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After Nazism-
Democracy?

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After Nazism— Democracy?

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After Nazism— Democracy?

**A Symposium
by
four Germans**



**Edited
by
Kurt Hiller**



Lindsay Drummond, London

First Published
1945

After Nazism—
Democracy?

A Symposium
by
Four Germans

Edited
by
Hart Miller

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Editor's Preface

THIS book has originated from discussions within the Group of Independent German Authors in London. The group was founded before the war (at the beginning of 1939) by political refugees who were unanimous not only as anti-Nazis but also in their critical attitude to the old Parties of the Left, organisations whose incompetence formed the humus on which the success of the Nazis flourished. Of course, there were differences of opinion amongst us, not only aesthetic but political. We discussed things over, but no attempt was made at reciprocal *Gleichschaltung*.

Our book is an expression of this relationship. As the honour of editing has fallen to me, perhaps I could avail myself of the convenient formula, "The editor cannot be held responsible for the views expressed by contributors" (nor a contributor for the views expressed by one of his colleagues, including the editor). I have no wish, however, to tread this bridge of security. For that, I feel the weight of consensus among all four of us to be too considerable. Each of the contributors to this volume aims at the annihilation and extirpation of Nazism in Germany and of all barbarisms bound to or closely related to it; the just, stern punishment of the guilty with effect lasting for generations; the establishment of an organisation of peace among the peoples, such as would be enduring; in Germany a regime that will bring simultaneously both Freedom and Socialism—two ideals which not only do not exclude each other, but whose practical synthesis it is the task of our century to realise. We repudiate a "Freedom" which leads to the exploitation of the masses and to Pauperism; we repudiate a Socialism which hardens into a despotism; which enslaves the individual, prohibits discussion, strikes the spirit with a hammer.

We are also unanimous that internationally simply to return to Versailles or nationally to Weimar is not possible. And as for the constitution, we collectively regard the wish of some worthy German *Bürger* for a restoration as thoroughly reactionary. The position of the devil must not be occupied by that old system which was the womb in which devilry was conceived. What new system is to replace it then? Some of us have formed ideas about this; they appear in the book.

As editor, I feel a big part of the work of my co-contributors as a valuable complement of the ideas set out by myself . . . or mine

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as a useful complement of theirs. This also applies to a considerable part of Hans Jaeger's exposition. Should some readers find the dissonance between certain of his views and certain of mine as disturbing, I would put forward as editor the excuse that he who demands from the State freedom of speech cannot violate it within his own small confines, but should rather take the lead with his own good example.

LONDON, December 1944.

K. H.

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*The essays by Hiller and Jaeger
are translated by*

O. S. GRIFFITHS.

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are translated by*

E. W. DICKES.

The Problem of Constitution

I

“**W**ITH sudden step comes death on man.” This warning has a special urgency in these latter days for everyone, not excepting those who are in the habit of frankly expressing their thoughts in public, thereby acting as mouthpieces for those who remain silent. The shorter the span that may be granted us, the more determinedly should we express our thoughts with death-bed precision. Without a trace of dissimulation, without taint of vanity or fear, without diplomatic refinement, we must unreservedly profess that which lies in the deepest recesses of our knowing.

So I hereby profess that my judgment of the ideal of “democracy,” as it arose among the most progressive brains in Europe in the second half of the eighteenth century, is that, in one single, separable, definite respect, it is thoroughly unsound, is barbarising, and opposed to the interests of the people and of mankind. In other respects I acknowledge the ideal, as does every decent man. The explanation will follow, but, before embarking on it, I must point out that I am far from wanting to meddle in matters that are no business of mine, to question the Constitution of States of which I am not a citizen, to make a wiseacre’s problems out of conditions which are perhaps no problems at all, or to carp at arrangements which may have justified themselves. To be an internationalist, that is, to have an eye to the welfare of all mankind, does not mean to neglect that tact which in private life limits the number of the spheres into which one should poke one’s nose—tact without which the political theoretician, too, would become a tiresome and ridiculous nuisance.

German as I am (my “denationalisation” in 1935, by the rabble in power in my homeland, is of course devoid of all legal significance), I am concerned about the problem of the Constitution of Germany, and of Germany alone. Democracy in Germany to-morrow? To many people that is not open to question; to me, however, it is a very involved question, and, above all, a fundamental one. Apart from Nazism, there is scarcely anything in the world of politics that revolts me so much as the frivolous superficiality with which the term “DEMOCRACY” is used in the anti-Nazi camp, the manner in which an expression of so many meanings is handled as though unambiguous, and a word is embroidered in golden letters on banners without its meaning having been first inves-

tigated. That which is set up against the devil-worship that has to be uprooted and burnt out is not a well-considered counter-ideal, but a mere *locution*.

II

“Democracy” is not simply ambiguous. The word covers *three* ambiguities.

It was Lenin who revealed the first. He distinguished “formal” from “real” democracy. The formal is that of general political equality (universal suffrage)—which is in truth no equality, so long as the economic conditions of large sections of the people effectively prevent full use being made of it—because of poverty and misery, lack of time, exclusion from educational facilities, as well as the scarcely limited monopoly of the possessing classes in the formation of popular convictions through schools, press, and other apparatus for influencing the public. Until this monopolistic position is abolished, there can be no question of equal rights, that is, of “democracy” (rule of the people in the State); mass poverty in itself is in conflict with equality; equality in everyone’s material handicap is a part of democracy; one of the essential conditions of *real* political democracy is economic democracy, which is socialism. And to arrive at the real democracy, the democracy of the equal handicap, of a society without classes, the rules of formal democracy must be temporarily abrogated. The “Dictatorship of the Proletariat,” Lenin held, leads from the capitalist State, whether of semi-feudal or of formal-democratic form, through a series of phases, to real democracy, the socialist community of equal rights for all. Once this goal has been reached, he thought, the dictatorial forms will be unjustifiable and superfluous; nobody need then be excluded from political rights, and the rules of the old formal democracy can be re-introduced without danger—assuming that they are still wanted. Lenin seems to have agreed with Engels in believing that, after the abolition of class-society by the completion of the socialist revolution as the result of long struggles, “the State will die off.”

We may bow low before the great historic figure of Lenin, but that does not imply accepting his theories blindly.

A State is an organised society, and force is implicit in the conception. The advocate of freedom wants force to be used only against social pests, and the definition of the pest is a standing problem. The death of the capitalist State by no means involves the death of the *State*. It neither dies suddenly nor does it “die off” slowly. Only if everyone without exception acts of his own accord for the good of society, if without exception and without legal compulsion everyone’s sense and will prevent them from being pests, only then is the State no longer needed and the unruléd society can come into existence. Anarchy does not cease to be an ideal, but it is attainable only when “men are good”—*all* men—and

this state of thing cannot be expected before the Greek Kalends. But if the State as a form of organisation survives the capitalist State (as it survived the feudal State), then the desirability of the re-introduction of the old democratic rules of the game becomes extremely doubtful, for reasons which I will mention.

It is doubtful, too, whether that form of government which Lenin meant by the "Dictatorship of the Proletariat," which he realised in principle, and from which he promised himself the introduction (in stages) of socialism, corresponds to the wishes of the best Germans in Germany and to the objective interests of our nation. It is practically certain that the best Germans in Germany have had enough of dictatorship; past experience shows that the "Dictatorship of the Proletariat" turns into the dictatorship of a party, or of a clique within that party, and that, however progressive the kernel of its doctrine may be, such a dictatorship has little to distinguish it, in its methods and its whole course of action, from a reactionary despotism. The best Germans in Germany abhor any despotism of an autocrat or of an autocratic clique, *any* dictatorship, *any* tyranny, whatever the colour of its flag. To have enjoyed the brown totalitarianism for more than a decade gives but little appetite for a red one. There is a yearning for *freedom*, the passionate desire of men of good will: peace and freedom. If the opposite to any kind of dictatorship is called "democracy," the will of the best Germans in Germany is unquestionably "democratic." By "best Germans" I mean those whose heart and mind have remained unsubjected to the idiotic barbarism of the Nazis, who have withstood it, if only inwardly; who have never ceased to be good Europeans and humanists, or have become such through their experience of evil; who, after the crushing defeat and humiliation of their nation which appear inevitable, are prepared for a lasting enrolment of the nation in a peace-community of peoples.

There is, however, no doubt that these same individuals certainly do not aspire to a merely formal democracy but to a real one, that of the equal handicap, that of socialism. On this point, they are Leninites, however little attracted by the path which Lenin took.

III

The second ambiguity of the word "democracy" is comparatively harmless, but clearness demands its inclusion. The expression is sometimes used to signify the equality of all in State matters, and at other times to indicate that, in some much narrower sphere, in a group within the State (as in the organisation of a party), all enjoy equal rights. It is possible to oppose the legislative equality of all in the State and yet to be a thorough supporter of the equality of all participants in a corporative action, of all members of a movement, also of all inside a State organ,

for instance, of those who belong to a legislative body. Someone may object to the privileged position of some clique of officials or fraction in his party or association, and demand "internal democracy," advocating in particular unhampered freedom of discussion between different opinions, with free voting and the consequent possibility of the transfer of control from the majority of yesterday to the former minority. In spite of this, he may be no friend of that constitutional absolutism of majorities in State matters which is preached by the old democratic orthodoxy. On the other hand, events have shown that the dogmatist in favour of the universal and equal right to be heard (in spite of the differences of worth between individuals, of the inequality of their characters and powers of judgment) is quite capable of suppressing in the most drastic and un-"democratic" manner dissidents and unorthodox shades of opinion in his party organisation—the measures taken ranging from denial of the right to speak, exclusion and hushing-up, to assassination. The democrat who is most fanatical for the equality of all in State rights can be the most rabid opponent of that democracy which implies fair treatment of his political associates who differ from him about the way there. Is he a democrat or the opposite? The question remains open because the word has more than one meaning.

IV

The third ambiguity of "democracy" is the most serious. It has already appeared in what has gone before. With every intention of mathematical clearness and anatomical precision it is as little possible in the mental as in the physical sphere to separate the components completely. In view of the confusion and mistiness that prevail in most brains, the chemical analysis of conceptions is an unavoidable task, but the separation of the elements cannot be carried out strictly, merely approximately. We are not experimenting in a vacuum.

The third ambiguity is this:

In many men's mouths, especially in the West (which must include such a master of statecraft as Masaryk) "democracy" signifies not so much a Constitution as an attitude of mind, and conveys an idea which does not greatly differ from moral sense, religious feeling, love of one's neighbour, statecraft based on philanthropy, a guarantee of individual liberty, freedom of public discussion, a high standard of law, of research, of the arts, favourable social conditions for productivity, the spirit of peace, happiness, fairness . . . an idea, in short, which is that of broad-mindedness and humanism (both in the Christian and, as it were, in the Athenian sense). *Equality* plays in this ideal the part that it plays in the theological notion of the "equality of all before God," in the philosophical assertion of the "identical value of the reasoning principle in every human being," and in the legal doctrine of the "equality of all

before the law." If, however, all are to be equal before the law, that is a long way from saying that the law is to deal with all alike, with the rascal as with the honest man, with the cretin as with the genius, and least of all must it ordain that everyone is equally qualified to make the law. The liberal or humanist conception of democracy is intended as a counterblast to every despotism and dictatorship, to every form of arbitrary rule, no matter whether it is that of a single autocrat, of a social caste, or of the bosses of a political party. According to this conception the State exists for the people, not the people for the State (rejection of "totalitarianism"); every individual has the right to enjoy the miracle of life fully, subject to his respecting the similar right of others; a State has no justification which fails to ensure, within the limits of the possible, that its people live free from want; it is criminal if it sacrifices them to the ambitions of a clique in power (it is not to these that the State belongs, in equity at any rate, although unfortunately in many cases *de facto*); in principle, every member of a State is entitled to active participation in politics, irrespective of class origin, of race, or of sex, provided that the member is in possession of those qualities of character and intellect for which law-givers and administrators must be distinguished if the people are to thrive and the State to flourish.

All this is covered by the liberal, humanist, (or, in their modern sequel) socialist conception of the democratic ideal. That all are equally fitted to make laws or to choose law-makers is *not* its meaning. How a nation obtains the best legislators is a problem which is in no way prejudiced by the decision on the attitude of mind implied by this "democratic" ideal, that is, by the ideal of the just State, of liberalism, of humanism, of socialism. Universal equal suffrage for the legislative body may be compatible with this ideal; that it follows therefrom is a mere dogma, an assertion which is not proved by being daily repeated a dozen times as though it were a matter of course. But whether this is true or not, in certain connections the term "democracy" is constantly used to denote a system of government which puts the work of legislation and control wholly or to a decisive extent into the hands of a freely-elected body—a parliament in which the majority of the "representatives of the people" chosen by majorities decide the event. It is true that this system permits of considerable variation in the method of arriving at the "will of the majority" (an advantage for a merely relative majority; second ballot; proportional representation), but, since it is bound up in the closest manner with party organisation, whatever procedure is in force the representatives are in practice hardly ever elected by the majority of the electors. Instead, majorities of party executives or of election committees decide on the candidates between whom the people have a choice. Consequently, with the inevitable ageing of the parties and the low level which has prevailed in the party leadership in certain historic periods, we find that the most perceptive, the most competent,

the best qualified voters among the people are in the position of being able, I admit, to choose the least of several evils, but hardly ever to give their vote to the man who seems to them the most suited to be a member of parliament . . . to say nothing of the difficulty, in fact impossibility, of securing his election.

Thus there is often concealed behind the "democratic" curtain of universal and equal suffrage merely the unedifying countenance of dictatorship, even though it is not that of a blood-thirsty dictator, of a dyed-in-the-wool tyrant, but "only" that of the party bureaucracy, of the frigid acolytes of political routine. Moreover, in cases where parties with genuinely popular, civilising, "democratic" intentions have failed through their fault or misfortune, it is only too easy for the clever demagogues of the malignant opposition, of the party with reactionary or even barbarous tendencies, to bring to their side the masses of the justifiably disappointed; the "mutable, rank-scented many" of Coriolanus are as eternal as Shakespeare. This does not prevent the command, to make each unit of these many the object of helpful philanthropy, from being as eternal as Moses and Confucius, as Buddha and Christ. The adequate object of philanthropy does not, however, present itself simultaneously as a suitable subject for forming the future of a nation or of mankind. "That all men are created equal" does not mean that all men are of equal merit, neither as thinkers nor as athletes nor as artisans nor as farmers nor as artists nor as teachers, physicians, officials or judges; it does not imply the equal employment of all nor that all are equally qualified to select legislators and leaders.

The fact that the recognition of this has in the past been misused by reactionaries of all kinds, by land-grabbers and share-sharks, by enemies of the people, and by adversaries of the poor, has succeeded in discrediting but not in annulling it. Truths can become buried beneath the dust of ages, yet they are always uncovered again, if not by the zephyr of philosophy then by the tempest of events.

Howsoever majorities come into being, and quite apart from whether they are real or merely nominal, a majority decision is no criterion of what is politically right, and is never an argument for what the moral sense demands. It is not majorities that represent a nation; its best people represent it. To ascertain what is right from the standpoint of ethics and what is intelligent from the standpoint of the intellect is a task for a just and intelligent person and not for the majority. And, also, to judge who is a just and intelligent person is not a task for which the majority is qualified, but rather a just and intelligent person or the representatives of this type *in common*, though it is clear that differences between *them* must be decided by their majority.

The problems of Constitution are more than a subject of jurisprudence and history, they belong to the sphere of *spiritual movement*. In

the spiral of spiritual movement the idea of a rule of Quality lies a whorl higher than the idea of a rule of Equality—which, for its part, lay a whorl higher than the obsolete aristocratism of the Feudal era. The revolutionary democratism of 1789 is now reactionary. In the coming decades all conservatives, in the effort to defend themselves against the impetuous demands of a progressive social ethic, will equip themselves with “democratic” catchphrases. The democratism of the past, which in theory means a rule of mass majorities (ochlocracy!), meant in practice plutocracy. The democratism of the future will be *logocratic*—both in theory and practice.

Logos is not “word”; *logos* is *spirit, mind, reason*, the highest principle in the natural world and for the moral world—according to Philo of Alexandria (who was thirty years older than Christ) the most universal mediator between God and World, the idea of all ideas, the power of all powers, God’s “deputy and ambassador,” the “second God”—that very same principle which, as John the Evangelist (about forty years younger than Philo) declared, “was in the beginning.” Let us abstain from discussing here the ontological significance of the *logos* principle; it is its political sense that is to be clarified and propagated. Every man potentially carries within him the *logos* (in this connection one glimpses the importance of Education); those in whom the *logos* is developed to any considerable degree in relation to the standard of their time form necessarily always a minority. This fact would be misinterpreted if it is taken as a delusion of haughtiness. *The logos, resting with the few, works for all.* Indeed; it acts on behalf of all and serves all. In its liberality, in its love of all, the new oligarchy of the spirit will be, to the old oligarchy of the sword and of money, what day is to night.

Whether the future that is to bring *logocracy* will begin with the end of our millennium or only during the next—it would be useless to prophesy. We should not guess, we should will and act. If we use all the power of our will to recognise that which is needed and spare no effort to try to contribute to its realisation, we may help to bring it about that the historical process towards the earthly paradise will not last quite so long as we must fear. The only thing worth taking seriously and worth working for is a Utopia. Optimism is, of course, naive, but cynicism is mean, and the sceptical capitulation to crudity and stupidity no worthy token of an advanced intellect, but a sign of tiredness, decay and weakness.

Returning to our Constitution question let us remember this: If ever history has provided an example of the incompetence of mass majorities, modern German history has provided it. It has shown how, after the failure of the republicans and the moderates (a failure accentuated by the excessive lack of realism of the extreme left), it was possible for Nazism, the most reactionary, the most barbarous, the most stupid of all political doctrines, the extreme antithesis of *logos*, to secure a relative majority (although not an absolute one) of dimensions unheard of in the

history of the German parliament, with all the horrible consequences for the nation and mankind that are so notorious.

Is it only in Germany that masses manage to go so much astray? Good; my remarks are intended to apply solely to Germany.

V

Let me sum up, still only in order to get our terms clearly defined: real democracy contrasted with formal; dictatorship for the attainment of the real democracy, abrogating for a time the formal democracy, and therefore democratic—democratic even in the “formal” sense as regards the ultimate objective. This is Ambiguity No. 1.

Democracy as the constitutional principle of a State and democracy as a fair method of co-operation between members of a group or body. This is Ambiguity No. 2.

Democracy as a State practising justice, morality, and humanity, and permitting discussion (liberal ideal) and democracy as a State with the equal participation of all in the appointment of legislators and leaders (equalitarian-majoritary ideal). This is Ambiguity No. 3.

If we leave out the comparatively unimportant discrepancy, No. 2, the following combinations result from 1 and 3:

(a) The “formal” democrat strongly objects to democracy as conceived by the “real” democrat, so long as there is no majority for it in parliament. Democrat against democrat.

(b) The “real” democrat strongly objects to democracy as conceived by the “formal” democrat, because it helps to maintain the capitalist system, which is radically undemocratic. Democrat against democrat.

(c) The “formal” democrat strongly objects to democracy, as intended by the “human rights” ideal, from the moment when a majority decides against human rights. He must accept the verdict of the majority. Democrat against democrat.

(d) The liberal democrat strongly objects to this decision (which the “formal” democrat regards as logically democratic), because it puts the enemy of humanity into the saddle. Democrat against democrat.

(e) The liberal democrat, however, also strongly objects to the dictatorship proposal of the “real” democrat, because it abrogates liberty, human rights, and democracy, at any rate temporarily. Democrat against democrat.

(f) The equalitarian democrat (to equate him to the “formal” democrat without prejudice to the distinction between their opposite numbers) gets into the most frightful dissension with himself, because he can neither approve of a system which abolishes democratic equality nor refuse his assent to a scheme adopted as a result of a majority

decision, even though it may be most undemocratic. The democrat against himself!

To the facts about this tangle, whose threads it is neither an easy nor an agreeable task to sort out, let us add the following from the records of the parties concerned: in the United States, some of the most famous champions of the democratic ideal, such as Lincoln, belonged to the committee of the "Republican Party," which is the opponent of the "Democratic Party"; again, in republican France for decades the Democratic Union was the great party, not of the most extreme but of the most outspoken right wing, a group without ideals but with interests, who were diametrically opposed to the ideals of liberal-humanist democracy and to the socialist "real" democracy (although no attack was made on republicanism and parliamentarism). So it seems that "democracy" and "democratic," if used without explaining their meaning, are *empty phrases*, the employment of which does not decrease the general confusion, but increases it.

VI

Democracy in Germany to-morrow? When I put this question, I mean in the first place: Is democracy in Germany to-morrow *desirable*? And then: Is democracy in Germany to-morrow *possible*? These questions would be meaningless, in fact, the height of foolishness, if, in view of the catastrophic ambiguities of the term "democracy," I did not first explain exactly which conception or conceptions I adopted. The need for logical tidiness (which, unfortunately, I share with but few writers, but, let us hope, with most readers) has made inevitable the circumstantial and tedious analysis in the earlier chapters.

I confess (in so far as every sort of confession is not present in what I have already said):

1. I assent to Lenin's "real" democracy of the equal opportunity for all in a classless society. For I am a socialist. It is a lie to call oneself a socialist if one does not assent to this democratic ideal. A person who admits the idea of justice in all possible relations of social existence, but does not apply it to the economic sphere, has not the faintest inkling of justice; he is blathering. A person who professes to be religious but who in his social theories or his daily political practice supports the maintenance of the capitalist system is a Pharisee, nothing less. No irresponsible moneygrubber, no egoist, can be convinced in a quasi-mathematical way that he is wrong to be an egoist, but it can be made very clear to him that he is ridiculous if he uses weighty ethical or religious words. The maintenance of the economic system which at present prevails over six-sevenths of the earth's surface (excluding the sea) is unethical and irreligious. How inapt is the assertion of Aristotle (in his "Politics"), that democracy is not the form of government in which the majority

rule but that in which the poor rule, becomes obvious when we glance at the middle-class or bourgeois democracies of our day and of the previous century. This shows us that only where the poor are closely organised, supported by a section of the middle-class, and for these two reasons sometimes get within sight of a majority at elections, do they participate (participate!) in the government, and then only weakly or through weaklings—in fact, more for the sake of formal prestige than for any practical effect on the social economy. Where these premises are not in evidence, it is the rich and not the poor who rule the roost, and the latter are incapable of this even when the conditions are fulfilled.

Perhaps the utterances of the old philosophers should not be measured by the experience of our times, but by that of their own, using our historic sense and relativist justice? Good. Then it must be pointed out that in Aristotle's times his assertion was much falser than to-day! Those were the days of slave economics; the craftsmen, artisans, mechanics, clerks of the time, corresponding to the portion of the population which modern sociology calls "workers" in the widest sense, were all the property of others, and were chattels, non-citizens, excluded from any participation in legislation and administration. The main body of the poor in the old democratic city-states, the slave sector, were certainly better treated by their masters than the "free" proletariat by the majority of industrialists in the early days of capitalism (and perhaps not in the early days alone), but not only did they *not* represent the sovereignty and the support of democracy, but the faintest trace of any co-operation on their part in the democracies was absent. Jeremy Bentham, one of the neatest and clearest thinkers of all time (and therefore out of keeping with the age), was, so far as I know, the first to point this out, in a footnote to his forgotten "Fragment on Government" (1776).

It is precisely the ancient democracies that, with the exclusion of the proletariat, were typical majority rules (with the central idea of individual freedom, except for slaves), and it is a lie on the part of Aristotle to say that they were rather governments by the poor. His quibble in saying that the rôle of majority in democracy is an accident, arising from the fact that the rich always form a minority in society, and the poor a majority (as though even in a democracy the poorer people could not be split and their own majority decide against their own minority!), has some validity only if slaves—as animals or chattels—were not counted as human beings, and so were not among the poor. This sort of reckoning is certainly Aristotelian; Aristotle championed energetically the maintenance of slavery, and this at a time when the more refined and advanced minds of Greece were already beginning to doubt its legitimacy. Aristotle, a sort of Hegel of antiquity, is among the most overrated minds in literature. If only he had meant his definition of democracy as the rule of the poor in the sense of a standard, a

challenge, an obligation ("deontologically"), in the sense in which Lenin over two thousand years later postulated "real" democracy! Nothing of the kind; Aristotle was a conservative (tutor to the Crown Prince at the Court of King Philip of Macedon), he meant his definition to be "ontological," descriptive, empirical. And so we have to interpret the contrast between it and the social actuality not as an antithesis between what ought to be and what is, between ethics and physics, between ideal and fact, but as a symptom of that often clever and very often very learned lack of intellectual honesty which is striking in other passages in his works, as we find also in the case of other false stars of history.

The superiority of the ancient democracies over the oligarchies of the rich and the tyrannies (a superiority which cannot be denied, although it was neither oligarchy nor tyranny, but, according to Eduard Zeller, *democratic reaction* that committed the infamous judicial murder of Socrates) corresponds to the superiority of the modern bourgeois democracy over the surviving feudal or semi-feudal systems and over all dictatorships; Plato knew, and the modern Platonist knows, why a form of government still better than this must be sought for, whether it is called "democracy" or something else.

Moreover, justice is not the sole reason for socialism. The socialist system, in so far as it is a planned economy, is more practical than the old haphazard one, and more rational; it contains in itself the power to prevent crises, both national ones and, since it is international in conception, international ones as well. Furthermore, it widens greatly the field of selection; the incompetent will, under socialism, no longer be put into important posts merely because they are the sons of their fathers, and the capable must no longer languish for lack of a parent's bank-account. That rule of the best which Plato proposed has far greater chances under socialism than under capitalism, which almost excludes it. The most successful money-grubber would not himself claim to be one of the best in the sense of the Platonic philosophy.

I am therefore for "real" democracy, because I am a socialist.

But as I am a freedom-loving socialist, I reject the dictatorial, despotic, way to "real" democracy. Of course I understand how impatience at the resistance of the dull masses can lead a passionate advocate of socialism to demand this method and to follow it, but I do not follow it and I demand something different. There is another way, and it is a mistake to think that the socialist has to choose between dictatorship and democracy (formal, majoritary), in the absence of a third possibility. The view that there were only the two alternatives—a compulsory "either-or"—was fatal to Germany in 1918 and in the troubled years which followed; this was all the more tragic inasmuch as the concept of a third way had been evolved and was in print seven months before the defeat and the so-called revolution. The Press of the bourgeois democracy devoted leading articles to the proposal, reject-

ing it, of course, but with respect, while the Ebertist and the Marxist Press simply ignored it. There is no more convenient method of getting rid of inconvenient people than to kill them, and there is no more convenient method of making inconvenient ideas "safe" than to keep them from the people by silence in the Press. Assassination is punishable by law, but hushing up is permissible, though it deserves a more severe punishment than assassination. For the latter strikes at individuals, the former at ideas, and ideas are more important to the community than individuals.

Apart from the "dictatorship of the proletariat" (which leads inevitably to the despotism of a party clique), and from the formal democracy in the old style, there is a third way; it begins at the point where the line of the revolutionary democracy created by the Encyclopaedists cuts the line of Platonism.

2. I assent to the requirement of democracy inside the socialist movement. German socialism is split up (there are at the present time, in exile, at least eight sections), and the anti-barbarian, anti-nationalist, progressive part of the German masses shows an evident and reasonable desire for a *unified* socialist party (that is, a party which, in spite of shades of opinion and divisions, is capable of powerful action to realise socialism). Now, it is inconceivable that a single one of the many socialist parties and groups should be in a position to master the German future, and there is therefore a peremptory need for the co-operation and coalition of the different socialist sections. These considerations make it the more imperative, in the view of thinking men, that there shall be fairness and equality between sections, and "democracy" in the framework of a great party capable of bringing action to a successful issue. The desire that this party shall be controlled by real leaders, by *men of high type*, as in the great days, and not, as at the downfall, by mediocrities, mere officials, puffed-up second-raters, shallow, cold, ambitious philistines (much more conservative-minded—whatever their programme—than the great personalities of all conservative parties), does not exclude democracy inside the party. If democracy and real authority were alternatives, it would be necessary, for the people's sake, to decide for authority. But they are not alternatives. True democracy and false authority are the alternatives. The democracy of Weimar did not even succeed in turning out the false authorities of the Empire, let alone in putting real ones in their place. True democracy and true authority do not exclude one another; they condition one another—in the State, and in every group, movement, and party.

3. I assent to the eternal ideas of humanity and liberty, as well as of the law, without which there is no guarantee of humanity and liberty, while law itself is without foundation, infamous, and deserving of destruction, if it becomes a sham and a mere instrument of a despot

or of an antiquated autocracy, and fails in its mission of guaranteeing humanity and liberty. If "democracy" means justice, liberty, humanity, then a State Constitution which shall stand erect at the tribunal of moral sense must be democratic. But it should be clear that this conception is at bottom only a negative, representing nothing but a "No" said to tyranny and barbarism, and that it is not enough for a constructive theory.

An equal right of co-decision for all in the State is the constructive theory of a Constitution . . . and a wrong one. It would be right, if this arrangement led more quickly than other ways to the rule of humaneness, of social justice, of peace, of liberty, of joy. In Germany the opposite happened. There was equal suffrage for all, and a parliament of the equalitarian-majoritary democracy without any check from a non-elective body which might have been a body of real authority, a chamber of the best, an upper house of the *élite* (*élite*, of course, not in the sense of money and magnificence or academic title!) In practice, there was endless fussing about majorities of the mediocre, the mind proscribed, the enlightened and (as Plato calls them) true kings of the nation condemned to be on-lookers and of no more account than so many King Logs—whither did this lead? To Hitler. An influence of the Enlightened on German politics would have prevented the shameful failure of those black-red-golden¹ mediocrities, who as the trusted of the mass-majorities looked upon themselves as the representatives of the people, and without this failure such a scandalous pre-religious, cave-man, ridiculous movement of excited underlings as was the raising of the swastika would never have scored a success; its unexampled career was a tremendous phenomenon of disillusion. The rule of the Enlightened in Germany, instead of that mindless Weimar absolutism of Tsar Majority, would, moreover, in spite of the strength of numbers of Nazism, never have allowed it to get into power. With free voting the Nazi score never rose above 44 per cent, even under the psychological terror of the lie about the burning of the Reichstag; how unimportant this number would have been if the adherents of an equalitarianism which had been impressed upon the masses (including Herr von Hindenburg) had not prostrated themselves in number-worship! The rule of the Enlightened, true democracy, would not admit to power even an absolute majority, if it wanted what was immoral and irrational; the pseudo-democracy of Weimar cringed before a merely relative one. Now picture to yourself what would happen, not just what theoretically *might* happen but what, with a probability bordering on necessity, *must* happen, if the majority of a nation which had been for more than a decade at the Nazi school ("school" in both the true and the derived sense) were left to decide the fate of the nation. Whatever one may think, in principle and generally, about formal, equalitarian, majoritary democracy, to apply it

¹ The colours of the flag of the German ("Weimar") Republic.—Translator.

to the German people of the next few decades would be nothing but lunacy. To reintroduce into Germany universal equal suffrage for the legislative body would, as I said at the beginning, *be to perpetuate barbarism and would be opposed to the interests of the people and of mankind*; in this "single, separable, definite respect" democracy for Germany would be "thoroughly unsound." My theory, worked out in principle in the second decade of this century, and first published in 1918, from which I have never receded, has been confirmed by the events which I have experienced, and especially by what has happened since 1933; I stand by it . . . as the pupil of great masters and as one who has confidence in his own reason; to apply such terms as despisers of the people, reactionaries, fascists, to me and to those who share my beliefs is falsehood or loose thinking. We believe, in fact we *know*, that those social, progressive, anti-fascist aims, which are the objective of the humanist, the liberal, the socialist, cannot be attained by the path of equal participation of all in the election of leaders and legislators—at any rate not in Germany, or at the very least that this path would demand more blood and more time than the path of legislation and control by an *élite*, revolutionary in the humanist sense, under the criticism of all and with perfectly free public discussion.

A German ex-Marxist of considerable intelligence, in a book devoted to liberty, which was published in Paris shortly before the devil's invasion, assures us that "any theory of an *élite* is in essence undemocratic"; this statement is a tautology and an identical equation ($a=a$), and therefore a platitude, or it is false. It is a tautology if we define "democratic" as "equating the unlike," "excluding selection," "conferring the same voting power on fit and unfit." But it is false if we, with the deepest respect for Demos as a whole, look upon its *élite*, the type of Plato's βασιλικὸς ἀνὴρ (kingly man), as good enough to represent it. If that is done, then we can say: "Every democracy amounts in essence to the rule of an *élite*." It is just a question of what meaning one attaches to this most obscure, most unfruitful, most confusing of all political terms: "democracy."

VII

The routine politician in the Weimar "democracy" created the conditions from which Hitler's kakistocracy (the rule of the worst) sprang; the Weimar routine politician is bankrupt, whether his self-important letter-heading was once nationalist or "Christian," conservative or democratic, or even social-democratic. To clear away the ruins which he will have left, and to put in their place a reign of light, liberty, reason, happiness (for Germans and non-Germans), is the superhuman task of the politician of ideas. If the notion of religion on the Continent were not tied up with all manner of obsolete practices, foggy meta-

physics, misanthropic notions of morality, persecutions of freedom, with Roman, orthodox-Protestant, and Rabbinical Torquemadism, we could use the term *Religious Politician* instead of *Politician of Ideas*, in order to emphasise the distinction from mere empiricists and routiners, self-interested and business politicians. In Great Britain a cleric is often a man of enlightenment. Bishops as champions of humanity, even of socialism; there is nothing of that sort on the Continent, least of all in Germany. The celebrated Niemöller and Count Galen were certainly doughty critics of particular clawings of the beast (especially against the Church), but were stout nationalists and war-patriots, excusing aggression, if not glorifying it. Pan-Germanism and Church Christianity have always been reconcilable, and if Nazism got rid of its anti-church features, the Galens and Niemöllers would have nothing against its pan-Germanism, and would support it without reserve. All honour to their reservations, but they are only reservations. (It is not denied that the followers of these leaders of the Church include many who reject nationalism in principle—and not only Nazism as an unhealthy and immoral form of nationalism—who moreover reject Nazism as being a gutter creed thoroughly anti-humanist, second-rate, despicable, and a disgrace to the best German traditions.)

Religion is not the same as church or chapel. The politician of ideas, the enlightened politician, the religious politician—contrasted with the self-interested and business politician—may belong to any church, but is not obliged to belong to any; he may adopt a critical attitude towards the ontological theories, and even to some of the moral ones, of the historic religions. Terminologies which have something to recommend them should not be rejected because asses' ears can easily misunderstand them. (The same applies to "aristocracy." The original conception of "Aristokratia" = "rule of the best," an *eternal* idea of the philosophy of State and Constitution, means neither big landlords nor the descendants of field-m Marshals nor stock-exchange magnates. It means: instead of the rule of the average man, rule by the community's best in character and intellect.) "Religious" implies a consciousness of something higher than the belly. To be religious does not necessitate a woe-begone countenance and the hanging head of false humility, nor the rumble of rites, a heavy atmosphere of absurdity, and divagation into transcendence (observation for atheists). The kernel of that which the champions of the Mind call "Mind" is religious, for it includes the attachment of the heart to something nobler than the standards of private utility; it includes fidelity to a grander principle than the animal goal. The politician of ideas, the politician of enlightenment, the religious politician, will above all have two enemies: the one conquerable, the reactionary; the other unconquerable, the philistine. It becomes necessary henceforth to exclude systematically the reactionary, and especially the philistine, from

every influence on legislation and government. That can't be done? It can!

In a legal manner, it is possible without any dictatorial harshness; on the contrary, the dictatorship of reaction and barbarity, as well as that of mediocrity and of dull inaction which often calls itself "democracy" (the Tsarism of number, therefore of the philistine), must be abolished. For this very reason there can be no question of a simple return to the past in Germany, perhaps of a restoration of the Weimar Constitution. Advocates of such a restoration must have their noses rubbed in the fact that this Constitution was the womb in which the nasty foetus of Nazism grew and ripened. The results of eleven or twelve years of Nazi youth and popular "education" will not be finally blown away off-hand even by a military catastrophe of unexampled dimensions, nor can they be removed by military occupation and by "re-education." Meanwhile, universal suffrage could more easily lead to majorities of crude unintelligence than was the unfortunate case in the early thirties, after a period of public education which was certainly not on ideal lines, but which was far more liberal, far more humanitarian. It is true that it would hardly be as soon as the first, second, or third election that we should see the victory of a party of slave-owners and oppressors at home and subjugators abroad; but all the more surely later on; and "later" means probably sooner than happened after the defeat of 1918. Universal franchise has barbarising results, at least where there is no dynastic-conservative or (in the Platonic sense) aristocratic compensating factor; at least in a politically backward nation; at least in Germany. Only a superficial view will overlook this fact; only doctrinaire obstinacy will deny it. One should not foul one's own nest, and when I call my Germany a politically backward nation, do I slander her? It is as little slander as it is flattery when I declare that in poetry and philosophy she is second to none, and that in musical composition no nation is the equal of Germany. It is very questionable whether one race is superior to another (e.g., possibly the whites superior to the Mongols or both to the negroes); between nations belonging to the same race (e.g., the whites) there is certainly *reciprocal* superiority and inferiority. Such superiority of one over the other as exists is not general but affects particular qualities. As regards political insight and State-forming capacity the German nation remains behind the ancient Chinese, Greeks, Romans, and behind the modern Britons, French, Scandinavians, probably also behind some of the Slav peoples; that means that the *average* German has in politics less common sense than the average Chinese, Greek, Roman, than the average Briton, Frenchman, Scandinavian, Russian, Czech. That is no disgrace. The lack of a virtue becomes ridiculous only when the person concerned stubbornly refuses to recognise the fact and draw deductions. If it becomes evident that a boy has no gift for mathematics and science,

his parents ought not to make a point of having him taught physics and chemistry, while he may be able to become the greatest philologist or sculptor or church historian of his time. Talents are variously distributed, among individuals and among peoples. It is not sufficient to characterise Hitler and Co. as criminals; they are that, of course, but above all they are political idiots. Desiring power and greatness for Germany, they systematically, though involuntarily, brought about the abasement of Germany, and are leading the nation to the verge of destruction. Warmongers, bovine tacticians, brutal thrusters with early success against the peacefully unprepared, but in psychology babes in arms, halting unrealists, real boobies in higher strategy, and undoubted duffers when playing the part of commanders-in-chief. With an eye to their personal fame, they made themselves infamous among their own people, and among all other peoples, as swindlers, robbers, and murderers, and the only alternative to the scaffold for them is suicide. This is the conduct of idiots. A relative majority of the population elected them to control the State, the nation as a whole put up with them. For years it has been only a minority that had to be terrorised not to reject this rabble rule openly. William II was certainly not a criminal, but only an arrogant blockhead with the shoddy universalism that understands something of everything and nothing thoroughly. If imperial expansion was desired for Germany, it meant going with the giant land-power Russia against the giant sea-power England, or *vice versa*; like a fool, he fell out with both. In one of my books I have called him "William the Liar," and proved that he was; but at bottom that is a sentimental point of view; "William the Dunce" would be more correct. For thirty years the German people put up with him and at the end tossed him millions of gold marks. About the President of the Reich, von Hindenburg, words need not be wasted; this country-policeman type with the respectable moustaches himself declared, when a Field-Marshal, that he had not read a book since he was a cadet, apart from a few on military matters. His one historic feat was the losing of the world war. Thereupon the German social-democracy adopted him as their candidate for the Presidency (1932), "in order to prevent Hitler." As Hitler actually stood for the Presidency, and the moderate Right was against him, a single candidate on whom the Left had united would have had phenomenal chances. The wild things of the Communist party broke out of the jungle with the impossible candidature of the (honest) transport-worker Thälmann . . . and thereby provoked the Hindenburg decision of the Social-democratic Party of Germany. There was no possibility of agreeing on a candidate? Nonsense; a pretence. With goodwill it would have been quite possible to unite on a popular and definitely anti-war engineer-industrialist like Count Georg Arco, or on a trusted labour-leader between the social-democratic and the Communist camps, like old Ledebour, or on the

most respected and most social of the radical writers, Carl v. Ossietzky, or on the great leader of revolutionary-humanist activism, Heinrich Mann, who stood apart from all party strife. All these were, of course, men of enlightenment, such as mediocrities do not love, but unite to hate: for they hate personality. A second-rate person acting as leading official for the workers will prefer, as head of the State, a second-rater in a field-marshal's uniform, even if almost illiterate, before a man of enlightenment, however friendly to the workers. President Ebert was such a second-rater acting as leading official for the workers. He was an uneducated, narrow-minded, though cunning, petty bourgeois, who, by his own admission (on the testimony of Prince Max of Baden, Kaiser William's last Chancellor), "hated the social revolution like sin." In 1918 he promptly allied himself with generals and nationalists, allowed unarmed workers who were demonstrating for socialism to be fired upon, shamelessly violated the Reich Constitution to which he had sworn (execution against Saxony and Thuringia in 1923) . . . a really nasty figure among the elected Heads of States in modern times, but the trusted of millions, a "man of the people." The majority of a people that gives its trust to such men, and believes that they are really serving the interest of the people, is lacking in political sense; I assert no more than that.

Moreover, the destiny of a nation is certainly not solely formed by the men at the top, as, for instance, dramatists settle autocratically the destinies of their characters. Such an individualist point of view is wrong. But the mechanist and materialist custom of minimising the influence of persons on the course of events, for good or evil, is still more mistaken. It matters a great deal of whom, for years on end, the highest selective principle in a nation is constituted.

Possibly the high level of German social legislation during recent decades may seem to conflict with the theory of the political inferiority of the Germans. In fact this legislation was as good as it could be under capitalism, especially when compared with what existed in certain other countries. But that is not to the credit of the majority; the social legislation in Germany was the work of a Prussian *Junker*, Otto von Bismarck, and the Republic merely completed what the monarchy had, in the eighties, begun to build on a generous scale. Of course, this had not been done from social conviction, but in prudent fear of the socialist movement, which in William I's time had begun to acquire threatening strength. After the foundation of the Empire (1871) the Social Democrats had 2 seats in the Reichstag; in 1884 they numbered 24. That was rightly regarded as a threat. For the party was young, full of enthusiasm, and led by personalities. When, in 1919, it commanded almost ten times as many votes in the National Assembly (including the independent social democrats), amounting to over 45 per cent of all the seats, it did not know what to do with them,

because it was led by honest, or not so honest, philistines, whose political arithmetic did not get past the fact that 45 is 6 less than 51. These leaders were no usurpers, but were appointed by Tsar Number. Tsar Number, Tyrant Mediocrity, Dictator Majority, carried Germany to disaster. This sort of democracy, this side of democracy, must not return in Germany. *If democracy is the supremacy of nobodies, it is not an ideal.*

VIII

It is not true that if the political philosopher rejects the distinguishable forms of tyranny he has no choice but universal suffrage, with its consequences. It is not true that Democracy cannot possibly have a more rational meaning than a guarantee to every citizen of the same voice in State matters, of the same right to select the legislators, of the same share in shaping the destiny of the people. This implies giving to the ignorant (the majority!) the same part as the expert, to the fool (the majority!) the same part as the wise man, to the crudely-backward (in Germany after Hitler the majority till further orders) the same part as the humanist and the friend of cultural evolution, to the narrow-minded egoist (always the majority everywhere!) the same part as the great-hearted man, who is devoted to large ideas with their eternal moral significance and their changing substance; to the rascal the same part as the man of character. It is also not true that democracy must mean that no principle of one political code counts for more than that of another, that there are no truths in the domain of politics, and no values, and that everything is relative; that what is good and right will always be decided by the majority, there being no other source of the knowledge of good and evil than the majority, so that what it authorises is good.

This equalitarian, relativist, nihilist (in the sense of not affirming any values) conception of DEMOCRACY, making a fetish of number, of accident, of the majority, is certainly the one that has prevailed for one-hundred-and-fifty to two hundred years; it is "dead but it won't lie down." Philologically and philosophically, in particular, it is not the only possible conception. What the shallow man-in-the-street takes to be the most self-evident is generally the most questionable . . . as in this case. If democracy in its original revolutionary significance is to be an expression for a system under which the government of the people belongs to the *people* instead of to a family, a stratum, a caste, a class, then we whole-heartedly shout our assent to this idea, but we consider a people to be represented not by its majority or by favourites of its majority, but by some of its best minds. We hold that the majority idea is a *falsification* of the democratic thought, although it has for generations been current and popularly taken to be self-evident. *In our belief the conceptions of true democracy and true aristocracy coincide.*

Democracy considered as a principle which asserts that nothing and nobody have any quality of their own but that everything and everybody only attain a quality through a decision of the majority (that is, a principle which establishes an equality between competence and inferiority, so that the inferior, in the majority, vote down the competent) seems to us as unworthy an aberration as the interpretation of aristocracy as a parcel of big landlords, generals, "captains of industry," and stock exchange magnates. We want to get back to the original sense of these distorted conceptions, away from their non-senses. The original sense shows a "*coincidentia oppositorum*."

IX

The inner structure of the (federated, let us hope) States of the new Europe will be their own affair; the same forms and institutions are not suitable for all. To impose them from outside would have devastating results; both Roosevelt and Churchill have recognised this. There is only one thing that will apply equally to all: they must, if the Continent is to be healed, surrender a portion of their sovereignty—not to a leading power with supremacy, but to a collectivity of the European States. Europe needs a Customs Union, a unified currency, unity in productive policy, military unity (the recent aggressors being, of course, excluded), and above all it requires a unity of human rights, including the unity of legal guarantees for freedom of propaganda of reason, for manifestations of the spirit, in word and deed, of that spirit of justice, of true nobility, and of fraternity, which permeates the old religions and forms the warm core of all modern humanism and socialism.

It is unnecessary to remark that the so-called "new order" which Herr Hitler tried to introduce against the will of hundreds of millions of Europeans represented in part a blood-stained travesty of all this and in part its exact opposite. In the same way, the "aristocratic" "ideas" of political structure laid down in "*Mein Kampf*" are only an involuntary caricature arising in the brain of an evil-minded philistine, only a grotesque distortion of the "*élite*" idea evolved by the new humanist spirit. Since it is apparent that Herr Hitler is largely a thing of the past, it is no longer worth while making these "ideas" the subject of a serious critical analysis, however attractive to a satirist such an essay might be.

On the Why and How of the unification of Europe, no one has meditated so thoroughly and fruitfully, although mainly for a time that is past, as Richard Nikolaus Coudenhove-Kalergi, whose thoughts are recorded in the book "*Panuropa*" and in the works with which this great and admirable thinker followed up the appearance of this epoch-making volume in 1923. Coudenhove, with whom I have crossed swords, and whom, in the light of to-day, I more than ever hold to be one of

the most enlightened and enlightening teachers of our time, certainly made some mistakes; many he himself corrected, and many were corrected for him by events; he remains the classic of the pan-European thought. The idea of a European Union cries aloud for realisation; the fragmentation of Europe means perpetual war, if "only" economic, and implies the self-destruction of our part of the world and the passing of its control to other continents, economically, politically, and ultimately even culturally. The World State is still the ideal, but if we omit the stage of continental federation, as the League of Nations did in 1919, the ideal is not brought nearer, but actually made more remote; the failure of the Geneva scheme shows this. Geneva remains a noble experiment, which provided an opportunity for the flower of ethical statesmanship to operate; but men like Briand and Herriot, Beneš and Politis, the constructive revolutionary Maxim Litvinov, the delightful figures from Scandinavian and Latin-American politics, this distinguished team did not succeed in realising the idea of the League. Disarmament was not brought about, nor was world armament against a violator of the peace. World resistance to a future aggressor must be the principal task of the League of to-morrow; the armament of Europe against a peace-breaker must be the main preoccupation of the European Union.

This is not only the common interest of all those at present engaged against Hitler and Co., it is also in keeping with the interests of the freedom-loving and peaceful part of the German and Italian nations, especially of their socialist sections, who stand for internationalism or even for the World State. With proper handling from without and education from within, these sections will in the future doubtless constitute an overwhelming majority in both nations. If, however, they are handled wrongly, the nationalist and bellicose tendencies among them will not be weakened, but strengthened. Statesmen with a sense of responsibility and with a view extending far beyond five years, will know what they have to do and to leave undone about this. Never would a policy of simple revenge and subjection be more comprehensible than this time, but even this time it would be nothing but a boomerang, which would finish by coming back to the thrower. Coalitions of great Powers sometimes hold together for many years, but never for generations.

Those who ridicule the European idea—and for that matter every other idea—as "Utopian," with particular regard to the Babel of tongues in Europe, must be reminded of the United States of America, since historical experience is the only thing which impresses them. When the U.S.A. came into being, the English, German, Dutch, French, and Spanish languages were striving for the mastery to such a degree that it was only by a majority of a single vote that the decisive resolution established English as the State language. In spite of the Babel of

tongues the Union came into existence, and became full of life and strength. Pan-Europa requires no unitary language, just as Switzerland has none, where for generations the people of their cantons have lived and worked peacefully together with four languages. The *Confoederatio Helvetica* is the pattern and would be the core of a *Confoederatio Europaeorum*.

Of course, the Federal idea does not stop at Europe. Just as it wants to combine the peoples of a continent into a living and peaceful unity, so it would like to combine the continents into one world-wide State of peace embracing all mankind. The old dream of all that is noble in humanity! Dreams of the *technical* imagination, even the boldest, have become fact; why should such a plain dream of *social science* as that of a lasting peace between the peoples be unrealisable? Its impossibility is asserted by the blood-thirsty, by the conquerors, by the philistines. What is needed is that these three types shall be removed from power. This was always the need, but to-day its necessity is perhaps more obvious. It is time that technical science, for the present mainly misused for the destruction of life, should not only consider its purpose, but should also withdraw a little behind the almost undeveloped social science. (Of course, we must not, after the fashion of the Taoists and similar canting anti-civilisationists, throw out the technical child with the bath-water; to be "anti-technic" is to be an ass, an absurd reactionary and misanthropist.)

The success of systematic efforts in social science (one might equally say "socialist efforts") is dependent on two factors alone; firstly, on the clearness and force of human will; and secondly, for their realisation, on a happy solution of the problem of constitutional law, or, more exactly, of the problem of political selection. It is not at all obvious why, according to the prescription of equalitarian democrats, it is always necessary to wait for the majority of the dull masses to understand and agree before a progressive proposal, a sound social suggestion, a brilliant inspiration, can be followed up and carried out. This ritual may be "democratic"; it is not for the good of the people. Youthful hearts rushed to Fascism-Nazism because it broke with this ritual of democratic waiting . . . to devilish ends, it is true; if there had been a break with it for the ends of the Spirit, of the eternal ideas of freedom and social justice, love of mankind and peace between nations, Mussolini and Hitler would not have gained power.

What was missed in 1918 remains to be redeemed in the new crisis of the entire German political life that is coming. In such times of crisis it is possible to bring about things which in quiet periods cannot be saved from the generally accepted theory. As long as the nation receives her laws from the average elected by the average instead of from the warmest hearts and most distinguished minds, so long will social science lag on the wretched level on which technical science

would be if it had always been a matter for only "common or garden" engineers, and if brilliant inventors and innovators had been obliged to spend a purely private existence as onlookers at the side of the technical highway. If the creation of a reasonable constitutional law and consequently of a peace organisation for all mankind should be irreconcilable with the capitalist system, then the idea of the World State, the lofty idea of the sanctity of all human life, that idea for which, paradoxically, people must first be killed, would be quite sufficient to justify the replacement of that system by a socialist one. Really socialism does not *need* this argument.

