The Personal Implications of Proverbs:
Wealth and the Rich, Poverty and the Poor

by

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A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of

the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

(Hebrew Bible)

at the

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN-MADISON

2020

Date of final oral examination: 5/26/2020

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Acknowledgements

There are many people to thank in the completion of a project as long as this one. I wish I could adequately express my gratitude to the people who have been perceptive (and entertaining) conversation partners, tireless supporters and encouragers, careful readers, and wise counselors.

I grew interested in the book of Proverbs, because I had the exceptional privilege of studying it with Michael V. Fox at UW-Madison. Your uncompromising attention to the sense and mechanics of texts, your insistence on down-to-earth exegesis, and your openness to well-reasoned argument are models of reading and interpretation to which I aspire. I have learned so much from you, and I cannot thank you enough for serving on my committee in the midst of a very productive retirement. I also thank Cynthia L. Miller-Naudé for introducing me to the world of linguistics and linguistic approaches to the Hebrew Bible. Your meticulous scholarship and instruction have modeled for me the kind of precision I aim to achieve in my own work. I am also grateful to the delightful and generous Eve Sweetser. You have shown me the manifold importance of cognitive approaches to language and how to use cognitive linguistics in the study of ancient texts. Having you on my committee and getting to talk with you about current and future work has been a rare gift.

I am indebted to all the members of my dissertation committee—Michael Fox, Eve Sweetser, Kevin Chau, Jordan Rosenblum, William Brockliss, and my advisor, Jeremy Hutton. Kevin, your input has been invaluable—particularly your insights into the interaction between poetry, metaphor, metonymy, and reasoning processes in interpretations of material in Proverbs. Jordan, your insistence that dissertators say why our work matters is a constant refrain in my mind. But not only do you insist on this; you help us articulate a response. Will, you pointed me

in productive directions for future work in encouraging me to think more precisely (and diversely) about readership and the wisdom literatures of different cultures.

Finally, more thanks than I can say go to Jeremy. You have been such a supportive and insightful advisor. I have benefited in so many ways from your attention to detail, insistence on clarity, and creative engagement at every point. I left every conversation we had with new energy for the next step and a clearer sense of what that step should be.

All the years I spent writing my dissertation I have had the privilege of working as an advisor with an incredible team at the UW-Madison Center for Pre-Health Advising. You have picked up my slack, encouraged my writing, and inspired me with your dedication to students, equity, and representation. Thank you, All. And to our past and present directors, Susan Nelson and Molly Reinhard, thank you especially for your patience and support.

So many other friends have been constant supports as well. Many of you live far from Madison, Wisconsin—Jeanette Thomas, Kristen Brown, Katie Farmer, Megan Raun, Jesse Kharbanda, Amber and Josh Jipp, Beth Urton, Dana Harris, Jared Henson, Steve and Serina Modugno, Chris Jones, Lance Hawley, Kevin Mattison—and some of you have been closer supports—Julie Dahl, Erin Falligant, Mary Beth Lundgren, and Carmen Boyd. Thank you, All, for every conversation and every fun thing. JT, KB, and KT—we are all still on this long climb.

And my family—words fail. You keep me going with your endless love and support. You are the brightest spots in my life. And I would not have finished this dissertation without you. I love you all so much. Thank you.

Abstract

This dissertation challenges prevailing views of wealth, poverty, the rich, and the poor in the book of Proverbs. Most scholars agree that Proverbs presents conflicting guidance on these themes, reading everything in Proverbs that mentions wealth, poverty, the rich, and the poor as though it is all mutually informing. This is understandable, because these are *related* themes. In this study, however, I argue against this perspective. I contend that most previous studies have inappropriately conflated the meaning of material that is pragmatically *un*related. The various materials in Proverbs mentioning these themes serve different *pragmatic functions* throughout the book. Wealth, poverty, the rich, and the poor may be the focus of instructions, the central feature in motivations, or simply supporting features in instructions or motivations.

Linguistic pragmatics, psycholinguistics, and cognitive linguistics inform the approach I develop to three pragmatic features in Proverbs—the communicative context, instruction, and motivation. Drawing from these fields, I develop a cognitive model of how readers are likely to interpret material in Proverbs *broadly speaking* in light of these features. I then apply this model to all the material in Proverbs that mentions wealth, poverty, the rich, and the poor to demonstrate how readers are likely to interpret this material *in particular*.

Thorough consideration of pragmatics and the influence of pragmatics on language processing (i.e., interpretation) enables analysts to disambiguate how wealth, poverty, the rich, and the poor are portrayed (and used) throughout the book of Proverbs. In sum, when readers construe a directive pragmatic context, they are primed to imagine personal implications for themselves as they read. Further, when they imagine these personal implications, they are primed to simulate the meaning of material in Proverbs from participant viewpoints. It is ultimately the relations between readers and wealth, poverty, the rich, and the poor *within viewpointed reader*

simulations that undermine the conflations that many scholars perform. Because these conflations have typically led to perceived contradictions concerning wealth, poverty, the rich, and the poor in Proverbs, this project undermines the overall perspective that Proverbs presents conflicting guidance on these themes.

Abbreviations

General

ANE	Ancient Near East
BH	Biblical Hebrew
BS	Ben Sira
HB	Hebrew Bible

Text Critical Terms

BHQ	*Biblia Hebraica Quinta*
BHS	*Biblia Hebraica Stuttgartensia*
OG	Old Greek (the reconstructed original Septuagintal text)
K	*ketiv* ("what is written")
LXX	Septuagint (manuscript sigla according to the Göttingen system)
M	Masoretic text
Ms/Mss	manuscript/manuscripts
Q	*qere* ("what is read")
S	Syriac Peshitta
T	Targum
V	Latin Vulgate

Modern Translations

ASV	American Standard Version
ESV	English Standard Version
CJB	Complete Jewish Bible
KJV	King James Version
NASB	New American Standard Bible
NIV	New International Version
NRSV	New Revised Standard Version
OJB	Orthodox Jewish Bible

Secondary Literature

AB	Anchor Bible
AEL	*Ancient Egyptian Literature*, Lichteim (1973-1980)
AYB	Anchor Yale Bible
b.	Babylonian Talmud
BibInt	*Biblical Interpretation*
BibBul	*Biblical Bulletin*

BHRG	*A Biblical Hebrew Reference Grammar*, van der Merwe, Naudé, Kroeze, 2004
CBQ	*Catholic Biblical Quarterly*
HALOT	*Hebrew and Aramaic Lexicon of the Old Testament*
GBH	*A Grammar of Biblical Hebrew*, Joüon and Muraoka, 1991
GKC	Gesenius, Kautsch, and Coweley, *Gesenius' Hebrew Grammar*, 1910
IBHS	*Introduction to Biblical Hebrew Syntax*, Waltke and O'Connor, 1990
HS	*Hebrew Studies*
JBL	*Journal of Biblical Literature*
JSOT	*Journal for the Study of the Old Testament*
JSOTSup	Journal for the Study of the Old Testament, Supplement Series
NICOT	New International Commentary on the Old Testament
OHCL	*Oxford Handbook of Cognitive Linguistics*, eds., Geeraerts and Cuyckens, 2007
OTL	Old Testament Library
OrAnt	*Oriens Antiquus*
SBL	Society of Biblical Literature
SBLMS	Society of Biblical Literature Monograph Series
WBC	Word Biblical Commentary
ZAW	*Zeitschrift für die Alttestamentliche Wissenschaft*

Linguistic Terms

abs	absolute
C	C (causative) stem (*Hiphil*)
Cp	Cp (C-passive) stem (*Hophal*)
cnst	construct
D	D (resultative/factitive/etcetera) stem (*Piel*)
Dp	Dp (D-passive) stem (*Pual*)
Dt	Dt (D-t infix) stem (*Hitpael*)
f	feminine
G	G stem (*Qal*)
m	masculine
N	N (G-passive) stem (*Niphal*)
p	plural
ptc	participle
s	singular

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CHAPTER 1
Dealing with wealth and the rich, and poverty and the poor in Proverbs

1.0 Introduction

Scholars who study wealth, poverty, the rich, and the poor in Proverbs are in general agreement that when it comes to these related themes, taken as a whole, the book is ambiguous, conflicting, and, some say, incoherent.[1] Ronald Whybray reflects that Proverbs "presents no single attitude towards wealth and poverty" (1990, 113). Samuel Adams describes the "complex and often contradictory values concerning wealth and poverty" in Proverbs (2014, 184). Harold Washington writes that Proverbs "gives no coherent view of the rich and the poor" (1994, 1). Other examples could be given. My contention is that what Proverbs says regarding wealth, poverty, the rich, and the poor appears less contradictory when we consider how pragmatic dimensions of meaning influence how readers interpret this material. The pragmatic context of Proverbs is a directive one. In other words, the pragmatic—or, *pedagogical*—purpose of Proverbs is to *direct* readers to do certain things and become certain kinds of people.

A core facet of my argument is that readers who construe this pragmatic context are primed to imagine *personal implications* for themselves when they read Proverbs. When a reader imagines that material in Proverbs holds personal implications for them as they read, a third-person indicative sentence in the sentence literature is not merely a theoretical reflection on the abstract nature of righteousness.[2] Rather, it is a *directive* instructing the reader to become a

[1] Von Rad 1972; Malchow 1982; Wittenberg 1986, 1987; Habel 1988; Whybray 1990; van Leeuwen 1992; Washington 1994; Sneed 1996; Pleins 2001; Sandoval 2006; Adams 2008, 2014; Scheffler 2012.

[2] The "sentence literature" in Proverbs comprise the sentence collections in 10:1-22:16 and 25:1-29:27. "Sentence sayings" or "sentences" are the indicative statements, almost always formulated in the third person, that are commonly referred to as "proverbs" or "sayings." An example is Prov 10:3, "Yahweh does not let the righteous hunger, but he thwarts the craving of the wicked."

righteous person. I turn in chapter two to language processing theory that informs how I envision readers interpreting material in Proverbs.

In the present chapter, I review how other scholars have sought to deal with apparent contradictions in Proverbs regarding wealth, poverty, the rich, and the poor. This material presents a challenge precisely because these are related themes. It is natural, therefore, to expect that an instruction pertaining to one of them would relate to instructions that address the others. However, treating all the instructions in Proverbs that mention wealth, poverty, the rich, and the poor as though they are all related leads scholars to treat diverse meanings and instructions as mutually informing. It leads, in other words, to scholars conflating the meaning and instruction of sayings that do and say very different things with (and about) these themes. I will argue that what Proverbs says about poverty cannot be related to what it says about the poor. I will also argue that what it says about the rich has very little to do with what it says about wealth. Finer distinctions must be made with respect to material that deals with each individual theme as well.

To set the stage for how I approach this material in subsequent chapters, I summarize three things in the present chapter: 1) contradictions that scholars observe in portrayals of wealth, poverty, the rich, and the poor in Proverbs (§1.1); 2) conflations that lead to these contradictions (§1.2); and 3) how scholars have addressed the perceived contradictions (§1.3). These summaries show why a reanalysis of the situation is needed. After providing these summaries, I present a general outline of my approach in §1.4 to §1.6 and then move on to chapter two.

1.1 The contradictions

The contradictions that scholars perceive in Proverbs regarding wealth, poverty, the rich, and the poor involve relations between sayings and longer units of material that concern: 1) wealth alone, 2) wealth and the rich, 3) poverty alone, and 4) poverty and the poor.[3] The following table represents my interpretation of the observations that scholars make regarding material in Proverbs that would fit in these categories.

Wealth Alone	WEALTH IS A GOOD THING IN PROVERBS	*Wealth is a reward for virtue and virtuous behavior.* *Wealth is a blessing, provides security, and indicates prosperity.*
	WEALTH IS AN AMBIGUOUS OR BAD THING IN PROVERBS	*Wealth leads to greed.* *Wealth is ephemeral and does not last.* *Wealth is insufficient help during critical times.*
Wealth and the Rich	WEALTH IS A GOOD THING IN PROVERBS	*Wealth is a reward for virtuous people.*
	THE RICH ARE NOT GOOD IN PROVERBS	*The rich are not presented as virtuous people.*
Poverty Alone	POVERTY IS A BAD THING IN PROVERBS	*Poverty is a punishment for vices.*
	POVERTY IS BETTER THAN SOME THINGS IN PROVERBS	*Poverty with virtues and other good things is better than having wealth but living with vices and other bad things.*

[3] The titles of the following works refer to one or two of these themes (wealth, poverty, the rich, and the poor). However, each one explores all four of these themes: "Poverty in the Book of Proverbs: Looking from Above?" (Scheffler 2012); *The Discourse of Wealth and Poverty in the Book of Proverbs* (Sandoval 2006); "The Role of the Poor in Proverbs" (Houston 2003); "The Poverty Debate" (Pleins 2001); *Wealth and Poverty in the Instruction of Amenemope and the Hebrew Proverbs* (Washington 1994); "Wealth and Poverty: System and Contradiction in Proverbs" (Van Leeuwen 1992); *Wealth and Poverty in the Book of Proverbs* (Whybray 1990); "Poverty and Punishment in the Book of Proverbs" (Crenshaw 1989); "Wisdom, Wealth, and Poverty Paradigms in the Book of Proverbs" (Habel 1988); "Poverty in the Social World of the Wise" (Pleins 1987); "The Situational Context of Statements Concerning Poverty and Wealth in Proverbs" (Wittenberg 1987); "The Lexical Context of the Terminology for 'Poor' in Proverbs" (Wittenberg, 1986); "The Semantic Field of Rich and Poor in the Wisdom Literature of Hebrew and Accadian" (Donald 1964).

Poverty and the Poor	POVERTY IS A BAD THING IN PROVERBS	*Poverty is always a negative consequence.*
	THE POOR ARE GOOD IN PROVERBS	*The poor are objects of God's special concern.* *Readers are commanded to secure justice for and to care for the poor.* *The poor are portrayed as wise and blameless.*

Scholars who perceive information in the middle column above as contradictory do so because they treat information in the third column as though it is all mutually informing. In other words, they conflate the meaning of all of this material. Such scholars seem to seek *singular* readings of material in Proverbs that mentions wealth, poverty, the rich, and the poor when we need *differentiated* understandings of each of these themes.

When we observe these themes in Proverbs, we find the following. Wealth is portrayed as a reward and a good and helpful resource in many sayings. But in others, it is portrayed as fleeting (for the sake of a particular argument in 27:24), easily lost (possibly in 23:5, though I provide an alternate reading of this verse), and insufficient help in a day of trouble (compared to righteousness in 11:4, 28). In addition, people who have wealth—i.e., the rich man (*ʿāšîr*)—are never portrayed in a particularly positive light or as people who embody any kind of virtue in Proverbs (10:15; 14:20; 18:11, 23; 22:2, 7, 16; 28:6, 11). We might expect the rich man to be virtuous because wealth is frequently portrayed as a reward for virtues in Proverbs. However, the rich man is presented in only neutral to negative ways in Proverbs. He is a foil to the poor without explicit reference to his (or their) moral character (10:15; 22:2, 7). He is not particularly kind to the poor (18:23). He is dishonest (28:6, and with emendation, 19:2). He is a target for

self-promoting, false friends (14:20; 22:16). And he is depicted as deluded regarding both the security that his wealth affords (18:11) and the nature of his wisdom (28:11).

Presentations of poverty and the poor in Proverbs are straightforward when considered on their own. However, when these portrayals are lumped together, they are perceived as exhibiting contradictions. Poverty is nearly always a consequence in Proverbs.[4] The poor, however, are never presented in a bad light. They are consistently presented in a morally positive, if economically afflicted, light. They are an object of Yahweh's special concern (14:31; 17:5; 19:17; 21:13; 22:22-23; 23:10-11), and readers are thereby exhorted to treat the poor in the ways that Yahweh does. In four instances, a poor character is portrayed as a person who embodies a particular virtue (blamelessness in 19:2 and 28:6; honesty in 19:22b;[5] understanding in 28:11). Scholars wonder how these characterizations of the poor can be said to comport with the presentation of poverty as a consequence. In addition, many find the better-than sayings that assess living with meager material resources as better than having wealth to be inconsistent—both with the idea that wealth is a blessing, a reward, and necessary for survival, and with the corollary notion that poverty is a punishment (15:16, 17; 16:8, 19; 17:1).

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[4] In all eight occurrences of *maḥsōr* (6:11b; 11:24b; 14:23b; 21:5b, 7a; 22:16; 24:34b; 28:27a) and in five of the eight occurrences of *rêʾš* (6:11a; 10:4a with emendation; 13:18a; 24:34a; 28:19b), poverty is portrayed as a consequence. The other three instances of *rêʾš* vary. The cause of *rêʾš* is not portrayed in 10:15, where the ruin of the poor (*měḥittat dāllîm rêʾšām*) is contrasted with the wealth of the rich. (I will argue for an interpretation of this saying that is more involved than a simple contrast.) In 30:8b, Agur asks God to give him neither poverty (*rêʾš*) nor riches. And in 31:7, Lemuel's mother tells Lemuel to give strong drink to the poor, so that they can forget their poverty (*rêʾš*). In addition, other ways of referring to poverty profile consequences as well: the N stem of *y-r-š* ("to become impoverished") in 23:21; *ḥāsēr* ("lack") in 28:22; *ḥ-s-r* ("to lack") in 13:25b; *ʾên* (negative existential particle, "having nothing") in 13:4a; 20:4b; and *r-ʾ-b* ("to be hungry") in 10:3a; 19:15b.

[5] The statement in 19:22b is that a poor person (*rāš*) is better than a liar. Because the *rāš* would have to be in contrast with the liar with respect to their honesty for this comparison to be meaningful, I interpret 19:22b as affirming the honesty of the *rāš*.

I will argue that rather than imagine a single conceptual frame for "poverty and the poor" or "wealth and the rich," we need to view these themes as four separate and differentiated frames. But before turning to my approach, we will consider the conflations that scholars perform in seeking a single unified reading of "poverty and the poor," "wealth and the rich," and undifferentiated notions of "wealth," "poverty," "the rich," and "the poor" in Proverbs.

1.2 The conflations

A number of conflations—or, efforts at singular rather than differentiated readings—lead to interpretations of the material in Proverbs as contradictory regarding wealth, poverty, the rich, and the poor. These conflations are the following:

1) conflations of the meaning and instruction of sayings that mention wealth with the meaning and instruction of sayings that mention the rich,
2) conflations of the meaning and instruction of every saying that mentions wealth with the meaning and instruction of every other saying that mentions wealth,
3) conflations of the meaning and instruction of all the sayings that mention poverty with the meaning and instruction of all the sayings that mention living with scarce material resources (i.e., the better-than sayings), and
4) conflations of the meaning and instruction of sayings that mention poverty with the meaning and instruction of sayings that mention the poor.

As noted above, when scholars make these conflations, they end up discussing diverse material in Proverbs as though it is mutually informative. For example, when we read all the sayings that mention wealth as though the meaning and instruction of each one mutually informs the meaning and instruction of each other one, it is perplexing to try to reconcile sayings that portray diligent characters acquiring wealth (e.g., 10:4; 13:4, 11; 14:23; 21:5) with sayings that instruct readers

not to depend on wealth (e.g., 11:4, 28; 18:11; 27:24) (e.g., Malchow 1982; Wittenberg 1986, 1987; Habel 1988; Whybray 1990; Washington 1994).

One set of conflations draws more attention than the other three, and that is the conflation of sayings that mention poverty with sayings that mention the poor. This conflation presents an especially striking problem in that it leads to a troubling conclusion. Consider: if we treat the meaning and instruction of sayings that mention poverty and sayings that mention the poor as mutually informing, the logical conclusion is that *Proverbs blames the poor for being poor*. Because poverty is almost always a consequence in Proverbs, the logic goes, Proverbs must view the poor as having brought their poverty on themselves. They must be experiencing poverty as a *consequence*, in other words, for something *they* did. Scholars tend to do one of three things in response to this idea. Some (albeit very few) do not find it terribly problematic. Gerhard von Rad, for example, writes that sayings in the sentence collections "often judge poverty very coolly and unemotionally, for often enough it is the person's own fault" (1972, 76). Other scholars try to temper the idea that Proverbs blames the poor for being poor. Norman Whybray reflects, "Although [poverty] is frequently caused by human shortcomings, the poor should be helped and not shunned" (1990, 62). And Roland Murphy writes, "The poor are not always to be blamed; indeed they are to be objects of particular concern" (1990, 20).

The third response to the idea that Proverbs blames the poor for being poor is at odds with the first and second responses—and is often framed in the strongest of terms. The third response is to amplify the idea that Proverbs blames the poor for being poor and then to censure Proverbs for being so terrible to the poor. James Crenshaw, for example, argues that Proverbs shows "unmitigated bias against the poor" and characterizes the portrait of the poor in Proverbs as one in which the poor are "morally deficient" and in which they deserve the misery they get

(1989, 34, 31, 32). In another somewhat more recent example, John David Pleins accuses Proverbs of "at times disdaining the poor" and writes that Proverbs characterizes the poor as "morally obtuse" and "a despised and lazy lot" (2001, 474, 470). Crenshaw calls Proverbs cruel in what it says about the poor, and Pleins goes so far as to accuse Proverbs of attacking the poor and setting them up as opponents (Crenshaw 1989, 31; Pleins 2001, 465).

Of these three responses to the idea that Proverbs blames the poor for being poor, the third is most consistent with how Proverbs actually instructs readers to view and treat the poor. Scholars in the third group rightly problematize the act of blaming the poor for their poverty. However, as I understand it, this is not an act that the producers of Proverbs intend to perform. I show in the course of this study that the producers of Proverbs do not blame the poor for their poverty. Rather, reaching this conclusion is a logical result of conflating material in Proverbs that I argue should not be conflated.

1.3 Dealing with the contradictions

Commentators address perceived discrepancies in what Proverbs says regarding wealth, poverty, the rich, and the poor in different ways. Most divide material in Proverbs into more or less discrete groupings within which there is apparent agreement on the themes of wealth, poverty, the rich, and the poor. All appeal to one or more of the following as criteria for the distinctions they make:

1) the social location of the origination and/or use of sayings,
2) the ideological development of the producers of sayings,
3) the complex realities of wealth and poverty, and/or
4) the didactic focus of sayings.

Appeals 1 and 2 involve the assumption that material in Proverbs which seems discordant derives from different social settings and/or from different periods in which the producers espoused different ideologies concerning wealth and poverty. A primary assumption behind the third appeal is that material in Proverbs sounds discordant when it comes to wealth and poverty because human experiences of wealth and poverty are also discordant. The main idea behind the fourth appeal is similar to a central idea in the approach that I develop—namely, that different parts of Proverbs talk about and use wealth and poverty with different didactic ends in mind. It is common for a study to enlist more than one of the above explanations in its treatment of wealth and poverty in Proverbs. I spend more time reviewing the work of scholars who take the fourth approach than I spend on the first three, because the fourth of these appeals is closest to the approach that I develop. In other words, I take more time with the work of scholars in the fourth group in order to demonstrate how their work is different from my own.

Significantly, each of these four approaches deals in some way with the representation of connections between acts, character traits, and consequences in Proverbs. As noted above, wealth is frequently portrayed as a reward or a positive consequence in Proverbs. Corollary to this, almost every time that poverty is mentioned in Proverbs it is a punishment or a negative consequence. Following Klaus Koch (1955), scholars refer to portrayals of reward and punishment in Proverbs as the "act-consequence relation"—or, as Koch first phrased it, the *Tun-Ergehen Zusammenhang*.[6] Lennart Boström (1990, 2017) helpfully reframes this relation in

[6] Koch (1955) was the first to describe this feature in Proverbs as the *Tun-Ergehen-Zusammenhang* (the act-consequence relation). He examined limited portions of Proverbs as part of a larger study in which he questions whether different books in the Hebrew Bible reflect forensic notions of retribution in which Yahweh is seen as a judge who reliably and zealously doles out consequences for human actions. Koch determines that Proverbs does not display this view of retribution. With his notion of a *Tun-Ergehen-Zusammenhang*, Koch sought to dissociate Yahweh from the distribution of reward and punishment as these are depicted throughout the book of Proverbs. He construes retribution as a judicial process and emphasizes that juridical proceedings do not precede consequences anywhere in Proverbs. (However, we

order to emphasize that the concern in Proverbs is not the individual acts that a person might perform as much as it is "the totality of a person's life-style" (1990, 133; see also 90-91, 138).[7] I agree with him and therefore refer to the "act/character-consequence relation" in the present study, following Boström.

How commentators view this relation informs how they view the representation of wealth, poverty, the rich, and the poor in Proverbs. Scholars tend to view the act/character-consequence relation in one of two ways. Some view it as a kind of empirical calculus that the producers of Proverbs used to interpret patterns of cause and effect in the world around them. Others view it as a pedagogical construct that the producers of Proverbs used to motivate readers to think, believe, and behave in certain ways. Some scholars view it in both ways simultaneously. I view the act/character-consequence relation in Proverbs as a pedagogical construct, as do many others (e.g., Fontaine 1982; Huwiler 1988; Boström 1990; Murphy 1990; Bergant 1997; Freuling 2004; Lyu 2012). Significantly, however, scholars whose work I review below tend to view this relation as a kind of empirical or "quasi-empirical" (Sandoval 2006)

might point out Prov 22:22-23 and 23:10-11.) Rather, Koch argues for the "concept of a built-in and inherent connection between an action and its consequence" such that actions and their consequences go hand in hand (Koch 1983 [1955], 59). One inevitably leads to the other. For Koch, every human act is a *schicksalwirkenden Tat* (a fate-inducing act). Everything that a person does, in other words, creates whatever fallout they experience. According to Koch, Yahweh functions at most like a "midwife who assists at a birth" in the human experience of reward and punishment, helping bring to fruition what previous human action had already set in motion (Koch 1983 [1955], 61). Koch envisions Yahweh as watching over, enforcing, and at times accelerating the connection between actions, character traits, and consequences in human spheres. However, he stresses that, in Proverbs, consequences come part-and-parcel with actions, and that no real interference from Yahweh is needed for consequences to come about. People create a kind of "act sphere" (*Tatsphäre*) around themselves that corresponds to the goodness or badness of their actions. According to Koch, the good and/or harm that people experience is due to the conditions they have created within that sphere, which he describes further as a kind of "sphere of influence in which the built-in consequences of actions take effect" (1983 [1955], 78).

[7] See also van Leeuwen (1992), 28, n. 10, and his discussion of Skladny (1962).

calculus. This is a significant difference between the approach that I develop and the work of these other scholars.

1.3.1 Social location explanations

Scholars who give social location explanations to account for perceived discrepancies in what Proverbs says regarding wealth, poverty, the rich, and the poor attune to imagery and subject matter in sayings. They assume that if the imagery or subject matter in a saying reflects a certain *Sitz im Leben*, as they understand it, then someone living in that particular *Sitz im Leben* must have produced that saying. For example, these scholars would see agricultural imagery or agricultural concerns in a saying and conclude that the saying must have originated in farming communities. In the same way, they would assume that when sayings deal with goings-on in a royal court, these sayings must have been coined by members of a royal court. Of all the scholars who investigate wealth, poverty, the rich, and the poor in Proverbs, Whybray (1990) may present the most elaborate social-location schematization. He identifies four groups who are responsible for different types of material in Proverbs: the court, educated urban society, prosperous farmers, and small farmers who are struggling to make ends meet (Whybray 1990, 116). It is certainly true that material in Proverbs derives from a diversity of origins. It is also useful to imagine ancient situations in which material in Proverbs would have been meaningful. In addition, however, it is equally important to acknowledge how much we cannot know about those ancient situations.

There is a certain logic and good sense that leads to social location hypotheses. On occasion, they do seem appropriate. The level of detail (as well as the argument conveyed by) the

portrayal of agricultural practice in Prov 27:23-27 must stem from actual experience in that setting. In the end, however, most social location explanations are deeply reductive and assume more knowledge than we have about ancient communities and how they developed and used traditional sayings (Fontaine 1982; Sneed 1996; Fox 1996). The reductive nature of social location explanations is especially evident when we see how different scholars develop hypotheses on the basis of sayings that portray wealth and poverty as consequences. Some theorize that these sayings must have originated in rural communities where hard work was necessary for survival (Whybray 1990; Golka 1993; Washington 1994; Westermann 1995). The idea here is that people in these communities would have wanted to motivate one another (and their children) to work hard in order to avoid poverty, which was always an impending threat.

Other scholars argue that members of wealthy upper classes would have used these sayings to legitimize their way of life (Kovacs 1974; Malchow 1982; Pleins 1987, 2001; Habel 1988; Crenshaw 1989). The idea here is that people with wealth would naturally want to portray wealth as a reward for virtues, thereby identifying themselves as the virtuous. Both of these hypotheses are based on highly stereotyped ideas of people in ancient communities that cannot be corroborated. Neither serve as reliable foundations for building a picture of how the producers of Proverbs might really have viewed wealth and poverty. In addition, as Michael Fox points out, if a saying makes a valid statement (e.g., that hard work pays off or that righteousness is important), then that statement may be assumed to valid everywhere (1996, 233).

1.3.2 Ideological development explanations

Ideological development explanations are also reductive. They may project even more modern assumptions about ancient ideologies onto the producers of Proverbs than do social location hypotheses. Ideological development explanations are, in a way, a subset of social

location explanations. Like social location hypotheses, ideological development explanations also involve speculation regarding ideological tendencies on the basis of social location. I review two rather elaborate ideological development explanations to demonstrate how scholars perform this appeal.

First, George Wittenberg (1987) follows Gustav Boström (1935) in assigning an "agriculturalist ideal" to the producers of Proverbs. Wittenberg characterizes the ideological development of the producers of Proverbs as one in which the producers start out in the early monarchy with a high regard for wealth but go on to adopt communitarian ideals in response to the growth of an urban money economy in the latter part of the monarchy. According to Wittenberg, it would have been in the early monarchy when the producers developed (or collected) sayings that portray wealth as a reward and poverty as a consequence. However, Wittenberg hypothesizes that when the producers of Proverbs saw peasants and farmers become poor, struggle, and experience oppression in the later monarchy, they developed their agriculturalist ideal. He suggests that it was in this period when the producers began to create sayings that objected to oppression (e.g., 13:23; 29:13) and that viewed poverty in a more positive light (e.g., the better-than sayings, 15:16, 17; 16:8, 19; 17:1; 19:1; 28:6).

Crenshaw elaborates an equally conjectural ideological-development reconstruction. However, in contrast with Wittenberg, rather than speculate that the suffering of *others* led the producers to change how they viewed wealth, poverty, the rich, and the poor, Crenshaw conjectures that the producers changed their views when they *themselves* began to suffer. He speculates that the producers of Proverbs went from viewing the poor as morally culpable for their poverty to defending the poor only when "their own world came crashing down" (1989, 31). He does not identify a specific historical event that led to the suffering of the producers of

Proverbs, or even a specific period in which they would have suffered. The only information Crenshaw gives regarding the suffering he envisions is that "the story of Job's fall from an exalted position to the ash heap forced the wise … to admit that not all miserable persons deserved what befell them" (1989, 31).

It is again the case that neither of these proposals offers a sound foundation on which to build our understanding of what Proverbs has to say about wealth, poverty, the rich, and the poor. Wittenberg and Crenshaw both base their reconstructions on highly stereotyped and reductive ideas about the producers of Proverbs, the times they lived in, and social groups of which they were a part, as well as how the producers *interpreted* their times and the social groups of which they were and were *not* a part. Like social location explanations, ideological development explanations leave interpreters without firm grounding for understanding views of wealth, poverty, the rich, and the poor in Proverbs. We have no access to information that would falsify developmental schemes and therefore no sound reference point according to which we might relate interpretations of material in Proverbs in light of them.

1.3.3 Complex reality explanations

A number of scholars cite the complexity of wealth and poverty in actual human experience as a reason for discrepant views of wealth, poverty, the rich, and the poor in Proverbs (e.g., von Rad 1972; van Leeuwen 1992; Westermann 1995; Adams 2014). Von Rad observes the "not unambiguous" value of wealth and the "positives" of poverty (1972, 126). Wealth is necessary for survival and human flourishing, but it can also lead to greed, corruption, oppression, and misplaced trust. Poverty, on the other hand, is an "impairment" but better-than

sayings in Proverbs present it "in a positive light" (von Rad 1972, 126). Westermann reflects on the fact that there have always been and always will be disparities between the rich and the poor. He sees multiple competing perspectives on these realities within Proverbs and argues that none "are reduced to any common denominator" (Westermann 1995, 21). Adams notes the possibility of attributing different portions of Proverbs to "different sectors of society" but concludes that "it is more helpful to characterize the economic language in Proverbs as showing the ambiguous nature of money itself" (2014, 189). Van Leeuwen (1992) approaches the question in a methodical way. He theorizes that Proverbs exhibits systematic contradictions in how it represents wealth and poverty in relation to virtues and vices.

In elaborating these contradictions, van Leeuwen's aim is to demonstrate that Proverbs is not dogmatic or naïve when it comes to its views of relations between acts, character traits, and consequences. His thesis is that the producers of Proverbs endeavor systematically to make these contradictions apparent to readers. He suggests that the contradictions are systematic, because he characterizes them using the following rubric (van Leeuwen 1992, 28).[8]

	Virtue	Vice
Wealth	1	3
Poverty	2	4

Van Leeuwen places sayings that portray wealth as a reward for virtues in quadrant 1 and sayings that portray poverty as a punishment for vices in quadrant 4. His argument is that the sayings in Proverbs that can be placed in quadrants 2 and 3 are evidence that the producers of Proverbs were aware of situations in which the

[8] Van Leeuwen uses the terms "righteousness" and "wickedness" in his rubric rather than "virtue" and "vice" (1992, 28). However, he includes sayings that refer to diligence/laziness and wisdom/folly as well as those that highlight righteousness/wickedness in his analyses. He points this out himself.

act/character-consequence relation did not materialize in human experience.[9] Van Leeuwen treats these sayings as evidence that the producers of Proverbs were not dogmatic or naïve in their understanding of how acts, character traits, and consequences relate in real human experience. According to van Leeuwen, these producers were very aware of injustices that are "ultimately inscrutable" and do not conform to the act/character-consequence relation (1992, 34). Van Leeuwen views this relation more as a kind of empirical calculus than as a pedagogical construct. Rather than view sayings that belong in quadrants 1 and 4 of his rubric as enlisting this relation for pedagogical purposes, van Leeuwen is compelled to defend the producers of Proverbs against criticism for being naïve and simplistic in how they viewed the world.[10]

There is much to commend in complex reality explanations. Most do not try to explain away apparent contradictions in Proverbs through speculative and reductive historical reconstructions.[11] Nor do they characterize the producers of Proverbs as incognizant of discrepancies between the contents of some of their sayings and human experience in the worlds

[9] Van Leeuwen lists these sayings as those that portray the suffering of the innocent (which he identifies as Prov 13:23, 18:23, 28:15-26, and 30:14), the success and condemnation of the wicked (e.g., 10:2; 13:23; 15:25; 21:6; 22:8; 23:10), and also better-than sayings (e.g., 15:16-17; 16:19; 17:1; 19:22b).

[10] Van Leeuwen ultimately seeks to explain how the producers of Proverbs could commend righteousness when they could not guarantee that it would always be rewarded. He offers three answers. First, he suggests that the producers did believe that virtues made "life better and richer," even if they could not guarantee these outcomes (1992, 32). In connection with this, van Leeuwen also underscores a point made repeatedly by von Rad. He argues that "the sages knew that there are limits to human wisdom. General patterns may be discerned, but many particular events may be unjust, irrational, and ultimately inscrutable" (1992, 32-33). Second, and more importantly, van Leeuwen reflects that because the producers believed that God loves the one and hates the other, they formulated their instructions accordingly. Ultimately, van Leeuwen characterizes hope in future justice as a "hallmark of Yahwistic faith" and cites this an explanation as to why the producers were confident enough to assert the value of virtue over vice, even if they could not promise unbreakable connections between acts, character traits, and consequences (1992, 34). His final argument is that the producers were convinced that everyone will get their "just desserts" at some point in the future. For this reason, in addition to the two just described, the producers persisted in commending righteousness and other virtues.

[11] Westermann (1995) assigns different portions of Proverbs to different social locations.

around them. I agree with the idea that the complexity of human experience with respect to wealth, poverty, the rich, and the poor leads to some of the diversity that we find in representations of these themes in Proverbs. In addition to this likelihood, however, I believe that attention to the pedagogical design of material in Proverbs allows us to explain even more of this diversity. Of the scholars reviewed in this section, only von Rad and Adams give any consideration to the pedagogical intent and design of the material they examine. In contrast with the approach I develop, they focus only momentarily on the didactic intentions of this material.[12]

1.3.4 Didactic focus explanations

I share an impulse with scholars who offer didactic focus explanations for apparent contradictions in Proverbs concerning the themes of wealth, poverty, the rich, and the poor. I agree with these scholars that material in Proverbs sounds different at different points when wealth, poverty, the rich, and the poor are on view, because the didactic concerns are different at these different points. A primary difference between us lies in the attention we pay to the pedagogical design of this material. In addition, I make more fundamental distinctions than do these four scholars with respect to material in Proverbs that mentions wealth, poverty, the rich, and the poor. Wittenberg (1986), Habel (1988), Sandoval (2006), and Adams (2014) all present categories of material within Proverbs. Each category reflects a different didactic focus, as will be seen in the following discussion. Wittenberg identifies two semantic fields in which words for

[12] Von Rad reflects that *some* of the portrayals of consequences in Proverbs are due to "didactic simplification." He is clear to say that not all such portrayals are "to be understood in such a theoretical way," but he does underscore that at least some are (1972, 130). Adams describes the purpose of diligence-versus-laziness sayings that portray wealth and poverty as consequences, as well as sayings that show drunkenness leading to poverty, as "didactic" and "motivational" in intent (2014, 187).

poor are used;[13] Sandoval elaborates three "subdiscourses of wealth and poverty"; Habel distinguishes six "paradigms for life" that involve a nexus between wisdom, wealth, and poverty; and Adams describes four "theses" on wealth and poverty in Proverbs. Sandoval and Adams make especially valuable observations. I begin with a short discussion of Wittenberg's argument. However, because Sandoval, Habel, and Adams articulate approaches to Proverbs that are closer to the approach I develop, I summarize their work in more detail. For each of these three scholars, I describe the overall framework that each one employs, the data they examine, and some of what I think are their most significant contributions and conclusions.

Wittenberg (1986) offers sensible categories in his use of lexical field theory, *social status* and *social justice*. As is evident in his 1987 study, Wittenberg perceives an observable shift in Proverbs in its views of poverty and the poor. In his later study reviewed above, he posits an ideological development hypothesis. In his 1986 study, he identifies different lexical fields in which different terms for *poor* are used to explain why some sayings exhort care and justice for the poor, while others portray poverty as a consequence or issue neutral observations about inequitable social and living situations that the poor face vis-à-vis the rich. Wittenberg's whole study is based on conflations of the meaning and instructions of sayings that mention the poor with the meaning and instructions of sayings that mention poverty. This in itself is a problem. In addition, the lexical fields that he identifies—*social status* and *social justice*—are so broad that they do not bring a great deal of clarity to the use of *dal*, *rāš*, *ʿānî*, and *ʾebyōn* in Proverbs. All of these words pertain to *both* social status and social justice. I turn to the question of finer semantic distinctions between these terms in chapter six.

[13] There are four words for "poor" in Proverbs: *dal*, *rāš*, *ʿānî*, and *ʾebyōn*.

More critically, with regard to Wittenberg's lexical field categories, it is impossible conceptually to separate social status from social justice. Trying to limit the semantic valence of words to just one of these so-called lexical fields is therefore all the more troubled an effort. We see this materialize in Wittenberg's analysis. He uses lexical field theory to argue that the lexical properties of different terms for *poor* account for discrepant presentations of the poor in Proverbs. He does this by trying to show that specific terms for *poor* are used in one of his two lexical fields. He concludes that *rāš* predominates in his lexical field of social status, and that *dal*, *ʿānî*, and *ʾebyôn* appear primarily in his social justice lexical field. However, *rāš* is used in contexts where social justice is the primary didactic concern (e.g., 13:23; 17:5); and *dal* and *ʿānî* are both used in situations in which social justice is not the primary didactic concern (e.g., 15:15; 16:19; 28:11). We see, then, that not only are Wittenberg's lexical-field categories too broad. In addition, the terms for *poor* in Proverbs exceed the lexical-field boundaries that Wittenberg specifies.

Sandoval elaborates three "subdiscourses of wealth and poverty" in Proverbs: a "wisdom's virtues" discourse, a "social justice" discourse, and a "social observation" discourse. Like Wittenberg, Sandoval also hypothesizes that specific terms for *poor* can be primarily identified with one of his subcategories of material. Also like Wittenberg, Sandoval has to note instances when words are used outside of the boundaries he allots for them. He reflects that such instances are to be expected in light of the probability that the subdiscourses would have been in dialogue with one another (2006, 69, 155, 201). He also cautions against trying to maintain "procrustean categories" (2006, 155). However, he often seems overcommitted to his categories. The most important facet of Sandoval's work is the attention that he pays to the rhetorical strategies that predominate in the subdiscourses he identifies. Sandoval characterizes his three

discourses in the following way. Each one deploys a different rhetorical strategy. I place these rhetorical strategies in italics in the summaries below and offer one example of each of the category members. (The translations are my own. In order to save space, I do not include the Hebrew at this point.)

1) The "wisdom's virtues" discourse promotes wisdom (and other virtues) by using wealth and poverty as *motivational symbols*. Sandoval further subdivides material in this discourse into the following categories:

   - The wisdom's virtues discourse in Proverbs 1-9
     (1:10-19; 2:4-5; 3:14-16; 4:5-9; 8:10-11, 18-21)

     If you seek it [wisdom] *like silver and search for it like hidden treasures,*
     then you will understand the fear of the Lord and find the knowledge of God.
     (2:4-5)

   - Comparative valuing ("better-than") sayings
     (15:16; 16:8; 19:1; 28:6; 15:17; 16:19; 17:1; 22:1)

     A little with fear of Yahweh is better than a great treasure and trouble with it.
     (15:16)

   - Figurative wealth and poverty sayings
     WISDOM IS A COMMODITY (16:16; 17:16; 23:23)
     Valuing wisdom and its virtues (10:20; 20:15; 25:11-12)
     Further figurative sayings (21:20; 24:3-4)

     The tongue of the righteous is choice silver; the mind of the wicked is like nothing.
     (10:20)

   - The value of diligence sayings (10:4; 12:11; 14:23; 20:13; 24:30-34; 28:19)

     The palm of a slacker makes poverty, but the hand of the diligent makes rich.
     (10:4)

   - Character-consequence sayings
     Righteousness (10:16; 11:18; 15:6)
     Wicked wealth (10:2; 15:27; 21:6)
     Virtue over wealth (11:4, 28; 28:11)
     Moderation (21:17; 23:20-21)

     The income of the righteous leads to life, the produce of the wicked to sin.

(10:16)

2) The "social justice" discourse promotes social justice by providing *concrete or direct instruction*. Sandoval further subdivides material in this discourse into the following categories:

- The social justice discourse in the Proverbs 1-9
  (3:9-10; 3:27-28; 6:1-5)
  Do not withhold good from those to whom it is due,
  when it is in your power to do it.
  Do not say to your neighbor, "Go and come again, tomorrow I will give it"—
  when you have it with you. (3:28-29)

- Comparative valuing ("better-than") sayings (16:8; 21:3)

  A little with righteousness is better than great produce with no justice.
  (16:8)

- Justice in economic practices (11:1; 16:11; 20:10, 23)

  False balances are an abomination to Yahweh, but a just weight is his delight.
  (11:1)

- Kindness to the poor (14:31; 22:22; 29:7)

  A person who oppresses the poor insults his maker,
  but a person who is kind to the needy honors him. (14:31)

- Social justice and the king (28:15; 29:11-13; 31:2-9)

  A roaring lion and a charging bear—a wicked ruler over a poor people.
  (28:15)

- Character-consequence sayings
  Care for the poor (21:13; 22:9; 28:17)
  Divine concern for the poor (17:5; 19:17; reminiscent of 14:31)
  Royalty and justice for the poor (28:16; 29:14)

  A person who closes his ear to the cry of the poor—
  when he cries out, he will not be answered. (21:13)

3) The "social observation" discourse provides instructions (mainly with regard to social justice) by giving *indirect instruction*. Sandoval further subdivides material in this discourse into the following categories:

- Comparative valuing ("better-than") saying (27:10)

Do not forsake your friend or your father's friend,
and do not go to your brother's house on the day of your calamity.
A neighbor who is near is better than a brother who is far. (27:10)

- Excessive wealth, lack, and the rich (10:15; 18:10-11, 23; 22:7)

  The wealth of a rich man is his strong city; their poverty is the ruin of the poor. (10:15)

- The critique of social ties (14:20; 19:4, 6, 7)

  A poor man is hated even by his friend, but those who love a rich man are many. (14:20)

- Ironic wealth and poverty sayings (13:7, 22; 22:2, 16; 28:8; 29:13)

  There is a person who thinks himself rich—but nothing,
  and a person who thinks himself poor—but great wealth. (13:7)

I note above the problem faced by Wittenberg and Sandoval in their attempts to isolate words for *poor* in certain categories. The way that Sandoval associates rhetorical strategies with specific subdiscourses is problematic in the same way. The rhetorical strategies he identifies also transcend his discourse boundaries. For example, the use of wealth and poverty as motivational symbols and the issuing of direct instruction are rhetorical strategies employed in both his "wisdom's virtues" discourse and his "social justice" discourse. For Sandoval, the quintessential motivational feature in Proverbs is the act/character-consequence relation. He renames it the "wisdom prosperity axiom." Yet, Sandoval identifies act/character-consequence sayings in his "social justice" discourse as well (e.g., 3:9-10; 14:31; 17:5; 19:17; 21:13; 22:9; 28:27). Further, several of the sayings that he classifies as "ironic wealth and poverty sayings" in his social observation discourse exhibit the act/character-consequence relation (e.g., 13:22; 22:16; 28:8). Each of these sayings also present direct instruction, in the manner according to which Sandoval defines direct (or concrete) instruction.

My strongest agreement with Sandoval is with his description of material in his "social observation" discourse. Sandoval places sayings that sound like neutral observations in this category. Consider Proverbs 18:23: "A poor person speaks entreaties, but a rich person answers roughly" (*taḥănūnîm yĕdabbēr rāš / wĕʿāšîr yaʿăneh ʿazzōt*). Some scholars treat this saying and others like it as though they are simple and callous observations about disparate realities faced by the poor and the rich (McKane 1970; Pleins 1987, 2001; Crenshaw 1989; Whybray 1990, 1994; Clifford 1999). In contrast, Sandoval argues that these kinds of sayings

> present not unfiltered snapshots of brute social fact. Rather, like the photojournalist's art, they are composed and evaluative statements that carry and reflect a particular perspective. They depict "how things are," but only as seen and evaluated within a set of particular assumptions and values. (Sandoval 2006, 186)

Rather than neutral statements, Sandoval interprets sayings in his "social observation" discourse as implicit critiques.[14] He argues that the overall "literary and moral Gestalt" of the book leads readers to interpret the seemingly neutral "social observations" in Proverbs as in fact issuing moral instruction. I follow him in this assessment. In addition, like Sandoval, I identify motivational uses of wealth and poverty. I also distinguish between direct and indirect instruction in Proverbs. However, I describe each of these things differently than does Sandoval. I turn to my descriptions of motivation and direct and indirect instruction in chapter two.

We now turn to the work of Habel. He identifies what he calls six "paradigms for life" that involve interrelations between wisdom, wealth, and poverty (Habel 1988). He views the paradigms he identifies as standing in clear contradiction to one another. He also suggests that each one derives from a different social group, though he identifies social groups in relation to

[14] Other scholars who study Proverbs interpret the material in Sandoval's social observation discourse as implicit critiques as well (e.g., van Leeuwen 1992; Murphy 1998; Fox 2009).

his paradigms more clearly in some cases than in others. Two missteps plague his analyses. First, Habel picks and chooses the material that he discusses in relation to each of his paradigms. In so doing, he fails to discuss all of the relevant material within his paradigms. Second, his characterizations of wealth and poverty within each paradigm stem more from his ideas about the social groups he deems responsible for each one than they do from the texts in each one.

1) *The wisdom leads to success paradigm*
(Proverbs 1-9, the Introduction to the book)

Habel discerns a "singularly" positive portrayal of wealth in Proverbs 1-9. He argues that, according to this paradigm, wisdom leads to success, and success is measured by wealth. He bases these ideas on 3:16, 8:18, and 8:20-21. However, he fails to note the better-than sayings in 3:14-15, 8:11, and 8:19, and the imperative voiced by Lady Wisdom in 8:10 to "Take my instruction instead of silver and knowledge instead of choice gold." In addition, Habel does not discuss two related considerations with respect to material in Proverbs 1-9: 1) the portrayals of outcomes of wisdom that do not involve wealth,[15] and 2) passages that present different views of wealth (e.g., 1:10-19; 3:14-15, 27-28; 6:1-5, 6-11; 8:10-11, 19). The audience of this paradigm, according to Habel, is comprised of the wealthy elite.

2) *The hard work paradigm*
(10:4; 12:9, 11, 24, 27; 13:4; 14:23; 15:19; 19:15: 28:19)

Habel describes this paradigm as one in which wealth is presented as an ambiguous blessing. However, the ambiguity he discerns is apparent only in what I would consider a misreading of 10:22, which reads *birkat YHWH hîʾ taʿăšîr / wĕlôʾ yôsîp ʿeṣeb ʿimmāh*. Habel translates this

[15] Life and death are portrayed as outcomes of wisdom and folly more often than any other kind of outcome in Proverbs 1-9—and also in the book as a whole (e.g., in chs 1-9—1:18-19, 33; 2:12-22; 3:2, 4, 8, 22-26; 4:4-8, 18, 22; 5:5-6, 9-14, 23; 6:15; 7:2, 22-23, 26-27; 8:35-36; 9:11, 18).

saying as, “The blessing of Yahweh brings wealth. But with it there is no end of pain.” In support of this translation, Habel does not explain his interpretation of the causative C stem (*yôsîp*). Rather, he discusses his notion, which he considers a general one, that wealth brings pain (Habel 1988, 39). Instead of Habel’s rendering, I would translate 10:22 as, “It is the blessing of Yahweh that makes rich, and toil adds nothing to it.” Every other saying in this paradigm portrays the diligent being rewarded with wealth and the lazy or hasty falling into poverty. I would argue, in contrast to Habel, that these latter sayings portray wealth as an *un*ambiguous blessing. Habel identifies the audience of this paradigm as “peasants, craftsmen, or labourers” who have to work hard for a living (1988, 40).

3) *The harsh reality paradigm*
(10:15; 11:24; 13:8, 23; 15:16, 17; 17:1; 18:23; 19:4, 6, 7; 22:7)

Habel views this paradigm as one that is not so much “concerned to exemplify a traditional natural law of reward and punishment” as it is to depict “reality as it is experienced” and “characteristic roles” played by the rich and the poor (1988, 42). All of the sayings in this paradigm (apart from the better-than sayings) are those that Sandoval places in his social observation discourse. Habel describes wealth in this paradigm as a “dangerous dream” and a “heavy burden” (1988, 42). He uses these phrases in describing wealth as something that people are afraid to lose and feel guilty about acquiring dishonestly. I agree with Habel that the sayings he includes in this paradigm portray harsh realities. However, I would not psychologize early uses of them in the ways that Habel does. Rather, I would interpret their rhetorical substance in the way that Sandoval does. Specifically, rather than encapsulating fear and guilt, these sayings *critique* what they depict. It seems as though Habel sees the poor as the audience of this paradigm. He does not state this as clearly as he identifies the audiences of other paradigms. However, he offers the following problematic conclusion. He suggests that because wisdom is

not one of the values featured in the better-than sayings in this paradigm that "Wisdom is not a primary value of the poor, while love and righteousness clearly are" (42).

4) *The social order paradigm*
(Proverbs 22:17-24:34)

Habel identifies the fundamental concern of this paradigm as the maintenance of a social order in which the wealthy enjoy their economic advantage but also view their riches with circumspection. He sees the audience of this paradigm as the wealthy. However, in contrast to the wealthy audience of the first paradigm, this group of wealthy people are careful not to overvalue their wealth and to support the poor. Habel treats 23:4-5 as the summary statement for this paradigm, interpreting 23:4-5 as a characterization of wealth as "elusive and impermanent." (I present a different reading of these verses in chapter three.) In addition, Habel views the portrayal of Yahweh as the redeemer of the poor as a warning to the rich (22:22-23; 23:10-11). As in other paradigm descriptions, Habel does not discuss sayings within the parameters of the social order paradigm that also concern wealth (e.g., 22:26-27, 28; 23:1-8, 20-21; 24:17, 30-34).

5) *The trusting righteous paradigm*
(Proverbs 28-29)

Habel discerns a new emphasis in the antithesis between the rich and the poor in this paradigm. Here, he sees the poor as the "trusting righteous." In contrast, he observes that the rich in this paradigm, "instead of being wise and good, may be devious and self-centered" (45). A clear problem with this assessment of the rich is that the *ʿāšîr* ("rich person") is never portrayed as wise or good in Proverbs. Habel describes the rich in this way because he conflates references to the *ʿāšîr* ("rich person") with references to wealth as a reward for virtue in Proverbs. In addition, Habel glosses over significant portions of Proverbs 28-29. He bases his characterization of this paradigm primarily on 28:6 and 28:11. In 28:6, a poor person is described as blameless in

contrast with a "crooked" rich person; and in 28:11, a poor person, because he has understanding (*mêbîn*), is able to expose a rich person who "is wise in his own eyes" (*ḥākām bĕʿênāwv*). Habel does not seem to associate this paradigm with any particular audience.

6) The via media paradigm
(Agur's prayer in 30:1-14)

Agur asks God not to give him wealth or poverty in 30:7-9. Rather, he seeks a *via media*. Habel underscores that finding this middle way, according to this paradigm, is dependent not on wisdom, but on favor from God. This is indeed how 30:7-9 depicts Agur seeking a middle way. Habel does not seem to identify any particular audience of this paradigm.

As I note above, Habel's analyses are plagued by incomplete representations of data and reductive ideas about people in ancient communities. However, Habel is motivated by a commendable desire. He wants to draw attention to an inequity he discerns in Proverbs. He writes that "wisdom, it seems, is a possible goal only for the elite, the peasant, the shepherd, the artisan … the poor are apparently excluded by virtue of their status in society" (1988, 47). It is true, at least, that the poor would most likely have been excluded from interacting with the earliest written forms of Proverbs. Access to writing in ancient Israel was not widespread (Jamieson-Drake 1991; Schams 1998). Moreover, it was most likely the case that only social and economic elites would have interacted with literary forms of writing (e.g., Carr 2005; van der Toorn 2007). Yet, whether we envision the exclusion of the poor from "wisdom" in the way that Habel does is another question.

Finally, we have the work of Adams to consider in this section. He describes his assessment of how Proverbs represents wealth and poverty as four "theses" or "distinct

propositions" that concern these themes. The following is a summary of how Adams describes these theses and the material in Proverb that supports them.

1) *The character-consequence thesis*
   (1:10-19; 2:9; 3:10; 4:14, 18; 5:5-6; 11:28; 13:21; 18:11; 22:4)

Adams identifies material in Proverbs that supports this thesis as that which portrays "fair outcomes that hinge on personal conduct" (e.g., 3:10; 11:28; 13:21; 18:11; 22:4). He includes sayings that reflect the ethical dualism of the "path" or "way" motif in this category as well (e.g., 1:10-19; 2:9; 4:14, 18; 5:5-6) (Adams 2014, 185). However, he does not include in this group sayings that portray wealth as a reward for diligence and poverty as a punishment for different ways in which people are not diligent. Instead, he gives these sayings a category of their own—namely, the category of his "hard work thesis."

2) *The "preferability of wisdom over wealth" thesis*
   (15:17; 16:16; 17:1; 22:1)

Sayings that support Adams's "preferability of wisdom over wealth" thesis are most often better-than sayings that involve comparisons between domestic situations of material scarcity where virtues are present and material abundance where vices plague a household. Adams describes these sayings as portraying "the pursuit of money as an unlawful distraction from virtuous behavior" (ibid., 186). According to this thesis, virtues and loving relationships are more valuable than wealth. Adams characterizes the material in this category as mitigating overzealous responses to sayings in the previous category.

3) *The pragmatic thesis*
   (10:15; 13:23; 19:4; 22:23)

The sayings that Adams includes in this category offer "more pragmatic observations about daily life, including honest assessments of the plight of the poor and their vulnerability in the social

structure" (ibid., 186). These are the sayings that Sandoval includes in his "social observation" discourse and that Habel places in his "harsh reality" paradigm. Adams notes the remarkable candor of these sayings. With no flinching to be observed, they depict difficult life circumstances that the poor have to endure—misery, injustice, and social isolation. Adams also includes sayings in which Yahweh is portrayed as a protector of the poor in this category. He interprets the function of sayings in this category as intending to generate "sympathy for and solidarity with those most likely to become victims of economic oppression" (ibid., 187).

4) The hard work thesis
(6:6-9; 23:20-21; 24:30-34)

Adams describes the material in this category as addressing "the *basis* for becoming rich or poor" (2014, 187; italics added). On a first reading, it sounds as though Adams views this material as providing encyclopedic information about the world rather than issuing exhortations. However, he goes on to describe the purpose of this material as "didactic" and "motivational" (ibid., 187). This is the category in which Adams places what he calls the diligence and laziness sayings. He identifies the pedagogical purpose of this material as cultivating "personal responsibility in relation to economics" and a "vigorous work ethic" (Adams 2014, 187).

In conclusion, Adams states that, like "other commentators, we recognize the inconsistencies in Proverbs" (2014, 188). He goes on to reflect that "the editors conveyed their complex and often contradictory values concerning wealth and poverty … the contradictory nature of certain sayings in Proverbs is palpable and does not fit neatly into one model for social ethics" (188). I do not want to overstate the cohesion of material in Proverbs that talks about wealth, poverty, the rich, and the poor. However, I see a great deal more cohesion than Adams

and Habel in particular. Sandoval also argues that Proverbs is more consistent on these themes than scholars typically allow. However, Sandoval and I differ in a number of important ways.

1.3.5 Summary

In this section, I have reviewed four approaches to apparent contradictions and ambiguity that scholars find in Proverbs with respect to its perspectives on wealth, poverty, the rich, and the poor. Of these four, the first two—"social location" and "ideological development" hypotheses—offer the most tenuous ground on which to stand. As I argued above, they present reductive and ultimately unreliable historical reconstructions. None serves as a strong basis for interpretations of material in Proverbs. In contrast, the "complex reality" and "didactic focus" explanations bring more clarity. Most of them avoid reductive historical reconstructions. In particular, "complex reality" explanations demonstrate the value of relating tensions in human experience concerning wealth and poverty to representations of these themes in Proverbs. "Didactic focus" explanations offer useful categories of didactic concerns which lead the producers of Proverbs to talk in different ways about wealth, poverty, the rich, and the poor.

My approach differs from all of these approaches in three ways. First, I pay more attention to the pedagogical intent and design of material in Proverbs. I do this from the perspective of readers who construe personal implications for themselves when they read this book. Second, I draw from the work of cognitive and pragmatic theorists in describing how this type of reader is likely to interpret material in Proverbs. And third, rather than make distinctions in the material I examine on the basis of only the topic and literal content of a saying or longer

unit, I make distinctions on the basis of the *pragmatic function* that wealth, poverty, the rich, and the poor play in either the instruction or the motivation in didactic units.

1.4 Making distinctions

My understanding of Proverbs' pedagogy is tied to my understanding of the pragmatic context of, and features in, the book. I noted in the introduction to this chapter that I view the pragmatic context of Proverbs as a directive one—that is, as a context in which readers are instructed or *directed* to become certain kinds of people who do certain kinds of things. Each instruction in Proverbs is an instructional frame. In chapter two, I elaborate the pragmatic context of Proverbs and the nature of instruction and motivation in the book. Here, I describe three fundamental distinctions that I recommend making in order to reframe how we ought to understand what Proverbs says regarding wealth, poverty, the rich, and the poor.

We need first to distinguish material that mentions wealth and poverty from material that mentions the rich and the poor. This is the most fundamental distinction that must be made. It may also be the one that brings the most clarity regarding how each of these themes are presented in Proverbs. As I said at the beginning of this chapter, what Proverbs says about poverty cannot be related to what it says about the poor, and what it says about the rich has very little to do with what it says about wealth. In other words, it is misleading to envision "wealth and the rich" and "poverty and the poor" instructional frames.

There are also finer distinctions that must be made.

Specifically, a number of additional distinctions need to be made within "wealth and poverty material" and, separately, within "rich and poor material." As I will explain in chapter

two, following Phillip Johannes Nel (1982), I see the basic structure of persuasion in Proverbs as consisting of *instruction + motivation*. As I demonstrate in the course of this study, wealth, poverty, the rich, and the poor are presented in both instruction and motivation portions of didactic units in Proverbs. To understand how these themes are viewed in Proverbs, we must distinguish:

1) when wealth/poverty or the rich/the poor are the *focus of an instruction*;
   [as in the general instructional frames, *do not build wealth by wicked means* and *be kind to the poor*];
2) when wealth/poverty or the rich/the poor are *central in a motivation*
   [as in when wealth and poverty are portrayed as consequences—e.g., *The palm of a slacker makes poverty, but the hand of the diligent makes rich*, 10:4]; and
3) when wealth/poverty or the rich/the poor are a *supporting feature* in either an instruction or a motivation
   [this category is more various, but one example is when wealth and poverty are source frames in metaphors—e.g., *Grandchildren are the crown of their elders, and their fathers are the splendor of their children*, 17:6].

Beyond these distinctions, there is another set of distinctions that must be made. This third set of distinctions is similar in concept to the categories of didactic focus that Wittenberg (1986), Sandoval (2006), Habel (1988), and Adams (2014) offer. Like them, I also propose categories of specific didactic foci. However, I refer to these categories as specific "instructional frames." In addition, I view these frames as embedded within the first two distinctions that I recommend making. In summary, then, I recommend making a distinction between wealth-poverty material and rich-poor material. Second, I recommend distinguishing material according to its pragmatic function as either an instructional or a motivational component of a didactic unit. And finally, I identify instructional frames that encapsulate specific instructions issued by means of material in Proverbs, and I distinguish the instructional focus upon, or motivational use of, wealth, poverty, the rich, and the poor within these specific instructional frames.

1.5 Collecting the data

Like others who have studied these themes in Proverbs, I collect data with an eye toward relevant motifs and vocabulary. I divide the material I examine into chapters three to six according to the distinctions described in §1.4. In chapters three to five, I analyze the centrality of wealth and poverty in *instructional* components (ch. 3), *motivational* components (ch. 4), and as *supporting features* of instructional and motivational components (ch. 5). In chapter six, I examine all the material in which the rich and the poor are explicitly mentioned. Within each of these chapters, I separate material further. In chapters three, four, and six, the first additional distinction I make is according to *instructional frame*. Instructional frames are a representation of the particular instruction issued through a saying or longer didactic unit—e.g., "how to build wealth" instructional frames, "how to treat the poor" instructional frames, and "what to do with wealth" instructional frames. In contrast, in chapter five, the first additional distinction I make is according to the type of rhetorical support that wealth and poverty provide to didactic units—e.g., as source frames for metaphors, similes, frame metonymies, and other types of analogies. The following sections list the relevant motifs and lexical items that I divide into chapters three through six. The data listed here is that which I examine in these chapters.

1.5.1 Words and motifs that have to do with wealth

MOTIF	TERM	GLOSS	OCCURRENCES
Generosity / Kindness	*ṭôb ʿayin*	generous	22:9
	ḥnn	to be kind	14:21b; 14:31b; 19:17a; 28:8b
	ntn	to give	3:28; 21:26; 28:27; 31:6
	pzr	to scatter	11:24
Greed / Haste (after wealth)	*raʿ ʿayin*	stingy	23:6; 28:22
	bhl	to hasten	13:11; 20:21; 28:22
	ʾwṣ	to hasten	21:5; 28:20; 29:20

Extortion	*tarbît*	interest	28:8
	nešek	usury	28:8
Dissipation	*zll*	to gorge	23:20, 21; 28:7
	sbʾ	to be drunk	23:20, 21
Enrichment	*dšn*	to be enriched	11:25; 13:4; 28:25
Market Transactions	*ʾeben*	measuring stone	11:1; 20:10; 16:11
	ʾepâh	dry unit measure	20:10
	mōznayim	scales	11:1; 16:11; 20:23
	měḥîr	price	17:16; 27:26
	peles	balances	16:11
Wages	*pĕʿullāh*	wage	10:16; 11:18
	śeker	wage	11:18
Gifts/Bribes	*mattān*	gift	18:16; 19:6; 21:14
	mattĕnāh	gift	15:27
	mattat	gift	25:14
	šōḥad	bribe	6:35; 17:8, 23; 21:14
Loans	*ʿarubbāh*	loan	17:18
	ḥbl	to receive surety	20:16; 27:13
	ʿrb	to stand surety	6:1; 11:15; 17:18; 20:16; 22:26; 27:13
	maśśāʾōt	debts	22:26
	tqʿ (+ kp)	to make a surety agreement (i.e., strike hands)	6:1; 11:15; 17:18; 22:26
Inheritance	*naḥălāh*	inheritance	17:2; 19:14; 20:21
	nḥl	to inherit	3:35; 8:21; 11:29; 13:22; 14:18; 28:10
Extravagant Wealth	*ʾōṣār*	storehouse	8:21; 10:2; 15:16; 21:6; 21:20
	hōn	wealth	1:13; 3:9; 6:31; 8:18; 10:15; 11:4; 12:27; 13:7, 11; 18:11; 19:4, 14; 24:4; 28:8; 28:22; 29:3; 30:15, 16
	zāhāb	gold	11:22; 17:3; 20:15; 22:1; 25:11; 12; 27:21
	ḥōsen	treasure	15:6; 27:24
	ḥārūṣ	fine gold	3:14; 8:10; 8:19; 16:16
	kesep	silver	2:4; 3:14; 7:20; 8:10, 19; 10:20; 16:16; 17:3; 22:1; 25:4, 11; 26:23; 27:21
	ketem	fine gold	25:12
	maṭmōn	hidden treasure	2:4
	mōtār	profit	14:23; 21:5
	ʿăṭārāh	crown	4:9; 12:4; 14:24; 16:31; 17:6
	ʿōšer	riches	3:16; 8:18; 11:16, 28; 13:8; 14:24; 22:1; 22:4; 30:8
	ʿšr	to be/become rich	10:4, 22; 13:7; 21:17; 23:4; 28:20
	paz	refined gold	8:19
	pĕnînîm	precious stones	3:15; 8:11; 20:15; 31:10
	šālāl	spoil	1:13; 16:19; 31:11
	taʿănûg	luxury	19:10

	tîrōš	new wine	3:10

1.5.2 Words and motifs that have to do with poverty and material scarcity

Poverty	*ḥeśer*	lack	12:9; 28:22
	maḥsōr	want	6:11; 11:24; 14:23; 21:5, 17; 22:16; 24:34; 28:27
	rêš	poverty	6:11; 10:4, 15; 13:18; 24:34; 28:19; 30:8; 31:7
Scarcity	*ʾărūḥat yārāq*	portion of herbs	15:17
	pat ḥărēbāh	dry morsel	17:1
	pat leḥem	piece of bread	28:21
	pinnat gag	corner of a roof	21:9; 25:24
Verbs	*r'b*	to hunger	6:30; 10:3; 19:15
	ḥsr	to lack	13:25; 31:11
	N of *yrš*	to be impoverished	20:13; 23:21; 30:9

1.5.3 Words for the rich and the poor

Rich	*ʿāšîr*	rich	10:15; 14:20; 18:11, 23; 22:2, 7, 16; 28:6, 11
Poor	*ʾebyôn*	poor	14:31; 30:14; 31:9, 20
	dal	poor	10:15; 14:31; 19:4, 17; 21:13; 22:9, 16, 22; 28:3, 8, 11, 15; 29:7, 14
	ʿānî	poor	3:34; 14:21; 15:15; 16:19; 22:22; 30:14; 31:9, 20 (K *ʿănîyîm* / Q *ʿănāwîm*, 3:34; 14:21; 16:19)
	rāš	poor	13:8, 23; 14:20; 17:5; 18:23; 19:1, 7, 22; 22:2, 7; 28:3, 6, 27; 29:13 (emendation at 10:4)

1.6 Discussing the data

As noted above, I discuss the data presented in §1.5 in four text chapters. As also noted above, I divide material into these chapters according to the distinctions adduced in §1.4.

Ch 3 *Wealth and poverty as the focus of instructions*
Ch 4 *Wealth and poverty as central in motivations (and not instructions)*
Ch 5 *Wealth and poverty as supporting features of instructions and motivations*
Ch 6 *The rich and the poor*

My argument is that when we make these distinctions, we are not tempted to perform the four conflations discussed in §1.2. Further, when we avoid performing these conflations, we do not perceive material in Proverbs that mentions wealth, poverty, the rich, and the poor as being contradictory in the ways that many scholars do.

I turn in chapter two to an extended consideration of the pedagogical intent and the rhetorical design that lie behind Proverbs. There are three primary things that I do in chapter two. First, I characterize the pragmatic context that I believe primes readers to imagine personal implications for themselves when they read Proverbs. Second, I characterize the nature of instruction in Proverbs, both direct and indirect. And third, I characterize the nature of motivation in Proverbs. What I ultimately suggest is that the intended goal of Proverbs' producers—i.e., compelling readers to apprehend personal implications of material in the book—should prevent the conflations that lead scholars to view Proverbs as inconsistent and contradictory when it comes to wealth, poverty, the rich, and the poor. Language processing theories, pragmatic and cognitive, provide a number of models and frameworks that inform us as to how this works. Therefore, these processing theories feature centrally in the extended consideration I offer in chapter two of the pedagogical intent and design of material in Proverbs.

CHAPTER 2
Meaning Construction in Proverbs

2.0 Introduction

As explained in chapter one, the present study differs from other studies that investigate portrayals of wealth, poverty, the rich, and the poor in Proverbs in three significant ways. It focuses greater attention on the pedagogical intent and rhetorical design of material in Proverbs. Second, I draw from cognitive and pragmatic theory in order to model how readers are likely to interpret material in the book in light the pedagogical intent and design of Proverbs. And third, rather than make distinctions in this material on the basis of *only the topic and literal content* of a didactic unit, I make distinctions on the basis of the *function* that wealth, poverty, the rich, and the poor play in either the instruction or the motivation in didactic units. My understanding of the pedagogical intent and rhetorical design of material in Proverbs is rooted in three pragmatic features in the book: the pragmatic (or pedagogical) context of the book, the nature of instruction in the book, and the nature of motivation in the book. These three pragmatic features in Proverbs are the subject of chapter two.

There are really two facets that comprise the remainder of this study. The first is an extended consideration of how readers interpret material in Proverbs *broadly speaking*. This is the subject of chapter two. The second facet is an extended consideration of how readers interpret what Proverbs says about wealth, poverty, the rich, and the poor *in particular*. I consider the pedagogical intent and design of material in Proverbs from the vantage of how readers[16] are likely to process (i.e., interpret) instructions when they read this book. Developing a

[16] When I use the term "readers," I envision an idealized construct that is a composite of hearers and readers. I elaborate this cognitive model in §2.2.2. In sum, I envision addressees of all types who are

model of how readers interpret material in the book broadly speaking provides a finely-grained means of describing how readers interpret material in Proverbs that mentions or focuses on wealth, poverty, the rich, and the poor in particular. After developing a general model of interpretation here in chapter two, I apply it in chapters three to six to texts in Proverbs that mention or focus on wealth, poverty, the rich, and the poor. Because the work of cognitive and pragmatic theorists informs how I envision readers interpreting material in Proverbs, the rest of chapter two is essentially an extended discussion of how their work informs my own.

I follow cognitive linguists in viewing all language use and understanding as *meaning construction*. According to this view, language guides meaning construction. More specifically, language prompts "the set up of cognitive constructs" that support and reflect linguistic meaning and understanding (Fauconnier and Sweetser 1996, 1). Cognitive linguists develop cognitive models that represent the conceptual structures—that is, "the set up of cognitive constructs"—that mediate between individual human understanding, language, and the world around us. A primary tenet of cognitive linguistics is that people are able to use and understand language only by means of our rich and varied conceptual systems—i.e., the "intermediate informational structures" in our minds (Geeraerts and Cuyckens 2007, 5). None of us have unmediated cognitive access to the world. Cognitive mediation is a fact of all human language and meaning. As Eve Sweetser writes, "all we humans have is our cognitive models" (2012, 3). I adopt the models that inform my work primarily from cognitive linguists. I use these models to describe

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receptive to instructions that Proverbs offers. I mean for it to be an open concept—that is, as inclusive of any type of reader who reads with an eye to the personal implications that material in Proverbs may hold for them. However, in a number of instances, I imagine how the earliest young male readers of Proverbs might have performed meaning constructions of certain types. More work is needed in the theorization of additional specific readings of material in Proverbs using the model of reading that I develop—e.g., feminist, post-colonial, and others. The open concept of "reader" to which I refer is intended to disentangle our modern reader-selves from our reconstructed understandings of audiences of Proverbs. (I thank Eve Sweetser for the formulation of the last sentence in personal communication, May 2020.)

the mental work that readers perform when they interpret (i.e., construct the meaning of) material in Proverbs. As such, what I offer is a scratching of the surface. However, even a limited consideration of the cognitive processing that readers perform when they interpret material in Proverbs leads to observable clarity regarding how wealth, poverty, the rich, and the poor are presented in the book.

Before getting to the main sections in this chapter, I need briefly to introduce three terms and the concepts they describe: *frames*, *spaces*, and *Ground*. Each one plays important roles in the models I adopt from cognitive theorists in order to describe meaning construction in relation to Proverbs. Frames (also referred to as "conceptual" or "semantic frames") are mental representations of situations and concepts that are stored (and added to) in long-term memory (LTM).[17] Within conceptual systems, frames represent knowledge people have about situations we have encountered, learned about, and/or imagined: social interactions, physical actions, habits, cultural norms and practices, the coffee shop you like to go to. Lawrence Barsalou (1992a) defines basically everything that people think about as a frame—even simple nominal categories such as chairs and birds (see also Fillmore 1977). Barbara Dancygier and Sweetser define frames similarly as any "prefab" chunk of conceptual structure (2014, 17).

Crucially, frames are *gestalts*. They "come" and are *perceived* as wholes. Because they are intrinsically perceived as wholes, one element in a frame may evoke an entire frame. The evocation of an entire frame by means of one frame element is known as frame metonymy.

[17] Charles Fillmore first introduced the idea of frames to linguistics as an alternative to semantics based on perceptual feature lists (1982, 1985). As Barsalou explains, "Contrary to feature lists, people do not store representational components independently of one another" (1992a, 27). Frames are conceptual structures in which relations between elements are primary. This feature of frames is reflected in their gestalt structure. Fillmore developed his theory of frames in linguistics from the basis of his ideas about case grammar (1976, 1977). Frames are also a type of idealized cognitive model or ICM (Lakoff 1987).

Frame metonymy is a crucial and pervasive cognitive operation in many pragmatic processes. It plays important roles in this study, which I will explain as we come to them. In addition, Dancygier and Sweetser explain that lexical frames are frames that are paired with the lexical items (i.e., words) that represent them (2014, 17). Frames are thus versatile and pervasive structures in human conceptual systems.[18]

In contrast to frames, *mental spaces* (also referred to as simply "spaces") are the basic elements in cognitive constructions that people build *as* they use and understand language.[19] Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner explain that "Mental spaces are small conceptual packets constructed as we think and talk, for purposes of local understanding and action" (2002, 40). In other words, spaces are used to model meaning construction *as it is happening*. Unlike frames, spaces are not stored in LTM. Language users recruit *frames* from LTM during meaning construction to provide conceptual structure to *spaces*. In sum, mental space configurations are cognitive models of the mental work that people do *when* we process language. They represent the conceptual structures that mediate between (and enable and support) language and cognition in real time. As such, in appealing to spaces (and frames), analysts use

> a representation which is explicitly not connected to any extralinguistic reality. Mental Space analysts agree that there is a world out there (and that it would still be there if we weren't),

[18] George Lakoff defines the thesis of *Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things* (1987) as his hypothesis that humans "organize our knowledge by means of structures called *idealized cognitive models*" (1987, 68). Lakoff identifies the propositional structure of frames as one of the four structuring principles that constitute *idealized cognitive models* (ICMs) (1987, 68). The other three exhibit and are inclusive of frame structure—namely, image-schematic structure, metaphoric mappings, and metonymic mappings. Thus, Lakoff's definition of the conceptual structure of ICMs demonstrates the pervasive presence of frames in human knowledge (i.e., in human conceptual systems).

[19] Gilles Fauconnier first describes mental spaces in *Espaces mentaux* (1984; English translation, *Mental Spaces* 1994). He develops mental space theory further and also introduces the idea of blending, or conceptual integration, in *Mappings in Thought and Language* (1997). And he goes on to expand that framework with Mark Turner into a general model of human thought in *The Way We Think* (Fauconnier and Turner 2002).

> but people's experience of it lies in their perception of it and their interaction with it, and we can never access it independently of that. The world that a human knows is the world she conceptualizes. (Dancygier and Sweetser 2014, 77)

In emphasizing the subjective and conceptual nature of human understanding, cognitive linguists do not question extralinguistic reality. Rather, they recognize the involvement of thinking subjects whose conceptual systems inform their perceptions of and interactions with extralinguistic reality. Spaces (and frames) preserve this understanding of language and cognition. Specifically, as the products of human conceptual systems, spaces and frames serve as the cognitive constructs that mediate between individual human understanding, language, and the world in linguistic analysis.

Finally, *Ground* is a technical term that cognitive linguists use to refer to communicative (or pragmatic) context. Cognitive linguists demonstrate that language users rely implicitly on some conception of communicative context—or, Ground—in order to interpret the language we encounter. This goes not only for language in face-to-face communication, but also for language on the radio, in novels, on the sides of buildings, over the phone with a telemarketer, and even in ancient texts. Cognitive theorists demonstrate that it is impossible to communicate outside of a Ground. Construing communicative context (or Ground) is basic to communication. As Lillian Ferrari and Sweetser explain: "No utterance is referential without Grounding; without a Now, tense marking fails to locate a described event in time, and without a shared discourse record or physical context including a cat, *the cat* fails to locate a specific cat" (2012, 48).

I refer to these cognitive constructs throughout the present study, beginning here in chapter two. Ground in particular is the focus of §2.1 and §2.2. There are five main sections in this chapter:

2.1 Ground in communication
2.2 Ground in Proverbs
2.3 Instruction in Proverbs
2.4 Motivation in Proverbs
2.5 The basic structure of persuasion in Proverbs and the rest of this study

At the end of chapter two, I present a mental space model in §2.5 that is based on the work of cognitive linguists who have built on the work of Fauconnier in his theory of mental spaces (1994, 1997). This model represents the cognitive work that I think readers perform when they interpret material in Proverbs. In chapters three to six, I provide an abbreviated form of this model following the close readings I offer of relevant passages. In the abbreviated form of the model, I include two summaries of meaning construction processes—an inferential reasoning summary and a simulation summary. These summaries are important, because they represent and track two critical features of interpretations: 1) the causal reasoning that leads to directive interpretations of material in Proverbs, and 2) the personal viewpoint from which readers understand material in this book. Tracking these features of Proverbs will help us clarify how material in Proverbs views *and uses* wealth, poverty, the rich, and the poor. I will describe these summaries in detail at the end of the chapter in §2.5.

2.1 Ground in communication

Langacker first developed the idea of Ground to describe the involvement of thinking subjects in linguistic meaning (e.g., 1987, 1990, 2003, 2008). Enlisting his notion of a subjective Ground, he describes different construal processes that people perform when we use language. For example, people make choices to represent (or construe) objects that we describe with more or less specificity. We may choose to draw attention to either a *dog* or a *Labradoodle* walking on a street, though the object of conceptualization (i.e., the dog) is the same in both cases. People

also choose to describe objects of conceptualization from different perspectives. Depending on where a person may be standing in relation to the Labradoodle walking on a street, speakers may say that it is walking *down the street* or *up the street*. These are basic examples of construal processes—namely, of specificity and perspective.[20] In each instance, the object of conceptualization is the same. However, words used to describe it are different in each case; and the difference in each case is dependent on the speaker—or, the *subject* of conceptualization.

What Langacker shows in introducing thinking subjects to linguistic analysis is that meaning is more than the sum of observable properties of *objects* of conceptualization. Meaning always relies in fundamental ways on thinking *subjects* of conceptualization. Thinking subjects draw on their individual conceptual systems from their embodied perspectives in order to formulate linguistic construals. Langacker draws critical attention to the subjective nature of linguistic meaning in elaborating the idea of a subjective Ground.[21] Others build on his ideas in ways that are important for my project. Because language users can only use language with

[20] E.g., specificity, focusing, perspective, and prominence in Langacker (2008). See Verhagen (2007) for a survey of classification systems of construal processes that Langacker and other cognitive linguists have developed. In the end, Verhagen underscores that "it is precisely from a cognitive point of view that one should not expect that classifications of construal operations can be set up that are exhaustive and complete" (2007, 57). Rather, he advises the study of the "most important" and "well-studied" construal processes. He observes further that of all the construal processes identified by cognitive linguists perspective is the most commonly observed. He reflects that this is "hardly surprising since the concept of 'construal' was introduced to capture aspects of conceptualization that cannot be adequately analyzed in terms of the object of conceptualization but require reference to a subject's perception, choice, or point of view" (2007, 58). He therefore assumes the centrality of perspective in construal operations that people perform.

[21] N.B.: "subjective" here should not be confused with the more everyday use of this word, as in the dichotomy, "subjective vs. objective." In Langacker's use, "subjective" and "subjectivity" are technical terms that describe the degree to which construal is *implicitly* versus *explicitly* dependent on the Ground. For example, there is a higher degree of subjectivity in the sentence *Jane is across the table* than in the sentence *Jane is across the table from me*. This is so, because in saying *from me* the speaker has *explicitly* Grounded the location of Jane. Whereas, in the first sentence her location is more *implicitly* Grounded (Langacker 1990; see also Ferrari and Sweetser 2012 on subjectification in language).

respect to a Ground, cognitive theorists stress that Ground is an ever present, tacit, implicit, or direct point of reference in the production and interpretation of all language (Langacker 2008, 28-30). As such, it "enters into the meaning of every linguistic expression" (ibid., 78)—even linguistic expressions in ancient texts such as the book of Proverbs.

In the remainder of §2.1, I describe a number of cognitive frameworks that offer critical resources I use in elaborating the Ground (i.e., pragmatic context) in relation to personal-implication readings of Proverbs. Three sets of ideas are critical—1) ideas regarding intersubjectivity in language use (§2.1.1), 2) ideas about intersubjectivity between writers and readers in particular (§2.1.2), and 3) ideas that lead to a mental space model of communication called the Basic Communicative Spaces Network (Sanders, Sanders, and Sweetser 2009; Ferrari and Sweetser 2012) (§2.1.3). These three sets of ideas are critical for the present study, because they provide a means of modeling the pragmatic context of Proverbs as a necessarily cognitive *and* interactive context, however asynchronous the interaction may be.

2.1.1 Intersubjectivity in language use

The subjective ground that Langacker envisions is a communicative context in which a lone thinking subject is performing different types of construals.[22] Arie Verhagen (2005) builds on this notion and elaborates what he calls an "intersubjective Ground." Verhagen defines

[22] It must be said that Langacker underscores the interactive nature of language and the importance of pragmatics in language processing throughout his work. However, he also stresses that, "cognitive linguistics insists that even its interactive function is critically dependent on conceptualization … [and that] [m]eaning is first and foremost its meaning for a single representative speaker" (2008, 28-29, 30). Other linguists would argue that no single language user is able to think of themselves or to conceptualize independently of other language users—especially the ones with whom they are trying to communicate.

intersubjectivity as the mutual coordination of cognitive systems. He envisions the coordination of cognitive systems as one conceptualizer inviting another to engage in joint attention to something—that is, in the consideration of something from the perspective of the first conceptualizer.[23] Rather than imagine a lone thinking subject performing different types of construals in a subjective Ground, Verhagen envisions two thinking, communicating subjects performing coordinated processes of construal in an *intersubjective* Ground. For Verhagen, intersubjectivity in an intersubjective Ground is a general property of all language use.

As a general property of language use, intersubjectivity is not a feature of communicative exchange that is *sometimes* in operation. It is always operative, regardless of whether interlocutors are close to one another, communicating "live" in the same time and place, or whether they are far removed from one another in every imaginable respect. Verhagen writes the following.[24]

> Even in the absence of an actual speaker, an addressee (for example, the reader of an ancient text) always takes a linguistic utterance as having been intentionally produced as an instrument of communication by another being with the same basic cognitive capacities as the addressee; otherwise it would not be justified to call the material being interpreted a 'linguistic utterance'. Thus the addressee is always engaging in cognitive coordination with some subject of conceptualization, who is held responsible for the production of the utterance. Similarly, even in the absence of an actual addressee, a

[23] Verhagen bases his ideas regarding the intersubjective nature of grounding that people engage when using language with one another in large part on developmental and comparative psychologist Michael Tomasello's research into social dimensions of human cognition and communication. Tomasello (1999, 2008) argues that humans have a unique ability among primates that has developed over millennia of evolutionary processes "to take another's perspective" and to engage collaboratively with others via joint attention in order successfully to perform cooperative communication. The processes of understanding that Tomasello elaborates corresponds with descriptions of the same by cognitive scientists, psychologists and psycholinguists. Briefly, Tomasello explains that human communicators actually imagine and simulate the perspectives of others in order to figure out how to communicate with them. He suggests further that these perspectivized mental simulations of the intentions and mental states of others serve as the basis for all human communication.

[24] I want to underscore that the following reference to "the reader of an ancient text" is what Verhagen wrote. The two parentheses in this paragraph are his. However, the brackets near the end are mine. In place of the brackets in the original text is the phrase "Figure 2.1," for which, see Verhagen 2005, 7.

> speaker (for example, one making a note in a personal diary) is committed to the assumption that her utterance is in principle interpretable by someone else sharing the knowledge of certain conventions. The idea that some utterance could in principle only be interpretable for a single individual makes the idea that it is an instance of language void. Thus the conceptual structure of [Verhagen's revised intersubjective version of Langacker's construal configuration] is inherent in any linguistic usage event, even if not all of its features are formally marked in the utterance itself. (Verhagen 2005, 7)

As Verhagen conceives of linguistic communication, language users cannot *not* imagine the person they are in communication with. That person could be someone in the room with them, or it could be a completely unknown individual. In Verhagen's estimation, language users always produce language in ways that others would be able to receive it. Conversely, we interpret language assuming that some other thinking subject has produced it. This assumption of intersubjectivity is a foundational element in the model I propose for the Ground and pragmatic context of Proverbs.

A number of psycholinguists discuss the cognitive coordination that takes place between writers and readers specifically who may be separated by large expanses of time and space. Two in particular, Herbert Clark (1996) and Raymond Gibbs (1999), offer extended and insightful studies on this topic. Their ideas precede and comport with those of Verhagen. In addition, the work of critical discourse theorist, Teun van Dijk, also reinforces Verhagen's view of language use. I present the work of these three scholars in the following section.

2.1.2 Intersubjectivity between writers and readers

In his book *Using Language* (1996), Clark precedes Verhagen in characterizing language use as a joint action. Clark describes language use as an individual and a social process, and he emphasizes that language must be studied as both: "Speakers and listeners, writers and readers,

must carry out actions as individuals if they are to succeed in their use of language. But they must also work together as participants" in social units that Clark calls *ensembles* (1996, 3-4, 23-25). Participants in ensembles act in coordination with one another. Clark gives the examples of waltzing, paddling a canoe, and playing a piano duet.

Like Verhagen after him, Clark underscores that "Writing and reading are no less joint actions for the lack of synchrony" (Clark 1996, 90).[25] People enjoy the synchronous, real-time opportunities to check understanding, gauge reception, and adjust communicative strategies accordingly when in face-to-face conversation. However, according to Clark, a certain jointness of action continues to obtain in asynchronous communication. What Clark stresses with respect to writers in particular is that what they choose to write depends on what they think readers will know, think, and feel when they read what they have written. Clark explains:

> Joint actions are required in language use regardless of setting. The coordination of content required is much the same across settings, but the coordination of process is not. In conversation, speakers and addressees synchronize the phases of their actions. In asynchronous settings, speakers try to make processing optimal for their addressees. (Clark 1996, 90)

What Clark describes here is known as the Audience Design Hypothesis (see also Barr and Keysar 2006). This principle suggests that people design the language they produce in ways that they think will lead to reception by audiences they want to reach in whatever specific ways they want to reach them.

[25] Langacker also writes that written works "in the broadest sense" still involve "a linguistic interaction: via the text produced, the writer expects to have some effect on any potential reader" (2008, 478; cf. 459). And Fox (2003) reflects similarly on interactions between writers and readers. He underscores that this communicative dimension is present in any written work in the author's and transcriber's intention.

In his book *Intentions in the Experience of Meaning* (1999), Gibbs provides compelling evidence from psycholinguistic research in support of the complementary notion that readers construe the communicative intentions of writers when they process language. Gibbs' project is broader than an investigation into language use. He explores how people infer communicative intentions in the processing of visual art as well. The view of intentionalism that he endorses is known as Hypothetical Intentionalism. It is complementary in every way to the Audience Design Hypothesis. Gibbs explains:

> Hypothetical intentionalism holds that people find language and artworks meaningful without necessarily knowing the actual beliefs and intentions of the person(s) creating the artifact. Readers and spectators form meaningful interpretations of what is written or created by reconstructing an idealized version of what someone has said, written, or created, given the artifact (i.e., the language or artwork) and an understanding of the conditions under which the artifact was created. (Gibbs 1999, 328)

In situations where a person has very little (or no) knowledge about the conditions in which an artifact was created, they fill in as many (or as few) blanks as they can or choose to—enough, that is, to make whatever meaning the interpreter wants to take the time to construct. The depth of processing both context and language within contexts varies not only from person to person but also from situation to situation. Psycholinguists and cognitive psychologists suggest that people vary in the effort they put into mental processing in different situations.[26]

Gibbs stresses that imagining intentions is necessary in language processing given "the psychological nature of communication" (Gibbs 1999, 331). He reviews fascinating psycholinguistic research that supports the idea of hypothetical intentionalism. Sounding very much in agreement with Verhagen and Clark, Gibbs writes,

[26] See Barsalou *et al*. 2008; Bergen 2012; Zwaan 2004, 2008, 2009, 2014, 2016.

> Although different in many respects, writing and reading, like speaking and listening, are social transactions that require cooperation and coordination on the part of writers and readers. A central aspect of producing written language, and understanding it, is the specific attempt to achieve successful communication of intentional meanings. (Gibbs 1999, 176-177)

Obvious questions arise when we try to imagine ancient producers and modern readers (or readers in any period, for that matter) coordinating with one another via joint attention in an *ensemble* (à la Clark) that is located in an *intersubjective Ground* (à la Verhagen). The object of the joint attention they share is the text. However, because the specific situational conditions of producers and readers are both, in the main, indefinable and altogether asynchronous, we need to elaborate how analysts can still appeal to joint attention and intersubjectivity in discussing how readers are likely to interpret Proverbs.

According to the above theorists, writers and readers—however far removed they are from one another—imagine the other when they produce and interpret texts. To say this is not to say that ancient producers of Proverbs imagined readers in the twenty-first century (or in any period but their own). Neither is it saying that twenty-first century readers can intuit the psychologies of ancient producers. It is to say that ancient producers imagined idealized versions of readers (or students) when they prepared their texts. It is also to say, likewise, that modern readers imagine (at whatever level of depth or accuracy) the pragmatic (or pedagogical) intentions of ancient producers when they read Proverbs. This is how I propose that analysts can imagine ancient producers and modern readers coordinating with one another in a kind of joint-attention ensemble in an intersubjective Ground. We can imagine them imagining the other.

Imagining writers and readers is not a trivial facet of producing and reading texts broadly speaking. Imagination plays a central role in the production and interpretation of all language. Sweetser writes that “if we take embodied cognition seriously, all hearers and readers are

imagined hearers/readers—we have no direct access to their cognitive states, so we are always speaking or writing to a reader or a hearer whose knowledge states, presuppositions, affect (and so on) we are estimating or imagining" (2012, 6).[27] We have no choice but to estimate and imagine these things—even in face-to-face communication. In the same way, hearers and readers imagine the cognitive states, intentions, expectations, feelings, and knowledge of speakers and writers.

Dijk offers a cognitive model of context that includes these properties of writers and readers, as well as additional features of communicative situations. His model serves as a conceptual bridge between ideas regarding intersubjectivity between writers and readers and the Basic Communicative Space Network (BCSN) discussed in the next section. He calls this cognitive model of context, appropriately, a *context model*. Context models are cognitive models of communicative situations that people store in LTM (long-term memory). Dijk hypothesizes that these models are activated automatically any time people engage in communication. He explains,

> It is not the "objective" social environment itself that influences the appropriateness of discourse, but the subjective ways language users construe, that is, analyze, understand, and represent the ongoing relevant properties of this environment. In other words, the interface between discourse and the communicative situation is necessarily cognitive. There is no direct relation between social or other structures of the environment and discourse structures, which are structures of a very different nature. Context, thus, is how language users dynamically *define* the communicative situation—and as such also experience it as real. (Dijk 2015, 4; italics in original)

[27] I discuss embodied simulation below. But I will note here that a great deal of experimental research supports what Sweetser says in the quote above. For example, neuroscientist Vittorio Gallese investigates the role of simulation in the process of imagining the physical, mental, and emotional states of others for the purpose of interacting with them (e.g., Gallese 2001, 2003, 2007, 2014; Gallese and Sinigaglia 2011; Gallese and Carauna 2016). Empathy as an outcome of simulation is a primary focus of his research, as is the reverse: simulation as the mechanism for empathy. See also Tomasello 1999, 2008, 2014, 2018.

In short, context models are cognitive models of communicative situations that people store in LTM and recruit (and update) each time they engage in communication. Dijk specifies that context models include information about the participants in a communicative situation, where they are and what they are doing, their goals, intentions, and assumptions about one another (including what they think the other knows, believes, wants, and feels). In addition, Dijk envisions context models containing mental representations of "the very experience of speaking, writing, listening or reading, and also evaluative *opinions* and *emotions* (happiness, fear, etc.) associated with the communicative situation" (2015, 7; italics in original).

We can conclude, then, on the basis of Dijk's elaboration of context models, that readers who read Proverbs have a context model stored in LTM of what they think is going on when they read Proverbs. This may be a frame-rich or a more schematic model. That would depend on the reader and their experiences with and thoughts about Proverbs. Note that as knowledge structures, context models are a type of conceptual frame. In addition, in the same way that frames provide conceptual structure to spaces during online meaning construction, context models provide conceptual structure to Basic Communicative Space Network models during online meaning construction.

2.1.3 A Basic Communicative Space Network model of communication

The Basic Communicative Space Network (BCSN) is a mental space model of how communication works.[28] BCSN models use mental spaces to represent the minimal components

[28] See Sweetser 1990; Dancygier and Sweetser 2000, 2005; Sanders, Sanders, and Sweetser 2009; Ferrari and Sweetser 2012. The BSCN is first called the BSCN in Sanders, Sanders, and Sweetser 2009. However, the beginnings of the BCSN are apparent already in Sweetser 1990 (*From Etymology to*

of semantic and pragmatic conceptual structure that BCSN theorists would say are implicitly in place when people communicate (Sanders *et al*. 2009, 26).[29] BCSN models build on Fauconnier's earlier mental space models by introducing pragmatic conceptual structure in Ground Space Networks and attaching these networks to Content Space Networks. The minimum components of pragmatic conceptual structure that BCSN theorists envision in Ground Space Networks are mental representations of: speaker/writer or hearer/reader, the situation in which they are communicating, the language they are using to communicate, their shared discourse history (oral or written), the thoughts and feelings that each has regarding the other and the discourse they share, and the nature of the speech act(s) that the speaker/writer is performing in their communicative exchange. (All of these components are included in Dijk's context models.)[30]

Pragmatics: Metaphorical and Cultural Aspects of Semantic Structure) in her references to "domains of use"—specifically, to content, epistemic, and speech act domains of use. These domains of evolve into the epistemic and speech act spaces in the Ground Space Network of BSCN models. Likewise, content domains of use correspond to spaces in the Content Space Network of BCSN models.

[29] There are many pragmatic dimensions of meaning. I characterize information in the Ground Space Network of BCSN models as pragmatic in nature. In doing so, I mean to distinguish between pragmatic considerations that Korta and Kepa (2015) refer to as "far-side" or "beyond-saying" pragmatics. Far-side pragmatic considerations differ from what Korta and Kepa call "near-side" pragmatics. They identify near-side pragmatics as concerned with the nature of certain facts pertaining to relations between language users and the language they use that are relevant to determining *what is said*—e.g., ambiguity, indexicals and demonstratives, anaphors, and some issues involving presupposition. In contrast, they describe far-side pragmatics as concerned with speech acts and implicature. For ease of expression, in the remainder of this study, I refer to the "pragmatic information" that BCSN models represent in Ground Space Networks. However, the phrase "far-side pragmatic information" would more precisely characterize to what I refer in using the simpler phrase "pragmatic information." This is important to note, because "near-side pragmatic information" is present throughout Content Space networks as well. In Sum, "The crucial thing about Ground spaces is that they are the 'grounding' of the network for all the rest of the content"—i.e., the content in the Content Space network (Sweetser, personal communication, May 2020).

[30] In addition, the intersubjectivity that Verhagen envisions in his notion of an intersubjective ground obtains in BCSN models. BCSN theorists say explicitly that their model of communication includes Verhagen's notion of intersubjectivity (Sanders *et al*. 2009; Dancygier 2012; Ferrari and Sweetser 2012; Sweetser 2012).

When mental space theorists use the word "network," they are referring to the mental space configurations that people build in order to—and *as* they—use and interpret language. In other words, these networks are mental representations of meaning that people construct on the basis of language. Traditional mental space models represent the semantic conceptual structure of interpretations of what people say or write in a discourse. In one of many examples, Fauconnier demonstrates using the sentence *Maybe Romeo is in love with Juliet* (1997, 42-43). Every mental space configuration begins with a base space. The base space of a mental space configuration of an interpretation of *Maybe Romeo is in love with Juliet* would contain some notion of Romeo and Juliet. (Fauconnier represents the internal structure of spaces in boxes that he places beside the spaces in his diagrams.)



Figure 2.1 The base space of *Maybe Romeo is in love with Juliet* (based on Fauconnier 1997, figure 2.4)

Fauconnier notes that in a real discourse situation, all previous meaning construction that had comprised the discourse prior to the utterance of *Maybe Romeo is in love with Juliet* would be implicit in the base space as well. The word *Maybe* in this sentence is a space builder. Space builders prompt language users to build new spaces in their configurations. In this case, *Maybe* prompts readers to set up what Fauconnier calls a *possibility space*. The sentence *Maybe Romeo is in love with Juliet* would prompt readers to recruit the frame "a in love with b" from long-term memory (LTM) into the possibility space. This frame would contain background knowledge that people associate with the idea of lovers and what it means to say that one person is in love with

another person. Fauconnier represents the internal space structure that this frame would bring to the model with the denotation, LOVE a' b'.



