyers.

The range of jobs held by women is probably widest in North Vietnam. But

there the movement of women into factories can also be seen as a continuation of the old concept of women as properly occupying supportive roles in the family; now they release men for service in the army and bureaucracy.

Under the old patriarchal system of Vietnam, a person existed only in relation to the family. But the protection it offered its members, especially women, has shrunk through the years of occupation and war. Young city women in the fifties were urgently seeking degrees to cope with this change as a career became for the first time an alternative to marriage and a necessity for survival. Le Kwang Kim, writing of these years, speaks of the exhilaration she felt when she was no longer under the authority of her father or her husband after his death. Till then, she says, she had lived only "at second hand".

Greater awareness of self and of individual responsibility was forced on women of all social classes. For many were living in a world without men permanently in the home; and in the South older women began taking part in the councils of the extended family and some were elected its head.

Polygamy and concubinage were legally abolished in both the South and North in an effort to raise the status of women. But in the South the Diem regime tried to order the relations between men and women by outlawing divorce and separation except with government consent.

MOST SOUTHEAST Asian regimes can claim credit for what they have done to reduce the inferior status of women. All nationalist governments came to power on platforms committed to emancipation of women: equality of the sexes was proclaimed—most insistently in the 1946 constitution of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam—and provisions were made, on paper at least, for equal pay, paid maternity leave, and day-care centres. When elections have been held, women have been able to vote and stand for office; and in Indonesia they were defined as an interest group and as such allotted representation along with workers soldiers and youth in government councils.

But most male-dominated governments of Southeast Asia opposed, or did nothing, on establishing family planning centres and making modern birth control techniques available. Singapore was the great exception. The government first opened free clinics in 1949; and the visitor

is immediately struck by the many posters and billboards proclaiming the benefits of small families and by the contrasting pictures of two well-fed schoolchildren and ten hungry ones.

SUKARNO'S GOVERNMENT told its people population limitation was unnecessary, and the women of Java continued having the midwife twist their uterus, wrecking it, after the fifth or sixth child to prevent further conceptions.

In 1964 the Thai government opened a pilot family planning project in a rural district about sixty miles west of Bangkok, where most people had four years or less of schooling. Acceptance of family planning was found to be very high and desired by men as well as women. The same results were found after a clinic was opened in Bangkok; but a survey of doctors (all male) found them opposed to birth control unless a woman could prove she had five or more children and already severe economic hardship.

Women still have to be educated to full human status, according to a Burman feminist, Ni Ni Gyi, discussing the problems of educated women deterred from working after marriage lest they harm the status of their husbands.

Nor does the revolutionary restructuring of a society automatically bring changes in the relations of men and women. In "On the Way in the Fight for Women's Equality with Men" Nguyen Thi Thap says: "the concept of favoring men and scorning women is still very much alive in our society" (North Vietnam), and urges women's groups to end wife-beating and abuse of female children through hard work to prove their equality and devotion to liberation of the country.

NONE OF THE OBVIOUS abuses of women that we vaguely associate with "the East" are found in Southeast Asia. Women have never been veiled for instance, not even in the Muslim areas of Malaya, Indonesia and the southern Philippines. Nor have widows been expected to die on their husband's funeral pyre, with the exception of upper class women in Hindu Bali.

Most women, in fact, support themselves, and can divorce fairly easily, both objectives sought by western women's liberation movements. The Southeast Asian example suggests that depressed status of women is not simply a matter of economics, and that age-old notions of female inferiority live on, even if they assume new guises from time to time.

McCarthy '72

GENE McCARTHY SAYS WHAT MUST BE SAID

PEACE

"The time for negotiations is still now as it has been for five years."
"If elected I will end the war." "I would say that with reference to this war we should judge harshly those who extended the doctrine 'my country right or wrong' to the even more fallacious doctrine, 'my party right or wrong'."

ECONOMY

"I find the approach to wage price controls unacceptable. Big business, big labor and government sit down together, as if they're 3 equal forces, to decide what will be done. In actuality, government should represent all of us—it is not a third force—the public body should make the decisions. Instead of setting national policy we negotiate."

POVERTY

"We must meet the needs of people for hunger, clothing and housing. If this calls for a redistribution of the material resources of this country and a redistribution of participation in productive effort in this country then let us commit ourselves to that kind of distribution."

PEOPLE

"We have to commit ourselves to establishing one system of justice for all people." "We have to admit that our penal system is, in its psychological and moral influences worse than medieval." "The constitution does not contain an exclusive grant of the land around the cities to the non-poor and the non-black."

TOGETHER WE CAN DO WHAT MUST BE DONE

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The War is Over: Fact or Fiction?

By Miles Mogulescu

no short haired—yellow bellied son of tricky dicky
is gonna mother hubbard soft soap me
with just a pocketful of hope
all i want is the truth
just gimme some truth

—John Lennon

The theory that the Indochina war is "winding down" and just about over has slowly moved from the editorial page—the realm of opinion—to the front page, where it is assumed as the basis for most reporting—the realm of fact.

But is it a fact? Is the war just about over? What if precisely the opposite is true? What if this is just another attempt to distract us from the real truth? What if the apparent winding down is simply a cover for the reverse policy—the continuation of technological war into the indefinite future—perhaps with tactical nuclear weapons? And more, what if the apparent thaw with China is meant to lay the basis not for a permanent peace in the Pacific but for a new nuclear confrontation?

The Pentagon Papers should certainly have made us suspicious of all government claims if we weren't already—the government is certainly capable of saying one thing and doing the opposite. Moreover, there are also important facts that point to the conclusions that the Indochina War is being permanently extended, not ended, and that overtures to China are pointed not to a new peace but to a new war—cold or hot. Even as I begin the first draft of this article, the radio is announcing 200 U.S. bombing raids against North Vietnam, the greatest number since bombing was supposedly halted in 1968.

LISTEN TO the words of a combat GI in a September AP report, explaining why he hates Martha Mitchell, Melvin Laird, and George Romney in that order.

"That Mitchell women said the war's over. My mom writes to tell me how lucky I am not to be in the bush anymore. But I'm going out on patrol same as before. We're still stepping in their (NFL's) booby traps.

La

"Laird said I'm in a defensive position. What the hell's so defensive about a combat assault?

"AND NOW Romney tells me the only alternative to combat deaths is unemployment back home. Well, I'd much rather be unemployed than dead."

For this GI, much less the Vietnamese

he is fighting, the war is hardly over. There is strong evidence of this from above—from the policy makers—as well as from below.

Clark Clifford, Secretary of Defense under Johnson, has for 20 years played a key foreign policy role among the Eastern internationalist wing of capitalist policy-makers, and what he says is a good tip-off to what this group is thinking. In the cover

story from a recent N.Y. Times Magazine, Clifford delineated his analysis of Nixon's policy:

"He (Clifford) is convinced that President Nixon is committed to the preservation of a non-communist regime in South Vietnam, that Nixon's demands are unacceptable to the Communists and that the result will be U.S. military forces in South Vietnam for the indefinite future.

"He (Clifford) believes that the Communists, rather than passively accept a U.S. residual force, will launch a major military offensive this winter, one aimed at influencing public opinion in this country by inflicting heavy casualties on American forces.

"HE FEARS THAT NIXON, rather than accept heavy losses, will re-escalate the U.S. military involvement, perhaps to the point of using nuclear weapons.

"He (Clifford) thinks a re-escalation would trigger widespread public demonstrations against the Government and lead to a political crisis that could 'tear this country apart'.

"Finally, Clifford is not optimistic that Nixon's proposed visit to China will lead to peace in Vietnam. On the contrary, he fears the President is using the trip as an excuse for not responding to the National Liberation Front's seven-point peace plan which was announced July 1 in Paris."

SO COMPLETE and so truthful is Clifford's analysis that there is little the sharpest revolutionary analyst could add except to underline its importance, considering from where it's coming: A wealthy corporate lawyer, top foreign policy advisor to Truman, Secretary of Defense under Johnson, and always chief salesman of policy for the Eastern wing of American corporate leadership; Clifford's views are a pretty good indication of what

this very powerful group is thinking.

That they should feel compelled to be candid, first releasing the Pentagon Papers, through their house organs—The New York Times and the Washington Post—then turning Clark Clifford loose to "sound the alarm" with such precision, shows they're scared about Nixon's policy. If Clifford says the war isn't ending but being continued indefinitely, perhaps to the point of nuclear confrontation—it's probably worth thinking about.


To elaborate on Clifford's points, Nixon has "made it perfectly clear" time and time again that he has no intention of ending America's military presence until a stable pro-American, anti-communist government has been permanently established. Again to quote Clifford, "I have analyzed everything President Nixon has said about Vietnam going back to the early 1950's. I keep a file on every word he utters. I read it, underline it, and I think about it. I now believe I understand what his policy is. . . I've reached the conclusion that he would consider the war lost unless our efforts result in a non-Communist government there. Thus he talks about not being the first President to lose a war, and about not letting the U.S. become a pitiful, helpless giant." He apparently thinks the American people will accept a permanent residual force in South Vietnam, as long as casualties can be kept to a minimum."

SUCH A policy is unlikely to work. As the recent electoral farce indicated, Thieu couldn't stand a minute without American support. He has no domestic base, even among the bourgeois classes. He has been forced to arrest large numbers of Buddhist clergy, middle class intellectuals, even National Assembly members. Even under conditions of extreme repression, there have recently been a series of militant demonstrations by students, disabled veterans, and buddhist monks, as well as a new outbreak of urban terrorism.

The CIA has reported 30,000 NLF infiltrators in the Saigon government, including an aide to Ky, a former province chief, high officials in military intelligence, and members of the Paris negotiating team. This clearly indicates that large numbers of government bureaucrats have switched allegiance and are now informing for the NLF.

If Nixon will not withdraw until an anti-communist government is stabilized but

(continued on page 6)



DO YOUR RECORDS FEEL REJECTED?


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Another Way of Looking At It...

By Patrick Korten

When I was first contacted by the Daily Cardinal, and asked to write an editorial piece on Viet Nam, I figured I had a couple of options. One was to simply say no. The other was to say yes, and risk the ire of my former colleagues on the Badger Herald, which newspaper I helped found and for which I sacrificed the better part of my academic career at the University which was already nearly a shambles anyway.

I decided on the latter, for several reasons. First, there didn't seem to be anyone else around to write anything approaching a conservative piece on Viet Nam (conservatives are a trifle hard to come by around here); second, I have been getting some exercise lately, and figure I might be able to outrun the angry mob from the Herald when they come looking for me, tar and feathers in hand.

I HAVE FOUND, during years of participation in debates on the subject, that Vietnam discussions almost inevitably degenerate into conflicting views of history. While I've got my own historical view of the Southeast Asian situation, that's not the point I choose to stress in this article. Rather, I hope to emphasize convincingly an overall philosophy which I believe should govern in such situations. Viet Nam, after all, though it has its own unique twists which differentiate it from other Communist revolutions around the world, still has quite a lot in common with them too. In fact, I believe that our main problem in Viet Nam has not been all of the military, economic, and political involvements in which we have become involved, but rather the haphazard, almost absurdly incongruous way in which we have become involved.

It doesn't really matter to me whether or not the United States, through the CIA or anybody else, was involved in the ouster of Diem. What does upset me is the fact that, while we must have had some sort of political goal in mind in the Diem incident, and while the Pentagon had drawn up all sorts of military contingency plans for this or that eventuality in Vietnam, the two were never meshed into a single, coherent set of goals, and plans to achieve those goals.

Call me Machivellian if you wish; the

title may well be accurate. But I have never had much faith in negotiating problems out of existence, at least not big problems, which involve two absolutely diametrical views, and which are, for all intents and purposes, irreconcilable. Talking such problems out at a negotiating table may postpone the blowup for a while, but it is rare indeed when negotiations will settle a serious dispute for once and for all.

ARBITRATION WORKS, for example, within the confines of the United States, because there is a common accession to the rule of law; you win a few, you lose a few, but the decision is final, and accepted by both parties. The principle does not work on an international scale, and shows no promise of working for a long, long time to come. For although 132 nations have decided that it's just fine to be a member of a debating society in New York, few, if any of them are interested in

submitting to arbitration of a final and binding nature, or even mediation, when it comes to their disputes with another the shape of the negotiating table, have resulted in agreement on absolutely nothing in the three years since then. Though I rue it, the simple fact is that talking about such serious problems has to date only resulted in raising the false hopes of our citizenry, then dashing them in bitter disillusionment when negotiations fail to produce anything.

My point in all of this is that we have consistently refused to recognize the Viet Nam War as one of those conflicts which is simply not solvable by any other means than by force. One side must prevail. And though it is a difficult decision to make whether or not we shall give up for lost a country of eighteen million persons is anything but an easy choice, it is one which should have been made long before 45,000 men died without really knowing why.

MOST PEOPLE, I guess, would agree with this must. But it carries with it some

(And don't misquote me here: I am not saying that I like right wing dictatorships. I don't. I merely regard them as less evil than left wing variations on the same theme.) At any rate, most of these assumptions are hard for a lot of people to swallow, particularly on this campus.

Applying some of these criteria to the Vietnamese situation, I think that the only truly logical choice back in the early 1960's was to make a stand in Viet Nam. But our involvement should have been decisive, not apologetic. Communist expansion there could have been checked quickly and decisively if we had decided to do it. Perhaps not as simply as in the case of Che Guevara in Bolivia, but in a similar vein. Instead, we decided to play games. While North Vietnamese troops would blithely ignore national boundaries (which were largely arbitrary anyway), we would observe them scrupulously. We allowed a gradual escalation over four years, when we had the capacity to do it in months, and get it over with.