In his scheme for the world, Coudenhove made the British Empire a "continent" to itself, and was inclined, at any rate at first, to exclude Great Britain from Europe, although not for the stupid reasons of our "continental politicians" (from Cohen-Reuss to Klaus Bühler), who used to abolish "the" Englishman and "the" Russian in turns, and sometimes both, while seeing everything good in "the" Frenchman. In spite of the Dreyfus case, they could not, or would not, imagine him in the role of Laval, Déat, or Doriot. The role of Poincaré pleased them. From the standpoint of ideas, which shine like stars above this frightful war, it is essential to smash the German hegemony in Europe for ever. But the more essential this is, so much the more unbearable, not only for the Germans, would be the dominance over Europe of any other Continental power, whether of the East or of the West. None of the victor Powers of to-morrow would be in such a high degree capable and suitable as Britain to carry through a settlement devoid of hegemony. Europe and peace have therefore an interest in seeing Britain take an active part in Pan-Europa. This would in no way involve the loss of the leadership of her Empire; why should she not belong both to her Commonwealth and also to a European United States? She would thus, as the leading member of *two* Empires, of two non-imperialist (so to speak) Empires, form a bridge for inter-continental peace.

I have no wish to flatter anyone in this country. Flattery would be a very tasteless form of thanks. But I must and will, as a German, not conceal what I feel in agreement with so many of my countrymen: Britain, as the regulator of Europe, would treat the new Germany without hysteria, practically, justly, according to the dictates of religion, and therefore, in a long view, wisely. This is a confidence that we do not unreservedly feel in every other Power, we of the Left, we European, humanist, *freedom-loving* Germans of some experience . . .

X

Someone asks: What has the German question to do with the World State and Pan-Europa? The German question has a great deal to do

with them, since it is only in a European and international setting that it can be solved. A German who is mainly interested in internal politics, in the Constitution, economic organisation, and intellectual culture, should be the very one to understand that a condition of mutual dependence exists between internal and external policy. Thus the internal policy of a country is, among other things, a reflex of its relationships with the outer world, both of its actual relationships and of those ideological ones at which its leaders aim. (It is equally true that the attitude and objective of a country's foreign policy are a reflex of its internal tendencies, and therefore of its general internal political condition. The doctrine of "primacy," whether of internal or of external policy, remains pure nonsense.)

The sin against the command of solidarity among mankind, the revolt against the conceptions of international law, the attack on the principle that the same standards of human decency are valid between nations as between individuals, these are the *crimes* of this Germany, and it is only as a member of the community of European and world nations that the German nation can atone. Atone she *must*.

I say advisedly "the German nation." It is true that a substantial part of the Germans can claim innocence, that part which was the first victim of the beast in that most abominable of all counter-revolutions (that of 1933), and has not ceased to be victimised, as others have also been to an unexampled degree. But this in no way alters the corporate responsibility of the Reich as a State and the liability of the German nation for the damage which under Hitler it has inflicted on unoffending nations. The legal point must here be distinguished from the moral one. In ethics, everything is individualised; law can treat collectivities only as collectivities. In the intercourse between States the subject and the object of legal obligations are definitely collective, necessarily collective, inevitably collective, while ethical analysis has as its subject the soul, and therefore the individual. Here is an example, purposely a very prosaic one. Let us assume that a joint-stock company has evaded taxation, and has been mulcted in a heavy fine. In consequence of the fine, no dividend or a much reduced one is paid for some years. The shareholders lose enormously, even if they sell out, since the price of the shares has fallen to nothing. The overwhelming majority of the shareholders is guiltless; the fraud was committed without their knowledge by the Managing Director and his associates. The shareholders are "in the soup"; was the punishment of the company by the Court unjustified on that account? Could the Court do otherwise? Must not the interests of the innocent shareholders give way to the interests of the community, a more comprehensive and a larger body than the shareholders? The interests of the community of nations take precedence of the interests of the innocent portion of the German nation. If, for the sake of the innocent portion of the German nation,

the world allowed the indescribable horror of oppression, torture, extermination, and devastation, committed by the German State, to go unatoned, it would be an invitation to future governments, not only German, to perpetrate similar horrors. Above all, it would be an affront to justice, by depriving the undeservingly injured peoples of their compensation. In any case, life cannot be restored to the legions of the murdered. I could wish that the head butchers should be pitilessly shut up in zoo-cages, between the beasts of prey and the ape-house, and fed behind bullet-proof glass, where they might remain on exhibition and perish in their own filth more slowly than up to the present their most pitiable victims in the concentration camps, famine ghettos, and gas chambers. But, even if this were done, the murders of hundreds of thousands, whether by a quick death or by a more abominable slow one, would be in no way atoned for. What can be restored must be restored, so far as it lies in human power. The German nation, organised in the German State of to-morrow, is collectively responsible to the peoples for the humanly possible replacement of losses. It must not hide behind the innocence of its representatives of to-morrow and that of a large part of those represented. If, entirely without any fault of mine, my dog bites my neighbour's child, I must pay damages. Morality exculpates me, but the law holds me responsible, even though I could not have dreamt that my dog would go mad overnight. (It was not overnight that the brown dog of the Germans went mad . . .)

That is the legal position. To establish it, there is no need for hysterically generalising judgments about "the" Germans.

XI

I do not personally take it amiss that the Marquess of Donegal declared in his paper: So many Germans, so much vermin. The damage done by this statement from an often witty journalist falls elsewhere than on my nation. Besides, it is far preferable to consider the heirs of Hutten and Kant, Goethe and Beethoven, to be vermin than to take Hitler for a statesman, with whom a gentleman makes pacts. My friends in Germany have never committed this mistake.

Still less do I complain of extravagant generalities of national hate from the relatives of the peoples over whom the German robber, incendiary, slave-driver, and hangman rules (or ruled yesterday). I reject these generalities as objectively inapplicable, but I understand them after all that has happened, to such a degree that I am unable to speak emphatically against them. For a member of one of these unspeakably brutally-treated nations to be still capable of making a distinction between German devils and German men is a form of mental heroism. Heroism, mental or otherwise, cannot be demanded. One can only be moved, moved and grateful, if one meets it occasionally in broad-

mind Frenchmen, Norwegians, Czechs, or Greeks, or in a Polish socialist of the Jewish "Bund."

Very different feelings are aroused when it is Germans who rival one another in piling up anti-German cries of hate of a generalising character. They keep providing the most narrow chauvinists of the other side with fresh material, false or tendencious, to "confirm" the assertion that there just does not exist and never has existed another Germany, a better one which stands in a positive relation to the ideas of civilisation, and which is rightminded, co-operative, and humane. They contend that it is nothing but a fanciful legend to say that there is a widespread secret opposition to the Nazis in Germany itself, though decimated in the terror and scattered, and for the present necessarily powerless. They hold that there is no difference between the Nazis and the rest as far as nationalism, acquisitiveness, aggression, and cruelty to those of another race are concerned, and that Germany and Hitler's Germany are identical not only in the technical sense of the law of nations, but also psychologically and morally. When certain emigrant German bankers, writers, and "social pedagogues," rival one another in denunciatory assurances of this kind, the exiled representatives of Goethe's Germany and Liebknecht's Germany must wipe this dirt off their soiled clothes; to analyse it chemically is not worth while.

It is true that, as far back as we have records, the *mind* of Germany has never been in power. The type of German by whom the German nation is represented among the nations in the history of civilisation, and by whom it ought to have itself represented constitutionally at home, has never had his turn. I have just said that the nations are neither superior nor inferior to one another in individual merit, but are in a relationship of reciprocal superiority, and that the average German remains behind most other nations in his talent for politics. It is untrue that "the" German is coarser, more wolfish, more of a robber, more Hunnish, more aggressive, more imperialist, than others. The blood-thirsty, the cannibalistic, Caliban-like, pre-religious type is at present on top in Germany. A hundred and fifty years ago he was on top in another country, which nevertheless keeps and will keep its position as one of the leaders of culture. Heaven knows where he will be on top to-morrow. Historically viewed, these are accidents incidental to the business of being a nation! This kind of thing may happen to any people in the course of their history. As for imperialism and aggression, it should be permitted to point out that, when other European peoples conquered large tracts of the earth, and partly subjugated, partly almost exterminated, great races, not only primitive ones, but also those of a high culture although of another colour, the Germans, politically backward, were busy with quarrels among themselves, partly religious, partly inter-tribal. When finally grouped together as a nation (1871), they found the world substantially divided up. That should not be

forgotten, although it is no excuse for the Hottentot-like behaviour of the rulers of Germany during the last half century, and for their mad crime against European nations at a time when the idea of international law was beginning to be recognised, even in relations with coloured peoples. What the Conquistadors in Mexico and Peru, and their successors of other nationality in other parts of America, Asia, and elsewhere, did in past centuries, is no excuse either for William II's offence or for the infamies of the wolf-pack led by Herr Hitler. It is not even an extenuating circumstance, seeing that the moral conceptions of the progressive of our age are not those of past times, when even the more enlightened regarded things as allowable which are no longer so. It is time, too, that a line was drawn under imperialist developments in general, and an end made of the age-long continuance of wholesale murder. Indeed, to put a stop to the self-laceration of mankind, the nations who have come off badly in the partition of the earth ought to resign themselves to recognise the *status quo* as of right, and thus inspire the beneficiaries to make up the disadvantage to them in some way other than territorial. The Atlantic Charter contains theoretical hints of the method.

I am therefore far from attempting a tittle of justification of the international misdeeds of the despicable Hitler, which commenced with the aggression against Prague. I would not seek arguments to extenuate the behaviour of the National-Socialists, as we sometimes hear done by national "Socialists" of German speech. The programme of these national "Socialists" is repudiated in this book—but not the idea of international justice. For this reason certain outstanding facts of history should impose a certain reticence on certain people in certain connections, quite apart from modern trifles such as the Congo horror, the Armenian massacres, the casemates of Brest-Litovsk, or the French concentration camps (the Vichy ones were not the first, be it noted).

In every nation there are all the types. Passionate indignation and energetic repression should be directed against types, and not against nations. No nation is secure against the possible rise to power of the worst among them. After the conservative and moderate liberal circles in Germany had lost the war of 1914, black inertia, red discord, golden stupidity, or, to sum up, black-red-golden¹ pretentiousness and impotence had made a mess of the republic from its third day. Then this complete inadequacy engendered Nazism, as a carcass does maggots. Fear for property suckled it, but it was born of disillusion. There are always to be found some artful go-getters, to beget such a changeling with disillusion. The same sort of thing can happen, and has happened, to other nations. But, because the French Revolution in its last phases murdered in a wild, unjust, bestial, inhuman manner, with mob fanaticism, it would be idiotic to describe as a blood-thirsty gang the

¹ See note on p. 21.

people of Descartes and Montaigne, of Racine and Molière, of Voltaire and Rousseau, of Vauvenargues and Chamfort, of Claude Lorrain, Delacroix, Daumier and Rodin, Stendhal and Flaubert, Verlaine and Zola, Anatole France and André Gide. It is no better to say something analogous about "the" Germans.

The base and bloodthirsty crimes of German nationalism started at home, with an eye to foreign policy, it is true, but long before its outrages abroad, and long before Hitler. The beginning was the murder of Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg on the night of 15th/16th January 1919, though the culmination came a quarter of a century later with the revolting mass murders of Germans and non-Germans. To proclaim these deeds as "typically German" would be in no way more sensible and fairer than to assert that "the" Athenians executed Socrates (even among the Heliasts, who condemned him, there was a strong minority for acquittal) or that "the" Jews crucified Christ (all the disciples of Jesus were Jews). The rulers of a people at a particular time are not the people. Less paradoxical would be an agreement to apply the words "the people" to the imaginary community of the *Saints* of a nation, the secret union of its religious, scientific, artistic, militant *geniuses*, right through the centuries. Is it just the nitwits and foes of the Mind among the people who are to be "the people," just the cads and the hooligans, the dross and the rabble, the scum that has been brought to the top by a national misfortune? No. Professor Paul Tillich, the socialist theologian (formerly at German universities) wrote in 1942 in a New York newspaper:

"I have fought and will continue to fight against any general moral condemnation of a natural or historically formed group. Such a condemnation is contrary to the spirit of justice, as I have received it from the Old Testament prophets from my youth up. In this spirit, which is to me, as a Christian theologian, a fundamental element of the Christian gospel, I have fought against German anti-Semitism and am now fighting against American anti-Semitism. But in this spirit, too, I shall fight against the now growing anti-Germanism. . . . He who adopts the method of group defamation will himself fall a victim to it at the next turn of events."

This war has, for the first time for generations, an ideological character, although of course not exclusively so. In Great Britain there are Britons whose mentality is akin to that of the German Nazis; they found their way to jail, and their papers were forbidden. Germans in Britain go about freely in the middle of a war waged against Germany; they are free and are helping, in the consciousness of thus being good internationalists, good Europeans, and also good Germans, incomparably better in any case than the Nazis, and it is only by incorrigible dunderheads that they are despised and regarded as "traitors." It is just the same in America and in the Soviet Union. That was not the

case in the previous war. The leading circles of the United Nations thereby acknowledge the ideological side of this war; it is for us to emphasise it, not to efface it.

With ideas, however, it stands thus: It is true that, in certain historic epochs, one State can, as a State, side with the good cause, while another State, as a State, takes up the bad cause, but on the other hand the nations themselves, the population of each State, cannot as a whole be taken either for knights on the good side or for rascals who back the evil principle. Such a suggestion would be simply contrary to psychological experience, or, in short, to the facts. It would be the expression of a quite foolish mysticism, or even of a mendacious one. It would be Nazi-like. That mystic conception of a "collective," "super-individual," soul, with qualities of a "stronger" or "higher" reality than the individual soul shows, is psychological trash, and no more. The champions of an idea and their opponents are distributed over the whole world, and their bonds of association run in all directions through peoples and races. A mistaken sentiment sees "the" men of a particular nation as the chosen of God, a mistaken resentment sees "the" men of another as servants of the devil. The International of the Chosen (a world association of the Mind) must finally pull itself together and smash Satan's International for good and all . . .

If this is to succeed, an end must first of all be made of the "democratic" twaddle and of a system of constitutional law that gives the devil's own as much voice and as much power to influence the shaping of the fate of the people and of the nations as are allotted to the men of ideas, the champions of reason, the fighters for the Spirit.

These existed among the Germans; they still exist and will continue to exist. For generations they were powerless; to-day they are shamelessly repressed by a low-browed despotism, by a violent gang reeking of corpses and lies.

The victorious States ought to pledge themselves to release the powerless from their powerlessness and the repressed from their bondage; the enslaved Germans are the natural allies of the United Nations. Belief in them, a summons to them, a clear promise to them, would steel their courage, make them more active and rebellious, and so shorten the war and save strength and blood. To minimise their existence or even to argue them away is to enfeeble them completely. To treat them the same as their oppressors when making plans for the future of Germany is to drive them as close as possible to their oppressors in the last phase of this gigantic conflict.

But the knowledge of this (a knowledge fortunately shared by many statesmen and publicists in this country) does not alter the fact that, between State and State, the wrong must be righted. Horace's line still holds good: *Quidquid delirant reges plectuntur Achivi*; whatever madness possesses their chiefs, is the Achaeans who suffer for it. Whether

the leaders are so born and crowned or uncrowned and self-appointed, it makes no difference. *There comes a reckoning if a nation allows itself to be led by a rabble.* This is a law of the world, and a just one. There must be responsibility towards those who have been injured, just as surely as treaties must be kept. Among those who chose this leadership, who raised to power this scum, these dregs, this low malice, this muck, this gargoyle, there may have been millions of disappointed folk who had no Nazi intentions but wanted to protest against inaction, and, despairing of the old party cows that no longer gave any milk, wanted to try a new one. Behold, it gave, but not milk, only poison. But they have no right to complain of the results of their stupidity; if they did not wish for them, they nevertheless made them possible.

The just folk would have the right to complain. There were more of them in Germany than in Gomorrha. (Not to speak of the present, seeing that events have awakened reason and the will to justice in many.)

A policy of exemplary punishment of all the guilty, a policy of reparations, a policy of the most drastic insurances against Germany is not only the moral right of the Allies, but the wish of all, including all Germans, who think objectively and can see more than an inch in front of their noses. But a policy of raging revenge would not even see an inch in front of its nose; it would be blind, and would only be a preparation for the next world-wide blood bath . . . instead of closing the era of wars. I know a mother whose son, a true gentleman and a poor man's lawyer, was slowly murdered at Hitler's behest through five years and in seven jails. This old lady, who had had a thoroughly Christian upbringing, said to me: "'Revenge?' I am *for* revenge!" So am I. And what is right for individuals is good enough for nations. But I am against revenge on the innocent. The quaker, who commonly disavows revenge, and even punishment, may do good but cannot practise statecraft, either internal or foreign; anyone who preaches or indulges in revenge on the innocent does not in fact practise statecraft. That he would be a contemptible hypocrite if he professed to be a Christian may be beside the question; the main point is that he is not a statesman.

That a German can say this in England before the end of the second world-war shows the high standard of political culture in Great Britain, the genuineness of British freedom, the profound moral right of this State to wage war not only for the existence of its Empire but also for the idea which it has inscribed on its standard. *Freedom and Fairness*; in no other language do these two conceptions sound so well together.

XII

Humanists and thinking men of German nationality can, therefore, have no doubt of the necessity for the complete disarmament of

Germany, without any reservation, for many decades and under rigorous supervision. (This, incidentally, must include effective international guarantees for Germans assisting in this supervision; after 1918, not protected by the *Entente*, they were sent to jail as "traitors"!) The same applies to Germany's duty to make reparation, which it will indeed be difficult but certainly not impossible to fit in with the conquered nation's vital economic needs. On the other hand, however, all the humanists and thinkers in the camp of the victorious nations ought to be convinced that in Germany the "other" Germany, the civilised, European-minded, peaceful, freedom-loving, and socialist Germany, in fact, the ethical Germany, the spiritual Germany, must finally be helped into power.

However much this power is bound to be negligible in a military sense (for there can be no adequate reason for a German army, even the smallest), and however much limitation will naturally be for a long time imposed in foreign politics, the extent of the power which this new Germany will possess in internal affairs should be considerable. There is one thing that is accurate in the arguments of the sceptical about Germany, of the slanderers and the venomous; it is that the better, civilised, international-law-abiding, humane Germany, the Germany of Goethe, the Germany of the Mind, freedom-loving and progressive Germany, has never been in power, either in the nineteenth or in the twentieth century, except in small enclaves. Even in the short intermezzo after 1918 its power was only weak and episodic. That must be altered for the future by a revolutionary fact in relation to public law. This new act can only be a *Constitution* of a type that has not hitherto existed; a Constitution which contains the human maximum of guarantees that representatives of the truly spiritual Germany, incarnating the best values of the nation, shall be put into power, and shall, moreover, be maintained in power. Maintained, instead of being displaced by representatives of an inferior Germany which may perhaps some day have become majoritary again.

That is the problem of problems.

The solution can only be found in practice; but theory is entitled to propose the way which may lead to practice. Without theoretical proposals there would be no practical progress through the ages. A whole bundle of proposals which have been made are nothing but waste-paper. These are proposals to replace the universal suffrage by one conferred as a privilege on certain classes, to replace the equal vote by an unequal graduated one, a plural vote. That is all rubbish. It was proposed to favour the rich above the poor, the seniors above the juniors, the married above the bachelors, the educated above those whose schooling has been indifferent.

The favouring of the rich in the suffrage is so openly and stupidly reactionary that argument against it would be tiresome.

The favouring of the elders, the raising of the minimum age for voting (a maximum, on account of calcification, has not yet been proposed!) is usually justified by the reformers because in the time of Weimar the twenties often went "extreme," and voted communist or Nazi. Certainly, they did. They did it because those parties had go, temperament, dash, energy, that is to say, youth, and attached importance to being run by the young. They wanted and were able to attract the young. The "democratic" parties also wanted to, but could not. They were without exception conservative, not in the sense of the Prussian Junkers, but in thought and pace, disposition, habits, and methods. "Youth is drunkenness without wine," says Goethe. The German "democratic" parties were, *with* alcohol, out-and-out-spiritless, extremely unyouthful and infected with philistinism to their marrows. The only kind of youth that they could do anything with was one that itself had a touch of the philistine, and which was sober, unsparking, elderly, and second-rate, a youth that neither thought nor willed, that had no interests or strength to spare, apart from their daily life and occupation and their animal necessities, except for folk-dances, old songs, and playing the lute. These young people distinguished themselves by the vagueness of their political feeling; they were without any ideas of their own, uncritical, unrebelling, and obedient. Certainly the same is true of a considerable part of those who were drawn to the "extreme" parties, especially the Nazi youth; but while they joined these parties, or gave them their votes, they were conscious of supporting an idea, of supporting rebels and fighters, pitilessly critical of the *status quo*. The What of the idea, the Why of the criticism, the Wherefore of the fight, the Whither of the rebellion, are questions which, with vigorous individuals between twenty and twenty-five, play a smaller part than the That. I do not say "no part"; I say "a smaller." Had there been in Weimar Germany a party of freedom-socialism, fired with ideas, destructive-constructive in temper, energetic, dashing, in short, a youthful party, at least as many young people would have poured into it as joined the communists and the Nazis. There was no such party; and the parties of the clerical, liberal, and social democrats repelled and expelled even the more youthful-minded of the older generation. Catholic champions of peace and socialism like Ernst Thrasolt and Vitus Heller found no field of activity in the Centre Party; minds like Ludwig Quidde, Theodor Wolff, Harry Count Kessler, Carl von Ossietzky found none in the Democratic Party—business magnates and sanctimonious municipal bureaucrats set the time there, while a Hellmut von Gerlach was excluded. The same happened, in the Social Democratic Party, to Leonard Nelson, their most outstanding intelligence since Bebel and Eduard Bernstein, possibly since Marx; and other men of intelligence and character (such as the educational reformer Paul Oestreich) were frozen out. To repeat: whatever meant ideas and

enthusiasm, mind, force, youth, youth of any age, was repelled or expelled by these parties. So a party should be made (in so far as there must be parties) which is modern and attractive to the young of all ages, and political life must not be deprived of youth by taking from young spirited people between twenty and twenty-four, twenty-five, or even thirty years of age, what is granted without consideration to hundreds of thousands of dunderheads of ripe age.

The favouring of the married or of those with large families rests on the quite correct psychological fact that, the more domesticated a man is, so much the more does he live apart from politics, and therefore the more comfortably for the rulers. The community which—half-consciously—he seeks to serve in the first place is neither the State nor mankind, but his family. Among the burning idealists, the fanatical social prophets, the revolutionary innovators (for good and for bad), it is certain that the number of the married and of those with large families is smaller in proportion to those with small or no families than among the politically cautious, the opportunist half-reformers, the conservatives, and the non-political. A plural vote in favour of the domesticated would tend to the decay of politics and to conservatism, or at least would promote procrastination. It would help to strengthen the three institutions of Capitalism, Clericalism, and War.

The favouring of university men is, to me, the most provocative of all these proposals. If it is taken seriously, it can only be looked upon as a sign of a shockingly uncultured confusion between quantity and quality, between knowledge of a particular subject and mental standing. To desire a legislative preference for the competent (as we desire it) does not mean privilege for those who have learnt their trade at a university. One is not necessarily competent in politics because one has studied some special subject and gained an academic degree. That is no guarantee of competence in one's own subject, let alone in general knowledge. That the proportion of idiots among German university men was high, enormously high, is known to every non-idiot who has studied at German universities and taken a peep into the club-life of our undergraduates (and graduates!), including the so-called scientific clubs. He knows, too, what was the matter with the professorial staff, apart from the notable exceptions. What blinkered hacks, how paltry, how ethically inferior, how parochial and inhuman most of them were—perhaps not in the exact sciences and medicine, but all the more in the inexact ones. The great majority of our university teachers of philosophy, literature, political science, international law, constitutional law, criminal law . . . I should not like to entrust the legislation for the future Germany to such as these. I am not referring to the leaders of the band in the Hitler days, but to the average typical specimen in previous decades. Moreover, nothing demonstrates the low level of these university teachers so much (I am keeping to the "cultural" faculties)

as the fact that almost all of them pursued their occupation under Hitler as though nothing had happened. I do not know whether it is necessary to be a pupil of the great liberal criminalist, Franz von Liszt, to feel as sick as another of Liszt's pupils makes me, at any rate, feel. I refer to Herr Professor Kohlrausch, who was not ashamed to go on lecturing on criminal law at the University of Berlin under the swastika, and who even acted as principal; in fact, to crown all, he helped the Nazi bosses to patch up their new criminal code. This swine among swine is but an example. They all had the pretence: "If we resign now, we shall let in someone worse; we are staying in order to prevent the worst." In reality, they made the worst possible, through the boundlessness of their cowardly connivance. Under the glorious leadership of Herr Gerhart Hauptmann, the German intellectuals (all honour to the exceptions) showed with unsurpassable clearness that to be an "intellectual" does not mean to be a man of mind, and that it is possible to be in the scholar's line of business, in the poetical line, or in one or another of those lines which boast of using the brain for their work in a higher degree than other mere branches of the professions, and yet to fail more completely than many a handicraftsman in the obligations imposed by the reason. Yes, a farmhand, an artisan, a clerk, a workman, may be a man of mind; a university man is not bound to be one, and experience suggests that it is only in a minority of cases that he is one.

We may be quite unprepared silently to accept the resentment of the hide-bound, which expresses itself in the habit of deriving from the simple fact of a person's intellectuality an objection to his suitability as a politician (the "low man's" fear of the Mind!). Yet it remains to be clearly said that the "intellectual" calling which anyone practises does not even provide a warranty for his intelligence, let alone endow him with special capacity as legislator or statesman or as a selector of legislators. In ninety-five per cent of the cases the "intellectual" professions are just business, like hosiery, or they are higher handicrafts, as honourable as the "lower" ones and in no way more endowed with Mind. Of the remaining five per cent who pursue knowledge for its own sake a further good number must be deducted for that type of narrow specialist which is diametrically opposite to the thinking type. If the philosopher's process of reasoning may easily have the appearance of skipping to the eye of the scholar, the scholar's process of reasoning may seem like crawling to the philosopher. "Academic method" means exactness and completeness, and therefore care and slowness . . . constant dallying in byways to byways. This is just what is *stupefying* in the pursuit of knowledge: its practitioners get stuck in the secondary—in the decimal, in fact—find themselves at home in blind alleys, become unfamiliar with the world, and annoyed with folk who are in a hurry because they have a long way to go. Such scholars are happy in their

blind alleys, and lose all sense of direction, as well as all knowledge of the main thoroughfare of their problem, of the relative unimportance of their problem, and of the sense of what they are doing. With their quite exemplary exactitude, conscientiousness and precision, they really become slowly more *stupid* than they were at the beginning.

The adepts of the exact sciences seem to be comparatively immune against this danger; most frequently, most painfully, often most comically do historians, philologists, economists, statisticians, and "theorists of cognition" succumb to it. Among the learned in these faculties the proportion of idiots is certainly higher than among ordinary men. The very small percentage of "intellectuals" who can be so described without inverted commas, and who are men of Mind in their being, their temperament and type, their behaviour and significance, is nothing like sufficient to justify the conferring of political privileges on the constitutionally quite uninteresting sociological group of university men, or, in other words, to give special civic rights to occupations for which there is a qualification by examination. Examinations prove little as regards knowledge, and nothing concerning culture and statecraft.

"Knowledge is a treasure." No doubt, but knowledge is not sufficient, in fact, it is politically valueless without intellectual strength and character—qualities possessed by many who are lacking in academic learning. It is true that, for legislation, intellectual strength and character are not enough, but a man possessing intellectual strength and character can acquire without too much trouble the knowledge that he lacks, while it is impossible for the best informed person, even for the walking dictionary, to get hold of the intellectual strength and character which are not in him.

The ideal legislator and statesman will be he who is distinguished by the co-existence of these three qualities: intellectual strength, character, and knowledge. Of course, persons thus distinguished are rare. But they do exist. The best constitution will be one which contains means of bringing together this type, and which gives to them, as a body, the function which is appropriate to them from the point of view of the national good and the good of mankind—that is from the point of view of enlightenment.

XIII

What is wanted, therefore, is not a "pluralist" "reform" of the universal equal suffrage, by removing its universality or its equality, but we have to consider whether general *election* is really the right way to obtain the best legislators. Is there no other way? Once more: this is the problem of problems. We can solve it absolutely as democrats. Democracy, sensibly understood, and aristocracy, sensibly understood,

are the same thing. Democracy, as we saw, does not necessarily involve the negation of quality, not necessarily equalitarianism, a right of co-decision for all the unfit, lobbying, majority tyranny, dictatorship of mediocrity, an eternal conspiracy of the many-too-many against the morally and mentally superior few, the despotism of the philistine, and, in specially atrocious cases, of the swaggering liar and the wolfish sub-human type. No; democracy also means liberality, free discussion, the rights of man, an equal opportunity for all, the equality of all before the law, mutual kindness and fairness between man and man, between State and individual, between State and State; the State never an end in itself, but always an instrument in the service of men; free air, in which we can all breathe, work, and enjoy life—the most primitive of us, and the most complex.

This democracy of discussion, of light, of right, of the fullest personal freedom, only limited by the similar interest of our fellow-man, this democracy of *humanity* is an indestructible ideal of all real Hellenists, of all real Christians, of all real socialists. Its realisation in the future Germany would not be guaranteed, but made more difficult, by the re-introduction of the old parliamentarism, with universal suffrage for the legislative body. Weimar has shown what a handicap *equalitarian* democracy means to *humanitarian*. It was precisely out of the equalitarian democracy, which was not tempered with any authority composed of the *élite*, that this Hitler grew. In the same way Napoleon grew out of the French democracy of the Jacobins, though, for that matter, he was an angel of light compared to Hitler. After more than a decade of Hitlerism, the re-introduction of the old constitution would multiply the handicap for humanity. It cannot be repeated too often: if, when the nightmare is over, the new German republic returns to the old forms of democracy, the educational and mental condition of a considerable portion of the Germans, particularly the young, provides no guarantee that history will not repeat itself, and that, after a longer or shorter interval, a national-socialist party, under some new name or other, will not again attract to itself the most backward portion of the masses, and open for itself the door to power with the picklock of equalitarian democracy, in order to destroy humanitarian democracy in the bud.

Humanitarian democracy would be guaranteed by a regime of the enlightened. If the traditional democrat, remembering Lincoln, objects that democracy implies government of the people, by the people, for the people, we do not contradict him, but merely beg for a little more sagacity. FOR the people—that is simply obvious to the humanist and socialist. BY the people or OF the people (at bottom the same!)—here too we assent with decision. The question we formulate is not: government by the *people* or by some other authority, *another*, it may be a class, a caste, a ruling family, a dictator. But it is: *How and by whom,*

by specimens of what human type, is the people best represented? It is only in dwarf States that the people can govern themselves, and even there this is, under capitalism, a mere illusion. But, even under socialism, the "people" literally, "the people" in the sense of a so-called direct democracy, would hardly be in a position to make laws and to govern themselves if the population were only 7,000; with a population of 70,000,000 it becomes flatly impossible! In States of any size there can be no democracy without the *representative principle*. Of course, that is recognised by every democrat, even of the oldest style, and when he says "democracy" he does not mean the "direct" type of small primitive cantons, but the so-called "representative" democracy known to the constitutional law of all schools.

We too. The difference is that the other side believes that a people's vote in which the voter has a choice between persons or lists which have been decided upon by certain committees of certain more or less monopolist associations (called "parties") produces a body by which the Nation is represented. So far, so good. We, far from seeing in this method the self-evident road to the representation of the people, are, on the contrary, of the opinion that a people is theoretically represented by its best and that it is also in practice best represented by them. To discover these best, however, the highest values in intellect and character, the men most fitted for legislation and government, is as little a matter for masses, multitudes, and majorities, as it is for masses, multitudes, and majorities to judge what inventors, scholars, thinkers, poets, and artists are the most valuable and the most important.

The rule of the best and the rule of the people do not exclude each other; no, the rule of the best is the true rule of the people. The rule of the best, if it came to pass, would prove infinitely more friendly to the people, infinitely more useful to the people, than majority rule with its affinity to every kind of mediocrity and its occasional barbarising effect.

"'For men are not equal,' thus speaks justice" (Nietzsche, Zarathustra II, "Of the learned") is a fundamental statement of enduring validity. It does not mean, forsooth, the quite unimportant fact that men, like the leaves of different sorts of trees, or even like the leaves of one and the same tree, differ in externals (in size, colour, form, physique); it means the thing that matters, that they differ in *worth*. This is a matter of course to unprejudiced persons, and to the quite simple but uneducated who have not been misled. But it is a truth which is ignored by the modern "democratic" constitutional law. Human beings are not of equal worth. To allot to men of unequal worth equal powers of determination in the State is opposed to natural feeling, to a serious consideration of justice, and, for Germany of to-morrow, to realistic judgment. From unequal worth one thing alone follows reasonably: unequal rights. If we know that, instead of a

privileged family, caste, or class of the people, the people themselves are to rule over themselves (a postulate of justice, indeed), yet we are still far from knowing through what organ they are to rule: far from knowing who shall claim to incorporate and represent them. There is a view that everybody should be called upon to do it, that every single citizen represents the people exactly as well as any other, and consequently that when differences of opinion arise the will of the majority decides, that this will must be taken to be the "will of the people." Such a view, popular though it may be, is nothing better than a dogma in no way proved, a dogma for which there is no argument, a dogma which is deduced solely from the axiom of the equal worth of all individuals, and this axiom is false.

Is it always necessary to defend oneself against a bovine misunderstanding? As though we wanted to confer privileges on that generally uninteresting company which wrongly calls itself "aristocracy," and which, at any rate in Germany, has formed the backbone of all reaction for generations, those inheritors of great estates, those cynical money-grubbers, those arrogant supports of dullness and immobility! Not those, but the real best, the true "aristoi" of every people, who grow out of all the strata and classes of a nation in an unbroken process of selection and outgrow their origins, individuals of redemptive and constructive will and the most expert knowledge. This is a type that can never petrify into a caste and become degenerate, because their ranks are continually replenished from all points of society, and this *real* aristocracy of a people is, we believe, its true representation.

However heretical and revolutionary this belief may seem, it is of ancient origin. When I say "we," I refer, of course, to what is at present only a small circle, but has the support of great minds of the past. I will conjure up some of these; that will be worth while.

I will first call upon the greatest of the Chinese, upon one of the greatest Greeks, upon one of the greatest Frenchmen, upon one of the most enlightened of English women, and then upon nine Germans, amongst them the two greatest.

CONFUCIUS said:

"By raising the straight so that they press upon the crooked, the crooked can be made straight."

In PLATO's *Statesman*,¹ we find:

"Since a multitude, however it may be composed, never and nowhere produces the intellectual power which is needed for the wise conduct of a community . . ."

In PLATO's *Republic* ("Politeia")² is the following:

¹ In that same book which introduces the conception of the βασιλικὸς ἀνὴρ, the "kingly man" = "the man of mind" in our language.

² The version adopted is that of Davies and Vaughan (Macmillan and Co., 1852).—*Translator*.

“ Unless it happen either that philosophers acquire the kingly power in States, or that those who are now called kings and potentates be imbued with a sufficient measure of genuine philosophy, that is to say, unless political power and philosophy be united in the same person, most of those minds which at present pursue one to the exclusion of the other being peremptorily debarred from either, there will be no deliverance, my dear Glaucon, for cities, nor yet, I believe, for the human race; neither can the commonwealth, which we have now sketched in theory, ever till then grow into a possibility, and see the light of day. But a consciousness how entirely this would contradict the common opinion made me all along so reluctant to give expression to it; for it is difficult to see that there can be no other way by which happiness can be attained, by the State or by the individual.”

(Psychologists may dispute why Plato here, as usual, puts his thoughts into the mouth of Socrates, whether from gratitude or modesty or to evade responsibility, since the historian and reporter of a forbidden philosophy may be tolerated more than one who enunciates the forbidden philosophy on his own account. Undoubtedly the idea of the kingship of men of mind, the leading idea of the “*Politeia*” and of all such *Politeias*, is of *Socratic* origin. And it is not surprising that he who first uttered it publicly, to the eager minds of the youths in the *palaestra*, had to drink the cup of poison.)

In ANATOLE FRANCE we read:

“ In the name of the sovereign people the ruling party of the moment makes the most tyrannical laws. For there is no Magna Carta which is able to guarantee freedom against attacks from the sovereignty of the people. Democratic despotism theoretically knows no limits. In fact, and as regards the present only, I admit that it is mediocre.”

ANNIE BESANT said (in lectures which this important socialist who turned to theosophy—this does not affect the point—delivered in 1904 at Benares):¹

“ Socialism in its main idea is true, but not the democratic socialism which gives equal power to ignorance and wisdom, equal power to vice and virtue, equal power to industry and indolence, equal power to sage and criminal. Democratic socialism is impossible; it is against the order of nature; but a socialism that may be called hierarchical is the ideal of the future . . . Very weariness of the incompetency of Parliament is driving people to see that the suffrage which puts the guidance of the State into the hands of people who know nothing about it is wrong . . . The business of the nation is the one business in the world which men are allowed to carry on while they do not know anything about it. You will not allow it in your own office . . . But when it comes to voting, then the most ignorant man, who is

¹ “ Theosophy and Human Life ” (Theosophical Society in England).

absolutely innocent of any knowledge of politics, may give his vote, and it counts as much as the vote of the most learned . . . I know that this counsel of perfection will not be popular until democracy has ruined many a nation and many a people, until at last nations will throw themselves at the feet of some military dictator and learn wisdom by suffering. Then, and then only, will they begin to consider reason."

What a prophecy of forty years ago! (After all that has been said in the course of this essay, there is no need to draw attention to the fact that Annie Besant here uses "democracy" in the sense of its equalitarian, anti-qualitative conception, and that she not only does not reject, but eloquently supports, the ethic of the humanitarian freedom-democracy.)¹

GEORG CHRISTOPH LICHTENBERG wrote:

"The commonest opinions and what everyone takes for granted are usually the most deserving of examination." "The weal of certain countries is decided by a majority of votes, although everyone grants that there are more bad men than good." (It might be asked why Lichtenberg did not mention here that there are also more muddle-headed men than clear-headed ones. This fact is a commonplace to him, Goodness knows. He apparently omits it here because it is not the case that "everyone grants" it.)

GOETHE has this:

"All that is great and sensible exists in the minority. It is never to be expected that reason will become popular. Passions and feelings may become popular, but not reason. It will always be a possession of a few outstanding individuals."

¹ During the production of this book appeared Bernard Shaw's capital *Everybody's Political What's What*. When Shaw here "professes" himself "a democrat," "though Democracy is staked on the monstrous assumption that Mr. Everyman and Mrs. Everywoman, being Omniscient, must be made Omnipotent" (pp. 362, 364), he is evidently launching two completely different conceptions of Democracy: a wise and a ridiculous one. Shaw reaches the conclusion that it will be necessary "to demand the disfranchisement and disqualification of political nincompoops from every political activity." (From nearly "every.") This standpoint shows so close an affinity with the idea which the writer of this essay has ventured to propagate since April 1918, that the reader will realise how happy he is to be in agreement with this great man, whom he for long has considered as the wisest European author of our time, alongside Sigmund Freud and Andre Gide, and, of course, the most brilliant.

Also an Italian, I am glad to state—G. A. Borgese, an outstanding thinker and writer—asserts that same principle in his most recent book *Common Cause*. The author visualises a Community of Nations where "the higher talents in science, in philosophy, and in poetry will build the aristocracy in world government, with councils of elites intermediate between the power and the people." (p. 248.)

Perhaps I may be allowed to quote another sentence of Borgese's from the same book: "If we think of the German race as condemnable in itself, we are borrowing racial standards from German Fascism and behaving toward the German as he does toward the Jew." (p. 116.)

In SCHILLER we read:

“ . . . The majority?
Majority, what's that? It makes no sense.
It's aye the few that have intelligence . . .
That State must perish either soon or late
Where numbers rule and folly guides their fate.”

FICHTE said:

“ More trust can always be placed in a committee of the wisest than in a majority which has come about God knows how . . . For so long as more men are bad than good it can always be reckoned with certainty that it will not be the proposal of the wise and good but that of the unwise that will win over the majority.”

The following is from BÖRNE:

“ It is not at all the question whether there should or should not be an aristocracy; Nature herself has answered that in the affirmative. The question is whether the aristocracy shall be an immovable or a movable one.” (To-day we should say: “ caste-like or constantly renewed from all classes.”)

SCHOPENHAUER has:

“ A radical improvement in human society and thereby in the human lot generally could not permanently come about except by the regulation of the positive and conventional ranks in accordance with nature.”

This is LEONARD NELSON's opinion:

“ He who recognises the sovereignty of majority decisions abandons the sovereignty of the reason.”

ERNST TOLLER puts it thus:

“ It is true that socialism will realise equality on one plane: everyone will have an equal right to food, shelter, and education. But on other planes it is just socialism that will produce a graded order of precedence. Those who are capable of managing political, social, and cultural domains will form an aristocracy, not of birth, but of mind, of performance, of merit. Charged with higher duties, not provided with material privileges.”

And here we have NIETZSCHE:

“ It is easy, ridiculously easy, to set up a model for the choice of a legislative body. First of all the honest and reliable men of the nation, who at the same time are masters and experts in some one branch, have to become prominent by mutual scenting out and recognition. From these, by a narrower process of selection, the learned and expert of the first rank in each individual branch must again be chosen, also by mutual recognition and guarantee. If the legislative body be composed of these, it will finally be necessary, in each individual case, that only the voices and judgments of the most specialised experts should decide; the honesty of all the rest should have become

so great that it is simply a matter of decency to leave the voting also in the hands of these men. The result would be that the law, in the strictest sense, would emanate from the intelligence of the most intelligent. As things now are, voting is done by parties, and at every division there must be hundreds of uneasy consciences among the ill-taught, the incapable of judgment, among those who merely repeat, imitate, and go with the tide. Nothing lowers the dignity of a new law so much as this inherent shamefaced feeling of insincerity that necessarily results at every party division. But, as has been said, it is easy, ridiculously easy, to set up such a model; no power on earth is at present strong enough to realise such an ideal—unless the belief in the highest utility of knowledge, and of those that know, at last dawns even upon the most hostile minds and is preferred to the prevalent belief in majorities.”¹

This gem of prose is to be found, under the title “Of the mastery of them that know,” in the second volume of the book *Human, All-Too-Human*, aphorism 318, and must have been written between the years 1876 and 1878. The work in which the passage occurs first appeared in March 1879, that is, during a period of social and political consolidation in Germany and Europe; the Congress of Berlin under the chairmanship of Bismarck had just taken place.

It is, perhaps, only in revolutionary epochs that plans of such a radically decisive character as that which Nietzsche here describes as “ridiculously easy” can be carried out. He felt that; he felt the enormous discrepancy between idea and possibility of realisation. In this, as in everything else, the Titan rushed a long way ahead of his age.²

Thirty-nine years after the publication of this splendid passage its idea could, for the first time, have been brought near to realisation; in 1918, a company too small in number, whose words gained insufficient attention, and who found the opposing plebs of all classes persistently deaf, failed to carry the day in the confusion of “revolutionary” mediocrity. If the present war results as we desire and as the strength of the United Nations practically guarantees, a situation will soon arise in Germany which will give such plans a better opportunity than they had a quarter of a century ago, a situation which will be more favourable to such plans if only because the nation has meanwhile had a most horrible experience of non-qualitative, equalitarian, mass-majority democracy, and it is precisely the intelligent minorities of all grades of society (e.g., among the working classes) who will understand what majority implies. Moreover, it is as good as certain that there will be

¹ This version is from the translation of Nietzsche's works edited by Dr. Oscar Levy (T. N. Foulis, 1911).

² That Nietzsche here meant by “them that know” not experts but “kingly men” (in Plato's phrase), that is, men of mind, is clear to all who know the thinker who wrote, for instance, later: “We are something other than learned men, although it cannot be denied that we are learned, among other things” (*The Joyful Wisdom*, 1882-6), and “It is possible to be even a great scholar without a mind” (*The Twilight of the Idols*, 1888).

a military occupation of the country, and not as happened previously; it is difficult to imagine that the victorious powers would have any confidence in the majority of Germans in view of recent German history. Lord Vansittart is a personality in whom a German socialist can recognise and respect one of the best brains of England, even if the point of view of an Aneurin Bevan makes more appeal to that socialist. In a well-known preface, Lord Vansittart estimates at a maximum of twenty-five per cent the number of *good* Germans according to the ideas of right and humanity, which seems to me to be a very favourable estimate. Not that, in my opinion, the rest are *bad*; the bad, wolfish, and aggressive are probably much below twenty-five per cent, but a block of certainly over fifty per cent is unpolitical, personally selfish, parochial, stupid, opportunist, imitative, a willing object of all demagogic spouting and propaganda. For that matter you will find the same in every nation, except that it is even worse in Germany owing to the people's political inferiority. So it comes to this: whoever thinks seventy-five per cent of the Germans useless in the light of the ideal, whose realisation lies in the future, must logically reject the dogma that the choice of legislators and leaders is bound to be left to the majority of one hundred per cent, and therewith the decision over the fate of their own nation, the co-decision over Europe's, over humanity's, fate.

What Nietzsche at the end of the seventies rightly held to be Utopian, and mere literature, will be realisable in principle after this war, if among the better brains there is a spread of good will and, above all, of good insight.

XIV

Most men think without imagination, not only without ethical but without psychological imagination, and they simply project historical experiences into the future. Thus they picture the coming upheaval in Germany on the lines of what the revolution of 1918 provided. In nearly all respects, however, conditions were extremely different. No twelve years of a rule of lies and terror; the opposition parties quite intact; very little limit on the freedom of public discussion; no bombed cities; no military occupation. In the foreground of the consciousness of to-morrow's Germans will be this bunch of problems: Where to sleep and live? How to feed ourselves and our children? Where to get clothes? The first of these has the special character of being quite unexampled, and is bound up with another, also quite new: How to come to an understanding with unwanted billeted people and get rid of them as soon as possible, since we must temporarily share with them, for good or for evil, the bit of sleeping-room and the wretched dwellings that we have got hold of? This kind of thing, in contrast to 1918, will be dominant in private consciousness and in public debate, and will be much more pressing and assume a much greater importance than ideals

and the struggle about political principles. It will be clear to a few only that there is a definite need for ideals and political principles if even these grossly realistic problems are to find a tolerable solution. Still fewer will understand that the questions which are less vital, in the sense of being less immediate, questions whose solution is acknowledged to require an ideological foundation, cannot be simply pushed off into the indefinite and left to themselves. "To themselves" only means: to reaction or stupidity or to the most energetic scoundrels. In such an all-embracing crisis which would even affect the entire activity of everyday life the greatest chance of success lies with that unpleasant type of mentality which Dimitroff at the 7th world-congress of the Comintern (1935) called "dull practicism."

In any case a dynamic procedure similar to that of the revolution of 1918 is as good as impossible in Germany after the collapse. In no way impossible, in one sense certain, and in another desirable, is an objective revolution, which would take place partly by the operation of other forces, with other solutions, and in entirely different forms from those of 1918. It is idle to prophesy about this. It is our duty to recognise probable dangers, to issue a warning about them, and to point out how the nation can perhaps avoid them.

From the first hour of the upheaval and onward, the greatest danger for the productivity of that which the best hearts and heads will desire and regard as a revolution will be that it may degenerate into the wildest anarchy, into an atomisation of the released forces striving for renovation, into a sanguinary chaos, which would make thoughtful people regard interference from without as desirable, in fact, as a matter of fervent hope, if the victorious Powers had not already long decided to interfere. Such action on their part was unnecessary in 1918 and would have had an injurious effect, but this time the internal conditions which may be expected in Germany simply call for it. A well-organised authority which might reconstruct on a tolerably central basis is entirely lacking this time; its remains or fresh beginnings were systematically destroyed by the Hitler-Himmler tyranny years ago. Any illusion on the subject would be childish or insincere; the opposition in Germany is of immense and daily growing extent, but formless, extremely disconnected, a giant mass of diminutive conventicles incapable of common action. If to-morrow this mass emerges into daylight it can be nothing but a dust-storm of millions of unorganised atoms. That magnetic centres will form in this whirlwind is certain, but it is quite uncertain that the best qualified will prove the most attractive—the contrary is more probable. If things are left to be fought out between a hundred preachers of sense, all preaching differently, five hundred preachers of some half-sense, and ten thousand ambitious shouters of nonsense, including cunning and rascally demagogues, it is clear that it will not be the league of the sensible that will win.

That applies always and everywhere, but in Germany to-morrow doubly so.

We are *logocrats*, that is, adherents of the rule of Reason, and therefore do not wish to make either number or chance the ruler of the fate of our nation. As Reason is no deity, only acting from and through mankind—fallible mankind—its rule and sovereignty can, even in the most favourable case, be but a limited and approximate one. The *logocratic* idea is absolute, but reality can come only relatively near to it. Even a very relative approximation to the ideal is better than a complete contradiction of it. (This is for those who bleat "Utopia!")

How far Reason will be incarnated in the victors and occupying Powers of to-morrow (in themselves a heterogeneous group) may perhaps be guessed by the international of freedom-socialism, but cannot be definitely known; what can be known is that the occupying Powers will hardly be able to do without the co-operation of Germans in Germany. The desire of a freedom-loving German, who does not just put up with the occupation as something unavoidable but as a hater of chaos welcomes it, will at all events be that the victor will draw a *fair line of demarcation* between his rights and those of the German government of to-morrow. If it is drawn, the ethical and psychological conditions will be present for that *collaboration* without which it seems to us—and perhaps not only to us—that the German and European future will be rather clouded. The victor will be aware that this fruitful collaboration, with its promotion of peace and a new golden age for mankind, is unthinkable with creatures and quislings, and can come about only with intrinsically independent, clean, and strong personalities. With such people, however, a victor can collaborate only if he does not demand the impossible. There are demands which a German socialist, internationalist, and opponent of war can recommend to his nation as being just, even if they must be a heavy burden, but there are others which he could never advocate (for example, the dismemberment of the German State). The tact of great statesmen and their sense of historic responsibility even in the flush of victory is a thing in which one can make up one's mind to retain confidence, in spite of some uneasiness which may occasionally assert itself.

XV

It has been pointed out that the forms and the slogans of the change in Germany must be very different from those of 1918. That does not mean that the change will not take place, and that an immense movement with a will to revolution against Nazism (including retaliation) and aiming at the reconstruction of the State on new principles will not flame up. Now "revolution," like "democracy" and "aristocracy," is a word that covers various conceptions; in a certain sense we shall of course have a revolution. The occupation of the country by no means

excludes a revolution; whether the occupying Powers will in fact try to smother the revolution or, preferably, to guide it into the path of reason, no one can foretell. We desire the latter. There are the dangers of anarchy, of a despotism with a new catchword which may grow out of it, of a sham-democratic return, not to "totalitarian" but to reactionary dull-wittedness, under Cardinals, generals, trade-union Bumbles, privy councillors, and industrialists. A sound protection against these dangers would be a well-prepared collaboration of the victor Powers with the acting and acknowledged leaders of the anti-Nazi movements, and it might well be thought that the *legislative assembly* of the young republic would come into being in the following manner instead of by a general election.