Figure 2.2 Space configuration for *Maybe Romeo is in love with Juliet* (based on Fauconnier 1997, figure 2.4)

There are two salient roles in the LOVE frame, the lover (a) and the loved one (b). The a' and b' roles in the possibility space are thus set up as counterparts to a and b in the Base Space. The lines connecting a to a' and b to b' indicate this. The counterpart relations between a and a' and b and b' are possible by virtue of the Access or Identification Principle. Fauconnier gives this principle a technical definition. The following is a simplified version of this:

> Access Principle: If two space elements are linked by a connector, then the element in one space (a') can be identified by naming, describing, or pointing to its counterpart (a) in another space. (Fauconnier 1997, 41)

Thus, *connectors* are conceptual connections of different types that link counterparts in mental space configurations. The symbol 𝔈 represents the connectors (or conceptual connections) in figure 2.2. In both cases, the conceptual connection between counterparts is one of *identity*. In other words, Romeo (a) is understood to be Romeo (a'), and Juliet (b) is understood to be Juliet (b'). The dashed line between the spaces in figure 2.2 indicates that the possibility space is set up relative to the base space in the thinking of the person interpreting this sentence.

Spaces proliferate as discourse proceeds. Analysts demonstrate links between spaces that are appropriate for the discourse at hand. Mental space networks can grow to be quite complex. Fauconnier stresses that within each one, there will always be a base, a focus, and a viewpoint space. Focus and viewpoint spaces shift as discourse proceeds. They may at times be the same space. But consider the example above. In saying *Maybe Romeo is in love with Juliet*, the speaker shifts discourse attention to the possibility that Romeo loves Juliet. Therefore, the *focus space* in figure 2.2 is the possibility space. However, the possibility that Romeo is in love with Juliet is understood from the vantage of the base space. Therefore, the base space is the *viewpoint space* in this instance.

Figure 2.2 represents the earliest methods that Fauconnier developed in his work using mental spaces to model meaning construction. As noted above, in these more traditional methods of mental space modeling, analysts limit themselves to representations of the semantic conceptual content of *what people say or write* in discourse. In collaboration with other linguists, Sweetser developed the Basic Communicative Space Network (BCSN) in order to introduce a differentiated model of Ground to traditional mental space configurations. Sweetser and her colleagues represent not only *what people say or write* in BCSN models. They also represent all the situational pragmatic information that people rely on when they construct meaning.[31]

In order to represent situational pragmatic as well as semantic information in their models, BCSN theorists include two space networks in the BCSN—a Content Space Network

[31] Other linguists also include ground (or communicative context) in mental-space models. See L. Brandt & P. A. Brandt 2005; P. A. Brandt 2005; Coulson and Oakley 2003, 2005; Houggard & Oakley 2008; Oakley and Coulson 2008. It must be said that throughout his work, Fauconnier is deeply attuned to the role of pragmatic information and pragmatic reference functions in meaning construction (1990, 1994, 1997, 2002). However, he does not represent the kind of situational pragmatic information in his mental space models that these later theorists do.

and a Ground Space Network. *Content* Space Networks contain mental space configurations that correspond to Fauconnier's models. *Ground* Space Networks contain mental representations of situational facets of meaning construction that involve speakers/writers and hearers/readers. The spaces in Ground Space Networks are the following:

- a *Ground base space* that contains mental representations of the speaker/writer, hearer/reader, and their immediate surroundings or circumstances;
- a *metalinguistic space* that contains mental representations of the shared language forms that the speaker/writer and hearer/reader use in communication;
- a *metatextual* or *metadiscourse space* that holds mental representations of the discourse history that the communicators share;
- a *speech-act space* that holds mental representations of the speech acts involved in their communication;
- and finally, *epistemic spaces* that contain mental representations of the beliefs, knowledge, emotional states, and reasoning processes that speakers/writers and hearers/readers engage and imagine that the other engages when they communicate.

In saying that all of this pragmatic information is implicitly accessible in the minds of communicators, BCSN theorists do not mean that all of this information is always accurate or even consciously thought through. What they mean is that cognitively, these pieces of conceptual structure implicitly support, and are necessary for, communication. They *can* be thought through, but maybe in most instances of everyday communication, they are not and do not need to be—at least not extensively. The following is a basic BCSN model with each type of space in the Ground Space Network represented.



Figure 2.3 The Basic Communicative Space Network (based on Ferrari & Sweetser 2012, figure 2.1)

As Ferrari and Sweetser explain, "This extended BCSN complex is what allows the referential interpretation of the Content Spaces—that is, even though we may not be talking about the Ground, we inevitably need it (in Langacker's terms) to referentially 'Ground' our talk about other things" (2012, 49). Ferrari and Sweetser demonstrate with a number of BCSN models how language users implicitly rely on information that is represented in Ground Space Networks in order to process language they encounter.

Take the simple phrase, *the book*. Successful use of this phrase depends on hearers and readers knowing which book *the book* is. A hearer would consult the situation in which they share space with a speaker to see which book is in question. A reader would consult prior discourse to figure out which book *the book* is in the discourse. In addition, a speaker or writer

would need to consult the epistemic spaces of a hearer or reader, respectively, in order to be certain that hearers and readers would know which book is in question when they use the phrase *the book*. These cognitive processes can be represented using the BCSN. In the following BCSN model, spaces containing conceptual content that is in focus are outlined in bold. In addition, bold arrows point from the Content Space Network to spaces in the Ground Space Network which contain information that supports the production and interpretation of *the book*.

The following model represents an interpretation of *the book* that a reader would perform when reading a novel. W is the writer. R is the reader. The counterparts of W and R are represented throughout the Ground Space Network as W', W", and so on. The conceptual connections between them are represented with solid lines. In each case the conceptual connection is one of *identity*. In BCSN modeling, analysts characteristically represent only those spaces in Ground Space Networks that are especially important for the meaning or interpretation of an expression. Therefore, I do not include a metalinguistic space in figure 2.4.[32]

[32] The model in figure 2.4 is based on a model that Ferrari and Sweetser use to demonstrate the subjectification involved in the use of *the book* in comparison with the use of *this book*. All of the models they produce in their 2012 study illustrate different instances of subjectification (e.g., demonstratives vs. the definite article and deontic modals vs. epistemic modals). I simplify their models in order to illustrate how BCSN models represent pragmatic and semantic conceptual structure more generally.



Figure 2.4 BCSN model of the meaning of *the book* in a written context (based on Ferrari & Sweetser 2012, figure 2.3)

Ferrari and Sweetser offer a striking example of how people depend on the Ground when we communicate. They model how we interpret our simple (and frequent) use of the word *goodbye*. Saying *goodbye* is pragmatically a departing greeting. Ferrari and Sweetser emphasize that the conventional meaning of *goodbye* resides entirely in the speech-act space of a Ground Space Network in a BCSN model. Therefore, they represent the meaning of *goodbye* in the following way.



Figure 2.5 BCSN model of the meaning of *goodbye* (based on Ferrari & Sweetser 2012, figure 2.6)

Ferrari and Sweetser do not even include a Content Space Network in this model, because the meaning of *goodbye* is focused entirely in the speech-act interaction between a speaker and a hearer—that is, in the speech-act adjustment of them taking their leave of one another.

A final example that Ferrari and Sweetser discuss is especially relevant in considering how people interpret material in Proverbs. Ferrari and Sweetser model the production and interpretation of the sentence *Ann knows that the world is round*. This sentence is relevant to material in Proverbs, because it involves a presupposition that a speaker and hearer share with Ann—namely, that the world is round. Ferrari and Sweetser underscore that if the speaker did *not* share this presupposition with Ann, the speaker would have used the word *thinks* or *believes* rather than *knows* in this sentence (2012, 53). Ferrari and Sweetser locate presuppositions in the epistemic spaces of Ground Space Networks, because presuppositions represent the mental processes and beliefs of speakers/writers and hearers/readers. (P in the following model stands for *presupposition*.)



Figure 2.6 BCSN model of the meaning of *Ann knows that the world is round.*
(based on Ferrari & Sweetser 2012, figure 2.4)

A full interpretation of the word *know* in this statement is dependent on consulting information in multiple spaces in the above model. In the Content Space Network, the word *know* represents Ann's mental state regarding P. Ferrari and Sweetser observe that the presupposition (P) is not the focus of the sentence *Ann knows that the world is round*. Rather, the focus of this sentence is Ann's mental state—namely, one of certainty—concerning the idea that the world is round. In addition, Ferrari and Sweetser stress that producing and interpreting the word *know* in this sentence requires reference to the epistemic states of the speaker and hearer. It is only because

the speaker assumes that the hearer shares the presupposition that the world is round that the speaker presents no additional qualifying content. Likewise, the hearer assumes the same about the speaker in order to understand this sentence.

Presuppositions involve high degrees of epistemic certainty. No conceptual content in Proverbs is framed as *X knows that Y*. However, when readers interpret material in Proverbs, they imagine the epistemic stance of the producers of Proverbs toward the material they produce. Readers will do this in different ways. It is inevitable that readers will view the epistemic stance of the producers of Proverbs toward the content of material in the book differently. Dancygier defines epistemic stance as a "speaker's specific evaluation of assertability" (2012, 74). I consider how readers might imagine the manners in which the producers evaluate the assertability of—i.e., the epistemic certainty they hold toward—their statements in §2.5.

The theoretical importance of BCSN models in linguistic analysis cannot be overstated. First, the models in figures 2.4-2.6 above illustrate the fact that information contributing to the meaning of linguistic expressions resides *throughout* BCSN models. This is apparent (and critical) when we come to material in Proverbs. Readers interpreting Proverbs rely on information especially in the speech-act and Ground base spaces in BCSN models but also to presumably different degrees on information in producer epistemic spaces as well. In addition, their reasoning processes would be located in reader epistemic spaces. The cognitive status of BCSN models is important. What people draw from a communicative exchange lies in their *perceptions* of what is involved in the exchange. Like context models, BCSN models illustrate the subjective nature of the communicative contexts that people have in mind when they communicate. As Dijk underscores in his description of context models, context "is how language users dynamically *define* the communicative situation—and as such also experience it

as real" (Dijk 2015, 4; italics in original). Thus, information in every space throughout a BCSN model is information that language users "dynamically *define*"—i.e., construe. This holds for any instance of communication, that between friends in face-to-face conversation and that which takes place when people read Proverbs.

In the next section, I turn to the Ground of Proverbs. The Ground of Proverbs is its performance context. Reader construals of this performance context stored in LTM equate to context models of their encounters with Proverbs. The BCSNs that readers construct in their "online" reading of Proverbs equate to the performance contexts in which they participate.

2.2 Ground in Proverbs

Carol Fontaine (1982) was the first to introduce performance context and performance analysis to Biblical studies.[33] Performance context is an actual social situation in which a proverb or traditional saying is used for a specific communicative purpose. Paremiologists stress two things regarding the performance context of proverbial expressions. First, the meaning of a proverb or traditional saying cannot be understood without a performance context. Raymond Firth, an early advocate of performance analysis before it was called this, writes, "The meaning of a proverb is made clear only when side by side with the translation is given a full account of the accompanying social situation,—the reason for its use, its effect, and its significance in speech" (Firth 1926, 134; quoted in Grzybek 1987, 42). Fox writes similarly that the

[33] Fontaine explores the use of traditional sayings in the Hebrew Bible outside of Proverbs. She discusses these contexts as literary in nature and also speculates regarding the real existence and social use of traditional sayings in ancient Israelite communities on the basis of the textual models she develops.

performance context of a proverb (or traditional saying) is a "situation (real or fictional) in which someone uses a proverb in an attempt to influence others" (2003, 154).

Second, paremiologists stress that proverbs or sayings in anthologies like Proverbs *have no performance context*. Most scholars who study Proverbs view the book in precisely this way. As Fox explains, "the editors have, by the very nature of their task, detached sayings from actual use and assembled them (as well as new coinages) in readiness for redeployment in a limitless variety of new contexts" (2003, 154; Fox 2009, 484). Thus, scholars envision these *new* contexts as performance contexts proper, because these new contexts would be *actual* social situations in which people who had read Proverbs would use sayings *from* Proverbs in order to influence another person.

A number of scholars who study Proverbs propose substitutes for this kind of real social performance in efforts to make performance context an operational paradigm for the study of Proverbs. Two substitutes are most common: the literary context of Proverbs and the discourse context of Proverbs.[34] Fox argues decisively against the idea that literary arrangements could serve as substitutes for performance context. Literary *arrangements* "are not situations (real or fictional) in which someone uses a proverb in an attempt to influence others" (Fox 2003, 154). Rather, literary contexts are merely the vehicle for that influence. Literary context is the *object* of conceptualization, in other words. It cannot also be the performance context.

[34] Ansberry (2011) starts out with a strong notion of performance context apart from literary context. He reflects at some length on the need for a real social performance in order to discern the meaning of proverbial expressions. However, he ends up conflating performance context with literary context. He writes, "Once a proverb is grafted into a collection it receives a new performance context, viz., the literary context, the *Sitz im Buch*" (Ansberry 2011, 72).

In contrast, Fox reflects that in works of ancient Near Eastern didactic wisdom the "discourse setting in which the teachings are delivered" functions as a type of context "that is comparable to proverb performance but that has not been recognized as such" (2003, 154). He observes that, "Here we do hear someone speaking to someone else with an attempt to influence him or the situation" (Fox 2003, 154). Fox examines the "way that Wisdom books *present themselves* and define their speakers and audiences, the media by which their teachings are said to be communicated, and their purposes" (2003, 155; italics in original). He concludes that "Future readers are to place themselves imaginatively in this setting, standing, as it were, in place of the son listening to his father" (2003, 169). This is the performance context of Proverbs as Fox envisions it. He characterizes this imagined communicative situation as a kind of "reconstituted orality," which he describes as allowing "the act of teaching to be reenacted repeatedly and perpetually" (2003, 170). In addition, Fox recognizes the communicative situation that obtains between writer and reader:

> The father is not the only communicator, nor the son (and future generations) the only audience in Wisdom literature. The author is sometimes conscious of speaking to future readers. This dimension of communication is present in any written work (either in the author's or transcriber's intention), but only rarely are future readers given explicit attention. (Fox 2003, 158)

Fox reflects further that the communicative frame of a father teaching a son may not have applied to material in the older collections (Prov 10-29) before they were joined with Prov 1-9. However, there is a virtual consensus among Proverbs scholars that, "When the prologue was added, its view of the audiences and purposes of Wisdom naturally became those of the book in its entirety" (Fox 2003, 160). Therefore, according to Fox, the discourse setting of a reader imagining they are being instructed by the father figure in Proverbs 1-9 can now be conceived as the performance context of the book.

Jacqueline Vayntrub (2018) also focuses on the "speakers" of Proverbs and envisions a kind of reconstituted orality. She examines the literary representation of what she calls "speech performance frames" in a number of ancient Near Eastern works of didactic instruction and compares them to discourse frames in Proverbs. She highlights salient differences between the staged performance of speech in Proverbs and other instructional texts—namely, the total absence in Proverbs of any kind of narrative of speech performance. Her conclusion is similar to Fox's in that she envisions repeated use of material in Proverbs. Her notion of the speaker, however, is more specific—and also, I would argue, unnecessarily confined. She writes that,

> outside of narrative time, what we read as poetry presents itself in the text as the perpetually speaking voice of the speaker … it is the medium of the text itself that functions as the perpetual voice. We might say that, in Proverbs, the text—not the legendary figure named in the titles—has become the speaker. (Vayntrub 2018, 184)

For Vayntrub, then, the text replaces human speaker in the performance of speech in Proverbs. I follow Vayntrub in a number of respects (which I explain below), but I depart from her in this. The notion of text as speaker is too confined when we consider the "psychological nature of communication" (Gibbs 1999). Specifically, it fails to include the critical role of readers imagining actual human speakers in interpretation (§2.1).

In order to flesh out the Ground (i.e., the performance context) of Proverbs as I see it, I offer the following as my own examination of the self-presentation of Proverbs.

2.2.1 The self-presentation of Proverbs

I examine two ways in which Proverbs presents itself—first, in the preface it provides in the prologue (1:1-7) (§2.2.1.1), and then, in staged speech performances throughout the book

(§2.2.1.2). My argument in the second subsection (§2.2.1.2) is that there is both literarily staged and *actual* speech performance when people read Proverbs.

2.2.1.1 The prologue of Proverbs

The prologue of Proverbs (1:1-7) presents the rest of the book as an instructional resource for two audiences: for students (vv 2-4) and teachers (vv 5-6). All the contents in Proverbs that follow the prologue function as lessons that address students (i.e., readers) and that teachers can use in teaching students. The prologue explains what at least one ancient producer thought the book in its final form could be used to accomplish in these respects and lays out in a schematic way how students and teachers alike can benefit from it.

1 מִשְׁלֵי שְׁלֹמֹה בֶּן־דָּוִד מֶלֶךְ יִשְׂרָאֵל
2 לָדַעַת חָכְמָה וּמוּסָר לְהָבִין אִמְרֵי בִינָה
3 לָקַחַת מוּסַר הַשְׂכֵּל צֶדֶק וּמִשְׁפָּט וּמֵישָׁרִים
4 לָתֵת לִפְתָאיִם עָרְמָה לְנַעַר דַּעַת וּמְזִמָּה
5 יִשְׁמַע חָכָם וְיוֹסֶף לֶקַח וְנָבוֹן תַּחְבֻּלוֹת יִקְנֶה
6 לְהָבִין מָשָׁל וּמְלִיצָה דִּבְרֵי חֲכָמִים וְחִידֹתָם
7 יִרְאַת יְהוָה רֵאשִׁית דָּעַת חָכְמָה וּמוּסָר אֱוִילִים בָּזוּ

1 "Proverbs of Solomon, son of David, king of Israel"

2 To know wisdom and discipline,
to understand words of understanding,

3 to receive the discipline of insight —
righteousness, justice, and equity,

4 to give inexperienced youths cunning,
a young man, knowledge and discretion —

5 let a wise man hear and add to his persuasiveness,
and let a man of understanding acquire guidance —

6 to understand a saying and a difficult saying,
words of the wise and their riddles:

7 the fear of Yahweh is the beginning of knowledge,
but fools despise wisdom and discipline.

The two groups mentioned in the prologue are the young and inexperienced students, the *pětāyîm* ("inexperienced ones" in v 4a) and *naʿar* ("young boy" in v 4b), on one hand and then the older and wiser teachers, the *ḥākām* and *nābōn* ("wise" and "understanding" in v 5), on the other.[35] As Fox explains, the audience of the prologue are the teachers only.

> Since a naïve, untutored boy can hardly be expected to educate himself by independently studying the book, the book must be intended for use by someone else in educating him. This user is a reader, to be identified with the 'wise man' mentioned in 1:5. It is he, not the boy, to whom the prologue speaks. (Fox 2003, 159)

The use of Proverbs by readers has evolved. Many have and continue to read it without the mediating influence of teachers. However, as we consider the way the book presents itself, this is exactly as Fox describes—as a resource for wise men to use in teaching untutored young boys.

Most commentators envision the earliest students of Proverbs as young men on the verge of becoming adults, old enough to be tempted by dangerous characters (1:9-20; 2:12-15; 4:14-17) and sexual encounters (2:16-19; 5:1-23; 6:20-35; 7:1-27; 23:27; 29:3; 30:20). These young men were looking toward marriage (5:15-19; 11:22; 12:4; 14:1; 18:22; 19:14; 21:9, 19; 25:24; 31:10-31) but were still young enough to be called *petî* ("simple" or "inexperienced") and *naʿar* ("boy")[36] and to receive the very basic instructions that we find in Proverbs. They are the audience of everything in the book after the prologue. They are also the ones whom we can imagine producers imagining when they arranged their collections in the ways that they did.

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[35] A third type of person is mentioned in v 7, the *ʾăwîlîm* ("fools"). They are what the *petî* and the *naʿar* will become, if they do not heed the words of their teachers.

[36] Fox notes that Hebrew *naʿar* is used to refer to infants (Exod 2:6; 1 Sam 4:21), mid- to later-adolescents (Gen 21-22, 37:2), and also young adults (1 Sam 30:17; 2 Sam 18:5) (2000, 62).

The benefits that the prologue describes for teachers and students are listed in the string of five infinitives that run from v 2 to v 6 with the interruption of direct address to wise men in v 5.[37] The implicit subjects of the infinitives in vv 2-3 are the young students, and the implicit subjects of the infinitives in vv 4 and 6 are the wise teachers:[38]

Benefits to students:	v 2a	**to know** wisdom and discipline
	v 2b	**to understand** words of insight
	v 3a	**to receive** the discipline of insight —
	v 3b	righteousness, justice, and equity
Benefits to teachers:	v 4a	**to give** inexperienced youths cunning —
	v 4b	a young man, knowledge and discretion
	v 6a	**to understand** a saying and an difficult saying,
	v 6b	words of the wise and their riddles

Benefits that the prologue promises teachers all relate to their teaching skills (vv 4-5) and abilities to interpret difficult sayings (*mĕlîṣāh*) and riddles (*ḥîdōtām*) (v 6). Regarding the latter two terms, commentators note that there really are no *mĕlîṣōt* or *ḥîdōt* anywhere in Proverbs (Whybray 1994; Murphy 1998; Fox 2000: Perdue 2000). The instructions are all highly accessible and seem geared toward young rather than advanced learners.[39]

Explanations abound as to possible referents of *mĕlîṣōt* or *ḥîdōt* in v 6.[40] I offer an additional explanation. The first nouns in each of the nominal phrases in both vv 6a and 6b are

[37] Of all the ancient Near Eastern instructions that precede Proverbs, only Amenemope also opens with a series of infinitives that are dependent on a heading in the same way that infinitives in the prologue of Proverbs are (Whybray 1994; Fox 2000; Loader 2014).

[38] Many commentators construe the implicit subject of *ntn* in v 4 as the book itself. This is of course possible. I opt for imagining the wise as the subject in light of the fact that in the earliest uses of the book, there would always have been a teacher/father mediating the instructions in Proverbs to students/sons.

[39] See Brown 1996, Yoder 2009, Ansberry 2011, and Clifford 2017 for proposals regarding possible developmental trajectories that can be discerned from the beginning to the end of Proverbs.

[40] See Fox 2000 for a summary.

also present in four of the five headings of collections in Proverbs—namely, the *mišlê* of Solomon (1:1, 10:1, 25:1) and the *dibrê ḥăkāmîm* (22:17). It is also likely the case that *dibrê ḥăkāmîm* are referents in the fifth heading as well. This can be concluded on the basis of the expression *gam ʾēlleh laḥăkāmîm* ("these also are of/by/belong to the wise") in 24:23. These headings lead me to wonder if the first word in the two phrases in v 6 are meant to allude to them. Both *dābār* and *māšāl* are relatively common words—especially *dābār*. However, it is also true that these are the two only terms that appear in the headings of the main collections of Proverbs as characterizations of the literary forms that follow. On the basis of this observation, I offer the following speculation. If allusions to subsequent material in Proverbs are in fact intended in v 6, the pragmatic rhetorical thrust of v 6 may be, "to understand *not only* a saying (which you will find in this book) *but also* a difficult saying (for which you will have to look outside this book) // and *not only* the words of the wise (which you will find in this book) but also their riddles (for which you will have to look outside this book)." This is admittedly speculative, but it is also one of many hypotheses.

The nouns *leqaḥ* (v 5a) and *taḥbulōt* (v 5b) both describe skills that are required for good teaching. *Leqaḥ* refers to persuasive speech, that which "inheres in the communication of the message rather than in the knowledge itself" (Fox 2000, 62). Commentators typically point this out. The situation is different with *taḥbulōt*. This word is used to refer to "guidance" of some kind. Fox describes it as "the skill that directs actions, and possibly the act of giving advice and direction." He continues,

> The wise can acquire *taḥbulōt* by studying Proverbs. The guidance called *taḥbulōt* can be used in directing oneself or others. (Fox 2000, 63)

Most commentators interpret *taḥbulōt* as guidance that wise teachers can expect to gain for their own benefit in their continued reading of Proverbs (Whybray 1994; Murphy 1998; Clifford 1999; Fox 2000; Perdue 2000; Waltke 2004). It makes sense to imagine that the more a person reads and uses Proverbs to teach others, the more they themselves would gain from the book. As Proverbs 9:9a says, "Give to the wise, and he will become wiser." However, I would argue that both *leqaḥ* (v 5a) and *taḥbulōt* (v 5b) refer to the quality of teaching that the wise offer others, not to guidance they gain for themselves.

Taḥbulōt is an uncommon word in the Hebrew Bible, occurring only six times (five of them in Proverbs). Each time it is used, it evokes conceptualizations of guidance given for the good (or bad) of others—for the good of clouds in Job 37:12; for the good of students in Prov 1:5; the absence of *taḥbulōt* leads to people stumbling (or falling) in Prov 11:4; the wicked use *taḥbulōt* to deceive others in Prov 12:5; commanding officers use *taḥbulōt* to guide soldiers in Prov 20:18; and *taḥbulōt* is again used to refer to the counsel that soldiers receive in war in Prov 24:6. In three of these uses, *taḥbulōt* is parallel to a word that also refers to offering counsel to others: *yōʿēṣ* in Prov 11:14 ("one who counsels"), *ʿēṣāh* in Prov 20:18 ("counsel"), and *yōʿēṣ* in Prov 24:6 ("one who counsels"). Parallelism is not always indicative of similar meaning (e.g., Kugel 1998). However, in these cases, similar meanings seem likely. If similar meanings do obtain in these cases, then *taḥbulōt* in Prov 1:5 must also be descriptive of something that a teacher would use to guide students, not himself.

Commentators debate the nature of the teaching situation that the prologue (Prov 1:1-7) prepares for—namely, that which we see reflected in the addresses of a father to a son or sons in the rest of Proverbs 1-9. Are we to imagine a school-like setting in which a teacher teaches a pupil (or group of pupils) or a family situation where it is really a father who instructs a

biological son (or sons)? The frames of address that occur throughout Proverbs 1-9 involve a father speaking to a son or sons (1:8-19; 2:1-22; 3:1-2; 3:21-35; 4:1-9; 4:10-19; 4:20-27; 5:1-23; 6:20-35; 7:1-27). Some scholars interpret this frame of address as though it represents a non-familial setting in which a teacher teaches students (McKane 1970; Loader 2014). Some envision actual family instruction (Crenshaw 1985, 1992; Murphy 1998; Clifford 1999; Fox 2000; Waltke 2004; Ansberry 2011). Others think it could be either (e.g., Whybray 1994). David Carr underscores that, as in other cultures, sons in ancient Israel generally adopted the occupations of their fathers. According to Carr, this would require some sort of family-based education "by a 'father' in both the biological and pedagogical sense" (2005, 130). In addition, many point to the role of the mother as a teacher in Proverbs 1:8-9 and 6:20. The analogy between a "father" and a non-familial teacher is conceivable. However, an analogy between a *mother* and a non-familial teacher is much less (or not) conceivable (Carr 2005; Fox 2003, 2009; Ansberry 2011).

However we envision the relationship between teacher and student that serves as the staged communicative situation of Proverbs, when we consider the frame of address in father-son instruction, it is literarily staged speech performance that is in question. In the next section, I examine in more detail the literary representation of speech performance throughout Proverbs, including father-son instruction.

2.2.1.2 Staged and actual speech performance in Proverbs

Vayntrub (2018) reanalyzes poetry in the Hebrew Bible—the *māšāl* (typically translated "proverb") in particular—as the literary representation of moments of performed speech. I adopt her notions of "represented speech performance" and "speech performance frames" but identify

them differently throughout Proverbs. In this section, I describe her working typology of instructional frames and the heart of her project in *Beyond Orality: Hebrew Poetry on Its Own Terms* (2018). I also describe my understanding of speech performance and speech performance frames as I think we find them in Proverbs.

Exemplars of speech performance frames as Vayntrub defines them are the narratival introductions that preface didactic instructions from elsewhere in the ancient Near East (e.g., the Mesopotamian *Instructions of Shuruppak,* the Aramaic *Instructions of Ahiqar*, and the Egyptian *Instructions of Ptahhotep* and *Amenemope*). The narrative introductions in these texts provide substantial information about the relevant staged speech situations—minimally, the names of speakers, hearers, and the nature of the relationship between them (usually father and son); also, characteristically, some narrative about the occasion for the composition and/or transmission of the text (i.e., the speech performance) that follows the speech performance frame. In contrast, as Vayntrub notes, we find almost none of this information about the staged speakers and hearers in Proverbs.

Vayntrub identifies the following frames of instruction in Proverbs: 1) headings that mention a famous speaker who does not speak at all—namely, Solomon (1:1; 10:1; 25:1); 2) headings that name an obscure speaker (Agur in 30:1 and Lemuel's mother in 31:1); and 3) instances where the speakers are anonymous and stereotyped figures (e.g., the father in chs 1-9) (2018, 204).[41] In comparison to other ancient Near Eastern didactic texts, the headings in Proverbs are spare, to say the least. In most cases, they offer only two pieces of information—a proper name (1:1; 10:1; 25:1; 30:1; 31:1) or reference to "the wise" (22:17; 24:23) followed by a

[41] Vayntrub does not explicitly represent the frames in 22:17 and 24:12 in her working typology, but she discusses these headings thoroughly in her study.

term that characterizes the ensuing discourse (*měšālîm* in 1:1, 10:1; 25:1; *dĕbārîm* in 22:17, 30:1, 31:1; and simply *ʾēlleh* in 24:23).[42] Lemuel is the only named addressee in Proverbs, and, as Vayntrub points out, his speaking mother is not named. Significantly, nothing about the broader circumstances or the reason or occasion for the performed moments of speech in any part of Proverbs are mentioned in any of its headings.

Vayntrub's thesis—and the heart of her project—is the idea that Proverbs purposefully departs from traditional ways of introducing didactic instructions. She suggests that unlike the producers of *Shuruppak*, *Ahiqar*, *Ptahhotep*, and *Amenemope*, the producers of Proverbs do not provide contextualizing information about the performance or transmission of discourses in Proverbs for a very specific reason. She believes this is because, as noted above, the producers of Proverbs want readers to identify the *text* as the speaker—not a famous individual. A quotation from Vayntrub's study already cited above illustrates this point: "it is the medium of the text itself that functions as the perpetual voice" (2018, 184). Vayntrub sees Proverbs making a distinct literary claim against broader traditions of instruction text-making. She concludes, "The work uses its frames to shift authority from a fictional moment of speech performance, in the voice of a named-and-famed individual to the enduring presence of the text itself" (2018, 205). Vayntrub demonstrates this shift in Proverbs away from headings that contextualize performed speech by authoritative speakers to headings that introduce authoritative texts decisively. As a result, there is a mismatch between the rhetorical function that the Solomonic (1:1; 10:1; 25:1) and *ḥăkāmîm* (22:17; 23:12) headings perform and their classification as speech performance

[42] Vayntrub notes that the use of *ēlleh* ("these") in the headings in Prov 24:23 and 25:1 show "stronger traces to an awareness of the texts [that follow] as written collections." She appropriately suggests that the word *these* in both of these instances "refers to something outside the utterance itself" (2018, 196-197). In other words, the demonstratives in these headings point to the written text that follows.

frames. In other words, the shift from a literary representation of a famous speaker speaking to that famous speaker *not* speaking is so decisive that alternate terminology to describe the Solomonic and *ḥăkāmîm* headings is called for. We might call these headings *frames of production* in order to underscore their distinction from the introductory frames in other ancient Near Eastern instructional texts. This terminological change would also highlight their distinction from the frames of staged speech performance in the rest of Proverbs.

Where Vayntrub sees three frames of instruction in Proverbs, I see two *frames of production*, two types of *explicit speech performance frames*, and thirdly, *implicit speech performance frames*, which I will argue encompass each individual saying in the sentence collections. (The italicized portions below represent translations of actual material in Proverbs.)

FRAMES OF PRODUCTION

1)	Proverbs 1:1	*The měšālîm of **Solomon**, son of David, king of Israel*
	Proverbs 10:1	*The měšālîm of **Solomon***
	Proverbs 25:1	*These are also měšālîm of **Solomon**,* *which the men of Hezekiah king of Judah copied.*
2)	Proverbs 22:17	*… the words of **the wise** …*
	Proverbs 24:23	*These also belong to **the wise**.*

FRAMES OF STAGED SPEECH PERFORMANCE

1)	Proverbs 30:1	*The words of **Agur** son of Jakeh of Massa*
	Proverbs 31:1	*The words of **Lemuel** king of Massa,* *which his mother taught him*
2)	Proverbs 1-9, 22:17-24:34	father-son addresses
	Proverbs 1:20ff; 8:1ff; 9:4ff	Lady Wisdom addresses
	Proverbs 6:6-11	direct address to a sluggard (by the "father")
	Proverbs 27:23-27	direct address to readers by an agriculturalist

IMPLICIT SPEECH PERFORMANCE FRAMES	throughout sentence collections (10:1b-22:16; 25:1-29:27)

The frames of production in Proverbs are not frames of speech performance. As Vayntrub demonstrates, Solomon and "the wise" (as in the plural *ḥăkāmîm* of the headings in 22:17 and 24:23) do not speak in Proverbs.[43] The Solomonic and *ḥăkāmîm* headings are purely the kinds of "authorizing devices" that Vayntrub and others envision them to be. These headings do not stage speech performances in which the named individual speaks (Vayntrub 2018, 204).[44] Therefore, they are better designated *frames of production*. They play central authorizing and organizing roles in the production of the book, and that is all.

In contrast, we *do* see Agur, Lemuel's mother, the father, Lady Wisdom, and an agriculturalist speak in Proverbs. Regarding the speech of Agur and Lemuel's mother, the

[43] Most commentators agree with this, though some maintain that it is possible for Solomon to have spoken or written at least some of the sayings that we find in Proverbs (e.g., Loader 2014, 50). Very few maintain that Solomon was responsible for the book as a whole (e.g., Waltke 2004, 2005). Fox cogently summarizes why it is more logical to see a disconnect between the person of Solomon and material in Proverbs: "Historically, it is improbable that many—if any—of the proverbs were written by Solomon. The social background implied by the sayings is quite varied. The proverbs do not usually bespeak concerns of the royal court and never speak from the perspective of a monarch. Moreover, many of the teachings would not make sense as Solomon's tutelage of his son. Concerns such as the dangers of guaranteeing a loan for another, the threat of public disgrace, and the assumption of monogamy do not seem like words of Solomon to Rehoboam. A prince would hardly fall in with highwaymen (1:8-18), and 7:6 is not compatible with the location of Solomon's palace" (Fox 2000, 56). In addition, Crenshaw observes that Proverbs makes no mention of anything that is listed in 1 Kgs 5 as the subjects of Solomon's 3,000 proverbs and 1,005 songs (1 Kgs 5:10-14 [4:30-34]) (e.g., cedars and hyssop trees, beasts, birds, reptiles, and fish) (Crenshaw 1995, 356-357; 1989, 33). There are sayings in Proverbs that mention animals (Prov 6:6-8; 30:24-31). However, they are few in number, and none present the encyclopedic kind of insight that the passage in Kings seems to suggest Solomon offered. Ansberry (2011) views the Solomonic headings as prompts for readers to imagine Solomon's as "the voice that is heard throughout the document"—and more specifically, as a prompt for readers to picture "Solomon in the implied role of father" (2011, 46). The reading that Ansberry provides is strained and in service of his larger project of characterizing the courtly or royal nature of Proverbs as a whole. His interpretation of Prov 1:5-6 as addressing the young and inexperienced student in particular has problems.

[44] Regarding the *ḥăkāmîm* headings, the fact that the speaker in the discourses following both 22:17 and 24:23 speaks in the first-person singular—e.g., 1cs forms in 22:17, 19, 20; 24:30, 32, and *bĕnî* ("my son") specifically in 23:15, 19, 26; 24:13, 21—signals a disconnect between the staged speaker in 22:17-24:34 and the *ḥăkāmîm* in the headings of 22:17 and 24:23. It is also telling that *ḥăkāmîm* ("words of the wise") is parallel to *daʿtî* ("my knowledge") in 22:17. It is as if the staged speaker is both identifying a prominent source (the *ḥăkāmîm*) of his discourse and also acknowledging his redeployment of material from that source in his discourse—namely, because his knowledge (*daʿtî*) derives from the words of the *ḥăkāmîm*.

headings in 30:1 and 31:1 share formal similarity with the Solomonic (1:1; 10:1; 25:1) and *ḥăkāmîm* (22:17; 24:23) headings. However, we actually "see" and "hear" Agur and Lemuel's mother speak in Proverbs 30 and 31. The discourse function of the headings in 30:1 and 31:1 is thus distinct from the Solomonic and *ḥăkāmîm* headings. For this reason, I view the Agur (30:1) and Lemuel's mother (31:1) headings as speech performance frames. The speech of both Agur and Lemuel's mother *is* represented in Prov 30-31.

The precise nature of frames in this category of *explicit speech performance frames* varies. These speech performance frames stage the father, Lady Wisdom, and an agriculturalist as speakers. To begin, we can compare frames that introduce speech by the father (1:8; 2:1; 3:1, 21; 4:1, 10, 20; 5:1; 6:20; 7:1) with frames that introduce the speech of Lady Wisdom (1:20-21; 8:1-3; 9:1-3). Only Lady Wisdom is given narrative introductions. She is portrayed on the street, in the market, and at the city gate raising her voice (1:20-21); at high points by the road and at crossroads (8:1-3); preparing her home, preparing a meal, and sending her servants to invite the simple and those who lack sense to come to her banquet (9:1-6).

In contrast, the speech performance of the father is framed primarily through only the vocative *bĕnî* ("my son") and other first- and second-person forms. The performed speech of the agriculturalist in 27:23-27 is framed in even more minimal terms—namely, through *only* the use of second-person verbal forms. These differences are readily apparent. However, speech performances of the father, Lady Wisdom, and the agriculturalist are *all* framed by means of second-person linguistic forms (the father in 1:8-19; 2:1-22; 3:1-12, 21-35; 4:1-6:11, 20-26; 7:1-5, 24-27; Lady Wisdom in 1:22-27; 8:4-6, 10, 32-33; 9:4-6, 11-12; the agriculturalist in 27:23, 26-27). In addition, the father and Lady Wisdom both use first-person forms as well (the father in 1:8, 10, 15; 2:1; 3:1, 11, 21; 4:1-2, 3-4, 10-11, 20; 5:1, 7, 20; 6:1; 7:1-2, 6-7, 24; Lady Wisdom

in 1:23-26, 28, 30, 33; 8:4-36; 9:5, 11). To this list of explicit speech performance frames, we could add all the occurrences of explicit directives (i.e., imperatives and prohibitions) that appear sporadically in the sentence collections.[45]

There are obvious differences between the minimal framing of speech performance of these explicit frames and the elaborate introductory speech performance frames in texts like *Shuruppak*, *Ahiqar*, *Ptahhotep*, and *Amenemope*. The more elaborate introductory frames in these other texts serve different rhetorical purposes than the minimal frames of staged speech performance in Proverbs. The narrative frames in Mesopotamian, Egyptian, and Aramaic texts associate an ideal performance with a specific famous individual at a particular point in their life and/or career (e.g., on the eve of Ptahhotep's retirement). In other words, these other texts socially locate the performances they portray. In doing so, they also encourage a particular reception and reuse—e.g., within a royal lineage (Vayntrub 2018, 192-193). These differences notwithstanding, speech performance frames in Proverbs and other ancient Near Eastern instructions share the function of literarily staging moments of performed speech. Moreover, Vayntrub offers a compelling thesis regarding their differences by identifying a shift from authoritative famous speaker to authoritative text in Proverbs. To be clear, I follow Vayntrub in perceiving an *intentional* shift of authority from a famous individual to the text itself in Proverbs. However, I differ from Vayntrub in maintaining a conception of humans with certain pragmatic intentions behind the text as the "speaking voice" of the book, whereas she envisions "the text itself" functioning "as the perpetual voice" (2018, 184).

[45] Direct address and admonitions are infrequent in the sentence collections, but they do occur. See 14:7; 16:3; 17:12; 19:18, 20, 27 (also includes *bĕnî*); 20:13, 16, 22; 22:6, 10; 25:6-7, 9-10, 17, 21-22; 26:4-5; 27:1, 10, 11, 13, 22, 23-27. In addition, sentence sayings appear in instruction collections as well—sometimes as capstone statements in lectures (e.g., 1:19; 3:33-35). See also 24:3-9, 23b-26.

The frame of staged speech performance that I have yet to describe is what I call the *implicit speech performance frame*. I view second-person address as an *explicit* literary representation of speech performance—even in the absence of a profiled speaker (as is the case in the agriculturalist's speech in 27:23-27 and the intermittent instances of direct address that are scattered throughout the sentence collections). Yet, I would argue further: because I view the pragmatic context of Proverbs as an actual communicative situation, I view even third-person speech in Proverbs as representative of speech performance. Third-person speech in Proverbs is meant to *address* readers in the same way that second-person language in the book does. I present a detailed argument for this in §2.3. My contention is that the producers of Proverbs mean to address readers in genuine acts of communication. Speech performance in the sentence literature is not staged in the same way as in other parts of the book. However, I envision an implicit speech performance frame around each didactic unit in the sentence collections. However, other scholars do not talk about the sentence literature in this way.

Like most scholars who study Proverbs, Vayntrub describes the father-son addresses and the "unframed" discourses of the sentence collections in Proverbs 10-22 and 25-29 as lacking a "meaningful performance context." She describes the father-son instructions in particular as "speech events without the event, awaiting destination or effect, ready for adoption by a father instructing his son" (2018, 203). However, reliance on cognitive theory provides a different account of these instances of represented speech performance. I argue that any reading of any didactic unit in Proverbs is a "speech event." I argue this because in each reading, a communicative exchange takes place. In other words, each reading of material in Proverbs can be analyzed as an *actual speech performance*, not in the sense that the producers have physically "spoken" to readers—but in the sense that a "communicative performance" has taken place,

however asynchronous the performance. It will be remembered that cognitive theorists stress that joint attention and intersubjectivity between writers and readers are general properties of communication via texts. Therefore, rather than imagine instructions in Proverbs "awaiting destination or effect," we should assume that the producers of Proverbs intended to have an immediate effect on readers in an actual speech (i.e., communicative) performance.

2.2.2 The performance context of Proverbs: producers imagining readers, readers imagining producers

Our reconstructive effort in imagining the producers as they imagined their readers and readers as they imagine the producers requires more than imagining one group imagining the other. We must also imagine producers imagining *themselves* instructing their readers; and in the same way, we must imagine readers imagining *themselves* being instructed by producers. In short, we must reconstruct self-reflective producers and audiences. Information generated from such considerations constitutes essential elements in the context models that producers and readers would access while producing and interpreting material in Proverbs. This does not mean that everything each one might imagine about the other is accurate or even the same—or, for that matter, that what any trained analyst imagines about either one is accurate or the same as what other trained analysts imagine. It means that certain background considerations always proliferate in the context models that inform how producers create their texts and how readers construe their experiences reading these texts. For our purposes, especially important among these background considerations are producer ideas about the reception of readers and reader ideas about the pragmatic (or pedagogical) intentions of producers.

The producers and readers that we imagine are blends. Blending is something that we do in the most basic kinds of thought—making an analogy between our mom and our mom's mom, combining a noun and an adjective, understanding a metaphor, saying that Obama was the president of the United States in 2009.[46] Fauconnier and Turner (2002) show that blending, or conceptual integration, is a primary process in literal and figurative thinking alike. Dancygier and Sweetser describe blending as "a general theory of meaning emergence" (2014, 75, fn 2). Four blends are important in the meaning construction that readers perform when they read Proverbs: a Producer blend, a Reader blend, an Instructional Setting blend, and a Reader in the Scene blend. These blends all pertain to language users and the settings in which they communicate. Therefore, I refer to them as pragmatic blends. I describe each one after a brief introduction to blending theory.

Blending involves selecting analogous conceptual structure (or mental space topology) from two or more mental spaces and combining it in a single space. The result is a new entity with emergent meaning. All metaphors are blends. Metaphors map corresponding conceptual structure from a source and target space into a single space that contains the metaphorical blend.[47] Consider *mental detox* and *infotoxins*. Dancygier and Sweetser (2014) demonstrate how to build a blend using these (and other) expressions that were prominent during the Occupy Wall Street movement. To build a blend, a minimum of four spaces is needed: a generic space, at least

[46] See Fauconnier 1997, 149-186; Fauconnier and Turner 2002, 7-8, 39-50; Dancygier and Sweetser 2014, 82-97. The examples in this sentence reflect more than one type of blend. Fauconnier and Turner (2002) identify four: single-scope, simplex, mirror, and double-scope blends. See Dancygier and Sweetser for a summary of these blends (2014, 87-94).

[47] For this reason, metaphors are single-scope blends. Single-scope blends are blends in which one of the input spaces provides the organizing frame for the blend. In the toxic information blend (described below), the body (i.e., the source frame) is the primary organizing frame in the blend. In this blend, the mind is conceived as a whole-body organism.

two input spaces, and a blend space. The generic space contains conceptual structure that all the input spaces share. Input spaces all share elements of conceptual structure that are mapped onto one another in the blend. Finally, the blend space contains conceptual structure that has been selectively mapped from each input space to create the blend. Dancygier and Sweetser provide the following diagram to illustrate the blend on which both *mental detox* and *infotoxins* rely for meaning:



Figure 2.7 The "toxic information" blend (based on Dancygier and Sweetser 2014, figure 4.2)

Dancygier and Sweetser stress that inputs cannot be projected into a blend as whole gestalts. Not every detail in their conceptual structure is relevant for the blend. Fauconnier and Turner describe this facet of blending as *selective projection* (2002, 47). Only corresponding elements of

inputs that are important in the emergent meaning are mapped into the blend. In the above example, the specific way in which a harmful element might enter the body (e.g., mercury being absorbed through the skin) is not mapped onto how information enters the mind. That is an irrelevant detail. Dancygier and Sweetser underscore, in addition, that blends have very general structural properties (2014, 83). As noted above, the emergent meanings that result in blends rely on selective mappings of general structure. Therefore, the conceptual structure of blends is usually very general in nature. Apprehending the new emergent meaning in blends is called *running the blend*. Running the blend is a matter of perceiving the inferences that a blend may yield. In the blend above, information is toxic, and ridding the mind of toxic information heals the mind. These inferences give the expressions *infotoxins* and *mental detox* new and impactful meaning, and they are only possible because of the blend.

Turning to Proverbs, the four pragmatic blends to be described are not metaphorical. Each one relates to the performance context of the book. The first two characterize the *participants* in the performance context; the third is a cognitive model of the *performance context* itself; and the fourth one materializes each time that readers apprehend the *personal implications* of material in Proverbs at their reception-end of the performance context. The fourth blend requires more discussion than the others. For this reason, I review the first three here and return to Reader in the Scene blends at the end of §2.2.2.2.

Each of these four blends are mirror blends. Mirror blends are blends in which each input space shares conceptual structure, or mental space topology. Consider the *Producer blend*. The input spaces in this blend receive conceptual structure from frames that analysts would have in their conceptual systems of people they imagine as responsible for creating the book of Proverbs. It is crucial to keep in mind that blends, like all conceptual structures, vary from person to

person. There is no one *correct* Producer blend. Scholars who study Proverbs will have very different blended notions of the producers of Proverbs than lay readers. The point of elaborating this blend is to underscore that when talk about the producers of Proverbs, the collective we have in mind is a composite (or blended) mental construct. We can imagine the following roles in the production of the book blending into a composite notion of the producers of Proverbs.

GENERIC SPACE	a person producing a verbal instruction
INPUT SPACES	1) a speaker coining a saying 2) other speakers using that saying 3) someone writing down that saying 4) someone collecting that saying in a collection of sayings 5) someone taking that saying and adding it to Proverbs
BLENDED SPACE	a composite notion of all of these producers producing Proverbs

Turning to how analysts may picture the readers of Proverbs, any conception that we imagine is also a necessarily composite one. However, we can make the *Reader blend* simpler:

GENERIC SPACE	an individual encountering language in a communicative setting
INPUT SPACES	1) the earliest audiences of Proverbs (hearers and readers) 2) subsequent audiences of Proverbs (hearers and readers)
BLENDED SPACE	a composite notion of hearers and readers of Proverbs as readers

When I talk in the rest of the study about producers and readers, these are the blended cognitive models that I have in mind. My primary assumption regarding the communicative intentions of the producers of Proverbs is that they intended to impact students who would use their book as an instructional resource *directly*. I assume, in other words, that the producers intended to instruct readers to do and believe certain things and to become certain kinds of people. Corresponding with this conception of the producers, I assume that readers imagine(d) the pragmatic intentions of producers in precisely this way. Therefore, I imagine readers who apprehend (or construe) personal implications for themselves when they read material in

Proverbs. I imagine, in other words, that readers imagine they are being instructed to do and believe certain things and to become certain kinds of people each time they read material in the book of Proverbs.

The model of reading and interpretation that I develop is applicable to any type of reader who imagines personal implications for themselves when they read Proverbs. The Reader blend is essentially an open template that can be used to describe any reader. For the operational purposes of the present study, I theorize mainly how the young male students who most likely comprised the earliest audiences of Proverbs might have interpreted material in this book. However, this model of reading can be repurposed to describe interpretations of readers in other times and places as well.

2.2.2.1 Embedding in a BCSN: *Instructional Setting blends*

The *Instructional Setting blend* is a cognitive model of the performance context of Proverbs that is informed by the self-presentation of Proverbs. In this model, the blended notions just described of producers and readers of Proverbs interact. This is of course not an actual social interaction, but it is an actual speech performance in the sense that the communicative use of language is produced by one party (with the other party in mind) and apprehended by another party (who have the producing party in mind). It will be remembered that Dijk stresses the cognitive nature of all notions of context (§2.1.2). The cognitive nature of the performance context of Proverbs is especially apparent in that each participant in the instructional situation *imagines* the other. The producers imagine the students they intend to teach, and the readers imagine the producers who created the book in order to teach them. Therefore, inputs to the

Instructional Setting blend are structured by frames of teaching scenarios in which writers teach people who are going to use the book for purposes of instruction.

GENERIC SPACE	an instructor teaching a learner
INPUT SPACES	1) a writer teaching a wise man 2) a writer teaching a reader
BLENDED SPACE	producers teaching readers

Readers who construe the Ground of Proverbs in this way envision a *directive pragmatic context* when they read the book. This notion of performance context is different from the notion presented by Fox in which he envisions a reader placing themselves imaginatively "in the place of the son listening to his father" (2003, 154). A similarity between these notions of performance context is that in each one, readers imagine they are being instructed when they read Proverbs. They imagine, in other words, that the purpose of Proverbs is to influence choices they make.

A difference between these construals of the performance context of Proverbs is that the interaction I imagine readers imagining is one in which they learn from *the producers of Proverbs*. Whereas, the interaction that Fox imagines readers imagining is one in which they imagine learning from *the father figure in Proverbs*. In other words, Fox envisions readers as participants in the staged speech performance of father-son instruction. Whereas I envision readers as participants in a communicative exchange that obtains between the producers and readers an Instructional Setting blend. In other words, I see the staged speech performance that Fox characterizes as the discourse context of Proverbs as being *embedded within* interactions between the producers and readers. We can represent this nested relation as [producers teaching readers [a father teaching a son]].

2.2.2.2 Personal implications and viewpoint in simulation: *Reader in the Scene blends*

Readers who have some notion of an Instructional Setting blend in mind when they read Proverbs—whether they reflect consciously on this blend or not—are primed to construe personal implications for themselves when they read this book. That means this particular kind of reader is prompted to imagine themselves as a *participant* in scenes that are portrayed throughout Proverbs. In the sentence literature, the primary mode of instruction is the presentation of examples that readers are pragmatically exhorted either to follow or to avoid. Thus, readers who imagine themselves as the participants in the scenes of sentence sayings in Proverbs imagine themselves following or avoiding the examples of the characters in the scenes. In the case of direct address in Proverbs, a reader who construes personal implications is prompted to imagine themselves as the addressee in the scenes of explicitly staged speech performance.[48]

Readers who imagine themselves as participants in the scenes of any of these didactic units in Proverbs perform what I call a *Reader in the Scene blend*. This blend is crucial in the present study. Information derived from it undermines the conflations that many scholars perform which I describe in chapter one. It will be remembered that these conflations lead to interpretations of Proverbs as presenting conflicting views of wealth, poverty, the rich, and the poor. My contention is that information gleaned from Reader in the Scene blends makes these conflations impossible. I describe this information in §2.5.

[48] This is very much the manner of learning—or, we might say, the learning exercise—that Fox (2003) envisions. I see readers performing this imaginative exercise as well, just *within* the larger producer-reader instructional frame.

Two inseparable features of language processing play central roles in Reader in the Scene blends, simulation and the construal of viewpoint in simulation.

2.2.2.2.1 Simulation

Cognitive models of semantics assume that when language users produce and interpret language, they *simulate* what the language describes (e.g., Gibbs 2006; Bergen 2012; Dancygier and Sweetser 2012, 2014). This means that when people understand language, they mentally picture and even experience what language is "about." This may sound strange. What does it mean to *experience* what language is about? Cognitive psychologists and psycholinguists have performed a great deal of experimental research suggesting that "information in perceptual, motor, and introspective brain areas becomes active when people think and use language" (Barsalou 2008, 250). [49] This research shows, for example, that when a person hears or reads the words *throw* or *kick*, areas in the brain that are dedicated to these motor movements light up in fMRI scans. The person processing these words is not throwing or kicking anything. However, fMRI scans indicate that the parts of their brains that direct these actions are active when people simply *understand* these words. This suggests that brain areas which are responsible for the motor movements of throwing and kicking play fundamental roles in the mental processing of the words *throw* and *kick*. This is simulation. Cognitive psychologist Lawrence Barsalou describes simulation in vivid detail as

[49] See Barsalou 1999, 2003, 2008, 2010, 2016; Zwaan 1999, 2004, 2008, 2009, 2014, 2016; Gallese 2001, 2003, 2014; Bergen 2007, 2012. Simulation theories stand in contrast to cognitive frameworks that describe language and cognition as amodal and nonperceptual. In amodal theories, language and cognition involve the processing of symbolic data structures that are independent of systems in the brain that are dedicated to perception, action, and introspection.

> the *reenactment* of perceptual, motor, and introspective states acquired during experience with the world, body, and mind. As an experience occurs, (e.g., easing into a chair), the brain captures states across the modalities and integrates them in a multimodal representation stored in memory (how a chair looks and feels, the action of sitting, introspections of comfort and relaxation). Later, when knowledge is needed to represent a category (e.g., a chair), multimodal representations captured during experiences with its instances are reactivated to simulate how the brain represented perception, action, and introspection associated with it. (Barsalou 2008, 618; italics added)

Modalities in the brain are different brain systems—namely, systems of perception, motor movement, and introspection (e.g., emotion and motivation). The multimodal representation of the experience of sitting in a chair that Barsalou describes in the quote above is what is known as *mental imagery*. Mental images may represent multiple facets (or modalities) of an experience—namely, facets that relate to perception, motor movement, and introspection. This is what it means to say that people mentally picture and even experience what language is about. Our brains *simulate* or reenact experiences—actual and imagined—that relate to language as we produce and interpret that language.

Cognitive researchers emphasize that any facet of experience or learning may play a role in simulation. Barsalou *et al*. (2018) identify elements of simulations that are internal and external to a person. Elements of internal experience that may feature in simulations are self-relevance (which they elaborate as goals, values, norms, and identities), emotion, motivation and mentalizing (i.e., thinking and reasoning processes). External elements they describe are settings, agents, actions, objects, and outcomes of actions. Barsalou *et al*. suggest that any combination of these elements may comprise the situations that people simulate when they process language. Further, Barsalou describes people mentally representing concepts during language comprehension in such a way that

> it is as if people were *being there* with one of its instances. Rather than representing a concept in a detached isolated manner, people construct a multimodal simulation of

> themselves interacting with an instance of the concept. (Barsalou 2002, 9; italics in original)

When people process language, in other words, we do so from what Rolf Zwaan (2004) names "immersed experiencer" perspectives. Processing language from immersed experiencer perspectives involves a language understander simulating "being there" in a situation that language describes.

It should be obvious that I cannot describe the subconscious or multimodal simulation that people perform when they process material in Proverbs. What I *can* offer are hypotheses regarding how people are likely to simulate on a conscious level when they interpret Proverbs. Cognitive scientist, Benjamin Bergen explains that

> We actually simulate all the time. You do it when you imagine your parents' faces, or fixate in your mind's eye on that misplayed poker hand. You're simulating when you imagine sounds in your head without any sound waves hitting your ears, whether it's the bass line of the White Stripes' *Seven Nation Army* or the sound of screeching tires. And you can probably conjure up simulations of what strawberries taste like when covered with whipped cream or what fresh lavender smells like. You can also simulate actions. Think about the direction you turn the doorknob on your front door. You probably visually simulate what your hand would look like, but if you're like most people, you do more than this. You are able to virtually feel what it's like to move your hand in the appropriate way … in all these examples, you're consciously and intentionally conjuring up simulations. (Bergen 2012, 13-14)

The simulations that I describe in this study are *conscious* mental images. They are not the deeper-level, subconscious simulations that cognitive scientists investigate. However, the principles of simulation that cognitive scientists elaborate inform my understanding of the conscious simulations that readers perform when they read material in Proverbs.

Because simulation is inherently viewpointed, Zwaan's notion of immersed experiencer perspectives is of central importance. *Performing a Reader in the Scene blend is simulating a scene from the perspective of an immersed experiencer*. As an immersed experiencer, a reader

can simulate (or mentally represent) that scene from only one perspective (or viewpoint). This does not mean that readers cannot simulate the meaning of a single sentence (or saying) in multiple ways. They can. But it does mean that they are able to simulate from only one perspective at a time. As Dancygier and Sweetser explain, "you experience a visual scene from some particular point rather than any other, and you experience situations from your own participant role rather than another" (2014, 2). For this reason, it is critical to consider viewpoint in language processing.

2.2.2.2.2 Viewpoint in language processing

Viewpoint in language is evident in the perspective taken in (or on) a situation that is described in discourse. For example, when we read *She <u>came</u> into the garage,* we mentally represent this scene from a perspective that is *inside* the garage. In contrast, when we read *He <u>went</u> into the house*, we simulate this scene from a perspective that is *outside* the house. These are basic examples of the simulation of spatial viewpoint. However, viewpoint is as multidimensional as it is pervasive. People consult spatial viewpoint in relation to physical surroundings (real or represented) in discourse. We also pervasively simulate temporal viewpoint which is tied to a Now that is either an actual present moment or a represented present moment in discourse. In addition, there are other innumerable types of experiential viewpoint that are complex and variable from person to person. For example, we can imagine viewpoints that are attached to different kinds of mental, affective, social, introspective, and perceptual experience and learning. All of these types of viewpoint may play roles in simulation.

Visual experience serves as a framework in many models of psycholinguistic experimentation.[50] For this reason, spatial viewpoint is frequently consulted to describe how people process language. As Bergen reflects, "it appears that understanding meaning, at least in part, happens in the mind's *eye*" (2012, 66; italics added). My simulation hypothesis involving Reader in the Scene blends is that the pragmatics of material in Proverbs (or, how readers construe the pragmatics of this material) influences the visual perspectives from which they simulate (as immersed experiencers) when they read Proverbs. I base this hypothesis on two studies in particular (Brunyé *et al*. 2009; Bergen 2012),[51] both of which investigate how the grammatical property of person can lead readers to simulate from either external-observer viewpoint or internal-participant viewpoint. Consider the sentence *The driver gripped the steering wheel and pounded on the horn as he waited for the light to change*. Bergen explains,

> If you're simulating yourself as the driver, you'll be projecting your own visual system into that of the driver, so that you see what the driver would see; a steering wheel, with hands gripping it, in front of a windshield through which the street and perhaps a stoplight are visible … If you're not the driver but merely an observer, you can place your imagined eye—the mind's camera—at any of a number of locations. (Bergen 2012, 109)

In this description, Bergen observes how the same sentence can lead to dramatically different simulations, depending on whether a person adopts a participant or an observer visual perspective in (or on) the scene. If a person adopts a participant visual perspective when they

[50] The Visual World Paradigm is a model that psycholinguists use in such experimentation (Tanenhaus *et al*. 1995; Huettig *et al*. 2011). In this type of experimentation, subjects of experiments are provided with visual images (i.e., context) as they process language. Eye-tracking software is used to see where subjects focus their vision at each point of language processing. Barsalou reflects that, "Prior to the visual world paradigm, what we knew about the processing of words and syntax was based on paradigms that largely examined them in isolation. Once researchers began studying them in the context of visual worlds, understanding evolved considerably to reflect substantial contributions from context" (2016, 1137).

[51] Bergen (2012) describes this study that was performed in his lab in his book *Louder than words* and does not cite a separate article in which it was published.

read the sentence above, they are the driver in their simulation. If they adopt an observer visual perspective, as Bergen explains, they could place themselves in any number of positions watching a driver gripping his steering wheel and honking his horn while waiting for a light to change. Bergen (2012) and Brunyé *et al*. (2009) investigate how grammatical person in particular modulates the representation of visual viewpoint in simulation.

Bergen (2012) describes an experiment performed in his lab at the University of California, San Diego in which participants were primed with second-person and third-person language about moving objects—namely, baseballs that were thrown by either *you* or *the pitcher*:

1 You threw the ball to the catcher.
2 The pitcher threw the ball to the catcher.

After reading these sentences, participants were shown two images. These images were either two different things—e.g., a baseball and a shoe—or they were two baseballs. The only image series that Bergen and his colleagues cared about were the series that involved two images of baseballs. In these series, the two baseball images would either appear to be moving away from the study participant or from left to right across the screen in front of them. The ball moving away from the participants was intended to replicate a first-person internal-participant visual perspective that a person would adopt if they imagined themselves as the pitcher throwing the ball (sentence 1). The ball moving from right to left was intended to replicate a third-person external-observer visual perspective that a person would experience if they were standing off to the side, watching a pitcher throw the ball to a catcher (sentence 2). Upon seeing these images, participants in the study had to push a button that said “yes” or “no” to indicate whether the images on the screen were the same as that represented in the sentence they had just read. Bergen found that, “People responded significantly faster when the perspective induced by the

grammatical person and that of subsequently moving images were compatible" (2012, 112). In other words, this study seems to indicate that second-person language tends to induce participant visual perspective in simulation, and that third-person language tends to induce observer visual perspective. Bergen describes what he concludes from this study as follows.

> This suggests that person acts as a grammatical cue that modulates the character of embodied simulations; in particular, that who is described as engaging in an activity affects the perspective we're more likely to adopt in mentally processing that activity. (Bergen 2012, 112)

Another set of studies using a different methodology found similar results and also added an experimental feature that changed those results. Tad T. Brunyé and a number of colleagues at Tufts University performed two experiments that were also designed to investigate the influence of grammatical person on language processing. In the first, they tested how the pronouns *I*, *you*, and *he* influence the representation of visual perspective in simulation. They began by showing participants one of the following sentences:

1 I am slicing the tomato. / You are slicing the tomato. / He is slicing the tomato.
2 I am taping the package. / You are taping the package. / He is taping the package.
3 I am ironing the pants. / You are ironing the pants. / He is ironing the pants.

After participants had read one of the above sentences, they were shown images of the action described in the sentence from both internal-participant and external-observer visual perspectives. Similar to the study that Bergen and colleagues performed at UCSD, Brunyé and his colleagues discovered that the second-person statements seemed to prompt participant visual perspective in simulation and that the third-person statements seemed to prompt observer visual perspective. However, the inclusion of first-person sentences in this experiment led to interesting results. In the first experiment that Brunyé and his colleagues conducted, participants seemed to simulate mostly from participant visual perspectives in response to the first-person sentences.

When participants had read first-person sentences, they imagined themselves as the ones performing the sentence action. In a second experiment, however, Brunyé and his colleagues added two sentences of narrative in introduction to the first-person sentences. For example:

> I am a 30-year-old deli employee.
> I am making a vegetable wrap.
> Right now, I am slicing the tomato.

What they found was that when participants were given even a brief narrative context like this, they no longer simulated from an internal visual perspective in response to first-person language. Brunyé and his colleagues explain:

> With single sentences, such as *I am slicing the tomato*, the ambiguity with regard to the actor seems to lead readers to adopt internal perspectives of described events … However, when character identity is explicitly revealed through an extended discourse we find that readers are more likely to adopt an external perspective following first-person pronouns. (Brunyé *et al*. 2009, 31)

In other words, when people are primed to identify a first-person speaker as someone who is not themselves, they are likely to process first-person language from external-observer visual perspectives. Rather than simulate themselves performing the action in the above scenario, when participants in the study had read the narrative preceding the tomato-slicing sentence and *then* the tomato-slicing sentence, they imagined a 30-year-old deli employee making the vegetable wrap *and* slicing the tomato.

Both of these studies suggest that viewpoint in simulation is influenced by, but not exclusively tied to, grammatical person. More important than grammatical person is how readers envision their role in a scene. This is important for conclusions I draw in the present study. What I suggest regarding material in Proverbs is that the pragmatic context of this material functions like the brief narrative introduction that Brunyé and his colleagues utilized in the second

experiment they ran in their 2009 study. Whereas Brunyé and his colleagues found that just two sentences of narrative push visual perspective in simulation into an observer viewpoint when a participant viewpoint is expected, I suggest that construing the communicative context of Proverbs as a *directive pragmatic context* prompts an unexpected shift in viewpoint. Specifically, I contend that reader apprehension of a directive pragmatic context pushes visual perspective in simulation into participant viewpoint, whereas we would normally expect observer viewpoint.

On the basis of Bergen 2012 and Brunyé *et al*. 2009, we would expect two features in Proverbs to induce observer viewpoint in simulations. First, we would expect the third-person language in the sentence literature to prompt observer viewpoint. Second, we would expect the presence of characters who are not readers in father-son and other explicit speech performance frames to prompt observer viewpoint in simulation as well. In sum, we would expect grammatical person in material embedded in implicit speech performance frames and the presence of characters who are not readers in explicit speech performance frames to prompt readers to simulate from external-observer visual perspectives when they read Proverbs. However, my contention is that when readers construe a directive pragmatic context, that expected viewpoint in simulation is reversed. In other words, I argue that the directive pragmatic context of Proverbs prompts readers to perform Reader in the Scene blends, and that Reader in the Scene blends involve readers simulating from internal-*participant* visual perspectives.

2.2.2.2.3 Personal implications in Proverbs: building *Reader in the Scene blends*

The thinking, believing, being, and behaving of *characters* in Proverbs are not the primary concern of the producers of Proverbs. Rather, the producers are concerned with choices

that *readers* will make. Readers who apprehend this perform Reader in the Scene blends. In these blends, readers blend some construal of themselves into the scenes and situations that they read about when they read Proverbs. We can imagine the conceptual structure of Reader in the Scene blends in a schematic way as follows:

GENERIC SPACE	an agent with volition and ability to do things
INPUT SPACES	a character in a saying in Proverbs doing something specific a reader of that saying having volition and ability to do things
BLENDED SPACE	a reader of that saying doing the specific action in that saying (with internal-participant visual viewpoint)

Implicit in this cognitive model is an assumption that the "performance values" of sayings in Proverbs are apparent to readers when they read them. The performance value of a saying is the meaning that a saying acquires in actual use. Viewing the performance context of Proverbs as one in which the producers and readers of Proverbs interact by imagining one another makes each reading an actual—if asynchronous—instance of performance. As an asynchronous performance, the performance value of a saying is aimed directly at readers. The performance value of a saying is the personal implication that a reader construes for themselves when they read it. My contention, in other words, is that the producers *intend* for readers to apprehend *in the moment of their reading* what a saying is instructing them to do or not do, or to be or not be.

Most commentators describe the *future* performance value of material in Proverbs. On this understanding, the performance value of a saying is not a meaning that readers would apply to themselves in the moment of their reading. Rather, the performance value of a saying on this understanding is the meaning that a saying will acquire when readers *use* that saying in an actual social situation in which they (not the producers of Proverbs) seek to influence someone else. For example, Fox writes that the performance value of material in Proverbs "exists only as a

potential." He describes each saying in the book "like a coin whose value is definable but remains latent until the coin is spent on something, whereupon it can be said to have 'performance value'" (Fox 2003, 153). Similarly, as noted in §2.2.1.2, Vayntrub describes both the father-son instructions as "speech events without the event, awaiting destination or effect, ready for adoption by a father instructing his son" (2018, 203). Material in Proverbs can certainly be used by readers in future social situations. However, I argue that it is designed also to influence readers in the moment of their reading.

As I understand it, the goal of Proverbs' producers is to influence readers directly. This is why I would call each reading of material in Proverbs a communicative (or speech) event. As Clark (1996), Gibbs (1999), and Verhagen (2005) underscore, the asynchronicity of this communication does not make it any less (jointly and intersubjectively) communicative (§2.1). Further, as discussed in this section, when readers apprehend this directive pragmatic context, they are induced to simulate from participant viewpoint as they work out the meaning of material in Proverbs. Before describing information that can be gleaned from these simulations to clarify views regarding wealth, poverty, the rich, and the poor in Proverbs, I need first to elaborate the nature of the content of what is communicated through material in the book.

We have reviewed the first of the three pragmatic features in Proverbs that I elaborate in this chapter—namely, the pragmatic context of the book. I turn now to the nature of instruction (§2.3) and will then discuss the nature of motivation (§2.4) in Proverbs.

2.3 Instruction in Proverbs

There is direct and indirect instruction in Proverbs. As noted in chapter one, Sandoval (2006) identifies direct and indirect instruction in Proverbs as well, but Sandoval and I define these types of instruction differently. Sandoval considers instruction that he does not describe as figurative to be *direct* or *concrete* instruction. I refer to *direct* instruction as instruction that is issued by means of direct commands or prohibitions—i.e., by means of imperatives, vetitives, and jussives. Regarding *indirect instruction*, I consider instruction in Proverbs that is issued by means of indicative statements "indirect instruction." Whereas Sandoval describes only the material in his social observation discourse as "indirect instruction." The material in his social observation discourse are those sayings which many interpreters describe as dispassionate observations of social disparities between the rich and the poor (e.g., 10:15; 18:23; 19:4, 6, 7). For Sandoval, this material issues *indirect* instruction in the sense that rather than *merely state* observations, these sayings *indirectly* issue implicit critiques. I agree with Sandoval's interpretation of these sayings as implicit critiques, but I view indirect instruction more broadly. A great deal of what Sandoval considers *direct* instruction—namely, all that formulated as indicative sentences—I would describe as *indirect* instruction.

Speech act theory informs how I use the terms *direct* and *indirect* instruction. Both direct and indirect instruction in Proverbs carry *directive* illocutionary force. Direct instruction is that in which the primary illocutionary force of an expression is represented in the grammar of the expression. For example, the directive illocutionary force of imperatives and vetitives is conveyed *directly* by these grammatical forms. In contrast, indirect instruction is instruction in which the primary illocutionary act is *not* represented in the grammar of an expression. The directive nature of indirect instruction is expressed through implicature. I offer an analysis of the indicative sentence sayings as indirect speech acts that issue indirect directives below (§2.3.3.2).

Within the book, *direct instruction* predominates in the "instruction collections," and indirect instruction comprises most of the "sentence collections."[52] The short indicative statements in the latter are the "sentences" that make up the sentence literature in Proverbs. In contrast, direct commands and prohibitions constitute the "lessons" or "lectures" (Fox 2000) that we find in the instruction collections. I provide a brief overview of additional differences between instructions and sentences in the next section (§2.3.1). I survey the contents of instruction and sentence collections in the book of Proverbs in §2.3.2. And in §2.3.3, I overview speech act theory and describe cognitive processes that are involved in the interpretation of indirect speech acts. Readers of Proverbs engage these processes in order to interpret sentence sayings as *indirect instruction*.

2.3.1 Instructions and sentences in Proverbs

Four related formal features distinguish instructions from sentences in Proverbs. First, instructions are comprised of longer poetic units relative to the short and usually independent sentence sayings in sentence collections. Second, the predominant verbal modality in instructions is some kind of explicit (or direct) directive. This is usually an imperative, vetitive, or, less often, a jussive. (However, in Prov 2, second-person conditionals function pragmatically as directives.) In contrast, the predominant verbal modality in sentence collections is the indicative statement. Verbal forms in these statements are typically perfective (*qatal*) or imperfective (*yiqtol*) forms. More often, sentence sayings are comprised of verbless clauses, many of which contain

[52] Direct address and admonitions are infrequent in the sentence collections, but they do occur. See 14:7; 16:3; 17:12; 19:18, 20, 27 (also includes *bĕnî*); 20:13, 16, 22; 22:6, 10; 25:6-7, 9-10, 17, 21-22; 26:4-5; 27:1, 10, 11, 13, 22, 23-27. In addition, sentence sayings appear in instruction collections as well—sometimes as capstone statements in lectures (e.g., 1:19; 3:33-35). See also 24:3-9, 23b-26.

participles functioning as nominal phrases. A third formal difference between instructions and sentences in Proverbs is that the vocatives *bĕnî* (“my son”) or *bānay* (“my sons”) typically introduce the longer didactic units in instruction collections. These forms are rarely used in sentence collections (only in 19:27 and 27:11). Finally, the direct directives in instruction collections are always followed by explicit motive clauses. These clauses are usually but not always introduced by a conjunction serving a logical function, such as, *kî* , *lĕmaʿan*, or *waw*. In contrast, we generally do not find explicit motive clauses in the sentence literature. However, other means of motivation are connected to the indirect instructions in sentence collections. I discuss these means of motivation in §2.4.

My theses regarding both instruction and motivation in Proverbs build on the work of Philip Johannes Nel (1982). Nel surveys all the *direct* instructions in Proverbs, including the direct directives that appear occasionally in the sentence collections. He determines that every direct admonition in the book shares the structure, *instruction* + *motivation*. Consider Prov 8:10-11. (Lady Wisdom is the staged speaker of this unit.)

קְחוּ־מוּסָרִי וְאַל־כֶּסֶף וְדַעַת מֵחָרוּץ נִבְחָר	a b	8:10	**Take** my discipline and not silver, and knowledge more choice than gold,	INSTRUCTION
כִּי־טוֹבָה חָכְמָה מִפְּנִינִים וְכָל־חֲפָצִים לֹא יְשֻׁוּוּ־בָהּ	a b	8:11	**for** wisdom is better than jewels, and nothing that is desirable compares with her.	MOTIVATION

The direct directive appears in v 10 in the form of an imperative (*qĕḥū*), and the explicit motive clause is headed by a *kî* in v 11. The assertion in v 11 that wisdom is better than jewels and anything else that a person might desire serves as motivation to follow the instruction in v 10.

Nel does thorough work surveying all the direct instructions in Proverbs. He also operationalizes a narrow conception of admonition and motivation in that he limits these

pragmatic features to their explicit expression in linguistic forms. Narrow conceptions of these pragmatic features lead Nel to examine the *explicit* admonitions and motive clauses in Proverbs only. However, Nel also recognizes the directive nature of material in the sentence collections. He asserts that sentence sayings, like direct instruction in Proverbs, do issue a "call to obedience, even though the formulation may appear to be neutral, for lack of appeal to specific persons" (1982, 76). He goes on to surmise that there could be implicit motivational elements in the sentences, even "without structural indications," and recommends giving attention to the "semantic aspect" of sentence sayings in order to discern motivational elements in the sentence literature as well (1982, 85).

My study builds on Nel's in that *I maintain that every didactic unit in Proverbs consists of an instruction and a motivation*. I would argue that every (or very nearly every)[53] saying in the sentence collections, like every explicit admonition in the instruction collections, consists of both of these pragmatic features. As noted above, the present section focuses on the nature of *instruction* in Proverbs. §2.4 addresses the nature of *motivation* in the book. Whereas Nel attaches these pragmatic features to linguistic forms, I locate them in the pragmatic intentions of the producers of Proverbs. Imagining the pragmatic intentions of the producers includes but ultimately exceeds Nel's recommendation noted above. Interpreters must attend to semantic *and* pragmatic dimensions of meaning in order to discern motivational elements in the sentence

[53] The *directive* nature of the following sayings is somewhat more challenging to determine without more information about situations to which they may pertain—Prov 13:12; 14:10, 13; 15:13; 16:26; 18:14; 20:27. These are sayings the "personal" meaning of which may become evident only in the redeployment (i.e., new performance) by a reader or in the construal of a specific relevant situation to which a reader relates them. Most of these sayings normalize grief (with the exceptions of 16:26 and 20:27). As such, they may implicitly counsel readers in how to work through their own grief or in how to support others as others deal with loss or disappointment. In some contrast, Prov 16:26 may be the one saying in Proverbs that could be interpreted as a truly neutral observation. However, it could also be interpreted as a critical comment on the fact that the appetite of some is perpetually unsatiated in comparison with that of others. Finally, Prov 20:27 seems to function similarly to 17:3 in portraying Yahweh as a deity who searches (and tests) the internal thoughts, motivations, and beliefs of humans.

literature.[54] I turn now to a summary of the contents of instructions in the different parts of Proverbs (§2.3.2) and will explain how readers interpret the indirect instruction that pervades the sentence collections in §2.3.3.

2.3.2 The different parts of Proverbs

There are three instruction collections in Proverbs, two sentence collections, and three appendices that conclude the book. The instruction collections are:

Collection 1	1:1-9:18
Collection 3	22:17-24:22
Collection 4	24:23-24:34

The sentence collections are:

Collection 2	10:1-22:16
Collection 5	25:1-29:27

And the three appendices of Proverbs are:[55]

[54] Semantic and pragmatic aspects of meaning are always intertwined. Linguistic pragmatics is frequently defined in contrast with linguistic semantics. Both disciplines study linguistic meaning. There are pragmatic and semantic dimensions of meaning in every use of language. Traditional descriptions characterize semantics as the study of *sentence meaning* and pragmatics as the study of *utterance meaning*, where a *sentence* is something studied *apart from* use and an *utterance* is an instance *of* use. The nature of the interface between semantics and pragmatics has been and continues to be widely discussed. Helpful discussions can be found in Leech (1983, 1-15), Levinson (1992, 1-38), Recanati (2004), and Archer *et al*. (2012, 24-34, 162-169). Cognitive linguists view pragmatic dimensions of meaning on a continuum with semantic dimensions of meaning (e.g., Lakoff 1977; Fauconnier 1990; Langacker 2008). In sum, pragmatics is concerned with relations between language use and language users in specific situational contexts, and semantics focuses on dimensions of meaning that may obtain across different language users and situational contexts.

[55] Fox identifies four appendices in the final two chapters of Proverbs—30:1-9; 30:10-33; 31:1-9; 31:10-31 (2009, 849-917). I follow others who attribute all of chapter 30 to Agur but do not follow these scholars in their attribution of all of chapter 31 to Lemuel's mother (e.g., Waltke 2005; Yoder 2009; Ansberry 2011; Brown 2017).

Appendix 1	30:1-33	(the words of Agur)
Appendix 2	31:1-9	(the words of Lemuel's mother)
Appendix 3	31:10-31	(the woman of strength poem)

The three appendices are meaningfully appended to the end of Proverbs. In other words, they fit the ethos and pedagogical goals of the book. They also, however, exhibit notable differences from material in the five major collections of Proverbs. The first two contain headings with non-Israelite names that associate the staged speaker (30:1) or addressee (31:1) of each one with Massa, a region in northern Arabia.[56] In addition, the contents of 30-31 are distinct in Proverbs. Proverbs 30 contains the only prayer (vv 1-9) and the only numerical sayings (vv 15-16, 18-19, 21-23, 24-28, 29-31) in the book. Prov 31:1-9 is the only instruction from a royal mother to her son in the book, and Prov 31:10-31 stands out as an extended acrostic poem in which an *ʾēšet ḥayil* ("woman of strength") serves as an exemplar of wisdom and diligence for readers. As an encomium to an individual who embodies the fulfillment of so many instructions in the book, the *ʾēšet ḥayil* poem is a fitting conclusion to Proverbs as a whole. The many resonances between 31:10-31 and material throughout Prov 1-29 testify to the purposeful placement of the poem, as well as the integral connection between both it and appendices 1 and 2 to the rest of the book.[57]

Each of the collections in Proverbs 1-29, like the appendices in 30-31, are introduced with headings as well. We saw these headings above in §2.2.1.2. The headings of the three

[56] Scholars interpret the word *hammaśśāʾ* in 30:1 and *maśśāʾ* 31:1 differently. Some read both as references to the region of Massa (e.g., Murphy 1998; Clifford 1999; Fox 2000). Others read the first as a reference to "the oracle" spoken by Agur and the latter as a reference to the region of Massa (e.g., Fox 2009). Still others read both as a reference to an oracle (e.g., Waltke 2005). Massa is a northern Arabian tribe that is mentioned in Gen 25:14, 1 Chr 1:30, and also in Assyrian sources (Murphy 1998; Clifford 1999; Waltke 2005; Fox 2009). The syntax in M of Prov 30:1 requires emendation. 30:1a reads *dibrê ʾāgūr bin jāqeh hammaśśāʾ* ("the words of Agur son of Jaqeh *the Massa*"). The emendation that is required turns the nominal phrase *hammāśśāʾ* into a gentilic, *hammaśśāʾî* or, "the Massaite." The syntax in 31:1 requires no emendation. In 31:1, Lemuel is identified as the king of Massa, *lĕmūʾēl melek maśśāʾ*.

[57] Fox 2009; Ansberry 2011; Clifford 2017.

"Solomonic collections" in Proverbs (1:1-9:18; 10:1-22:16; 25:1-29:27) contain the phrase, *mišlê šĕlōmōh* ("the proverbs of Solomon"). The first instruction collection (1:1-9:18) is conventionally referred to as the *introduction* to Proverbs, because it serves as a kind of extended exordium or preface to the rest of the book. It is encompassed by an explicit father-son speech performance frame and consists of ten *lectures* and five *interludes* (Fox 2000). Each lecture begins with an address to *bĕnî* ("my son") or *bānay* ("my sons") and consists of three parts: 1) an exordium, which is comprised of a call and reasons to listen; 2) a lesson, which is typically composed of a series of explicit directives or conditional statements functioning as directives followed by motive clauses; and 3) a conclusion, which is typically some kind of summary or capstone statement that conveys the primary lesson of the lecture (Fox 2000, 45). The ten lectures in Proverbs 1-9 are the following. I follow Fox (2000) in naming many of these lectures. Some of the titles of sections are his, and some are mine.

Lecture 1	1:8-19	*Avoid dangerous men*
Lecture 2	2:1-22	*The path to wisdom*
Lecture 3	3:1-12	*The wisdom of piety*
Lecture 4	3:21-35	*The wisdom of being a good neighbor*
Lecture 5	4:1-9	*A grandfather's instruction*
Lecture 6	4:10-19	*Keep to the way of wisdom, Avoid the way of the wicked*
Lecture 7	4:20-27	*A right mind, good speech, and a straight path*
Lecture 8	5:1-23	*Another man's wife and one's own*
Lecture 9	6:20-25	*Adultery and an offended husband*
Lecture 10	7:1-27	*Avoid dangerous women*

Each of these lectures portrays two "lifeways" or orientations to life that readers might take—a good one and a bad one. The producers directly exhort readers to choose the good and avoid the bad throughout these lectures. Specifically, the producers exhort readers to choose wisdom, piety, honesty, righteousness, and fidelity in marriage. In contrast, the producers of course want readers to avoid every antithesis to these things.

Interspersed among the ten lectures in the introduction to Proverbs are what Fox (2000) refers to as five *interludes*. Four of these five interludes portray and praise Lady Wisdom. She is herself staged as the primary speaker in interludes A and D. She is praised by an anonymous speaker in interlude B. And interlude E contrasts the banquets that she and Lady Folly prepare. Interlude C stands out as the only interlude that does not mention Lady Wisdom. Rather, interlude C consists of a series of four epigrams on folly and evil.[58]

Interlude A	1:20-33	*Wisdom calls*
Interlude B	3:13-20	*The benefits of Wisdom*
Interlude C	6:1-19	*Four epigrams on folly and evil*
Interlude D	8:1-36	*Wisdom praises herself*
Interlude E	9:1-18	*Two banquets*

The two lifeways that are put before readers throughout the introduction to Proverbs culminate in the two banquets that we see in Prov 9. Lady Wisdom and Lady Folly both prepare food and drink and call out to passersby, inviting them to come in and enjoy what they have to offer (9:1-5, 13-18). However, as expected, the differences between their offerings are stark. Lady Folly's drink is "stolen water" (*mayim gĕnūbîm* in v 17a), her food is "bread of secrets" (*leḥĕm sĕtārîm* in v 17b), and her guests end up "in the depths of Sheol" (*bĕʿimqê šĕʾōl* in v 18b). In contrast, Lady Wisdom slaughters animals (v 2a), mixes her own wine (v 2b), sets her table (v 2c), and invites addressees to leave their "simplicity" (*pĕtāyîm* in v 6) and "live" (*ḥĕyū* in v 6).

These banquets and their projected ends are fitting metaphors for the choices with which readers are presented throughout Prov 10-31, beginning right away in 10:1, *bēn ḥākām yĕśammaḥʾāb ūbēn kĕsîl tūgatʾimmô* ("A wise son makes a father rejoice, but a foolish son is a sorrow to his mother"). For every positive choice in the book, there is a negative alternative.

[58] Fox describes epigrams as brief poems that make "a single point" (2000, 15).

When only one choice is stated in a didactic unit, the other is always implicit. Choosing one thing is always inherently avoiding the other. Thus, an inherent alternativity of choice obtains throughout the book.

Three characteristics of the two sentence collections (collection 2, 10:1-22:16, and collection 5, 25:1-29:27) stand out clearly. 1) The first half of the first sentence collection (10:1-15:33) has the greatest concentration of righteous-wicked sayings in the book. 2) The first part of the second sentence collection (Prov 25:1-26:28) contains the greatest concentration of metaphorical sayings. And finally, 3) The second sentence collection as a whole (25:1-29:27) contains the most sayings that talk about the king.

Turning to the instruction collections, the second and third of these (the first being Prov 1-9)—collection 3, 22:17-24:22, and collection 4, 24:23-34, respectively—are both commonly referred to as the *words of the wise* collections. The heading of collection 3 describes the instructions that follow as *dibrê ḥăkāmîm* ("the words of the wise") in 22:17. The heading of collection 4 is *gam ēlleh lāḥăkāmîm* ("These too are by the wise") in 24:23a. The producer of the bulk of collection 3 (22:17-23:11) demonstrably based his work on the *Instructions of Amenemope*.[59] Other sections in collection 3 may also reflect the use of international source material.[60] Whether or not this is the case, the producers who placed collection 4 after collection

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[59] Fox (2014) demonstrates how the producer of this unit (22:17-23:11) drew from Amenemope in five "sweeps" as the producer formulated his text. See also Fox 2009, 724-725.

[60] Fox notes that collection 3 as a whole (Proverbs 22:17-24:22) includes a relatively high frequency of Aramaisms, which he thinks may indicate that the producer(s) of this collection based some of their material on international sources (e.g., Ahiqar in 23:13-14 and Anii in 23:29-35). Fox suggests that this material may have been drawn from Aramaic-language sources, in other words, and that the Aramaisms reflect this (see Fox 2009, 706, 753-756).

3 indicate the connection between them by writing, ***gam ēlleh*** *lāḥăkāmîm* in 24:23a ("**These too** are by the wise").

In the close readings I offer in chapters three to six, I frequently situate the passages I discuss in relation to the part of the book in which it appears. Therefore, this brief survey of material in Proverbs can serve as a reference point for discussion in subsequent chapters. Having broadly described the contents of Proverbs, I now turn to discuss how readers are likely to interpret sentence sayings in the sentence collections as *indirect instructions*.

2.3.3 Interpreting indirect instruction in Proverbs

Most commentators interpret material in the sentence literature of Proverbs as though it is directive in nature.[61] As Nel observes, sentence sayings issue a "call to obedience, even though the formulation may appear to be neutral, for lack of appeal to specific persons" (1982, 76). Fox reflects similarly on the directive force of interlude D (8:1-36), which contains only one direct directive (v 10). (This interlude is of course not included in the sentence literature of Proverbs. However, it *is* comprised of indicative statements.)

> This interlude is a didactic discourse, not a theoretical treatise. Everything in the chapter serves the rhetorical goal of influencing the reader to desire wisdom. The reason the author declares that the earth's potentates avail themselves of wisdom is to make *you* want to bring this mighty and renowned resource into your own life. It will bring *you* wealth and honor. Even the grand survey of creation is subordinated to the pedagogical

[61] Nel 1982; Huwiler 1988; Boström 1990; Whybray 1990, 1994, 1995; Washington 1994; Bergant 1997; Murphy 1998; Waltke 2004, 2005; Sandoval 2006; Adams 2008; Fox 2009. There have, however, been scholars who characterize the sentences, with their lack of direct addresses and direct directives, as not didactic in purpose, by which they seem to mean as not *directive* in purpose (McKane 1970; Westermann 1990 [1995]). Others have described them as secondarily didactic (read *secondarily directive*) (von Rad 1972 [1970]; Crenshaw 1995 [1974], 1987; Wittenberg 1986; Murphy 1990). McKane (1970) is an especially strong advocate for *non-directive* readings of the sentence literature.

goal. (Fox 2000, 293)

In short, there is always a *you* in Proverbs. Thus, there is always an "appeal to specific persons." This *you* is the reader. Everything in Proverbs is designed to persuade readers to adopt certain ways of thinking, believing, being, and behaving—to desire wisdom and other good things that producers of Proverbs want to promote. It is in this sense that Proverbs is *about* readers. It is not fundamentally about abstract notions of virtues and vices and virtuous and vicious character types. However, as was shown in chapter one, even scholars who view sentence sayings as directive in nature sound at times as though they view the illocutionary force of indicative statements in Proverbs as merely assertive (or representative)—i.e., as though indicative statements merely *state* information.

Two paradigms in pragmatics offer resources that aid in analyzing sentence sayings as directive in nature: paradigms of indirect speech acts and implicature. I follow theorists who see these two paradigms as descriptive of virtually the same phenomena (e.g., Leech 1983; Green 2017). I begin with a brief overview of speech act theory in §2.3.3.1. This overview highlights the importance of two mechanisms in the interpretation of indirect speech acts and implicature—namely, Austin's notions of the total speech act and the total speech act situation.

2.3.3.1 Total speech acts and total speech situations

John L. Austin (1962) developed his theory of speech acts in response to the fact that people do more with language than state and describe things. We also make promises and requests, greet each other, apologize, give advice, warnings and comfort, make demands, jokes, and exclamations, declare marital partnerships, declare others innocent and guilty, and more.

Austin's project highlights a basic insight of cognitive linguistics, which is that language use is more about understanding than it is about truth conditions. It is more about the subjective and intersubjective efforts of language users, in other words, than it is about the objective dimensions of linguistic content. Like cognitive theorists and pragmaticians alike, Austin stresses the role that context (i.e., some notion of a communicative situation) plays in determining linguistic meaning and understanding. Near the end of *How to do things with words*, he writes, "The total speech act in the total speech situation is the only actual phenomenon which, in the last resort, we are engaged in elucidating" (Austin 1962, 147). The total speech act and total speech situation stand side by side at the center of Austin's philosophy of language. He receives criticism for the methods he proposes for investigating each one. However, both remain central in studies of language.

The heart of Austin's project is to dissolve the distinction between so-called constatives and performatives. In developing his typology (or ontology) of the speech act (e.g., his notion that every speech act consists of a locutionary, an illocutionary, and a perlocutionary act),[62] Austin does just that. His composite notion of speech acts is the total speech act that Austin places at the center of his language philosophy. He recommends replacing the dichotomy of constative and performative—which he stresses does not exist, because all speech acts are

[62] A locutionary act is the act of uttering an expression with a certain sense and reference (see Austin 1962, 92-93, 95-97 for further breakdown of locutionary acts into phonetic, phatic, and rhetic acts). An illocutionary act is the act of doing something *in* uttering an expression (e.g., promising to do something). And a perlocutionary act is the act of doing something *by* uttering an expression (e.g., assuring someone that you will do something by promising to do it) (Austin 1962, 98-101, 108-109, 120).

performative—with a new distinction between explicit and implicit (or primary) performatives.[63] Examples of these are the following:

> Implicit (primary) performative: *I shall be there*.
> Explicit performative: *I promise that I shall be there*. (Austin 1962, 69)

Austin observes that these two speech acts both do (or perform) the same thing. The explicit performative is not more genuinely performative than the implicit performative. It is just that it is explicit: it *explicitly* describes what it does. In contrast, the implicit performative does what it does *implicitly*. Both promise to be there, and both are comprised of locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary acts. Of these three dimensions of, or acts within, the total speech act, the illocutionary act receives the most attention in subsequent speech act theory.[64]

An illocutionary act is what a speech act "counts as" in terms of the illocutionary force that it is used to express. For example, if someone says *I will be there* and intends in saying this to promise to be there, saying *I will be there* counts as promising to be there. (This is also Searle's essential condition, on which see below.) Speech acts have come to be characterized almost exclusively in terms of illocutionary force. This is perhaps due to the way that Austin recommends proceeding with speech act research. His recommendation is to develop a typology of illocutionary forces. He is careful to distinguish illocutionary force from explicit performative verbs. He in fact cautions directly against developing a typology of explicit performative verbs in order to avoid leaving out implicit performatives in speech act classifications. However, in

[63] Austin refers to implicit performatives as "primary" performatives, because he theorizes that implicit performatives would have preceded explicit performatives in evolutionary development.

[64] The criticism that Austin receives concerning his analysis of the total speech act revolves around his initial attempt to characterize types of illocutionary force that are operative in different illocutionary acts.

illustrating his classifications of illocutionary force, his examples are basically all lists of explicit performative verbs (Austin 1962, 151-162). The categories of illocutionary force that Austin offers are the following.[65] (Note that the examples he gives of each are nearly all explicit performative verbs.)

1)	Verdictives	giving a verdict (e.g., declare, acquit, estimate, reckon, convict, find as a matter of fact, hold as a matter interpreted according to a law, etc.)
2)	Exercitives	exercising powers, rights, or influences (e.g., appoint, order, vote, advise, urge, warn, degrade, excommunicate, command, etc.)
3)	Commissives	committing oneself to do something (e.g., promise, covenant, undertake, contemplate, adopt, embrace, consent, dedicate, etc.)
4)	Behabitives	expressing attitudes or typical social behavior (e.g., apologize, congratulate, commend, condole, curse, challenge, thank, etc.)
5)	Expositives	making plain how an utterance fits into an argument or conversation (e.g., concede, illustrate, argue, assume, postulate, reply, analyze, etc.)

Many agree that John Searle (1969) improves upon Austin's initial descriptions with the following classifications (e.g., Levinson 1983).

1)	Representatives	committing to the truth of an expressed proposition (e.g., asserting, concluding, affirming)
2)	Directives	attempting to get an addressee to do something (e.g., requesting, commanding, questioning)
3)	Commissives	committing to perform some future action (e.g., promising, threatening, offering)
4)	Expressives	expressing a psychological state (e.g., thanking, apologizing, welcoming)

[65] Austin underscores that he is "far from equally happy about" these classifications. He calls them "a floundering around," insisting that, "We should be clear from the start that there are still wide possibilities of marginal or awkward cases, or of overlaps" (1962, 150-151). He points out many of these marginal, awkward, and overlapping cases himself in the descriptions that he provides of each illocutionary class (1962, 151-162). He also underscores that he does not intend to put "any of this forward as in the very least definitive" (1962, 151).

5) Declarations — effecting immediate changes in an institutional state of affairs, which tends to rely on elaborate extra-linguistic institutions (e.g., excommunicating, declaring war, christening)

Searle ultimately contends with the same difficulty that Austin does in illustrating his classifications with lists of explicit performative verbs (e.g., Leech 1983). I represent these ways of identifying illocutionary force not to discuss them further, but for two other reasons: 1) in order to provide a full(er) representation of speech act theory and efforts at speech act classification, and 2) in order to show the source from which I draw in talking about speech acts in Proverbs. I use Searle's category of directive illocutionary force when I characterize the acts of speech that we find in Proverbs.

Turning to the total speech situation that Austin places at the center of his language philosophy alongside the total speech act, we come to his notion of felicity conditions. Austin develops his notion of felicity conditions in order to characterize what he envisions as the total speech act situation (1962, 14-15). Later theorists criticize these conditions. They fault Austin for paying too much attention to procedural and ceremonial speech situations, such as marriage ceremonies, ship christenings, and judicial sentencings (e.g., Strawson 1964; Leech 1983; Levinson 1983). Situations like these are a natural place for Austin to have started, because they hold within them easily identifiable situational features that pertain to felicitous and infelicitous uses of language. They are not, however, reflective of the situations in which people most commonly use language in everyday life.[66] The latter are of more interest to later speech act theorists.

[66] It must be said that Austin discusses more everyday situations of language use in *How to do things with words*. However, the felicity conditions that he elucidates in a systematic way all pertain to more formal procedure-based or ceremonial communicative events. This is evident in the following summary of his formulation of three primary felicity conditions (see Austin 1962, 14-15). 1) There must exist an accepted

However, Austin's concern with the total speech situation resonates with cognitive research into Ground and representing Ground in linguistic analysis. The total speech situation envisioned by Austin is in fundamental ways a conceptual equivalent to intersubjective Ground in cognitive linguistic analysis, and therefore also the Ground Space Network in BCSN models. In addition, Dijk envisions his notion of context models as cognitive models of felicity conditions for speech acts (§2.1.2). Researchers who appeal to one or more of these paradigms stress the importance of having some conception of a total speech situation (i.e., contextual conditions that support communication) in any investigation into language use. The importance of interlocutor perceptions of conditions that support communication is readily apparent when we turn to indirect speech acts and implicature. People rely on their understanding of the communicative situation, which includes their understanding of the people with whom they are communicating, in order to interpret indirect speech acts and implicature.

2.3.3.2 Analyzing indirect speech acts

Present already in Austin's distinction between explicit and implicit performatives is awareness that language users can and often do perform speech acts with different degrees of indirectness. For example, saying *I will be there* (an implicit performative) is a more indirect way of promising to be somewhere than saying *I promise to be there* (an explicit performative).

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conventional procedure which has a certain conventional effect. This procedure must include the uttering of certain words by certain persons in certain circumstances. In addition, the particular persons and circumstances must be appropriate for the invocation of the particular procedure invoked. 2) The procedure must be executed by all participants both correctly and completely. 3) The person invoking the procedure must sincerely have the requisite thoughts and feelings which are particular to the procedure and must intend to conduct themselves accordingly in order to inaugurate the procedure.

2.3.3.2.1 Searle on indirect speech acts

Searle (1979) draws attention to speech acts that are especially indirect. He defines indirect speech acts as taking place when a person performs one illocutionary act by means of performing another (Searle 1979, 59). He uses the sentence *Can you pass the salt?* as an example. Searle notes that on the surface this sentence sounds like an information-seeking question about the ability of an addressee. However, he observes that the real pragmatic (i.e., communicative) purpose of this question is to request that the addressee pass salt to the speaker. Searle labels the pragmatically real act the *primary* illocutionary act and the linguistically expressed act the *secondary* illocutionary act. So, posing the request as the question *Can you pass the salt?* is a secondary illocutionary act to the primary illocutionary act (i.e., the implicature) of requesting that the addressee actually pass the salt.

Paul Grice developed the notion of implicature as a way to account for precisely this gap between what people say (i.e., "the said") and what they mean (i.e., "the meant"—or, "the implicated").[67] Implicature and speech act theory are both premised upon the idea that people who try to communicate (and who do so with differing degrees of success) must share some level

[67] Horn and Ward call the advent of implicature theory a "landmark event" in the study of language (2004, xi), and Levinson names implicature "one of the single most important ideas in pragmatics" (1992, 97). Grice developed implicature theory after elaborating a paradigm of intentional semantics, at the center of which is the notion of speaker meaning—or, non-natural meaning (meaning-nn). Grice (1957) describes *natural* meaning as non-intentional meaning. This is meaning, in other words, that does not involve human intention. He gives the examples of saying *Smoke means fire* and *Those bumps mean measles*. Smoke does not intend to mean fire, and bumps on a person's skin do not intend to mean measles. Humans extrapolate these meanings. In contrast, *non-natural* meaning (meaning-nn) is intentional meaning in the sense that humans intend to mean different things when we try to communicate. Non-natural meaning is therefore speaker meaning—i.e., what a speaker intends to communicate. According to Grice, speaker meaning flows from reflexive communicative intentions, which he calls m-intentions (meaning-intentions). He specifies further that m-intentions must be overt, directed toward an addressee, and also recognized by the addressee. The precise nature of reflexive communicative intentions is debated. But, as Levinson explains, according to Grice, "communication is intending to be recognized as having been intended to be recognized" (1992, 101).

of mutual understanding as to what is going on when they communicate—what conditions, in other words, they tacitly (if not explicitly) agree are operative in making their exchange what each person understands it to be. They may not have the same understandings. Communication is not always successful. However, the most basic instances of communication require tacitly agreed-upon conditions of all sorts—from the mutual knowledge that interlocutors share regarding a topic or situation at hand to the intentions that each has (and assumes that the other has) in communicating.

