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THE DAILY CARDINAL

University of Wisconsin at Madison  
Tuesday, January 26 Special Edition

This issue is put out under the auspices of the Daily Cardinal with the sponsorship of the Wisconsin Student Association by a group of concerned students in anticipation of the upcoming visit by United States deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Gen. Daniel "Chappie" James.

**Lest we forget...**


**OPPOSE THE WAR, Jan. 27**

**Assemble Library Mall 12 noon**

**Speakers:**

**Rennie Davis, Linda Evans**

**John Froines**



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O VIETNAM VIETNAM  
PLEASE LISTEN TO  
THE LAST WORDS  
OF ONE WHO LOVES  
VIETNAM. / I AM ON  
THE SIDE OF MY  
FOREFATHERS OF  
REVOLUTION, OF THE  
YOUNG GENERATION,  
OF ALL THOSE WHO  
SUFFER: ORPHANS, WIDOWS,  
THE INJURED, AND EXILED.  
I AM THE FATHERLAND; I CRY  
BECAUSE OF THE SHEDDING OF  
BLOOD OF BOTH INNOCENTS AND  
WICKED. / O VIETNAM, VIETNAM.  
WHY THIS HATRED AMONG MEN? WHY  
THIS KILLING OF ONE ANOTHER? WHO  
WILL BE DEFEATED? WHO WILL BE  
THE WINNER? / O PLEASE REMOVE  
ALL LABELS, WE ALL ARE VIET-  
NAMESE, WE ARE ALL VIETNAMESE / LET US TAKE  
EACH OTHER'S HAND TO PROTECT THE FA-  
ATHERLAND. / O VIETNAM, VIETNAM!  
THE ONE WHO BURNS HERSELF  
FOR PEACE.  
PHUN THU  
MOI

# urbanization and the war



## Is this the enemy?

Bud Antle is one of the only growers of lettuce in the Salinas valley not to have signed a contract with the United Farmworkers. Antle ships \$22 million worth of lettuce a year, receives almost one million in government subsidy, and sells U.S. Military outfits 60% of its produce. When the Pentagon found out about the lettuce strike, it doubled its consumption of non-union lettuce, thus following a pattern it had established during the grape strike. (Guardian, Nov. 7, 1970, p. 16)

\* \* \*

Seymour Hersh, who won the Pulitzer prize for his exposure of the My Lai incident says that the level of conspiracy is much greater than has been publicized. "Fourteen Army agencies received official reports of the massacre and at least 800 people were aware of it with no action taken for a number of months." (Cap. Times, Nov. 6, 1970, p. 21)

\* \* \*

Daniel also questioned Meadlo about the babies who were shot at My Lai.

"You were afraid they would attack you?"

"Yes, I was," Meadlo replied.

"Babies?"

"Well they might have been fully loaded with grenades." (Cap. Times, Jan 12, p. 4)

\* \* \*

Sergeant Gene Tingley usually got to the orderly room shortly before 6 a.m. to relieve the night sergeant. That morning he overslept. At 6:03 five pounds of plastic explosives blew the headquarters building apart. "It took me until about noon to figure out they were out to get me," Tingley said. "Then it was kinda shocking." Tingley first Sergeant of Headquarters Co., 14th Engineers, was the target of "fragging"—an attack by a GI using a fragmentation grenade against another American, usually his sergeant or an officer. (Cap. Times, Jan. 9, p. 5)

\* \* \*

When asked why he didn't tell the Senate Foreign Relations Committee about Rocket attacks in the vicinity of Hanoi, Laird replied, "I only answer questions that are asked." (Progressive Magazine, Jan. 71, p. 3)

\* \* \*

A former army officer said yesterday that Army Intelligence personnel had spied on student political groups on college campuses in New York City and on Welfare mothers demonstrating at City Hall. He said men were assigned to spy on student activities at Columbia, NYU, Fordham, and City College. Ralph M. Stein of Flushing, Queens said that when he was a sergeant in Army Intelligence in Washington, D.C. in 1967 he helped organize a "left-wing" desk at the Pentagon and that hundreds of people were put under surveillance. He said they included some folksingers, actress Jane Fonda, Rev. Ralph David Abernathy, and others.