WELL, I WARNED you that my assumptions might be a little hard for you to swallow. I have stated them a bit boldly because I wanted to express a point of view which stands out in contrast to those more commonly expressed around here. I do not really wish to see the president exercise foreign policy like a bull in a china shop. (no pun, really!) But I think that a tough stance in the realm of foreign policy will win more respect and will mean more in the critical situations in which the slightest miscalculation can mean war, than all of the generous foreign aid in the world.

The loss of tens of thousands of lives in Viet Nam has a ruinous effect on the United States. And although the simple loss of these lives is deplorable enough, the more significant long-range effect will be American inability to cope with potential world threats to its security.

Some say this is healthy; that we should have learned long ago that we cannot dictate each move on the world chessboard as we see fit. Perhaps this is true. But I would rather that we had exercised our influence and power judiciously, but decisively when necessary, rather than acting timidly and rendering ineffective and useless the power which we do have.

A Conservative's Analysis of the Vietnam Conflict

country. The India-Pakistan war, the Israeli-arab conflict, the Viet Nam War, Sino-Soviet border conflicts, the Korean War, and a whole series of confrontations between the United States and the Soviet Union (the Berlin Crisis, the Soviet Missile Crisis, etc.) all stand as testament to the utter uselessness of the United Nations when it comes to a deep-rooted international difference of opinion.

International conferences outside of the UN have fared a little better, but not much. Neither the US nor the USSR have tested nuclear devices in the atmosphere for about ten years. But then again, both countries have tested a great many underground, and China has tested in the atmosphere to its heart's delight. The Paris "Peace" Talks, hailed so enthusiastically when they were deciding on

major assumptions which are anything but commonly agreed upon. I assume, for instance, that we should give serious consideration to military aid or active involvement when a non-Communist nation is threatened by a Communist "war of national liberation." I assume that a victory by Communist rebels is by definition bad for a people, no matter how bad things were before the revolution. I believe this to be true because of the qualitative difference between right wing and left wing dictatorships. Under a right wing dictatorship, a man may at least go his own way as long as he doesn't stomp on official toes. A left wing dictatorship, on the other hand, demands much more: it requires active ideological support of the regime, cf. memorizing Mao's little red book, or "voting" in Soviet Russia.

The War is Over?

(continued from page 5)

this impossible in the foreseeable future, what is his real policy?

SEN. THOMAS Eagleton (D.—Mo.), back from a trip to Vietnam, testified before the Senate Foreign Relations

Committee that top U.S. generals in Vietnam told him that the administration plans to keep American support and air forces in the war zone "indefinitely", even after U.S. ground combat operations end. "These military men told me that the plan

under which they were operating called for a residual American force... and for a protracted period of massive American air power, including helicopters, based in Thailand and Okinawa and various places in Indochina."

While ground troops have been withdrawn, air strikes have been stepped up. Since Nixon took office, more than 2.7 million tons of bombs, by Pentagon estimates, have been dropped on In-

(continued on page 14)

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Parting Shots

'a mental war story'

By Thomas C. McLean



Dawson sat in the jeep as it idled in front of the officer's tent, waiting for his passengers, Sergeant Philips and Warrant Officer Kelly. The afternoon was flawless but for the sun drawing evanescent vapors out of the parched earth. Dawson took to the warm climate, the quiet Vietnamese countryside—the war had only begun to affect the country in those days. He saw it coming, and in moments like this idling in the constant afternoon sun, these moments filled him with sentiments for Vietnam's simple way of life. He could feel the native purity of it ebbing with the burgeoning scale of the war.

Sergeant Philips and Warrant Officer Kelly came out of the tent. As he got into the front seat, the sergeant saw that Dawson did not have his rifle. "You want my M-16, Dawson?" he suggested. "It's right here." He gestured toward the tent. "We don't need one, Sarge," Dawson explained.

"Wouldn't hurt to take one along just in case," countered the sergeant.

DAWSON LOOKED at him insistently. "You'll just be asking for trouble. We're only going to Saigon after all."

Sergeant Philips remained silent as Warrant Officer Kelly climbed into the back seat of the jeep.

"You're not taking a weapon along, Sergeant Philips?" the warrant officer observed.

"Relax, Mr. Kelly," the sergeant looked over his shoulder grinning at the warrant officer. "I know what I'm doing."

Kelly resisted the urge to reproach the sergeant. "I don't get out much myself," he advised, "but I sure don't think it's a good idea to go out of the camp unarmed."

"We get out every day, Mr. Kelly," the sergeant assured him.

"Dawson knows this country like the back of his hand, don't you, Dawson? Nothing to worry about, Mr. Kelly. It's a beautiful Sunday afternoon—your last Sunday in Vietnam. So why don't you just enjoy it and we'll do the worrying." Sergeant Philips lit a cigar. "Beautiful Sunday afternoon," he repeated with a broad grin.

WARRANT OFFICER Kelly ignored the sergeant's lackadaisical attitude. "I hope you don't mind my asking, Sergeant Philips," he complained again. "But isn't that the road to Saigon?" He pointed out of the jeep to the highway they were just crossing.

"Yes, Mr. Kelly," the sergeant confirmed. "That's the road to Saigon."

Kelly grew anxious behind the insolent sergeant and the silent private. "Would somebody mind telling me why we aren't on that road?" he asked patiently.

"Listen, Mr. Kelly, didn't I tell you Dawson knows this territory like the back of his hand? The highway's overloaded with traffic. It's a miserable way to spend a nice Sunday afternoon."

"At least it's safer," the warrant officer argued with forced calm.

"Nothing's going to happen to you, Mr. Kelly. You're in safe hands, believe me. We know what we're doing."

KELLY STARED out into the dense broad-leaf palms and banana trees that leaned over the narrow road. "What route is this?" he finally spoke again.

Sergeant Philips leaned over the seat to face the warrant officer. "This is the scenic route, Mr. Kelly," he replied. "Nobody else knows about it, that's all."

As the jeep penetrated deeper along the unpaved road, the foliage grew thicker and taller until the tropic sun only pierced through intermittently. The warrant officer listened above the rumbling engine of the jeep and eyed the encroaching vegetation suspiciously. "I haven't seen a gook along the whole way," he expressed doubtfully.

Sergeant Philips ignored him. "Nice country, isn't it, Dawson?" he spoke to the driver.

"If you ask me," the warrant officer offered another observation, "this country's crawling with VC. Would you

deny that, Sergeant Philips?"

"I'd say that's accurate," the sergeant replied. "Wouldn't you, Dawson?"

"There's a war going on if that's what you mean," the driver replied.

"**WELL, IF YOU** ask me, this is VC country all right," Kelly repeated. "I've never seen such dark looking trees. They're probably watching us every minute along the whole way. I don't know about you guys, but it gives me the creeps."

"Maybe it's something you ate, Mr. Kelly," the sergeant said over his shoulder to the warrant officer.

Kelly did not reply as he stared out of the jeep, glancing from one side to the other. The jeep rolled through the shadowy jungle bouncing over the oxcart ruts in the dirt road.

"You don't have a price on your head, Sergeant," explained the warrant officer. "I don't suppose the VC would bother with a staff sergeant—what's one more sergeant. That's the way I see it anyhow."

Sergeant Philips gazed out over the windshield into the winding path, ignoring the warrant officer. "Hot enough for you?" he asked the Pfc at the wheel.

"I'll grant you that," the warrant officer interrupted. He adjusted his cap as beads of sweat rolled into his eyes.

"I like it," the driver replied. "THIS IS A hell of a country," the warrant officer added. "Hot isn't the word for it."

"Don't you like it here, Mr. Kelly?" asked the sergeant.

"I ought to. Almost twelve months in this steaming place."

"Dawson likes Viet Nam, don't you, Dawson?" said the sergeant.

"Sure," the driver replied simply.

"That's what it does to you, Sergeant," remarked Kelly. "Drives you crazy if you survive."

Kelly lit the cigarette and gazed out of the jeep into the rich green foliage that had enclosed the length of the trip since they crossed the main highway to Saigon. The incessant jungle unnerved him. "Scenic route," he murmured to himself as he smoked in silence.

"What's that, Mr. Kelly?" asked the sergeant.

"Nothing, Sergeant," the warrant officer replied, "talking to myself." He continued to stare out of the jeep. "What's so great about this? Just a bunch of trees, Sergeant. And a lousy road. This whole country isn't worth two cents, you know that? All it is is one big rotten steaming worthless jungle." Kelly puffed on his cigarette. "You'd think these trees would be worth something, Sergeant. But you know what, they're no good for anything."

He tossed the cigarette into the road, lifting his cap to wipe away the sweat gathered on his forehead. "How much longer is this going to take, Sergeant?" he inquired looking away from the perpetual trees passing around them.

"**NOT LONG, Mr. Kelly,**" the sergeant uttered, with his cigar clenched in his teeth. "What would you say, Dawson, not too long to go?"

"No," the Pfc replied, "not long."

"That's all there is here," the warrant officer continued. "A lot of worthless crap. You'd think they'd clear all this land and make some use of it. You know. You'd think they'd take the trouble to cultivate it or something. Tree after worthless tree—choking each other to get a drop of rainwater. Look at it. Far as you can see, huge trees smothering everything to get a little sunlight in all this blessed jungle."

Sergeant Philips took a moment to look at the trees. "You got a point, Mr. Kelly. Doesn't he, Dawson?"

The driver only smiled as he aimed the jeep over the rough narrow road.

"**THEY'RE JUST** plain lazy, that's all," the warrant officer offered a further observation. "How in hell can they live in this God-forsaken jungle. I'd go nuts. But you know something? That's the thing about

these gooks—they're not even gooks, they're savages. You got to be to take all this steaming rot. All you have to do is look at it. You know a human being couldn't survive a day in this stench. That's what gets me. A human can't survive a day in this stinking jungle. You know what I mean, Sergeant? It smothers you." He leaned back and wiped the sweat away once more. His eyes fell shut for a moment to close out the sight of the endless passing jungle.

"It isn't easy living in this ungodly country for twelve incessant months without a break," he resumed. "You've got to admit, anybody that can take this boiling stench for a year has got to get some credit."

"No point feeling sorry for yourself, Mr. Kelly," Sergeant Philips advised him.

"Feeling sorry for myself?" the warrant officer repeated. "Look at this miserable place. I've been putting up with this for twelve blessed months. You don't have to tell me how to take it, Sergeant Philips. I'm up to here in it. You know what I mean? I don't even know what's real anymore. You can't tell me I'm feeling sorry about it."

KELLY GLANCED among the trees again. "It's been one endless nightmare, that's what it's been. Jungle choking you till you can hardly breathe, surrounded by these crazy savages. God, they drive you out of your wits, creeping around in the dark. You don't know from one second to the next—you never know, Sergeant Philips. But you know your days are counted, that's for sure. Any second they're going to come leaping out of those rotten trees."

Kelly closed his eyes once more. The grinding whine of the jeep was all he could hear above his own voice.

"We'll have to stop for gas pretty soon," the driver spoke.

"How much further to Saigon, Sergeant?" Kelly inquired, opening his eyes to the scorching sun.

"Still a ways yet, wouldn't you say, Dawson?" the sergeant replied.

"Yes," the Pfc agreed, "still a ways."

"You know what I could go for?" Kelly suggested. "I could really go for a drink. Anything. My throat is parched in this blessed heat."

"You want a drink, Mr. Kelly?" Sergeant Philips turned to face the bleak warrant officer. "I got a fifth right under the seat."

"**WHY DIDN'T** you say so, I'm dying." The warrant officer loosened his shirt as Sergeant Philips searched underneath the seat. He produced a bottle of Scotch and took a swallow, then handed it to Kelly.

"God, what a life saver. I don't know how I stood it this long." He took a drink. "What are you doing with booze like this, Sergeant Philips?" he queried, wiping his face on his sleeve.

"Emergencies, Mr. Kelly," the sergeant laughed. "Like you said, you never know what's coming next."

Kelly sat back in the seat, breathing relief. He balanced the bottle of Scotch on his knee. "You don't know how much I needed that, Sergeant," he sighed. "It's this ungodly heat, I'm not used to it like you guys are."

"That's what your air-conditioned office does to you, Mr. Kelly," the sergeant humored. "You got it too easy up there."

"Yah. I know how easy I got it," the warrant officer replied. "While you guys got nothing else to do but cruise around the countryside."

"**YOU COULD HAVE** cruised around, Mr. Kelly, and let us sit in your office for you," suggested Sergeant Philips.

The warrant officer laughed. "Nothing doing, Sergeant. You wouldn't get me into the field like that, not for anything."

"What's wrong with cruising around all day long, Mr. Kelly? What could be easier?"

"I'm not that stupid, Sergeant Philips. You don't know when your next step is

your last."

"Sure. Nothing safer than sitting in your air-conditioned office, is there, Mr. Kelly?"

"I feel safer there." The warrant officer took another drink. "Besides who do you think's responsible for these guys running around crazy getting themselves killed all the time. They don't know any better, yet I'm supposed to be responsible for them. God, you don't realize, Sergeant Philips." Kelly capped the Scotch and laid it on the floor of the jeep. "You got another cigarette?" he asked.

Sergeant Philips gave him one from Dawson's pack.

"**YOU SEE WHAT I** mean, Sergeant Philips? And you guys think all I do is lounge around the office. How so I know a mortar's not going to pop through the roof and blow my brains out? That place is a sitting target any time of day. I'm trying to take care of you guys and I'm a sitting duck myself. Day and night, I never get out of that camp. You know that, Sergeant? I've been sitting on that one little plot of ground for twelve months, waiting to get blown off the face of the earth. You think your days are counted. God. There can't be too many numbers left for me anymore. I go crazy just thinking about it. Just stop and think, all the days I wasn't zapped." Kelly inhaled the cigarette. "I mean just how many more days do you think I got left?"

"You just got to know what you're doing."

"You're going to get yourself zapped if you ask me, Sergeant. Sooner or later your number's going to come up, regardless of what you think you know, Sergeant," observed the warrant officer. "That's a fact."

