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


1943

Volume III

THE BRITISH
COMMONWEALTH
EASTERN EUROPE
THE FAR EAST

Department of State
Washington



Foreign Relations
of the
United States
Diplomatic Papers
1943

Volume III

The British Commonwealth
Eastern Europe
The Far East



United States
Government Printing Office
Washington : 1963

DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 7601

HISTORICAL OFFICE
BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

For sale by the
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Washington, D.C., 20402 - Price \$3.50 (Buckram)

PREFACE

The principles which guide the compilation and editing of *Foreign Relations* are stated in Department of State Regulation 1350 of June 15, 1961, a revision of the order approved on March 26, 1925, by Mr. Frank B. Kellogg, then Secretary of State. The text of the current regulation is printed below:

1350 DOCUMENTARY RECORD OF AMERICAN DIPLOMACY

1351 *Scope of Documentation*

The publication *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers*, constitutes the official record of the foreign policy of the United States. These volumes include, subject to necessary security considerations, all documents needed to give a comprehensive record of the major foreign policy decisions within the range of the Department of State's responsibilities, together with appropriate materials concerning the facts which contributed to the formulation of policies. When further material is needed to supplement the documentation in the Department's files for a proper understanding of the relevant policies of the United States, such papers should be obtained from other Government agencies.

1352 *Editorial Preparation*

The basic documentary diplomatic record to be printed in *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers*, shall be edited by the Historical Office, Bureau of Public Affairs of the Department of State. The editing of the record shall be guided by the principles of historical objectivity. There shall be no alteration of the text, no deletions without indicating where in the text the deletion is made, and no omission of facts which were of major importance in reaching a decision. Nothing shall be omitted for the purpose of concealing or glossing over what might be regarded by some as a defect of policy. However, certain omissions of documents are permissible for the following reasons:

- a. To avoid publication of matters which would tend to impede current diplomatic negotiations or other business.
- b. To condense the record and avoid repetition of needless details.
- c. To preserve the confidence reposed in the Department by individuals and by foreign governments.
- d. To avoid giving needless offense to other nationalities or individuals.
- e. To eliminate personal opinions presented in despatches and not acted upon by the Department. To this consideration there is one qualification—in connection with major decisions it is desirable, where possible, to show the alternatives presented to the Department before the decision was made.

1353 *Clearance*

To obtain appropriate clearances of material to be published in *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers*, the Historical Office shall:

- a. Refer to the appropriate policy offices of the Department and of other agencies of the Government such papers as appear to require policy clearance.
- b. Refer to the appropriate foreign governments requests for permission to print as part of the diplomatic correspondence of the United States those previously unpublished documents which were originated by the foreign governments.

The responsibilities of the Historical Office, Bureau of Public Affairs, for the preparation of this *Foreign Relations* volume were entrusted, under the general supervision of the Director of the Office, William M. Franklin, to the Foreign Relations Division under the direction of the Chief of that Division (Editor of *Foreign Relations*), E. R. Perkins. The compilers of *Foreign Relations*, 1943, Volume III, were N. O. Sappington, Ralph R. Goodwin, and John P. Glennon for the British Commonwealth, Rogers P. Churchill and William K. Medlin, a former staff member, for Eastern Europe, and John G. Reid and Herbert A. Fine for the Far East.

The Division of Publishing Services is responsible with respect to *Foreign Relations* for the editing of copy, proofreading, and preparation of indexes. Under the general direction of the Chief of the Division, Jerome H. Perlmutter, the editorial functions mentioned above are performed by the Foreign Relations Section in charge of Elizabeth A. Vary, Chief, and Ouida J. Ward, Assistant Chief.

For 1943, the arrangement of volumes is as follows: Volume I, General; Volume II, Europe; Volume III, The British Commonwealth, Eastern Europe, the Far East; Volume IV, The Near East and Africa; Volumes V and VI, The American Republics. The *Foreign Relations* series for 1943 also includes the unnumbered volume on 1943, China, and that on the Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, already published. Documentation on the Casablanca, Third Washington, and First Quebec Conferences, held in 1943, is scheduled for publication in subsequent volumes of *Foreign Relations*.

E. R. PERKINS

Editor of Foreign Relations

JULY 2, 1963.

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THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS
UNITED KINGDOM

VISIT OF BRITISH FOREIGN SECRETARY ANTHONY EDEN IN
WASHINGTON, MARCH 12-30, 1943¹

740.00119 EW 1939/1193½

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] November 30, 1942.

The British Ambassador called to see me this afternoon at his request. Lord Halifax stated that he had read with particular approval the address I had delivered at the New York Herald Tribune Forum two weeks ago.² He said he thought it was imperative that some agreement be reached at least on basic principles of post-war adjustments between the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union before the armistice period arrived. He said that if such an agreement were not reached before that time he saw no hope of any satisfactory solution and the very great probability that violent discord, suspicion and recrimination will exist between the three leading members of the United Nations. He said that he wanted me to know that Mr. Eden³ and Oliver Lyttelton⁴ felt exactly the same way that he does on this subject.

He went on to say that the President had spoken with Oliver Lyttelton with regard to certain post-war adjustments, requesting the latter to transmit his views to Mr. Churchill⁵ solely for the latter's confidential information. The Ambassador said that, as I would have seen from Mr. Churchill's speech of yesterday,⁶ that Mr. Churchill had not yet reached the point where he was considering the possibility of such agreements being reached until after Axis resistance, at least in Europe, had broken down. Lord Halifax insisted that only the President himself could cause Mr. Churchill to change his point of view in this regard. He felt very strongly that the President should take the lead on this issue and should keep the initiative in his own hands. He

¹ For an account of this visit from British sources, see Sir Llewellyn Woodward, *British Foreign Policy in the Second World War* (London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1962) pp. 437-441.

² For text of address, made on November 17, 1942, see Department of State *Bulletin*, November 21, 1942, p. 939.

³ Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

⁴ British Minister of Production.

⁵ Winston S. Churchill, British Prime Minister.

⁶ For text, see *New York Times*, November 30, 1942, p. 5.

said that at one time they had considered urging that Mr. Eden be sent to this country for exploratory conversations but that the idea had been discarded for two reasons: first, the group within the War Cabinet which felt the way he did believed that Mr. Churchill would not wish to have Mr. Eden come to the United States on a mission of this character since he might be afraid that he would go further than he, Mr. Churchill, himself would wish him to go; and second, a visit of Mr. Eden to Washington at this time would undoubtedly give rise on the part of the Soviet Union to apprehensions as to secret arrangements or understandings which might be entered into by Great Britain and the United States.

The Ambassador emphasized that he was speaking to me in great personal confidence in this matter, but that he felt so strongly on the subject that he had wished to talk to me in this personal way.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

033.4111 Eden, Anthony/6: Telegram

*The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt*⁷

FEBRUARY 11, 1943.

Personal. Apart from all the broad topics we have discussed together with so much agreement, there is in my opinion a real need for our Foreign Office and your State Department to have a much more thorough and detailed understanding of each other's viewpoints than now exists. I should like to send Anthony Eden to you for this purpose. He would also be able to tell you about things here and you would certainly find him a most agreeable companion. Pray let me know how this strikes you. He could start about the last week of this month.

*President Roosevelt to the British Prime Minister (Churchill)*⁸

[WASHINGTON,] 11 February, 1943.

Personal for the Former Naval Person^{8a} from the President, despatch No. 260.

That is an excellent thought about Anthony Eden. Delighted to have him come—the sooner the better.

Your speech⁹ was grand and will do lots of good everywhere.

ROOSEVELT

⁷ A copy of this telegram was sent to the Secretary of State by the British Ambassador with a letter of February 13.

⁸ Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

^{8a} Code name for Prime Minister Churchill.

⁹ Mr. Churchill's speech in the House of Commons, February 11, 1943, concerning the Casablanca Conference; for text, see *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 386, cols. 1468, 1473-1478.

033.4111 Eden, Anthony/6

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt

WASHINGTON, February 15, 1943.

Ambassador Winant¹⁰ spoke to me this morning of the proposed visit of Mr. Anthony Eden to this country, and handed me your memorandum on the subject¹¹ which I am returning herewith. I would suggest, if it suits your convenience that Eden be invited to come and the sooner he comes the better as that will also suit my convenience. This could be any time beginning next week as I understand that Madam Chiang Kai-shek's¹² visit will be finished by the end of this week.