\* \* \*

"I came to realize that the Army's nothing but a Frankenstein monster, and I was a little part of it." Lt. William Calley, (Esquire, Feb. 71, 114)

\* \* \*

The sharp decline of ROTC for the second straight year is causing concern among military planners over the future ability of ROTC to turn out enough officers. According to new figures compiled by the Pentagon for release, enrollment in Army, Air Force, and Navy ROTC at 502 schools during the current academic year dropped to 109,598. This compares with 155,946 in 1969 and 212,717 in 1968. The latest Pentagon figures show enrollment in the program down 33% for the Army; 24% for the Air Force, and 14% for the Navy. Of more marked significance is the large decrease of freshmen and sophomores now signing up, raising doubts as to whether there will be any officers graduating in two or three years. (N.Y. Times, Dec. 3, 1970, p. 14)

Ever since the success of the Chinese revolution in 1949, one agony of "official" United States policy has been the failure to discover tactics capable of countering rural based guerilla movements.

The greatest strength of revolutionary forces has proved to be their immunity to conventional military warfare. This has been repeatedly proven by Chinese resistance to Japanese invasion, Viet Minh defeat of French colonial powers, and the extended involvement of the United States in Viet Nam.

With this realization, counterinsurgency experts such as Sir Robert Thompson urged that emphasis be placed on "positive goals" of political stability instead of expansion of unsuccessful military ventures. This advice has been the basis of "pacification" programs aimed at creating viable political structures capable of rivaling the "infrastructures" of the Viet Cong. But pacification has failed to yield the intended results. Samuel Huntington of Harvard's political science department who also serves as a major consultant to the defense department has concluded that the territory controllable under pacification is about equal to what is uncontrollable.

An unanticipated by-product of the conventional war is now becoming a crucial aspect of American policy. Huntington maintains that the war is not to be measured in terms of loyalty to the government, nor the amount of land "pacified", but by the percentage of the population "under government control".

In 1960 the population was primarily under Viet Cong control because 85% of the population resided in the countryside. But drastic population shifts have resulted from the war waged in the countryside. More than 40 per cent of South Vietnam's population now resides in the cities. The cities have quadrupled in size. In 1962, the population of Saigon was approximately 1.4 million. It is now over the four million mark. The in-

creases in smaller cities is even greater. South Vietnam is now more of an urban nation than Sweden, Canada, Poland, or Austria. As a result of these massive population movements, the population under government "control" from 1965 to 1968 rose from 40 to 60 per cent.

Not all of the population movement has been voluntary. Over two million of the total increase of people in urban areas have been forcefully moved through "refugee" camps. It has been largely ignored that such methods are in clear violation of war crimes as defined in Nuremberg Principle VI. Nor is their new urban environment an example of modern city planning.

Massive slums have spontaneously arisen on the edge of old city boundaries. Lack of health standards or sanitary facilities is prevalent. Unemployment is extraordinary and those who do find work are usually connected to the now withdrawing military. Labor is cheap to the satisfaction of corporations who find foreign investment profitable in Viet Nam.

While this situation precludes hope for the millions of culturally dislocated Vietnamese, official advisers see it as the basis of successful counter tactics against the rural guerillas. Professor Huntington maintains that "if direct application of mechanical and conventional power takes place on such a massive scale as to produce massive migration from the countryside to the city, the basic assumptions underlying the Maoist doctrine of revolutionary war no longer operate. The Maoist inspired rural revolution is undercut by the American sponsored urban revolution." So if the war in Vietnam is based on population control, and people cannot be controlled while they inhabit their traditional villages, bomb them into the cities.

In obvious objection to such a strategy it is often asked why the Viet Cong cannot come to the cities too and regain their support. Herman Kahn of the Hudson Institute

argues that they have already tried and failed. While the Tet offensive was scored as a psychological victory for the communists, it proved that government forces could successfully respond and drive the attackers from the cities. In anticipation of more attempts of this kind as well as potential urban riots, Kahn urges the build up of a strong and massive police force.

But the most obvious question is ignored by these advisors. Doesn't forced and accelerated urbanization create the classical communist situation in which labor centers serve as the foundation for the socialist revolution? The only response that is ever given is that this is a "second generation" problem.

The Nixon policy of Vietnamization is now placed into perspective. Conventional ground forces are not only a source of domestic turmoil, but they are also ineffective in directing forced urbanization. The main mission must be carried out through the penetration of the countryside with defoliants and bombs. When we consider that 80 per cent of the bombing missions originate in Thailand, we can see that the large numbers of troops attest to the fact that the bombing is to compensate for their removal.