Where Austin and other speech act theorists elaborate sets of felicity (or satisfaction) conditions, Grice construes what he calls the Cooperative Principle (CP) and its four attendant maxims.[68] Objections to, and reformulations of, the CP and its maxims abound.[69] What most agree is central in the operation of implicature (and indirect speech acts) is the idea that there are conditions that require cooperation and some level of mutual understanding (or common ground) on the part of communicators which guide and constrain their communicative exchanges.

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[68] Grice's Cooperative Principle is the following: "Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged" (Grice 1975, 45). And the attendant maxims are: Quantity (Make your contribution as informative as is required for the current purposes of the exchange, and do not make your contribution more informative than is required), Quality (Try to make your contribution one that is true), Relation (Be relevant), and Manner (Be perspicuous). The CP and its maxims are widely discussed. Some pragmaticians reduce the number of maxims (Levinson 2000; Horn 2004). Others add to them—e.g., Leech's Politeness and Irony Principles with attendant maxims (Leech 1983). Grice himself reflects that there "are, of course, all sorts of other maxims (aesthetic, social, or moral in character), such as 'Be Polite,' that are also normally observed by participants in talk exchanges" (Grice 1975, 47).

[69] Some theorists underscore that people are often less than eager to cooperate with one another in communication (Kecskes 2010, 2008; Davis 1998). Grice himself notes that the CP is not applicable in cases of quarreling (1967a, 48). Some linguists, philosophers, and pragmaticians characterize the CP and the maxims as naïve, simplistic, and trivial. Horn answers such objections explaining that neither the CP or its maxims are designed as prescriptions: "A more accurate approximation is to view them as default settings" (2004, 8). Levinson responds to objections similarly: "Grice's point is not that we always adhere to these maxims on a superficial level but rather that, wherever possible, people will interpret what we say as conforming to the maxims on at least some level" (1992, 103).

Sounding very much like Grice, Searle specifies that the interpretation of indirect speech acts depends on "ideas about recognizing intentions and getting someone else to recognize your intentions, mutually shared background information, general powers of rationality and inference on the part of the hearer" (1979, 61). These can all be identified as elements in Austin's understanding of the total speech situation as well.

Theorists offer detailed models that represent how language users perform series of inferences based on their ideas about the communicative intentions of others and background knowledge that they share in order to interpret indirect speech acts. Searle (1975), for example, elaborates a ten-step model that he suggests is a possible (not veritable or verifiable) series of inferences that an addressee might perform in order to interpret an indirect speech act. Others develop similar inferential models (e.g., Bach and Harnish 1979; Leech 1983). More recently, cognitive linguists have questioned the cognitive plausibility of these models.[70] They underscore that people typically interpret indirect speech acts quite quickly and with seemingly little cognitive effort. For this reason, Linda Thornburg and Klaus-Ewe Panther (1997; Panther and Thornburg 1998; Panther 2005) offer simplified models of the cognitive work that people do when we interpret indirect speech acts.

[70] Theorists who elaborate detailed inferential models underscore that they do not intend to suggest that people strategically and painstakingly engage in the detailed reasoning elaborated in their models (e.g., Searle 1979; Bach and Harnish 1979; Leech 1983). Neither, however, do they elaborate an alternate means that would take place more quickly in language processing. Interestingly, however, Searle seems to anticipate the metonymic modeling that Thornburg and Panther elaborate in reflecting near the end of "Indirect Speech Acts" (1979). He writes, "The problem seems to me somewhat like those problems of epistemological analysis of perception in which one seeks to explain how a perceiver recognizes an object on the basis of imperfect sensory input. The question, How do I know he has made a request when he only asked me a question about my abilities? may be like the question, How do I know it was a car when all I perceived was a flash going past me on the highway?" (Searle 1979, 82).

Their model serves as a basis for two models that I develop to describe how readers interpret sentence sayings in Proverbs as indirect instruction. The models that Thornburg and Panther (and other theorists) use to describe the interpretation of indirect speech acts are incomplete with respect to the communicative ground (i.e., performance context) of the book of Proverbs. Therefore, I propose speech-act scenarios that reflect the "total speech situation" as we might imagine it when we picture the producers and readers of Proverbs communicating by means of material in the book. After reviewing cognitive models of indirect speech act interpretation proposed by cognitive linguists in §2.3.3.2.1, I offer the models that I develop in §2.3.3.2.2. Central in each one is the operation of illocutionary metonymy.

2.3.3.2.2 Illocutionary metonymy

Panther and Thornburg develop a model of what they call illocutionary metonymy to explain how people apprehend the implicatures of indirect speech acts with both speed and little cognitive effort. Illocutionary metonymy is premised upon the idea that people store idealized cognitive models (ICMs; Lakoff 1987) of speech-act situations in long-term memory (LTM). The speech-act ICMs that Panther and Thornburg (and other theorists) develop are thus cognitive equivalents of Dijk's context models and cognitive versions of the felicity or satisfaction conditions of speech act theorists. They could also be characterized as speech-act frames. The speech-act ICMs that Thornburg and Panther develop are a composite of an action scenario that they adopt from action theorists and Searlean satisfaction conditions:

ACTION SCENARIO

(i)	The BEFORE:	preconditions that enable, legitimize, or motivate an action
(ii)	The CORE:	properties that define an action
(iii)	The RESULT:	properties that define the immediate outcome of an action

(iv) The AFTER: intended or unintended consequences of the action that are not its immediate result (Thornburg and Panther 1997)

SEARLEAN SATISFACTION CONDITIONS

1) **Preparatory conditions** are "real-world prerequisites"—conditions in the world, in other words, that must be in place for an utterance to be issued (e.g., if a speaker asks a hearer to do something, it must be the case that the hearer can do it).
2) **Propositional content conditions** involve what an utterance is about (e.g., a request is about a future act of a hearer).
3) **Sincerity conditions** involve the feelings, beliefs, and intentions of a speaker (e.g., if a speaker asks a hearer to do something, the speaker genuinely wants the hearer to do that thing).
4) The **essential condition** amounts to the equation of uttering X with "counting as" doing Y (e.g., if a speaker says *Can you shut the door?* that utterance counts as a request that the hearer shut the door). (Searle 1969)

The BEFORE component in speech-act ICMs corresponds to Searle's preparatory and sincerity conditions. The CORE and RESULT components together correspond to Searle's propositional content and essential conditions. And the AFTER component stands outside of the conditions that Searle elaborates.

The speech-act ICM which Panther and Thornburg develop that is relevant to my study of Proverbs is their *directive* speech-act ICM. They elaborate this particular speech-act ICM as follows. (H stands for hearer; S stands for speaker; and A stands for a particular action.)

THORNBURG AND PANTHER'S DIRECTIVE SPEECH-ACT ICM

(i) The BEFORE: H can do A.
S wants H to do A.
(ii) The CORE: S puts H under a (more or less strong) obligation to do A.
(iii) The RESULT: H is under an obligation to do A.
(iv) The AFTER: H will do A. (Thornburg and Panther 1997, 208)

The operation of illocutionary metonymy on this model happens in the following way. Panther and Thornburg theorize that indirect speech acts are interpreted so quickly because the mention

of any one of the elements in a speech-act scenario (or ICM) metonymically activates the whole scenario in the mind of an addressee. Illocutionary metonymy is a form of frame metonymy. Recall from §2.0 that a crucial feature of frames is their gestalt nature. Further, because frames are perceived as wholes, perception or mention of one frame element can evoke the whole frame. This is what takes place in illocutionary (or speech-act) metonymy.

What Thornburg and Panther suggest is that when an addressee apprehends one element in a speech-act scenario (or ICM), the whole speech act is activated. For example, when someone poses the question, *Can you pass the salt?*, this question asks explicitly about the *ability* of the addressee (H). H's ability is an element in the BEFORE component of Thornburg and Panther's directive speech-act ICM—namely, *H can do A*. The idea is that upon recognizing the role of this element in the directive speech-act ICM, an addressee will apprehend the CORE and RESULT components in the scenario as well. And then, ideally, they will pass the salt (fulfilling the AFTER component of the scenario). Panther and Thornburg would model this interpretation of *Can you pass the salt?* in the following way.



Figure 2.8 A metonymic model of an interpretation of *Can you pass the salt?* (adapted from Panther & Thornburg 1997 and Panther 2005)

Cognitive linguist Francisco José Ruiz de Mendoza and a number of his colleagues (Pérez Hernández and Mendoza 2002; Mendoza 2007; Mendoza and Baicchi 2007) add to Thornburg and Panther's model in important ways. They introduce additional pragmatic variables that influence the operation of illocutionary metonymy. They conceptualize these additional variables as ICMs as well and conceive of them as cognitive versions of Leech's pragmatic scales (Leech 1983, 123-126). The following are simplified versions of their descriptions of these new components:

1) A cost-benefit ICM specifies who benefits from A and who absorbs cost in the performance of A.
2) An optionality ICM specifies how optional it is for H to do A.
3) A power ICM specifies whether S and H relate through solidarity or authority.

Mendoza and his colleagues focus in particular on the cost-benefit ICM and elaborate a tentative three-part cost-benefit ICM in Hernández and Mendoza (2002) and more a detailed thirteen-part cost-benefit ICM in Mendoza and Baicchi (2007). Both models are centrally concerned with (im)politeness.[71] The types of indirect directives that (im)politeness researchers investigate are different in obvious ways from the indirect directives that we find in Proverbs.[72] Politeness is not

[71] A majority of researchers who theorize about indirect speech acts in North American and European contexts are centrally concerned with (im)politeness in speech. This is because people in these contexts (and probably others) usually perform indirect speech acts in order to be polite. Power, optionality, and probable cost and benefit to speakers and hearers are all important dimensions of communicative exchanges in which (im)politeness is a salient feature.

[72] Pérez Hernández and Mendoza (2002) do elaborate an Advising Scenario, but they relegate discussion about it to a footnote, explaining that, "'Advising,' like 'warning,' is a largely altruistic type of act. It counts as an attempt to help or benefit the addressee and it does not usually involve greater cost to the speaker than that of producing the utterance. The fact that 'advising' does not prototypically involve a cost or a benefit to the speaker distinguishes this illocutionary category from other directives like "offering" (which involves a cost to the speaker) or 'requesting' / 'ordering' / 'suggesting' (which involve a benefit to the speaker)" (Pérez Hernández and Mendoza 2002, 266, fn. 9). The speaker receives greater focus than hearers in (im)politeness research, because the (im)politeness of speakers is the primary focus of this research.

a salient issue in the latter. However, (im)politeness research offers useful frameworks for analyzing material in Proverbs. Power, optionality, and cost-benefit all factor into interpretations of instructions and sentences in Proverbs. However, as noted above, the particular speech-act scenarios that speech-act theorists use to describe indirect speech acts are incomplete with respect to the communicative ground (i.e., performance context) of the book of Proverbs. In the following section, I propose two speech-act ICMs that reflect conditions we can imagine being operative for the producers and readers of Proverbs: a command speech-act ICM and a prohibition speech-act ICM.

2.3.3.2.3 Two speech-act ICMs and illocutionary metonymy in Proverbs

I base both of the speech-act ICMs that I use to model the interpretation of material in Proverbs on the Panther-Thornburg-Searlean scenarios described above. Drawing from Mendoza and his colleagues as well, I incorporate notions of cost-benefit, power, and optionality into both models. A prominent—but not the only—form of cost and benefit that we see portrayed in Proverbs are the consequences involved in different expressions of the act/character-consequence relation throughout the book (§1.3). A reward would be a benefit to a reader, and a punishment would of course be a cost. Power and optionality would reside, respectively, in reader construals of their relation to the producers of Proverbs, as they imagine these figures, and the nature of the instructions they imagine the producers offering.

In thinking about the expression of cost and benefit in Proverbs, we begin to consider the nature of motivation in the book. Briefly, I see the expression of *evaluation* as the basic strategy of motivation in Proverbs. In relation to this, the expression of cost and benefit to readers in the

form of positive and negative consequences is just *one* mode of evaluation that we find in the book. Other types of motivation appeal to what is good and bad for *others* and also to what the producers think is good and bad *in the eyes of Yahweh*. One or both of these means of motivation (i.e., evaluation) may, in the minds of many readers, equate to what is good and bad for them as well. In order to be inclusive of these other means of motivation, I formulate speech-act ICMs that represent speech acts in Proverbs using notions of what is good and what is bad *generally speaking* in the AFTER component of each scenario.[73] The two speech-act ICMs I offer represent the directive acts of command and prohibition that we find throughout the book. The following, as I see it, are schematic representations of the basic nature of instruction in the book of Proverbs.

A COMMAND SPEECH-ACT ICM

(i)	The BEFORE:	H can do A. S wants H to do A. S is an authoritative figure over H. S has H's and others' best interests in mind.
(ii)	The CORE:	S compels H to do A.
(iii)	The RESULT:	H is compelled to do A.
(iv)	The AFTER:	In doing A, H and/or others will benefit in some way.

A PROHIBITION SPEECH-ACT ICM

(i)	The BEFORE:	H can avoid doing A. S wants H to avoid doing A. S is an authoritative figure over H. S has H's and others' best interests in mind.
(ii)	The CORE:	S compels H not to do A.
(iii)	The RESULT:	H is compelled not to do A.
(iv)	The AFTER:	In not doing A, H and/or others will benefit in some way.

[73] Paremiologist Peter Grzybek reflects that the difference between "'good' and 'bad' is the most essential feature expressed in paremiology" (1987, 57; Grzybek 2015; Norrick 2015).

Contents in the BEFORE components of the above scenarios are (as in Panther and Thornburg's model) essentially Searlean preparatory and sincerity conditions. The speech acts themselves (Searle's propositional and essential conditions) are represented in the CORE and RESULT components. The CORE component represents the actual speech act, and the RESULT component represents reader apprehension of the speech act. Contents in the AFTER component of each scenario are the same. Due to the inherent alternativity of choice in Proverbs, choosing the good is always avoiding the bad—and vice versa. In addition, choosing the good characteristically leads to some kind of benefit in Proverbs—to oneself, to others, or to both.

To illustrate how illocutionary metonymy would operate on the above speech-act ICMs in an interpretation of material in Proverbs, consider Prov 13:18b, "a person who heeds a rebuke is honored" (*šōmēr tōḥakat yĕkubbād*). Readers who imagine personal implications for themselves when they read this saying would perform a Reader in the Scene blend and imagine *themselves* as the person who is honored as they simulate the meaning of this saying. Being honored would of course be a *benefit* to them. As such, the mention of a person being honored in 13:18b comprises the AFTER component in the command speech act ICM elaborated above. Therefore, upon reading this saying, operation of illocutionary metonymy would involve the reader, upon apprehending the notion of being honored, also apprehending the whole command speech-act ICM. Further, upon apprehending an entire speech-act scenario in which a command is issued, the reader would further discern that, by means of Prov 13:18b, they are being *directed to heed rebukes*. The operation of illocutionary metonymy can be encapsulated in a simple statement of causal reasoning: *Because heeding a rebuke leads to being honored, I should heed a rebuke*. This is how I represent illocutionary metonymy in the abbreviated models of interpretations I offer in chapters three to six. It is in this way that merely profiling the benefit of

"doing A" *metonymically* activates the whole command speech-act ICM. We can model this in the following way.



Figure 2.9 A metonymic model of an interpretation of *šōmēr tōḥakat yĕkubbād* ("a person who keeps a rebuke is honored," Prov 13:18b) (adapted from Panther & Thornburg 1997 and Panther 2005)

As I understand it, the model in figure 2.8 is a basic representation of how readers interpret indirect instruction when they read sentence sayings in Proverbs. Readers are *primed* for exhortation by their construal of the pragmatic context of the book as a directive or instructional communicative situation. When this expectation for exhortation is operative, the mere expression of some type of evaluation (which *may* be instantiated explicitly as something that will benefit the reader) triggers illocutionary metonymy. Then, with the activation of illocutionary metonymy and the causal reasoning it induces, readers interpret *directives* when they read indicative statements in the sentence literature.

The operation of illocutionary metonymy depends on readers recognizing the evaluation that the producers embed in their material. The producers use different motivational means at their disposal to get readers to recognize and align with what they present in each didactic unit as

either good or bad. The alignment or disalignment of producer and reader perspectives is one facet of the cognitive coordination that takes place between them. The ultimate goal of the producers in this coordination is to convince readers not only to align with their perspectives, but to act on them also. This is the *perlocutionary* effect that the producers want to achieve. In the next section, I consider further how the producers work to motivate readers toward this end.

2.4 Motivation in Proverbs

As noted above, I see the basic strategy of motivation in Proverbs as evaluation. If we accept this, a corollary assumption is the idea that a preliminary pragmatic (or pedagogical goal) that lies behind Proverb is to persuade readers to align with the evaluative judgments that the producers of Proverbs want to promote. This effort of the producers at alignment (and reader responses to it) comprise the kind of cognitive coordination that Verhagen describes taking place in his intersubjective Ground. Following cognitive theorists, we can imagine this coordination taking place asynchronously between producers and readers (§2.1.2). In this section, I elaborate different means of evaluation (i.e., motivation) that the producers use to achieve the effect of readers aligning with their perspectives regarding what is good and what is bad. These means of evaluation are what I use to expand Nel (1982) in looking for motivational features in the sentence collections. Rather than look for explicit motive clauses as Nel did, I look for ways in which the producers seem to be assessing some act, character trait, relationship, or life situation as good or bad, thereby seeking to influence readers to align with their perspectives—and, we can imagine them hoping, for readers to act on these perspectives.

There are two main subsections in this unit. In the first, I provide an overview of the types of evaluation that we find in Proverbs (§2.4.1). In the second, I describe the motivational force of cultural models as cognitive anthropologists characterize this force (§2.4.2). Following these discussions, I conclude chapter two in §2.5 with a presentation of the basic structure of persuasion in the book of Proverbs, as I understand it. I also explain in §2.5 how my understanding of this structure informs the close readings I offer in chapters three to six.

2.4.1 Types of evaluation in Proverbs

Like instruction, evaluation in Proverbs is both explicit (or direct) and implicit (or indirect). We see a cline in the level of explicit and implicit evaluation that is expressed in Proverbs. Examples of clearly explicit evaluation involve the use of adjectives, stative verbs, and explicit reference to virtues and vices. Many sayings describe something directly as *good* (*ṭôb* in, e.g., 2:9; 3:4; 11:23; 24:13) *not good* (*lôʾ ṭôb* in, e.g., 18:5; 19:2; 20:23; 25:27; 28:21), *pleasant* (*nōʿam* in, e.g., 3:17; 15:26; 16:24; *n-ʿ-m* in, e.g., 2:10; ironically in 9:17; 24:25), *choice* (*nibḥār* in, e.g., 8:10, 19; 10:20; 16:16; 21:3; 22:1), *precious* (*yĕqār* in, e.g., 20:15), or *not fitting* (*lôʾ nā'weh* in, e.g., 19:10; 26:1). Better-than sayings are included in those that offer explicit evaluation by means of adjectives. They offer the explicit description of one thing as better than another (e.g., 12:9; 15:16, 17; 16:8; 21:9). In addition, reference to characters who are described in some direct way as being virtuous or not—e.g., as being righteous (*ṣaddîq*) or wicked (*rāšāʾ*), wise (*ḥākām*) or foolish (*kĕsîl*)—is another means of expressing explicit evaluation in Proverbs. These are all examples of ways in which the producers offer more explicit evaluation of something (or someone) as either good or bad.

There are also more implicit means of evaluation that serve motivational functions in Proverbs. Two are most common—1) portrayals of consequences (or outcomes) of actions and character traits, and 2) portrayals of Yahweh. The latter involve either explicit descriptions of what pleases or displeases Yahweh (e.g., 3:32-33; 6:16-19; 11:1, 20; 12:22; 15:8-9; 20:10, 23), or portrayals of what Yahweh himself does or does not do (e.g., 15:3, 25; 16:4, 7; 17:3; 19:14; 22:2, 22-23; 23:10-11). Implied in each presentation of what pleases and displeases Yahweh, and of what he does and does not do, is an evaluation of whatever act or character trait is in question. What pleases Yahweh and what he does is always good. In contrast, what displeases Yahweh and what he does not do is always bad. How an action or character trait might impact the relation that a person has with Yahweh is a particular type of consequence that appears more than once in Proverbs (e.g., 3:34; 8:35; 10:3; 12:2; 14:31; 16:5, 20; 17:5, 15; 19:17). Each time a positive or negative consequence or outcome is portrayed, an evaluation is implied. Consider Prov 13:18b again, "a person who heeds a rebuke is honored" (*šōmēr tōḥakat yĕkubbād*). The connection between the act of heeding a rebuke and the consequence of being honored is an expression of a positive evaluation of heeding rebukes. The pedagogical intent behind this implicit evaluation is to motivate readers to heed rebukes.

In the cline that we find in Proverbs of the level of explicitness in evaluations, a third category is the *least* explicit. In sum to this point, we have seen more explicit means of evaluation in the use of adjectives, stative verbs, and references to virtues and vices. We have also seen that portrayals of Yahweh in action, as well as his likes and dislikes, and each portrayal of consequences in Proverbs express evaluation. These latter means of expressing evaluation are more implicit than the use of adjectives and stative verbs, but they are more explicit than a third means of evaluation in Proverbs. The third and final category of evaluative means that we see in

Proverbs is the *seemingly neutral statement*. This category includes the material that we would find in Sandoval's "social observation discourse," most of the material in Habel's "harsh reality paradigm," and much of that in Adams' "pragmatic thesis" (§1.3.4).

Consider Prov 19:7a-b, "All the brothers of a poor man hate him; how much more do his friends go far from him" (*kol ʾăḥê rāš śĕnēʾūhūʾ kî mĕrēʿēhū rāḥăqū mimmennū*). A number of commentators interpret this saying as a neutral statement—that is, as a truly non-evaluative observation of what life can be (or is) like for the poor (McKane 1970; Habel 1988; Whybray 1994; Murphy 1998; Waltke 2005). However, interpreting 19:7 (and other sayings like it) in this way falls short on two counts: 1) it does not integrate the thrust of teachings elsewhere in Proverbs that fixate on concern for the poor (e.g., 14:31; 17:5; 19:17; 21:13; 28:27), and 2) it does not consider the pragmatic purpose of this type of saying.

This third category of evaluation—the seemingly neutral statement—requires what Fox calls a *moral aesthetic* (2009, 975-976). Sandoval describes a similar concept in elaborating his idea of the *moral Gestalt* of Proverbs (2006, 69-70, 190-193). Seemingly neutral statements in Proverbs articulate "the fact that something 'is,' but ought not to be" (Sandoval 2006, 193). Determining that something ought not to be depends on readers having a sense for what *ought* not to be. This sense of what ought not to be—and of what ought to be—is what Fox refers to as *moral aesthetics*. He describes this kind of aesthetic further as a "configuration of soul." When the configuration of a soul is informed by the producers of Proverbs, Fox associates it with "wisdom itself" (2009, 975-976). The moral Gestalt or aesthetic that Proverbs seeks to cultivate (or enculturate) in readers is embodied in teachings throughout the book. In the end, therefore, if we read Proverbs in this way, we would say with Fox and Sandoval that it is wisdom itself that

enables readers to apprehend implicit evaluations when they read seemingly neutral statements in the book.

Each means of evaluation that we find in Proverbs is tied to a cultural model. Cultural models on their own are infused with positive and negative evaluations. Cognitive anthropologists describe cultural models as having the potential to function as goals for at least some people. Therefore, negative cultural models must function as anti-goals for at least some people as well. I discuss cultural models in the next section. Here, consider that cultural models of the poor, for many, would include imperatives to treat the poor with dignity and kindness. For this reason, the mere portrayal of a life situation that is harmful to the poor serves as a negative evaluation of that life situation. Further, in light of that negative evaluation, the mere portrayal of such a situation activates illocutionary metonymy, which would lead readers to interpret the portrayal of social isolation in a saying like Prov 19:7 as a *prohibition* against treating the poor in any way that would perpetuate that situation.

2.4.2.2 Cultural models

Cultural models are "cultural takens-for-granted" (Keesing 1979, 14). In other words, they are cognitive models that reflect what people hold to be the case in their respective cultural worlds. This includes what is generally considered good and bad. Dorothy Holland and Naomi Quinn define cultural models as "presupposed, taken-for-granted models of the world that are widely shared (although not necessarily to the exclusion of other, alternative models) by the members of a society and that play an enormous role in their understanding of that world and their behavior in it" (1987, 5). They explain further that "Cultural models frame our

understanding of how the world works, including our inferences about what others are up to and our decisions about what we ourselves will do" (Holland and Quinn 1987, 22).[74] Roy D'Andrade defines cultural models as "a set of cognitive elements used to understand and reason about something" (1992, 399). These descriptions of cultural models are applicable to material in Proverbs. Models of righteousness and the righteous, wisdom and the wise, the rich and the poor, how one should be considerate of one's neighbors in early morning hours (Prov 27:14)—each topic and concern that we find in the book is tied to a cultural model. Readers who are outsiders to the cultural worlds of the producers of Proverbs and their earliest audiences cannot know every detail that would have been included in cultural models they may have shared. It is also true that the producers of Proverbs provide clear guidance as whether cultural models they profile should be evaluated as good or bad (§2.4.2.1). In addition, many of the assessments that are implicit in cultural models that we find in Proverbs—e.g., that it is good to care for the poor—transcend cultural boundaries.

D'Andrade (1984, 1992) characterizes at least some cultural models as goals. He hypothesizes that certain cultural models come to carry directive illocutionary force for at least some people.[75] He is clear to say, however, that cultural models do not have the same degree of

[74] In the late 1980s, in collaboration with interdisciplinary members of a group dedicated to the study of culture and human cognition, Dorothy Holland and Naomi Quinn (1987), both cognitive anthropologists, proposed the concept of cultural models as a replacement for the then widely used construct of "folk models" in anthropological research (see also Quinn 1980). Cultural models were in development before the late 1980s, however. As D'Andrade reflects, "Since the 1970s cognitive anthropologists have developed a variety of methods for the description of cultural schemas, or cultural models as they are called in Holland and Quinn (1987)" (1992, 34).

[75] D'Andrade specifies that he developed his theory that cultural models have the capacity to carry illocutionary force in light of Austin's (1962) and Searle's (1975) investigations into speech acts and illocutionary force (D'Andrade 1992, 35-36). See *Human motives and cultural models* (D'Andrade and Strauss 1992).

motivational force for every person in a cultural group.[76] D'Andrade studied groups in middle-class North American contexts, and he identifies a number of cultural models that serve as goals for at least some people in these contexts (e.g., friendship, love, and success). The phenomenon of cultural models as motives for choices, however, is a cross-cultural phenomenon. D'Andrade identifies four elements that he thinks make cultural models directive (or motivational) in force for at least some people: external sanctions, desire to conform, direct personal reward, and attachment to particular sets of values. Holland and Quinn add the level of authority and expertise with which cultural models are invested as another incentivizing feature that infuses them with motivational properties (1987, 9).

The producers of Proverbs appeal explicitly to three of these facets of cultural models—1) the authority and expertise of the staged speakers (e.g., the father figure and Lady Wisdom), as well as the famous or reputable figures who are named in the two frames of production (e.g., Solomon and the *ḥăkāmîm*), 2) the mention of direct personal rewards, and 3) attachment to particular sets of values. In addition, it is certainly possible that external sanctions and desire to conform may be motivational properties that at least some readers associate with material in Proverbs as well. D'Andrade reflects that "the directive function of most cultural meaning systems is highly overdetermined: Overdetermined in the sense that social sanctions, plus pressure for conformity, plus intrinsic direct reward, plus values, are all likely to act together to give a particular meaning system its directive force" (D'Andrade 1984, 98). The producers of Proverbs repeatedly appeal to authority, rewards, and values. By those means alone, they

[76] D'Andrade (1992) roots this idea in the work of Melford Spiro, who stresses that not all parts of a culture are adopted by people in the same ways, and relatedly, that different people internalize cultural propositions to different degrees. Spiro (1987) elaborates four levels of internalization: acquaintance, observance, internalization, and salience.

thoroughly overdetermine the directive nature of instructions and sentences alike. Without empirical research, how external sanctions and desire to conform may materialize as motivations for different readers in different places and periods can only be hypothesized.

The inherent alternativity between virtues and vices (and other good and bad things) throughout the book calls for an understanding that cultural models in Proverbs serve as either goals or *anti*-goals. I hypothesize that the producers intend for all the positive cultural models to function as goals for readers. In contrast, they deploy the negative cultural models as anti-goals. The producers want readers to desire the good things they promote and to be averse to the bad. My contention in relating motivation to instruction in Proverbs in this way is to say that any indication of evaluation triggers illocutionary metonymy and the subsequent interpretation of *indirect instruction* when people read Proverbs. In other words, I argue that it is this cognitive process that makes evaluation in Proverbs tantamount to motivation.

2.5 The basic structure of persuasion in Proverbs and rest of the study

In the course of this chapter I have described three pragmatic features in Proverbs. Each one supports and influences how readers interpret material in this book. These features are the directive performance context of the book (§2.2), the nature of direct and indirect instruction in the book (§2.3), and the nature of motivation in the book (§2.4). Here in the final section of chapter two, I offer a BCSN (Basic Communicative Space Network) model that encapsulates these features in Proverbs (§2.5.1), and I describe the abbreviated form of this model that I present throughout the rest of the study (§2.5.2).

2.5.1 A BCSN model of an interpretation of Proverbs 28:19

The pragmatic inferences that readers perform when they read material in Proverbs guide meaning construction as much as do linguistic expressions in the book. Readers pragmatically enrich the meaning of the linguistic expressions they encounter in Proverbs on the basis of their understanding of the communicative context, instruction, and motivation in the book. The pragmatic inferences that readers perform on the basis of these features lead them to imagine that they are both addressed and instructed when they read Proverbs. I argue that this imaginative involvement of readers in this instructional situation constitutes the reception end of the performance context of the book. The imaginative interaction that I envision between the producers and readers is what I model in the following BCSN configuration. I will describe the contents of the Ground Space and Content Space Networks in this model, and then I will provide the model (figure 2.10). After presenting the model, I will discuss a fundamental presupposition that the producers and readers share as "ensembles" à la Clark (1996), coordinating asynchronously in an intersubjective ground à la Verhagen (2005) (see also the work of other scholars reviewed in §2.1).

Three types of spaces in the Ground Space Network are most important: the *Ground base space*, the *speech-act space*, and the *epistemic spaces*. The context models that readers have stored in LTM (long-term memory) which represent their understanding of what takes place when they read Proverbs provide conceptual structure to the Ground base space in the Ground Space Network. It is in this space that the producers and readers asynchronously (and imaginatively) engage in joint attention to material in Proverbs. The producers would have imagined how readers might receive the material they produced, and readers imagine the communicative (i.e., pragmatic or pedagogical) intentions of the producers. The speech-act space

in the Ground Space Network is also crucial. This space contains the "performed speech interactions" (Ferrari and Sweetser 2012, 49) that the producers and readers imagine taking place between them. Therefore, content in the speech-act space represents readers' apprehension of the *directive* illocutionary force of material in Proverbs. I represent this conceptual structure schematically in the Command and Prohibition speech act ICMs that I elaborate in §2.3.3.2.2. Finally, the epistemic spaces of both the producers and readers are important in BCSN models as well. Content in the *producer* epistemic spaces represents the epistemic certainty that the producers might have held toward their statements in Proverbs. And content in *reader* epistemic spaces represents the inferential reasoning that readers perform when they imagine and work out the personal implications that they think Proverbs holds for them when they read the book.

There are also three sets of spaces that are most important in the Content Space Network of the BCSN model in figure 2.10: the *content base space*, *causal reasoning spaces*, and *directive spaces*. The model that I present below is a model of an interpretation of a sentence saying. Only the content base space includes conceptual content that is explicitly profiled in sentence sayings in Proverbs. This space contains the conceptual contents of the sayings themselves, which is usually some scene, situation, or explicit comparison or evaluation that has been linguistically profiled. The operation of illocutionary metonymy is represented in the causal reasoning spaces of the Content Space Network. As we saw in §2.3.3.2.3, this reasoning can be summed up as, *Because X is bad / leads to bad things, I should not do X*. This reasoning process leads readers to interpret sentence sayings as *directives*—which, in Proverbs is usually either a command or a prohibition (thus the Command and Prohibition speech act ICMs in §2.3.3.2.3).

The model below is an interpretation of Prov 28:19, "A person who works his land will have plenty of food, / but a person who pursues worthless things will have plenty of poverty"

(*ʿōbēd ʾadmātô yiśbaʿ leḥem* / *ūměraddēp rēqîm yiśbaʿ rîš*). I identify the *directive space* as the one in focus in the Content Space Network. This is because the *primary* illocutionary act of an indirect speech act is the one that is performed *by means of another* (Searle 1979, 59). In 28:19, this is the *directive* act. The *representative* act, which is linguistically profiled in 28:19, is the *secondary* illocutionary act. In the model below, dashed lines encompass spaces in the Content Space Network that represent the inferential reasoning of an interpreter. This is in contrast to explicitly formulated linguistic content. Finally, P stands for *producer*, and R stands for *reader*.



Figure 2.10 A BCSN model of an interpretation of Proverbs 28:19

It is important to note that the causal reasoning readers perform when they read Proverbs is a *pedagogical exercise*. In other words, these reasoning processes are not performed in order

to reflect on how the world always, unfailingly works. The world *may* work in the ways that material in Proverbs describes from time to time. However, I would argue that the producers of Proverbs were more concerned to persuade readers to become certain kinds of people than they were concerned to persuade readers to believe that the world always, unfailingly, works in certain ways—specifically, in ways that involve intrinsic connections between acts, character traits, and consequences. This brings us to the question of the epistemic certainty (or stance) that readers might attribute to the producers of Proverbs toward the material they produced.

As noted in §2.1.3, Dancygier defines epistemic stance as a "speaker's specific evaluation of assertability" (2012, 74). How the producers may have evaluated the assertability of their statements in Proverbs is ultimately an open question. But recall the sentence *Ann knows that the world is round*. I suggest in §2.1.3 that this sentence is relevant to material in Proverbs, because it involves a presupposition that a speaker and hearer share with Ann—namely, that the world is round. No content in Proverbs is explicitly framed in this way—that is, as *X knows that Y*. However, readers naturally attribute some level of epistemic certainty to the producers of Proverbs toward their material.

The directive pragmatic context of the book leads me to modify what we might call the "epistemic certainty frame" *X knows that Y* in order to characterize the epistemic certainty of the producers of Proverbs and how we can imagine them evaluating the assertability of their statements. Instead of the frame, *X knows that Y*, where X stands for the producers of Proverbs, and Y is the connection between acts, character traits, and consequences, an epistemic certainty frame that is more appropriate for material in Proverbs is rather, *X wants you to live as though Y*. Conceiving of the epistemic certainty of the producers (and therefore also how they would evaluate the assertability of their statements) in this way reflects the centrality of their

pedagogical concerns. It also constitutes what I would argue is the fundamental presupposition shared by the producers and readers. My thesis in this regard is that the presupposition they share is a pragmatic one. Namely, on one hand, readers assume that the producers want to teach them to become certain kinds of people who think, believe, and do certain kinds of things. And on the other, we can imagine that the producers assumed that readers would assume this.

2.5.2 The abbreviated form of BCSN models in the rest of this study

There is not space in chapters three to six to present BCSN models in full. Therefore, I present an abbreviated form of the model in fig. 2.10 after close readings. Each abbreviated model in chapters three to six consists of only information in the Content Space Network of the BCSN model and must be understood to be *embedded within* the Ground Space Network mapped out in fig. 2.10. In other words, the abbreviated models in chapters three to six is possible only because information in the Ground Space Network of each one is consistent with that in fig. 2.10. There are two summaries provided in the abbreviated model: an inferential reasoning and simulation summary. The *inferential reasoning summaries* represent contents in the three Content Space Network spaces that illustrate interpretations of material in Proverbs—namely, the *content base spaces*, *causal reasoning spaces*, and *directive spaces*. These summaries illustrate the meaning construction that readers are likely to perform when they read material in Proverbs. The causal reasoning in each case leads to interpretations of *directives*. The following is an inferential reasoning summary that represents the meaning construction readers may perform when they read Prov 28:19.

Inferential Reasoning Summary

Proverbs 28:19

Content Base Spaces	a	A person who works hard being satisfied with food
	b	A person who pursues worthless things being satisfied with poverty
Causal Reasoning Spaces	a	Because working hard leads to good things, I should work hard.
	a	Because pursuing worthless things leads to bad things, I should not pursue worthless things.
Directive Spaces	a	Do not ignore instruction.
	b	Heed rebukes.

The *simulation summaries* are based on contents in the *causal reasoning spaces* in the inferential reasoning summaries. Specifically, the simulation summaries track two features of simulations that readers perform when they elaborate the contents in *causal reasoning spaces*: 1) the role and viewpoint of readers, and 2) the relation between readers and wealth, poverty, the rich, and the poor. I hone in on causal reasoning spaces, because contents in these spaces are the result of Reader in the Scene blends. It is in the causal reasoning spaces that analysts can imagine how readers are likely to work out the personal implications of material in Proverbs—namely, in the context of *viewpointed reader simulations*. Information provided by these simulations supports my contention that the conflations described in §1.2 lead to misunderstandings of how wealth, poverty, the rich, and the poor are portrayed in Proverbs. Only when analysts imagine how readers would imagine their *personal hypothetical involvement* in the scenes they read about in Proverbs can we see what material in Proverbs is mutually informing and what must be kept distinct. The following is an example of a simulation summary for Prov 28:19.

Simulation Summary (in causal reasoning spaces)

Proverbs 28:19a

Role and Viewpoint of Reader	Reader is the person who chooses to work hard.
Relation between Reader & Wealth	Wealth would be something that the reader would acquire by choosing to work hard.

Proverbs 28:19b

Role and Viewpoint of Reader	Reader is the person who chooses not to pursue worthless things.
Relation between Reader & Poverty	Poverty would be something that the reader would avoid by choosing not to pursue worthless things.

We will see in the course of chapters three to six that inferential reasoning and simulation summaries are largely uniform within the subsections of each chapter.[77] In addition, these summaries within each chapter share significant commonalities as well (some more than others). However, when we compare the summaries in one chapter with summaries in other chapters, differences are apparent. The differences and similarities in simulation summaries are all apparent, because nearly all the subsections (with the exception of subsections in §5.1) share *instructional frames*. The relations that readers simulate between themselves and wealth, poverty, the rich, and the poor will of course be similar within the same instructional frames. This is a crux in this study. I argue that only when instructional frames share frame structure can the contents of those frames be fully related to one another. In other words, when frame structure in one instructional frame does not map onto frame structure in another, analysts cannot relate the meaning of these instructions as though they are mutually informing.

This will become clear as we work through material in chapters three to six. As noted in chapter one, the contents of these chapters are the following:

Ch 3 *Wealth and poverty as the focus of instructions*
Ch 4 *Wealth and poverty as central in motivations (and not instructions)*
Ch 5 *Wealth and poverty as supporting features of instructions and motivations*
Ch 6 *The rich and the poor*

I turn now to consider the sayings and longer didactic units in Proverbs in which wealth and poverty are the focus (or object) of instructions.

[77] There are a number of instances when I do not propose a directive interpretation of a saying, because I cannot work out with certainty what it would be (17:8, 18:16, 19:6, and 21:14 in §3.7; and 13:8 in §6.2.4).

CHAPTER 3
Wealth and poverty as the focus of instructions

3.0 Introduction

This chapter surveys material in Proverbs in which wealth and/or poverty are the *focus of instructions*. It is the longest text chapter by far. The amount of material included here attests to the notion that the producers of Proverbs were very concerned with how readers relate to and think about wealth (and poverty). The vast majority of instructions in this chapter are concerned with wealth. However, thinking about wealth often means thinking about poverty as well. The goal in many of the instructions in this chapter—especially those in §3.2.1, which includes material characterized by *build wealth through diligence* instructional frames—is the avoidance of poverty through the responsible (and reasonable) building of wealth. Seven broad instructional frames characterize material in this chapter:

3.1 How not to build wealth instructional frames
3.2 How to build wealth instructional frames
3.3 What not to do with wealth instructional frames
3.4 What to do with wealth instructional frames
3.5 How not to think about wealth instructional frames
3.6 How to think about wealth and material scarcity instructional frames
3.7 How to think about and use gifts and bribes instructional frames

Most of these sections divide further into more specific instructional frames. I specify what these are as we come to them. Due to the inherent alternativity between §3.1 and §3.2, §3.3 and §3.4, and §3.5 and §3.6, some sayings appear in more than one section. I discuss the portions of these sayings that are relevant to one instructional frame at a time.

It must also be said that in addition to being the focus of instructions, wealth and poverty play central motivational roles in much of the material in this chapter as well. The difference

between material in this chapter and chapter four is that chapter four includes material in which wealth and poverty are *only* central in the motivation portions of didactic units. In other words, both chapters include material in which wealth and poverty play motivational roles, but only material here in chapter three issues *instructions* in which wealth and poverty are the focus. In contrast, the instructional frames in chapter four have nothing to do with wealth and poverty.

3.1 How not to build wealth instructional frames

There are six ways in which the producers of Proverbs do not want readers to build wealth: by (an unspecified) wicked means (§3.1.1), through robbery (§3.1.2), haste (§3.1.3), toil (§3.1.4), deceptive means (§3.1.5), and through oppression (§3.1.6).

3.1.1 Do not build wealth by (an unspecified) wicked means instructional frame

Prov 10:2a prohibits building wealth by wicked means without specifying what those means are. It does so through use of the phrase *ʾōṣărōt reša*ʿ ("storehouses of wickedness"). How the storehouses came to be characterized by (or filled with) wickedness, what precisely the wicked contents are, and what makes them wicked are not described. It is probably the way in which the contents of the storehouses were gathered that makes them wicked—in other words, by some wicked means. Readers are invited to fill in the blanks as to what these means could be.

לֹא־יוֹעִילוּ אוֹצָרוֹת רֶשַׁע	a	10:2	Storehouses of wickedness do not profit,
וּצְדָקָה תַּצִּיל מִמָּוֶת	b		but righteousness delivers from death.

The evaluation that producers perform (and want readers to perform) when they read this saying

is clear from the use of *reša*ʿ ("wickedness") to describe the storehouses. The negative evaluation is also clear from the portrayal of consequences: the storehouses will not provide any profit (*lôʾ yôʿîlū*). This lack of profit could be construed as material or non-material in nature. If readers interpret *ʾōṣărōt reša*ʿ ("storehouses of wickedness") as a material lack of profit, they might imagine the actual wealth in the storehouses not providing the expected sustenance. Any number of inferences as to why or how this consequence would materialize are possible.

The most salient concern in 10:2a is the wicked means that would have been used to accumulate the contents of the *ʾōṣărōt reša*ʿ ("storehouses of wickedness"). The negative outcome in v 2a creates a sense of investing in wasted effort. This contrasts with the profitable investment in righteousness that is portrayed in v 2b. In addition, we can imagine the accumulation of righteousness in v 2b in contrast with accumulating items in the storehouse in v 2a. The motivation implied in both lines of v 2 thus relate to one another and work together. There is a clear idea of irony in this saying in that the disastrous outcome in v 2a is exactly opposite to what the actor is trying to achieve.[78] We can imagine readers constructing the meaning of 10:2 in the following ways.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 10:2		
CONTENT BASE SPACES	a	Storehouses of wickedness not profiting
	b	Righteousness delivering from death
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	a	Because building wealth by wicked means leads to bad things, I should not build wealth by wicked means.
	b	Because being righteous leads to good things, I should be righteous.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	a	Do not build wealth by wicked means.
	b	Be righteous.

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 10:2a	
ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses not to build wealth by wicked means.

[78] I thank Kevin Chau for articulating the observations expressed in this paragraph, each one rooted in the poetry (i.e., the poetic implications of the parallelism) of Prov 10:2 (personal communication, May 2020).

RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	Wealth is something that the reader would choose not to build by wicked means.

3.1.2 Do not build wealth through robbery instructional frame

Prov 1:10-19 is the first of the ten lectures that span the introduction to Proverbs in chapters 1-9. This lecture warns readers (through a father-son frame of address) to stay away from dangerous people who would try to lure readers into joining them in all sorts of violent things—e.g., *lying in wait for blood* (1:11b), *ambushing the innocent without cause* (1:11c), and *swallowing the living like Sheol* (1:12a)—all of them acted out in order to "find all precious wealth" (1:13a)[79] and "fill our houses with plunder" (1:13b). The father urges the son with direct prohibitions (characteristic of the "instruction" form) not to join in these terrible escapades. He uses four primary means to make the motivation to follow his instruction especially vivid: 1) he puts words in the mouths of the dangerous young men who are the focus of his warning (1:11-14), 2) he makes these words describe flagrantly wicked acts (1:11b-c, 1:12a) and selfish reasons for committing them (1:13-14), 3) he evaluates these acts in equally dramatic terms in his own voice (1:16), and 4) he caps his lecture with a devastating analogy that underscores the stupidity of trying to build wealth by robbing others (1:17-19).

בְּנִי אִם־יְפַתּוּךָ חַטָּאִים	a	1:10	My son, if sinners entice you,
אַל־תֹּאבֶא	b		do not go;

[79] The word for "wealth" in v 13a is *hôn*. Fox defines *hôn* as some kind of movable wealth. In other words, according to Fox, *hôn* is a collective noun that describes possessions that can be moved around (2000, 151). *Hôn* is not landed property (e.g., fields, vineyards, the home in which a household lives). Wealth in the form of *ʿōšer* (*ʿošrô* in v 28a) can be interpreted as movable wealth as well (see esp. Ps 112:3). The meaning of *hôn* as movable property is also evident throughout Ezekiel 27 in references to items traded in market transactions; in Psalm 112:3, which describes the *hôn* and *ʿōšer* that are found in a house; and also in Prov 1:13 and 6:31 which both describe *hôn* that is contained in a house, and Prov 3:9, which describes the best of one's crops that are gathered from fields. More examples could be given.

אִם־יֹאמְרוּ לְכָה אִתָּנוּ	a	1:11	if they say to you, – “Come with us,
נֶאֶרְבָה לְדָם	b		let us lie in wait for blood,
נִצְפְּנָה לָנָקִי חִנָּם	c		let us ambush the innocent without cause,
נִבְלָעֵם כִּשְׁאוֹל חַיִּים	a	1:12	let us swallow the living, like Sheol,
וּתְמִימִים כְּיוֹרְדֵי בוֹר	b		and the blameless, like those who go down to the pit;
כָּל־הוֹן יָקָר נִמְצָא	a	1:13	let us find all precious wealth,
נְמַלֵּא בָתֵּינוּ שָׁלָל	b		let us fill our houses with plunder.
גּוֹרָלְךָ תַּפִּיל בְּתוֹכֵנוּ	a	1:14	Cast your lot in our midst;
כִּיס אֶחָד יִהְיֶה לְכֻלָּנוּ	b		we will have one purse,” –
בְּנִי אַל־תֵּלֶךְ בְּדֶרֶךְ אִתָּם	a	1:15	my son, do not go on a way with them;
מְנַע רַגְלְךָ מִנְּתִיבָתָם	b		keep your foot from their paths,
כִּי רַגְלֵיהֶם לָרָע יָרוּצוּ	a	1:16	for their feet run to evil,
וימַהֲרוּ לִשְׁפָךְ־דָּם	b		and they hasten to shed blood.
כִּי־חִנָּם מְזֹרָה הָרֶשֶׁת	a	1:17	For in vain a net is spread
בְּעֵינֵי כָל־בַּעַל כָּנָף	b		within sight of any bird,
וְהֵם לְדָמָם יֶאֱרֹבוּ	a	1:18	but these [young men] lie in wait for their own blood,
יִצְפְּנוּ לְנַפְשֹׁתָם	b		they hide in order [to take] their own lives.
כֵּן אָרְחוֹת כָּל־בֹּצֵעַ בָּצַע	a	1:19	So are the paths of anyone who gets unjust gain by unjust means:
אֶת־נֶפֶשׁ בְּעָלָיו יִקָּח	b		it takes the life of those who own it.

Three verses in this lecture mention wealth or items of wealth: the speakers who are portrayed as attempting to compel the son to join them in terrible things talk about the *precious wealth* (*yāqār hōn* in v 13) that they want to rob from others, which they promise will be kept in *one collective purse* (*kîs ʾeḥād* in v 14); and at the close of the lecture, v 19a summarizes the instruction it offers with reference to “unjustly gaining unjust gain” (*bōṣēaʿ beṣaʿ*).

The father portrays the speakers in strikingly negative terms. He puts heartless speech in their mouths (vv 11-14) and describes them as viciously “running to evil” and “hastening to shed blood” (vv 15-16). He also describes them as less sensible than birds (vv 17-18) and ultimately characterizes them as destined for a bad and presumably early end (vv 18b-19). Birds have the sense to avoid life-endangering situations. They naturally seek to preserve their lives. In contrast,

the father describes the dangerous young men he is warning his son against as people who create life-ending traps for themselves to fall into and who lie in wait for themselves to do so. The images of them "lying in wait for their own blood" and "hiding in order [to take] their own lives" in v 18 portray this group with irony as both hunter and hunted. This is a severe jab at anyone who would try to build wealth by robbing others: not only are they violent and immoral, they have less intelligence than birds. The final statement in v 19 caps the lecture with a sentence saying that prohibits unjust gain (*beṣaʿ*) as something that will kill all who acquire it unjustly (*bōṣēaʿ*). (The redundancy in my English translation of this phrase is intended to represent the cognate accusative in the Hebrew.)

Ultimately, this first lecture in Prov 1-9 warns readers against joining with characters who would harm others in order to rob people of their wealth. The father describes these characters in terms that are dramatic in portraying both how dangerous and how senseless they are. He issues direct instructions to prohibit the son from joining in their exploits: *ʾal tōbēʾ* ("do not go/enter") in v 10b, *ʾal tēlēk* ("do not go/walk") in 15a, and *měnaʿ raglekâ minnātîbātām* ("keep your foot from their paths") in v 15b. In the inferential and simulation summaries below, I represent the meaning construction that readers might perform when they read v 19 only. As the capstone statement in the lecture, this saying summarizes the lesson of this lecture.

Inferential Reasoning Summary

Proverbs 1:19

CONTENT BASE SPACES	a	A correspondence between the actions described in 1:18 and the paths that people who unjustly gain unjust gain (*bōṣēaʿ beṣaʿ*) take
	b	Unjust gain taking the life of those who own it
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	a-b	Because unjust gain leads to bad things, I should not build wealth by unjust means.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	a-b	Do not build wealth by unjust means.

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 1:19

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses not to gain wealth unjustly.

3.1.3. Do not build wealth through haste instructional frames

Five sentence sayings in Proverbs warn readers not to build wealth by hastening after it (13:11a; 20:21; 21:5b; 28:20b; 28:22).[80] Each one portrays the consequence of haste as a loss of some kind. In four of the sayings the loss is described as something material (13:11a; 20:21; 21:5b; 28:22); and in one, it is framed as a legal consequence (*lôʾ yinnāqēh*, "he will not be acquitted" in 28:20b). In each case, portraying loss functions as a negative evaluation of trying to build wealth in haste. The instruction of the portion of each of these sayings that mentions haste is therefore *do not hasten after wealth.* Wealth is not mentioned in 21:5b. Commentators debate the nature of the haste in 21:5b for this reason.[81] Consider the five sayings altogether.

הוֹן מֵהֶבֶל יִמְעָט	a	13:11a	Riches gained hastily[82] dwindle,
וְקֹבֵץ עַל־יָד יַרְבֶּה	b		but a person who gathers by hand increases.

[80] Two of the three Hebrew words in Proverbs that are translated "hasten" in English are used in these five sayings. The three words and their occurrences in total in Proverbs are the following: *b-h-l* (13:11a, with emendation; 20:21a; 28:22a), *ʾ-w-ṣ* (19:2b; 21:5b; 28:20b; 29:20a), and *m-h-r* (1:16; 6:18; 7:23; 25:8). No instance of *m-h-r* refers to hastening after wealth. All three occurrences of *b-h-l* refer to hastening after wealth. One of the four uses of *ʾ-w-ṣ* unambiguously portrays hastening after wealth (with *lĕhăʿāšîr* in 28:20b), and a use of *ʾ-w-ṣ* second might refer to hastening after wealth (21:5b).

[81] The participle *ʾāṣ* has no object in 21:5b. Some commentators interpret it as meaning "hastening after wealth" in spite of this (e.g., Toy 1908, 369, 399; Whybray 1994, 308; Waltke 2005, 99; Fox 2009, 648-649, 681). Others think that *ʾāṣ* in 21:5b refers more generally to hurried and frantic action that is unrelated to wealth or greed (e.g., McKane 1970, 527, 549; Murphy 1982, 142, 159; Clifford 1999, 176, 189). I follow the first group of interpreters who read 21:5b as viewing haste after wealth.

[82] BHS editors suggest emending M's *mēhebel* ("from a vapor"), which is difficult to make sense of in 13:11a, to the Dp participle *mĕbōhāl* ("hastened"). Many commentators adopt this emendation (e.g., Gemser, Ringgren, Barucq, McKane, Murphy, Fox). The LXX reflects the emendation: *ὕπαρξις ἐπισπουδαζομένη* ("property gained hastily").

נַחֲלָה מבהלת בָּרִאשֹׁנָה וְאַחֲרִיתָהּ לֹא תְבֹרָךְ	a b	20:21	An inheritance gained hastily[83] at the beginning – at its end is not blessed.
מַחְשְׁבוֹת חָרוּץ אַךְ־לְמוֹתָר וְכָל־אָץ אַךְ־לְמַחְסוֹר	a b	21:5b	The thoughts of a diligent person – only to profit, and all who hasten – only to poverty.
אִישׁ אֱמוּנוֹת רַב־בְּרָכוֹת וְאָץ לְהַעֲשִׁיר לֹא יִנָּקֶה	a b	28:20b	A faithful man – many blessings, but a person who hastens to be rich – he will not be acquitted.
נִבְהָל לְהוֹן אִישׁ רַע עָיִן וְלֹא־יֵדַע כִּי־חֶסֶר יְבֹאֶנּוּ	a b	28:22	A person who hastens after wealth is a stingy man, and he does not know that lack will come upon him.

Three of these sayings use antithetical parallelism (13:11; 21:5; 28:20), and two use synthetic parallelism (20:21; 28:22). In the three that use antithetical parallelism, a person who hastens after wealth (if we read 21:5b as portraying this) is opposed to two different types of people: to a person who is diligent (13:11;[84] 21:5) and to a person who is faithful—specifically, to "a man of faithfulnesses" (*ʾîš ʾĕmūnōt* in 28:20a). The sense of the opposition is different in the two cases. In the first, the *carelessness* of hastening after wealth is highlighted in the opposition to diligent work in 13:11b (*qōbēṣ ʿal yad*, "a person who gathers by hand"). Similarly, in 21:5a, the *carelessness* of hastening after wealth is opposed to diligent thought or planning (*maḥšĕbōt ḥārūṣ*, "thoughts of the diligent"). In contrast, in the second case, opposing a person who hastens to get rich (*ʾāṣ lĕhāʿāšîr* in 28:20b) with a "faithful man" (*ʾîš ʾĕmūnōt*) in 28:20a seems instead

[83] The consonantal text of *mbhlt* reflects the *qere* in M. The *ketiv* in M is *mbḥlt* (possibly *mĕbuḥelet*), which would be translated as "abhorred" (Dp of *b-ḥ-l*). The *qere* would be vocalized as the Dp participle *mĕbōhelet* (*b-h-l*, "to hasten"). The LXX, Vulgate, Peshitta, and Targum all reflect *mĕbōhelet*.

[84] The phrase *qōbēṣ ʿal yad* ("a person who gathers by hand") in 13:11b occurs only here in the Hebrew Bible. Fox suggests that it means something like to "gain gradually" or "item by item" (2009, 566). It may be intended to evoke an image of a person gathering produce by hand in a field or vineyard. I associate this action with diligence, because it refers to a person at work in an agricultural setting.

to highlight the *unreliability* of the person who hastens after wealth.[85] In every case, referring to a person who hastens after wealth implies that this person is doing so out of greed.

The characters in the sayings with synthetic parallelism are characterized by greed in different ways. In 20:21, an inheritance gained by the focal character is described as *naḥălāh mĕbōhelet* (“an inheritance gained hastily”). Commentators identify a link between 20:21 and the preceding saying. 20:20 reads, “A person who curses his father and his mother—his lamp will go out in utter darkness.” 20:21 functions as an example of a transgression that a person may commit against their parents: seeking and somehow getting an inheritance from their parents before the proper time of its allotment.[86] The character in 28:22 is referred to explicitly as *ʾîš raʿ ʿayin* (“a stingy or greedy man”) in v 22a. The phrase *raʿ ʿayin* (“evil of eye”) is used only twice in the Hebrew Bible—here in Prov 28:22 and again in Prov 23:6. It is interpreted as “stingy” or “greedy” by commentators for two reasons: 1) the context provided by both 23:6 and 28:22, and 2) the apparent meaning of *ṭôb ʿayin* in Prov 22:9 (the only occurrence of this phrase in the Hebrew Bible). In 22:9, the character who is described as *ṭôb ʿayin* gives from their own food to the poor. In 23:6, the character who is described as *raʿ ʿayin* has negative inward thoughts toward dinner guest(s). Here in 28:22, the character described by this phrase is someone who hastens after wealth and, ironically, ends up lacking wealth.

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[85] In addition, it seems likely that 28:20-22 could be read as a unit (Whybray 1994; Waltke 2005). Vv 20 and 22 are connected thematically. Both mention hastening after wealth. The connection with v 21 is a judicial background that vv 20-21 may share. In v 20, this background could be reflected in the reference to the greedy person not being acquitted (*lôʾ yinnāqēh*) in v 20b and also to *ʾîš ʾĕmūnōt* (“man of faithfulnesses”) in v 20a. The root meaning of *ʾĕmūnāh* is something like “reliability” or “constancy” (see *ʾĕmūnāh, ʾ-m-n,* and *ʾĕmet* in HALOT I, 62-64 and 68-69), and it is used to refer to honesty in legal settings in Isaiah 59:4 and Proverbs 12:17. In v 21, the legal background is hypothesized on the basis of the phrase *hakkĕr pānîm*, which translates woodenly to “to recognize a face” and has the metonymic meaning of “showing partiality” in judgment.

[86] McKane 1970; Whybray 1994; Waltke 2005; Fox 2009.

The irony in these sayings is readily apparent: *hastening* after wealth leads to *losing* wealth. Wealth is the focus of the instruction and is also central in the motivation in these sayings. We can therefore imagine readers constructing meaning in the following ways when they read this material.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 13:11, 20:21, 21:5, 28:20, 28:22

CONTENT BASE SPACES	13:11a	Riches gained hastily dwindling
	13:11b	Careful effort producing an increase
	20:21a	An inheritance gained hastily (and prematurely)
	20:21b	That inheritance not having a good end
	21:5a	A diligent person producing a profit
	21:5b	People who hasten coming to poverty
	28:20a	A faithful man receiving many blessings
	28:20b	A person hastening to get rich being punished
	28:22a	A person who hastens after riches being described as a stingy man
	28:22b	That person not knowing that lack will come upon him
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	13:11a	Because hastening after wealth leads to bad things, I should not try to build wealth in this way.
	13:11b	Because diligence leads to good things, I should be diligent.
	20:21	Because hastening after an inheritance leads to bad things, I should not try to gain my inheritance before the proper time.
	21:5a	Because diligence leads to good things, I should be diligent.
	21:5b	Because hastening after wealth leads to bad things, I should not try to build wealth in this way.
	28:20a	Because faithfulness leads to good things, I should be faithful.
	28:20b	Because hastening after wealth leads to bad things, I should not try to build wealth in this way.
	28:22	Because hastening after wealth leads to bad things, I should not try to build wealth in this way.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	13:11a	Do not hasten after wealth.
	13:11b	Be diligent.
	20:21	Do not hasten after an inheritance before the proper time.
	21:5a	Be diligent.
	21:5b	Do not hasten after wealth.
	28:20a	Be faithful.
	28:20b	Do not hasten after wealth.
	28:22	Do not hasten after wealth.

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 13:11a, 20:21, 21:5b, 28:20b, 28:22

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses not to hasten after wealth.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	Wealth is something that the reader would choose not to hasten after.

Proverbs 13:11b and 21:5a

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses to be diligent.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	Wealth is something that the reader would acquire.

Proverbs 28:20a

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses to be faithful.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	Wealth could (but need not) be construed as a form of blessing that the reader would acquire.

3.1.4 Do not build wealth through toil instructional frames

One sentence saying (10:22) and one saying pair (23:4-5) in Proverbs tell readers not to strain to get rich through overexertion—i.e., through "toil" (*ʿeṣeb*, "toil" in 10:22b; and *ʾal tîgaʿ lĕhāʿāšîr*, "do not toil to be rich" in 23:4a). The Hebrew words that are used in 23:4 and 10:22 to describe toil and overexertion bring to mind work or toil that wears a person out and, in many cases, is portrayed as painful to do (see *HALOT* I:386 and 865).

23:4-5 are part of the Amenemope section (22:17-23:11) in the third major collection of Proverbs (22:17-24:22). This saying pair is part of the Amenemope section that is concerned with a specific situation in which young men of a certain upper-class would find themselves at the start of their careers—namely, that of dining with superiors. 23:1-3 warn young men in this situation to restrain their appetites and not to indulge indiscriminately in delicious food that is set before them. Then, somewhat suddenly in v 4a, the producer of this unit breaks away from his focus on readers restraining their appetites and prohibits readers from toiling to be rich. I read v 4a as an exclamation that diverts focus momentarily away from the food at these meals, and vv 4b-5b as again focused on this food. This is different from most readings of this unit. Most read vv 4-5 as a whole as concerned with wealth in general. Consider this saying pair.

אַל־תִּיגַע לְהַעֲשִׁיר	a	23:4	Do not toil to be rich;
מִבִּינָתְךָ חֲדָל	b		stop your staring!

הֲתָעוֹף עֵינֶיךָ בּוֹ וְאֵינֶנּוּ	a		If your eyes light upon it, it is gone;
כִּי עָשֹׂה יַעֲשֶׂה־לּוֹ כְנָפַיִם	b	23:5	for it surely makes wings for itself
כְּנֶשֶׁר ועיף הַשָּׁמָיִם	c		[and] like an eagle flies [to] the skies.[87]

My translation of v 4b calls for an explanation. I follow Fox in translating *mibbînātĕkā ḥădal* in v 4b as "stop your staring" (Fox 2009, 722). However, I envision a different object being stared at than Fox. No object is stated, so context must be consulted. Most commentators translate *mibbînātĕkā ḥădal* in v 4b as something like "because of your *understanding*, *discernment*, or *insight*, cease!" (e.g., McKane 1970; Whybray 1994; Murphy 1998; Clifford 1999; Waltke 2005). In other words, these commentators read v 4b as saying, *Cease striving after wealth, because you have the understanding to know better*.

There are two differences between the reading that Fox proposes and readings of these other commentators—namely, how each one construes the meaning of the *min* preposition and the meaning of the noun *bînāh* in v 4b. A majority of commentators read *bînāh* in v 4b as *understanding*. This is what *bînāh* usually means in Proverbs. However, Fox underscores that when *ḥ-d-l* plus *min* is used, the *min* preposition never means "because of." It always expresses the meaning *to cease <u>from</u>* something.[88] For this reason, Fox reflects that it is unlikely that the producers of Proverbs would tell readers to cease from *understanding*.

Therefore, Fox reads *bînāh* in v 4b as a feminine G infinitive of *b-y-n*. *HALOT* notes that *b-y-n* can be used to mean "to pay attention to" or "to consider" (*HALOT* I:122).[89] The start of v

[87] Both instances of *ʿ-w-p* in 24:5 have K/Q readings: *tāʿūp*/*tāʿîp* in line a and *wĕʿāyēp*/*yāʿūp* in line b. I adopt the *qere* readings in each instance in the translation above.

[88] See Exod 14:12; 23:5; 1 Kg 15:21; Job 7:16; 2 Chr 26:5.

[89] The Hebrew verb *b-y-n* is thus similar to English "see" in that it is used in cognitive domains of both vision and understanding (Sweetser 1990; Dancygier and Sweetser 2014).

5 supports Fox's reading of *mibbînātĕkā ḥădal* in v 4b in that v 5 opens with the clause "when *your eyes* light upon it" (*hătāʿîp ʿêneykā bô*). This clause picks up the image of a person staring at something. Like most commentators, Fox reads the object of *bînāh* in v 4b as wealth in general. He also reads the "it" upon which "your eyes" alight in v 5 as wealth in general as well. This reading views vv 4-5 as a kind of interruption within the meal-time instructions in vv 1-3 and 6-8. This is how the majority of commentators read this unit.

In contrast, I read vv 4-5 in closer relation to vv 1-3 and 6-8. Rather than wealth in general, I read the object of *bînāh* in v 4b and the "it" in v 5 as the delicious food that is spread before the young addressee. The opening of the longer unit in vv 1-8 supports this. In the same way that *bînāh* in v 4b refers to staring at the food on the table, two verbal forms of *b-y-n* (*bîn tābîn*, an infinitive absolute + a *yiqtol*) combine to express the command "look intently at / carefully consider what is before you" (*bîn tābîn ʾet ʾăšer lĕpānekâ*). The object in 23:1b is the delicious food that is spread out on the table in front of the young addressee. In line with (but also opposed to) this command in v 1b, I read v 4b as a command to the young addressee to stop his staring. Rather than carefully consider the food in front of him, he may have begun to fixate on it. This would be as inappropriate as engorging himself on it.

Both vv 1-3 and 6-8 are preoccupied with the food served at meals with superiors. Both include the admonition, "do not desire his delicacies" (*ʾal titʾāw lĕmaṭʿammōtāw* in 23:3a and 23:6b). The point of the unit as a whole is to admonish readers to exercise restraint at meals with superiors. When vv 4-5 are imagined in this context, the admonitions in v 4 and the figurative expression in v 5 can be read as pertaining specifically to what a young male addressee would experience in this setting. The prohibition in v 4a not to toil after wealth stands out in this context. It may anticipate the envy or greed that a young man might feel being surrounded by

wealthy superiors. Turning to the metaphor in v 5, reading the target frame as the "delicacies" on the table fits this context as well. These delicacies are described as "deceptive food" (*leḥem kĕzābîm*) in v 3b. In vv 6-8, they are said to be offered by a superior whose intentions are "inwardly calculating" and therefore cannot be trusted. For this reason, it is fitting that the staged speaker would describe the delicacies at which the young addressee is caught staring as sprouting wings and flying away. They cannot be trusted because the person offering them cannot be trusted. In addition, the masculine singular "deceptive food" (*leḥem kĕzābîm*) in v 3b is the nearest 3ms form that could serve as an antecedent for the 3ms suffixes on *bô* ("on it") and *ʾênennū* ("it is gone") in v 5.

Interpreting 23:4-5 in this way impacts our understanding regarding views of wealth that are portrayed in Proverbs. If the source frame of the figure in v 5 is interpreted as portraying the ephemeral nature of wealth in general, this saying would be the only instance in which wealth is characterized as *arbitrarily* ephemeral. Every other time that wealth is portrayed as unreliable, that unreliability is tied to a character flaw in the possessor of the wealth in question (§3.1.1; §3.1.3). When wealth is compared with another source of security and characterized as lesser in reliability, that other source of security is either Yahweh (e.g., 10:15-16) or righteousness (e.g., 11:4, 28). The pragmatic reasons for portraying wealth in these ways when virtues, vices, and trust in Yahweh are in question are straightforward. The producers want to emphasize the importance of virtues, vices, and trust in Yahweh. Only in 23:5 does wealth evaporate for seemingly no reason.[90] However, I would argue that the seeming arbitrariness of the

[90] We may also mention Prov 27:23-27. This passage presents a sustained argument that renewable sources of wealth (animals and fields) are superior to movable, more extravagant wealth (*ḥōsen*, "treasure" or "riches" in v 24a) and royalty (*nēzer*, "crown" in v 24b). Therefore, the statements in 27:24 that "riches do not last forever" and "a crown does not endure generation to generation" do not support the idea that wealth in general is unreliable. The point in 27:23-27 is to argue for the greater reliability of

disappearance of the "it" in v 5a is not due to the way that the producers of this section viewed wealth in general. Rather, the disappearance of the item in question is due to the deceptive nature of the food at the meal (v 3b)—which is really a reflection of the deceptiveness of the person providing the food (vv 6-7).

We can imagine readers constructing the meaning of 23:4-5 in the following ways. Wealth is again central in the instruction and the motivation.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 23:4-5

CONTENT BASE SPACES	4a	Direct command not to toil to be rich
	4b	Direct command not to stare at [delicacies on the table]
	5a	A person seeing the delicious food on the table and it disappearing
	5b	That food making wings for itself
	5c	That food flying away
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	4a	Because it is bad to toil to become rich, I should not toil to get rich.
	4b-5c	Because the delicious food at these meals is deceptive and easily taken away, I should not stare at it[or eat too much of it—taking vv 1-3 and 6-8 into consideration as well].
DIRECTIVE SPACES	4a	[explicit in v 4a]
	4b	[explicit in v 4b]
	5a-c_2	Do not stare at the food on the table in front of you. [explicit in v 4a]

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 23:4

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	a	Reader is the person who chooses not to toil to get rich.
	b	Reader is the person who chooses not to stare at the delicacies on the table in front of him
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	a	Wealth is something that the reader would choose not to toil to acquire.
	b	Wealth (in the form of delicacies) is something that the reader would choose not to stare at.

Proverbs 23:5

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses not to stare at the food on the table in front of him.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	Wealth (in the form of delicacies) is something that the reader would choose not to stare at.

renewable sources of wealth found in agricultural work in comparison with extravagant and non-renewable wealth and social position.

* * *

Prov 10:22 instructs readers not to toil to get rich by describing the *birkat YHWH* ("blessing of Yahweh") as that which *taʿăšîr* ("makes rich").

בִּרְכַּת יְהוָה הִיא תַעֲשִׁיר	a	10:22	It is the blessing of Yahweh that makes rich,
וְלֹא־יוֹסֵף עֶצֶב עִמָּהּ	b		and toil (*ʿeṣeb*) adds nothing to it.

As Fox writes, "This proverb first of all reminds the successful man that his prosperity comes from God rather than his own efforts and talents" (2009, 522). In some ways, this saying seems to contradict Prov 14:23a, which states that "In all *ʿeṣeb* (toil) there is profit" (§3.2.1). It could also be construed in concert with it. Fox reflects on the relation between these sayings as a matter of perspective (2009, 523). 14:23 is written from the perspective of the person working hard to make a living, and v 22 is written from the perspective of how the producers of Proverbs envision Yahweh making the profits of a person's labor materialize. As such, v 22 stresses that an inordinate amount of toil will not add to what Yahweh chooses to bestow. We can imagine readers constructing these meanings in the following ways.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 10:22

CONTENT BASE SPACES	a	The blessing of Yahweh making rich
	b	Toil adding nothing to what Yahweh provides
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	a-b	Because toil adds nothing to the wealth that Yahweh grants, I should not toil to get rich, and I should trust Yahweh to provide what I need.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	a-b	Do not toil to build wealth. / Trust Yahweh for what you need.

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 10:22

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses not to toil and to trust Yahweh.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	Wealth is something that the reader would choose not to toil to acquire.

3.1.5 Do not build wealth by deceptive means instructional frames

Four sayings in Proverbs prohibit readers from building wealth through deception (11:1a; 20:10; 20:23; 21:6). Three of them profile deception in marketplace transactions (11:1a; 20:10; 20:23), and a fourth presents a striking figure to convey this instruction. Consider the marketplace sayings first.

מֹאזְנֵי מִרְמָה תּוֹעֲבַת יְהוָה וְאֶבֶן שְׁלֵמָה רְצוֹנוֹ	a b	11:1	Deceptive balances are an abomination to Yahweh, but a whole measuring stone is his delight.
אֶבֶן וָאֶבֶן אֵיפָה וְאֵיפָה תּוֹעֲבַת יְהוָה גַּם־שְׁנֵיהֶם	a b	20:10	Stone and stone, ephah and ephah – both of them are an abomination to Yahweh.
תּוֹעֲבַת יְהוָה אֶבֶן וָאָבֶן וּמֹאזְנֵי מִרְמָה לֹא־טוֹב	a b	20:23	Stone and stone are an abomination to Yahweh, and deceptive balances are not good.

The evaluation of marketplace practice in these sayings is tied to what Yahweh is said to think of it. Deceptive practices are an "abomination" to him (*tōʿăbat YHWH*), and honest practices are "his delight" (*rĕṣōnô*). Consequences are not mentioned in these sayings. Cultural models that readers associate with Yahweh may include consequences for practices that he considers an abomination or a delight. There is also the explicit evaluation in 20:23b that "deceptive balances" are *lôʾ ṭôb* ("not good"). Fox notes that *lôʾ ṭôb* in Proverbs "is worse than it sounds" (2009, 622). It is a litotes in Proverbs. Thus, when something is said to be *lôʾ ṭôb*, it is not just not good. It is very bad. The same is true of everything described as *tōʿăbat YHWH* (20:23a) in the book of Proverbs as well.

The repetitive phrases "stone and stone" (*ʾeben wāʾeben*) and "measure and measure" (*ʾēpāh wĕʾēpāh*) that are used in 20:10 and 20:23 refer to disparate sets of stones and ephahs that were used for measuring the amounts of items bought and sold in marketplace transactions. Fox explains that, "By nicking off a bit of the balance stone used in measuring grain, a merchant could inflate the payment he was receiving, and by using a heavier stone when measuring the

silver paid, he could make the payment seem less than it was really worth" (Fox 2009, 530). Therefore, the prohibitions in all three of these sayings are against a merchant having a larger stone and ephah for buying and a smaller stone and ephah for selling.[91] Thus, the repetition in these phrases is meant to elicit the following construals—*ʾeben wāʾeben*: *a* [*heavier*] *stone and a* [*lighter*] *stone*; and *ʾēpāh wĕʾēpāh*: a [*heavier*] *ephah and a* [*lighter*] *ephah*.

Marketplace practices are portrayed in 11:1, 20:10, and 20:23. However, the scope of these sayings exceed the marketplace. They prohibit building wealth by dishonest means in any setting. For this reason, we can imagine readers constructing meaning in the following ways when they read these sayings.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 11:1, 20:10; 20:23		
CONTENT BASE SPACES	11:1a	Deceptive balances being an abomination to Yahweh
	11:1b	An honest measuring stone being a delight to Yahweh
	20:10a-b	Deceptive stones and ephahs being an abomination to Yahweh
	20:23a	Deceptive measuring stones being an abomination to Yahweh
	20:23b	Deceptive balances being very bad

Proverbs 11:1a, 20:10; 20:23	
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	Because deceptive practices in the marketplace are an abomination to Yahweh, I should not build wealth through deceptive marketplace transactions.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	Do not build wealth through deceptive marketplace transactions. / Do not build wealth dishonestly.

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 11:1a, 20:10; 20:23	
ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses not to be deceptive in marketplace dealings or any other means of building wealth.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	Wealth is something that the reader would choose not to acquire through deceptive marketplace dealings or any other means of building wealth.

[91] Deut 25:13-16 prohibits the use of disparate stones and measures as well (and compare Lev 19:36; Mic 6:11; Eze 45:10). Commentators note that this is one of many commonalities between wisdom literature and Deuteronomy (see Weinfeld 1972). Another interesting feature common to both is the phrase *tōʿăbat YHWH*. This phrase occurs only in the books of Proverbs and Deuteronomy.

* * *

Prov 21:6 is the fourth saying in Proverbs that prohibits building wealth by deceptive means. As noted above, it conveys this instruction through the use of a striking metaphor. The basic set of metaphorical mappings underlying the expression in v 6 is PEOPLE ARE OBJECTS.

פֹּעַל אוֹצָרוֹת בִּלְשׁוֹן שָׁקֶר הֶבֶל נִדָּף מְבַקְשֵׁי־מָוֶת	a b	21:6	A person who builds[92] storehouses with a lying tongue is a driven vapor that seeks[93] death.

The person in v 6a is described as someone who builds storehouses with a "lying tongue" (*lĕšōn šeqer*). "Tongue" is a metonymy for speech. The negative evaluation of building wealth through deception is expressed vividly in the source frame of the metaphor: "a driven vapor that seeks death" (*hebel niddāp mĕbaqqēš māwet*). Commentators discuss how to understand this expression. The predication is a strange one. As Fox reflects, the image is of a person tossed or "buffeted about like a vapor" (Fox 2009, 681). Vapors are insubstantial and fleeting. Therefore, a driven vapor (*hebel niddāp*) has no hope of resisting a force propelling it. It would seem that a *hebel niddāp* would be at the mercy of an external force. However, the predication in v 6b presents this driven vapor actively seeking death—not being compelled against its wishes toward death.

Kevin Chau pointed out to me in personal communication (May 2020) that the metaphorical reasoning prompted by this metaphor ties to imagery which stands in opposition to the fleeting and fading nature of a vapor that is blown effortlessly away. Specifically, the

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[92] The translation above reflects reading *pōʿēl* ("a person who works/makes/builds") rather than M *pōʿal* ("work") at the start of v 6a. I follow Fox (2009) in making this emendation. This reading is reflected in the LXX: *ὁ ἐνεργῶν*.

[93] The translation above reflects reading *mĕbaqqēš* (ms abs form of the D ptc) in place of M *mĕbaqqĕšê-* (mp cnst form of the D ptc).

substantive nature of items that can be collected and, even more, the *concentrated nature* of their collective substance, stands in conceptual opposition to a *hebel niddāp* ("driven vapor"). This image conveys a huge sense of irony in that trying to build wealth through deception leads to that wealth (and apparently one's life) vanishing. Portraying the driven vapor as actively seeking death serves to underscore this irony by characterizing the building of wealth through deception as ultimately *self*-destructive. The ultimate consequence here is dramatically portrayed not as loss of wealth, but as loss of life. We can therefore imagine readers constructing the meaning of this saying in the following way.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 21:6		
CONTENT BASE SPACES	a	A person who builds wealth deceptively
	b	being a driven vapor that seeks death
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	a-b	Because building wealth through deception leads to bad things, I should not build wealth through deception.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	a-b	Do not build wealth through deception.

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 21:6	
ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses not to acquire wealth through deception.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	Wealth is something that the reader would choose not to acquire through deception.

3.1.6 Do not build wealth through oppression instructional frames

Both Prov 22:16 and 28:8 prohibit building wealth by oppressing the poor. Predatory lending could be the background of both sayings. However, this background is more apparent in 28:8. 22:16 prohibits building wealth by oppressing (*ʿ-š-q*) a *dal*, but it does not say what this oppression entails. Therefore, 22:16 *can* be interpreted as a portrayal and condemnation of predatory lending, but it could also be interpreted as referring to other means of building wealth

by oppressing the poor (e.g., forced labor or taking bribes to testify against the poor). In contrast, 28:8 explicitly profiles two ways in which lenders might extort money from borrowers.

עֹשֵׁק דָּל לְהַרְבּוֹת לוֹ נֹתֵן לְעָשִׁיר אַךְ־לְמַחְסוֹר	a b	22:16	A person who oppresses a *dal* to increase for himself, who gives to a rich man – only to poverty.
מַרְבֶּה הוֹנוֹ בְּנֶשֶׁךְ וּבתרבית לְחוֹנֵן דַּלִּים יִקְבְּצֶנּוּ	a b	28:8	A person who increases his riches by interest and usury[94] – he gathers it for a person who is kind to *dallîm.*

Whybray (1994), Fox (2009), and *HALOT* explain what the terms *běnešek ūtarbît* in 28:8a represent. The term *nešek* ("bite") reflects the practice of taking money out of the principal. The person offering the loan, in other words, takes a *bite* out of the principal as a fee for the service of providing the loan. In contrast, but with a similar result for both borrower and lender, *tarbît* (related to the C of *r-b-h*, "cause to increase") reflects the practice of creating a fee for the service of lending by adding interest to the principal. In both situations, the borrower pays more than he borrows, and the lender gets more than he gives. Either way, the lender makes a profit. Both of these practices are condemned in the Torah (Ex 22:24 [25]; Lev 25:36-37; Dt 23:20 [19]), the prophets (Eze 18:4, 13, 17; 22:12), and the Psalms (Ps 15:5). These condemnations encompass situations in which the borrower is described as poor (Ex 22:24 [25]; Lev 25:36-37) and situations in which he is not (Dt 23:20 [19]; Eze 18:8, 13, 17; 22:12; Ps 15:5).

28:8a does not name *dallîm* as the targets of the lending that it prohibits. However, the mention of *dallîm* in 28:8b and the likelihood that the grammatical subject (i.e., the oppressor) is the same in both lines support conceptualizing *dallîm* as the victims in 28:8a as well. Turning to 22:16, as noted above, the more abstract frame of a person oppressing (ʿ-*š*-*q*) a *dal* in order to

[94] There is a *ketiv-qere* reading in 28:8b. The *ketiv* includes a *bet* preposition immediately before *tarbît* (after the conjunctive *waw*), and the *qere* does not.

"cause increase for himself" (*lĕharbôt lô*) could reflect any number of means of exploiting the poor.[95] Predatory lending is one way in which a person could both oppress a *dal* and make a profit doing so. As noted above, other possible backgrounds could be forced labor or taking a bribe to testify against the poor in a legal proceeding. The ironic consequence in both 22:16 and 28:8 is that any wealth that a lender or oppressor might gain through oppression is lost in the end. We can thus imagine readers interpreting 22:16 and 28:8 in the following ways.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 22:16		
CONTENT BASE SPACES	a	A person oppressing a *dal* to gain an increase for himself
	b	That same person giving to a rich man and coming to poverty
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	a	Because building wealth by oppressing the poor leads to bad things [explicit in 22:16b*β*], I should not build wealth by oppressing the poor.
	b	Because trying to ingratiate oneself with the rich leads to bad things, I should not try to ingratiate myself with the rich.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	a	Do not build wealth by oppressing the poor.
	b	Do not use your wealth to try to ingratiate yourself with the rich.
Proverbs 28:8		
CONTENT BASE SPACES	a	A person building wealth through predatory lending
	b	A person building wealth only to give it to someone who is kind to *dallîm*.
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	a-b	Because building wealth through predatory lending leads to bad things, I should not build wealth through predatory lending.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	a-b	Do not build wealth through predatory lending.

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 22:16a	
ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses not to oppress the poor [possibly

[95] Commentators debate what happens to whom in each line of 22:16. Specifically, they discuss who gets the increase in 16a (the oppressor or the *dal*) and who ends up in need in 16b (the rich man or the person giving to the rich man). Some choose to translate in a way that leaves all options open—e.g., Murphy, who translates, "One oppressing the poor—for his enrichment; // one giving to the rich—only for impoverishment!" (1998, 163). Whybray (1994) concludes that the saying as we have it in M is comprised of fragments of sayings that cannot be meaningfully related to one another. Others interpret Prov 22:16 as a paradoxical saying. On this reading, both lines express paradoxes. 16a is construed to mean something like, "Sometimes a person oppresses a poor man yet *he*, the oppressor, ends up giving the poor man even more," and 16b is taken to mean something like, "And sometimes a person gives to a *rich man* yet he, the rich man, ends up poor" (Fox 2009, italics in original; see also McKane 1970). I read 22:16 as describing two things that the same person does—namely, oppressing a poor person in v 16a and giving to a rich person in v 16ba. The consequence that we see in v 16bb, on this reading, are experienced by this one person for all of this wrongdoing.

	through predatory lending or forced labor].
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	Wealth is something that the reader would choose not to acquire by oppressing the poor.
Proverbs 28:8	
ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses not to oppress the poor through predatory lending.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	Wealth is something that the reader would choose not to acquire through predatory lending.

3.1.7 Summary

The directives in this section all issue prohibitions against building wealth in censurable ways—by an unspecified wicked means (10:2a), robbery (1:10-19), haste (13:11a; 20:21; 21:5b; 28:20b, 22), toil (10:22; 23:4a), deception (11:1a; 20:10, 23; 21:6), and by oppressing the poor (22:16a; 28:8). The motivations to follow these instructions vary. All but one involve the portrayal of consequences. In addition, irony and hyperbole both play prominent rhetorical roles in all of these sayings. 10:2a threatens that wealth gained wickedly will not profit, leaving open to readers' imaginations how it might not profit. All the sayings that warn against hastening after wealth (13:11a; 20:21; 21:5b; 28:20b, 22), as well as the two that condemn gaining wealth by oppressing the poor (22:16a; 28:8), portray the ironic consequence of people who gain wealth by either of these means losing it in the end. Death is threatened in 1:10-19 and 21:6. Offending Yahweh is the one consequence in the honesty-in-the-marketplace sayings (11:1a; 20:10, 23). Finally, the two prohibitions against toiling after wealth motivate readers to follow this instruction in different ways. 23:4a relies on the perceived authority of the speaker, and 10:22 states plainly that toiling will not add to what Yahweh gives.

Because all the directives (i.e., instructional frames) in this section warn readers against building wealth improperly, readers who imagine personal implications for themselves when

they read Proverbs will imagine *direct* relations between themselves and wealth in simulations. The contents of the causal reasoning spaces in the inferential reasoning summaries in this section all involve *readers choosing not to do certain things in order to build wealth*. It is important to note that this type of reader imagines themselves as the ones experiencing the consequences that are portrayed—not someone else. In other words, they apprehend that they are being addressed and instructed, and upon this apprehension, they imagine their choices leading to certain outcomes. It must be said again that the inferential reasoning readers perform when they interpret Proverbs in this manner is a pedagogical exercise—not a lesson in empirical realities.

3.2 How to build wealth instructional frames

There are two ways in which the producers of Proverbs instruct readers to build wealth—by working hard to produce wealth (§3.2.1) and by dealing honestly in marketplace transactions that involve wealth (§3.2.2). The amount of attention given to these instructions and the motivational strategies used to promote them differs. Only two sayings in Proverbs instruct readers to be honest in marketplace dealings (11:1b; 16:11). In contrast, thirteen individual sentence sayings (10:4, 5; 11:16; 12:11, 24, 27; 13:4; 14:23; 19:15; 20:4; 21:5; 28:19), two saying pairs (20:12-13; 21:25-26), and five longer didactic units (6:6-11; 24:30-34; 27:23-27; 30:24-28, esp. vv 24-25; 31:10-31) instruct readers to work hard in order to build wealth. The latter, much larger group of material reviewed in §3.2.1 include all of the diligence and laziness sayings in Proverbs.[96]

[96] As noted in chapter one, this material divides scholars who offer social location explanations in order to account for perceived discrepancies in how Proverbs portrays wealth, poverty, the rich, and the poor. Some view this material as originating in village communities where hard work was necessary for survival (e.g., Whybray 1990; Golka 1993; Washington 1994; Westermann 1995). Others argue that it

3.2.1 Build wealth through diligence instructional frames

Of all the material examined in this study, didactic units that address diligence, laziness, and other distractions from diligence (e.g., gossip and other "worthless pursuits") comprise the largest group. The quantity of material in Proverbs that is concerned with readers working hard and not doing otherwise suggests that the producers of Proverbs were very intent for readers to develop robust ethics of work—likely with the goal of supporting themselves and their families. Because there is so much of this material, I divide it into five smaller subsections:

3.2.1.1 Sayings with agricultural imagery
3.2.1.2 Sayings with the *ḥărūṣ* and their counterparts
3.2.1.3 Sayings without the *ḥărūṣ* or any of their counterparts
3.2.1.4 The woman of strength poem
3.2.1.5 Sayings with only slackers and sluggards

In the book of Proverbs, diligence is a form of wisdom, and laziness is a form of folly. Many of the sayings reviewed below explicitly relate diligence to wisdom and laziness (and other distractions from diligence) to folly or "lacking sense" (*ḥăsar lēb* in 12:11b). Diligence as wisdom and laziness as folly reflect the practical nature of wisdom and folly in Proverbs.

3.2.1.1 Sayings with agricultural imagery

Four sentence sayings (10:5; 12:11; 24:27; 28:19) and portions of three longer didactic units (6:6-8; 27:23-27; 30:25) exhort readers to build wealth through diligence using agricultural imagery and scenarios. This material may have originated in agricultural settings, or it may have

would have been used by the rich to legitimize their way of life (Kovacs 1974; Malchow 1982; Pleins 1987, 2001; Habel 1988; Crenshaw 1989). All of these studies are somewhat dated. Few scholars continue to appeal to the social location of the origination of material in Proverbs in the same ways as these scholars.

originated elsewhere. What must be noted is that all of these instructions to be diligent, even though set in agricultural contexts, are applicable in any setting where work is required. This said, the level of detail in 27:23-27 is so earthy and vivid, and its instructions so specific, that this unit does seem to reflect agricultural origins and also to be particularly concerned with agricultural work. We will consider this unit at the end of this section.

We see right away in Prov 10:5 an example of the producers portraying diligence as an embodiment of wisdom and laziness as an instance of folly.

אֹגֵר בַּקַּיִץ בֵּן מַשְׂכִּיל	a	10:5	A prudent son gathers in the summer;
נִרְדָּם בַּקָּצִיר בֵּן מֵבִישׁ	b		a son who brings shame sleeps during the harvest.

The "prudent son" (*bēn maśkîl*) works hard. In light of his work gathering crops in the summer, referring to this character as a *bēn maśkîl* connects his prudence with his diligence. Opposite the prudent son in this saying is a "son who brings shame" (*bēn mēbîš*). Rather than work, the *bēn mēbîš* sleeps during the harvest. The verb used for sleep in v 5b (*nirdām*) is relatively rare in the Hebrew Bible, occurring only seven times. When it is used, it describes the deepest of sleeps. It describes the sleep of Sisera before Jael kills him (Jdg 4:21); that of Jonah when he sleeps through the terrible storm that terrifies the mariners (Jon 1:5, 6); the deep sleep that Daniel sleeps, first, after being touched by a divine messenger (Dan 8:18) and, then, after hearing a divine voice (Dan 10:9). The word *nirdām* is also used to describe the state of horse and rider after being rebuked by God in Ps 76:7 [6]. These other occurrences of *nirdām* demonstrate that the sleep the second son sleeps in v 5b is a very deep one indeed.

Folly is not explicitly mentioned in v 5b. However, the opposition between a *bēn maśkîl* ("prudent son") and a *bēn mēbîš* ("son who brings shame") suggests this association. First of all, laziness is a type of folly in Proverbs, and shame is associated with folly numerous times in the

book (3:35; 12:4; 14:35; 17:2; 19:26; 29:15). Describing the second son in v 5 as one who brings shame is an indirect means of calling out his folly. Further, a broader system of construals in Proverbs associates shame with the performance of other vices as well.[97]

The motivation in 10:5 derives from positive cultural models of honor, prudence, and working hard on one hand and negative cultural models of shame, folly, and laziness on the other. As pointed out to me by Kevin Chau in personal communication (May 2020), in profiling *sons*, v 5 evokes a family frame. Thus, at issue in this saying is the honor or shame that the diligence and (therefore prudence) of sons (and children broadly speaking) may bring to parents—otherwise, why portray sons? In light of this, the motivation underlying the instruction in v 5 may be rooted in the honor or shame that children bring their parents, the mere mention of the virtue of prudence, and also, finally, the produce that each son helps (or does not help) in bringing to yield. The natural outcomes of hard work and laziness (in idealized scenarios) may be part of the cultural models associated with gathering at the right time and not sleeping during harvest time that readers hold. We can therefore imagine readers constructing the meaning of this saying in the following way.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 10:5

CONTENT BASE SPACES	a	A prudent son gathering crops in the summer
	b	A son who brings shame sleeping during the harvest
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	a	Because gathering crops in the summer is prudent, I should gather crops in the summer.
	b	Because sleeping during the harvest brings shame, I should not sleep during the harvest.

[97] Wickedness in general (i.e., expressed by *rāšāʿ*) is also associated with disgrace and shame—e.g., C of *b-w-š* and C of *ḥ-p-r* in 13:5; *b-w-z* in 18:3; and, if we interpret *ʾîš naʿănwēh lēb* (a man of a twisted mind) as a person who is described as wicked, then we can add this association with *b-w-z* in 12:8 as well. In addition, if we consider adultery (6:33), scoffing (*lēṣ* in 9:7 and 22:10), and pride (11:2) as instances of folly and/or wickedness, then these instances also associate vice with disgrace. More examples could be given.

DIRECTIVE SPACES	a	Gather crops in the summer / Work hard.
	b	Do not sleep during the harvest / Do not be lazy.

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 10:5a

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses to work hard.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	Wealth is something that the reader would choose to acquire through working hard.

Proverbs 10:5b

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses not to be lazy.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & POVERTY	Poverty is something that the reader would choose to avoid by choosing not to be lazy.

* * *

Prov 12:11 and 28:19 are near doublets. The first line and first half of the second line in these sayings are the same. They diverge only at the final clause in their second lines. The character whom readers are exhorted to emulate in these sayings in the mere profiling of his example is "a person who works his ground" (*ʿōbēd ʾadmātô*). In contrast, the character whose example readers are warned against is "a person who pursues worthless things" (*měraddēp rêqîm*).

עֹבֵד אַדְמָתוֹ יִשְׂבַּע־לָחֶם וּמְרַדֵּף רֵיקִים חֲסַר־לֵב	a b	12:11	A person who works his ground is sated with bread, but a person who pursues worthless things lacks sense.
עֹבֵד אַדְמָתוֹ יִשְׂבַּע־לָחֶם וּמְרַדֵּף רֵקִים יִשְׂבַּע־רִישׁ	a b	28:19	A person who works his ground is sated with bread, but a person who pursues worthless things is sated with poverty.[98]

Both lines in these doublets offer additional motivation to readers to follow these instructions. 12:11a and 28:19a and 19b all profile the gain or loss of wealth as outcomes for working hard and not working hard, respectively. The symmetry between the ends of the two lines in 28:19 is notable. The hard worker is "satisfied with bread" (*yiśbaʿ leḥem*) in v 19a, while the pursuer of

[98] *HALOT* lists *rîš* as an alternate spelling of *rêš*, "poverty" (II, 1229).

worthless things is "satisfied with poverty" (*yiśbaʿ rîš*) in v 19b. In contrast, the motivation in 12:11b is simply a negative cultural model—namely, that of a person who "lacks sense" (*ḥăsar lēb*). The failure to be diligent in v 11b is associated explicitly with folly in this case. In contrast, 28:19 is the only diligence-in-agricultural-settings sayings that does not explicitly refer to wisdom or folly. In saying that a person is sated with either bread or poverty, the sense is that they take as much as they can handle of either one. In other words, there is a sense that people take their *fill* of consequences—whether positive rewards or negative punishments—that they secure for themselves.[99] The instruction and motivation are clear in each line of the doublets above. We can imagine readers construing the meaning of these sayings as follows.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 12:11		
CONTENT BASE SPACES	a	A person doing agricultural work in a field and having plenty to eat
	b	A person pursuing worthless things and lacking sense
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	a	Because working hard leads to having plenty to eat, I should work hard.
	b	Because pursuing worthless things is foolish, I should not pursue worthless things.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	a	Work hard.
	b	Do not pursue worthless things.
Proverbs 28:19		
CONTENT BASE SPACES	a	A person doing agricultural work in a field and having plenty to eat
	b	A person pursuing worthless things and coming to poverty
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	a	Because working hard leads to having plenty to eat, I should work hard.
	b	Because pursuing worthless things leads to poverty, I should not pursue worthless things.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	a	Work hard.
	b	Do not pursue worthless things.

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 12:11a and 28:19a	
ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses to work hard.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	Wealth is something that the reader would choose to acquire through working hard.
Proverbs 12:11b and 28:19b	
ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses not to pursue worthless things.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & POVERTY	Poverty is something that the reader would choose to avoid by choosing not to pursue worthless things.

[99] I thank Kevin Chau once again for this formulation (personal communication, May 2020).

* * *

Prov 6:6-11 is the third epigram in a series of four that comprise the third interlude in the opening chapters of Proverbs (1-9). It is formulated as an address to a sluggard. This address is embedded in the father-son speech performance frame that encompasses Prov 1-9. In staging an address to a sluggard, the father figure invites the son to listen in on the rebuke. Or, if the son is a sluggard, we may imagine that the father intends to addresses him as such.

The father opens the address commanding the sluggard to go to an ant and learn to be wise. The wisdom that the ant displays is that of being diligent.

לֵךְ־אֶל־נְמָלָה עָצֵל	a	6:6	Go to the ant, sluggard –
רְאֵה דְרָכֶיהָ וַחֲכָם	b		see her ways and be wise.
אֲשֶׁר אֵין־לָהּ קָצִין	a	6:7	Though she has no leader,
שֹׁטֵר וּמֹשֵׁל	b		officer, or ruler,
תָּכִין בַּקַּיִץ לַחְמָהּ	a	6:8	she prepares her food in the summer;
אָגְרָה בַקָּצִיר מַאֲכָלָהּ	b		she gathers her food during the harvest.

The father portrays ants as impressive creatures. With no leadership to speak of, they accomplish an incredible amount of work—enough to secure all the food they need. Ants are the focus of another segment from a longer didactic unit as well. 30:24-28 is a numerical epigram that surveys four examples from the animal world. Each one is an exemplar that the producers of Proverbs put forward as paragons of wisdom and skill.

אַרְבָּעָה הֵם קְטַנֵּי־אָרֶץ	a	30:24	Four things are small,
וְהֵמָּה חֲכָמִים מְחֻכָּמִים	b		but they are wise and skilled.
הַנְּמָלִים עַם לֹא־עָז	a	30:25	The ants are a people not strong,
וַיָּכִינוּ בַקַּיִץ לַחְמָם	b		but they prepare their food in the summer.

The size of the ant makes its productivity so notable in this unit. In addition, where its lack of leadership is highlighted in 6:7, its lack of strength is underscored in 30:25. These features of ant

experience should impede the ant from accomplishing all the work they do—or so humans might think. But ants are not impeded. For this reason, the ant serves as an especially impressive example of a diligent character. The setting and type of work that the ant is portrayed doing in both 6:8 and 30:25 are agricultural. The action of the ant in 6:8b (*ʾ-g-r*) is the same as that of the prudent son in 10:5a, and the action of the ant in 6:8a (C of *k-w-n*) is the same as that of the ant in 30:25b. It is again the persuasive power of positive cultural models and the probability that they involve positive outcomes that serve as motivation in 6:6-8 and 30:25. Consider the following reasoning processes that would lead readers to interpret the following directives when they read these passages.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 6:6-8

CONTENT BASE SPACES	6:6a	A sluggard being commanded to go to an ant
	6:6b	A sluggard being commanded to see the ant's ways and to become wise
	6:7a-b	An ant having no leader, officer, or ruler
	6:8a	An ant preparing her food in the summer
	6:8b	An ant gathering her food during the harvest
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	Because working diligently is wise and leads to good things, I should work diligently (like the ant).	
DIRECTIVE SPACE	Work diligently (like the ant).	