It would seem to be advisable in order to avoid any undue significance being given to Eden's visit that an announcement be made when the news is given out that he is coming over in order to be brought up to date with regard to matters concerned with the furtherance of the war effort, and that his visit is a part of a series of contacts made between the high officials of the United Nations in order to keep up the mutual exchange of ideas and information which is undertaken with a view to keeping all the interested governments informed of current developments.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

033.4111 Eden, Anthony/1½ : Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Matthews) to the Secretary of State*LONDON, February 15, 1943—9 p. m.
[Received February 15—7:15 p. m.]

1171. While the date has not definitely been set, Mr. Eden will probably leave here for Washington by air the early part of next week, the date of his arrival depending upon the route taken which has not yet been determined. He will be accompanied by Sir Alexander Cadogan¹³ and probably by Oliver Harvey, Mr. Eden's private secretary, and by Gladwyn Jebb, Chief of the Economic and Reconstruction Department at the Foreign Office. Mr. Eden plans to remain in the United States at least a fortnight, after which he may spend a day or two in Canada.

Please inform Ambassador Winant.

MATTHEWS

¹⁰ John G. Winant, Ambassador to the United Kingdom, temporarily in the United States for consultation.

¹¹ Not found in Department files.

¹² Wife of the President of the National Government of China.

¹³ British Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

033.4111 Eden, Anthony/18

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] February 16, 1943.

The British Ambassador called at his request and said that Eden expected to leave London for this country about the middle of next week. I expressed special gratification at his coming and assured him of the warmest greeting and welcome. I said we had no agenda or program thus far but that we were now working on various phases of such an arrangement. I stated that whatever we may develop I shall be glad to acquaint him accordingly and that I hoped the Ambassador in turn would do likewise with me.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

033.4111 Eden, Anthony/18 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, February 18, 1943—3 p. m.

[Received February 18—11:03 a. m.]

1246. My telegram number 1171, February 15, 9 p. m. I learn that in addition to those mentioned Strang¹⁴ will likewise accompany Mr. Eden. In mentioning this Sir Orme Sargent¹⁵ expressed some little anxiety lest the size and composition of Mr. Eden's party might lead to public expectations on both sides of the Atlantic that important negotiations are on foot and subsequent disappointment and harmful speculation when no great tangible results of the talks in Washington can be announced.

MATTHEWS

033.4111 Eden, Anthony/21

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Welles)

[WASHINGTON,] February 22, 1943.

The British Ambassador called to see me this afternoon at his request. The Ambassador took up with me the text of the proposed statement to be made when Mr. Eden arrives in Washington. He said that he had cabled to Mr. Eden the text of the statement which the

¹⁴ William Strang, British Assistant Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

¹⁵ British Deputy Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

President desired issued¹⁶ and that Mr. Eden had raised various questions with regard to it and had asked that the following text be approved in place of the text desired by the President:

"Mr. Anthony Eden, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, has arrived in Washington on the invitation of the United States Government. The purpose of his visit is to discuss the political aspects of the war situation and to exchange preliminary views with the United States Government on questions arising out of the war which will have to be considered by the United Nations. Mr. Eden will also wish to see at first hand something of the great war effort of the United States. Mr. Eden is accompanied by Sir Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and by other officials of the Foreign Office."

I told the Ambassador that I did not believe the President would approve the text suggested by Mr. Eden, particularly because of the fact that the phrase "to discuss the political aspects of the war situation" would probably create either resentment or suspicion on the part of the Government of the Soviet Union and it would not be clearly understood by public opinion in the United States, but that I would submit Mr. Eden's message to the President and let the Ambassador have the President's decision in the matter.

I subsequently laid this before the President. The President asked me to let Lord Halifax know immediately that he did not approve the text suggested by Mr. Eden and that he desired the text of the release to be as follows:

"Mr. Anthony Eden, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, has arrived in Washington on the invitation of the United States Government. The purpose of his visit is to undertake general exchange with the United States Government on all aspects of the war situation and to discuss the most effective method of preparing for meetings between the Governments of all the United Nations to consider questions arising out of the war. Mr. Eden will also wish to see at first hand something of the great war effort of the United States. Mr. Eden is accompanied by Sir Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and by other officials of the Foreign Office."¹⁷

I then informed Lord Halifax on the telephone of the President's decision in the matter and he stated that he would immediately communicate this to Mr. Eden.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

¹⁶ Not printed.

¹⁷ A similar text, omitting the last sentence, was released by the White House on March 12, Department of State *Bulletin*, March 13, 1943, p. 216.

033.4111 Eden, Anthony/2: Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, March 4, 1943—8 p. m.

[Received March 4—7:55 p. m.]

1583. Mr. A. Eden and his party now plan to leave here March 11 arriving Washington March 13. Mr. Eden tells me that he is most anxious that Ambassador Winant be there at least during part of his stay and hopes therefore that the Ambassador can postpone his return to London a little longer.

Please inform Ambassador Winant.

MATTHEWS

033.4111 Eden, Anthony/28

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] March 8, 1943.

The British Ambassador called upon me this morning at his request. The Ambassador wished to tell me that Mr. Eden had just sent him word that if all went well so far as weather was concerned, he would arrive on the afternoon or evening of Friday, March 12, and asked that the President be informed accordingly. Lord Halifax added that Sir Alexander Cadogan had unfortunately been taken ill and would not be able to leave with Mr. Eden so that Mr. Eden's party would consist solely of his private secretary and Mr. William Strang in addition to himself.

Lord Halifax said that Mr. Eden had suggested that during his visit in the United States he might fly out to San Francisco to speak there and also to speak in Kansas City on his way back to the East. Lord Halifax asked me what my judgment would be concerning such a plan.

I said that of course I was not informed of what the President might have in mind, but that it seemed to me that there was nothing useful to be gained by such a trip. I said I thought the stress on Mr. Eden's visit should be laid upon his official conversations with this Government and that nothing should be done which could be misinterpreted deliberately or innocently by public opinion in this country as propaganda efforts. I said I felt sure the President would indicate his wishes to Lord Halifax when Mr. Eden arrived. Lord Halifax said he felt entirely the way I did in the matter.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

*Memorandum by the Ambassador to the United Kingdom (Winant),
Temporarily in Washington, to President Roosevelt*¹⁸

[WASHINGTON,] March 10, 1943.

The purpose of Mr. Eden's trip was set forth in a communiqué which you approved and in which Mr. Eden's journey here was limited to informal discussion of "the most effective method of preparing for meetings between the governments of all the United Nations to consider questions arising out of the war." Therefore, no formal agenda has been prepared by the State Department. The European Division in the State Department, however, has listed a number of subjects which it felt might usefully be explored. This will be given to you by Mr. Welles.

This memorandum is confined to problems in the economic and social field. There are three subjects which are already under discussion.^{18a}

A. Relief and Rehabilitation which has been before the governments of the United Nations for a considerable period of time and on which the four Great Powers have reached a common understanding in relation to the language and formula of organization.

B. The question of International Monetary Stabilization in which there has been an exchange of papers at a technical level, i.e., the White Plan and the Keynes Plan.

C. The conference on post-world war food problems which you discussed at your press conference on February 24.

These three subjects for conference, together with the other enumerated essential fields for discussion and understanding, call for decision on timing and careful planning to avoid overlapping in content which in turn affects timing.

With the exception of Relief and Rehabilitation, all the subjects herein enumerated could stem from Article VII of the Lend Lease Agreement.¹⁹ The early discussions on these subjects with the British should be informal and exploratory. The objective would be to work out tentatively the principle of international economic and financial arrangements suitable for world-wide application, on the lines laid down in Article VII. They should not be confined to special Anglo-American problems.

The discussions should start from the common ground that the countries concerned have already committed themselves to work out an agreement on, and to seek international acceptance of, economic

¹⁸ Copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

^{18a} For documentation relating to these three subjects, see vol. I, pp. 851 ff., 1099 ff., and 820 ff., respectively.