"You're going to get zapped, Dawson," the sergeant repeated to the Pfc. "Mr. Kelly has it a fact."

DAWSON SMILED without looking away from the road.

"Well, if you guys'd be a bit sensible about it," Kelly told the sergeant. "You wouldn't end up dead."

"Sooner or later your number's up," the sergeant returned the warrant officer's observation.

"Well, if you ask me, there's no sense going out and asking for it."

"That's just what Dawson here was telling me when we were leaving the camp," Sergeant Philips agreed. "He said I was just asking for trouble bringing along an M-16. That's a fact, isn't it, Dawson?"

The driver simply laughed.

"God," Kelly remarked, looking around at the trail of dust stirred up by the jeep. "It gives me the creeps coming way out here without anything to defend ourselves. And I only got a couple days left in the country. Just look out there," he pointed to the dense trees bending over the winding road. "Crawling with them."

The sergeant squinted over his cigar. "I don't see anybody, Mr. Kelly."

"**LET ME TELL** you, Sergeant Philips, that's the thing about this crazy war, you can't even see them. But you know as well as anybody, that jungle right there's infested with them."

"What do you think, Dawson?" the sergeant turned to the driver.

"Yes, it's probably infested with them," the Pfc replied.

"See what I mean, Sergeant? You make us come all the way out here to get to Saigon, and Dawson himself agrees with me." Kelly looked around a second time.

"Dawson, you want to turn back?" the sergeant asked the driver.

"No."

"Neither do I," Sergeant Philips agreed. "You want us to turn back, Mr. Kelly?"

The warrant officer did not reply. He studied his watch in silence. "You sure this leads us to Saigon, Sergeant?"

(Continued on Page 20)

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
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Economics of the Military

By Senator William Proxmire

The cost of the Indochina War has been nearly 50,000 lives, more than a quarter million men wounded, thousands of lives wrecked by drugs and demoralization, and some \$100 billion that could have gone to make the United States live up to its promise.

Still the war goes on.

More lives will be lost to a cause that is no cause at all.

American men will continue to be stationed in Southeast Asia, and they will continue to kill—mostly from the air—and be killed.

MORE BILLIONS will be spent in an effort that has no proven reason and that has no support from a majority of Americans.

More money will be lost to setting right our social and economic problems at home.

A war that never should have been ours is being wound down. But not fast enough. All Americans could be out now, and should be taken out—now.

Even should they all be brought home, the economics of preparing for warmaking (in a defensive way, to be sure) is eroding America's strength. A superabundance of taxpayers' money for the Pentagon make no sense in contrast to hungry kids, unemployed blacks, underemployed whites, untreated and undertreated elderly sick, dying cities, deteriorating transportation, restless youth.

THIS COUNTRY requires a strong, proud military establishment that is fully equipped and supplied and ready to defend it. Anything less in a troubled world would be foolhardy.

The fact is we could have the kind of a defense force for less money than we are spending now. At least \$15 billion a year could be diverted from the Pentagon without detracting from that goal. Many say more could be saved.

It could be done by eliminating waste.

Despite the reduction in American ground activity in Southeast Asia, total military spending is barely down. At the height of the Vietnam War the United States was spending \$26 billion a year just for that war. This year the Pentagon refused to tell the Congress how much it was spending for "security" reasons, although it was not reluctant to give figures on troop strength.

The estimate, for the fiscal year that began on July 1, 1970, was \$17 billion a year for Vietnam.

All of this is happening at a time when the administration's arm has to be twisted to make it fulfill the law on the school lunch program; when some \$12 billion is impounded for needed sewer and other health and pollution control needs; and when 80 C-As cost \$2 billion more than estimated for the original 120 planes.

Where is the money going?

Much of it is being wasted.

Forget for a moment that there are more generals and admirals now than there

Planning estimates for the nine totaled \$26.4 billion; now they are expected to cost \$41.9 billion. In one year, the costs of these nine programs shot up by \$3.1 billion.

THAT TOTAL increase in cost overruns of \$15.5 billion in just one year would have been enough money to pay for:

Three years of federal support to education.

Almost four years of federal housing and urban development programs.

Almost the year's cost of health programs.

Almost more than one year's cost of the welfare program.

What can be done about this waste?

The first step would be to convince the Congress and the Pentagon not to buy until prototypes had been tested satisfactorily. In other words, "fly before you buy."

THE MOST IMPORTANT step is for citizens to demand of their Senators and Congressmen that they vote to cut the military budget. The mood of Congress is changing. There was a time when defense requests went through relatively unchanged. Recently, committees have been making cuts, and making them stick.

The support of the voters, of really interested people is heard. It was heard on the supersonic transport, which was killed. It was almost heard on the Lockheed loan, which lost by only one vote.

Progress toward spending money where it will do some good and cutting where it is wasteful will be made when the voters get more involved in the political system.

Involvement works. It slowed down the Vietnam War. It helped make the country conscious of the environment and of consumer affairs.

The same thing can work with the economics of the military.

The Costs of the War-- In Dollars and Nonsense

IT MIGHT BE assumed that the figure is now less—probably \$8 billion this year. Yet it is known that the bomb tonnage dropped in Indochina has actually increased.

Nevertheless, the annual cost of the war is down by \$18 billion. And even with the pay increases granted military personnel, there should be \$8 to \$10 billion left to be used for other purposes.

But there is not.

Despite drops in appropriations by Congress, actual spending by the Pentagon has remained almost constant, and it has always been more than estimated. In each of the fiscal years 1968 through 1970 Pentagon spending exceeded \$77 billion. In fiscal 1971, based on the first six months, spending was expected to be \$74.6 billion—some \$3.5 billion more than previously estimated.

were in World War II when the country was completely mobilized. Forget that we still have more than 300,000 troops in Europe a generation after that war ended. Forget, too, that we still have 400 major and almost 3,000 minor bases and outposts around the world.

That kind of waste is miniscule when set aside the procurement scandal.

The General Accounting Office—the agency that audits the executive branch for the Congress—recently reported cost overruns totaling \$35.2 billion on 45 weapons systems procurements. Just a year before that, the excess of costs above original projections were running \$28.2 billion.

That was a 25 per cent increase in just one year!

The overruns on just nine of those 45 weapons systems added up to \$15.5 billion.



MUSKIE

'72

When Ed Muskie came to realize what his country had been doing to the land and people of Vietnam, he was humiliated, sickened and angry. But being the man he was, he did not just talk about it. He acted. In the Senate he made himself a leader in the fight to impose a legal mandate for ending the war...

- In 1969 he introduced the resolution calling for a negotiated settlement to the war and economic aid to rebuilt Southeast Asia.
- In 1970 he supported the Cooper-Church Amendment which barred funds for military involvement in Cambodia after June 30, 1971.
- In 1971 he supported the Mansfield Resolution of June 22 which stated the "It is the policy of Congress to withdraw from Vietnam in 9 months if we have assurances on the Prisoners of War."
- In 1971 he endorsed the April 24 demonstrations in Washington D. C.

- In 1971, following the Cambodian invasion, he sponsored the Sense of the Senate Resolution, "Declaration of Peace" which set a withdrawal deadline of December 31, 1971 and pledged economic and technical assistance for the reconstruction of Vietnam.

- In both 1970 and 1971, he sponsored the McGovern-Hatfield Amendments (setting December 31, 1971 withdrawal date).

But just as important in a man who wants to be president, he has reworked his own vision of American foreign policy, rejecting the national arrogance and delusions that first led us into Indochina.

There must never be another Vietnam. Our present war in Indochina must end now. And no one knows this better than Ed Muskie.

"It is clear that the only light at the end of the tunnel will be the one we strike ourselves. We must withdraw all our troops from Vietnam. We must do so by the end of this year. We must be willing—all of us—to say, 'Enough!'"

Edmund S. Muskie, May 1971

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Nixon Administration: Vietnam in Perspective

By Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird

The following "Article by Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird" was written for the Daily Cardinal on December 23, 1971. It is published here unedited and without editorial comment. The accompanying chart and graph were similarly provided by the Department of Defense and is similarly presented.

The perspective from which this article on Vietnam is addressed understandably is that of the administration of President Nixon which assumed office in January 1969—eight years after President Kennedy's decision to commit more than a small military advisory mission to assist the Republic of Vietnam and four years after President Johnson's decision to send a large American ground combat force to fight in South Vietnam.

President Nixon and his appointees could waste no time in fruitless debate about the validity of past decisions.

The question in January, 1969, was what do we do now, not what should we have done or not done in the past.

The year that had just ended, 1968, was the year of the most intense and costly military action of the long conflict in Vietnam. It was a year in which American troops bore a heavy, often major,

share of combat responsibility, evidenced by more than 14,000 combat deaths and the expenditure of an additional \$22 billion for Vietnam.

At the time of the change of administration in Washington in 1969, the authorized troop strength in Vietnam was 549,500. "We had no plan to reduce the number of

"We intend to continue to build toward that level... at any time in the foreseeable future."

The hope of the outgoing Administration for ending the deep American involvement in Vietnam was pinned exclusively on the Paris negotiations. On December 10, 1968, Secretary Clifford expressed the belief that "there is an

When the 40-day period expired, however, the only agreement in Paris that had been reached by Ambassador Harriman with Hanoi had to do with the shape of the negotiating table — nothing more.

There was one further important element in the Vietnam policy inherited by the Nixon Ad-


nam. This program, however, had as its only objective the development of an indigenous military force that would be able to withstand the internal threat posed by the Viet Cong forces after North Vietnamese troops had returned home.

AFTER MY FIRST VISIT to Vietnam in March 1969, I reaffirmed to President Nixon that, as we had discussed in 1968, a new policy was needed which would provide both a supplement and an alternative to the effort to achieve peace through negotiation. We could not accept the proposition that Americans must remain in Vietnam in great numbers indefinitely if no settlement proved attainable in Paris. I recommended implementation of a policy of Vietnamization, the orderly transfer to the Vietnamese of responsibility for their security and development and the reduction of American troop strength in Vietnam. I urged that the program of equipping and training the South Vietnamese be accelerated and that this program aim at a new objective—the development of a South Vietnamese force capable of defending the country against external as well as internal threats, against North Vietnamese as well as Viet Cong military forces.


(continued on page 15)

DoD - charts and graphs

US ATTACK AIRCRAFT IN SEA



AUTHORIZED TROOP LEVEL IN SOUTH VIETNAM



troops in Vietnam at all," then Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford said on September 25, 1968.

opportunity to agree with Hanoi upon the mutual withdrawal of troops" within the next forty days.

ministration—a program launched in mid-1968 to improve the armed forces of South Viet-

For Children: Why We are There

By The State Department

The following is entitled "An Explanation of the War in Viet Nam for Primary School Children." It was prepared by the U.S. State Department Bureau of Public Affairs a few months ago as a response to young school children who had written to the President and the State Department about Viet Nam.

Vietnam is a very old country in Asia, about 8,000 miles away from the United States. About 17 years ago, part of the Vietnamese people called Viet Minh were fighting against France which had ruled Vietnam for many years. Many of the Viet Minh wanted Vietnam to be a communist dictatorship rather than a free country. The Vietnamese communists are especially dangerous because they believe in the use of armed force and terror.

The Viet Minh finally won a big victory over the French forces. The French and officials from some other countries who were interested in Vietnam sat down to talk with the Viet Minh in the city of Geneva in Switzerland. They agreed to make peace and to divide Vietnam into two parts. The northern part is held by the communists and is called North Vietnam. South Vietnam is held by those Vietnamese who do not want to live under communist rule. It is also called the Republic of Vietnam. Many people in the North went to live in the South to get away from the communists. Many more wanted to go too but the communists broke the rules of the agreement made at Geneva and would not let them go. A few years went by. The North Vietnamese were planning to take over all of South Vietnam by elections because the communists would make sure, by force if necessary, that more people would vote for the North than for the South. The leaders of South Vietnam refused to take part in elections that they knew would not be fair. This made the communist leaders of the North very angry, and they decided to take over South Vietnam by force.

When the country was divided into two parts, the communists had left some men in the South who pretended to be like the Southerners. These men received orders to dig up the guns which they had hidden and to kill people in the South so the men in the South would be afraid to fight against the communists. These communists in the South, called guerrillas, would often go into villages at night and kill important


people such as the mayor and the school teacher. This would make the villagers afraid to tell the South Vietnamese soldiers where the guerrillas were hiding. The guerrillas did not wear uniforms and it was easy for them to hide in the jungle or to pretend they were villagers. During this time we were sending guns and supplies to the South Vietnamese so they could fight

people of the South. They wanted to be able to decide how to run their country for themselves. So they asked us to help them fight the North Vietnamese. The South Vietnamese had showed that they were brave people and we know that if the North Vietnamese were not stopped from trying to take over another country by shooting and killing, the other countries in Asia

many other things to help the South Vietnamese. We have been fighting very hard for six years to help the South Vietnamese soldiers. Together we have done well and the soldiers from the North are not winning any more. They are still trying to take over the South but they know that the South with our help is stronger than they are. The South Vietnamese are becoming such good soldiers that we are bringing some of our men back to America. In May and June last year American and South Vietnamese soldiers destroyed the communist bases in the next-door country of Cambodia. We did this because the bases gave the communists a chance to attack our men in South Vietnam and then to run and hide in Cambodia. Our action in Cambodia made it safe to go on bringing our men home. This year some South Vietnamese forces, with the help of U.S. air power, have moved into the nearby country of Laos to cut the supply lines the communists need to carry on the war in South Vietnam.

We and South Vietnam do not want to take over the North and we do not want to make the war bigger. All we want to do is to stop the communists from taking South Vietnam. President Nixon has said that if the communists go back home to the North and leave the South alone, the war will end. We are having talks with leaders from the North in the city of Paris in France. At these talks, we are telling them that if they will take all of their soldiers out of South Vietnam, we will too. But if we take all of our soldiers out of South Vietnam before peace is made or before we are sure that the South Vietnamese can take care of themselves, we would be breaking our promise to them. Other countries which are our allies would then believe that our word was no good and they would not respect us. Also, President Nixon is very concerned about our men held prisoner by the enemy. He has said that as long as North Vietnam holds a single American prisoner, we will have forces in South Vietnam.