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 6:6-8

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses to work hard.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	Wealth is something that the reader would choose to acquire through working hard.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 30:24-25

CONTENT BASE SPACES	24a	Four things being small
	24a	Four things being wise and skilled
	25a	Ants as creatures who are not strong
	25b	Ants preparing their food in the summer
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	24-25	Because it is wise to work hard like an ant, and because working hard like an ant leads to having food to eat, I should work hard like an ant.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	24-25	Work hard (like an ant).

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 30:24-25

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader the person who chooses to work hard.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	Wealth is something that the reader would choose to acquire through working hard.

* * *

Prov 24:27 is a self-contained series of commands in the fourth and shortest collection in the book, Proverbs 24:23-34. This is the collection with the heading, "These also are by the wise" (*gam ʾēlleh laḥăkāmîm*). 24:27 is one of two units in this collection that have to do with diligence or laziness. 24:27 explicitly commands diligence, and 24:30-34 explicitly warns against laziness. Consider 24:27.

הָכֵן בַּחוּץ מְלַאכְתֶּךָ	a		Prepare your work in the soil,
וְעַתְּדָהּ בַּשָּׂדֶה לָךְ	b	24:27	and get it ready for yourself in the field.
אַחַר וּבְנֵיתָ בֵּיתֶךָ	c		And afterward, build your house.

Most commentators interpret this saying as instructions to a young man who is about to establish his household independently from that of his father (e.g., McKane 1970; Murphy 1998; Clifford 1999; Waltke 2005). On this reading "your house" (*bêtekā*) is "your household"—as in, the people who constitute your household—rather than a physical abode. Following Ehrlich, Fox underscores that "household" readings are anachronistic. "In ancient Israel (and in patriarchal societies generally), men married young and lived in the father's extended household while working the family holdings" (Fox 2009, 772). Therefore, the command "build your house" in v 27c is best taken literally. The young son is instructed to continue to work on his family property before building a *dwelling* of his own somewhere on that property. Fox generalizes the instruction of 24:27 as "first things first" (ibid).

The instruction in this unit is direct. Two imperatives in v 27a-b and the *weqatal* form with *waw* consecutive in v 27c all issue direct commands. No motivation is made explicit. The perceived authority of the speaker and the perceived wisdom of the instruction are the sources of motivation on which this instruction depends. We can imagine readers inferring the motivation of this instruction in the following way.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 24:27

CONTENT BASE SPACES	27a	Command to prepare the soil (for planting)
	27b	Command to get fields ready (for planting)
	27c	Command to build a house (only when the work outside is done)
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	27a-c	Because it is wise to ensure a good harvest before building myself a house, I should prepare the fields for planting before I build myself a house.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	27	[explicit in v 27a-c]

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 24:27

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses to work in the fields before building himself a house.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	Wealth is something that the reader would choose to acquire through working hard in a certain order of tasks—namely, ensuring an agricultural yield and then building a house.

* * *

Prov 27:23-27 stands out in the sixth collection (25:1-29:27). This collection is comprised primarily of indicative sentence sayings. In contrast with this, 27:23-27 contains two explicit directives and an extended argument that serves as motivation to follow these directives. This is the extended unit in Proverbs which is comprised of the represented speech performance of an agriculturalist. As such, it also sounds as though the speaker is addressing other agriculturalists. Consider the unit as a whole.

יָדֹעַ תֵּדַע פְּנֵי צֹאנֶךָ שִׁית לִבְּךָ לַעֲדָרִים	a b	27:23	Know well the condition of your flock, set your mind on your herds,
כִּי לֹא לְעוֹלָם חֹסֶן וְאִם־נֵזֶר לְדוֹר וָדוֹר	a b	27:24	for riches are not forever, nor does a crown last from generation to generation.
גָּלָה חָצִיר וְנִרְאָה־דֶשֶׁא וְנֶאֶסְפוּ עִשְׂבוֹת הָרִים	a b	27:25	Grass goes away, and new growth appears, and the vegetation of mountains is gathered –
כְּבָשִׂים לִלְבוּשֶׁךָ וּמְחִיר שָׂדֶה עַתּוּדִים	a b	27:26	lambs for your clothing, and the price of a field – goats,
וְדֵי חֲלֵב עִזִּים לְלַחְמֶךָ לְלֶחֶם בֵּיתֶךָ וְחַיִּים לְנַעֲרוֹתֶיךָ	a b	27:27	and there will be enough goat milk for your food, for the food of your house and life for your maidservants.

The argument the agriculturalist makes is that renewable sources of wealth are better than non-renewable sources. Specifically, animals and the food that feeds them are all renewable resources. The specific argument of the agriculturalist is the following. If a person takes good care of their animals (following the instructions in v 23), they will always have enough clothing for their household (v 26a), enough livestock (and their milk) with which to barter for more land on which to grow more food (v 26b), and also enough food for everyone in their household, even their maidservants (v 27). In contrast, the agriculturalist describes "riches" (*ḥōsen*)[100] as not being forever (v 24a), and royal dynasties (through metonymy—*nēzer*, "crown" or "turban") as not extending from generation to generation (v 24b). Animals are a better source of wealth than riches and royalty, because when well cared for, animals reproduce themselves. In addition, their food reproduces itself as well (v 25): when vegetation is used up (*gālāh ḥāṣîr* in v 25a*α*), "new vegetation appears" (*nirʾeh dešeʾ* in v 25a*β*).

[100] The word *ḥōsen* occurs only five times in the Hebrew Bible (Isa 33:6; Jer 20:5; Eze 22:25; Prov 15:6; 27:24) and seems to be something that is stored up, similar to *ʾōṣār* ("storehouse") (see Jer 20:5; *HALOT* I, 338). It is frequently translated into English as either "treasure" or "riches."

The word *nēzer* ("crown") in v 24b leads some commentators to read 27:23-27 as an allegory of kingship and kingly duties (e.g., Van Leeuwen 1988; Malchow 1996).[101] These interpreters read *nēzer* as a clue that the real function of this passage is to issue the warning that royal dynasties are temporary, and to exhort kings to treat their people the way that good shepherds treat their livestock. On this reading, the flocks and herds are people whom the monarch must protect. KINGS ARE SHEPHERDS is a widespread metaphor of kingship throughout the ancient Near East (Weinfeld 1995; Sparks 2005). But Fox rightly rebuts this interpretation of 27:23-27. He observes that there is no reference to anything that resembles royal duties in the extended reflections of vv 25-27. There is no mention of justice, righting of wrongs, or caring for the weak. In addition, "whereas 'shepherd' in royal metaphors and titulary always refers to the king's obligations toward his people, nothing in the present epigram speaks of responsibilities *toward* the livestock, except insofar as they profit the owner" (Fox 2009, 815; italics in original). The point of referring to the transience of riches and royal dynasties in v 24 is to compare their shorter tenures to the endlessly renewable lives of animals and their food. It is not, in other words, to evoke notions of kings as shepherds.

The specificity of the instructions and the reflections in 27:23-27 seem limited to an agricultural situation. It is also true that principles of hard, careful, and wise work can be applied in any setting where such work is required. In other words, the *level* of diligence displayed in this unit can serve as a model for any kind of work. However, only animal husbandry can adopt the specific argument that animals are better than movable riches as a source of wealth. In any case, we can imagine readers constructing meaning in the following way when they read this unit.

[101] Some commentators emend *nēzer* to *ʾōṣār* ("storehouse") (Toy, Scott). Fox points out that *ʾōṣār* shares only *rēš* with *nēzer* (2009, 816). I maintain *nēzer* in my reading.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 27:23-27		
CONTENT BASE SPACES	23a	Command to know the condition of one's flock
	23a	Command to be attentive to the condition of one's herds
	24a	Riches not lasting forever
	24b	A crown not lasting from one generation to the next
	25a	Grass withering and new growth appearing in its place
	25b	Vegetation on mountains being gathered
	26a	Having [the wool of] lambs for one's clothing
	26b	Having goats [or goat milk] serve as payment with which to buy a field
	27a	Having enough goat milk to serve as one's food
	27b	Having enough goat milk to serve as food for one's household, which would extend even to one's maidservants
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	24-27	Because taking diligent care of one's flocks and herds leads to having all the clothes and food that a household needs, I should take diligent care of my flocks and herds.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	24-27	Take good care of your animals. [explicit commands in 27:23] [Work diligently (at whatever you do).]

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 27:23-27	
ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses to take good care of their animals. [Reader is the person who chooses to work diligently at whatever they do.]
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	Wealth is something that the reader would choose to acquire through diligence.

3.2.1.2 Sayings with the *ḥărūṣ* and their counterparts

Six sayings in Proverbs use the word *ḥārūṣ* with the meaning "diligent."[102] That is, we *would* count six *ḥārūṣ* sayings in Proverbs, if we adopt a proposed emendation at 11:16b. The *ḥārūṣ* has four counterparts in these sayings—three negative and one positive. The three negative counterparts are the *rĕmiyyāh* ("slacker"[103] in 10:4a; 12:24b, 27a), the *ʿāṣēl* ("sluggard" in

[102] *HALOT* identifies six homophonous roots of *ḥārūṣ*: I *gold*; II *town moat*; III *cut, threshing sledge*; IV *mutilation*; V *decision*; and VI *diligent* (I, 352). In Proverbs, *ḥārūṣ* as "gold" occurs four times (3:14; 8:10, 19; 16:16). The other meanings of *ḥārūṣ* do not occur in Proverbs.

[103] The word *rĕmiyyāh* occurs fifteen times in the Hebrew Bible. *HALOT* offers two sets of glosses for it: "slack/loose" and "treacherous/deceptive" (II:1243-1244). Some commentators identify its primary meaning in Proverbs as deceptive (Fox 2009, 512). However, the data is suggestive that the use of

13:4a), and a character we saw in §3.1.3, the *ʾāṣ* ("person who hastens" in 21:5b). The one positive counterpart to a *ḥārūṣ* is an *ʾēšet ḥēn* ("a gracious woman" or "woman of favor" in 11:16a). Cultural models that readers associate with diligence would be enough motivation to compel them to construe the instruction, *be diligent*, when they read these sayings. However, these sayings all portray positive consequences experienced by *ḥărūṣîm* as well. These consequences vary. In five cases, *ḥărūṣîm* gain some kind of material wealth (10:4; 11:16; 12:27; 13:4; 21:5); and in one, *ḥārūṣ* acquires power (12:24).

רָאשׁ עֹשֶׂה כַּף־רְמִיָּה וְיַד חָרוּצִים תַּעֲשִׁיר	a b	10:4	The palm of a slacker makes poverty,[104] but the hand of the diligent makes rich.
אֵשֶׁת־חֵן תִּתְמֹךְ כָּבוֹד וְעָרִיצִים יִתְמְכוּ־עֹשֶׁר	a b	11:16	A woman of favor keeps hold of honor, and diligent men[105] keep hold of riches.

rĕmiyyāh evolved from concrete to more abstract uses by virtue of DECEPTION IS SLACKNESS metaphorical mappings. In two of its occurrences, it describes a "loose bow" (*qešet rĕmiyyāh* in Hos 7:16; Ps 78:57). Twice it describes a "loose tongue" (*lĕšōn rĕmiyyāh* in Mic 6:12; Ps 120:2, 3). In ten occurrences, it is not used as an attributive adjective. In five of these instances, it represents something like "deceit" (Ps 32:2; 52:2; 101:7; Job 13:7; 27:4), and in the other five, it means something like "slacker" or "lazy person" (Jer 48:10; Pr 10:4; 12:24, 27; 19:15). The occurrences of *rĕmiyyāh* as an attributive adjective are indicative of a trajectory of development. Consider: a loose bow is an unreliable bow, and therefore, a deceptive bow. The ability of the tongue to curve and arc like a bowstring may have influenced initial mapping of looseness and unreliability onto deceptive tendencies in the three instances of *lĕšōn rĕmiyyāh* ("loose tongue"). More specifically, the slackness or looseness (and therefore unreliability) of the *qešet rĕmiyyāh* is implicitly mapped onto the deceptiveness (and therefore unreliability) of the *lĕšōn rĕmiyyāh*. The *rĕmiyyāh* in Proverbs is in each case an unreliable individual, because the person portrayed is lazy—i.e., slack in work—not because they are deceptive. They may also be deceptive, but that would be coincidental.

[104] BHS and BHQ editors make two notes on Prov 10:4a that I need to describe. First, they suggest emending from *rāʾš* (ms abs G ptc of *r-y-š*, "poor person") to *rēʾš* ("poverty"). The LXX shows *πενία*, and the Peshitta, Targum, and Vulgate all reflect this. Most commentators adopt the small vowel shift from *qameṣ* to *ṣere* required by this emendation (e.g., Fox 2009, Whybray 1994, McKane 1970). The second note concerns the participle *ʿōśeh*. The word *rēʾš* is the object, and *kap rĕmiyyāh* is the subject. The sense of this line requires another vocalic emendation. Specifically, the ms abs ptc in M must be emended to the fs abs ptc, *ʿōśāh*.

[105] Most commentators maintain the reading in M—*ʿărūṣîm*, "ruthless men" (e.g., McKane 1970; Whybray 1994; Murphy 1998; Clifford 1999; Waltke 2004; Sandoval 2006). Some of these commentators follow Driver in his suggestion that, on the basis of Arabic *ʿaraṣa* and *ʿariṣa* (words that "describe a nervous and vigorous activity which may express itself either in restless energy … or in ruthless violence"), Hebrew *ʿārîṣ* can have a positive connotation and mean something like *vigorous*

יַד־חָרוּצִים תִּמְשֹׁול וּרְמִיָּה תִּהְיֶה לָמַס	a b	12:24	The hand of the diligent rules, but a slacker is put to forced labor.
לֹא־יַחֲרֹךְ רְמִיָּה צֵידוֹ וְהוֹן־אָדָם יָקָר חָרוּץ	a b	12:27	A slacker does not roast his game, but the precious wealth of man (comes to) a diligent person.[106]
מִתְאַוָּה וָאַיִן נַפְשׁוֹ עָצֵל וְנֶפֶשׁ חָרֻצִים תְּדֻשָּׁן	a b	13:4	A sluggard craves but there is nothing for his appetite, but the appetite of the diligent is enriched.
מַחְשְׁבוֹת חָרוּץ אַךְ־לְמוֹתָר וְכָל־אָץ אַךְ־לְמַחְסוֹר	a b	21:5	The thoughts of a diligent person – only to profit, but all who hasten – only to poverty.

We saw 21:5 above in the section on sayings that prohibit building wealth by hastening after it (§3.1.3). I include it here as well, because it mentions a *ḥārūṣ* in 21:5a. The instructions in these sayings are clear enough, with the possible exception of 11:16a.

A number of metonymies in these sayings bring to mind particular qualities that relate to diligence. For example, hand metonymies in 10:4a, "the palm of a slacker" (*kap rĕmiyyāh*), and 10:4b, "the hand of the diligent" (*yad ḥărūṣîm*), evoke ideas of physical labor. In contrast, in 12:24a, the "hand of the diligent" (*yad ḥărūṣîm*) is said "to rule." This hand metonymy may not allude to physical labor as much as the strong hand of a ruler in exercising his function as a head of government. 21:5a refers to the "thoughts of the diligent" (*maḥšĕbōt ḥārūṣ*), a metonymy for the intelligence and thoughtful planning of the diligent. It is no surprise that "the appetite of the diligent" (*nepeš ḥărūṣîm*) is sated in 13:4b. This metonymy evokes the larger scenario in which the diligent, because of their hard work, always secure plenty of food for both themselves and their families. In contrast, the negative counterparts of the diligent in these sayings are portrayed

(Driver 1951, 180; see McKane, Whybray, Murphy). Fox recommends an emendation that I adopt as well. He reads *ḥărūṣîm* in place of M *ʿărūṣîm* (2009, 537-538; Fox 2015, 190). The graphic and aural similarity between *ḥărūṣîm* and *ʿărūṣîm*, as well as the sense of the emended reading, all make this a sound emendation.

[106] For similar syntax in which blunt juxtaposition of this type occurs (object + recipient of object) see Prov 13:18a and possibly 14:22b.

as suffering poverty (10:4a, 21:5b), forced labor (12:24b), wasted resources (12:27a), and hunger (13:4a).

The one positive counterpart to the diligent in the sayings in this section is the *ʾēšet ḥēn* ("a gracious woman" or "woman of favor") in 11:16a. She is said to "keep hold" (*t-m-k*) of honor (*kābōd*). That action is parallel to *ḥărūṣîm* "keeping hold" (*t-m-k*) of riches (*ʿōšer*) in this saying. (See footnote 105 for discussion regarding the emendation of *ʾărūṣîm* to *ḥărūṣîm* in 11:16b.) Fox explains that the verb *t-m-k* is used to describe "laying hold of something and grasping it tightly" (2009, 537). The juxtaposition of a female character with a group of male characters is anomalous in the book of Proverbs. Fox reasons that the woman in v 16a is portrayed holding onto honor, while the men in v 16b are portrayed holding onto wealth, because women were not typically seen as possessors of property, while men were (2009, 538).

Whybray suggests that the purpose of 11:16a is to instruct the young male readers in the earliest audiences of Proverbs to look for a gracious young woman to be their wife (Whybray 1994, 183). Possibly. The function of v 16a is difficult to discern. Fox (2009, 537-538) presents a survey of interpretive options. In contrast, the instruction in v 16b is readily apparent. Once again, diligent characters are portrayed as possessors of wealth. The use of wealth and poverty as consequences is a prominent and regular feature of diligence and laziness sayings. It must be noted again that wealth and poverty are natural outcomes of diligence and laziness. That is, in ideal conditions in the real world, hard work leads to wealth. In contrast, not working hard really can lead to losing or never having wealth in the real world. Diligence and laziness sayings are unique in this regard. Other sayings that portray wealth and poverty as consequences do not portray outcomes that readers could expect to follow naturally from the actions and character traits they depict (e.g., righteousness, pride, or folly in the abstract). Therefore, the portrayal of

wealth and poverty as consequences here in §3.2 is distinct from this use of wealth and poverty in other instances.

Given the portrayed benefits of hard work and the negative outcomes of not working hard, we can imagine readers constructing meaning in the following ways when they read the sayings in this section.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 10:4		
CONTENT BASE SPACES	a	A slacker becoming poor
	b	A diligent person becoming rich
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	a	Because being lazy leads to bad things, I should not be lazy.
	b	Because being diligent leads to good things, I should be diligent.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	a	Do not be lazy.
	b	Be diligent.
Proverbs 11:16		
CONTENT BASE SPACES	a	A gracious woman keeping hold of honor
	b	Diligent men keeping hold of riches
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	a	---
	b	Because being diligent leads to good things, I should be diligent.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	a	---
	b	Be diligent.
Proverbs 12:24		
CONTENT BASE SPACES	a	A diligent person ruling
	b	A slacker being put to forced labor
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	a	Because being diligent leads to good things, I should be diligent.
	b	Because being lazy leads to bad things, I should not be lazy.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	a	Be diligent.
	b	Do not be lazy.
Proverbs 12:27		
CONTENT BASE SPACES	a	A slacker not roasting his game
	b	A diligent person getting precious wealth
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	a	Because being lazy leads to bad things, I should not be lazy.
	b	Because being diligent leads to good things, I should be diligent.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	a	Do not be lazy.
	b	Be diligent.
Proverbs 13:4		
CONTENT BASE SPACES	a	A sluggard craving but having nothing to satisfy his appetite
	b	The appetite of a diligent person being enriched
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	a	Because being lazy leads to bad things, I should not be lazy.
	b	Because being diligent leads to good things, I should be diligent.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	a	Do not be lazy.
	b	Be diligent.

Proverbs 21:5

CONTENT BASE SPACES	a	A diligent person producing a profit
	b	People who hasten coming to poverty
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	a	Because being diligent leads to good things, I should be diligent.
	b	Because being hasty leads to bad things, I should not be hasty.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	a	Be diligent.
	b	Do not be hasty [in whatever way].

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 10:4a

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses not to be lazy.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & POVERTY	Poverty is something that the reader would choose to avoid by choosing not to be lazy.

Proverbs 10:4b

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses to be diligent.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	Wealth is something that the reader would choose to acquire through working hard.

Proverbs 11:16b

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses to be diligent.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	Wealth is something that the reader would choose to acquire through working hard.

Proverbs 12:24a

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses to be diligent.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	Wealth is something that (since wealth often accompanies power) the reader would choose to acquire through working hard.

Proverbs 12:24b

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses not to be lazy.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & POVERTY	Poverty is something that the reader would choose to avoid (since being forced to perform labor often involves material scarcity in the experience of laborers) by choosing not to be lazy.

Proverbs 12:27a

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses not to be lazy.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & POVERTY	Hunger is something that the reader would choose to avoid by choosing not to be lazy.

Proverbs 12:27b

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses to be diligent.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	Wealth is something that the reader would choose to acquire through working hard.

Proverbs 13:4a

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses not to be lazy.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & POVERTY	Hunger is something that the reader would choose to avoid by choosing not to be lazy.

Proverbs 13:4b

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses to be diligent.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	Satiety is something that the reader would choose to experience by working hard.

Proverbs 21:5a

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses to be diligent.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	Wealth is something that the reader would choose to acquire through working hard.

Proverbs 21:5b

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses not to be hasty.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & POVERTY	Poverty is something that the reader would choose to avoid by choosing not to be lazy.

3.2.1.4 Sayings without the *ḥărūṣ* or any of their counterparts

Two additional sayings in the sentence literature exhort readers to be diligent and warn them away from laziness. These sayings do so without explicit reference to the *ḥărūṣ* or any of their counterparts. Prov 14:23 presents two nominal lexical frames that have no agent to express these exhortations, and 20:13 issues two direct directives—a vetitive (v 13a) and an imperative (v 13b). Consider 14:23.

בְּכָל־עֶצֶב יִהְיֶה מוֹתָר	a	14:23	In all toil there is profit,
וּדְבַר־שְׂפָתַיִם אַךְ־לְמַחְסוֹר	b		but mere talk – only to poverty.

As noted above in discussion of 10:22 (§3.1.4), *ʿeṣeb* refers to hard, wearying, painful toil (e.g., Gen 3:16). As also already observed, 14:23 takes a different perspective on *ʿeṣeb* than 10:22. 14:23 exhorts readers to work hard, and 10:22 cautions against overwork. The concern in 10:22 is for readers to trust that Yahweh will make good of the work they do. In contrast, the concern in 14:23 is that readers not be distracted from work by talking too much.

Reference to *dĕbar-śĕpātayim*, literally "a word of two lips," refers to useless talk that replaces productive work. The phrase *dĕbar-śĕpātayim* is used twice in the Hebrew Bible—here and in 2 Kings 18:20. In 2 Kings, the *Rab-šāqeh*, an official sent by Sennacherib to intimidate Hezekiah and the people who were walled up with him in Jerusalem during the siege in 701

BCE, taunts everyone in earshot. He calls out to the officials on the wall, asking them, "Do you think *dĕbar-śĕpātayim* is strategy and power for war?" He is of course implying that talk alone is not sufficient for war. Prov 14:23b asserts that talk alone is not sufficient to produce a profit. A person must exercise "toil" (*ʿeṣeb*) in order to ensure a good return on work. We can imagine readers performing meaning construction in the following way when they interpret this saying.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 14:23		
CONTENT BASE SPACES	a	There being profit in all toil
	b	Mere talk leading only to poverty
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	a	Because working hard leads to profit, I should work hard.
	b	Because mere talk leads only to poverty, I should work instead of merely talk.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	a	Work hard.
	b	Do not merely talk (but rather, work hard).

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 14:23a	
ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses to work hard.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	Wealth is something that the reader would choose to acquire through working hard.

Proverbs 14:23b	
ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses not merely to talk.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & POVERTY	Poverty is something that the reader would choose to avoid by choosing not merely to talk.

* * *

Prov 20:13 is one of the infrequent occurrences of direct directives in the sentence collections. It is meaningfully paired with 20:12. On its own, v 12, though a model of pious belief, is not particularly informative. With v 13, it joins the latter in an exhortation to work and be diligent, rather than waste resources Yahweh has given.

אׇזֶן שֹׁמַעַת וְעַיִן רֹאָה	a	20:12	A hearing ear and a seeing eye –
יְהוָה עָשָׂה גַם־שְׁנֵיהֶם	b		Yahweh made both of them.

אַל־תֶּאֱהַב שֵׁנָה פֶּן־תִּוָּרֵשׁ	a	20:13	Do not love sleep, lest you become impoverished.
פְּקַח עֵינֶיךָ שְׂבַע־לָחֶם	b		Open your eyes; be satisfied with bread.

20:13a prohibits readers from sleeping too much (i.e., loving sleep). Referring to an ear that hears (*ʾōzen šōmaʿat*) and an eye that sees (*ʿayin rōʾāh*) points to critical resources that a person who sleeps all the time wastes. In addition, reference to an "eye" (*ʿayin*) in v 12a and "your eyes" (*ʿênekâ*) in v 13b link the description of resources that Yahweh has given in v 12 with resources that readers must use in v 13—namely, the energy in wakeful states (v 13a) and eyes (v 13b). Keeping with other laziness sayings, the result of sleeping too much is portrayed in v 13a as impoverishment. A second directive is issued in v 13b. The cause-and-effect relation is compressed to an impressive degree in this line. Opening one's eyes does not immediately result in being sated with bread. The compressed sequence of events in v 13b is a lengthy one. A person must wake up, work hard, and somewhere down the line, produce, prepare, and then eat food. The point in v 13b is taken. Not "opening one's eyes" will not lead to this result. We can imagine readers constructing meaning in the following ways when they interpret v 13.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 20:13

CONTENT BASE SPACES	a	Command not to love sleep / reader becoming impoverished
	b	Command to open one's eyes / reader being satisfied with bread
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	a	Because sleeping too much leads to bad things, I should not be lazy.
	b	Because being diligent leads to good things, I should be diligent.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	a	[explicit in 20:13a]
	b	[explicit in 20:13b]

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 20:13a

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses not to be lazy (i.e., sleep too much).
RELATION BETWEEN READER & POVERTY	Poverty is something that the reader would choose to avoid by choosing not to sleep too much.

Proverbs 20:13b

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses to be diligent (i.e., open their eyes).
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	Wealth is something that the reader would choose to acquire through working hard.

3.2.1.5 The poem about the woman of strength

The poem about the "woman of strength" (*ʾēšet ḥayil*) in Proverbs 31 is widely discussed. Commentators have different takes on different facets of the poem and the woman it portrays. All agree that she is put forward as a "perfect model of industry" (Masenya 2018, 4). Every line of the poem portrays the *ʾēšet ḥayil* exercising the wisdom of diligence, reflects on why she is so valuable because of this, or affirms that she should be praised for all that she does. The most pressing questions about the poem relate to its instructional purpose as the final, concluding element in the book; the relation of the *ʾēšet ḥayil* to actual women; the relation of the *ʾēšet ḥayil* to Lady Wisdom; and whether commentators offer adequate discussion of this poem given its misuse in certain settings. These questions vary in their level of pertinence to the present study. I do not deal with them all at equal length. I include the poem in its entirety in order fully to display all the ways in which the *ʾēšet ḥayil* is presented as a paragon of the wisdom of diligence.

אֵשֶׁת־חַיִל מִי יִמְצָא	a	31:10	A woman of strength who can find?
וְרָחֹק מִפְּנִינִים מְכִרָהּ	b		Her worth is far above rubies.
בָּטַח בָּהּ לֵב בַּעְלָהּ	a	31:11	The mind of her husband trusts in her,
וְשָׁלָל לֹא יֶחְסָר	b		and he does not lack spoil.
גְּמָלַתְהוּ טוֹב וְלֹא־רָע	a	31:12	She repays him with good and not evil
כֹּל יְמֵי חַיֶּיהָ	b		all the days of her life.
דָּרְשָׁה צֶמֶר וּפִשְׁתִּים	a	31:13	She seeks wool and flax,
וַתַּעַשׂ בְּחֵפֶץ כַּפֶּיהָ	b		and she works with willing hands.
הָיְתָה כָּאֳנִיּוֹת סוֹחֵר	a	31:14	She is like ships of a merchant –
מִמֶּרְחָק תָּבִיא לַחְמָהּ	b		she brings her food from afar.
וַתָּקָם בְּעוֹד לַיְלָה	a	31:15	And she rises while it is still night
וַתִּתֵּן טֶרֶף לְבֵיתָהּ	b		and gives food to her household
וְחֹק לְנַעֲרֹתֶיהָ	c		and a portion to her maids.
זָמְמָה שָׂדֶה וַתִּקָּחֵהוּ	a	31:16	She considers a field and takes it.
מִפְּרִי כַפֶּיהָ נָטְעָה כָּרֶם	b		From the fruit of her hands she plants a vineyard.

חָגְרָה בְעוֹז מָתְנֶיהָ	a	31:17	She girds her loins with strength
וַתְּאַמֵּץ זְרוֹעוֹתֶיהָ	b		and strengthens her arms.
טָעֲמָה כִּי־טוֹב סַחְרָהּ	a	31:18	She discerns that her wares are good.
לֹא־יִכְבֶּה בַלַּיְלָה נֵרָהּ	b		Her lamp does not go out at night.
יָדֶיהָ שִׁלְּחָה בַכִּישׁוֹר	a	31:19	She puts her hands to the spindle,
וְכַפֶּיהָ תָּמְכוּ פָלֶךְ	b		and her palms keep hold of the spinning rod.
כַּפָּהּ פָּרְשָׂה לֶעָנִי	a	31:20	She spreads her palm to the afflicted,
וְיָדֶיהָ שִׁלְּחָה לָאֶבְיוֹן	b		and she sends her hands to the needy.
לֹא־תִירָא לְבֵיתָהּ מִשָּׁלֶג	a	31:21	She does not fear for her household because of winter,
כִּי כָל־בֵּיתָהּ לָבֻשׁ שָׁנִים	b		for all her household is clothed with crimson.
מַרְבַדִּים עָשְׂתָה־לָּהּ	a	31:22	Coverings she [also] makes for herself;
שֵׁשׁ וְאַרְגָּמָן לְבוּשָׁהּ	b		linen and purple are her clothing.
נוֹדָע בַּשְּׁעָרִים בַּעְלָהּ	a	31:23	Her husband is known at the gates
בְּשִׁבְתּוֹ עִם־זִקְנֵי־אָרֶץ	b		when he sits with the elders of the land.
סָדִין עָשְׂתָה וַתִּמְכֹּר	a	31:24	She makes fine linen and sells it,
וַחֲגוֹר נָתְנָה לַכְּנַעֲנִי	b		she sells loincloths to the trader.
עֹז־וְהָדָר לְבוּשָׁהּ	a	31:25	Strength and splendor are her clothing,
וַתִּשְׂחַק לְיוֹם אַחֲרוֹן	b		and she laughs at the day to come.
פִּיהָ פָּתְחָה בְחָכְמָה	a	31:26	Her mouth opens with wisdom,
וְתוֹרַת־חֶסֶד עַל־לְשׁוֹנָהּ	b		and the teaching of kindness is on her tongue.
צוֹפִיָּה הֲלִיכוֹת בֵּיתָהּ	a	31:27	She looks to the ways of her house,
וְלֶחֶם עַצְלוּת לֹא תֹאכֵל	b		and she does not eat the bread of idleness.
קָמוּ בָנֶיהָ וַיְאַשְּׁרוּהָ	a	31:28	Her sons rise and call her blessed.
בַּעְלָהּ וַיְהַלְלָהּ	b		Her husband praises her:
רַבּוֹת בָּנוֹת עָשׂוּ חָיִל	a	31:29	“Many daughters have done great things,
וְאַתְּ עָלִית עַל־כֻּלָּנָה	b		but you are higher than all of them.”
שֶׁקֶר הַחֵן וְהֶבֶל הַיֹּפִי	a	31:30	Favor is deceptive, and beauty is a vapor.
אִשָּׁה יִרְאַת־יְהוָה הִיא תִתְהַלָּל	b		A woman who fears Yahweh—she is to be praised.
תְּנוּ־לָהּ מִפְּרִי יָדֶיהָ	a	31:31	Give to her from the fruit of her hands,
וִיהַלְלוּהָ בַשְּׁעָרִים מַעֲשֶׂיהָ	b		and let her deeds praise her at the gates.

The woman in this poem is portrayed as the matriarch of a household that enjoys a substantial amount of wealth. The portrait is idealized, as are the portraits of every character in Proverbs. A pertinent question for the present study regarding this poem is whether the portrait it presents is

an attainable or unattainable ideal for human beings. Scholars vary in how they answer this question.

Many commentators dismiss the possibility that an actual woman could ever accomplish everything that the *ʾēšet ḥayil* is portrayed doing in this poem (e.g., Whybray 1994; Murphy 1998). Others affirm that an actual woman could indeed accomplish all that the *ʾēšet ḥayil* does (e.g., Yoder 2003; Waltke 2005; Fox 2009; Ansberry 2011; Meyers 2014). Fox in particular reflects that "We would slight human women to assume otherwise." He goes on to hypothesize that this woman

> does not do all these things every day. Some activities, such as buying fields, planting vineyards, and dealing with traders, would be occasional tasks. She also has a staff of maids to help her. What she does is impressive but doable. (Fox 2009, 912)

A final group of scholars agree that an actual woman could accomplish all the tasks portrayed in the poem but go on to critique the poem for portraying a repertoire of tasks that are doable only when a woman overexerts herself for the sake of others and to the detriment of herself (e.g., Claassens 2016; Masenya 2018).[107] Feminist Bible scholars observe the high views of female intelligence, ability, and reputation that are promoted in the idealized portrait of the woman of strength in this poem. However, they also critique patriarchal values that the poem reinforces.

[107] Relatedly, Chitando (2004) offers a devastating appraisal of readings in Zimbabwean contexts of Prov 31:10-31 that use harmful patriarchal ideas as interpretive lenses. L. Juliana Claassens (2016) draws additional attention to neglected questions of race, class, and the consideration of the point at which one person's social privilege and flourishing "infringes on another's right to live a good life" (2016, 16; Masenya 2018, 2006, 2004; Chitando 2004). A number of scholars from African countries in particular critique scholars from European and North American contexts who detach interpretations of this poem from harsh sociopolitical and socioeconomic realities and thus fail to address harmful applications of the woman of strength poem (see especially Chitando 2004; Kimilike 2006, 2018; Scheffler 2012; Masenya 2004, 2006, 2018).

Primary among these is the observation that the *ʾēšet ḥayil* is lauded for the benefits that she brings to her husband more than she is hailed for her worth apart from him.[108]

The relation of the *ʾēšet ḥayil* to actual women raises the question of the poem's instructional purpose. Most scholars classify it as either a hymn or encomium of praise to the *ʾēšet ḥayil*.[109] Most also consider its purpose to be didactic. Some describe the *ʾēšet ḥayil* as a model for young female readers of the kind of married woman they should hope to become. Others view the *ʾēšet ḥayil* as a model of the kind of woman that the producers of Proverbs want young male readers to hope to marry (e.g., Whybray 1994; Clifford 1999; Yoder 2003; Ansberry 2011). Fox reflects that the "poem can work in various ways" (2009, 905).

> When read by a young man, it teaches him to choose a wife not for her beauty but for her practical and moral strengths. These are what will really benefit him. When heard by young women, the poem would hold up to them a standard of excellence … When recited to a wife and mother (as in contemporary Jewish practice), it expresses gratitude for her achievements and contributions to the family. (Fox 2009, 905)

However the audience and use of this poem on its own are envisioned, most scholars also consider the relation of one or more of these instructional purposes to the rationale behind the placement of the poem as the final element in the book.

A number of scholars discern an inclusio between chapters 1-9 and 31:10-31 (Whybray 1994; Murphy 1998; Clifford 1999, 2017; Yoder 2003; Waltke 2005; Ansberry 2011). In making

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[108] Fox responds to this criticism (2009, 912-914). Two of his points are especially illuminating: 1) the *ʾēšet ḥayil* is as much a beneficiary of her hard work as is the rest of her household, and 2) the virtues for which the *ʾēšet ḥayil* is lauded are the same as those that are praised in men throughout the book (wise speech, kindness, industry, and fear of God). In addition, in the end, the point of the *ʾēšet ḥayil* is to exhort all readers to follow her example.

[109] Whybray 1994; Murphy 1998; Clifford 1999; Waltke 2005; Ansberry 2011. Fox distinguishes between the hymn and encomium forms by noting that hymns are usually and properly sung in praise to God (2009, 902). Given this distinction, he recommends the classification of encomium for the woman of strength poem, rather than hymn.

this connection, many also relate the *ʾēšet ḥayil* in 31:10-31 to Lady Wisdom in chs 1-9. As Murphy writes, "If Wisdom is inviting guests to her home in chap 9, the portrait in chap 31 symbolizes Wisdom finally settling down with her own" (1998, 250). There are indeed similarities between Lady Wisdom and the *ʾēšet ḥayil*. Fox lists the following (2009, 908-909):

	the *ʾēšet ḥayil*	Lady Wisdom
is more precious than rubies	31:10	8:11
brings wealth	31:18	8:18, 21
is mistress of a house	31:15, 21, 27	8:34; 9:1
has maidservants	31:15	9:3
provides food	31:14	9:5
produces fruit	31:16, 31	8:19
speaks teachings	31:26	1:23; 8:6-9
has honor	31:25, 28-31	8:18
possesses strength	31:17, 25	8:14

Fox also underscores a number of important *distinctions* between Lady Wisdom and the *ʾēšet ḥayil*. First, the *ʾēšet ḥayil* is hard to find (31:10). In contrast, Lady Wisdom is not only available to all who seek her (8:17, 35), she actively pursues and calls out to her audience (1:20-21, 24; 8:1-6; 9:3-5). Further, the *ʾēšet ḥayil* is married and has children. Lady Wisdom does not. In sum, Fox concludes that Lady Wisdom *personifies* wisdom, and that "the Woman of Strength *typifies* it." In contrast with Lady Wisdom, the *ʾēšet ḥayil* belongs squarely in "the map of humanity" (Fox 2009, 910-911). Fox also reflects on the role of the poem in its position at the very end of Proverbs:

> It is fair to surmise that the primary reason the poem was appended was to say something about wise women in a book that usually neglects them. The scribe who added the poem might reasonably have concluded the book with a grand encomium to the wise *man*, summarizing all that has been said about him so far. Instead, he chose to have the

> culmination be an encomium on the wise woman, in which there resonates all that is said about wise women and Lady Wisdom elsewhere. But she does not personify wisdom; she *instantiates* it … However the Woman of Strength may fare when judged by modern criteria, the fact is that she excels in the very qualities most important to the sages themselves, the authors and collectors of the book of Proverbs. For them, she is not just an ideal woman, she is an ideal person. By reminding us that the most important features of the wise man characterize the woman too, the whole book of Proverbs, despite its male orientation, is made to apply to women as well. (Fox 2009, 915-916)

The *ʾēšet ḥayil* is a model for all readers to follow. She models diligence, skill in work, care for family, kindness to the poor, wisdom in teaching others, prudence and skill in negotiations, and fear of Yahweh. The instructions that readers might glean from the *ʾēšet ḥayil* poem are thus manifold. They are a summary of instructions offered throughout the book. In the summaries below, I encapsulate the manifold potentialities of specific directives interpreted upon reading this poem as *choose wisdom*. The implication of the woman of strength poem is that if you choose wisdom, you will become like this woman—and possibly also, you will look for a life partner making the same choices. It is true that this interpretation envisions male and female readers alike simulating in response to this saying in similar ways—namely, as following the example of the *ʾēšet ḥayil* and also as looking for a partner who does the same. It may seem odd to some that young male readers would simulate from the perspective of a female character. I would argue that this interpretation (and simulation process) is imaginable each time a female character is held up as exemplary or as an example to be avoided (e.g., 11:22; 12:14; 21:9, 19; 25:24).

It is the fact that the wisdom of the *ʾēšet ḥayil* is embodied as diligence at so many points in the woman of strength poem that I see fit to include it here in §3.2.1. However, in order to save space, I do not represent the conceptual contents in Content Base spaces in the following summaries of meaning construction.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 31:10-31

CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	Because choosing wisdom (including exercising diligence) leads to good things, I should choose wisdom and be diligent.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	Choose wisdom and be diligent.

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 31:10-31

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses to be wise and diligent.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	Wealth is something that the reader would acquire.

3.2.1.6 Sayings with only slackers and sluggards

The didactic units in this section all focus solely on characters who exhibit qualities and behaviors that are opposed to diligence. Two sentence sayings (19:15, 20:4), two saying pairs (18:8-9; 21:25-26), and two longer didactic units (6:6-11 and 24:30-34) in Proverbs feature only characters who exemplify how never to build wealth—the *rĕmiyyāh* (19:15b), the *ʿāṣēl* (6:6-11; 20:4; 21:25a-26a; 24:30-34),[110] and *the brother of a master of destruction* (*ʾāḥ hūʾ lĕbaʿal mašḥît*, literally "he is a brother to a master of destruction" in 18:9b). In giving readers examples of characters who will never build wealth, the producers of this material, in effect, instruct readers to become the opposite kind of person—namely, a diligent one.

[110] A number of other sayings in Proverbs portray the *ʿāṣēl* as well (see 10:26; 15:19; 19:24; 22:13; 26:13; 26:14, 15, 16). However, I do not discuss these additional *ʿāṣēl* sayings, because they do not portray material loss as a consequence of the sluggard's failure to work. The focus of this section is material in Proverbs that tells readers how never to build wealth. Therefore, I include only the sluggard sayings that portray losing or failing to build wealth as outcomes. The other *ʿāṣēl* sayings highlight features of the indigence of this character that do not relate directly to failing to work to build wealth. For the sake of being more complete, I offer a brief summary of these sayings here. In them the *ʿāṣēl* is portrayed as an annoyance to people who choose to rely on him (10:26), as someone who fabricates the presence of dangers outside (lions) in order to justify never leaving his house (22:13; 26:13), who refuses to get out of bed (26:14) or feed himself even though his hand is already sitting in a dish of food (19:24; 26:15), and (perhaps most devastatingly) as someone who is still somehow wise in his own eyes (26:16). Being wise in one's own eyes is a terrible vice in Proverbs (e.g., 28:11 and 26:1-12). It is also interesting to note that the *ʿāṣēl* is set in antithetical parallelism opposite the upright (*yĕšārîm* in 15:19) and the righteous (*ṣāddîq* in 21:26). These sayings give the sloth of the sluggard notable moral shading.

Poverty or some kind of material loss or lack is portrayed as a consequence in each unit in this section. That is, this is the case if readers imagine material loss in their construal of the "destruction" (*mašḥît*) described in 18:9b. Consider this saying.

גַּם מִתְרַפֶּה בִּמְלַאכְתּוֹ אָח הוּא לְבַעַל מַשְׁחִית	18:9	*Indeed, a person who is slack in his work—* he is brother to a master of destruction.

The designation *baʿal mašḥît* ("master of destruction") is dramatic. It reflects the extreme concern that the producers of this saying have for readers who are slack in work. In addition, v 9 seems to be paired with v 8. The *gam* (translated "indeed" above) at the start of v 9a signals this possibility. Characteristically, *gam* performs an additive or emphatic function and is glossed "as well as, also, on his part, nor, even, yet" in *HALOT* (I:195-196). In order to perform an additive function at the start of v 9a, *gam* would need to continue a line of thought from something preceding v 9.

Read together, 18:8-9 present an instruction that is similar to 14:23. We considered this saying above. It reads, "In all toil there is profit, but mere talk—only to poverty" (14:23). However, where 14:23 profiles positive and negative alternatives, 18:8 presents a single negative example and 18:9 comments on that one negative example.

דִּבְרֵי נִרְגָּן כְּמִתְלַהֲמִים וְהֵם יָרְדוּ חַדְרֵי־בָטֶן	18:8	*The words of a gossip are like delicious morsels;* they do down to the depths of the belly.
גַּם מִתְרַפֶּה בִּמְלַאכְתּוֹ אָח הוּא לְבַעַל מַשְׁחִית	18:9	*Indeed, a person who is slack in his work –* he is a brother of master of destruction.

The phrase *dĕbar śĕpātayim* ("word of two lips") is used to describe wasteful conversation, or "mere talk," in 14:23b. 18:8 portrays an especially damaging kind of wasteful conversation, that of a *nirgān*. The word *r-g-n* is used only seven times in the Hebrew Bible—six times in the N

stem (Dt 1:27; Ps 106:25; Pr 16:28; 18:8; 26:20, 22) and once in the G stem (Isa 29:24). In the N stem, it means something like complaining, slandering, gossiping, or grumbling. In the two occurrences outside Proverbs, it is used to describe the "murmuring" or "grumbling" of the Israelites when they were in the wilderness (Deut 1:27; Ps 106:25). Characters in Proverbs who are described as a *nirgān* separate close friends (16:28), cause quarrels (26:20), and provide tantalizing but destructive information (18:8; 26:22). 18:8 and 26:22 are doublets. Both read, "The words of a *nirgān* are like delicious morsels; they go down to the depths of the belly." However, where 26:22 is followed by sayings that warn readers to beware of duplicitous speech, 18:9 moves in another direction. The latter warns readers not to be distracted by "the words of the *nirgān*" to the point of failing to do their work. We can imagine readers construing the personal implications of this strong warning in the following way.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 18:9

CONTENT BASE SPACES	a	A person being slack in work [including consideration of v 8, because they indulge in gossip or slander]
	b	That person being brother to a master of destruction
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	a-b	Because being slack in work is destructive, I should not be slack in work.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	a-b	Do not be slack in work.

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 18:9

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses not to be slack in his work.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & POVERTY	Possibly none, but destruction could be construed as the calamity of poverty. If this is a reader's construal, poverty would be something that the reader would choose to avoid by choosing not to be slack in work.

* * *

Prov 19:15 is the one remaining saying in Proverbs that profiles a *rĕmiyyāh* ("slacker"). The other three are discussed above in §3.2.1.2. As it was in 10:5 and 20:12-13, sleep is again a problem for a lazy character in 19:15. Also similar to 10:5, the type of sleep portrayed in 19:15 is

a very, very deep one—this time, *tardēmāh* (in contrast with *nirdām* in 10:5; both derive from the root *r-d-m*).

עַצְלָה תַּפִּיל תַּרְדֵּמָה וְנֶפֶשׁ רְמִיָּה תִּרְעָב	19:15	Sloth causes [a person] to fall [into] deep sleep, and the appetite of a slacker hungers.

The word *tardēmāh* is used seven times in the Hebrew Bible. In each case, like *nirdām*, it also depicts very deep sleep.[111] In 19:15, *ʿaṣlāh* ("sloth") is personified as an agent causing *tardēmāh* to fall on a *rĕmiyyāh*. The implication, of course, is that the slacker caused this himself. The producers of this saying dramatize what laziness does to a person by portraying sloth as a powerful agent. The irony that the lazy person creates this agent who then destroys him further problematizes the trait of sloth. The consequence of the deep sleep that sloth "casts" (*tappîl*) on a lazy person in v 15 is portrayed as hunger. This is a common consequence for lazy characters in Proverbs (e.g., 12:27; 13:4; implied in 20:13, 21:25-26 and others). It is also a consequence for characters who are wicked (10:3; 13:25). In light of this negative evaluation, we can imagine readers constructing the meaning of 19:15 in the following ways.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 19:15

CONTENT BASE SPACES	a	Sloth causing a person to sleep deeply
	b	The appetite of a slacker hungering
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	a	Because sloth causes a person to sleep deeply (and therefore not work), I should not be a slothful.
	b	Because slackers experience hunger, I should not be a slacker.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	a	Do not be slothful.
	b	Do not be a slacker.

[111] In four of these uses, it is a sleep that Yahweh causes to fall on people (when he puts Adam to sleep in order to make Eve in Gen 2:21; when he puts Abram to sleep in order to perform a covenant ratification ritual in Gen 15:12; when he makes Saul and his army sleep in order to give David a safe opportunity to take Saul's spear and water jar in 1 Sam 26:12; Is 29:10). Twice in the HB, *tardēmāh* is a deep sleep that involves the sleeper seeing a vision or visions of the night (*ḥezyōnôt laylāh* in Job 4:13 and *ḥezyōn laylāh* in Job 33:15). The remaining occurrence of *tardēmāh* in the HB is that of a *rĕmiyyāh* in Prov 19:15.

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 19:15a

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is a person who chooses not to be lazy.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & POVERTY	The implication is that a person who sleeps does not work, and therefore poverty is something that the reader would choose to avoid by choosing not to sleep too much.

Proverbs 19:15b

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses not to be a slacker.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & POVERTY	Poverty [hunger] is something that the reader would choose to avoid by choosing not to be lazy.

* * *

The sluggard (*ʿāṣēl*) in 20:4 resembles the son who brings shame (*bēn mēbîš*) in 10:4. Both refrain from the required work of farmers.

מֵחֹרֶף עָצֵל לֹא־יַחֲרֹשׁ יִשְׁאַל בַּקָּצִיר וְאָיִן	20:4	A sluggard does not plow in autumn; he inquires[112] at the harvest, but nothing.

Because the sluggard did not do the requisite work of plowing, he has nothing to reap at harvest time. The negative example of the sluggard is clear, and we can imagine readers interpreting 20:4 as follows.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 20:4

CONTENT BASE SPACES	a	A sluggard not plowing in autumn
	b	A sluggard inquiring at harvest time and finding nothing
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	a-b	Because being a sluggard leads to bad things, I should not be a sluggard.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	a-b	Do not be a sluggard.

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 20:4

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses not be a sluggard.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & POVERTY	Poverty [lack of produce] is something that the reader would choose to avoid by choosing to not to be lazy.

[112] There is a *ketiv-qere* reading at the start of 20:4b. The *ketiv* is the *yitqol* form in the text above, and the *qere* is a *qatal + waw—wĕšāʾal*. I read with the *ketiv*.

* * *

The saying pair in Prov 21:25-26 demonstrates that rhetorical uses of words that mean "kill" have a long history in human language use. The desire of the sluggard does not really kill him, but it does make him miserable. Consider this saying pair.

תַּאֲוַת עָצֵל תְּמִיתֶנּוּ כִּי־מֵאֲנוּ יָדָיו לַעֲשׂוֹת	21:25	The desire of a sluggard kills him, for his hands refuse to work.
כָּל־הַיּוֹם הִתְאַוָּה תַאֲוָה וְצַדִּיק יִתֵּן וְלֹא יַחְשֹׂךְ	21:26	All day he desires and desires, but a righteous person gives and does not withhold.

I include this saying in the present study, because readers might imagine that the sluggard craves food or other material possessions. The parallelism in this saying between a sluggard craving and a righteous person giving support this reading. We will consider v 26b below as an example of what producers of Proverbs want readers to do with wealth (§3.4.2). We might also interpret vv 25a-26a as an example of what *not* to do with wealth—namely, desire it too much. However, in light of the impressive examples of sloth that sluggards offer throughout the book of Proverbs, my first impulse is to keep this saying with other sluggard sayings that address diligence and laziness. We can imagine readers constructing the meaning of this saying in the following way.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 21:25		
CONTENT BASE SPACES	a	The desire of a sluggard killing him
	b	The hands of a sluggard refusing to work
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	a-b	Because being a sluggard leads to bad things, I should not be a sluggard.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	a-b	Do not be a sluggard.
Proverbs 21:26		
CONTENT BASE SPACES	a	A sluggard desiring continuously
	b	A righteous man giving and not withholding
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	a	Because being a sluggard leads to bad things, I should not be a sluggard.
	b	Because a righteous person would give and not hold back, I should give and not hold back.

DIRECTIVE SPACES	a	Do not be a sluggard.
	b	Be righteous, give, and do not hold back from giving.

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 21:25

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses not to be a sluggard.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & POVERTY	Poverty is something that the reader would choose to avoid by choosing not to be lazy.

Proverbs 21:26a

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is person who chooses not to be a sluggard.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & POVERTY	Poverty is something that the reader would choose to avoid by choosing not to be lazy.

Proverbs 21:26b

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is person who chooses to be righteous and to give and not hold back from from giving.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	Wealth is something that the reader would choose to give to others.

* * *

Two longer didactic units in Proverbs revolve around the sluggard—6:6-11 and 24:30-34. This character is addressed and warned in 6:6-11, and his property is examined in 24:30-34. These units have similar structural features, including the same concluding quatrain (6:10-11; 24:33-34). In addition, both have a short opening, a lesson, and some kind of pivot that leads to the final quatrain. We saw part of 6:6-11 above in §3.2.1.1, where we considered the example of diligence an ant provides for a sluggard in 6:6-8. Here, we consider the opposite example of sloth provided by the sluggard. Consider 6:6-11 and 24:30-34 in turn.

OPENING:	לֵךְ־אֶל־נְמָלָה עָצֵל רְאֵה דְרָכֶיהָ וַחֲכָם	a b	6:6	Go to the ant, sluggard – see her ways and be wise.
LESSON:	אֲשֶׁר אֵין־לָהּ קָצִין שֹׁטֵר וּמֹשֵׁל	a b	6:7	Though she has no leader, officer, or ruler,
	תָּכִין בַּקַּיִץ לַחְמָהּ אָגְרָה בַקָּצִיר מַאֲכָלָהּ	a b	6:8	she prepares her food in the summer; she gathers her food during the harvest.
PIVOT:	עַד־מָתַי עָצֵל תִּשְׁכָּב מָתַי תָּקוּם מִשְּׁנָתֶךָ	a b	6:9	How long, sluggard, will you lie down? When will you rise from your sleep?

QUATRAIN:	מְעַט שֵׁנוֹת תְּנוּמוֹת	a	6:10	A little sleep, a little slumber,
	מְעַט חִבֵּק יָדַיִם לִשְׁכָּב	b		a little folding of hands to lie down –
	וּבָא־כִמְהַלֵּךְ רֵאשֶׁךָ	a	6:11	and your poverty will come upon you like a bandit,
	וּמַחְסֹרְךָ כְּאִישׁ מָגֵן	b		and your want like an armed man.
OPENING:	עַל־שְׂדֵה אִישׁ־עָצֵל עָבַרְתִּי	a	24:30	By the field of a sluggard I passed,
	וְעַל־כֶּרֶם אָדָם חֲסַר־לֵב	b		by the vineyard of a man who lacks sense,
LESSON:	וְהִנֵּה עָלָה כֻלּוֹ קִמְשֹׂנִים	a	24:31	and behold, thorns had gone up over it,
	כָּסּוּ פָנָיו חֲרֻלִּים	b		nettles covered its surface,
	וְגֶדֶר אַבְנָיו נָהֳרָסָה	c		and its stone wall was destroyed.
PIVOT:	וָאֶחֱזֶה אֲנֹכִי אָשִׁית לִבִּי	a	24:32	I myself paid heed and set to mind,
	רָאִיתִי לָקַחְתִּי מוּסָר	b		I saw and took discipline:
QUATRAIN:	מְעַט שֵׁנוֹת תְּנוּמוֹת	a	24:33	a little sleep, a little slumber,
	מְעַט חִבֵּק יָדַיִם לִשְׁכָּב	b		a little folding of hands to lie down –
	וּבָא־מִתְהַלֵּךְ רֵישֶׁךָ	a	24:34	and your poverty will come upon you like a bandit,
	וּמַחְסֹרֶיךָ כְּאִישׁ מָגֵן	b		and your want like an armed man.

The pivots in each unit (6:9; 24:32) turn attention to the final quatrain. In 6:6-11, after demanding that the sluggard observe the ant, a paragon of diligence, the staged speaker challenges the sluggard, asking him, “How long will you lie down? When will you get up from your sleep?” In stark contrast with the ant, the sluggard is perpetually in bed. As we have already seen in 10:5, 19:15, and 20:13, sleep is a prominent theme in laziness sayings. The questions here in 6:8 pivot seamlessly to the quatrain in vv 10-11—“A little sleep, a little slumber, a little folding of hands to lie down, and your poverty will come upon you like a bandit, and your want like an armed man.”

In 24:30-34, the pivot leads to the quatrain in a different but equally logical way. The speaker describes walking along and seeing a vineyard owned by a sluggard. The vineyard has been neglected and overrun with thorns and weeds (vv 30-31). The pivot in this unit is the speaker describing how this sight led him to reflect—more specifically, to stop, think, and draw a

lesson from what he saw (v 32). This narration leads seamlessly to the final quatrain in vv 33-34 as well, which spells out the lesson that the speaker draws from the decrepit vineyard—namely, that too much sleep (i.e., laziness or sloth) leads to poverty.

Poverty (*rêš*) and lack (*maḥsōr*)—virtual synonyms—are portrayed as ruthless and dangerous agents in 6:11 and 24:34. In addition, they are somewhat paradoxically referred to as "your poverty" and "your lack" (2ms *-kāh* suffix in 6:11b*α*, 11b*β* and 24:34b*α*, and 34b*β*). The metaphor POVERTY IS A VIOLENT PERSON provides the personification of poverty and lack as ruthless characters with meaning. Readers may have elaborate cultural models of what bandits (*měhallēk*, literally, "one who walks around or about") and armed men (*ʾîš māgēn*, literally, "man of a shield") are like. These models would inform how readers imagine poverty as an attacker. This representation of poverty is an interesting one. As in 19:15, the sluggards in 6:6-11 and 24:30-34 choose sleep over work and in so doing, create assailants they cannot fend off and who come and destroy them. In addition, the consequences of their choices are portrayed as having grown dramatically out of their control.

The implication in all of the relevant units in §3.2.1 is that the sluggards are to blame for their poverty. Note that no poor character is mentioned in any of these sayings or longer units. In reader simulations, readers would imagine themselves as the lazy characters—or, as those choosing not to be lazy. The directives in both 6:6-11 and 24:30-34 are quite clear. We can imagine readers constructing the meaning of these instructions as follows.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 6:6-11

CONTENT BASE SPACES	6:6a	A sluggard being commanded to go watch an ant
	6:6b	A sluggard being commanded to see the ant's ways and to become wise
	6:7a-b	An ant having no leader, officer, or ruler
	6:8a	An ant preparing her food in the summer
	6:8b	An ant gathering her food during the harvest

	6:9	A sluggard being asked how long he will sleep
	6:10-11	Poverty coming upon a person who sleeps too much

Proverbs 6:6-8

CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	Because working diligently is wise and leads to good things, I should work diligently (like the ant).
DIRECTIVE SPACE	Work diligently (like the ant).

Proverbs 6:9-11

CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	Because being lazy (and spending all one's time sleeping) leads to poverty, I should not be lazy (and spend all my time sleeping).
DIRECTIVE SPACE	Do not be lazy (and spend all your time sleeping).

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 6:6-8

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses to work hard.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	Wealth is something that the reader would choose to acquire through working hard.

Proverbs 6:9-11

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses not to be lazy.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & POVERTY	Poverty is something that the reader would choose to avoid by choosing not to be lazy.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 24:30-34

CONTENT BASE SPACES	24:30a	Speaker passing by the field of a sluggard
	24:30b	That field being a vineyard of a man who lacks sense
	24:31a	Thorns having grown up over that vineyard/field
	24:31b	Nettles covering the vineyard
	24:31c	The stone wall of the vineyard being destroyed
	24:32a	Speaker paying heed and setting this vineyard to mind
	24:32b	Speaker seeing [i.e., understanding] and interpreting the lesson given by the sight of the vineyard
	24:33-34	Poverty coming upon a person who sleeps too much
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	Because being lazy (and spending all one's time sleeping) leads to poverty, I should not be lazy (and spend all my time sleeping).	
DIRECTIVE SPACE	Do not be lazy (and spend all your time sleeping).	

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 24:30-34

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses not to be lazy.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & POVERTY	Poverty is something that the reader would choose to avoid by choosing not to be lazy.

3.2.2 Build wealth by honest means instructional frames

We reviewed the three sayings in Proverbs that prohibit deception in marketplace practices above in §3.1.4 (11:1a; 16:11; 20:10). Here we see the positive counterparts to the negative examples in those sayings. Two sayings in Proverbs commend honesty in the marketplace as a way to build wealth (11:1b; 16:11). As is the case in the deception-in-the-marketplace sayings, Yahweh's esteem of the practices in question are again used to evaluate the contents of these sayings.

מֹאזְנֵי מִרְמָה תּוֹעֲבַת יְהוָה וְאֶבֶן שְׁלֵמָה רְצוֹנוֹ	a b	11:1b	Deceptive balances are an abomination to Yahweh, but a whole measuring stone is his delight.
פֶּלֶס וּמֹאזְנֵי מִשְׁפָּט לַיהוָה מַעֲשֵׂהוּ כָּל־אַבְנֵי־כִיס	a b	16:11	A scale and balances of justice belong to Yahweh; all the stones of a purse are his work.

The motivation to follow these instructions is the prospect of aligning with and thereby pleasing Yahweh. Using what he owns (*peles ūmōznê mišpāṭ*, "a scale and balances of justice" in 16:11a), what he has made (*kol ʾabnê kîs*, "all the [whole, i.e., honest] stones of a purse" in 16:11b), and what brings him delight (*ʾeben šĕlēmāh*, "a whole [i.e., honest] stone" in 11:1b) will please him. Reference to a "whole stone" (*ʾeben šĕlēmāh*) contrasts with the deceptive balances in 11:1a. A whole stone is also a positive counterpart to the deceptive use of disparate stones in marketplace dealings that we saw in 20:10 and 20:23 (*ʾeben wāʾeben*, "stone and stone"). The disparate stones in 20:10 and 20:23 are a pair of stones—one heavier and one lighter—used to deceive buyers, forcing them to pay more for less product. In contrast, a merchant who uses only one stone uses a "whole stone" (*ʾeben šĕlēmāh* in 11:1b). This stone is a delight to Yahweh.

11:1b and 16:11 present readers with the tools for honest dealings in a market. However, the scope of these sayings extends beyond marketplace dealings. Actual marketplace practices are certainly included, but 11:1b and 16:11 exhort honesty in any manner of building wealth. We can imagine readers constructing meaning in the following ways as they interpret these sayings.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 11:1		
CONTENT BASE SPACES	a	Deceptive balances being an abomination to Yahweh
	b	A whole measuring stone being a delight to Yahweh
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	a	Because deceptive balances are an abomination to Yahweh, I should not use deceptive balances.
	b	Because whole measuring stones are a delight to Yahweh, I should use whole measuring stones.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	a	Do not use deceptive balances in marketplace dealings. / Do not build wealth dishonestly.
	b	Use whole measuring stones in marketplace dealings. / Build wealth honestly.
Proverbs 16:11		
CONTENT BASE SPACES	a	A just scale and balances belonging to Yahweh
	b	All the [whole] stones of a purse being the work of Yahweh
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	a	Because just scales and balances belong to Yahweh, I should use just scales and balances.
	b	Because [whole] stones are made by Yahweh, I should use [whole] stones.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	a	Use just scales and balances in marketplace dealings.
	b	Use whole stones in marketplace dealings.
	a-b	Build wealth honestly.

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 11:1b and 16:11	
ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses to use honest marketplace practices.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	Wealth is something that the reader would choose to acquire through honest marketplace dealings or any other means of building wealth.

3.2.3 Summary

The directives in this section make clear that the producers of Proverbs want readers to have the wealth they need (§3.2.1). They also make it apparent that the producers clearly want readers to acquire the wealth they build honestly (§3.2.2). The motivation to follow the instructions in §3.2.1 and §3.2.2 differ. When honesty in the marketplace is on view (§3.2.2; §3.1.5), the motivation is to link honest marketplace practices with Yahweh and what pleases him (16:11). In contrast, when diligence or laziness are on view (§3.2.1), the motivation is almost always the portrayal of wealth and poverty as consequences. Only 12:24 of all the

diligence sayings portrays different outcomes. In 12:24, a diligent character is said to rule, and a slacker is put to forced labor.

As noted above, gaining wealth is a natural outcome of hard work in the real world. Likewise, failing to work can naturally lead to not having wealth. Therefore, as also noted above, the portrayal of wealth and poverty as outcomes of diligence and laziness must be distinguished from instances in Proverbs where wealth and poverty are consequences for other virtuous and vicious actions and character traits, respectively. Fox and Boström note this as well (Fox 2009, 571; Boström 2017, 140). Boström writes, "Here [in diligence and laziness sayings] it could be relevant to talk about actions with built-in consequences. For the man who does not work his fields the outcome is obvious" (2017, 140). It must also be noted, however, that portrayals in Proverbs of the diligent acquiring wealth and the lazy and otherwise not-diligent losing or failing to acquire wealth are all idealized scenarios. These sayings do not present obstacles to building wealth that readers might actually experience, because that is not the focus of these instructions. The focus is to compel readers to work hard. It is for this reason that only the positive outcome of working hard is given as motivation.

The simulation summaries in this section are quite uniform. Readers who imagine personal implications for themselves when they read this material imagine themselves building wealth and avoiding the loss of wealth. Significantly, once again, when this type of reader reads sayings that portray poverty as a consequence, *they* are the ones who would experience this consequence—not someone else—if they imagine *not* following the instruction to be diligent.

3.3 What not to do with wealth instructional frames

Now we turn to instructions in Proverbs that instruct readers on what to and not to do with wealth when they have it. Beginning with the latter, there are four things that the producers of Proverbs do not want readers to do with wealth: use it to ingratiate themselves with the rich at the expense of the poor (§3.3.1), withhold it from those who need it (§3.3.2), offer it as a loan guarantee (§3.3.3), and squander it in dissolute revelry (§3.3.4).

3.3.1 Do not use wealth to ingratiate yourself with the rich at the expense of the poor instructional frames

One saying in Proverbs prohibits readers from ingratiating themselves with the rich at the expense of the poor—22:16b. We considered v 16a above (§3.1.6). Here, our focus is v 16b.

עֹשֵׁק דָּל לְהַרְבּוֹת לוֹ נֹתֵן לְעָשִׁיר אַךְ־לְמַחְסוֹר	a b	22:16	A person who oppresses a *dal* to increase for himself, who gives to a rich man – only to poverty.

In the second half of this saying, the person who builds wealth by exploiting the poor is portrayed as turning around and giving to a rich man (*ʿāšîr*). No direct object is specified in v 16b. We should imagine a gift of some kind. Gift giving was a common cultural practice in societies of the ancient Mediterranean. I address this practice in §3.7. The problem with the gift in v 16b is not the gift. The problem is that the gift giver built his wealth by oppressing a *dal* (v 16a). Nothing a person does with wealth gained by oppressing the poor would be acceptable in Proverbs. The consequence of coming to poverty in v 16b emphasizes this. There is again an irony in the consequence: the person who oppresses a *dal* did so in order to build wealth; he managed to build wealth and then loses it, because he built wealth in a terrible way. Both the negative cultural model of oppressing the poor and the portrayal of the character who does this

losing wealth express a clearly negative evaluation of the character in this saying. We can therefore imagine readers constructing the meaning of this saying as follows.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 22:16		
CONTENT BASE SPACES	a	A person oppressing a *dal* to gain an increase for himself
	b	That same person giving to a rich man and coming to poverty
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	a	Because building wealth by oppressing the poor leads to bad things [explicit in 22:16b], I should not build wealth by oppressing the poor.
	b	Because trying to ingratiate oneself with the rich leads to bad things, I should not try to ingratiate myself with the rich.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	a	Do not build wealth by oppressing the poor.
	b	Do not use wealth to try to ingratiate yourself with the rich.

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 22:16b	
ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses not to give a gift to the rich that he would be able to give because he had gained wealth by oppressing the poor.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	Wealth is something that the reader (in the first place) would choose not to acquire by oppressing the poor and would then not have to give to the rich.

3.3.2 Do not withhold wealth from those who need it

Prov 11:24-26 is a saying cluster that contains contrasting examples of giving and withholding. Vv 24b and 26a profile the two negative examples of withholding items that, according to these sayings, should be given to others. I examine the positive examples in §3.4.2.

יֵשׁ מְפַזֵּר וְנוֹסָף עוֹד	a	11:24b	There is a person who scatters and adds still more,
וְחוֹשֵׂךְ מִיֹּשֶׁר אַךְ־לְמַחְסוֹר	b		and a person who withholds from a rightful portion – only to poverty.
מֹנֵעַ בָּר יִקְּבֵהוּ לְאוֹם	a	11:26a	People curse a person who withholds grain,
וּבְרָכָה לְרֹאשׁ מַשְׁבִּיר	b		but a blessing is on the head of a person who distributes grain.

A chiasm is observable in the saying cluster as a whole. We will see the whole unit in detail in

§3.4.2. Here, consider a schematic representation of the overall structure. The two negative examples are the middle terms on either side of the chiasm.

24a	positive example
24b	**negative example**
25a	positive example
25b	positive example
26a	**negative example**
26b	positive example

The negative examples that vv 24b and 26a offer are a person who withholds (*ḥōśēk*) a "rightful portion" (*yōšer*) (24b) and a person who withholds (*mōnēaʿ*) "grain" (*bār*) (26a). In the translation that I provide for v 24b, the word *yōšer* ("rightful portion") is an ABSTRACT FOR CONCRETE metonymy. *HALOT* glosses *yōšer* as "straightness, honesty, uprightness, agreement" (I:450). This word and the *min* preposition affixed to it lead commentators to debate the meaning of v 24b. Two interpretations of *miyyōšer* in 11:24b predominate in the literature. Some translate *yōšer* in v 24b as "rightful portion" (Whybray 1994; Clifford 1999; Waltke 2004; Fox 2009—when v 24 is read with vv 25-26). This is the reading I follow. However, others read v 24b as a situation in which a person, "out of uprightness or integrity" (*miyyōšer*), carefully saves wealth that he paradoxically (and undeservedly) ends up losing (McKane 1970; Murphy 1998; Fox 2009—when v 24 is read on its own). Fox argues that if v 24 is interpreted independently of vv 25-26, the latter is the better reading. In contrast, if v 24 is read with vv 25-26, Fox favors the first reading (2009, 541).[113] In the first reading, the loss of wealth is a consequence of

[113] Fox cites passages from Egyptian Wisdom literature (Papyrus Insinger and Anksheshonq) in support of the second reading above. Papyrus Insinger 7.13-19 reads, "There is one who lives on little so as to save, yet he becomes poor … Nor is it the one who spends who becomes poor / The god gives wealth of supplies without an income / He also gives poverty in the purse without spending" (Fox 2009, 542). Anksheshonq 26.7-8 reads, "There is one who saves and does not profit. All are in the hand of the fate and the god" (ibid). Fox does not envision direct influence from Papyrus Insinger and Anksheshonq on producers of Proverbs but rather thinks this particular paradox was a Wisdom topos that reached all three of these books in their respective cultural settings.

withholding what should be given to others. This is not a natural consequence. Rather, it coheres with the pedagogical economy in Proverbs according to which virtues lead to good things.

Scholars note that the grain distribution on view in v 26 is a major, probably regional, operation (e.g., McKane 1970; Waltke 2005; Fox 2009). The word *mašbîr* is used to describe major grain distributors elsewhere in the Hebrew Bible—Joseph in Gen 42:6 and the rich men in Amos 8:5-6 (see also Sihon in Dt 2:28). In addition, Fox underscores that whenever the word *lĕʾōm* is used in the Hebrew Bible, it is used to refer to "the nation as a whole, not just neighbors or townspeople" (2009, 544). Therefore, the person who withholds grain in v 26b is cursed by a large group of people, possibly an entire region, who are dependent on a single grain producer. McKane in particular envisions the person withholding grain in v 26a as someone who takes advantage of "scarcity conditions" (1970, 434). When yields are wanting and grain is not in plentiful supply, this character withholds his grain, hoping to drive up the price with no regard for peoples' wellbeing.

In contrast, the *mašbîr* in v 26b is not motivated by maximum economic gain, but rather by a sense of responsibility to the people (McKane 1970, 434). The focus on a major grain distribution operation in v 26 is more specific than we usually see in Proverbs. The instruction against withholding in v 26a includes this specific situation. It also exceeds it. The point is that the producers of Proverbs do not want readers to withhold wealth that others depend on when it is in their power to give it (see also 3:28). The blessing and curses in v 26 clearly express the evaluation of the characters and their actions in this saying, as does the negative outcome in v 24a. We can therefore imagine readers interpreting these sayings in the following ways.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 11:24b

CONTENT BASE SPACES	A person withholding wealth that should be given to others and coming only to poverty
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	Because withholding wealth that should be given to others leads to bad things, I should not withhold wealth that should be given to others.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	Do not withhold wealth that should be given to others.

Proverbs 11:26a

CONTENT BASE SPACES	a	People cursing a person who withholds grain
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	a	Because withholding grain [wealth] leads to bad things, I should not withhold grain [wealth].
DIRECTIVE SPACES	a	Do not withhold grain [wealth].

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 11:24b

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses not to withhold wealth that should be given to others.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	Wealth is something that the reader would choose not to withhold.

Proverbs 11:26a

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses not to withhold grain [wealth].
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	Wealth is something that the reader would choose not to withhold.

* * *

Prov 3:28 is one of a series of admonitions that comprise the lesson portion of the fourth lecture (3:21-35) in the opening chapters of Proverbs. It reads,

אַל־תֹּאמַר לְרֵעֲךָ֗ לֵךְ֮ וָשׁוּב וּמָחָר אֶתֵּן וְיֵ֫שׁ אִתָּֽךְ׃	a b	3:28	Do not say to your friend,[114] “Go, and come back; tomorrow I will give it,” when it is with you.

The other admonitions in this lecture address other ways in which people should not treat others. Some commentators argue that the scenes in v 28 allude to withholding charity from the poor (McKane 1970; Whybray 1994; Murphy 1998; Clifford 1999; Waltke 2004; Sandoval 2006; Loader 2014). Fox argues that the use of *rēʿăkā* in v 28a weighs against this idea. “The admonition has nothing to do with giving alms, for that would require a reference to the poor

[114] The *ketiv* has the plural, and the *qere* has the singular. I read with the *qere*.

rather than the more inclusive 'your fellow'" (Fox 2000, 165). At issue in v 28 is withholding something that a person wants or needs. Fox lists a number of things this could be: "money or something of value lent, valuables deposited in pledge for a loan, goods held in safekeeping … or wages owed" (2000, 165). The instruction is direct in v 28. No motivation is offered apart from the authority of the perceived speaker and the notion that not withholding is the right thing to do. We can therefore imagine readers constructing meaning in the following way when they read this saying.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 3:28

CONTENT BASE SPACES	A command not to lie to a friend and tell them to come back to get what they need or want when you have what they need or want
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	Because withholding what I have to give that someone needs or wants is not good, I should not withhold that thing.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	Do not withhold wealth that should be given to others.

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 3:28

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses not to withhold wealth that should be given to others.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	Wealth is something that the reader would choose not to withhold.

* * *

Prov 28:25 does not explicitly portray a character withholding wealth. But it does profile a *rĕḥab nepeš*—a "greedy person."

רְחַב־נֶפֶשׁ יְגָרֶה מָדוֹן	a	28:25	A greedy person stirs up strife,
וּבוֹטֵחַ עַל־יְהוָה יְדֻשָּׁן	b		but a person who trusts in Yahweh will be enriched.

The greedy person in this saying is contrasted with someone who trusts in Yahweh. A more wooden way of translating *rĕḥab nepeš* would be "broad of appetite" or "wide of throat." The implication of these images is that this character consumes an inordinate amount, stuffing as

much as he can down his throat, hoarding as much as he can for himself and not giving anything away. The parallelism in this saying is what Fox refers to as *disjointed parallelism* (2009, 494-498). In disjointed parallelism, elements that would complete the logical relation between parallel items are left out. Fox describes disjointed parallelism as a kind of enthymeme. An enthymeme is an argument in which at least one premise or conclusion is left unstated—an "argument with gaps," in other words (Fox 2009, 497). We can fill in the gapped elements in 28:25. I put them in italics in the following paraphrase.

> A greedy person*, in hoarding material wealth all to himself, does not trust in Yahweh,*
> stirs up strife *and will not be enriched*.
> But a person who trusts in Yahweh *does not hoard material wealth*
> *and therefore does not stir up strife and* will be enriched.

The aptness of the comparison between stirring up strife and being enriched is evident when these gaps are filled. As Waltke writes, "the greedy person's insatiable appetite brings him into conflict with others, for he transgresses social boundaries. Not content with his portion, he becomes disruptive and destructive" (2005, 427). According to the parallelism in v 25, this anti-social behavior, stemming from an impulse to hoard wealth for oneself, demonstrates a lack of trust in Yahweh. In contrast, the person who trusts in Yahweh is not driven by greed and, because of this, does not generate conflict. The evaluation of greed and trusting in Yahweh are clear. The producers of this saying want readers to connect greed with negative outcomes and trusting in Yahweh with positive. We can therefore imagine readers constructing the meaning of this saying in the following way.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 28:25

CONTENT BASE SPACES	a	A greedy person stirring up strife
	b	A person who trusts in Yahweh being enriched
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	a	Because being greedy leads to bad things, I should not be greedy
	b	Because trusting in Yahweh leads to good things, I should trust in

		Yahweh.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	a	Do not be greedy.
	b	Trust in Yahweh.

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 28:25a

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses not to be greedy.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	Wealth is something that the reader would choose not to hoard.

Proverbs 28:25b

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses to trust in Yahweh.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	Wealth is something that the reader would gain.

3.3.3 Do not offer wealth as a loan guarantee

Four individual sayings (11:15; 17:18; 20:16; 27:13),[115] one saying pair (22:26-27), and one longer didactic unit (6:1-5) in Proverbs warn readers against guaranteeing the loans of others. In four of these instances (two of them doublets), the warning is against guaranteeing the loans of *strangers* (6:1-5; 11:15; 20:16; 27:13). In two, the borrower is not described (17:18; 22:26-27). Three parties participate in loan guarantee scenarios—the borrower, the lender, and the guarantor. The borrower acquires the loan; the lender provides the loan; and the guarantor guarantees the loan. Instructions in Proverbs that concern loan guarantees all address the guarantor. The counsel in each case is *not* to guarantee the loans of others.

There is confusion regarding the role of the "neighbor" (*rēaʿ*)[116] in loan guarantee scenarios in Proverbs. A closer look at the constructions used to profile these scenarios brings clarity. Three terms are used to refer to loan guarantees in Proverbs: *ʿ-r-b*, *ḥ-b-l*, and *t-q-ʿ + kap*.

[115] Prov 20:16 and 27:13 are doublets.

[116] Fox stresses that the *rēaʿ* is not to be understood as someone who actually lives in a dwelling near a person to whom they relate as a *rēaʿ* (2000, 165-166). A *rēaʿ* could be merely an acquaintance or even someone who merely *knows of* a person in question.

Each of these terms is used outside of Proverbs as well, but only in Proverbs are they used to refer to loan guarantees.[117] These three terms profile loan guarantee arrangements from different viewpoints. The word *ʿ-r-b* cues viewpoint from the perspective of the guarantor and is translated "to guarantee [X]" (6:1a; 11:15a; 17:18b; 20:16a; 22:26b; 27:13a). The word *ḥ-b-l* cues viewpoint from the perspective of the lender and is translated "to receive [Y]" (20:16b; 27:13b).[118] Finally, the phrase *t-q-ʿ* + *kap* cues the shared viewpoint of lender and guarantor as they shake hands in formal acceptance of the loan guarantee arrangement. This phrase is usually translated "shake hands" (6:1b; 11:15b; 17:18a; 22:26a).[119] In one of these instances (11:15b), the word *kap* ("hand") is left out, but translators generally supply this term in their translations of 11:15b. The borrower is not an active agent in any of these verbal frames. The actions of the guarantor and lender are the only actions on view in loan guarantee arrangements, and the actions of the guarantor are the only ones of pedagogical concern.

The use of *ḥ-b-l* and *t-q-ʿ* + *kap* in their respective constructions is straightforward. It is the use of *ʿ-r-b* that requires further discussion. Confusion regarding the roles that "neighbors"

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[117] Within the Hebrew Bible, loan guarantees are a topic only within the book of Proverbs. Ben Sira discusses them as well (29:14-20), but they do not appear anywhere else in the Hebrew Bible.

[118] The word *ḥ-b-l* occurs twelve times in the Hebrew Bible and only twice in Proverbs. Its two occurrences in Proverbs appear as the doublets in 20:16 and 27:13. Each time this verb is used outside of Proverbs, rather than signify the receipt of a loan guarantee from a guarantor on behalf of a borrower, it describes the receipt of a pledge from the borrower themselves (two forms in Ex 22:25 [26]; two forms in Dt 24:6, 17; Eze 18:16; Amo 2:8; Job 22:6; 24:3; 24:9).

[119] Only in its uses in Proverbs and Job 17:3 does *t-q-ʿ* + *kap* convey the meaning "shake hands," and only in Proverbs is it used to convey the meaning "shake hands to signal agreement on a loan guarantee arrangement" (Prov 6:1; 17:18; 22:26). When *t-q-ʿ* is used with *kap* as an object in Nah 3:19 and Ps 47:2, it means "clap" as in "clap one's own hands together." In most of the 69 uses of the verb *t-q-ʿ*, it is used to mean either "blow" as in "blow a trumpet" (e.g., Num 10:10; Jos 6:8; 2 Kgs 9:3; Eze 7:14) or "pound" as in "pound a peg" into the ground (i.e., to set up a tent in Gen 31:25; Jer 6:3; see also the metaphorical use of this verbal frame in Isa 22:23, 25), into a head (Jdg 4:21), into a wall (e.g., 1 Sam 31:10; 1 Chr 10:10), or into a tree (2 Sam 18:14).

play in loan guarantee scenarios stems from misconstruing relations between terms in the constructions in which ʿ*-r-b* is used. Specifically, commentators confuse the direct objects of ʿ*-r-b* and the objects of prepositions in 6:1a and 17:18b. In the following table, objects of ʿ*-r-b* are underlined, and prepositions and their objects are in bold.

6:1a	אִם־עָרַבְתָּ לְרֵעֶךָ	*ʾim ʿārabtā* ***lĕrēʿekâ*** … If you guarantee **to your neighbor** …
11:15a	עָרַב זָר	… *ʿārab* <u>*zār*</u> … … he guaranteed <u>a stranger</u> …
17:18b	עֹרֵב עֲרֻבָּה לִפְנֵי רֵעֵהוּ	… *ʿōrēb* <u>*ʿărubbāh*</u> ***lipnê rēʿēhū*** … … a person who guarantees <u>a pledge</u> **before his neighbor** …
20:16a	עָרַב זָר	… *ʿārab* <u>*zār*</u> … … he guaranteed <u>a stranger</u> …
22:26b	בַּעֹרְבִים מַשָּׁאוֹת	… *bāʿōrĕbîm* <u>*maššāʾōt*</u> … … among those who guarantee <u>debts</u>.
27:13a	עָרַב זָר	… *ʿārab* <u>*zār*</u> … … he guaranteed <u>a stranger</u> …

Direct objects are *not marked* in ʿ*-r-b* constructions. They simply follow the verb directly. Significantly, both times that neighbors appear in the above texts, they are the objects of prepositions (***lĕrēʿekâ*** in 6:1a; ***lipnê*** *rēʿēhū* 17:18b). As such, in neither case can *rēaʿ* be the object of ʿ*-r-b*. This means that in both 6:1a and 17:18b, the neighbor is the *lender*—not the borrower. The neighbor, in other words, is the person with whom the guarantor makes the arrangement to guarantee the loan of a borrower. A number of translations and commentators construe the neighbor as the borrower in both 6:1a and 17:18b (e.g., LXX; CJB; NIV; NRSV; OJB; Clifford 1999). Even more construe the neighbor as the borrower in only 6:1a (e.g., S; T;

ASV; ESV; JPS; KJV; NASB; Whybray 1994; Murphy 1998; Waltke 2004).[120] Of the commentators I have consulted, only McKane (1970) and Fox (2000, 2009) interpret the neighbor as the lender in both 6:1a and 17:18b. This is the construal I adopt as well.

Before turning to these passages in full, one additional source of confusion must be addressed, and that is the *nature* of the direct objects that occur in construction with ʿ*-r-b*. As presented in the table above, there are three objects that occur in constructions with ʿ*-r-b* in Proverbs: *zār* ("a stranger" in 11:15a; 20:16a; 27:13a), ʿ*ărubbāh* ("pledge" in 17:18b), and *maššāʾōt* ("debts" in 22:26b). These are three very different elements in the ʿ*-r-b* frame—a stranger, a pledge, and debts. However, each one points to the same thing—namely, the *future payment* of a loan that a borrower has borrowed. This is the guarantee of the guarantor—specifically, the guarantor promises to ensure that future payment will be made. In portraying the guarantor "guaranteeing" (ʿ*-r-b*) these three different things, the above sayings all rely on frame metonymy. In other words, mention of the stranger (11:15a; 20:16a; 27:13a), a pledge (17:18b), and debts (22:26b) all function as frame metonymies. Each one is a frame element that evokes a larger verbal frame—namely, the future payment of the loan. The metonymies with *zār* ("stranger") are of particular importance. Reference to "a stranger" in 11:15, 20:16, and 27:13 is a kind of AGENT FOR OBJECT metonymy in the ʿ*-r-b* constructions in each of these sayings.

Turning to the loan guarantee passages, I begin with these three sentence sayings that include the clause *kî ʿarāb zār* (11:15; 20:16; 27:13). As noted above, 20:16 and 27:13 are

[120] Commentators who interpret the neighbor as the borrower in 17:18 and/or 6:1 treat the prepositions *l-* in 6:1a and *lipnê* in 17:18b as though they mark the direct object of ʿ*-r-b*. I hypothesize that a tendency to use the English glosses "stand surety *for*" or "offer surety *for*" when translating ʿ*-r-b* may lead some commentators to mistranslate 6:1a and 17:18b. The fact that these *English* verbal phrases require the preposition "for" seems to predispose some translators to interpret the Hebrew prepositions *l-* in 6:1a and (less often) *lipnê* in 17:18b as though they serve a similar function as this "for" in English.

doublets. The only difference between them is that 27:13a uses the apocopated form of the imperative (*qaḥ* in comparison with *lĕqaḥ* in 20:16a).

רַע־יֵרוֹעַ כִּי־עָרַב זָר וְשֹׂנֵא תֹקְעִים בֹּוטֵחַ	a b	11:15	A bad man will be harmed *because he guaranteed a stranger*, but a person who hates striking [hands] is secure.
לָקַח־בִּגְדוֹ כִּי־עָרַב זָר וּבְעַד חַבְרֵהוּ נָכְרִים	a b	20:16	"Take his garment *because he guaranteed a stranger*, and on behalf of foreigners,[121] receive it."
קַח־בִּגְדוֹ כִּי־עָרַב זָר וּבְעַד חַבְרֵהוּ נָכְרִים	a b	27:13	"Take his garment *because he guaranteed a stranger*, and on behalf of foreigners,[122] receive it."

I follow Fox (2009) in reading the doublets in 20:16 and 27:13 as quotations. Other commentators translate similarly but view the imperatives as addressing the reader directly. On that reading, the reader is called to *participate* in the punishment of the person who has guaranteed the loan of a stranger. However, it arguably makes more sense to imagine readers being called to *observe* a scene in which a garment is taken from a guarantor for the express purpose of learning a lesson from his punishment, rather than being commanded to participate in his punishment. The punishment that readers imagine the guarantor experiencing serves to warn them against following his example. The instruction *do not guarantee the loans of strangers* is clear in these sayings.

The instruction not to guarantee the loans of strangers is clear in 11:15 as well. However, many commentators and translations misconstrue 11:15a. To demonstrate, consider the

[121] 20:16 has a discrepancy between *ketiv* and *qere* readings at this point. The *ketiv* is *nōkrîm* and the *qere* is *nōkriyyāh*. I read with the *ketiv*. As Fox reflects, *nōkriyyāh* is problematic because women would not have taken out loans in ancient Israel. In addition, *zar* and *nōkrî* always match when they occur as a pair (Fox 2015, 284).

[122] The translation above reflects an emendation of *nōkriyyāh* in M to *nōkrîm*. I make this emendation on the basis of Fox's reasoning presented in the preceding footnote. In addition, LXX and V reflect the plural in 27:13.

uniformity of translations of the clause *kî ʿarāb zār* ("because he guaranteed a stranger") in 20:16a and 27:13a by commentators. Translations of this clause are in italics.

McKane (1970, 242, 254)	Take his garment, *for he has gone surety for a stranger*
Murphy (1998, 148, 204)	Take his garment, *for he has provided surety for a stranger*
Clifford (1999, 180, 235)	Take his garment, *for he went surety for another*
Waltke (2005, 138, 369)	Take away one's garment *when he becomes surety for a stranger*
Fox (2009, 669, 809	"Take his garment, *because he has given surety for a stranger*

Now compare the above translations with translations by the same commentators of the *same* clause in 11:15a. The translation of *kî ʿarāb zār* ("because he guaranteed a stranger") is again represented in italics. Also, representation of *kî* is indicated by bold font.

McKane (1970, 227)	*He who has gone surety for a stranger* will have to suffer for it
Murphy (1998, 79)	*Whoever goes surety for a stranger* suffers
Clifford (1999, 119)	Trouble will befall *one giving surety for another*
Waltke (2004, 489)	One suffers harm grievously ***when*** *one becomes surety for a stranger*
Fox (2009, 536)	"He shall be severely harmed, ***because*** *he has given surety for a stranger*!"

Only Fox translates *kî ʿarāb zār* consistently in 11:15a, 20:16a, and 27:13a; and only Waltke and Fox represent the *kî* in their translation of *kî ʿarāb zār* in 11:15a. The word *raʿ* ("bad") in 11:15a is the primary cause of difficulty. BHS (but not BHQ) editors recommend emending it to the infinitive absolute *rōaʿ*. McKane, Murphy, Clifford, and Fox all perform this emendation. Waltke does not, arguing that the internal accusative expresses the same meaning (2004, 490). Fox supports the emendation by suggesting that the person who offers surety for (or guarantees) the loan of another would not be considered bad so much as he would be considered unwise (2009, 536). I maintain *raʿ* in 11:15a. An argument for not emending is the possibility that guarantors of loans in Proverbs are actually supposed to be seen as bad. More on this below.

The notion that *zār* (“stranger”) activates an AGENT FOR OBJECT frame metonymy undermines what I think are mistranslations of 11:15a. It is true that, literally, the guarantor is offering to stand as surety *for* the stranger. However, the construction *ʿarāb* + *zār* does not literally express this. Rather, as noted above, through frame metonymy it expresses the promise of the guarantor that he will ensure the future payment of the loan.

17:18 is the only other sentence saying that deals with loan guarantees. 17:18a describes guarantors, and v 18b contains a nominal phrase that is in apposition to the guarantors in v 18a.

אָדָם חֲסַר־לֵב תּוֹקֵעַ כָּף	a	17:18	A person who strikes hands is a man who lacks sense,
עֹרֵב עֲרֵבָה לִפְנֵי רֵעֵהוּ	b		a person who guarantees a pledge in the presence of his neighbor.

The neighbor in v 18b is a witness to the arrangement of this loan guarantee. The pledge (*ʿărubbāh*) is the collateral for the loan that the borrower is borrowing. As noted above, the viewpoint of the phrase *t-q-ʿ* + *kap* could be attached to the lender or the guarantor. Given the negative assessment of the character who “strikes hands” in v 18a, the viewpoint of consequence in this saying is probably that of the guarantor. The evaluation of this person is made clear in describing them as lacking sense—that is, as being *ʾādām ḥăsar lēb* (“a man who lacks sense”).

The saying pair in Proverbs that deals with loan guarantees is 22:26-27. This saying pair occurs in the Amenemope section (22:17-23:11) and employs the characteristic grammar of instruction collections in issuing a direct instruction and supporting it with a motivation to follow that instruction.

אַל־תְּהִי בְתֹקְעֵי־כָף	a	22:26	Do not be among those who strike hands,
בַּעֹרְבִים מַשָּׁאוֹת	b		among those who guarantee debts.
אִם־אֵין־לְךָ לְשַׁלֵּם	a	22:27	If you have nothing [with which] to pay,
לָמָּה יִקַּח מִשְׁכָּבְךָ מִתַּחְתֶּיךָ	b		why should your bed be taken from under you?

The addressee in vv 26-27 is someone with few material resources. The speaker warns him not to guarantee debts (i.e., the future repayment of loans) out of fear that he will lose his last possession, if he is in fact called on to repay a loan for a borrower. Fox suggests that reference to the guarantor's bed may be intended to evoke conceptions of a garment (2009, 718). People who were poor would sleep in their garments. Exodus 22:25-26 and Deuteronomy 24:12-13 both stipulate that if a person who is poor (*ʿānî* in both passages) has given a garment in pledge, that garment must be returned to them before nightfall.

The final passage in Proverbs that deals with loan guarantees is a longer didactic unit (6:1-5) that opens the third interlude (6:1-19) in Prov 1-9. It is the first of four epigrams that comprise this interlude, and it is the only one that addresses *bĕnî* ("my son") directly.

בְּנִי אִם־עָרַבְתָּ לְרֵעֶךָ	a	6:1	My son, if you guarantee to your neighbor,
תָּקַעְתָּ לַזָּר כַּפֶּיךָ	b		striking your hands for a stranger,
נוֹקַשְׁתָּ בְאִמְרֵי־פִיךָ	a	6:2	[if] you are ensnared in the words of your mouth,
נִלְכַּדְתָּ בְּאִמְרֵי־פִיךָ	b		[if] you are captured in the words of your mouth,
עֲשֵׂה זֹאת אֵפוֹא בְּנִי וְהִנָּצֵל	a	6:3	do this, then, my son, and deliver yourself –
כִּי בָאתָ בְכַף־רֵעֶךָ	b		for you have come into the hand of your neighbor –
לֵךְ הִתְרַפֵּס וּרְהַב רֵעֶיךָ	c		go, hasten, and storm (i.e., plead with) your neighbor!
אַל־תִּתֵּן שֵׁנָה לְעֵינֶיךָ	a	6:4	Do not give your eyes sleep,
וּתְנוּמָה לְעַפְעַפֶּיךָ	b		or slumber to your eyelids!
הִנָּצֵל כִּצְבִי מִיָּד	a	6:5	Deliver yourself like a gazelle from [the] hand [of a hunter][123]
וּכְצִפּוֹר מִיַּד יָקוּשׁ	b		or like a bird from the hand of a fowler!

In this case, the neighbor is the lender (v 1a). Every element in this unit manifests urgency. The father seems beside himself with concern that his son is about to lose everything. The drama is palpable. According to the father, the son has allowed himself to be "ensnared" (N of *n-q-š* in v

[123] Many commentators think *miyyad* ("from a hand") in 6:5a is a copying error and emend to *miṣayyād* ("from a hunter"). In support of this emendation, Fox notes the similarity between *y* and *ṣ* in the archaic script, as well as the fact that "one does not catch a gazelle with a hand" (2015, 129; also Fox 2009, 214).

2a), "captured" (N of *l-k-d* in v 2b), and has fallen into the "hand of [his] neighbor" (*bĕyad rēʿekâ* in v 3b). The father urges him to "go, hasten, and storm [his] neighbor" (v 3c)[124]—all before the son allows himself to sleep (v 4). The comparisons that the father makes to a gazelle escaping a hunter and a bird escaping a fowler in v 5 are apt. In his mind, his son has become the prey of the neighbor. He seems certain that his son is in perilous financial jeopardy.[125]

At least one feature in almost all of these loan guarantee passages signals that the guarantor has few material resources:

- The urgency with which the father pleads with the son in 6:1-5 could be due to his fear that his son is about to lose the little wealth that he has.
- 11:15, 20:16, and 27:13 all demand that the *garment* of the guarantor be taken from him. A garment would be collateral of last resort. Only a person with no other resources would use a garment as collateral (Ex 22:25-26; Dt 24:12-13).
- 22:26-27 poses the rhetorical question, "If you have nothing with which to pay, why should your bed [possibly garment] be taken from under you?" The implication of this is clear: the addressee has no other resources with which to pay.

What is less clear is why readers may be motivated to guarantee loans in the first place. Commentators differ in their ideas about this. Some identify charity as the motivation (Whybray 1994; Murphy 1998; Clifford 1999; Waltke 2004, 2005). In great contrast, others think the prospect of making an easy profit would serve as motivation for readers to guarantee loans (McKane 1970; Fox 2000; Loader 2014). I agree with the second reading. It seems clear that the

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[124] The verbs *r-p-s* and *r-h-b* occur infrequently in the Hebrew Bible. The root meaning of *r-p-s* is a concrete one: to pollute water or make it muddy (see Ezekiel 32:4; 34:18; Proverbs 25:26). The scene envisioned in v 3c is of the son prostrate on the ground, groveling in a puddle, mixing up the mud, beseeching his neighbor. The meaning of *r-h-b* is something like *be insolent toward* in Isaiah 3:5 and *overwhelm* in Song 6:5. Here in v 3c, the purpose of the action is to overwhelm the neighbor with persistence, not insolence.

[125] Fox notes that borrowers are protected from lenders in Israelite legislation, but that guarantors are not (Ex 22:25-26; Dt 23:19-20; 24:6, 12-13, 17). Therefore, "The guarantor is worse off than the bankrupt borrower!" (Fox 2009, 670).

intended audience of 6:1-5, 11:15, 20:16, 22:26-27 and 27:13 are people with little wealth to offer in payment for borrowers who defaulted on loans. Presumably, this type of guarantor guaranteed loans in the hope that they would never have to pay for them. They would, however, always count on charging a fee for the service of guaranteeing a loan. Therefore, in Proverbs, loan guarantees *may* be a form of predatory lending. This would make sense of the use of *raʿ* as "bad man" in 11:15a. It also makes sense of the harsh consequences in 11:15, 20:16, 27:13, and 22:26-27 of the guarantor being deprived of his garment (or bed). Why the drastic punishment, if the guarantor had loaned out of charity? In addition, a predatory lending background may also explain why borrowers are protected from lenders in Israelite legislation but guarantors are not (Ex 22:25-26; Dt 23:19-20; 24:6, 12-13, 17) (on which, see n. 125 above).

All of this said, concern for the economic security of would-be guarantors is also apparent in these passages in Proverbs. Loan guarantee instructions are complex. The producers of this material seem immediately concerned with both the wellbeing and the morality of readers. Both concerns seem to compel the producers in how they motivate their prohibitions against loan guarantees. Whatever concerns were primary, the negative evaluation of offering to guarantee the loans of others is unequivocal throughout this section. In light of all the strong warnings against guaranteeing loans, we can imagine readers constructing the meaning of these instructions in the following ways.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 11:15

CONTENT BASE SPACES	a	A bad man being harmed because he guaranteed the loan of a stranger
	b	A person who hates making loan agreements feeling secure
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	a	Because guaranteeing the loan of a stranger leads to bad things, I should not guarantee the loan of a stranger.
	b	Because a person who hates loan guarantees feels secure, I should not guarantee loans.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	a	Do not guarantee the loan of a stranger.
	b	Do not enter loan agreements.

Proverbs 20:16 and 27:13

CONTENT BASE SPACES	a-b	A scene in which a speaker commands an addressee to take the garment of a person who had guaranteed the loan of a stranger.
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	a-b	Because guaranteeing the loan of a stranger leads to bad things, I should not guarantee the loan of a stranger.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	a-b	Do not guarantee the loan of a stranger.

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 11:15a, 20:16, and 27:13

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses not to guarantee the loan of a stranger.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	Wealth is something that the reader would choose not to offer as a loan guarantee.

Proverbs 11:15b

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses not to enter into loan agreements.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	Wealth is something that the reader would choose not to offer as a loan guarantee.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 22:26-27

CONTENT BASE SPACES	26a	Command not to be among people who make loan agreements
	26b	Command not to be among people who offer surety for debts
	27a	Conditional question protasis: a person with nothing with which to pay
	27b	Conditional question apodosis: a person's bed being taken away
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	27a-b	Because I have nothing with which to pay a loan guarantee, I should not offer to guarantee the loans of others.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	26a-b	[explicit]
	27a-b	Do not enter loan agreements.