¹⁹ Signed at Washington, February 23, 1942. For correspondence pertaining to negotiations of the Agreement, see *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. I, pp. 525 ff.; for text, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 241, or 56 Stat. (pt. 2) 1433.

policies designed to maintain continuously a high level of production, employment and the exchange and consumption of goods, and to eliminate all forms of trade discriminations and reduce tariffs and other trade barriers. It is recognized that adjustments in international balances of payments will have to be made in order to reach these objectives. The subjects covered are interdependent and form parts of a related whole.

1. Methods and machinery of international collaboration to deal both with transitional and long run international monetary problems. These would include the problems involved in the correction of transitional difficulties in regard to the balance of payments, and the maintenance of appropriate exchange rates and the removal of currency restrictions on trading operations and the control of undesirable flights of capital. This subject has already been begun under Item "B"—The question of Monetary Stabilization.

2. Methods and machinery of international collaboration with respect to the supply and distribution of certain primary products, with special reference to the problems of preventing excessive fluctuations in raw material prices, and correcting maladjustments due to the retention of unduly high cost capacity in certain areas, and to monopolistic tendencies and international cartels. The first subject to be discussed under 2 would be Item "C"—The Conference on Post-world War Food Problems. Nutrition should be related to the permanent food problem. This program is a self-help program. It should result in helping countries to help themselves.

3. Methods and machinery of international collaboration to reduce tariffs, to eliminate trade preferences and discriminations, dumping and export subsidies. The first step in approaching this subject would be Congressional approval of continuing the Reciprocal Trade Treaties.

4. Methods and machinery of international collaboration to promote and direct the flow of international investment into channels which will ensure its maximum usefulness in world reconstruction and in the development of enterprises designed to raise standards of living of the masses of people, especially those in regions of low per capita income. It is the opinion of the Treasury that this subject of credits should be treated separately from the question of monetary stabilization and delayed until agreement could be reached on monetary stabilization. The British have *not* prepared a paper on this subject to-date as they felt that the major portion of credits would necessarily come from us. They recognize that the whole question of credits, however, is an essential part of reconstruction. The later phases of "Relief and Rehabilitation under Rehabilitation" might precipitate the long-term credit discussion before we were prepared to meet it.

5. Methods and machinery of international cooperation to coordinate where possible internal measures for economic expansion and the maintenance of a continuously high level of employment in each country. These might make provision for international technical discussions of domestic measures designed to secure the essentials of life to all, especially in relation to nutrition, housing and health. The International Labor Office should be useful in this area of collaboration.

6. Transportation

- (a) Air Transport
- (b) Shipping
- (c) Railroads, trucks and canals, particularly as this latter problem relates to the European situation, i.e., a united railway system.

7. Communications

- (a) Mechanics
- (b) Methods to prevent the poisoning of international news which the Germans, Italians and Japanese used so successfully against the non-aggressor nations.

840.50/1716

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] March 15, 1943.

Participants: Secretary of State Hull, The Right Honorable Anthony Eden, Foreign Minister, and Lord Halifax, British Ambassador

The British Ambassador, accompanied by Foreign Minister Anthony Eden, called at his request.

After the usual exchange of felicitations and expressions of welcome, the Foreign Minister brought up the Free French situation and its bearing on the relations between Great Britain and the United States.²⁰ Mr. Eden had nothing particularly new to offer to the well-known story about the course of De Gaulle and his followers toward all phases of the international situation as related to the Governments of Great Britain, and more particularly to the United States. In fact he did not seem to be familiar by any means with the full story of the United States' side of this matter. I began with the fall of Paris and traced the course and attitude of the United States toward the Vichy Government, toward the Free French and toward the French people as a whole and concluded with the completion of the preliminary preparations for the North African military expedition.

I then emphasized the fact that in March 1941 Prime Minister Churchill had in writing strongly urged this Government to maintain its policy toward Vichy,²¹ and that on other occasions, including his two visits to this country, he personally urged me to continue this policy by all means, saying among other things that the French fleet constituted the balance of power in the Mediterranean and that it to-

²⁰ For correspondence concerning the disunity between Generals Giraud and de Gaulle in French North Africa, see vol. II, pp. 23 ff.

²¹ See Prime Minister Churchill's message to President Roosevelt, March 12, 1941, *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. II, p. 119.

gether with the Italian fleet would be entirely superior to the British fleet. On each occasion I said that this Government would continue to maintain its relations with Vichy, and I explained on each occasion some of the vital phases of this policy. I emphasized also the fact that De Gaulle had rarely ever approached this Government except for political recognition, and had never engaged in serious discussion of the military situation; that this Government, not deeming it practical to become involved in French politics, consistently declined to join in the desires of De Gaulle for general and worldwide political recognition, and that this is, so far as I know, the sum total of his grievance against this Government. I further emphasized the fact that the Government here has no ill will toward De Gaulle but that it only regrets that he seems to be so constituted, temperamentally at least, that he seeks political preferment in the main. I then added that according to Churchill, he was a most difficult person to get along with and had given them almost unlimited trouble. I concluded this reference by saying that if there were other cases of temperamental persons like De Gaulle, they would materially interfere with the military duties and undertakings of our Governments. Mr. Eden made a mild effort to justify Great Britain's course by mentioning the aid which De Gaulle had brought to Great Britain in the war. I had already pointed out the tremendous aid this Government through its Vichy policy had brought to the British and to the whole Allied cause.

The Foreign Minister then said that he was over here to discuss any and all questions pertaining to the present or future international situation. I expressed appreciation at this and said that this Government for various reasons had not moved as rapidly in approaching some of the important questions and problems that lie ahead as had the British Government, one of the reasons being that we were greatly concerned in the first place about the development of public opinion in this country in favor of the more vital and important phases of international cooperation which must be invoked by the United Nations. I added that I and my associates had during recent months been giving much attention to this phase, and that I now feel that public opinion is much more favorable to the renewal of our Trade Agreements Act²² than it was prior to either of the preceding renewals. I turned to the British Ambassador for corroboration on this point and he readily agreed. I then said that this Government, by means of an informal exchange of views, feels much more competent now to go forward with the exploration of the many problems presented than had been the situation heretofore. I emphasized at this point the vital importance of each country, especially the United States, in keeping public opinion educated and up to date with re-

²² Approved June 12, 1934; 48 Stat. 943.

spect to each of the important methods, plans or proposals calling for international cooperation. I said that this step is absolutely necessary to safeguard any plan or program against fickle and sudden lapses or changes in public sentiment during the present and the future when thinking is abnormal and opinion is brittle and often rests on misapprehensions or prejudices or other unstable and uncertain considerations. I added that so long as a sound and stable public opinion is kept up to date in support of the necessary methods and programs of international cooperation, there will not be serious difficulty, relatively speaking, in working out such programs by the United Nations and carrying them forward with certainty and speed; otherwise, an attitude of uncertainty will pervade everything everywhere. Mr. Eden concurred in this and expressed his gratification at my statement about public opinion in relation to the trade agreements program and liberal commercial policy involving questions of monetary exchange, credit, capital movements, surpluses, et cetera.

Mr. Eden inquired about the proposed Congressional resolution approving in advance the necessary degree of international cooperation called for during the present and post-war periods. I replied that naturally a suitable expression of this sort by Congress would have a splendid effect abroad, including Russia; that the whole question of establishing and preserving close and understanding working relations between the legislative and Executive branches of the Government calls for close attention at all times during the war and post-war period; that thorough understanding of all essential phases must be maintained between the two branches to the end that each can function as fully and effectively as possible within its respective spheres, and that this is the only way to avoid controversy and deadlocks and other deadly effects on the international situation. I added that, of course, the Executive branch, charged under the Constitution primarily and chiefly with the conduct of foreign policy, is at least impliedly charged with the initiation of foreign policy, and that in order to avoid misunderstanding and apparent conflict between the Executive and legislative branches, especially the Senate, it is very important that neither should bestow on the other, functions or privileges or other authority that might result later in efforts of one to veto the plans or objectives of the other contrary to the strict limitations of their respective functions. I concluded by saying that every attention will be given to the always difficult problem of keeping up the closest possible working relations between the Executive and the Senate as it relates to foreign policy and international affairs; that while the Senate undertakes on its own initiative and in its own separate and independent capacity as a vitally important member of the legislative branch of the Government to define its views on any

phase of foreign policy, present or future, without any delegation by the Executive branch of its legitimate functions under the Constitution, such expression by the Senate is most desirable, assuming that the situation is first carefully canvassed in order to make sure that any such proposal will receive an overwhelming vote, in any event, more than two-thirds of the vote. I again emphasized that the effect of such a statement on countries like Russia, not to mention others, would be exceptionally good. I said that the hurdle to get over related to the necessity for several weeks of the most detailed conference among all of the senators favorably inclined and agreement on every essential phase carefully worked out in advance, so that there would be understanding and unity in the actions of the senators. I added that this preliminary step of full and detailed conference was an indispensable prerequisite to any successful action by the Senate on a proposed resolution. I reiterated that it is all-important to keep public opinion educated and stabilized up to date with respect to the hitherto controversial questions in foreign affairs. Otherwise, Congress could not be expected to maintain any position that it might take in the event public opinion should lapse or swerve in the wrong direction.