Vietnamization does not mark the end of the American war on the Vietnamese people. It merely indicates that new tactics have been adopted aimed at the same destruction of communist influence in South Vietnam. The policy makers in Washington are obviously elated at the fact that they have discovered a tactic which is not overtly repugnant to the American public. The illusion of the fast approaching end of the war will protect the politicians while the "residue force" pounds away as maliciously as before at the aspirations and independence of the Vietnamese people. Thus the real questions of morality, legality, legitimacy, and aims of American Foreign policy are obscured in the new war phase of forced urbanization.

## on vietnamese life

Susan Sontag, in an essay on her trip to Hanoi, wonders at the seeming simplicity and single-mindedness of purpose exemplified by the Vietnamese. Further describing the Vietnamese way of life, she concludes that their struggle utilizes these qualities in the form of ingenuity and devotion. Her passages quoted here from her book "Styles of Radical Will" show that it isn't immaturity but knowledge that make the Vietnamese unfamiliar with our kind of existence:

The war has democratized the society by destroying most of the modest physical means as well as restricting the social space Vietnam had at its disposal for differentiated kinds of production (I include everything from industry to the arts.) Thus, more and more people are working at all kinds of activities at the same level—with their bare hands.

Each small, low building in the complexes of evacuated schools that have been set up throughout the countryside had to be made in the simplest way: mud walls and a straw roof. All those kilometers of neat trenches connecting and leading away from every building, to get the children out in case of attack, had to be painstakingly dug out of the red clay . . . Late one night we visited a decentralized factory housed in crude sheds at the foot of a mountain. While several hundred women and young boys were operating the machines by the light of kerosene lamps, a dozen men using only hammers were widening the walls of a small adjacent cave to make a shelter safe from bombing for the biggest machinery.

Almost everything in North Vietnam has to be done manually, with a minimum of tools . . . The country is pitifully lacking in such elementary hospital equipment as sterilizers and X-ray machines, in typewriters, in basic tools like lathes and welding machines; there seem to be plenty of bicycles and quite a few transistor radios, but books, paper, pens, phonographs, clocks and cameras are very scarce; the most modest consumer goods are virtually nonexistent.

A Vietnamese is lucky if he owns two sets of clothes and one pair of shoes; rationing allows each person six meters of cotton fabric a year . . . Even the clothes of very high officials are frayed, dully stained, shiny from repeated washings . . . Food is very short, too, though no one starves. In-

dustry workers get a monthly ration of 24 kilos of rice; everyone else, including the highest government officials, gets 13.5 kilos a month.

Lacking almost everything, the Vietnamese are forced to put everything they do have to use, sometimes multiple use. Part of this ingenuity is traditional; for example the Vietnamese make an astonishing number of things out of bamboo . . . But there are many new inventions. Thus, American



planes have become virtual mines in the sky . . . Each plane that's shot down is methodically taken apart. The tires are cut up to make the rubber sandals that most people wear. Any component of the engine that's still intact is modified to be reused as part of a truck motor. The body of the plane is dismantled, and then melted down to be made into tools, small machine parts, surgical instruments, wire, spokes for bicycle wheels . . . Every last nut, bolt, and screw from the plane is used.

The same holds for anything else the Americans drop. In several hamlets we visited, the bell hanging from a tree which summoned people to meetings or sounded the air-raid alert was the casing of an unexploded bomb. Being shown through the infirmary of a Thai hamlet, we saw that the protective canopy of the operating room, relocated in a rock grotto, was a flare parachute . . .

Indeed, one of the most striking aspects of

Vietnam is the positiveness of their approach to almost any problem. Among the advantages . . . in having been forced to evacuate the colleges of Hanoi into the countryside were that the college students had to put up their new school buildings themselves and learn how to grow their own food (every evacuated school or factory forms a new community and is asked not to be parasitic on the nearest village but to become self-sufficient on the level of a subsistence economy.) Through these ordeals, "a new man" is being formed. Somehow, incredibly, the Vietnamese appreciate the assets of their situation, particularly its effect on character . . .