The serious revolutionary parties, leagues, and groups, being to-day already capable of acting through their exponents in exile, though merely of actions of a provisional character, will be finally able to act as soon as a bridge has been built between the leading forces of anti-Nazism in Germany, emerging from underground, and the leading forces in exile (better a forceful leadership of the exiles; but that does not yet exist). These serious revolutionary groups will nominate, through their executive committees, a definite number of legislators. These must be German personages who appear, as seen by the new attitude and in view of the new tasks, to be genuine, really destined, leaders of the mind of the nation, in character as well as in brain, and who will know how to bring the new spirit, the spirit of humanitarian democracy, into the required legislative form for the weal of the people and of humanity. This will imply expert knowledge on their part in the various spheres of legislation. They will therefore be distinguished, staunch and politically reliable, jurists and economists, teachers and psychologists, physicians and technicians, artists and publicists, sociologists and professional politicians. Experienced administrators are not included in the category, because during the last twelve years (not to say, in recent decades) Germany has been administered in an unspiritual spirit, and the experience of the devil can be used by the servants of the good principle in only a very limited and purely technical sense. With the exception of a tiny number of surviving patriarchs there cannot be any administrative authorities of reputable mentality in the Germany of to-morrow. Certain young officials who may have been secretly in opposition, and who may not be wanting either in character or in mind, are lacking in experience of the most responsible positions, a thing which in administration, in particular, is essential to real authority.

Character (disposition) and mind (universality) are not sufficient alone, nor has expert knowledge any weight without them. The cry for experts in the Weimar days always came from the mouths of reactionaries, who objected less to the lack of expertness in anyone they criticised than to his devotion to the interests of peace, freedom, and the workers.

So the idea was to replace him by a fellow of their own sort, a reactionary, or—better still—by someone with *no* mental attitude. "The expert," in the terminology of Weimar and indeed before Weimar, meant the *conservative* expert, or, at the least, the *non-political* expert, which came to the same thing. In the future the selection can be a happy one only if it is made on the basis of specialised knowledge and experience, certainly, but at the same time on that of progressiveness and general intellectual level. The expert who is a philistine, the expert who is a nit-wit, the expert who is reactionary, not to mention the expert who is a rogue, must be eliminated just like the true-hearted bungler, the tub-thumping bungler, the wordy-journalist bungler, the genially-romantic bungler. Everything depends on the selection, therefore on the identity of the electors at the beginning, and therefore on the decree of fate. If the electors are the combined executives of those recognised leading groups of political reconstruction, who will enjoy the confidence of a *wise* occupying authority (unless this condition is fulfilled, the idea is merely a paper one!), then a reasonably happy selection may be counted upon . . . from the ranks of the returning exiles and of the surviving opposition in Germany.

Subjective judgment in the selection of the nominees remains indispensable; since the selection is made by different individuals, and by persons of authority, by the executive committees of divergent movements, although united in a common aim and therefore related, the greatest conceivable approximation to the ideal, to the objectivity of the selecting judgment (if any!), will be attained. It is inevitable that that "mutual scenting out and recognition" of personages, of which Nietzsche speaks in the passage already quoted, *shall be replaced by Nomination in an unprecedented act of realisation*; nomination by the relatively best qualified, by the relatively best fitted to select those who are suitable under the star of a specific cultural purpose, with avoidance of partiality which might bear in itself the seed of a new totalitarianism. The (so to speak) totalitarianism of humanity and liberty in contrast to that of barbarism and despotism by all means remains the essential assumption.

It results from this that the *Coalition* which will be first in control of developments in the new Germany (in control on *this* side of the line of demarcation, of course, not immediately after the German collapse) must consist exclusively of movements which support without qualification the idea of humanism and freedom, which is "democracy" in a reasonable sense. Lip service to democracy is not enough; parties which at bottom seek a dictatorship of their own, a despotism with concentration camps and the firing squad for those who disagree with them have no part in the matter, however far to the "left" their trade-marks may be. There are others, promoters of world conflagrations, who equally have no place in the new government: reactionaries and nationalists, who indeed quite honestly object to Hitlerism,

principally because it has led them to ruin (if it had won, they would have thought otherwise), but who are secretly preparing for the third world war, speculating on antagonisms between the Soviet and the Anglo-Saxon Powers. These people are trying to intrigue among the generals, publicists, and diplomats of the victors, intent on worming their way forward through the latter's differences. They mock at democracy, however it may be defined. They despise freedom (for others!), and scorn the idea of humanity, although their infamous opportunism prevents them from doing this openly for the present. It may be that the "left" totalitarians and these reactionary nationalists will play into each other's hands for a time or even join hands impudently; it would not be for the first time. This is a further reason for keeping both sorts out of a coalition which aims at a common good-neighbourly fight for peace and fairness at home and abroad, for freedom and happiness, and for the realisation of a civilised German State in a community of human beings vowed to humanity.

Of course I do not mean that we freedom-loving socialists of various shades of opinion should form this coalition among ourselves. While being exclusive as regards the spokesmen of inhumanity, it should take care not to shut out from the new comradeship any religious, liberal, or other humanitarians, who, for reasons for which they, and not we, are responsible refuse or hesitate to decide for socialism. (On the other hand, there are collectivists who refuse to decide for freedom; this variety is the much more dangerous.)

Socialism as a form of production and distribution meets the necessities of a nation such as the German nation will be after this war, to a degree which will reconcile to its measures many who for long maintained their traditional reservations against it. These pietists and these liberals will withdraw their individualist objection if the new socialist remains circumspect and shows himself uncompromising only in his intolerance against champions of "free initiative" and contractors who would contract to play the part of hyenas and vultures on the nation's battlefields. This rabble with their stream-lined cars deserve more than just the contempt of all decent people; they deserve a *law* which outlaws the doers of their deeds. We must be careful not to repel by doctrinaire ways any non-socialists or not-yet-socialists who are ready to help us in passing such a law and in applying it, as well as in many other good things. To regard their association with a block of freedom-loving socialists as not only permissible but as desirable does not imply forgetfulness of the fact that such a block has first to be *created* and that it must be strong in order to be *capable* of forming the core of a coalition. It cannot be created in exile, but definitely only with, and for the main part through, the people in Germany; but the Germans in exile could perform important preliminary work—could and should.

What powerful work for the future of their peoples was performed

in exile by Sun Yat Sen, Lenin and Trotsky, Masaryk and Beneš (the last of these now for the second time!)! The historic part which it is possible for the temporary political emigrant to play must be neither overestimated nor underestimated. There is no justification for the pomposity of certain persons stripped of their former power who act as if nothing has happened and as if the future will be the same as the past, with streets, squares, Constitutions, parties, "Zahlabenden," pot-houses—the serio-comic attitude of those ghosts who think that they are alive; nor yet for the scornfully self-administered slap-in-the-face of the inefficiency which assumes superiority, and summarily depreciates everyone because it rightly despises itself. The German political exiles might have a task which could be fulfilled even at the eleventh or twelfth hour. Their freedom-socialist section, at least, should, with good will, be even to-day in a position to organise itself into a unit (perhaps made up of different groups), in the first place in Great Britain, and then by means of contacts, which to a large extent do not need to be started from the beginning, in all the countries in question. A scheme for an organisation of this kind has been on the table since November 1943. If this unification succeeds, the combination of the freedom-socialist forces in exile with those of the homeland, and therewith the realisation of the plan of a Constitution here presented, would be considerably facilitated.

Politics, according to the ideal conception, are certainly a matter of moral thinking; a matter of wishful thinking are they not. I admit that I deem the realisation of such a coalition to be rather unlikely, in spite of its desirability; rather unlikely, judging from past and recent experience. We have already referred to the average German's specific lack of talent for politics. This deficiency displays itself among other ways in the disinclination of the exiled remnants of the old parties for genuine historical self-criticism as well as in their incapacity for approaching a really constructive conception of something new—notwithstanding the undeniable qualities of individuals in particular spheres. However honestly some of them have determined to "begin afresh," as a whole they stick to the old, and fail to escape from the urge to go on knitting the same stocking from the point where they left off in 1933. Schiller wrote, in "*Xenien*":

"Singly regarded, you find people sane and sensible, mostly;
Put them together and there stands a blockhead at once."

Schiller was thinking of "learned societies." If we did not know this, and if he had come into the world but 125 years later, we might imagine that it was the German parties of the Left who served him as model, both those psalmodying "democracy" and those of "dialectic materialism" as well as those based on the interdict against eating herrings.

We must therefore be prepared to find that the socialist and, in a

broader sense, anti-Nazi or liberal groups of Germans, split and at odds with one another as they are, will prove even at zero hour to be incapable of an understanding and thus will not reach a synthesis of their own accord. In this case, as regrettable as it is probable, I should consider it better that the victors themselves should nominate a German legislative body, adopting the principle that I have been bold enough to propose, rather than that the attempt should not be made. Of course, this implies ~~wise~~ victors, well-informed or well-advised in the selection of nominees. The happy touch in the initial selection is everything, and will decide the fate of the nation for generations, just as the unhappy touch would do. If they select without vision: for instance, prominent rats who left Hitler's sinking ship in good time (Rauschning was the first), or those honourable relics of the Weimar days, who certainly bear no blame for the horrible misdeeds of Nazism but are all the more guilty of the horrible fact that it was able to seize power; or (worst of all!) scribblers of the empty and smart, conscienceless and adaptable, type which knows everything and nothing, can do nothing and everything—then I should prefer to see Germany administered as a colony, with fewer Germans on the staff than there are Papuans in the Papua administration. If, however, the view is shared which Sir Walter Layton thus expressed: "Outsiders cannot dictate the inner life of a community with the history, achievements and quality of the German people" (*News Chronicle*, August 21, 1944), then the need will be recognised, and ways will be found, to install *suitable Germans* as legislators. Not on the day when hostilities finally cease—that would be technically impossible. I well realise that the Germans will have to wait; on the other hand the reader will realise that as a German I cannot but desire the term to be as short as possible. Suitable Germans as legislators. That the criterion of suitability is not that of being a cog in a party machine but *high-mindedness*, i.e., that (not frequent, but not absurdly rare) combination of character and intelligence, of universality and expertness, of humanism and organising ability, has been already so clearly dealt with that it would be superfluous to say more about it.

If then the leadership of the new Germany at first lies in the hands of trustees either of a wise victor or of a coalition of German political forces under the wise victors' control (a Coalition which would, it is true, exclude totalitarians and reactionaries, and would be decidedly against them, but which would otherwise be of anything but one-sided composition), then the Legislative Assembly nominated by these men would in its healthy variety be very near to the ideal of objective competence and could well be looked upon as the real and worthy representation of the nation. This Council of Minds, of (ideally) the best minds of the people, would consist of perhaps fifty, perhaps a hundred persons: men of convictions, but with knowledge of their material: experts, but with very general education and interests. For each branch of legislation

there would be some specialists, and for drawing up the draft of a law coming within their sphere they would have to call together a committee of (say) twenty members, consisting of the most notable experts in the subject, who would not necessarily be members of the Council itself. (Men of knowledge and ability, let me again emphasise, who are eminent not only in the sense of knowledge and ability but also in that of character.)

Thus for all questions of economic legislation, for the problems of wages and salaries, of working hours, of technical and sanitary working conditions, of the freedom to choose employment and its necessary limitations in view of planned production, of social insurance, of taxation, of finances in general, and for the (let us hope) burning questions of successive socialisation, nominees of the trade unions would have to be brought in through a central trade union council, the head organisation of a well articulated system of associations of manual and office workers and civil servants, to which bodies representing the interests of the professions, the farmers, and independent craftsmen might be affiliated.

Another example: instruction and education are to be founded on new principles: important enough! The experts on this subject in the Council of Minds (socialist-humanitarian school-reformers of the type of Gustav Wyneken, Paul Oestreich, Minna Specht) appoint from the whole of Germany those who, with a substantially similar view of life, have done valuable service in theory or practice at progressive elementary or secondary schools or universities: teachers, philosophers, psychotherapists, sociologists, publicists, teachers. "Leftish" teachers in the first place, but if religious groups take part in the Coalition and consequently in the appointment of the Council of Minds, then, to be sure, there will be added some pedagogues and school theoreticians of a more conservative point of view and some clerics with special knowledge of education. In so far as the planning of universities comes under consideration it will be possible, in addition to professors, to put forward one or two specially progressive-minded undergraduates as members of the education committee.

A third example: A new penal code is to be created (a task which was notoriously too much for the Weimar republic). The Council has perhaps three specialists in criminal law among its members; these three now select seventeen prominent progressive-minded judges, advocates, university teachers, and other experts in criminal law, some with a practical experience of prison administration, sociologists, pedagogues, sex experts, and psychiatrists, call them together, and discuss in common with them the principles of a draft Bill. If agreement is reached and the Bill discussed and drafted, the draft goes to the plenary meeting of the Council; in case of a difference of opinion a minority report is added, or even several. The Council decides. Similarly; it decides on the pro-

posals of the economic committee (Example 1), on those of the education committee (Example 2), and on those of all other such committees—not only when there is disagreement. Even if the draft Bill of an expert committee were unanimously adopted, the plenary meeting of the Council might amend it. As in every parliament.

Of course, the Council arrives at its decisions by majorities. Only a mental defective could rage against “majority” as a technical principle, against voting as a means to discover the collective will when attempts to convince one another have not succeeded; I have not yet met a lunatic of that sort in the literature of the *élite* theory. We are no absolutists on non-voting, we do not get hysterical about the abstraction “majority,” but we oppose the stupid tyranny of mass-majorities, the despotism of incompetence.

The objection may be raised that even this Council of the elect may make a mistake. By all means. Even the most distinguished brains of the nation are not gods. What is strange is that the objector should never come upon the notion that parliaments elected by the crowd could ever make a mistake. They consist of much less distinguished persons; an excessive proportion being party hacks and representatives of petty business interests. That a young athlete may possibly fall ill is no reason for sending a semi-paralysed octogenarian into the boxing ring. Because even the most modern 50,000-ton liner may sink in a hurricane, would you rather cross the Atlantic in a rowing-boat? It is only a blank refusal to understand that manufactures such arguments. Besides, satisfaction can be given to the hypersensitive ideological foresight by the concession that no resolution of the Council of Minds shall acquire the force of law until the President of the State has affixed his signature. Up to 1918 it was a famous matter for disputation in Germany whether the Kaiser had the *right* or the *duty* of carrying out and promulgating laws voted by the *Bundesrat* and the *Reichstag*—whether he was *obliged* to sign them or not. The Bismarck Constitution of 1871 is clearly not clear on this point; its Articles 5 and 17 contradict one another! I can see no objection to the new Constitution prescribing that the Head of the State has a *right* regarding the ratification of laws, with a consequent right to *veto* the decisions of the Council. There is little fear of such a veto proving an obstacle to what is good, just, and sensible. But it does not seem to me to be really necessary.

My reason is that all the legislative procedure described does not in any way take place in the dark-room of a dictatorship, or in the decreefactory of a party caucus from which the people are hermetically sealed off, but on good democratic lines in the fullest publicity, supervised by a free Press, which is served by independent personalities, and by vigorous and equally independent political and cultural associations. The contact of the legislator with public opinion and with the mental trends of the country will exist; in fact, he himself will be in the current.

And the absurdity of the William-and-Ebert-and-Hindenburg era will be at an end: the most difficult legislative questions will no longer be decided by an assembly of mainly incompetents elected by voters whose competence is not of a higher degree; this absurdity of equalitarian democracy, under which it is really the malignantly-stupid Conservative official (the "*Geheimrat*") who frames the laws, will come to an end without tyranny, autocracy, or despotism taking its place. What will result is: permanent team-work by the most capable legislators selected in the most effective way: an optimum of competence, vitality, and objectivity on the part of the law-givers, and therefore in the quality of the laws; knowledge illumined by imagination; genuine authorities as legislators; the *mind* as the law-maker ("mind": an ellipse with talent and character as the two focal points); a *logocratic* system; an approximation to a rule of reason instead of a rule of number, in fact one of chance (not to mention the rule of vested interests); the mastery of the *qualified minority* of a community of millions over its *less qualified majority*, but at the same time *promoting* the vital interests of that majority too—the realisation of true democracy.

A legislative body thus constituted and operating would not only be a benediction, it is also realisable! Certainly precautions would have to be taken against its becoming senile or petrified. It would be possible to limit its members to advisory powers after they become 65 or 70 years old, and to keep the originally nominated assembly continually rejuvenated by co-optation, perhaps also by appointment by the Head of the State or by nomination by specified cultural organisations, such as universities, peace associations, philosophical, medical, and law societies, as well as political and social unions. To some extent the renewal of the Council might be a matter for the testamentary disposition of its members; the right to nominate his own successor could be conferred by the Head of the State as the highest distinction for every especially distinguished personality in the Council. It is not impossible that in the civilisation of the future such an institution will acquire a halo of greater glory in the eyes of the people than any crown or throne, or than that honourable ring which from generation to generation was left by the greatest actor to the greatest actor.

Other precautions against collective arterio-sclerosis and torpidity in the supreme assembly can be devised. Since the Council, like the House of Lords and not like the House of Commons, would be a permanent chamber and in principle indissoluble, it would be possible to reduce the resulting dangers by excluding a part of the Councillors from permanent membership. 75, 60, or even only 50 could be appointed for life, while 25, 40 or even 50 might from the beginning be temporary, so that the second category would be replaceable every three or five years. And the choice of the temporary members might be a matter either for the permanent members (co-optation, according

to Nietzsche's idea) or for those authorities outside the Council which I have already mentioned: the Head of the State, university senates, peace and other political societies, perhaps also political parties and trade unions. (A proscription of parties, or worse still, a *numerus clausus* for them, "not more than two" and that sort of thing, would be the foulest fascism, antidemocratic in every sense, at best an involuntary lapse of political amateurs into fascist practices).

It might be proposed (but not necessarily) that the Council would choose the Head of the State, that the confidence of the Council in the Cabinet formed by him¹ would be expressed, withheld or withdrawn, and that, in general, this (so to speak) unsenile senate, this parliament of the *élite*, would correspond in its functions to the old style representative assembly. Consequently its powers would extend beyond legislation alone.

It is foolish to be against "parliamentarism"; it is a question of the quality, and therefore at bottom of the genesis of the parliament. When Nietzsche in the *Joyful Wisdom* writes: "Parliamentarism, which is official permission to choose between five basic political opinions . . .", this is a hit at the parliamentarism of contemporary equalitarian democracy. A parliament which might well have groupings within it but which had not resulted from the election battles of the masses (masses guided on leading strings by obtuse party-bureaucrats and by often quite questionable tribunes), a parliament of ethical and intellectual competence, a Chamber of Minds—the parliamentarism rooted in this soil is not touched by the whip of the Dionysian.

Naturally such a parliament is conceivable only in conjunction with unrestricted freedom of speech, of the spoken, broadcast, filmed, and printed word. There must be precisely defined penal clauses against attempts at totalitarian or reactionary subversion; this is high treason against liberty and peace, and the punishment at first should be death. There should also be clauses against besmirching ideas which are sacred in the eyes of civilised man, as well as against mean insults against great dead champions of such ideas (the living can take care of themselves). At the same time, the freedom of serious criticism, even against the great and the greatest, must be carefully safeguarded: this is a problem for the higher legal technique. Besides, the higher legal technique is of no use if the judges are as inferior as, to the grief of all progressive Germans, they often were under the republic. My conclusion is that, with due regard to the penal code, every public criticism must be allowable, from every conceivable standpoint, *even* from that of an enemy of the new State. We must not take over the accursed methods of the totalitarian rabble, must not turn these methods into the opposite direction, must not paint their brown blinkers red for our own wear.

¹ The members of the Cabinet could, though not necessarily, be chosen from the members of the Legislative Assembly.

It was not for this that those seas of blood of the innocent have flowed, not for this that great cities have become rubble, not for this that in the land of Goethe in place of Hitlerism an anti-Hitlerite Hitlerism should spring up, a dictatorship with a different banner, a gang of freedom-smashers without the swastika. We are opponents of weakness, but that would not be strength. To employ violence against the spirit does not denote vigour. If we forbid those whom we regard as enemies of the new State and as reactionaries to take part in public discussion, the day will soon come when men of our own side who deviate from the views held by our majority will be denounced as "enemies" of the new State. The offenders will probably be the most fervent, the most genuine, the most refined, and the process will go on. The narrowing of the freedom of discussion would be a weapon with which we should strike ourselves. If our cause is good and our work respectable, we shall be able to defend ourselves against the attacks of a troglodyte Press with reasons and with mind, and shall not need police and force. Reasons and mind mean vigour; police and force mean weakness. We should allow the cave gentlemen their Press, and not merely their Press. Only if the rascals indulge in lies and defamation must there be a clause in the code which gives the government and the supporters of the ruling idea an opportunity of enforcing an adequately extensive correction. Unlimited freedom of meeting! But woe to a nationalist opposition party which at its public meeting hinders from speaking any champion of humanity, of freedom, and of peace, who asks to be heard, or which affords him insufficient protection against physical attack from the reactionary mob.

Only with absolute freedom of public speech (within the limits of the criminal law) is the Council of Minds placed outside the danger of losing touch with the people from which it sprang and which it is to represent. The public opinion expressed through newspapers, reviews, books, broadcasting, the cinema and theatre; through cultural associations, political parties, and trade unions, is the source of light, sparkling from a thousand facets, whence will come the inspiration by whose rays the new legislators will work. They need seriously and sincerely free speech, including that of all in opposition.

On the other hand, after our painful experiences, freedom of speech can be sensibly granted only if its misuse can never again lead to the seizure of power by rascals, that is to say, if the legislature and control are removed from the accident of number, of decision by mass-majorities, and, for all time, placed in the hands of the competent, of the most wise, of men of character and brain, of the optimal representatives, of the spiritual leaders, of "them that know," of the *élite*. *Without freedom of speech no Council of Minds; without a Council of Minds no freedom of speech.*

XVI

A regime like that proposed is not "inimical to the masses." It is, on the contrary, decidedly friendly to them. It is the demagogue who acts as their enemy, addressing himself successfully, as Hitler did, to the lower instincts of the masses and flattering them into helping him to pursue a policy of barbaric stupidity, which is bound to lead to the ruin of the masses, to mass death, mass poverty, mass subjection. As an enemy of the masses (in effect) that man similarly acts who is of the honourable average and strives for the rule of the honourable average, finally producing the honourable argument that the honourable average represents a broader section of the populace than the people of quality do, and that the former can therefore claim the mastery with better right than the latter. The rule of this honourable average was the ruin of Germany. A government of the average, by the average, is never a government *for* the average, not to mention that it is a government against the excellent. Certainly it is better than the dictatorship of the *canaille*, but it easily leads thereto.

There is another respect in which the proposed regime would not be inimical to the masses, since under it every member of the masses would have the opportunity of climbing into the circle of the *élite* by adequate performance; the new aristocracy is neither one of birth nor one of cash. Neither is it a caste closed against any class or stratum. It is the constant selection of a *type* of person that thrives in all classes and strata.

Moreover, even without any striking record of achievement, and without outstanding qualities, everyone would be entitled to take part in public life. For there is *legislation* and there is *administration*. Administration is intrinsically the application of the laws, and even jurisdiction is from this standpoint merely part of administration. If legislation remains an activity for the few, for those of a definite rare type, for an *élite* (just as philosophy, poetry, musical composition, the fine arts), yet a *supervision* of the administration, a *watch* to see whether the laws are properly applied, is reasonably a matter for *every* citizen, and is therefore his clear right, from the legislator's angle even his duty, for the legislator must desire that every member of the State shall watch over the proper application of the laws which he has made.

Keeping an eye on the administration does not require the special qualities needed by the legislator; common-sense and the sense of justice inborn in every man are sufficient. Only from children and the weak-minded should the right to such activities be withheld. And it would be in keeping with the ideas of the new democracy if a vast network of watching organisations were spread over the whole machinery of administration, bodies in whose actions everyone interested could in principle take part—either in parents' councils, adult pupils' councils, students' councils for supervision of the teaching in history, philosophy, and

literature, in the schools and universities, or powerful councils of manual and office workers for supervision of production, working conditions, and the treatment of employees. The idea of a threefold division of power put forward by Montesquieu two hundred years ago is not at all out-of-date, however much certain constitutional-law snobs may want to persuade us to the contrary. Possibly it only requires bringing to completion, and although the executive, the legislative, and the judicature should be clearly separated from one another, lest the State fall a victim to arbitrary rule, it does seem to me to be worth consideration to add the *supervising* power as a fourth.

In contrast to the freedom of the Press and the kindred freedoms, as well as to the freedom of coalition and assembly, of research and the arts, and above all to the physical freedom of the person (which is not fully established even in some of the old democracies), the *freedom of teaching*, with the young as its object, *cannot* reasonably be reintroduced. Are we again to let loose on the growing and learning youngsters, as in the Weimar days, the most retrograde section of the German population, the stupifiers, the brutalisers, the nationalist drummers and professors? To hand over the bud of the nation to the grip of a petty-bourgeois and reactionary sham-intelligentsia? Are we to concede that what the new government will have slowly and laboriously straightened by Press, broadcast, councils, good books, and good laws, shall again be secretly distorted in the human soul on the way through school and university? Our secondary school and university teachers (I speak of the type, and remain grateful to the notable exceptions)—what boobies, what pig-headed guttersnipes and miscreants they were! Let this tribe have a fresh lease of life? Just to satisfy the doctrine of “freedom of teaching”? We should take care not to repeat democratic stupidities for the sake of the democratic freedom! Under the Rule of Right the freedom of teaching consists in freedom to teach humanity and justice, also international justice. Schoolmasters and professors who cannot adapt themselves to this may have to earn their livings as stone-breakers or drain-cleaners!

The supervision of justice is, chiefly, a matter for the Press, so long as cases are heard in public—which is essential. Instruction does not generally take place in public; the pupils are its public. All the more indispensable is school inspection; not by privy councillors, but by organs of the people themselves, which, without the zealotry of the narrow-minded, must be uncompromising. The reactionary teacher *has* not an “equal” right to teach and the same “freedom” as the progressive one. What is reaction and what is progress is not decided by him, but by the view of life taken by the circles in power. We cannot “prove” to the cave-dwellers that we are the progressive ones; but we know that we are; and we shall do foolishly, in fact shall be forgetful of our duty, if, once we have the power, we let it slip from us because relativism teaches that

“from his standpoint” “the other too” is right. This undecided, relativist, democracy of the equivalence of all standpoints, of the equal entitlement of the satanic and the divine, of insanity and wisdom, leads to decline, to the most extreme human misery. Demagoguery, despotism, wars of aggression, events fatal to the world, are the consequences of a democratism which, from weakness or blind stubbornness, wilfully subordinates quality to equality, and which looks upon freedom as being essentially the right of its most bitter enemies to destroy it.

That must not come again. Nor must the practices resulting from that false theory about the equality of gold and muck, with the constitutional compromise between the two which potters along to the eventual autocracy of muck. An arrogant “*élitism*” (and there *is* such a thing as well) would be just this kind of evil. A cold, loveless, shallow, irreligious “*élitism*,” preening itself on a nervous culture or a subtle development of the intellect. New ideas, which are fighting their way, always bring their own caricature in their train. The revolutionary equalitarianism of 1789 brought with it that caricature of itself whose symbol was the guillotine. In the realm of the young *logocratic* propaganda there is hardly anything more objectionable and ridiculous than a certain permanent moralising sectarian self-complacency, with the philosopher’s stone in its brief-case. *Supervision*, in the hands of all as a fourth power, represents under the much longed-for Rule of Reason the constitutional equivalent of what was healthy and remains right in the old idea of equalitarian democracy. The supervision idea combines with that of the *élite* in a manner which is all the more natural the more probable it is that the most reputable and gifted, the most important and deserving, members of the supervising councils would soon rise to the highest organ of these councils, and thence, little by little, would find their way into the Council of Minds.

Of course, appointment to the supervising councils would be by equal election, from the bottom upwards. The composition of these councils would be in the form of a pyramid. At the top would be a popular chamber (organised by occupations and parties) whose competence might extend beyond the limits of mere supervision, just as that of the Council of Minds extends beyond mere legislation.¹ A matter for discussion, also from the standpoint here put forward, might be a *two-chamber system* with functions partly separate and partly common. *Legislation* and *supervision* would definitely have to be separated, but supervision would of course not be compelled in consequence to limit itself to protest. It should rather have the power of change, that is to say, constitutional authority to carry out actual alterations in the administration. A common function of the two chambers might be the criticism of “general,” “main,” policy, and laying down principles for

¹ On this point the reader may compare the explanations of Walter D. Schultz in this volume, in which I agree throughout.

it, especially for foreign policy, and, in addition, perhaps the choice of the Head of the State (instead of this being a matter for the Council of Minds alone), as well as votes of confidence for the Cabinet appointed by the Head of the State and the withdrawal of confidence, which means their fall. In this connection, I could well imagine a regulation that the government must resign if one of the two chambers demands resignation by a two-thirds majority or if both chambers have a simple majority for it.

“Unremovable governments of the wise” are an excess of unwise and quite unrealistic day-dreaming and an ideological mischief, but their serious refutation would be too much waste of my time as well as of my readers’. Theorems of this sort are fit for nothing else than the discrediting of the neo-aristocratic idea, the *logocratic* idea, the *élite* idea, or what we please to call it. The conception of an infallible and all-wise ruler is a good one, but only as an ideal, only as a heuristic principle. There exists no infallible person, no all-wise man. Even in Catholic dogma the Pope is reckoned to be infallible only when he speaks “*ex cathedra*.” The fallibility of the noblest character, the scrappiness of the deepest and most comprehensive knowledge are matters of experience, as sure as death, although the empirical certainty of death does not do away with the great thought of “*macrobiotics*”: the thought which aims at the abolition of death. Just because the most select minds cannot be expert in everything, particularly in our times of unexampled complications and division of labour, I have proposed for the legislative assembly that system of committees, under which politically reliable specialists would be called together from the whole country for every Bill.

Unremovable governments would be the beginning of an unbearable caste and caucus rule. Who, for that matter, is to appoint the first of such governments? The unremovable god-like “regent” perhaps, as one of our socialist sects actually proposed, without, to be sure, betraying the secret of how his regency was to come about, though they apparently imagined their No. 1 official as “the regent.” Yes, the “unremovable government of the wise” would be the beginning of an unbearable caucus domination and so the rapid end of a first attempt at a *logocratic* constitution. Not majority rule, and not caucus or caste rule, but a *rule of the best* constantly renewed from the whole width of the nation is the irrevocable end of the *rule of the beast*.

XVII

The idea of the State is the deepest and widest possible goodness to be realised through the shrewdest possible social technique. On this point Christ and socialism become identical. In this a socialism redeemed of materialism and a religiousness purged of conservatism should meet. In this creed . . . and in the practical conclusions arising therefrom. A

constitution is a means to the realisation of goodness. Unbalanced equalitarian democracy is a dogma on which in Germany it was not goodness that flourished, but satanism that grew like a weed. If a repetition is to be prevented, then we Germans, with the support of far-sighted victors—victors in a just war forced upon them by the rabble girt with power in Germany—must step out to that *aristocratic venture* which is in no way discordant with, but is in *accord* with, the enlightened conception of democracy, with the conception of freedom and goodness. We must boldly place legislation in the hands of the *most qualified*, of the *few*—not of a few permanently distinguished by external marks, but of that changing few of all origins, classes, districts, and ages, who have shown to those who resemble them that they *have rank*, and that, because of that, they *represent* the nation. These men, in their non-rigid, flexible, collectivity are the competent legislators, and, because the best laws are of no use (as I have already said) if a largely reactionary, resistant, obstinate, malicious army of administrators, teachers, judges, more or less silently obstructs them, therefore in our conception of the German future the mass-democratic corrective of supervising councils is added to the *élite* principle. This corrective is no sort of “concession” to democratic tradition and to the inflexibility of the dull; it is the fruit of realist judgment.

As regards the delimitation of the functions of the two bodies, beyond what has been indicated, juristic precision would be precipitate so long as the philosophical principle is not admitted and is not at least established in theory. Such a delimitation is also a problem in every old-style democratic State with a two-chamber system as we can see from the disputes about competence between the Senate and the House of Representatives in Washington, and between Senate and Chamber in Paris. And those who adhere to our principle may differ on this question, which is a matter for mutual agreement inside the movement, not one of pure compelling reason. There is at this time no need to manufacture clauses; what we have to do is to secure recognition of a principle.

That is not easy. For more than two hundred years humanitarian democracy has been confused with equalitarian, especially in the minds of the more progressive sections. Even the “great” French revolution displayed a squabble between FREEDOM and EQUALITY, which only too soon developed into one between neck and guillotine. The result, after the Napoleonic interlude, was the Bourbon reaction. The rest of the Continent, without Bourbons, became, as far as possible, still more reactionary. During the whole of the nineteenth century and in the twentieth until this day, under the banner of democracy, freedom and equality have been equated by the friends of freedom. They have left it to fascists and Nazis, the extreme enemies of freedom, to apply to that ridiculous identification the corrective which has led to a caricature of the sensible, but which would have led to sense if the friends of

freedom had been the correctors. The idea of the equal value of all men "before God," in the cosmos, of the equal right to live, of the equal right to the essentials for existence, has been for 3,300 years (*Akhnaton*) the object of a slow and toilsome fight by the most exalted of human minds, and had been at least theoretically realised when betrayed by Nazism. This noble, charitable, basic idea of modern religions, as well as of socialism, the anti-barbaric idea *par excellence*, in no way weakens the conception of quality or the fact of the difference in the qualities of individuals (inequality at first in their inborn qualities and only later in their acquired ones), nor does it mitigate the foolishness of the demand that laws shall be made for peoples and mankind, directly or indirectly, by the less qualified, by the average, instead of by those best qualified to legislate.

The struggle against the capitalist system waged by all working and thinking men is now no longer revolutionary, but has become a matter of course. (However much a revolution may be necessary in many countries to attain victory against the powerful resistance of the possessing minority.) Revolutionary to-day, and for a long time yet, is the fight against the equating of unequals in constitutional law, the fight for the activation of quality in the sphere of the legislature, the fight against a perverse equalitarianism which ignores facts of nature. Against an equalitarianism such as has never prevailed anywhere in the domain of the arts and sciences. Against self-misunderstanding and a going astray of the democratic idea.

The fight for socialism can only win, its tempo quicken, its length be shortened, if the *logocratic* principle, the vanguard principle, the revolutionary *élite* principle is carried through. This was the principle that actuated Lenin, but he tied it to the idea of dictatorship. This connection is possible, not necessary. I have sought to show how undictatorially, with what freedom of discussion, how democratically (in the intelligent sense), in what a *free* atmosphere, a system of legislation by the actual *élite* of the legislatively gifted can function. Especially if to Montesquieu's three powers in the constitutional State a fourth one is added: the supervising power.

The ultimate proof can be secured by practical test alone. That is true. But theory must precede practice; that is what it is for. To object against a theory "Only a theory!" is the most stupid of all possible objections. I can think of cleverer things to bring against what is here proposed. Cleverer, not clever.

As, for instance, that the masses will not accept legislation by men of mind. But they *have* accepted legislation by anti-minds, by the sham *élite* of the Hitler gang! The truth is that the majority of the masses is dull, and will accept anything. Those among the masses who are the valuable in a humanist and socialist sense would joyfully assent to the system in Germany which I propose, since it serves the rightful

interests of the masses, since it invites them to collaborate (in supervision), and since the legislative body which I have in view will originally be nominated by the executives of parties and associations who are outspoken exponents of ideas for the good of the people, champions of the rightful interests of the masses, old or new organisations of the masses, at least the object of the confidence of the masses. Not, of course, of the nationalist section of the masses; the opposition of *this* part of the masses must be taken into account and *broken*—for that matter, in an *old-style* democracy *too*! Therefore, such opposition is no objection to the system I recommend. If the Legislative Assembly is not nominated by Germans but by the victors, then the problem of acceptance by the masses will raise wider issues than the structure of that body.

Or someone might come and say that the initial coalition, to which I assign the right of nominating the legislative council, will not be able to maintain itself in power except by force, if at all. Now we cannot tell the future, nor do we want to. No government can avoid the use of a certain amount of force, not only against criminals, but also against rebels who aim at getting rid of the ruling system by violence. To what extent a humanist German government of the future will be able to defend itself against its reactionary opponents with its own resources (police) or with the help of the victor Powers cannot be determined to-day. The closer, the more friendly, the more fruitful the collaboration between a wise occupation authority and a German government in the service of the new spirit, so much the more smoothly can that problem be solved. Besides, slight rearrangements inside the Coalition, and even the addition of other groups, would be quite compatible with the continuance of the legislative body, which would, of course, consist of independent persons, apart from the fact that the scheme for a section of the members being only temporarily appointed would permit of rearrangements in the membership of the Council as well. The better it works, the more confidence it will inspire in the people, and the more adherents it will gain—coalitions or no coalitions! After all, in democracies the academic faculties and the judiciary continue to work without restaffing (essentially) if a government coalition is succeeded by a new one. The causal connection between Coalition and Council of Minds would consist exclusively in the original act; and this only because no other way seems practicable.

Thirdly, I could imagine that someone does not believe in the Council because he does not believe in the Coalition. I, too, do not “believe” in it; I *want* it. A short transition period, or perhaps even one of some length without any German government or parliament seems unavoidable for technical reasons. After that, while the military and industrial control of Germany from outside continues, the internal administration of Germany by Germans should begin. If the tale runs differently, that is, if Germany is administered by the victors as a colony, without German

leaders and legislators (I leave the "federalist" question here purposely open), or if a German government is, in fact, installed, but a conservative one, with generals, managing directors, Cardinals, Brünings, Rauschnings, a Puppet Government consisting of Neo-Quislings—then my idea of a Constitution can as little become reality as any other democratic one. Even if the label "democracy" were to be stuck on that contrivance, it would be no more a democracy in the traditional sense than in the new one. If, on the other hand, my proposals are adopted, then, truly, reactionaries, totalitarians, nationalists, and war-mongers of all complexions (not only Nazis and German-nationalists) will be excluded from the new control of the State, therefore above all from the executive and the legislature. But that is what they would have to be just the same if a democracy of the old type were installed, otherwise the old game of Weimar would begin once more, with a new world war as its object. A democracy of the old type with a basic and actual exclusion of its opponents, of any kind of opponent, is, however, a contradiction in terms! A democracy with universal equal suffrage, which bans parties, or which, if displeasing parties grow, bars their way to power, is no democracy, at least, not in the sense of its own conception and of its own propaganda, but is a lie, a wretched lie, and would inevitably perish of its own falsehood. Accordingly, there is nothing left but to renounce the old democracy or to abolish altogether the German constitutional law and the German State if it is not desired to smooth the way for a new barbarism. I hold it to be unlikely that there will be even one among the responsible statesmen of the Allied Nations who wants that—although there are "Germans" who are not ashamed to want it, and who are already getting ready to co-operate, in case, contrary to my expectation, the Allied Nations should nevertheless want it.

It is for the Allies to decide whether, after the transitional period which I have already discussed, they will be able to govern Germany without German political helpers, or not unless they have them. If the verdict is "*with* Germans," then they will have to distinguish between venal creatures, who are ready for anything, and personalities. Obviously, personalities who in principle are open or secret opponents of collaboration cannot be considered for helpers. But one can be a friend of collaboration in principle and at the same time a decided opponent of what has already been suggested in German refugee quarters as unconditional co-operation. Those who think with me definitely reject co-operation regardless of conditions. Of course we know that the conditions for Germany will be hard, and in a sense we desire that—for reasons of justice and as a preventive; but a certain measure must not be exceeded if our conscience is to permit us to justify the imposed decisions, for instance, before a German audience in a German hall. What could one of us justify and what not?

(1) We¹ justify the extreme radicalism of disarmament. At the general meeting of the German Peace Society at Bochum, in 1921, the writer of these remarks was the spokesman of that section which demanded the abolition of the "*Reichswehr*" (not the "black" one, which did not then exist; but the legal black-white-red), and which then succeeded in getting this demand adopted by the strongest organisation of German opponents of war. In vain, it is true; but perhaps the mention will carry some conviction.

(2) We justify the dismemberment of Prussia; we had demanded it (in vain!) as early as in 1918. A lot of mischief has indeed been done with the anti-Prussian catchword; the nasty qualities which are decried are to be found equally shared between Prussian and non-Prussian Germans; as it happens, among the half-dozen most prominent Nazi scoundrels there is not a single Prussian—they are all Austrians, Bavarians, Rhenish Franconians; it was Thuringia that had the first Nazi Minister, and it was the "State" of Brunswick that naturalised Herr Hitler as a German! But as a State there is no justification for Prussia's existence, less because it is a collection of grabbings than because a Prussian nation may once have existed, but has long ceased to exist. Prussia can, without harm, be split up into its various component parts, which must be put on an equal political footing with the smaller German States (or ex-States), all of them as "territories," "provinces," or what you will. Nor would there be any objection to the "United States of Germany," with an intentional decentralisation of administration, provided only that organs of the central legislature and executive are left. To destroy these, to break up the unity of the Reich, to chop Germany into a number of little States independent of one another—such a solution could not be accepted by any German with a sense of responsibility. Least of all one who fervently longs for lasting peace. For such a "solution" would perpetuate war in Europe, instead of abolishing it once and for all. If, out of revenge, the German nation is deprived of the right to organise itself as a State, after it has been made, with the applause of decent Germans, to surrender completely everything which, under Hitler's accursed "leadership," it has stolen from others; if it is deprived of what all other nations on earth possess, and what it has, later than most others, itself laboriously won in age-long struggles—State unity (the name Reich is of no importance)—then the still healthy part of the soul of the nation would be poisoned; a consciousness of infamy would be implanted in the very section of the nation which is European and peacefully minded, non-nationalist, "democratic," personally innocent. This would have horrible consequences for the nation's neighbours. "Federation" is capable of a good meaning, but in a certain propaganda which has suddenly developed it is often a

¹ Here and in the next few pages "we" refers to the members and sympathisers of the German Socialist Freedom League, in whose midst I am working.

euphemism for dismemberment. To take the Reich from the Germans would mean sowing the seed of a revengefulness and a nationalism such as has not yet been known. The dissolution of the Reich by the victors would contain the germ of the third world-war; it would be a crime against the generations to come.

(3) We recognise that the frontiers of Germany must be laid down otherwise than at Versailles. We look upon protests against the cession of East Prussia and Upper Silesia as futile and unreasonable. The "corridor" of 1919 was an unhappy compromise. If the German territory east of the "corridor" drops out of the Reich, the corridor ceases to be one, and healthy relationships can rule between two neighbours. East Prussia is inhabited predominantly by Germans—perhaps not in race, but in speech and national consciousness. They have, in accordance with the human rights recognised by all civilised peoples, a claim to remain Germans in language and culture, with German schools, churches, law-courts, books, theatres, and so on. This would be best guaranteed if East Prussia, with Dantzic and Memel (to which the same thing applies), were combined into a province autonomous in internal affairs, to be placed directly under the new League of Nations or the European federation or even under the totality of the United Nations, in the same way as was done with Dantzic up to 1939. If this cannot be conceded, then we co-operatively-minded Germans must accept the annexation of this territory by the Soviet Union and the Poles as final. Upper Silesia, with its mixed population, must in any case be regarded as one of the regions which naturally come under consideration for rectifications of frontiers. With a European perspective and from the point of view of world peace, it is a matter of *indifference* whether regions of mixed population, however important industrially, are united with the one State or with the other. This is not cynicism, but merely the converse of nationalist blinkerdom. Of course there must be insurance against the members of the one nationality becoming parias of the other. One way, often propounded of late, to prevent this and at the same time to protect the predominant nation from undermining by national minorities, is the evacuation of the minorities into the country of their origin.¹ This way is a harsh one. It may, however, be right to follow it. For those affected, or at least for their descendants, it may prove to be a lesser evil than the oppression with which they are otherwise threatened. Of course this presupposes that whenever such transferences of population are decided upon, they will be organised by an International Body, and conducted in such a way as to involve the minimum amount of human suffering; that, for instance, they will be carried out over a period long enough to allow the successful absorption of the transferred peoples by Germany. It will be

¹ On pp. 195-197 of this volume E. Brehm treats the same question; but from another point of view and with different conclusions.—*Editor's Note.*

the task of the Germans to co-operate in this undertaking, by doing everything in their power to make that absorption as easy and smooth as possible. Under such conditions the transfer of populations would not necessarily be the worst of solutions. Even those who do not agree should admit that, after such a catastrophic occurrence as Hitler, Europe must be thoroughly re-arranged . . . with a view to a happier future for all. Moreover, the more workers we Germans have to send abroad to help in re-building, the more we shall be able to rejoice over labour from outside pouring into our country, into a country which, in turn, will need years of re-building. The sentimentality which opposes evacuation is certainly comprehensible, but it has a touch of the provincial and lacks the eye of the historian, of the political constructor. There is a provincialism of location and also one of time. We live in a terrible but creative time, full of horror *and* full of greatness. This should be borne in mind by all who ponder over the future . . . instead of thinking conventionally, traditionally, in a petty hole-and-corner manner.

What we should never be able to accept, because it could not bring lasting peace, is the detachment of purely German regions, whether in the East—*west* of the “corridor”—or in the West or elsewhere. Separatist “movements” can be brought into being and fattened by hand, until they shout things like “Will of the population”; such a will would generally be an illusory will; in any case, a reactionary one.

(4) We accept the internationalisation of that part of the West German heavy industry which has nourished German nationalism and war-mongering. Yes, we desire a control of this sort—provided that German workers, manual and black-coated, do not lose their living and are not robbed of their trade-union rights. A transfer of the German industrial machinery to other countries is a thing which we shall never be able to defend before a German audience. The reduction of the Germans to a merely agricultural and cattle-rearing people: never. Never the removal eastwards of ten million Germans as work-slaves. But in full recognition of the right of the invaded nations to the guilty State's assistance in reconstruction we can defend in principle, at any rate, the export of man-power from Germany; in practice, too, if its extent does not exceed the measure of the reasonable, that is, if it does not entirely destroy the German economic system, which has been thrown into the most serious confusion by Hitler and the war,¹ and, above all, if it is guaranteed that the drafts shall be chosen in accordance with just principles. We should greet this export with enthusiasm if we knew that those sent by force from their homeland were those hundreds of thousands or perhaps millions of fanatical Nazis who have failed to learn the lesson of present

¹ “Germany will emerge from this war politically and economically shattered.” (Stalin, 6th November, 1944, in his address to the Moscow Soviet.)

and coming events. To get rid in this manner of these incorrigible adepts of the lowest rowdy-ideology of our time would be no sacrifice but a blessing for our nation. But it would be a tragedy if the selectors neglected to select, or, worse still, if those independent liberty-loving characters who refuse to be squeezed into a conservative party mould, or into a communist one, were picked out and deported.

(5) We would not only justify before any German audience, but we long whole-heartedly for the international supervision of certain spheres of public life in Germany with the purpose, of course, of ensuring peace, accompanied, if necessary, by drastic interference in schools, law-courts, Press (not to mention industry); and there is nothing better that we opponents of war can wish, for ourselves and mankind, than the extension of this supervision far beyond the initial and intermediate stages (for decades if necessary), provided that the Great Powers mutually renounce war. If, however, the idea of prevention is made a pretext by a bureaucratic censorship to stifle discussion, to crush artistic and philosophic creativeness, to clip the eagle's wings of the free mind, to reproduce pre-1848 conditions, a Nazi-slave atmosphere even if its wind blows from an anti-Nazi quarter, then we can never champion anything of the sort. We should, the rather, feel that the moral significance of this war had turned to its opposite. Above all, public discussion about the new part which both workers and men of mind have to play in society, the great debate about a new economic organisation and a new constitution, must be allowed to proceed in full *freedom*. Free, too, must be the shape of things emerging from the debate. We can and will defend before the nation the *poverty* of the nation; never the *unfreedom of the mind*.

And with all that we believe ourselves to be good democrats—in the sense which is common to both the traditional and the modern conception of “democracy.”

A return to the old democracy is definitely no road. The scoundrels in Germany and the fools must remain excluded, however much they dislike it, when the good and the enlightened join hands. Otherwise nothing can be done. And for this reason we need to create a *new* kind of democracy, which is at the same time a new kind of aristocracy. This is what is here described and recommended. That those who are excluded will grumble is clear. Their growl will not worry us! If we admit the enemies of freedom and peace into the government of a newly-established State of freedom and peace, then we immediately jeopardise freedom and peace at the birth of this State. To act in this way may be, in the old sense, “democratic”; it is not enlightened. I plead for reasoned, enlightened action, ignoring all obsolete dogmas.

Therefore I, as a German, am against the nationalist solution, against a national-masochist one, and for the *collaborationist* solution of

the German question. For the solution of "collaboration, with a fair line of demarcation."

Neither ethics nor mathematics can tell us how the line of demarcation should run between the power of the victors and the relative autonomy of the conquered. If it is drawn *fairly*, so that it seems fair to the Germans who are in spirit with the Allies, to the million-strong anti-satanic part of the German people, then democracy in Germany—you know which one is meant!—is not only desirable for to-morrow, but also *possible*.

As a German freedom-loving socialist, I honour Moscow for its socialist vigour, and love London-Washington for their consistent loyalty to freedom. I should consider it an unbounded misfortune if these two giant forces parted company. I refrain from giving even the roughest outline of the consequences as they might be imagined. It is solely the unity of the two powerful colossuses, the Communistic and the Liberal, that may give us the possibility to-morrow of helping to bring to pass on German soil what has never existed in history up to the present: *socialism with freedom*.

That is what ought to be written on our banners, because its meaning is unequivocal and clear; it should be *that*, and not "democracy," that vague expression of many significations, which helps out the braying of every ass and the humbug of every hypocrite.

That the term can be used to indicate something sensible is not disputed. But it is antiquated, and dangerous.

If the ideologue struggles to grasp this, the psychologist ought to comprehend it. After peace and work, shelter and food, the German people long, and their best languish for freedom and socialism.

If catchwords must be held aloft, then let us have them unequivocal, sharp-edged, strong, and clear. Those that correspond to the inward fact and to the soul conditions. Effective ones. Washed-out stuff that has not stood up to criticism is of no use. The critical, analytical, person who often finds something apt both in a thesis and in its antithesis, is so cordially attached to the child truth that he will not willingly throw it out even with the dirtiest of bath-water. Such a person readily appears to the herd, to routineers, to dogmatists and fanatics, to be sitting between more than two stools. I know that, after my utterances, the traditional democrat will look upon me as a better sort of fascist, the uncompromising priest of Nietzsche as an incorrigible democrat, the orthodox collectivist as a sanctimonious member of the Manchester school, the capitalist as a wild Bolshevik, the atheist as a converted heretic, the pious sectarian as a warped, arrogant, heathen monster, the German nationalist opponent of the Nazis and their next-door neighbour as a mad Vansittartist, the hysterical German-eater as an ultra-Prussian.

I am used to it, and it makes no odds. How secondary a matter it is, what is thought about individuals! Persons count less than ideas, and,

without much interest in defending myself (others may do that!), I will defend my idea—which in its essence is a quarter of a century old—to the last. It does not rave blindly after some specific doctrine; at the risk of being stigmatised as “eclectic,” it seeks to smelt out the gold from the quartz of a multiplicity of doctrines and to forge it into a spiritual crown which . . . will fit on the head of reality. Idealist dreaming is as absurd as an empirical neglect of ideas so that they remain mere paper. The former was the mark of leading circles in Germany about 1800, the latter about 1900. For my part, politics may be the art of the possible; this art cannot be practised until it is known what is the requisite. But it is not enough to recognise what is the requisite if the trouble of bringing it to realisation is shirked. If, at the last, thanks to the most powerful force in history—stupidity—all the trouble is yet in vain, one can nevertheless fall asleep with a tolerably easy conscience.