Mr. Eden spoke about the cumbersome situation of democratic governments in carrying on negotiations and referred to an incident between him and Stalin ²³ some months ago, in which the latter indicated just how he could that afternoon draw a map with respect to certain areas, but that Eden was obliged to say to Stalin that he could not go into such matters without consulting his Government. We both agreed on the extreme importance of ascertaining Russia's probable future course with respect to Europe and the world situation. I inquired whether, in his opinion, there was any alternative course Russia might pursue in addition to the possible course of isolation on her part after lopping off certain territory along the boundaries of Europe, accompanied by the maintenance of heavy armament, or whether in her own best interests, economically and otherwise, she might not decide to be a part of the world and to meet all of her responsibilities under a sane practical policy of international cooperation in all essential respects. Mr. Eden replied by saying that there was no alternative course that he knew of.

I said to Mr. Eden early in the conversation that I trusted him absolutely so far as the most confidential conversations are concerned, both on and off the record, and that the doors of the State Department are wide open to him to confer at any and all times fully and freely with any official from Under Secretary Welles down to the desk men in the geographic and other divisions. I added that I hoped he

²³ Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin, President of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union.

would feel entirely free to avail himself of this invitation to any extent at all desirable on his part. He said that he would be glad if I or my associates would talk with Mr. Strang, one of his associates in the Foreign Office, who accompanied him. I said that I, of course, would be glad to comply with his request. It was agreed that Mr. Strang has been considered by us as more or less unfriendly.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

*Memorandum by Mr. Harry L. Hopkins, Special Assistant to
President Roosevelt* ^{23a}

[WASHINGTON,] March 15, 1943.

The President, Mr. Eden and I dined last night and discussed, in great detail, the post-war geographical problems of Europe.

Russia. Eden stated he thought Russia was our most difficult problem; that she undoubtedly had two different plans up her sleeve—one based on British-American cooperation with Russia and the other on the assumption that the U.S. would withdraw from all interest in European affairs after the war. Eden said he believed that Russia preferred and hoped for the former because Stalin was not prepared to face the implications of Russia's control over European affairs, and England would probably be too weak to face Russia alone diplomatically. I asked him what he thought Russia's demands at the Peace Table would be. Eden said he thought they first would demand that the Baltic States be absorbed as states in the USSR. He felt Stalin would insist upon this for reasons of security and that he would make out a case that there had been a plebiscite in 1939 which indicated the desire of the Baltic States to join the USSR. ^{23b}

The President stated that he thought that this action on the part of Russia would meet with a good deal of resistance in the United States and England; that he realized that, realistically, the Russian armies would be in the Baltic States at the time of the downfall of Germany and none of us can force them to get out. He, the President, said he thought the United States would urge Russia not to take them into the USSR without a new plebiscite but agreed that they would have very close economic military arrangements with the Soviet pending a plebiscite.

Eden thought Stalin would not agree to this and would be insistent that we agree to the absorption of the Baltic States into the Soviet Union.

^{23a} Copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

^{23b} For correspondence on the forcible occupation of the Baltic States and their incorporation into the Soviet Union, see *Foreign Relations*, 1940, vol. 1, pp. 357 ff.

The President said he realized that we might have to agree to this, but if we did, then we should use it as a bargaining instrument in getting other concessions from Russia.

Poland. Eden said he thought that Russia would demand very little territory of Poland, possibly up to the "Curzon Line".^{23c} This would not affect Poland unduly from an economic point of view. Eden said he believed that Stalin wanted a strong Poland, providing the right kind of people were running it and that their policy at the Peace Table would depend on this.

The President said it would be difficult to work out geographical boundaries on this basis because, while there might be a liberal government in Poland at the time of the Peace Conference, they might well be thrown out within a year.

Finland. Eden thought that Russia would insist on the line which was drawn up at the end of the last war^{23d} and he even thought this was reasonable and the President shared this point of view. Eden said that Stalin had told him he was going to insist on Hangoe for security reasons. The President said that with the emergence of air power this would not be necessary, but Eden reiterated that he was sure Stalin was going to insist on it. Both agreed that this would be a difficult matter to handle. Eden indicated that he thought there would be no trouble with Russia about the Straits, because, after all, it merely was a way of entrance from one locked sea into another. If Stalin really wanted to find a water route he would go after a new arrangement at the Suez Canal or Gibraltar. Stalin would surely demand Bessarabia. Both the President and Eden agreed that Russia should have Bessarabia because it has been Russian territory during most of its history.

Poland. Eden said that the Poles are being very difficult about their aspirations. He told a story of how the British Government wanted to turn a cruiser over to the Poles and Sikorsky insisted on naming it "The Lemberg"^{23e} after the city over whose sovereignty Russia and Poland are bound to have a bitter fight. Eden stated that he told Sikorsky that naming this cruiser "The Lemberg", would merely irritate the Russians and there was no earthly reason for giving it that name because Lemberg is not a seaport. However, Sikorsky

^{23c} In regard to the origin of the Curzon Line, and for a description of it, see *Foreign Relations*, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, vol. XIII, pp. 793-794. Further details are in H. W. V. Temperley, *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, (Oxford, 1924), vol. VI, pp. 233-283, 317-322, and summary descriptions are in S. Kononov, *Russo-Polish Relations: an Historical Survey* (London, 1945), pp. 33-38, 57-63.

^{23d} For summary of peace treaty signed at Moscow on March 12, 1940, see telegram No. 283, March 13, 1940, noon, from Moscow, *Foreign Relations*, 1940, vol. I, p. 314.

^{23e} Władysław Sikorski was Prime Minister of the Polish Government in Exile at London. He later agreed to name the cruiser *Gdańsk*.

insisted and would not take the cruiser when the British refused to permit it to be named "Lemberg". Eden said Sikorsky was forever meeting with the small states of the Balkans promoting Polish ambitions; that all this was known to the Russians and Eden thinks Sikorsky is doing far more harm for Poland than good. Poland has very large ambitions after the war and Eden says that privately they say that Russia will be so weakened and Germany crushed that Poland will emerge as the most powerful state in that part of the world. Eden thinks this is completely unrealistic. Poland wants East Prussia and both the President and Eden agree that Poland should have it. Eden said that the Russians agree privately with this but are not willing to tell this to the Poles because they want to use it as a bargaining instrument at the Peace Table. Poland will want her original boundaries as they existed prior to the war. The President said that, after all, the big powers would have to decide what Poland should have and that he, The President, did not intend to go to the Peace Conference and bargain with Poland or the other small states; as far as Poland is concerned, the important thing is to set it up in a way that will help maintain the peace of the world.

The President said he thought we should make some arrangement to move the Prussians out of East Prussia the same way the Greeks were moved out of Turkey after the last war; while this is a harsh procedure, it is the only way to maintain peace and that, in any circumstances, the Prussians cannot be trusted.

Finland. Eden said that the Finns were trying to use both Great Britain and the United States now to approach Russia about peace. He, Eden, thought the Russians would not deal with Finland in that round-about way and Eden thinks that Stalin will not answer the note from the United States Government and that we should tell the Finns to talk direct to the Russians.^{23f} Eden thinks Russia wants an independent Finland but is going to insist on a line that will not threaten Leningrad. He, Eden, thinks the Finns must give way here. The President said he thought that probably Russia is not too anxious to make peace with Finland now because they are containing 7 good divisions (German) in Finland which, if peace is declared, would move down on the Russian front. The Russians, the President said, were containing these 7 divisions with 5 inferior divisions at the present time. Both Eden and the President expressed the belief that the Finnish post-war problem would be difficult to arrange.