We are sorry the North Vietnamese are not ready to pull back their soldiers, but we think they will come to see that peace is better than to go on killing. President Nixon and all of us believe that a good and just peace is possible. Until the North Vietnamese agree, we must have lots of patience and grit to go on with the talks in Paris and with the fighting in Vietnam.



back. We also sent some soldiers to advise them how to fight.

As time went on, the North Vietnamese sent more and more men from the North into South Vietnam. They began to send soldiers who attacked the soldiers of the army of South Vietnam and soon there was a real war going on. The soldiers from the North and the guerrillas were well trained to fight. Things were going badly for the

would be in danger too from the communists. So we decided to help. That way we hoped to keep the war in Vietnam from becoming a big war that might put the whole world in danger.

America promised to help the South Vietnamese and we sent soldiers, ships and airplanes to Vietnam. Five other countries also sent soldiers. Over 30 countries gave food, medical supplies and

Vietnamization: A Way of War

"The Agonizing Paradox of American Politics"

The following is the first part of an interview with Harvey Goldberg.

Do you believe that the Nixon administration is sincerely and effectively "winding down" the war in Vietnam?

Certainly not. We have to distinguish clearly between the "peace tactics" of our policy-makers (i.e., the gradual reduction in the level of US ground troops; the subtle politics of piecemeal withdrawal) and their unyielding commitment to an American "presence" in Indo-China. Only if we understand the difference between appearance and reality can we explain what Jacques Almaric (*Le Monde*, October 5, 1971) has called the "agonizing paradox of American politics": that public sentiment is now strongly opposed to our engagement in SE Asia, yet the war continues and the peace movement has virtually disintegrated. The Administration's tactics are an elaborate exercise in mystification; and a successful one, when we realize that the Pentagon Papers and the farcical elections in South Vietnam barely troubled the political atmosphere.

Let's consider two hard facts. First, American policy-makers neither acknowledged nor responded to the 7 Point Proposal which the NLF's Provisional Revolutionary Government at Paris presented last July as the basis for serious negotiations. Yet that proposal specifically addressed the exaggerated emotional issues which American diplomacy had exploited as a pretext for its intransigence. Thus, once the US stated a precise terminal date for the withdrawal of all its troops from Vietnam, the NLF promised to negotiate an accord for a cease-fire; for the safety of US forces as they withdrew; and for the release of all POW's.

Furthermore, though the NLF has justifiably insisted upon the freedom of the Vietnamese people from foreign interference, it nonetheless agreed (Point 7) to effective international supervision over any settlement which might be reached. Despite such clear evidence of political realism and flexibility, our policy-makers consciously killed off this important initiative; for in protecting Nguyen Van Thieu and patronizing his re-election, they barred a coalition government which might have made a settlement possible.

Second, despite the gradual reduction in the level of American ground troops, our policy-makers insist that the US will maintain "residual" or "transitional" forces in Vietnam indefinitely. At the same time, they have steadily expanded the air war against the Indo-Chinese peoples; more bombs have been dropped over Indo-China in the past three years, we learn from a recent Cornell study, than in the three years before Johnson's bombing pause.

All of which belies the peaceful pretensions of American diplomacy and demonstrates its commitment to the shadowy client regimes of Saigon and Phnom-Penh. The shift from a stalemated ground war to one of high technology is a clever gambit to contain the public pressure for peace and to dismantle a drugged or demoralized land army. But we have yet to greet the first definitive sign—whether in the level of military spending, or the use of air power, or the integrity of peace negotiations—that the American presence in Indo-China is about to end; or that the martyred peoples of Indo-China may soon be free to recover their devastated land and live in peace.

But what about Vietnamization?

Vietnamization isn't a brilliant new stratagem of the Nixon brain trust, but a grandiose version of an old French scheme, discredited almost twenty years ago: i.e., a Vietnamese army to fight their counter-revolutionary war and a puppet government to safeguard their colonial interests. The French had finally to admit defeat, but American policy-makers, oblivious to the power of a decades-old liberation movement, cling to the bargain-basement strategy of subsidizing a "loyal" Vietnamese army to carry on the most atrocious war of recent times. And to what effect?

Administration spokesmen, acrobats of the varnished truth, bombard us with progress reports: a Vietnamese army "almost ready" to assume full responsibility; a government at Saigon not perfectly democratic but reliable; the culmination, in a word, of the American mission to protect the Vietnamese from themselves. A catalogue of inventions which objective observers in Indo-China have mercilessly reviewed:

"Most experts questioned," reported Peter Kann, the *Wall Street Journal's* well-informed man in Saigon, on November 11, 1971, "tend to believe that within two or three years Saigon will have abandoned to the enemy large chunks of territory, if not towns, in the Central Highlands and the western part of I Corps in the North . . . In most ARVN units desertions rise dramatically when they are about to be shifted or sent into battle . . . The expert who talks of gaining the 'forced cooperation' of the people is at least implying the crucial catch in pacification: controlling people by military occupation

Binh's initiatives at Paris and stepping up the mad air war over Indo-China, our policy-makers have suffered no reprisals at home. It is a measure of the superficiality of American politics that the gradual withdrawal of ground troops, the rhetoric of Vietnamization, and the mystique of the journey to Peking have combined to "de-fuse" the war issue; so that the present Administration may yet parlay an illusion into re-election in 1972, while protecting the option of American expansion.

But the point is that Vietnamization doesn't add up to American disengagement in SE Asia. So long as our policy-makers translate the interests of the "American system" into the goals their predecessors set—the containment of the Vietnamese revolution; the show of American might to contain other revolutions in the Third World; the integration of South Vietnam (like South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, or India) into a US-dominated "free market

even at its crest in Vietnam, failed to break the resistance of the NLF and Hanoi. In the long run, our policy-makers will be forced to yield in Indo-China. For if they have co-opted the opposition at home, they can't readily dismiss "objective reality": i.e., the deepening strains in American society and the weakening of the empire. They know that 1972 isn't 1945 or 1954; that the era of uncompromising American power is over; that concession and retreat are the only way to safeguard the social system and the hegemony of its dominant classes. The tragedy is that we haven't yet, after all the disjointed actions of the anti-imperialist movement in the 1960's, created a radical political force coherent and organized enough to quicken the pace of change and to set its terms. That remains our pressing and immediate task. In fulfilling it, we will begin to repay those Indo-Chinese peoples who trapped the Behemoth and brought us to our senses.

Do you see a direct relationship between Nixon's "Peking Diplomacy" and peace in Vietnam?

Not if we think that the Chinese would speak for the Vietnamese; or alter their 7 Point Proposal; or sell them out to the Americans. The Vietnamese may depend on the aid and support of the Russians and the Chinese, but they are an independent people. The road to peace, as both Chou-En-Lai and Kosygin have reiterated in recent months, leads only to Hanoi and Paris, not to Peking or Moscow. But the Administration has managed to obscure that hard truth behind a cloud of hope for an Asiatic detente.

In the large, however, the "opening to Peking" is dramatic proof that the world our policy-makers built twenty-five years ago—ringed with powerful military bases, its strategic raw materials controlled by American investors, its markets at their disposal; its governments the clients of American money—has begun to crumble. Who would have thought, a decade or two ago, when our strategists openly discussed war against China, that Nixon would go to Peking? Or that Chile could elect a Marxist and nationalize its copper without American intervention? Or that even "loyal" Venezuela would get tough with the oil companies? Or that the Nixon Administration, in sheer desperation, would break those two rules—multilateral freedom of trade and convertibility of currencies—which had defined America's economic supremacy?

Whatever the precise reasons informing the Administration's China policy (the inevitability of Peking's admission to the UN; the possibility of trade; the hope for a counter-force to the USSR's growing diplomatic strength; the containment of domestic peace pressure), it signals the emergency of another world than the one Acheson or Dulles knew. A world in which American imperialism must bargain more and risk less; in which another Vietnam may be impossible; in which the Common Market Bloc and Japan are serious rivals of America's economic hegemony; in which Third World peoples will recover their initiative; in which most Americans, as a recent Trendex poll indicated, don't give a damn about "being first in the world" but do care about the abuse of power and resources.

In this context we can understand, for example, the near-panic of American diplomacy in the India-Pakistan war: not because it cared so much about their struggle for control in East Pakistan; or because it feared a Bangla Dosh controlled by the safe Awami League; but because the war itself might catalyze the radical revolutions which are germinating beneath the surface in both halves of Bengal. And if that happened, then what? Our policy-makers may nourish grandiose dreams but realistically, they have a system to protect . . . In that large sense, the visit to China and peace in Vietnam are linked.

But for compelling human and political reasons, time is of the essence. The Indo-Chinese peoples need peace, and the present crowd is determined to delay and obfuscate, to play at Vietnamization. The moment is ripe, more so than in the 1960's, for a serious assembly of the Left . . .

A Cardinal Interview with Harvey Goldberg


is a vast distance from really winning their hearts and minds. 'These people are still Vietcong in their hearts,' said an ARVN general recently of the people in the officially pacified hamlets of Binh Dinh Province . . . The general view here is that without continued US economic assistance at the present level, the Vietnamese economy would collapse . . . Many analysts, here just don't see a 'residual force' making much difference, except for delaying the inevitable. They figure that the only long-term hope for Vietnam is a political settlement with the Communists and that a US presence only delays that."

When we consider that the puppet government of Phnom-Penh exists only by the fiat of the US; or that the pretence of

system"—they will commit American power to Indo-China and try to finesse public opinion.

Thus, the top-level Smithies Report, a recent survey financed by the Pentagon and not intended for publication, seriously entertained no other course for the future but a continuing American presence "sufficient to permit the South Vietnamese economy to enter the free market in trade and the use of foreign capital."

An agony and a delusion! Agonizing, because the peoples of Indo-China suffer, day after day, while our policy-makers forestall "the inevitable" and a once-aroused public barely stirs. "After spraying the forests and fields of Vietnam with herbicides, saturation bombing them with B 52's, and repeatedly shelling with



passing the democratic torch to Saigon died in the Vietnamese elections; or that the ARVN can never kill off the revolution, then we see in Vietnamization only another variation of the politics of bluff: not a strategy to end our involvement but rather, as the *Wall Street Journal* put it, "to reduce dissent"; a stratagem to accommodate both the war-weariness of the public and the deep concern in the Establishment over the dangerous weakening of the dollar; in a word, American aggression with a fig leaf.

As propaganda, let's admit, it has thus far worked. Though ignoring Mme

artillery," runs the most recent report (*New Republic*, October 30, 1971) by Prof. Arthur Westing, the botanist who has made first-hand investigations in Vietnam, "the US Army Corps of Engineers is now using giant bulldozers to level hundreds of thousands of acres. Seven days a week the Engineers cut through trees, farms, scrub, leaving the soil grey, bare, lifeless, destroyed." We will one day have to know why we're not sentient and political enough to denounce our policy-makers, in millions of angry voices, for visiting such wanton destruction in a long-lost cause.

And delusive, because American power,



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

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
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- (1) A Russian-made artillery round blasted a helicopter fuel pipe at Khe Sanh, sent GIs scurrying for fire equipment.
- (2) An 'apolitical' extortionist bled to death after a shoot-out with police in Saigon.
- (3) A North Vietnamese 122mm rocket killed this man and two others at a South Vietnamese artillery base inside Laos.
- (4) RVN president Nguyen Van Thieu at Vung Tau on Jan. 1, 1971.
- (5) Pfc. Dino Schumacher found himself literally waist deep in the big muddy.
- (6) This trooper celebrated 74 days of unchanged fatigues after his unit emerged from Cambodian jungles.
- (7) A pilot 'punched' his cargo as light arms fire interferes with a resupply mission at the same fire base.
- (8) ARVN troops waited in the rain at Khe Sanh, hours before the Laos invasion began.
- (9) This Montagnard child lived in a resettlement village not far from Pleiku in the central highlands.
- (10) Howard Lavick, of Stars and Stripes, took this picture of Ulevich and Montagnard children.

Indochina

Photos By
Neal Ulevich



(6)



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(10)

From Vietnam to Weatherman

By Daniel Schwartz

"That's the way many of the Nam vets are," someone once remarked about Cuchulain, "they just drift when they get back—they really have trouble coming up with any kind of perspective on things."

We were talking about Cuchulain, a veteran who fought for 16 months in America's Southeast Asian war. Today, he looks ten pounds slimmer than he should be and lives in a state adjoining Wisconsin. His driftings have taken him through the very traumatic moments of American society in the late sixties—the Tet offensive, the Weathermen, the student movement, the steel mills of Gary and presently the unemployed. His story, like some pop sociologist's favorite dream, crisscrosses the battlefronts at home and abroad which helped to define the last decade.

"I was 100 per cent working class," Cuchulain says about himself, "and I went to a high school in a small, mid-western town near the Gary mills. The high school itself was quite a trip but that's another story. Most of my friends tried college but I wasn't sure about it and I didn't have the money. So I started working and generally f—king off."

"Anyway one night we got caught ripping off some store and the police gave us the choice of the army or jail. So naturally we got ripped out of our heads and volunteered right away."

"THE NEXT DAY I freaked but it was too late. My freak wasn't political though. People in my town weren't all that political than (November '66) and while two guys from the town had been shot in Vietnam everyone viewed it differently than they might now."

"In a way I wanted to volunteer for Nam. I had all sorts of visions of halting the creeping crud of communism and I had read this book about a green beret who, by the way, I still kinda respect for the shit he went through."