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 22:26-27

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses not to enter loan agreements.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	Wealth is something that the reader would choose not to offer as a loan guarantee.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 6:1-5

CONTENT BASE SPACES	1a	Address to son:	son offering surety to his neighbor
	1b		son making a surety agreement for a stranger
	2a	[1a-2b are	son being ensnared in the words of his mouth
	2b	protases]	son being captured in the words of his mouth
	3a		command to son to deliver himself
	3b		son coming into the hand of his neighbor
	3c	[3a-5b are	commands to son to go and plead with his neighbor
	4	apodoses]	commands to son not to sleep
	5		command to son to deliver himself (like a gazelle and a bird)
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	1-5	Because loan agreements lead to bad things, I should not enter loan agreements.	
DIRECTIVE SPACES	1-5	Do not enter loan agreements	

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 6:1-5

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses not to enter a loan agreement.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	Wealth is something that the reader would choose not to offer as a loan guarantee.

3.3.4 Do not squander your wealth in dissolute revelry

Three sayings in sentence collections (21:17; 28:7; 29:3) and one saying pair in an instruction collection (23:20-21) counsel against squandering wealth in dissolute revelry. Consider the sentence sayings.

אִישׁ מַחְסוֹר אֹהֵב שִׂמְחָה	a	21:17	A man who loves pleasure is a man of poverty;
אֹהֵב יַיִן־וָשֶׁמֶן לֹא יַעֲשִׁיר	b		a man who loves wine and oil will not be rich.
נוֹצֵר תּוֹרָה בֵּן מֵבִין	a	28:7	A son who has understanding observes teaching,
וְרֹעֶה זוֹלֲלִים יַכְלִים אָבִיו	b		and a companion of gluttons brings shame to his father.
אִישׁ־אֹהֵב חָכְמָה יְשַׂמַּח אָבִיו	a	29:3	A man who loves wisdom makes his father rejoice,
וְרֹעֶה זוֹנוֹת יְאַבֶּד־הוֹן	b		but a companion of prostitutes make wealth perish.

Loving pleasure (*śimḥāh*) in 21:17a is elaborated in 21:17b as loving wine and oil. The implication is that the person in question drinks *too much* wine and enjoys *too much* oil. 28:7b also warns against eating too much, and 29:3a prohibits indulging in prostitutes. Each of these pursuits requires wealth. The glutton in 28:7b and the companion of prostitutes in 29:3b are both contrasted with a character who exhibits wisdom and understanding. The implication is that squandering wealth in dissolute revelry like gluttony and hiring prostitutes is foolish. The one brings shame (28:7b), and the other makes wealth perish (29:3b). Poverty is portrayed as a consequence in 21:17 as well. These negative consequences make the instructions in these sayings clear. We can imagine readers constructing meaning when they read these sayings in the following ways.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 21:17

CONTENT BASE SPACES	a	A man loving pleasure coming to poverty
	b	A man loving wine and oil not being rich
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	a	Because loving pleasure leads to bad things, I should not spend wealth in dissolute kinds pleasure.
	b	Because loving wine and oil leads to bad things, I should not spend wealth overindulging in these things.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	a	Do not spend wealth in dissolute kinds of pleasure.
	b	Do not spend wealth overindulging in too much wine and oil.

Proverbs 28:27

CONTENT BASE SPACES	a	A son who has understanding observing teaching
	b	A glutton bringing shame to his father
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	a	Because observing teaching is a good thing, I should observe teaching.
	b	Because being a glutton leads to bad things, I should not spend wealth overindulging in too much food.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	a	Observe teaching.
	b	Do not spend wealth overindulging in too much food.

Proverbs 29:3

CONTENT BASE SPACES	a	A man who loves wisdom making his father rejoice
	b	A person who indulges in prostitution losing wealth
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	a	Because loving wisdom leads to good things, I should pursue (love) wisdom.
	b	Because indulging in prostitution leads to bad things, I should not spend wealth overindulging in these things.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	a	Pursue (love) wisdom.
	b	Do not spend wealth on prostitution.

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 21:17a

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses not to spend their wealth on dissolute kinds of pleasure.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	Wealth is something that the reader would choose not to spend on dissolute kinds of pleasure.

Proverbs 21:17b

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses not to spend their wealth on too much wine and oil.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	Wealth is something that the reader would choose not to spend on too much wine and oil.

Proverbs 28:27b

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses not to spend their wealth on dissolute kinds of pleasure.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	Wealth is something that the reader would choose not to spend on dissolute kinds of pleasure.

Proverbs 29:3b

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses not to spend their wealth on prostitution.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	Wealth is something that the reader would choose not to spend on prostitution.

* * *

Prov 23:20-21 prohibits drunkenness and gluttony. This saying pair is part of the Amenemope section in the third collection in Proverbs.

אַל־תְּהִי בְסֹבְאֵי־יָיִן בְּזֹלְלֵי בָשָׂר לָמוֹ	a b	23:20	Do not be among drinkers of wine, among gluttons of meat,
כִּי־סֹבֵא וְזוֹלֵל יִוָּרֵשׁ וּקְרָעִים תַּלְבִּישׁ נוּמָה	a b	23:21	for a drunkard and a glutton will become impoverished, and slumber will clothe them with rags.

The logical particle *kî* connects v 21 to v 20 and introduces the motivation in v 21 to follow the instruction in v 20. The motivation in v 21 is the same as the motivation in 21:17a and 29:3b. As in these other sayings, both lines in 23:21 portray poverty as a consequence of indulging in too much alcohol and food. The metaphor AN ACTION IS A PERSON underlies the personification of slumber clothing the drunkard and glutton with rags. The image is striking. It is again the case that characters choose a certain course of action and are overwhelmed by the consequences. We can imagine readers constructing meaning in the following way when they read 23:20-21.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 23:20-21

CONTENT BASE SPACES	20a	Command not to be among people who drink too much
	20b	Command not to be among people who eat too much
	21a	A drunkard and a glutton becoming poor
	21b	Sleep clothing a drunkard and a glutton with rags
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	Because drinking and eating too much leads to bad things, I should not drink and eat too much.	
DIRECTIVE SPACES	[explicit in v 20]	

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 23:20-21

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses not to spend their wealth on drinking and eating too much
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	Wealth is something that the reader would choose not to spend on drinking and eating too much.

3.3.5 Summary

The instructions in this section address what the producers of Proverbs do *not* want readers to do with wealth. There are four primary instructional frames in §3.3: do not use wealth to ingratiate yourself with the rich at the expense of the poor (§3.3.1); do not withhold wealth from those who need it (§3.3.2); do not offer wealth as a loan guarantee (§3.3.3); and do not squander wealth in dissolute revelry (§3.3.4). The motivation in most of this material is the prospect of losing wealth. However, a number of units use other means of motivation. Both 3:28 and 6:1-5 rely on the authority of the father figure who serves as the staged speaker in much of Prov 1-9. 11:26a portrays a person who withholds grain from those who need it being cursed by the people (*lĕʾōm*). 17:18a associates guaranteeing a loan with "lacking sense" (*ḥăsar lēb*). 28:25a describes a greedy person stirring up strife. And Prov 28:7 describes a son who consorts with gluttons bringing shame to his father.

It is again the case that readers who perform Reader in the Scene blends when they read this material would imagine themselves as the ones experiencing the above outcomes. In addition, we see in the simulation summaries that readers would also imagine themselves interacting in some direct way with wealth, poverty, and the poor. The poor are portrayed in 22:16 (§3.3.1) and may be the targets of loan guarantees in the material in §3.3.3. The concern in both of these units is that the agents in them (i.e., the readers) do not exploit or oppress them.

3.4 What to do with wealth instructional frames

There are only two things that the producers of Proverbs instruct readers to do with wealth: offer it in sacrifice to Yahweh (3:9-10), and give it to others (11:24-26; 21:26b). There are additional sayings that instruct readers to give to the poor specifically. I discuss them in chapter six. Because 11:24-26 and 21:26b do not explicitly mention the poor, I read these sayings as instructions regarding giving to others more broadly speaking.

3.4.1 Offer your wealth as a sacrifice to Yahweh

Prov 3:9-10 is the only instruction in all of Proverbs that portrays a cultic obligation—namely, the offering of sacrifice. This passage occurs near the end of the third lecture (3:1-12) in the introduction to the book. The focus of the third lecture is piety—keeping instruction (vv 1-2), maintaining love and kindness (vv 3-4), trusting in Yahweh (vv 5-6), not being wise in one's own eyes (vv 7-8), honoring Yahweh with one's wealth (vv 9-10), and not despising discipline from Yahweh (vv 11-12). 3:9 is a command to honor Yahweh with your wealth, and 3:10 is a motivation follow this instruction.

כַּבֵּד אֶת־יְהוָה מֵהוֹנֶךָ	a	3:9	Honor Yahweh from your wealth
וּמֵרֵאשִׁית כָּל־תְּבוּאָתֶךָ	b		and from the firstfruits of all your produce,
וְיִמָּלְאוּ אֲסָמֶיךָ שָׂבָע	a	3:10	and your barns will be full of grain,
וְתִירוֹשׁ יְקָבֶיךָ יִפְרֹצוּ	b		and your vats will burst with new wine.

The form of this instruction is typical for that found in instruction collections: a direct admonition (imperative in v 9a) followed by motive clauses (v 10a-b). This passage connects giving the best of one's produce as an offering to Yahweh (v 9) with gaining even more in return

(v 10). This sequence of cause and effect is not a natural one in any empirical sense. Rather, it reflects belief in Yahweh that the producers wanted to inculcate in readers. We can imagine readers reasoning in the following way when they interpret this didactic unit.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 3:9-10		
CONTENT BASE SPACES	9a-b	Command to honor Yahweh with one's wealth [i.e., offer sacrifice]
	10a	One's barns being full of grain
	10b	One's vats bursting with new wine
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	9-10	Because honoring Yahweh with my wealth leads to good things, I should honor Yahweh with my wealth.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	[explicit in 3:9]	

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 3:9-10	
ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses to honor Yahweh with their wealth.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	Wealth is something that the reader would choose to offer to Yahweh.

3.4.2 Give your wealth to people who need it

Most of the sayings in Proverbs that exhort readers to give wealth to others focus on giving to the poor (14:31; 19:17; 22:9; 28:8, 27; 31:20). As noted above, I consider these sayings in chapter six. There are also a handful of sayings that exhort readers to give to others who are not described as poor (3:28; 11:24-26; 21:25-26). I discussed two lines in 11:24-26 above (§3.3.2). Consider this saying cluster as a whole here.

יֵשׁ מְפַזֵּר וְנוֹסָף עוֹד וְחוֹשֵׂךְ מִיֹּשֶׁר אַךְ־לְמַחְסוֹר	a b	11:24	There is a person who scatters and still more is added, and a person who withholds what is due – only to poverty.
נֶפֶשׁ־בְּרָכָה תְדֻשָּׁן וּמַרְוֶה גַּם־הוּא יוֹרֶא	a b	11:25	A person of blessing (who blesses others) is enriched, and a person who gives water – he is also watered.[126]

[126] The emendation is from *yôre'* (*he teaches*) in M to *yirwe'* (*he is given drink*).

מֹנֵעַ בָּר יְקֻבֵּהוּ לְאֹום	a	11:26	A person who withholds grain – people curse him,
וּבְרָכָה לְרֹאשׁ מַשְׁבִּיר	b		but a blessing is on the head of a person who distributes grain.

We can now fill in the chiasm that I presented above with the actions portrayed in each of these sayings. The negative examples are again in bold.

24a	scattering [something] to others and getting more in return
24b	**withholding [something] from others and coming to poverty**
25a	blessing others and being enriched
25b	giving others water [to drink] and being given water [to drink] in return
26a	**withholding grain and being cursed in return**
26b	distributing grain and being blessed in return

The actions grow in specificity from v 24 to v 26. Most commentators reflect on the possibility of two readings of v 24. In one, v 24 is a saying that expresses two paradoxes and no moral. As Murphy puts it, the *mĕpazzēr* ("person who scatters") in v 24a is a "big spender who somehow gets richer," while his opposite, the *ḥōśēk miyyōšer* ("person who saves out of honesty") in v 24b, is "carefully sparing" and still somehow "becomes poorer" (1998, 83).

In v 25, a person who blesses others (*nepeš bĕrākāh*)[127] is enriched (Dp of *d-š-n*), and a person who gives others water to drink (*marweh*) is given water to drink in return (*yirweʾ*). The same principle obtains in both vv 24 and 25: giving results in receiving. In the moral economy of Proverbs, a person reaps what they sow (e.g., 1:31; 12:14; 26:27). In this type of economy, giving to others leads inevitably to others giving to you. This economy is instantiated in a way in v 26 in which giving a material good leads to (probably) verbal blessing, and withholding a material good leads to (undoubtedly) verbal cursing. As we saw in §3.3.2, some kind of large-

[127] Commentators generally agree that the construct phrase *nepeš bĕrākāh* in v 25a expresses what Waltke and O'Connor call a genitive of mediated object (*IBHS* §9.5.2d; see also Whybray 1994; Murphy 1998; Clifford 1999; Waltke 2004; Fox 2009). In this relation, the construct term "does something" with the genitive term. In the case of *nepeš bĕrākāh*, the *nepeš*—that is, the person—does something with the *bĕrākāh* ("blessing"): namely, he blesses others with it.

scale, possibly regional, grain distribution is on view in v 26. Therefore, grain is what is given in v 26a and withheld in v 26b. This is the most specific of the scenarios portrayed in vv 24-26.

The evaluation of each action in this short unit is clear. It is also the case that while each of these sayings portrays different scenes and situations, they all, in effect, issue the same instructions—namely, give needed things to others and do not withhold what they need. We can therefore imagine people constructing meaning in the following ways when they read 11:24-26.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 11:24		
CONTENT BASE SPACES	a	A person giving wealth to others and somehow adding to his own
	b	A person withholding wealth that should be given to others and coming only to poverty
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	a	Because giving wealth to others leads to good things, I should give wealth to others.
	b	Because withholding wealth that should be given leads to bad things, I should not withhold wealth that should be given to others.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	a	Give wealth to others.
	b	Do not withhold wealth that should be given to others.
Proverbs 11:25		
CONTENT BASE SPACES	a	A person who blesses others being enriched
	b	A person gives others water to drink being given water to drink in return
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	a-b	Because giving to others leads to good things, I should give to others.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	a-b	Give to others.
Proverbs 11:26		
CONTENT BASE SPACES	a	People cursing a person who withholds grain
	b	People blessing a person who gives grain
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	a	Because withholding grain [wealth] leads to bad things, I should not withhold grain [wealth].
	b	Because giving grain [wealth] leads to good things, I should give grain [wealth].
DIRECTIVE SPACES	a	Do not withhold grain [wealth].
	b	Give grain [wealth].

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 11:24a	
ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses to give wealth to others.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	Wealth is something that the reader would choose to give to others.
Proverbs 11:24b	
ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses not to withhold wealth that should be

	given to others.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	Wealth is something that the reader would choose not to withhold.

Proverbs 11:25

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses to give to others.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	Wealth is something that the reader would choose to give to others.

Proverbs 11:26a

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses not to withhold grain [wealth].
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	Wealth is something that the reader would choose not to withhold.

Proverbs 11:26b

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses to give grain [wealth].
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	Wealth is something that the reader would choose to give to others.

* * *

We saw Prov 21:25-26 in the section on sluggards, slackers, and how never to build wealth (§3.2.1.5). The *ṣaddîq* ("righteous person") in v 26b serves as an example of the kind of generosity that the producers of Proverbs want to readers to embody.

תַּאֲוַת עָצֵל תְּמִיתֶנּוּ כִּי־מָאֲנוּ יָדָיו לַעֲשׂוֹת	21:25	The desire of a sluggard kills him, for his hands refuse to work.
כָּל־הַיּוֹם הִתְאַוָּה תַאֲוָה וְצַדִּיק יִתֵּן וְלֹא יַחְשֹׂךְ	21:26	All day he desires and desires, but a righteous person gives and does not withhold.

What the *ṣaddîq* does in v 26b matches the exaggerated portrayal of the sluggard's bad example in vv 25a-26b. Whereas the sluggard "desires and desires" (*hitʾawwāh taʾăwāh*), the *ṣaddîq* gives and gives. No direct or indirect objects are mentioned in v 26b. Readers may imagine different scenarios. No positive consequence is portrayed either. The positive cultural models that readers associate with the *ṣaddîq* and giving to others serve as motivation in this saying for readers to follow the instruction. We can therefore imagine readers constructing meaning when they read v 26b in the following way.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 21:26b	
CONTENT BASE SPACES	A righteous man giving and not withholding
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	Because a righteous person would give and not hold back, I should give and not hold back.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	Be righteous, give, and do not hold back from giving.

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 21:26b	
ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is person who chooses to be righteous and to give and not hold back from from giving.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	Wealth is something that the reader would choose to give to others.

3.4.3 Summary

This section contains instructions that describe what readers are to do with wealth—namely, offer it in sacrifice to Yahweh (§3.4.1) and give it to those who need it (§3.4.2). The motivation to follow these instructions varies. In a number of instances, giving leads to receiving—sometimes wealth (3:9-10; 11:24a); other times, something else (11:25a-b). In contrast, the motivation to follow the instruction to give to others in 21:26b is rooted solely in the fact that the character who is portrayed giving to others is a *ṣaddîq* ("a righteous person"). Readers who hold cultural models of righteousness as a goal would be compelled by the example of the *ṣaddîq* alone to follow the instruction *give to others*.

As we see in the simulation summaries, it is again the case that when readers perform Reader in the Scene blends, they imagine themselves as agents who interact in some *direct* way with wealth. Specifically, in this section, they simulate themselves choosing to give wealth to others (including Yahweh) and then experiencing positive consequences of having done so.

3.5 How not to think about wealth instructional frames

Material in this and the next section instruct readers on how to and how not to think about wealth and poverty. Material throughout this study could be said implicitly to instruct readers on how to and how not to think about these things. However, the *primary* concern in §3.5 and §3.6 is how readers think about wealth and poverty. In other words, the "action item" of instructions in §3.5 and §3.6 is thinking or not thinking in certain ways about wealth and poverty.

3.5.1 As a source of ultimate security

Two individual sentence sayings and a sentence saying pair exhort readers not to think about wealth as an ultimate source of security. This particular way of thinking about wealth is apparent in numerous other sayings in Proverbs as well (e.g., nearly all the better-than sayings, §3.6, and every saying that exhorts trust in Yahweh, especially 3:1-12). The sayings in this section explicitly describe wealth as an insufficient resource in situations where deliverance and even security more generally are on view (11:4, 28; 18:10-11).

לֹא־יוֹעִיל הוֹן בְּיוֹם עֶבְרָה וּצְדָקָה תַּצִּיל מִמָּוֶת	a b	11:4	Wealth does not profit on a day of fury, but righteousness delivers from death.
בּוֹטֵחַ בְּעָשְׁרוֹ הוּא יִפֹּל וְכָעָלֶה צַדִּיקִים יִפְרָחוּ	a b	11:28	A person who trusts in his wealth – he will fall, but the righteous flourish like a leaf.
מִגְדַּל־עֹז שֵׁם יְהוָה בּוֹ־יָרוּץ צַדִּיק וְנִשְׂגָּב	a b	18:10	The name of Yahweh is a strong tower; the righteous run into it and are *niśgāb*.
הוֹן עָשִׁיר קִרְיַת עֻזּוֹ וּכְחוֹמָה נִשְׂגָּבָה בְּמַשְׂכִּיתוֹ	a b	18:11	The wealth of a rich man is his strong city – like a high wall in his imagination.

In 11:28 and 18:10-11, a person who trusts in wealth is compared to someone who is described as righteous (11:28b; 18:10b). 18:10 describes this person further as trusting in Yahweh.

Contrasting trust in wealth with trusting in Yahweh and righteousness frames the choice to trust in wealth as a moral one. These sayings do not question the value of, or need for, wealth. They challenge perceptions of wealth an ultimate source of security. These sayings claim that wealth cannot save a person from inevitable calamities (11:4a),[128] and that anyone who trusts in wealth will ultimately fall (11:28a). This is all because the security it affords is significant only in the imagination of the rich (18:11b). In contrast, righteousness is portrayed as powerful enough to deliver from death (11:4b). And the righteous are said to flourish (11:28b) and find security in Yahweh (18:10).

The evaluation in these sayings is clear. We can therefore imagine readers reasoning in the following ways as they interpret these sayings.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 11:4		
CONTENT BASE SPACES	a	Wealth not being any help on a day of fury [i.e., calamity]
	b	Righteousness delivering from death
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	a	Because wealth offers no help when calamity comes, I should not think of wealth as my ultimate source of security.
	b	Because righteousness delivers from death, I should be righteous / think of righteousness as my ultimate source of security.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	a	Do not think of wealth as your ultimately source of security.
	b	Be righteous. / Think of righteousness of your ultimate source of security.
Proverbs 11:28		
CONTENT BASE SPACES	a	A person trusting in his wealth and "falling"
	b	Righteousness delivering from death
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	a	Because trusting in one's wealth leads to bad things, I should not trust in wealth.
	b	Because righteousness delivers from death, I should be righteous / think of righteousness as my ultimate source of security.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	a	Do not trust in your wealth.

[128] Reference to a "day of fury" (*bĕyôm ʿebrāh*) is intended to prompt construals of some kind of calamitous situation, not one of ultimate judgment. Readers might imagine "famine, earthquakes, wars, storms, and the like" or "any catastrophe that threatens everyone" (Fox 2009, 511, 532).

	b	Be righteous. / Think of righteousness of your ultimate source of security.
Proverbs 18:10		
CONTENT BASE SPACES	a	The name of Yahweh being a strong tower
	b	The righteous running into that tower and being saved
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	a-b	Because Yahweh offers security, I should be righeous and trust in Yahweh.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	a	Be righteous and trust in Yahweh.
Proverbs 18:11		
CONTENT BASE SPACES	a	The wealth of a rich man being his strong city
	b	A rich man imagining that his wealth offers security like a high wall
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	a-b	Because wealth offers security only in one's imagination, I should not trust in wealth as my source of security.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	a-b	Do not trust in your wealth.

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 11:4, 11:28, and 18:10-11	
ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses not to think of wealth as their source of security / to trust in their wealth.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	Wealth is something that the reader would choose not to trust in or think of as their source of security.

3.5.3 Summary

The inferential reasoning summaries in this section all represent interpretations of 11:4, 28, and 18:10-11 as directives to readers not to think of wealth as an ultimate source of security. The simulation summaries correspond with this. The contents of the causal reasoning spaces involve readers who construe personal implications for themselves when they read these sayings imagining themselves choosing not to think of wealth as their ultimate security.

The motivations to follow the instructions in 11:4, 28, and 18:10-11 are based in each case on the idea that wealth provides inadequate support or security in comparison with righteousness and Yahweh himself. The lesson in these sayings is not that wealth qua wealth is an inadequate resource. Rather, these sayings exhort readers to put *more* trust in Yahweh and the

importance of their character (which ultimately ties to trust in Yahweh in the minds of the producers of Proverbs) than readers place in wealth.

3.6 How to think about wealth and poverty (or scarcity) instructional frames

The instructions in this section are complementary to the instructions in §3.5. They are also numerous. This section includes twenty-four better-than sayings, another saying that enlists better-than reasoning but is not formulated as a better-than saying (28:11), and part of the only prayer in Proverbs (30:7-9). All of these units instruct readers on how *to* think about wealth.

3.6.1 Better-than sayings

Before getting to the better-than sayings, I will explain my approach to them. The better-than sayings in Proverbs all use a *ṭôb*-X-*min*-Y (*good*-X-*from*-Y) construction to express direct better-than evaluations of the contents they profile. The *min* preposition in *ṭôb*-X-*min*-Y constructions marks the element in comparative equations that serves as the standard (Y) by which something else (X) is measured. For example, consider the statement in Prov 8:11a,

ṭôbāh	*ḥōkmāh*	*mippĕnînîm*
good	wisdom	*min*-gems

A wooden rendering of this statement would be something like, “Good is wisdom from gems.” This is made more elegant in translation as, “Wisdom *is better than* gems.” There are also sayings in Proverbs that use other adjectives in place of *ṭôb* to express a “better-than” relation. Four sayings use *nibḥār* (“chosen” or “choice”) in a *nibḥār*-X-*min*-Y (“choice is X more than Y” → “X *is more choice than* Y”) construction (8:10b, 8:19b, 16:16b, and 22:1a); one saying uses a

yĕqārāh-X-*min*-Y ("precious is X more than Y" → "X *is more precious than* Y") construction (3:15a); and a final saying uses *rāḥōq* in a *rāḥōq*-X-*min*-Y ("far is X more than Y" → "X *is farther from* Y") construction (31:10b). In most cases the adjective precedes the *min* preposition. However, when parallel lines both contain a comparative construction, the order is reversed in the second parallel line to *min*-Y-adjective-X (see 8:10b, 8:19b, and 22:1b).[129]

There are a total of 29 better-than statements in Proverbs. This includes those statements in which *nibḥār*, *yĕqārāh*, and *rāḥōq* are used in place of *ṭôb* or *ṭôbāh* to make a comparison. Twenty-four of these better-than sayings use wealth, a situation of scarcity, or a poor person (*rāš* in each case) in their comparative equations. These are the sayings that I review in §3.6.2-3.6.6. Wealth, poverty, and the poor are used in this material as comparative elements intended to train readers in how to think about wealth. Due to the inherent alternativity of options in Proverbs, these sayings all effectively tell readers how *not* to think about wealth as well.

Better-than statements relativize the value of wealth and poverty vis-à-vis more important things—namely, wisdom (§3.6.2), righteousness (§3.6.3), piety (§3.6.4), love and peace in the home (§3.6.5), a good spouse (§3.6.5), and a good reputation (§3.6.6). Therefore, when wealth, items of wealth, and situations that depict abundant wealth are profiled, *these other things* are evaluated as better, more choice, more precious than, or far from (as in "far better than") the item of wealth. In contrast, when situations of scarcity or a *rāš* are profiled in better-than sayings, they fall on the *better* side of the equation.

[129] Prov 8:10a does not contain an adjective-X-*min*-Y construction but does compare two items, clearly identifying one as better than the other. In addition, both lines in 16:16 contain adjective-X-*min*-Y constructions (in this order). However, both v 16a and v 16b also begin with separate non-comparative clauses. The non-comparative clauses at the start of these lines seem to influence the word order, preventing it changing from adjective-X-*min*-Y to *min*-Y-adjective-X in v 16a and v 16b.

The framework I use to interpret better-than sayings is a modified version of a model that Theodore Perry (1983) elaborated on the basis of a framework that paremiologist George Milner developed.[130] Perry and Milner theorize that there are four elements in every proverbial saying—two positive and two negative. I do not attempt to apply their framework to every saying in Proverbs. Norrick (2015) and Fontaine (1982) caution against applying it too broadly. I use the framework developed by Perry and Milner only in relation to better-than sayings. Their "quadripartite structure," as they call it, provides an elegant way to illustrate the kind of critical thinking that better-than sayings are designed to prompt. Quadripartite structures are comprised four elements (A, B, A', B'). Each one has a positive or negative valence:

A	material abundance	a good thing
B	material scarcity	a bad thing
A'	a wisdom value	the best thing
B'	a wisdom liability	the worst thing

A better-than equation without wisdom terms would naturally be A > B—that is, material abundance (a good thing) is better than material scarcity (a bad thing). However, when wisdom terms are introduced to the equation, a wisdom value is paired with material scarcity, and a wisdom liability is paired with material abundance. When this happens, the natural A (material

[130] Fox (2009) pointed me to Perry's work and Hutton (in personal communication) helped me modify it. Milner's paradigm (on which Perry's is based) is critiqued by paremiologists, because it requires analysts to assume they know what the producers of proverbial sayings intended to designate as good and bad (see especially Grzybek 1987; Norrick 2015; in biblical scholarship, see Fontaine 1982). Paremiologists deem this problematic, because it is not always clear which items in a proverb are supposed to be good and which are bad—e.g., "Monkey see, monkey do." This is especially true in cross-cultural analyses. In addition, not every proverbial expression has four discernible elements—e.g., "Time flies" and "Money talks" (Norrick 2015, 15). These are important critiques. However, Milner's quadripartite model works well in analyzing better-than sayings in Proverbs for two reasons. The positive and negative character of cultural models that appear in Proverbs (i.e., their function as goals and anti-goals) are readily identifiable. Second, even though some better-than sayings in Proverbs explicitly profile two or three elements in the quadripartite structure, the gapped elements are construable. As Fox explains, "they are like the back and side walls of a house that are not seen in the front but still must be there" (2009, 598).

abundance) > B (material scarcity) relation is reversed: material scarcity (a bad thing) with a wisdom value (the best thing) is now *better than* material abundance (a good thing) with a wisdom liability (the worst thing).

The wisdom value and liability terms (A' and B') not only counterbalance the material value terms (A and B). They outweigh them. Every better-than comparison in Proverbs is premised on the notion that wisdom values and liabilities are *greater* in worth than material values. This is why introducing them to A > B equations reverses the valuation in the equation:



B + A' > A + B' is the full quadripartite structure that describes the relations between terms in Proverbs' better-than sayings. Shortened versions of this template appear in Proverbs as well. Recall Prov 8:11, "Wisdom is better than gems." This is an A' > A equation—the best thing (a wisdom value) is better than a good thing (material abundance). Fox labels the full quadripartite structure the *complex* better-than template and the shortened version, the *simple* better-than template (Fox 2009, 597-598). Fourteen of the twenty-four better-than sayings in Proverbs that mention wealth, scarcity, or a *rāš* use a simple template, and ten use a complex one.

Better-than sayings are designed to prompt readers to reevaluate their preexisting evaluations of wisdom values and material wealth. Each equation that I represent below models the pedagogical critical-thinking exercise that the producers of Proverbs want readers to perform when they read these sayings. Readers themselves have to work out which terms in better-than sayings fill which slots in the quadripartite structure.

3.6.2 Wisdom and wealth

Nine better-than statements (in six better-than sayings) compare wisdom and wealth. All of them use a simple better-than template. Seven occur in the wisdom interludes in Prov 1-9. In every case, the comparison is between wisdom as the best thing and wealth as a good thing. Therefore, the equation that readers have to work out is A' > A—as in:

B	A'	A	B'
bad thing	best thing	good thing	worst thing
---	*wisdom*	*wealth*	---

The seven sayings that occur in wisdom interludes must be interpreted within the Lady Wisdom frames that readers have stored (and continue to develop) in long-term memory (LTM). Lady Wisdom is a powerful and compelling individual who is portrayed with great wealth (3:16; 8:18) and dispensing appropriate portions of it to "those who love her" (8:21). The better-than statements in wisdom interludes subordinate the value of her wealth to the value of her instructions. Wealth is an integral element in Lady Wisdom frames that readers might construe. However, wealth is always subordinated to Lady Wisdom and the wisdom she offers. She and her wisdom offer many benefits beyond wealth to readers. Before Lady Wisdom is pictured with and distributing wealth in 3:16, 8:18, and 8:21, readers are told that she is better than wealth in 3:14-15, 8:10-11, and in 8:19. This is significant. The producers of the wisdom interludes underscore the priority of wisdom over wealth before highlighting wealth as a benefit of wisdom.

The following inferential reasoning and simulation summaries model interpretations of all the sayings reviewed in §3.6.2. To save space, I offer this one summary since all of them would reflect the same interpretive process.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

CONTENT BASE SPACES	[various, depending on the saying]
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	Because wisdom is better than wealth, I should value wisdom more than wealth.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	Value wisdom more than wealth.

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses to value wisdom more than wealth.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	Wealth would be something that the reader would choose to think of as less valuable than wisdom.

3.6.2.1 Proverbs 3:13-15

The first better-than sayings in Proverbs appear in the second wisdom interlude (3:13-20). The macarism opening this interlude identifies the blessings in question as finding wisdom and attaining understanding. Vv 14-15 compare the value of these blessings to the value of wealth and assess the latter as less than.

אַשְׁרֵי אָדָם מָצָא חָכְמָה	a	3:13	Blessed is the man who finds wisdom,
וְאָדָם יָפִיק תְּבוּנָה	b		and the man who obtains understanding,
כִּי טוֹב סַחְרָהּ מִסְּחַר־כָּסֶף	a	3:14	for her gain is better than the gain of silver
וּמֵחָרוּץ תְּבוּאָתָהּ	b		and her produce than gold.
יְקָרָה הִיא מִפְּנִינִים	a	3:15	She is more precious than jewels,
וְכָל־חֲפָצֶיךָ לֹא יִשְׁווּ־בָהּ	b		and nothing you desire compares with her.

There are two better-than statements in v 14 and one in v 15. In v 14, the benefit of wisdom ("her gain," *saḥrāh* in v 14a and "her produce," *tĕbūʾātāh* in v 14b)—that is, what wisdom offers—is described as better than the gain of wealth (*sĕḥar kesep* in v 14a and *ḥārūṣ* in v 14b). In v 15, wisdom is described as more precious than jewels (v 15a) and as surpassing anything that a person could conceivably desire (v 15b).

3.6.2.2 Proverbs 8:10-11

Prov 8:10-11 concludes the exordium (8:4-11) that opens the fifth wisdom interlude in the opening chapters of Proverbs. It conveys the same message as that in 3:14-15 with much of the same language. 8:11b is almost an exact doublet of 3:15b—the only difference being the interesting dual form *ḥăpāṣayim* in 8:11b. This word has a 2ms pronominal ending in 3:15b.

קְחוּ־מוּסָרִי וְאַל־כָּסֶף וְדַעַת מֵחָרוּץ נִבְחָר	a b	8:10	Take my discipline and not silver, for knowledge is more choice than gold,
כִּי־טוֹבָה חָכְמָה מִפְּנִינִים וְכָל־חֲפָצִים לֹא יִשְׁווּ־בָהּ	a b	8:11	for wisdom is better than gems, and nothing that is desirable compares with her.

Wisdom is again assessed as more valuable than wealth and anything else a person might desire. Lady Wisdom is the speaker in Proverbs 8. She characterizes her teaching as noble (*nāgîd*), upright (*mêšārîm*), reliable (*ʾĕmet*), righteous (*bĕṣedeq*), and straight (*nĕḥōkîm*) (8:6-9). Therefore, it is in comparison with this characterization of her instruction that the better-than statements are made in vv 10-11. After describing the morally incomparable nature of her instruction, Lady Wisdom issues a direct command to readers in v 10 to take her instruction and not silver. The two better-than statements that follow in vv 10b and 11a and the final nothing-compares-with-her statement in v 11b all serve as motivation to follow Lady Wisdom's direct instruction in v 10a.[131] Readers are set up to reason that in comparison with the morally exceptional nature of her instruction (vv 6-9), the value of wealth pales in comparison.

[131] Commentators discuss the fact that if Lady Wisdom is the staged speaker, the 3fs pronominal suffix on *b-* at the end of Proverbs 8:11b is out of place. This discussion is part of a larger conversation about 8:10-11. Some think it is a later interpolation (Whybray, Murphy). Others do not (Clifford, Fox, Loader). Fox reflects that "the verse works well as a proverb cited to support the preceding advice and to cap off the first section of Wisdom's speech. Since variants of vv 10-11 appear elsewhere, these verses give the impression of being existing apothegms incorporated into Lady Wisdom's speech" (2000, 271). Rather than a later insertion, in other words, Fox and others view it as a citation that was included from the start in the original composition.

3.6.2.3 Proverbs 8:18-19

Lady Wisdom is still the speaker in Prov 8:19. She makes similar assessments of her value vis-à-vis that of wealth in this verse as she makes in vv 10-11. This portion of the interlude in chapter 8 is again very close to 3:14.

טוֹב פִּרְיִי מֵחָרוּץ וּמִפָּז וּתְבוּאָתִי מִכֶּסֶף נִבְחָר	a b	8:19	My fruit is better than gold and refined gold, and my produce is more choice than silver.

Lady Wisdom says that her fruit (*piryî*) is better than both gold (*ḥārūṣ*) and refined gold (*pāz*), and that her produce (*tĕbūʾātî*) is better than choice silver (*kesep nibḥār*). This is a heightening of the earlier descriptions in which the gain of wisdom is said to be better than the gain of silver (*kesep*) and gold (*ḥārūṣ*) alone in 3:14 and 8:10.

3.6.2.4 Proverbs 16:16

Because Prov 16:16 occurs at the midpoint of the book (noted in the Masora at 16:17), and because it uses language that echoes language in the interlude passages (3:14-15; 8:10-11, 18-21), some commentators suggest that this saying was added late in the editorial process in order both to mark the middle of the book and also to draw attention once again to its central pedagogical concern—namely, the pursuit of wisdom.

קְנֹה־חָכְמָה מַה־טּוֹב מֵחָרוּץ וּקְנוֹת בִּינָה נִבְחָר מִכָּסֶף	a b	16:16	Gaining wisdom – how much better than gold, and gaining understanding is more choice than silver.

Sayings surrounding v 16 in Prov 16 do not reflect the same kind of wisdom-over-wealth and pursue-wisdom rhetoric. Therefore, the contents of this saying do make it stand out in its literary context. It could indeed be that editors in the final stages of producing Proverbs wanted to

introduce a saying at the very mid-point of the book that sums up the importance, purpose, and value of their production.

3.6.3 Righteousness and wealth

Righteousness is a broad concept in Proverbs (Lyu 2012). A whole constellation of lexical frames are used throughout the book to evoke conceptions of righteous actions, choices, and characters—*ṣaddîq* (“righteous”), *ṣedeq* and (more often) *ṣĕdāqāh* (“righteousness”), *yōšer* (“upright”), *mêšārîm* (“equity”), *ṭôb* (“good”), *tōm* (“blamelessness”), *tam* (“blameless”), and *nĕḥōkîm* (“straight”). More could be listed, including both specific instantiations of righteous actions (e.g., *ḥōnēn ʾebyôn*, “a person who is kind to the poor” in 14:31b) and also all the ways that wicked actions and types of characters are portrayed. Wicked actions and characters automatically evoke conceptions of their opposite in Proverbs. The types of righteousness that we see in the sayings here in §3.6.3 are profiled (or alluded to) using three lexical frames: *ṣĕdāqāh* (“righteousness”) in Prov 16:8, *tōm* (“blamelessness”) in Prov 19:1 and 28:6, and *kāzāb* (“lie” → “liar”) in Prov 19:22b. Consider each one in turn.

3.6.3.1 Proverbs 16:8

Prov 16:8 compares situations involving material abundance and scarcity with wisdom values that, according to producers of Proverbs, are much more valuable. Lack of wealth is represented in v 8a by a single word *mĕʿaṭ* (“little”). Having wealth is represented by *rōb tĕbūʾōt* (“an abundance of produce”) in v 8b. Both *mĕʿaṭ* and *rōb tĕbūʾōt* are metonymies for

conceptions of broader material situations. Each of these terms prompts readers to imagine entire domestic settings that are characterized by material scarcity and abundance, respectively.

טוֹב־מְעַט בְּצֶדֶק	a	16:8	A little with righteousness is better
מֵרֹב תְּבוּאוֹת בְּלֹא מִשְׁפָּט	b		than an abundance of produce with no justice.

B	A'	A	B'
bad thing	best thing	good thing	worst thing
having a little	*righteousness*	*abundant produce*	*no justice*

The best thing (the wisdom value) is of course *ṣĕdāqāh* ("righteousness"), and the worst thing (the wisdom liability) is having no justice (*bĕlōʾ mišpāṭ*). The better-than equation in this saying is thus, B + A' > A' + B'.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 16:8	
CONTENT BASE SPACES	Having a little with righteousness being better than having an abundant produce with a lack of justice
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	Because righteousness is better than wealth, I should value righteousness more than wealth.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	Value righteousness more than wealth.

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 16:8	
ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses to value righteousness more than wealth.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	Wealth would be something that the reader would choose to think of as less valuable than righteousness.

3.6.3.2 Proverbs 19:1 and 28:6

The better-than sayings in Prov 19:1, 22, and 28:6 all feature a *rāš* ("poor man"). This person is described as someone who "walks in his blamelessness" (*hōlēk bĕtummô*) in 19:1 and 28:6, and simply as a *rāš* in 19:22. I discuss the 19:1 and 28:6 in §3.6.3.2 and 19:22 below in §3.6.3.3. The first lines in 19:1 and 28:6 are doublets, and the second lines in these sayings are

nearly so as well. The second lines have even more in common when two emendations are adopted—1) from M *kĕsîl* to *ʿāšîr* in 19:1b,[132] and 2) from M *dĕrākayim* to *dĕrākāyv* in 28:6b.[133] The former is of more consequence than the latter.

[132] The emendation that I adopt in 19:1b is from M *kĕsîl* to *ʿāšîr*. Semantically and graphically, this emendation is a bit of a jump. However, there are four reasons why I read 19:1b in this way—1) versional support, 2) the doublet in 28:6b, 3) the more common opposition between *rāš* and *ʿāšîr* in Proverbs than that between *rāš* and *kĕsîl*, and 4) the logic of better-than quadripartite structures. The following is a brief overview of the support each of these considerations extends to the emendation from M *kĕsîl* to *ʿāšîr* in 19:1b. 1) The LXX is missing Prov 18:23-19:1, so we have to look to other ancient translations for versional support. The Peshitta and Vulgate both support emendation to *ʿāšîr*. S has ܥܬܝܪ (“rich man”), and V has *dives* (“rich man”). See Fox 2015 (271) for a more thorough discussion of this evidence. 2) Prov 19:1 and 28:6 are near doublets; they have identical first lines and nearly identical second lines. The only differences between these verses materialize in the two words that I think call for emendation. On the second, see the following footnote. 3) The *rāš* appears 14 times in Proverbs. In these 14 appearances, *rāš* is opposite *ʿāšîr* four times (14:20; 18:23; 22:2; 28:6), and in one case is in relation with the *ʿāšîr* in a syntagm (22:7). Three times, the *rāš* is opposite either some mention of wealth or another character with social, political, and/or economic power (13:8, 23; 29:13). Three times, the *rāš* is mentioned in relation to some kind of misfortune or calamity (17:5; 28:3; 28:27). Only once is this character construed as a foil to a character who has no ties to either wealth or poverty, and that is in 19:22 (on which see below). This does not mean that *rāš* cannot be set in opposition to *kĕsîl*. It just makes it less likely than an opposition between *rāš* and *ʿāšîr*. Finally, and I think more compellingly, 4) quadripartite logic calls for a mention of some frame element that belongs in a frame of material abundance in 19:22b to be opposed to the frame element that belongs in a frame of material scarcity in 19:22a—namely, the *rāš*. According to this logical relational scheme, *ʿāšîr* is a much better fit in 19:22b than *kĕsîl*.

[133] The emendation that I adopt in 28:6b is from M *dĕrākayim* to *dĕrākāyv*. This emendation does not affect the instruction issued in this line, but I do think it is of some consequence. I adopt it for four reasons—1) versional support, 2) the oddness of a dual form of *derek*, 3) symmetry in the parallelism between *tummô* in v 6a and *dĕrākāyv* in v 6b, and 4) correspondence with the form *śĕpātāyw* in the doublet, 19:22b. Reasons three and four are self-explanatory. The versional support for this emendation is again found in the Peshitta, which reads ܒܐܘܪܚܬܗ (“his ways”), and also the Targum (*drkyw*), which usually follows the Peshitta in Proverbs (on which, see Fox 2015, 2009, 2000). The LXX has a monostich at 28:6, showing only, *πλουσίου ψευδοῦς* (“a rich man is a liar”). Regarding the oddness of the dual form of *dĕrākayim*, it occurs only two times in the Hebrew Bible, here in Prov 28:6b and again in Prov 28:18b. In both cases, it is preceded by a form of *ʿ-q-š*—a D participle (“to make crooked”) in 28:6b and an N participle (“to make oneself crooked”) in 28:18b. Murphy interprets these phrases as allusions to the “doctrine of the two ways” and suggests that the meaning of each is that a person who makes *the* two ways crooked—namely, the good way and the bad way—is someone who makes the good way bad and the bad way good (1998, 213, note 6a). This is possible. I emend in light of the absence of this dual form everywhere else in the Hebrew Bible and also on the basis of the form *śĕpātāyw* in 19:1b, the status of which is not in question.

טוֹב־רָשׁ הוֹלֵךְ בְּתֻמּוֹ מֵעִקֵּשׁ שְׂפָתָיו וְהוּא כְסִיל	a b	19:1	A *rāš* who walks in his blamelessness is better off than a person with crooked lips, though[134] he is rich.
טוֹב־רָשׁ הוֹלֵךְ בְּתֻמּוֹ מֵעִקֵּשׁ דְּרָכַיִם וְהוּא עָשִׁיר	a b	28:6	A *rāš* who walks in his blamelessness is better off than a person whose ways are crooked, though he is rich.

B	A'	A	B'
bad thing *being a* rāš	best thing *being blameless*	good thing *being rich*	worst thing *being crooked*

The *rāš* in these sayings represents material scarcity. The *ʿāšîr*, in contrast, stands for material abundance. The better-than equation in both sayings is again, B + A' > A + B'—or, a bad thing with the best thing is better than a good thing with the worst thing. Therefore, we can imagine readers constructing meaning when they read these sayings in the following way.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 19:1 and 28:6

CONTENT BASE SPACES	Being a *rāš* who is blameless being better than being rich and crooked.
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	Because blamelessness is better than wealth, I should value blamelessness more than wealth.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	Value blamelessness more than wealth.

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 19:1 and 28:6

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses to value blamelessness more than wealth.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	Wealth would be something that the reader would choose to think of as less valuable than blamelessness.

[134] I translate the *waw* in the final clause of both 19:1b and 28:6b as "though." Concession is more characteristically expressed in Biblical Hebrew through *ʾim*, *kî*, *kî ʾim*, and even *ʿăšer*. Biblical Hebrew grammars do not comment on the use of *waw* to express concessions (e.g., *GBH*, *BHRG*, and *IBHS*), and *HALOT* does not offer "though" as a gloss for *waw*. However, this function is arguably attested in Lev 5:1; Num 5:13, 14; 35:23; Dt 19:9; Ruth 2:13; 1 Sam 1:5; Prov 21:9, 25:24; Ecc 9:16; possibly Jer 2:11 but certainly Jer 31:32; Eze 14:18; 18:11; 28:9; and Mal 2:14. In each of these contexts, a *waw* is attached to a nominal form, in many cases an independent personal pronoun, as it is in Prov 19:1b and 28:6b. The *waw* also attaches to an independent personal pronoun in Lev 5:1; Num 5:13, 14; Ruth 2:13; Jer 2:11 (may be better translated "but"); Jer 31:32; Ezek 18:11, 28:9; Mal 2:14.

3.6.3.3 Proverbs 19:22b

Prov 19:22b presents the only B > B' better-than equation in the book. In this equation, a bad thing is said to be better than a worst thing. The bad thing in v 22b is being poor (a *rāš*), and the worst thing is portrayed as being a liar (interpreting *kāzāb*, "lie," as a metonymy for "liar").

תַּאֲוַת אָדָם חַסְדּוֹ וְטוֹב־רָשׁ מֵאִישׁ כָּזָב	a b	19:22	The produce[135] of a man is his steadfast kindness – a *rāš* is better off than a man who is a liar.

B	A'	A	B'
bad thing	best thing	good thing	worst thing
being a rāš	---	---	*being a liar*

Some consider 19:22b trite (e.g., Fox 2009), which it may be. Others make it more complicated (e.g., Whybray 1994), which it can be made to be. Whybray suggests that the background of v 22b is a legal proceeding. He concludes in light of this that, "the point of this line is that it is better to remain poor than to seek to gain an advantage by perjury" (1994, 284). This saying would certainly apply in legal settings. However, it also applies in any setting in which a person might be tempted to lie to gain an advantage. In addition, it must be noted that 19:22b instructs all readers to be honest. Whybray interprets this saying as an exhortation literally to remain poor rather than lie in a legal setting. Again, this is a possible reading. However, I would argue that the portrayal of a poor character in 19:22b serves a motivational function, much like wealth and poverty do in other better-than sayings (more on this in §6.2). I would also argue against the idea

[135] The translation above reflects an emendation of M *taʾăwat ʾādām* ("desire of man") to *tĕbūʾat ʾādām* ("produce of man"). Commentators who keep M *taʾăwat ʾādām* interpret it as either a good desire (McKane 1970; Clifford 1999; Waltke 2005) or a bad desire (Whybray 1994; Murphy 1998). Commentators who interpret it as a bad desire go on to interpret *ḥasdô* in 19:22a as negative as well—i.e., as "his disgrace" or "his humiliation." These renderings corresponds to what *ḥesed* seems to mean in Lev 20:17 and Prov 14:34. Fox suggests the emendation to *tĕbūʾat ʾādām* on the basis of both sense and correspondence with the LXX (*karpos*) (2009; 2015).

that 19:22b is intended as an instruction addressing poor people, telling them to remain poor rather than lie. If a person who is poor reads this saying in the particular situation of being faced with an opportunity to lie (possibly in a legal setting), Whybray's interpretation works well. However, the broader valence of 19:22b must be kept in view. With this in mind, we can imagine readers constructing the meaning of 19:22b in the following way.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 19:22b	
CONTENT BASE SPACES	Being a *rāš* is better than being a liar.
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	Because being a liar is worse than being poor, I should value honesty more than wealth.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	Value honesty more than wealth.

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 19:22b	
ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who values honesty more than wealth.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	Wealth would be something that the reader would choose to think of as less valuable than honesty.

3.6.4 Piety and wealth

Within Proverbs, piety pertains most prominently to trusting in Yahweh, fearing Yahweh, offering sacrifice to Yahweh (only in 3:9-10), and to humility. The two better-than sayings in Proverbs that deal with piety are concerned with fear of Yahweh (15:16) and humility (16:19).

3.6.4.1 Proverbs 15:16

Material scarcity is represented in 15:16a with the same term as in 16:8a (§3.6.3.1)—the single word *mĕʿaṭ* ("little"). Material abundance is represented in v 16b with the phrase *ʾōṣār rāb* ("a great storehouse"). The wisdom terms in this saying are fear of Yahweh (*yirʾat YHWH* in v 16a) and panic or turmoil (*měhūmāh* in v 16b).

טוֹב־מְעַט בְּיִרְאַת יְהוָה	a	15:16	A little with fear of Yahweh is better
מֵאוֹצָר רָב וּמְהוּמָה בּוֹ	b		than a great storehouse with panic in it.

B	A'	A	B'
bad thing	best thing	good thing	worst thing
having a little	*fearing Yahweh*	*having a great storehouse*	*having panic*

The source of the panic or *měhūmāh* is left open for readers to imagine. The word *měhūmāh* is a dramatic one. *HALOT* glosses it as "dismay, consternation, panic" (I:552). It occurs only twelve times in the Hebrew Bible (and just this one time in Proverbs). It is used to describe the panic and confusion of war (1 Samuel 14:20; 2 Chronicles 15:5) and, more frequently, an event that is described as judgment from Yahweh (Deuteronomy 7:23, 28:20; 1 Samuel 5:9, 11; Isaiah 22:5; Ezekiel 7:7, 22:5; Amos 3:9; Zechariah 14:13). Readers who read the Hebrew Bible in Hebrew enough to know that Yahweh is frequently the source of *měhūmāh* may include some conception of Yahweh in their frame for *měhūmāh*. The opposition between *yirʾat YHWH* and *měhūmāh* would be fitting in this sense. The producers want readers to anticipate *měhūmāh* from Yahweh if they are without *yirʿat YHWH*. We can imagine readers construing the meaning of 15:16 in the following way.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 15:16

CONTENT BASE SPACES	Having a little with fear of Yahweh being better than having a great storehouse with panic in it
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	Because having a little with fear of Yahweh is better than having a great storehouse with panic in it, I should value fear of Yahweh more than wealth.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	Value fear of Yahweh more than wealth.

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 15:16

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses to value fear of Yahweh more than wealth.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	Wealth would be something that the reader would choose to think of as less valuable than fear of Yahweh.

3.6.4.2 Proverbs 16:19

It seems likely that Prov 16:19 was placed after v 18 with intention. 16:18 reads, "Before breaking—pride. // Before stumbling—a haughty spirit." In v 19a, the producers of Proverbs turn from a negative example of pride to a positive example of humility. The latter is profiled in v 19a as being "lowly of spirit" (*šĕpal rūaḥ*). Material scarcity in this saying is represented by *ʿāniyyîm* in v 19a,[136] and material abundance is represented by *šālāl* ("plunder") in v 19b. The antithesis of humility in this saying—pride—is represented in v 19b through reference to the proud, or "proud ones" (*gēʾîm*).

טוֹב שְׁפַל־רוּחַ אֶת־עֲנִיִּים מֵחַלֵּק שָׁלָל אֶת־גֵּאִים	a b	16:19	Better off lowly of spirit with *ʿāniyyîm* than to divide plunder with the proud.

B	A'	A	B'
bad thing	best thing	good thing	worst thing
being with the ʿāniyyîm	*being humble*	*dividing plunder*	*being with the proud*

The better-than equation in this saying is again B + A' > A' + B'—that is, material scarcity with humility is better than material abundance with pride. The more concrete meaning of the Hebrew word *gēʾîm* is "high ones." I discuss metaphors that underlie the use of *gēʾîm* as "the proud" in chapter four (§4.3.1). Here, we can observe that pride is a serious vice in Proverbs (e.g., 15:25; 16:18; 18:12), and therefore, a serious wisdom liability. We can also observe that the image of being low, *šĕpal rūaḥ* (G inf of *š-p-l* in v 19a*α*, "be or become low"), is the opposite of being high. Therefore, being "lowly of spirit" (*šĕpal rūaḥ*) is a fitting antithesis to "high ones" (*gēʾîm*). However, in most cases, when a person or group of people are caused to be low (C of *š-p-l*) and

[136] Prov 16:19 contains one of the three *ketiv-qere* discrepancies between *ʿāniyyîm* (*ketiv*) and *ʿănāwîm* (*qere*). The other two are 3:34 and 14:21. I adopt the *qere* in 3:34 and the *ketiv* here in 16:19 and also in 14:21. I discuss these decisions in more detail in chapter six.

even when a person is described on their own as being low (G of *š-p-l*), these are not good things in the Hebrew Bible. The phrase *šĕpal rūaḥ* deviates from the more common uses of *š-p-l*. I discuss this reversal in the valuation of "being low" in chapter four as well. For now, imagine readers constructing the meaning of 16:19 as follows.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 16:19	
CONTENT BASE SPACES	Being humble with the poor being better than dividing plunder with the proud
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	Because being humble with the afflicted is better than dividing plunder with the proud, I should value humility more than wealth.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	Value fear of humility more than wealth.

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 16:19	
ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses to value humility more than wealth.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	Wealth would be something that the reader would choose to think of as less valuable than humility.

3.6.5 Home life and wealth

There are six better-than statements in Proverbs that compare peaceable and non-peaceable family relations in a home with having and not having wealth. We see all four parts of quadripartite structures in the first two (15:17 and 17:1), three parts in two of the three contentious wife sayings (21:9 and 25:24), and two parts of the quadripartite structure in both the third contentious wife saying (21:19) and in the first line of the woman of strength poem that concludes the book (31:10b). The first two sayings in this group compare having meals of very meager portions to having meals of presumably rich and large portions of meat.

3.6.5.1 Proverbs 15:17

The meager meal in Prov 15:17a represents material scarcity in this saying, and the rich meal with presumably large portions of meat in v 17b represents material abundance. The wisdom value and liability in this saying are love in the home and hatred in the home, respectively.

טוֹב אֲרֻחַת יָרָק וְאַהֲבָה־שָׁם	a	15:17	A portion of vegetables with love there is better than a fattened bull with hatred in it.
מִשּׁוֹר אָבוּס וְשִׂנְאָה־בוֹ	b		

B	A'	A	B'
bad thing	best thing	good thing	worst thing
only herbs to eat	*love in the home*	*a fattened bull to eat*	*hatred in the home*

The better-than equation in this saying is a complex one, B + A' > A' + B'. This equation reflects the judgment that material scarcity with love in the home is better than material abundance with hatred in the home. Reference to a fattened bull (*šôr ʾābūs*) alludes by way of frame metonymy to rich meals with plenty of meat. By further metonymic extension, the rich meal alludes to living situations that would include other kinds of wealth as well. In contrast, the *ʾărūḥat yārāq* ("a portion of vegetables") frame metonymically evokes the idea of a domestic situation that, in contrast, is perpetually lacking in material wealth. Fox notes that *ʾărūḥāh* ("portion") actually means something more like "provisions," as in the provisions that are allotted to members of an army (see 2 Kgs 25:30; Jer 40:5; 52:34). As Fox reflects, "This definition sharpens the comparison: It is better to have cheap green vegetables even for one's *regular* provisions, if love is present, than to have a regular rich fare of meat, if the atmosphere is spoiled by hostility" (Fox 2009, 596; italics in original). We can therefore imagine readers constructing the meaning of this saying in the following way.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 15:17

CONTENT BASE SPACES	Having a meager meal with love in the home being better than having a rich meal with hatred in the home
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	Because having a meager meal with love in the home is better than having a rich meal with hatred in the home, I should value love in the home more than wealth.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	Value love in the home more than wealth.

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 15:17

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses to value love in the home more than wealth.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	Wealth would be something that the reader would choose to think of as less valuable than love in the home.

3.6.5.2 Proverbs 17:1

Prov 17:1 conveys a similar message as the one in 15:17. However, in place of love and hatred in the home, the wisdom value and liability in 17:1 are tranquility (*šalwāh*)[137] and contention (*rîb*) in the home. The representatives of material scarcity and abundance are again food items that comprise two very different meals.

טוֹב פַּת חֲרֵבָה וְשַׁלְוָה־בָהּ	a	17:1	A dry morsel with tranquility in it is better
מִבַּיִת מָלֵא זִבְחֵי־רִיב	b		than a house full of sacrifices of contention.

B	A'	A	B'
bad thing	best thing	good thing	worst thing
only a dry morsel to eat	*a quiet home*	*much sacrifical meat*	*contention*

It is again the case that references to items that represent material scarcity (*pat ḥărēbāh*, "a dry morsel" in v 1a) and material abundance (*zibḥê rîb*, "sacrifices of contention") function as frame

[137] *HALOT* glosses this word as "literally the ease of being silent" (II:1505), and English versions gloss it variously as "quiet" and "quietness" (e.g., ASV, ESV, JPS, NIV, NRSV). I think the word "tranquility" best reflects the sense of this word in 17:1a and follow Fox in translating it this way (2009, 623).

metonymies in this saying. Both *pat ḥărēbāh* and *zibḥê rîb* evoke conceptions of domestic situations—as in 15:17, one that is characterized by material scarcity and another by material abundance. In addition, in describing the domestic situation in v 1b as "a house *full of* (*mālēʾ*) sacrifices of contention," producers of this saying accentuate both the volume of material abundance as well as the amount of strife that characterizes relations in this home. We can therefore imagine readers constructing the meaning of this saying in the following way.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 17:1	
CONTENT BASE SPACES	Having a meager meal with peace in the home being better than having a rich meal with contention in the home
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	Because having a meager meal with peace in the home is better than having a rich meal with contention in the home, I should value peace in the home more than wealth.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	Value peace in the home more than wealth.

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 17:1	
ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses to value peace in the home more than wealth.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	Wealth would be something that the reader would choose to think of as less valuable than peace in the home.

3.6.5.3 Contentious wife sayings

There are five contentious wife sayings in Proverbs (19:13; 21:9, 19; 25:24; 27:15). Three of them are better-than sayings, and two are doublets (21:9; 25:24). The three contentious-wife better-than sayings are the only ones in Proverbs that use a B > B' + A equation.

טוֹב לָשֶׁבֶת עַל־פִּנַּת־גָּג	a	21:9	Better to live on a corner of a roof
מֵאֵשֶׁת מִדְיָנִים וּבֵית חָבֶר	b		than [with] a contentious woman and a house full of people.[138]

[138] The meaning of the term *bêt ḥābēr* in the doublets, 21:9b and 25:24b, is debated. Fox (2009) and Waltke (2005) provide extensive summaries of interpretive options. The most compelling is the one that provides the clearest situational antithesis to the image of a husband living on a corner of a roof, and that

טוֹב שֶׁבֶת בְּאֶרֶץ־מִדְבָּר מֵאֵשֶׁת מְדוֹנִים וָכָעַס	a b	21:19	Better to live in the wilderness than [with] a contentious and angry woman.
טוֹב שֶׁבֶת עַל־פִּנַּת־גָּג מֵאֵשֶׁת מִדְיָנִים וּבֵית חָבֶר	a b	25:24	Better to live on a corner of a roof than [with] a contentious woman and a house full of people.

B	A'	B'	A
bad thing	best thing	worst thing	good thing
living in a bad place	---	*a contentious woman*	*a full house*

In the B > B' + A equation, a bad thing (material scarcity) by itself is better than the worst thing (living with a contentious woman) with a good thing (living in a full house). These sayings differ from other better-than sayings in not being concerned with wisdom values and liabilities. There is no *best thing* to prioritize in these sayings, only bad things to lament. Commentators debate the significance of these sayings. Some offer the idea that these instructions would have served as warnings to young men not to marry a contentious woman. However, Fox notes that "in the absence of a long courtship, a young man would be unlikely to know whether his bride is of a contentious sort" (2009, 683). Picturing older male audiences, Fox reflects that these sayings may "offer the comfort of cynicism and anonymous camaraderie, to let a man who feels harried see his experience as a common one" (2009, 683). Murphy is troubled by the lack of sayings in Proverbs that describe "quarrelsome" husbands (1998, 159). This is a commendable lament. However, the lack of such sayings is also understandable when we imagine the earliest audiences as young men.

Considering the question of readership *since* those earliest audiences, Fox provides another valuable reflection: "proverbs are everywhere and everyone's, and women may have had

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is to interpret *bêt ḥābēr* as a "communal or community house"—as a house, in other words, that is "full of people." A house that is full of people is intended to be a good thing in Prov 21:9 and 25:24.

equally sharp sayings of their own about nasty husbands" (2009, 683). If we could read them in Proverbs. Instead, we have sayings about contentious and angry women. They are not wonderful representations of valuing or understanding women. They are also not the only sayings about women in Proverbs. Others commend the great worth of wives who make strong and astute partners in marriage (e.g., 12:4; 19:14; 31:10-31). However, upon reading the contentious wife sayings, young, unmarried male readers may construct their meaning as follows.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 21:9 and 25:24	
CONTENT BASE SPACES	Living on the corner of a roof being better than living in a full house with a contentious wife
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	Because living on the corner of a roof is better than living in a full house with a contentious wife, I should hope to marry a woman who is not contentious.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	Hope to marry a woman who is not contentious.
Proverbs 21:19	
CONTENT BASE SPACES	Living in the wilderness being better than living with a contentious and angry wife
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	Because living in the wilderness is better than living with a contentious and angry wife, I should hope to marry a woman who is not contentious or angry.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	Hope to marry a woman who is not contentious and angry.

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 21:9 and 25:24	
ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses to hope to marry a woman who is not contentious.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	Wealth would be something that the reader would choose to think of as less valuable than marrying a woman who is not contentious.
Proverbs 21:19	
ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses to hope to marry a woman who is not contentious or angry.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	Wealth would be something that the reader would choose to think of as less valuable than marrying a woman who is not contentious or angry.

3.6.5.4 Proverbs 31:10b

One of the antitheses to the contentious wife in Proverbs is the *ʾēšet ḥayil* ("woman of strength"). (Another is the *ʾiššāh maskelet*, "astute woman," in 19:14, who serves to

counterbalance the contentious wife in 19:13.) We see an *ʾēšet ḥayil* in 12:4 and in the woman of strength poem that concludes the book. Ruth is the only other *ʾēšet ḥayil* in the Hebrew Bible (Ruth 3:11). The better-than statement that opens the woman of strength poem in Prov 31 compares the worth of an *ʾēšet ḥayil* to the value of precious stones (or gems, *pĕnînîm*).

אֵשֶׁת־חַיִל מִי יִמְצָא	a	31:10	A woman of strength, who can find?
וְרָחֹק מִפְּנִינִים מְכָרָהּ	b		Her worth is far above gems.

B	A'	A	B'
bad thing	best thing	good thing	worst thing
---	*woman of strength*	*wealth*	---

The comparative term in this case is *rāḥōq*, which means "far" in the sense of *distance from*—not *height above*. This is the only use of *rāḥōq* in an adjective-X-*min*-Y construction. My translation is influenced by the metaphor GOOD IS UP. The Up/Down image schema resonates more (in my mind) with a quantitative comparison between the value of an *ʾēšet ḥayil* and the value of precious gems than a horizontal relationship of distance between them. We can imagine readers constructing the meaning of 31:10a in the following way.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 31:10a

CONTENT BASE SPACES	The worth of an *ʾēšet ḥayil* being greater than the worth of gems
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	Because an *ʾēšet ḥayil* is worth than gems, I should value an *ʾēšet ḥayil* more than wealth.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	Value an *ʾēšet ḥayil* more than wealth.

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 31:10a

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses to value an *ʾēšet ḥayil* more than wealth.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	Wealth would be something that the reader would choose to think of as less valuable than an *ʾēšet ḥayil*.

3.6.6 Reputation and wealth

Two better-than sayings in Proverbs compare the value of wealth and reputation. One does so in a way that is straightforward (22:1). The other requires more thinking (12:9). The strategy of the instruction behind the better-than saying in 12:9 is different from any that we have seen to this point.

3.6.6.1 Proverbs 22:1

This saying contains two better-than statements that evoke frames of extravagant wealth—*ʿōšer rāb* (“great wealth”) in v 1a and *kesep* and *zāhāb* (“silver” and “gold”) in v 1b.

נִבְחָר שֵׁם מֵעֹשֶׁר רָב מִכֶּסֶף וּמִזָּהָב חֵן טוֹב	a b	22:1	A name is more choice than great wealth; favor is better than silver and gold.

B	A'	A	B'
bad thing	best thing	good thing	worst thing
---	*good reputation*	*wealth*	---

The better-than equations in both lines are simple ones—namely, A' > A. The wisdom value term (i.e., the best thing) in both cases is one’s reputation, and the good thing in both cases is an extravagant form of wealth. Readers are cued by this saying to reevaluate their own valuation of wealth in light of the greater value of having a good reputation. Therefore, we can imagine readers construing the meaning of 22:1 in the following way.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 22:1

CONTENT BASE SPACES	Reputation being more valuable than wealth
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	Because a person’s reputation is more valuable than wealth, I should value my reputation more than wealth.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	Value your reputation more than wealth.

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 22:1

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses to value reputation more than wealth.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	Wealth would be something that the reader would choose to think of as less valuable than their reputation.

3.6.6.2 Proverbs 12:9

Prov 12:9 offers a different instruction regarding wealth than we have seen in better-than statements to this point. The use of quadripartite logic is unique in this saying, because nothing in the second line can be said to be a very good thing.

טוֹב נִקְלֶה וְעֶבֶד לוֹ מִמְּתַכַּבֵּד וְחֶסַר־לָחֶם	a b	12:9	Better off despised and having produce (with emendation)[139] than honoring oneself and lacking bread.

Material abundance is represented by *ʿăbūr lô* ("having produce" with emendation in v 9a) in this saying, and material scarcity is represented by *ḥăsar leḥem* ("lacking bread" in v 9b). Therefore, the sense of v 9 results in the following valuations. Note the anomalous second half of the equation. The second half of the equation in the other better-than sayings we have considered to this point is A (good thing) + B' (worst thing). But here we see:

being despised	*having produce*	*honoring oneself*	*lacking bread*
B	A'	B'	B
bad thing	best thing	worst thing	bad thing

In place of the more common bad thing + best thing > good thing + worst thing equation, 12:9 reflects a bad thing + best thing > worst thing + bad thing equation. There is no A term (i.e., good thing) in v 9. Instead, there are two B terms (i.e., bad things). In addition, also unlike other

[139] This translation reflects an emendation from *ʿebed lô* ("he has a servant") to *ʿăbūr lô* ("he has produce"). I follow Fox in making this emendation, who, in turn, follows Tur-Sinai (Fox 2009, 550).

better-than saying in Proverbs, having material wealth is the most valuable thing in this saying. Wealth (*ʿăbūr*, "produce") is not portrayed in particularly extravagant terms. As such, this saying seems to prioritize moderate but solid economic security over social esteem. However, the esteem it condemns is self-bestowed. The form *mĕtakkabbad* ("honoring oneself") is highly unusual.[140] The t-infix reflects the Dt stem, but the vocalization does not. Commentators I have consulted do not discuss the anomalous nature of this form. All analyze it as a hithpael (Dt stem), which would be vocalized, *mitkabbēd*. In the absence of an alternate explanation, I attribute a reflexive sense to this form as well.

The imbalance in this quadripartite structure may highlight the folly of a person wasting energy hankering after social esteem (*mĕtakkabbad* in v 9b*α*) while their livelihood founders (*ḥăsar leḥem* in v 9b*β*). Their energy would be better spent harvesting produce (*ʿăbūr* in v 9a*β*), even if their social standing falters (*niqleh* in v 9a*α*). The more typical "better-than" valuation is flipped in 12:9. Rather than urge readers to think of wealth as *less* valuable than something else, the producers of this saying exhort readers to *prioritize* the building of wealth over something else. It is clear in v 9 that honoring oneself is a bad thing. We can therefore imagine readers constructing meaning in the following ways when they read this saying.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 12:9

CONTENT SPACES	Being despised and having produce being better than honoring oneself and lacking bread
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	Because it is better to be despised and have produce than it is to honor myself and lack bread, I should value having enough to eat more than being honored.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	Value having enough to eat more than being honored.

[140] My advisor, Jeremy Hutton, drew my attention to the perplexing nature of the morphology of *mĕtakkabbad* in v 9b. BHS and BHQ editors do not note it, and *HALOT* does not identify *k-b-d* in the Dt. But the Masoretes do indicate that this is the only occurrence of this form in the Hebrew Bible.

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 12:9

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses to value having enough to eat more than being honored.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	Wealth [having enough to eat] would be something that the reader thinks of as more valuable than being honored.

3.6.7 The words (and the prayer) of Agur[141]

Commentators generally agree that the words and prayer of an otherwise unknown sage named Agur are anomalous in the book of Proverbs.[142] The part of Agur's prayer that is relevant in the present study are vv 7 to 9. Agur prays for two things in these verses—1) that he be spared vanity and falsehood (*šāwʾ* and *dĕbār kāzāb* in 8a), and 2) that he be spared riches and poverty (*rēʾš* and *ʿōšer* in 8b).

שְׁתַּיִם שָׁאָלְתִּי מֵאִתָּךְ	a	30:7	Two things I ask from you –
אַל־תִּמְנַע מִמֶּנִּי בְּטֶרֶם אָמוּת	b		do not withhold them from me before I die:
שָׁוְא וּדְבַר־כָּזָב הַרְחֵק מִמֶּנִּי	a	30:8	Vanity and falsehood keep far from me;
רֵאשׁ וָעֹשֶׁר אַל־תִּתֶּן־לִי	b		poverty and wealth do not give me;
הַטְרִיפֵנִי לֶחֶם חֻקִּי	c		feed me the bread of my portion,
פֶּן אֶשְׂבַּע וְכִחַשְׁתִּי	a	30:9	lest I become sated and deny (you)
וְאָמַרְתִּי מִי יְהוָה	b		and say, "Who is Yahweh?" –
וּפֶן־אִוָּרֵשׁ וְגָנַבְתִּי	c		and lest I become poor and steal
וְתָפַשְׂתִּי שֵׁם אֱלֹהָי	d		and profane the name of my God.

[141] See Yoder 2009, Fox 2009, and Brown 2017 for summaries on which commentators attribute which portions of Proverbs 30 to Agur. Yoder 2009 and Brown 2017 attribute the whole chapter to Agur. Fox 2009 attributes only 30:1-9 to Agur. I follow scholars who view the whole chapter as "the words of Agur" (*dibrê ʿāgūr* in 30:1a).

[142] The anomalous nature of 30:1-9 lies in three facets of this unit—1) in the fact that it is a prayer in which a character addresses God directly (as noted above, no other prayer is voiced in the book); 2) in the unattainable nature of wisdom that Agur describes in vv 2-4; and 3) in the warning against adding to what God has spoken in vv 5-6. The rest of the book may be perceived in contradiction with facets 2) and 3). The rest of the book operates on the assumption that wisdom is attainable. In addition, the contents in the rest of the book may be seen as additions to what God is perceived as already saying.

All that Agur wants is "the bread of his [or *my*] portion" (*leḥem ḥuqqî* in v 8c). Some commentators interpret v 8c as a third request (Murphy 1998). I read it as an elaboration of the request in v 8b that Agur be spared wealth and poverty. Agur wants a *via media*, as Habel (1988) describes it, between wealth and poverty—a life of moderation. This would be his *leḥem ḥuqqî* ("bread of my portion").

He does not want wealth to make him overly sated, ungrateful, and one day, incognizant of God (v 9a-b). But neither does he want poverty, which would lead to theft and cursing God (v 9c-d). Cursing and failing to acknowledge God may be the vanity and falsehood (*šāwʾ* and *dĕbār kāzāb* in 8a) that Agur wants to avoid. As an example for readers to follow, Agur models thinking of wealth as sufficient in moderation. Therefore, we can imagine readers constructing meaning in the following way when they read this part of the prayer of Agur.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 30:7-9

CONTENT SPACES	7	Agur asking God to grant him two things
	8a	Agur asking God to keep vanity and falsehood far from him
	8b	Agur asking God not to give him poverty or wealth
	8c	Agur asking for only the amount of food that he needs
	9a-b	Agur reflecting that wealth will lead him to deny God
	9c-d	Agur reflecting that poverty will lead him to steal and profane God's name
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	Because wealth and poverty can both harm my relation with God, I should desire only the wealth that I need.	
DIRECTIVE SPACES	Desire only the wealth you need.	

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 30:7-9

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses to desire only the wealth they need.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	Wealth would be something that the reader would choose to think of as sufficient in moderation (and as a danger to their relation with God).
RELATION BETWEEN READER & POVERTY	Poverty would be something that the readers would choose to think of as a danger to their relation with God.

3.6.8 Summary

The directives in this section exhort readers to think of wealth with circumspection. The reason for this is not because wealth is an unreliable or faulty resource in and of itself. Rather, it is because wealth can obscure the greater value of other more important things. Better-than sayings are the primary means used to instruct readers on how to think about wealth in the material in this section. Therefore, in the simulation summaries, the relation between readers and wealth is direct in the sense that readers would imagine themselves *thinking directly* about wealth. Specifically, they would think of wealth as less valuable than wisdom (§3.6.2), righteousness (§3.6.3), piety (§3.6.4), love and peace in the home (§3.6.5), and one's reputation (§3.6.6). Two of the units in this section differ in the instructions they issue. 12:9 reverses the typical valuation in better-than sayings and relativizes social esteem in relation to wealth. This saying declares that it is better to have a viable livelihood than to be admired by others—or, to *act* as if the latter is the case. Finally, the prayer of Agur exhorts readers to follow his example in seeking a life of moderation, asking only for the wealth they really need.

3.7 How to think about gifts and bribes instructional frames

Eight sayings in Proverbs focus on the giving and/or receiving of gifts (*mattān* in 18:16a, 19:6b, 21:14a; *mattānāh* in 15:27b; *mattat* in 25:14b) and bribes (*šōḥad* in 6:35b; 17:8a, 23; 21:14b). *HALOT* glosses all these four words as "gift"; in addition, it includes "bribe" in its characterization of *šōḥad* (II:1457) and "present" in its characterizations of *mattān*, *mattānāh*, and *mattan* (I:655-656). Giving gifts and bribes were common practices in ancient Mediterranean cultures. Seth Schwartz (2010) studies later Jewish literature in which he observes the kind of diverse instructions regarding gifts and bribes that we find in Proverbs. Specifically,

Schwartz investigates the traditions of Ben Sira, Josephus, and the Palestinian Talmud to see what they have to say about the practice of giving and receiving gifts.

His interest is in determining whether Jewish communities in the later Roman Empire engaged in the gift giving practices of surrounding Mediterranean cultures. Schwartz characterizes the reciprocity established through gift giving in the later Roman Empire as a fundamentally inegalitarian mechanism of social and political advancement. In contrast, he describes the idealized version of society presented in the Torah as one in which individuals are bound together by *ʾăhābāh* ("love") and other-interested concern. Schwartz concludes that Ben Sira, Josephus, and the Palestinian Talmud all work "to adapt the Torah's utopian antireciprocity to altered political and social realities" with which the producers of these texts had to deal (2010, 20). He shows that in performing their respective adaptations, Ben Sira, Josephus, and the Palestinian Talmud each exhibit tensions around gift giving as a way of establishing reciprocity. Each one vacillates between endorsing the cultural practice of giving gifts and warning against it. We may see a similar dynamic in Proverbs. Proverbs comes from a much earlier time than the Roman Empire, but the giving (and use) of gifts and bribes do as well.

Four sayings (§3.7.1) in this section portray gifts and bribes "smoothing the way" upward in elite social circles (*mattān* in 18:16 and 19:6), craftily (or judiciously) through hostility (*mattān* and *šōḥad* in 21:14), and into an unspecified but desirable kind of success (*šōḥad* in 17:8). Two sayings (§3.7.2) portray gifts that could have been successful but fail for different reasons—in one case, because the giver failed to give it (*mattat* in 25:14); and in another, because the giver had committed an offense for which the bribe could not hope to atone (*šōḥad* in 6:35). Finally, two sayings (§3.7.3) in Proverbs describe gifts in extremely negative terms (*mattānōt* in 15:27b; *šōḥad* in 17:23).

Because I cannot be certain about the instructions in some of the material in this section, I refrain in a number of cases from providing inferential and simulation summaries.

3.7.1 Useful gifts, useful bribes?

In the four sayings that portray gifts and bribes serving profitably for people who use them, *mattān* is used three times (18:16a; 19:6b; 21:14a), and *šōḥad* is used twice (17:8a; 21:14b). These sayings all raise questions. They could all be read as *earnest* observations and even guidance on how to use gifts and bribes well for social advancement and relations with others. However, each one could also be read as a *cynical* comment expressing veiled contempt for people who use gifts and bribes for self-promotion.

אֶבֶן־חֵן הַשֹּׁחַד בְּעֵינֵי בְעָלָיו אֶל־כָּל־אֲשֶׁר יִפְנֶה יַשְׂכִּיל	a b	17:8	The bribe is a stone of favor in the eyes of its owner; everywhere he turns, he succeeds.
מַתָּן אָדָם יַרְחִיב לוֹ וְלִפְנֵי גְדֹלִים יַנְחֶנּוּ	a b	18:16	A man's gift makes room for him; and before the great it leads him.
רַבִּים יְחַלּוּ פְּנֵי־נָדִיב וְכָל־הָרֵעַ לְאִישׁ מַתָּן	a b	19:6	Many seek favor in the presence of a noble, and everyone is the friend of a man of gifts.
מַתָּן בַּסֵּתֶר יִכְפֶּה־אָף וְשֹׁחַד בַּחֵק חֵמָה עַזָּה	a b	21:14	A gift in secret subdues anger, and a bribe in the cloak strong wrath.

It is not possible to know for sure how the producers intended these sayings to be read. 17:8, in particular, is widely open-ended. Any kind of success could be on view. Commentators debate whether the owner of the *šōḥad* in 17:8 is the person who gives or receives the *šōḥad* in this saying. The giver is the best reading. Whenever *šōḥădîm* are given in the Hebrew Bible, the

giver is the one who profits. More specifically, the giver is always a person who gives a *šōḥad* in order to persuade someone to do something that will benefit them.[143]

18:16 and 19:6 both portray characters advancing in social circles. Fox envisions the scene in 18:16 in particular as a group of officials "bunched sycophantically around their superior," stepping aside to let a man through who has "oiled his way with a gift" (2009, 643). Others imagine the background of 18:16 similarly (e.g., McKane 1970; Murphy 1996; Waltke 2005). Turning to 19:6, Fox observes that *nādîb* ("noble") in v 6a can mean "generous" as well as "noble in status" (2009, 650). This heightens the ambiguity of 19:6. Is the *nādîb* in v 6a the one giving the gifts in v 6b, and is he doing so out of true generosity? Possibly. Or, is he obsequious and self-serving? Either reading is possible, and neither can be confirmed.

Many commentators read 21:14 as a positive portrayal of the *mattān* and *šōḥad* used in this saying. They do so, because the goal in 21:14 is to bring peace (Fox 2009, 685; Clifford 1990, 191; McKane 1970, 555). In contrast, Whybray reads this saying as a cynical portrayal of a "briber" who has managed to get himself "out of trouble" (1994, 311). The secrecy of the transaction in 21:14—*bĕsēter* ("in secret") in v 14a and *bĕḥêq* ("in a chest" in v 14b)—casts a shadow on the exchange. Assuaging anger is indeed a positive and peaceful outcome. However, the hiddenness of the exchange raises questions. Whatever the nature of the exchange portrayed

[143] Individuals and governments give *šōḥădîm* in order to get someone to do something for their benefit. The most common use of *šōḥad* in the Hebrew Bible is as a bribe in legal settings. This is always portrayed as reprehensible (Ex 23:8; Dt 10:17; 16:19; 1 Sam 8:3; Isa 5:23; Mic 3:11; 2 Chr 19:7). The *šōḥad* is also used as a gift in diplomatic relations when a less powerful kingdom seeks to persuade a more powerful kingdom either to leave them alone (e.g., Asa of Judah compelling Baasha of Israel in 1 Kings 15:19) or to assist them (e.g., Ahaz persuading Tiglath-Pileser to support Judah against Israel and Aram in 2 Kings 16:8). In addition, Cyrus as the servant of Yahweh, is said *not* to require a *šōḥad* to carry out Yahweh's mission in Isa 45:13. As Yahweh's chosen servant, Cyrus needs no bribe. The *šōḥad* is also taken as atoning payment for the "shedding of innocent blood" (Dt 27:25; Ezek 22:12) and other kinds of wickedness (Is 33:15; Ps 15:15; 26:10; Job 15:34). These are all the uses of *šōḥad* in the HB. Of the four types of "gift" that appear in Proverbs, outside of Proverbs, the *šōḥad* is used to the most injurious ends.

in this saying, the *mattān* and *šōḥad* accomplish their purpose with great efficacy. As do the two uses of *mattān* in 18:16 and 19:6, and the *šōḥad* in 17:8.

The four sayings in this section all depict the usefulness and efficacy of using both *šōḥad* and *mattān*. I remain uncertain how to assess the instructions in these sayings. Therefore, I refrain from providing inferential reasoning and simulation summaries.

3.7.2 Failed gift, failed bribe

Prov 6:35 and 25:14 portray a failed bribe and gift, respectively. They fail for different reasons. The *šōḥad* fails in 6:35, because the person trying to offer it committed an offense for which it cannot atone. In contrast, the *mattat* fails in 25:14, because the giver fails to give it. In both cases, an implicit acknowledgment obtains: had the circumstances been different, both of these transactions could have been successful.

Consider Prov 6:34-35. These are the final verses in the fourth lecture in the opening chapters of Proverbs. The topic of this lecture is adultery. This is the offense for which the character in 6:35 cannot pay recompense. This lecture ends as follows:

כִּי־קִנְאָה חֲמַת־גָּבֶר	a	6:34	For the wrath of a man is jealousy,
וְלֹא־יַחְמוֹל בְּיוֹם נָקָם	b		and he is not appeased on a day of vengeance.
לֹא־יִשָּׂא פְּנֵי כָל־כֹּפֶר	a	6:35	He [the offended husband] will not accept any ransom;
וְלֹא־יֹאבֶה כִּי תַרְבֶּה־שֹׁחַד	b		he will not be willing, though you increase *šōḥad*.

The fact that the adulterer tries to recompense his wrong with a *šōḥad* means there was precedent for the effectiveness of such an offer. Either adultery itself crosses a line, or the adulterer offended a husband whose anger exceeds that of others. In either case, the lecture makes clear

that all the adulterer can do is endure the wrath of the husband. The instruction in 6:34-35 is clearly *do not commit adultery*. Because this instruction has nothing to do with the bribe in question, I will not provide inferential or simulation summaries at this point—though I do review 6:30-35 in chapter five (§5.3).

In a very different scenario, 25:14 likens the feeling of disappointment in not getting a gift that was promised to the disappointment that a farming community would feel at the coming of clouds that portend rain when they are blown away before any rain waters their land.

נְשִׂיאִים וְרוּחַ וְגֶשֶׁם אָיִן אִישׁ מִתְהַלֵּל בְּמַתַּת־שָׁקֶר	a b	25:14	Clouds with wind and no rain – a man who boasts about a false gift.

Commentators envision the man boasting about a false gift in v 14b as a wealthy benefactor who does not follow through on his promise to give a gift that would have provided needed support to a community. This is what makes his gift a false one: it never comes. Both the metaphor and the description of the *mattat* in question as a "false" one (*mattat šeqer*) express a negative evaluation of the boaster of a false gift in v 14b. However, the evaluation of the gift is positive. Had it only come. We can therefore imagine that readers might construct the meaning of this saying in the following way.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 25:14		
CONTENT SPACES	a	Clouds pushed across the sky by wind not releasing any rain
	b	A man boasting about a gift that does not come being likened to those clouds
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	a-b	Because boasting about a gift that you do not give is so disappointing for people, do not boast about a gift that you cannot (or will not) give.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	a-b	Do not boast about a gift that you are not going to give.

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 25:14	
ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses not to boast about a gift that they do not plan to (or cannot) give.

RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	Wealth is something that the reader would choose not to boast about being able to give, if he did not plan to (or could not) give it.

3.7.3 Wicked gift, wicked bribe

Prov 15:27 and 17:23 provide a great deal of evaluative information that characterizes the gift and bribe in these sayings in clearly negative terms. In 15:27, hating *mattānōt* is parallel to *bōṣēaʿ beṣaʿ* ("gaining unjust gain unjustly").

עֹכֵר בֵּיתוֹ בּוֹצֵעַ בָּצַע וְשׂוֹנֵא מַתָּנֹת יִחְיֶה	a b	15:27	A person who gains unjust gain unjustly troubles his house, but a person who hates gifts will live.

The negative evaluations of unjust gain in v 27a and gifts in v 27b are quite clear. Unjust gain brings trouble to a house in v 27a. In contrast, a person who hates gifts lives in v 27b. What is not clear is whether "hating gifts" in v 27b is meant to prohibit giving gifts, receiving gifts, or both. I leave this open in the following summaries. We can imagine readers constructing the meaning of 15:27 in the following way.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 15:27

CONTENT SPACES	a	A person who gains unjust gain bringing trouble on his house
	b	A person hating gifts living
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	a	Because unjust gain brings trouble, I should avoid unjust gain.
	b	Because hating gifts leads to good things, I should avoid gifts.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	a	Do not gain unjust gain.
	b	Avoid gifts.

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 15:27

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	a	Reader is the person who chooses not to gain unjust gain.
	b	Reader is the person who chooses to avoid gifts.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	a	Wealth is something that the reader would choose not to gain unjustly.
	b	Wealth is something that the reader would choose not to acquire [or give] as gifts.

* * *

Similar to 15:27, 17:23 presents a clearly negative use of a *šōḥad*. The setting of 17:23 is most likely a legal proceeding. Arguments for a legal setting are made on the basis of both the frequency with which *šōḥădîm* appear in legal settings outside of Proverbs and the clause in v 23b, *lĕhaṭṭōt ʾorḥōt mišpāṭ* ("to pervert the paths of justice").

שֹׁחַד מֵחֵיק רָשָׁע יִקָּח לְהַטּוֹת אָרְחוֹת מִשְׁפָּט	a b	17:23	A wicked man takes a bribe from a cloak to pervert paths of justice.

Everything profiled in this saying is negative. The person giving the *šōḥad* is described as a *rāšāʿ* ("a wicked man"). His reason for giving the *šōḥad* is "to pervert the paths of justice" (*lĕhaṭṭōt ʾorḥōt mišpāṭ*). In addition, he takes the *šōḥad* "from a cloak" (*mēḥêq*)—that is, from a hidden place. The word *ḥêq* is the same one used in 21:14b. The evaluation of the situation in 17:23 is clear. We can therefore imagine readers constructing the following interpretation when they read this saying.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 17:23

CONTENT SPACES	A wicked man taking a bribe from a cloak to pervert the paths of justice
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	Because it is wicked to pervert justice with bribes, I should not pervert justice with bribes.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	Do not pervert justice with bribes.

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 17:23

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses not to pervert justice with bribes.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	Wealth is something that the reader would choose not to use to pervert justice.

3.7.4 Summary

As Fox notes, the giving of gifts and bribes is only clearly objectionable in Proverbs when it is used to wrong ends (§3.7.3), as it is in 15:27 and 17:23 (2009, 628). The other units reviewed in this section all suggest that gifts and bribes are effective in accomplishing what they are used to do. Even though 6:34-35 and 25:14 portray failed gifts (§3.7.2), these units both suggest that had circumstances been different, the *šōḥad* in 6:35 and the *mattat* in 25:14 could have been effective. The *šōḥad* and *mattān* in 17:8, 18:16, 19:6, and 21:14 all function in profitable ways for their users. Whether the producers of Proverbs endorse their use or not is an open question. Readers who imagine personal implications for themselves when they read the sayings in this section would imagine themselves as the ones using the gifts and the bribes.

3.8 Conclusions

This chapter covers a lot of ground. The amount of material in Proverbs that focuses on how readers relate to and think about wealth testifies to the substantial concern of producers regarding these matters. As noted above, they clearly want readers to have the wealth they need. They also clearly want readers to acquire the wealth they have honestly through hard work (§3.1.1, 2, 5, 6; §3.2) and without greedy motivation, carelessness, or overexertion (§3.1.3, 4). Further, it is apparent that the producers do not want readers to use the wealth they have in wasteful or exploitative ways (§3.3). In contrast, they want readers to give wealth to those who need it and to offer wealth in sacrifice to Yahweh (§3.4). They also want readers to think about wealth in appropriate ways, not valuing it more highly than other more important things (§3.6) or thinking of wealth as an ultimate source of security (§3.5). What is not as clear is how to interpret the gift and bribe sayings in Proverbs (§3.7). These sayings require access to cultural models that modern readers do not have.

The instructions in this chapter do not produce disparate views of wealth qua wealth. Different instructions regarding wealth address different needs and different concerns in different situations. It is for this reason that analysts must have differentiated notions of instructions concerning wealth and how wealth is portrayed (and used) in different instructional frames. Simulation theory enables analysts to imagine in systematic ways how readers would imagine relating to wealth, poverty, the rich, and the poor when they simulate from personal participant viewpoints within these frames. The influence of pragmatic dimensions of meaning on the construal of viewpoint in simulation is critical in this regard. Only when readers perform directive interpretations of material in the book would they simulate from participant viewpoints and imagine relating to (or interacting with) wealth, poverty, the rich, and the poor. This is the level of analysis needed to bring clarity to the question of how these themes are portrayed in Proverbs. Specifically, analysts must imagine how readers would imagine their *personal hypothetical involvement* in the scenes they read about when they read this book. Further, within these hypothetical simulations, analysts must theorize how readers would imagine relating to (or interacting with) wealth, poverty, the rich, and the poor. My contention is that only this granular level of frame analysis will produce needed clarity regarding these themes in Proverbs.

Wealth is the *focus of instructions* in the material in this chapter. Therefore, as readers simulate in response to this material, they imagine *direct relations* between themselves and wealth (and poverty)—e.g., how *they* build wealth, what *they* do with wealth, how *they* think about wealth. What must be observed is that wealth in one frame does not necessarily map onto wealth in another frame. Nor does the simulated action of a reader in one frame map onto the simulated action of a reader in another frame. When mappings are not licensed, conflations (as described in chapter one) cannot be performed. Only when actors and actions in one statement

map fully onto the actors and actions in another statement can the statements be compared to see whether contradictions obtain. More precisely, only when statements *apply within the same instructional frame* can contradictions obtain.

Consider the following. Exhorting readers to work hard to build wealth (§3.2.1) does not contradict warning readers against working *too hard* to build wealth (§3.1.4). This is because actions of the reader in one instructional frame do not map onto the actions of the reader in the other instructional frame. In one frame, wealth is pursued in a good way; in the other, the pursuit is bad. Therefore, the pursuit of wealth in these different instructional frames cannot be related to one another. Likewise, encouraging readers to build wealth is not incompatible with warning them against hastening after wealth (§3.1.3), treating it as their ultimate security (§3.5), or valuing wealth more than they value more important things, like virtues, love and peace in the home, and a good reputation (§3.6). The pursuit of, and thinking about, wealth is again positive in the first frame and negative in the others. In addition, instructing readers to prioritize having enough to eat (12:9) over being recognized as especially honored in reputation does not contradict prioritizing a good reputation over wealth (22:1) (§3.6.6). Recall that the wealth in 12:9 is needful, while the wealth in 22:1 is extravagant. Therefore, the wealth in 12:9 cannot be mapped onto the wealth in 22:1.

In each case, the instruction must be fit to a particular situation. Critically, there is not one “wealth” frame in Proverbs. There are many instructional frames in which wealth is an element. Analysts must determine when a relation with wealth in one frame maps onto a relation with wealth in another frame. Pragmatics and simulation theory provide mechanisms that license and prevent these mappings. These mechanisms are the viewpointed simulations that readers perform when they interpret material in Proverbs as directive in illocutionary force.

CHAPTER 4
Wealth and poverty as central in motivations (and not instructions)

4.0 Introduction

As *central motivational features*, wealth and poverty are portrayed as consequences in material throughout this chapter. They serve as consequences in much of the material chapter three as well. However, as previously noted, in chapter three, wealth and poverty are *also* the focus of instructions. The instructions in chapter four have nothing to do with wealth or poverty. Rather, instructions in this chapter focus on wisdom, folly, righteousness, wickedness, humility, and pride. Therefore, I divide material in chapter four into the following instructional frames (and sections):

4.1 Pursue Wisdom and Avoid Folly instructional frames
4.2 Pursue Righteousness and Avoid Wickedness instructional frames
4.3 Pursue Humility and Avoid Pride instructional frames

There is another important distinction between much of the material in chapters three and four. Namely, there is a secondary level of idealization in portrayals of wealth and poverty as consequences in chapter four in comparison with much of the material in chapter three. Specifically, in chapter three, wealth and poverty can be said to be natural (if idealized) outcomes of working hard and not working hard in diligence and laziness (and other ways of not being diligent) sayings (§3.2.1).[144] The scenarios in chapter four are different. Gaining and losing wealth cannot be said to be natural outcomes of wisdom and folly *in the abstract* or of righteousness, wickedness, humility, or pride in the same way that they are natural outcomes of

[144] This secondary level of idealization also obtains in material in chapter three (§3.1, §3.2.2, §3.3.1, §3.4.1). As in chapter four, the material in these sections of chapter three portrays wealth and poverty as consequences of actions and character traits that do not involve diligence and not being diligent.

diligence and laziness. I say "in the abstract" in the previous sentence, because diligence and laziness are embodiments of wisdom and folly, respectively.

I draw attention to this dimension of material in chapter four in order to differentiate an important resultant feature in the inferential reasoning that I model here. I have noted it before. The additional level of idealization involved in portrayals of wealth and poverty as consequences in chapter four (and in §3.1, §3.2.2, §3.3.1, and §3.4.1) motivates me to mention it again. This additional level of idealization impacts how readers may perceive the *nature* of relations between acts, character traits, and consequences. In contrast to diligence and laziness (and other ways of not being diligent) sayings, the connections between acts, character traits, and consequences in this chapter (and in §3.1, §3.2.2, §3.3.1, and §3.4.1) cannot be perceived as real-world outcomes that readers could hope to anticipate in any direct manner. In the history of interpretation of Proverbs, as noted in chapter one, many scholars have conceived of the act/character-consequence relation as a kind of empirical calculus. In doing so, scholars have imagined, first, that the producers of Proverbs assiduously consulted this calculus to discern patterns of cause and effect in the world around them. Subsequently, these scholars would presume that each didactic unit in Proverbs is a reflection (or result) of these painstaking empirical observations performed by the producers in their "search for wisdom."[145]

In light of these ideas about the producers of Proverbs, many have disparaged the producers for being naïve, simplistic, and altogether detached from reality. Reflecting on the

[145] Fox (2007b) offers a cogent assessment of this idea (also Fox 2009, 962-976). We can compare the collection phase of the production of Proverbs to the teaching that the producers intended to perform (and facilitate) through their book. However, in collecting traditional sayings for their collections, the producers of Proverbs *represented shared wisdom*. They did not *seek* patterns of cause and effect in order to shed light on a cosmic or world order. (See Huwiler 1988 and Fox 1995 for summaries of twentieth-century scholarship on notions of order in Proverbs.) As Murphy writes, the producers of Proverbs "were teachers, not searchers" (1990, 12). It is the students who are the searchers for wisdom in Proverbs.

act/character-consequence relation through an empirical-calculus lens, William McKane writes,

> The extreme tidiness of the doctrine is an indication of its sterility and its disengagement from mundane realities. This is not old wisdom but the theory of a kind of Yahwistic piety which is condemned to emptiness because it has disengaged itself from the realities of life and has left all problems behind … a precious piety which left no question open, no ends untied and which secured its mathematical precision by detaching itself from the messiness and confusion of men's lives in the world and by shutting its ears to the still, sad music of humanity. (McKane 1970, 16, 19)[146]

I would argue that McKane is as misguided as he is eloquent in this characterization of Proverbs' producers. My sense is that few scholars still express these views so extremely. However, many do still discuss material in Proverbs in terms of empirical or quasi-empirical "cosmic orders" or "orders inscribed in creation" (e.g., Sandoval 2006; Ansberry 2017). Further engagement with this avenue of Proverbs scholarship exceeds the scope of the present study. However, I present these views for two reasons. One is for the sake of historical memory. This misperception of the producers of Proverbs has dominated scholarship in many periods.[147]

The second reason I present these views of Proverbs' producers is to prepare the reader for material in chapter four. Without a clear sense that the act/character-consequence relation serves as a pedagogical construct, and not as an empirical calculus, material in this chapter will sound especially naïve, simplistic, and detached from reality. This is due to the secondary level of idealization involved in the use of the act/character-consequence in this chapter. Imagining that righteousness *automatically* leads to wealth, or that wickedness *unfailingly* results in poverty

[146] This quote reflects a theory for which McKane is well known, and that is his idea that the book of Proverbs is comprised of three redactional layers—one constituted of "old wisdom" (A), another that is concerned with the community over the individual (B), and a third that comprises a moralizing redactional "Yahwistic piety" layer (McKane 1970, 11).

[147] Elizabeth Huwiler (1988) (now Elizabeth Faith) gives a thorough review of this history prior to 1988.

are untenable thoughts. We can all imagine extrapolated scenarios in which different virtues and vices really would lead to gaining or losing wealth. Honest merchants may get more customers than wicked ones. Wise investors probably always get better returns on investments than foolish investors. However, the purpose of material in Proverbs is *not to promise* readers that acts, character traits, and consequences are inextricably linked. It is not even most fundamentally to present *principles* of how the world *usually* works. This is a very common view of material in Proverbs. However, if we view the book as a compendium of principles of workings of the world, it is hard to know where to draw the line between principle and promise in the case of the act/character-consequence relation. The world certainly may work in ways that Proverbs describes. We might even say that it often does. No neighbor wants to be woken too early by a loud greeting (Prov 27:14). However, as has been said more than once in this study, the primary pedagogical purpose of Proverbs is to compel readers to become certain kinds of people. Therefore, when it comes to the act/character-consequence relation, I argue that its use is not primarily to give instruction on the inner workings of the world or orders in creation. Rather, the act/character-consequence relation is best viewed a pedagogical construct. With this in mind, let us turn to the first section in chapter four: Pursue Wisdom and Avoid Folly instructional frames.

4.1 Pursue Wisdom and Avoid Folly instructional frames

There are segments from wisdom interludes (3:16, 8:18, and 8:20-21) and individual sentence sayings (13:18, 17:2, and 21:20) in Proverbs that motivate readers to pursue wisdom and avoid folly by portraying wealth and poverty as consequences. The three segments from wisdom interludes profile only the benefits of wisdom. Whereas the three sentence sayings all profile characters who are both wise and foolish and who thus experience positive and negative

outcomes, respectively. In light of the inherent alternativity between wisdom and folly—i.e., that choosing wisdom is also choosing to avoid folly—the wisdom interludes also effectively exhort readers to avoid folly, even though they portray only the benefits of wisdom. I begin with the interludes (§4.1.1) and then consider the individual sentence sayings (§4.1.2).