^{23f} For the conversation on March 12, 1943, between Ambassador Standley and People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, when the Ambassador read "a carefully prepared statement" on the American interest in bringing about peace between Finland and the Soviet Union and proposing that the United States might act as an intermediary to work for direct discussions, see telegram No. 155, March 13, 4 p. m., from the Ambassador in the Soviet Union p. 249.

Serbia. The President expressed his, oft repeated, opinion that the Croats and Serbs had nothing in common and that it is ridiculous to try to force two such antagonistic peoples to live together under one government. He, the President, thought that Serbia, itself, should be established by itself and the Croats put under a Trusteeship. At this point Eden indicated his first obvious objection to the Trustee method which the President is going to propose for many states. Eden did not push it but it was clear to me that the British Government have made up their minds that they are going to oppose this. Eden thought the President's opinion about the inability of the Croats and the Serbs to live together a little pessimistic and he, Eden, believed it could be done.

Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Bulgaria, Turkey, Greece. Both Eden and the President thought that none of these countries offered real difficulties from a geographical point of view.

Austria and Hungary. Both agreed that Austria and Hungary should be established as independent states. Eden said he thought Stalin would want to be pretty arbitrary about Hungary because the Russians do not like the Hungarians, and that Stalin would be unwilling to give them any favors at the Peace Table.

Germany. Eden said that the most important thing we had to get a meeting of the minds on in regard to Germany was the question of whether we were going to be able to deal with Germany as a unit after the war, disarming them, etc., and also for the peace, or whether we were going to insist that it be broken up into several independent states. Eden said that from the conferences he had had with the Russians he was sure that Stalin would not trust the Germans; that in his speech the other day when he said the Russian armies were going to stop at the German Border, this was for propaganda purposes inside Germany (Eden believed); that he, Stalin, has a deep-seated distrust of the Germans and that he will insist that Germany be broken up into a number of states. The President said he hoped we would not use the methods discussed at Versailles and also promoted by Clemenceau ^{23g} to arbitrarily divide Germany, but thought that we should encourage the differences and ambitions that will spring up within Germany for a Separatist Movement and, in effect, approve of a division which represents German public opinion.

I asked what they would do if that spontaneous desire did not spring up and both the President and Eden agreed that, under any circumstances, Germany must be divided into several states, one of which must, over all circumstances, be Prussia. The Prussians cannot be permitted to dominate all Germany.

^{23g} Georges Clemenceau; he became Premier of France on November 16, 1917.

Eden said he believed that one of the reasons Stalin wanted a second front in Europe was political; that if Germany collapsed he had no desire, in Germany, to take the full responsibility for what would happen in Germany or the rest of Europe, and he believed it was a fixed matter of Russian foreign policy to have both British and United States troops heavily in Europe when the collapse comes. Eden expressed this purely as his private opinion and said that he was sure that in Russia a different view was held in some quarters but, nevertheless, he thought he had stated Stalin's position.

We, then, discussed, at some length, the political effect of our troops being in Italy as against France at the time of the collapse of Germany and, while both Eden and the President thought it would not be as advantageous it was far better than not being there at all.

I told the President it was important that we have the frankest kind of talk with Mr. Eden about potential differences in Europe and that, at the moment, I saw two—1, The people of Serbia and Croatia and, 2, the problem of what countries, free and otherwise, should be disarmed in Europe. I felt that from what Mr. Eden had said he would not believe in a disarmed Poland or France and I thought it would be very unfortunate if he went back to London without fully understanding the President's position in this, even if he did not fully agree and that he, Eden, should tell the President, frankly, what his objections [were] to the disarmament of countries like France and Poland. The President reiterated to Eden what he had told Churchill, that after Germany is disarmed what is the reason for France having a big military establishment?

I suggested to Eden, in the light of this evening's conversation, that he articulate in his own mind the potential differences which the British and ourselves might have in Europe and, secondly, the differences which either or both of our countries might have with Russia in Europe and see if we could not come to grips with those, even though they would not be decided with definiteness at this conference. I suggested that we not explore anything beyond the European situation tonight and that we give two more evenings—one to the problems of the Southwest Pacific and the Far East and a third evening to Africa. I said it was clear that in these latter two areas there were bound to be conflicts of opinion but, nevertheless, I thought that we should exchange, with complete frankness, our points of view about such ticklish subjects, as

Hong Kong, Malayan Straits, India. I said I thought no useful purpose would be served at this stage of the war, and surely no useful purpose at the Peace Table, by Great Britain and ourselves having no knowledge of our differences of opinion. Both the President and Eden agreed to this and plans will be made for these conferences soon.

In the meantime, I suggested that Hull, Eden and the President meet tomorrow for tea and the President asked me to arrange it.

Eden and I left and went to the Carlton for some oysters and reviewed the evenings conference. Eden thought that some real progress was made and he was surprised that he and the President seemed in as much agreement as they were about the European situation. He realized that the rest of the world might not be so easy to get a meeting of the minds on. Eden expressed his amazement at the President's intimate knowledge of the geographical boundaries of Europe and said that this knowledge would be of tremendous advantage in any conference.

740.00119 European War 1939/1930

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] March 16, 1943.

Foreign Minister Eden called at his request. The discussion that followed was more general than otherwise and covered in this general manner all parts of the world. Russia was discussed in relation to her position, especially as regards the European situation and, to a certain extent, the world situation.

The question of Germany and her relation to the situation generally was discussed somewhat in detail, with special reference to the question of whether Germany should be dismembered at the end of the war. Mr. Eden was inclined to the latter view. I said that I had been giving attention to as many of the opposing views on this question as had been possible, with the idea thus far of not expressing a final opinion, adding that this subject should be given lengthy and most deliberate consideration, especially since there is time in which to do so. I stated that I did not mean to imply by this that it should be delayed to an extent that might prove embarrassing in the event of a sudden ending of the war, which of course is not at all probable at this time. (Later in the day both viewpoints were again discussed with Mr. Norman Davis ²⁴ present and participating.)

The general exploratory conversations of today and yesterday with Mr. Eden and Ambassador Halifax are considered of value at this stage. They indicate fairly definitely the course that each Government would have the world take after the war. There was general agreement or approximate agreement with respect to these general phases.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

²⁴ Member of the Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy.

740.00119 EW/1325½

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] March 16, 1943.

[Participants:] Mr. Eden, Lord Halifax, Mr. Welles

I said to Mr. Eden that I realized that he had been having a good many general conversations since his arrival in Washington and that I wondered if in the course of his conversations with me it might not be preferable for us to undertake them with precision in order to get down to some detail. Mr. Eden said that he was entirely in accord and suggested that this morning we might discuss the European problems.

Mr. Eden stated that in his judgment there were two main issues: the future disposition of Germany, and the general question of our relations with the Soviet Union and the future policy of the Soviet Union.

He asked me if we had had any occasion to learn the views of the Soviet Government with regard to the desires of the Soviet Union in post-war adjustments, and when I replied that we had had absolutely none, he told me that just before he had left London for Washington the Soviet Ambassador, Mr. Maisky, had called upon him and had given him in complete detail the position of the Soviet Union. Mr. Eden said that he had made it clear that he was not coming to Washington as "Russian Ambassador" but he nevertheless believed that the views expressed to him by Mr. Maisky would be of value to us at this time.

With regard to the problem of the disposition of Germany, Mr. Eden said that the views of the British Government and his own views in particular were tending towards the dismemberment of Germany. He said he wished to make it clear that he was not in a position as yet to speak for the British Government and that the views which he would express to me were consequently tentative and contingent.

I replied that I felt it of course necessary to make it equally clear that whatever I might say in the course of these conversations with Mr. Eden was primarily purely an expression of my individual views in as much as none of these questions had been finally determined by the President, and that while of course the views which I might express reflected the opinions of those with whom I had been studying these problems during the past year and a half, they could only safely be considered as individual opinions.

I stated that it would seem from what Mr. Eden had said that my own opinion with regard to the future disposition of Germany was entirely in line with the views which he had indicated to me.