In these circumstances, the notion of a "people's war" is no mere propagandistic slogan but takes on a real concreteness, as does that favorite hope of modern social planners, decentralization. A people's war means the total, voluntary, generous mobilization of every ablebodied person in the country, so that everyone is available for any task. It also means the division of the country into an indefinite number of small, self-sufficient communities which can survive isolation, make decisions, and continue contributing to production. People on a local level are expected, for instance, to solve any kind of problem put to them as the aftermath of enemy bombing.

To observe in some of its day-to-day functioning a society based on the principle of total use is particularly impressive to someone who comes from a society based on maximal waste. An unholy dialectic is at work here, in which the big wasteful society dumps its garbage, its partly unemployable proletarian conscripts, its poisons, and its bombs upon a small, virtually defenseless, frugal society whose citizens, those fortunate enough to survive, then go about picking up the debris, out of which they fashion materials for daily use and self-defense . . .

It was my impression that the Vietnamese, as a culture, genuinely believe that life is simple. They also believe, incredible as it may seem considering their present situation, that life is full of joy. Joy is to be discerned behind what is already so remarkable: the ease and total lack of self-pity with which people worked a back-breaking number of hours, or daily faced the possibility of their own death and the death of those they love.

# asia and counter-revolution

by harvey goldberg

The war which the United States government is waging against the peoples of Indo-China is clearly counter-revolutionary; it is the centerpiece of a strategy which defines the world as the province of American power and the client of its production. In its defense our policy-makers have sunk to depths of deception. "If, when the chips are down," intoned the President in April 1970 as troops moved into Cambodia, "The United States acts like a pitiful, helpless giant, the forces of totalitarianism and anarchy will threaten free nations and free institutions throughout the world."

Only in rare moments of candor have these policy-makers revealed their ultimate purposes. "In the past," admitted the Vice-President for Far Eastern Operations of the Chase Manhattan Bank in 1965, once the bombing of North Vietnam had significantly escalated the war "foreign investors have been somewhat wary of the overall political prospect for the region. I must say though that the U.S. actions in Vietnam this year have considerably reassured both Asian and Western investors. In fact, I see some reason for hope that the same sort of economic growth may take place in the free economies of Asia that took place in Europe after the Truman Doctrine." No obstacle, then, to that century-old mission of expansion, save the revolutionary resistance of its victims; in launching their war in Vietnam, American policy-makers, already sobered by the "loss" of China, thought to kill off one revolution and inhibit others.

But the struggle of the Indo-Chinese peoples has been no ordinary one; longer and deeper than most, it has yielded neither to superior force nor limitless suffering. Scarcely had France reduced the peninsula in 1885 than the Vietnamese organized their resistance to Western imperialism, a movement for independence which began under the leadership of their old elites but culminated in the revolutionary struggle of the nation. With the capitulation of Japan in August 1945, the Viet-Minh fused a popular insurrection which led, on September 2, 1945, to the proclamation of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Less than fifteen months later, the French government, economically and ideologically supported by American policy-makers, unleashed a war to destroy that independence and restore colonialism; for eight years Vietnamese forces resisted the French army until, in the spring of 1954, they defeated it decisively in the historic battle of Dien Bien Phu. The lessons of that defeat—the power of guerilla warfare; the futility of "pacifying" occupied zones; the im-

possibility of building mass support for puppet governments—might have restrained American policy-makers; but too much was at stake, nothing less than the strategy of expansion.

"We can't put down our arms," Vice-President Nixon warned in July 1953, "until victory is certain." Even as the French faced certain defeat in 1954, American officials proposed to intervene directly on their side; even before the French sat down to negotiate at Geneva, those same officials set out to organize a military coalition (by September 1954, it would emerge at SEATO) which should undermine the compromise reached at Geneva. For the terms of the Geneva Accords—the military neutrality of Indochina, the ultimate reunification of Vietnam, free elections in that country no later than 1956—American policy-makers had persistent and arrogant contempt; hardly had peace come to an exhausted Vietnam than they embarked on that long and disastrous effort to establish their dominion over the South: to impose Ngo-dinh Diem, an early CIA "find", as Prime Minister; to surround him with American "advisors"; to militarize the country; to penetrate it economically and ideologically.