Walter D. Schultz

Democracy, Freedom, Socialism

Introduction

KURT HILLER has set out the principles of a new Constitution for Germany, principles with which it is possible to agree or to disagree. On the whole I agree with them. One of the things Hiller has incorporated in his draft is the idea of *Supervision*—Supervision as fourth power in the State, in addition to Executive, Legislature and Judicature. He indicates the importance and the function of supervision; he does so only briefly, of necessity. In this essay I want to devote myself partly to other questions but mainly to this problem, because I see in the carrying out of the idea of supervision the carrying into effect of a rightly understood and rightly applied, and above all a practicable, democracy.

As a Socialist I naturally want the new Germany to be a Socialist Germany, and the new Europe a Socialist Europe. As a Socialist I adhere to a conception of democracy that is only partly in agreement with the traditional conception. As a Socialist I stand for freedom, not merely freedom in the more narrowly political sense, but in the sense that includes freedom from economic exploitation.

“Freedom,” “Socialism,” and other current catchwords cover in their vagueness various unsolved theoretical problems. They beg questions that must be answered before it is possible to approach a practicable political plan with any prospect of fruitful result. Accordingly I shall not embark on my task of sketching the main lines of a control-democracy until I have attempted a critical clarification of the following terms—Socialism, European internationalism, and democracy.

I

For Socialists their aim, Socialism, remains the object of their struggle even though to-day the prospects of its achievement seem gloomier than ever. Independently of the question When, of the chances of early or relatively remote fulfilment, it remains their aim. They still desire to establish the Socialist society as quickly as possible, as bloodlessly as possible, as completely as possible.

No sensible person doubts the possibility of the achievement of Socialism. Opinions differ on the question whether it *ought* to be achieved.

Freedom-loving Socialists see in Socialism not the end of all things but the condition under which alone the most urgent problems of our time can find their solution. The outset of the Socialist epoch marks not the end of human history but the opening of a new page that will record fewer material disasters, with less consequent suffering in body, mind, and soul than before. Socialism is not a leap into perfection and not a guarantee of a free society: what it does is to create conditions under which ideals can thrive which to-day for many reasons are withering. Humanity, liberty in political, spiritual, and social matters, the security of the individual and of society, creative intellectual achievement—for all this the existing organisation of society no longer suffices. So long as the capitalist order is retained, even with the best will, a peaceful, free, progressive world is an impossibility.

For those, of course, who are sceptical of the possibility of any sort of human progress, it is only logical that they should lack the desire to make any change in things as they are. But for those who recognise the possibility of social progress, and who accordingly desire it, it is an axiom that unnecessary suffering should be done away with; they regard that as obvious, though they have no illusions as to the possibility of entirely banishing tragedy from human life.

To confine Socialism to the economic field would be a mutilation of its idea. Socialist planning is a decisive step, but it is not all-sufficient. A planned economy, a collective economy, is only a means to a higher aim. If treated as all in all, it will fail of its purpose. Socialist planning is the most rational method of producing a high degree of social wealth, though that result is only of ethical value if the social wealth is justly distributed; but for freedom-loving Socialists Socialism means more than merely the most rational method of production. It aims at liberating mankind from the despotism of property over human beings; it aims at ending the exploitation of the great majority by a small minority, and in ending that exploitation it extirpates more than one material injustice.

Socialism aims at increasing every man's share of good fortune, and at distributing not only material but spiritual goods more justly than hitherto. It does not interrupt the flow of human history, but adapts itself organically to it. It does not repudiate the great traditions of other epochs, but helps to give effect to them.

We are living in a period of transformation. A profound scepticism is spreading, challenging anything and everything, and denying eternal values. This may be intelligible after the collapse of liberalism, of formal democracy, of the world of ideas of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries; it may be intelligible in view of the repudiation of all the heritage of the past by the organised violence of National Socialism in the heart of Europe. But scepticism is no solution. At best it prepares the soil for

new ideas that enter upon the heritage of the old ones. The one idea that is efficacious to-day is the Socialist idea. Even this one cannot escape from scepticism. But it has the power to overcome scepticism, to emerge clarified from that process of thought, and to implant a new faith on the vacant spot left by the fallen tree of the old society.

II

The German question is a European question.

Pre-war Europe was an anachronism: it had failed to keep pace with technical and industrial progress. Technical advance and industrial productivity have long burst the political boundaries of States. Just as industrialisation, and the improvement of economic and political organisation that grew out of it, compelled the amalgamation of the petty States of Germany into a unitary State, so the same development in our day is urging forward the union of the States of Europe.

Efficient industries presuppose the permanent investment of vast sums in fixed capital and the maintenance of expensive organisations for their operation and development. Disturbances of the sensitive apparatus of industry inevitably produce social troubles, the effects of which have grave repercussions beyond the borders of the State affected.

The tendency of all industrial activity is towards expansion; self-sufficiency is against its nature. If a country's internal market no longer suffices, other markets must be found, beyond its borders.

No one can escape from the process of technical and industrial development. Up to the present this inescapable development has proved a curse: the task before us is to turn it into a blessing for mankind.

The political frontiers on the Continent are obstacles in the way of technical, industrial, and commercial advance, and hinder the natural process of the amalgamation of national into continental industries. Accordingly, the next step for Europe must be the achievement of economic unification on the basis of political agreement, while retaining the general principle of national independence everywhere outside the economic field. A unity based not on violence, dominance, and compulsion, but on voluntary agreement and integration, without which a lasting pacification of the Continent will remain unattainable.

Germany's subjugation of Europe is undoubtedly giving a strong impulse to nationalism in every country. The demand for national freedom, for political, administrative, and cultural independence, is a matter of course. But that does not in itself solve the problem. Of equal importance is social transformation, bringing better satisfaction of the needs of all peoples. The satisfaction of men's needs by means of the

industrial and other products of all Europe involves no technical problem. Given the political conditions, the yield of European production and organisation would provide a far higher standard of living than hitherto for all the peoples of Europe. But the political conflict is the direct product of the social inequalities in Europe: on one side a highly developed technical equipment and industrial system in search of markets, and on the other technical, economic, political, and social backwardness in need of remedy. Remedy can only come from planning within a single unit: to deal with the problem within national compartments is merely to postpone a solution, not to provide one.

It may be that the dreadful experience of this war will act as catalyst. Those who insist on a national economic system do a disservice to their own peoples, because the social tasks of a State and the social liberation of its people are impossible of achievement by action that is confined within its own frontiers.

In proportion, however, as the social needs of peoples are satisfied, personal, political, and cultural liberties will be attainable. In a State shaken by crisis, in a society of which the very existence is menaced from within and without, there can be no question of freedom. Emergencies are overcome by means of compulsion. The will to freedom can achieve nothing alone, when the objective conditions necessary for the materialisation of the principles of freedom are absent. Once the objective conditions are created, the soil prepared on which freedom can thrive, the will to freedom can develop. Economic collaboration of all Europe—and political and cultural collaboration with it—provides the objective conditions for the social, political, and national freedom of the peoples of the Continent. And in this sense the German problem is a European problem. The creation of a European order in which each State can find its place is indispensable to the permanent welfare of Europe. With the voluntary assembling of the peoples in the economic, political, and cultural fields it may well be hoped that ties will be formed that will ultimately extend beyond economic to political unity, in which the freedom of the European society will prosper far more than within the narrow limits of the separate European States.

To outline political plans for Germany now does not mean, of course, that there is any prospect of putting them into operation at once, immediately after the armistice. Such a belief would be utterly unrealistic and ludicrous. These are ideas for a long-term policy for introduction as political life gradually develops again.

With the approaching cessation of hostilities in the field, however, the future trend of a new political system in Germany is showing itself. At this very moment the pressing need is to determine how the Allies

can carry out their plans for Germany, both while operations in the field are still in progress and after fighting has ended. What kind of Germany will the Allies find? And how will Germany react to plans which in the eyes of the Germans are not so much plans for a great European principle as plans made by the victorious enemy?

One of the questions we cannot answer at present is, whether the Nazis can continue the war after the smashing of the German Army, by converting the war into a guerrilla war centred on the Salzkammergut. An article, however, in the S.S. organ, "*Das Schwarze Korps*," of the beginning of October, under the headline "*Deutscher Partisanenkrieg organisiert*," and the subsequent setting up of the "*Volkssturm*," do show that the Nazis mean business. It may be doubtful whether this plan can succeed militarily. But military success would not be the chief aim of the Nazi leaders. Their purpose is to create a psycho-political basis for the future rise of a new Nazi movement. They speculate that the many difficulties which the Allies will have to face in Germany will provide a breeding ground for discontent. They speculate on mistakes, on a very hard peace and on harsh and brutal treatment which, they hope, will make the individual German desperate and drive him into the arms of the nationalistic partisan formations, or will at least prepare a good recruiting field among the Germans, even without means of propaganda in press and radio—for reality may provide enough stimulus and help for the new Nazi movement. This plan is in preparation now. The Nazi propaganda has one main *Leitmotiv*, which is: "German people, whatever you have to endure, all the hardship of war is nothing in comparison with what you will have to suffer after defeat—in peace."

Of course the peace will be hard, but it will be just—we hope. Still, any hardship after the war, in "peace," must seem to prove that the Nazis were right, their prediction correct, their "anxiety" well founded. The investment of the Nazis is a sound one, because even the most considerate peace will bring hardships which cannot be avoided altogether. That, in any case, is the Nazi game. We must realise it unemotionally. That game has to be defeated.

Unless one is prepared to create a system in Germany that rests entirely on force, introducing a system of forced collaboration which the average German will stigmatise as Quislingism of a revolting type, there is no other way than to seek to create a basis of voluntary co-operation with willing Germans. This, in turn, requires certain conditions under which individual Germans in Germany can co-operate with the Allies without compromising themselves in the eyes of the mass of the German people. Such a policy must necessarily take into account both the Allied view and the German view, and must leave open a reasonable hope for the future of Germany.

What will be the conditions confronting those Germans who are willing to work with the Allies?

There will be a situation of housing shortage on an unimaginable scale, food shortage, exhaustion, lack of transport, lack of raw materials, disorganisation, and an industrial apparatus that has been worn out by the war. The Allies will find a Germany with a destitute population crowded on a territory certainly smaller than before, and with an altered social structure, because millions of skilled industrial workers are, according to some plans, to be deported, while millions of others, mainly the agricultural population, will flood the remnants of the German Reich from the annexed parts or those territories which had a German minority before the war. This Germany will have been bombed to an extent unparalleled in any other country. It will lack all essential means for a smooth and quick rebuilding of the devastated areas, at least for a considerable time to come. Transport will have been reduced by the war and will be further reduced by the surrender of a great part of it to countries which have been deprived of locomotives, waggons, and other means of transport by the German army. If the deportations and the destruction of industry in Germany proposed in the Morgenthau plan are carried out even on a modified scale, there will be hardly any possibility of having, for instance, fertilisers and machinery for agriculture, nor would any exportation be possible in order to enable essential goods to be imported.

In so far as material conditions are concerned, Germany's situation will for a time be much the same as that of other states in Europe which have had to suffer so dreadfully from the war. But in one respect there is this significant difference: All surrounding countries will be able after a while to look forward to an organised life, to a new start of political, economic and cultural activity. This prospect is lacking in Germany, especially as the principles of the Atlantic Charter as a whole will presumably not be a guide any longer for the future policy of the Allies so far as Germany is concerned. Therefore the Nazi hope of carrying on a guerrilla war is not so unrealistic as purely military considerations might suggest. Politically and psychologically, this kind of brigandry, coupled with a wild romanticism and mysticism fed by a continual state of desperation, and with a sense of guilt and frustration, will favour the Nazi plan. On the other hand, it should not be left to the Nazis alone to determine the development of events. Whether their "anarchism in permanence" can be brought to fruition or not will partly depend on the policy of the Allies toward Germany. This policy has started already and will continue all through the occupation period. It should take account of the simple truth that:

"Seventy million people in the heart of Europe cannot be outlawed for ever, and at some future date they must take their place with the other nations of the world."

(*Sir Walter Layton in his brochure "How to Deal with Germany."*)

In a statement to the Press the Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, Civil Affairs Branch of Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, has proclaimed the aim of uprooting and destroying Nazism in Germany. That is a task in which all people of good will would like to participate, especially those Germans in Germany who are anti-Nazi. In fact, without the help of Germans this achievement will not be possible. As Sir Walter Layton says in the brochure just mentioned:

“It would be the best possible outcome if, in the first awakening to the degradation into which Germany has fallen, the German people themselves were to turn against and punish or dispossess those who have actively collaborated with the Nazis . . . Nothing the Allies can do can take the place of this internal purge.”

The question is whether the Allies, as occupying powers, will allow any “disorderly behaviour” in this respect, and whether they will not prefer an internal purge by “nice” methods, which amounts to prohibiting the internal purge altogether. In any case, that is a question of punishing individuals. The destruction of an ideology cannot be accomplished by military force, nor is it sufficient to adopt simply organisational measures. No ideology has ever been destroyed by organised force alone, because even under the most terrorist regime there is still freedom of thought, reduced of course by methods of scientific propaganda. Not even the Nazis have succeeded in killing a different ideology to their own. They have, it is true, murdered and crippled the opposition elements in Germany, have decimated them and reduced them to inactivity. But they have never reached a point at which the vigilance of the Gestapo and other police or party forces would be unnecessary or could be relaxed to an appreciable extent, nor have they been able to close down their Concentration Camps. The latest horrors committed against potential leaders of the German opposition, the murder of Breitscheid, Leuschner, Thaelmann, and many others, the murder even of generals and of Right wing politicians like Goerdeler, prove that the Nazis are at least conscious of the fact that at some time an opposition might arise. So potential leaders were murdered—the ideological remnants of the past.

It was proclaimed not long ago from high Allied quarters that this war is becoming less and less ideological, whereas President Roosevelt once said that this is a “war of ideas,” and the term “European Civil War,” implying a war between Freedom and Slavery, Democracy and Nazism, cutting through the nations and disregarding frontiers, gripped all people in the first years of this war. If the conception of a continually less ideological war were adopted by the occupying authorities, then there would be scarcely any hope of eradicating Nazism. Nor would it be possible to win over freedom-loving Germans to a progressive Allied policy, because there would be no progressive policy, but only old, very old measures for a new, a unique situation. The suppression of the

Nazi party is not enough. War must be waged against the ideology of Nazism by means of a stronger and a better ideology. Only great ideas count in a time like this.

Honest co-operation cannot be secured from those who are prepared to give unconditional collaboration; the co-operators must be looked upon as partners, not as slaves; they must know and have the right to know to what end their co-operation will lead. The stress laid on the non-ideological character and content of this war—and consequently of the following peace—has one paramount danger: Nothing would suit Nazis and reactionaries in Germany better than this formula. They could and would exploit to the full the purely administrative orientation of the Allies. They would acclaim very heartily the "*Sachlichkeit*," the matter-of-fact, business-like attitude of the Allies and their disregard of ideological "nonsense," apart from some vague phrases of "anti-Nazism" which even ardent Nazis would be prepared to stomach for a certain period. They would acclaim this non-ideologic policy if only for the reason that they themselves would not be brought into conflict with their own belief. So much consideration they have not deserved.

No nation, and in particular no Allied nation, can hope to rule successfully in Germany by force alone; that is to say with the aim of creating a stable Europe and, as a pre-condition, a stable Germany. Sooner or later the Allied occupying powers will be faced with the question how far they will seek the co-operation of Germans, as the Nazis have sought the co-operation of Frenchmen, Norwegians, Dutch, Belgians, and others. The Nazi policy succeeded to a considerable degree. In the beginning there was a readiness in the occupied countries to collaborate with the new masters, if only because there seemed to be no other hope of survival. This will happen in Germany too. The collaborators in the formerly German-occupied countries are being punished as traitors. And rightly so—they have betrayed their country and have served a system which is the incarnation of evil. But why was that cause evil? Because we judge by ideological and moral standards and not by standards of success. Thus the problem of German co-operation will stand before the Allies in its full significance. And every German is confronted by the same question. But let us get one thing clear now:

The policy of the Allies will determine which type of German is prepared to co-operate (ruling out co-operation by compulsion). The Nazis have employed the most evil individuals of every country as collaborators, men and women who served their Nazi masters by the most repulsive methods. The reaction of the masses of the people was accordingly hostile. The collaborationists were a minority backed by German military force. The nations under occupation were split

into collaborators and the rest of the people. The outcome was a state of suppression and a smouldering civil war, if not in the beginning, at all events toward the end. The Allies will find in Germany men and women ready to work with them, as they were ready to serve Hitler so long as he was successfully defying the world, while the others, his opponents, were put into Concentration Camps and murdered. In other words—the type of German that will come forward to co-operate will be determined by the policy the Allies employ. A progressive policy will appeal to progressive forces in Germany, a reactionary policy will revive the reactionaries. As Sir Walter Layton writes:

“Fortunately, there are many Germans who have never sold their souls. How widely anti-Nazi views are held we do not know. But they exist and will undoubtedly spread if conditions are favourable.”

Are the Allies to rule Germany in such a way that no freedom-loving, democratic-minded, socialistic, decent men or women who love their country can willingly give their support? Are these Germans to be asked not only to defend measures which are hard but just, but to defend those which are morally indefensible and can be accepted only by those who figure as tools without convictions of their own? In this latter case the Allies will no doubt find collaborators; collaborators who are interested in discontent, for this policy would play into the hands of the Nazis, showing the German people how right they were to predict a “ruthless enemy,” who is out to destroy the German nation, to enslave the Germans, starving them, deporting them, reducing them to a miserable rabble—in the name of humanity, decency, democracy, in the name of Christ and of Socialism. A policy in Germany which is beyond the comprehension even of those of definitely good will, must produce difficulties for the Allies themselves on a scale which can be met only by machine-guns and bombs. Such a policy would also rule out any material reconstruction in Germany, and therefore rule out any political stability. “If ten years hence the German people are worse off than they were under the Nazis, the hope of permanent peace will be faint.” This statement by Sir Walter Layton puts the whole question in a nutshell. It is a directive as well as a warning. This constructive line does not, of course, by any means exclude drastic measures against war criminals. Only this punishment has to be explained to all those who do not know the facts—by facts. Punishment is necessary, but it has to be balanced by a positive, constructive policy. Furthermore, any just punishment would find perfect understanding among those Germans who never bowed their head to Nazism. They should be used by the Allies not as tools for a doubtful policy forced on them, but as allies inside Germany who have the right to take part in shaping the policy for which they, as co-operators, will shoulder part of the responsibility.

The question before the Allies at this very moment is certainly a very difficult one: should they outline a policy which would encourage co-operation, or should they give up hope of having Germans on their side who would be willing, under favourable conditions, to work with the occupation authorities? Of course, the path to be pursued is to some extent determined by the partly objective, partly prejudiced estimate formed of the conditions existing in Germany, of the strength of the anti-Nazi section, and partly by higher policy covering the question what shall be done with Germany. It might be imagined that co-operation is not wanted at all, because if it is wanted it cannot be obtained without giving a certain amount of rope to the co-operators, a certain amount of freedom to shape their own life, in short a certain degree of independence in their own sphere. Furthermore, such a policy would have to admit from the start that there *are* co-operators and that there *is* consequently a willingness to make a joint effort.

The happenings inside Germany are at present rather obscure. The British public has to rely on newspaper reports, taking for granted that a picture as unbiased as is humanly possible is being presented. These reports naturally influence public opinion, and so help to shape the future policy of the Allies toward Germany. Truthful and reliable reporting in the Press is consequently a very important requisite. No doubt the Press has tried hard on the whole to give a correct picture of what is going on in Germany, as far as it can be ascertained, and what is happening in that small corner of Germany which is under Allied occupation. As to reporting—there are exceptions. Here is one:

In the *Daily Mail* of October 21, 1944, column 3, page 1, a "Special Correspondent," John Hall, writes about German co-operation:

"There is little evidence that even the Germans who are not Nazis have any intention of giving us real aid. Those who are working with us are working to help their fellow citizens in the occupied area—not us. In my view the term "anti-Nazi" should be forgotten. All observations in this corner of Germany lead to the conclusion that they don't exist."

The same correspondent, column 1, page 1, *Daily Mail*, October 21, 1944:

"Two days later the garrison defending the city was out of touch with the German Army. A helpful German labourer aided the Americans in that. Within a few minutes of the air raid shelter where he was hiding being overrun by American troops he led sappers to the sidewalk. "Three feet down," he said, "you will find the telephone cables connecting Aachen with the rest of Germany." The sappers had the cables uncovered in a matter of seconds and severed the lines."

Headline, splashed over two columns in heavy type:

"AMERICANS FIND ONE TRAITOR IN AACHEN."

One cannot blame the correspondent for the headline. But his report in column 3, headed "This people will never co-operate," is blown sky-high by his report in column 1. It was perhaps unfortunate that these two reports from the same correspondent appeared the same day on the same page in the same paper. The branding of this "helpful German labourer," who possibly saved many American lives, as a traitor, is a matter of taste. The important question is: will those Germans who co-operate be considered as traitors? Another important question is, will the facts be twisted in such a way that they fit the current opinion, or will opinions be allowed to adapt themselves to facts? In this particular case the correspondent has, apart from contradictory reports, come to general conclusions which are based on observations in a tiny corner of Germany. The reliability of such reports may be doubted.

The Allies are outspoken in their policy. They say: We will enter Germany as conquerors, but not as oppressors. That is a very wise outline for the immediate policy while fighting is still in progress. On the other hand, the Americans have decided that there shall be no "fraternisation"—whatever this term may mean. In the matter of co-operation, what does "No fraternisation" mean?

This much is clear: co-operation, if successful, can only take place on the basis of sincerity on both sides. Sincerity involves a certain amount of sympathy and certainly mutual trust and confidence. There must be an agreement between the two parties as to the basic elements of the policy pursued. Is the term "no fraternisation" intended to cover co-operation? If it is, it will make honest co-operation very difficult, because it would erect an artificial barrier between Allied authorities and German co-operators. For both the work would be complicated. Such a term lacks clearness and encourages misunderstanding.

As for co-operation itself—of course the Germans who do co-operate want to help themselves and their countrymen. It is well to have that point clear. Besides, occupation brings hardship. Reasonable people, even Germans, will understand that and put up with it. Co-operation of Germans is born of consideration not for the Allies, but mainly for Germany, although this attitude serves the interest of both Germany and the Allied nations. To expect "real" help from the Germans under occupation, without explaining what "real" help means, is nonsense, and to expect help without anything in return is at best *naïveté*. Co-operation can only function for any length of time if both sides consider it advantageous, not for emotional reasons. That does not exclude honesty, and it certainly should not exclude criticism. The occupying authorities may want co-operation because it eases their task and makes it possible for them to achieve something. So do the Germans. But co-operation

based on sentimentality would come to nothing. Co-operation, then, must aim at a joint effort for a common purpose.

A policy dictated by the assumption that in Germany after the defeat there will be no one willing to co-operate, even under reasonable conditions, is a pessimistic and negative policy which must necessarily produce right from the beginning an atmosphere of mistrust and failure. A policy based on the assumption that all Germans are misled Germans who, when spoken to softly and understandingly, would be prepared to co-operate without reservations, is doomed as well. In every nation there are opportunists, idealists, the leaders who mislead, and the misled who are willing to learn better. It is now up to the Allies to decide which part of the German people should receive their support. And that will be decided by the still hidden plans of the Allied Governments towards Europe. If their aim is to create a Europe which is split into "spheres of influence," then they will have no use for Germans who aim at a policy of good neighbourliness. If, on the other hand, the Allied plans aim at a stable Europe with a policy which supports the unity of that war-ridden continent, then the progressive Germans, the type of the "good Europeans," will have a field in which to work. Good judgment will be needed to steer the right course under the very difficult conditions. Openmindedness, insight, knowledge, understanding without sentimentality and weakness, a firm hand when necessary, and a balanced policy of punishment for the culprits and help and hope for the innocent and passive onlookers—all these things are needed. There will be masses of people who are hostile. There will be many opportunists who will submit to anything. And there will be a number of people with a clear idea of their own about Germany, about Europe, and about co-operation. It will perhaps not be so easy to work with the latter, because they see the problems and have both the Allied and the German view in mind. But they are the people who, from conviction, would resist any attempt by the Nazis to start their movement again. The thing needed is to find them, and, when found, to support them. Given conditions under which they can work among their fellow countrymen, they may be of immense assistance not only to their own country, but to the Allies as well. All primitivism in a policy toward Germans and Germany will make a mess of things. It has to be realised that mistrust does not exist only among the Allies toward Germany; owing to happenings in the past it exists also among progressive Germans, anti-Nazi Germans, toward the Allies! It does no good to overlook such facts.

If the Allies have any dealings with forces in Germany which helped to build up Nazism and which made it possible to wage war, which lent their hand to the suppression of the progressive movements in Germany before and under Hitler, and which would leave the Nazi ship only because there is no safety left in that vessel, then estrangement between Allies and their natural co-operators is inevitable. The mere

declaration of being "anti-Nazi" is not enough; that label may cover those reactionary forces of old standing which are always prepared to accept any label. The cleaning of that German house must come from within, but the help of the Allies would be welcome.

Co-operation? Yes, under sane conditions. Let us always bear in mind that the German question is a European question, and the fate of Europe is bound up with that of Germany. If the Allied policy breaks down in Germany, all will suffer—Allies, Germany, Europe, and in the wider sense, the world. The future offers a chance once more. Let us hope that not emotion but reason will reign with those who have the say.

III

Clearness of aim, clearness as to the ways and means of attaining the aim—these are no guarantees of success, but they are indispensable conditions for it.

The conception of "democracy" would enjoy less popularity if it provided a clearer outline of what it implies. Its ambiguities enable every politician to make play with it without any risk of being tied down to precise, clearly defined, unambiguous principles. The use of the term does not serve unity in the Socialist sector; it does not assist the clarification of controversial ideas; least of all does it assist the materialisation of the Socialist idea.

If the attempt is made to determine whether in the post-Hitler Germany "democracy" is possible at all, and if so whether it is desirable, no answer is possible without a preliminary dissection of the conception, to establish what is meant by democracy and what political consequences it involves. This seems to me to be the more urgent since the Weimar democracy has left in the minds of many Germans an impression that will create little desire to see it again, for the simple reason that the psychological conditions for it seem to be absent among large sections of the people. Weimar provided the Germans with an ample measure of political freedom, but without mastering the real problems, the essential social problems. The Weimar Republic foundered on that reef. The recognition of this forbids any automatic, unthinking repetition.

Moreover, history does not stand still. That which at one time seemed adequate for the existing conditions is not bound to be adequate for the conditions of the morrow.

The conception of democracy badly needs chemical purification and isolation.

A Liberal will say: "Democracy is the guarantee of freedom and justice; it is the counterpart of human dignity."

A Socialist: "Socialism is complete democracy; for Socialism guarantees the participation of all in the social wealth of a society."

A Communist: "True democracy is the dictatorship of the proletariat; for in it the overwhelming majority of the people, all the exploited, find their representation."

A German pocket dictionary, published before the "*Umbruch*", the Nazi "ploughing up" of the German State, defines democracy as "The rule of the people; that is to say, a State in which legislation and administration are carried out by officials elected by the people."

Hitler declares that National Socialism is the truest form of democracy, since he, Hitler, has carried with him the majority of the German people.

Meyers Lexicon, 1937 edition, vol. ii, has the following entry under "*Demokratie*": "'Rule of the people,' form of State in which the power of the State lies with the people. Direct democracy and indirect (representative) are distinguished . . . The contrasting of D. and authoritarian State is a Liberal falsification . . . We find the purest form of a true D. realised in Nat. Soc. Germany. The Leader is supported by the trust and the love of the people and feels responsible to it alone . . . Since then (1933) there has been in the German people only one remaining bearer of sovereignty, and that is the people itself."

In the *Pocket Oxford Dictionary* we find under "Democracy": "Government by the people, State in which this prevails . . . the principle that all citizens have equal political rights."

In the symposium *Freedom—its Meaning*, from which the following quotations are taken, Thomas Mann says at the outset of his essay: "Modern democracy is historically nothing more than the form of sovereignty of the bourgeoisie, of the *tiers état*", and at the end of the essay we read: "We have discovered what democracy is: it is human adjustment between a logical contrast, the reconciliation of freedom and equality, of individual values and the demands of society."

Jacques Maritain: "Truly, and even by reason of the complex and ambivalent phenomenon just referred to, the word democracy itself has become so equivocal that it would be perhaps desirable to find a new word to designate what I called a moment ago the true city of human rights."

Harold J. Laski: "We have sought to project the idea of democracy on to the political plane; we have denied it access to the planes of economic and social life."

In *America, the Story of a Free People*, Allan Nevins and Henry Steele Commager include human behaviour in the conception of democracy: "Manners were becoming more democratic, less formal and punctilious. Foreign observers were shocked by the general tobacco-spitting; the rapid feeding at table; the impertinent curiosity."

"S.A." writes in *Aufbau*, New York, November 5, 1943: "The world

has recognised that democracy is the highest form of national community. The subordination of the individual and of the minority to the majority is an indispensable condition for the attainment of unity.”

These few quotations make it clear that democracy may mean (a) a Constitution, (b) a type of social behaviour, (c) a way of thinking. Is it surprising that thinking people find it irritating when, for instance, James Burnham, in his interesting book *The Managerial Revolution*, gives this brief and smart definition of the Socialist society: “Socialist society means a society which is classless, democratic, and international”?

The sin of omitting to explain the meaning attached to “democratic” and “democracy” is committed again by the drafters of appeals from the German *émigrés*; in one we read (Point 3): “The first objective of the post-war international policy of German Socialists must be to integrate a democratic Germany into this international order. It is essential for the success of such a policy that the principles of the Atlantic Charter should be applied to a democratic Germany in their full extent.”

Here it is taken for granted that “democratic” and “democracy” are conceptions free from all ambiguity; words with which everybody associates a clear and precise idea. They are far from being so: when we look into it we find the word used as a synonym for all sorts of ideas. It is used in the sense of Parliamentaryism; universal, equal, secret, direct franchise; majority decision; State based on law; progress; right of coalition; freedom of the Press; rights of minorities—and, indeed, of freedom in general. In other connections “democracy” means protection of property, human rights, anti-imperialism, humanity, absence of violence; justice, equality before the law, human equality in general, human decency. “Democracy” is also used as antithesis to tyranny, dictatorship, absolute monarchy, oligarchy, despotism, hierarchy, privilege, corruption. This short list could be vastly extended.

With such a mass of permissible interpretations of the term, it is the duty of serious students of politics to seek and pursue clarity as to the aspects of democracy to be accepted and those to be rejected.

It is particularly the duty of Socialists to consider whether the use of the term “democracy” in the sense of majority decision on important questions of social life is acceptable or not; whether such majority decision is injurious or not to the higher principle of the Socialist idea; and, indeed, whether the achievement of Socialism itself may or may not legitimately be made the subject of majority decision. For a consistent democrat, ready to bow to the decisions of the majority even when he is convinced that the majority is in the wrong, there is only one answer: he must be ready even to run open-eyed into disaster if the majority of the people so decides.

Is the majority the criterion in all questions? Is the will of the majority to be the guiding line for all political action? If so, the Admin-

istration, however wise its members, must adapt itself to the will and come down to the level of the average man. In that case its duty is no longer to make ethical principles, convictions, and a definite aim the bases of political action; principles, convictions, aim are replaced by the force of mass decision.

Leadership of high quality in a Government and administration cannot be the creature of mass emotions, but must itself create and shape the will of the masses. A rightly understood democracy is compounded of both liberty and authority. The rule of the mediocre leads not to a "medium" and moderate dictatorship, but to the worst despotism, to tyranny.

Authority and liberty—in a broadly conceived speech before the United Kingdom Branch of the Empire Parliamentary Association, one of the most important speeches of this war, Field Marshal Smuts dealt with the problem of democracy and declared:

"We should only get to practical solutions of our problems if we had a good mixture of both democracy and freedom on the one hand and leadership on the other. Here in this great democracy we had learned what leadership meant in a great emergency. Freedom, like patriotism, is not enough. In the difficulties before us we shall want both leadership and democracy. We shall want not only freedom but also discipline. Discipline is just as essential."

In so far as democracy is taken to connote justice, freedom, equality before the law, equality in social matters, protection of the person, humanity, human dignity, in so far as it is taken to include the eternal values of human culture, no reasonable person and certainly no Socialist will utter a word against it. If, however, democracy also implies the universal right of participation in the decision of matters that demand qualifications for their proper determination, qualifications that cannot be attributed to the majority of those participating, then it demands the veto of all sensible people.

It demands it if only because in an egalitarian democracy it is not usually the best type of a people that makes its appearance, but the average type of voter. Outsiders with ideals, knowledge, and initiative have little chance of gaining an adequate number of votes from a constituency, because they lack, to begin with, the needed party machinery, which provides powerful support for party candidates, and further because they have a different outlook from the rest, and are a disturbance to the peace of the average man. He has no liking for "nonsense"; what he wants is "solidity," "traditions"; he wants to be represented by a "sensible man," in short a man who has proved by his mediocrity that he does not regard himself as a cut above his electors' estimate of themselves.

What seems to me one of the most weighty arguments against the one-sided, "pure" "democracy" of the single-chamber system repre-

sented by Weimar Germany, a system lacking the balance of a counterweight, is that once it was in operation it smoothed the path into Parliament for mediocrity and inferiority. It actually bred a sheep-like docility, and permitted only one type of parliamentarian to enter the representative assembly, the persons who were prepared to "toe the line", to accept the position of subordinates, to "observe discipline", even in questions of outstanding importance and questions of conscience. It is only fair to add that even in the German Reichstag there were personalities of high character who stood out honourably above the average. In general, however, it was the average that established itself in the German Parliament and not the type above the average: it was a type corresponding to the qualities, both surface and inward, of the average voter rather than of the best among the voters.

John Stuart Mill, that great prophet of Liberalism, gives expression to that view in the following words in his essay "On Liberty":

"No government by a democracy or a numerous aristocracy, either in its political acts or in the opinions, qualities, and tone of mind which it fosters, ever did or could rise above mediocrity, except in so far as the sovereign Many let themselves be guided (which in the best times they always have done) by the counsels and influence of a more highly gifted and instructed One or Few . . . The honour and glory of the average man is that he is capable of following that initiative; that he can respond internally to wise and noble things, and be led to them with his eyes open."

So wrote John Stuart Mill. No other passage shows so plainly as this one that Mill's enthusiasm for democracy did not extend so much to its egalitarian side. But Mill is above the suspicion even of the most extreme egalitarians of being an opponent of those elements of democracy which still seem just as valuable to us in these days, the elements concerned with personal liberty, humanity, and justice.

There are people who not only approve but desire the triumph of the mediocre and the average in politics, the so-called "sensible people" and "realists"; with that attitude it is useless to argue. But those who sincerely contend that majoritarian democracy is the only means of helping the best in a people to triumph must be shown that they are mistaken.

Let us consider the contention that democracy is the rule of the people. "The rule of the people" means "the sovereignty of the people", it means that a will of the people exists and that the people can decide and does give decisions. Where do we find that? Would a democratic system be conceivable in which this principle of popular sovereignty really existed?

We may hear it said that representative democracy, as distinct from direct democracy, is a watering-down of the original principle. This it

indeed is—but in reality direct democracy is not the original form of complete democracy, but is farther from that ideal than those theorists would have us believe.

There have been examples in history of a direct democracy, examples which were remote from “popular sovereignty”. Direct democracy was practised in ancient Athens. But that was not “democracy of the people” but the democratic rule of a minority of free citizens over a majority of unfree. The selection for the *Ecclesia* was carried out in the most rigorous fashion. Only those citizens were allowed to take part in it whose parents had themselves been free citizens of Athens. The classic democracy of Athens seems to us less “classic” when measured by our present-day conceptions of democracy. The *Encyclopaedia Britannica* puts it quite plainly:

“Thus Pericles restricted citizenship to those who were the sons of an Athenian father, himself a citizen, and an Athenian mother. This system excluded not only all the slaves, who were more numerous than the free population, but also resident aliens, subject allies, and those Athenians whose descent did not satisfy this criterion. The Athenian democracy, which was typical in ancient Greece, was a highly exclusive form of government.”

In other words, the participation of the people in the Athenian direct democracy was so limited and so much smaller than even in the capitalistic democracies of our day, that there can be no comparison between the two. The modern conception of egalitarian democracy is sharply distinguished from the “classic” in that present-day democracy, or at all events the idea that inspires it, is against exclusiveness and aims at the extension of political rights to all adult members of society, with the exception of certain categories such as criminals and the insane.

There still exists in our day one example of direct democracy—in Switzerland. In the Canton of Glarus, in Ausser-Roden and Inner-Roden (the two sections of the Canton of Appenzell), and in Obwalden and Nidwalden (Canton of Unterwalden), the male inhabitants (women are excluded) assemble for the annual *Landesgemeinde* (provincial assembly), elect the Government, and decide on legislation proposed. In the Canton of Uri this method was followed until 1928.

The assembly of the *Landesgemeinde* is technically manageable in these Swiss Cantons, because the number of participants is relatively small. But there is not only the question whether direct democracy is technically practicable, but the political question whether or not the summoning of all men entitled to vote, that is to say their direct participation in the act of government, provides a guarantee that their sovereign individual will can find expression.

Originally there met in the *Landesgemeinde* men of very similar social status—peasant proprietors who enjoyed a great measure of independence in their homesteads, each a petty king of his land. There were,

in any case, no great differences in extent of property. To-day, in the twentieth century, the inequality of possessions is great and manifest, and while this fact has not yet destroyed the outward political form of direct democracy in these Swiss cantons, it has radically deformed its content.

The men meeting in the *Landesgemeinde* follow the lead, inevitably, of those among them who are in a socially stronger position; for the simple reason that it is the wealthy men who provide the daily bread of the majority of those assembled. The rest are politically "free" but socially very far from free. The big owner-farmer or the manufacturer, the banker or the merchant, will march with "his men" to the *Landesgemeinde*, either first giving his views on the questions to be dealt with or doing so with the utmost plainness at the assembly. This done, is it conceivable that the many propertyless voters who are dependent on these wealthy men would dare to vote against the will of their employer, courting instant dismissal? The difference between direct and indirect democracy in this concrete case lies in the following fact: Under direct democracy the big farmer, the manufacturer, the high official, the banker, as members of the possessing class, all exercise more direct influence over the socially weaker voters than under representative democracy, in which more subtle forms of influencing come into use.

Direct democracy, even when desirable, is technically possible only in tiny States. In its idea it is the purest form of democracy, but as a rule it is technically impracticable. In addition to this, in the era of capitalism it is now, where still practised, no more than a caricature, and not a lovely one.

Still less does representative democracy, the handing over of votes to delegates, the yielding up of the right of decision and the transfer of this right to others—still less does representative democracy correspond to the idea of "popular sovereignty" in the sense of an equal influence of all over the business of state. How does representative democracy function? How is the electing done and who is elected?

Candidates are elected, but not candidates of "the people" but candidates of the parties, which as organisations represent only a small minority of the people.

The voter usually has only a very limited number of candidates from whom to choose, and candidates not of his own nomination but nominated for him. As a democrat and a responsible citizen of the State, the voter has no desire to waste his vote on tiny parties or groups, and this still further restricts his choice, for as a rule only two or three or, exceptionally, four parties are worth the assignment of his vote from the point of view of serviceability and common sense.

Three or four parties offer their candidates. These are men with whom the individual voter has no acquaintance at all or only a superficial acquaintance from attendance at meetings or through some such

means; and even at those meetings it is not Mr. "X" personally but the candidate of the party who addresses the voter. Thus the voter is invited to choose a man of whom he knows, or should know, that he does not represent the interests of the voter, even if he has any desire to do so, but represents the interests of his party. For it is the party with its organisation that confers power. It has it in its own power to launch the candidate on his career or to drop him. Psychologically it is entirely intelligible and natural that the candidate's interest should be bound up in reality with his party and not with the voter. The two are not necessarily irreconcilable, but often they have been in the past, and often they still are.

Thus the voter, as such, has exercised no influence over the selection of candidates. Has the man in the party, the party member, who also functions as voter? Only to a very limited extent can he secure a hearing in the party for his own view. The actual deciding factor in this regard is the bureaucracy, the party officials, who in their turn carry on the administration of the party by means of the delegation of membership. A perfectly honourable occupation, for that matter, but not without its dangers. Sometimes there are actually primary elections in the party. But even then the law of inertia usually carries the day; the candidates elected are those proposed by the party leadership, and the membership "confirms" them. If in spite of this outsiders make their way into the circle of the elect, outsiders who seem unsuitable, nothing is easier than to eliminate them; they are offered a hopeless constituency and consequently come to grief; the case has been disposed of and democracy has received its due. Often enough in Germany, in any case, it was not the moral and intellectual quality of the candidate that determined his candidature, but his adaptability to the idiosyncracies of the party cliques, his tractability and obsequiousness, his unquestioning loyalty to the mighty in his party. Under such circumstances there could be no question of any real sense of responsibility to his electors. Here it seems to me that a critical principle of democracy is infringed.

This, at all events, was what happened in most cases in Germany. One thing that unquestionably helped to discredit the Weimar Republic, and democracy itself as a political system, was the cool, calculating, routine procedure of the Republic. Among other reasons was this:

The man in the street felt that he was delivered over to the political powers, over which he had no control. This often led to political abstentionism and to the catch phrase that politics ruins character, the truth being that bad characters ruined politics. It was possible for the man who kept out of politics to do so as an individual, but not as a social being. Instead of being an active participant in politics, with a will of his own, he became merely the subject of other people's will.

Indifference to politics was, in any case, the normal thing in Germany. In addition to this, it was demonstrated during the crisis of 1929-33 that

even the "freest democracy in the world" did nothing for the most pressing needs of the mass of the people. Emergency decrees did not solve the problem of social misery, they only accentuated it. It is entirely possible that certain obscure men in authority actually wanted that misery, and promoted it by emergency decrees devised for that very purpose. However that may be, what remained? The desire for change, for something new, no matter what; for a "strong hand", to make an end of the old lumber of a weak and incompetent democracy. And the New came; the "strong hand" seized control—seized it so powerfully that very soon Weimar seemed even to the most extreme of its critics on the Left the lesser evil. Many came to this realisation too late. The tragedy pursued its course. Many went to their death, many more will do so yet. But that does not absolve us from the duty of recognising that the Weimar democracy in Germany prepared the way for the capitulation of great masses of the people to barbarism. Without cynicism it may be said that Weimar did good service to National Socialism.

For Germany, apart from the fundamental question of the desirability of any form of democracy, the fact of the failure of the Weimar democracy has its own significance. Psychologically it has had the result that to Germans "democracy" is synonymous with weak leadership in the State, with foolish humanitarianism that indulges in fine phrases but gets nothing done; it is associated with venality and corruption in Parliament, with party intrigues, with unemployment and hunger, destitution and hopelessness. Where the stomach rumbles—and in Germany it has rumbled in many people—formal democratic liberty counts for nothing: the physical hunger must be stilled before the hunger for the vote. Great as is the longing for freedom among the German people, for freedom to speak, to live, to exist as one chooses, any repetition of Weimar would lead—quite apart from the sequelae of the poisoning with National Socialism—to the same failure as before. Thus the essential thing for Germany is not to hold elections and set a new Parliament on its feet, but to solve the question how personal, political, and social freedom is to be assured.

Those who imagine that these problems can find their solution exclusively in the democracy of the old style, that some such state of constitutionalism and freedom can be restored in a Germany that is suffering from profound scepticism and, especially among the young, from cynicism—those who imagine this have learnt nothing from history and are destitute of psychological insight.

Instead, new forms of democracy must be found that will remove the risks involved in majority rule while retaining the acceptable and, indeed, desirable elements of democracy, such as equality before the law and political, personal, and spiritual liberty. All ready-made

solutions, all attempts to build up a democracy in Germany on the model of other States with a different history and tradition and different social and political conditions, are doomed to failure.

The solution of the internal political problem in Germany is bound up with certain indispensable conditions, which must be grasped wherever it is desired to see a change in Germany.

Without the uprooting of the fundamental evil of German aggression, that is to say without a radical change in the conditions of ownership of industry, land, and banks, no change to a policy of peace is conceivable.

The disintegration of German democracy has clearly and unambiguously demonstrated what Lenin placed on record in countless articles on the functioning of formal bourgeois democracy; his forecasts have been borne out. The German bourgeoisie was ready to keep to the "rules" of the "democratic game" so long as it saw no real threat to its claims to dominance. The rules of the democratic game mean in this connection that the possessing and, *nolens volens*, the non-possessing section of the people shall make up their minds to seek a social compromise and to observe it; a "compromise" that does not remove class struggle but modifies it and so makes compromise possible.

The crisis of 1929, which reduced vast masses of workpeople to unemployment and destitution, and also ruined large sections of the middle and lower middle classes, faced Germany with the question, of the utmost urgency, of finding a way out. The only possible way of deliverance for the propertyless masses, living in the deepest misery, was through the socialisation of the vast means of production—then lying idle—of the German industries, of the junker estates, and of the banks. But if the relative conditions of ownership were so radically changed, the relative power would naturally be changed proportionately. Positions of power of vital importance to the bourgeoisie would have had to be given up, and this was regarded as out of the question. A deep ideological fissure passed through the people; and this had fateful consequences, as Joseph A. Schumpeter says in his *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*: "The democratic method never works at its best when nations are much divided on fundamental questions of social structure."

More than six million men who were able and willing to work were workless for years. Great numbers of small tradesmen and members of the middle and lower middle classes were robbed of their assets and their assured incomes. No means of rescue from this plight were visible; on the contrary, each day brought new anxieties. The parties of the Left, which at the last free election had substantially maintained their voting strength, were nevertheless losing more and more of their ideological attraction, not least because they appealed separately to the country at the polls and did not join forces after the election, and because in Germany's situation weakness and the spirit of compromise had no

power of attraction. The parties of the Right lost more and more of their membership to Hitler, and the Left were not willing—although they had the needed arms and material, a fact that should not be overlooked—to fix bayonets, *their* bayonets, in defence of the Weimar democracy. Panic, weakness, lack of confidence, cowardice, perplexity, and fear of the consequences of a civil war—which might have prevented the world war—were the signs of the situation of the Left; among the Right there was a liking for the “strong man” who was out to save Germany from Socialism and Bolshevism. The Left stood ready armed but motionless. Not so Hitler. With his thugs and his satellites, in unison with the German ruling caste, he seized his opportunity and made an end of certain political liberties and later of all others, an act of which the mass of the people, leaderless as they were, and at first ready for any “change”, did not realise the full gravity, because amid all the freedom brought by the Weimar democracy the essential social demands had remained unfulfilled. In the thirties it was felt in Germany that the franchise was a farce; and freedom of the press and of discussion and of organisation logically lost its value if, after all, it all brought no real change for the better. In place of all this, what did Hitler offer?

Hitler did not offer freedom within the State, but he offered an apparent social security, as will be seen; and, indeed, a security with some substance: there was work, though for a devilish purpose. He also offered external freedom, national “liberation” from fetters which everyone who was honest with himself admitted to be non-existent, but which Hitler, astute psychologist as he was, made more keenly felt than the real fetters he himself fastened on the people. And indeed the policy of imperialist expansion, of finding outlets abroad for the discontent at home, of transferring the threatened explosion to foreign soil—all this was what the German ruling caste wanted. They recognised the hand of a master and gave him their support, even to a length that was suicidal.

There were those in Germany who saw the abyss for which the country was rapidly heading. They were a minority. Some of them opened their mouths; they were rapidly and radically silenced. They were out of sight, in mass graves, long before their contemporaries dreamed that war was approaching. Others found their way into the concentration camps and prisons. The rest of the active spirits went into the underground movements where they are still at work. These men were fighting a heroic but hopeless fight. It is not so hopeless now, so far as concerns the overthrow of Hitler. Whether it will also have political success remains to be shown after the war. It is wisest to be sceptical as to this.

In 1933 it was clear in Germany, for all who had eyes to see, that Hitlerism meant war. The countries around Germany were not yet awake to the peril, or were too deeply involved in their own problems to be ready to give full attention to what was happening in Germany.

The stories the first German émigrés had to tell of events in Germany, and of their own experiences, were dismissed with a sympathetic but thoroughly incredulous smile. In other quarters abroad Hitler was regarded especially as the saviour from Socialism and Bolshevism, though in Germany he destroyed even the progressive, humanist, democratic front (if that term is preferred), tore the parties to shreds, smashed the trade unions, confiscated the co-operatives and stole their assets, and suppressed all liberalistic organisations, even non-Socialist ones, or Nazified them by *Gleichschaltung*. In these anti-Socialist quarters abroad, everything was regarded from the point of view of class interest. Even the monumental rearmament did not disturb the slumbers of these people so long as they thought there was reason to hope that the immense military machine of the Third Reich could be used—or was actually directed—against other quarters than their own. And as Hitler continually inveighed against Bolshevism, and was keeping the word “plutocracies” in the background, all seemed well.

It is childish to suppose that Germany's rearmament, the reintroduction of universal military service, the reoccupation of the Rhineland, the annexation of the Sudetenland and of Austria and finally of Czechoslovakia—that these misdeeds inside and outside Germany could not have been prevented with the military force in the hands of the other countries. To every underground worker in Germany it was clear that, at all events, rearmament, conscription, and the occupation of the Rhineland were carried out at a time when Germany's military forces would have failed to stand against the slightest military effort on the part of the Great Powers.

But did their statesmen want to move? Did they know what was going on in Germany? Did they want to know? That was the point—did they want to know? In the foreign embassies and legations in Berlin there were men who did know: they saw Hitler's game. They were by no means reticent as to the things they saw or divined. They spoke out, at the risk of severe criticism from their superiors, sometimes imperilling their whole careers. They sent emphatic warnings, fighting against the blindness of their own compatriots, and supplied the evidence for their statements. They said no more than everyone in Germany with eyes to see had long known, though it was impossible to say so openly: Hitlerism meant war. To the very end their warnings were fruitless. It was almost too late. It *was* too late, as France proved. One people alone stood firm and faced the menace, with determination and at that moment firmly convinced of its mission. Britain stood, bleeding, but with her head high. Britain made victory certain for the world of decency and progress, and in so doing she also helped the decent and progressive section of the Germans. We have no intention of forgetting that. No possible political or social differences can efface this fact from the book of history. Britain stood firm, and with bitter sacrifices at sea,

on land, and in the air secured for the rest of the world the time needed for arming against its most atrocious enemy—Hitlerism and all that it involved. Britain stood, and stood alone. Whatever may yet happen, the greatest feat of this war was accomplished in 1940. We do not mean ever to forget that!

IV

Socialism implies planning, State planning. Planning implies a higher form of economic organisation. Socialist economic planning thus means the integration of the economic sector in the machinery of the State. In Socialism the State comes forward as trustee for the whole society; it plans the economic system, and is at once producer, administrator, and distributor.

When the State takes over the planning of social production, or at least the essential parts of it, when it controls the principal sectors of the economic system, there fall upon it far greater tasks than in the capitalist order, where it was merely bound to watch over the "free play of forces", over the observance of the generally accepted rules of play of the capitalist order.

With the enlargement of the field of operations of the State there comes of necessity an elaboration of the State organism. And with the elaboration of the fabric of the State there comes increased sensitiveness to disturbances, although the improved organisation of the economic system results in higher productivity. Planning also implies rigid centralisation. As producer the State must have the power to see to the carrying out and completion of its plans, and this can only be done by a stable central power.