Mr. Eden then said that in his own judgment the best solution would be for the dismemberment of Germany to take place as the result of spontaneous movements for such partition coming from within Germany herself and that in his belief some result of this character might have taken place after the year 1919 had it not been for the fact that France at that time had blocked the separatist movements in Germany perhaps because of the fact that the French Government feared that some of these separated portions of Germany might receive too kindly treatment from Great Britain.

I remarked that so far as I could recollect, some of these separatist movements in Germany in 1919 had been anything but spontaneous and had in fact been artificially promoted by the French authorities. Mr. Eden said that he thought this was the case in certain instances but not in others.

Mr. Eden further said that the views of the Soviet Government as to the desirability of a partitioned Germany were entirely in accord with the views of the British Government as he had explained them to me. He said, however, that Stalin had remarked that he doubted whether any movement for partition would ever arise within Germany and that he, Stalin, believed that the dismemberment of Germany must be undertaken by force.

Lord Halifax expressed the opinion that the dismemberment of Germany by force would tend to create again among the German people the existence of a major grievance which would stimulate immediately a movement for the reunion of the dismembered portions and might result in the phenomenon of another Hitler within a short period. He went on to say that if the United Nations undertook the necessary military control of Germany and the prevention of the utilization by Germans of any portion of German industry for the production of war matériel, that would offer very material safeguards and that these might advantageously be accompanied by the replacement of objectionable officials and of any particular professors in universities and schools so that the German youth would not be subject to dangerous influences of the kind which would again play up the militaristic philosophy and the revenge philosophy which had been so prevalent in the two decades subsequent to the Versailles Treaty.²⁵

I said that one of the things that concerned me most was the effect which German propaganda had upon the Anglo-Saxon peoples and particularly upon the people of the United States. I said that what I feared particularly was the probability that after a short period, were Lord Halifax's ideas followed by the United Nations, German propagandists would be most efficiently persuading the people of both of our countries that the German people were not responsible for what

²⁵ Signed June 28, 1919; for annotated text, see *Foreign Relations*, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, vol. XIII.

had occurred in the present war, that they were being treated outrageously, and that if they were only treated on a basis of equality from every standpoint with all of the other peoples of Europe they could be trusted as decent members of the family of nations. I said it seemed to me that we had learned by experience that the urge of militaristic Pan-Germanism was so potent a force as to make any united Germany a very dangerous factor in the world whether it was ostensibly governed by a communist regime, or by a socialist or by a liberal democratic regime.

Mr. Eden said that the whole trouble after the last war had been the fact that the solution then arrived at had been in the nature of a compromise. The French had wanted something akin to the type of a partitioned Germany which we were now discussing, and the British had favored the solution of a Weimar Republic, but in the final analysis neither policy had been carried out and the result had been a compromise which possessed the advantages of neither solution.

I went on to say that with regard to the other issues which Lord Halifax had mentioned, I myself could not go along with the idea of placing teachers in schools to teach the German youth the kind of doctrine which we considered sound and that I felt that a more practical solution would be the agreement that any nation which became a member of the international organization which I hoped would be created must automatically in order to achieve membership provide in its constitution for the granting to its individual nationals the right of free speech, of free press, of free information, and of freedom of worship, et cetera, and that in this manner I believed the kind of education which we believed would make the Germans safer members of the family of nations would be attained.

Mr. Eden expressed his concurrence in this suggestion.

I then said that the way our minds here had been running was towards four major steps to be undertaken in Germany:

1. The removal of East Prussia from German sovereignty.
2. The creation of a southwestern German unit composed in general terms of the Rhineland, Württemberg, and Bavaria which would be a predominantly Catholic unit and which I trusted could have its economy directed towards the West rather than towards the East.
3. The setting up of a reduced Prussian or northeastern German unit.
4. The creation of a northwestern German unit running from the Danish frontier south to the Ruhr. I added that from a general survey of this possibility it would seem as if the three German units so suggested were all of them economically capable of self-reliance and would make possible one general premise which seemed to us essential, namely, that each German national would be assured of the opportunity of economic comfort and security and would be treated on a par in so far as economic opportunity was concerned with the nationals of all other European states.

Lord Halifax inquired as to what my opinion might be with regard to the treatment of the Ruhr and I said that it seemed to me that this region should be under international control, not so far as the sovereignty of the region was concerned, but in so far as the control of the industrial organization of the region was involved.

Mr. Eden said that the Soviet Government had made it clear that they did not favor the payment of reparations in money by Germany after the war, but the payment of reparations in kind and particularly payment of reparations in the form of industrial production for the rehabilitation of Soviet industry.

I said that this seemed to me entirely admissible provided the distribution of German industrial production was undertaken on a fair basis so as to include other regions which had been devastated by Germany during the past four years.

Mr. Eden then suggested that we pass to the consideration of Russia. He said that in talking yesterday with the President on this subject the President had asked him if he thought there was anything in the Bullitt²⁶ thesis that the Soviet Government was determined to dominate all of Europe by force of arms or by force of communist propaganda. Mr. Eden stated that he had answered that that was not his own belief but that in any event a wise and expedient thing to do was to cultivate to the utmost extent possible the friendship and confidence of the Soviet Government so as to pave the way for international cooperation with Russia and to avoid in every way possible the determined hostility and antagonism of Russia. He said that of course on many matters they were exceedingly difficult to deal with and that their suspicions at the moment both as to the policy of the United States and as to the policy of Great Britain was accentuated. He reminded me of the difficulties which the British Government had recently had with regard to the stationing of British Air squadrons in northern Russia in order to protect the northern convoys. He emphasized the fact that one of the reasons for the present suspicions was the quarrel between Poland and the Soviet Union²⁷ which he trusted could be allayed and he wondered in fact if some agreement as to Polish-Soviet relations in which the United States and Great Britain would take part could not actually be achieved before the end of the war.

Mr. Eden then indicated to me the Soviet post-war desires as partly outlined to him by Stalin when he last visited Moscow²⁸ and as complemented by the statements made to him last week by Mr. Maisky in London. The Soviet aspirations were as follows:

²⁶ William C. Bullitt, Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy, and former Ambassador to the Soviet Union.

²⁷ See pp. 314 ff.

²⁸ For correspondence on Mr. Eden's visit to Moscow, December 16-22, 1941, see *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, pp. 192-205, *passim*.

1. The incorporation within the Soviet Union of the three Baltic states, and on this Mr. Eden remarked the Soviet Government was adamant and would not agree to any discussion thereof.

2. In the case of Poland the Soviet Government desired the institution of a Polish-Soviet frontier which would be approximately equal to the Curzon line. Stalin had stated that the Soviet Government did not wish the future Poland to include minorities although the Soviet Government desired to see the reconstitution of a "strong Poland". Stalin desired Poland to incorporate within its frontiers East Prussia and was likewise disposed to see a rectification of the Silesian frontier in favor of Poland. Stalin did not insist upon a communist Poland but he did desire the creation of a Polish Government which would represent the will of the Polish people. He was not disposed to see Poland governed by the present group of émigrés constituting the Polish Government in exile, although he had specifically excluded General Sikorski and the present Foreign Minister, Count Raczynski, from this ban of excommunication. The Soviet Union could not maintain any friendly or cordial relations with a future Poland which was not governed by a government responsive to and freely elected by the Polish people.

3. With regard to Czechoslovakia the Soviet Government desired to see the reconstitution of Czechoslovakia as it had existed before 1938 with possibly some slight boundary rectifications.

4. Mr. Eden said that he had encountered upon his last visit to Moscow great antagonism towards Hungary. I asked Mr. Eden if he could tell me specifically what Stalin might have stated with regard to Hungary and Mr. Eden replied that he thought all that was said was that Stalin demanded that "Hungary be punished". Lord Halifax suggested that this might mean that Hungary would be obliged to make territorial concessions to the future Rumania. Mr. Eden said that he thought it was likely.

5. The Soviet Government demanded the restoration of Bessarabia²⁹ to the Soviet Union.

6. Mr. Eden stated that no reference had been made by the Soviet Government to the Bucovina.

7. Mr. Eden stated that the Soviet Government had advanced no pretensions towards the Straits.

8. The Soviet Government demanded the restoration of the 1941 frontiers between the Soviet Union and Finland and, he believed, the cession to the Soviet Union of Hango.