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Training camp soon followed for Cuchulain. "I must've been ambushed 16 times in the mock Vietnam trial they made us run thru and while I never thought I might die I must admit I was getting pretty suspicious." On July 4th, 1967, he arrived in Viet Nam.

His story is one Cuchulain has told before and as he leans back in his chair smoking a cigarette he cannot resist taking certain humorous tangents as if to jest with himself about his new found confidence. "There was a time," he once told me, "when I couldn't talk about my experience there."

HE BEGAN HIS work in Nam as a radio operator. He went through an ambush on his sixth day over. "We were travelling in these trucks across a jungle trail and boom shots are being fired all over the place. By the time the thing was over I was ready to shoot. My gun turned out to be jammed anyway."

For awhile Cuchulain was set up in base headquarters running the radio communications. He saw little action except for an occasional night patrol. There was even time for some of the army's more notorious activities—like whoring. "If you f—k in Nam," Cuchulain points out, "You get the clap."

A run-in with an officer, however, changed his situation. An argument with the officer ended in an order for Cuchulain to follow a rule or "leave for the field tomorrow." He refused the rule and three days later found himself hanging off the end of a truck clutching his gun on a wild Viet Nam curve.

There is much of Heller's Yossarian in Cuchulain. Tales depicting close friends shot by American bullets fired blindly in the night are not unusual. Once, Cuchulain found himself in a patrol whose front section was attacking its rear.

TET PROVIDED an abundance of such tales. "To say the American army was surprised by Tet," he explains, "would be an understatement of some merit. It was incredible. Nobody in the American army knew what was going on til it was half over. The Viet Cong were incredible."

Experience provided him with ample opportunity for change. Eventually he began to smoke dope. Sitting in the night air during the Tet offensive, he sat stoned watching the Tet rockets splinter in the air in fantastic displays of light.

Politically, too, Cuchulain began to question the assumptions of the war. For, if there are any heroes in his tale, it is the Viet Cong—who at the very least merit his praise for their ingenuity. But Cuchulain's war was fought on a personal level and increasingly its only political truth became survival.

The enemy too had its personal side. During an American offensive after Tet, he had his first direct kill. A patrol led by a new ROTC trained officer walked into a grenade ambush. Cuchulain was wounded but trancelike found the strength to drag himself and a maimed friend to safety in a ditch. Eventually two Viet Cong headed his way. At 15 yards he was forced to shoot; he saw one fall dead. Later, he was picked up by some American soldiers and found a picture of the dead man's family under his shirt. "That picture changed a lot of things for him," a friend said of Cuchulain, "he stopped carrying his own family picture and began to understand the North Vietnamese as human beings."

THE WOUND ENABLED him to go to a hospital. He returned to the field and eventually suffered a less serious wound in the thigh. Cuchulain knew that the next time he might not be so lucky.

Cuchulain's remaining term on duty was drenched with his distaste for the army and the war. He received a rest and relaxation (R&R) and took off for a trip to Taiwan. He went through a whirlwind of whores, liquor and situations no less surreal than those taking place on the battlefield.

Eventually his term drew to its close. For the final weeks he started to avoid going out on patrol. For the last week he simply went AWOL refusing orders to report for duty. "I'd sneak in the mess-hall and steal food," he said, "I'd sleep in the back of jeeps too. There was no way anyone was going to send me back out to be killed a week before I went home."

"He made it back—his parents met him at the airport. There was a scene at the airport. I had this jungle fungus on my body and my mother freaked. But there were a lot of things I couldn't handle either. I watched a lot of cartoons on TV and just sat around. The people I ran with were doing the same lame things. I started finding myself hanging out with 40 and 50 year old men."

"I EVENTUALLY enrolled at the University nearby and tried to work in the mills fulltime simultaneously. It didn't work. At the same time I was getting into dope and tripping. One time my dad came

home and started hasseling me. I told him the townhouse bombing, the weatherman were pretty paranoid and security was pretty tight. That meant that for every meeting I had to walk the goddamn length of the town."

"When I burst upon the scene the struggle was to smash monogamy. A being working class, I became the perfect sexual tool for everyone to use. We would live, by the way, anyway we could. We would hassle people for change or to buy old papers and rip off dorm rooms. (I'm sure the students will boo on that one.) Sessions would get pretty heavy—the



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I was on LSD and if he didn't leave me be I would freak out and kill him. He left me alone."

"I was still apolitical but I was gradually turning into a real hippy-dippy. I was tripping three or four times a week and letting my hair grow. I went out west with a friend and started crashing around. I would carry a notebook and write things down. The people I ran with were a lot like me and we started getting into all sorts of fights with the rednecks who thought they could handle the hippies."

"I was living in a western town near a University not unlike Wisconsin."

"I had read Abbie Hoffman and his macho-smart-ass style was right up my lane. I still respect Hoffman although for different reasons. A lot of people shit on him and I wasn't too surprised to hear he recently quit the movement."

The jobs Cuchulain was taking at this time were menial and offered no promises that his town couldn't match. But he was moving deeper and deeper into the essentially middle class catharsis which characterized the American student movement in the late sixties.

"RIGHT AROUND the time of the Chicago trial I helped organize a yippie group called Revolutionary Moose. We did crazy things like leaving weird, inexplicable slogans all over the place. One thing led to another and finally I became affiliated with some weatherman collectives on the west coast. Let's just say that being a working class hero made them take to me—so much in fact that I ended up serving some time for various and sundry activities."

"I moved into a collective and we began struggling full time. They were laying some heavy lines on me and the hippy-dippy burst on the radical scene was a little puzzled. But I didn't know where I was coming from anyway, so it all made a kind of sense. We would meet three or four

times a day and while this was before Weatherman being very big on spontaneous violence—so there would be fights and bottles thrown at a lot of the meetings."

"The people in the collective were mostly middle class and it used to be a joke that you couldn't join the collective unless your parents were worth \$25,000. I had also mostly stopped doing drugs much and most of my hippy friends were bummed out."

"I was pretty skeptical from the start about the things the weather people were saying. The first day I walked in I challenged on why they had a Manson poster on the wall. 'Boom' everyone is shouting the line to me on Manson as hero."

"THE WEATHERMAN were also into idolizing the third world in a very romantic way. If the Panthers, for instance had said the thing to do was to eat shit three times a day, then you can bet the collective with its usual blind obedience would be eating shit in the street three times a day."

"The townhouse bombing came and rumors were flying that the collective would be getting the word from higher-ups to split up and move on to more strategic locations. I feigned disappointment but I was clearly thinking about getting out."

By the summer of '70 Cuchulain had begun to slip out of the Weatherman. Travelling a bit, he became less and less political in his viewpoint. No group seemed to interest him at all.

Cuchulain has stayed at that juncture for some time now. Reflecting on where he's going, he said "Right now I'm just like everyone else. I'm depressed, and tuned out. Hell the movement doesn't know where it's going either."

Cuchulain leans back in his chair and draws pensively on his cigarette. He looks up as if to give a final comment but then shrugs his shoulder and exhales instead.

The War is Over?

(continued from page 6)

dochina, more than the total U.S. tonnage in World War II and the Korean War combined. Six million tons of bombs a day, 4,000 pounds every minute are being dropped.

The Sept. 24 New York Times says that according to administration officials, "they expected the president would order more such strikes as the American combat strength declined in South Vietnam and the 1972 (political) campaign season approaches." Times editorialist Mitgang concludes, "These activities hardly accord with the periodic announcements from Washington about 'winding down the war' through 'Vietnamization.'"

IN SHORT, Nixon hopes to be able to reduce U.S. manpower to a residual force under 100,000 and to rely on technology to bomb the countryside back into the Stone Age, forcing the population into the cities where, it is hoped, they can be more easily controlled. There is a word for such a policy—genocide—the systematic destruction of a people and country. No mere rhetoric, this is the simple fact of Vietnam.

By all conventional standards, military and political, the liberation forces have won the war. Yet, it is possible, through strategic use of technology, to deny them final victory, as long as the domestic political will remains to continue the air war. If the Vietnamese will not submit, the entire nation will be tortured until it can take no more. As Under Secretary of the Air Force Hoopes wrote in 1968, "Anything resembling a clear-cut military victory in Vietnam appears possible only at the price of literally destroying South Vietnam," or as counter-insurgency expert Prof. Huntington notes, the NFL is "a powerful force which cannot be dislodged from its constituency so long as the constituency continues to exist."

Nixon believes the American people will accept such a genocidal policy for the indefinite future, as long as the actual member of American ground troops is minimal. His policy resembles Orwell's prediction in 1984, "In a physical sense war involves very small numbers of people, mostly highly trained specialists. The fighting... takes place on the vague frontiers whose whereabouts the average

man can only guess at."

Thus Vietnamization represents not so much the winding down of the war as the "winding down of the anti-war movement."

By last spring, 73 per cent of the American people had come out against the war. If Nixon wanted to continue the war until his objectives were met, he needed some way to continue the war while making it seem like he wasn't.

THIS IS in part the effect of his announced China trip. On July 1, the PRG in Paris issued a new seven-point peace proposal which seemed to concede the main point Nixon had been claiming was holding back an agreement—prisoners of war. The PRG agreed to begin releasing prisoners immediately when Washington announced a withdrawal date and to progressively release the rest as troops withdrew, to protect withdrawing American troops from attack, and to agree to a coalition government.

Suddenly up against the wall in his own terms, Nixon admitted that there were a few other conditions, that the US won't withdraw until an anti-communist

government is reasonably assured, and until North Vietnam withdraws from South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.

Nixon never even made an official response to the PRG proposal. Pressure rose sharply in Congress to quickly accept the PRG proposal. Suddenly, a few weeks later, Nixon announced that sometime before next May he would go to China. The implication was there no more need to worry about the war because next year it would be settled in Peking.

BUT IF he intended to end the war, Nixon would have to do it in Paris, not Peking. Both the PRG and the Chinese have made this unmistakably clear. As Chou En-lai told a delegation from the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars, "We believe that the question to be solved first should be the question of Indochina... The only way to solve this problem is that we show our complete support for the seven point proposition put forward by Mme Binh on the first of July on behalf of the Provisional Revolutionary Government, the representative of South Vietnam and the Vietnamese people."

Nixon didn't even have the diplomatic courtesy to respond to the PRG proposal.

(continued from page 10)

On May 14, 1969, about a month before public announcement of the Vietnamization program, President Nixon sought to move negotiations off dead center by proposing mutual withdrawal of foreign troops, the reestablishment of the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962, release of prisoners, and an election within South Vietnam under international supervision.

For almost three years, the President has diligently pursued every opportunity to end all fighting in Southeast Asia by negotiation. He has, as one example, offered Hanoi a ceasefire in place, which would bring an immediate halt to all killing. Thus far, Hanoi has rejected every proposal.

Despite the stalemate in Paris, the United States continues to negotiate for an end to the war. We want to end the fighting swiftly and completely by agreement with Hanoi. But Hanoi's intransigence so far has barred this route to peace.

IT IS EVIDENT THAT Vietnamization, the second element of our dual track approach, has saved American lives and drastically reduced other human and material costs for our country.

American troop strength in Vietnam will have been reduced by more than 400,000 by February 1, 1972, down to 25 per cent of the number stationed in Vietnam at the time the present Administration took office.

American combat deaths have dropped from a weekly average of 279 in 1968 to an average below 10 for the past three months. This compares to a 1968 high point of 586. We will not be satisfied until casualties reach zero.

American ground combat responsibility, except for the security of American troops, has been ended. So has American responsibility for in-country naval operations.

The annual budgetary cost of the Vietnam war to the American taxpayer has been cut by about two-thirds from its high point.

Contrary to the erroneous impression many may hold, the air war has also been scaled down substantially. Secretary of the Air Force Seamans, a former Professor at M.I.T., recently returned from a trip to Southeast Asia. Looking at the Southeast Asia theater as a whole he reported that the number of sorties by our tactical aircraft and our bombers in 1971 is down to 35 per cent of the 1968 level. The size of our force of attack aircraft has likewise been cut to about one-third of the 1968 force.

The policy of Vietnamization is the first application of the Nixon Doctrine and the Strategy of Realistic Deterrence.

The new strategy lessens the strain on our country's resources through more equitable burden sharing by other nations. It puts within reach the day when the draft can be ended. It raises the threshold at which the military power of the United States need be committed in future conflicts. It makes unlikely any future involvement of the type in which the nation has been engaged in Vietnam. And it brings greater security by mustering the latent strength of nations that have made too little effort to develop their capacity to defend themselves.

The Nixon Administration has thrown off the bureaucratic inertia that resulted in continued assumption by the United States of a disproportionate part of the burden of keeping peace in the world—the tendency to want to be the cop on every beat. It has called on other nations to do more—to provide more cops on the beat in their own neighborhoods. These other nations are responding. And the result will be improved prospects for the realization of lasting peace which is the objective of the President's foreign and military policies.

WHERE DO THEY STAND ON THE ISSUES?

	McGOVERN	MUSKIE	LINDSAY
● Termination of Draft	Yes	No	?
● Publicly Committed to appointing a Woman to Supreme Court, National Security Council, U.N., Cabinet	Yes	No	No
● Amnesty for War Resisters	Yes	No	No
● Support of Congressional Black Caucus' 60 Points	Yes	No	?
● Abortion with Doctor's Approval	Yes	No	Yes
● Publicly Against Jail for Marijuana Users	Yes	No	No

➤ Senator McGovern pledges a redirection of budget priorities starting with a \$30 billion cut in the Defense budget. This money instead would be used toward solving our domestic problems.

➤ One billion dollars of this money Senator McGovern has proposed using to create annually 200,000 new scholarships (\$5,000 each) for college students.

➤ George McGovern introduced into the Senate the National Welfare Rights Organization bill creating a \$6,500 minimum income for a family of four.

➤ He was the sponsor of the 1970 Food Stamp Act which doubled the amount of money for food stamps.