4.1.1 Wisdom interludes in Proverbs 1-9

The personified form of wisdom as a woman (Lady Wisdom) provides conceptual structure to interpretations of Prov 3:16, 8:18, and 8:20-21. Readers who read Prov 1-9 in its entirety will develop Lady Wisdom frames informed by all four of the wisdom interludes (1:20-33, 3:13-20, 8:1-36, and in 9:1-18). Alone, these segments provide only pieces of a larger picture and longer narrative of this central character in the interludes. 3:16 and 8:18 portray similar relations between Lady Wisdom and wealth, one from third-person perspective and the other from the first-person perspective of Lady Wisdom herself portrayed as speaker:

אֹרֶךְ יָמִים בִּימִינָהּ בְּשְׂמֹאולָהּ עֹשֶׁר וְכָבוֹד	a b	3:16	Length of days are in her right hand; in her left hand are wealth and honor.[148]
עֹשֶׁר־וְכָבוֹד אִתִּי הוֹן עָתֵק וּצְדָקָה	a b	8:18	Wealth and honor are with me – lasting riches and righteousness.

In these interlude segments, wealth is one of several accoutrements that appear "with" Lady Wisdom: *ʿōšer* ("wealth") and *kābōd* ("honor") are with her in 3:16 and 8:18; long life (*ʾōrek yāmîm*) is added in 3:16; and lasting riches and righteousness (*hōn ʿātēq ūṣĕdāqāh*) are added in

[148] A number of commentators read the phrase *ʿōšer wĕkābōd* ("wealth and honor") as a hendiadys meaning "honorable wealth" or "substantive wealth" (e.g., Fox 2000). Commentators frequently view wealth and honor as mutually implicating. Therefore, when one is mentioned, they assume the other is implied as well.

8:18. Wealth is not overtly promised to those who pursue and find Lady Wisdom in 3:16 and 8:18. In these segments, wealth is something that is portrayed simply as being "with" Lady Wisdom. It is her possession: she carries it in her left hand in 3:16b, and she describes it as being with her ("with me," *ʾittî*) in 8:18a. However, the implication for readers is of course that if they choose to pursue Lady Wisdom, they will subsequently find her and then be with both her and her accompaniments. In some contrast, Lady Wisdom is portrayed announcing explicitly that she gives material wealth to "those who love her" in 8:20-21:

בְּאֹרַח־צְדָקָה אֲהַלֵּךְ	a	8:20	In a righteous path I walk,
בְּתוֹךְ נְתִיבוֹת מִשְׁפָּט	b		within paths of justice,
לְהַנְחִיל אֹהֲבַי יֵשׁ	a	8:21	to cause those who love me to inherit wealth,
וְאֹצְרֹתֵיהֶם אֲמַלֵּא	b		and their storehouses to fill.

The wealth that Lady Wisdom possesses she also distributes with intention.

Other portions of the wisdom interludes include more information about what Lady Wisdom does, to whom she calls, benefits she extends to those who heed her calls, and threats she issues to everyone who ignores her. She calls out in the most public of places to *pětāyîm* (the "young and inexperienced" in 1:22, 8:5a, and 9:4a), *ʾîšîm* ("men" and *bĕnê ʾādām*, "humans" in 8:4), and even to *ḥăsar lēb* ("someone who lacks sense," 9:4b) and *kĕsîlîm* (fools, 8:5b). She threatens abandonment, derision, and death to those who do not heed her calls (1:26-32) and promises knowledge, insight, and security to those who do (1:23, 33; 9:6). Wisdom also describes her prudent and moral character (8:12-13); her powerful intellect, counsel, and strength (8:14); her instrumental roles in both contemporary organized governments (8:15-16) and primordial creation events (8:22-31); and the reciprocal love she has for those who love her (8:17).

The producers of the interludes thus make the pursuit of wisdom compelling by creating a portrait of a compelling person: wisdom personified as Lady Wisdom. Wealth plays a relatively small part in this overall portrayal. Lady Wisdom is portrayed with apparently unlimited power to make life very good for people who love her (in ways that exceed the bestowal of wealth) and as someone who will leave those who do not love her to their own devices—which always ends badly (e.g., 1:24-32; 8:36; 9:18). Like all instances of personification, Wisdom is a metaphorical blend based on the metaphor HUMAN ATTRIBUTES ARE PEOPLE.[149] Wisdom is characterized as a woman who very publicly and with what seems like great energy and high expectations pursues human beings, threatens those who ignore her, praises herself, and is praised by others. As all instances of personification do, this portrayal serves to compress the human attribute of wisdom to human scale (Fauconnier and Turner 2002; Dancygier and Sweetser 2014). Compression to human scale occurs when entities or events that are abstract or that exceed singular interactional situations are presented in a way that allows for a comprehender to imagine the entity, event, or series of events in question in singular interactional frames (Fauconnier and Turner 2002; Dancygier and Sweetser 2014). Dancygier and Sweetser explain that "individuals and temporally local events, with close temporal proximity of cause and effect, are conceptually 'human scale'" (2014, 86).[150] The personification of wisdom in the interludes prompts readers to imagine Lady Wisdom as someone with whom they can interact and from whom they can learn—and also from whom they can benefit in numerous ways.

[149] In conceptual metaphor theory, metaphors are blends that involve mappings of elements in source and target frames (or spaces) into blended frames (or spaces) (§2.2.2; §5.1.1). Also, in conceptual metaphor theory, metaphors are represented in a kind of shorthand in which a predication describes the mappings involved in a metaphor—namely, SOURCE FRAME IS A TARGET FRAME. Small caps are used to represent metaphors in this shorthand.

[150] See Fauconnier and Turner (2002) for discussion on the ubiquity of "compression through blending [to] achieve human scale" in human cognition and language processing (89-137).

As noted above, in this broader Lady Wisdom frame, wealth has a comparatively small role to play. We can also observe, however, that wealth is an expected element. The inclusion of wealth among Lady Wisdom's possessions fits the larger frame of her narrative in the interludes. The personification of wisdom almost *requires* that wealth be "with" Lady Wisdom: how could such a powerful entity conceived at human scale *not* have wealth? The primary focus within the Lady Wisdom frame, however, is Lady Wisdom herself. Wealth is always subordinate to Lady Wisdom. She owns it and offers it to those who love her (8:20-21). More prominent among the rewards that she offers are wisdom itself, righteousness, security, and long life (1:23, 33; 3:16a, 17-18; 8:3, 18b*β*, 34-35; 9:6, 11). In addition, and perhaps more significantly, the value of the benefits that wealth offers is explicitly subordinated to the value of what Lady Wisdom herself yields in 3:14-15, 8:10-11, and 8:19 in a series of better-than statements (reviewed in §3.6). The better-than statements instruct readers on how to think about wealth. Whereas the instructions reviewed here exhort readers to pursue wisdom and avoid folly. We can therefore imagine that readers may construct the meanings of 3:16, 8:18, and 8:18-21 in the following ways.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 3:16

CONTENT BASE SPACES	a	Long life being in the right hand of Wisdom
	b	Wealth and honor being in the left hand of Wisdom
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	a-b	Because Wisdom holds long life, wealth, and honor, I should pursue wisdom.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	a-b	Pursue wisdom.

Proverbs 8:18

CONTENT BASE SPACES	a	Wealth and honor being with Wisdom
	b	Lasting riches and righteousness being with Wisdom
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	a-b	Because lasting wealth, honor, and righteousness are with Wisdom, I should pursue wisdom.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	a-b	Pursue wisdom.

Proverbs 8:20-21

CONTENT BASE SPACES	Wisdom walking in righteousness in order to cause those who love her to inherit wealth and to fill their storehouses
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	Because Wisdom grants wealth to those who love her, I should pursue wisdom.

DIRECTIVE SPACES Pursue wisdom.

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 3:16, 8:18, 8:20-21

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is a person who chooses to pursue wisdom.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	Wealth is something that the reader would acquire because they pursued wisdom.

4.1.2 Sentence sayings

Like 3:16, 8:18, and 8:20-21, the three sentence sayings in this section (13:18, 17:2, and 21:20) all portray some kind of material reward or punishment as outcomes of wisdom or some kind of folly. But rather than Lady Wisdom, 13:18, 17:2, and 21:20 profile human characters who, in some way, embody wisdom or folly. As such, each one is portrayed gaining or losing wealth in ways that the producers of Proverbs want readers mentally to connect with the exercise of wisdom on one hand and folly on the other:

רֵישׁ וְקָלוֹן פּוֹרֵעַ מוּסָר וְשׁוֹמֵר תּוֹכַחַת יְכֻבָּד	a b	13:18	Poverty and disgrace come to a person who ignores discipline, but a person who heeds a rebuke is honored.
עֶבֶד־מַשְׂכִּיל יִמְשֹׁל בְּבֵן מֵבִישׁ וּבְתוֹךְ אַחִים יַחֲלֹק נַחֲלָה	a b	17:2	A prudent servant rules over a son who brings shame, and in the midst of brothers he divides an inheritance.
אוֹצָר נֶחְמָד וָשֶׁמֶן בִּנְוֵה חָכָם וּכְסִיל אָדָם יְבַלְּעֶנּוּ	a b	21:20	A desirable store resides[151] in the dwelling of a wise man, but a fool of a man swallows it up.

The expressions of wisdom and folly vary in their level of specificity in these sayings. They are most specific in 13:18 and least specific in 21:20. In 13:18, the foolish character ignores

[151] The translation and Hebrew text above reflect an emendation from M *wāšemen* ("and oil") to *yiškōn* ("it dwells"). Commentators puzzle over the text in M, but many retain what is written (Toy 1908, Whybray 1994, Murphy 1998, Clifford 1999, Waltke 2005). I follow Fox in opting for the emendation. The verb *yiškōn* is reflective of the LXX: *θησαυρὸς ἐπιθυμητὸς ἀναπαύσεται ἐπὶ στόματος σοφοῦ* ("Desirable treasures rest [or remain] in the mouth of the wise"). Regarding the difference between M and G at the end of the line, the LXX translator may have read *bĕpî* ("in the mouth of") rather than Mˁs *binwēh* ("in the dwelling of").

discipline (*pōrēaʿ mūsār*)[152] in v 18a, and the wise character heeds rebukes (*šōmēr tōkaḥat*)[153] in v 18b. There are no specific actions performed by the wise characters in 17:2 and 21:20. But the wise character in 17:1a is described with somewhat more detail as *ʾebed maśkîl* ("a prudent servant") than the *ḥāk̲ām* ("wise man") in 21:20a. Similarly, the foolish character in 17:2a is more specifically identified as *bēn mēbîš* ("a son who brings shame") than the *kĕsîl* ("foolish man") in 21:20b.

The evaluation of these actors is clear from the identification of each with either wisdom or folly. In each of these three sayings, however, the producers of Proverbs provide additional motivation for readers by portraying material gain or loss as consequences of wisdom and folly as well:

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[152] The lexical frame *mūsār* is closely associated with wisdom and instruction in Proverbs. The verbal root of *mūsār* is *y-s-r*, the root meaning of which is "to chastise, rebuke, or punish" in the D stem. Due to the pervasive links in Proverbs between notions of wisdom and *mūsār*, many commentators and translators gloss the latter as "instruction" throughout Proverbs (e.g., Whybray 1994; Murphy 1998; JPS; KJV; NRSV; ESV). *HALOT* glosses *mūsār* as "discipline" (in the sense of chastisement or correction), "training," and "exhortation or warning" (I: 557). In the book of Proverbs, the noun *mūsār* is construed explicitly with wisdom (*ḥōkmāh* in 1:2, 7; 15:33; 23:23; *ḥākām* in 13:1; and *ḥ-k-m* in 8:33; 19:20), knowledge (*daʿat* in 4:1; 8:10; 12:1; 19:27; 23:12), teaching (*tōrāh* in 1:8; 6:23), rebuke (*tōkaḥat* in 3:11; 5:12; 6:23; 10:17; 12:1; 13:18; 15:5, 10, 32), and threat (*gaʿarāh* in 13:1). Fox describes the "core notion" of *mūsār* as "the teaching of the avoidance of faults," which he elaborates as "basically correction, whether by verbal rebuke or physical punishment" (2000, 34). In sum, a person who heeds (or keeps) *mūsār* ("discipline") is someone who aligns with wisdom. Further, discipline (e.g., verbal rebuke or physical punishment) may have characteristically accompanied instruction in the minds of the producers.

[153] Within the book of Proverbs the substantive *tōkaḥat* (Prov 13:18b) is also always a frame element that ties directly to wisdom or a more specific value of wisdom. It is used in construct with *mūsār* in Prov 6:23 (*tōkaḥōt mūsār*) and is parallel to *mūsār* in Prov 3:11; 5:12; 6:23; 10:17; 12:1; 13:18; 15:5, 10, and 32. It is used in parallel to a form of *ʿēṣāh* ("counsel") in Prov 1:25 and 1:30. Lady Wisdom refers to her *tōkaḥat* in Prov 1:23, 25, and 30. An author refers to Yahwehʿs *tōkaḥat* in Prov 3:11. And *tōkaḥat* is parallel to the wise (*ḥăkāmîm*) in Prov 15:31. Finally, in Prov 29:15, *tōkaḥat* is linked by the conjunction *wĕ-* with *šēbeṭ* ("a rod"), and the two are said there together to give wisdom (*ḥōkmāh*). The association of instruction with disciplinary notions (e.g., *šēbeṭ*, *mūsār*, *tōkaḥat*, and *gaʿarāh*) lead scholars to reflect on the punitive nature of the instruction that is portrayed in Proverbs (e.g., Murphy, Clifford, Whybray, Waltke). Fox concurs but also provides important balance to these ideas by underscoring the affirming and encouraging nature of "the idea of education" in Prov 2 (Fox 2000, 131-134).

13:18	poverty and disgrace (*rêš wĕqālōn*) being honored (*yĕkubbād*)	for ignoring instruction (*pōrēaʿ mūsār*) for heeding rebukes (*šōmēr tōkaḥat*)
17:2	sharing in an inheritance (*yaḥălōq naḥălāh*) losing an inheritance	for being a prudent servant (*ʿebed maśkîl*) for being a son who brings shame (*bēn mēbîš*)
21:20	a desirable and lasting store of possessions (*ʿōṣār neḥmād yiškōn binwēh ḥākām*) swallowing up the wealth one might have (*yĕballĕʿennū*)	for being wise (*ḥākām*) for being a fool (*kĕsîl*)

21:20 suggests that wealth remains (i.e., "dwells," *yiškōn*) in the house of a wise person, but that, in contrast, a foolish person will "swallow up [their wealth]" (i.e., consume it quickly) and thereby squander whatever material resources they may manage to gain. Metaphorical mappings prompted by the metaphor USING WEALTH IS EATING FOOD supply meaning to interpretations of 21:20. The consumption indicated by the verb *b-l-ʿ* ("swallow") in the D stem in the Hebrew Bible is characteristically violent and dramatic. Frequently, it is tantamount to "destroy" (e.g., 2 Sam 20:19, 20; Isa 25:7, 8; Ps 21:10 [9]; Job 2:3). The consumption portrayed in 21:20b is meant to be understood as a ravenous devouring of possessions. The resultative sense of the D stem is also relevant (*IBHS* §24.3). The point of 21:20b is that the foolish person has no wealth left in their home as a *result* of their ravenous consumption. This is in comparison with the wise person in 21:20a whose desirable (*neḥmād*) storehouse (*ʿōṣār*) of possessions remains (*yiškōn*) in their home (*binwēh ḥākām*) in a lasting way. In addition, the frequentative use of the D stem is applicable in this saying as well (*IBHS* §24.3.3b). The ravenous consumption of wealth would not be an exceptional or solitary action of the fool in Proverbs. Within the highly stylized frame of the fool in Proverbs, this ravenous consumption would be a regular and habitual action.

Frames of honor and shame are activated in 13:18 and 17:2. "Poverty and disgrace" (*rêš wĕqālōn*) are outcomes of ignoring instruction in 13:18a, and the foolish character in 17:2a is described as a "son who brings shame" (*bēn mēbîš*). In contrast, the person who heeds a rebuke

in 13:18b is "honored" (*yĕkubbād*), and the prudent servant in 17:2, against all odds, is given a share of a family inheritance (*yaḥălōq naḥălāh*). This would be a wildly honorable bestowal in light of his servant status (more on this below). Honor is frequently attributed to characters who embody virtues in Proverbs (e.g., generosity to the poor in 14:31b; humility in 15:33, 18:12, 22:4, and 29:23; righteousness and kindness in 21:21) and is deemed unfit for fools (26:1; 26:8).[154] Correspondingly, shame is associated with vices. We see two examples here: *qālōn* ("disgrace") is an outcome of ignoring instruction (a form of folly) in 13:18a, and the son who brings shame in 17:2 is opposed to a prudent servant (*ʿebed maśkîl*). Five of the six occurrences of a C form of *b-w-š* in Proverbs appear in parallel (10:5; 12:4; 14:35; 29:15) or in a construction (17:2) with a person who is described as wise—if we construe the *ʾēšet ḥayil* ("woman of strength") in 12:4 as wise (which we should):

10:5	*bēn mēbîš*	//	*bēn maśkîl*		
12:4	*m^{e}bîšāh*	//	*ʾēšet ḥayil*		
14:35	*mēbîš*	//	*ʿebed maśkîl*		
17:2	*bēn mēbîš*	+	*ʿebed maśkîl*	→	*ʿebed maśkîl yimšōl bĕbēn mēbîš*
29:15	*mēbîš ʾimmô*	//	*ḥōkmāh*		

A broader system of construals in Proverbs associates shame with the performance of other vices as well.[155] None of this is surprising given the pedagogical purposes of the book. In addition, as

[154] In addition, we will see in chapter five that crowns and garlands serve as metonymies for honor in Proverbs and are most frequently bestowed as, for, or by wisdom, Lady Wisdom, or instruction itself (e.g., 1:9; 4:9; 12:4; 14:24).

[155] The sixth occurrence of a C form of *b-w-š* appears in Proverbs 19:26, "A person who does violence against a father and makes a mother flee is a son who brings shame [*bēn mēbîš*] and reproach [*maḥpîr*]." Wickedness in general (i.e., expressed by *rāšāʿ*) is also associated with disgrace and shame—e.g., C of *b-w-š* and C of *ḥ-p-r* in 13:5; *b-w-z* in 18:3; and, if we interpret *ʾîš naʿănwēh lēb* (a man of a twisted mind) as a person who is described as wicked, then we can add this association with *b-w-z* in 12:8 as well. In addition, the word *qālōn* is parallel to *kĕsîlîm* in Proverbs 3:35. And if we consider adultery (6:33), scoffing (*lēṣ* in 9:7 and 22:10), and pride (11:2) to be instances of folly and/or wickedness, then these occurrences add to the associations of vices with disgrace as is expressed by *qālōn* as well. More

noted above, commentators frequently assume that wealth and honor implicate one another in Proverbs (McKane 1970; Whybray 1994; Murphy 1998; Waltke 2004, 2005; Fox 2009).[156] For this reason, many assume that wealth is a covert element in 13:18b in the portrayal of a person who heeds rebukes being honored (McKane 1970; Whybray 1994; Waltke 2005).

The reward for the prudent servant (*ʿebed maśkîl*) in 17:2 underscores the rhetorical nature of the consequence portrayed in this saying. This saying presents what Fox (2009) and Murphy (1998) consider "an extreme case." No matter how excellent and prudent a servant might have been in ancient Israel, it is unlikely that any would have had the opportunity to advance in a household to the point of sharing in a family inheritance—especially in a household that included living sons.[157] There *is* a son in 17:2. The prudent servant is said to "rule over him" (*yimšōl*) and also to receive the family's heritable property in place of him.

The rhetorical strategy in 17:2 is therefore similar to that in Qoheleth 4:13-16 and 9:13-16. In Qoheleth 4:13-16, there is a *yeled miskēn wĕḥākām* ("a youth who was poor and wise")

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examples could be given, but these demonstrate the links between vices and shame or disgrace in Proverbs.

[156] In reflecting on the association of wealth (*ʿōšer*) and honor (*kābōd*), Fox notes that there are instances in which *kābōd* reflects the meaning of "wealth" (e.g., Gen 31:3; Isa 10:3, 61:6) (2009, 57). He speculates, in addition, that it may carry this meaning when it is used in combination with *ʿōšer* in particular (e.g., 2 Chr 17:5, 32:27; Qoh 6:2). He finds it tenable to read synonymity between these terms given their occurrence in either order in the construct (e.g., Est 1:4, 5:11), and also because whenever these terms share a verb, the verb is in the singular. He reflects further that because one of Lady Wisdom's hands is said to hold "wealth and honor" in 3:16b, "the pair of nouns probably designates a single concept"—either "substantive wealth" or "honorable wealth" (Fox 2000, 157).

[157] Fox explains: "It is unlikely that this proverb seeks to inspire diligence in slaves by letting them hope to inherit as a family member. That eventuality would be too far-fetched. To be sure, it was possible for a slave to be manumitted and adopted (AYBD 1.78). Mesopotamian practice allowed for this possibility (AYBD 6.61), and it is presupposed in Gen 15:2-3. A genealogy in Chronicles (1 Chr 2:34-35) includes a slave (a foreigner, no less) whose presence in the family line indicates that he was adopted. Possibly this practice is behind the promise in the present verse. In the above-mentioned cases, however, there were no sons in the family" (2009, 624).

who advances to the throne though he was born poor (*kî gām bĕmalkūtô nōlād rāš* in Qoheleth 4:14). And in Qoheleth 9:13-16, an *ʾîš miskēn ḥākām* ("poor wise man") delivers a small city (*ʿîr qĕṭannāh*) from a great king (*melek gādōl*). All three of these scenarios present unlikely situations in which an extreme underdog triumphs. In each of these instances, the underdog is said to be wise or discerning—*maśkîl* in Prov 17:2.[158] The rhetorical purpose of each is therefore to amplify wisdom's potential effects by portraying a character who is wise overcoming incredible odds, odds that each character should not have been able to overcome and could not have overcome without wisdom. It must also be said that inasmuch as 17:2 displays the power of wisdom, it also accentuates the power of folly. It would have been unthinkable for a son to be denied his inheritance or be ruled by a servant. But these are the outcomes that the producers connect with folly in 17:2. Like the positive outcome in this saying for the *ʿebed maśkîl*, these outcomes are equally contrived. The point is for readers to recognize the warning.

With the evaluation of wisdom and folly so clearly expressed in all three of these sayings—13:18, 17:2, and 21:20—we can again imagine readers constructing meaning in the following ways when they read them. [I provide alternate construals for a reader$_1$ and a reader$_2$ for 17:2. Reader$_1$ would identify with the servant and take the instruction *be wise*, and reader$_2$ would identify with the son and take the instruction *do not be foolish*. It is of course the case that the same reader may and likely does perform both construals as personal implications of this saying.]

[158] All thirteen occurrences of a form of *ś-k-l* in the book of Proverbs appear in the C stem, which *HALOT* glosses in four ways: "to understand, comprehend," "to have insight," "to make wise, insightful," and "to achieve success" (II: 1328-1329). Nine of the thirteen occurrences of a form of *ś-k-l* in Proverbs appear specifically in the form of a C participle, *maśkîl*, as we have in Proverbs 17:2. Commenting on this form in particular, Fox reflects that, "*maśkîl* is nearly always synonymous with *ḥākām*;" in addition, regarding the C form of *ś-k-l* more broadly, Fox states that, "*hiśkîl* always refers to genuine understanding, never to mere cleverness or skill, and it always has a positive moral valence" (Fox 2000, 59).

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 13:18

CONTENT BASE SPACES	a	A person who ignores instruction experiencing poverty and disgrace
	b	A person who heeds rebukes experiencing honor
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	a	Because ignoring instruction leads to poverty and disgrace, I should not ignore instruction.
	a	Because heeding rebukes leads to being honored, I should heed rebukes.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	a	Do not ignore instruction.
	b	Heed rebukes.

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 13:18a

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses not to ignore instruction.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & POVERTY	Poverty would be something that the reader would avoid by choosing not to ignore instruction.

Proverbs 13:18b

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses to heed rebukes.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	If wealth is construed in association with honor, then wealth would be something that the reader would choose to acquire by heeding rebukes.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 17:2

CONTENT BASE SPACES	a-b	A discerning servant ruling over a foolish son and getting that son's portion of the family inheritance
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	a-b	Because being prudent leads to good things, I should be prudent. Because being foolish leads to bad things, I should not be foolish.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	a-b	Be prudent. Do not be foolish.

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 17:2

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER_1	Reader is the person who chooses to be prudent.
RELATION BETWEEN READER_1 & WEALTH	Wealth would be something that the reader would choose to acquire by being prudent.
ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER_2	Reader is the person who chooses not to be foolish.
RELATION BETWEEN READER_2 & WEALTH	Wealth is something that the reader would avoid losing by choosing not to be foolish.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 21:20

CONTENT BASE SPACES	a	Desirable possessions remaining in the dwelling of a wise man
	b	A foolish man swallowing up his possessions
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	a	Because being wise leads to good things, I should be wise. Because being foolish leads to bad things, I should not be foolish.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	a	Be wise.
	b	Do not be foolish.

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 21:20a

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses to be wise.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	Wealth would be something that the reader would choose to acquire by choosing to be wise.

Proverbs 21:20b

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses not to be foolish.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	Wealth is something that the reader would avoid losing by choosing not to be foolish.

4.1.3 Summary

The material in this section instructs readers to pursue wisdom and avoid folly. The sentence sayings (13:18; 17:2; 21:20) issue the instruction *avoid folly* more directly than instructions in the wisdom interludes (3:16, 8:18, and 8:20-21). However, due to the inherent alternativity of virtues and vices in Proverbs, readers apprehend the instruction to avoid folly when they read the wisdom interludes as well. Wealth and poverty function solely as motivation in the material in this section. As consequences, wealth and poverty express evaluations of the virtues and vices in question. Once again, readers who construe personal implications when they read the material in this section would perform Reader in the Scene blends. In doing so, they would imagine *themselves* as the ones experiencing wealth and poverty as consequences in simulations as they mentally work out directive interpretations of this material—specifically, directives to *pursue wisdom* and *avoid folly*.

4.2 Pursue righteousness and avoid wickedness instructional frames

Five individual sentence sayings in Proverbs motivate readers to pursue righteousness and avoid wickedness by portraying material gain and loss, respectively, as seemingly direct outcomes of this virtue and vice. Righteousness and wickedness are broad concepts in Proverbs.

In addition, reference to the righteous and the wicked is often articulated in the most general of terms. The adjectives *ṣaddîq* and *rāšāʿ* used substantivally serve as the most frequent means of profiling righteous and wicked characters in Proverbs.

I create groups in this section according to the consequences that sayings portray. In the first, the consequences are having food or going hungry (10:3; 13:25 in §4.2.1). In the second, both righteous and wicked characters have wealth. In this section, the wealth that righteous and wicked characters have is qualified as either good or bad. The frames that structure these sayings all have to do with income or possessions—*pĕʿullāh* ("income") and *śeker* ("wages") in 11:18; *ḥōsen* ("stored goods")[159] and *tĕbūʾāh* ("produce") in 15:16 (§4.2.2). Finally, the third group of material in this section contains one saying with two scenarios that portray the passing on of wealth—one that goes according to plan, and one that does not (13:22 in §4.2.3).

4.2.1 Sayings structured by hunger and lack of hunger frames

Prov 10:3 and 13:25 both portray a *ṣaddîq* ("righteous person"), who does not hunger (10:3a) or whose appetite is sated (13:25a), and a *rāšāʿ* ("wicked person"), who, in contrast, experiences perpetual hunger (10:3b and 13:25b). Yahweh is the agent causing (and not causing) hunger in 10:3. In contrast, no agent (other than the righteous and wicked characters) is

[159] The word *ḥōsen* is used only five times in the Hebrew Bible (Isa 33:6; Jer 20:5; Eze 22:25; Prov 15:6, 27:24). It parallels (in Jer 20:5) and is close in meaning to *ʿōṣār* ("storehouse"). Like *ʿōṣār*, *ḥōsen* is also frequently translated "treasure." The occurrence of *ḥōsen* with *yāqār* ("precious") in Eze 22:25 and its being opposite *nēzer* ("crown") in Prov 27:24 (which I discuss in chapter four) may influence that translation. As I do with *ʿōṣār*, I gloss *ḥōsen* with the more neutral expression "stored goods." *HALOT* lists the following as possible glosses: "stronghold," "treasury," and "stocks" (I:338). The translation "treasure" for both *ʿōṣār* and *ḥōsen* is fitting in that treasure is often stored in some kind of stronghold.

portrayed causing (and not causing) hunger in 13:25.

לֹא־יַרְעִיב יְהוָה נֶפֶשׁ צַדִּיק וְהַוַּת רְשָׁעִים יֶהְדֹּף	a b	10:3	Yahweh does not cause the appetite of the righteous to hunger, but he thwarts the desire of the wicked.
צַדִּיק אֹכֵל לְשֹׂבַע נַפְשׁוֹ וּבֶטֶן רְשָׁעִים תֶּחְסָר	a b	13:25	A righteous man eats until his appetite is sated, but the belly of the wicked is lacking.

10:3 and 13:25 profile the same experiences—being sated and being hungry—with and without Yahweh being involved. Mention of Yahweh in 10:3 is an additional source of motivation. In addition, simply profiling the *ṣaddîq* and *rāšāʿ* serves as motivation. When these most general models of stock characters appear in Proverbs, the point is not to identify specific actions that might have made them righteous or wicked (or wise or foolish). The point is for the reader to imagine what *they* understand to be righteous or wicked (or wise or foolish) and to imagine themselves choosing the path they imagine for the one and avoiding the path they imagine for the other. In other words, these sayings are not accounts of why some people go hungry and others do not. They are instructions to be righteous and warnings against being wicked. Therefore, we can imagine readers constructing meaning in the following ways when they read 10:3 and 13:25.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 10:3		
CONTENT BASE SPACES	a	Yahweh not causing the appetite of the righteous to hunger
	b	Yahweh thwarting the desire of the wicked
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	a	Because being righteous leads to good things, I should be righteous. Because being wicked leads to bad things, I should not be wicked.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	a	Be righteous. Do not be wicked.
Proverbs 13:25		
CONTENT BASE SPACES	a	A righteous man eating until his appetite is sated
	b	The belly of a wicked man being empty
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	a	Because being righteous leads to good things, I should be righteous. Because being wicked leads to bad things, I should not be wicked.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	a	Be righteous. Do not be wicked.

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 10:3a and 13:25a

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses to be righteous.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	Wealth [as food] would be something that the reader would choose to acquire by choosing to be righteous.

Proverbs 10:3b and 13:25b

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses not to be wicked.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & POVERTY	Poverty [hunger/desires unfulfilled] is something that the reader would choose to avoid by choosing not to be wicked.

4.2.2 Sayings structured by income and possession frames

Prov 11:18 and 15:6 profile reliable (*ʾĕmet*, "firmness, trustworthiness" construed as "reliable" in 11:18b and *rāb*, "great" in 15:6b) and unreliable (*šeqer*, "false" in 11:18a and *neʿkeret*, "troubled" in 15:6b) wealth as an outcome of a person being either righteous or wicked. The person who is righteous in 11:18 is profiled not as a *ṣaddîq* but as someone "who sows righteousness (*ṣĕdāqāh*)."

רָשָׁע עֹשֶׂה פְּעֻלַּת־שָׁקֶר וְזֹרֵעַ צְדָקָה שֶׂכָר אֱמֶת	a b	11:18	A wicked man makes a false wage, and a person who sows righteousness, a reliable income.
בֵּית צַדִּיק חֹסֶן רָב וּבִתְבוּאַת רָשָׁע נֶעְכָּרֶת	a b	15:6	In[160] the house of a righteous person is a great store, but the produce of a wicked person is troubled.

Frames related to earning an income (*pĕʿullāh* in 11:18a and *śeker* in 11:18b) provide conceptual structure to interpretations of 11:18; frames of owning and storing possessions (*ḥōsen*) structure interpretations of 15:6a; and frames of producing an agricultural yield (*tĕbūʾāh*) are evoked by 15:6b. The lexical frames that evoke these semantic frames are all modified by attributive adjectives in 11:18 and 15:6. These adjectives characterize, and thereby express a direct

[160] This translation reflects two emendations: the removal of the *bêt* preposition from *tĕbūʾat* in 15:6b and adding it to the noun *bêt* in 15:6a. These emendations are reflected in the LXX, S, and T. V reflects M.

evaluation of, the items of wealth in these sayings:

VERSE	WEALTH LEXICAL FRAME	EVALUATIVE MODIFICATION
11:18a	*pĕʿullāh* (wage/recompense)	*šeqer* (false)
11:18b	*śeker* (wage/recompense)	*ʾĕmet* (reliable)
15:6a	*ḥōsen* (store)	*rāb* (great)
15:6b	*tĕbūʾāh* (produce)	*neʿkeret* (troubled)

The righteous characters have wealth that is reliable (11:18b) and great (in amount) (15:6a). In contrast, the wicked characters possess wealth that is unreliable (11:18a; 15:6b).

The descriptions of the wealth of the righteous characters are straightforward. They have reliable wealth (*śeker ʾĕmet*, "a reliable income") and a great amount of wealth (*ḥōsen rāb*, "a great store"). How to interpret the wealth of the wicked characters requires more thinking. One has *pĕʿullat šeqer* ("a false wage"), and the other has *tĕbūʾat rāšāʿ neʿkeret* ("the income of the wicked is troubled"). These descriptions raise questions. How is the wage of the wicked in 11:18a false? Is it false because it is a false source of security, or is it false because the wicked character earned it in a deceptive way? Further, what makes the income of the wicked troubled in 15:6b? Is it troubled because it is insecure or fleeting, or is it troubled because it was gained in a wicked way? The answer may be yes to all of these questions. The outcome is bad for the wicked characters, whatever details readers imagine as to what makes the wealth false in one case and troubled in the other. With this in mind, we can imagine readers constructing meaning in the following ways when they read 11:18 and 15:6.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 11:18

CONTENT BASE SPACES	a	A wicked man making a false wage
	b	A righteous person making a reliable income
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	a	Because being righteous leads to good things, I should be righteous.
	b	Because being wicked leads to bad things, I should not be wicked.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	a	Be righteous.
	b	Do not be wicked.

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 11:18a

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses not to be wicked.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	Unreliable wages would be something that the reader would choose to avoid by choosing not to be wicked.

Proverbs 11:18b

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses to be righteous.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	Reliable wealth would be something that the reader would choose to acquire by choosing to be righteous.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 15:6

CONTENT BASE SPACES	a	Great possessions being in the house of a righteous person
	b	The produce of a wicked person being troubled
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	a	Because being righteous leads to good things, I should be righteous. Because being wicked leads to bad things, I should not be wicked.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	a	Be righteous. Do not be wicked.

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 15:6a

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses to be righteous.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	Great wealth would be something that the reader would choose to acquire by choosing to be righteous.

Proverbs 15:6b

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses not to be wicked.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	Unreliable wealth is something that the reader would avoid by choosing not to be wicked.

4.2.3 Saying structured by inheritance frames

The two scenarios in 13:22 both portray the passing on of wealth. In the first, the *bounty* of the inheritance passed on is remarkable. In the second, things do not go to plan. The righteous character in v 22a is referred to as *ṭôb* (“a good man”), and the wicked character in v 22b is described as a *ḥōṭēʾ* (“sinner”).

טוֹב יַנְחִיל בְּנֵי־בָנִים	a	13:22	A good man causes his grandchildren to inherit,
וְצָפוּן לַצַּדִּיק חֵיל חוֹטֵא	b		but stored up for a righteous man is the wealth of a sinner.

The goodness of the *ṭôb* (“a good man”) is emphasized in v 22a in the description of him leaving such a bountiful inheritance that not only his children, but also his *grand*children receive it. In contrast, the scenario in v 22b does not go to plan. It is also ironic: the sinner stores up wealth (*ḥayil*) for himself (and his progeny?) but ends up losing it to a person who is righteous. The evaluation of the characters in both cases is made doubly clear—through the description of the one as *ṭôb* (“a good man”) and the other as *ḥōṭēʾ* (“sinner”), and also by the planned and unplanned outcomes of the passing on of their wealth. We can therefore imagine that readers would construct meaning in the following way when they read 13:22.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 13:22		
CONTENT BASE SPACES	a	A good man leaving an inheritance to his grandchildren
	b	A sinner storing up wealth for a righteous man
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	a	Because being good leads to good things, I should be good. Because being a sinner leads to bad things, I should not be a sinner.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	a	Be good. Do not be a sinner.

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 13:22a	
ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses to be good.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	Wealth [an inheritance] would be something that the reader would choose to leave for his grandchildren through choosing to be good.

Proverbs 13:22b	
ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses not to be a sinner.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	Wealth would be something that the reader would choose not to lose by choosing not to be a sinner.

4.2.5 Summary

The directives in this section are all *be righteous* and *do not be wicked*. In the simulation summaries, we again see that when readers imagine personal implications for themselves as they

read Proverbs, they will perform Reader in the Scene blends and imagine themselves as the characters who experience the outcomes of wealth and poverty.

4.3 Pursue humility and avoid pride instructional frames

Four sayings in Proverbs exhort readers to pursue humility and avoid folly by portraying consequences that could be construed as material in nature. Two of them open with the same construction, *lipnê šeber* (“before breaking”) (16:18 and 18:12 in §4.3.1). The other two mention Yahweh (15:25 and 22:4 in §4.3.2).

4.3.1 “Before breaking” sayings

The first and second lines in 16:18 and 18:12 begin with the same construction, *lipnê šeber* (“before breaking”) in the a-lines and *wĕlipnê* (“and/but before”) in the b-lines. However, the second half of the b-lines in 16:18 and 18:12 contain very different elements: *kiššālōn* (“stumbling”) in 16:18b and *kābōd* (“honor”) in 18:12b. These outcomes could be construed as material or non-material in nature. I include them here because readers could imagine material loss in 16:18a-b and 18:12a, and material gain in 18:12b. As noted above (p. 280, §4.1.2), honor and wealth are frequently viewed as co-extensive in Proverbs.

לִפְנֵי־שֶׁבֶר גָּאוֹן וְלִפְנֵי כִשָּׁלוֹן גֹּבַהּ רוּחַ	a b	16:18	Before breaking—pride, and before stumbling—a haughty spirit.
לִפְנֵי־שֶׁבֶר יִגְבַּהּ לֵב־אִישׁ וְלִפְנֵי כָבוֹד עֲנָוָה	a b	18:12	Before breaking the mind of a man is high, but before honor is humility.

Schematic reference to frames of pride, humility, breaking, stumbling, and honor provide

conceptual structure to interpretations of these sayings. Hebrew words that evoke ideas of pride, humility, honor, breaking, and stumbling all rely on primary metaphors for meaning. Primary metaphors are metaphors that are rooted in what Mark Johnson (1987) calls *primary scenes*. Dancygier and Sweetser describe primary scenes as "early and pervasive correlations" in human experience that are "often specifically between physical experiential input and subjective judgment or assessment" (2014, 25). For example, "the physical experience of being lower than your adult caregiver correlates with a subjective experience of being less powerful; physical observation of an increase in height of a liquid within the same container correlates with an assessment of increased quantity" (Dancygier and Sweetser 2014, 25).

Primary metaphors derive from these types of correlations that people construe between physical and subjective experiences in early life. Thus, rather than drawing from frame-rich domains, as many metaphors do, primary metaphors build on schematic conceptions of these physical and subjective experiences. The experiential basis of primary metaphors and the metaphorical reasoning involved in working out the meaning of primary metaphors make them incredibly powerful as motivational components in the sayings in this section. This is due to the fact that the causal reasoning involved in primary metaphors is rooted in everyday, inescapable, physical reasoning processes. Consider the fact that we do not need to reason strategically when we think in terms of everyday physical scenes. We cannot *not* be aware of physical reasoning. For example, we do not need strategically to stop and reason about the fact that a huge boulder is above us, or that a high and heavy object will fall hard.[161]

Dancygier and Sweetser discuss two primary metaphors that underlie Hebrew vocabulary

[161] I thank Kevin Chau and Eve Sweetser for helping me articulate the ideas in this paragraph in clearer, stronger terms (personal communication, May 2020).

that evokes conceptions of pride and humility. The experiential correlation between volume and verticality leads to the primary metaphor MORE IS UP and to its counterpart LESS IS DOWN (Dancygier and Sweetser 2014, 26, 79). Both of these metaphors provide meaning to (and prompt causal reasoning processes associated with) Hebrew words that are used in the Hebrew Bible to talk about pride and humility. The primary metaphor MORE IS UP provides meaning to the words:

- *gāʾōn* ("height" and "pride") in 16:18a
- *gōbah rūaḥ* ("high in spirit" or "haughty") in 16:18b
- *g-b-h* + *lēb* ("a heart or mind is high")[162] in 18:12a
- *gēʾeh* or *gēʾîm* ("high" and "proud") in 15:25a (§4.3.2) and 16:19 (§3.6.4.2)

In addition, the meaning of these Hebrew lexical frames each depends on the primary orientational metaphor STATUS IS VERTICALITY and its subframe HIGH STATUS IS UP. Both of these metaphors inherit basic mappings from MORE IS UP.[163] In the metaphor HIGH STATUS IS UP, the high regard a person has for themselves is mapped onto physical height. Thus, the metaphor HIGH REGARD FOR ONESELF IS HEIGHT is reflected in Hebrew words used to refer to pride and people who are proud.

The Hebrew word for humility (*ʿănāwāh*) reflects the antithesis of this.[164] The word

[162] The verbs *g-b-h* and *g-ʾ-h* are both glossed as "to be or become high" and "to be arrogant or proud" (*HALOT* I:168, 171).

[163] Dancygier and Sweetser reflect that if they had to pick one metaphor as a crosslinguistic universal MORE IS UP might be the one they would choose; they also think that HIGH STATUS IS UP is another strong candidate (2014, 165-166). The evidence we have from biblical Hebrew supports this.

[164] Additional Hebrew vocabulary that is used to evoke conceptualizations of humility and characters who are humble depends on these metaphors as well—especially that which is related to the root *š-p-l* ("to be or become low"). I discuss these terms in chapter five in relation to Proverbs 16:18 in which a character who is "lowly in spirit" (*šĕpal rūaḥ*) is portrayed.

ʿănāwāh is related to the verbal root that *HALOT* identifies as *ʿ-n-h* II, one of the meanings of which is glossed as "to bend" or "to be or become bowed" (I:853). Thus, the opposite experiential orientation in comparison with HIGH REGARD FOR ONESELF IS HEIGHT metaphors lies behind the Hebrew word *ʿănāwāh*. The primary metaphor on which this word depends is LOW STATUS IS DOWN. Further, a more specific mapping that characterizes the meaning of *ʿănāwāh* is LOW REGARD FOR ONESELF IS LACK OF HEIGHT.

What is interesting with respect to these words in Proverbs is that the evaluative scales of what is good and bad are reversed. Typically, GOOD IS UP and BAD IS DOWN inherit mappings from MORE IS UP and LESS IS DOWN metaphors. However, in Proverbs, pride is *bad*, so HIGH IS BAD; and humility is *good*, so LOW IS GOOD. These reversals of the value attributed to height and lowness are activated by frames of self-regard. According to Proverbs, when people regard themselves as high in status, this is bad. In contrast, when they regard themselves as low in status, this is good. Thus, HIGH IS BAD and LOW IS GOOD metaphorical mappings obtain when self-regard is superimposed on notions of "height" and "lowliness" in the metaphors that underlie Hebrew words that evoke conceptions of pride and humility.

The use of *šeber* ("breaking") and *kiššālōn* ("stumbling") in 16:18a-b and 18:12a also rely on primary metaphors and metaphors that inherit mappings from primary metaphors:

šeber	STATES ARE PHYSICAL OBJECTS HARM TO A STATE IS HARM TO A PHYSICAL OBJECT
kiššālōn	ACTION IS MOTION DIFFICULTIES ARE IMPEDIMENTS TO MOTION

16:18a-b and 18:12a give no specific information about source frame content beyond the notions of *šeber* ("breaking") and *kiššālōn* ("stumbling"). In addition, neither profile anything that might

be related to the targets of *šeber* and *kiššālōn*. Readers may import some kind of specific frame structure into their construals when they read these words. For example, they may imagine a person tripping as they walk when they read *kiššālōn*, or a jar falling off a ledge and shattering when they read *šeber*. However schematic or specific construals are, readers know that *šeber* and *kiššālōn* are both bad events. Breaking and stumbling may equate to material loss in construals that at least some readers perform. Whatever outcomes readers construe when they read *šeber* and *kiššālōn* in 16:18a-b and 18:12a, it is apparent that they are being advised to *avoid pride*.

Finally, consider *kābōd*. As mentioned above, when *kābōd* is on view, commentators frequently assume that wealth is part of the scene in which a person is described as honored. The root meaning of *kābōd* is "heaviness" or "weight" (*HALOT* I:457). Imagining some conception of *honor*, then, upon encountering the word *kābōd*, is dependent on metaphorical mappings that derive from the primary metaphor SIGNIFICANCE IS WEIGHT.

We may now consider how the primary metaphors reviewed above support and prompt the causal reasoning that readers perform when they read the sayings in this section—and why the support they provide is so powerful. To do this, we need to ask what difference these metaphors make in the motivation that readers construe when they perform those reasoning processes. Why describe pride in terms of height? Why characterize humility as being low? Why associate honor with weight? Further (and importantly), how do the metaphors behind these predications all work together? The metaphors in this section introduce an additional causal element in the reasoning that readers perform in the causal reasoning spaces of interpretations, and it is this additional element that makes the motivation in these sayings so powerful. The mappings in the primary metaphors HIGH REGARD FOR ONESELF IS HEIGHT, LOW REGARD FOR ONESELF IS LACK OF HEIGHT, and SIGNIFICANCE IS WEIGHT make the good and bad outcomes of

pride and humility seem inevitable. The metaphorical reasoning that these metaphors prompt is rooted in everyday and inescapable physical reasoning. In other words, bad things happen to the proud, because high things tend to fall and break (16:18a; 18:12a). Low things, in contrast, do not (18:12b). Further, when low things are also heavy, they are immovable in their great substance (18:12b). Therefore, the physical scene in 18:12b contrasts with a high thing stumbling down from a high height 16:18b.[165]

The negative consequences of *šeber* ("breaking" in 16:18a and 18:12a) and *kiššālōn* ("stumbling" in 16:18b) convey clearly negative evaluations of pride and thinking highly of oneself. In contrast, the portrayal of *kābōd* ("honor") following *ʿănāwāh* ("humility") in 18:12b expresses a clearly positive evaluation of humility. We can therefore imagine the following steps in inferential reasoning (i.e., meaning construction) that readers may engage when they encounter these two sayings.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 16:18 and 18:12

CONTENT BASE SPACES	16:18a	A person being proud before "breaking"
	16:18b	A person being haughty before "stumbling"
	18:12a	A person being proud before "breaking"
	18:12b	A person being humble before being honored
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	16:18a	Because bad things happen to the proud, I should not be proud.
	16:18b	Because bad things happen to the proud, I should not be proud.
	18:12a	Because bad things happen to the proud, I should not be proud.
	18:12b	Because good things happen to the humble, I should be humble.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	16:18a	Do not be proud.
	16:18b	Do not be proud.
	18:12a	Do not be proud.
	18:12b	Be humble.

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 16:18a-b and 18:12a

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses not to be proud.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & POVERTY	Uncertain, but poverty could be something that the reader would

[165] I must again thank Eve Sweetser and Kevin Chau for insights in this paragraph on the impact and mechanisms of metaphorical reasoning involved in interpretations of Prov 16:18 and 18:12 (personal communication, May 2020).

	choose to avoid by choosing not to be proud.

Proverbs 18:12b

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses to be humble.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	Uncertain, but wealth could be something that the reader would choose to acquire by choosing to be humble.

4.3.1 Yahweh sayings

Yahweh is an element in the frames that provide conceptual structure to interpretations of both 15:25 and 22:4. He is a zealous actor in 15:25, and fear of him (*yirʾat YHWH*) is the result of humility in 22:4.

בֵּית גֵּאִים יִסַּח יְהוָה	a	15:25	Yahweh tears down the house of the proud,
וְיַצֵּב גְּבוּל אַלְמָנָה	b		but he maintains the boundary of a widow.

It is certainly the "low" (or humble) social status of widows in ancient Israel that led the producers of this saying to oppose the *gēʾîm* ("high or proud ones") and the *ʾalmānāh* ("widow"). It must also be noted that other features of the imagined stories or backgrounds of the *gēʾîm* and the *ʾalmānāh* cannot be opposed. The scenes in 15:25 are asymmetric in the sense that readers are likely to imagine that the *gēʾîm* ("high or proud ones") made choices (in some construed narrative) that put them in a compromised relation with Yahweh. However, when they imagine narratives for the widow, the *ʾalmānāh*, readers would likely not presume that the widow chose to become a widow or that she did anything to "deserve" this storyline. However, another feature of possible storylines for these characters *do* appear in clear opposition—namely, the idea that Yahweh shows special favor to widows (in addition to other vulnerable groups, such as orphans, Levites, and the poor), and that he opposes the proud and arrogant.

The action attributed to Yahweh in 15:25a is dramatic: tearing down a house. The dramatic nature of this action corresponds to the severity of the consequences that producers

want readers to associate with pride. The personal implications that 15:25b might hold for readers who are not themselves widows are not as direct but can be extrapolated. I see at least two options. One involves readers imagining that they are being exhorted to emulate Yahweh as someone who cares for people who are vulnerable, one example of which are widows. The other involves imagining readers identifying with the widow. The latter is more complex. It would involve readers imagining ways in which they felt they needed protection or provision from Yahweh similar to ways in which a widow in ancient Israel would have. This would involve mapping the needs of the widow onto their own situation—whatever it might be.

Prov 22:4 includes one of the 14 occurrences of the phrase *yirʾat YHWH* ("fear of Yahweh") in Proverbs. (There are 22 in the all of the Hebrew Bible.) Fear of Yahweh, however, is not the primary object of instruction in 22:4; humility is.

עֵקֶב עֲנָוָה יִרְאַת יְהוָה עֹשֶׁר וְכָבוֹד וְחַיִּים	a b	22:4	The result of humility is fear of Yahweh— riches and honor and life.

22:4a describes humility *leading to* fear of Yahweh: "the result of humility is fear of Yahweh" (*ʿēqeb ʿănāwāh yirʾat YHWH*).[166] This is the only saying in Proverbs that gives any explicit indication of what *leads to* fear of Yahweh. More often, a saying or segment in a longer poetic unit describes what fear of Yahweh leads to (1:7; 9:10; 10:27a; 14:26; 14:27b; 16:6), what might

[166] Commentators interpret this verse in various ways. Whybray (1994) describes the syntax as difficult and follows Toy (1908) in speculating that *ʿănāwāh* is not original to the saying but could be a scribal gloss defining *yirʾat YHWH* ("the fear of Yahweh"). Waltke (2005) keeps *ʿănāwāh* in his rendering of the text but also interprets v 4a as defining *ʿănāwāh* as *yirʾat YHWH* ("the fear of Yahweh"). These interpretations both *equate* humility with fear of Yahweh. Murphy (1998) follows Plöger (1984) in suggesting, in contrast, that v 4a portrays a humility that is *based on* fear of Yahweh. Different from both of these readings, Fox interprets v 4a as describing fear of Yahweh as a reward (*ʿēqeb*) for humility. His is the only reading that adequately represents the meaning of *ʿēqeb*. The root meaning of *ʿēqeb* is glossed in *HALOT* as "the very back, the end" and "result, wages" (I:873). The four instances of *ʿēqeb* that reflect the meaning "result" or "end" include Proverbs 22:4, Psalm 19:12 [19:11], 119:33, 112.

be equated with fear of Yahweh (1:29; 2:5; 8:13a; 14:27a; 15:33a), and what fear of Yahweh is better than (15:16). Therefore, 22:4a stands out in Proverbs in profiling a *precondition* for fear of Yahweh: humility.

22:4b also stands out. It consists of three nominal phrases that are portrayed as additional rewards that come from fear of Yahweh: *ʿōšer wĕkābōd wĕḥayyîm* ("wealth and honor and life"). If we compare v 4b to sayings that portray other things to which fear of Yahweh leads (1:7; 9:10; 10:27a; 14:26; 14:27b; 16:6), 22:4 is the only saying in Proverbs that depicts a *material* reward for fear of Yahweh. Consider the following:

WHAT FEAR OF YAHWEH LEADS TO

1:7	knowledge: "fear of Yahweh is the beginning of knowledge" (*yirʾat YHWH rēʾšît daʿat*)
9:10	wisdom: "fear of Yahweh is the beginning of wisdom" (*yirʾat YHWH tĕḥillat ḥokmāh*)
10:27a	life: "fear of Yahweh lengthens life" (*yirʾat YHWH tôsîp yāmîm*)
14:26	strong confidence: "In fear of Yahweh is strong confidence" (*bĕyirʾat YHWH mibṭaḥ ʿōz*)
14:27b	turning away from the snares of death: "to turn from the snares of death" (*lāsūr mimmōqĕšê māwet*)
16:6	turning away from evil: "by fear of Yahweh a person turns from evil" (*bĕyirʾat YHWH sūr mēraʿ*)

As Fox notes, the trio of rewards in 22:4b—*ʿōšer wĕkābōd wĕḥayyîm* ("wealth and honor and life") "sum up the benefits promised to the wise throughout the book." They are also the rewards that Lady Wisdom bestows on her disciples in 8:18 and 8:35 (Fox 2009, 697). As such, we can imagine readers constructing meaning in the following way when they read 22:4 and 15:25.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 15:25

CONTENT BASE SPACES	a	Yahweh tearing down the house of the proud
	b	Yahweh maintaining the boundary of a widow
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	a	Because Yahweh punishes the proud, I should not be proud.
	b_1	Because Yahweh protects widows, I should also protect widows.
	b_2	Because Yahweh protects widows, I should trust him to protect me.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	a	Do not be proud.
	b_1	Protect widows.
	b_2	Trust Yahweh.

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 15:25a

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses not to be proud.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	Wealth [a house] is something that the reader would choose not to lose by choosing not to be proud.

Proverbs 15:25b

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF $READER_1$	Reader is the person who chooses to protect widows.
RELATION BETWEEN $READER_1$ & THE POOR	If a reader imagines that the widow is poor, the poor would be a person with whom the reader would choose to interact or act on behalf of.
ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF $READER_2$	Reader is the person who chooses to trust Yahweh.
RELATION BETWEEN $READER_2$ & THE POOR	None

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 22:4

CONTENT BASE SPACES	a	The result of humility being fear of Yahweh
	b	Fear of Yahweh leading to riches, honor, and life
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	a	Because humility leads to fear of Yahweh, I should be humble.
	b	Because fear Yahweh leads to good things, I should fear Yahweh.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	a-b	Be humble.

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 22:4

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses to be humble.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	Wealth is something that the reader would choose to acquire by being humble.

4.3.3 Summary

As in §4.1 and §4.2, the instructions in §4.3 again prompt readers to construe interpretations of directives by profiling wealth and poverty as consequences for virtues and vices, respectively. In this section, the directives are *be humble* and *do not be proud*. Wealth and poverty again function as motivational elements. As we have also seen in §4.1 and §4.2, neither have anything to do with the instructions in §4.3. Further, readers who perform Reader in the Scene blends will again simulate from participant perspectives and imagine themselves as the ones experiencing the consequences portrayed in this section.

4.4 Conclusions

Wealth and poverty are used to motivate readers to follow the instructions issued by material in this chapter—instructions to be wise and not foolish (§4.1), righteous and not wicked (§4.2), and humble and not proud (§4.3). Because wealth and poverty have nothing to do with the directives in this chapter, their motivational role operates at a more contrived level of idealization in comparison with sayings that exhort readers to be diligent and not lazy. Therefore, when readers imagine themselves gaining and losing wealth as they process the material in this chapter, they imagine themselves gaining or losing wealth in an act/character-consequence scenario that does not represent a natural outcome in the real world. As noted above and in the introduction to chapter four, this is an important distinction between material in this chapter and material in §3.2.1. It is also a commonality between material in this chapter and material in §3.1, §3.2.2, §3.3.1, and §3.4.1.

The simulation summaries in chapter four are highly uniform. Because wealth and poverty are used in the same way in material throughout this chapter, analysts need not differentiate between these uses. In each case, as consequences of virtues and vices, wealth and poverty are central in motivations—but not in instructions. However, analysts *do* need to differentiate between portrayals of wealth as a consequence in scenarios that depict natural outcomes in the real world from scenarios in which wealth is not a natural outcome of an act or character trait. In other words, wealth portrayed as a consequence of diligence cannot be mapped onto wealth portrayed as a consequence of, for example, righteousness. More specifically, the relations between readers and wealth in *be diligent* instructional frames cannot be mapped onto relations between readers and wealth in instructional frames such as *be righteous*.

CHAPTER 5
Wealth and poverty as supporting features of instructions and motivations

5.0 Introduction

Wealth and poverty play *supporting roles* in the instructions and motivations of material in chapter five. They support instructions and motivations in different ways. I divide the material in this chapter according to the type of support that wealth and poverty provide to didactic units. They function as: 1) source frames in metaphorical analogies, 2) profiled frame elements in frame metonymies, and also 3) frame elements in scenarios involved in *qal waḥomer* analogies. Therefore, the three main sections in this chapter are:

5.1 Metaphorical analogies
5.2 Frame metonymies
5.3 *Qal wāḥōmer* analogies

In most cases, the instructional frames in chapter five have nothing to do with wealth or poverty. When wealth or poverty support an instruction, it is usually not because the instruction has to do with one of these themes. Exceptions are (possibly) 10:16 (§5.2.1), 14:4 (§5.2.3), and 19:14 (§5.2.4). More commonly, when wealth and poverty are supporting features in instructions, they perform one of two functions. They either serve adverbial functions, characterizing the manner in which an instruction must be carried out (§5.1.2; §5.1.3); or, they activate frame metonymies, frame metonymically bringing to mind a scenario that serves as the setting for an instruction (§5.2). Wealth and poverty serve as supporting features in motivations with more frequency than they support instructions. As motivational support, wealth and poverty characterize the object of an instruction as highly valuable (§5.1), fitting and good (10:16a, §5.2.1), highly inappropriate (10:16b, §5.2.1; §5.2.2; 6:35, §5.3), needful (§5.2.3; §5.2.4), or not as valuable as something else (19:14, §5.3). In addition, when wealth and poverty are used in similes (§5.1.2), smelting

analogies (§5.1.3), and frame metonymies (§5.2), they support both the instruction and the motivation in didactic units.

5.1 Metaphorical analogies

The material in this section features figurative uses of language in which the source frames of metaphorical mappings are items of wealth. There are three subsections in §5.1: predicational metaphors (§5.1.1), similes (§5.1.2), and smelting analogies (§5.1.3).

5.1.1 Predicational metaphors

Dancygier and Sweetser (2014) distinguish metaphorical mappings expressed in predicative constructions from more common uses of conceptual metaphor. Predicative constructions *establish* metaphorical mappings (e.g., *Achilles is a lion, My job is a jail,* and *That surgeon is a butcher*), rather than merely rely on them, like more common uses of conceptual metaphor (e.g., *We are not getting anywhere in this discussion, He was in a depression,* and *They shot down all my arguments*) (Dancygier and Sweetser 2014, 140).[167] The fourteen metaphorical expressions in §5.1.1 all use predicative constructions that establish metaphorical mappings in which the source frame is an item of wealth. Wealth is not a reward in these sayings. Rather, it is used to characterize the value of people, virtues, and, in one case, a long life (16:31), all things

[167] In addition, Dancygier and Sweetser (2014, 49) stress that while it may be unavoidable shorthand, referring to a single linguistic expression as a "metaphor" can mask a great deal of complexity. Due to intricate networks of inheritance between levels of schematicity in metaphors and potentially overlapping metaphors in a single expression, one metaphorical linguistic form may activate multiple metaphoric mappings.

that the producers want readers to value more than wealth. As such, wealth is used in these sayings to provide *evaluative* information about the objects of instructions. It is in providing this evaluative information that wealth supports the *motivation* in the sayings in this section.

The source frames in this section are either a physical adornment or another possession of high material and/or social value. The rhetorical purpose of each metaphor is of course to persuade readers that the target frame element (e.g., a family member, 12:4, 17:16; old age, 16:31; wisdom, discretion, wise speech, and listening to wise speech, 1:9; 4:9; 10:20; 11:22; 14:24; 20:15; 25:11-12) is as valuable and desirable as the item in the source frame: a crown (*ʿăṭeret* in 4:9b, 12:4a, 14:24a, 16:31a, 17:6a-b), a garland (*liwyāh* in 1:9a, 4:9a, 14:24b), necklaces (*ʿănāqîm* in 1:9b), jewels (20:15b), and other silver and golden ornaments (11:22a; 25:11a, 25:12a). I divide the material in this section into subsections on the basis of the predicational metaphors they contain:

5.1.1.1 PEOPLE ARE OBJECTS
Subcase: PEOPLE OF VALUE ARE PRECIOUS OBJECTS
12:4a; 17:6a, b; 11:22

5.1.1.2 STATES ARE OBJECTS
Subcase: OLD AGE IS A PRECIOUS OBJECT
16:31a

5.1.1.3 ABSTRACT ENTITIES ARE OBJECTS
Subcase: ABSTRACT ENTITIES RELATED TO VIRTUES ARE PRECIOUS OBJECTS
1:9b; 4:9a-b; 14:24a-b; 20:15b; 25:11a-b; 25:12a-b

5.1.1.1 PEOPLE ARE OBJECTS metaphors

The predicational metaphors in 12:4, 17:6, and 11:22 all establish PEOPLE ARE OBJECTS metaphors. Sets of mappings in these metaphors cascade into the more specific PEOPLE OF VALUE

ARE PRECIOUS OBJECTS mappings in these sayings. 12:4 and 17:6 profile relationships between family members: a wife and husband (12:4), grandchildren and grandparents (17:6a), and fathers and children (17:6b). 11:22 is different. It profiles and evaluates the person in question according to only one particular attribute (her beauty) by means of PEOPLE OF VALUE ARE PRECIOUS OBJECTS mappings but immediately undercuts the value of that one attribute with another metaphor.

Viewpoint in simulation is variable in the PEOPLE ARE OBJECTS sayings. Three portray different family members in relation to one another (§5.1.1.1.1), and one portrays a character either *with* whom a reader could imagine being in a relationship or whose *example* a reader could imagine avoiding (§5.1.1.1.2). For the sake of simplicity, I imagine how the earliest readers of Proverbs (i.e., young, unmarried males) might have interpreted these sayings. This is typically the default means by which commentators discuss their interpretations of this material. I note when other viewpointed simulation options are possible, but I do not provide inferential reasoning or simulation summaries to describe these interpretations.

5.1.1.1.1 PEOPLE ARE CROWNS metaphors

A strong wife, grandchildren, and fathers are all characterized as a *crown* (*ʿăṭeret*) in 12:4 and 17:6. The use of crowns in the predicational metaphors in 12:4 and 17:6 maps the high value (and honor inferring properties) of crowns onto the people who are characterized as crowns in these sayings. Consider 12:4.

אֵשֶׁת־חַיִל עֲטֶרֶת בַּעְלָהּ	a	12:4	A woman of strength is the crown of her husband,
וּכְרָקָב בְּעַצְמוֹתָיו מְבִישָׁה	b		and a woman who brings shame is like rot in his bones.

This saying contrasts two types of wives, one who brings honor to her husband and another who

brings her husband shame and misery. The second type of wife is called a *mĕbîšāh* ("a woman who brings shame") and is likened by simile (*kĕ-*) to *rāqāb bĕʿaṣmōtāwv* ("rot in his bones"). In contrast, the first type of wife is called an *ʾēšet ḥayil* ("woman of strength"). Her value is reflected in the statement that she is "the crown of her husband" (*ʿăṭeret baʿlāh*). In the metaphor this predication establishes, the high value and honor-inferring properties of a crown are mapped onto the high value and honor-inferring properties of the *ʾēšet ḥayil* as wife to her husband. Married and unmarried women would simulate from the perspective of the crown in their interpretations of this saying—that is, from the viewpoint of the marriage partner conferring honor to her spouse. In contrast, young, unmarried male readers in the earliest audiences of Proverbs would most likely interpret this saying in the following way.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 12:4		
CONTENT BASE SPACES	a	A woman of strength bringing honor to her husband
	b	A woman who brings shame bringing shame and misery to her husband
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	a	Because a woman of strength will bring me honor, I should hope to marry a woman of strength.
	b	Because a woman who brings shame will make me miserable, I should hope not to marry this kind of woman.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	a	Hope to marry a woman of strength.
	b	Hope not to marry a woman who will bring you shame.

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 12:4a	
ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is a young, unmarried man who chooses to hope for a strong wife who will bring him honor.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	The hoped-for future wife of the reader is characterized as a crown.
Proverbs 12:4b	
ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is a young, unmarried man who chooses to hope not to marry a woman who will bring him shame and make him miserable.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	None

* * *

Prov 17:6 affords multiple viewpoint options as well, depending on whether the reader is

a child, parent, or grandparent. For the sake of simplicity, I imagine that members of the earliest audiences of Proverbs would have been children. In addition, there is a source frame in 17:6 that requires further discussion. Crowns serve as source frames in Proverbs in two ways—by means of the phrase *ʿăṭeret tipʾeret* ("crown of splendor" or "splendid crown" in vv 4:9b, 16:31a), and also simply through reference to an *ʿăṭeret* ("crown" in vv 12:4a, 17:6a, 14:24a). The noun *tipʾeret* ("splendor, glory, beauty") stands alone in parallel relation to *ʿăṭeret* in 17:6. In light of this parallelism and use of the phrase *ʿăṭeret tipʾeret* ("crown of splendor" or "splendid crown") elsewhere, I read *tipʾeret* as an ATTRIBUTE FOR ENTITY metonymy that alludes to *ʿăṭeret* in v 6b. Therefore, I read predicational metaphors in both vv 6a and 6b that have *crown* as source frame.

עֲטֶרֶת זְקֵנִים בְּנֵי בָנִים	a	17:6	Grandchildren are the crown of elders,
וְתִפְאֶרֶת בָּנִים אֲבוֹתָם	b		and their fathers are the splendor of children.

The use of wealth in *ʿăṭeret* in v 6a and (through metonymy) *tipʾeret* in v 6b again characterizes grandchildren (*bĕnê bānîm*) and fathers (*ʾābōt*) as valuable. If we imagine young male readers as children, they would imagine themselves characterized as crowns of their grandparents (i.e., "elders," *zĕqēnîm*) when they read v 6a. In contrast, when they read v 6b, they would imagine their *fathers* characterized as *their* crowns. 17:6 may be meant to function as a kind of merismus that alludes to the reciprocal relations and valuations of all members in a family. Each one honors and is honored by all the others. As such, this saying may be read as an exhortation to young male readers simultaneously to be grateful for their family and to honor them.

The exhortation to honor their family can be extrapolated from the metaphor in which *they* are characterized as a crown. This metaphor—"grandchildren are the crown of their elders" (*ʿăṭeret zĕqēnîm*)—in v 6a could be read as an exhortation to live up to that characterization. Simultaneously, the exhortation to be grateful for their family can be derived from the metaphor

in which their fathers are characterized as their *tipʾeret* (“splendor”) in v 6b. We can therefore imagine the earliest young readers constructing meaning in the following ways when they read this saying.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 17:6

CONTENT BASE SPACES	a	Grandchildren bringing honor to grandparents
	b	Fathers bringing honor to children
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	a	Because I have the potential to bring my grandparents honor, I should bring them honor.
	b	Because my father brings me honor, I should be grateful for him.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	a	Bring honor to your grandparents [and all family members].
	b	Be grateful for your father [and all family members].

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 17:6a

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses to bring honor to their family.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	The reader is characterized as a crown of their grandparents

Proverbs 17:6b

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses to be grateful for their family.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	The father of the reader is characterized as a crown. (via metonymy by means of *tipʾeret*)

5.1.1.1.2 A BEAUTIFUL WOMAN IS A GOLD RING metaphor in Proverbs 11:22

Prov 11:22 is a complex metaphorical expression in which two metaphors interact. In one, a beautiful woman is the target, and a gold ring is the source; and in the other, turning from discretion is the target and placement in the nose of a pig is the source.

נֶזֶם זָהָב בְּאַף חֲזִיר	a	11:22	A gold ring in the nose of a pig –
אִשָּׁה יָפָה וְסָרַת טָעַם	b		a beautiful woman who turns from discretion.

The A BEAUTIFUL WOMAN IS A GOLD RING metaphor derives from the PEOPLE OF VALUE ARE PRECIOUS OBJECTS metaphor, and the TURNING FROM DISCRETION IS BEING IN THE NOSE OF A PIG

metaphor derives from the EVENTS ARE STATES family of metaphorical mappings. In 11:22, the second metaphor cancels the value expressed in the first. In the first metaphor, the high value of a gold ring is mapped onto the beauty of the woman. However, the high value of this ring is nullified when placed in the nose of a pig. In the second set of metaphorical mappings, the grossness of that location is mapped onto turning away from discretion. It must be said that nothing is wrong with the ring in v 22a. The ring is good. However, it is a pretty but useless object to a pig. In the same way, nothing is wrong with the beauty of the woman in v 22b. Her beauty is a good thing. But, like the ring in the nose of a pig, it is a useless quality of her person for her partner when she has no sense. The point of v 22 is to say that beautiful women who do not exercise discretion are not good life partners. This saying could also be construed as an exhortation to exercise discretion.

Young male readers may interpret at least two instructions when they read this saying: *do not turn away from discretion* and *find a partner who does not turn away from discretion*. In both cases, reference to wealth supports the motivation in this saying by symbolizing the high value of a good thing that is ruined by a worse bad thing. We can therefore imagine readers performing the following meaning constructions when they read this saying.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 11:22

CONTENT BASE SPACES	a	A gold ring in the nose of a pig being compared to
	b	A beautiful woman turning from discretion
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	a-b_1	Because women who turn from discretion are not good (no matter how beautiful they are), I should avoid women who turn from discretion (no matter how beautiful they are).
	a-b_2	Because turning from discretion is not good, I should not turn from discretion.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	a-b_1	Avoid women who turn from discretion.
	a-b_2	Do not turn from discretion.

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 11:22

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	$a\text{-}b_1$	Reader is the person who chooses to avoid women who turn from discretion.
	$a\text{-}b_2$	Reader is the person who chooses not to turn from discretion.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	$a\text{-}b_1$	A woman with whom the reader would imagine being in a relationship is characterized as a gold ring in the nose of a pig.
	$a\text{-}b_2$	The discretion of the reader is characterized as a gold ring.

5.1.1.2 STATES ARE OBJECTS metaphor

Gray hair is a metonymy for old age in 16:31. Therefore, the more specific metaphor that inherits from STATES ARE OBJECTS and DESIRABLE STATES ARE PRECIOUS OBJECTS metaphorical mappings in this saying is OLD AGE IS A SPLENDID CROWN (*ʿăṭeret tipʾeret*).

עֲטֶרֶת תִּפְאֶרֶת שֵׂיבָה	a	16:31	Gray hair is a splendid crown;
בְּדֶרֶךְ צְדָקָה תִּמָּצֵא	b		it is found in the way of righteousness.

16:31b explains how readers might achieve the feat of reaching old age—namely, by living a righteous life (i.e., by walking in "the way of righteousness"). The earliest young male students reading this saying would not themselves have been near a period of old age. Therefore, they may still have interpreted at least two instructions when they read this saying. They could have read it as an exhortation to be righteous themselves and also as a command to honor their elders. The characterization of old age as a "splendid crown" (*ʿăṭeret tipʾeret*) maps the high value of this crown onto the state of old age. Living a long life is a desirable outcome. In addition, 16:31b attributes value more specifically to a long life that has been lived "in the way of righteousness" (*bĕderek ṣĕdāqāh*). With these evaluative features in mind, we can imagine the earliest audiences of Proverbs constructing meaning in the following ways when they read this saying.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 16:31

CONTENT BASE SPACES	a	Old age being an honorable state
	b	People reaching old age because they have led righteous lives
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	a-b_1	Because leading a righteous life leads to a long life, and because that long life is a point of honor, I should be righteous.
	a-b_2	Because leading a righteous life leads to a long life, and because that long life is a point of honor, I should honor my elders.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	a-b_1	Be righteous.
	a-b_2	Honor your elders.

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 16:31

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	a-b_1	Reader is a young person who chooses to be righteous.
	a-b_2	Reader is a young person who chooses to honor their elders.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	a-b_1	A future life state of the reader is characterized as a crown.
	a-b_2	The life state of elders in the community of the reader is characterized as a crown.

5.1.1.3 ABSTRACT ENTITIES ARE OBJECTS metaphors

The didactic units in Proverbs that include ABSTRACT ENTITIES ARE OBJECTS metaphors divide into two subgroups. The metaphors in both involve more specific ABSTRACT ENTITIES THAT ARE ASSOCIATED WITH A VIRTUE ARE PRECIOUS OBJECTS metaphorical mappings. In each case, the virtue in question is wisdom. The first subgroup (§5.1.1.3.1) includes material that contains the more specific metaphors WISDOM IS A CROWN and WISDOM/FOLLY IS A GARLAND (1:9; 4:9; 14:24). The second subgroup (§5.1.1.3.2) includes sayings in which wise speech and listening to wise speech are the target frame items.

5.1.1.3.1 WISDOM IS A CROWN and WISDOM/FOLLY IS A GARLAND metaphors

Prov 1:9 and 4:9 both occur in lectures in the opening chapters of the book. 14:24 occurs in the first collection of the sentence literature in Proverbs. Each of these units contains some

combination of WISDOM IS A CROWN, WISDOM IS A GARLAND, and FOLLY IS A GARLAND metaphors. The metaphors represented by each of these mappings interact with metonymy as well. Specifically, as in the crown sayings above, references to crowns, garlands, and necklaces in this section all also function as metonymies for *honor*.

5.1.1.3.1.1 Proverbs 1:9 and 4:9

As segments in two different lectures in the opening chapters of Proverbs, the explicit speech performance frame in which both 1:9 and 4:9 are embedded is a father-son instructional frame of address. The source frames in the metaphors in these units are explicitly named—*liwyat ḥēn* (“garland of favor”) in 1:9a; *ʿănāqîm* (“necklaces” or “chains”) in v 9b; *liwyat ḥēn* again in 4:9a; and an *ʿăṭeret tipʾeret* (“splendid crown”) in 4:9b. However, the target frames are explicit only in 1:9. We will see, though, that the target frames in 4:9 can be equated with the explicit target frames in 1:9. 1:8-9 are the opening lines of the first lecture (1:8-19) in Prov 1-9.

שְׁמַע בְּנִי מוּסַר אָבִיךָ	a	1:8	Hear, my son, the discipline of your father,
וְאַל־תִּטֹּשׁ תּוֹרַת אִמֶּךָ	b		and do not forsake the teaching of your mother.
כִּי לִוְיַת חֵן הֵם לְרֹאשֶׁךָ	a	1:9	For they are a garland of favor for your head,
וַעֲנָקִים לְגַרְגְּרֹתֶיךָ	b		and necklaces for your neck.

The son is exhorted to listen and hold onto the discipline and teaching that he receives from his parents in vv 8-9. This discipline and teaching are characterized in v 9 as adornments that are placed on the head of the son (*liwyat ḥēn*, “garland of favor” in v 9a) and also on his neck (*ʿănāqîm*, “necklaces” or “chains” in v 9b). Readers who imagine (i.e., simulate) personal implications for themselves when they read this lecture in Proverbs are primed to construe themselves as the addressee in the place of the son. They will imagine, in other words, that they

are the ones being told to heed parental instruction when they read 1:8-9.

The source frame in the metaphor in v 9a is a "garland of favor" (*liwyat ḥēn*),[168] and in v 9b, the source frame is a "necklace" or "chains" (*ʿănāqîm*).[169] The Hebrew words for both "garland" and "necklaces" are rare in the Hebrew Bible. The word glossed "garland" occurs only two times, both as a *liwyat ḥēn* ("garland of favor") and both in Proverbs (here in 1:9 and 4:9; but see below on 14:24b for a possible third occurrence of *liwyat-* in a construct phrase). The target frame in both lines of 1:9 is the parental instruction described in v 8. The high social and material value of the garland and the necklaces are mapped onto the high value that the producers of Proverbs want readers to identify with parental instruction.

The high social value is mapped onto these metaphors via metonymy. The crowns, garlands, and necklaces in 1:9 and 4:9 *stand for* the honor attributed to those who wear these items. The implication is that children who heed parental instruction can anticipate receiving honor. The compression of the causal connection between heeding instruction and being honored in the crown, garland, and necklace metonymies in 1:9 and 4:9 make this positive consequence seem inevitable—or at least more direct. In other words, people are more primed to heed instruction when the result or outcome seems more direct or inevitable. "It is not that [heeding

[168] Fox underscores, citing Ehrlich and Ibn Yaḥyah, that the term *ḥēn* ("favor") in both 1:9a and 4:9a alludes to public honor, i.e., having or being shown favor in the eyes of others (2000, 83). So, even the qualifying feature attributed to the garland evokes the idea of honor.

[169] The particular form of *ʿănāqîm* occurs only here in the Hebrew Bible. A ms form of this word is used in Song 4:9, and an fp form is used in Judges 8:26. The Shulammite woman (the bride) wears a single-stranded *ʿănāq* in Song of Songs, and in the book of Judges, the camels of Midianite kings are said to have been decked with *ʿănāqōt*. Comparing the situations in Song 4:9 and Judges 8:26, adornments worn by the camels of kings may associate more strongly with honor than the singular chain worn by the Shulammite. Her beauty may be a more salient feature in Song 4 than her honor. However, honor may be part of her portrait in Song 4 as well.

instruction] leads to honor, it is your honor."[170] This is part of the simulation: readers may imagine themselves wearing these items. Reference to physical metonyms of honor activates feelings of honor that readers may have experienced at some point—or can imagine receiving had they been given a crown, garland, or necklace. Chau also notes the completeness that is reflected in the gender and number of terms in 1:9. Compare the fs *liwyat ḥēn* ("garland of favor") in v 9a and the mp *ʿănāqîm* ("necklaces" or "chains") in v 9b (personal communication, May 2020).

The metaphors in 4:9 are ultimately the same as the metaphors in 1:9. However, they are expressed in slightly different ways.

תִּתֵּן לְרֹאשְׁךָ לִוְיַת־חֵן עֲטֶרֶת תִּפְאֶרֶת תְּמַגְּנֶךָּ	a b	4:9	She [Lady Wisdom] will give your head a garland of favor, (with) a splendid crown she will crown you.

The difference in 4:9 is that only the source frames *liwyat ḥēn* ("garland of favor") in v 9a and an *ʿăṭeret tipʾeret* ("crown of splendor") in 9b are made explicit. It is clear, as Fox notes, that the metaphor in 4:9 again "signifies the benefits of learning" (2009, 175). However, the target frames are implicit. 4:9 serves as the conclusion of the fifth lecture (4:1-9) in the opening chapters of Proverbs. The explicit directives preceding v 9 comprise the lesson of the fifth lecture. They also supply the target frames for the metaphors in 4:9. These directives may be summarized as follows:

4:4	Let your mind/heart (*lēb*) keep hold of my words
	Keep my commandments
4:5	Acquire wisdom
	Acquire understanding
	Do not forget and do not turn aside from the words of my mouth
4:6	Do not forsake her (Wisdom)
	Love her

[170] Kevin Chau (personal communication, May 2020). I again thank Chau for pushing me to elaborate the metonymic and metaphorical reasoning prompted by these sayings more fully.

4:7 Acquire wisdom
4:8 Prize her (Wisdom)
Embrace her

Motivation to follow these instructions is provided throughout the lecture. For example, v 8 reads, “Prize her greatly, and she will exalt you; she will honor you, if you embrace her” (*salsělehā ūtĕrōmĕmehā tĕkabbēdĕkâ kî tĕḥabbĕqennā*). Therefore, as the concluding statement, v 9 adds a kind of capstone motivation to the lecture in that v 9 builds on v 8 by portraying what v 8 says that Lady Wisdom will do.

We can imagine readers interpreting 1:9 and 4:9 in the following ways when they come to them in their readings of the first and fifth lectures in Prov 1-9.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 1:9

CONTENT BASE SPACES	a-b	Parental instruction being of great value and bringing honor to the addressee
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	a-b	Because parental instruction is so valuable and will bring me honor, I should heed the instruction of my parents.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	a-b	Heed the instruction of your parents. [explicit in Proverbs 1:8]

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 1:9

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	a-b	Reader is the person who chooses to heed the instruction of their parents.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	a-b	The instruction of the reader’s parents is characterized as a garland and necklaces.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 4:9

CONTENT BASE SPACES	a-b	Wisdom bestowing honor on the addressee
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	a-b	Because wisdom is so valuable and will bring me honor, I should pursue wisdom.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	a-b	Pursue wisdom. [explicit in Proverbs 4:4-8]

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 4:9

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	a-b	Reader is the person who chooses to pursue wisdom.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	a-b	The honor that wisdom would bring to the reader, should they pursue wisdom, is characterized as a garland and a crown.

5.1.1.3.1.2 Proverbs 14:24

Prov 14:24 (with emendations) contains the final crown and garland metaphors that we find in Proverbs. If the proposed emendations are accepted, this saying also presents readers with an ironic twist in its use of garland-as-metonymy-for-honor imagery. This is because of the FOLLY IS A GARLAND metaphor in v 24b.

עֲטֶרֶת חֲכָמִים עָשְׁרָם אִוֶּלֶת כְּסִילִים אִוֶּלֶת	a b	14:24	The crown of the wise is prudence (with emendation); the garland of fools is folly (with emendation).

Without the proposed emendations, the text in M reads, "The crown of the wise is their wealth, and the folly of fools is folly." These are understandable statements. However, neither align well with other uses of crown and garland metaphors in Proverbs. Both the parallelism and the sense of this saying comport much more with other crown and garland metaphors in the book when two emendations are made.[171] With regard to parallelism, the emendations produce tighter symmetry than that in M. Compare the two. The symmetrical items are underlined.

<u>item of wealth</u> in construct with a virtuous character *ʿăṭeret ḥăkāmîm*	<u>a virtue</u> *ʿărūmāh*
<u>item of wealth</u> in construct with a vicious character *liwyat kĕsîlîm*	<u>a vice</u> *ʾiwwelet*

In comparison, without the emendations, there is observable asymmetry in M (noted in bold).

[171] I follow the LXX in the first emendation and Fox (who follows Ehrlich) in the second. Regarding the first, the LXX has *πανοῦργος* ("cunning") where M has *ʿošrām* ("their wealth"). The emendation involves assuming that the LXX translator may have read *ʿrmh* (the feminine adjective, *ʿărūmāh*) rather than *ʿšrm* in his Vorlage. The second emendation involves emending the first *ʾwlt* (*ʾiwwelet*, "folly") in v 24b to *lwyt* (*liwyat*, "garland" in construct form preceding *kĕsîlîm*, "fools"). In favor of not emending, Fox makes the persuasive point that LXX could have rendered a moralizing reformulation of *ʿošrām* in providing *πανοῦργος* (Fox 2015, 223-224). Moralizing translations are fairly common in LXX Proverbs. However, I cannot get past the sense and parallelism of the saying with this first emendation. Regarding the second emendation of *ʾwlt* (*ʾiwwelet*, "folly") to *lwyt* (*liwyat*, "garland" in construct form) in v 24b, Fox underscores that it is entirely conjectural and also reflects that it "fits perfectly" (2009, 582).

item of wealth in construct with a virtuous character *ʿăṭeret ḥăkāmîm*	**an item of wealth** *ʿošrām*
a vice in construct with a vicious character *ʾiwwelet kĕsîlîm*	**a vice** *ʾiwwelet*

With no emendations, an item of wealth parallels a vice in vv 24a*α* and 24b. Symmetry between lines is not always tight in Hebrew poetry. Neither does it need to be. However, when it is, it can be very striking poetically—as it is in 14:24 with the adoption of the proposed emendations. With these emendations, an item of wealth parallels an item of wealth in v 24a*α*, and a virtue parallels a vice in v 24b.

Regarding the sense of the instructions in v 24, the emendations produce stronger resonance with other instances of crown and garland metaphors (and metonymies) in Proverbs. In every other case of ABSTRACT ENTITIES ARE OBJECTS metaphors in which an item of wealth is the source frame (1:9; 4:9; 10:20; 20:15; 25:1-12), the target frame item is a virtue—not wealth itself. With the above emendations, the target frame of the crown metaphor in v 24a is prudence (*ʿărūmāh*); and the target frame of the garland metaphor in v 24b is the opposite of wisdom—namely, folly (*ʾiwwelet*). Thus, with the proposed emendations, the target frame items are again related to wisdom (or the lack thereof).

In sum, the proposed emendations produce two symmetrical metaphorical expressions—one that earnestly describes the value of prudence and another that mocks the value of folly in irony. The garland in the phrase *liwyat kĕsîlîm* (“garland of fools”) in v 24b is a legitimate emblem of honor. However, in construct with “fools” (*kĕsîlîm*), the value of the garland is inverted. Only within that inverted-value frame (i.e., *liwyat kĕsîlîm*, “a garland of fools”) is a *liwyāh* (“garland”) appropriately attached to folly. A garland that belongs to a fool is a worthless garland. Therefore, the “crown of the wise” in v 24a and the “garland of fools” in v 24b clearly

define the one as great in value and the other as very little (or worthless) in value. The first metaphor (with metonymy) functions as an earnest description of value, and the other as an ironic means of devaluing the value of fools. We can therefore imagine readers constructing meaning in the following way when they read 14:24.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 14:24		
CONTENT BASE SPACES	a	The prudence of the wise bringing honor to the wise
	b	The folly of fools bringing ridicule [ironic use of *liwyāh*] to fools
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	a	Because wisdom will bring me honor, I should pursue wisdom.
	b	Because folly will bring me ridicule, I should avoid folly.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	a	Pursue wisdom.
	b	Avoid folly.

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 14:24		
ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	a	Reader is the person who chooses to pursue wisdom.
	b	Reader is the person who chooses to avoid folly.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	a	The honor that wisdom would bring to the reader, should they pursue wisdom, is characterized as a crown.
	b	The ridicule that folly would bring to the reader, should they not avoid folly, is characterized ironically as a garland.

5.1.1.3.2 Metaphors that involve wise speech

There are four predicational metaphors in Proverbs in which the source frames are items of wealth and the target frames involve speech (10:20; 20:10; 25:11, 12). One involves speech of the righteous (10:20); one profiles wise speech (20:10); and two portray situations in which wise speech is spoken and heeded (25:11, 12). In each case, the metaphors inherit mappings from ABSTRACT ENTITIES ARE OBJECTS and ABSTRACT ENTITIES THAT ARE RELATED TO VIRTUES ARE PRECIOUS OBJECTS metaphors. Consider 10:20.

כֶּסֶף נִבְחָר לְשׁוֹן צַדִּיק	a	10:20	The tongue of the righteous is choice silver;
לֵב רְשָׁעִים כִּמְעָט	b		the mind of the wicked is as a trifle.

"Tongue" (*lāšōn*) in 10:20a is a metonymy for speech. The metaphor that underlies (and is evident in the linguistic predication in v 20a) is therefore THE SPEECH OF THE RIGHTEOUS IS CHOICE SILVER. The high value of "choice silver" (*kesep neḥmād*) maps onto the high value of the speech of the righteous in this saying. The term in v 20b that parallels *kesep neḥmād* ("choice silver") in v 20a is the phrase *kimʿat* ("like or as a little"). As a term in parallel with the high-value item of "choice silver," *mĕʿat* ("little") profiles the little worth of the mind (*lēb*) of the wicked. The word *lēb* in v 20b is a metonymy for the intelligence or intellect of the wicked. The implication is therefore that the substandard intelligence of the wicked could never produce speech equal in value to that of the righteous. We can therefore imagine readers constructing meaning in the following way when they read 10:20.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 10:20

CONTENT BASE SPACES	a	The speech of the righteous being characterized as choice silver
	b	The mind of the wicked being characterized as of little worth
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	a	Because the speech of the righteous is so valuable, I should learn to speak like the righteous / I should be righteous.
	b	Because the mind of the wicked is of little worth, I should not be wicked / listen to the wicked.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	a	Learn to speak like the righteous. / Be righteous.
	b	Do not be wicked. / Do not listen to the wicked.

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 10:20a

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses to learn to speak like the righteous or to be righteous.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	Righteous speech [ideally, righteous speech that the reader will speak in the future] is characterized as choice silver.

Proverbs 10:20b

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses not to be [or listen to] the wicked.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	The intelligence of the wicked is characterized as being of little value.

* * *

Metonymy and metaphor are again both active in the meaning construction that is cued by 20:15. In this case, "lips" (*śĕpātayim*) serve as a metonymy for speech. The metaphor underlying the expression in 20:15b is therefore WISE SPEECH IS A PRECIOUS JEWEL.

יֵ֣שׁ זָ֭הָב וְרָ֣ב־פְּנִינִ֑ים וּכְלִ֥י יְקָ֝ר שִׂפְתֵי־דָֽעַת	a b	20:15	There is gold and an abundance of gems, but lips of knowledge are a precious jewel.

20:15 could be interpreted as expressing a kind of better-than statement without a *ṭôb-min* formula. The reference to gold and an abundance of gems in v 15a assumes the high value of these items. However, the implication of v 15b is that a precious jewel is even more valuable. The wise speech (*siptê daʿat*) in v 15b is thus also more valuable than gold and an abundance of gems. Characterizing wise speech as a precious jewel again maps the high value of the jewel onto the value of wise speech. We can therefore imagine readers constructing meaning in the following ways when they read this saying.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 20:15

CONTENT BASE SPACES	a	There being gold and an abundance of gems
	b	Wise [i.e., knowledgeable] speech being characterized as a precious jewel
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	a-b	Because wise speech is so valuable, I should learn to speak wisely.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	a-b	Learn to speak wisely.

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 20:15

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses to learn to speak wisely.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	Wise speech [ideally, wise speech that the reader will speak in the future] is characterized as a precious jewel.

* * *

Prov 25:11-12 fit together much like the "apples of gold" encased in the "settings of

silver" in 25:11a. 25:11 characterizes "a word spoken at the right time," and 25:12 describes "a wise person offering a rebuke to a listening ear." The more specific mappings that support and are cued by these expressions again derive from ABSTRACT ENTITIES ARE OBJECTS and ABSTRACT ENTITIES THAT ARE RELATED TO VIRTUES ARE PRECIOUS OBJECTS mappings.

תַּפּוּחֵי זָהָב בְּמַשְׂכִּיּוֹת כָּסֶף דָּבָר דָּבֻר עַל־אָפְנָיו	a b	25:11	Apples of gold in settings of silver – a word spoken at its right time.
נֶזֶם זָהָב וַחֲלִי־כָתֶם מוֹכִיחַ חָכָם עַל־אׇזֶן שֹׁמַעַת	a b	25:12	A gold ring and vessels of fine gold – a wise person offering a rebuke to a listening ear.

The source frame items in vv 11-12 are more elaborate than in other metaphors in this section. The detail of the imagery in v 11 is especially notable. The relation between the apples of gold and the settings of silver in which they are placed are opposite the relation between a word and the right time at which it is spoken. In other words, readers can imagine a word addressing a situation "at its right time" as elegantly and fittingly as "apples of gold" that have been placed in "settings of silver." The one fits beautifully into the other. As Chau pointed out to me in personal communication (May 2020), the metaphor here is one of crafting: words spoken at the right time must be carefully crafted and require skill in the same way that apples of gold must be crafted and skillfully placed in settings of silver.

The imagery in v 12 does not include relations between items in the way that the imagery in v 11 does. Rather, source frame items in v 12 ("a gold ring and vessels of fine gold") give the impression of a cache of items and hence their great value. The target frame in v 12 is unique in that it represents two instances of wisdom in action, the *speaking* of wise words and the *reception* of wise words. We can imagine readers constructing meaning in the following ways when they read these sayings.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 25:11		
CONTENT BASE SPACES	a	Apples of gold in settings of silver being used to characterize
	b	A word spoken at the right time
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	a-b	Because saying the right thing at the right time is such a good thing and must be carefully crafted, I should learn to carefully craft the right words at the right time.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	a-b	Learn to carefully craft the right words at the right time.
Proverbs 25:12		
CONTENT BASE SPACES	a	A gold ring and vessels of fine gold being used to characterize
	b	A wise person offering a rebuke to a listening ear
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	a-b	Because giving and listening to wise rebukes are such good things, I should learn to give and listen to wise rebukes.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	a-b	Learn to give and listen to wise rebukes.

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 25:11-12		
ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	11	Reader is the person who chooses to learn to say the right thing at the right time.
	12	Reader is the person who chooses to learn to give and listen to wise rebukes.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	11	A word spoken at the right time and the right time in which it is spoken are characterized by items of wealth.
	12	Wise rebukes [that the reader might give] and ears that listen to wise rebukes [that might belong to the reader or someone to whom the reader speaks] are characterized by items of wealth.

5.1.2 Similes

Dancygier and Sweetser analyze similes as limited single-scope blends (2014, 138-148). Single-scope blends are blends in which *one* of the two inputs to a blend serves as the primary organizing frame for the blend (Dancygier and Sweetser 2014, 87, 90). All metaphors are single-scope blends. In metaphors, the source frame provides the primary conceptual structure for the blend. As *limited* single-scope blends, similes also receive their primary organizing structure from a single source frame. However, unlike metaphors, similes do not make broad use of the conceptual structure available in frames and domains. Metaphors map whole networks of relational and inferential structure from one frame or domain onto another. In contrast, similes

map single salient attributes in one frame onto singular relevant elements in another. Thus, these more limited mappings are fittingly called “limited single-scope blends.”

There are two similes in Proverbs in which an item of wealth is part of the source frame. Both occur in Prov 2:4. 2:4 is part of the lengthy exordium (2:1-11) that opens the second lecture (2:1-22) in Prov 1-9. Consider v 4 in the flow of the first part of this exordium.

בְּנִי אִם־תִּקַּח אֲמָרָי	a	2:1	My son, if you take my words,
וּמִצְוֹתַי תִּצְפֹּן אִתָּךְ	b		and you store my commandments with you,
לְהַקְשִׁיב לַחָכְמָה אָזְנֶךָ	a	2:2	making your ear attentive to wisdom,
תַּטֶּה לִבְּךָ לַתְּבוּנָה	b		inclining your mind to insight,
כִּי אִם לַבִּינָה תִקְרָא	a	2:3	if you call out for understanding,
לַתְּבוּנָה תִּתֵּן קוֹלֶךָ	b		[if] you lift your voice for insight,
אִם־תְּבַקְשֶׁנָּה כַּכָּסֶף	a	2:4	if you seek it like silver,
וְכַמַּטְמוֹנִים תַּחְפְּשֶׂנָּה	b		and search for it like hidden treasures,
אָז תָּבִין יִרְאַת יְהוָה	a	2:5	then you will understand fear of Yahweh,
וְדַעַת אֱלֹהִים תִּמְצָא	b		and you will find knowledge of God.

The similes in v 4 support both instructional and motivational components in this lecture. As a support for the instruction, the similes serve an adverbial function. Specifically, they depict the manner in which readers are to search for wisdom. The source frame of the similes in v 4 is searching for wealth and the target frame is searching for wisdom. Thus, the salient attribute in the source frame that maps onto the target frame in the similes in both lines of v 4 is the manner in which a person would conduct each search. Therefore, the instruction in v 4 is, *search for wisdom with the same energy and focus with which you would search for wealth*.

These similes also contribute to the motivation in the lecture overall. The metaphor that underlies the similes in v 4—WISDOM IS A PRECIOUS OBJECT—maps the value of “silver” (*kesep*) and “hidden treasures” (*maṭmōnîm*) in v 4 onto the value of wisdom. We can situate this

motivational element in the overall structure and content of lecture two. This lecture can be read as one long conditional sentence. Consider its intricately structured argument.

2:1-4 **If** you listen to, cry out for, and search diligently for wisdom
(ʾ***im***, ***kî*** ʾ***im***, and ʾ***im*** in vv 1, 3, and 4, respectively)
2:5-8 **Then** (ʾ***āz***) you will understand the fear of Yahweh and obtain knowledge of God
Because (***kî***) it is God who gives wisdom,
and this will protect you
2:9-11 **Then (**ʾ***āz*****)** you will understand righteousness, justice, uprightness, and every good path
Because (***kî***) you will have received wisdom,
and this will protect you
2:12-15 **In order to deliver you** (***lĕhaṣṣîlkā***) from dangerous men …
2:16-19 **In order to deliver you** (***lĕhaṣṣîlkā***) from dangerous women …
2:20 **So that** (***lĕma*ʿ*an***) you will continue on a path of goodness
2:21-22 **For** (***kî***) the upright will remain in the land
but the wicked will be cut off from it.

In the following summaries, I specify information that readers might construe in their content base spaces of interpretations of only v 4. However, I represent contents in causal reasoning and directive spaces that would derive from the lecture more broadly. (The contents in directive spaces derive specifically from the conditional statements in vv 1, 3, and 4.)

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 2:4

CONTENT BASE SPACES	a	Conditional statement: a son seeking wisdom as if for silver [protasis]
	b	Conditional statement: a son seeking wisdom as if for hidden treasures [protasis]

Proverbs 2:1-22

CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	Because wisdom will protect me from temptations and lead to a long and secure life in the land, I should listen to, cry out for, and search diligently for wisdom.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	Listen to, cry out for, and search diligently for wisdom. [explicitly represented in the conditional statements in vv 1, 3, and 4.]

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 2:1-22

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses to listen to, cry out for, and search diligently for wisdom.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	The effort that the reader would put into searching for wisdom is characterized as the effort that they might put into searching for wealth.

5.1.3 Smelting analogies

The smelting of precious metals is the source frame of analogies that we find in 17:3, 25:4-5, and 27:21. The salient feature of the precious metals—*kesep* ("silver") and *zāhāb* ("gold")—which is of greatest concern in these sayings is not their high value. Rather, the process of getting silver and gold into a pure form is the focus of 17:3, 25:4-5, and 27:21. The process of extracting silver and gold from their respective ores is compared to three very different processes in 17:3, 25:4-5, and 27:21—purifying a royal court (25:4-5), Yahweh testing peoples' "minds" (17:3), and people testing what others say about them (or what they say about others) (27:21). The smelting analogies in these sayings function rhetorically in a similar way to the similes in 2:4 in that they perform adverbial functions in support of instructions and valuational functions in support of motivations. Wealth in these analogies supports instructions by characterizing either the manner in which something will be done to readers (the testing of Yahweh in 17:3) or the manner in which readers (or other human characters) must carry out instructions (removing wicked people from a royal court in 25:4-5 and testing praise in 27:21). In support of motivations, the end results of smelting—pure silver and gold—are mapped onto the value (and purity) of the end results of each of the above processes.

5.1.3.1 A king and his reign

There are two analogies in 25:4-5. In the first, the refining of silver maps onto the purification of the court of a king; and in the second, the purity of a silver vessel that is formed from smelted silver maps onto a reign that is established in righteousness.

הָגֹו סִיגִים מִכָּסֶף	a	25:4	Remove dross from silver,
וְיֵצֵא לַצֹּרֵף כֶּלִי	b		and a vessel comes forth for the smelter.
הָגֹו רָשָׁע לִפְנֵי־מֶלֶךְ	a	25:5	Remove a wicked man from the presence of a king,
וְיִכֹּון בַּצֶּדֶק כִּסְאֹו	b		and his throne is established in righteousness.