If here, in the nerve centre, disturbances come, if there is bad planning, if wrong decisions are made, the inevitable result will be a nation-wide catastrophe. Even reductions of output, whatever their cause, have grievous results if they exceed the margin of inadequacy allowed for.

To expose this sensitive machinery of a Socialist State, with its many-sided and all-embracing tasks, to a chance majority, would be pure madness. Egalitarian democracy in a Socialist State would be a negation of planning, and therewith a negation of Socialism itself. Where would it lead if the State Planning Council could not plan for decades ahead, but had to fear the intervention of authorities elected by chance majorities, authorities which, out of opportunism or for other reasons, sought to throw the planning overboard? Such a practice must mean the end of any Socialist State.

It is thus important to recognise at once that there are important fields of social life—the economic field among them—that must be withdrawn from the influence of chance majorities. This is the more justifiable since the Socialist economic system produces not for the profit of

the few but for the good of all. The decisions of the Socialist economic bodies coincide with the objective interests of society, as the production is no longer of the things that "yield a return" but of those of which society has need. The withdrawal of the economic sector from the right of decision of the broad mass of the people, which is quite incompetent to judge of the rightness or wrongness of planning, to say nothing of deciding its course, is simply a matter of common sense. (We are here considering only economic affairs, but there are undoubtedly other fields in which the same is true.) Since, moreover, in the Socialist State there are no class interests, and consequently no differences of class interest, many problems that arise from the conflicts of interest under capitalism will be eliminated without difficulty.

No doubt there will be group interests, at all events for a considerable time, after the establishment of the Socialist economic system; between, for instance, industry and agriculture; between the heavy and the light industries; between large and small undertakings; between State undertakings and undertakings still privately carried on (which will continue—not every barber's shop must absolutely be turned into a State barber's shop). But the differences arising from the variety of branches of trade and business will no longer be part of a struggle of all against all or of the stronger against the weaker, but will be settled by negotiation, by a commonsense adjustment of interests for the sake of an over-riding and unquestioned aim.

The decisions adopted will be the result of discussions in the Planning Council,¹ which will decide democratically, that is to say by majority vote. There shall be no advocacy here of a principle that excludes in advance every majority decision; the question is simply who, that is to say what authority, decides what, that is to say what subject. The decision of complicated economic questions with complicated effects cannot be the subject of mass votes; such problems must be considered by the men and women whose political insight and technical knowledge qualify them for arriving at the most accurate decision, humanly speaking.

It may seem that the opinion is here expressed that the Socialist State is willing or able to dispense with the collaboration of its citizens. To think that is to think mistakenly.

The objection to majoritarian democracy is not directed against the principle of collaboration, and not against that of the popular exercise of influence over the political life of the State; the objection to egalitarian democracy is based on the recognition that mass voting, if political life is confined to it, does not guarantee real popular influence over the fortunes of the State, and further that egalitarian democracy is unable

¹ This is discussed in greater detail in Section VI, pp. 120-127.

to take due account of the principle of the selection of persons from the points of view of their quality and qualification, or does so only very inadequately and purely by accident.

It is an essential characteristic of the bourgeois State to admit the mass of the people as little as possible to the actual problems of the business of the State, and, as far as possible, to recruit men for the direction of the State and for the staff of officials mainly from the privileged classes. This is not always (though often it may be) a deliberate and artificially engineered process; all that is involved is the necessary securing of certain conditions of quality and qualification. In the overwhelming majority of cases, however, these conditions are fulfilled only by those citizens whose privileged material situation has permitted them better education and better professional training.

It is in the interest of the bourgeois State to allow the great mass of the people to intervene in politics only at the elections, and for the single purpose of gaining for itself a confirmation of the constitutionality of the class order; in normal times, "peaceful" times, it succeeds in doing so through the ruling classes' monopoly of culture, propaganda, and power. But in the Socialist State the situation is actually reversed in one respect: the Socialist State is not only unable but unwilling to dispense with the most direct collaboration of its citizens. It wants it, demands it, and makes it a duty, when the leaders of the new State and its social pillars feel themselves bound by the basic principles of Freedom Socialism.

One form of political life for the Socialist State seems to me to be control democracy (*Kontroll-Demokratie*), based on supervising councils.¹ Its task is:

To supervise the carrying out of economic planning.

To collaborate, in the fields in which it is competent, in the planning and shaping of the Socialist State.

¹ The word "control" covers both direction and supervision. The system of councils consists of the National Control Council and of supervising councils. The National Control Council acts in both ways, mainly controlling but also supervising, while the lower units, the supervising councils, mainly supervise but act also in province, district, locality, or plant as servants of the National Control Council. In the following pages the lower units are therefore called "supervising councils"—provincial supervising councils, district supervising councils, local supervising councils, plant supervising councils—and the highest body of the control system "National Control Council."

The supervising council in an industrial plant, for instance, would have much the same duties as a British production committee, management and employees collaborating in working out the plans for the plant and jointly exercising functions of control and supervision in the plant. The main idea of supervision is thus to guarantee in the lower units of the council system the carrying out of the plans worked out at the top. The supervising councils are responsible to the National Control Council. This body should be compared with the "Popular Chamber" discussed by Hiller on p. 66.

To supervise the inevitable bureaucracy, with the right to dismiss officials.

To be the reservoir of criticism—

In short, to be an organisation that has its share in the life of the State both through criticism of the existing conditions and through positive collaboration in the shaping of the new; and to be an organisation that remains directly associated with the mass of the people.

The beginning of councils of this sort was seen in Germany in 1918, when, after the collapse, more or less spontaneous workers' and soldiers' councils were formed. But there was no leadership among the Left with the will to power, with clear political conceptions of the Socialist goal, though on the Right, among the reactionaries, there were powerful elements with clear conceptions of the way to prevent Socialist development. The Right parties had perseveringly sown their seed, knowing well what they were doing, and fifteen years later, in 1933, it bore its fatal fruit.

With strong Socialist leadership, with a Left wing that counted, it would have been impossible to let the workers' and soldiers' councils die the obscure death that was their actual lot. All that remained was a poor vestige of the system—workers' and employees' councils, possessing no power of supervision deserving the name, and confined mainly to matters of labour legislation and social policy. They were something, but not enough.

The workers' councils movement collapsed because the new State of Weimar—a formally liberal but a capitalist State—was more friendly to the Reaction than to the new forces that were manifesting themselves in the councils. The councils knew that an effective supervision exercised by them was impossible if the capitalist methods were retained in trade and industry and each employer remained "master in his own house" in the factories. The capitalist representatives, on the other hand, regarded the councils' claim to supervision as intolerable, rightly seeing in the councils the grave-diggers of the whole capitalist order. It was out of the question entirely to prevent the formation of the councils, and accordingly a compromise was arrived at: a dangerous compromise, since to all appearance a council system had been set up, whereas in reality the right of supervision, the chief function of the councils, had been surgically removed. What remained was the mere welfare work of the councils—and capitalism.

It would be wrong, it is true, to overlook the fact that the supporters of the councils in Germany formed a conception of the tasks of the councils that took no account of those bodies' practical capacity, while other supporters of the council idea paid no attention at all to the supervising functions of the councils. Among those to whom this

criticism applies was Karl Kautsky, as is clear from the quotation that follows from his brochure *Das Weitertreiben der Revolution* ("The Furtherance of the Revolution") (1919), pages 3-4:

"The military autocracy that stood in the way of all progress until now has been overthrown, but the old machinery of administration and domination in State and army continues at work. We were faced with the choice between destroying it at a blow, which would have meant making impossible any demobilisation, any administrative activity in the State, indeed any social life at all; or allowing it to continue in existence, and with it the basis of the old regime that had plunged us into the abyss, and thus confining the revolution to a temporary exchange of roles [*sic!*]. *We were helped out of this desperate choice by the workers' and soldiers' councils, which by their supervision made it possible for the old machinery of the State to continue to function without bringing about the counter-revolution.*"

It will be seen that, in spite of his "recognition" of their supervising duties, Karl Kautsky saw in the councils a means of preserving intact the old machinery of the State, of enabling the old order to "continue at work." This State-maintaining role of the council movement brought it to its end. Later it was realised that in the first place the Revolution of 1918 had actually—in spite of the councils—been confined to a "temporary exchange of roles"; that in the second place the counter-revolution made vigorous progress, was entirely untroubled by the councils' supervision (which was no supervision at all), and in the end won the day; and thirdly that the workers' and soldiers' councils possessed no real power for the enforcement of supervision or for the scotching of the counter-revolution that was already in preparation in 1918-19. The upshot was that the old order remained virtually unchanged and the new was destroyed.

This is not to say that "councils" cannot have their uses in a State organised on a non-Socialist basis. They certainly have them, as the Weimar State showed: within the province it assigned to them the works councils were able to do a good deal of good in the field of social policy. But these were not "supervising councils" in the sense here implied, but simply supervisors of the observance of the regulations laid down under social legislation. "Supervision" and the enforcement of the acknowledged rights of the councils depends in the last resort on the powers with which the councils are invested in the State. Those powers have to do with one of the most important fields of social life—the economic field. In the absence of power the councils are bound to fail. If the council system is irreconcilable logically or politically or in the matter of psychology or of power with the system of rule, one of the two must give way, the social system or the system of councils. Never will the lords of production, the capitalists and their hangers-on, voluntarily accept subordination to the councils. For them to do so would be

to commit suicide. Nobody commits that sort of suicide, and certainly no social system. The spontaneous abdication of the capitalist position of dominance is unthinkable. Consequently the setting up of real control councils under capitalism is unthinkable.

Admitting, however, the objective hindrances to the development of the council movement in Germany, it must not be overlooked that the councils as devised could not have made good even under more favourable conditions. To recognise this to-day may help us to avoid mistakes to-morrow.

At the outset the council movement proposed to select works managers and other official persons, whose work demanded a quite definite qualification, technical or political or organising, by free election, by voting, by a majority resolution. It was intended in this way to find the men who, organised in councils, would lead the economic life of the whole Socialist State. The basic idea was the integration of the legislative, executive, and control elements in a single body—the councils. That sort of *Gleichschaltung* or procrustisation of functions leads to tyranny.

What was meant to happen in the plants is shown by a quotation from the brochure *Was will der Spartakus-Bund?* ("What do the Spartacists want?"), by Rosa Luxemburg. We honour her achievements as Socialist and theorist, but to-day, in the light of further experience, we do not hesitate to criticise her ideas. In this brochure we read, in point 7 of the section *Nächste wirtschaftliche Forderungen* (Immediate economic demands), on the subject of the duties of the councils:

"Election of factory councils in all plants, to regulate the internal affairs of the plants in agreement with the workers' councils . . . to control production and finally to take over the carrying on of the plants."

It has since become clear to many people that the carrying on of plants, of great combines, of undertakings that are a whole industry in themselves, or whole categories of industries, of great agricultural undertakings—that the "taking over" of such mammoth formations is a task beyond the power of factory councils or supervising councils. In that admirable book *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*, Joseph A. Schumpeter quotes the example of the way the Socialisation Commission in Germany reacted, when it came to actual practice, to the idea of such a method of selecting the holders of posts of responsibility:

"The idea that managers of plants should be elected by the workmen of the same plants was frankly and unanimously condemned."

It may be that it was a general hostility to the council idea that led the members of the Socialisation Commission to reject the principle of the election of directors of plants by the workers in the plants. In any case it remains true that their attitude, whatever the motives that inspired it, was justified by the facts.

Councils have their particular task, a highly important and productive one—the task of supervision. They are bound to fail where demands are made of them which are by their very nature beyond the capacity of the councils. To make demands of them which it is impossible for them to fulfil is to compromise the council idea in advance, to imperil its materialisation, and to hinder the good that lies in it.

The slogan "All power to the councils!" may be a powerful incitement, as was Lenin's "All power to the Soviets!" But it is a dangerous slogan, because it cannot be carried into effect. It would be as mistaken to adopt it as to go to the other extreme with "No power to the councils!" "All power" means that the conduct of the State is exercised through the councils and through them alone, the councils being made the single organ of the legislative, executive, and supervising functions. "No power" means depriving the councils even of the position of power that they need in order to carry out their desired supervising activity. Instead of either course a reasonable middle course should be pursued—a middle course that is certainly not one of compromise, but one of synthesis.

The synthesis would consist in the creation of supervising councils. These are the concrete form of control democracy (*Kontroll-Demokratie*). Their chief duty would be to see to it that Socialist planning, and the ideas and principles of the Socialist State, are fulfilled. The relation of supervising councils to the directorate of plants is the same as the relation of the planning council, as an independent body, on one side, to the National Control Council and the legislative body on the other side. Above, in the planning council, planning goes on in the closest collaboration between the various bodies; below, in the plants, planning goes on in the closest collaboration between the plant management and the supervising council.

It would especially be the task of the councils to exercise supervision at points where the carrying out of the plans worked out by the Socialist planning council necessarily goes on behind closed doors, or half-closed doors—in industrial and agricultural undertakings, or in the administration of justice, of taxation, and of education. Other councils, as in other administrative bodies or in universities and schools, would probably be more or less free from the social supervision of those concerned, as is evident in the case of parents' councils. In the industrial, commercial and agricultural councils the social field may be tilled by those affected if it is not decided to entrust it to independent works councils.

The construction of the supervising-council organisation will be pyramidal. The base will be the local and plant supervising councils (*oertliche und betriebliche Kontroll-Räte*). They will elect from among their members the district supervising council (*Bezirks-Kontroll-Rat*).

The district supervising councils will elect from among their members the provincial supervising council (*Landes-Kontroll-Rat*). The provincial supervising councils elect from among themselves the head of the pyramid, the National Control Council (*Reichs-Kontroll-Rat*). Such is the formal structure of the council organisation.

At its base the council system is constructed locally, and by plants, where these are of sufficient size. In the lowest cell of the system any organisation according to occupation is impossible, since not every important trade is represented in every plant and in every locality. To elect the supervising councils according to trade would be open to objection, for if this were attempted there would result a sort of corporative parliament with all its reactionary implications and its internal stresses. On the other hand, there is no difficulty about dealing with the voters for the supervising councils locally and plant by plant, though care should be taken that in drawing up party lists attention is paid as far as possible to the representation of the various trades in proportion to their importance. This is desirable in the interest of the parties themselves.

The district and provincial councils will be elected by the local population as a whole; only at the top, in the National Control Council, will members be assembled according to trades. The full assembly of the National Control Council will be split up into five chambers—industry, commerce, and communications; agriculture; education; justice; arts and sciences.

The tasks of the councils on behalf of the chamber of industry, commerce, and communications, and of the chamber of agriculture, need no detailed comment. In education the councils—which may, for example, be identical with parents' committees at the elementary and secondary schools and with students' committees at the universities—would be responsible for seeing that the curricula drawn up by the legislature or by the supreme school authorities were adhered to, and for providing a stream of lively and fruitful criticism, concerned not only with particular schools or universities but with school life and education in general.

In the administration of justice the supervising councils would be less concerned with questions of irregularities in procedure, since the courts work almost entirely in public and are subject to public criticism. But a supervision of the official staffs would be desirable, particularly in view of the reactionary tradition of the judiciary in Germany, above all in dealing with political offences. Supervising councils elected from among the various categories of officials might well reveal and put an end to official tendencies in the direction of reviving the old reactionary practice and outlook.

In science and art a wide measure of freedom would be desirable, though it must not be wrecked by the interference of unqualified persons. Supervising councils should have, for instance, no say in the wireless pro-

grammes or in the plans for the theatre or those of research institutes. It is conceivable, however, that these councils should see to it that moneys allocated by the State are not squandered but devoted to their assigned purpose, and also that in case of need there should be a grant of further sums for this or the other branch.

In the various chambers of the National Control Council there would be no need for each occupational category to be represented in proportion to its numerical strength: this might easily lead to unfair advantage for some and unfair disadvantage for other groups. The one thing needed is that the chambers, with their professional knowledge and their specific political points of view, should provide for the general planning and for the conduct of the State a sound and thoroughly realist basis. It would also be of little importance how the numerical strength of the chambers varied.

The chambers will be made up of members chosen principally in consideration of their professional fitness for membership. The work of the members of each chamber should not be strictly kept apart from that of members of other chambers; there should be a constant exchange of views and experience between the members of each chamber and those of the others. Many dividing lines cut across each other. In practice there would probably be much collaboration between the chamber of industry, commerce, and communications and the chamber of agriculture. Participation of the chamber of science and art in sittings of the chamber of education are conceivable, while the chamber of justice has points of contact with almost all the others. These are problems of detail that will find their solution in practice.

The essential activities of the National Control Council take place in the chambers. Here criticisms coming from the lower units of the council organisation, and their proposals and suggestions, will be worked out. Here, in cases where difficulties or mistakes have been revealed, concrete remedies will be sought. Here the thousand and one day-to-day problems of detail will be dealt with. From the chambers there will go to the legislative bodies a steady stream of suggestions and proposals, to be put finally into the form of laws, in the elaboration of which the members of the National Control Council and its chambers will participate according to their special qualifications, in the service of the whole people.

Naturally there are cases in which under the Constitution the National Control Council will assemble in plenary session—for instance, for the election of the Head of the State, and for a vote of confidence, or of no confidence, in the Government.

The local supervising councils and the plant supervising councils are elected as councils had always been elected in pre-Nazi Germany—by secret, equal, universal franchise. The majority decides who enters the supervising council. A proportional system might ensure that minorities are represented in proportion to their strength. The election of the

district and provincial supervising councils and that of the National Control Council similarly observe the majority principle.

The function of the National Control Council is thus fourfold:

1. Controlling and supervising;
2. Participating within its competence in legislation;
3. Administrative, in cases in which it makes use of its right to dismiss officials;
4. Participation as an essential factor in the appointment or dismissal of the highest national executive organ.

The lower units of the councils organisation are mainly entrusted with the task of supervision; they see to it that the laws, regulations, and instructions coming from "above" are observed "below." The members of the supervising councils in a plant are placed on a level with the plant management. The plant management has in its hands the organisation of the execution of all industrial work, but it is bound to carry out this work jointly with the supervising council, and it is especially bound to give account to the council for all that happens within the plant; for instance, for the extent to which the liability under the planning is met, for the expenditure involved, and for the time taken. Without a supervising authority on the spot it would be easy for relatively quickly removable errors to accumulate, whereas in the supervising council an authority has been created that concerns itself with the discovery of sources of error.

Another purpose of the supervising council is to see to the earliest possible remedying of the existence at the head of a plant, or near the head, of incompetent persons who may, thanks to any sort of private connection, have slipped into positions that require qualities which they do not possess. Above all, the linking of plant management and supervising council is intended to secure a division of power without which, alike on the plant and on the national scale, the growth of an uncontrolled and ultimately an uncontrollable bureaucracy is favoured. In addition to this the councils work as a system of organised criticism. But the all-important contribution of the supervising councils must be that of preventing the bureaucratisation toward which there is an inevitable tendency in a Socialist State.

"Supervision and control from beneath" should also provide the means of dismissing corrupt and incompetent officials from their posts. This is no new idea, this sort of right of supervision. John Stuart Mill, in his *Considerations on Representative Government* (1861), gives examples of contemporaries whose thoughts ran in a similar direction:

"Some thinkers, among others Mr. Bentham, have been of opinion that, although it is better that judges should not be appointed by popular election, the people in their district ought to have the power,

after sufficient experience, of removing them from their trust. It cannot be denied that the irremovability of any public officer, to whom great interests are entrusted, is in itself an evil."

Thus the idea is here expressed—"Appointment of officials, yes. But at the same time public supervision." A supervising authority is demanded, and one furnished with the power to remove from their posts officials who do not fulfil the demands made of them, who are corrupt, or who do not enjoy the confidence of the people—in the case of the plant supervising council, of the workers in the plant. There is a vast difference between the power of election on the basis of majority resolutions and the power of supervision and removal on the basis of majority resolutions.

The question now arises, which of the supervising councils is to be authorised to exercise the power of dismissal.

Should plant councils be permitted to decide in their own case, for their own plant? That would make them both prosecutors and judges, a system contrary to every reasonable principle of justice. Thus the lower councils should be recognised as having in principle a right of complaint, while the investigation of the case and the right of decision must be placed in other hands. The next higher authority might be entrusted with it—the district council or, if there is reason to doubt the impartiality even of this authority, the provincial supervising council might be defined as the lowest authority for the dismissal of officials. To transfer the right of decision exclusively to the National Control Council would lead to an undesirable clogging of the machinery. These are only general indications, as there are various possible courses.

Attention should be paid to yet another point of view. In so far as it is officials in the lower positions who are concerned, district or provincial councils might be competent to order dismissal. But higher officials and those in the highest posts should not be subject to the lower councils, probably not even to the provincial supervising council, but only to the highest authority, the National Control Council, and here either to the council in plenary session or to the competent occupational chamber.

Needless to say, this does not refer to criticism in itself. Criticism of officials may be made by the public—through Press and other organs—and also through the lowest supervising councils. In principle all public officials are subject to criticism. We are discussing here simply the right of deciding whether an official shall be dismissed or not. And the executive must fall in absolutely with the decision of the competent supervising authority.

It would naturally be contrary to the idea of justice to deny the accused officials the right of appeal. The highest appeal authority of the council organisation would, of course, be the National Control Council, or the competent occupational chamber. The first appeal authority

for an accused official would be the next above the council that heard the complaint against him. Steps must be taken for the right of appeal not to be used for purposes of delay; thus the appeal to a higher authority by an official would have the effect of postponing his definite dismissal, but meanwhile he should be suspended from his office.

One of the conditions for the functioning of control democracy is the right of criticism. Freedom to criticise presupposes freedom of expression of opinion. Freedom of expression of opinion means political freedom. And finally, political freedom is "fundamentally the right to differ", as Gaetano Salvemini says in his admirable essay *Democracy Reconsidered* (an essay that does not, perhaps, go far enough in the criticism of majority democracy), in the book already repeatedly mentioned, *Freedom—Its Meaning*.

"Political liberty is fundamentally the right to differ," says Gaetano Salvemini; it is well to take that sentence to heart, and to do the same with the concluding sentences in the same essay:

"From this right to disagree spring all other political rights of the citizen in a democratic regime. These rights are meant not so much to establish the power of the majority as to protect the minorities in their right to opposition. The best test of the standards of a democratic constitution is the provision it makes for the protection of minorities."

Control democracy is to be the means of attaining, through the earnest interplay of opinions, ideas, and interests, the right paths and the right values.

The decisions made at the head of the State—and those, indeed, above all others—are subject to the criticism of the councils. It is necessary that this should be so in order to attain a balance between the things desired from above and those to be established from below, without bringing costly conflicts that would shake the whole edifice of the State to its foundations. Control democracy would also provide a counterweight against efforts at the head of the State to ignore popular opinion; it demands above all the essential of every State based on justice and quite certainly of every Socialist State—responsibility to the people. Criticism, control, supervision, the formation of a common will through labour in common—that is the aim and the method of control democracy; in it every citizen can fill his place directly or indirectly as one of the pillars of the Socialist State.

In this system of councils, growing up from below, the essential organisations of the workers would find their field of activity—the trade unions, the co-operatives of production and consumption, and the cultural organisations.

If a truly democratic spirit, in the sense of common participation and common decision, pulsates through the life of the council organisation, if this spirit of democratic collaboration and joint decision is also

maintained in the organisations of the people, the actual life of the State will reflect that spirit. In the system of supervising councils, above all, a main principle of democracy should find realisation—the principle of the equality of rights of all citizens in the daily life of the State.

It may perhaps be objected in some quarters that the system of councils is nothing but a new form of dictatorship and is irreconcilable with freedom and democracy. To that contention one may reply that the dictatorship of control democracy is, at all events, better than control through dictatorship.

In the economic field a thorough-going control is bound to be of service, if only to prevent new captains of industry from climbing into power and smartly acquiring unjustified privileges with the help of the State.

James Burnham has foreseen this danger in his book *The Managerial Revolution*. Instead, however, of recognising it as a danger and considering ways of warding it off, he regards this development as scarcely less inevitable than a natural law. Freedom-loving Socialists can accept his warning, but not his conception of the inevitability of development. He writes:

“Effective control of the instruments of production will be held not by the workers but by the managers through their State. . . . There being only one major employer (the State), there will be no bargaining among competing employers. . . . The workers, on their side, are no longer the ‘free proletarians’ of capitalism. . . . The instruments of production are the seat of social domination; he who controls them, in fact not in name, controls society, for they are the means whereby society lives.”

This tendency to a concentration of power in a new master class must be seen and recognised, not ignored. There is no question that the danger exists. The important thing is to obviate it. Burnham says that is impossible, and consequently there is no need to search for a remedy. We simply have to pass through that phase—and then it will be possible to see further.

Well, it will not be possible to see further, and what will be the consequence of that? Oppression still harsher, still more gruesome, still more bestial, than in the past. Simply to pronounce the verdict “inevitable” in a tone of scientific “superiority”, with a certain masochistic arrogance, and then to wait in idleness—that gets nothing done. Our task can only be to determine the desirable course and to guide developments in that direction, deliberately to influence them as far as is possible, without, of course, forgetting the truth that the synthesis that matters is that of knowledge and will.

Our objection to what Burnham writes is thus not that he exaggerates the danger of a dictatorship of the directorate, nor that he sees a danger

that has no real existence, but that he prophesies that it cannot be averted.

Against this sort of accumulation of power it is necessary to make effective provision. This provision consists in the setting up of a democratically working supervision: a supervision that sets limits to the lust for power (which, be it emphasised once more, undeniably exists) of servants of the State both in the economic and in other fields: a supervision that clips the wings of the ambitious individual. If the various branches of the administration and the conduct of the State itself are subject to criticism and supervision, and if the supervising authorities have the means of intervening against misuse of the power vested in officials, the danger can be minimised and any growths in one quarter or another can be prevented from developing into cancerous tumours that will destroy every organ of the State.

In other words, what is needed is the development of a system that will enable a balance to be set up between the legislative and executive authorities—the system of supervision.

If, on the other hand, supervision is misused, or at all events misconceived and wrongly applied, it will frustrate itself and fail to do the good it might have done. It cannot be the task of the lower units of the supervising councils to stick their fingers into the pie of the central planning authority: their task is to secure, by means of sound criticism, an adjustment of planning to realities, to the best that is objectively attainable. Thus it is not intended for a moment to deny that precisely in a planned, centralised, collectivist, Socialist state system the tendency to standardisation and bureaucracy is a particular danger (no State can entirely dispense with bureaucracy). There must be the utmost possible internal latitude, though this must not be carried so far as to injure the very complicated machinery of the Socialist State. Supervision from within must be the means of compensating for any excessive concentration of power at the head of the State and of enabling opinions held in the lower regions to have effect higher up. For the State does not exist for its own sake but for the citizens. And in a State in which the citizens have no influence at all or only extremely restricted influence, the regime is bound to degenerate and ultimately to turn into a despotism. Such a State stifles the independent expression of its citizens' opinions, makes all life uniform, and leads in the end to a rigid routine. As Wilhelm von Humboldt wrote in his *Limits of the State* ("Die Grenzen des Staats," Kiepenheuer Verlag, 1920):

"Thus, the more the State takes a hand, the more uniform become not only all who act but all their acts . . . The individual who is often and very much under orders is easily reduced to the state of almost voluntarily giving up the last vestiges of his own initiative."

Criticism, collaboration, supervision, the essential elements of control

democracy, are needed in order to preserve alertness, independence, and initiative in the life of the Socialist State.

It is clear that supervising councils should come into existence democratically by means of the universal vote. The vote is, indeed, in this case, one in which the voters are familiar both with the candidate and with the subject on which they are pronouncing. In the council organisation the elected candidate is subject to the observation and criticism of his electors; he must give account for what he does; he gives account, indeed, through his daily activities under the eyes of his electors. In addition to this it should be possible for him to be removed by an appropriate majority.

In my view the problem lies less in the manner in which the councils come into existence than in their relation to the State. It would be a complete misconception of the idea of control democracy to regard the councils as an instrument of the Government. It is true that they are a component part of the State, but not as servants of the executive; and although they assist the legislature they are independent of it. They are freely and independently working bodies, whose political weight will be the greater the higher are their achievements.

As a system subject to the executive, as a mere instrument of the Government, the supervising organisations would be bound very soon to lose all their vitality; their activities would ultimately be reduced to a farce. Consequently there must be a jealous watch over the freedom of speech of the councils, as of their electors; no harm must be allowed to come to them if they criticise higher authorities. Protective legislation would be possible in their favour, and there can be no doubt of its necessity. Of still more importance will be the consciousness of those at the head of the State that the councils are representatives of the people and that their will cannot be flouted with impunity; it is essential, too, that the people shall have the consciousness that in the councils they have in their hands a resource against the State organisation which cannot be abused with impunity. Both among the leaders of the State and among the people the recognition must be created and kept alive that the free play of ideas and opinions in the political life of the councils serves the State as a whole, serves society. Any serious restriction in this respect would result in a process of mortification of liberty in one of the crucial sections of society. It is obvious that the councils, for their part, must impose a certain political restraint upon themselves.

While it is the duty of the heads of the State to concern themselves for the understanding and consent of the councils, it is no less the duty of the councils to show that they appreciate the points of view of the heads of the State. An autocratic practice of issuing decrees from above and

an unvarying and obstinate opposition from below could only end in the negation of any sort of co-operation, and so to the discontinuance of democracy.

Control democracy has not only negative but especially positive tasks. Although the councils work mainly in the economic field, their activities are not confined to it. Still less is it intended that with the aid of the supervising councils a dividing line should be struck between "pure politics" and "pure economics", an idea that seems to float in some heads, the aim being that the struggle over economic interests should be kept out of the political arena. Any such division is impossible in practice, as the development and direction of economic affairs are largely dependent on politics, or more precisely on the ideas that seek materialisation in politics. Assuming that parties must be permitted in principle in the Socialist State, this necessarily involves the freedom to unite in pursuit of particular aims. And a not unimportant element in the building up of the ideas of a party is the conception of the organisation of economic life, on the good or less good quality of which will depend the weal or woe of millions of human beings. But the question what is or is not good sense, in the economic field as in any other field of the life of human communities, is precisely the subject of the varying conceptions of political parties. Consequently, whatever the differentiations of policy in economic and cultural politics, any dividing line between "economics" and "politics" is logically indefensible.

Political parties—the sole reason for the existence of which can only consist in the conquest of power in the State, in order to attain their aims, or at any rate in the acquisition for that purpose of as large a share of power as possible—are unable through their very nature to dispense with a share in the shaping of one of the most essential parts of social life, the economic system. To propose to exclude them from influence over the economic field would be to exercise constraint that would be the negation of the free play of parties. Consequently, if parties are permitted at all—and every freedom-loving Socialist will consider that they ought to be permitted—they must not be denied the freedom to engage in a competition for power in the field that is of the greatest social importance, that of economic affairs. The exclusion of parties from this field and their admittance to others as "purely political" means either a negation of parties, leading of necessity to the one-party system (for any group of like-minded people must obviously assure their influence upon economic affairs), or else that those who hold such a view are unacquainted with the parts played by parties in politics and in economic affairs. Carried to its logical conclusion, this idea would imply organising the Socialist State as a form of society in which purely economic considerations took precedence of all others, the remaining elements of

policy, home and foreign and cultural policy, being no more than incidentals.

Parties, if they came into existence at all, would then be nothing more than a form of club with no influence, discussion clubs for general argument on world affairs, or religious or atheistic associations.

Such a development seems highly improbable. What is probable is that the parties, which are nothing more than organised minorities of like-minded persons, would try to secure by crooked ways, that is to say by illegal ways, the influence on matters of critical importance to them on which they are not permitted to exercise influence by fair means. This would promote methods which could not but seriously endanger the existence of the Socialist State.

V

In a new Germany it may be hoped that school education will be in the hands of really competent persons, men and women whose attainments and character will enable them to implant in the hearts of the children in their care the spirit of humanity, freedom, and Socialism. In this way it will be possible for the basis to be created of a sense of political responsibility. That sense will be further developed outside the school, in practical life.

A Socialist Germany would have to cope with the task—after a certain transition period on the return of normal conditions—of introducing the growing generation to politics. It would have to secure continuity between school life and practical life, to build a bridge between the late 'teens and the time when the young citizen enters into his full civic rights.

The Socialist State would have the task of providing free play for the youthful intellectual powers, providing ample room for youthful energies not only in sport but in other directions, not hampering but promoting youthful originality, and integrating the creative will of the young in the life of the State.

How can this be done?

It can be done by a bold step—the setting up of a statutory Parliament of Youth.

Assuming that he has had suitable education, the youngster of sixteen, though neither politically nor intellectually ripened, will have acquired sufficient power of political judgment to enable him to live his own political life within a community. At that age the political will forms itself. It will thrive the better the wider its field of political activity. Why not, then, set up a forum for youths of sixteen to twenty years of age, in which the intellectual battle can be fought out?

What would be the task of a Parliament of Youth?

It should not be vested with legislative powers; the young people

have not the needed political maturity and knowledge of the world for that. Yet the Parliament of Youth would have an important task—that of considering the questions that concern youth: education from the primary school to the university; occupational training; culture; social questions; youth welfare and children's courts, to mention only a few examples. Needless to say, the Parliament of Youth would not be prohibited from considering problems of general human affairs, or the wider problems of the State.

This Parliament of Youth would have no right of decision or of legislation, but it would have a right of supervision within its own field. It must be granted, of course, a certain influence over the shaping of legislation on youth matters and over legislation in general, or as a parliament it would be a farce.

Thus some guarantee should be provided that resolutions emerging from the discussions and debates within a prescribed field shall receive attention in the highest quarters of the State, and that in the event of proposals put forward by the Parliament of Youth being rejected the grounds of rejection shall be stated by the supreme authorities in the State. Above all, this parliament must, obviously, have the right and duty of sharing in the supervision of the carrying into effect of existing youth legislation. The attitude to general problems in this parliament should be taken into account as the expression of the opinion of an important part of the population and an advisory contribution deserving attention.

It may be assumed that the young in general, from sixteen to twenty years of age, will maintain contact in some form with political or semi-political organisations and with institutions of the State. Elections to the Parliament of Youth might be organised by these bodies. In so far as the young people are attending technical or secondary schools or universities, election would be carried out by the student councils; for those in industrial employment the election would take place in youth councils in factory or office. And for young people who are members of political, trade union, or cultural organisations, candidates could be elected through these organisations.

The mass of small youth parliaments organised locally or in plants would send delegates to provincial youth parliaments, and these would delegate members to a National Youth Parliament, which should not be in permanent session but should meet perhaps for a week every six months. There would no doubt be difficulties of organisation, of industrial regulation, and of finance in connection with the dispatch of these youth delegations, but with good will these difficulties would easily be overcome.

The purpose of the Parliament of Youth would be to secure active participation of youth in political affairs in fields in which it is at least in a certain sense competent; to promote the sense of responsibility of

the individual to society and of society to the individual; and to arouse and develop the political sense. In short, the purpose is to provide an arena in which youthful pugnacity shall be directed into channels in which decisions are made not in accordance with physical strength but with the strength of argument. Here healthy competition may develop a healthy ambition from which in later years society cannot but profit.

A Parliament of Youth may have yet another result, and one of no little importance. Political parties are apt to grow stiff in the joints. There is no visible reason why in the Socialist State parties should be exempt from this rule, not to say this law. A dose of criticism from that section of youth that brings to existing problems an open, unprejudiced, agile, eager attention cannot but have a stimulating effect. Every party that wants to live is regenerated from its young membership. A politically awakened youth offers the best recruiting field for the most progressive party in the State. A Parliament of Youth working alongside the institutions of the State would provide an effective platform for opposition to the comfortable self-contentment of successful statesmen and party politicians. Moreover, vigorous criticism from youthful hearts stirs up those oppositionists who are older in years but young in spirit, urging them on to new activities within the parties and inducing them to seek and find allies in the Parliament of Youth. This institution may also modify the tendency of party representatives to be over-convinced of their own superior wisdom.

In short, a Parliament of Youth would be not only in the interest of youth itself but of value to the whole nation. It may be doubted whether the adult population will be prepared to submit to a fruitful but certainly uncomfortable experiment. But it may well be that a coming dramatic development in Germany will help to tear to pieces any petty objections and smooth the way for new ideas—ideas that are not necessarily worse than the old ones for not yet having become matters of tradition.

VI

Many opponents of Socialism come to the conclusion that planning and freedom are irreconcilable, are mutually exclusive. Since Socialism demands central economic planning, they argue that it is not the bringer of freedom it claims to be, but the destroyer of freedom.

Here the purpose of Socialist planning, the ending of social misery, is left entirely out of account. It is claimed that the content of the planning makes no difference, since the human will is unable either to prevent or to master results of planning that are inimical to freedom.

Many Socialists, again, fall victims to the fallacy that the socialisation of the means of production and the planning of economic life are in themselves guarantees of a free Socialist regime. They regard it as entirely absurd and ridiculous to "take active steps" to build up a free

Socialist society. Given the one, the other follows automatically, they think.

Here the purpose of planning is realised, but it is taken for granted that that purpose will not be forgotten. It is claimed that the technical and organising process of planning of necessity enforces the ideological, humanitarian, Socialist aim. The human will plays only a secondary part if any at all; everything proceeds of its own accord.

Thoughtful persons can accept neither of these lines of reasoning. Both assume the disguise of a pseudo-scientific seriousness, while in reality they pursue a theory of automatism that stamps every purposeful act, every pursuit of an aim, as senseless, a theory that has disastrous results because its uncritical supporters infer that any exertion of will is senseless or superfluous.

The truth is that the idea of freedom does not guarantee the reality of freedom. The truth is that the "setting up" of ideals is senseless when they are in conflict with the laws of reality. The truth is that the attainment of a political aim presupposes the existence of certain objective conditions—political, psychological, technical, economic, on the basis of which certain ideas can be carried into practice. That is incontestable. But it remains no less true that any rational being can, within the limits of the possible, influence developments in one direction or another; that in particular phases of history man faces alternatives, stands at cross-roads, and can choose his path. The individual does, of course, lack the power as a rule to attain his end and to master or shape history. But a number of individuals, assembled in groups, formed into powerful organisations, united in aim, led by able persons fired by a great idea, may summon the strength to turn the desired into the real. Such a movement has good justification.

Economic planning is not in conflict with the libertarian aims of Socialism. Planning in the Socialist State, economic planning, need not mean the loss of liberty in other fields, and in the deeper sense not even in the economic field. It need not, it only may mean that. There can be no talk of any logical necessity. The recognition that economic planning is *capable* of leading to the uniformisation of the whole life of State and society may save us from running blindly into that entirely avoidable condition. Let us admit that from the point of view of planning the individual has no existence, only the collectivity exists. Let us admit that planning involves objectionable tendencies in the State, such as bureaucratisation, excessive uniformity, the growth of privilege—where is it written that under Socialist planning the conditions must be worse than under the unplanned system of the present day in which these tendencies are manifest?

As compared, however, with liberalistic, capitalistic economic principles, the Socialist planned and rational economic system demands a tighter, more close-knit, more comprehensive, more centralised organi-

sation. Critics of the Socialist idea are too prone to forget that what is at issue is not simply planning but Socialist planning. Planning as such simply begs the question of purpose and objective. The planning, for instance, of mammoth industries and immense trusts brings no benefit to society as a whole; it only helps a powerful moneyed group to more money and more power. That sort of "collectivism" does not serve mankind but only certain powerful groups who are out to maintain and increase their power by more efficient organisation. Socialist economic planning is hostile to that sort of aim.

It may very likely happen that at first Socialist planning cannot dispense with certain restrictions of freedom; it is conceivable that freedom of movement in the matter of choice of place of employment must be limited until a balance has been arrived at between the need for labour and the available supply. It is conceivable that it might be impossible to distribute free time, wages, and social services to all equally, although a minimum must be guaranteed. It may be that for a while individual and group interests must give way in order to safeguard the general interest. All this may happen. What matters is that where there has to be a restriction of freedom in one direction, compensation is possible and is given in other directions. If that is done, the restriction of freedom will not be felt to be burdensome. If provision for assuring the general food supply is made by a planned tillage and the conversion of fallow land into arable, the freedom to trample on the newly ploughed land has come to an end. But the compensation through freedom from want is greater than the reduction of freedom to ramble.

Socialist planned economy is collective economy. Collective work is not an end in itself but a means to an end. It is a means to a better, happier life, free from want; a life in which the development of all the powers of the individual is not hindered but promoted in every possible way.

"It is not the amount of organisation but its kind and its purpose that cause our trouble", writes Bertrand Russell in his *Icarus*. He adds: "To a rational mind, the question is not: Do we want organisation or do we not? The question is: How much organisation do we want, and where and when and of what kind?"

Freedom-loving Socialists have to become clear in their minds as to the purpose for which they intend to plan. *Obviously they must plan not for planning's sake, but for men's sake.* That alone can be the purpose of planning. The question is: Who plans, for what purpose, and on what scale; what fields remain untouched; what is the aim of the planning? In the coming years the struggle will centre on these questions, and not on the question whether there shall be planning or not. That question has been decided already. With the vast productive power of the industrial system, it is no longer possible to do without planning. The planless competitive capitalist form of industry, wasteful

of resources, is superseded, an anachronism. It is unable to satisfy human needs, and it no longer serves progress. Its principle of profitability has had its day. To hold fast to old forms of economic life in a period that demands new ones can only lead to crises and disasters. Half-measures are of no avail here. The will of man can form history, but it cannot make it stand still or return to the outgrown past. The abler and the more up-to-date capitalists no longer offer the slightest objection to planning; all they attack is Socialist planning. For they are aware that planning can be pursued with success under their domination, though under other auspices than the Socialist. Their ideas are described in Jack London's *The Iron Heel*; their goal is oligarchy, world-wide super-monopoly.

Planning goes on to-day in every industrial country in the world. Without it it would be impossible to continue the war. Planning in war is accepted as a war measure, as an emergency requirement. But with the return of peace there will be not fewer but more problems. For that very reason planning will be necessary if chaos is to be averted.

Planning in the Socialist State is carried out in the Planning Council; this council is in permanent session. Planning falls into two main sections:

1. The lines of planning—a political decision.
2. The carrying out of the plans—an organising decision.

The Socialist Planning Council cannot do without either economic experts, who see to the organisation of the execution of plans, or political experts, who determine the lines of planning. The politician is the general staff officer; the economist the executive officer.

Obviously economic planning (and not that only) is of the utmost political importance. The separation of economic planning from the ideological objective that determines its character is an impossibility. The question, for instance, how much of the social product shall go to the consumer and how much to the production goods industry cannot be decided on purely economic bases because a choice of path has to be made; a choice of alternatives that is a political one. The best path from the point of view of organisation, the best path from the economic or the scientific point of view, is not bound to be the most advisable politically; it may, indeed, under the existing circumstances, be directly opposed to the Socialist and humanist ideal and aim.

The Planning Council of the Socialist State must therefore include both ideologists and scientists. In it must also be represented not only the interests of the producers (through trade unions) but above all those of the consumers (through co-operatives and similar consumers' organisations). The legislative bodies and the supervising councils must also be represented. The members of the chambers of the National Control Council would be able to give the most valuable assistance from their rich store of experience.

The technical solution of the manifold problems is unattainable without planning. The thing that matters is the political direction, the general idea, of the planning. Freedom-loving Socialists desire a Socialist planning and clearly recognise that only through this is political, intellectual, and social freedom attainable.

Socialist planning—that is a declaration of will, the setting of an aim. For its attainment it is not enough to arrange a collection of historic exhibits and to make a set of analyses. For too long there has been nothing but analysis and interpretation; as Karl Marx wrote, "The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point, however, is to change it."

That is the task—to change it! To change it in the Socialist direction. Merely to bow to facts means stagnation and in the end the death of the Socialist movement. Activity, spiritual vitality, constructiveness, boldness in action—this attracts new support; great ideas transform themselves into strong movements—"Theory too becomes a material power as soon as it captures the masses," wrote Karl Marx in 1843.

The man who confines himself to recognition, observation, explanation is no more creative than the wild revolutionary who sets out to make the impossible possible without taking account of realities. Recognition, political instinct, well thought out and yet daring action are all needed. Things recognised must be availed of, facts must be made use of, but there must be no supine capitulation to them: that leads to the ending of any movement at all.

Even the extremest freedom movement will find the optimum freedom in the objective circumstances. But even under the most difficult circumstances the ultimate deciding factor is the human will: on that depends the practical attainment of a maximum of freedom or of unfreedom. If the thought of freedom lives among leaders and people, it will be possible to remove temporarily introduced restrictions on freedom. A cynical attitude to freedom can only lead to the disappearance of of any sort of freedom. Not only that, but political, intellectual, and social freedom cannot endure unless it is continually defended against every new attack, steadily fought for over and over again. Laws alone cannot guarantee freedom; the most liberal laws are impotent in the hands of administrators who are enemies of freedom. What are needed are liberal laws in association with the will to their most liberal administration.

The limits of freedom lie where the activities of individuals or of groups run counter to and injure the interests of society. What has to be ascertained is when the interests of society—not merely those of social groups—must be regarded as injured. It is for the law to determine that. But the law also guarantees the security of the citizen and his

protection in the event of his interests being injured by other citizens or by the State itself. Thus freedom depends on the setting up of the State based on justice. In a State that maintains freedom the interests of society must be protected from anti-social elements, and at the same time the interests of the citizens must be protected from encroachments by the State or by any collectivity.

Security does not imply freedom in the State. But without security it is impossible for freedom to flourish; as Wilhelm von Humboldt writes in "*Grenzen des Staats*" (*Limits of the State*), "Without security a man can neither attain full development of his powers nor enjoy the fruit of it, for without security there is no freedom."

Yet "freedom" does not mean absolute freedom, but a relative freedom, limited by law, custom, and tradition. Freedom in social life demands the sovereign rule of Right, right to which all without distinction must bow; right secured alike to the strong and to the weak.

Thus, for freedom-loving Socialists the only possible principle is: *Every citizen shall have the right to pursue his interests and intentions in so far as they are not injurious to the community and do not overstep the restrictions of the law.* But the limits set by the law must be drawn as generously as possible and must provide as much free play as possible for the individual.

It is not proved that the idea of freedom is incapable of materialisation under Socialism. All that is proved is that a State organised under economic planning, in which there is no personal property in capital that has resulted not from the holder's own earnings but from the exploitation of other human beings, and in which there is no personal ownership of the means of production or of land, that in such a State it is not a foregone conclusion that there must be a regime based on freedom. That is proved, but nothing more. From this it follows that there may exist even under economic Socialism regimes favourable and regimes hostile to freedom. The possibility of an economically collectivist and at the same time a freedom-supporting Socialism has yet to be proved.

There is no regime in the world that has denied all rights and all freedoms to all members of society without distinction. But there are regimes under which not all members of society have enjoyed an equal measure of rights; consequently the share of freedom has also varied. Thus in National Socialist Germany and in other totalitarian States in the world there is excessive freedom for certain groups; so much freedom, in fact, that the members of those privileged groups had no need to feel bound by any laws, and were able to commit with impunity actions that ran counter to the principle of right.

In Nazi Germany looting, robbery, murder, incarceration, trickery,

illegal enrichment, maltreatment have been everyday affairs. A tiny majority—the heads of the Nazi hierarchy—has had freedom to commit these criminal acts. The majority of the people has been enslaved, while the few have been able to revel in their unbounded freedom. One man alone enjoyed the maximum of all freedoms—the “Führer.” He owed no account to anyone. He was the top of the pyramid, and descending from him the various classes received their share of the liberties of the Nazi jungle. Even the humblest member of the National Socialist Party enjoyed greater freedom than the man who had no party badge in his lapel; he was relatively safe from the terrorism of the Gestapo, while all outside the party were at the mercy of the terrorist organisations of the Nazi party and the Nazi State.

Thus the freedom possessed by a people is to be measured not by the freedom enjoyed by certain privileged classes but by the fundamental liberties of every individual member of the State, independently of any chance sociological or political category in which the law may place him and which no one can challenge.

Privileges, too, imply the conferment of increased freedom. I do not think that in a modern State it is possible to do without the conferring of certain privileges, depending, of course, not on birth and rank but on work done, and kept within certain limits. They are justifiable, however, only when they are accorded not at the expense of general freedoms but as an addition to those which are universal and inalienable.

The basis of universal freedoms consists of

- The right of free expression of opinion and of criticism;
- The right of opposition and coalition;
- The protection of the citizen from attack by other citizens of the State and from unjustified encroachments by the State;
- Inalienable equality before the law;
- The protection of personal possessions, the quality and quantity of which is determined by Socialist legislation;
- The right to earn a living;
- The right to education;
- An equal start for all.

Socialists recognise that the liberties of bourgeois society can no longer be guaranteed in our day, because the social tensions make doubtful the continued existence of the ruling classes. The greater these tensions are the greater is the tendency on one side to make an end of general freedoms, and on the other to increase the power of the ruling classes through the extension of privileges. The end of this process is the igniting of the accumulated inflammable material and the destruction of the foundations of society, bringing chaos and barbarism—unless success is achieved in reshaping and reconstructing society. This reconstruction can only be accomplished if the revolting section is able to build up a new society on new foundations. There can be no doubt

that precisely this catastrophe took place in Germany, where the opposition parties of the Left had not the strength or the determination or the political intelligence needed to prevent the National Socialist "solution" and to carry through the liberalistic, socialistic, humanitarian common-sense solution, and so to build up on new foundations. Why this was so need not be discussed here; the fact that it was so has brought tragedy not only upon Germany but upon Europe and the whole world—a tragedy that has demanded the sacrifice of millions of human lives and may demand millions more.

Society cannot continue to exist on the old lines. That is plain not only to Socialists but to many non-Socialists. Science has clearly recognised the necessity of social change. A manifesto of the Genetics Congress (Edinburgh, August 1939) declared that

"The effective genetic improvement of mankind is dependent upon major changes in social conditions, and correlative changes in human attitudes . . . There can be no valid basis for estimating and comparing the intrinsic worth of different individuals without economic and social conditions which provide approximately equal opportunities for all members of society instead of stratifying them from birth into classes with widely different privileges." (Quoted by Henry A. Wallace in *Freedom—Its Meaning*.)

Only in a socialistically planned economic system, in a Socialist society otherwise free and unhindered, can the balance be recovered, only so can the way be found out of misery; only so can the values of human society recover their effective existence; only so is the future of mankind assured, the way opened for progressive advance in the world. The continuance of the class struggle—based on the extremities of inequality and injustice with all their profound consequences—makes for the dissolution of society and for anarchy. The Socialists did not invent the class struggle, nor did they promote it or advocate it for its own sake; all they have done is to refuse to shut their eyes to facts. Socialists show that the oppressed classes struggle against the oppressing class; they are in favour of this struggle because it ends with the final abolition of classes. And the abolition of classes removes an injustice. The ending of this most frightful and most lethal of all struggles serves true peace and procures the conditions for a greater freedom in the national and the international sphere, for a rational society in which avoidable suffering is avoided and human tragedies, in so far as they can be alleviated, are alleviated.

VII

That egalitarian democracy guarantees freedom; that this and this alone can solve political problems; that egalitarian democracy is the only possible form of expression, and a desirable one, of "the sovereignty

of the people" and of "the national will"; that it accords with the dignity of man; that it is only through the majority principle that human contentment and happiness and justice can be granted to men; that it is an assurance against tyranny and barbarism—this conception seems to me to be an illusion and a dangerous superstition.