➤ He was the principal sponsor of the 1970 School Lunch Legislation which doubled the number of children receiving free and reduced price lunches.

➤ George McGovern was the first Director of President Kennedy's Food for Peace program which has brought relief to millions of undernourished peoples around the world.

➤ Senator McGovern led in Congressional support for Cesar Chavez efforts to ensure a fair income for California farm workers. He has led Congressional inquiries into the problems of migrant workers.

➤ McGovern has built up a carefully documented case of grievances against FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover which is designed to lead to a full Congressional investigation. He has asked the Director to resign because of his discriminatory enforcement of the law.

➤ He pledges a negative tax for the poor and an excess profits tax on defense contractors for the duration of the Indochina War.

➤ Since 1965 he has introduced several bills for wholesale conversion of our economy from military to civilian productions, including industry incentives for factory conversion and labor retraining.

➤ Senator McGovern, unlike other candidates didn't wait for anti-war sentiment to become fashionable. On the Senate floor on Sept. 24, 1963, he called our presence in Vietnam "a moral debacle."

➤ And then there was the McGovern-Hatfield Amendment . . .

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Evict Nixon

By Rennie Davis

This December, Congress will have appropriated funds for warfare in Indochina for 25 years. As money for murder is once again approved, the people of Indochina will be experiencing a greater intensity of civilian bombing than at any time in history. Although Johnson directed an awesome nightmare of destruction against the Indochinese people—60,000 tons of bombs every month he was President—Nixon has drastically stepped up that killing, averaging 96,000 tons of bombs every 30 days that his hand has held the American trigger. While the "war was winding down," the number of human beings killed or crippled or driven into refugee camps is 22,000 more people a month than the 95,000 monthly war casualties under Lyndon Johnson.

Vietnamization is a plan to wind down the U.S. anti-war movement. It has led the American people into a trap made possible by the racist underpinnings of this culture—an attitude that allows people to reason that the killing of Asians is somehow inconsequential against the public agony of GI deaths. While the troops are coming home, the technology of the war has been escalated. While public interest wanes, the U.S. warlords are developing the military of the 21st century.

The million people who at this moment are living in holes and caves in Cambodia and Laos are the human prey of spotter planes, prop bombers, jet reconnaissance, jet bombers, flare ships, gunships, rescue helicopters, super tankers and command and control aircraft that are equipped with computers, infra red devices, seismic and acoustic sensors, radar that can see through the trees, TV guided missiles and bombs that can be aimed with pin point accuracy into the mouth of a cave with laser beam control. The technology is staggering, yet public consciousness about the automated air war is almost nonexistent.

THE BOMBING goes on beyond the range of newsmen and cameras. The official U.S. line is that no civilians are bombed, despite the stream of refugees (that now number 10 million) flooding into camps and urban centers. The fact that Nixon's plans are openly discussed in foreign policy papers with frank admission that the traditional IndoChinese population must be destroyed and a "war-induced urbanization" created through mass slaughter and terror goes unnoticed in the press. After all, the war is "winding down." The troops are coming home.

We are reminded of this sober truth at a time when many of us are going through considerable head changes. This summer has been a time of reflection and examination of basic assumption for work and struggle. We have seen that national mobilizations that build no permanent organization are inadequate if not self-defeating. Our rhetoric and "revolutionary" style has created obstacles to communicating with people. We see that a movement unable to relate to tens of millions of Americans who are angry and frustrated and want change is a

(Continued on Page 23)

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is coming
watch for grand
opening

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256—0055

Scientific Skills Aid North Viet People

By Lorne Taichman

While street protests and mass rallies have marked the antiwar response of most University activists, a movement to make use of specific academic skills has arisen on many campuses. Science for Vietnam grew out of a visit to Hanoi in December 1970 by a group of international scientists. The group is devoted to aiding the war-isolated Vietnamese in setting up a modern library of scientific resources.

The Madison collective of the Science for Vietnam project has completed its compilation on the recent advances in the treatment of tuberculosis and will shortly send the packet of journal publications and drugs to the University of Hanoi. The packet contains summaries and data on the newer antituberculous drugs—how they compare with the more commonly used medications, how they could be synthesized—and small samples of two of the most promising ones, Rifampicin and Ethambutol.

The Madison chapter of Science for the People, located in the TAA office on North Brooks St., is working with other groups across the country to supply the North Vietnamese with a modern condensed western library on topics helpful in their reconstruction program.

Besides the urgent need to rebuild devastated areas such as forests and crops, the Vietnamese maintain a long range outlook. As the Vietnamese said to Val Woodward who recently returned from Hanoi, "Science is even as important as poetry and music". They are trying to begin programs in many biological and agricultural fields but are hampered by the lack of access to world literature and the lack of cumulative experience with the accompanying technology.

Although they are not closed off from Russian, Chinese and East European literature, they have been forced by the

war to concentrate on military exchanges. The American Science for Vietnam program was initiated at the request of scientists at the University of Hanoi in hopes of overcoming some of these barriers and in order to establish personal communication with politically active scientists here.

The Madison collective, as they call themselves, is composed of a small number of undergrads, grads, and post-doctoral fellows in various science areas including agriculture, medicine, physics, mathematics and genetics. "The North Vietnamese are more than capable of looking after themselves. The real problem lies here in America, with the war, with the continuing imperialist policy of the government, and with attempts to control other countries to suit our own ends. Scientists are intimately involved in this war. They provide the continuing supply of technology which is used to suppress local wars of liberation and maintain our hegemony on an international sphere.

"American scientists are led to believe that all knowledge is good, or at least neutral, so they need not be concerned with the uses of their research. They are alienated from the communities in which they live as a result of their academic elitism, and subsequently feel no real desire to be responsive to these communities."

Science for the People is hoping that this project will demonstrate that alternate ways of working with science are possible, ways in which competition for ideas and prestige are not factors, ways in which the real needs of people form the stimulus for research, and ways in which the fruits of the labor are shared by the community as a whole.

Science for Vietnam members believe
(Continued on Page 23)

THE GODFATHER
is coming
watch for grand
opening


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A Personal Look at Vietnam-- the War and the People

By Betty Boardman

It was March, 1967, and I was walking along a dirt path lined with shelter holes, past the ruins of a school, a pagoda, a market and many homes. A pretty young woman with a year old baby girl walked beside me answering questions. I was one of eight American Quakers who had sailed a 50 foot ketch loaded with medical supplies from Hiroshima to Haiphong.

The young woman guiding us was the mayor of Hoang Liet, a village of 150 people near Hanoi. Her husband was away "defending his country against the imperialistic American aggressors" while she and the other women, old men and older children worked the rice paddies, made repairs as they could on the buildings, managed the business of the community, and took care of their homes and children and old people.

Since the brick and cement school was destroyed the small children have gone to school in one of the homes while the older ones go to the next village. The pagoda is half ruined, but 15 Buddhas still sit in silence ready to serve the villagers when called upon. Rain falls on them through the ruined roof, but they will have to bear that until the rice crop is safely in and the more urgent repairs made.

AS WE WALKED along the narrow paths between the houses our hosts cautioned us to avoid the deep holes dug in for air raid shelters every ten feet or so. These were simply narrow holes in the ground, under tree roots or right in the open, which had saved most of the village when, on a day in December 1966, American planes dropped bombs there. One child and five adults were killed and several others wounded.

We were told that the square green algae covered ponds we saw interspersed among the houses were fish ponds and supplied most of the protein for the hamlet. The algae was cultivated and harvested for fertilizer. These people live in one or two room houses built of wattles and roofed with thatch. Their clothes were clean but much patched. The children were well-fed, bright, and happy looking.

While moving to the community building where tea would be served we saw a long line of about 50 women coming in for lunch from the rice paddies where they had been working on the main crop of the hamlet. They smiled at us and joked with out interpreters. Watching them I had a huge surge of emotion which I had trouble identifying and then believing.

I WAS ENVIOUS of the camaraderie, the "togetherness" of these women. It wasn't just that they were working together on a common cause, which they all believed in, but they had their heads together. I could see in that brief glimpse that they were relaxed, satisfied with their work, and open, eager and curious about what was happening around them. Their determination, energy and intelligence was manifest to the casual observer—their

vibes were good. I had a right to envy them, poor, ragged, living under the constant threat and actuality of bombs falling on them. They exuded health—both physical and mental—and the dynamic spirit with which they have proven that they cannot be beaten.

The difference between them and the uptight, closed in, resentful, underpaid, and underappreciated working women and housebound housewives in America is remarkable. There the food is divided up so all eat. Nobody gets fat and nobody starves. Everyone has enough clothing, but no one has more than enough. Here in the U.S. we fight for too few jobs, we climb into better jobs on someone else's back, and some get rich while others starve. We must compete to eat.

In Vietnam the women work at obviously vital jobs, like food production, clothing manufacturing, building, child care,

the farmers whom we honor by driving them off their land and onto welfare rolls in the cities.

FOR A YEAR or two after I had been to Vietnam I traveled about the country making speeches, showing a movie, talking with government officials, joining and organizing actions against the war, and generally making that one issue—ending the war—the central concern of my life. The people I met in Hanoi and Haiphong, in Phu Xa and Phu Ly were real to me. When I heard on the radio that U.S. planes had flown so many sorties against North Vietnam I knew who the bombs were falling on, and I was frightened and furious, and my insides reacted.

Even now, nearly five years later, the bombs are still falling and in greater numbers than ever. While American soldiers are being withdrawn and the

government do our will. Our representatives in Congress know that over 70 per cent of the people want the war stopped, and if they truly represented us they would refuse to pass any military appropriations bills.


But they do not represent us. They represent the corporations which pay for their campaigns, and which are making the greatest profits in history out of this war. They are bought by their patrons, so while big business gets bigger and richer one and one-half per cent of the people or three million people own 80 per cent of all U.S. corporation stocks and bonds) the rest of us become more powerless, more competitive for the declining number of jobs, and (one good thing) more aware of who our enemy is.

OLDER PEOPLE are now coming to realize what college age people have known for a long time—city people, workers and consumers, are not responsible for the low return the farmer gets for his labor; welfare recipients are not the cause of the worker's high taxes; the farmer is not responsible for high prices in the markets. Workers, farmers, blacks, whites, men, women, retired and unemployed are all victims of a conspiracy to keep us all powerless and at each others' throats.

How can we end a war when we cannot even control whether we work or not, whether we get a decent wage, whether our society is civilized enough to care about its members? The difference between Illinois which has just cut its welfare 60 per cent in response to the President's Family Assistance Plan, and North Vietnam where no one is allowed to go hungry or be humiliated by unemployment and poverty is so great that it is absolutely clear what we must do. We must gain the power to make a decent society here, and then we will have the power to stop and prevent our country's imperialistic aggression overseas.

Our schools, hospitals, local governments, and other institutions should come under the control of those who work in them, pay for them, and are their clients. If we cannot take over the old institutions at this time, we will have to build new ones and form a shadow government alongside the old. There are organizations in every city working to make these revolutionary changes. Some of them are single issue groups like the Welfare Rights Organization and the Madison Tenant Union; others are multi-issue organizations like the Wisconsin Alliance.

I FEEL SOMETIMES as though I have abandoned my friends in Vietnam—I have even lost the ring they gave me—but I remember one thing we were told over and over when we asked the people whether they wanted us to send doctors, rebuild houses, bring more medicine or what. Everyone of them said, "Go home and do something about your country." That's what we have to do to end this war.



teaching—basic industries—while in our country most jobs are so far removed from basic needs it is hard to believe that it matters whether one goes to work or not—except that the money return is so important.

There is the difference. In Vietnam the people are working for essentials; in the U.S. most people are working for money. The one group of workers in the U.S. who are producing the most basic product are

expression "winding down the war" is heard over and over, the truth is that the air war is building up and our friends in the north are cleaning out their air raid shelters again as Americans begin to relax and welcome their sons back home.

For the last year or two I have understood what many have known all along—that this war is no accident, that educating, petitioning, demonstrating, demanding an end to it will do no good because we have no power to make our

FEIFFER

A FEW SHORT YEARS AGO MOST OF US SUPPORTED THE WAR—




SO THE QUESTION IS WHAT TO DO WITH THOSE THOUSANDS OF YOUNG MEN WHO THOUGHT THE WAR WAS IMMORAL YEARS BEFORE WE THOUGHT THE WAR WAS IMMORAL, AND DESERTED TO CANADA AND SWEDEN?



I SUPPORTED THE WAR.

WHILE TODAY MOST OF US OPPOSE THE WAR—




SHOULDN'T THEY BE GIVEN AMNESTY?



I OPPOSE THE WAR.

ABSOLUTELY NOT!



AND, ACCORDING TO THE POLLS, THINK IT'S IMMORAL.




WHY NOT?



I THINK IT'S IMMORAL.

PREMATURE MORALITY.



Book Reviews

The War

Book Reviews

By Miles McMillin

THE VANTAGE POINT;
PERSPECTIVES OF THE PRESIDENCY

1963-1969; By Lyndon Baines Johnson
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, \$15.
569 pages not counting photos, appendices
and index.

No one can review this book and honestly
say he read it. I tried. God knows I did. But
the glutton for boredom who can last this

But you will search fruitlessly in these
pages for anything to add to what is
already known about his role. Like Nixon,
his attitude is that he inherited the thing
and tried to orient his dovish instincts to it.
You will not find in these pages that he was
taking a cut as Sec. of Defense McNamara
for "going dovish on me" or sneering at
the "nervous Nellies" who questioned the

wisdom of the build-up.

The story of the 1964 campaign against
the impossible Goldwater could have been
written by some hack in Mayor Daley's
office. There is no inkling of the historic
deception of that campaign in which
Americans were given to believe that he
was pledged to let "Asians fight Asians."

The reader does not get the picture that

the two candidates were in basic
agreement on the war. He is led to believe
that campaign was based on Johnson's
disagreement with Goldwater's reckless
extremism. "Goldwater," he says,
"brought the peace issue into focus early
in the campaign with a series of
statements implying that he would be
willing to threaten to use, or even use,
nuclear weapons to gain American ends."