The impurity of the dross in v 4a maps onto the impurity with which the wicked in v 5a would defile a royal court before being removed from it. The phrase "his throne" (*kisʾô*) in v 5b is a metonymy for the reign of a king. Therefore, in the second analogy, the purity of the vessel in v 4b, formed from the smelted silver, maps onto the purity of the reign of the king in v 5b, which is purified once the wicked are removed from the court.

Van Leeuwen (1986) and Fox (2009) both observe a gap in the process portrayed in v 4. After smelting, molten silver and gold would have to be cooled and shaped before a vessel would be ready "for the smelter"—*laṣṣōrēp* in v 4b. Likewise, removing wicked counselors would be one step in a longer process leading to a righteous reign. As Fox suggests, "This gap is to the point" (2009, 779). The point being to compress the causal structure in v 5, so that the link between removing wicked members of a court and the establishment of a righteous reign seems direct. The smelting process is an illustration of the instruction in v 5. The suggestion is that removing dross from silver leads to a pure vessel in the same way that removing wicked members from a court leads to a long and just reign. In this way, the mention silver as part of a smelting process in v 4a supports the instruction in v 5. We can also see how profiling the finished vessel in v 5b supports the motivation to follow this instruction. In the metaphor underlying this analogy—A RIGHTEOUS REIGN IS A PRECIOUS OBJECT—the value of the finished vessel is mapped onto the value and purity of the reign of a king in the absence of wicked members of his court.

Instructions that mention kings in Proverbs can be construed in at least two ways—as

instructions to readers who are kings and as instructions to readers who are not kings. When readers who are not kings read sayings in Proverbs that are about kings, they would derive instruction on how to assess kings and what kinds of kings to hope for. Readers who are kings (or some other kind of ruler) would interpret the instruction to remove wicked people from their court or leadership structure. Therefore, we can imagine both types of readers constructing meaning in the following ways when they read 25:4-5.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 25:4		
CONTENT BASE SPACES	a	A command to remove dross from silver
	b	A vessel coming forth for the smelter
Proverbs 25:5		
CONTENT BASE SPACES	a	A command to remove wicked people from the court of a king
	b	The throne of that king being established in righteousness
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	a-b_1	Because my throne will be established in righteousness if I follow the command to remove wicked people from my court, I should remove wicked people from my court.
	a-b_2	Because his throne will be established in righteousness if he follows the command to remove wicked people from his court, I should hope for a king [or other ruler] who removes wicked people from his court.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	a-b_1	Remove wicked people from your court. [explicit in 25:5a]
	a-b_2	Hope for a king [or other ruler] who will remove wicked people from his court.

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 25:5		
ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	a-b_1	Reader is a king who chooses to remove wicked people from his court.
	a-b_2	Reader is the person who chooses to hope for a king who will remove wicked people from his court.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	The court of the king is characterized as purified silver vessel on analogy with the smelting and vessel-making processes in 25:4.	

5.1.3.2 Two tests

Prov 17:3 and 27:21 both also involve smelting analogies. However, the construal of viewpoint in simulation prompted by the smelting analogies in 25:4, 17:3, and 27:21 differs. In

25:4 and 27:21, viewpoint is tied to *actors working on* the precious metals in a smelting process—namely, the smelter (*ṣōrēp*) in 25:4 and 27:21a. In contrast, in 17:3, readers are meant to simulate from the perspective of the *metals themselves*. Readers are the ones being "tested" (*b-ḥ-n*) in 17:3, not those conducting the test (i.e., the purification). The source frames (and first lines) in 17:3 and 27:21 are identical. However, the tests, testers, and tested materials in these sayings are quite different.

מַצְרֵף לַכֶּסֶף וְכוּר לַזָּהָב וּבֹחֵן לִבּוֹת יְהוָה	a b	17:3	A crucible is for silver and a furnace is for gold – so Yahweh tests minds.
מַצְרֵף לַכֶּסֶף וְכוּר לַזָּהָב וְאִישׁ לְפִי מַהֲלָלוֹ	a b	27:21	A crucible is for silver and a furnace is for gold – so a man is for a mouth that praises him.

Yahweh is the one who "tests" (*bōḥēn*) in 17:3. The "minds" (*libbōt* in v 3b) of readers are the targets of the test. The word *lēb* in v 3b is a metonymy for a person's thoughts, intentions, and motivations. In this analogy, the intensity of the heat required to purify silver and gold is mapped onto how readers imagine the process of Yahweh testing their thoughts, intentions, and motivations. Thus, readers are meant to simulate an intense and painful test or purifying process. As Fox underscores, the analogy with the smelting of silver and gold in 17:3 "implies a hard trial" (2009, 625). This analogy also implies a pure product. The producers of Proverbs want readers to imagine that their thoughts, intentions, and motivations, having undergone such a test, will be in an acceptably purified state. Imagining the purity of that state serves a motivational function in the processing of 17:3. The instruction is somewhat opaque but must be something like, *expect Yahweh to examine your thoughts, intentions, and motivations*.

The intensity of the heat in a smelting process maps onto an object of instruction in 27:21 as well. However, in the analogy in 27:21, the heat maps onto the intensity of effort that readers must exercise in testing praise that they either give or receive. Most commentators interpret

27:21 to mean that *a man* is tested *by "*the mouth of his praise"—in the sense that the "quality of a person" can be determined by:

a) "the amount of praise he receives from others" (Whybray 1994, 385; also Toy 1908; McKane 1970; Murphy 1998);
b) the "sort of person who holds him in esteem" (Fox 2009, 813; also Clifford 1999; Waltke 2005)
c) whether a person allows praise to make them proud (Murphy 1998)
d) the type of praise that a person gives to others (Waltke 2005)

These readings all attribute an instrumental function to the *lamed* in v 21b. However, this does not preserve the relation between the crucible and the silver (*maṣrēp <u>la</u>kkesep*) and that between the furnace and the gold (*kūr <u>la</u>zzāhāb*) in v 21a in the relation between a man and the mouth that praises (him or that he uses to praise someone else) in v 21b. The construction in these phrases is $noun_1$ + *lamed* + $noun_2$. In the two figures in v 21a, the *lamed* marks the precious metal that is smelted (i.e., "tested")—not the instrument that performs the test. In the same way, the *lamed* in v 21b marks "the mouth of his praise" (*pî mahălālô*). If we follow the analogy and map the conceptual structure of the scenes in v 21a to the situation in v 21b, we would construe "his praise" (like the silver and gold in v 21a) as the item that undergoes the test in v 21b—not the "man" (*ʾîš* in v 21b*α*). It is the man in v 21b*α* who parallels the crucible and the furnace in v 21a. Therefore, it is the man who must test or purify "his praise" in v 21b.[172]

What does it mean to say that a person must test their praise? As noted above, the praise could be praise that a person receives or praise that they give. The phrase "the mouth of his praise" (*pî mahălālô*) in v 21b leaves this open to interpretation. If a person tests praise they

[172] I thank my advisor, Jeremy Hutton, for pointing this out to me. In my first reading of 27:21, I read it in the way that commentators typically do, construing the man as the tested element and the praise as the tester.

receive, they would make sure it speaks accurately of their qualities or abilities while also guarding against allowing the praise to inflate their sense of themselves. If a person tests the praise they give, they would make certain that it is always honest and also that it is given not as flattery in order to ingratiate themselves with the person to whom they give it, but only to encourage with good reason. The intensity of the heat in the smelting process in both cases would map onto the rigor with which a person scrutinizes either the praise they give or the praise they receive. We can therefore imagine readers performing the following steps in meaning construction when they read these sayings.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 17:3

CONTENT BASE SPACES	a	A crucible being for silver and a furnace being for gold
	b	Yahweh testing minds
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	Because Yahweh tests minds [thoughts, motives, intentions] in the way that precious metals are "tested" in smelting, I should expect Yahweh to search my motives and intentions with intensity and rigor. I should also keep pure thoughts, motives, and intentions in order to avoid a really painful trial.	
DIRECTIVE SPACES	Expect Yahweh to examine [i.e., test] your motives and intentions, and be prepared for this to be thorough and uncomfortable, if you do not keep pure thoughts, motives, and intentions.	

Proverbs 27:21

CONTENT BASE SPACES	a	A crucible being for silver and a furnace being for gold
	b	A person testing praise that they receive
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	a-b	Because a person testing the praise that they receive is compared to the way that precious metals are "tested" by the smelting process, I should test the praise that I give and receive rigorously.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	Examine the praise that you give and receive rigorously.	

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 17:3

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses to expect Yahweh to test their thoughts, intentions, and motives and who also chooses to keep their thoughts, motives, and intentions pure.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	The results of the testing that Yahweh performs [i.e., pure motives and intentions of the reader] are characterized as pure silver and gold on analogy with the precious metals in 17:3a.

Proverbs 27:21

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses to test the praise that they give and receive with rigor.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	The results of the testing that the reader performs are characterized as pure silver and gold on analogy with the precious metals in 27:21a.

5.1.4 Summary

Wealth is used in three types of metaphorical analogies in the material in this section. Items of wealth serve as source frames in metaphors in §5.1.1—PEOPLE ARE OBJECTS, STATES ARE OBJECTS, and ABSTRACT ENTITIES ARE OBJECTS. In each case, the item of wealth serves a motivational function. The high value of the item of wealth maps onto the high value of an object of instruction (e.g., family members, a long life lived in righteousness, wisdom, wise speech and listening to wise speech). The relation between readers and wealth in simulations of this material is always *indirect*. Something that readers are supposed to value (family members, old age), embody (wisdom), or perform (wise speech, listening to wise speech) is characterized as being as high in value as an item of wealth. Therefore, there is no real relation between readers and wealth in simulations of the meaning of the material in §5.1.1.

In §5.1.2, the similes in 2:4 (*seeking wisdom like silver / searching for wisdom like hidden treasure*) serve an adverbial function. They illustrate the kind of effort that the producers of Proverbs want readers to put into pursuing wisdom. Therefore, these similes support the instruction in 2:4. Once again, there is no direct or real relation between readers and wealth in simulations of the meaning of this unit. In addition, the metaphor WISDOM IS A PRECIOUS OBJECT underlies the similes in 2:4 as well. Wealth as a source frame in this metaphor implicitly serves a motivational function, characterizing wisdom, once again, as highly valuable.

The use of wealth in the smelting analogies in §5.1.3 is more complex. There are at least three mappings in 25:4-5. The impurity of the dross in v 4a maps onto the wicked person in the royal court in 5a. The purity of the finished vessel in 4b maps onto the righteous reign of a king that has been purified of wicked members of his court in 5b. In addition, the intensity of the heat required to purify the silver in v 4 maps onto the process of removing wicked members of a royal

court in v 5. This may be the intense and exhaustive nature of processes that would be required to rid a royal court of wicked members. In 17:2 and 27:21, the intense heat used to refine precious metals is the salient feature in the smelting frame that is mapped onto targets as well. As we saw above, readers are meant to identify with the precious metals being tested in 17:3 and with the smelter purifying the metals in 27:21. The source frame in both cases again serves an adverbial function. The intensity of heat required in a smelting frame to purify metals maps onto the intensity with which readers must anticipate being purified by Yahweh in 17:3 and with which they must purify either praise they offer or receive in 27:21.

In 25:4-5, 17:3, and 27:21, the precious metals in a smelting frame support both the motivation and the instruction. As support for instructions, the precious metals are elements in a frame that illustrates either the manner in which an action should be carried out (25:4-5; 27:21) or the manner in which readers should expect an action to be carried out on them (17:3). As support for motivations, the high value of the purified form of the precious metals maps onto objects of instructions—a righteous reign in 25:5; pure thoughts, motives, and intentions in 17:3; and pure or valid praise in 27:21.

In simulating all of these scenarios, readers would not imagine any direct or real relation between themselves and wealth. Rather, the purified precious metals characterize the *end results* of the three processes of purification illustrated in 25:4-5, 17:3, and 27:21. These end results, again, are: a righteous reign; pure thoughts, motives, and intentions; and valid praise. It is to each of these entities that readers would imagine being in direct relation—not to wealth or poverty.

5.2 Frame metonymies

As noted in chapter two, frames are conceptualized as wholes, and an important feature of frames is this gestalt structure. Fillmore explains, "By the term 'frame' I have in mind any system of concepts related in such a way that to understand any one of them you have to understand the whole structure in which it fits; when one of the things in such a structure is introduced into a text, or into a conversation, all of the others are automatically made available" (1982, 111). Dancygier and Sweetser explain similarly that "an expression referring to some aspect of a frame structure gives conceptual access to the entire structure, so that evoking one aspect of a frame provides access to the entire frame, and individual frame components are understood in the context of the entire frame" (2014, 17).

Frame metonymy operates on the gestalt structure of frames. It is a form of metonymy in which reference to one element in a frame metonymically activates the whole frame. As we saw in §2.3.3.2.2, illocutionary metonymy is a form of frame metonymy. In illocutionary metonymy, reference to one element in a speech-act scenario activates the whole scenario. The frame metonymies in §5.2 are all activated through mention of an item associated with wealth or poverty. In each case, the profiled item of wealth or poverty metonymically activates either some conception of a person living a wealthy lifestyle or a conception of a person living in poverty. And in each case, the reader is supposed to judge the goodness or badness of the life situation in question.

5.2.1 Be righteous and do not be wicked instructional frames

Prov 10:16 instructs readers to be righteous and not wicked. It does so by profiling the wage (*pĕʿullāh* in v 16a) and the agricultural yield (*tĕbūʾāh* in v 16b) that the character in each

line obtains through some means of work. One leads "to life" (*lĕḥayyîm*), and the other leads "to sin" (*lĕḥaṭṭāʾt*).

פְּעֻלַּת צַדִּיק לְחַיִּים	a	10:16	The wage of a righteous person – to life,
תְּבוּאַת רָשָׁע לְחַטָּאת	b		the produce of a wicked person – to sin.

The items of wealth in v 16 (*pĕʿullāh* in v 16a and *tĕbūʾāh* in v 16b) both activate frame metonymies. Both activate conceptions of what righteous and wicked characters might be expected to do with the wealth they earn or produce (and possibly also how they produced it in the first place). In this way, mention of the *pĕʿullāh* in v 16a and *tĕbūʾāh* in v 16b both support the instruction of v 16. Both prompt readers to imagine a character whose example they should either emulate or avoid. As in most sayings that portray the righteous and the wicked, nothing specific about their actions is portrayed. The cultural models that readers hold of these types of characters (and people) inform how they envision the behavior and character of the righteous and wicked. Thus, the motivation in this saying is not provided by either reference to wealth. Both characters have wealth. The question is what they do with it (and possibly, how they earn it). The motivation in this saying is provided through the mere references to the *ṣaddîq* ("righteous") and the *rāšāʿ* ("wicked"), and also by portraying the respective ends to which their different uses of wealth lead—the one to "life" (*ḥayyîm*) and the other to "sin" (*ḥaṭṭāt*).

Sin is not the literal opposite of life. "Death" (*māwet*) would produce a tighter symmetry in v 16b. However, sin leads to death in Proverbs (e.g., 2:18; 5:5; 7:27; 21:6). Therefore, the ends that readers imagine for each way of life may be more symmetric than the ends that are linguistically profiled in the saying itself. In v 16b*β*, *ḥaṭṭāt* ("sin") functions as a SOURCE FOR RESULT metonymy for death. This plays into the causal reasoning that readers would perform upon reading this saying. Specifically, because sin leads to death, I should not be wicked. On the

basis of each means of evaluation in v 16, we can imagine readers constructing meaning in the following way when they read this saying.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 10:16

CONTENT BASE SPACES	a	The income of a righteous man leading to life
	b	The produce of a wicked man leading to sin
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	a	Because being righteous will lead to life, I should be righteous.
	b	Because being wicked will lead to sin (which leads to death), I should not be wicked.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	a	Be righteous.
	b	Do not be wicked.

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 10:16

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	a	Reader is the person who chooses to be righteous.
	b	Reader is the person who chooses not to be wicked.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	a	The reader would be someone who earns an income.
	b	The reader would be someone who yields produce.

5.2.2 Do not be a fool instructional frames

Two sentence sayings in Proverbs (17:16; 19:10) and one segment in an epigram series (30:22b) prohibit readers from being fools with the support of frame metonymies in which the profiled item is something related to wealth. 17:16 mentions "payment in the hand of a fool" (*měḥîr bĕyad kĕsîl*); 19:10 says that "luxury (*taʿănūg*) is not fitting for a fool"; and 30:22b suggests that fools do not deserve to be sated with food (*leḥem*). In each instance, the item of wealth (*měḥîr* or "payment" in 17:16; *taʿănūg* or "luxury" in 19:10; *leḥem* or "food" in 30:22b) activates conceptions in readers' minds of broader lifestyle frames—namely, frames within which a fool enjoys wealth. The message in each of these units is that wealth is not fitting for fools. Consider 17:16.

לָמָּה־זֶּה מְחִיר בְּיַד־כְּסִיל	a	17:16	Why is there payment in the hand of a fool,
לִקְנוֹת חָכְמָה וְלֵב־אָיִן	b		to buy wisdom though he has no mind?

Commentators suggest that the portrayal of a fool with payment (*měḥîr*) in his hand to buy wisdom is probably intended to mock the foolish character for misunderstanding the figurative nature of exhortations to buy (*q-n-h*) wisdom in Proverbs (e.g., 1:5, 4:4, and 4:5). There is a general consensus that people did not pay for instruction during periods of Proverbs' production. If this is the case, the larger situational frame alluded to through the mention of "payment in the hand of a fool" (*měḥîr bĕyad kĕsîl*) in v 16a could be both that of a fool misinterpreting exhortations to buy wisdom in Proverbs and also that of a life situation in which a fool has enough wealth to pay for instruction.

Either way, the fact that payment would be wasted in the hand of a fool is the focus of v 16b. The payment is wasted in v 16b because the fool has no mind. Profiling a fool alone is motivation enough for readers to construe the instruction, *do not be a fool*. Saying that he has no mind adds to that motivation. On top of that, saying that the payment in his hand is wasted supports the motivation further. We can therefore imagine readers constructing meaning in the following way when they read this saying.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 17:16

CONTENT BASE SPACES	a-b	Question: why does a fool have payment for buying wisdom when he has no mind to become wise?
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	a-b	Because fools have no mind, I should not be a fool.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	a-b	Do not be a fool.

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 17:16

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses not to be a fool.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	The reader would be someone who is portrayed in 17:16a as a person who has wealth enough to "buy wisdom."

* * *

The tone of 19:10 and 30:22b is stern where 17:16 is mocking. Many commentators describe Proverbs as deeply conservative in the views it projects of hierarchical relations within societies. Both 19:10 and 30:21-23 reflect this way of thinking about social relations. Concern regarding upheavals in the social order is the primary concern in 19:10 and 30:21-23. Therefore, the mention of a fool stands out in both of these didactic units as references to a character by means of a vice and not a social station.

לֹא־נָאוֶה לִכְסִיל תַּעֲנוּג	a	19:10	Luxury is not fitting for a fool –
אַף כִּי־לְעֶבֶד מְשֹׁל בְּשָׂרִים	b		how much less for a servant to rule over princes.

Rigid views of social relations are even more pronounced in 30:21-23.

תַּחַת שָׁלוֹשׁ רָגְזָה אֶרֶץ	a	30:21	Under three things the earth trembles,
וְתַחַת אַרְבַּע לֹא־תוּכַל שְׂאֵת	b		and under four it is not able to bear up:
תַּחַת־עָבֶד כִּי יִמְלוֹךְ	a	30:22	under a servant who becomes king,
וְנָבָל כִּי יִשְׂבַּע־לָחֶם	b		and a fool who is sated with food;
תַּחַת שְׂנוּאָה כִּי תִבָּעֵל	a	30:23	under a hated woman who is married,
וְשִׁפְחָה כִּי־תִירַשׁ גְּבִרְתָּהּ	b		and a maidservant who displaces her mistress.

Proverbs is not alone in the ancient Near East in its rigid views of social hierarchy and position. Qoheleth writes, “There is an evil I have seen under the sun, an error that proceeds from a magnate: folly is set in many high places, while rich men sit in lowly places. I have seen servants on horses and princes walking on the ground like servants” (Qoh 10:5-7). Concern with the idea of the “world-turned-upside-down” is even more prominent in Egyptian Wisdom.[173] What we

[173] See the Middle Kingdom works of the Prophecies of Neferti (AEL I.139-145), the Complaints of Khakheperre-sonb (AEL I.145-149), and the Admonitions of Ipuwer (AEL I.149-163). Fox draws attention to these works in his 2009 commentary. Lichteim observes that these writings and the topos of a “world-turned-upside-down” (or what she calls the topos of “national distress”) required “no basis in reality, or almost none” (AEL I. 134). They reflect “an intellectual problem that became a literary topos. It required no specific factual basis but merely the general phenomenon of civil disorders that could, and did, break out periodically” (AEL I.139). Lichteim explains that royal transitions motivate their creation in ancient Egypt, and that they become “a matter of literary ingenuity, or inventing ever more images by

see on an arguably smaller scale in Proverbs and Qoheleth, we see a larger scale in the social-class reversals portrayed in Egyptian Wisdom. In the Prophecies of Neferti, we read,

> I show you the master in need, the outsider sated,
> The lazy stuffs himself, the active is needy. (AEL I.142)
>
> I show you a land in turmoil:
> The weak-armed is strong-armed,
> One salutes him who is saluted.
> I show you the undermost uppermost,
> What is turned on the back turns on the belly.
> Men will live in the graveyard,
> The beggar will gain riches,
> The great will rob to live.
> The poor will eat bread,
> The slaves will be exalted. (AEL I.143)

In the Complaints of Khakheperre-sonb, we read, "those who shone are overthrown," and "he who gave orders takes orders" (AEL I.148). And in the Admonitions of Ipuwer, the writer laments,

> Lo, poor men have become men of wealth,
> He who could not afford sandals owns riches …
> Lo, nobles lament, the poor rejoice …
> The robber owns riches, [the noble] is a thief … (AEL I.151)
>
> Ladies suffer like maidservants …
> Lo, all the maidservants are rude in their speech,
> When the mistress speaks, it irks the servants … (AEL I.153)
>
> Lo, the great council chamber is invaded,
> Beggars come and go in the great mansions …
> The wise says, "Yes," the fool says, "No,"
> The ignorant is satisfied. (AEL I.155)

---

which to describe the alleged distress" (AEL I. 135). She notes further that these works are written from a loyalist point of view but that what is new in them (in comparison with Old Kingdom works) is that now the theme of king as the guarantor of justice and order is "formulated through a depiction of chaos, the chaos that overtakes the nation when kingship is weak" (AEL I.134). Lichteim underscores that while each of these works depicts national chaos and distress, each one was actually written during periods of peace and prosperity in Egypt (AEL I.149). She observes further that while Neferti has political-propagandistic aims, Khakheperre-sonb seems more predominantly rhetorical, and that Ipuwer is "the last, fullest, most exaggerated and hence least successful, composition on the theme of 'order versus chaos'" (AEL I.150).

As Lichteim explains, these Egyptian works of didactic Wisdom represent substantial development of the world-turned-upside-down theme—or, as Lichteim refers to it, the theme of "national distress" or "order versus chaos." (See n. 168 above.) We cannot track this kind of development in Israel or reflect in any way on the historical growth of related ideas, but we do see the world-turned-upside-down theme featured in 19:10 and 30:21-23, and also in Qoheleth 10:5-7. Like the Egyptian producers of Neferti, Khakheperre-sonb, and Ipuwer, the producers of Proverbs and Qoheleth lament, and in so doing effectively condemn, the upheaval and reversal of expected social roles. Ipuwer's lament that "the ignorant is satisfied" (AEL I.155) seems to be the very situation in 30:22b under which "the earth trembles and cannot bear up" (30:21)—namely, that in which "a fool is sated with food" (30:22b). The life situation of the fool in 19:10a is more exaggerated. There the fool lives in luxury (*taʿănūg*).

In both 19:10a and 30:22b, mention of an item of wealth (*leḥem* or "food" in 19:10a and *taʿănūg* or "luxury" in 30:22b) frame metonymically activates conceptions in the minds of readers of a life situation in which a fool enjoys either a moderate amount of wealth (*leḥem*) or in which he has more extravagant wealth (*taʿănūg*). The producers of Proverbs assess a fool enjoying both of these life situations negatively. They describe the first as "not fitting" (*lōʾ nāʾweh*) in 19:10a, and as something that causes the earth to tremble and under which it cannot bear up in 30:21. Thus, both 19:10a and 30:22b can be interpreted as expressing the instruction, *do not be a fool*. In both cases, the mention of *leḥem* or "food" in 19:10a and *taʿănūg* or "luxury" in 30:22b support the motivation to follow this instruction. They support the motivation as part of having wealth frames that are deemed inappropriate for fools. We can therefore imagine readers constructing meaning in the following ways when they read 19:10a and 30:22b.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 19:10a

CONTENT BASE SPACES	Luxury not being fitting for a fool
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	Because fools are not fit to enjoy luxury, I should not be a fool.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	Do not be a fool.

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 19:10a

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses not to be a fool.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	The reader identifies with someone who is portrayed as not being fit for luxury in 19:10a.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 30:22b

CONTENT BASE SPACES	Being sated with food not being appropriate for a fool
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	Because fools are not fit to be sated with food, I should not be a fool.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	Do not be a fool.

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 30:22b

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses not to be a fool.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	The reader identifies with someone who is portrayed as not being fit to be sated with food in 30:22b.

5.2.3 Be merciful instructional frame

Commentators interpret 28:21 in different ways. The instruction to be merciful seems to contradict the statement in v 21a.

הַכֵּר־פָּנִים לֹא־טוֹב	a	28:21	Showing partiality is not good,
וְעַל־פַּת־לֶחֶם יִפְשַׁע־גָּבֶר	b		but for a piece of bread a man may do wrong.

In a *be merciful* reading of this saying, the character who did wrong is someone who stole a piece of bread. A more common reading envisions the person doing wrong as a judge dispensing the judgment alluded to in v 21a (e.g., Whybray 1994; Murphy 1998; Clifford 1999; Waltke 2005). This more common reading assumes that a judge, knowing he should not favor either party in a legal proceeding, accepts a piece of bread as a bribe to rule in favor of one of the

parties. McKane (1970) and Fox (2009) both find it implausible that a judge would be corrupted by something so trivial as a piece of bread. McKane argues instead that a witness is more likely to be someone who might be compelled to do something wrong at the prospect of getting a piece of bread as compensation. The offense of this witness is then envisioned as offering false testimony in a legal proceeding. This interpretation, however, does not make good sense of the phrase in v 21a, *hakkēr pānîm* ("to recognize faces"), which is interpreted metonymically as "to show partiality." This phrase alludes to a judgment that is made, not a testimony that is given. Therefore, in a witness-does-wrong reading, the ruling is corrupted by the false testimony, not the desire to show partiality—and this does not comport with the sense in v 21a.

Fox articulates the most compelling reading of 28:21. He views the *defendant* as the person who does wrong "for a piece of bread" (*ʿal pat leḥem* in v 21b). This wrongdoing would have been stealing the bread in the first place and then ending up in a position in which the thief hopes for a judge who will show him partiality and extend a merciful ruling. This interpretation reflects the bias conveyed in Prov 6:30 as well (on which see below), which reads, "People do not despise a thief when he steals to fill his appetite because he is hungry." It also, as noted above, calls for an exception to the principle that "showing partiality is not good" in v 21a.

Mention of "a piece of bread" (*pat leḥem*) in v 21b serves as a metonymy for both the action of stealing bread and for the situation of economic need in which a person would find themselves feeling desperate enough to steal a piece of bread. As such, reference to *pat leḥem* supports both the instruction and the motivation in this saying. In support of the instruction, mention of *pat leḥem* cues readers to imagine the thief stealing a piece of bread. This theft frame provides the context required for the instruction in v 21. Simultaneously, in support of the motivation, mention of *pat leḥem* metonymically activates the life situation of the thief as a

person who lives in poverty. This is meant to incite pity and compassion and to motivate readers to *be merciful*.

The basis of a *be merciful* reading is the idea that the larger frame of a person living in poverty functions as an appeal in itself. As noted in §2.4, appeals to cultural models of the poor are meant in every case in Proverbs to elicit compassion and pity. If we accept this, readers are obliged to read 28:21 as an exhortation to make exceptions to the rule stated in v 21a that proscribes showing partiality in judgment. In other words, the instruction offered in v 21 as a whole is: when a person is forced, through need, to commit a small offense, that person should be shown mercy. The following summaries represent this interpretation.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 28:21		
CONTENT BASE SPACES	a	Showing partiality being characterized as not good
	b	A person doing wrong for a piece of bread
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	a-b	Because some people do not have enough to eat, I should show them mercy when they are caught stealing in order to eat.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	a-b	Have mercy on people who steal out of hunger.

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 28:21	
ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who is called on to show mercy to someone who is caught stealing out of hunger.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & THE POOR	The reader is called on to act on behalf of someone who has stolen a piece of bread.

5.2.4 Adequate supplies instructional frames

Prov 14:4 affords multiple interpretations. Like 27:23-27, it refers to animal husbandry and could also be construed as really appealing to practical concerns of farmers. It could also be imagined more broadly as an appeal to any situation in which the right supplies are needed to do a job well.

בְּאֵין אֲלָפִים אֵבוּס בָּר	a	14:4	With no oxen, a trough is clean [i.e., empty],
וְרָב־תְּבוּאוֹת בְּכֹחַ שׁוֹר	b		but an abundance of produce with the strength of a bull.

Mention of the oxen (*ʾălāpîm*), the bull (*šôr*),[174] an empty (or "clean") trough (*ʾēbūs bār*), and an abundance of produce (*rob tĕbūʾôt*) in this saying all function as frame metonymies. The larger frame that each of these lexical frames evokes will depend on readers. Mention of the oxen and bull may activate specific conceptions of the work that animals do for farmers when agriculturalists interpret this saying. Readers who are farmers may conclude their interpretation of 14:4 at this point. Others might construe this saying as telling readers that in any situation, with the right resources or supplies, a person can accomplish a great deal; but in contrast, when a person does not have the supplies they need to do a job well, they will not be able to do the job well. If readers reflect even further, 14:4 could be construed as a comment on inequitable distributions of wealth—i.e., on the fact that there are people who have labor animals (or some other resource or supply). Therefore, they are able to produce plenty of food. However, there are also people who do not, and what can they produce in comparison? Some readers might even imagine that 14:4 is an exhortation for them to do something about this inequitable distribution.

The frame metonymies in 14:4 support both the instruction and the motivation in this saying. As support for the instruction, the larger scenarios of having and not having adequate supplies serve as contexts for the instruction to acquire for oneself, or to help others acquire for themselves, the supplies needed for a job. As support for the motivation, the frame metonymies in 14:4 activate desirable and undesirable scenarios in readers' mindes. Readers would want to avoid the scenario in v 4a and, in contrast, to experience the scenario in v 4b. They would also,

[174] In addition, mention of "the strength of a bull" (*kōaḥ šôr*) in 14:4b functions as a frame metonymy as well: the strength of the bull metonymically refers to the larger frame of the bull itself.

ideally, want to help others do the same. Therefore, we can imagine the following processes of meaning construction that readers might perform in response to this saying. The first model represents how a reader would interpret this saying with their own supplies in mind, and the second models how someone would interpret this saying as an exhortation to help others get the supplies they need.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 14:4

CONTENT BASE SPACES	a	The absence of oxen and a corresponding absence of food in a trough
	b	An abundance of produce being yielded by the work of a strong bull
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	$a\text{-}b_1$	Because a lack of supplies leads to a lack of produce, and—correspondingly—because adequate supplies lead to a productive yield, I should get the supplies that I need to produce a good yield.
	$a\text{-}b_2$	Because a lack of supplies leads to a lack of produce, and—correspondingly—because adequate supplies lead to a productive yield, I should help others get the supplies that they need to produce a good yield.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	$a\text{-}b_1$	Get the supplies you need to do the job you need to do.
	$a\text{-}b_2$	Help others get the supplies they need to do the job they need to do.

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 14:4

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	$a\text{-}b_1$	Reader is the person who chooses to get the supplies that they need to do a job that they need to do.
	$a\text{-}b_2$	Reader is the person who chooses to help others get the supplies that they [the others] need to do a job they need to do.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	$a\text{-}b_1$	The reader would get supplies [items of wealth] in order to produce wealth.
	$a\text{-}b_2$	The reader would help others get supplies [items of wealth] in order to produce wealth.

5.2.5 Summary

The supporting roles that wealth and poverty play in the material in §5.2 are more varied than in the previous section (§5.1). Wealth and poverty activate frame metonymies in the material in §5.2. The larger frames they bring to mind in almost every case support both the motivation and the instruction in a didactic unit. As support for instructions, these larger frames

serve as the conceptual context for instructions—e.g., righteous and wicked characters using wealth (10:16); a fool enjoying wealth (17:16; 19:10; 30:22a); a person stealing a piece of bread out of need (28:21); having or not having adequate supplies for work that must be done (14:4). The instructions in these sayings pertain to these situations—i.e., be righteous (and use wealth like the righteous) / do not be wicked (and do not use wealth like the wicked); do not be a fool; have mercy on a person who has to steal out of need; and get the supplies you need to do a job well. The items of wealth and tokens of poverty within these scenarios also provide motivational support in every case but that in 10:16. They characterize the objects of instructions as good (a person having the supplies they need in 14:4a in §5.2.4), highly inappropriate (a fool enjoying wealth in §5.2.2), or needful (a person stealing out of need in §5.2.3; people having or lacking supplies they need in 14:4b in §5.2.4).

5.3 *Qal wāḥōmer* analogies[175]

Qal wāḥōmer analogies express lesser-to-greater arguments. There are two *qal wāḥōmer* analogies in Proverbs in which wealth serves as an item in the "lesser" frame that is compared to either a situation of greater consequence or a more valuable item in the "greater" frame. The first occurs in 6:30-35, and the second appears in 19:14. In both cases, the mention of wealth supports motivation that is used to compel readers to follow the instruction that each of these passages issue—namely, *do not commit adultery* in 6:30-35 and *hope for an astute wife* in 19:14.

[175] *Qal wāḥōmer* analogies are "lesser to the greater" analogies. Literally, this phrase means "light and a *ḥōmer*." A *ḥōmer* is a measurement unit that is used to measure dry goods. The word *ḥōmer* is thus used in the phrase *qal wāḥōmer* as a lexical frame that refers to something heavier than something else that would be called *qal* or "light" in comparison.

5.3.1 Do not commit adultery instructional frame

Prov 6:30-35 serves as the conclusion to the fifth lecture (6:20-35) in Prov 1-9. The exhortation of this lecture as a whole is a prohibition against adultery. In the conclusion to this lecture, the consequences faced by a thief who is poor and steals because he is hungry are compared to what a man who commits adultery must face. The message is clear: the man who commits adultery faces the far worse consequences of the two. The implication in 6:30-35 is that what the adulterer has done is far worse than what the thief has done.

לֹא־יָבוּזוּ לַגַּנָּב כִּי יִגְנֹוב לְמַלֵּא נַפְשׁוֹ כִּי יִרְעָב	a b	6:30	People do not despise a thief when he steals to fill his appetite because he is hungry.
וְנִמְצָא יְשַׁלֵּם שִׁבְעָתָיִם אֶת־כָּל־הוֹן בֵּיתוֹ יִתֵּן	a b	6:31	But when found, he pays back sevenfold, he gives all the wealth of his house.
נֹאֵף אִשָּׁה חֲסַר־לֵב מַשְׁחִית נַפְשׁוֹ הוּא יַעֲשֶׂנָּה	a b	6:32	A person who commits adultery lacks sense, a person who does it destroys himself.
נֶגַע־וְקָלוֹן יִמְצָא וְחֶרְפָּתוֹ לֹא תִמָּחֶה	a b	6:33	He gets wounds and disgrace, And his shame will not be wiped away.
כִּי־קִנְאָה חֲמַת־גָּבֶר וְלֹא־יַחְמוֹל בְּיוֹם נָקָם	a b	6:34	For jealousy [makes] a man furious, and he will not spare on a day of fury.
לֹא־יִשָּׂא פְּנֵי כָל־כֹּפֶר וְלֹא־יֹאבֶה כִּי תַרְבֶּה־שֹׁחַד	a b	6:35	He will not accept any ransom, he will refuse though you increase the bribe.

Wealth is mentioned in this lecture segment at two points—at the beginning and then again at the very end. In both cases, the wealth referred to is payment that the thief (in the beginning) and the adulterer (at the end) are portrayed as paying (the thief) or trying to pay (the adulterer) in order to recompense their wrongs. In both cases, the mention of wealth is a prop in the storytelling. Reference to the hunger of the thief frame metonymically activates his whole life situation as one of economic need. We also see that the thief who lacks wealth and is an object of some compassion, when caught stealing, still has to pay (when he is able, presumably) for his

understandable crime "seven times over" (*šibʿātayim*)—in other words, an exorbitant amount, i.e., "all the wealth of his house" (*kol hōn bêtô*) in v 31—even though his crime is a pitiable one.

At the end of this unit, the adulterer is portrayed as never being able to pay enough: no amount of wealth he offers will appease the offended husband (v 35). The point of this morality story is to warn readers against committing adultery, not to exhort them not to steal. The character in the story whose consequences readers are meant to be warned by, therefore, are those of the adulterer. The thief is a foil. Public perception of the two characters could not be more different: people do not despise (*lôʾ yābūzū*) a thief who steals because he is hungry (v 30), but the shame (*ḥerpātô*) of the adulterer will not be wiped away (*lôʾ timmāḥeh*) (v 33b). Readers could construe the consequence of the thief paying for his theft, even though people do not despise him, as a warning not to steal. However, the much stronger warning in this lecture is the exhortation repeated throughout the lecture as whole—namely, *do not commit adultery*. We can therefore imagine readers construing this interpretation of 6:30-35 in the following way.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 6:30-31	
CONTENT BASE SPACES	People having compassion on a thief who steals because he is hungry That thief, when caught, still paying an extreme penalty for his theft
Proverbs 6:32-33	
CONTENT SPACES	A person who commits adultery lacking sense and destroying himself That person being wounded, disgraced, and weighed down with shame
Proverbs 6:34-35	
CONTENT SPACES	An offended husband being furious and not relenting from his anger That husband accepting no amount of compensation for the offense
Proverbs 6:30-35	
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	Because committing adultery is tantamount to destroying oneself, and because there is no way to atone for adultery, I should not commit adultery.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	Do not commit adultery.

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 6:30-35	
ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	The reader is the person who chooses not to commit adultery.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	The reader identifies with the adulterer who cannot use *enough* wealth to recompense his offense.

5.3.2 The blessing of an astute wife instructional frame

Prov 19:14 argues that the inheritance a man can expect to receive from his father (or family) is inferior to the astute wife that he might receive from Yahweh.

בַּ֣יִת וָה֣וֹן נַחֲלַ֣ת אָב֑וֹת וּמֵיְהוָ֥ה אִשָּׁ֝ה מַשְׂכֶּֽלֶת	a b	19:14	A house and wealth are the inheritance of fathers, but an astute wife is from Yahweh.

Items of wealth in the *qal wāḥōmer* argument in v 14 serve a more central function than the use of wealth in 6:30-35. Items of wealth served as props in the storytelling of 6:30-35. They were part of the scenarios that were compared as lesser and greater in terms of the seriousness of offenses in that longer passage. Here in 19:14, items of wealth (*bayit wāhōn*, "a house and wealth" in v 14a) serve as the items of lesser value that are compared with an item of much greater value. The vastly higher status of Yahweh over that of human fathers (or family) is a clear indication in v 14 of the much greater value that the producers of Proverbs associate with an astute wife over against the value of a house and wealth. 19:14 balances the profile of the wife in the preceding saying, which reads, "A foolish son is a ruin to his father, and the contentions of a wife are an incessant dripping" (19:13). As is always the case in Proverbs, when wealth is compared with something that the producers deem as more valuable, wealth is the lesser item. We can therefore imagine readers constructing the meaning of 19:14 in the following way.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 19:14

CONTENT BASE SPACES	a	A house and wealth being what a son inherits from his father
	b	An astute wife being something a young man receives from Yahweh
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	a-b	Because an astute wife is more valuable than a house and wealth [since the former comes from Yahweh and the latter comes only from fathers], I should hope to marry an astute wife.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	a-b	Hope to marry an astute wife.

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 19:14

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses to hope to marry an astute wife.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	The astute wife for whom the reader hopes is characterized as more valuable than a house and wealth.

5.3.3 Summary

References to wealth and poverty in 6:30-35 and 19:14 serve as support for the motivation to follow the instructions in both of these units. In both of these passages, wealth and poverty prompt readers to conceptualize a foil to the object of the instruction in question. In each case, that foil is lesser either in consequence (6:30-35) or in value (19:14) than the object of the instruction. In 6:30-35, the thief who steals because he is hungry has to pay an exorbitant amount because of his crime, even though people pity his need for food. As we saw above, the real pragmatic point in this unit is evident in the fact that the adulterer has a worse fate. In contrast with a thief who is poor, an adulterer can never pay enough to atone for his offense. Further, the adulterer is despised rather than pitied (as the thief is). The instruction of 6:30-35 is therefore *do not commit adultery*. In 19:14, the value of the house and wealth that a person receives as a family inheritance is described as lesser in value in comparison to the great worth of an astute wife. The instruction in this unit (for the earliest young male audiences), would therefore be something like *hope to marry an astute wife.*

Readers who imagine personal implications for themselves when they read this material would imagine direct relations between themselves and wealth in simulations. However, neither of these instructions focus on wealth. In each case, the scenarios in which readers would imagine having wealth serve as support for instructions in that the having-wealth scenarios are compared to other scenarios. In 6:30-35, if readers imagine personal implications, they would imagine that they are the adulterer and subject to the consequences in vv 32b-35. They would therefore have

wealth to offer as recompense for their offense, but this wealth would not be accepted. The purpose of imagining this scenario is to underscore the seriousness of adultery (in another scenario). In 19:14, readers would imagine the house and wealth they may one day receive as an inheritance in one scenario. However, in their simulation of the saying as a whole, an astute wife would be characterized as surpassing the value of that house and wealth. Therefore, the scenario of having an astute wife is judged to be better than a scenario in which the reader has "a house and wealth."

5.4 Conclusions

The topics of instructions in this chapter vary. A few may address how readers actually relate to wealth and poverty (10:16 in §5.2.1; 14:4 in §5.2.4; 19:14 in §5.3). At least two may address how readers relate to the poor (28:21 in §5.2.3; 14:4 in §5.2.4). However, in the main, similar to the material in chapter four, the instructions in this chapter are unrelated to wealth and poverty. Wealth and poverty are used in the material in this chapter as *supporting features* in both instructions and motivations.

As supporting features of *instructions*, wealth and poverty serve adverbial functions, characterizing the manner in which an instruction must be carried out (§5.1.2; §5.1.3); or they activate frame metonymies, frame metonymically bringing to mind a scenario that serves as the setting for an instruction (§5.2; §5.3). In addition, when wealth and poverty are used in similes (§5.1.2), smelting analogies (§5.1.3), and frame metonymies (§5.2), they support both the instruction and the motivation in didactic units.

As support for motivation in this chapter, wealth and poverty serve in different ways.

When wealth is used as the source frame in a metaphorical analogy, the high value of an item of wealth maps onto the high value of the object of an instruction (§5.1; §5.2). When wealth and poverty activate frame metonymies, they bring to mind a scenario in which an item of wealth or token of poverty assign an evaluation to the object of an instruction (e.g., the inappropriateness of a fool enjoying wealth in 19:10 and the pitiable state of a person who steals bread out of need in 28:21). When items of wealth are frame elements in one scenario that is compared with another in a *qal waḥomer* analogy, they prompt readers to conceptualize a foil to the object of an instruction. In one instance, the foil is lesser in consequence than the object of instruction (6:30-35). In the other, the foil is lesser in value than the object of instruction (19:14).

Finally, when readers imagine personal implications for themselves and perform Reader in the Scene blends as they process this material, in most cases, they process *indirect* relations between themselves and wealth or poverty. Wealth and poverty characterize objects of instruction with which readers would imagine directly relating in most cases. However, in 10:16 and 14:4, readers may imagine how they actually use wealth. In addition, in 14:4b and 28:21, readers may imagine how they interact directly with the poor. Finally, in 6:30-35 and 19:14, readers would simulate different relations between themselves and wealth. In processing 6:30-35, readers would identify with the adulterer and imagine trying to pay recompense for their wrong—to no effect. In contrast, when readers process 19:14, they would imagine *thinking* of the wealth they will one day receive as an inheritance being lesser in value than the astute wife they may one day marry.

CHAPTER 6
The rich and the poor

6.0 Introduction

The material in this chapter is that in which the rich and the poor are explicitly profiled. No other study of which I am aware separates material in Proverbs that profiles the rich and the poor from material that refers to wealth and poverty when discussing these themes.[176] My hypothesis is that *not* making this distinction (along with the other distinctions I recommend in §1.4) results in what many consider a scholarly consensus—namely, that Proverbs is contradictory, ambiguous, and/or incoherent in what it says about wealth and poverty. This consensus is based on a number of conflations that scholars perform when they discuss this material (§1.2). I challenge two of these conflations here in chapter six:

1) conflations of the meaning and instruction of sayings that mention wealth with the meaning and instruction of sayings that mention the rich,
2) conflations of the meaning and instruction of sayings that mention poverty with the meaning and instruction of sayings that mention the poor.

As stated in chapter two, I contend that what Proverbs says about poverty is not related to what it says about the poor, and that what it says about wealth has little to do with what it says about the rich. Conflating the meaning and instructions of sayings that mention poverty with the meaning

[176] Houston (2003) approaches this distinction but does not ultimately articulate it. Consider the following titles: *The Discourse of Wealth and Poverty in the Book of Proverbs* (Sandoval 2006); "The Role of the Poor in Proverbs" (Houston 2003); *Wealth and Poverty in the Instruction of Amenemope and the Hebrew Proverbs* (Washington 1994); "Wealth and Poverty: System and Contradiction in Proverbs" (Van Leeuwen 1992); *Wealth and Poverty in the Book of Proverbs* (Whybray 1990); "Poverty and Punishment in the Book of Proverbs" (Crenshaw 1989); "Wisdom, Wealth, and Poverty Paradigms in the Book of Proverbs" (Habel 1988); "Poverty in the Social World of the Wise" (Pleins 1987); "The Situational Context of Statements Concerning Poverty and Wealth in Proverbs" (Wittenberg 1987); "The Semantic Field of Rich and Poor in the Wisdom Literature of Hebrew and Accadian" (Donald 1964). Each title listed here refers to one or two of these themes (i.e., wealth, poverty, the rich, and the poor). However, each of the works examines data in Proverbs that mentions all four of these themes.

and instructions of sayings that mention the poor, in particular, leads to a troubling conclusion—namely, that Proverbs blames the poor for being poor. Interpreters reach this conclusion, because poverty is almost always a consequence in Proverbs (e.g., 10:3a, 4a; 6:11; 1:24b; 13:18a, 25b; 14:23b; 19:15b; 21:5b, 7a; 22:16; 23:21; 24:34; 28:19, 22). The logic is that because poverty is a consequence, the producers of Proverbs must think the poor brought their poverty on themselves.

However, we have seen in chapters three to five that when readers construe personal implications for themselves and perform Reader in the Scene blends, they simulate from participant perspectives as they interpret material in Proverbs. This involves readers imagining themselves as the ones who experience the consequences portrayed in sayings—not someone else. Therefore, when readers come to sayings in which poverty in particular is a consequence, they imagine *themselves* as the ones becoming poor as a result of not following an instruction—not someone else. Their personal or participant viewpoint in simulation, in other words, is attached to the character who is (or who becomes) poor. In contrast, we will see here in chapter six that when the poor are explicitly mentioned in Proverbs and are also the *focus of instructions*, the poor person is *someone else* in reader simulations. Therefore, in contrast with "poverty" sayings, in simulating the meaning of "poor" sayings, the viewpoint of readers is attached to a character *interacting with* or *on behalf of* the poor—not the poor characters. There are also sayings in which characters who are described as poor are *central in motivations*. In these sayings, the poor character is held up as an example that readers are prompted to imagine themselves emulating. In these instances, readers would again imagine themselves *as* the poor character in their simulations. However, in contrast with "poverty" sayings, in "the poor as a positive example" sayings the characters who are poor are paragons of virtue.

We will see in the course of this chapter that no saying in Proverbs in which the poor are explicitly mentioned blames them for being poor. Nor does any saying that mentions the rich attribute their wealth to their great virtue. There are three main sections in this chapter:

6.1 Interacting with and on behalf of the poor instructional frames
6.2 Instructional frames using the rich and the poor as examples
6.3 Rulers and the poor instructional frames

In the first section, the poor are the *focus of instructions*. In each case, the instruction is some version of how to or not to treat the poor. In the second section, the poor and the rich play *motivational roles*. Each one is held up as an example to follow or not to follow. The third section contains instructions about how rulers should and should not treat the poor. The poor are mentioned much more frequently than the rich in Proverbs. Specifically, the poor are mentioned forty-one times, while a rich man (*ʿāšîr*) is mentioned only ten (10:15; 14:20; 18:11, 23; 19:2 [with emendation]; 22:2, 7, 16; 28:6, 11). In addition, in nine out of the ten times that an *ʿāšîr* appears in Proverbs, this character is either in parallel or syntagmatic relation with a poor character. Only in 18:11 does an *ʿāšîr* appear apart from a character who is described as poor.

Before turning to the main sections in this chapter, it will be instructive to introduce the Hebrew words that are used in Proverbs to refer to "the poor." There are four of them: *ʾebyôn*, *ʿānî*, *dal*, and *rāš*. *HALOT* offers glosses and etymological theses concerning each one:

ʾebyôn	from hypothetical *ʾ-b-h*, "to be needy": *needy, poor* (I:5)
dal	from I *d-l-l*, "to be little/tiny": *low, poor, helpless, powerless, insignificant, small* (I:222)
ʿānî	from II *ʿ-n-h*, "to be wretched": *without property, poor, wretched, in a needy condition* (I:856)
rāš	G participle of *r-w-š*, "to be poor" (II:1209)

A number of scholars offer hypotheses on the differences (or a lack of difference) between the meanings of these four terms. You may recall from chapter one that Wittenberg (1986) and Sandoval (2006) want to isolate the use of different terms for poor in different subsets of material

in Proverbs. Both have to concede, however, that the terms for *poor* in Proverbs exceed the boundaries they allot for them (§1.3). In addition, Pleins (1987, 2001) theorizes that the terms *dal* and *rāš* are part of a "specialized language of wisdom teachers" that together represent the "value system of the wise" in comparison with the values and ideals of the prophets. Pleins points to the fact that *ʾebyôn* and *ʿānî* are used with relative frequency in the prophets but only rarely in Proverbs. We find the following distribution of these terms in Proverbs:

ʾebyôn	14:31; 30:14; 31:9, 20 (4 occurrences)
dal	10:15; 14:31; 19:4, 17; 21:13; 22:9, 16, 22 (two times); 28:3, 8, 11, 15; 29:7, 14 (15 occurrences)
ʿānî	3:34 (K/Q); 14:21 (K/Q); 15:15; 16:19 (K/Q); 22:22; 30:14; 31:9, 20 (8 occurrences)[177]
rāš	13:8, 23; 14:20; 17:5; 18:23; 19:1, 7, 22; 22:2, 7; 28:3, 6, 27; 29:13 (14 occurrences)[178]

In the prophets, *ʾebyôn* is used seventeen times; *dal* is used twelve times; *ʿānî* is used twenty-one times; and *rāš* is never used.[179] All told, then, the ratios of words for *poor* are somewhat reversed in Proverbs in comparison to their use in the prophets. What is not clear, however, is the idea that, in being used with more frequency by the prophets, the words *ʾebyôn* and *ʿānî* reflect a stronger concern for social justice than do *dal* and *rāš*.

[177] The K/Q readings are discussed below. In each one, the *ketiv* shows a form of *ʿānî* ("poor"), and the *qere* shows a form of *ʿānāw* ("humble").

[178] A word with the spelling *rāʾš* ("poor person") is used in Prov 10:4. Many emend this to *rēʾš* ("poverty") (§3.2.1). The LXX, S, T, and V all show readings that reflect *rēʾš* (§3.2.1). I elect to make this emendation.

[179] On this point, *dal* is used five times in Isaiah (10:2; 11:4; 14:30; 25:4; 26:6), four in Amos (2:7; 4:1; 5:11; 8:6), two times in Jeremiah (5:4; 39:10), and once in Zephaniah (3:12); *ʾebyôn* is also used five times in Isaiah (14:30; 25:4; 29:19; 32:7; 41:17), five times in Amos (2:6; 4:1; 5:12; 8:4, 6), four times in Jeremiah (2:34; 5:28; 20:13; 22:16), and three times in Ezekiel (16:49; 18:12; 22:29); and *ʿānî* is used thirteen times in Isaiah (3:14, 15; 10:2, 30; 14:32; 26:6; 32:7; 41:17; 49:13; 51:21; 54:11; 58:7; 66:2), four times in Ezekiel (16:49; 18:12, 17; 22:29), three times in Zechariah (9:9; 11:7, 11), and once in Zephaniah (3:12), Habakkuk (3:14), Amos (8:4), and Jeremiah (22:16).

In assigning *dal* and *rāš* to a "special vocabulary of wisdom teachers," Pleins (1987, 2001) intends to argue that the producers of Proverbs do not value or seek to promote social justice as much as the prophets. He identifies the producers of Proverbs as "the wise" with whom Jeremiah in particular contends (Jer 8:8-9). In the end, however, Pleins fails to consider the different audiences and rhetorical purposes that prophetic books and the book of Proverbs were designed to address. The prophets addressed political elites in most cases. Central among their strong rebukes are denouncements of the corruption and mistreatment of the poor by these political elites in particular, as well as by people in upper classes more broadly speaking. In contrast, the producers of Proverbs address young male students. Concern for the poor is one of many values that producers seek to inculcate in these students. Thus, the rhetorical settings of the prophets and Proverbs are very different. It must also be said that while the producers of Proverbs focus on many things, only one of which is how to and not to treat the poor, they do not shy away from scathing images of injustices against the poor that are perpetrated by people in positions of power (e.g., 13:23; 28:15-16; 30:14).

The question remains as to semantic differences between terms for *poor* in Proverbs. Whybray considers possible differences in their meanings but ultimately concludes that there are no significant semantic distinctions among them (1990, 22). In some contrast with both Whybray and Pleins, Wittenberg (1986) and Sandoval (2006) both assign *ʾebyôn*, *ʿānî*, and *dal* to "social justice" categories in their analyses. However, in identifying *rāš* with his "social observation" discourse, Sandoval effectively classifies this word as a "social justice" term as well. I see all of these terms being used to promote social justice in Proverbs. Regarding distinctions in their specific meanings, I will elaborate what these might be in the course of the present chapter.

6.1 Interacting with and on behalf of the poor instructional frames

There are two subsections in §6.1. The first is comprised of two units from the Amenemope section (22:22-23; 23:10-11). Both contain direct prohibitions that instruct readers in how *not* to treat the poor as well as another group who are similarly vulnerable—orphans. This section (§6.1.1) is relatively short. The much longer subsection (§6.1.2) comprises the majority of chapter six. It contains sayings from the sentence literature that instruct readers how to and how not to treat the poor. Within instructional frames that concern how people should and should not treat the poor, the poor (and in a few cases the rich) are the *focus of instructions* throughout §6.1. In addition, due to cultural models of the poor that are evident throughout the book, it must also be said that when the poor are portrayed in Proverbs, the producers intend to elicit sympathy for them as well. Therefore, there is always a sense in which merely mentioning the poor serves a motivational function.

6.1.1 Direct commands: how not to treat the poor

Two segments in the Amenemope section (22:17-24:22) contain direct prohibitions against treating the poor (*dal* and *ʿānî* 22:22-23) and orphans (*yĕtōmîm*, in 23:10-11) in ways that are abusive and unjust. The first unit warns readers against robbing the poor and oppressing them in legal proceedings (22:22-23). The second prohibits stealing land from orphans (23:10-11). The first set of commands addresses legal situations that play out "at the gate" (*bašša ʿar* in 22:22b), and the second concern transgressions against orphans on their property (*śĕdê yĕtōmîm*, "the fields of orphans" in 23:10b).

6.1.1.1 At the gate

The first two prohibitions in the Amenemope section against treating the poor badly presuppose a judicial setting. This is evident in the phrase "at the gate" (*bašša ʿar* in 22:22b). Commentators usually assume that this setting obtains in v 22a as well (e.g., Whybray 1994; Murphy 1998; Waltke 2005; Fox 2009).

אַל־תִּגְזָל־דָּל כִּי דַל־הוּא	a	22:22	Do not rob a *dal* because he is *dal*,
וְאַל־תְּדַכֵּא עָנִי בַּשָּׁעַר	b		and do not crush an *ʿānî* at the gate.
כִּי־יְהוָה יָרִיב רִיבָם	a	22:23	For Yahweh will argue their case,
וְקָבַע אֶת־קֹבְעֵיהֶם נָפֶשׁ	b		and he will rob the life of those who rob them.

The two poor characters in v 22 are the *dal* and the *ʿānî*. In both cases the command is a prohibition against abusing them in some way—against robbing (*g-z-l*) them in v 22a and against crushing (*d-k-ʾ*) them in v 22b. The two legal abuses could refer to the same action. Both robbery and "crushing" in a judicial setting could refer to the seizure of property or land owned by a *dal*, or possibly to the seizure of the *dal* himself. In these situations, a poor person may have acquired debts that he could not pay back. The crushing of an *ʿānî* at the gate in v 22b is a vivid image. It inherits mappings from both PEOPLE ARE OBJECTS and OPPRESSING IS CRUSHING metaphors. These mappings combine in the metaphor OPPRESSING A PERSON IS CRUSHING AN OBJECT.

Motivation to heed the prohibitions in v 22 is articulated in v 23. The motivation is marked by a *kî* ("for") at the start of the verse. The explicit motivation provided in v 23 is the idea that Yahweh will come to the defense of the *dal* and the *ʿānî* and will "rob the life of those who rob them" (*qābaʿ ʾet qōbĕʿêhem nepeš*). This motivation is rooted in frames of Yahweh as special protector of the poor and vulnerable. He is portrayed as such throughout the Hebrew Bible (e.g., Ex 22:25; Lev 19:10; 23:22; Dt 15:7-11; Dt 24:14-15; 1 Sam 2:8; Ps 12:6 [5]; Ps

69:34 [33]; Ps 72:12-14; Ps 107:41; Ps 113:7; Ps 140:13 [12]; Job 5:15; Pr 14:31; 19:17; Is 25:4; Amos 2:6; 5:12; 8:4-6). Yahweh as arbiter in a legal contest is a common literary conceit in the Hebrew Bible as well.[180] However, he is even more commonly imagined as judge and the one dispensing both legal sentences and their punishments. When Yahweh is an advocate giving voice in a legal context as a legal advocate, as he is here in v 23a, readers imagine him in an earlier moment of a legal process. 22:23b portrays him in the role of punisher once again. Thus, Yahweh is portrayed in multiple roles defending the poor in this saying pair.

The judgment he doles out in v 23b is extreme. It goes beyond the principle of *lex talionis* in assigning a death sentence to anyone who would extort or oppress the poor in a legal proceeding. In portraying the punishment so severely, and in having Yahweh as the agent carrying out the punishment, the producers of Proverbs underscore how grave an offense it is to oppress the poor. The instruction is direct in v 22, but we can still represent the reasoning that readers might engage when they connect that instruction with the motivation in v 23.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 22:22-23

CONTENT BASE SPACES	22a	Command not to rob a *dal*
	22b	Command not to crush an *ʿānî* at the gate
	23a	Yahweh arguing the case of the *ʿānî* [and the *dal*]
	23b	Yahweh robbing the life of those who rob the *ʿānî* and the *dal*
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	22-23	Because Yahweh will defend the *dal* and the *ʿānî* and punish those who treat them unjustly, I should not treat the poor unjustly.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	22-23	[explicit content in 22:22]

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 22:22-23

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses not to rob or treat the poor unjustly.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & THE POOR	The poor would be people with whom the reader would interact.

[180] 1 Samuel 24:16 [15]; 25:39; Isaiah 3:13; 49:25; 50:8; 51;22; 57:16; Jeremiah 2:9; 50:34; 51:36; Hosea 4:4; Micah 7:9; Psalm 35:1; 43:1; 74:22; 119:154; Lamentations 3:58.

6.1.1.2 On their property

The direct prohibitions in Prov 23:10-11 concern the preservation of "ancient boundaries" (*gĕbūl ʿōlām* in v 10a). Deut 19:14 legislates against moving the boundary line of a neighbor, and Deut 27:17 includes doing so as a cursable offense in the list of curses in the covenant ratification ceremony portrayed on Mount Ebal. The words *dal*, *ʿānî*, *ʾebyôn*, and *rāš* do not appear in Prov 23:10-11. The characters whose property is guarded in this passage are not described as poor, but they would have been vulnerable like the poor. The characters whose property is in question in 23:10-11 are orphans (*yĕtōmîm* in v 10b). Because orphans are included in lists of vulnerable groups in ancient Israel along with the poor (e.g., Ps 82:3; Is 10:2; Job 24:9, 12; Zech 7:10; note also the many references to the sojourner, orphan, and widow as a group throughout Deuteronomy), I include 23:10-11 in the present study. (Note also the defense by Yahweh of the boundary of the widow—*gĕbūl ʾalmānāh*—in 15:25, on which see §4.3.2.)

אַל־תַּסֵּג גְּבוּל עוֹלָם	a	23:10	Do not remove an ancient boundary,
וּבִשְׂדֵי יְתוֹמִים אַל־תָּבֹא	b		and do not enter the fields of orphans.
כִּי־גֹאֲלָם חָזָק	a	23:11	For their redeemer is strong,
הוּא־יָרִיב אֶת־רִיבָם אִתָּךְ	b		He himself will argue their case with you.

Yahweh is not named explicitly in 23:10-11, as he is in 22:22-23. However, many readers will imagine Yahweh when they read the phrase "their redeemer" (*gōʾălām*) in v 11a, and it is most likely that the producers intended this. Yahweh is once again portrayed coming the legal aid of the vulnerable in 23:10-11, as he was in 22:22-23.

Yahweh is portrayed as the redeemer of Israel or of individuals within Israel in three types of situations. In one, he redeems people from exile, which is conceived as forced servitude

for sins in the prophets and many psalms.[181] In another, he redeems individuals from personal wrongdoing (Ps 19:15 [14]; 103:4). And in a third context, Yahweh redeems people from oppression or enemies who are opposed to them when no instance of their own wrongdoing is implied (Ps 69:19 [18]; 119:154). This final situation comports with Prov 23:10-11.[182] The background of the commands in v 10 is the unlawful encroachment on land owned by orphans. The orphans had of course done no wrong but would have been at the mercy of people who had the power to steal their landed property. Yahweh as *gōʾălām* ("their redeemer") is portrayed coming to their defense.[183] The prospect of facing Yahweh in a legal contest is prohibitive. In addition, merely portraying injustice and doing wrong to orphans are negative cultural models. We can therefore imagine readers constructing the meaning of this unit as they connect the logic of the direct instructions in v 10 to the motivation in v 11 in the following way.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 23:10-11		
CONTENT BASE SPACES	10a	Command not to remove ancient boundaries
	10b	Command not to encroach upon the fields of orphans
	11a	Their redeemer being strong
	11b	Their redeemer arguing their case with the reader
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	10-11	Because their redeemer is strong and will argue their case for them, I should not move the boundaries of, or encroach upon, the fields of orphans [i.e., I should not take advantage of the vulnerable].
DIRECTIVE SPACES	10-11	[explicit in 23:10]

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 23:10-11	
ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses not to steal landed property from

[181] This is pictured or inferred twenty-two times in Isaiah (35:9; 41:14; 43:1, 14; 44:6, 22, 23; 47:4; 48:17, 20; 49:7, 26; 51:10; 52:3, 9; 54:5, 8; 59:20; 60:16; 62:12; 63:9, 16), twice in Jeremiah (31:11; 50:34), and once in Hosea (13:14) and Micah (4:10). Lam 3:58 also refers to Yahweh as the redeemer of the speaker from exile. In addition, psalmists celebrate Yahweh's deliverance of Israel from exile in Babylon (74:2; 77:16 [15]; 106:10; 107:2) and in their exodus from Egypt (78:35).

[182] Similarly, in one of the two psalms "of Solomon" (*lišlōmōh*), the psalmist describes the king as one who redeems the poor (*dal* and *ʾebyôn*) from oppression and violence (72:13-14).

[183] The phrase *gōʾălām ḥāzāq* ("their redeemer is strong") is also used in Jer 50:34.

RELATION BETWEEN READER & THE POOR	orphans [or to take advantage of the vulnerable]. If we imagine that orphans would in some cases have been poor, the poor would be people with whom the reader would interact.

6.1.2 Indirect instructions on how to and how not to treat the poor

This section consists of four subsections. They contain sayings that directly mention injustice (13:23) or the legal right (*dîn*) of the poor (§6.1.2.1); sayings that portray kindness to the poor and negative counterparts of this (e.g., oppressing, mocking, and ignoring the poor, §6.1.2.2); sayings that portray social relations between the rich and the poor and their friends, neighbors, or associates and, in one case, family (§6.1.2.3); and finally, sayings that show the rich and the poor interacting with one another in some way—even if only theoretically, as in 22:2 and 29:13 (§6.1.2.4). Most of the sayings in §6.1.2.3 and §6.1.2.4 are those that Sandoval includes in his social observation discourse. You may recall that though these sayings are formulated as seemingly neutral statements, each one conveys implicit and, I would argue, rather scathing critiques.

6.1.2.1 Justice and injustice

Prov 13:23, 29:7 and 30:14 all condemn injustice against the poor. 13:23 portrays an instance of injustice. 29:7 compares the *ṣaddîq* and *rāšāʿ* vis-à-vis their knowledge regarding the legal right (*dîn*) of the poor. And 30:14c-d concludes an epigram with a vivid figurative depiction of injustice against the poor. The verbal frame in both 13:23 and 30:14c-d is the verb *ʾ-k-l* (“eat”). In both cases, the meaning this verb carries is appropriately dramatized by the

English word "devour." The object of this verb is the poor in 30:14 and something that belongs to the poor in 13:23. To begin, consider 13:23, to which I make two emendations.[184]

רַב־אֹכֶל נִיר רָאשִׁים	a	13:23	A great man devours the fallow ground of *rāšîm*,
וְיֵשׁ נִסְפֶּה בְּלֹא מִשְׁפָּט	b		and there is a person who is swept away for lack of justice.

The great man (*rab*) in v 23a is a foil to the good man (*ṭôb*) in v 22a. Recall that the good man in v 22a leaves an inheritance not only to his children but also to his grandchildren. The great man in v 23a, in notable contrast, consumes (or "devours") land from which *rāšîm* might otherwise find sustenance. The good man in v 22a leaves wealth for others (and *for* a second generation, no less), while the *rab* in v 23a takes it from others (and *from* the poor, no less). The land in view is an unplowed field (*nîr*).[185] This may be a small plot of land owned by *rāšîm* or land that an owner left unplowed specifically so that the poor could glean from it (see Lev 19:9-10; 23:22; Dt 24:19-22). In either case, the scene in v 23a is the unjust seizure of a resource on which *rāšîm* depended by a great man who does not need the additional produce that the *nîr* of the *rāšîm* might provide.

Prov 13:23b could be interpreted in one of four ways. The word *yēš* could be read as "wealth," and the line could read, "and wealth is swept away by lack of justice." However, Fox notes that *s-p-h* in the N stem is always used in conjunction with people as objects (2009, 570).

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[184] Both emendations require only vowel changes: M *rōb* to *rab*, and M *ʾōkel* to *ʾōkēl*. I follow Fox (2009) in making both of these emendations. Without emending, English translations can be represented as follows: "An abundance [*rōb* instead of *rab*] of food [*ʾōkel* instead of *ʾōkēl*] is in the fallow ground of the *rāšîm*." With the proposed emendations, this saying reads, "A great man [*rab* instead of *rōb*] consumes [*ʾōkēl* instead of *ʾōkel*] the fallow ground of the poor." Fox notes that R. Simeon bar Yochai (*Midrash Proverbs* ad loc.) and the Targum (MS^Z) reflect the emended reading. He also observes with good insight that a problem with the reading in M is that, "people who have an abundance of food cannot be called poor" (Fox 2009, 570).

[185] The word *nîr* is used only two other times in the Hebrew Bible (Jeremiah 4:3 and Hosea 10:12).

This does not make it impossible for *nispeh* to be used with an inanimate object in v 23b, but it does make this reading less likely. In another two readings of this line, *yēš* is interpreted as the existential participle ("there is"). In one, the person referred to by the participle *nispeh* ("be swept away") is pictured as a *rāš* who lost land or access to land because a great man took it. In the other, *nispeh* refers to the great man (*rab*) who unjustly devoured the *nîr* of the *rāšîm* in v 23a. These two readings require different interpretations of the *bet* proposition in the phrase *bĕlôʾ mišpāṭ* in v 23b*β*. In the first reading, where a poor person is swept away, the *bet* marks the instrument of the sweeping away. In the second, the *bet* marks the reason for the sweeping away. I adopt the second of these two readings. Every other time that *s-p-h* is used in the Hebrew Bible in the N stem, as it is in v 23b, it portrays judgment (Gen 19:15, 17; Num 16:26; 1 Sam 12:25; 26:10; Is 13:15; 1 Chr 21:12). In personal conversation, Jeremy Hutton suggested a fourth possible reading of v 23b*α* in which the phrase *wĕyēš* ("and there is") is emended to *wĕʾîš* ("and a man"). This reading comports with the third reading. In both, the *rab* ("great man") would be the subject of *nispeh* ("swept away"). Therefore, in both, the great man would be swept away in judgment for his unjust seizure of land that should have been preserved for the poor.

There are at least two motivations that support the instruction in v 23. The mere portrayal of stealing land from the poor is enough to prompt revulsion toward this action. In addition, if we view the *rab* ("great man") as the one who is swept away in v 23b, his punishment adds to the motivation in this saying as well. We can therefore imagine readers constructing meaning in the following way when they read this saying.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 13:23

CONTENT BASE SPACES	a	A great man stealing away land that belongs to *rāšîm*
	b	That great man being swept away because of [his] lack of justice
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	a-b	Because stealing from the poor is bad, and because it leads to bad

		things, I should not steal from *rāšîm*.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	a	Do not steal from the poor.
	b	Do not commit any kind of injustice.
		[And possibly, do not stand by while others commit injustices.]

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 13:23a

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses not to steal from the poor.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & THE POOR	The poor would be people with whom the reader would interact.

Proverbs 13:23b

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses not to commit any kind of injustice and possibly also chooses to stop others from committing injustices.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & THE POOR	The poor would be people with whom [and on behalf of whom] the reader would interact.

* * *

Prov 29:7 refers explicitly to "the right of the poor" (*dîn dallîm*) and makes securing justice for the poor in legal judgments a matter of knowledge, which, in Proverbs, is a matter of moral character.

יֹדֵ֣עַ צַדִּ֣יק דִּ֣ין דַּלִּ֑ים	a	29:7	A righteous man knows the right of *dallîm*,
רָשָׁ֥ע לֹא־יָ֝בִ֗ין דָּֽעַת	b		a wicked man does not understand knowledge.

This saying pits the righteous (*ṣaddîq*) against the wicked (*rāšāʿ*) and claims that the *ṣaddîq* knows (*y-d-ʿ*) the *dîn dallîm*. In contrast, the *rāšāʿ* is described as not understanding (*b-y-n*) knowledge (*daʿat*). On its own, v 7b sounds like a broad statement criticizing the *rāšāʿ* for having a weak intellect. 29:7a directs attention to one facet of the intellect of the wicked in particular: his understanding of the legal right of the poor. In addition to exhorting readers to recognize the "right of the poor," this saying also functions like other righteous-wicked sayings as a commendation of the righteous and a condemnation of the wicked. It is therefore arguable that *be righteous* and *do not be wicked* instructional frames underlie the more specific instruction in v 7 of *know the right of the poor* (like the *ṣaddîq* does). It is also the case that with this more

specific instruction would come the expectation that a person would act on the knowledge they have. Readers may therefore construct the meaning of this saying in the following ways.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 29:7

CONTENT BASE SPACES	a	A righteous man knowing the right of *dallîm*
	b	A wicked man not understanding knowledge [and specifically, the right of the *dallîm*]
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	a	Because people who are righteous know [and by implication protect] the right of *dallîm*, I should know and protect the right of *dallîm*.
	b	Because people who are wicked do not understand knowledge [and specifically, the right of *dallîm*], I should learn to understand knowledge [and specifically, the right of *dallîm*].
DIRECTIVE SPACES	a	Know and protect the right of the poor. / Be righteous.
	b	Learn to understand knowledge [and the right of the *dallîm*]. / Do not be wicked.

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 29:7a

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses to know and protect the rights of the poor.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & THE POOR	The poor would be people with whom [and on behalf of whom] the reader would interact.

Proverbs 29:7b

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses to learn to understand knowledge [and specifically, the rights of the poor].
RELATION BETWEEN READER & THE POOR	The poor would be people with whom [and on behalf of whom] the reader would interact (if we infer from parallelism that the knowledge in v 7b pertains to the rights of the poor mentioned in v 7a).

* * *

Prov 30:14 concludes a short epigram that describes a rather deplorable "generation" (*dōr*) in a series of four depictions of terrible things that this generation does. As Fox underscores, the description of this generation "is enough to condemn it" (2009, 865).

דּוֹר אָבִיו יְקַלֵּל	a	30:11	A generation who curses their father
וְאֶת־אִמּוֹ לֹא יְבָרֵךְ	b		and does not bless their mother,
דּוֹר טָהוֹר בְּעֵינָיו	a	30:12	a generation who is pure in their [own] eyes
וּמִצֹּאָתוֹ לֹא רֻחָץ	b		but is not washed of their filth,

דּוֹר מָה־רָמוּ עֵינָיו	a	30:13	a generation—how high are their eyes,
וְעַפְעַפָּיו יִנָּשֵׂאוּ	b		and how high their eyelids!—
דּוֹר חֲרָבוֹת שִׁנָּיו	a	30:14	a generation whose teeth are swords
וּמַאֲכָלוֹת מְתַלְּעֹתָיו	b		and whose fangs are knives
לֶאֱכֹל עֲנִיִּים מֵאָרֶץ	c		to devour the *ʿăniyyîm* from the land
אֶבְיוֹנִים מֵאָדָם	d		and the *ʾebyônîm* from humankind.

There is a chiasm observable in this epigram. The two middle descriptions of this "generation" (*dōr*) both highlight self-aggrandizing misconceptions they have of themselves—specifically, mistaken perceptions of purity in v 12 and mistaken high self-regard in v 13. The outer two descriptions profile terrible actions that this generation performs—failing to bless and respect their parents in v 11 and oppressing the poor in v 14. The placement of the final two lines in v 14 (c and d) outside the series proper designates these last two lines as a climax to the epigram (Fox 2009, 867). It is in these last two lines that the poor are mentioned: the *ʿăniyyîm* in v 14c and *ʾebyônîm* in v 14d. Lines c and d conclude the epigram with two purpose clauses that explain what the "teeth" and "fangs" in v 14a-b are bared to do—namely, to "devour" (*ʾ-k-l*) the poor.

At least three metaphorical mappings are activated in readings of v 14. Mappings in the more basic metaphor PEOPLE ARE ANIMALS cascade into the metaphors PEOPLE WHO OPPRESS OTHERS ARE CARNIVOROUS ANIMALS and PEOPLE WHO ARE VULNERABLE TO OPPRESSORS ARE THE PREY OF CARNIVOROUS ANIMALS. In addition, the related set of mappings, ANIMAL TEETH ARE HUMAN WEAPONS, is also operative. In this metaphor, animal teeth are the source-frame element and whatever readers conceive as the weapon used against the poor and needy is the target-frame element. This target-frame element could be any means of oppression and injustice.

The imagery in v 14 resonates with imagery in 28:15, which reads, "A roaring lion and a charging bear // a wicked ruler over a *dal* ("poor") people" (on which, see §6.3). 28:15 explicitly names "a wicked ruler" (*mōšēl rāšāʾ*). 30:14 may be meant to evoke images of rulers oppressing

the poor or—more generally—to portray a group of people who have enough power to threaten the wellbeing of the poor in some way. If readers envision rulers when they read 30:14, this saying could serve at least three pedagogical functions. Specifically, 30:14 could instruct rulers and readers who are not rulers in at least three ways: 1) how to assess rulers (and what kind of ruler to be), 2) what kinds of rulers to hope for (and what kind of ruler to be), and 3) how to treat the poor (as rulers and as people who are not rulers). As Weinfeld (1995) underscores repeatedly, everyone in ancient Near Eastern societies—not only rulers—were expected to secure justice for the poor and vulnerable.

In the summaries below, I represent only the third of the three interpretations that are listed above. Other construals are possible.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 30:14		
CONTENT BASE SPACES	a-b	A generation of violent people
	c-d	This violent generation targeting *ʿănîyyîm* and *ʾebyônîm*
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	a-d	Because this generation is so violent and does such terrible things, I should not be like this generation [and possibly actively work against what they do or have done by caring for *ʿănîyyîm* and *ʾebyônîm*].
DIRECTIVE SPACES	a-d	Do not oppress the poor—rather, protect and care for the poor.

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 30:14	
ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses not to oppress the poor but instead to protect and care for them.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & THE POOR	The poor would be people with whom [and on behalf of whom] the reader would interact.

6.1.2.2 Kindness and its negative counterparts

Many sayings in Proverbs exhort kindness to the poor. I divide this material into three groups —one that includes sayings that portray some kind of oppression in contrast to kindness

(§6.1.2.2.1), another that includes sayings that profile situations in which the poor are mocked or ignored (§6.1.2.2.2), and a third in which only kindness to the poor is depicted (§6.1.2.2.3). Each of these sections contain "kindness" sayings. Only the first two include examples of their negative counterparts. I identify "kindness" sayings as those in which the poor are objects of *ḥ-n-n* ("be kind" or "generous to" or "show favor" in the G stem; *ʿānî* in 14:21b;[186] *dal* in 14:31b and 19:17a; *dallîm* in 28:8b), indirect objects of *n-t-n* ("give"; *dal* in 22:9b; *rāš* in 28:27a), and a recipient of whatever form of kindness the *ʾēšet ḥayil* ("woman of strength") extends in 31:20 to an *ʿānî* and an *ʾebyôn*.

6.1.2.2.1 Oppression and kindness

The four sayings in this section could be discussed with sayings that prohibit injustice against the poor (13:23, 29:7, and 30:14 in §6.1.2.1). Oppression is of course a kind of injustice. I discuss them separately only because the saying in this section (14:31; 22:16; 28:3, 8) all contain the word *ʿ-š-q* ("oppress") to refer abstractly to oppression of the poor (14:31a; 22:16a: 28:3, 8). Significantly, only *dal* and *dallîm* are portrayed as objects of *ʿ-š-q* in Proverbs (14:31a; 22:16a; 28:3a). Consider 28:3 first.

Prov 28:3 is the only saying in Proverbs that portrays two "types" of poor people interacting—a *rāš* and *dallîm*. It is evident in the scenario portrayed in this saying that the *rāš* has more power than the *dallîm*.

[186] Prov 14:21 contains the one form of *ḥ-n-n* in Proverbs that is not in the G stem. It is one of two occurrences in the Hebrew Bible in which this verbal root is used in a poel form (*mĕḥōnēn*). The other is Ps 102:15. *HALOT* glosses *ḥ-n-n* in the poel stem as "have compassion on" (I:335).

גֶּבֶר רָשׁ וְעֹשֵׁק דַּלִּים	a	28:3	A *rāš* man who oppresses *dallîm* –
מָטָר סֹחֵף וְאֵין לָחֶם	b		a driving rain that leaves no food.

The food (*leḥem*) in v 3b could be interpreted as real food that the *geber rāš* ("poor man") takes from the *dallîm*. It could also be construed as a source frame that is mapped onto other possessions of the *dallîm* that the *geber rāš* takes or destroys. Or, the whole scenario of crops being destroyed could be descriptive of other ways in which oppression is destructive in human experience. The most basic metaphor underlying v 3b is again PEOPLE ARE OBJECTS. This metaphor interacts with OPPRESSION IS A DESTRUCTIVE STORM in this saying. Finally, food or other possessions may be compared to crops—or, again, the destruction of crops could characterize other ways in which oppression harms people. The sets of metaphorical mappings that combine to give meaning to 3b can be summarized as PEOPLE WHO OPPRESS OTHERS ARE TORRENTIAL DOWNPOURS THAT DESTROY CROPS. This complex metaphor adds to the evaluation (and therefore motivation) in this saying. Oppressing the poor is already a reprehensible thing and therefore functions as an anti-goal in Proverbs. 28:3 portrays in unequivocal terms just how horrible it is to oppress the poor.

The broad instruction issued in this saying is therefore quickly interpreted as *do not oppress the poor*. However, this saying adds complexity to this scenario in portraying a *geber rāš* ("man who is *rāš*") oppressing *dallîm*. Commentators debate the identity of the *geber rāš* in this saying. Some think this person is someone who was "formerly poor" (Murphy 1982, 214). Fox argues against this idea, reflecting that if this person was in fact a *nouveau riche* he would not be described as *rāš* (2009, 820). He would have left that characterization behind. Others emend *rāš* to *rāšāʿ* ("bad" or "evil") (e.g., REB, NRSV) or *rōʾš* ("head" as in "leader" or "chief") (McKane 1970, 629), because they consider it implausible that one kind of poor person

would oppress others who are also poor (Whybray 1994, 389). LXX translators either shared this impulse or used a source text that does not reflect M. Where M has *geber rāš wĕʿōšēq dallîm*, the LXX reads *ἀνδρεῖος ἐν ἀσεβείαις συκοφαντεῖ πτωχούς* ("one who is courageous, by ungodliness oppresses the poor"). The Syriac Peshitta (S), however, corresponds with M. S has ܓܒܪ ܡܣܟܝܢ (ʻgeber miskînʼ) ("poor man") at the start of 28:3. Like S, I maintain *geber rāš* in v 3a.

Some more specific situation could have been in the minds of the producers of this saying. The *geber rāš* clearly has power over the *dallîm* in this saying. We might conclude from this that *rāšîm* were better off than *dallîm*. If this is correct, 28:3 may address some specific situation in which *rāšîm* specifically would be tempted to oppress or take advantage of *dallîm*. This could have been extorting resources from the poor in predatory lending scenarios (§3.3.3) or falsely accusing them in legal proceedings (§6.1.1.1). We cannot know for sure. Whether readers would be able to identify as *rāšîm* or not, we can imagine them construing the basic instruction not to oppress the poor when they read this saying.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 28:3

CONTENT BASE SPACES	a	A *rāš* oppressing *dallîm* being likened to
	b	a driving rain that leaves no food
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	a-b	Because oppressing *dallîm* is so bad, I should not oppress *dallîm*.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	a-b	Do not oppress the poor.

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 28:3

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses not to oppress the poor.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & THE POOR	The poor would be people with whom the reader would interact.

* * *

I turn now to two sayings that have already been discussed, 22:16 and 28:8. Both were discussed in chapter three as instructions on how not to build wealth (§3.1.6), and 22:16b

appeared again as an instruction on what not to do with wealth (§3.3.1). Both prohibit readers from building wealth by oppressing the poor. 22:16b, in addition, prohibits readers from using wealth that has been gained by oppressing the poor to ingratiate themselves with the rich. I present these sayings again in order to include all the sayings that prohibit oppressing the poor here in §6.1.2.2.1. A *dal* is portrayed as the object of oppression in 22:16a, and we see *dallîm* in 28:8b.

עֹשֵׁק דָּל לְהַרְבּוֹת לוֹ נֹתֵן לְעָשִׁיר אַךְ־לְמַחְסוֹר	a b	22:16	A person who oppresses a *dal* to increase for himself, who gives to a rich man – only to poverty.
מַרְבֶּה הוֹנוֹ בְּנֶשֶׁךְ וּבְתַרְבִּית לְחוֹנֵן דַּלִּים יִקְבְּצֶנּוּ	a b	28:8	A person who increases his riches by interest and usury[187] – he gathers it for a person who is kind to the *dallîm.*

We saw in chapter three that the background of both of these sayings could be construed as the practice of predatory lending but that 22:16 allows for the construal of other backgrounds as well—specifically, forced labor or false testimony against the poor in legal proceedings leading to seizure of their person or their property. In addition, 28:8b instructs readers to be kind to the poor by profiling *ḥōnēn dallîm* ("a person who is kind to the *dallîm*"). This person ends up getting the wealth that the person who preyed on the poor in 28:8a had managed to gain. Merely portraying kindness to the poor is sufficient motivation for readers to emulate the *ḥōnēn dallîm* in 28:8b. Yet it is again the case that producers of this saying add a layer of motivation by portraying this character receiving the wealth that the oppressor in v 8a had gained through unjust means. In correspondence with this, the character in 22:16 first gains wealth by oppressing a *dal*, turns around and gives some of it to the rich, and then comes to poverty. Thus, both sayings add to motivation that would be intrinsic to cultural models on how to treat the poor by

[187] There is a *ketiv-qere* reading in 28:8b. The *ketiv* includes a *bet* preposition immediately before *tarbît* (after the conjunctive *waw*), and the *qere* does not.

portraying ironic consequences. We can therefore imagine readers constructing meaning in the following ways when they read these sayings.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 22:16		
CONTENT BASE SPACES	a	A person oppressing a *dal* to gain an increase for himself
	b	The same person giving to a rich man and coming to poverty
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	a	Because building wealth by oppressing the poor leads to bad things [explicit in 22:16bb], I should not build wealth by oppressing the poor.
	b	Because trying to ingratiate oneself with the rich leads to bad things, I should not try to ingratiate myself with the rich.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	a	Do not build wealth by oppressing the poor.
	b	Do not use your wealth to try ingratiate yourself with the rich.
Proverbs 28:8		
CONTENT BASE SPACES	a	A person building wealth through predatory lending
	b	The same person building wealth only to give it to someone who is kind to *dallîm*.
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	a-b	Because building wealth through predatory lending leads to bad things, I should not build wealth through predatory lending.
	b	Because giving to *dallîm* leads to good things, I should give to *dallîm*.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	a-b	Do not build wealth through predatory lending.
	b	Give to *dallîm*.

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 22:16a	
ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses not to oppress the poor [possibly through predatory lending].
RELATION BETWEEN READER & THE POOR	The poor would be someone with whom the reader would interact.
Proverbs 28:8b$_2$	
ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses not to oppress the poor through predatory lending.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & THE POOR	The poor would be people with whom the reader would interact.

* * *

Prov 14:31 is the final saying that prohibits oppression of the poor in general. It again does so using the verb *ʿ-š-q* (“to oppress”). It also exhorts readers to be kind to the poor, again using the verb *ḥ-n-n* (“favor” or “be kind to”). And it is again the case that in addition to portraying vicious and virtuous characters interacting with the poor, another layer of motivation

is provided in 14:31—namely, the correlation of how a person treats the poor with how they relate to Yahweh.

עֹשֵׁק דָּל חֵרֵף עֹשֵׂהוּ וּמְכַבְּדוֹ חֹנֵן אֶבְיוֹן	a b	14:31	A person who oppresses a *dal* insults his maker, and a person who is kind to an *ʾebyôn* honors him.

The "him" in the second line is the maker referred to in the first. The antecedent of both is best understood as Yahweh. This saying contrasts oppression of, and kindness to, the poor vis-à-vis the effect that each has on the actors' relationship with, or standing before, Yahweh. Yahweh's concern for the poor is again evident—so much so that oppressing (*ʿ-š-q*) a *dal* is equated with insulting him as their maker. Further, being kind (*ḥ-n-n*) to an *ʾebyôn* is equated with honoring him. The instructions issued in 14:31 are thus clearly *do not oppress the poor* and, in contrast, *be kind to the poor*. We can imagine readers constructing meaning in the following ways when they read this saying.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 14:31		
CONTENT BASE SPACES	a	A person oppressing a *dal* and thereby insulting his maker
	b	A person being kind to an *ʾebyôn* and thereby honoring his maker
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	a	Because oppressing a *dal* insults Yahweh, I should not oppress the poor.
	b	Because being kind to an *ʾebyôn* honors Yahweh, I should be kind to the poor.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	a	Do not oppress the poor.
	b	Be kind to the poor.

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 14:31a	
ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses not to oppress the poor.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & THE POOR	The poor would be people with whom the reader would interact.

Proverbs 14:31b	
ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses to be kind to the poor.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & THE POOR	The poor would be people with whom the reader would interact.

6.1.2.2.2 Mocking, ignoring, and kindness

One saying in Proverbs prohibits mocking the poor (*l-ʿ-g* 17:5), and two prohibit ignoring the poor—"closing one's ears" in 21:13a and "hiding one's eyes" in 28:27b. In contrast to ignoring the poor, 28:27a exhorts readers to "give" (*n-t-n*) to them. Before discussing 21:13 and 28:27 (the "ignoring" sayings), consider 17:5.

How a person relates to Yahweh is again a source of motivation in 17:5. In addition, 17:5a*β* uses the same construction that is used in 14:31a*β*, *ḥērēp ʿōśēhū* ("he insults his maker"). However, the action that causes the insult and the object of the action are different in 17:5a from what we see in 14:31a.

לֹעֵג לָרָשׁ חֵרֵף עֹשֵׂהוּ	a	17:5	A person who mocks a *rāš* insults his maker,
שָׂמֵחַ לְאֵיד לֹא יִנָּקֶה	b		a person who rejoices at calamity – he will not be found innocent.

The actor in 14:31a is a person who oppresses (*ʿ-š-q*) a *dal*, and the actor in 17:5a is a person who mocks (*l-ʿ-g*) a *rāš*. Does this difference reflect a difference in the social power of *dallîm* in comparison with *rāšîm*? Would *dallîm* be more likely to be oppressed, in other words, because they have less power than *rāšîm*, and would *rāšîm* be more likely to be mocked and not oppressed because they are not as vulnerable as *dallîm*? Possibly. As noted above, three of the four times in Proverbs that the verb *ʿ-š-q* ("oppress") is used, *dal* or *dallîm* is the direct object. (The fourth use of this verb has nothing to do with one person oppressing another.)[188] However we answer this question, it is clear that the producers of Proverbs condemn the treatment of both

[188] The fourth instance is Prov 28:17 and refers to *guilt* oppressing a person. This is conveyed metonymically in the phrase *ʾādām ʿāšūq bědām nepeš* ("a man who is burdened with [or oppressed by] the blood of another").

dallîm and *rāšîm* in 14:31a and 17:5a. Their equation of oppressing a *dal* and mocking a *rāš* with insulting Yahweh is evidence of this.

"Calamity" (*ʾêd*) in 17:5b is parallel to the *rāš* in 17:5a. Being a *rāš* means experiencing a particular kind of calamity. This equation corresponds to the description of poverty (*rêš*) in 10:15b as "ruin" (*měḥiṭṭāh*). When poverty is explicitly described in relation to the poor, it is characterized as a ruinous or calamitous state—and therefore, a pitiable one. It is never described as a blameworthy state when the poor are explicitly profiled. Rather, 17:5a prohibits mocking the poor and rejoicing at any kind of calamity that a person might experience. The inherent alternativity of instructions in Proverbs may lead readers to imagine that 17:5 commends the opposite of what it portrays as well—namely, being kind to and having compassion on the poor and people experiencing poverty or any other kind of calamity. We can imagine the following ways that readers might construe the more explicit prohibitions when they read this saying.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 17:5		
CONTENT BASE SPACES	a	A person mocking a *rāš* and thereby insulting his maker
	b	A person rejoicing at calamity and being found guilty
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	a	Because oppressing a *rāš* insults Yahweh, I should not oppress the poor.
	b	Because rejoicing at calamity leads to being found guilty, I should not rejoice at calamity.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	a	Do not mock the poor.
	b	Do not rejoice at calamity.

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 17:5a	
ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses not to mock the poor.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & THE POOR	The poor would be people with whom the reader would interact.

Proverbs 17:5b	
ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses not to rejoice at calamity.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & THE POOR	The poor would be people with whom the reader would interact (if we infer from parallelism that the calamity portrayed involves poverty).

* * *

Prov 21:13 and 28:27 both exhort readers not to ignore the poor. As noted above, 21:13 does so by condemning "closing one's ear" (*ʾōṭēm ʾoznô* in 21:13a), and 28:27 does this by prohibiting "hiding one's eyes" (*maʿlîm ʿênāw* in 28:27b). Both also portray consequences for these actions. 21:13 is an especially pointed example of a person reaping what they sow.

אֹטֵם אָזְנוֹ מִזַּעֲקַת־דָּל	a	21:13	A person who closes his ear from the cry of a *dal* –
גַּם־הוּא יִקְרָא וְלֹא יֵעָנֶה	b		when he cries out, he will not be answered.

According to this saying, a person who ignores the poor will be ignored themselves when they cry out. Closing one's ear (*ʾōṭēm ʾoznô*) in v 13a parallels not being answered (*lôʾ yēʿāneh*) in v 13b, and the cry of a *dal* (*zaʿăqat dal*) in v 13a is opposed to the character in v 13b crying out (*hūʾ yiqrāʾ*). In 28:27, we see a positive and a negative example of interacting with the poor.

נוֹתֵן לָרָשׁ אֵין מַחְסוֹר	a	28:27	A person who gives to a *rāš* – no poverty,
וּמַעְלִים עֵינָיו רַב־מְאֵרוֹת	b		and people who hide their eyes – many curses.

28:27a is also a pointed instance of a person reaping what they sow—this time, with a good result. This saying suggests that giving to the poor will result in a person not becoming poor themselves. Thus, v 27a presents a motivational use of poverty while instructing readers on how not to treat the poor. Significantly, the poverty (*maḥsōr*) portrayed is poverty that the person who follows this instruction will avoid. It is not the poverty of the *rāš*. In addition, the *rāš* is not profiled as the object from which people would hide their eyes v 27b. However, the parallelism between giving to a *rāš* in v 27a and hiding one's eyes in v 27b is highly suggestive that a *rāš* is in fact intended as the object of sight from which people are not supposed to hide their eyes.

The *dal* (21:13a) and the *rāš* (28:27a) in these sayings are both ignored. So, while differences may have existed between the meanings of these terms in antiquity, there were also overlaps in how these characters were conceived and (apparently) treated. We can imagine readers constructing meaning in the following ways when they read 21:13 and 28:27.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 21:13		
CONTENT BASE SPACES	a	A person ignoring the cry of a *dal*
	b	That person being ignored when he cries out
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	a-b	Because I will be ignored when I need help if I ignore the poor, I should not ignore the poor.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	a-b	Do not ignore the poor.
Proverbs 28:27		
CONTENT BASE SPACES	a	A person who gives to a *rāš* [never] experiencing poverty
	b	A person who hides their eyes [from a *rāš*] being cursed
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	a	Because giving to the poor leads to good things, I should give to the poor.
	b	Because ignoring the poor leads to bad things, I should not ignore the poor.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	a	Give to the poor.
	b	Do not ignore the poor.

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 21:13	
ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses not to ignore the poor.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & THE POOR	The poor would be people with whom the reader would interact.
Proverbs 28:27a	
ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses to give to the poor.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & THE POOR	The poor would be people with whom the reader would interact.
Proverbs 28:27b	
ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses not to ignore the poor.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & THE POOR	The poor would be people with whom the reader would interact.

6.1.2.2.3 Kindness alone

Three sayings in Proverbs profile only kindness to the poor—two by means of synthetic parallelism (19:17; 22:9) and one with synonymous parallelism (31:20). The verbal action in each is different. Only in 19:17 is the word *ḥ-n-n* used.

מַלְוֵה יְהוָה חוֹנֵן דָּל	a	19:17	A person who is kind to a *dal* lends to Yahweh,
וּגְמֻלוֹ יְשַׁלֶּם־לוֹ	b		and he will repay him his recompense.

19:17b builds on v 17a synthetically, elaborating the outcome of lending to Yahweh—namely, that he will repay the lender. How a person treats the poor is again equated with how they relate to and stand before Yahweh. 22:9 uses synthetic parallelism as well. The kind action toward the poor in this saying is giving (*n-t-n*) from one's own food (*millaḥmô*) to the poor (*laddal*).

טוֹב־עַיִן הוּא יְבֹרָךְ	a	22:9	A generous person – he is blessed,
כִּי־נָתַן מִלַּחְמוֹ לַדָּל	b		for he gives from his food to the *dal*.

The actor in 22:9 is called a *ṭôb ʿayin*—or, a generous person. Literally, this expression would be translated "good of eye." The only time it is used in all the Hebrew Bible is here in Prov 22:9a. We have seen its counterpart in 23:6 and 28:22—the *raʿ ʿayin* ("bad of eye"), which is typically translated as "a greedy or stingy person" (§3.1.3). The generosity of the *ṭôb ʿayin* is evident in the fact that this person gives (*n-t-n*) from their own bread "to the *dal*" (*laddal*). Note that *dal* is the indirect object of "give" (*n-t-n*) here in 22:9, and that *rāš* is the indirect object of this verb in 28:27. Therefore, even though a *rāš* might have some measure of power over a *dal* (28:3), readers are exhorted to give to both.

The final saying in Proverbs that shows only instances of a person being kind to the poor is a segment in the woman of strength poem that concludes the book in 31:10-31. We considered this poem at more length in chapter 3 (§3.2.1.4). Consider here how the woman of strength is depicted interacting with the poor—specifically, with an *ʿānî* and an *ʾebyôn*.

כַּפָּהּ פָּרְשָׂה לֶעָנִי	a	31:20	She extends her palm to the afflicted,
וְיָדֶיהָ שִׁלְּחָה לָאֶבְיוֹן	b		and she sends her hands to the needy.

What she does when she extends her "palm" (*kap*) and sends her "hand" (*yād*) to the *ʿānî* and the

ʾebyôn is not specified—possibly giving food or clothing, or reaching out to provide some other kind of help. These schematic scenes of the *ʾēšet ḥayil* doing something to help the poor are part of the larger portrait of this woman. She is someone who embodies (possibly) everything that the book of Proverbs tries to persuade readers to become and do. Caring for the poor is an integral part of the larger picture of a wise person in Proverbs. It is included in the portrayal of the *ʾēšet ḥayil* precisely because it is a central instruction in the book as a whole.

There are thus two forms of motivation in 31:20. Neither involves a consequence or mention of Yahweh. Rather, they are: 1) the intrinsic goodness of the actions that the *ʾēšet ḥayil* performs, and 2) the fact that a good, wise, and diligent character like the *ʾēšet ḥayil* is performing them. Readers know a good and a bad example when they see one. They are generally able to translate the good and bad examples portrayed in Proverbs into instructions. We can therefore imagine the following ways in which readers might arrive at interpretations of directives when they read each of these three kindness-to-the-poor sayings.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 19:17		
CONTENT BASE SPACES	a	A person who is kind to a *dal* lending to Yahweh
	b	Yahweh repaying that person his recompense
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	a-b	Because being kind to the poor leads to good things, I should be kind to the poor.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	a-b	Be kind to the poor.

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 19:17	
ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses to be kind to the poor.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & THE POOR	The poor would be people with whom the reader would interact.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 22:9		
CONTENT BASE SPACES	a-b	A person who gives from his own food to a *dal* being blessed
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	a-b	Because giving food to the poor leads to good things, I should be kind to the poor.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	a-b	Give from your own food to the poor.

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 22:9

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses to give food to the poor.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & THE POOR	The poor would be people with whom the reader would interact.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 31:20

CONTENT BASE SPACES	a	The woman of strength reaching out to the *ʿānî*
	b	The woman of strength reaching out to the *ʾebyôn*
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	a-b	Because the woman of strength is kind to and cares for the poor, I should be kind to and care for the poor.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	a-b	Be kind to and care for the poor.