In declaring here my adhesion to democratic Socialism, I am, surely, after all that has been said, safe from the misunderstanding that might easily occur without these explanations.

Socialists do not look upon freedom as a "bourgeois prejudice," a middle-class fad. Nor do they set out to "supersede" the idea of freedom: they set out to materialise it and carry it into practice. To the conquests of the bourgeois revolutions, the intellectual and political freedoms of the classic democracy of the nineteenth century, they add new ones—social freedoms; they thus extend the conception of freedom without denying the value of the bourgeois freedoms.

Freedom-loving Socialists are aware that with the mere socialisation of the means of production and expropriation of the great capitalists, the achievement, that is to say, of economic Socialism, an important but only a partial advance will have been made; that economic Socialism only paves the way for the formation of a free society. Without social freedom there can be no genuine political freedom; but the converse is equally true. One of the two freedoms is the foundation of the Socialist edifice, the other the superstructure; only the two together complete the building.

Without intellectual and political freedom the Socialist State degenerates into a termite State; the collectivity becomes an end in itself; the State becomes the end of all things. Freedom-loving Socialists aim at placing the collectivity in the service of the individual; they conceive the State as the sum of all resources and the servant of the people. Socialist collectivism, though a higher form of society, fails of its purpose if it fails to be guided by the humanist idea.

German democracy? If this term covers Socialism in Germany, high quality in leaders, and a maximum of human freedom—why, it will do!

A New Form of Democracy

I

GERMAN affairs are much too complicated for a complete solution of the problem to be found in gradual democratisation after the collapse of the dictatorship. The opponents of dictatorship are the very people who cannot overlook a fact which is hardly paralleled in other countries and which therefore stands in the way of a mechanical application to Germany of experience elsewhere. And this is the fact, however absurd it may seem, that Germany headed into national socialism by a democratic route.

That will appear strange to many people. For, although it is generally known that Hitler, after his failure in November, 1923, vetoed insurrection—in spite of pressure from the leaders of the S.A.—and did not get into power through a *coup d'état*; yet many have taken the assertion about the “little clique of usurpers” at its face value. The assertion that democracy was responsible for putting the national socialists into the saddle will cause all the more astonishment since the Nazis are of course an anti-democratic party and did not even have an absolute majority in 1933.

It is clear that there is no intention here of presenting Hitler as a “good democrat.” It is, therefore, not to whitewash him, but with a view to a critical investigation of the functioning of German democracy, that it is emphatically stated that the anti-democratic spirit of the Nazis was not shown in the manner in which they came to power, but in their objectives, their extra-parliamentary methods, their terrorist acts before and after they seized power, the theories which they enunciated, their contempt for freedom, their principle of “leadership.” Göbbels even had the cynicism to describe as “ennobled democracy” this system, which, in contrast to an authoritarian regime, depended on a mass-movement, but which tolerates no opposition and would never leave the stage of its own free will.

It was from fear of the army and the President of the Reich that Hitler decided to go the legal way. His reason for delaying so long, and for asking impossible conditions, without which he could have been Chancellor at an earlier date, was that he hoped for an absolute majority, and, aiming at totality, wanted to avoid coalitions, even as a by-way to totality. At the last, when, owing to these delays and the impatience of his supporters, coalition became unavoidable, he hesitated whether to

form it with the Centre Party, as Gregor Strasser wished, or with the German Nationalists and the Centre-renegade, Papen, as Göring advocated.

Before him no party that appointed the Chancellor had an absolute majority. Consequently all governments had been founded on coalitions. So was Hitler's. That Hitler later got rid of his partner in the coalition and made the other parties "toe the line"¹ belongs to another story; here we are concerned only with the fact that the party took the helm in accordance with the democratic rules of the game. When the Republic started, the strongest party, the social democrats, appointed the Chancellor. Later that ceased to happen, either because there was a majority against a social democratic chancellorship, although not against the participation of social democrats in the government, or because there was a majority against even their participation, and a comparatively solid coalition was formed from other parties, to the exclusion of the strongest one, or even because in the era of a certain presidential dictatorship the powers were exercised without regard to the majority (the Papen and Schleicher governments). From that point of view Hitler's appointment was, grotesquely enough, in actuality almost a return to the democratic rules, while the failure to appoint him previously had been an evasion of those rules. Papen, who was only at first supported by the Nazis, had then carried on the government against the majority, which meant against the Nazis also (that he only did this to "tame" them and to make them more modest and riper for partnership, not from any question of principle, is, again, another matter), and it was the same with Schleicher. It does not affect the unfortunately indisputable "democratic form" of Hitler's attainment of power that a lot of intriguing preceded his appointment. Participants in this were the industrial financiers under Hugenberg's leadership, who were anxious about their investments, as well as von Papen, who thought that he had now made the Nazis sufficiently mellow. The idea behind this intrigue was that, after the failure of two authoritarian experiments, it was now necessary to go the "democratic way"—as a formality—even though on the basis of a very tiny narrow majority, and not for the sake of democracy itself, but in order to supplant it. This majority soon swelled to giant dimensions, not only through terrorism and forced synchronisation² but also from voluntary assimilation, from the influx of millions of success-worshippers, who in two months trebled the membership of the Nazi party, and through the multitude of those who on principle are loyal to every government and for whom the regime represented simply and plainly Germany's Government. Hitler was, moreover, supported by the solidarity in questions of foreign policy which was evidently expressed by the unanimous approval of his declaration in the Reichstag

¹ "Gleichschaltete."

² "Gleichschaltung."

on the subject. All this is so much the less surprising since Hitler's direct reserves for a dictatorial regime were, in the last resort, not limited to the German nationalists admitted to the coalition. They also extended to the greater part of the other parties of the Right, which on account of their small size had not been brought into the government but which were in total not inconsiderable. Right-wing groups of the other parties might also be added.

All in all we can say that the dictatorship was brought about in a democratic way, and not dictatorially. Anyone who denies that wants either to shift the responsibility to as small a class as possible or to mitigate the faults of the Weimar Republic. The state of affairs has been depicted in so much detail in order to make it clear why there should be more scepticism with regard to Germany and why a general slogan such as the setting up of a democratic government or, if you like, the restoration of democratic government (which would, of course, imply a continuation of established tradition, and gives the impression of a repetition of the old mistakes) would not be satisfying. Very definite experience has been gained in Germany, unlike anything in the Western democracies, and the resulting difficulties must be taken into account. The whole question is: what deductions are to be drawn from these negative experiences?

A series of proposals have been made. In order to deal with the problem exhaustively, we will consider them in turn. One view proceeds from the assumption that, in consequence of the lack of democratic traditions, Germany simply had not yet a true democracy, that the Weimar State was a democracy without democrats, and that all that is wanted is this time to set up a *better*, a genuine, a true *democracy*. In detail, something like the following arguments are used:

On 30th September, 1918, the Kaiser introduced parliamentary democracy by edict. The Social Democrats and the Progressive People's Party had petitioned for the Crown's initiative and had renounced the right of proposing a Chancellor, while the Centre Party, which had previously displayed opposition to a parliamentary system, immediately accepted the new state of affairs. None of the parties had at that time been striving for anything else than parliamentary monarchy. Then the parties, they say, "slid" into the Republic, which they had not wanted. For his proclamation of the Republic, Scheidemann is said to have been bitterly reproached by Ebert. Democracy is held not to have become a political or social form of life, but to have remained a collection of constitutional precepts. The Weimar Constitution prescribed that the Chancellor and, at his proposal, the Ministers of the Reich were to be appointed and dismissed by the President, that the Chancellor and the Ministers required the confidence of the Reichstag in the exercise of their offices, that the Chancellor was to decide the general lines of policy and be responsible to the Reichstag in that respect, and that

within these limits each Minister was to control his allotted sphere independently and have his own responsibility to the Reichstag. In practice, however, it was quite different. The right of the Chancellor to nominate and dismiss Ministers had largely become a dead letter, since actually the political groups prescribed the nominees to the Chancellor, and it was only Wirth and Stresemann who had tried to free themselves from this. Nominations and dismissals of Ministers by resolutions of the political groups had been the rule. As the Ministers came into office with a load of party commissions and entanglements, it had become harder and harder for the Chancellor to decide the general lines of policy. Some Chancellors, like Marx, refrained generally from taking their own line. Marx, they say, had conducted the government in the manner of the chairman of a company, and had limited himself to taking the line laid down for him by the groups. This destroyed the principle of responsibility. The presidential dictatorship was only a consequence of the fact that the parliamentary republic was but a parliamentary monarchy without a monarch, and had now found a monarch of a new kind. The fall of Wirth and the nomination of Cuno had already revealed the incomplete nature of the parliamentary system and the effect of anonymous forces.

In addition to all this the critics of the Weimar democracy allege the following:

The economic monopolies had established their separate government and had captured the Press, so that the formation of an independent opinion became immensely difficult. In the Ministries the specialist officials had played a wrecking game, and representatives of industry had crept in under the title of "experts." Proportional representation had torn up the ties between the deputies and the electors, and had proved to be a premium on mediocrity. Men of standing had been replaced by officials, the party bureaucracy becoming the deciding factor. When candidates were being put up, the local party organisations were, for financial reasons, dependent on the economic associations, and were therefore under a strong temptation to fill the lists with the representatives of the various interests. It was not persons, but organisations, that had been elected. The members of parliament had been chosen without regard to their suitability, so that they thought they had acquired a claim to maintenance for life. In the case of the lists which were provided for the surplus votes in the Reich the central bureaucracy of the parties had arrived at the decision unchecked; there was less question there than anywhere about political quality, and the interests alone had any say in the matter.

Would the problem be solved if all these defects, which are quite correctly described, were abolished? Would this get rid of the incongruity that of 44 millions of voters (of whom, for that matter, 20 to 25 per cent took no part in the elections, except in the last year before

the establishment of the dictatorship, 1932, when there was a political boom!) only some 10 per cent were organised in political parties (and that too was not until the time of the political boom, in the twilight of the Weimar democracy) and therefore were associated in the nomination of candidates (and even that was largely only in theory, since it was the central committees of the parties who decided)? And would that finally prevent the possible misuse of democracy by its opponents? It can certainly be objected that a parliamentarism that functioned better would not lead to such a weariness of democracy, to such anti-parliamentary moods. But did national socialism arise only from discontent with the functioning of democracy and with the inadequacy of the parties? Guarantees remain in any case necessary, and that is a root problem.

Now it is precisely in view of this particular question that many people have given the answer that it is inevitable that *dictatorial* means shall be used as a protection against the attempt to establish a new dictatorship. In actual fact, that is not as absurd as it sounds. It often happens that political phenomena, which at first glance seem to lead to quite self-evident conclusions, may in reality produce consequences of an entirely opposite nature. The presence of a dictatorship may quite as well produce a passionate outcry for the re-establishment of democracy as give rise to the thought that democracy was previously a failure and that in consequence the one dictatorship must be succeeded by another which will take up a less suicidal attitude towards its opponents and will not handle them with velvet gloves. Similarly the destruction of the constitutional State may on the one hand call forth a demand for its restoration, and on the other may lead to the reflection that the conception of legality had previously helped only the despisers of law, and that the lesson must therefore be learned from them not to be delicate in future and no longer to make shadows into stumbling-blocks. Those who now advocate a new dictatorship are composed of two categories: firstly, those who demand a dictatorship of the proletariat, but who actually championed this solution earlier and quite independently of the phenomenon of national socialism, and who regard all other possibilities as exhausted. Secondly, those who proceed primarily not from social but from constitutional points of view, and therefore were not already advocates of the dictatorship of the proletariat, but adopted the postulate of dictatorial measures only because of the faults of Weimar and after the experiences which followed 1933; this section naturally shows a number of gradations. In spite of their different origin and standpoint, these two groups are not very far apart, since even those who believe in a dictatorship of the proletariat officially regard this ideal of theirs as provisional, although of indefinite duration, and it is also a provisional arrangement that is envisaged by the advocates of dictatorial measures of transition. That a

large part of those who long supported the idea of a dictatorship of the proletariat now speak, for tactical reasons, of democracy, is, again, another matter.

Of this solution, however, it may be said that the cry for freedom on account of past experience will be overwhelming, when wide circles of the German people after the end of the present regime have once come to the conviction that they have been living in a sort of trance. "Never again a dictatorship!" will be the natural reaction. And nobody will be prepared to exchange one dictatorship for another, however opposed the new one may be to the one that is past. This reaction will be so strong that we must even partly reckon with the discrediting of certain institutions (e.g. industrial planning) which not only had a place in the national-socialist programme, but were even carried out by them, though for other reasons and for noxious ends.

As regards the transition period, Germany will be relieved of this problem by the military occupation. Although Germany's part in this is a passive one, it is not a matter of indifference whether the wreckers or those who are ready to co-operate predominate. Collaboration will be indispensable for the future normalisation, which is dependent on the nature of that collaboration and on the future attitude and change of mind of the Germans. It is also important whether this collaboration is sought in a peevish and morose spirit, with cold calculation and from tactical motives, or whether out of an honest wish for understanding. It is to be hoped that, little by little, the view will gain ground that, on account of the conditions to be expected in Germany, military occupation will be a piece of good fortune for the German people.

However that may be, the occupation will give the question of the transition period a different complexion. It will be clear that the proper mean must be found between the notion that the restoration of the constitutional State excludes extraordinary measures and the view that the necessary extraordinary measures make the restoration of the constitutional State impossible. Insofar as influence on this question can be brought to bear from the German side even during the occupation—as in the case of the occupation being limited to supervision—the great difficulty will be to combine extraordinary measures with the restoration of the constitutional State, which is necessary for the prevention of a new despotism. It is certain that elections cannot be considered after the collapse of the regime, certain that a series of measures will have to be decreed, certain that, in face of the political immaturity of the German people and of the lack of democratic education, freedoms and rights cannot be given back except in combination with a maximum of guarantees. It is certain, too, that, in spite of the cry for freedom, which would also bring advantages to the opponents of freedom, the process of normalisation will be slow and gradual. But that has nothing to do with dictatorship, once the constitutional State has been restored. And this

situation must not be styled and looked upon as a "temporary dictatorship," for it is too easy in this way to bring about a new despotism, to perpetuate such transition measures, which develop their own dynamic force, become an end in themselves, and produce new groups of people who have an interest in the maintenance of this position.

II

The question of what is now to be done has been a special preoccupation of those whose critical attitude has caused them to go their own way, outside the old mismanaged parties. On the one hand, a return to the Weimar democracy is not possible at all, in view of the constructive faults which have been described, and an immediate return to a democracy of whatever form is unthinkable. On the other hand, dictatorship, whether actually or ostensibly looked upon as temporary, appears unbearable.

With these points in view, Kurt Hiller has developed the idea of the *élite*, the rule of the best. Many who do not follow Hiller in everything share the conviction that distinctions must be made between different features of democracy, e.g., between the possibility of discussion, criticism, and supervision, the freedom of the person, and protection against despotism, on the one hand, and on the other the rule of numbers, the majority principle, and the equalitarian principle. I subscribe to Hiller's contention that it is a false democratic doctrine that the people must put up with seeing themselves represented by mediocrities; to his assertion that it is not contrary to the root principle of democracy for the people to be represented by the "aristoi," the best, instead of by party secretaries, by second-rate sergeant-majors and bureaucrats; to his assertion that democracy in Germany did not make good, that the Weimar Constitution was the soil in which Nazism ripened, and that, finally, after more than a decade of Nazi teaching of youth and people, the results of which would not be swept away even by a military catastrophe, universal suffrage might still more easily lead to majorities of crude unreason. All this is, in my opinion, so much the more worthy of assent since it is free from illusions about the German people, as well as about the present-day position of the majority; discontent with the Nazi party does not in fact mean breaking away from the ideas which it has propagated, and could not even be relied upon to prevent the return of that party in new times of crisis.

For the sake of exactitude the following must be made clear. In his criticism of the current conception of democracy, Hiller has recently laid stress on the impossibility of holding elections after Hitler's fall. Hiller, however, arrived at his critical judgment of democracy and his demand for the "aristocratic venture," as he calls it, decades before the misuse of democracy by the Nazis; so that he would advocate the

élite solution even if all that has happened had not been, and he would, one may deduce, therefore continue to press his scheme even if the consequences and after-effects of the Nazi regime, the nationalist ramp, the corruption of the young, were no more. The two things are not the same. They may depend on one another; Hiller might regard what happened before and after 1933 as only an additional confirmation of his views. But the two things are not necessarily dependent on one another. One may be extremely critical of hitherto existing conceptions of democracy, on account of the "equalitarian" principle, of the difficulty of selection, of the rule of the mediocre and the inadequate, without having first experienced the manifestations of Nazism, which are in fact not sufficiently explained by these things. Yet, conversely, it is possible to be in favour of prophylactic measures in Germany, because of the present state of mind there, without adopting the idea of neo-aristocracy. In general, it is only those who believe in "the mighty army of anti-Nazis" who will be against prophylactic measures.

The two questions—criticism of democracy in itself and criticism of democracy because it made the Nazi regime possible—must, in my opinion, be thus clearly separated, because in the one case the elections would be deferred for a transition period, however many years that might last, while in the other case they would be deferred altogether. Moreover, prophylactic measures can have only a provisional character, while the *élite* solution is not intended to be provisional, and what is only temporary ought to be kept distinct from what is permanent.

Whilst accepting the main principles of Hiller's criticism, I do not arrive at all his conclusions.

In my opinion, in spite of the pertinence of the criticism of the old democracy, the main objection to Hiller's *élite* idea is (1) Even if it is held that the masses are immature, yet they will not consent to be permanently excluded in the manner proposed. Even participation in the supervising bodies would not be an adequate substitute. The argument is not valid that the masses did actually commit political hara-kiri of their own accord in 1933 and took no offence at their exclusion. This acceptance of political suicide was obtained by feeding the masses in return with the myth of the Führer, with the flattering tale of their "racial superiority," and with the vision of world dominion. However far we may be from ascribing all the events in Germany to the terror, it is in any case clear that its cessation must have effects in the opposite direction. Furthermore, the destruction of popular rights was compensated for by rights conferred on the party members, although at the cost of others; the regime, unlike an authoritarian one, actually depended on the masses, who were not conscious of their loss of rights. For the millions of supporters there was indeed "only" one freedom lacking, namely, freedom to change their minds. The suffrage cannot be permanently taken from the masses nor can its effects be circum-

scribed. The clock cannot be put back. We have to take note of the consequences of the authoritarian State and of the police State, but we must look for ways of overcoming those consequences, and we must not help to perpetuate them.

The question thus takes the form: how can indispensable rights be conferred without the injurious results which followed in 1933? In other words: how can Hiller's points be taken into account without arriving at his conclusions?

As regards the resistance of the masses, one could reply that the progressive-socialist part of them cannot be against his proposals since they agree to the end in view, and that, for the rest, no consideration can be given to the nationalist section of the masses. In this latter opinion nobody concurs more enthusiastically than I do. It is just for that reason that I am opposed to an immediate election, and, as I think that the nationalist section is far greater than Hiller estimates it to be, asserting, as I do, that it extends very considerably beyond the ranks of the Nazis, I should even regard the formation of a German government immediately after the war as an actual misfortune. We are, however, not talking of a transition stage, but of a time when nationalism has, for the most part, been liquidated; before this the experiment of an election cannot in any case be made. It may be regarded as extremely doubtful whether all non-nationalists would assent to the *élite* idea. There is no indication of this. Sections may be against it who are in agreement in the social and economic aims of the champion of the *élite* principle, but who do not like this procedure. (2) This brings us to the question whether such a comprehensive proposal would find sufficient support to carry it through. Even if it were desired and were possible to disregard the opinion of the masses, it might prove almost impossible to secure the necessary people for such a coalition from above, for such a Council of Minds. And if they were found it would be necessary to have recourse to the former parties. That would contradict the *élite* principle itself in every way. And (3) even if we assume that the selection could be made, and men of like mind got together, that differences, fresh despotism, the formation of an oligarchy in case of the experiment failing, could all be avoided, what would become of those who did not agree, who were not included, who broke away, who, while agreeing in the principle as such, did not approve of the method of selection? Such a government could then, before getting down to its tasks, only maintain itself by force. That would be the employment of force, not against nationalists and anti-socialists, but conceivably even against freedom-loving men, who might set themselves against the danger of despotism and clique rule, all the more because conceptions of socialism show great variations. In my opinion, therefore, it is desirable that the mixture proposed should have in it a few more drops of democratic oil: it could stand these without becoming too equalitarian.

III

The proposed *reform of democracy* that follows takes account of the objections that have been mentioned. It falls automatically into two parts: the general measures designed to meet the criticisms of the functioning of democracy in Germany, including the triumph of the Nazis on democratic lines, and, secondly, the transition measures, which must not lose sight of the still-present Nazi influence.

The characteristic feature of the new proposal is the separation of the general political Parliament from a *Chamber of Economics*,¹ which is to come into being on indirect lines by elections in the communes,² and is to consist of representatives of workmen, clerks, farmers, middle-class, and professional men, on the basis of their social proportion and without the interference of parties. The basic system might be called "council democracy." Such an arrangement has nothing to do with (1) the two-chamber system of other countries, since here the difference is solely in the matter of their tasks, (2) the old economic council of the Reich, which was purely decorative and impotent, of entirely one-sided composition and was not appointed in an exactly democratic manner, (3) the Guild parliament with its occupational organisation and its disadvantages for the broad masses of the people, thus being an authoritarian and reactionary body, (4) the Soviet system, which is based on the dictatorship of a class and a party.

What are the advantages of such an arrangement and the reasons for this novel proposal? (1) The same persons do not have to decide on both economic and other political (for instance, cultural) matters. (2) Political organisations are not in a position to allege cultural reasons for pushing their economic interests (as when, e.g., the German nationalists spoke of conservatism and traditional customs, but had in mind

¹ Of course "economic" questions imply "political" questions too. Nobody would deny that. This obvious fact is not overlooked in our using for the two chambers, only for reasons of simplicity, the terminology "Chamber of Economics" and "Political Parliament." The latter would deal with all political questions other than those dealt with by the Chamber of Economics. In so far as problems arise which concern both chambers, they would be discussed in both of them. In so far as difference of competence arises a special commission would decide.

² In Germany there are at present the following administrative units: The smallest units are the communes (*Gemeinden*), either small towns or villages. Several communes make up a "circle" (*Kreis*), which might be compared with a sub-district. Larger towns are divided into urban districts (corresponding to the communes) and constitute a circle or sub-district of their own; that means they are not included in other sub-districts. Several circles (rural or town circles) form a government district (*Regierungsbezirk*). In Prussia several government districts form a province, several provinces the State (*Land*). In the other German countries the names are partly different. But that would only confuse the picture.

the interests of the Junkers and of a part of the heavy industries, or when the German people's party spoke of liberalism, but had an eye to the interests of the Rhine-Ruhr industry). (3) It becomes possible to place the question of the social change on the order of the day without any disguise. (4) Attempts to wreck the social change are nullified (in this connection, the idea of excluding certain occupational groups of the working population is objectless, and to be rejected; unoccupied persons will, in any case, not vote for the economic parliament, and those who are noxious or wreckers, and former Nazi officials and officers, will be automatically excluded by the penalties for their misdeeds, which will involve the deprivation of civil rights. (5) The building up from below will promote the idea of self-government, develop initiative and responsibility, and will therefore furnish a contribution to the democratic schooling hitherto lacking.

It must be remembered that the former interweaving of economic and other political tasks produced a false picture. Millions of the middle-class voted for the so-called bourgeois parties, and that was not because they approved of the old economic order, but in spite of their not approving of it. Why? (1) They were afraid of a social revolution which would benefit none but the manual workers. (2) They allowed themselves to be influenced by the items in the party programmes, which were outside the economic sphere. This interplay will be destroyed by the arrangement proposed. Building up from below gets rid of the legacies from the authoritarian State.

The councils of workmen, farmers, middle-class, clerks, and professional men, are at the same time organs of the communal (urban or rural) and sub-district local government and the bodies charged with the social change. They elect from their own ranks, in accordance with a fixed formula, the economic councils of the authority immediately above (government districts, provinces, countries, or whatever names the new units may bear when Germany has been reorganised), and from these the highest stage, the German Chamber of Economics, is chosen. With this limitation of functions, and with the existence of connections between the candidates and their duties, the danger of the introduction of incompetents is reduced to a minimum, especially as the Chamber of Economics will be empowered to co-opt experts for the more complicated problems. At all events, a maximum of democracy can here be combined with a maximum of expert knowledge.

The candidates for the local councils might be appointed by the trade unions and the organisations of peasants and of the middle class. But if this basis is regarded as insufficient after the Labour Front, the workers and middle class organisation, and the "Food Estate," as peasants' organisation, have been destroyed and the system of compulsory universal membership abolished, the workers in the factories, the clerks in the offices and so on, might provide the new representation. In

this way every candidate will be known to his electors. The social composition of a commune will be reflected in the composition of the council. There will be a close connection between the members of the council and the electors. The elections in the other units (circles and so on) would be indirect.

The Chamber of Economics will have to deal with all questions of production and consumption, social change, economical planning, the problems of prices and wages, in so far as the interference of State is possible or necessary. The lower units will have to deal with the execution of these tasks and with the public services (gas, water, electricity), social welfare, and building. It would be desirable to entrust building to the communes, and the public services, according to situation, to the communes or the districts (in highly populated areas). Financial questions will very often concern both chambers.

The length of the period between elections to these councils and the question whether there should be terms of different length for the different stages should be decided according to the situation that then exists.

As mentioned, in this Chamber of Economics parties are unnecessary, whereas the political parliament is not based upon councils.

This system might be put into operation under the occupation as soon as a certain amount of order is restored. It may be repeated that all these tasks of reconstruction are not to start *after* the occupation, but are to be scheduled for completion by the time the occupation terminates; the end of occupation should therefore coincide with the start of normal conditions. It could even be said that the state of normality must be the condition for the cessation of the occupation.

For the political parliament, parties would be allowable. The separation from the Chamber of Economics will not only bring a cleansing of the political atmosphere but also limit party activities to some extent, though not unduly. The parties will then be able to resume their rôle of exponents of world-views, instead of being groups representing economic interests.

The political parliament would deal with all other questions, foreign policy, home policy, constitution, justice, culture, etc. Its functions would comprise: legislation (with the restrictions already mentioned), control, platform of discussion, the debating and amendments of measures. The danger of these activities and functions of this Parliament clashing with those of the Chamber of Economics need not exist provided the respective spheres of activity are properly co-ordinated beforehand. Until this parliament comes into existence all its functions would be carried out by the international authorities (to some extent with assistance from advisers whose importance would be, however, much greater in the lower units). Theoretically one might shorten this procedure, but in practice this might involve serious risks.

Incidentally it remains to be seen to what extent a crisis in party life will be experienced in Germany. National socialism utilised the discredit into which the many-party system had fallen in order to erect its one-party system. This, however, has not made parties more popular; even many who were entirely in agreement with the other attributes of national socialism, especially its nationalism, objected to the party, to its Bumbles and its bureaucratic apparatus (things which must be kept distinct). Smaller groups, including the German nationalists, would, for this very reason, have preferred to replace the many-party system by an authoritarian regime instead of by a one-party system, and will certainly show such tendencies again. But this can hardly appear as a way out, for this solution reeks too much of dictatorship (this time without the masses), and nobody wants to exchange the old bureaucracy once more for the new. Everyone will have to reckon with anti-bureaucratism, including those who are thinking of a social change. Moreover, the parties, which for their part were also ruled by a centralised bureaucracy, presented on other grounds anything but an ideal solution. They included as members, as already pointed out, only a small proportion of those entitled to vote (speaking, of course, of the time before 1933). Often the best brains were the very ones that kept away from the parties, which turned more and more into cages, or even coffins, for an opinion of their own. There commenced a development away from the old parties, partly in favour of "splinter" groups, which naturally remained powerless, of associations, which took no further interest in politics, of circles which worked behind the scenes and tried extra-parliamentary paths, of forces which went as far as definite disavowal of parliamentary activity. After 1933 new groups tried to interrupt this development. Incidentally this process does not seem to be limited to Germany. It is now argued that parties are a necessary evil, that there is no better solution, and that a parliamentary or democratic life without parties is unthinkable. That is not quite correct. In France, e.g., it was only the Left that had parties, while the Centre and the Right limited themselves to committees and fractions. This phenomenon is interesting, and was not responsible for the parliamentary crisis in France. Individual personality becomes in any case of more account in this way. It is quite possible that looser ties may be given the preference, and that rigid organisation, together with discipline exercised by a body of party sergeant-majors and a central committee active in smelling-out heresy, may be renounced. It would certainly be allowable to amalgamate, and thus to reduce the number of groups in existence.

It will be a weighty task to arrange for the return to one-man constituencies without renouncing the positive assets of proportional representation. The injustices which arise from the lack of proportional representation are so great that we must face the complicated task of working out exactly how the disadvantages of proportional representa-

tion resulting from the list system can be removed without throwing out the child with the bath-water and returning to the majority system. A method of computation is quite possible; a list system, which is only supplementary and can no longer be influenced by economic groups, would certainly not prejudice the return to the one-man constituency.

So far, too, as a loosening of the party system would still not suffice to bring the leading minds into parliament, there is no objection whatever to a *supplementary* nomination of persons of standing in all spheres of intellectual life. If the number of those thus nominated is in a suitable proportion to that of the other members, there will be no danger of the result of the elections being thereby prejudiced. The question of who shall be responsible for the nominations requires special consideration. It is true that this solution is a compromise, but it involves less risk than the "aristocratic venture" of which Kurt Hiller speaks. It takes into account his criticism of old-style parliamentarism, without going over to a 100 per cent system of nomination or even of reciprocal nomination.

A compromise is also possible on the question of the functions of parliament. The legislative activity should be deputed to *Committees* to the maximum extent, the limits of which require detailed prescription, and in the Committees the specialists should have sufficient influence. That does not, however, mean that all legislative activity must be deputed to Committees; the political parliament must not be emasculated in this way and sink to the level of a purely supervising body. What are intended are the ordinary parliamentary Committees, consisting of members of parliament. Special experts should also be attached to them, and this can be done within the framework of the supplementary nominations mentioned above. These Committees are thus dissimilar from those which Hiller suggests. Their constitutional structure is different, although there are certain points in common, arising from the nomination of experts.

All these proposals, particularly the separation of the Chamber of Economics from the political parliament and the council structure (in the form of council democracy, not of council dictatorship—to synthesize the opposed principles), without leaving the ground of democracy, make a sufficiently great distinction from old-style democracy (and, above all, get rid of the passivity of the Weimar democracy, which brought the masses to such despair that they at last came to think that the essential was that *something* should happen, even if it was something bad).

In concluding this section it may be advisable to summarise the main points of agreement and disagreement between the foregoing proposal and that of Hiller:

1. Agreed as to the need for a two-chamber system.

2. Not agreed as to the character of the two chambers. Hiller distinguishes, by functions, a legislative chamber and a supervising chamber. I distinguish, by the material to be dealt with, a chamber of political economy (with legislative *and* supervising functions) and a parliament charged with the remaining political tasks (similarly with legislative *and* supervising functions).

3. Not agreed about the structure of the two chambers. The chamber of political economy has a point of correspondence with Hiller's supervising chamber as regards its democratic origin, though in another form. The differences consist in the (more extensive) functions and the (limited) material (cf. 2). There is no relationship to Hiller's legislative chamber, either in functions or material, let alone origin, unless from the purely external point of view that both depart from the assumptions usual in the Weimar republic. The chamber dealing with the remaining political tasks has again a certain relationship with Hiller's supervising chamber in its origin, but not in functions and material. It is far removed from Hiller's legislative assembly, since it is based on universal equal suffrage, though not entirely on the Weimar model. It follows that there is no agreement about the details of the application of the *élite* principle.

4. It is, however, agreed that the selection of the Head of the State should be carried out through parliament, and that the Government should require to obtain a vote of confidence from parliament.

IV

This then is the general aspect of the problem. Now a few words on the transition period, certainly not a short one, the requirements of which take up much of the foreground in Hiller's arguments. It has already been stated that only a very few still retain the illusion of immediate elections. Even the majority of those who do not take part in the criticism directed at the functioning of democracy in Germany should be against such elections, not because of any fundamental principle but simply out of their estimation of the momentary situation. It can also be taken as certain that the occupying authorities, even in the case of their limiting themselves in defined sectors to mere supervision, would, for reasons of safety alone, not permit elections after the collapse. The warning against such experiments (for the prevention of which, in my opinion, there is no need to have recourse to such comprehensive measures as nominated or reciprocally nominated assemblies, and that permanently, without being subject to any confirmation) is also addressed to those who, whether out of an illusionary estimate of the attitude of the majority, or out of a false judgment of the Weimar Constitution, would who, whether out of an illusionary estimate of the attitude of the like, in spite of everything, to hold immediate elections (that would only

be a danger if their number were greater and if the supervision by the occupying Powers were very limited) or who do not reckon for a sufficiently long transition period.

The obvious objection is now: How then is a government ever to come into existence, if it is recognised that elections cannot be held at once, and if, on the other hand, both a dictatorship of the proletariat and a Council of Minds on the *élite* principle are equally rejected or considered dangerous? It might be asked whether in that case a Council of Minds is not in fact the only possibility, at least for the transition period. It is admitted that the problem has a materially different aspect if it is only a provisional arrangement that is under discussion, and if a corporate body can be subjected to later confirmation. Such an *élite* body, if intended as only an interim solution, would amount to a revolutionary government, which had to rule by means of decrees, always assuming that this was permitted. Some scepticism, however, must exist as to the possibility of forming such a body really on the basis of the *élite* principle. The kernel of the *élite* idea consists actually in the production of a permanent situation.

But just because such a government would have to employ dictatorial methods, even against its will, just because that would bring a demand for elections, which could not be held, and just because the doubt about obtaining general agreement implies the possibility of constant counteraction and the danger of chaos which a nominated or reciprocally nominated body might not be able to master, just on this account it would be in the interests of the German people themselves (and at the same time of the surrounding world) if normalisation arrived *in stages*, and that during (not after) the occupation era. It is quite possible that this solution would be as unpopular among Germans, who might misunderstand a transition period of this kind, as it might appear undesirable to the occupying Powers, in so far as they have considered a limitation of their tasks. In reality it would be of the greatest benefit to both parties. Neither on dictatorial nor on democratic lines is a stable government after the collapse conceivable; wishful thinking will not help. Germany must be compared with a man who, after a stroke, is slowly making attempts to walk again. The chaos which would arise in the other event would be much worse for everyone. But, it may be objected, what happens if the occupying Powers do not intend to burden themselves with tasks beyond a certain measure of supervision? In that case those who found themselves faced with such a situation would certainly not decide for the proposed *élite* remedy, whatever advantages it might present, but would adopt either the democratic solution, although this would simply not be workable after the collapse, or the dictatorial, although this might conceivably be unpopular and could not produce stable conditions. This is just where chaos would arise, as already stated, and this might perhaps then induce the occupying Powers to extend

their activity temporarily. And again there will be the objection that we must ourselves have an idea of what should happen if, unexpectedly, greater German responsibility is demanded, and that it is therefore not enough to limit oneself to pointing out what routes are impassable. In this event the attempt would, in my opinion, have to be made to rebuild the ruined organisation by districts, and thus circuitously to re-establish a State authority, by the meeting together of the district representatives, who can maintain their positions more easily in their smaller units. We must, in my view, fall back upon this method because, with the different political tendencies which may be expected in the Reich, embodying a reaction against "Gleichschaltung" (Nazi alignment) and the suppression of diversity, no central assembly will find the necessary authority to maintain its position. The route through attempts at regional regulation, easier to carry out, might then lead—perhaps—to a central emergency arrangement. This is, however, mentioned merely in order to meet even unexpected eventualities, and is not put forward as a solution, seeing that it artificially shortens—by cutting out various intermediate steps—a development which is possible only as a gradual process. What is actually proposed is a normalisation by stages.

In my opinion, then, immediately after the collapse it will not be possible to form either a government or a legislative assembly. This standpoint may seem objectionable not only to Germans who adopt an exclusively national view, instead of a European one, but also to those non-Germans who do not understand the quite peculiar basic conditions in Germany since 1933 (and some of whom even regarded the German anti-Nazis as low traitors because they opposed their government). It is, however, not only in the interests of Europe, but also in those of the German people. For there is no starting point from which we can halt to begin to form a government or a legislative body. The old parties are of no significance in Germany, whatever some reporters may say to the contrary. This negative judgment is unavoidable, and I do not think that this gap can be filled with the *élite* principle.

Any attempt at forming a government in Germany might well lead to chaotic conditions, as rabid German-haters, blind to the consequences, would perhaps wish. The failure of such attempts would then possibly only be a roundabout way of arriving at the above solution. There seems no reason why Germany cannot be ruled by an inter-allied commission for a transition period the extent of which cannot be estimated, but whose duration will depend entirely on the behaviour of the German population and on the change of heart asserting itself. If it is objected that this commission will not be also able to carry out all the legislative work, the reply is that it would be provisionally sufficient in many spheres (though, as far as practicable, *not* in the economic sphere) to prescribe a provisional revival of the Weimar laws until new Bills can be brought forward; all the Nazi laws having, of course, been first abrogated.

And so we come to the question of German collaboration. There is a mean between the conception that there is no possible field of activity at all for constructively-minded Germans (a distortion of the thought, true in itself, that there cannot be a German government) and the other conception that the Germans, as in 1919, can by themselves take their fate into their own hands—without distinguishing between those who are really prepared to collaborate and those who are only paying lip-service to the idea.

Just because we want to avoid getting the same results over again, we cannot again take the same risk. To the suggestion that it is sufficient to make Germany socialist and democratic, it must be retorted that these are the forces which in 1919 came to terms with the German generals, and that the world was imposed upon by the republic long *before* the Nazis.

On the other hand, Amgot will not arrive with 800,000 officials. Here is the opportunity for those Germans who are willing to collaborate and are honestly in favour of a policy of fulfilment. At first they will be a small minority. They can be propagandists, to convince the population of the need for co-operation, or at least to neutralise them. They can be advisers and counsel, doing preparatory work in the legislative sphere, and can help to introduce normalisation in stages, from the lower units, the communes, upwards. In the first stage, government would be carried on by decrees, either by the occupying Powers alone or by those Powers and by organs supervised by them. Among the measures belonging to this period would be included the beginnings of the social change (on the assumption that the occupying Powers do not prevent it), either with the occupying Powers declaring themselves not interested in the question, or even with their having acquired the conviction that these measures contain an assurance (though not of course the only one) for the future. That supposes, moreover, that this social change is accomplished in such a manner as to avoid all possible faults—the details of which would exceed the limits of the present work—and is thus made acceptable to the world.

After the first social measures have been carried out, but long before political elections, elections for the chamber of economics could be held. Since these, as already mentioned, would be based upon social proportions, the social results can no longer be placed in question by them. Political harm cannot be caused, as this system of council-democracy has no political tasks. Moreover, these elections would commence from below, in the small units of population, towns, villages, rural sub-districts. They are a kind of general sampling. A beginning can be made in one region, and it is not necessary to hold all elections on the same day, so that if the experiment is a failure proceedings can be stopped and deferred. These elections will at the same time provide those who will carry the responsibility of local government; the councils

will be made the instruments for achieving, guaranteeing, and building up the social change, and the small units will be schools of initiative, self-reliance, and democracy, which cannot be introduced to an untaught people in the largest-scale organs, as they do not give a bird's-eye view. Centralisation is in fact the enemy of democracy.

It is only long after this that elections for the political parliament should take place, and it is then a matter for consideration whether these also should not proceed by districts, and thus not all on one day, and whether sample elections should first be held in order to ascertain the stage of maturity that has been reached.

It might, lastly, be objected that some of these transition measures presume the existence of central authorities too, and that the question of the creation of these authorities has not been answered, when we merely speak of building up from below. We cannot know to-day whether they will be nominated by the occupying Powers or will only be confirmed and supervised by those Powers. We must remember that the old apparatus has to be smashed and not only its new, Nazi, components, but also its old predominantly "German national" ones, which are no less nationalist and have already been used, in 1919, to wreck the republic. Furthermore, the old parties have gone out of business, and the new forces are not strong enough. Neither of these includes the younger generation, and this position cannot be altered by an artificial addition of the old or by a mixture of old and new forces. In any case, therefore, the round-about way of making a selection in the various regions cannot be avoided, in order to get a sort of cross-section and to furnish such a body with at least a minimum of support. The help of the international administration will clearly be wanted for this.

As for the (much later) political elections, there is still one more important guarantee to be mentioned. It is inevitable that for a certain time the rule shall hold that dictatorship parties are not to be allowed to take part in the elections, that the principles of freedom are applicable only to those who recognise them. That would be the way to guard against misuse of democracy by the adherents of dictatorship. It is obvious that such a challenge would meet with the strongest criticism. To avoid misunderstandings the broader formula above has been purposely chosen, and the slogan "Democracy for democrats only" dropped, as this might be taken as showing an intention also to silence those who criticise certain phenomena of democracy and do not want immediate elections to be held. Otherwise it would be a definite advantage to those who would like to repeat the faults of Weimar. In reality, however, the slogan would be directed against dictatorship advocates alone, and not against those who want either to reform democracy or, while retaining the positive side of democracy, to replace its negative side by another principle, though on no account by a dictatorship.

Now it will be objected that a thing of this kind is not practicable,

since, as the practice of all dictatorship parties shows, these parties have a way of disguising themselves, of changing their names when dissolved, and even of pushing democrats into the foreground for purposes of deception. Against this, however, must be urged that after what has been experienced there should be enough intelligence in Germany for such dodges not to take anyone in again. Proceedings can equally well be taken against substitute parties. Experience has, nevertheless, also shown that the urge to disguise, if the other side is sufficiently inexorable and sceptical, can go so far that the organisation which is disguising may itself become the victim of its disguise, and be thereby rendered innocuous. The organisation may be so diluted through pressure from without that what was originally intended to be pretence becomes the involuntary truth. There exists a dialectic limit. If an organisation takes other-minded persons into its executive as a disguise, meaning them to be a bait for the other-minded members, and if, for the same purpose, it has to cease from all actions likely to attract attention, that state of things has its own dynamics; the internal ratio of forces becomes disturbed, the original aim is no longer attained, and, however artfully an executive behind the scenes may be put together, it can no longer make good from fear of being unmasked. It is quite sufficient to be familiar with these methods in order to deal with them.

The other objection, that a government which bans a party or its participation in an election can no longer be called democratic simply misses its mark. Is Switzerland, which some years ago banned the Communist party, not a democracy? Was Luxembourg, which did the same, not a democracy? Or Czechoslovakia, which dissolved the Nazi party? If democracy means freedom for everyone, does it also mean freedom for every object? Nobody would think of calling a constitution undemocratic because—as an illustration—it did not countenance parties which had in their programme murders or other common crimes. An unlimited permission is thus, in any case, not given. Why then should not dictatorship parties be denied permission? The above comparison is by no means far-fetched. The main thing is that such a stipulation shall not be interpreted in a formalist manner and that, in addition, there is a clear intention to put it into effect. That is the one point where, after what has happened, soft-heartedness is out of place. And it is no concession to the idea of dictatorship. For it is but right and fair that certain rules should apply only to those who themselves recognise them. This guarantee is quite sufficient, and is the very thing to make further measures of protection superfluous—measures which would really be borrowed from dictatorship methods. This is the obvious lesson from the experience of 1933. I am aware that a suspension of this sort is not in accordance with the ideas of the Anglo-Saxon democracies apart from wartime. But it should be borne in mind that England and America have not suffered Germany's experiences, and that in Germany,

in consequence of the lack of political maturity, circumstances are different. What is one man's meat is another man's poison, and it is precisely through the mechanical application of examples to altered conditions that mistakes arise. That which can be afforded in England in consequence of the maturity of her people and her inner strength could not and cannot be afforded in Germany. The failure to see this has brought its nemesis, and the mistake must not be repeated. Once this maturity has been attained, through schooling for local government as the best means of education in democracy, it will be possible in Germany also to measure with a different standard and to drop the use of these special means. To summarise:

1. Instead of suspending the suffrage for a long time, it is considered more efficacious to make its results harmless.

2. The alternatives are not: either immediate free elections or the acceptance of the *élite* principle. Even if one has doubts about some consequences of the *élite* principle, that does not mean that one would be so foolish as to favour immediate free elections. Even if one is opposed to immediate free elections, one is not obliged for that reason to accept the *élite* principle.

3. If the justification put forward for the *élite* principle is only the position to be expected in Germany after the collapse, this would mean that it should be applied only temporarily, and the question would remain open of what was to happen after this transition stage. If, however, a permanency is intended, the justification must extend beyond the causes and results of national socialism. The doubts expressed about the application of this principle do not include any objection to the basic criticism of the defects of the Weimar democracy, its passivity, its impotence, and its suicidal attitude towards the enemies of the State on the Right. Nor is there anything against the criticism of the equalitarianism which has been particularly fateful for Germany.

4. The lack of political maturity, which was previously used by the reaction to justify the retention of its positions, should, however, not be accepted as a lasting condition. The democratisation (not *re-democratisation!*) of the German people should be systematised, in order to overcome the consequences of the authoritative and police-ridden State, that is to say, the condition should be altered instead of adapting ourselves to misfortune. This democratisation can come only from below, from the small units, from the local governments. This schooling can very well take place under the military occupation. The belief in the possibility of a government of one's own after the collapse leads quite logically to premature democratic illusions or to fresh experiments in dictatorship or to ventures which serious examination does not commend. If, however, democratic schooling can be obtained during the transition period of the military occupation, it will then be possible to proceed to the "democratic venture."

V

The system of building from below upwards, instead of from above downwards, as previously adopted, leads us to the problem of *federalism*, which is closely connected with the reform of democracy.

It is again unavoidable in the first place to consider the negative side, viz., what federalism is *not*. Federalism has *nothing* to do with *separatism*. This must be emphasized with all distinctness. It cannot be helped if many constantly confuse the two, out of ignorance, insincerity about their own objects, or even out of malice. A very apposite explanation of the difference was recently given by a Rhenish federalist. He stated that in 1919 a number of Rhenish politicians were considering a Rhenish republic, detached from Prussia, with whom they no longer felt any bond, but remaining inside the Reich, like the republics of Saxony, Bavaria, Württemberg, Baden, and Hesse. In view, however, of the risk of being misunderstood, and on account of the other great difficulties which they had no desire to increase, the question was deferred. But in rejecting the separation of 1923, which aimed at breaking away from the Reich, all parties, from right to left, were in agreement. This sharp distinction, which must be kept in mind, is not affected by the fact that the Rhenish separatists tried to prevail upon the federalists, to use them for their own ends, and to bring them over to themselves. On the other hand, the German nationalists, especially the Prussian reactionaries, have never ceased to denounce and to discredit the federalists as separatists, pretending to confuse the two, and many people have since repeated their patter in good faith.

Just as little has federalism to do with a dismemberment of Germany. For federalisation (this word is purposely used here for the carrying out of a federalist programme, instead of "federation," for the former implies the organisation of a State, while the latter denotes the connection of various States in the framework of a federation) is an action which proceeds inside the Reich. Dismemberment, on the contrary, proceeds from without, by a tearing off of parts, and thus has nothing to do with the inner structure of the Reich. Theoretically, however, it is possible to tear pieces off a Reich, whose remainder is still centralistic. With partition, federalisation has nothing whatever to do, since that would be a contradiction in itself; there would then be no Reich left to federalise, if its component parts, again speaking theoretically, were given to six or eight different States. So the thing referred to by these critics of federalism who are so inexact in their conceptions, or, rather, who attack its imaginary dangers, would be so great a measure of federation that unity practically disappears, the member States become practically independent, and then show themselves so incapable of existence that they sacrifice their independence for the sake of new connections. But that depends on the degree of federalisation; a fear of this sort

cannot be properly expressed until the details of the federalisation intended are precisely known. That nothing of the kind is suggested will be seen from the further explanation, to follow, of the scope of this federalisation; it is enough to say here that such an arrangement as that referred to is not intended.

Another objection, the malice and simplicity of which are evident, is the mocking question whether it is desired to resuscitate Schaumburg-Lippe and Lippe-Detmold, the two Reuss territories, Schwarzburg-Rudolstadt, Schwarzburg-Sondershausen and Waldeck. It is merely necessary to say that the whole problem is not understood. No federalist has ever spoken of reviving these dynastic accidents, and yet that is taken to be an "argument" against federalism! If one is a federalist, one can renounce such absurd duodecimo States and odd corners; on the other hand, the Third Reich was over-centralised and yet retained Lippe! The question of dwarf States and that of the inequality of States have only indirectly to do with the problem of centralism versus federalism. It is not difficult to understand that the old-fashioned rubbish of the enclaves and exclaves, of principalities of the size of a London postal district, aroused such disgust that any alteration was welcomed, whether it brought fresh evils or not. This explains the cry for the unitary State, a solution originally directed against the 26 (later 18) German States, against the fragmentation and the 22 different dynasties. With the disappearance of these dynasties, those who shouted for the unitary State saw at least a portion of their desire fulfilled, even though they were disappointed about the continuance of the "States,"¹ among them even some of the very smallest (which still remained over after the amalgamation of eight "countries" into Thuringia and the absorption of Waldeck by Prussia). Indignation was also directed against the costly system of doubled administrations and doubled parliaments, as well as against the dualism of the Reich and Prussia, which had illogically become aggravated after the abolition of the old personal union. But with the apparent realisation of the tendencies to the unitary State, which in reality even in the Third Reich did not pass a definite limit, centralism increased. It had already been growing in the Republic, and in the Third Reich it reached its maximum. Many began to equate the conceptions of unitary State and centralistic regime, with the result that many adherents of the unitary State began to be reconciled to the idea of centralism, while others, out of dislike for centralism, looked upon the idea of a unitary State as discredited. Although the arguments of the adherents of the unitary State, as already indicated, are often directed zealously against the federalist idea, the two things are not necessarily connected. If when we speak of establishing a unitary State we understand in particular the abolition of fragmentation into small territories, it is possible for the rearrangement to

¹ 'Länder.'

be carried out otherwise than centralistically, and, conversely, as we have already seen, it is possible to establish an over-centralised regime and yet allow the small States to continue.

Before the justification for federalisation is mentioned, four more objections must be dealt with, which many people raise on principle:

1. It is said that a form of this nature would produce a West-German, a South-German, etc., nationalism, which would be just as threatening and disquieting to its neighbours. The reply to this is that federalism has not been put forward as the one and only guarantee, and constitutes merely an additional force to that end. When we add the other guarantees, disarmament, supervision, re-education and structural changes, the problem has quite a different appearance. But even if we suppose that such nationalist tendencies may still exist, nevertheless they are split up, and proceed no longer from a colossus, but only from a part. If such tendencies, aimed against France, should really arise in a West-German structure, they would no longer, as previously, produce an echo in the other German '*Länder*', seeing that they would come from the periphery, and not from the centre. That would weaken their driving power, and change the ratio of forces. To take a comparison: there would be nothing but potsherds in the hand, and not a complete piece of crockery. What might still exist would be only a partial nationalism, or in the worst case several partial nationalisms, which would be pulling in quite different directions.

2. Fear has been expressed that such a federalisation would be an obstacle to technical progress and to economic requirements. But from that point of view even the State frontiers are already too narrow, and no one would think of compressing the districts still more, of destroying existing units for the purposes of traffic and trade, of returning to the days of the mail-coach, of putting back the clock, and of introducing Customs barriers, etc. In that sphere, it is the opposite development that is needed.