He cites the Goldwater gem about
wanting "to lob one (nuclear bomb) into

Waging the War...

course has yet to be born. It should enjoy a
brisk market among insomniacs.

If the book is to be noted at all by history,
it will be for the miraculous manner in
which it converts some of the most ex-
citing history of this country into a
monumentally dull document. You keep
leaving it wondering, "How could anyone
who led such a dramatic political life have
extracted so many nuggets of ennui from
it?"

It is said that LBJ should not be blamed;
that it was really written by Walt Rostow,
and Rostow, like all Boswells, is a dull
man. But Johnson read the
thing—probably the only person outside
the publishers' office who did. Why did he
let it go out? Even the photos, which are
provided in massive quantities, are dull.

BUT IT IS an ill wind . . . During the
uproar over the Pentagon Papers it was
noted that Johnson and Rostow had carted
away from the White House bales of
documents classified in the name of
national security. They were to be used, it
was reported, in Johnson's memoirs. If
they have been used, the results stand as
the most damning case yet made against
the idiocy of the classification policy.
There is very little you can get out of this
book that couldn't be found in Johnson's
old campaign speeches.

It abounds, of course, with examples of
the celebrated Johnson modesty. "The
poor," he says at one point, "had finally
found their spokesman . . . No one ever
again would be able to ignore the poverty
in our midst."

This sweeping claim will be of particular
interest to the old whose frail pension and
social security benefits have been chewed
up by the ferocious inflation allowed to go
unchecked because Johnson wanted all the
goodies and none of the responsibilities of
his ambition to establish himself as the St.
George who slew the communist dragon in
Vietnam.

HISTORY WILL remember Johnson
chiefly as the President who was driven
from public office by the war he escalated.



the men's room at the Kremlin."

THESE RECOLLECTIONS explain, of
course, why the unbelievable Airzoonan
was buried in the 1964 avalanche. But they
were not at the heart of the Vietnam issue
at that time. The Great Deception was on.
It was the carefully contrived campaign to
give the voters the impression that there
was a disagreement on the basic issue of
our going into Vietnam with or without
plans for use of nuclear weapons. After the
election, the voters learned that it was a
fixed fight.

Everyone knows that the shallow
Goldwater was a setup. What we would
like to know is how Johnson managed to
beat his conscience in that campaign. The
book provides no help.

The book reveals the deep streak of
Agnewism there is in Johnson. He has a
similar paranoid reaction to the
"metropolitan press of the Eastern
Seaboard."

He tells, rather shamelessly, of his
elaborate whining to James Reston of the
New York Times about the abuse he ex-
pected from the press. Jim Rowe, one of
Johnson's Washington cronies, got into the
act with the assurance to the President
that Reston and Walter Lippmann would
protect him from the meanies in the
Washington Press Corps. "But it was not
long before these two reporters ceased to
support me and began their tireless
assaults on me," he whines. They refused,
of course, to follow him to Saigon.

ON THE WHOLE, the book is con-
firmation of the thesis set forth in the
excellent book by Johnson's former press
chief, George Reedy, who makes a good
case that this country suffers because its
Presidents are too isolated and soon begin
to play God. Johnson, without meaning to,
makes a better case for Reedy's point that
Reedy does.

But remember, I couldn't get through
the whole thing. Also that I am one of the
publishers embittered because I bought
the New York Times synopsis of the book
and inflicted it on my innocent readers.

...Protesting the War

By Eric Graf

MARCHING NOWHERE

By Ken Hurwitz
Norton, \$1.95 paper,
\$6.00 cloth.



Marching Nowhere is a personal account
of the author's involvement in the
Moratorium of October 15, 1969, the
paradigm of the recent mass demon-
strations aimed at achieving United States
withdrawal from Southeast Asia.

Hurwitz traces his growing anguish with
the impotence of anti-war forces in 1969.
The McCarthy effort was defunct. Mc-
Carthy had dropped out, covered the
World Series for Life, and gone to Europe.
SDS was anathema. Student strikes at his
school (Harvard) had accomplished
nothing. In short, he "was caught in that
great, guilt-corroded limbo between
liberalism and radicalism, sometimes
called left-liberalism."

Ken Hurwitz joined Sam Brown, et al., to
organize the Moratorium during the
summer and fall of 1969. The organizers
threw themselves into the effort to
organize the largest visible anti-war
demonstration in the history of this nation,
hopefully turning out millions of people at
the same time in protest of the war. They
expected the Moratorium would produce
different results than other protests.

WHAT EMERGES is an aggressively
clever account of the Moratorium, an

excellent archetypal model of any effort to
challenge and change the policies of the US
Government. There was success and there
was failure. Millions of people from all
occupations and age groups spent a day in
public opposition to the war.

There was clearly an impact on U.S.
Policy and on public opinion though not
sufficient impact to bring a rapid end to
the War.

The War goes on: that is the dilemma
that Hurwitz grapples with in the book.
The title, *Marching Nowhere*, is well worth
considering.

Occasional marches and demonstrations
will not achieve any significant change in
the US, says Hurwitz. These tactics can
never force an end to the war. Any change
in this country will be incremental and will
come from constant, plodding, organized
pressure.

Dilettantism will not achieve change.
Hurwitz writes that it isn't enough to "opt
for the more exciting and immediately
visible activities like rally organizing or
electioneering every two or four years."

Change comes, of course, from constant
work, not as the book amply demonstrates,
from a romantic attachment to politics.

Parting Shots

(continued from page 7)

"ALL THE ROADS do, just about. Don't they, Dawson?" answered the Sergeant. "One way or another," the Pfc agreed. "Well, it's a strange way to go to Saigon, if you want my opinion," the warrant officer offered.

"What's wrong with it?" the sergeant inquired bluntly.

"It's dangerous, that's what's wrong with it, Sergeant Philips. And you're crazy if you think you can tell me it's not," the warrant officer complained. "There aren't even any patrols out here. That's what's wrong with it."

The sergeant puffed on his cigar. "Is this the wrong road, Dawson?" he asked the driver.

"They're all dangerous, Sarge."

"Yah, lot of guys killed on the highway, I imagine," the sergeant added, "too many accidents."

"IT MIGHT BE dangerous, but at least you don't get your head shot off by some gook off the road," snapped the warrant officer.

"Is that a fact?" grinned the sergeant.

"Well, it's true, Sergeant Philips. You can't tell me this road's as safe as the highway." The warrant officer was sweating visibly in the tropic sun and smothering air.

Sergeant Philips looked over his shoulder at Kelly. "Dawson here says they're all dangerous, Mr. Kelly."

The warrant officer gazed out of the jeep into the passing trees. He remained silent while the jeep continued rolling over the narrow dirt road through the strange, and, to Warrant Officer Kelly, hostile territory. "Anybody got a cigarette?" he finally spoke.

DAWSON TOOK the pack from his shirt and handed it to Sergeant Philips who offered one to the warrant officer.

"Two," Sergeant Philips answered.

The Pfc pulled the jeep to a halt in the middle of the jungle road. Sergeant Philips got out and went to the rear of the jeep. "Why don't you check the radiator, Dawson," he yelled to the driver.

Dawson got out and opened the hood to check the water.

Kelly looked around the road in every direction, then climbed out of the rear seat and walked around the jeep to the sergeant.

"This is kind of risky, isn't it, Sergeant?" His eyes roamed the trees along the far side of the road.

"Can't go without gas, Mr. Kelly," the sergeant explained.

Dawson slammed down the hood of the jeep—the abrupt noise striking Kelly's ears with alarm.

"God," the warrant officer trembled. "They could hear that for miles." He crept

around the jeep again, his eyes following the immense trees folding over the road around them.

"TWO DAYS. One for processing," the sergeant explained once they were back in motion, rolling along the endless jungle-lined road. "And the next, they put you on the big bird. You ought to know that, Mr. Kelly."

"Yes," the warrant officer nodded. "I'm as good as gone."

"That's right. So why don't you relax and quit worrying yourself."

Kelly opened the Scotch and took another drink. "I'm relaxed. Really, Sergeant, I feel much better now. This stuff really calms your nerves. It's just that I got so much responsibility, Sergeant. It's my job to worry about you guys."

"Worrying never did anybody any good, Mr. Kelly," the sergeant turned to assure him.

"No, I don't suppose it does."

"Look at Dawson here," the sergeant gestured. "You don't have it as risky as Dawson does." officer.

"YOU KNOW WHAT Dawson does, Mr. Kelly? I bet you don't even know. I'll tell you what he does, you think you got something to worry about." Sergeant Philips unwrapped a fresh cigar. "Tell him what you do all day long, Dawson."

The Pfc looked away from the road for a second. "I sleep."

Sergeant Philips lit his cigar. "No—tell Mr. Kelly what you do while he's sleeping."

"I work."

"I'll tell you what he does, Mr. Kelly. Dawson here socializes with the Viet Cong while you're sacked out. That's a fact, isn't it, Dawson?"

"You never told me that," the warrant officer interjected, leaning forward in the seat. "Dawson, is that what you do when you go out at night?"

"It sure enough is, Mr. Kelly," the sergeant answered for him.

"I always knew there was something strange—the way you go out of the camp all the time," Kelly recalled, still curious.

"DON'T TELL nobody now, Mr. Kelly," the sergeant advised. "You give us your word."

"Sure, Sergeant, I won't, why?" Kelly perched on this seat bristling with curiosity.

"You just can't let it out around the camp," the sergeant explained. "The slopes in the village would find out in no time. You know how info leaks in the camp, Mr. Kelly. Can't keep nothing from these people for long."

"No, I suppose you're right."

"But it's all right for you to know, I guess," the sergeant added.

"I won't tell anybody, you know that."

"You won't be able to anymore," the sergeant assured him. "You only got two days left, and that's in Saigon."

"THAT'S TRUE, who could I tell?" Kelly remained silent for a moment. "Is that right, Dawson," he finally spoke again, "That's what you do?"

"Yes, Mr. Kelly," the Pfc answered. "That's what I do."

"You mean you find out everything that's going on out there, outside the camp," the warrant officer repeated. "Then, you must know every time they shell the camp and everything?"

"Not everything, Mr. Kelly."

"Well, if that's what you do all the time, how come you're not working in the intelligence section? You're in supply or something, aren't you?"

"You could say that," nodded the Pfc. "But I don't get it—if you find out when we're going to be attacked, then how come we never knew?—I mean, you never told us anything like that."

"Mr. Kelly," the sergeant interrupted, "You don't understand—"

"Course I understand, Sergeant Philips. What are you guys up to? You find out what's going on and you just let it happen—"

"LET ME EXPLAIN, will you?"

Sergeant Philips waved his cigar at the warrant officer. "You think this would last long? Think about it. The first time they saw we were ready, they'd have Dawson's head on a pike. Is that what you want, Mr. Kelly? Sure, we'd be ready the first time. After that, we'd lose all contact. We'd never know anything again." Sergeant Philips took a resolute puff on his cigar.

"Nope," he added, "no way, Mr. Kelly."

Kelly fell back on the seat of the jeep, silent. "I always wondered about you, Sergeant Philips—that wierd bunch in your platoon. But what are you doing in this intelligence stuff—"

Kelly fell back on the seat of the jeep, silent. "I always wondered about you, Sergeant Philips—that wierd bunch in your platoon. But what are you doing in this intelligence stuff—that's not your authority."

Sergeant Philips glanced into the face of the warrant officer. "We got our own intelligence," he uttered over the blunt of his cigar and turned back to face the road.

Kelly bristled with quiet indignation. "You've got no business—who do you think you are?"

The sergeant ignored him.

"God," Kelly mumbled to himself. "I can't believe it. It's just impossible—a plain Pfc like Dawson—how could he penetrate..." Kelly suddenly eyed the two soldiers in the front of the jeep suspiciously. A new insight struck him. "I should have known," he snapped at the sergeant bitterly. "You guys are collaborating with them, aren't you."

That's it, isn't it?"

"Relax, Mr. Kelly," Sergeant Philips laughed through his cigar. "You got it all wrong."

"THAT'S WHAT you're doing, isn't it!" shouted the warrant officer. "You're working for the VC and you're going to turn me over to them, aren't you? That's why you came this way. Well, you're in for a big surprise, Sergeant Philips. They're going to have to kill me to get me to talk. You know that, Sergeant?"

The sergeant only puffed his cigar, grinning out of the jeep into the winding road ahead of them.

"The joke's on you this time, Sergeant Philips," Kelly laughed nervously. "I don't even know anything." He looked at the sergeant with a desperate glare. "You won't get away with this, Sergeant. Soon as you get back, they'll know. They'll be calling from Saigon asking about me. They'll find out. And they'll know it's you. They'll know, Sergeant Philips. You won't get away with anything."

Kelly again tell silent, confused and pale. "No, I should have figured," he continued aloud. "You thought of that, didn't you? You didn't miss a thing, did you, Sergeant?"

He gazed into the trees as the jeep rumbled along the carved dirt road. "I should have realized a long time ago. All this time. You and your strange activities. How could I be so stupid—I never even suspected."

Kelly stared momentarily into the trees. He opened the Scotch and took a swallow, then closed his eyes to shut out the sun and the shadows.

"THIS IS SUCH a stupid war," he began again. "All these guys dying for nothing. It's a criminal war, I always knew it. Doesn't matter what side you're on. You know what I mean? All these years and we don't seem to be getting anywhere really—swallowed up in all those stupid futile battles all the time. Did you ever look at it that way, Sergeant Philips? No, you probably haven't. I mean, I don't care who you are. I'm a patriotic American and all that, but I just wonder sometimes. This thing has just gone wild. They're crazy to keep it up forever. Both sides are."