But that strategy founded on the hard rock of the South Vietnamese resistance; neither the brutal repression of Diem's government nor the increasing volume of American military aid could contain a movement nurtured by a long revolutionary tradition and a formidable national will. With the formation of the National Liberation Front in December 1960, dedicated to the integrity and unity of Vietnam, the resistance turned into a full-scale national war, in the villages and the cities, among young and old; by November 1963, in the wake of a great Buddhist revolt, his American protectors scuttled Diem, installed other puppets, and took over the war. Over the Vietnamese, who would see their environment and culture poisoned, their villages burned, their children maimed; over the Laotians and Cambodians, who would suffer endless bombardment and open intervention; over Americans, who would suffer the burden of their impotence and ignorance, a long and terrible night would fall.

The systematic air strikes against the People's Republic of North Vietnam, that deliberate escalation of the war for which American decision-makers opted in February 1965, reflected their will to crush

the near-victorious liberation movement in the South and to dismantle the painfully-built socialist society in the North. "By the beginning of 1965," we read in senator Mansfield's report a year later, "the military situation had become desperate." The collapse of the "special war"; eighty thousand desertions from the Saigon army in 1964 alone; the great NLF victory of Binh-gia at the end of the year. For our decision-makers a global strategy hung in the balance. They would, so they said, honor their treaty commitments to the "democratic" government of Saigon (Diem? Dy? Thieu?) and turn back Hanoi's aggression into the South (230,000 NLF troops at the end of 1965, according to the Mansfield report, and 14,000 from the North!) and behind that veil of mystification, they ground out their purposes: to perfect the technology of warfare; to rationalize the tactics of terror; and to control that Asiatic base, even if reduced to a wasteland, against all revolutionary comers.

From the escalation of 1965 their commitment to a military reduction of Vietnam seemed unabated: one billion dollars a month expended on the enterprise; 500,000 American troops on the scene; 100,000 tons of bombs dropped each month; 700,000 troops in the Saigon army. Something had to give. But not the Vietnamese resistance, which has held against "free fire" and "free strike" zones, against defoliants and napalm, against attrition at home and the cruel intransigence of American diplomacy in Paris. What cracked, so very late in our national experience, were the credulity and patience of Americans, enough of them to mount an anti-war movement, divide public opinion, and challenge the decision-makers; enough of them to bring war, patriotism, and American expansion into question; enough of them to wrench a few deceptive but meaningless victories: the retirement of Johnson, the "Vietnamization" of the war, the gradual substitution of paid mercenaries for American combat troops; but not enough of them, not yet, to end the war, alter America's global strategy, or unseat its beneficiaries.

To the Vietnamese, whose resistance spoiled the game and opened our eyes; to the Khmer revolutionaries and the Laotian-Patriotic Front whose suffering and struggle are the stuff of revolution, we owe an incalculable debt: one which we can repay only by resuming our own struggle, broadening its base, widening its perspectives. So that we can save the Indo-Chinese peoples who can't resist forever; and in the process, save ourselves.

## life in their army

The following is an excerpt about the National Liberation Front (NLF) taken from Wilfred Burchett's book *Vietnam Will Win*:

Thuong Chien, the regiment's political officer, explained that in discussions before an operation, commanders and men were on absolutely equal footing; that as long as any rank and file soldier raised any objection to an operational plan, discussion must continue until he was satisfied.

During the operation discipline was total, the rank and file were expected to carry out allotted tasks and execute every command of their superiors without fail. But after the action was over, commanders and men were back on the same equal basis, in the critical summing-up sessions which followed each operation.

"In that way we combine democracy with leadership," Thuong Chien said, and he went on to outline some basic precepts of the Liberation Army.

"Commanders and rank and file are of the same social and class origin, mainly peasant. We are united by hatred of the oppressors and foreign aggressors. We live, study, and fight together. Morale is high primarily because of the complete democracy within our armed forces."

"You have seen part of a typical pre-operational discussion. Often it is only after long complex discussions that unity of views is achieved. In this way the rank and file know that nothing is being imposed from above, that every suggestion to avoid losses while keeping the main aim in view is welcomed. The command has the benefit of the ideas of the whole collective."

"Such discussions are a concrete expression of courage and intelligence. For every action that we plan, similar discussions take place at which every phase of the projected operation is analyzed—the preparation, the actual attack, the results."

"From such critical summing up meetings we draw conclusions for the next action. Everyone takes part and this produces the best results in line with an old Vietnamese saying: Three idiots make one wise man."

## Is this the enemy? peace plan

The Vietnamese have long hoped that the United States would acknowledge the principles of self-determination and equality of nations and the independence of Vietnam. They have often been disappointed. On September 17, 1970 Madame Nguyen Thi Binh, acting chief of the NLF delegation delivered the 8 point peace plan issued by the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam.