9. The Soviet Government demanded the consummation of "mutual assistance pacts" between the Soviet Union and Finland and between the Soviet Union and Rumania with the further provision that these pacts cede to the Soviet Union air bases within the territories of those two nations. Mr. Eden said that when he had asked for an explanation of precisely what the Soviet Government implied by the cession of these air bases and as to whether it meant military occupation by the Soviet Union of those two countries, he had merely been told that the air bases were intended to afford the needed military security to the Soviet Government which it desired and that probably military forces would be needed to guard such bases as might be established.

²⁹ For correspondence regarding the activities of the Soviet Union in the Balkans, the seizure of Bessarabia and parts of Bukovina in 1940 (lost in the following year after the German attack upon the Soviet Union), see *Foreign Relations*, 1940, vol. I, pp. 444 ff.

With regard to the proposed creation of an eastern European federation it was clear that the Soviet Government did not favor the creation of such federations probably because of its belief that such federations would be directed against the Soviet Union. Mr. Eden said that he had attempted to explain that in the view of the British Government such federations were in fact desirable and useful from the standpoint of the Soviet Union. He had gained the impression that the Soviet Government would not oppose the creation of a Balkan federation but it made it clear that it would not agree to the incorporation of Rumania within such a federation. He had further gathered the impression that the Soviet Government was opposed to any federation between Poland and Czechoslovakia for fear of the effect which such federation might have upon the present sentiments of the Czechoslovak people towards the Soviet Union.

Mr. Eden said that the British Government strongly supported the idea of the creation of eastern European federations but thought that the major federation favored by General Sikorski would be less desirable than the creation of two federations, one composed of the Balkan states and the other composed in whole or in part of the remaining states of eastern Europe.

I said that in this particular regard my own belief was exactly the same, namely, that the most practical solution would be the creation of a Balkan federation and the creation of an additional federation composed of Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, with Hungary forming a part of the Balkan federation.

Mr. Eden emphasized the fact that in the view of the British Government the reconstitution of the former Yugoslavia was desirable. I said that this coincided with my own individual judgment although I thought I should make it clear that I felt that the President favored the determination by the Croats and the Slovenes of their own future destiny through the holding of appropriate plebiscites. I said that personally I felt that the most salutary objective in eastern Europe would be amalgamation rather than partition and that the President's objectives might be satisfied if both the Croats and the Slovenes were to obtain complete autonomy under the Yugoslav federative system.

I stated that it seemed to me with regard to the Soviet aspirations that some vitally important questions were raised. It looked to me as if these aspirations were tantamount to the desire of the Soviet Government to hold Finland and Rumania as protectorates. With regard to Poland, that issue seemed to me perhaps less difficult in view of the willingness of the Soviet to give the future Poland sovereignty over East Prussia and in a sense thus compensate for the eastern portion of Poland which the Soviet Government desired to incorporate in the future Soviet Union.

*Memorandum by Mr. Harry L. Hopkins, Special Assistant to
President Roosevelt*³⁰

[WASHINGTON,] March 16, 1943.

I called to see the Ambassador³¹ this evening and asked him what he believed the Russian demands at the Peace Table would be. He said that they, of course, would want the Baltic States; that Russia considered them now part of the U.S.S.R.; that they had always been historically part of Russia, apart from the fact that they were essential to them for security reasons.

Litvinov said he thought Russia had no desire to occupy all of Finland and, indeed, would like to see a healthy, independent country there, but that Russia would insist on moving the line about to a point where the Russian armies were at the end of the Finnish War.

I asked him what about Hango and he said he had no idea how his government would feel about that.

He said he thought Russia would agree to Poland having East Prussia but that Russia would insist on what he called "her territorial rights" on the Polish frontier. Said he did not anticipate any great difficulty with Poland about this although he said Poland would make "outrageous" demands. He felt that Great Britain and the United States should decide what was to be done about Poland and "tell them" rather than ask them.

He said he assumed that everybody would agree that Russia should have Bessarabia.

I asked him about their ambitions in the Far East and he was reluctant to discuss this in any way. He said he was sure Russia would like to see Germany dismembered; certainly Prussia should be cut off from the rest of Germany and probably 2 or 3 other, additional, states created.

*Memorandum by Mr. Harry L. Hopkins, Special Assistant to
President Roosevelt*³⁰

[WASHINGTON,] March 17, 1943.

Hull said he hoped that we could find a way to avoid any longwinded trials of Hitler and his principal associates after the war; that he hoped we could find a way to get the ones that should be shot and do it quietly. He said he thought a public trial would be very bad;

³⁰ Copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

³¹ The Soviet Ambassador, Maxim Maximovich Litvinov.

that we should settle with Hitler in the same way he would handle us if he were to do it.

We discussed, for some time, the question of precisely what our procedure in Germany would be during the first 6 months after the collapse of Germany.

I said I thought there was no understanding between Great Britain, Russia and ourselves as to which armies would be where and what kind of administration should be developed. I said that unless we acted promptly and surely I believed one of two things would happen—either Germany will go Communist or out and out anarchic state would set in; that, indeed, the same kind of thing might happen in any of the countries in Europe and Italy as well. I said I thought it required some kind of formal agreement and that the State Department should work out the plan with the British and the one agreed upon between the two of us should then be discussed with the Russians. The President agreed that this procedure should be followed. It will, obviously, be a much simpler matter if the British and American armies are heavily in France or Germany at the time of the collapse but we should work out a plan in case Germany collapses before we get to France.

Hull expressed his pleasure that Great Britain and the United States seemed to be getting closer together on the French question.

The President discussed the importance of the United Nations holding certain strong points like Bizerte, Dakar and the Harbor of Formosa after the war. These should be held by the United Nations.

740.00119 European War 1939/1351: Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, March 20, 1943—10 p. m.

[Received March 20—10 p. m.]

1973. The four top ranking Foreign Office officials with whom I have talked during the past few days have all expressed with enthusiasm their gratification at the reception accorded Mr. Eden in the United States both by our Government and by our press. They seem even a little surprised at the general cordiality with which he has been greeted and by the general agreement on principles between Mr. Eden and his American hosts during their preliminary conversations. They all emphasize, however, that the talks so far have been purely preliminary and that "they have not yet gotten down to brass tacks." Those, such as Nigel Ronald,³² primarily interested in post war ques-

³² British Assistant Under Secretary of State.

tions are evincing more optimism with respect to our attitude than has been the case for many months. Nevertheless, this optimism is decidedly cautious and we should not forget that every inhabitant of these isles has the events of 1919 deeply engraved on his memory. In fact, I believe it is no exaggeration to say that fear of an American withdrawal from its due interest in the building of the new world is the dominant factor in British feeling toward the United States today. Neither the British public nor the British Government dares count too strongly that the changed world and the lessons of the aftermath of 1919 will effectively prevent another American "back to normalcy" wave with all its power to destroy the spirit of cooperation founded on wartime need. To the extent that the four Senators' resolution ³³ implies a consciousness of this danger it has been highly welcomed here and British eagerness to see our Senate go on record against a return to isolationism is genuine indeed. It was this same anxiety which led Richard Law ³⁴ to tell me yesterday of his gratification at Senator Connally's statement ³⁵ following Mr. Eden's meeting with our Congressional committees.

The alternate, or perhaps I should say the corollary, fear of "American imperialism" is likewise real but is, I believe, more inclined to take the form of superficial irritation at utterances across the Atlantic than to constitute any deep-rooted anxiety.

While the feeling in that connection is slightly less strong now, I must point out that the interpretation which the British public placed upon our North African policy has resulted in a certain amount of disillusionment. The fact that, as some of our friends believe, the British Government lacked either the heart or the courage to explain that policy to the press and public or publicly to associate itself therewith may be one of the primary causes. That the British Government permitted free rein to the malicious but highly effective campaign of defamation emanating from Carlton Gardens ³⁶ from the middle of November until just recently is likewise a principal reason for the present feeling of the British public. Two years of strong British and Gaullist denunciation of the "men of Vichy" and their policies, and reciprocal virulent attacks on Great Britain from France, provided a fertile soil in which to plant charges of "appeasement", "pro-Fascism" and "ignorance of why the war is being fought" against American policy in the minds of the people of Great Britain. What-

³³ Senate Resolution No. 114, March 16, 1943, regarding a United Nations organization; *Congressional Record*, vol. 89, pt. 2, p. 2030.