When the jeep reached the top of the low hill, the far side opened wide to the sprawling facilities of the Saigon air base. Kelly looked over the shoulders of the two men in the front seat to view the modern complex of buildings in the distance.

"You think I'm crazy, Sergeant?" He trembled from the effects of the Scotch or the intense heat or from having lost control of himself.

"Just have a nice trip, will you, Mr. Kelly," the sergeant replied, lighting up another cigar. Dawson leaned over the seat and took a swallow of the sergeant's Scotch before driving down into the sun-drenched city.

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
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Vietnam: A History of Conflict

By Melvin D. Cohen

Over 49,000 Americans have been killed in Southeast Asia since our involvement there for nearly twenty years. How did it all begin and when and where will it end?

President Harry Truman aided the French government in its battle with the Vietminh to set our course of Indochina war policy.

President Eisenhower and his administration took a direct role in the breakdown of the Geneva settlement for Indochina in 1954.

Both the Kennedy and Johnson administrations escalated our military presence in Southeast Asia to a point where they knew we couldn't pull out without admitting total defeat . . . defeat of what?

SOME KNOWLEDGE of the turbulent history of Vietnam since World War II is essential to understanding the present situation of the country.

Japanese forces moved into Vietnam in 1940 by agreement with the Vichy regime of France, but formally ousted the French administration only in March 1945. The Japanese set up a nationalist regime under Bao Dai, Emperor of Annam (a pre-war protectorate of France in Vietnam since 1926) as a front for their control of Indochina after the Japanese surrender, encountered a sizeable and determined Vietnamese opposition, in which the various groups agreed on only one point—independence for Vietnam. After abortive negotiations, fighting broke out between French forces and Vietnamese groups in December 1946. The French received U.S. military aid from the Truman administration.

The best organized and most experienced element in this heterogeneous nationalist movement was the Communist group led by Ho Chi Minh, who had conducted a resistance movement against the Japanese. The Viet Minh, with Communists holding the leading positions and firmly spreading their grip through lower levels, rapidly emerged as the focus of opposition to the French. The conditions of the war, and the

actions of both protagonists against non-communist nationalist groups, limited the choice for the Vietnamese to cooperating with either the French or the Viet Minh. Many Vietnamese became increasingly disillusioned with both sides.

The French forces were able to wrest control of the major cities in North Vietnam from the Viet Minh. Large rural areas throughout the country, but especially in the north, became Viet Minh strongholds.

THE WAR DRAGGED on. The French forces, with a gradually increasing number of Vietnamese troops on their side, were able to mount operations that could achieve territorial objectives, but were unable to cope with Viet Minh guerrilla tactics and terrorist activities. The United States provided substantial military aid to the French-led forces, but after the Chinese Communists reached the Vietnam border in 1950, the Viet Minh received increasing military aid from both China and Russia, and presented an intensified threat in terms of large-scale military operations.

It had long been a tenet of French strategy in Vietnam that if they could entice the Viet Minh into a large-scale positional action they could smash the core of Viet Minh military strength. When their strong defensive position at Dien Bien Phu was attacked in March 1954, they at last thought their chance had come. But, instead, it rapidly turned into a vivid demonstration of the correctness of Mao Tse-tung's doctrine that pitched battle should be joined only when victory was assured. In the context of French domestic politics, the fall of Dien Bien Phu in May 1954 meant the end of the French effort to win the war in Vietnam. The surviving Frenchmen picked up their marbles and went home.

Meanwhile, back in the United States, the Eisenhower administration was watching closely

the Geneva Conference on Indochina (GCI).

The GCI concluded an agreement on cessation of hostilities in July 1954, which divided Vietnam at the 17th parallel and established a tripartite International Control Commission, composed of India, Canada, and Poland, to supervise and control the cease-fire. The final declaration of the Conference envisaged a political settlement in Vietnam on the basis of independence, unity, and territorial integrity. Provisions in the declaration (an unsigned document) concerning the holding of elections in July 1956 were, however, less than completely clear, particularly since the South Vietnamese Government had refused to sign the agreement or the declaration.

THE CEASE-FIRE agreement was signed by representatives of the French forces and the forces of the "Democratic Republic of Vietnam," as the regime in the North called itself. The United States, while it did not sign any of the Geneva Conference agreements, declared that it would not use force to obstruct the implementation of their provisions. The Government of Vietnam, although it did not consider itself bound by the agreements, followed a policy of de facto adherence to their provisions on the cease-fire.

Ngo Dinh Diem returned to Saigon on June 26, 1954, from four years voluntary exile to take the position of prime minister, with a delegation of full military and civil powers from Bao Dai.

In 1955, a referendum produced an overwhelming vote for Diem against Bao Dai, leading to Diem's proclamation of a Republic with himself as President. In the same year the complete withdrawal of French military forces was negotiated.

In the following years the Diem Government, with sizeable U.S. military and economic assistance, reorganized and retrained its 150,000-man defense forces.

By 1959, the Communist regime

in North Vietnam, which had been largely preoccupied with problems of fastening its grip firmly on its own area, began to take a more aggressive attitude toward South Vietnam.

NORTH VIETNAM is the creation of Ho Chi Minh, who for years was a roving revolutionary. Although Ho is dead, his regime reaps havoc in Southeast Asia today, particularly in South Vietnam, Laos, Thailand and

Cambodia.

Today, if you want to really do something about ending undeclared wars anywhere in the world, you could start by joining the Peace Post. Membership is a \$1.00 contribution and an obligation to be "willing to be identified as being for peace." Remember, your vote in the upcoming Presidential election could decide the destiny of our country . . .

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
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7-point Peace Plan

Responding to the Vietnamese people's aspirations for peace and national independence, considering the American antiwar people's desire for peace, showing its goodwill to make the Paris Conference on Vietnam progress, basing itself on the 10-point overall solution and following up the Sept. 17, 1970 eight-point and the Dec. 10, 1970 three-point statements, the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam (PRG) wishes to declare the following:

(1) **REGARDING THE TERMINAL** date for the total withdrawal of U.S. forces: the U.S. government must put an end to its war of aggression in Vietnam, stop the policy of "Vietnamization" of the war, withdraw from South Vietnam all troops, military personnel, weapons and war materials of the United States and of the other foreign countries in the U.S. camp and dismantle all U.S. bases in south Vietnam without posing any condition whatsoever. The U.S. government must set a terminal date for the withdrawal from South Vietnam of the totality of the U.S. forces and those of the other foreign countries in the U.S. camp. If the U.S. government sets a terminal date for the withdrawal from South Vietnam in 1971 of the totality of U.S. forces and those of the other foreign countries in the U.S. camp, the parties will at the same time agree on the modalities of:

(a) The withdrawal in 1971 from South Vietnam of the totality of U.S. forces and those of the other foreign countries in the U.S. camp.

(b) The release of the totality of military men of all parties and of the civilians captured in the war, including American pilots captured in North Vietnam, so that they may all rapidly return to their homes. These two operations will begin on the same date and will end on the same date. A ceasefire will be observed between the South Vietnam People's Liberation Armed Forces and the armed forces of the United States and other foreign countries in the U.S. camp as soon as the parties reach agreement on the withdrawal from south Vietnam of the totality of U.S. forces and those of the other countries in the U.S. camp.

(2) **REGARDING THE QUESTION** of power in South Vietnam. The U.S. Government must really respect the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination; put an end to its interference in the internal affairs of South Vietnam; cease backing the bellicose group headed by Nguyen Van Thieu, at present in office in Saigon; and stop all maneuvers, including tricks on elections, aimed at maintaining the puppet Nguyen Van Thieu. The political, social and religious forces in South Vietnam aspiring to peace and national concord will use various means to form in Saigon a new administration favoring peace, independence, neutrality and democracy. The Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam will immediately enter into talks with that administration in order to settle the following questions:

(a) To form a broad, three-segment government of national concord that will assume its functions during the period between the restoration of peace and the holding of general elections and organize general elections in South Vietnam. A ceasefire will be observed between the South Vietnam People's Liberation Armed Forces and the armed forces of the Saigon administration as soon as a government of national concord is formed.

(b) To take concrete measures with the required guarantees so as to

prohibit all acts of terror, reprisals and discrimination against persons having collaborated with one or the other parties; to assure democratic liberty to all of the South Vietnamese people; to release all persons jailed for political reasons; to disgorge all concentration camps and to liquidate all forms of constraint and coercion so as to permit the people to return to their native places in complete freedom and to freely engage in their

(c) To see that the people's conditions of living are stabilized and gradually improved, to create conditions allowing everyone to contribute his talents and efforts to heal the war wounds and rebuild the country.

(d) To guarantee on measures to be taken to assure the holding of genuinely free, democratic and fair general elections in South Vietnam.

(3) **REGARDING THE QUESTION** of Vietnamese armed forces in South Vietnam. The Vietnamese parties will together settle the question of Vietnamese armed forces in South Vietnam in a spirit of national concord, equality and mutual respect without foreign interference in accordance with the post-war position and with a view to making lighter the people's contribution.

(4) **REGARDING THE PEACEFUL** reunification of Vietnam and the relations between the North and the South zones:

(a) The reunification of Vietnam will be achieved step-by-step by peaceful means on the basis of discussions and agreements between the two zones without constraint and annexation from either party, without foreign interference. Pending the reunification of the country, the northern and the southern zones will re-establish normal relations, guarantee free movement, free correspondence, free choice of residence and maintain economic and cultural relations on the principle of mutual interest and mutual assistance. All questions concerning the two zones will be settled by qualified representatives of the Vietnamese people

(b) In keeping with the provisions of the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Vietnam, in the present temporary partition of the country into two zones, the northern and the southern zones of Vietnam will refrain from joining any military alliance with foreign countries, from allowing any foreign countries to have military bases, troops and military personnel on their soil; and from recognizing the protection of any country, of any military alliance or bloc.

(5) **REGARDING THE FOREIGN** policy of peace and neutrality of South Vietnam. South Vietnam will pursue a foreign policy of peace and neutrality, establish relations with all countries regardless of their political and social system in accordance with the Five Principles of Peace Coexistence; maintain economic and cultural relations with all countries; accept the cooperation of foreign countries in the exploitation of the resources of South Vietnam; accept from any country economic and technical aid without any political conditions attached and participate in regional plans of economic cooperation.

(6) **REGARDING THE DAMAGES** caused by the United States to the Vietnamese people in the two zones. The U.S. government must bear full responsibility for the loss and the destruction it has caused to the Vietnamese people in the two zones.

(7) **REGARDING THE RESPECT** and the international guarantee of the accords that will be concluded. The parties will find agreement on the forms of respect and international guarantee of the accords that will be concluded.

Evict Nixon

(continued from page 16)

movement that is out of touch with its own country and time.

We are coming to acknowledge our shortcomings, our thoughtlessness and shallow vision. But none of this makes it easier to know how to move. We are drawn to the woods and sky. Some feel rampant confusion and a breakdown of the movement. Others see a new strength and patience to build a genuine people's movement from the bottom up that would involve millions instead of thousands.

Whatever it is that describes our movement, this much is clear: there is no motion in this country for Vietnam. Attica produced more of a response in the media than in the streets.

IN THE AFTERMATH of more than a month of sustained and militant demonstrations in Saigon, in Danang and Hue, 25 students lie dead at the hands of the American trained and equipped puppet police. Other students remain critically wounded. Thieu has called for further reprisals, some students have gone underground to join the NLF while those who remain in the cities have publicly vowed to "set off more explosions of angry soldiers and people that will destroy the Thieu regime."

The students in South Vietnam and the inmates at Attica who risked their lives in the face of tyranny communicate a dynamic message to us and people like ourselves—a message that by its very example encourages us to take ourselves seriously in our struggle for the right to live.

In our desire to avoid the pitfalls of endless demonstrations, mobilizations and actions, we must move now to develop new forms of participation that can integrate the slow base building that must go on with national perspectives and national actions that concentrate our power and communicate our signal of love and solidarity to people who are far distant and need tangible signs of our struggle and support.

How do we relate to an election that will engage the vast majority of the people in this country in a process that has consistently proven its bankruptcy? How do we relate to the popular opposition for Richard Nixon, the individual, when we know that individual personalities and changes in Administration do not alter the fact that it is a system that must be transformed? The past five Presidents have employed American technology to wage war against non-white people in Asia, whatever the "mandates" they got from the voter.

We make the following assumptions: (1) the value of defeating Richard Nixon cannot be underestimated; and it is the people Nixon has attempted to intimidate, malign, brutalize and repress that should lead the campaign for his eviction, (2) that the most effective way to convince the next President to get out of Vietnam is not to work actively for the Democratic choice, but to create a climate in the United States that drives Richard Nixon from political power as Johnson was forced out in 1968; (3) that the Evict Nixon campaign must be grounded in a solid political analysis about power in this country and that the local organizing that is done from now until San Diego must help people to understand that the problems of this society run much deeper than the particular personality of Richard Nixon.

Science

(Continued from page 17)

elitism in the scientific community is of gigantic proportions and exists in many forms, ranging from a belief that all scientific research is neutral to a belief that only the scientist is able to solve social dilemmas. "Whatever the form," explains one member of the collective, "the end result is the same: Scientists working in isolation in a highly individualistic manner with no regard for the final outcome of their efforts. Not only that, the ones who do feel some sense of moral outrage are incapacitated by their widespread belief that they are not competent to venture into fields outside of their narrow speciality."

The desire to break down this feeling of helplessness was one main motivation in developing the Science for Vietnam program. "We have committed ourselves to work in areas where we know little, but we think we can succeed through a collective approach."

The people in the group have real hopes that their work on TB will be of use to the North Vietnamese and in the new project on forestry they are hoping to provide the Vietnamese with information on new techniques in forest management and on possible strains of trees that could be useful in the defoliated areas.

The Daily Cardinal.

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VOL. 1, No. 1

MADISON, WIS., MONDAY, APRIL 4, 1972

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


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
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