3. There is anxiety lest a decentralised State should have difficulty in smoking out Nazis resorting to illegality, or later in dealing with enemies of the State. That is a serious problem. In 1919 disarmament was opposed with arguments about the alleged Communist danger. Is it to be the Nazi danger this time, or both? Is it intended to wreck disarmament again? Or to disarm the army and to create in its place a police-force as a "substitute," more powerfully equipped than the most powerful army? Not every anti-Nazi who uses this argument has nationalist ideas in the background; many may speak from honest anxiety founded upon the history of the republic's struggle with the enemies of the State, and may not have considered the consequences. But that too is one argument more for the military occupation of Germany, since otherwise there is no escaping the dilemma: either powerlessness against the enemies of the State or fresh, even if indirect, re-armament. Occupation

and supervision will not be able to cease until a certain amount of real and not artificial re-education has gained ground, and until there is no more danger in Germany than in other countries of extremist *coups* or threats against the peace. Anyone who replies that in that case the occupation must last for ever shows a degree of pessimism which goes too far. The notion that enough democratic elements can be found to protect the State against wreckers, even without danger of misuse of such a concentration of the power of the State, is as illusionary as the idea of being able to hold elections immediately after the collapse. The chance was there in 1919, and was lost, and many optimists did not see that they were wrongly generalising from their Saxon or Rhenish-Westphalian knowledge, that the degree of maturity differed in the various parts of the Reich. These distinctions, it is true, were largely flattened out after 1933, but in a negative sense.

4. A warning is given that federalisation would favour cultural reaction. At first sight the argument seems apposite. But it is only a sham argument. What guarantee is there that in case of unification the progressive sections will be able to vote down the reactionary ones and take them in tow? Is that not too optimistic? Have not developments shown the exact opposite? Is not the real danger that with centralism the cultural reaction has the advantage over progress? Would not the effect of federalisation be the avoidance of this danger? Particularly if one does not believe that dangers of this sort can be obviated by a Council of Minds. It is not the case that centralism washes away the islands of reaction, but it is the case that federalism makes islands of progress possible. This "plus" will not be prejudiced by the fact that under federalism islands of reaction will maintain themselves. But they will no longer be able to impress their stamp on the whole. It will be objected that the same holds good for the other side. But we started from existing experience and ratios of forces, and a realist judgment, free from illusion, arrives at the conclusion that, in view of unequal chances, the two things cannot be compared. Therefore this criticism turns, rather, into an argument in favour of federalism.

Now that we have shown what federalism is *not*, and have tried to refute some objections, it is time to explain the reason for putting forward this idea.

It has already been indicated that federalisation is intended to act as an additional force for *safety*. There are people who will not understand why we speak in particular of a "German question"; they go on to point out that there is nationalism everywhere, and militarism in many countries, and that, in the last resort, it is from capitalism that war proceeds; they finish by asserting that to pick out the Germans specially is a generalisation bordering on racialism. Such folk overlook the simple fact that a compact mass of 65 million Germans (to take the population figure before the annexations) lives in the heart of Europe,

and that this constitutes a peculiarity in itself, just because of the combination of the two factors. In the heart of Europe there are other countries, such as Switzerland and Czechoslovakia, but they have only a fraction of Germany's population. On the other hand, Russia is much more populous, but it lies on the edge of Europe. The combination of both position and numbers occurs but the once. Germany has almost as many inhabitants as her two largest neighbours, France and Poland, together, 50 per cent more than all her other neighbours together, more than her Eastern and South-Eastern neighbours together, and, lastly, more than her Western neighbours together. The largest German 'Land', Prussia, has alone as many inhabitants as France, more than Poland, and about as many as all the other neighbours together. Such an organisation must always weigh like a nightmare on its neighbours if it is governed in an over-centralised manner. Those who maintain their suspicion that federalism is only a paraphrase for the destruction of the unity of the Reich, will perhaps now say: "A moderate degree of decentralisation would in no way alter this nightmare; if, therefore, an easing of the pressure is expected, then it becomes evident that the break-up of the Reich is intended." The answer to these suspicious ones is that the effect called in question can nevertheless be attained by federalisation without any necessity for exceeding a certain degree.

Without destroying the economic and juridical unity, it is amply sufficient to prevent that centralist development of power which could constitute a threat to the world. It might be replied that for this the disarmament of Germany is sufficient; but this time long views must be taken, and the time after the end of the military occupation has to be borne in mind, so as to make impossible a return of the warlike spirit working from within. The central authority must have merely that degree of power which is necessary for the weal of the population, no more; all ability to practise power-politics must be taken away. The two things are quite consistent with one another. The disappearance of Prussia, which will be further spoken of, is a means to this end, although not the only one. The organisation of the central police-force reached its height with the Nazis under the headship of Himmler, but had been already commenced by the republic (though not to the good of the republic); its abolition has been mentioned above, without omitting the new problems connected therewith. It is simply a matter of circumscribing the central power where it can be harmful, but of maintaining it where it not only cannot be harmful but is even indispensable; that is the double requirement. The organisation must be of such a character that, for instance, the representative of Thuringia or of Baden can successfully interpose his veto if new nationalist tendencies should flare up at any point. After the destruction of Prussia, the other German 'Länder' will in any case obtain their appropriate share of authority.

This re-arrangement of forces will operate in the long run as a calming factor in central Europe.

Although it was specially emphasized at the beginning that federalisation was not intended to interfere with the economic unity, there is certainly the inevitable objection that modern development is in the direction of extensions of economic space (not in the form vainly attempted by Hitler, but on the basis of equal rights and by peaceful means), and that, in spite of all opposition, it will lead away from the national States to confederations of portions of Europe, and finally to a European Federation. Consequently, an inner federalisation of Germany may be looked upon as a reactionary development in opposition to the general tendency. But the contrary is the case. It is just the development to higher unities which demands in compensation a decentralisation on the other side, because the tasks cannot otherwise be mastered.

It has been said very rightly that European development does not move in one direction, but on two fronts; that it is striding *at the same time* towards the greater and towards the smaller, to greater unity in social and economic matters and to greater freedom in national *and* in regional affairs. The movement towards the smaller can easily be overlooked in the face of that to the greater. It is more modern, it is said, to become enthusiastic about great schemes, giant undertakings, trans-continental organisations, but the one should not cause forgetfulness of the other. To every unification of European affairs there belongs, therefore, as an indispensable correlative the federation of all the "intimate homes" in which European culture in reality dwells. The European of the future will be able to unite both feelings, the intimacy of relationships within his range of vision and the liberating effect of wide spaces.

The conception cited was not framed with a view to German conditions alone, but it is applicable to German conditions, and in any case shows that federalisation on the small scale not only does not involve any contradiction of federation on the large scale, but is, on the contrary, its complement.

We must, however, dwell a little longer on the idea of European federation. It is in itself the means of reconciling on a high plane the demand for a State of one's own with the need for security and the economic requisites which cry aloud for a super-State framework. But it is clear that the hindrances have not become lesser, but greater. Because Hitler attempted the unification of Europe from wrong motives, with criminal means, and for mad ends, the idea of the unification of Europe seems to many to be generally discredited. The main reason for all these qualms is, however, the position of Germany. It is said that the unification of Europe without Germany would be incomplete, and that with Germany it is, at any rate for the present, impossible. The fear that such a federation might be immediately misused by Germany,

to attain indirectly, in spite of everything, her frustrated object of dominion over Europe, is nourished by irresponsible utterances of German nationalists, who cynically declare that nothing can happen to Germany, since she always has the way of European federation open. Steps have to be taken to remove this anxiety if it is shown to be an obstacle to the organisation of Europe. That is a further reason why Germany should undertake federalisation, that is, internal federation, in order to free the world from these fears, and thus remove an important psychological obstacle to the organisation of Europe. This explains my short excursion into foreign politics.

There are also, however, a number of factors in the realms of internal politics of organisation, and of psychology, which argue in favour of federalisation. Centralisation was for a time the fetish of mankind. It celebrated triumphs in the old socialist world of ideas, which sought in this matter to distinguish itself particularly from liberalism. On the other hand, it fitted exactly into the world of ideas of the Prussian bureaucracy, a fact which Spengler used in order to demonstrate that Prussianism was a suitable form of socialism for the German people. National socialism then raised centralisation, with all its accompanying aspects to the level of mania. The deeds of the Nazis have thus indirectly revealed other errors as well, have set men re-examining things which were thought axiomatic, and have made many established beliefs the subject of fresh discussion. The evil of centralisation has been recognised, and it has been realised that it is the enemy of freedom and democracy, cripples initiative, breeds excessive bureaucracy, and is portentously clumsy. These are the same discoveries as have meanwhile also been made about the mammoth concerns of the economic world. Decentralisation and local government have, accordingly, the opposite effect. In the smaller handy units it is possible to bring about once more the contact between people and government which promotes the development of true democracy and the liquidation of the old authoritarian State. In such units it is possible to develop that activity which has been snowed under by bureaucracy, formalism, and over-organisation (and which is included among the items meant for the attention even of the lower stages of the economic chamber), while that education for democracy is facilitated which in the large structures is fraught with so much risk. In short, by such means we realise a living collaboration which is dynamic and progressive, and compared with which the unelastic and immovable centralisation appears reactionary.

Further factors in favour of federalisation might be recounted. There is the consideration that, with this loosening of bonds, an event in Pomerania would not produce immediate effects as far off as Baden and Oldenburg. There is the fact that the individual German regions (in consequence of the lack of a common history, at any rate for a lengthy period) are quite extraordinarily unlike one another (so that it can

well be imagined that the occupation will last for varying periods). Lastly, there is the possibility that, the cultural levelling process being brought to an end by the loosening of bonds, new creative forces would be released (it can hardly be denied that, with few exceptions, political importance and mental exuberance have existed in inverse proportion to one another).

It is surprising that the countries always quoted as patterns for federalist systems are only Switzerland, whose example may not be sound for many in view of her small size, and the Soviet Union, whose member States, such as the R.S.F.S.R. or the Transcaucasian Republics, are again organised federally in themselves, but whose federalism, because dependent on the mixture of peoples, might appear to many as an example of a hardly parallel character. Model examples of federation are, however, Canada, Australia, and the South African Union, Mexico and Brazil, in a certain sense the U.S.A., and—the British Commonwealth.

Now the question about the How of this federalisation has to be answered:

1. It is quite self-evident that a completely new division of Germany is necessary. No serious man thinks of reviving the old fragmentation into tiny States as in the days of the mail-coach and of the Gotham ideal. This would mean a reversal of evolution, and would at all events please the supporters of the mediaeval State or of some other authoritarian regime, with all those dynastic accidents which were responsible for the somewhat outmoded demand for the unitary State and led to the opposite extreme of centralisation. The Germanic Confederation of 1815, which hindered necessary political and social developments and which existed before the so-called "industrial revolution," is no model, if only because it was not the expression of a true federalism. For a genuine federalism presupposes the approximately *equal size* (though not mathematically exact) of its members. This, however, was out of the question, since *Prussia* was twice as big as all the other members together. Thus neither the Bismarckian Reich nor the Weimar republic were federalist structures. 'Länder' of 40 millions (population), of 2-7 millions, of 500,000 and 50,000, made up an absurdity which needs no discussion. Reorganisation thus signifies the abolition of the excessively large units, the abolition of the dwarf units, the retention, generally speaking, of the medium-sized units—in fact, assimilation to an average figure.

The break-up of *Prussia* is a proposal which to-day meets with assent in the most diverse camps, and at the same time is regarded as a further means of ensuring peace. There is no space here for dealing exhaustively with the problem of *Prussia*. If the general slogan to-day is no longer: "Fight against the Nazis," but "Fight against national socialism and Prussian militarism," this is intended to express the fact that there is

another force which exists alongside the Nazis, which existed before them, and which will also do everything in its power to survive them, but must not be allowed to. To this extent the new slogan is an advance on the old one, which was unduly narrow, since it conveyed the impression that there was no question of anything but a party which had to be fought and which had no connection with the German past. It is also generally agreed that this programme is to be interpreted not geographically but symbolically, since militarism permeated all German spheres, in fact it even reached out over the German borders, and produced elsewhere German nationalist scions, at first in German nationalist and later in swastika guise. But Prussia, with her preponderance in Germany, was always the special propagandist of the tendencies projected by the Reich, and the force which carried the others along and which did not change when, at the end of 1918, the old personal union was torn up. The fact is not altered by Prussia having for a comparatively long time had a moderate government of the Left, until in July 1932 under von Papen she again openly took up the old position.

If thus the idea of "Prussianism" has regained its correct meaning, that will also serve to dispel all possible legends suggesting that particular regions had not been infected at all with German militarism. These legends ought, above all, not to lead to certain parts of the Reich being acquitted of the general responsibility for the atrocities that have taken place. This applies especially to the question of Bavaria. That, too, cannot be dealt with exhaustively here. Even if we concede that the doings of Ludendorff and Co. were to a great extent a Prussian import, yet the following facts cannot be denied: Nationalism had infiltrated into Bavaria as well, in considerable quantity, although it had not quite gone there with bag and baggage. National socialism started from Bavaria, was encouraged by the Government there out of dislike for Berlin in spite of its greater-Germany tendencies and in spite of the different motive for its opposition. Later on, however, there came a clash, and after Hitler's "Putsch" in 1923 the originally impetuous growth of the Nazis in Bavaria no longer kept step with the frantic development of the party in the Reich. In Bavaria a clerical semi-fascism was developed, which had authoritarian features and competed with the Nazis, but for that very reason was unable to resist them in 1933 when the young ran over to the greater-Germany camp.

In this question we must not throw the child out with the bath-water on the one or the other side. The generalising method of painting black or white does not help. Neither was Bavaria immune from nationalism on account of its enmity against Prussia, so that it might perhaps be possible to build up a "South-German solution," nor on the other hand can one go so far as to deny that Bavaria had to suffer under centralisation, that there were centres of resistance, that the loosening of ties would be easier there because certain traditions did not penetrate

so deeply, and that positive starting-points exist. These, however, also exist elsewhere. The reorganisation is, in any case, a problem affecting the whole of Germany, and cannot be limited to Prussia so as not to involve the other 'Länder' or just the South-German ones. Bavaria, too, is not a unity, and is artificially put together on the basis of dynastic accidents.

For that matter, the dismemberment of Prussia does not finish the job. It is true that genuine federalism cannot be carried out without this measure, but, conversely, a new centralism, based on 10-20 equally large constituent parts without rights, could very well be introduced without Prussia. Precautions must there be taken that centralism is not smuggled in again afterwards.

For the new units the term "provinces" smells too strongly of centralism, and 'Gau' (regions) sounds too Nazi-like. The terms *States* (*Länder*) and *territories* (*Landschaften*) come under consideration; *States* if it is decided to keep to a few large units and 'territories' if preference is given to a large number of smaller domains. For there are two different proposals being submitted for discussion, both based on approximately equal units, but with an entirely different number of constituent parts. It may be said at once that in the opinion of the present writer the creation of too many units may easily have the opposite effect to that intended, and may indirectly and involuntarily favour centralisation just as was done by the retention of the Prussian colossus alongside unduly small units.

The following are the two proposals:

Proposal I envisages nineteen *territories*: 1, Pomerania; 2, Silesia; 3, Brandenburg; 4, Berlin; 5, Schleswig-Holstein (with Hamburg); 6, North Hanover (with Bremen and Oldenburg); 7, South Hanover (with Brunswick, the government district of Magdeburg and Anhalt); 8, Westphalia (without the Ruhr and with Lippe); 9, Ruhr, Lower Rhine; 10, Mid-Rhine; 11, Rhenish Palatinate, Rhenish Hesse, Nassau; 12, Starkenburg, Oberhesse, Electoral Hesse; 13, West Saxony (with the government district of Merseburg); 14, East Saxony; 15, Thuringia (with the government district of Erfurt); 16, North Bavaria; 17, South Bavaria; 18, Wurtemberg-Baden; 19, Mecklenburg-Lübeck.

The old five stages of sub-districts—called *circles* (*Kreise*) in Prussia, with other names in other parts of Germany—government-districts, provinces, *States*, Reich, would then be replaced by four stages: *circles*, government-districts, territories, Reich. The government-districts are worth retaining, as otherwise a small-scale centralisation would arise. At an earlier date the *circles* and provinces were organs of State administration and local government, but the government-districts were only organs of the State. Since the idea of decentralisation is to increase local government, this should be retained in the territories and extended to the government-districts.

Proposal II envisages six *States*, which are relatively large; it is perhaps preferable to Proposal I:

I. *South Germany*: 1, Lower Franconia; 2, Middle Franconia; 3, Upper Franconia; 4, Upper Bavaria; 5, Lower Bavaria; 6, Upper Palatinate.

II. *South-West Germany*: 1, Swabia (Bavarian part); 2-5, Wurtemberg (Danube, Black Forest, Neckar, and Jagst "circles"); 6, Swabian part of Baden; 7, Aleman part of Baden; 8, Palatinate part of Baden; 9, Rhenish Palatinate; 10, Saar region; 11, Rhenish Hesse; 12, Nassau; 13, Starkenburg; 14, Upper Hesse; 15, Treves; 16, Coblence.

III. *Rhine-Ruhr*: 1, Aix-la-Chapelle; 2, Cologne; 3, Lower Rhine; 4, *Bergisches Land* (Elberfeld-Barmen); 5, Western Ruhr region; 6, Eastern Ruhr region.

IV. *Lower Saxony*: 1, Oldenburg; 2, Bremen; 3, East Friesland; 4, Osnabrück; 5, Lüneburg; 6, Stade; 7, Hanover; 8, Hildesheim; 9, Brunswick; 10, Government district of Minden (including Lippe); 11, remainder of government-district of Münster; 12, remainder of government-district of Arnsberg; 13, Schleswig-Holstein; 14, Hamburg.

V. *Central Germany*: 1-3, West Saxony (Leipzig, Chemnitz, Zwickau); 4, government-district of Merseburg-Halle; 5, East Saxony (including the regions of Kottbus and Görlitz); 6, Thuringia; 7, government-district of Erfurt; 8, Electoral Hesse; 9, government-district of Magdeburg; 10, Anhalt.

VI. *East Germany*: 1-3, Pomerania; 4, Mecklenburg; 5, Lübeck; 6, 7, Brandenburg; 8, Berlin; 9-11, Silesia.¹

In this case, too, four stages, *circles*, government-districts, *States* and Reich, would suffice. It might be considered whether, in view of the size of the *States*, it seems necessary to insert provinces between government-districts and *States*. In this case, for instance, there might be combined under IV: 1-3, 4-6, 7-9, 10-12, 13-14; under V: 1-4, 6-7, 9-10; under VI: 1-3, 4-5, 6-7, 9-11.

The statement above gives only rough outlines, and cannot go into details. It is obvious that all enclaves and exclaves have to disappear, just as previously the appertenance of Hohenzollern, Birkenfeld, and Eutin was settled. Dozens of absurdities still exist, as in Anhalt the district of Ballenstedt, in Brunswick the districts of Holzminden and in the Harz, in Thuringia the district of Sondershausen. A small piece of North-East Baden belongs more properly to Franconia, in Hesse-Nassau the regions of Hanau and Fulda are isolated. The re-union of the different parts of the Lausitz is dealt with in the table.

2. It is for consideration whether the term "Reich" should be abolished. It is a relic of the Holy Roman Empire (Reich) of German Nation, with which the later Reich has no connection, since that Reich

¹ East Prussia has been purposely omitted.

was universal, being the attempt of that day at the supernational unification of Europe. Later the Reich was the expression of domination, of power. In contrast, "confederation" would incorporate the idea of community, the equal rights of the parts, the regional traditions, the millennial connection with federative conceptions, as the expression of a State based on peace and law, which is strong enough to ensure the welfare of its inhabitants, but not strong enough to make a fresh attempt at gaining the mastery of the world. But the name of "Germanic Confederation" (*Deutscher Bund*) rouses reactionary memories. The terms "German States Confederation" or "Confederation of German countries" are too clumsy. The proposal "United States of Germany" has already been brought forward. That may sound to many too pompous. Perhaps simply "Germany" is sufficient, without any additions. In any case, the renunciation of the name Reich would have a symbolic effect, and do away with many unpleasant memories.

3. For political and psychological reasons, efforts should be made to shift the centre of gravity of the Reich towards the West, to promote a "Westernisation" of the Reich. Even if it is regarded as merely a joke to say that it was a misfortune for Germany that the Germans were victorious over the Romans in the battle of the Teutoburger Wald in the year 9 A.D., since this made it impossible for Roman culture to penetrate more deeply and was the cause of the "Limes" being drawn so far to the West and South, yet it will be admitted that Eastern Germany in particular was for historical reasons the traditional basis of a "colonial policy" in an Eastern, North-Eastern, and South-Eastern direction, aimed against Europe. Just as the barring of the gate of Vienna as the sally-port to the Balkans removes a temptation for a policy of expansion, so a firmer averting of the gaze from the East and its diversion to the West (and that involves far more than a mere diversion) might facilitate re-education and focus attention on the tasks of peace.

For such a Westernisation, the transfer of the capital from Berlin to the West would be a symbolic act. On many counts the most preferable substitute would be *Frankfort-on-the-Main*, the meeting point of Western and Southern Germany.

4. The root question of federalism is, of course, the *delimitation* of functions. The view has been put forward that a distinction must be made between the executive, which can be decentralised, and the legislature, which cannot. In my opinion this separation is not sufficient and not necessary. A *partial* application of the federalist principle even to the legislature does not by itself imperil unity. The emphasis is on *partial*, that is to say, just so far as is indispensable and possible. That a partial application of the federal principle does not destroy unity is shown by the U.S.A. For that matter it did not endanger the unity of the Reich either before 1933 or before 1918. The unitary legislature has a natural limit; there are enough spheres in which uniformity between

Holstein and Wurtemberg, between Silesia and the Rhineland, is out of place. In any case, a decentralisation of the executive would be too little, although the prevention of a centralised police system, together with the other basic requirement, the break-up of Prussia, is important enough.

Delimitation must thus take place between the separate functions. The fact that Germany is an *economic unity* and constitutes a single whole for supply and market purposes cannot be ignored. Any other solution would be reactionary and antediluvian, even idiotic, like an attempt to set up Customs barriers and passports between the various German countries. Such limitations are, of course, as little possible as hindrances to the freedom of migration or alterations in matters of civic rights. The new division of functions between central and regional power (purposely avoiding the expression "Reich power") will leave undisturbed the economic headship of the State. This has been already brought out in the scheme for council democracy, in which the councils are to be continued from the communes up to the central Chamber of Economics, as was laid out in the first section of this essay. It is quite another question what shall be the extent of the State's interference in trade and industry, how far economic control is to be adopted, contrary to the doctrine of liberalism, and to what extent it is desirable, after the extravagances of national socialist economic planning, to take a step back again and arrange for a slight loosening of control. That depends on the attitude towards socialism and on the degree to which, after the experience of excessive bureaucracy, it is decided to remodel the community on a basis which shall be freer, less bureaucratic, less "statisch," as the French put it. That is an economic question, and has nothing to do with the present enquiry. For it is possible for a centralist to be either socialist or anti-socialist, and for a federalist to be either socialist or anti-socialist. This point is not one to be shirked; I myself have, in my remarks about council democracy, acknowledged the ideal of the social change; but it had to be made clear that that has nothing to do with the present problem. Even those who wish to reduce State interference as far as possible, whether for anti-socialist reasons or from the standpoint of a modified socialism, cannot help supporting a central economic administration.

That which is true of trade and industry applies similarly to communications, post office, etc. The question of finance will be specially dealt with.

Unjustified as is the distrust felt by the opponent of federalism in the matter of economic unity, since there is no room here for a difference of opinion, in the matter of the administration of *justice* there might perhaps be considerable debate. It is, however, admitted that Switzerland has unified her criminal codes, that the lack of uniformity has caused much difficulty in the U.S.A., and that the path of evolution undoubtedly runs in the direction of unifi-

cation. The former Germanic Confederation, without compulsion, and simply from necessity, arrived by voluntary agreement at a uniform law of copyright and cheque, and international uniformity in patent law has already been achieved. The preceding arguments are not directed against uniformity, but merely intended to show that the question is not altogether clear. At all events, the uniform administration of Justice should *not* be disturbed. That, unlike the uniformed police, the plain clothes police must be unified, is pointed out merely in passing.

That the *internal* administration is to be left to the *States* is clear. Opinions are particularly divided about *cultural* matters. The opponents of federalism argue that the surrender of such things to the *States* would promote cultural reaction. At first glance that may seem plausible. Certainly a central government which favoured cultural progress would be preferable to a federal arrangement which left islands of reaction. But, conversely, a federal arrangement which not only left islands of reaction but also made islands of progress possible would be preferable to a central government which was in the service of cultural reaction. This is the aspect of the question which must be borne in mind. The matter then looks quite different. What guarantee is there that centralisation will operate as a unifying force on the positive side instead of on the negative? That is too optimistic a view in the light of the ratios of forces in Germany. The delegation of cultural functions to the *States* thus not only does not favour reaction, but may even be of advantage to cultural progress. For that matter there are not a few who push the argument so far as to say that even this would be the lesser evil compared with a bellicose centralisation, and would be not too high a price—and only a temporary one at that—to pay for a further guarantee of peace.

As for *foreign policy*, whatever objections may be raised, the "countries" must have a say in it. (Although there is no need to go so far as even the Imperial Reich where there was, amongst others, a Saxon Minister of Foreign Affairs.) There is no reason on this account to fear that the German *States* would at once make war on one another, start intriguing against each other, or pursue a mutually opposed policy (least of all if one is convinced that all Germans want to see the unity of the Reich maintained). It is, indeed, primarily a question of the spirit that reigns in a State. If State-mindedness is absent, then the best Constitution is not much use; if it is present, then in case of need it can even fill gaps in a Constitution. Thus, for instance, it is true that the Weimar Constitution horribly facilitated the work of the enemies of the State, but it did not produce them. A better Constitution would have made their work more difficult, but would not have exterminated them. The mechanism of a Constitution must not be made into a fetish.

5. After we have tackled delimitation, it remains only to see how the

scheme as a whole is to work. It is not intended here to submit a complete outline of a Constitution. That would be unpractical, as there are to-day too many factors which cannot be foreseen, and, besides, such an outline demands the collaboration of a number of experts. The most that can be given here is therefore a collection of basic ideas. Some of them are merely put up to be discussed.

Political elections have already been once mentioned. They would be held specially for the Reichstag, or, to use the better phrase, for the Central Parliament, if the problem of federalisation did not complicate this question. Federalisation implies parliaments for the *States*, another reason for preferring Proposal II with six *States* (above all, this arrangement would forestall a possible return of centralisation much more effectively than a number of territories would, without any anxiety being necessary on account of a new miniature centralisation of the still relatively large units). The whole matter cannot, however, be settled by setting up the parliaments for the countries and dispensing with a Reichstag. It is also not possible to be content with a committee of representatives of the countries which would correspond, more or less, to the pre-1918 Federal Council. Just as a central Chamber of Economics is necessary, since it would be foolish to leave politics to the Reich while leaving trade and industry to the '*States*,' so legislatures in the member countries and no legislature in the totality would be administratively impossible, and a Federal Council would not suffice, seeing that it would have to refer all decisions to the parliaments of the countries.

Now there arises (a) the question: How to avoid the intolerable dualism between the central parliament and the parliaments of the countries? It used to lead to electoral boredom, to continual friction between Reich and members, it had a confusing and politically demoralising effect, since the parties adopted somewhat different lines in the Reich and in the countries, and the electors voted, therefore, if elections for the Reichstag and the Prussian Landtag took place at the same time, often for two different parties one after the other. A serious proposal for avoiding over-organisation and election inflation is the creation of the central parliament by indirect election from the parliaments of the countries. This gives the countries their appropriate weight, nobody is at a disadvantage, a correct cross-section is obtained, with a true reflection of public opinion, and *dualism* is abolished.

(b) The *States* have their own governments and their own prime ministers. That has been a great success in Canada and Australia. The more drastic step of providing each country also with its own president would serve no good purpose. Radical federalists may, it is true, assert that this would underline still more the character of the confederation, but, in accordance with the then status of trade and industry, the Germanic Confederation did not concern itself with numerous tasks which are to-day essential—this wrecked it at a later date—and it did without a

head. That will not do to-day. A President with six others would be impossible, as has been well understood in Mexico and Brazil, where they work with governors (the federalisation being to some extent limited). In the Weimar Republic some of the countries had their "State President," but that was purely decorative, and they were at the same time prime ministers.

The President of Germany should no longer be chosen by popular election. ~~That has not been a success.~~ As the electoral body the central parliament, perhaps in combination with the central Chamber of Economics, might be considered. The function of a *Reich Chancellor* would, however, become superfluous. Secretaries of State, as they existed in the Imperial Reich, could assist the President. That again would be a combination of the American and the French systems but the opposite to the 1919 arrangement, when the popular election of the President was borrowed from America and the relations between the President, the prime minister, and parliament, from France. In this way again a cause of friction and a dualism would be avoided.

(c) Finally, it is for consideration whether, instead of establishing the roundabout procedure of Reich and *State* taxes, or, as after 1919, making the countries financially dependent on the Reich, the method chosen should be to have the central organs financed by the countries and to make the countries financially independent by means of their own taxes. That, too, is put forward for discussion.

A number of further questions could be taken up: the relation of the "country" governments to one another and to the central government, the working relationships between those organs which exist in both the country and the central governments (finance, justice, home affairs), the creation of a constitutional tribunal. But this present essay makes no claim to completeness nor yet to finality. It is only meant to demonstrate that federalisation is possible and about how far it must go.

We shall probably have to do with the following stages: Purely military administration, work of a new civil service machinery (after destroying the old one), local government in communes and sub-districts, local government in the medium units, normalisation of the central standards (first in economic affairs, then in political ones). That is the way for Germany to be again included in the European family of peoples, and the present proposal for a reform of democracy rests on the foundations of council democracy, local government, and the federal principle.

A Democratic Foreign Policy

“Freedom speaks many languages. I like to think that English is the language she knows best . . . Perhaps the only language she has never learnt is German. But that is an omission which she means to remedy; and when she learns a language, she does not forget it.”

PHILIP GUEDALLA: *The Liberators*.

I

A CHANGE OF ATTITUDE

THE interest of the mass of the public in the problems of foreign policy is of relatively recent date. It required the last world war to impress on the belligerent peoples the harsh truth of the dictum of Clausewitz that “War is simply the continuation of policy” (that is to say, of foreign policy) “by other means.” It required the sacrifices in life and property that they have had to endure during the war, and the inroads into their material security and their vital personal interests in the subsequent years of peace, to make it clear to the peoples that that dictum had lost nothing of its validity in the twentieth century. It had required a worldwide catastrophe to arouse in the ordinary citizen the demand for more information as to foreign affairs and for a share in the decision of issues and the control of policy. The process was the same everywhere; for the small man had borne the brunt of the war, whether his nation had been among the so-called victors or the vanquished.

However, the development was only gradual and, as we now know, inadequate in extent. Even in countries with a pronounced democratic tradition and an active political life, the average citizen found it difficult to get his bearings in a field that until recently had been the exclusive domain of the monarch or of a small group of statesmen, and that was still monopolised by a class of professional men who made frantic efforts to prevent having to share their privileges with “outsiders.” A thorough grasp of problems of foreign policy and a sound judgment of decisions arrived at by the home as well as by foreign governments in that sphere call not only for a high degree of political culture in the observer, but for a continuous study of the very complex and constantly changing

details of foreign affairs. This means that any profitable consideration of the problems of foreign policy depends on conditions such as a modern society often provides but inadequately for the mass of its citizens.

There are two obvious means of coping with this difficulty. One is the unbiased provision of information, easily accessible to interested persons, explaining the problem of foreign policy at issue not simply in the way their own Government sees it (or wants it to be seen), but also as it is represented in the other camp. The second means is the facilitation of insight into the methods of work and the activities of the diplomatic service, and the admission to that service of gifted persons from all classes of the population. The ordinary citizen can only have complete trust in his country's foreign policy if he knows not only its results but something of the way in which they were attained. Naturally negotiations concerning foreign questions cannot be carried on at every stage in the full glare of publicity. Unlike home politics, foreign politics is a field in which the State has no sovereign power of decision of matters at issue. Regard must be had to all sorts of factors, not the least important of which are the prestige and the goodwill not only of the State with which negotiations are in progress but also of the individual foreign negotiators. Thus, even in the freest of States, current democratic control of foreign affairs is impossible. The executive organs must always show a high degree of tact and reserve, and a secretiveness that must often seem to the uninitiated to be much like mystery-mongering. That is inevitable. All the more necessary is it to remove the barrier between the diplomatic machine and the public wherever that can be done without injury to the conduct of foreign policy.

While the last war aroused the interest of the mass of the public in foreign affairs, the peace that followed placed in the hands of governments an excellent means of satisfying that interest and guiding it into the right paths. The activities of the League of Nations and the introduction of a practical system of international law were new elements in the history of inter-State relations; other elements, among them such important ones as the decision of war and peace, were withdrawn from the exclusive control of Cabinets and became a subject of discussion before an international forum. (The Geneva League was, in fact, the first serious attempt to invalidate the "law of Clausewitz.") The machinery for the democratisation of foreign politics was thus provided. The well-informed are aware that the League's influence over the diplomacy of all the Member-States was very considerable. The methods pursued in foreign politics in the inter-war period are, in fact, no longer comparable with those pursued up to 1918; it had become much more difficult to carry on a personal policy in foreign affairs or to impose an autocratic decision, and the secret diplomacy so universal in the past was almost proscribed. Not until the collapse of the League did any revival of these methods become possible.

Yet it is scarcely an exaggeration to say that the plain man all over the world regards his country's diplomatic service to this day with the cynical distrust for which Sir Henry Wotton coined in 1604 his well-known epigram: "An ambassador is an honest man, sent to lie abroad for the good of his country." It is not enough to indicate the injustice and superficiality of this judgment in our day; there will be no change in the general view until the peoples can place genuine trust in their diplomatic services. After the last war the discussion and the shaping of foreign policy were raised to an international plane, but the diplomatic machinery of almost all nations failed to find adjustment to the changed situation; the diplomatic services remained in a state of social and intellectual exclusiveness that has made them in the eyes of the majority of their peoples a highly suspect relic of absolutism.

This problem is of so universal and so urgent a nature that I could not refrain from referring to it at the outset of an essay that aims at dealing with the specific question whether and on what lines a defeated Germany can pursue a foreign policy that does not of necessity make her a permanent danger to world peace. I felt the more justified in making this general observation, since here, as in so many cases in the field of foreign policy, we have a problem that can scarcely be dealt with by any State or people alone, but demands for its solution a wide measure of international harmony.

The Problem in Germany

The first condition for a change of German foreign policy is a change of attitude on the part of the German people. Can any such change of attitude be hoped for? In what state of mind will the world find Germany after this war?

It cannot be denied that to this day the German people have shown a remarkable lack of political maturity, not to say lack of political talent. The desire to form opinions of their own, to think independently on political issues, to secure liberation from the tutelage of the State, has remained depressingly undeveloped in Germany. The urge inborn in other peoples to gain individual freedom and to control the machinery of the State, seeing in the State not an end in itself but the servant of society, has so far been present only in a rudimentary condition in Germany. Among the German masses (who in this respect remind us of populations at a much lower level of civilisation) that positive urge is replaced by the negative desire for blind self-subjection to the State and so to the Government of the moment. Obedience to the authorities is not so much born of fear of the power of the State (though under the terrorist regime of National Socialism this fear must not be under-estimated) as of a feeling of relief and thankfulness to the State for freeing the individual from the necessity of thinking about political affairs and above

all from the responsibility for political decisions. The average German's hunger for intellectual activity and the famous German thoroughness find notable expression in every social field—only, unfortunately, not in politics. It is true that after the last war the interest in political problems grew among the German people as amongst all others, but the original lack of political education proved too great for the development of critical faculties of any importance. The political education of the average German remained entirely superficial, and from 1933 onward he was able to transfer his loyalty to National Socialism in the same way as he had transferred it fifteen years earlier from the monarchy to the Republic. This was so although he undoubtedly looked upon National Socialism with greater inner reservations than he had felt under the two earlier regimes.

There is a multiplicity of historical explanations of the readiness of the German masses to bow to their governments and give practical effect to their plans of aggression. It has been pointed out that Germany, like Italy, achieved her national unity later than the other European Great Powers. The attempt has been made to explain the expansionist character of German nationalism by the fact that unity was only attained after the other Great Powers had shared out among themselves the good things of the world, so that the German people had become one of the "have-nots." All this undoubtedly explains a good deal, but not everything. It does not explain, still less excuse, the assent of the average German, sometimes tacit, sometimes jubilant, to his governments' flagrant breaches of international law, to their cynical contempt of all moral laws in the field of foreign policy, and to the inhuman treatment to which other peoples who have fallen victims to this policy have often been subjected.

Yet in his private life this same average German is not a monster (or at all events was not until lately), and shows the social qualities that are the mark of civilisation, so that the explanation cannot be found in the German nation being a nation of beasts. Such a conception would not only be completely unserviceable in face of the political problems that must arise with the collapse of the existing German regime; it would be a moral victory for the National Socialism just beaten on the battlefield. The Nazi "racial doctrine" would not become less absurd or less reprehensible by being preached and applied no longer by Germans but against them.

The explanation can only be found in the fact—itsself beyond explanation—that politically the Germans of the twentieth century are still an almost entirely uneducated people; that they have not yet grasped the elementary rules of political life, and, indeed, have not yet even recognised the importance and the necessity of political activity. If to-day they appear to the world to be barbarians, it is not because they are by nature less capable of debarbarisation than other

peoples, but because they have remained backward in their development and have not yet mastered the problems of living together in a State.

Those who talk of the necessity of "re-educating" the German people must realise that before everything else the German people has to be educated in the first elements of politics.

The Philosophy of German Nationalism

All the manifestations of the German will to aggression, which have twice thrown the world into misery and against which the world has not only the right but the duty to protect itself, are in the last resort simply the emanations of the lack of political culture in the internal life of the State. If, as we have seen, it is difficult even for politically educated peoples to form an accurate picture of the complex problems of foreign policy, a nation whose political judgment has remained undeveloped is completely helpless in face of them. A people that has been taught for generations that the State is an ideal to which the interests of the individual have to be entirely subordinated, is bound one day to accept as self-evident the contention of its demagogues that its own State is better than all the others and is called to world dominion. A people to whom elementary rights of citizenship have remained unknown is bound after a time to lose the power of understanding that the dictum "That is right which serves my people" ignores two thousand years of human development.

Germany's downfall proceeded by stages. When the reactionary Hegel spoke to the German peoples of the Prussian police State as an ideal, nobody could have ventured to approach them with the conception of the *Herrenvolk*, the Master Race. Its advocates would have been laughed out of court, or sent to an asylum. It took a hundred years for the Germans to free themselves sufficiently from the ideas of humanism, world citizenship, and idealism to accept as rulers the representatives of the *Herrenvolk* ideal. To-day we can recognise in this process of the poisoning of German thought a consistent system that might be called the "philosophy of German nationalism."

It began with the glorification of the State. It led from the genuine and understandable longing for the union of the German territorial States (*Länder*) in a Reich to the ideal, at first still harmless, of Greater Germany; but the fact that the new Reich owed its existence to Prussia's wars of expansion created the intellectual foundation for a German nationalism that found its most consistent formulation in pan-Germanism. This development attained its first climax and conclusion with the First World War and the failure of William II's plan for German hegemony in Europe and in the Near East.

Hand in hand with this development went a moral decline of German thought into materialism. The sacrifices which the German masses had

to make for armaments and military adventure were made bearable by promises of the reward to be brought by war—at the cost of the conquered peoples. In order to make victory secure in advance, there must be no entanglement by international agreements or by international law. The end, it was said, justified the means. To those Germans whose conscience was disturbed, Darwin's materialist doctrine of the struggle of species was expounded. Since all natural history was simply a history of the struggle for the survival of the fittest, any trick or ruse was permissible in order to facilitate the victory of one's own species. Politics became an art and a science beyond good and evil. Immorality, craftiness, ruthlessness, and brutality towards other nations were raised to the level of virtues.

But this German materialism was of such a sort that it knew how to make the German's inborn tendency to idealism serve its purposes. This German materialism was never "soulless"; it was, so to speak, an idealistic materialism. The outer world was represented as not only decadent but acquisitive, envious, and always full of evil plans in regard to Germany; the whole world was Germany's potential enemy, and forced Germany into her aggressive attitude.

In the first years of the Weimar Republic the German people turned away for a time from nationalism; but National Socialism found it easy to associate itself with this "idealistic materialism" and to develop it further (although, God knows, the parties in power might have been able by means of a clear-sighted, active, and really idealistic policy, to repress if not to destroy the influence of National Socialism). Germany's defeat, argued the Nazis, was not due to the military superiority of the enemy, but to German disunity. The "stab in the back" had come from German traitors, led astray by an inferior and particularly malevolent race, the Jews: "in the field" Germany had remained "unconquered." The National Socialist racial doctrine developed originally in the struggle against this chimera of "international Jewry." In order to make it attractive to the Germans and other peoples, this doctrine, too, was developed stage by stage. First it "demonstrated" only the qualitative superiority of the "Aryan race" over all others, then that of the "Germanic race" over all other branches of the "Aryan race," and finally the superiority of the German "master race" (*Herrenvolk*) over all other branches of the "Germanic race," with the Messianic mission of world domination.

Here the development of the philosophy of German nationalism attained, for the time, its climax. The sceptic may ask whether it is not capable of further development after this war, and this question cannot be dismissed with a wave of the hand. The danger exists, if the whole philosophy is not entirely eradicated.

The Triumph of Nihilism

The end of National Socialism does not necessarily mean the end of German nationalism, and it would be fatal to suppose that with the disappearance of the Third Reich the German problem had been automatically disposed of. The coming collapse will merely provide the first condition for the solution of the German problem.

Not the slightest success could be expected from a repetition of the measures adopted in 1918—and this applies not only to the victor Powers but equally to the anti-nationalist Germans—for the simple reason that after this war the conditions in Germany will be totally unlike those of 1918.

At that time there had been in Germany parties that had been able to express their views even during the war; there had been parliamentary institutions; there had been a Press that was relatively free; and communications with neutral countries had been relatively easy. To-day all this is radically changed; for twelve years there have been no opposition parties in Germany, there has been no freedom of discussion; a totalitarian regime has taken all opportunity of really independent formation of opinion even from the German who sought after it—and this regime has been able to bring up millions of young Germans as fanatical Nazis.

In so far as it is possible to offer psychological and economic explanations for the rise of National Socialism under the Weimar Republic, they must be still more closely applicable to the future. Hunger, inflation, unemployment, will this time necessarily make their appearance in even intenser forms than last time, for they will be immensely accentuated by the vast material losses due to the air war, which has robbed millions of all they had in the world. No less widespread has been the spiritual uprooting through evacuation, camp life, and the tearing apart of families. Thus all the psychological and economic conditions are present for a new nationalism, even more embittered and infuriated than before.

But worst of all, beyond question, will be the spiritual wilderness we shall enter. On one side we see the Nazi type of German, with fanatical faith in Hitler's false doctrine. This Nazi type does not suffer in the least from the lack of political and individual freedom that certainly must often be painful to another German type: the Nazi sees his political freedom materialised in the collective life of the Party, and he sees his individual freedom marvellously provided in the atavistic ideals of which a civilised being would scarcely dream—in the right assured by the Party to dominate, to kill, to rob, to violate. The typical young German of to-day embodies the quintessence of barbarism. The last vestige of civilisation has fallen away from this practical "philosopher" of German nationalism. His "idealistic materialism" of the past has disappeared; he has raised personal materialism to an ideal; the "struggle

of species" has long become for him a struggle for individual self-preservation, in which he drags his own doctrine through the mire with cynical frankness and perverse lust. He allies himself against Western civilisation with the Japanese, although his racial doctrine tells him to despise them as "submen," and in the Waffen-SS, he has to-day as brothers-in-arms Kalmuks, Turkomans, and Arabs. So far has the process gone of the self-contempt and self-degradation of this German type, and if it finds it "serviceable" it will carry it yet farther. If this war lasts long enough (and for the Nazis the Armistice will be far from ending it), a horrified world will discover one day that the spiritual and moral standard of this Nazi German is even below that of the barbarian. To-morrow he will go on fighting just as fanatically as he is fighting to-day, though he knows in his heart already that Germany has lost the war and that any further resistance is a senseless sacrifice. He will fight with the mechanical inertia of a Robot, filled with the urge to kill or be killed. With the irrationality of the fanatic these Nazis will hurl against every whisper of reason a stiff-necked "*credo quia absurdum*"; and how many of them, by very laborious effort and very harsh measures, can ever be turned into human beings fit to find a place in the twentieth century, is an open question.

On the other side we see the German type of which Field-Marshal Smuts, that truly Christian statesman, has said:

"They are not all Nazi monsters, moral perverts or devil worshippers infected with the satanic virus of Hitler . . . What has happened inside Germany, what has been done to innocent neighbouring peoples . . . has sunk deeply, scorchingly into millions of German minds. How could it be otherwise where the deepest instincts of our common humanity have been violated and outraged on a scale never before seen in history? There is another and better Germany which must have passed through hell in witnessing this brutal and lawless inhumanity of their people."¹

Only the faith in this type of German gives a German anti-nationalist in exile the right publicly to express his view on these questions during the war. It is true that this faith alone is not enough; neither the world nor we have any right to rely on it. To these millions of Germans the collapse of National Socialism will come as liberation from a monstrous and intolerable incubus; they will greet the victorious armies of the Allies no less enthusiastically than the Italian anti-Fascists did; a wave of joy will pass over all Germany—but that wave will quickly break against the rising wall of the hard problems of a new everyday life. These Germans no less than the others will be burdened with the heritage of National Socialism. The terrorist character of the regime; the extraordinary initial successes of the regime in peace and war; the deep disgrace brought upon Germany's good name by the Nazi

¹ Broadcast to the South African people on the fourth anniversary of the outbreak of war, September 4, 1943.

type (with all the depressing consequences precisely for those who feel that disgrace); the impossibility of any political activity or even any effectual acquaintance with political affairs—all this is bound to have produced deep disheartenment and demoralisation throughout the nation, profound fatalism in all classes. What adds to the difficulties is that the Nazi type of German will be found as a rule among the young generation, those with the greater vitality, and the other type among the older people, the tired, the despairing. Will the people of this other type still have enough physical energy and spiritual strength not only to build up anew their personal and national life, to build it up anew from the very foundations, but to carry through this reconstruction against the active or passive resistance of a considerable section of their own nation? Above all the question must be asked: Will the good will of these masses find the articulate expression that will lead Germany on to the *right* path? It is impossible to assume that after twelve years of the Nazi regime the notorious political immaturity of the German people could suddenly turn now, under the influence of the national catastrophe, into political maturity.

There are, it is true, less gloomy elements in this picture: with many people the efforts to create a better Germany will correspond to the degree of their horror at the recent history of their people. Under the same psychological law there will spread among the better portion of Germany's youth a demand for genuine knowledge and genuine spirituality. The experience of two lost wars within a quarter of a century may become the starting point of a radical change in the whole political thought of the nation. The state of biological exhaustion in which Germany will find herself should strengthen that trend. (It will be recalled that France once passed through a similar development. The Napoleonic Wars brought not only the climax but at the same time, for biological and psychological reasons, the sudden end of a centuries-old militant nationalism.) Finally, the political superficiality of the Germans, which has enabled them to transfer their loyalty three times in a few decades to the most varied systems, may here lead for once to positive results: it should make it relatively easy for the average German to change his allegiance for the fourth time. This is not meant in the least cynically; it is simply a component of a sober diagnosis of the severe psychical and physical sickness that has seized on the body of the German nation. Erroneous considerations, however praiseworthy the motives from which they spring, could be of no help here; without an accurate (and honest) diagnosis there can be no possibility of a cure.

The sickness must be radically cured this time. It began with the glorification of the State, with the subjection of German thought to the ideal of the State, and here, at the seat of the national infection, the knife must be applied. The healing of the German people begins with its education in politics.

The Antidote

In the language of the twentieth century, education in politics means education in democracy. Democracy not in the sense of a particular system of government, but in the sense of those elementary social qualities without which a progressive State is no longer thinkable in our day. By democracy I mean: the citizen's right and duty of political activity; freedom of thought; freedom of discussion; freedom of teaching; freedom of faith; tolerance; I also mean the recognition, which the Germans have completely lost, that morality and politics are inseparable alike in national and international life; and I mean the political obligation implicit in Sir William Beveridge's phrase: "Democracy includes the responsibility for knowing how to choose the right Government."¹

The steps necessary for the democratisation of the German nation have been thoroughly discussed in the first three essays in this book; they fall outside the limits of this contribution. But the conditions for the successful carrying out of these steps come within the field of foreign policy and must not here be omitted. They proceed almost perforce from what I have already said:

1. The collapse of National Socialism is not in itself a guarantee against the repetition of German aggression. It is not a guarantee of the victory of "the other Germany." In her own interest as well as in the interest of world security, Germany must be militarily occupied by the victor Powers.

2. Not only National Socialism, but German nationalism and militarism in all their forms of activity, must be entirely driven from power and prevented from ever again acquiring influence. They must be deprived of their intellectual and material sources of existence. The fact that this "presupposes great changes in the distribution of social no less than political power"² must also be squarely faced by the victor Powers.

3. Before the last Government of belligerent Germany resigns, it must itself capitulate unconditionally before the eyes of its own people. No opponent of the regime must be burdened with the responsibility for the consequences of capitulation; the war party must itself bear them. No new legend of a "stab in the back" must be allowed to come into existence.

4. Germany must be completely disarmed for an indefinite period, and the *Wehrmacht* disbanded. Effective steps must be taken to render impossible any secret rearmament.

5. The personal responsibility of the leaders must find expression in the imposition (and execution!) of sentences of capital punishment—and the term "leaders" must be given a very wide interpretation in the

¹ In a lecture at Manchester. *Manchester Guardian*, December 18, 1943.

² *The Problem of Germany, an Interim Report by a Chatham House Study Group* (Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1943), p. 71.

case of the party. The collective responsibility of the nation must find expression in the bringing to justice of all war criminals, and the expropriation of all stolen lands, property, and treasures. The measures of reparation must be just to both sides, and must take into account the psychological fact that the principle that "war does not pay" will find genuine acceptance only if it is applied in earnest.

The re-education of the German people belongs to the sphere of internal politics, but some aspects of it must be mentioned because of their importance in foreign politics. They cannot be ignored if that change of attitude is to be produced from which alone a change of policy can proceed. They serve the creation of that "co-operative mentality" in the sense of a co-operative outlook on international affairs," in which the Chatham House Study Group rightly sees the condition for this new policy.¹

The education of the people in political responsibility must begin in the school. The whole German educational system, from the elementary school to the University, must be fundamentally transformed. Almost all school books in use to-day must be withdrawn from circulation. The teaching of geography must be placed on a new basis. History must no longer be taught as a succession of wars, in which the deeds of national heroes are glorified at the expense of other countries and often also of truth. History should be conceived as the teaching of the life of the nations in association, and our own national history should be treated as a section of world history and especially of the history of the peoples of Europe. Weight should also be laid on the teaching of citizenship. The citizen's duty in regard to politics could be explained by reference to the practical example of National Socialism. The crimes of the Nazi regime (recorded in a form suitable for the youthful mentality), Germany's war guilt and similar questions are best treated not as part of the teaching of history, which, as it were, views past events from the angle of foreign politics, but from the more domestic angle of schooling in citizenship, so as to create from the outset "the conviction that political leaders who are unscrupulous in their international dealings inevitably act unscrupulously towards their own people as well."² It will not be difficult after this war to find arguments showing that the German people was itself the first victim of National Socialism.