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 31:20

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses to be kind to and care for the poor.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & THE POOR	The poor would be people with whom the reader would interact.

6.1.2.5 Friends, neighbors, associates, and family

Five sayings in Proverbs portray the disparate experiences that producers of Proverbs imagine that the rich and the poor enjoy (or do not enjoy) in their relationships with family (19:7a) and especially with friends, neighbors, and/or acquaintances (14:20-21; 19:4, 6, 7b). A sixth saying that I discuss in this section does not profile specific social relations (10:15). I include it here because it can be taken as a reflection of the social isolation and misery that the poor experience in comparison with the advantages that the rich experience. Stark juxtapositions of what life is like for the rich and what it can be like for the poor appear in each of the six sayings reviewed in this section. Each one is written as though it is a neutral observation. However, as noted several times already in this study, no statement in Proverbs is neutral.

Prov 19:4-7 would work really well as a unit, if v 5 did not interrupt the connection between v 4 and vv 6-7. As a unit, v 6 elaborates what is said in v 4a, and v 7 builds on v 4b.

Some commentators do relate v 5 to vv 4, 6, and 7.[189] I include it below to show this full section, but my focus is on vv 4, 6, and 7—what they say and how they relate to one another.

הוֹן יֹסִיף רֵעִים רַבִּים	a	19:4	Wealth adds many friends,[190]
וְדָל מֵרֵעֵהוּ יִפָּרֵד	b		but a *dal* is separated from his friend.
עֵד שָׁקָרִים לֹא יִנָּקֶה	a	19:5	A false witness will not be acquitted,
וְיָפִיחַ כְּזָבִים לֹא יִמָּלֵט	b		though he spews lies he will not escape.
רַבִּים יְחַלּוּ פְּנֵי־נָדִיב	a	19:6	Many seek the presence of a noble,
וְכָל־הָרֵעַ לְאִישׁ מַתָּן	b		and everyone is the friend (emendation)[191] of a man of gift[s].
כָּל אֲחֵי־רָשׁ שְׂנֵאָהוּ	a	19:7	All the brothers of a *rāš* hate him,
אַף כִּי מְרֵעָהוּ רָחֲקוּ מִמֶּנּוּ	b		how much more do his friends go far from him …
מְרַדֵּף אֲמָרִים לֹא־[לוֹ־]הֵמָּה	c		[he pursues with words … they are not][192]

The basis of vv 4a and 6 is the notion that people are drawn to wealth. Producers of these sayings suggest that wealth adds many friends (or associates) (v 4a). In addition, if the noble (*nādîb*) and man of gifts (*ʾîš mattān*) in v 6 possess more than an average amount of wealth, v 6 implies the

[189] E.g., Waltke 2005. Reference to a false witness in v 5 could allude to the fact that the rich can count on witnesses coming to their defense in legal proceedings—possibly dishonestly so—and that the poor are more likely to be abandoned in a legal setting, even when they are innocent and deserve acquittal.

[190] I translate the word *rēaʿ* as "friend" each time it is used in this material (vv 4a, 4b, 6b, and 7b). This word, however, has a wide semantic valence. *HALOT* offers the following glosses: "friend," "darling," "lover," "comrade," and "companion," as well the more general "neighbor," "one another," and "another" (II:1254-1255). As also noted above (§3.3.3), Fox stresses that when conceived as a "neighbor," the *rēaʿ* is not to be understood as someone who must have lived in an actual dwelling near a *dal*, a *rāš*, or an *ʿāšîr* ("rich man") (2000, 165-166). The *rēaʿ* could be anyone who merely knew of a person in relation to whom they might be called a *rēaʿ*. Therefore, the semantic range of the word *rēaʿ* prompt broad applications when readers read these sayings. Whatever relations readers may have (or imagine having) with the poor or the rich, they can imagine themselves as one of the *rēʿîm* in each of these sayings.

[191] I follow Fox (who follows Tur-Sinai) in emending M *kol hārēaʿ* ("every friend [makes entreaties] to the gift giver") to *kullōh rēaʿ* ("everyone is a friend to a gift giver"). This emendation involves reading the definite article *he* prefixed to *rēaʿ* in M as a 3ms suffix *he* attached to *kol* instead. See Fox 2009, 650.

[192] Commentators typically view Prov 19:7c as corrupt. Fox calls it "a meaningless group of four words" (2009, 651; see also Fox 2015; Toy 1908; McKane 1970; Whybray 1994; Murphy 1998; Clifford 1999). Others read it as a meaningful clause—e.g., Waltke 2005 ("Though he pursues them with pleadings, they are not to be found") and Kimilike 2006b ("They plead with words to secure them, but they are inaccessible"; see also Kimilike 2006a).

same—that they have many friends (or associates) because of their wealth. Wealth, social influence, and prestige come and go together in Proverbs. The poor, of course, experience the opposite of these relations. The *dal* (v 4b) and the *rāš* (v 7a) are both isolated, abandoned, and avoided. Their neighbors (or friends or acquaintances) separate themselves from them (*yippārēd* in v 4b) and try to "go far from them" (*rāḥăqū mimmennū* in v 7b). Even more extremely, the family ("brothers") of the *rāš* in particular are said to "hate him" (*kōl ʾăḥê rāš śĕnēʾūhū* in v 7a). The differences in these portrayed experiences of the rich and the poor in social-relational situations are extreme. The producers of Proverbs portray the rich at the center of centripetal social forces in these sayings. In stark contrast, they portray the poor as though they are at the mercy of a toxic centrifugal force that flings them far from community.

Note again that both a *dal* (v 4b) and a *rāš* (v 7a) are portrayed in similar circumstances. However, in this case, the *rāš* may be described as experiencing a more extreme form of abandonment. Their *brothers* are said to hate them. An *a fortiori* argument is apparent in v 7: if *even* a poor person's family hates a *rāš* (v 7a), how much more (*ʾap kî*) will their friends or acquaintances try to get away from them (v 7b).[193] The fact that v 7b is framed by *ʾap kî* ("how much more") implies that in hating the *rāš*, the family also abandon him. Portraying this level of dejection is a strategy that the producers use to evoke sympathy and arouse compassion for the poor. In addition, in evoking compassion, the producers intend at the same time to prohibit abandoning, isolating, and hating the poor.

[193] We should also note, as Fox points out, that the use of *kōl* ("all") in both vv 6b and 7a must be interpreted as hyperbole. I translate *kōl* as "everyone" in 6b and "all" in 7a. As Fox reflects, "That this is hyperbole is shown by the way the first line [v 7a] is intensified *a fortiori* in the second [v 7b], for, strictly speaking, there cannot really be a degree beyond 'all'" (2009, 651).

Some commentators interpret this material (and material like it—e.g, 14:20, 18:23) as merely stark representations of the advantages of wealth and the disadvantages of poverty (McKane 1970; Whybray 1994; Murphy 1998 [on 19:4b and 7]; Waltke 2005). Others offer more nuanced readings (e.g., Van Leeuwen 1992; Washington 1994; Clifford 1999; Sandoval 2006; Fox 2009). Commentators in the latter group perceive in this material warnings to the rich regarding the quality of their friendships and associations, implicit critiques of excessive wealth and excessive lack, and also, as Fox writes, an implicit "demand to be sensitive to the lowly and their isolation" (2009, 649). These latter readings draw insight from teachings elsewhere in Proverbs regarding how the poor should and should not be treated (e.g., 14:31; 17:5; 19:17; 21:13; 22:9; 28:27; 31:9, 20). They also reflect concern expressed elsewhere in Proverbs on the nature of friendship and the challenges that come with having wealth—i.e., trusting too much in one's wealth, wanting more of it, and having to navigate social relationships that wealth can inspire (e.g., 11:4, 28; 17:8, 17, 23; 18:24; 21:14; 23:3-6; 27:10). Ultimately, the more nuanced readings of this material depend on what readers understand to be good and bad situations—both for the poor and for the rich. To arrive at these understandings when they read this material in Proverbs, readers would consult cultural models they have regarding the rich and the poor.

The question of reader perspectives is an interesting one in these sayings. Are readers rich or trying to be friends with the rich? Are readers poor or trying to avoid the poor? Of course, anyone can read this material. When imagining the perspectives of the earliest audiences, commentators often assume that they were neither rich nor poor, but rather that the earliest readers would have fallen somewhere in the middle.[194] These imagined earliest readers would

[194] See especially Gordis (1943), Kovacs (1974), Pleins (1987, 2001), and Ansberry (2011) for views that the earliest audiences of Proverbs were members of wealthy classes; and see Golka (1993), Washington (1994), and Westermann (1995) for views that see the earliest audiences as members of less affluent

have read 19:4-7 and construed instructions on navigating relationships with the rich on one hand and the poor on the other. We can imagine readings from perspectives of the rich and the poor as well. However, in the following inferential reasoning and simulation summaries, I offer construals of how the earliest audiences of Proverbs—whom I conceive as neither rich nor poor—might have understood these sayings. With these readers in mind, we can imagine the following interpretations.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 19:4, 6, 7

CONTENT BASE SPACES	4a	Wealth adding many friends
	4b	A *dal* being separated from his neighbor
	6a	Many people seeking an audience with a noble
	6b	Everyone being the friend of a person who gives gifts
	7a	All the family members of a *rāš* hating him
	7b	Even more, the neighbors of a *rāš* distancing themselves from him
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	4a	Because so many people are attracted to wealth, I should be circumspect in seeking friendship or association with the rich.
	4b	Because it is bad to abandon the poor, I should not separate from a *dal*.
	6a	Because so many people are attracted to nobles, I should be circumspect in seeking friendship or association with nobles.
	6b	Because so many people are attracted to people who give gifts, I should be circumspect in seeking friendship or association with people who give gifts.
	7a	Because it is bad to hate the poor, I should not hate a *rāš*.
	7b	Because it is bad to abandon the poor, I should know that it is wrong for people to abandon me.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	4a	Be circumspect in friendship with the rich.
	4b	Do not abandon the poor.
	6a	Be circumspect in friendship with nobles.
	6b	Be circumspect in friendship with people who give gifts.
	7a	Do not hate the poor.
	7b	Do not abandon the poor.

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 19:4a and 19:6

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses to be circumspect in friendship and other associations with people who have wealth.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & THE RICH	The rich would be people with whom the reader would interact.

village-based societies. For views of the earliest audiences of Proverbs falling somewhere between the rich and the poor, see Whybray (1990), Fox (1996, 2000, 2003, 2009), Sneed (1996, 2015, unpublished SBL paper), Murphy (1998), and Adams (2008, 2014).

Proverbs 19:4b and 19:7

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses not to hate or abandon the poor.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & THE POOR	The poor would be people with whom the reader would interact.

* * *

Prov 14:20 expresses the same instructions as those expressed in Prov 19:4, 6, and 7. In addition, 14:20 is followed by a saying that provides an evaluative lens according to which v 20 is meant to be read.

גַּם־לְרֵעֵהוּ יִשָּׂנֵא רָשׁ וְאֹהֲבֵי עָשִׁיר רַבִּים	a b	14:20	A *rāš* is hated even by his friend, but those who love a rich man are many.
בָּז־לְרֵעֵהוּ חוֹטֵא וּמְחוֹנֵן עניים אַשְׁרָיו	a b	14:21	A person who despises his friend is a sinner, but a person who is kind to *ʿăniyyîm*[195] is blessed.

Despising one's *rēaʿ* (friend, neighbor, associate, or acquaintance) in v 21a equates with hating a *rāš* in v 20a. The assonance between *gam* at the start of v 20a and *bāz* at the start of v 21a may be intended to highlight the connection between these situations. Calling a person who despises his *rēaʿ* a sinner (*ḥōṭēʾ*) in v 21a is a clearly negative evaluation of this person and action. In addition, this negative evaluation applies to the person and action in v 20a as well—that is, to a *rēaʿ* who hates a *rāš*. In contrast, v 21b commends the action of having compassion (poel of *ḥ-n-n*) on *ʿăniyyîm* ("poor") by calling a person who does this blessed (*ʾašrāw*).

[195] Prov 14:20 is one of three instances in Proverbs in which there is a discrepancy between the *ketiv* and the *qere* with respect to the plural form of *ʿānî*. The other *ketiv-qere* discrepancies occur in 3:34 and 16:19. In each case, the *ketiv* consonants reflect *ʿăniyyîm* ("poor ones"), and the *qere* pointing reflects *ʿănāwîm* ("humble ones"). Due to context, I read with the *ketiv* in 14:21 and with the *qere* in 3:34 and 16:19. Contrasting *ʿănāwîm* ("humble ones") with *lēṣîm* ("scorners") in 3:34, and *ʿănāwîm* ("humble ones") with *gēʾîm* ("proud ones") in 16:19 seems more appropriate than contrasting *lēṣîm* ("scorners") and *gēʾîm* ("proud ones") with *ʿăniyyîm* ("poor ones"). Similarly, opposing *ʿăniyyîm* ("poor ones") with an *ʿāšîr* ("rich man") in 14:20 is more fitting than would be contrasting *ʿănāwîm* ("humble ones") with an *ʿāšîr* ("rich man"). Still, all of this said, any of these oppositions are conceivable.

The word *rēʿēhū* ("his neighbor") does double-duty in these sayings. It refers to the offending agent in v 20a (to a person who hates a *rāš*) and to the offended party in v 21a (to a friend who is despised). The *rēaʿ* who is said to be despised in v 21a could be anyone. This person need not be poor. However, in light of the juxtaposition of vv 20 and 21, readers may be prompted to imagine the *rēaʿ* in v 21 as someone who is *rāš* as well. Reference to the *ʿăniyyîm* in v 21b supports this interpretation. In the following summaries, I again provide models of interpretations that would be construed by readers who are not rich or poor.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 14:20-21

CONTENT BASE SPACES	20a	A *rāš* being hated by his neighbor
	20b	Many people loving a rich man
	21a	A person who despises his neighbor being a sinner
	21b	A person who is kind to *ʿăniyyîm* being blessed
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	20a	Because it is bad to hate the poor, I should not hate a *rāš*.
	20b	Because so many people are attracted to the rich, I should be circumspect in seeking friendship or association with the rich.
	21	Because a person who despises his neighbor is a sinner, I should not despise my neighbor.
	21b	Because a person who is kind to the poor is blessed, I should be kind to *ʿăniyyîm*.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	20a	Do not hate the poor.
	20b	Be circumspect in friendship with the rich.
	21a	Do not despise your neighbor.
	21b	Be kind to the poor.

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 14:20a

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses not to hate the poor.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & THE POOR	The poor would be people with whom the reader would interact.

Proverbs 14:20b

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses to be circumspect in friendship and other associations with the rich.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & THE RICH	The rich would be people with whom the reader would interact.

Proverbs 14:21a

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses not to despise his neighbor.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & THE POOR	The poor would be people with whom the reader would interact (if the neighbor is construed as someone who is poor).

Proverbs 14:21b

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses to be kind to the poor.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & THE POOR	The poor would be people with whom the reader would interact.

* * *

As noted above, many commentators read 10:15 and conclude that it offers no moral instruction but instead is presented as a detached and heartless observation of the advantages of wealth and the disadvantages of poverty.

הוֹן עָשִׁיר קִרְיַת עֻזּוֹ	a	10:15	The wealth of a rich man is his strong city,
מְחִתַּת דַּלִּים רִישָׁם	b		the ruin of the *dallîm* is their poverty.

Murphy is representative of some commentators in writing that, "There is no intention here of communicating a moral lesson. This is simply a reflection upon reality; that is the way things are" (1998, 74). Toy also reflects that, "There is probably no ethical thought in the proverb—the sense is that wealth smooths one's path in life," and that poverty can only be described as ruinous (1908, 208). Wealth certainly does smooth a way through life; poverty is truly ruinous; and 10:15 does describe both of these realities in simple and stark terms that are, for some, really "the way things are" in lived experience.

However, as always, a saying like this in a book like Proverbs is most fully interpreted only in light of other sayings and the didactic (i.e., pragmatic) purposes of the book as a whole. In addition, 10:15 appears to be a saying whose meaning is modulated by a saying that follows it. Specifically, 10:16 can be construed as options for the rich man in 10:15a.

הוֹן עָשִׁיר קִרְיַת עֻזּוֹ	a	10:15	The wealth of a rich man is his strong city,
מְחִתַּת דַּלִּים רִישָׁם	b		the ruin of the *dallîm* is their poverty.
פְּעֻלַּת צַדִּיק לְחַיִּים	a	10:16	The income of a righteous man – to life,
תְּבוּאַת רָשָׁע לְחַטָּאת	b		the produce of a wicked man – to sin.

We examined 10:16 in §5.2.1, focusing there on the way in which reference to the income (*pĕʿullāh*) of the righteous and the agricultural yield (*tĕbūʾāh*) of the wicked support the instructions in 10:16 for readers to be righteous and not wicked. We can now elaborate 10:16 in its position after v 15 as, in addition, schematic portraits of wealth used well (v 16a) and wealth used poorly (v 16b). As noted in §5.2.1, nothing is said about *how* a person might use wealth well or poorly in v 16. 10:16 only suggests that it can be used both ways. This suggestion is implicit in the likelihood that on the basis of the cultural models readers have of the righteous and the wicked, readers would imagine the righteous using wealth well and the wicked using wealth poorly. The two characters in v 16, in other words, represent two options that the *ʿāšîr* in v 15a must choose between—to be righteous and use his wealth well, or to be wicked and not.

So, 10:15 can be interpreted as providing related but different instructions. When readings of v 15a are informed by v 16, readers are prompted to consider how they use their wealth—however much wealth they may have. When readings of v 15b are informed by both that instruction and also independently by cultural models of how readers envision the difficulty of living in poverty, readers are also prompted to have compassion on the poor as well. Therefore, we can imagine readers who are not poor and have some measure of material wealth to construe the meaning of 10:15 in the following way.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 10:15

CONTENT BASE SPACES	a	The wealth of a rich man being his strong city
	b	The ruin of the *dallîm* being their poverty
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	a	Because I can either use wealth well or poorly, I should use wealth well. [taking 10:16 into consideration)
	b	Because poverty is ruinous, I should have compassion on the poor.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	a	Use wealth well.
	b	Have compassion on the poor.

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 10:15a

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses to use wealth well.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	Wealth would be something that the reader chooses to use well.

Proverbs 10:15b

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses to have compassion on the poor.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & THE POOR	The poor would be people with whom the reader would interact.

6.1.2.6 The rich and the poor interacting

Three sayings in Proverbs depict the rich and the poor interacting (18:23; 22:2, 7), and a fourth may be construed this way as well (29:13). In 29:13, a rich person (*ʿāšîr*) is not *explicitly* profiled. In place of an *ʿāšîr* interacting with the poor in 29:13 is an *ʾîš tĕqāqîm* ("man of oppressions"). Because power and wealth go hand in hand, I assume that the *ʾîš tĕqāqîm* is someone in possession of wealth, possibly to the same degree as an *ʿāšîr*. For this reason, I include 29:13 in the present section. Consider these sayings in turn.

6.1.2.6.1 Speaking to each other

The parallelism in 18:23 and the fact that the verb is *ʿ-n-h* ("answers") in the second line may indicate that readers are meant to imagine the *rāš* and the *ʿāšîr* interacting directly with one another when they read this saying. This saying could also be interpreted as separate descriptions of how the poor and the rich tend to speak in general—to whomever they are speaking. Either way, the point in 18:23 is the asymmetry in the manner in which they speak—either to one another, or in general.

תַּחֲנוּנִים יְדַבֶּר־רָשׁ	a	18:23	A *rāš* speaks entreaties,
וְעָשִׁיר יַעֲנֶה עַזּוֹת	b		and a rich man answers forcefully.

The *rāš* is timid and supplicating, speaking "entreaties" (*taḥănūnîm*), and the rich man, in contrast, speaks "forcefully" (*ʿazzôt*).[196] It is again the case in this saying that some commentators interpret these depictions as neutral statements regarding social life and behavior—i.e., "the way of the world" (McKane 1970, 518; see also Whybray 1994, Clifford 1999). Others imagine that on its own, 18:23 may have been spoken as a neutral observation, but that now, as a saying in Proverbs, it should be read as an implicit critique of the rich and an exhortation to be kind to the poor (Van Leeuwen 1992; Murphy 1998, Waltke 2005, Fox 2009). As Van Leeuwen writes, "such sayings contain implicit normative judgment … The reader or hearer does not need to be told that Prov 18:23 portrays a disequilibrium of power and justice" (1992, 31). Nor do they need to be told, we can conclude, that such disequilibrium is a problem.

Whether readers are rich or not, they may apprehend an instruction when they read this saying that they themselves should not speak forcefully like the rich man in v 23b—to the poor in particular, and possibly to others as well. No evaluative lens is provided in v 23 of either the speech of the *rāš* in v 23a or that of the *ʿāšîr* in v 23b outside the fact—again—that readers are able to identify and assess the "disequilibrium of power and justice" in this saying. The picture of the *rāš* speaking entreaties in v 23a functions in the way that other portrayals in Proverbs of the poor function—namely, to elicit concern and compassion for the poor. In the summaries below, I represent interpretations that readers who are not rich or poor might construe. Others

[196] In the twenty three occurrences of the word *ʿaz* ("strong, mighty") in the Hebrew Bible, it refers either to physical strength (e.g., Ex 14:21; Num 13:28, 21:24; Jdg 14:14, 18; Is 43:16, 56:11; Pr 30:25; Song 8:6; Neh 9:11) or to a fierce or threatening manner of interacting with others (e.g., Gen 49:7; Dt 28:50; Ps 59:3; Pr 21:14). Other instances could reflect either use (e.g., Gen 49:3; 2 Sam 22:18; Is 19:4, 25:3; Ez 7:24; Amos 5:9; Ps 18:17; Dan 8:23).

could be construed as well. The evaluations that I represent derive entirely from readers' intuitions regarding what is good and (more to the point in this saying) what is not good. They know that it is good to be kind to the poor, and that it is bad to unkind.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 18:23		
CONTENT BASE SPACES	a	A *rāš* speaking entreaties
	b	A rich man answering forcefully
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	a-b	Because it is unkind to speak forcefully to the poor, I should not speak forcefully to the poor [and should instead have compassion on them].
DIRECTIVE SPACES	a-b	Do not speak forcefully to the poor [but have compassion on them].

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 18:23	
ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses not to speak forcefully to the poor.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & THE POOR	The poor would be people with whom the reader would interact.

6.1.2.6.2 Common ground

Prov 22:2 and 29:13 are near doublets. A *rāš* "meets" (N of *p-g-š*) a character with more power than him in the a-line of both sayings, and Yahweh is described as the creator of all the characters that appear in these sayings in the b-lines.

עָשִׁיר וָרָשׁ נִפְגָּשׁוּ	a	22:2	A rich man and a *rāš* meet –
עֹשֵׂה כֻלָּם יְהוָה	b		the maker of all of them is Yahweh.
רָשׁ וְאִישׁ תְּכָכִים נִפְגָּשׁוּ	a	29:13	A *rāš* and an oppressor meet –
מְאִיר־עֵינֵי שְׁנֵיהֶם יְהוָה	b		the one who gives light to the eyes of both of them is Yahweh.

The meaning of Yahweh as maker (*ʿōśēh*) is clear in 22:2b. The meaning of "the one who gives light to the eyes of both of them" (*mēʾîr ʿênê šĕnêhem*) in 29:13b can be explained further. The phrase "to see light" (*r-ʾ-h ʾôr*) is equated with being alive in Job 3:16 and Psalm 49:20 (Whybray 1994, 401; Waltke 2005, 441; Fox 2009, 839). Therefore, the b-lines in 22:2 and in 29:13 portray Yahweh as the creator of the *rāš*, the *ʿāšîr*, and the *ʾîš tĕqāqîm*.

Commentators offer different ideas as to the exact nature of the meetings that the producers of these sayings envision between the rich and the poor.[197] However, readers need only construe schematic frames of meeting in which the participants are an *ʿāšîr* and a *rāš* in 22:2 and a *rāš* and an *ʾîš tĕqāqîm* in 29:13. The point of portraying these meetings—however they are pictured specifically (or schematically) in simulations—is made clear in the b-lines. The second line in these sayings emphasizes the common ground that the rich, the poor, and even oppressors share as creatures to whom Yahweh is said to give life. Commentators extrapolate different instructions that these sayings may be intended to issue—to the rich man, that he not look down on the poor or treat them cruelly, but rather that he treat them with dignity as fellow creations of Yahweh; and to the poor man, that he not envy the rich man for his social station, and (according to some) that the poor accept his lot in life (McKane 1998; Whybray 1990, 1994; Waltke 2005).

I read 22:2 and 29:13 more exclusively as instructions to the rich and the oppressor. When other material in Proverbs is considered—specifically, all the sayings that reflect concern for how the poor are mistreated—it is apparent that instructions to readers who have power to secure more equitable situations for the poor are more prevalent than instruction to the poor on how they should accept their lot in life. Some may say that the better-than sayings do this, but I would question this. The purpose of the better-than sayings is to relativize the value of wealth. It is not primarily to exhort the poor to accept their lot in life. The greater prevalence throughout Proverbs of concern for the mistreatment of the poor makes it more likely that the instructions in

[197] Fox (2009, 695) offers a summary. He lists the following as possible ways of conceiving the meeting between the *rāš* the *ʿāšîr* in 22:2—as an incidental encounter, a meeting that involves a clash or conflict, a meeting that involves a clash in a legal setting specifically, an amiable encounter, a poor person approaching a rich person for help, and finally, a theoretical depiction of the rich and the poor as equals.

22:2 and 29:13 are designed to address this concern as well. If we accept this, we can imagine readers who are not poor constructing meaning in the following ways when they interpret these sayings.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 22:2		
CONTENT BASE SPACES	a	A rich man and a *rāš* meeting
	b	Yahweh being the maker of all of them
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	a-b_1	Because Yahweh is the maker of everyone, I should treat the poor well and with dignity.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	a-b	Treat the poor well and with dignity.
Proverbs 29:13		
CONTENT BASE SPACES	a	An oppressor and a *rāš* meeting
	b	Yahweh being the maker of all of them
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	a-b	Because Yahweh gives everyone life, I should not oppress the poor.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	a-b	Do not oppress the poor.

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 22:2	
ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses to treat the poor well and with dignity.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & THE POOR	The poor would be people with whom the reader would interact.
Proverbs 29:13	
ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses not to oppress the poor.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & THE POOR	The poor would be people with whom the reader would interact.

6.1.2.6.3 Social hierarchy

Prov 22:7 profiles two asymmetric relationships: one between a rich man and *rāšîm*, and another between a borrower and lender.

עָשִׁיר בְּרָשִׁים יִמְשׁוֹל	a	22:7	A rich man rules over *rāšîm*,
וְעֶבֶד לֹוֶה לְאִישׁ מַלְוֶה	b		and a borrower is a slave to a man who lends.

On its own, this saying could be construed solely as a warning not to borrow from a *malweh* ("a man who lends" in v 7b). As Fox observes, a rich man ruling over *rāšîm* in v 7a may be

construed solely as a point of comparison for the relationship in 7b between a borrower and lender. If we read v 7 in this way, we may not interpret any instruction regarding social orders apart from the warning not to borrow in v 7b. In this case, the saying as a whole could be read as instructing readers to "keep out of debt, for as surely as the rich subjugate the poor, so does the lender soon subjugate the borrower" (Fox 2009, 699).

Prov 22:7 could also be read with 22:8-9 and interpreted in light of these other sayings. Consider the three together.

עָשִׁיר בְּרָשִׁים יִמְשׁוֹל	a	22:7	A rich man rules over *rāšîm*,
וְעֶבֶד לֹוֶה לְאִישׁ מַלְוֶה	b		and a borrower is servant to a man who lends.
זוֹרֵעַ עַוְלָה יִקְצָר־אָוֶן	a	22:8	A person who sows injustice reaps calamity,
וְשֵׁבֶט עֶבְרָתוֹ יִכְלֶה	b		and the rod of his fury will fail.
טוֹב־עַיִן הוּא יְבֹרָךְ	a	22:9	A generous person—he is blessed,
כִּי־נָתַן מִלַּחְמוֹ לַדָּל	b		for he gives from his bread to the *dal*.

If we read vv 8 and 9 as comments on v 7, we can imagine v 8 as a portrait of a wicked version of the rich man in v 7a and the lender in v 7b. Moreover, we can read v 9 as a portrayal of a good version of these characters. The implication of this cluster as a whole would then be that there is a good way and a bad way to exercise the power a person may have because of the wealth they possess. If this is accepted, we can imagine the following steps in reasoning that readers might engage to reach this interpretation of 22:7.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 22:7-9

CONTENT BASE SPACES	7a	A rich man ruling over *rāšîm*
	7b	A man who lends ruling over a borrower
	8a	A person who sows injustice reaping calamity
	8b	The fury of that person failing
	9a	A generous person being blessed
	9b	That person giving their own food to the poor
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	8a-b	Because being unjust leads to bad things, I should not be unjust.
	9a-b	Because being generous leads to good things, I should be generous.

	7a-b	Because there is a good and a bad way to exercise power, I should use the power I have for good.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	7a-b	Use the power you have for good.

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 22:7

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses to use power in good ways.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & THE POOR	The poor would be people with whom the reader would interact.

6.1.3 Summary

The instructional frames in this section all relate to how the producers of Proverbs want readers to treat and not treat the poor. A few instructions pertain to seeking friendship or association with the rich as well and may also function as warnings to the rich to beware of the "false friend" (14:20a; 19:4a, 6; 22:16b). In the main, however, the material reviewed in §6.1 is concerned with how the poor are treated. Readers are exhorted to secure justice for the poor and not to oppress the poor—*dal* or *dallîm* in 14:31a; 22:16, 22a; 28:3, 8, 15b; 29:7, 14; *rāšîm* in 13:23; *ʿānî* in 22:22b; 30:14c; 31:9b; and *ʾebyôn* in 30:14d; 31:9b. They are prohibited from mocking (*rāš* in 17:5) and ignoring the poor (*dal* in 21:13 ; *rāš* in 28:27b). Relatedly, readers are urged not to hate or abandon the poor (*rāš* in 14:20b; 19:7; *dal* in 19:4b). In addition, positively, readers are exhorted to be kind to the poor—with *ḥ-n-n* (*ʿānî* in 14:21b; *ʾebyôn* in 14:31b; *dal* in 19:17a and 28:8b); with *n-t-n* (*dal* in 22:9; *rāš* in 28:27a); and by means of the example of the *ʾēšet ḥayil* (*ʿānî* in 31:20a; *ʾebyôn* in 31:20b).

I would argue that all of these instructions pertain to social justice. Any bad treatment of the poor, from mocking or ignoring them to enacting violence against them, is an injustice. Further, treating the poor with kindness, dignity, and assisting in helping meet their basic needs are just ways of interacting with the poor. Rulers have more power to ensure justice for the poor

on a broader societal scale, and they are exhorted to do so in Proverbs with both vivid figures (28:15; 30:14) and the only instruction in the ancient Near East portrayed as spoken by a queen mother (31:1-9) (on which, see §6.3). All of this said, there are distinctions to be observed in how the four terms for *poor* in Proverbs are used. First, *ʾebyôn* and *ʿānî* occur with one another more than they are used with *dal* and *rāš*. See 30:14, 31:9, and 31:20. Similarly, *dal* and *rāš* are used in many of the same contexts, if not in the same saying. Both are portrayed as being ignored (*dal* in 21:13 ; *rāš* in 28:27b). Both are portrayed as hated or abandoned by friends or associates (*rāš* in 14:20b; 19:7; *dal* in 19:4b). And both are recipients of gifts (*dal* in 22:9; *rāš* in 28:27a).

We also see *ʾebyôn* and *ʿānî* used with, and in similar contexts as, *dal* and *rāš* as well. Both *rāš* and *ʿānî* are portrayed in parallel situations of being hated and despised in 14:20-21. *Dal* and *ʾebyôn* appear in parallel relation in 14:31, where the *dal* is oppressed and the *ʾebyôn* is shown kindness. And finally, a *dal* and *ʿānî* are portrayed in parallel legal situations in 22:22-23. Both are vulnerable to exploitation but defended by Yahweh.

Another distinguishing feature of between the uses of these terms is that only two poor characters are presented in relation, or as a foil, to the rich (*ʿāšîr*; represented by *hôn* in 19:4a). Only *dal* and *rāš* appear opposite or in relation to the *ʿāšîr* in Proverbs. The hardness and insecurity of the lives that *dallîm* live is presented opposite the secure life of the *ʿāšîr* in 10:15. In contrast to wealth (*hôn*) drawing many friends in 19:4a, a *dal* is portrayed being abandoned in 19:4b. A *dal* is said to be oppressed by a character who turns around and gives to an *ʿāšîr* in 22:16. Similarly, an *ʿāšîr* is portrayed both in parallel with a *rāš* (14:20; 18:23; 22:2) and in syntagmatic relation with a *rāš* (22:7); in each of these cases, the *ʿāšîr* is presented as having material and social advantage and therefore power over the *rāš*.

In sum, we see substantial interchangeability in the situations in which all of these four terms are used. At the same time, it is also evident that the *most* substantial overlaps are evident between *ʾebyôn* and *ʿānî* on one hand and *dal* and *rāš* on the other. We can make only subtle distinctions between the members of these word pairs. We will have slightly more information to distinguish further between *ʾebyôn* and *ʿānî* after §6.2. We will also have a small amount of additional information to add to possible distinctions between *dal* and *rāš* after §6.3. However, there are two distinctions between *dal* and *rāš* that are evident at this point. Both have been mentioned above. First, only *dal* or *dallîm* are objects of *ʿ-š-q* (14:31a; 22:16a; 28:3a). Second, a *geber rāš* is said to oppress *dallîm* in 28:3a. These two features of the *ʿ-š-q* ("oppress") verbal frame may indicate that in ancient sensibilities regarding *rāšîm* and *dallîm*, the *rāšîm* would have had more power.

Finally, before moving on, we need to consider the simulation summaries in §6.1. When readers process material in this section with an eye to personal implications for themselves, they always imagine themselves *interacting with* or *on behalf of* the poor. We must contrast these reader viewpoints vis-à-vis the poor with reader viewpoints in simulations of material in chapters three and four where wealth and poverty are portrayed as consequences. In response to the material here in §6.1, readers who construe personal implications for themselves and perform Reader in the Scene blends will imagine themselves interacting with or on behalf of *someone else* experiencing poverty in simulations. This contrasts with simulations that these same readers would perform when they read "poverty" sayings. In response to material in chapters three and four, in other words, when poverty is portrayed as a consequence, these readers would imagine *themselves* as the poor person experiencing poverty as a consequence for a choice that *they* made.

Within the frame structure of "poverty" sayings, the *reader is the poor person* in simulations. In contrast, within the frame structure of "poor" sayings, the *reader interacts with or on behalf of the poor person* in simulations. This is critical. The roles of the reader and the poor person in the topologies of these frames *cannot be mapped onto one another*. In other words, we cannot superimpose frame structure in which reader viewpoint *attaches to a poor character* on frame structure in which reader viewpoint *attaches to a character who interacts with a poor character*. Because the role of the reader in one frame does not align with the role they play in the other vis-à-vis the poor, the poor character in these frames (and the reader relation with this character) cannot be conceived as the same. They do not align and must be understood in different terms. This means that the poor character in "poor" sayings cannot be projected into "poverty" sayings and blamed for being poor. It is only the reader who is blamed for being poor in Proverbs, should they not heed instructions.

The misalignment of frame elements and frame roles in "poverty" and "poor" sayings demonstrates why we cannot read these sayings as mutually informing. Poverty, when explicitly portrayed as *a consequence*, is a motivational resource in Proverbs that is pitched to readers; and the poor, when they are explicitly portrayed as *the focus of instructions*, are the objects of instructions to readers on how to interact with and on behalf of the poor. Nowhere in the book of Proverbs are the poor blamed for being poor.

6.2 Instructional frames using the rich and the poor as examples

As noted above, there is a sense in which material in §6.1 "uses" the poor as motivation. Even as the focus of instructions, portrayals of the poor in Proverbs are intended to arouse the

compassion and concern of readers. In the material reviewed here in §6.2, the poor (and in one case the rich) are used for motivational purposes in ways that diverge from that more common motivational use in the book. The material in this section presents characters who are described as poor and who serve as *examples for readers to follow* (15:15 in §6.2.1; 19:1, 22 and 28:6, 11 in §6.2.2). In only one case, a rich man is presented as an example to avoid (18:11 in §6.2.3). There are four subsections in §6.2:

6.2.1 The miserable poor? (15:15)
6.2.2 The virtuous poor (19:1, 22; 28:6, 11)
6.2.3 The deluded rich (18:11)
6.2.4 What to do with Proverbs 13:7-8

Prov 13:7-8 is a challenge to interpret. I review interpretive options in §6.2.4 and pick two that I think are most likely. However, I remain uncertain as to how it may originally have been meant to be understood.

Reader viewpoint in causal-reasoning-space simulations vis-à-vis characters who are described as poor in §6.2 are very different from reader viewpoint in relation to these characters in the processing of material in §6.1. Because characters who are described as poor—and in 18:11 as rich—are presented as examples for readers to follow (or not) in the material in §6.2, readers who perceive the sayings in this section as instructions to *them* would simulate from the viewpoint of these characters. In other words, they would imagine themselves following or not following their examples.

6.2.1 The miserable poor? (Proverbs 15:15)

All of the material in §6.1 depicts some way in which life is hard for people who are poor. They are portrayed as oppressed, mocked, ignored, abandoned, isolated, spoken to harshly, and in need of legal advocates and people who will be kind and generous to them. Prov 15:15a assumes all of this. It describes life experienced by an *ʿānî* as *raʿ* ("bad," "calamitous," or "evil"). There are at least two ways of reading 15:15 as a whole.

כָּל־יְמֵי עָנִי רָעִים	a	15:15	All the days of an *ʿānî* are bad,
וְטוֹב־לֵב מִשְׁתֶּה תָמִיד	b		but the good of heart—a continual feast.

In one reading of 15:15, the negative life experience of an *ʿānî* is simply contrasted with that of a person who is described as *ṭôb lēb* in v 15b. The phrase *ṭôb lēb* is usually interpreted to mean "happy" or even "cheerful."[198] These terms work well when they prompt readers to imagine happiness or cheer that is deeply felt—not superficial or trite versions of either one. 15:15b further describes the *ṭôb lēb* as someone who experiences life as a "continual feast" (*mišteh tāmîd*)—a metaphor for a life that is redolent with good things. In contrast, v 15a describes "all the days of an *ʿānî*" as *rāʿîm* ("bad," "calamitous," or "evil"). Taking these descriptions as simple contrasts between these life experiences is one way of reading v 15 as a whole.

Fox turns our attention to a second way of reading this saying. He reads v 15b not in contrast to v 15a but as a further description of the *ʿānî* in v 15a. He describes this *ʿānî* as a person who has an "inner happiness" (2009, 594). Read in this way, we can paraphrase v 15 as a concessive statement: "Though all the days of an *ʿānî* are bad, an [*ʿānî* who is] good of heart [will experience life as] a continual feast." The better-than sayings in 15:16-17 support this

[198] Fox writes that *ṭôb lēb* "means good cheer. This feeling may be a sense of satisfaction and well-being (Deut 28:47; Isa 65:14; 1 Kgs 8:66 = 2 Chr 7:10; Est 5:9). It may also be the gaiety or cheerfulness attendant on merry-making, something with a degree of inebriation (explicitly in 1 Sam 25:36; 2 Sam 13:28; probably also in Judg 16:25 and Est 1:10) (Fox 2009, 595).

reading. They both build on the feasting theme in v 15b and also offer specific examples as to what might inspire "an inner happiness" in the absence of material wealth.

כָּל־יְמֵי עָנִי רָעִים	a	15:15	All the days of an *ʿānî* person are bad,
וְטוֹב־לֵב מִשְׁתֶּה תָמִיד	b		but the good of heart – a continual feast.
טוֹב־מְעַט בְּיִרְאַת יְהוָה	a	15:16	A little with fear of Yahweh is better
מֵאוֹצָר רָב וּמְהוּמָה בּוֹ	b		than a great storehouse with trouble in it.
טוֹב אֲרֻחַת יָרָק וְאַהֲבָה־שָׁם	a	15:17	A meal of vegetables with love there is better
מִשּׁוֹר אָבוּס וְשִׂנְאָה־בּוֹ	b		than a fattened bull with hatred in it.

These better-than sayings reverse the expected notion that literal feasting is what would bring happiness in v 15 (Fox 2009, 594). The better-than statements in vv 16-17 suggest that the households who are portrayed with large feasts are worse off in comparison with the households portrayed with little to eat. The households with meager meals have the fear of Yahweh (v 16a) and love (v 17a), and presumably also freedom from trouble (v 16b) and no hatred in the home (v 17b). Therefore, the implication of placing vv 16-17 after v 15 may be to underscore that fear of Yahweh, freedom from trouble, and having love rather than hatred in the home should (or may) all inspire the inner happiness of an *ʿānî* who is *ṭôb lēb*.

Thus, 15:15 may be better classified as a saying that is about *ʿāniyyîm* who are *ṭôb lēb* than as one that is about "the miserable poor." If this is right, the *ʿānî* in v 15 serves as an example for readers to follow. However, it must also be said that this saying can be interpreted as a simple contrast between an *ʿānî* and someone else who is *ṭôb lēb*. This is the first reading described above. On that reading, 15:15 would be better classified with the material in §6.1.2.3, along with 10:15; 14:20; 18:23; 19:4, 7. The implicit instruction in the first reading would be to have compassion on the *ʿānî*. The interpretation that I model below is the second one described

here. As a saying that uses the *ʿānî* as an example for readers to follow, we can imagine readers constructing the meaning of this saying in the following way.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 15:15		
CONTENT BASE SPACES	a	All the days of an *ʿānî* being bad
	b	People who are *ṭôb lēb* experiencing life as a continual feast
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	a-b	Even though life is hard for people who are *ʿānî*, there are non-material things can make them *ṭôb lēb*. Because this is the case, I should value these non-material things more than material wealth and be *ṭôb lēb*.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	a-b	Value non-material things more than material wealth and be *ṭôb lēb*.

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 15:15	
ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses to follow the example of the poor character in this saying.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & THE POOR	The poor character in this saying provides an example that the reader chooses to follow.

6.2.2 The virtuous poor

The four sayings in this section are also discussed in §3.6. In that earlier section, we considered how the producers of Proverbs use these sayings to instruct readers regarding how to think about wealth. Those instructions obtain in this section as well. Here, in addition, we will consider further how the poor are used for motivational purposes. In each of these four sayings, a character who is described as poor also embodies a virtue—*tôm* ("integrity" or "blamelessness") in 19:1a and 28:6a; honesty in 19:22b; and understanding (*mēbîn*) in 28:11b. The poor character in each of these sayings provides both an example for readers to follow and a powerful reason for doing so. As noted in §3.6, the poverty attached to these characters does not (cannot, according to the producers of Proverbs) overwhelm the efficacy and value of the virtue that each one embodies. Three of these four sayings present better-than statements in which a *rāš* is used to fill the B (i.e., material scarcity as a *bad thing*) slot in a quadripartite structure (19:1a, 22b;

28:6a) (see §3.6). The fourth saying reviewed here (28:11) shares the quadripartite logic of better-than sayings but does not use a *ṭôb*-X-*min*-Y construction to make its comparison. Consider the three better-than sayings first.

טוֹב־רָ֥שׁ הוֹלֵ֗ךְ בְּתֻמּ֫וֹ מֵעִקֵּ֣שׁ שְׂפָתָ֑יו וְהוּא֥ כְסִֽיל	a b	19:1	A *rāš* who walks in his blamelessness is better off than a person with crooked lips, though[199] he is rich.[200]
טוֹב־רָ֥שׁ הוֹלֵ֗ךְ בְּתֻמּ֫וֹ מֵעִקֵּ֣שׁ דְּרָכִ֑ים וְהוּא֥ עָשִֽׁיר	a b	28:6	A *rāš* who walks in his blamelessness is better off than a person whose ways[201] are crooked, though he is rich.
תַּאֲוַ֣ת אָ֭דָם חַסְדּ֑וֹ וְטוֹב־רָ֥שׁ מֵאִ֝֗ישׁ כָּזָֽב	a b	19:22	The produce[202] of a man is his steadfast kindness – and a *rāš* is better off than a man who is a liar.

In two of these three sayings, which are clearly doublets, a *rāš* is described as someone who "walks in his blamelessness" (*hōlēk bětummô* in 19:1a and 28:6a). In the third saying, the *rāš* is simply said to be better than a "liar" (*kāzāb*, literally "lie" interpreted as a metonymy in 19:22b). The virtue of the *rāš* in 19:1a and 28:6a is apparent in the claim that this character walks "in his blamelessness" (*bětummô*). In contrast, the virtue of the *rāš* in 19:22b is not described explicitly. However, it is implicit in 19:22b that the *rāš* is not a liar. In order for the opposition between a *rāš* and a liar to be meaningful in v 22b, the *rāš cannot* be a liar. Therefore, in contrast to the liar in 22b*β*, the *rāš* in v 22b*α* must be honest, and this is a virtue.

The virtue of the poor character in the fourth saying is also explicitly described. The character in question in 28:11b is a *dal mēbîn* ("an understanding poor man" or "a poor man who is understanding"). The rhetoric of 28:11 is very much like that in the better-than statements

[199] See n. 134 in chapter three.

[200] See n. 132 in chapter three.

[201] See n. 133 in chapter three.

[202] See n. 135 in chapter three.

(19:1, 22; 28:6). 28:11b also profiles a virtuous poor person who is better off than a rich person. However, as noted above, 28:11 does not use a *ṭôb*-X-*min*-Y construction to make this comparison. It does not need to. The better-than comparison is still clear.

חָכָם בְּעֵינָיו אִישׁ עָשִׁיר	a	28:11	A man who is rich is wise in his own eyes,
וְדַל מֵבִין יַחְקְרֶנּוּ	b		but a *dal* who is understanding will find him out.

The superiority of the *dal mēbîn* over the *ʿāšîr* ("rich man") is made evident in two facets of this saying—first, through the description of the rich man as someone who is "wise in his own eyes" (*ḥākām bĕʿênāw*). This is a very bad thing in Proverbs (see 26:1-12 especially). And secondly, the superiority of the *dal mēbîn* over the *ʿāšîr* is made clear in the suggestion that a *dal mēbîn* will "find out" (*ḥ-q-r*), which means "expose" the *ʿāšîr* for not being truly wise.

As we saw in chapter three, these four sayings all exhort readers to value the virtues they feature—blamelessness (19:1a; 28:6a), honesty (19:22b), and having understanding (28:11b)—more than readers value wealth. Thus, these sayings all cohere with the better-than sayings that feature wealth and situations of living with scarce material resources. Poor characters are used in two ways in the sayings in this section: 1) as examples that provide the content of an instruction, and 2) as motivation to follow the instruction in question. The motivation that the poor characters in these sayings provide inheres in two features: 1) their identification with a virtue, and 2) their evaluation as superior to another character (the crooked rich in 19:1 and 28:6; a liar in 19:22; and a rich person who is wise in his own eyes in 28:11) *in spite of their poverty*. An evaluative metric that treats economic standing as primary would assess the poor characters in these sayings as "less than" or "worse off than" the rich characters. The metric that the producers of Proverbs want readers to use is different from this. The producers want readers to value the virtues of blamelessness, honesty, and understanding more than wealth. We saw this in §3.6. The poor

characters who embody these virtues serve motivational roles, because their poverty in no way diminishes the value and efficacy of the virtues in question.

I modify the interpretive summaries below from the versions provided in §3.6 in order to underscore that these sayings cue readers to imagine themselves following the examples of the poor characters in 19:1, v 22b, 28:6a, and v 11b. With this in mind, we can imagine readers constructing the meaning of these sayings in the following ways.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 19:1 and 28:6

CONTENT BASE SPACES	Being a *rāš* who is blameless being better than being rich and crooked.
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	Because blamelessness is better than wealth, I should follow the example of the *rāš* in these sayings.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	Follow the example of the *rāš* in these sayings.

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 19:1 and 28:6

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses to follow the example of the *rāš* in these sayings.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & THE POOR	The poor character in this saying provides an example that the reader chooses to follow.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 19:22b

CONTENT BASE SPACES	Being a *rāš* being better than being a liar
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	Because being a liar is worse than being poor, I should follow the example of the *rāš* in this saying.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	Follow the example of the *rāš* in this saying.

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 19:22b

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses to follow the example of the *rāš* in this saying.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & THE POOR	The poor character in this saying provides an example that the reader chooses to follow.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 28:11

CONTENT BASE SPACES	a	A rich man thinking that he is wise
	b	A *dal* who is understanding finding him out
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	a-b	Because the power of understanding is so great that being poor does not limit it from discerning false wisdom, I should follow the example of

		the *dal* in this saying.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	a-b	Follow the example of the *dal* in this saying.

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 28:11

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses to follow the example of the *dal* in this saying.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & THE POOR	The poor character in this saying provides an example that the reader chooses to follow.

6.2.3 The deluded rich

Prov 18:11 presents the one portrayal of a rich man (*ʿāšîr*) as a character whose example readers are not supposed to follow. We examined this saying along with 11:4 and 11:28 in §3.5. Each of these sayings instructs readers regarding how *not* to think about wealth. Here, we consider the use of a rich character in a motivational role. A number of other sayings in Proverbs could be interpreted as depictions of the rich as deluded in some way—e.g., with regard to the quality of their wisdom (28:11), the security that their wealth provides (11:4, 28), and, if we construe the proud characters in *do not be proud* sayings as wealthy people, with regard to self-perceptions that the rich may have of their own intrinsic greatness (16:19, 18:12). 18:11 falls in the category of delusions concerning the security that wealth affords the rich (as we saw in §3.5). 18:11a is an exact doublet with 10:15a. 18:11b, however, is quite different from 10:15b, which, as we saw above, reads, "and the ruin of the poor is their poverty." Consider 18:11.

הֲוֹן עָשִׁיר קִרְיַת עֻזּוֹ	a	18:11	The wealth of a rich man is his strong city –
וּכְחוֹמָה נִשְׂגָּבָה בְּמַשְׂכִּיתוֹ	b		like a high wall in his imagination.

The implication of v 11b is that the security that the *ʿāšîr* thinks his *hōn* ("wealth") offers him is an illusion. What the *ʿāšîr* thinks is "his strong city" (*qiryat ʿuzzô* in v 11a) is in fact only a bulwark of genuine security (i.e., "a high wall," *ḥōmāh niśgābāh* in v 11b) "in his imagination"

(*bĕmaśkîtô* in v 11b). Thus, the thoughts of this *ʿāšîr* are given as an example of how not to think about wealth. As noted in §3.5, 18:11 is a foil to 18:10. The righteous who trust in Yahweh and a person who trusts in their riches are set in opposition to one another in these sayings, much as they are in 11:4 and 11:28 (on which, see §3.5).

מִגְדַּל־עֹז שֵׁם יְהוָה	a	18:10	The name of Yahweh is a strong tower;
בּוֹ־יָרוּץ צַדִּיק וְנִשְׂגָּב	b		the righteous run into it and are secure (*niśgāb*).
הוֹן עָשִׁיר קִרְיַת עֻזּוֹ	a	18:11	The wealth of a rich man is his strong city –
וּכְחוֹמָה נִשְׂגָּבָה בְּמַשְׂכִּיתוֹ	b		like a high (*niśgābāh*) wall in his imagination.

The strong tower (*migdal ʿoz*) in 10a paralells the high wall (*ḥōmāh niśgābāh*) in 11b. The strong tower is Yahweh's, and the high wall is something that exists only in the rich man's imagination. It must be said that the tower belonging to Yahweh exists in the imaginations of the producers of this saying and possibly of readers as well. What must be noted is that the rhetorical function of the phrase *bĕmaśkîtô* ("in his imagination") in v 11b is intended to problematize the confidence that a rich man may place in his wealth.

From the perspectives of the producers (and possibly of readers), the imagination of the rich man in v 11 is faulty. In contrast, they would assess the imagined notion that the name of Yahweh affords security as sound. A play on words in vv 10 and 11 reflects these perspectives. The righteous are described as *niśgāb* ("high") in v 10b with no qualification.[203] In contrast, the wall in v 11b is described as *niśgābāh* (also "high" but in the feminine form) *only bĕmaśkîtô*—that is, *only* in the imagination of a rich man. We can therefore imagine readers constructing meaning in the following ways when they read this saying.

[203] The root *ś-g-b* in the N stem means "be high, inaccessible, exalted" (*HALOT* II:1305). The word *niśgāb* in v 10b is frequently translated "safe" or "secure" (e.g., ESV, NIV ASV, NRSV), because to be high or inaccessible in Yahweh's tower is to be safe or secure from any approaching threat.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 18:10

CONTENT BASE SPACES	a	The name of Yahweh being a strong tower
	b	The righteous running into that tower and being saved
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	a-b	Because Yahweh offers security, I should be righteous and trust in Yahweh.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	a	Be righteous and trust in Yahweh.

Proverbs 18:11

CONTENT BASE SPACES	a	The wealth of a rich man being his strong city
	b	A rich man imagining that his wealth offers security like a high wall
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	a-b	Because wealth offers security only in one's imagination, I should not trust in wealth as my source of security.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	a-b	Do not trust in your wealth.

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 18:10

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses to be righteous and trust in Yahweh.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	None

Proverbs 18:11

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses not to think of wealth as their source of security / to trust in their wealth.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	Wealth is something that the reader would trust in or think of as their source of security.

6.2.4 What to do with Proverbs 13:7-8

Commentators debate the meaning of 13:7-8. The difficulty of v 8 in particular leaves commentators assuming corruption of the text (e.g., Clifford 1999) or concluding that no satisfactory reading has yet been performed (e.g., Fox 2009). 13:7 can be interpreted as a saying that portrays characters whose examples readers are supposed to imagine following and not following. 13:8 is harder to construe in this way. Consider them together.

יֵשׁ מִתְעַשֵּׁר וְאֵין כֹּל	a	13:7	There is a person who thinks himself rich – but nothing,
מִתְרוֹשֵׁשׁ וְהוֹן רָב	b		a person who thinks himself poor – but great wealth.
כֹּפֶר נֶפֶשׁ־אִישׁ עָשְׁרוֹ	a	13:8	The ransom for the life of a man is his wealth,
וְרָשׁ לֹא־שָׁמַע גְּעָרָה	b		but a poor man hears no rebuke.

Regarding the sense of v 7, three types of readings are frequently formulated. Each one is contingent on interpreting the sense of the Dt participle in each line (*mitʿaššēr* in v 7a and *mitrōšēš* in v 7b). The Dt stem can convey any of the meanings conveyed by the italicized words below (compare *IBHS* §26.2; *BHRG* §16.6; *GBH* §53i).

A) There is a person who *pretends to be rich* but has nothing,
and a person who *pretends to be poor* but has great wealth.
B) There is a person who *grows rich* but has nothing,
and a person who *grows poor* but has great wealth.
C) There is a person who *thinks himself rich* but has nothing,
and a person who *thinks himself poor* but has great wealth.

Any of these readings are possible. The B and C readings share the feature that, in them, the terms at the end of each line—*wĕʾên kōl* ("but nothing" in 7a*β*) and *wĕhōn rāb* ("but great wealth" in 7b*β*)—are interpreted metaphorically. In the B and C readings, the character either really has or does not have material wealth but is lacking in or abounding with non-material kinds of wealth and poverty. Commentators frequently observe the possibility of interpretive options B and C but translate in a manner that comports with the A reading (e.g., McKane 1970; Murphy 1998; Waltke 2005; Fox 2009). Whybray and Murphy say explicitly that they think the B and C readings go beyond the sense of v 7. Regarding the instructions that commentators think v 7 might issue, they offer the following interpretations, which I paraphrase here:

McKane	Avoid unbalanced, immoderate, and extreme behavior.
Whybray	Do not judge by appearances. Do not conceal your true identity. Avoid extremes in behavior.
Waltke	Do not defraud others by pretending to be something you are not.
Murphy	Murphy does not interpret v 7 as a directive statement. He reads it as a comment on what he calls a paradox of contrast between appearances and reality.
Clifford	Clifford also does not interpret v 7 as a directive statement. He reads it as a reflection on the fact that money or its lack does not define a person's experience in life.
Fox	Fox reads v 7 as an indirect warning against pretense and pretension.

> He also thinks "but nothing" (7a*β*) and "great wealth" (7a*β*) could refer to non-material values.

There are merits in each of these interpretations. I find the B and C readings the most compelling. They would both instruct readers to *recognize and value what is most important in life*. This reading interprets *wĕʾên kōl* ("but nothing" in 7a*β*) and *wĕhōn rāb* ("but great wealth" in 7b*β*) as metaphorical expressions. It also envisions people who think of themselves as rich or poor with respect to material goods, because they really are rich or poor. This in itself is not a problem. The problem is that they do not recognize their poverty and wealth *with respect to non-material things*. How readers envision these valuable non-material things will vary, but readers who adopt a B or C reading will understand implicitly that the examples set by both of the characters in v 7 are examples that the producers of Proverbs do *not* want them to emulate.

Prov 13:8 is more difficult. Commentators consider its instruction obscure (McKane 1970, 458), without a clear point (Whybray 1994, 202), corrupt (Clifford 1999, 137), and, as already noted above, not yet satisfactorily explained (Fox 2009, 564). I will give a brief overview as to why. The greatest difficulty lies in v 8b, but there is some disagreement about v 8a as well. Minor disagreement has been voiced around interpretations of *kōpēr* in v 8a. *HALOT* glosses *kōpēr* as "bribe" and "ransom," both of which are offered in payment for wrongdoing (I:494-495). Most commentators view the *kōpēr* here in v 8a as an atoning payment for some kind of wrongdoing. However, at least a few commentators think the word *kōpēr* refers to a ransom that is demanded not because the rich person did something wrong, but just because they are rich. This interpretation projects a modern notion of ransom as extortion on v 8a (Toy 1908; McKane 1970). This is problematic. In the thirteen times that *kōpēr* is used in the Hebrew Bible, it is

never used to refer to a situation of blackmail. It almost always refers to a payment for wrongdoing (the only exceptions are one census-taking instance and two illicit bribe uses).[204]

The primary difficulty in v 8 that causes consternation lies in the statement in v 8b, "the *rāš* does not heed/hear a rebuke" (*lôʾ šāmaʿ gĕʿārāh*). This clause appears in 13:1b as well (*lôʾ šāmaʿ gĕʿārāh*). Its use in 13:1b leads Clifford (and others) to imagine that a scribe purposefully copied the end of v 1b at the end of v 8b. They theorize that the text a scribe was using was corrupt and unreadable at v 8b after *wĕrāš.* Therefore, they imagine this scribe looking elsewhere for a clause with which to end v 8, at which point they turned to 13:1 (Clifford 1998, 137).[205]

The final clause (*lôʾ šāmaʿ gĕʿārāh*) in 13:8b is considered difficult, because it is hard to imagine a context in which a *rāš* would either not *heed* or not *hear* a rebuke. Both are common meanings for *š-m-ʿ*. Fox characterizes a situation in which a *rāš* would refuse to *heed* a rebuke as "irrelevant and untrue" (2009, 563). This construal would be irrelevant and untrue because a *rāš* would have every reason to heed rebukes given his lack of power and social standing. Waltke also adopts a-*rāš*-does-not-*heed*-a-rebuke reading but, unlike Fox, interprets it as both relevant and true. This leads Waltke to describe the *rāš* in v 8b as "the incorrigible poor" (2004, 557, 559).[206] In contrast, Murphy (1998) and McKane (1970) envision scenarios in which a *rāš* would not *hear* a rebuke. McKane and Murphy interpret v 8b as a scenario that is contrasted with

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[204] The word *kōpēr* is used in the Hebrew Bible to refer to payment for wrongdoing that is demanded by other humans (Exod 21:30; Num 35:31, 32; Ps 49:8[9]; Prov 6:35, 13:8; Job 36:18), an atoning payment that is exacted during a census taking (Exod 30:12), an illicit bribe payment (1 Sam 12:3; Amos 5:12), or a ransom that God determines to exact as payment (Isa 43:3; Job 33:24; Prov 21:18).

[205] The LXX reflects M: *λύτρον ἀνδρὸς ψυχῆς ὁ ἴδιος πλοῦτος, πτωχὸς δὲ οὐχ ὑφίσταται ἀπειλήν* ("The ransom of a man's life is his own wealth, but a poor man cannot endure a threat").

[206] Clifford offers a reading of the text in M as well, but it is an implausible one. He suggests that the text in M functions as "an explanation of why some people are poor" (1999, 137). More on this below.

situations in which the rich are extorted for ransom payments. McKane and Murphy assume that, in contrast to targeting the rich for ransom or blackmail, no one would try to extort the poor. They would have nothing with which to pay (Murphy 1998, 96; McKane 1970, 458). As noted above, blackmail scenarios are not portrayed anywhere else in the Hebrew Bible using the word *kōpēr*. Therefore, these readings are questionable.

More tenable are the following options. As Fox points out with regard to v 8a, the fact that a rich person is able to pay off a *kōpēr* when he does something wrong "is an unfair reality" (2009, 563). A rich person can afford to "cover" or "atone" (*k-p-r*) for wrongs they commit. What is unfair is that a person who is poor cannot make this kind of payment, because they, in contrast, have no resources to do so. I adopt an a-*rāš*-does-not-*hear*-a-rebuke reading—but without the notion expressed above that the *kōpēr* is a kind of extortion or blackmail. There are two more plausible backgrounds. In one, the producers of Proverbs say that a *rāš* does not hear a rebuke in v 8b, because they assume that a *rāš* would not commit offenses against anyone who would demand a *kōpēr* from them. This portrait of *rāšîm* would correspond with the timidity of the *rāš* vis-à-vis the *ʿāšîr* in 18:23. Another plausible background for v 8b would envision a *rāš* causing offense to people with the social standing to demand payment for the wrongdoing. However, in this situation (on this reading), no one would bother trying to force a *rāš* to pay a *kōpēr*, because they would assume that the *rāš* would have no means of doing so. This is basically the reading of McKane and Murphy minus the blackmail scenario.

Either of these latter scenarios may be plausible enough. What is still unclear, however, is the point of the instruction in v 8. Is it to suggest that the poor have an advantage over the rich, because they will not be called to account for wrongdoing by means of some material recompense? If we think is this is the case, Whybray offers appropriate caution. He reflects that

imagining that the producers of this saying intend to tell "the poor that they are better off than the rich would have to be tongue in cheek" (1994, 202). It could be that v 8 builds or comments in some way on v 7. If it does so, it would appeal to the lowest common denominator in v 7—namely, to the value of material wealth and the detriment of material poverty—rather than to idealizations of non-material wealth and poverty. These appeals are possible, but it may be best to join Fox in concluding that v 8 still has not been satisfactorily explained. We can still imagine how readers might interpret 13:7-8. However, I do not imagine directives for v 8.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 13:7-8		
CONTENT BASE SPACES	7a	A person who thinks he is rich having nothing that really matters
	7b	A person who thinks he is poor having great wealth in terms of what really matters
	8a	The ransom for the life of a man being his wealth
	8b	A poor man hearing no rebuke
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	7	Because there are things that are more important than wealth, I should not judge material wealth and poverty as if they are of greater consequence than these more important things.
	8a	Because a rich person is rich, he will be able to pay a ransom.
	8b	Because a poor person cannot pay a ransom, no one will try to make him pay a ransom.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	7	Recognize and value what is most important in life.
	8	?

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 13:7	
ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who chooses to value what is really important.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & THE POOR	The reader may identify with someone who is either rich or poor in terms of material wealth.
Proverbs 13:8	
ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is ?
RELATION BETWEEN READER & THE POOR	The reader may be identify with someone who is either rich or poor in terms of material wealth.

6.2.5 Summary

Regarding the distribution of terms for *poor* in Proverbs, *ʾebyôn* is the only one of the four that is not used in this section. We see *ʿănîyyîm* in 15:15a, *rāš* in 13:8, 19:1, 22, and in 28:6,

and *dal* in 28:11. We also see the *ʿāšîr* serve as an example that readers are cued to avoid in 18:11. The additional information that material in this section provides regarding how we might distinguish further between *ʾebyôn* and *ʿānî* is therefore minimal. We can merely note that the *ʿānî* is portrayed in slightly more diverse contexts than the *ʾebyôn*. In addition to being the object of kindness and a target of injustice and cruelty, as the *ʾebyôn* is also (§6.1.3), the *ʿānî* is, in addition, portrayed independently as either an example to follow or as a person who requires compassion and understanding. As noted above, 15:15 may intend to prompt both instructions at once.

Some scholars view the portrayal of characters who are described as both poor and virtuous (19:1, 22; 28:6, 11) as being at odds with sayings in which poverty is a consequence. Murphy is representative in writing about 28:6, "Again we should note the concealed paradox: whoever walks in integrity is not supposed to be poor according to ideal wisdom—but reality cannot be denied" (1998, 215). I would argue instead, that, in one sense, the sayings in this section "use" characters who are poor to accentuate the power of the virtues these characters embody. The poor characters in this section are used as motivation, in other words, to compel readers to be blameless (19:1; 28:6), honest (19:22), and to grow in understanding (28:11). In addition, in another sense, the instructions issued in these sayings are more complex. Like other better-than sayings, these four sayings also function as instructions that modulate the value readers attribute to wealth. More specifically, similar to other better-than sayings, these sayings exhort readers to value blamelessness, honesty, and understanding more than wealth.

Information in the simulation summaries in this section is again consistent within this section, as it is in other sections. Readers who construe personal implications for themselves and imagine they are being instructed to emulate the characters who are poor in this section and to

avoid the example of the *ʿāšîr* in 18:11 would simulate from the perspectives of these characters. Therefore, in contrast to the reader viewpoint in simulations of material in §6.1, reader viewpoint in simulations of material in §6.2 would attach to the person who is poor. However, *unlike* in "poverty" sayings, where reader viewpoint also attaches to characters who are poor, the poor characters in §6.2 are virtuous and held up as *good* examples to follow.

6.3 Instructions on rulers and the poor

As noted above in discussing 30:14 (§6.1.2.1), instructions in Proverbs that talk about rulers can serve at least three functions. Specifically, they can instruct rulers and readers who are not rulers in at least three ways: 1) how to assess rulers (and what kind of ruler to be), 2) what kinds of rulers to hope for (and what kind of ruler to be), and 3) how to treat the poor (as rulers and as people who are not rulers). Two sentence sayings in Proverbs and one longer unit address how rulers should and should not treat the poor. The sentence sayings both occur in collection six (Prov 25-29). This collection is the one with the highest concentration of sayings in Proverbs that address or talk about rulers. The longer unit discussed in this section is the address to King Lemuel that his mother spoke to him (31:1-9).

The two sentence sayings both portray rulers who do not treat the poor in ways that they should. 28:15 is part of a saying pair, and 29:14 occurs in a cluster of three sentence sayings that seem to go together. Consider 28:15-16.

אֲרִי־נֹהֵם וְדֹב שֹׁוֵק	a	28:15	A roaring lion and a charging bear –
מֹשֵׁל רָשָׁע עַל עַם־דָּל	b		a wicked ruler over a *dal* people.

נָגִיד חָסַר תְּבוּנוֹת וְרַב מַעֲשַׁקּוֹת שֹׂנֵא בֶּצַע יַאֲרִיךְ יָמִים	a b	28:16	A ruler who lacks understanding increases[207] oppressions; a person who hates[208] unjust gain extends [his] days.

As noted in §6.1.2.1, the imagery in v 15 shares significant features with the imagery in 30:14. Both portray people in power metaphorically as wild and ravenous beasts who devour the poor. As in 30:14, the metaphors underlying 28:15 are the following: PEOPLE ARE ANIMALS, PEOPLE WHO OPPRESS OTHERS ARE CARNIVOROUS ANIMALS, and PEOPLE WHO ARE VULNERABLE TO OPPRESSORS ARE THE PREY OF CARNIVOROUS ANIMALS. As McKane writes, "The poor are as much at the mercy of a *mōšēl rāšāʿ* as are the potential victims of a lion on the hunt or a bear on the prowl" (1970, 629). Fox observes that other sayings in Proverbs describe rulers as menacing, even when they are good (e.g., Prov 19:12; 20:1). Therefore, how much more terrible is the prospect of *rulers* who are bad (Fox 2009, 827).

Commentators note that v 16b does not connect well with v 16a (Whybray 1994; Murphy 1998; Clifford 1999; Fox 2009). Whybray is representative in thinking there is "no logical connection between the lines of this verse" (1994, 393). Most agree, however, that there is a clear connection between vv 15a-b and 16a. Fox suggests that 28:15a-16a should be read as a tristich, and that v 16b should be read on its own as a monostich. He also reflects, however, that, "Though distinct from the preceding tristich, 28:16b as placed does comment broadly on the

[207] The translation above reflects an emendation from M *wĕrab* to a C form of *r-b-h* (*yarbeh*) (see McKane 1970; Murphy 1998; Waltke 2005). Others emend to a C form of *r-b-b* (*yārēb*), which is possible. However, *r-b-b* is not used in the C stem elsewhere in the Hebrew Bible. In addition, a number of English translations seem to excise the *waw* before *rab* and translate as if 28:16a is a verbless clause: "A ruler who lacks understanding is a cruel oppressor" (e.g., NRSV, NIV, ESV). The emendation from *wĕrab* to *yarbeh* produces more syntactic symmetry between vv 16a (SVO) and 16b (SVO), with C *yiqtol* forms in both lines.

[208] The *ketiv* includes a *yodh* at the end of *śōnēʾ*, and the *qere* recommends reading this participle without the *yodh* (if we understand the *qere* to recommend readings). The *yodh* would indicate that the participle is an mpc form, which would be construed in construct with *beṣaʿ* and translated, "haters of unjust gain." I read with the *ketiv*.

oppressive ruler's love of unjust gain" (Fox 2009, 827). I would argue that vv 16a and 16b do relate, and relate well—precisely along this line identified by Fox. We have seen that references to oppression can refer to instances of extortion (e.g., 22:16 and 28:8 in particular; possibly 11:15, 20:16, and 27:13; and maybe even 28:3). Extortion may be profiled in v 16a as *maʿăšaqqōt*, "oppressions." If it is, *maʿăšaqqōt* in v 16a is equated with the unjust gain (*beṣaʿ*) in 16b. The character in v 16b is said to "hate" unjust gain. This could mean that he refuses to procure unjust gain in particular by the oppressive means of extortion (*maʿăšaqqōt*). On this reading, *maʿăšaqqōt* ("oppressions") in v 16a is a rather precise antithesis of the *beṣaʿ* ("unjust gain") v 16b. In addition, Waltke makes a connection with Isaiah 33:15 that supports this reading. Isaiah 33:15 uses the phrase *beṣaʿ maʿăšaqqōt* ("unjust gain of oppressions"), demonstrating that these terms are in fact well related (Waltke 2005, 421).[209]

We can summarize the ties between vv 15 and 16 as follows: v 16a elaborates a particular way in which wicked rulers might behave like charging bears and roaring lions (*ʾărî nōhēm wĕdōb šōqēq* in 15a) toward a poor people (*ʿam dal* in v 15b). Specifically, these rulers might "devour" the poor by "increasing oppressions" (*yarbeh maʿăšaqqōt* in v 16a, with emendation). In addition, the unjust gain (*beṣaʿ*) that is condemned in v 16b represents one example of oppression that corrupt rulers may perform.

The evaluation of the bad rulers in vv 15a-16a is quite clear, though no consequences are portrayed. As we have seen throughout this study, evaluation is frequently expressed in Proverbs simply by profiling something that the producers of Proverbs assume that readers will assess as good or bad. In v 16b, the positive consequences for the person who hates unjust gain (the

[209] Waltke also nicely notes the consonance between *šōqēq* ("charging" in v 15a) and *maʿăšaqqōt* ("oppressions" in v 16a) and reflects that in blending these lines by means of sound, "V 16 defines the 'wicked ruler' as a leader who engages in extortion and other forms of unjust gain" (2005, 419).

extension of his days) add a motivational layer by portraying positive consequences for the character who hates unjust gain. There is a poetic logic here. It is one infused with irony: the ruler who refuses unjust gain (possibly that which has been acquired through oppression, v 16a) is the one who ends up gaining in the end (*yaʿărîk yāmîm*, "he extends days" in v 16b).

As a unit, 28:15-16 instructs rulers in *how not to treat the poor*. In addition, we must imagine that other readers would take the warning not to emulate the example of wicked rulers and also interpret prohibitions against their own mistreatment and exploitation of the poor. Or, readers who are not rulers may apprehend instruction on how to assess rulers and what kind of rulers to hope for. Therefore, we can imagine readers constructing the meaning of 28:15-16 in the following ways. The first set of readers whose interpretations I represent are those who are some type of ruler. The second are readers who are not rulers and interpret these sayings as instructions on what kinds of rulers to hope for. Other construals are possible.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 28:15-16

CONTENT BASE SPACES	15a	A roaring lion and a charging bear being likened to
	15b	A wicked ruler over a *dal* people
	16a	A ruler who lacks understanding being an oppressive ruler
	16b	A person [possibly a ruler] who hates unjust gain extending his days
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	15a-b_1	Because it is bad to oppress the poor, I should not oppress the poor.
	15a-b_2	Because it is bad for rulers to oppress the poor, I should hope for a ruler who does not oppress the poor.
	16a_1	Because it is bad for rulers to oppress the poor, I should not oppress the poor.
	16a_2	Because it is bad for rulers to oppress the poor, I should hope for a ruler who does not oppress the poor.
	16b	Because avoiding unjust gain leads to good things, I should avoid unjust gain.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	15a-b_1	Do not oppress the poor.
	15a-b_2	Hope for a ruler who does not oppress the poor
	16a_1	Do not oppress the poor.
	16a_2	Hope for a ruler who does not oppress the poor
	16b	Avoid unjust gain.

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 28:15-16a_1

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is a ruler who chooses not to oppress the poor.

RELATION BETWEEN READER & THE POOR	The poor would be people with whom [and on behalf of whom] the reader would interact.

Proverbs 28:15-16a$_2$

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who is not a ruler who chooses to take instruction from this saying on how not to oppress the poor.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & THE POOR	The poor would be people with whom [and on behalf of whom] the reader would interact.

Proverbs 28:16b

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is a person who chooses to avoid unjust gain.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	Wealth would be something that the reader chooses not to acquire unjustly.

*** * ***

The three sayings in 29:12-14 relate thematically. We reviewed 29:13 above (§6.1.2.6.2) and noted its similarity to 22:2. 29:13 is also different from 22:2 in that it profiles the problematic relation between an oppressor and the poor. We will now examine 29:13 in its immediate literary context. The saying that precedes it portrays a wicked ruler (v 12), and the saying that follows it describes a ruler who is good and whose reign can therefore be expected to last for a long time (v 14). 29:14 contains the one saying in this cluster that directly relates a ruler (a king, *melek*) to the poor (in this case, *dallîm*). Consider these three sayings together.

מֹשֵׁל מַקְשִׁיב עַל־דְּבַר־שָׁקֶר	a	29:12	A ruler who listens to a false word –
כָּל־מְשָׁרְתָיו רְשָׁעִים	b		all his counselors are wicked.
רָשׁ וְאִישׁ תְּכָכִים נִפְגָּשׁוּ	a	29:13	A *rāš* and an oppressor meet;
מְאִיר־עֵינֵי שְׁנֵיהֶם יְהוָה	b		the one who gives light to the eyes of both is Yahweh.
מֶלֶךְ שׁוֹפֵט בֶּאֱמֶת דַּלִּים	a	29:14	A king who judges *dallîm* in truth –
כִּסְאוֹ לָעַד יִכּוֹן	b		his throne is established for perpetuity.

The oppressor (*ʾîš tĕqāqîm*) is a kind of hinge around which the rulers in vv 12 and 14 revolve. He is a malevolent instantiation of the ruler in v 12 and a regrettable foil to the king in v 14. Judging the poor "in truth" (*bĕʾĕmet* in v 14a) means judging "reliably" as in "honestly" on their behalf. This means administering equitable and just judgments for the poor.

We considered v 13 above in §6.1.2.6.2 on the premise that the "man of oppressions" (*ʾîš tĕqāqîm*) is a person who is rich. The placement of this saying between vv 12 and 14 suggests, in addition, that the *ʾîš tĕqāqîm* in v 13 may be intended as some kind of ruler as well. It is again clear that rulers must ensure justice for the poor. The image of a king as a just judge who ensures equitable judgments for the poor is common throughout the ancient Near East. This conception of kings is fundamental in ancient Near Eastern royal ideologies (Fensham 1962; Weinfeld 1995; Sparks 2005). In addition, Fox reflects that "protecting the rights of the poor was a royal duty and not a matter of charity" (2009, 839). In other words, ancient Near Eastern conceptions of kings view kings as *obligated* to ensure that the poor are protected from oppressors. If they themselves act as oppressors against the poor, they and their rule operate in a way that is the antithesis of idealized ancient Near Eastern expectations. In the summaries below, I represent interpretations that rulers would construe when they read 29:14. But again, other construals are possible and would of course be expected when readers who are not rulers read this saying.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 28:15-16

CONTENT BASE SPACES	15a	A roaring lion and a charging bear being likened to
	15b	A wicked ruler over a *dal* people
	16a	A ruler who lacks understanding being an oppressive ruler
	16b	A person [possibly a ruler] who hates unjust gain extending his days
CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	15a-b_1	Because it is bad to oppress the poor, I should not oppress the poor.
	15a-b_2	Because it is bad for rulers to oppress the poor, I should hope for a ruler who does not oppress the poor.
	16a_1	Because it is bad for rulers to oppress the poor, I should not oppress the poor.
	16a_2	Because it is bad for rulers to oppress the poor, I should hope for a ruler who does not oppress the poor.
	16b	Because avoiding unjust gain leads to good things, I should avoid unjust gain.
DIRECTIVE SPACES	15a-b_1	Do not oppress the poor.
	15a-b_2	Hope for a ruler who does not oppress the poor
	16a_1	Do not oppress the poor.
	16a_2	Hope for a ruler who does not oppress the poor
	16b	Avoid unjust gain.

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 28:15-16a$_1$

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is a ruler who chooses not to oppress the poor.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & THE POOR	The poor would be people with whom [and on behalf of whom] the reader would interact.

Proverbs 28:15-16a$_2$

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is the person who is not a ruler who chooses to take instruction from this saying on how not to oppress the poor.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & THE POOR	The poor would be people with whom [and on behalf of whom] the reader would interact.

Proverbs 28:16b

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is a person who chooses to avoid unjust gain.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & WEALTH	Wealth would be something that the reader chooses not to acquire unjustly.

* * *

Prov 31:1-9 forms the closest parallel in Proverbs to royal instructions in Egyptian (*Merikare* and *Amenemhet*) and Babylonian (*Advice to a Prince*) Wisdom literature in which future kings are tutored and given guidance on morality and governance. The instructions in 31:1-9 are referred to as "the words of Lemuel, a king of Massa" (v 1a). They are also further described as words "that his mother taught him" (v 1b). These royal instructions are the only example in the ancient Near East of instructions that were taught to a king by his mother. The fundamental duty of a king to secure justice for the poor is the underlying subject and concern of Lemuel's mother's instructions.

דִּבְרֵי לְמוּאֵל מֶלֶךְ מַשָּׂא	a	31:1	The words of Lemuel, a king of Massa,
אֲשֶׁר־יִסְּרַתּוּ אִמּוֹ	b		that his mother taught him.
מַה־בְּרִי וּמַה־בַּר־בִּטְנִי	a	31:2	What, my son, and what, O son of my womb,
וּמָה בַּר־נְדָרָי	b		and what, O son of my vow?
אַל־תִּתֵּן לַנָּשִׁים חֵילֶךָ	a	31:3	Do not give your strength to women,
וּדְרָכֶיךָ לְמָחוֹת מְלָכִין	b		or your ways to those who destroy[210] kings.

[210] The translation above reflects an emendation from M *lamḥōt*, which is "enigmatic," to *lĕmōḥōt* (Fox 2009, 883, 886).

אַל לַמְלָכִים לְמוֹאֵל	a		It is not for kings, Lemuel,
אַל לַמְלָכִים שְׁתוֹ־יָיִן	b	31:4	it is not for kings – drinking wine,
וּלְרוֹזְנִים אוֹ [אַי] שֵׁכָר	c		and for princes – no[211] beer.
פֶּן־יִשְׁתֶּה וְיִשְׁכַּח מְחֻקָּק	a	31:5	Lest you drink and forget what is decreed
וְיִשַׁנֶּה דִּין כָּל־בְּנֵי־עֹנִי	b		and change the right of all those who are afflicted.
תְּנוּ־שֵׁכָר לְאוֹבֵד	a	31:6	Give[212] beer to a person who is perishing,
וְיַיִן לְמָרֵי נָפֶשׁ	b		and wine to a person who is sad [lit., "bitter of soul/appetite/life"] –
יִשְׁתֶּה וְיִשְׁכַּח רִישׁוֹ	a	31:7	let him drink and forget his poverty[213]
וַעֲמָלוֹ לֹא יִזְכָּר־עוֹד	b		and remember his trouble no more.
פְּתַח־פִּיךָ לְאִלֵּם	a	31:8	Open your mouth for the mute,
אֶל־דִּין כָּל־בְּנֵי חֲלוֹף	b		for the right of all those who are passing away.[214]
פְּתַח־פִּיךָ שְׁפָט־צֶדֶק	a	31:9	Open your mouth, judge righteously,
וְדִין עָנִי וְאֶבְיוֹן	b		and secure the right of the poor and needy.

Lemuel's mother prohibits her son from two vices that would undermine his just administration of royal duties: sexual indulgences (v 3) and inebriation (vv 4-5). Of all the royal duties that these vices would undermine, Lemuel's mother chooses to focus solely on how they would affect how her son might administer justice *and* provide care to those who are suffering and otherwise

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[211] The *ketiv* of Prov 31:4 at this point reads *ʾw* ("or"), and the *qere* reads *ʾê* ("where?"). Neither is sensible, though some maintain one or the other (Murphy 1998 reads "or"). Other commentators speculate about possible variants and offer different emendations—for example, to *ʾawwô* (G infinitive absolute, "to desire") (Driver 1951; Whybray 1994); to *ʾawweh* (D infinitive construct, "to desire") (Waltke 2005); and to *ʾî* (a Phoenician negative particle) (Clifford 1999; Fox 2009). The Phoenician negative particle is thought possibly to appear in Job 22:30 as well (*ʾî nāqî*, "not innocent"). However, I would argue that a Hebrew negative particle—namely, the contracted form *ʾên*—is a stronger candidate in both Prov 31:4 and Job 22:30. This emendation would adopt the consonants in the *qere* and assume that a scribe failed to copy the final *nun* at some point in the transmission of both of these passages.

[212] The imperative here (*tĕnū*) is the sole plural verbal form in this instruction. Fox reflects that the plural form may indicate that this line is a traditional saying that Lemuel's mother quotes to her son, one that is addressed to a collective of rulers, not just one (2009, 887).

[213] This spelling (*rîš*) is considered an alternative to *rêš* (also "poverty") (*HALOT* II:1229).

[214] This translation reflects the meaning of G *ḥ-l-p* as "pass away" (*HALOT* I:321; see Isa 2:18; Ps 102:27; Song 2:11).

vulnerable. Her singular focus demonstrates the importance of these royal functions in the ancient Near Eastern conception of kings.

The mother of Lemuel envisions people who are suffering or vulnerable in a number of ways. She refers to those who are perishing or passing away (vv 6a, 8b), sad (v 6b), living in "poverty" and with "trouble" (*rîš* and *ʿāmāl* possibly serving as references to the same thing in v 7), mute (v 8a), and finally, to those who are "poor and needy" (*ʿānî wĕʾebyōn* in v 9b). When Lemuel's mother refers to those who are "mute" (*ʾillēm*) in v 8a, this could be a reference to actual inability to speak. It could also be intended as a broader acknowledgment that many people who have physical voices are not heard when they use them. The *ʿānî wĕʾebyōn* are in a climactic position at the very end of this instruction.

If a king indulges too much in women and alcohol, Lemuel's mother warns, he may forget "what is decreed" (*mĕḥuqqāq* in v 5a) and change the "[right] judgment of all who are afflicted" (*dîn kol bĕnê ʿōnî* in v 5b). Lemuel's mother commends a better use for alcohol. Rather than consume it himself, Lemuel's mother commands her son to give alcohol to people who are suffering to help them forget their trouble. Lichtenstein (1982) observes the following lexical pattern in vv 4-7 in the references to wine, beer, drinking, and forgetting.

yayin (wine) in 4b and *šēkār* (beer) in v 4c	*š-t-h* (drink) and *š-k-ḥ* (forget) in v 5a
šēkār (beer) in 6a and *yayin* (wine) in v 6b	*š-t-h* (drink) and *š-k-ḥ* (forget) in v 7a

A failing king would drink and forget what he should not forget—namely, to care for his people. But people who are suffering would drink and forget the hardness of experiences that have been forced upon them. The two commands in vv 8-9 to "open your mouth" both function as metonymies for the general work of preserving justice for the vulnerable. Lemuel's mother makes this clear in the final two commands of her instruction: "judge righteously" in v 9a*β* and

"secure the right of the poor and needy" in 9b. We can also observe that the commands to Lemuel to open his mouth in vv 8-9 contrast with the experience of the mute (*ʾillēm*) who cannot speak (or are not heard when they do). He must use his voice for them.

There are no explicit "motive clauses" in this instruction, which commentators typically associate with the instruction form (especially McKane 1970). Motivations to follow the instructions in 31:1-9 are entirely implicit. They are all rooted in the sense that readers would have concerning what is right (i.e., good) and what is wrong (i.e., bad), as well as in any sense of authority they attribute to Lemuel and his mother. These motivations all root deeply within ancient Near Eastern cultural models of kings and their royal functions. In the case of this instruction, Lemuel's mother makes clear that it is wrong to overindulge in alcohol and women, because it is imperative (i.e., right and good) that rulers maintain justice for, and exercise kindness toward, the poor. Anything that would compromise these royal functions must be avoided.

It is significant that Lemuel's mother goes beyond securing justice for the poor. She demands kindness as well. She wants Lemuel to provide relief for those who are suffering (vv 6-7) as much as she wants him to execute just judgments on their behalf (vv 8-9). The directives in this unit are all explicit, but we can imagine the reasoning that readers who are rulers might perform as they articulate for themselves what motivations support the directives in this unit. Because the directives are all explicit in vv 6-9, I only represent the likely contents in readers' causal reasoning spaces in the model below.

INFERENTIAL REASONING SUMMARY

Proverbs 31:2-9

CAUSAL REASONING SPACES	Because kings should ensure justice for, and be kind to, the poor, I should secure justice for, and be kind to, the poor.

SIMULATION SUMMARY (IN CAUSAL REASONING SPACES)

Proverbs 31:2-9

ROLE AND VIEWPOINT OF READER	Reader is a king who chooses to secure justice for, and to be kind to, the poor.
RELATION BETWEEN READER & THE POOR	The poor would be people on whose behalf the reader would act and with whom the reader would interact [maybe not actually, but vv 6-7 portray interactions].

* * *

The characters who are poor in 28:15 and 29:14 are described as *ʿam dal* and *dallîm* respectively. In contrast, the characters in the speech of Lemuel's mother are described as *ʾebyôn* and *ʿānî* in 31:9. Only the *rāš* is not portrayed in a scene with a ruler in Proverbs. It is not clear if we should draw significance from this. What we can do is add the depiction of the *ʿam dal* as targets of oppression to the instances in 14:31, 22:16, and 28:3 where *dallîm* are objects of oppression. We can also relate the focus on the *ʾebyôn* and *ʿānî* in 31:9 to other instances in which they appear together (30:14 and 31:20). 31:9 is another instance in Proverbs when these terms as a pair portray the poor as possible targets of oppression, as they are in 30:14, and also as the focus of kindness, as they are in 31:20.

Readers who are not rulers will undoubtedly simulate differently in response to the material in this section. Some may simulate from external observer viewpoint, imagining scenes in which good and bad rulers interact with, on behalf of, or against the poor. These simulations would support interpretations of instructions on how to assess rulers. Others may draw instructions for their own conduct as well and simulate from internal participant viewpoint, performing Reader in the Scene blends. When readers do this, they would imagine choosing to act on behalf of the poor themselves.

6.4 Conclusions

The poor and the rich are the *focus of instructions* in the material in §6.1 and §6.3 and are *central features in motivations* in §6.2. The material in both §6.1 and §6.3 addresses how the producers of Proverbs think the poor should and should not be treated—by everyone (§6.1) and by rulers in particular (§6.3). The contents of these instructions demonstrate that Proverbs does not blame the poor for being poor. As noted at the end of §6.1, the role and viewpoint of readers in their causal reasoning space simulations do not license singular readings of "poverty" and "poor" sayings. In other words, the different roles and relations between readers and the poor in the frame structures of reader simulations make it impossible to conflate the meaning and instruction of "poverty" and "poor" sayings in Proverbs. In "poverty" saying simulation frames, the reader is the poor person. But in "poor" saying simulation frames, the reader interacts with or on behalf of a poor person. Therefore, these sets of sayings must be kept separate in analyses. Poverty and the poor are used in very different ways that do not relate as mutually informing.

In reader simulations of material in §6.2, we see a different dynamic. Here, readers would imagine themselves as the character who is poor. This is because they would imagine themselves following the example of the characters in 19:1, 22; 28:6, and 11. In these scenarios, the characters who are poor are exemplars of virtue. Therefore, the nature of the frames they inhabit in simulations cannot be compared to those in which poverty is portrayed as a consequence.

We must also consider how wealth and the rich relate in Proverbs. When wealth is a consequence, it is a reward for virtuous actions and character traits (including possible real-world outcome of the wisdom of diligence). As noted in chapter one, however, the rich are never featured for their great virtue in Proverbs. More often than not, the *ʿāšîr* ("rich man") serves as some kind of foil to a character who is described as poor. Consider the following:

The material security of a rich man is opposed to the insecurity of *dallîm* in 10:15.
The many friends a rich man are opposed to neighbors who hate a *rāš* in 14:20.
The forceful speech of a rich man is opposed to the timid speech of a *rāš* in 18:23.
A rich man and a *rāš* are said to meet in 22:2.
A rich man is said to ruler over *rāšîm* in 22:7.
Someone who oppresses a *dal* is said to turn around and give to a rich man in 22:16.
A crooked rich man (emendation) is said to be worse off than a blameless *rāš* in 19:1.
A crooked rich man is said to be worse off than a blameless *rāš* in 28:6.
A rich man who is wise in his own eyes is said to be worse off than a *dal* with understanding in 28:11.

The only time in Proverbs that the *ʿāšîr* ("rich man") is not mentioned in some kind of relation with a poor character is 18:11, where he is portrayed as deluded regarding the security that his wealth affords.

You may recall that I have claimed that what Proverbs says about wealth has *very little* to do with what it says about the rich. This is in contrast to my claim that what Proverbs says about poverty is not at all related to what it says about the poor. I make a different claim regarding "wealth" and "rich" sayings, because the *ʿāšîr* ("rich man") in at least a few cases seems to embody vices that the producers of Proverbs associate with wealth. Specifically, the crookedness of the *ʿāšîr* in 19:1 and 28:6 brings to mind many of the instructions in Proverbs on how not to build wealth (§3.1) and what not to do with wealth (§3.3). I have already connected 18:11 with instructions on how not to think about wealth (§3.5)—namely, as an ultimate source of security. Other connections between portrayals of the rich and instructions on how *not* to relate to wealth are possible. Given these connections and the ways that the *ʿāšîr* seems at times to embody concerns that the producers of Proverbs have regarding how readers relate to wealth, I would not say that wealth and the rich are not at all related in Proverbs. I would, however, say this about poverty and the poor. Simulation and frame theory supports these conclusions.

CHAPTER 7
Conclusion

7.0 Introduction

This study is based on the hypothesis that all learning takes place through simulated mental experience. What I have attempted to do can be summed up, first, as modeling how learning from Proverbs specifically may take place through the simulated mental experiences of readers who think they are personally addressed when they read this book. In addition, I apply that model of learning from Proverbs to material in the book that mentions wealth, poverty, the rich, and the poor.

The two major facets of this study have been an extended consideration of how readers interpret material in Proverbs *broadly speaking* and an extended consideration of how readers interpret material in Proverbs that talks about wealth, poverty, the rich, and the poor *in particular*. More than earlier studies that focus on how Proverbs deals with these themes, the present study focuses greater attention on the pedagogical intent and rhetorical design of material in Proverbs. I have approached these facets of pedagogy in Proverbs from the vantage of how readers who imagine personal implications for themselves when they read Proverbs interpret material in it. My overarching hypothesis has been that the ways readers construe three pragmatic features in Proverbs inform their interpretations. These pragmatic features are the performance (or communicative) context of the book and the nature of both instruction and motivation in the book. Cognitive and pragmatic language processing theories inform how I understand these three pragmatic features in Proverbs. They also inform how I envision readers interpreting the sayings and longer didactic units in the book in light of these pragmatic features.

To begin, readers' understanding of the performance context of the book cues them to imagine that they are addressed and instructed by the producers of Proverbs. This imaginative involvement of readers in the asynchronous communication in which they participate conceptually (and intersubjectively) with the producers serves as the reception end of the performance context of the book. This performance context is what I model using the Basic Communicative Space Network developed by Sweetser and a number of other cognitive linguists (§2.1.3). Each abbreviated form of this model that follows close readings in chapters three to six represents information in the Content Space Network of the larger BCSN elaborated in figure 2.10. In other words, each of these abbreviated models is embedded in the Ground Space Network of the model in figure 2.10.

As noted in chapter two, all language use and understanding is meaning construction. With a conception of the communicative context of Proverbs established in the Ground Space Network of the BCSN model in figure 2.10, the rest of the present study turned to describing the mental work (i.e., meaning construction) that readers perform when they interpret material in Proverbs. In the remainder of chapter two, I demonstrated how readers process both direct and especially indirect instruction in Proverbs (§2.3), and also how different means of motivation function in Proverbs. I see evaluation as the primary means of motivation in Proverbs (§2.4). Then, in chapters three to six, I turned to an extended consideration of how readers interpret material in Proverbs that talks about wealth, poverty, the rich, and the poor *in particular*.

We saw in chapters three to six that the pragmatic inferences readers perform guide meaning construction as much as do the linguistic forms in Proverbs. Readers who imagine personal implications for themselves when they read Proverbs are likely to perform the kind of inferential reasoning that I represent in the summaries throughout chapters three to six. The

inferential reasoning summaries track the instructional frames (i.e., the directives) in which wealth, poverty, the rich, and the poor are featured in both instructions and motivations (centrally and as supporting features)—e.g., *be righteous, do not be proud, build wealth honestly, give wealth to those who need it, do not ignore the poor, do not commit adultery*. The specific uses of wealth, poverty, the rich, and the poor within each of these instructional frames must be differentiated. As I explain in §1.4, we need to make a number of distinctions as we approach this material. Specifically, we must distinguish between:

- material that talks explicitly about wealth and/or poverty and material that talks about the rich and/or the poor;
- material in which these themes are used as the focus of instructions, central features of motivation, or as supporting features in instructions or motivations; and
- material that is characterized by different instructional frames.

These distinctions are premised upon the idea that readers imagine personal implications for themselves when they read Proverbs. Readers who imagine they are being addressed and instructed by the producers of Proverbs when they read this book are cued to perform Reader in the Scene blends. In performing these blends, readers imagine themselves interacting with wealth, poverty, the rich, and the poor in different ways. The different ways they imagine interacting with these entities in viewpointed simulations depends on the instructional frame of a didactic unit. Critically, I argue that the relations that readers imagine between themselves and these entities in simulations should serve as the basis for distinctions that analysts use in determining what Proverbs says about wealth, poverty, the rich, and the poor.

What I ultimately suggest is that the personal implications of material in Proverbs undermine the conflations that scholars perform (§1.2). These conflations have often led to the conclusion that Proverbs is inconsistent and incoherent when it comes to wealth, poverty, the

rich, and the poor (§1.1). Information gleaned from the simulation summaries in chapters three to six militates against these conflations. In the simulation summaries, I track two features of simulations in the causal reasoning spaces of interpretations: the role and viewpoint of readers and also the relation between readers and wealth, poverty, the rich, and the poor. I focus on the contents of causal reasoning spaces because they represent the contents in Reader in the Scene blends. It is in the causal reasoning spaces, in other words, that analysts can imagine how readers might work out the personal implications of what they read in Proverbs. Therefore, it is also in these spaces where we can see how readers imagine themselves interacting (in viewpointed ways) with wealth, poverty, the rich, and the poor (or not interacting with these entities) as they interpret material in Proverbs.

The interactions with these entities that readers imagine depend specifically on two features of instructional frames: 1) the nature of the instruction in a didactic unit, and 2) the role that wealth, poverty, the rich, or the poor play in the instruction and/or the motivation of a didactic unit. These features of interpretations are largely uniform within different subsections in each chapter and at times within whole chapters. Consider the following.

- In chapter three, all the directives directly involve wealth and/or poverty. Therefore, the role and viewpoint of readers in causal reasoning space simulations also relate directly to wealth and/or poverty. In addition, when the instructional frame concerns diligence and not being diligent, the relations that readers simulate between themselves and wealth or poverty represent natural outcomes that could occur in the real world.
- In chapter four, none of the directives have to do with wealth or poverty. Therefore, the role and viewpoint of readers in causal reasoning space simulations do not relate in any way to wealth or poverty. They all involve readers choosing to pursue specific virtues and avoid certain vices. In addition, the relations that readers simulate between themselves and wealth or poverty in these scenarios do not represent natural outcomes.
- In chapter five, a few directives may directly involve wealth (10:16; 14:4; 19:14) and two may involve the poor (14:4; 28:21). Therefore, only in simulations in causal

reasoning spaces of interpretations of *these* sayings in this section would the role and viewpoint of readers relate to wealth and poverty. The relations that readers simulate between themselves and wealth or poverty in the rest of the material in this chapter are all otherwise indirect. Wealth and poverty serve as different types of support for both instructions and motivations in the material in this chapter. In support of motivations, they characterize the objects of instructions as highly valuable (§5.1), highly inappropriate (§5.2.2), needful (§5.2.3; §5.2.4), or not as valuable as something else (§5.3). And in support of instructions, they serve adverbial functions (§5.1.2; §5.1.3), or they frame metonymically activate a scenario *in* which an instruction obtains (§5.2) or *to* which an instruction obtains (§5.3).

- In chapter six, the directives in §6.1 and §6.3 all directly involve the poor, and some involve the rich. The directives in §6.2 involve neither. The rich and the poor are used as motivational components in §6.2. Therefore, the role and viewpoint of readers in causal reasoning space simulations relate directly to the poor in §6.1 and §6.3 but not in §6.2. Therefore, the relations that readers simulate between themselves and the poor are direct in §6.1 and §6.3 and indirect in §6.2.

Breaking down the motivational use of, and instructional focus on, wealth, poverty, the rich, and the poor according to viewpointed reader simulations demonstrates that instructions in Proverbs that talk about poverty cannot be related to instructions in Proverbs that talk about the poor. We also see that what Proverbs says about the rich has little (but not nothing) to do with the rich. In sum, we need differentiated notions of each of these themes. I show this in chapters three to six.

Contrary to methods in previous studies, I have argued that rather than conflate the meaning of pragmatically unrelated uses of wealth, poverty, the rich, and the poor, analysts must locate the instructional focus on, and motivational use of, these themes within specific instructional frames. Only on the basis of mappings between frames can analysts determine with clarity and precision what can be related to what. There are many instructional frames in which wealth, poverty, the rich, and the poor are elements. Wisdom consists in knowing which instruction is appropriate in which situation. Therefore, we can also say that identifying the pragmatic purpose of material in Proverbs is a critical part of the wisdom process.

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