Meanwhile, communications between the Saigon Student Union, the North Vietnamese Student Association, and certain American student groups, including the National Student Association, produced the idea of American students negotiating a proposed 'People's Peace Treaty directly with Vietnamese students. Last month, in Hanoi and then in Paris, the negotiations produced the following 9 point treaty, based essentially on Madame Binh's peace plan.

Be it known that the American and Vietnamese people are not enemies. The war is carried out in the names of the people of the United States and South Vietnam but without our consent. It destroys the land and people of Vietnam. It drains America of its resources, its youth and its honor.

We hereby agree to end the war on the following terms, so that both peoples can live under the joy of independence and can devote themselves to building a society based on human equality and respect for the earth.

1. The Americans agree to immediate and total withdrawal from Vietnam and publicly to set the date by which all American forces will be removed.

The Vietnamese pledge that as soon as the U.S. Government publicly sets a date for total withdrawal:

2. They will enter discussions to secure the release of all American prisoners, including pilots captured while bombing North Vietnam.

3. There will be an immediate cease-fire between U.S. forces and those led by the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam.

4. They will enter discussions of the procedures to guarantee the safety of all withdrawing troops.

5. The Americans pledge to end the imposition of Thieu-Ky-Khiem on the people of South Vietnam in order to insure their right to self-determination and so that all political prisoners can be released.

6. The Vietnamese pledge to form a provisional coalition government to organize democratic elections. All parties agree to respect the results of elections in which all South Vietnamese can participate freely without the presence of any foreign troops.

7. The South Vietnamese pledge to enter discussion of procedures to guarantee the safety and political freedom of those South Vietnamese who have collaborated with the U.S. or with the U.S.-supported regime.

8. The Americans and Vietnamese agree to respect the independence, peace and neutrality of Laos and Cambodia in accord with the 1954 and 1962 Geneva conventions and not to interfere in the internal affairs of these two countries.

9. Upon these points of agreement, we pledge to end the war and resolve all other questions in the spirit of self-determination and mutual respect for the independence and political freedom of the people of Vietnam and the United States.

By ratifying the agreement, we pledge to take whatever actions are appropriate to implement the terms of this joint Treaty and to insure its acceptance by the government of the United States.



# prisoners of war



## Is this the enemy?

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On November 21, '70 President Nixon launched an abortive commando attack on what he said he thought was a North Vietnamese prison camp, killing some twenty-five North Vietnamese and capturing a few others. At the same time he ordered U.S. war planes to bomb throughout North Vietnam.

These dual attacks occurred after eighteen months of what critics have labeled a "campaign to arouse American public opinion" about the prisoner of war issue and to divert our attention from the fighting and killing and bombing that are still continuing throughout Southeast Asia. Since March of '69 officials in the Nixon administration have been attacking the North Vietnamese for their treatment of captured Americans. The critics say that Nixon is singling out, exaggerating and distorting the POW issue to revive sagging emotional support for the war.

The attacks on North Vietnam have accused them of not complying with the Geneva Convention's requirements about treatment of prisoners during times of war which specify regular correspondence be allowed between prisoners and their relatives; that a complete list of prisoners be published; that prisoners are not to be kept in solitary confinement; and that inspection of the camps by any official neutral body be permitted.

At the same time that the U.S. uses the Geneva accords as a criterion to criticize North Vietnam's actions towards prisoners in this undeclared war, the U.S. is using anti-personnel weapons also outlawed by the Geneva accord. The validity of the U.S. charges against North Vietnam has been questioned because of this inconsistency, as well as on the grounds that the truth of the charges themselves is not certain.

It is true that for a long time the North Vietnamese did not permit regular correspondence between prisoners and relatives but since December of '69, they have permitted it. Before Christmas of '69 the North Vietnamese announced their intention to deliver Christmas packages mailed to the prisoners and had arranged for the families to send them through Moscow.

After this announcement, H. Ross Perot, a Texas billionaire spent \$600,000 to send a jet filled with seventy-five tons of food stuffs and medical supplies around the world for the stated purpose of persuading the North Vietnamese to receive the plane in Hanoi and distribute the supplies to prisoners as Christmas presents.