The initial severe shortage of teachers must not lead to the retention of nationalists in their posts; it is preferable to bridge the gap by cutting down the hours of school attendance of pupils and lengthening the working hours of reliable teachers. The creation of a "co-operative mentality" will be assisted by making the learning of a foreign language obligatory even in the elementary schools. Students should pass at least one semester at a foreign University. Exchanges on a large scale

¹ *The Problem of Germany, an Interim Report by a Chatham House Study Group* (Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1943), p. 69.

² *Ibid.*, p. 68.

should be organised as soon as the international temperament has sufficiently calmed to assure fair treatment of the German youths taking part in the exchange. German sport must be entirely freed from its para-military character.

For adult education a number of positive and negative measures will be needed. Among the latter must especially be a law imposing heavy penalties, not so much (as in the past) for the insulting of the heads of foreign States as for the insulting or slandering of other nations and for every sort of war-mongering. A law of no less severity must assure veracious reporting of foreign affairs by the German Press. Particular attention must be paid in this connection to the activities of German foreign correspondents. A foreign news service for wireless and Press, controlled by the State, should substantially lighten the task of truthful news supply.

Steps must be taken to satisfy the hunger of the German public for the products of free cultural activity. In addition to provision as a matter of course for German culture, it must be the business of State institutions to make accessible the work done abroad, which for twelve years has systematically been withheld from the German people. The results of international scientific research achieved during that period must be publicised, the best works in European and world literature must be published in good and cheap editions (and in faithful German translation); the best foreign films must be shown. For film and literature the essential element is quality; this problem must be regarded not so much from the standpoint of international business as from that of the education of the German people. Entertainment must play an important part, but the flooding of Germany with intellectual productions of little value simply because they are foreign would soon produce a reaction in the German public that would be just the opposite of that desired.

The whole of the infamous activities of National Socialism must be placed before this public in word and picture, in doses and forms to which there will virtually be no limit; but, once again, the desired effect will only be attained if quality and truth are combined in the representation. A comprehensive collection of documents must be thrown on the market in masses, in the form of "Black Books"; it should contain not only the results of investigations carried out by German commissions (which must have unrestricted access to the German State archives), but all relevant official publications abroad, including the reports of proceedings against war criminals. Suitable extracts should be dealt with in the schools.

Writers, artists, scientists must be encouraged by the State to produce works that serve international understanding; this should be done through generous financial support, through grants for study and travel, and through competitions and prizes. The publicity associated with all this must help to assure for art and science the place of honour in the

German State hitherto reserved for militarism. A "European Culture Week" should be organised every year by the State, with exhibitions, theatrical performances, lectures, and so on, and all Europe should be invited to contribute of its best. This will not only help the German people to regain contact with the now alienated world around it; such an event could very soon be divested of its German beginnings and made into a general European organisation, an Olympiad of the European mind. It is in the field of art that the national characteristics that in politics tend to divide can best be harmoniously brought together in the service of a common aim.

The methods of carrying out these measures cannot be dealt with here. They can hardly be the task of a Ministry that would in any way suggest the revival of the "popular enlightenment" and "propaganda" ridden to death by Goebbels. Since Germany needs an entirely new conception of education, a future Ministry of Education with greatly widened spheres of competence might be considered. In any case, the proposals here made are of such fundamental importance to the reshaping of German foreign policy that the future Foreign Ministry should be allowed to have a say in these matters.

II

A CHANGE OF POLICY

The Initial Phase

A change of attitude in the German masses is the indispensable condition for a change of policy, and so for a constructive solution of the German problem. But "even more than for the co-operative mentality of the individual the world will be looking in future for signs of co-operative policy on the part of the German State."¹ We are bound, however, to ask ourselves whether "signs of co-operative policy on the part of the German State" are in themselves a proof that an actual *change* of policy has taken place.

It is obvious that a radical internal change in the framework of the German State must be accompanied by a no less fundamental revolution in the sphere of foreign policy. By this I mean not only a complete change in the structure of the diplomatic service in the sense indicated by my remarks at the outset, and the "democratisation" of foreign policy, but the acquisition—and practice—of a completely new conception, democratic and legalitarian, of foreign policy. The essential thing is its practice; in this alone will lie the proof that the German problem has actually been solved.

"Signs of co-operative policy on the part of the German State" may be inadequate evidence for the simple reason that they will be offered

¹ *The Problem of Germany, an Interim Report by a Chatham House Study Group* (Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1943), p. 69.

during the period of occupation, while the practical conduct of foreign policy can only begin when the foreign armies have withdrawn and an independent German Government is once more in control of the country's fate.

If it should then prove that Germany's foreign policy does not come up to the hopes of the former occupying Powers, one of two reasons might be responsible—either the "signs of co-operative policy" on the part of the German Government were merely simulated in order to get rid of the occupying Powers as soon as possible and to return then to the old principles of Germany's policy of aggression; or the new Government, though of entire good will, was unable to carry through the new conception with energy, for reasons beyond its control.

The first of these possibilities raises the question of the type of Germans with whom the Allies should collaborate; the second brings into the foreground the question of the environment with which the new Germany will have to deal. Since either possibility is bound, if it should materialise, to throw Germany back upon her old course and consequently to menace peace once more, it is important to take steps in advance to ward off both. A rather closer study of these questions seems, therefore, to be needed.

The Problem of Collaboration

The reader will have noted that I have tacitly assumed at several points that there will be collaboration between occupation troops and Germans, and he might ask whether such collaboration is at all necessary or desirable. It seems to me to be indispensable, for the same reasons for which I, as a German, am compelled to propose the occupation of my own country after this war: the patriotic desire to see my nation raised out of its frightful humiliation as quickly as is possible without endangering the security of the world and of human civilisation, together with the realisation, from the point of view of the citizen of the world, that the return of a peacefully inclined Germany into the family of nations is in the best interest of mankind. An occupation policy that took no account of the Germans and drew no distinction between them would seem to me not only impracticable, requiring a military and civil staff such as none of the victor States could provide without very serious complications for itself; but also incompatible with the conception of "re-education," which must comprise education in a positive ideal to be ultimately accepted voluntarily and with genuine agreement. Above all, it would be so incompatible with the ideals of the Western world and with the proclaimed war aims of the Allies that any detailed discussion of this possibility would be not only irrelevant but almost injuring.

The question remains, with what type of Germans should the

Allies work? The answer has already been implied in a general sense not only by me but by all the contributors to this volume—with the anti-Nazi, anti-nationalist, anti-militarist, the Socialist, humanitarian, liberal type of German. The actual selection and commissioning is, no doubt, a matter for the Allies, but in their decisions they will need to be guided by the recognition that the danger of deception is particularly great in the initial phase.

This applies above all in the field of foreign politics. For in this field the initial phase follows laws entirely different from those of the field of home politics.

In home politics, too, the collapse of the war regime will be the signal for a radical change of course, but the building up of the new system begins virtually at the same moment. From the point of view of society the boundaries between the last phase of the collapsing regime and the initial phase of the new will be indefinite, and the new regime, whatever forms it may first take, will have to embark on manifold activities at the very outset. Continuity will be preserved (a break in it would amount to anarchy), and in the daily work of reconstruction the Allies will have ample opportunities of gaining an accurate insight into the actual political attitude of their German associates.

In the external field, however, the collapse of the old regime will bring a sudden and complete stoppage of all activity. The whole system of foreign policy will simply cease to exist. The initial phase of the foreign policy of an occupied State is of necessity passive: the precise function of that phase is to serve simply the *preparation* of the new foreign policy, which can only begin its effective materialisation in the second, active phase that starts with the withdrawal of the occupying Powers.

The "new" foreign policy need not, of course, be really new: it may be no more than the active resumption of the old policy. Everything will depend on the spirit in which the preparatory work of the initial phase is carried out. The German who is honestly ready for reconciliation will know that the collapse of the old system of conduct of foreign policy must involve the collapse of the old *conception* of foreign policy; in the preparatory phase he will need to try to overcome the only too justified hatred and world-wide distrust of all that is German, and to resume relations with the Allied Powers in such a spirit that Germany's intercourse with the world around her can return ultimately to the normal paths that will make possible an independently conducted German foreign policy. For him the initial phase will mean the clearing away of the ruins left by National Socialism in this as in other fields, and the restoration of the international confidence in which he will recognise the *condition* for Germany's resumption of activity in foreign politics.

This brings us to the dangerous element against which I must utter a warning. The shrewd German nationalist will adopt an attitude that

is seemingly identical with that of the German who is ready for reconciliation, if by doing so he, the nationalist, can retain his hold of power. The shrewd nationalist (who, be it observed, is not the same as the fanatic) will know that in this passive phase of foreign policy the will of the victors rules supreme, and that no change of the decisions arrived at by the victors is yet conceivable. He will therefore, as so often in the course of German history, *sich auf den Boden der Tatsachen stellen*—he will realise and accept the situation. This realist type of German nationalist will leave the organisation of any campaign for sympathy for the beaten Germany to his brethren on the Left, and the organisation of active or passive resistance to hysterical National Socialists; he himself will accept the situation. He will be ready, to all appearance just as ready as the “other German,” to work with the Allies; in the guise of a patriot who is also a reasonable man he will endeavour to gain their sympathies—and will seek at the same time to take advantage of all his successes in this direction to sow discord between the Allies. For him the preparatory period will imply the opportunity to smash the anti-German coalition in order to prepare the way for new groupings of Powers that in the end will enable Germany to find herself in a third world war on the winning side. By his collaboration with the Allies this type of nationalist will not compromise himself in the least in the eyes of his supporters: they will have a high regard for him, as a particularly cunning politician, and—precisely during the initial phase—will develop the policy of feigned goodwill into a fine art. With the same understanding grin with which they noted the German Generals’ acceptance of the disarmament clauses of the last peace treaty, the same with which they readily swallowed not only Hitler’s general assurances of his peaceful intentions but even such unorthodox deviations from the course of German foreign policy as the pacts of friendship with Poland and Soviet Russia—with the same cynical grin they will profess to welcome their leaders’ collaboration with the Allies. An unprejudiced study of Hitler’s foreign policy will show that it owed all its extraordinary initial successes to this system of feigned goodwill; its ultimate failure at the critical moment can only serve its supporters as a spur to yet further refinements of this system in the future. Let there be no illusions as to the scale of the political and diplomatic intrigues that are possible actually during the initial phase. If the realists among the German nationalists succeed in this way in gaining the favour of the Allies, and in thus maintaining themselves in power, they will be ready to show every “sign of co-operative policy.”

We must go even further. Since for the nationalists in Germany the coming peace will be only a temporary affair, and the initial phase will be simply the period of preparation for the overthrowing of that temporary situation, the nationalist can show “signs of co-operative policy” in cases in which the German who is honestly ready for reconciliation

might be compelled to hesitate. For in the latter's view the coming peace treaty will be no temporary affair but the basis for Germany's recovery, and he will have every interest in helping to make that basis as solid as possible. Anything liable, even on a long view, to accumulate sources of conflict will be bound to fill him with misgivings. From the first day of his work with the occupying authorities he will acknowledge a double loyalty and a double responsibility—toward his own people and toward the Allies, in whom he will see the representatives of the ideals and the civilising principles that need to be established in Germany. I hope I can succeed in demonstrating that this double loyalty of the "other German" need not be a divided loyalty; that its elements are in the profoundest sense identical; and that the one is in truth entirely incapable of fulfilment without the simultaneous fulfilment of the other. A wise policy on the part of the victors will take account of this fact; for only so will it be possible to avoid misunderstandings from which the one and only element to profit will be the common enemy, German nationalism.

I can imagine that it might at times be possible for officials of the occupying Powers to work with more apparent absence of friction with nationalists than with "other Germans"; the latter may be led by their sense of responsibility to raise objections and to appear to fail to be "co-operative," where the former may readily give their consent, though fully aware that the step in question is against the true interests of both parties and also quite unnecessary: and this with the deliberate intention to keep alive and foster in the German people hatred of the "alien oppressors" and the demand for revenge. Here the discovery of the right course and the making of the right choice calls for political insight, knowledge of men, human understanding—and continual watchfulness. Leniency toward the compromised, indulgence toward the wolves in sheep's clothing, setting down the man who makes no difficulties as a "good fellow"—all this is bound one day to have terrible consequences. Above all, the fact that the handling of diplomatic affairs requires special qualifications that are not easily gained, and are possessed by very few of the "other Germans," must not lead to the acceptance in the new diplomatic service of the slippery crew that managed diplomacy for Hitler. These gentlemen's hands may not be stained with blood, but it must not be forgotten that their policy of feigned goodwill was part of the direct preparation for the present blood-bath.

The Problem of the Environment

The problem of collaboration is closely bound up with that of the environment. Both are, in fact, parts of the great question, How can the world live with Germany, and Germany with the world? The answer depends not only on whether the right type of German is successfully

chosen, but also on whether the German elements that are willing to undertake reconstruction will find what the Chatham House Study Group calls "a co-operative environment."¹

An effective policy of the "co-operative environment" may be best based on short-term and on long-term measures. The former may be summed up in the question. In what spirit is the occupation of Germany to be carried out? and the latter in the question, Into what international order shall an independent Germany return? The short-term measures are thus those which require application during the period of occupation, while the long-term measures only come into full operation when Germany is once more able to rule in freedom.

The short-term measures might also be called the "direct treatment" to be accorded to Germany. But while it is true that the indulgence the world showed soon after the last conclusion of peace to a rearming Germany must on no account be repeated, the wise victor knows that at the same time everything should be avoided that is bound, without serving the victor Powers, to produce despair in the masses of the conquered people and strengthen the will to resist:

"We shall not repeat the pitiful mistake of the last Armistice, when we actually allowed the position in enemy countries to become worse, the existing famine conditions to grow and spread, until the Armistice period inflicted in some respects greater injury and suffering on the civilian populations than the war itself, and became a more bitter memory." (Field-Marshal Smuts, Guildhall speech, October 19, 1943.)

To render impossible from the outset any repetition of this mistake in what Field-Marshal Smuts described as "the far more grave situation at the end of this war" would be the purpose of the short-term measures. They will have, however, not only an economic but a psychological aspect:

"What would defeat education is a policy of prolonged and deliberate humiliation"; "if the authors of public policy genuinely desire to promote a healthier outlook in Germany they will necessarily renounce all minor triumphs"; "a moral boycott of Germany . . . by extending its effects to those who . . . are trying to make a clean break with the past, might blast any possible first growths of a better mind."²

What is needed is not a "soft" policy toward Germany; a utilitarian policy is sufficient, designed, in Sir Walter Layton's words, "to co-operate on the basis of enlightened self-interest."³

The long-term measures will have the character of "indirect treatment." They will not be concerned with Germany herself but with her

¹ *The Problem of Germany, an Interim Report by a Chatham House Study Group* (Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1943), p. 78.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 77, 78, 73.

³ *The British Commonwealth and World Order*, Sidney Ball Lecture, 1944 (Oxford University Press, 1944), p. 14.

environment; they will serve the building up of a new international order, and obviously Germany cannot participate in this task. She must, however, be brought within that order as soon as the occupying Powers withdraw. We have seen that that moment (in which Germany's foreign policy will pass from the passive into the active phase) may introduce a serious crisis for the new international order. I have tried to make clear how the danger of deception by German nationalism may be avoided. There remains the question, Will the first Government of the independent Germany, even assuming it to be of good will, be strong enough to prevent Germany's return to the old policy of aggression?

The Problem of International Order

This, it seems to me, depends especially on the quality of the new international order. By "quality" I mean here not so much the material power at the back of this order, protecting and maintaining it, as its moral quality. (That there will have to be set up an international organisation that is more comprehensive than the old League of Nations, that its constitution and its machinery must be better suited to the political, economic, and legal tasks of a worldwide league, and that, above all, international law must to-morrow be protected from the disturber of the peace exactly as national law has long been protected by the police in all civilised countries—these are propositions so universally accepted to-day that it may be taken for granted that they will be given practical effect.)

Only an international organisation that is morally good can hope to endure. It needs the loyalty of its members, and this depends on the degree in which the organisation can fill its members with satisfaction and with a sense of security. Contentment without equality of rights is inconceivable; security against external dangers would be of doubtful quality so long as weaker Member States had reason to fear infringements or pressure from their stronger partners. An international organisation that permitted the pursuit of power politics in its midst could not possibly hope to establish the rule of law on a world scale; justice and equal rights for all Member States, big or small, are the first condition for its success.

If such a spirit informs the international organisation into which Germany is one day to be summoned, there is no reason why it should be impossible for a resolute Government to maintain the course of German foreign policy once for all within peaceful lines. For it could count on the full moral and material support of the organisation. This is so whatever the detailed forms of the new organisation may be: if it truly serves the interests of all its founders, Germany will be able to co-operate loyally with it, even if she has not shared in the settlement of those detailed forms. (Incidentally, in a league of that character even a German Government of ill-will would be able to achieve little; it would

be exposed and removed by league action before it could do any harm. Even the old Geneva League, with all the inadequacy of its technical resources, could have halted Hitler on his road to war if moral rottenness had not already attacked it from within.)

In an international organisation not founded on justice and law but itself working under the laws of power politics, Germany would soon be drawn into the old game of spheres of interest and the policy of alliances. Her geographical situation and her large population alone would make her the object of the most persistent attentions from the group of Powers most ardently interested in the overthrowing of the new order. A German Government loyal to the league would have to struggle not only against the power of resurgent nationalism in its own country, but against the influence of the group of Powers that found their natural partner in German nationalism. The issue of that play of forces could only be watched with the utmost concern.

If German nationalism is to be really deprived of all moral basis, if internal and external reform is really to be carried out, if the measures, some of them harsh, which the victors are bound to impose on the German people are to be made really acceptable, and if Germans are really to speak up for these measures and help to carry them through, it must be possible to give the German people faith in the majesty of the international law which generations of nationalist leaders had represented to the nation as a contemptible chimera. If an end is really to be made of the German policy of force, it must be possible to point to a genuine system of international policy of law to take its place; for the principle of right is the only realistic alternative to the principle of might. If the idols of pan-Germanism and Nazism are really to be thrown down, it must be possible to show to the German people the positive aim of a peaceful family of peoples, in which, after a period of quarantine, the German people may itself take its place as a member on a footing of equality of rights.

The creation of a new conception of German foreign policy means at bottom nothing else than the explanation of that aim to the German people during the period of occupation, and the preparation of ways and means of attaining it. This can only be done with any hope of success if the edifice of the new order of peace is founded and built up *during* the period of Germany's quarantine, and if, therefore, the short-term and the long-term measures, though serving different purposes, are entered upon simultaneously.

"Justice . . . must precede peace," writes Sir John Marriott in his admirable new work, *Federalism and the Problem of the Small State*.¹ At all events, justice and peace must proceed hand in hand. And justice presupposes equality of rights. On the other hand, it is clear that at the outset Germany cannot be accorded equality of rights. It might, there-

¹ Allen and Unwin, 1943, p. 43.

fore, be asked, Are not the principles of justice and the requirements of security mutually exclusive? Does not the appeal for permanent peace imply, after all, that the coming peace must of necessity be unjust to Germany?

The answer is No. Justice and security are compatible if the latter is regarded not simply as a question of power but as the means to a higher aim. They are compatible if the security measures are not regarded as a panacea but as the military contribution to the solution of a greater political problem, the immediate aspect of which is the re-education of the German people. They are compatible if it is admitted that Germany's own real need of security is bound to grow in proportion as the security measures of the victors are carried through, but can at the same time be fully satisfied by according to her the protection of the new international law before she can herself become a Member of the new international league.

I do not want to minimise the practical difficulties that may stand in the way of such a policy. Almost daily new decisions will have to be taken as to where leniency will be advisable and where hardness is necessary. The right mixture will be discoverable if Germany's treatment is not regarded as an isolated problem, but is seen in its relation to world policy, and especially to European policy. *The question facing the world is not whether a "soft" or "hard" peace is to be imposed on Germany, but how humanity can assure itself a lasting peace.*

III

GERMANY IN EUROPE

Germany and Her Neighbours

It is to the specifically European aspect of the German problem that special attention must be paid in this connection. Both world wars started in Europe; and since the attempt made after the first world war to give this continent a stable order was unsuccessful, all realistic planning to-day for world peace must proceed from the recognition that without a new and better European order the danger of a third world war cannot be banished from the world. The creation of this order is the task of the coming peace treaty, and while no reasonable person will suggest that the objective inadequacies of the order established at Versailles are to be explained by Germany's lust for aggression, there is no question that the responsibility for the breakdown of that order lies with Germany. Thus, to speak in terms of political practice, the coming peace treaty has the task of discovering a system that will guarantee to the many States of Europe a life in security, well-being, and national freedom alongside the German Colossus. It goes without saying that in

this connection special attention must be paid to the interests of Germany's neighbour States.

Most of these States have been overrun and cruelly oppressed by Hitler-Germany; some of them had already been attacked by William II, and some by Bismarck before him; and for all of them Germany has for generations been a perpetual source of anxiety. If to-morrow at the peace conference these States demand a European system that once for all removes the German peril, their demand will be both genuine and justified.

It is true that a beaten and disarmed Germany, battling with difficult internal problems, will cease for a long time to be a Great Power (though the sceptic can point to the fact that last time she recovered surprisingly quickly). On the other hand, France, too—to whom the small States had been in the habit of looking for protection from German assaults—will emerge greatly weakened from this struggle. Even if Germany's population should have been more seriously diminished by the war than the populations of her European opponents (and in view of Hitler's policy of extermination this is not very probable), Germany would remain numerically the greatest nation in Europe; this and her geographical key position make her, in spite of the lost war, still one of the strongest factors in Europe.

In view of this it is only natural that Germany's neighbours will be the more determined, the longer the war lasts, in demanding additional guarantees and in regarding the creation of a better European order more and more as an exclusively strategic problem. To these States H. A. L. Fisher's phrase "Security is a state of mind; so is insecurity"¹ is particularly applicable. It is because of this state of mind that there is to-day a growing inclination to expect a stable European peace to be achieved by such measures as the annexation of great stretches of purely German territory, the cutting up of Germany into several States, the mass transfer of German minorities to the Reich, and so on.

This is a deeply tragic development (concerning which a German may express regret but can make no complaint). The "other German," who must rely upon the Allies for so much psychological understanding in connection with the reconstruction of his own country, has for his part the bounden duty of showing a like understanding in regard to Germany's neighbours, and especially the smaller ones. He must recognise that their proposal of such far-reaching measures of security does not spring from inborn hatred of Germany, but from the fear, only too well justified, of new German aggression. Before any appeal can be made to them to "see reason" they must be freed from their apprehensions—and this can only be done by the Germans themselves.

The "other Germany" must recognise that the smaller the neighbour

¹ Introduction to Wheeler-Bennett and Langermann, *Information on the Problem of Security* (Allen and Unwin, 1927).

State, the greater will be its fear of Germany—but the greater also will be its interest in a truly lasting peace. The greater, consequently, will also be its readiness in principle to see justice done to Germany—assuming that it can dare to believe, really to believe, that Germany no longer represents a danger to it.

From the first day of the Armistice there will scarcely be any more important task for the “other Germany” than the winning of the genuine confidence of its neighbours, especially its smaller neighbours. Nowhere can the change of outlook of the new Germany be more usefully evidenced than here; in no more constructive way can the initial phase of German foreign policy be utilised than in this field. It is a task that may make special demands on the statesmanlike qualities, on the patience, tact, and imaginative understanding of the “other German”; but success or failure in this matter will have particularly far-reaching consequences. *The character of the coming peace treaty will be largely determined by the relations which the new Germany will have managed to set up with her neighbour States during the period of occupation. Thus the creation of a “co-operative environment” in Europe depends very largely on Germany herself.*

Assurances of goodwill and soothing references to Germany’s “weakness” will not be enough. The negative fact that for all practical purposes Germany is no longer a Great Power can only be confidently accepted if it is given positive expression in terms of policy. This means that Germany must be seen to be accepting her position and must pursue a foreign policy corresponding to that of the smaller States. From the very outset she must divest herself of all Great-Power airs, all prestige policy, all diplomatic “push.” She must no longer be “nationalist” in the old sense of *sacro egoismo*, but must clearly see her own nation as a component of a greater unit. She must be ready to co-ordinate the interests of her own nation with those of the greater unit, and if necessary to subordinate the former to the latter. *Germany’s new conception of foreign policy must be European.*

Germany Must Become Europe-minded

Only so can we enable Germany’s neighbours to realise that the interests of a non-nationalist, freedom-loving Germany are *identical* with those of the other freedom-loving States of Europe. *The European conception inspiring the new German foreign policy is the psychological condition necessary to the creation of that new European order which alone can be lasting, because in it security and justice are no longer mutually opposed but are mutually complementing components, the order on which rests the hope of all conscious Europeans—the democratic organisation of Europe on a federative basis.*

To exclude all misunderstanding at the outset—Germany’s initiative

in this matter must be confined to demonstrating to the others by her attitude that Germany not only need be no obstacle to the federative development of Europe, but herself regards that solution as the only constructive one, and is accordingly prepared to play her part in it. As regards the practical proposals and measures for the attainment of this aim, Germany must impose entire reserve on herself: as in the case of the new world organisation, so here, too, she has to recognise that the building up of the new European order is the task of the victor Powers. She must realise that at the outset she will not belong either to the world league or to a European federation or any of the regional federations that may first come into existence. Nothing would be more mistaken than any attempt of Germany's to make herself the leading champion of the idea of European union: this would not remove European apprehensions but would perpetuate them, adding yet further to the old and justified mistrust. After Hitler's attempt, only just frustrated, to unite Europe under the Nazi heel, such a policy must of necessity create the impression that it was merely paving the way for a fresh German attempt to gain hegemony on the Continent, or at best that Germany was trying to escape from the consequences of defeat by raising the war-cry of European fraternity. The psychological results would be the opposite of those aimed at, and in view of the practical difficulties that in any case stand in the way of the creation of a federative order, Germany's attitude might easily give the death-blow to all attempts at federation.

Nor is there any need for Germany to come forward as an instructor in this matter: the consciousness that Europe has need of union on a basis of freedom has long been common to all the peoples of Europe, even though to-day it has been pushed into the background. The history of the inter-war years is full of attempts to give that union concrete form. In this the initiative lay not with Germany but with her neighbours, especially the small ones. Europe found her tireless prophet in the Austrian Count Coudenhove-Kalergi; she found her courageous political protagonist in a Frenchman, Aristide Briand, whose memorandum on European Union of May 17, 1930, was condemned by the lack of interest of the Great Powers of Europe to remain just literature—but immortal; and the European sense was live enough among the small States to lead to a series of concrete political efforts—the Little Entente, the Balkan Entente, the Baltic League, and the Oslo Group of Nations. Historically regarded, these latter were attempts to set up supranational units at least on a regional scale.

At the beginning of the present war this consciousness found new expression; the inadequacies of the Versailles system and the missed opportunities of constructive reform were then fresh in everyone's memory; it was known that the war had been brought about by the illwill of the German Government, but that the scale of the catastrophe had only been made possible by the precarious state of the European order;

and men's sense of their own shortcomings produced everywhere a readiness for self-criticism and the desire for a really sound international order. At that time there was scarcely any progressive British, French, Polish, Czechoslovak, Dutch, Belgian, Scandinavian, or South-east European statesman or politician who had not publicly supported the idea of federation, either European or regional. European federation in some form seemed to have been raised to an obvious war aim. As recently as 1942 Poland and Czechoslovakia tried to form the nucleus of a regional federation, and about the same time there came a similar agreement between Greece and Yugoslavia.

To this day the representatives of the smaller European Allies may be heard at times emphasising the necessity for a federative order; but their voices are isolated, and they seem to lack conviction. For this development there may be various reasons; but whatever these may be, they have in the main a common origin: Germany's war against Europe has lasted so long that the Allies, great and small, now see no possibility of any sound order in Europe while the Reich retains its old form.

But the tragedy of this development lies not so much in the menace to Germany of an unjust peace as in the possibility that a European order might be set up that corresponds just as little to the true needs and interests of the European peoples as to those of the new Germany. The European-minded German will therefore plead not Germany's but Europe's cause; if he succeeds in convincing the peoples of the Continent that he no longer feels and thinks merely as a German but as a *European of German origin*, Europe will willingly remember that the German problem, urgent though it is, is but part of the greater problem of Europe, and that the coming peace treaty must serve the solving of this greater problem.

The Problem of European Order

"The idea of a united Europe is not a wrong idea . . . Cut up into small States, with their out-of-date customs barriers, the Europe of yesterday suffocated. Herein lies one of the causes of the war. It would be a thousand pities if the evil exploitation of a good idea by the Nazis, the caricature of this idea that is presented to us by the propaganda of Goebbels, should cause the necessity for a great federation of European peoples to go unrecognised. For it is a necessity—political, moral, and economic . . . Unity in diversity, co-operation without slavery, is the only possible future for Europe, unless it is to be torn between revolt against tyranny and disorder born of international anarchy." So wrote *Résistance*, the organ of the French Resistance Movement of the Northern Zone, on February 17, 1943.¹ Other passages in the French,

¹ Quoted from *Federal News*, May 1944.

Polish, Dutch, Norwegian underground Press, which one sees from time to time in free Britain, speak the same language. That these men and women, in spite of the desperate fight they have to wage against an often bestial occupying Power, to-day still speak this language, is humiliating for the German—but gratifying for the European. They do not speak it out of love for Germany (which they cannot love), but because within them the conscience of Europe has remained alive.

In those short sentences *Résistance* has so amply stated the case for federation that all further arguments could only have the character of variations. If nevertheless I want here to plead the cause of Europe in my own words, it is under the urge to appeal to those Europeans who see in the present war not merely a struggle between nations but the struggle of Good against Evil, and to say to them that an anti-nationalist Germany, if it is not to sign its own death-warrant, *must* think in terms of Europe.

Europe's condition to-day is reminiscent of that of the German territorial States (*Länder*) after the technical revolution produced by the invention of the steam engine. In the railway era it was found that Germany's division into a mass of petty units was no longer compatible with the requirements of economic advance. The petty State had become an anachronism. It could not permanently set its face against technical advance, and very soon the question was no longer whether the small States ought to amalgamate into one higher unit, but *how* they should do so. Two methods were open to them: that of voluntary union with equality of rights, unification by consent, and that of subjugation by the stronger, unification by conquest. Unification by consent would have meant the federation of the *Länder*; but the *Länder* entirely failed to grasp the needs of the moment and their own rightly understood interests, and could not make up their minds to take that step; as a result they were united by Bismarck—not, it is true, by force, but under the pressure of recent Prussian victories. That assured Prussia's predominance in the Reich—and the "German problem" had taken shape. To this day the whole world is suffering because the unification of Germany did not come by the free, democratic, federalist path.

In the age of the aeroplane the old form of Europe's organisation has become no less impossible to preserve. The economic needs of all our States demand co-ordination, planning, and a higher form of unity—and they come up against the restraint of political and economic frontiers. To-day all Europe is faced with the alternative which history put some seventy years ago before the German *Länder*—unite, or be united.

There is no third alternative; once more the only question is *How?* Hitler attempted unification by conquest. His failure gives Europe another opportunity of achieving unification by consent. So long as this is

not effected, the danger of unification by conquest remains; it will not be automatically averted by Hitler's disappearance. The motives of those tens of thousands of non-Germans who helped Hitler in his attempt at unification, although it meant the subjugation of their own country, may best be explained by their compatriots. But were they all necessarily traitors to their nation, self-seeking quislings—or were there not among them also disappointed idealists who despaired of the possibility of voluntary unification and preferred unification by conquest to the old European disorder? The political pacification of Europe seems impossible until the decision has been taken in one or the other direction.

But while the necessity for a higher form of unity for our little Europe seems particularly obvious, we see that other and greater continents which could much more easily permit themselves the luxury of national non-co-operation, have long taken energetically in hand the task of economic and political unification. The disadvantages arising for Europe from this development will be still further accentuated by the process of diminution of its power to which the Continent was subjected in the two world wars. The most notable result of these wars may perhaps be seen in the fact that they have led to the elimination, for a time at all events, of all continental Great Powers. The States of the Continent may differ substantially from one another in size and strength, but in comparison with the extra-continental Powers they will without exception be weak and small. In this situation Europe's renunciation of union would be equivalent to her retirement from the stage of world politics.

No world organisation, however good and strong, could give Europe the degree of internal stability she needs for her continued existence. One of the more dangerous illusions of the inter-war years was the belief that a league aiming at universality would make the setting up of a special European league unnecessary. The history of the Geneva League gives reason, indeed, for asking whether a lasting world organisation is conceivable without European unity. Clearly the world league and the European league must not be built up on different principles—one more argument, in reality, in favour of European federation. For the principles of law, justice, and equality of rights which the world league aims at establishing on an international scale are attainable in present-day Europe only along the federative path. The idea of European federation is not a blow at the ideal of the universal League of Nations, but, on the contrary, its necessary continental complement.

Federation—if the apparently complex problems of Europe are steadily regarded from this point of view, possible solutions reveal themselves so easily and with such obvious rightness that one is almost deterred from pointing them out. Federation is the only principle that permits the general problem to be approached not simply from the strategic or the economic or the political standpoint, with correspond-

ingly one-sided proposals. One-sided proposals no longer suffice—Versailles has proved it.

Versailles regarded the problem of Europe only from the political side. It did away with the dual State of Austria-Hungary and put in its place a number of small States. In so doing it created economic problems which had until then been unknown on that scale—and it did nothing to overcome them. The result was disorder. The result was that the Versailles order was very soon subjected to criticism from a purely economic standpoint. Almost the whole world was soon speaking regretfully of the “Balkanisation” of Europe, of the “self-contained economic entity” of the old Austria-Hungary, of the necessity for a “revision” in the direction either of a return to the order of 1914, or of the creation of a European economic block without any regard to political problems. And the danger to-day is that the justified criticism of the economic failure of the Versailles order will be carried too far and the grandiose achievement of that order be lost sight of.

The Versailles order, indeed, “Balkanised” Europe economically, but that was merely the negative aspect of the positive gain of liberating some-forty-eight million people from alien oppression. It was the nearest approach to a just order that Europe had ever known since the birth of nationalism; for never had so many Europeans lived in freedom in a State of their own. It was an organic order, for it ordered Europe on the principle of the Nation-State, so completing a process that had begun more than a century earlier. It was a just order; for it gave the right of self-determination of the smaller communities preference over the claim of the greater ones to hold them in subjection. For the first time in human history a heavy blow was thus struck against the principle of power politics; thenceforth that principle had to share its role of factor in the determination of history with another principle, that of the policy of law. Without the liberating act of Versailles the attempt to set up a world league of nations would have been unthinkable.

Nothing one has yet read in the way of purely economic (or purely strategic) proposals for the solution of the problem of Europe justifies the hope that they will leave this great achievement of the Versailles system unharmed. To give effect to any of these one-sided solutions would mean merely to repeat the old mistakes in a new form—with the old results or worse.

On the other hand, the maintenance of the equality of rights of nations in a federative system is not only possible; it is virtually an essential first condition. The remedying of the economic shortcomings of the Versailles order does not require its overthrow but simply its reform; the edifice of European unity can be erected with the natural material with which history has furnished us—the Nation-States. If the economic and political problems are first brought within a common

formula, the strategic problem should be capable of a perfectly natural solution.

It is true that a federation can only come into existence "when communities recognise a common interest for which it seems worth while to sacrifice something of their freedom to be separate"; when the peoples concerned are "prepared to barter . . . sovereignty for civilisation."¹ Keeping the example of the German *Länder* in mind as a warning, it should not be difficult for the European peoples to make the right choice.

Federation and Frontiers

A Europe resolved on federation will have no need to add to the immense national problems with which it will have to wrestle after the war the collective problem of drawing a new map. The old, pre-Hitler map is a good enough basis. It is true that its political frontiers do not everywhere correspond with the ethnographical ones; it is just as certain that in view of the thousands of years of intermingling of races and peoples those frontiers cannot everywhere correspond. The fact that entirely just frontiers, that is to say frontiers fully corresponding to the principle of nationality, cannot be drawn in Europe is, in truth, simply a further argument in favour of federation. The frontier disputes that have poisoned European peace, and not only since Hitler came, are not to be disposed of by removing frontier posts; these disputes will continue so long as the nation is the highest unit to which the citizen of Europe owes loyalty. Only allegiance to a higher principle of organisation can reduce the friction between national interests to a reasonable scale and open the way for impartial decisions of frontier conflicts. In a federation, such decisions can be arrived at from the point of view of the welfare of the European community, and it will therefore be possible for the parties concerned to accept them as final without loss of prestige. Any changes in the European map that might become necessary would have from the outset the character of mere adjustments of boundaries within the general organisation.

In such a system the question of the German frontiers could be treated in such a way as to serve the just interests of Europe without imperilling the aim of the re-education of Germany. The annexation of great areas of purely German territory for strategic reasons would no longer be necessary in a federation organised on the basis of Nation-States. If there grows up around Germany a federation to which Germany will one day belong, it is entirely possible for the "other German" to make acceptable to his people the contribution to the adjustments of frontiers which a unified Europe may demand from what will still be

¹ Sir William Beveridge, *Peace by Federation?* (Federal Union, 1940), pp. 23, 30.

territorially the greatest country of the Continent.¹ Cessions of territory, however, which were dictated purely by considerations of power politics would be bound not only to keep those Germans who are ready for an understanding morally isolated from their people (a development that would play directly into the hands of German nationalism); it must also very quickly bring the "other Germans" into conflict with their own sense of political realities, with their better insight, and with their conscience. If the German problem is to be solved, the anti-nationalism of the "other Germans" must not become a synonym for anti-patriotism; they must be able to demonstrate to their people that they are the better patriots and the greater realists, and must be able to assure to the German people within the circle of a peaceful family of European peoples the welfare that can never be attained by the folly of war. A federation cannot involve them in that conflict; any other principle of European ordering is bound to. Consequently I say that an anti-nationalist Germany that thinks realistically is bound at the same time to think in terms of Europe.

Such adjustments of boundaries within a European federation and, as it were, in its favour, could be the more expected from Germany since their territorially limited character would be assured in advance; and if they were demanded by Europe and accorded by Germany as a concrete sign of Germany's good will, this transaction, which in any other system would be bound to lead to more or less lasting unsatisfactory developments, would become the first handshake in the incipient reconciliation.

Federation and National Minorities

What is true of Europe's frontiers is true also of her minorities. If the freedom of the national States can in the long run be assured only in a federation, the rights of their national minorities can also be guaranteed only in a federation. Only this can create the atmosphere that

¹ This contribution, I think, would have to consist mainly in the cession of East Prussia. Federation or no federation, a revival of the "Corridor" could not possibly serve the interests of European peace, nor for that matter the cause of German-Polish understanding. Economically, East Prussia depends hardly less on Poland than, for instance, the Sudeten districts depend on the rest of Czechoslovakia, and a change of policy on the part of Germany implies *inter alia* the breaking with the obnoxious habit of looking upon large national entities as the "hinterland" of some much smaller German or German-populated area. The general interests of European security apart, there are political considerations that make it imperative for a new Germany to put relations with her biggest neighbour in the East on an entirely new footing, and in view of what Germany has done to Poland in the past, reconciliation depends primarily on Germany. Just as after the last war every anti-nationalist German knew that no German-French *rapprochement* is possible without Germany's final renunciation of all claims to Alsace-Lorraine, so the deadlock in German-Polish relations after this war can probably be overcome only by a major, and readily offered, sacrifice on the part of Germany. Unless one wants to advocate a "Greater Danzig" solution with the Federation assuming direct political authority, cession of East Prussia to Poland would seem to be the only constructive way of giving the German and Polish peoples the peace they need.

permits of a discussion without passion, and so make possible the supra-partisan arbitration which alone can harmonise the just interests of a national unit with those of its minorities.

That to-day "the harsh device of a large-scale transfer of populations" is being discussed in relation to the German minorities spread over Europe, is not surprising. Sir Walter Layton's view that "this plan, which sharpens up instead of minimising national differences, is quite contrary to the trend of a shrinking world,"¹ need not be unreservedly shared. In view of the new migration of peoples Hitler has inflicted on Europe, the "harshness" of this device is not an argument that a German can advance. Nor is this plan necessarily "contrary to the trend of a shrinking world"; the principle of federation (which is itself an acknowledgment of that trend) is entirely compatible with an ordered re-settlement. It is true that such a measure undeniably "sharpens up instead of minimising national differences," but it can and should be faced if on balance a mass transfer would be a gain for the speedy pacification of Europe.

Would it be a gain? The fact that the European peoples housing German minorities would be rid of them does not end the question; new problems would be created, which might involve Europe in suffering no less than Germany herself. Would it be in Europe's interest for Germany's population, substantially diminished by the war, to be artificially increased by the compulsory influx of millions of human beings? Would it be in Europe's interest for Germany's economic recovery to be complicated by such a mass influx, and her internal pacification imperilled by the strengthening of the nationalist element? For it is undeniable that in recent decades pan-German propaganda has particularly influenced the German minorities. In a federated Europe that guaranteed their just interests within a general minority law, those German groups could be all the more easily trained as loyal citizens of their host-State since they could no longer expect encouragement from Germany for any subversive activities; while, if they were expelled from their homes, their nationalism would be reinforced by the sense of injustice suffered. Above all, must not any such additional migration unnecessarily add to the difficulties of a problem that is already, in consequence of its immense proportions, "beyond the powers of any single country," and the solution of which, if the problem is not to become a mortal peril for European civilisation, must be one of the first common tasks of the European nations after the war—the problem of the return to their homelands of more than thirty millions of Europeans who have been uprooted by the war?²

¹ *The British Commonwealth and World Order*, p. 13.

² Cf. Eugene M. Kulischer, *The Displacement of Population in Europe* (I.L.O., 1943). The grand total, he says (p. 164), may well be "over 40 millions." His estimate was based on figures available up to 1943; how many more uprooted people will there be at the end of the war?

It is clear that the advantages and disadvantages of such a transfer cannot to-day be finally assessed. Probably the best policy would be to consider the possibilities at the moment in case after case, and to decide accordingly, keeping fully in mind the fact that this German problem is at the same time a European problem.

Federal Germany in a Federal Europe

But is not Germany's territorial extent too great not to represent in itself a danger in a federation? Must not Germany in any case be cut up into a number of smaller States for reasons of security?

Here again, I think, the "other German" must give the same answer as in the question of frontiers: that obviously Germany can be cut up after this war into just as many fragments as is desired—but this would be one of the surest ways of keeping German nationalism alive. The cutting up of a national State is in any case an arbitrary act; and no "other German," even if he were seriously to make the attempt, could bring the German people to conceive that a principle that is sound and just for all other peoples can be bad and inadmissible for Germany. To awaken illusions here would be the worst service that the anti-nationalist German could do for his European friends.

If Federation is really the best principle for the ordering of Europe, it is because unification is essential. But in this phase of history unification means *centralisation*, inter-State centralisation. It does not exclude the decentralisation of the German State-complex, but this decentralisation must not be carried so far as to come into conflict with the trend in the rest of Europe. Such centrifugal measures, however, as the cutting up of a national State—every national State—would be in conflict with the general European trend; they would introduce an element of disorder into the general system, an element that would soon become an element of unrest and would ultimately be bound to imperil the whole system.

What the European Federation must, indeed, insist on is the ending of Prussia's dominance in the Reich; that is to say, the rebuilding of Germany on the very principles of federation on which the European league will itself be based. In other words, the German *Länder* must at last take the step they omitted to take seventy years ago. That this is absolutely essential, apart from all else, as an internal political reform has been explained at length by Hans Jaeger. In a German federation on these lines the country's policy would not be determined by a single *Land* but by the whole of the *Länder*, on the basis of equality of status. The *Länder* must, of course, have a wide measure of self-administration; but too far-reaching self-administration would be a hindrance rather than a help to the European Federation—a difficulty that must not be overlooked. This applies, for example, not only to the main spheres of

legislation, the financial and economic spheres, but also to that of foreign policy. The idea that in future each German *Land* must pursue its own foreign policy may seem tempting, but only at first sight. It would mean in practice that Europe would have to concern herself not with one but with a dozen or a dozen and a half German foreign policies—a development that would not only be disturbing because of its anarchical character but would be in conflict with the very purpose of European federation, the purpose of ultimately enabling European foreign policy to be administered by a European office in exactly the same way as economic and financial affairs and defence. So long as there must be national foreign offices in Europe, the most sensible solution by far would be a German foreign policy determined in common by the *Länder*.

Conclusion

Reason, justice, and expediency all point in the same direction—to Federation. A Germany that seriously intends to break with power politics is bound to advocate European federation as the only practical alternative. So, it seems to me, must a Europe that wants lasting peace, lasting security—and a future.

There are a thousand reasons for which the Europeans of all countries must wish this to come into existence. Not the least of them is the discomfort that is bound to be felt at the thought of the day that may bring full equality of rights to Germany in a Europe *not* federalised. It would be foolish to imagine that that day could never come. In that anarchical Europe Germany would once more have the right to arm, the right to have a *Wehrmacht*, a General Staff, a Ministry of War—and then a war. Must that be?

In a Federation, too, Germany must one day attain full equality of military rights, clearly. But Germany would no longer be unconditionally supreme in her own arsenal; she would be an equal among equals, and with them only a servant of the greater community. She would have no need for her own *Wehrmacht*, or for a General Staff of her own—and no need even for a Ministry of War; a Security Department in her Foreign Ministry (if national foreign ministries have subsisted so long) would suffice.

A reasonable European population policy; a unified health policy; fair participation of all European peoples in the resources of our national territories; and therewith a standard of living that deserves the name, a social policy that deserves the name, a *life* that deserves the name, for all citizens of our homeland of Europe—cannot this be?

What divides us? The diversity of our national cultures? But are not these all children of the same European civilisation? Is it not the exact truth that Ortega y Gasset, that European of Spanish origin, has written on the *unifying* element in European civilisation?¹

¹ *The Revolt of the Masses*. (Translated from the German edition, p. 198.)

“If we were to take an inventory to-day of our mental stock—theories and standards, aspirations and assumptions—we should discover that the greater part of it does not come to the Frenchman from France, nor to the Spaniard from Spain, but to all of us from the common European store. In all of us to-day the European element far outweighs the French, German, Spanish—four-fifths of our spiritual wealth is the common property of Europe.”

Yes, the European element still preponderates even in Germany. Even Hitler has not been able to alter that.

Is it the difference in our national histories that divides us? Yet is it not true that while most of our countries have lived for long periods in enmity and discord with one another, there were also times when they worked together for a high common purpose? Is it not true that there were even times when all rallied to the ardent defence of that great heritage which they always had, and always will have, in common—this European civilisation, which is at the very roots of their national life? At its core, it seems to me, the national history of each of our peoples is supranational, European. In a Europe conscious of herself, and proud of her glorious past, our nations will be able to pool not only their governments, their resources, their knowledge, and their arms, but their history as well. Is it not clear to-day that even in adversity we have a common history, because we have a common fate?

Does it sound too fantastic? I cannot conclude better than by quoting the words with which a European of British origin, Sir William Beveridge, ends his own plea for Federation (in his pamphlet *Peace by Federation?*):

“Federation across national boundaries is a plan so new that it will be rejected by some critics as Utopian. If by Utopian these critics mean to describe a plan based on desires divorced from realities, then the plan is not Utopian. Whether the project outlined here be right or wrong, it starts from reality

“If, on the other hand, the term Utopian implies the vision of a world different from the world we live in, then the term describes literally the proposal of this paper. The plan of this paper is Utopian, for it aims at making a world different from the world that we have known for nearly a generation. The plan dares and needs to be Utopian because the choice is no longer between Utopia and the pleasant, ordered world that our fathers knew. The choice is between Utopia and Hell.”



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The Editor deeply regrets that the most mentioned figure in this book is the most despicable criminal of our time. But there are epochs which compel their contemporaries to deal more with Satan than with God.

Biographical Notes

KURT HILLER, DR. JUR. Born 1885 in Berlin. Educated at Berlin and Freiburg Universities. Studied law and philosophy and became freelance writer. Editor of *Das Ziel*, 1916–24, and founded the Activist movement within the circle of German intellectuals. Chairman of the German Political Council of Intellectual Workers in 1918. Was a leading member of the German Peace Movement, as spokesman of its left wing, from 1920–33. During these years was also a contributor to nearly all Left reviews and periodicals; became regular political contributor to the *Weltbühne* after 1924. Was also active as lecturer in over fifty German towns. From March 23rd to April 28th, 1933, in six prisons and concentration camps; in July 1933 only just escaped with his life in the Gestapo hell of Columbia House. In September 1934, with the help of underground compatriots, succeeded in escaping to Prague. Came to England in 1938. Co-founder of the German Socialist Freedom League in 1939 and since then President. Was never an adherent of a political party. Publications include: *The Wisdom of Boredom* (1913), *Departure for Paradise* (1922), *Realisation of Mind in the State* (1925), *Is Geneva Peace?* (1927), *The Leap into Light* (1932), *Profiles* (1938).

WALTER D. SCHULTZ. Born 1910 in Hamburg. From the age of fifteen an active member of the German Socialist Labour movement and of the Trade Union movement. Arrested in March 1933 in Hanover, as member of the underground movement. In three concentration camps—Moringen am Solling, the notorious Oranienburg and Lichtenburg. Released in August 1934 and continued underground activity. Forced to emigrate to Prague at the end of 1934. In Prague a regular contributor to the anti-Nazi weekly *Die Neue Weltbühne*, and member of its administrative and editorial staff. Also contributor to the anti-Nazi weekly, *Die Sozialistische Warte*, which appeared in Paris up to 1940. Came to London in December 1938. Since 1941 has been engaged on important war-work. Since 1938 has not been a member of any political party, but in 1939 joined the Trade Union Centre for German Workers in Great Britain.

Biographical Notes

HANS JAEGER. Born 1899 in Berlin. After his experience as a member of the Soldiers' Council in 1918 joined the Communist party soon after the Armistice, and worked for it as lecturer, propagandist and writer. From 1921—25 worked as news editor in various telegraph agencies. Later became an active member of the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research and, until 1933, German Director of the Marx-Engels Publishing House. For several years was head of the German section of the Anti-Imperialist League. In 1933 was driven underground and pursued by the Nazi police, and escaped to Prague, where he became for five years head of the Anti-Nazi Correspondence "Aeropress." Left the Communist Party and founded a new movement, the German Peoples Socialists, with the object of breaking away from the old parties in order to place Socialism on a broader basis, to work for a reformed Democracy and a Federal Germany, and to fight German Nationalism. After the occupation of Prague, Jaeger fled to Poland, and thence to England where, in addition to literary work, he has continued to act as Leader of the Peoples Socialists.


EUGEN BREHM. Born 1909 in Ulm (Württemberg). Educated at Ulm Realgymnasium. Writer. Active member of German anti-militarist and Socialist movements since 1926. Taken into "protective custody" in March 1933 for anti-militarist activities in Berlin. After release, joined Socialist underground movement there. Escaped to Prague, Czechoslovakia, in 1935. Contributed under pen-name Max Herb to Czech, Swiss and German anti-Nazi papers and periodicals on German and on South-East European affairs. Came to Britain early in 1939; engaged in important war-work in December 1939. Member of the Executive Committee of the Peoples Socialist Party since 1939. Publications: *Suedosteuropa—Form und Forderung*, Paris, 1938; *Towards a New German Foreign Policy*, London, 1944.

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