For several months before the commando raid at the Sontay prisoner of war camp the North Vietnamese were releasing the names of more and more men who are held in North Vietnam and were responding to specific inquiries about whether missing men are held in prison camps. Later in '69 a group of

anti-war activists established the Committee of Liaison with families of servicemen detained in North Vietnam. The North Vietnamese regularly respond to their requests about the status of specific men. And on November 26, five days after the raid at Sontay, the North Vietnamese answered requests by the Swedish government for information about 203 men.

It is true that the North Vietnamese keep pilots in solitary confinement, but certainly that practice is not unique to the North Vietnamese.

Prisoner of War Camps in South Vietnam are inspected by the International Committee of the Red Cross and the North Vietnamese do not allow this. They do not view that body as neutral. It is composed of Swiss nationals which have much better relations with the U.S. than with Vietnam. Also, since the Red Cross originally came with the colonizing missions of the West it is still regarded with great mistrust in the former colonies.

A more important reason that the North Vietnamese do not allow inspection is because they fear the United States learning the exact location of the prison camps. They

hot hut, for violating prison rules. Frishman also said the North Vietnamese had neglected persons who needed medical attention and had kept man prisoners in solitary confinement.

Recently, Joe V. Carpenter and Norris M. Overly of the Air Force have told their stories, almost three years after their release from North Vietnam. Their stories are without the horrors of Frishman and Hegdahl.

In order to see the criticism of the North Vietnamese in perspective we should cite some comparisons. Just before the commando raid the North Vietnamese revealed that 17 men out of 356 had died during captivity. This is low compared to the death rate in World War II when 27% of the soldiers in Japanese prisoner of war camps died during captivity.

The Department of Defense has classified as "confidential" the number of prisoners who have died in the Saigon-run POW camps. But in an article that appeared in St. Louis Post Dispatch on Dec. 6 '70, Richard Dudman reported that the figure is in fact over 800. There have been regular reports of such deaths, some as a result of "accidental" shootings by prison guards. Americans who have returned from Vietnam also constantly report episodes of brutality toward Viet Cong and North Vietnamese soldiers both during and after capture, in which torture before they are delivered to the formal prisoner of war camps is commonplace.

The International Committee of the Red Cross reported a year ago that seven North Vietnamese prisoners were transferred from the formal POW camps to the tiger cages in the prison on Con Son Island because they refused to salute the flag of South Vietnam.

believe that the Air Force and the Navy would then feel free to begin a saturation bombing campaign in all other parts of the country, not to mention more commando raids on the camps themselves.

The issue of brutality is obviously a volatile one. In August '69 three prisoners were freed by North Vietnam. When they met with the press just after leaving North Vietnam they said their food, housing and medical treatment had been adequate and they assured relatives of the Americans left behind in the North Vietnamese camps they had no cause to worry.

A month later, however, when the government presented two of them at an elaborate press conference, they had changed their story, and made serious accusations involving torture and physical abuse.

Navy Lieutenant Robert F. Frishman and Apprentice Seaman Douglas B. Hegdahl charged that the North Vietnamese had tortured certain prisoners by pulling out fingernails or tying their hands to the ceilings. Lieutenant Frishman claimed he was forced to sit in a stool in an unbearably

Last spring Nixon named Sunday, May 3, '70—a day that followed by three days his invasion of Cambodia and preceded by one day the killing of four students at Kent State—a national day of prayer for American prisoners in North Vietnam. As Nixon speaks of "Vietnamization" and a "solution to the war" critics wonder whether his continued emphasis on the prisoner of war issue is not again serving as a pretext for yet another expansion of the war.

## Oppose the War



The war goes on . . . the rally goes on!

Melvin Laird has been frightened away by the massive demonstration planned for Wednesday. Apparently the thought of several thousand angry students protesting while Melvin ate Salisbury steak gave him premature indigestion. In his place, he is sending deputy assistant secretary of war Gen. Daniel "Chappie" James.

But Laird's refusal to come does not change the reasons for which the rally was called. In light of current events in Cambodia, the danger of a new escalation increases hourly.

Laird himself is only a symbol of the military machine. If the anti-war movement does nothing more than reactively demonstrate against a symbol, it loses any dynamism it might have and is placed at the mercy of Nixon's whim.

For this campus, Wednesday's rally takes on added significance. Its success becomes a measure of the strength and vitality of a movement that has been dormant for five months. If we stop now, Laird's refusal to confront us will be a hollow victory.

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