³⁴ British Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

³⁵ Tom Connally, Senator from Texas and Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, in a statement on March 19, 1943, expressed approval of Mr. Eden's view given before key members of Congress that the four great powers were conducting the war in complete harmony and understanding, and hoped that they would be in general agreement after the war.

³⁶ Headquarters of the Free French Government in London.

ever the causes, no picture of present British feeling toward the United States would be accurate that omitted reference to the disillusionment (however temporary we may hope it will be) that has followed here in the wake of our North African landings³⁷ or to the feeling that the high ideals of the Atlantic Charter³⁸ may be sacrificed to expediency. My own deep conviction that the policy we have pursued with regard to France is both right and sound cannot blind me to the fact that, whatever the responsibility of the British Government therefor, a majority of the British people today have less confidence in American motives, idealism and understanding of Europe than they had before last November.

MATTHEWS

740.00119 European War 1939/1370

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] March 22, 1943

Participants: Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Great Britain, Mr. Anthony Eden,
British Ambassador, Lord Halifax,
Secretary of State, Mr. Cordell Hull.

The British Foreign Secretary came in this morning accompanied by the British Ambassador and Mr. William Strang, Assistant Under Secretary of the British Foreign Office. I had asked Mr. Welles to be present but he had found it impossible to join us because of previous engagements. Mr. Winant, Mr. Atherton,³⁹ and Mr. Dunn⁴⁰ were present, and Mr. Norman Davis joined us later in the conversation.

Mr. Eden brought up first the general question of the refugee problem and said that his Government desired that this matter be examined and that he wished to make the final arrangements, if possible, with respect to the recent British proposal that representatives of his Government and of the United States meet with a view to discussing the general subject.⁴¹ I referred to the assistance we were giving at present to the refugees in Spain and the refugees in Persia. I spoke of the assistance we were giving to the conveyance of refugees from France now coming into Spain and Portugal in proceeding to North Africa. Mr. Eden said that one of the principal problems was the matter of Jews in Axis occupied countries in Europe, and that this problem was nowhere near solution but that there were some immedi-

³⁷ November 8, 1942; for correspondence on this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. II, pp. 429 ff.

³⁸ Joint statement by President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Churchill on August 14, 1941; for text, see *ibid.*, 1941, vol. I, p. 367.

³⁹ Ray Atherton, Acting Chief of the Division of European Affairs.

⁴⁰ James C. Dunn, Adviser on Political Relations.

⁴¹ See section entitled "Bermuda Conference to consider the refugee problem, April 19-28, 1943 . . .", vol. I, pp. 134 ff.

ate aspects which might be taken care of. It was for this purpose that the British proposed conversations between the two governments on the general subject. Mr. Eden said that this proposed meeting might be informed of some of the projects the British are now planning to carry forward, among them the movement of 30,000 Jews from eastern Europe into Palestine. The arrangements with respect to moving these persons to Palestine is now in the process of discussion through the Swiss Government. When I raised the question as to the attitude of the Arabs with regard to this movement, Mr. Eden stated that this number would be accepted by the Arabs as the plan had already been announced by the Colonial Secretary and was possible under the present quotas, that is, under the numbers as set forth in the British White Paper. Mr. Eden further stated that with respect to western Europe it was his understanding that there were about 6,000 refugees composed not entirely of Jews but of all western European nationalities and Poles now in Spain and Portugal. The question arose as to what disposition could be made of these refugees. Mr. Eden also spoke of the importance of assuring neutral countries which were now taking care of refugees that these refugees would be returned to their countries when the present upsetting conditions had been eliminated. He said it was particularly important to give assurances of this kind to Spain, Portugal, Switzerland, and Sweden, who were now carrying the burden of many refugees in this connection. I pointed out that in my opinion there were two aspects of this problem. One was to find a place for these refugees to go, and, two, how to get them there. I recalled in this connection that we are now contributing a sum amounting to about \$3,000,000 for the transportation of refugees from Persia to Mexico. Mr. Eden inquired as to the nationalities and character of these refugees, and I said that from our information they were almost entirely Poles who had come out of Russia.

Mr. Eden then discussed the matter of where the conference would take place between the British and American officials as both he and Lord Halifax had the impression from word received from Ottawa that the Canadian Government did not desire the meeting to take place in Canada. There was some discussion of the points on which agreement had been reached with respect to the agenda of the meeting of these British and American officials on refugees and as to whether some announcement could be made by the British Government in view of insistent demands in Parliament with regard to some information with regard to developments in this respect. I then suggested that Mr. Strang and Mr. Atherton might consult with Mr. Long⁴² on this subject and endeavor to draw up the sense of an announcement which might be made in the British Parliament in this regard. Mr.

⁴² Breckinridge Long, Assistant Secretary of State.

Strang and Mr. Atherton thereupon withdrew to proceed with the drafting on the subject.

Mr. Eden then stated that he was leaving this afternoon with General Marshall ⁴³ and Sir John Dill ⁴⁴ to visit army camps and installations in the south and expected to be back here Wednesday evening for dinner at the British Embassy. He said that he had arranged to devote Thursday to inspection of Navy installations and that he would then be available on Friday, Saturday, Sunday, and Monday for talks with me and was at my complete disposal for that purpose.

I then told Mr. Eden and Lord Halifax that Senator McNary ⁴⁵ had informed me that he felt that the situation with regard to the whole field of the organization of peace should be kept before the public and that he was most anxious that the final result would be substantial cooperation on the part of the United States in the organization and maintenance of world security. I also told them that Senator McNary was prepared to get behind the renewal of the Trade Agreements Act when that came up for consideration, and as they knew, that matter would come before Congress in the fairly near future. I said that Senator McNary had expressed a desire to have a resolution which would be acceptable to the administration and which might be possible of receiving the support of all those Senators of good will toward the difficult problem of organization of the peace. I then read a draft of some language I had written down which might be useful in that connection. I told Mr. Eden and Lord Halifax that from their own experience I was sure they fully understood how necessary it was to obtain the cooperation of all the individuals in a large body who would be important in the consideration of such a proposal, and that I felt very much encouraged now that, with proper and careful management and taking up of this matter individually with the Senators concerned, we could feel every assurance that some resolution will come through the Senate in a manner which will express approval of the creation and maintenance of an international permanent peace organization. I said that of course the matter had to be handled with extreme care and delicacy and that I now felt sure that there would be no draft which would be brought up for serious consideration without previous discussion with all those concerned including myself, and that in this fashion the collaboration of the State Department could be secured. I again reverted to the procedure with which they in their experience must be fully conversant—that any such matter must be completely organized with the greatest detail in advance, that at times it was a matter of touch and

⁴³ Gen. George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff of the United States Army.

⁴⁴ British member of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington.

⁴⁵ Charles L. McNary, Senator from Oregon.

go because it revived old controversies including the discussions on isolationism and even more ancient matters of contention. We were thus proceeding to go along our own way in this regard and that the methods of proceeding must be selected most carefully and carried forward with the most complete discussion and exchange of views with the Senators concerned.

I then asked whether there were any suggestions as to ways we might be able to aid in keeping down in this country any sentiments against Great Britain. I gave as an example that during the critical discussions of the Indian matter we did our best to keep down the discussions here in every possible way, and made every effort to prevent this question from becoming a matter of serious contention and general discussion here. Mr. Eden said that he found this Government so generally very helpful in all matters of that kind that he did not have any particular suggestions in that regard. He said that perhaps the only matter he had run across during his visit here was the possibility of criticism arising in connection with the Colonial administration by the British Government, and he said that it might be possible to be helpful in this field in connection with some agreement with regard to the Colonial declaration which had been the matter of discussion back and forth between the Governments within the last six months or so. I said that I had given very careful consideration to this matter and that I had only just recently left with the President a draft ⁴⁶ of my latest suggestions on this declaration, that I was not in a position to speak for the President but that the President would no doubt take the matter up with Mr. Eden while he was here. Lord Halifax then referred to the draft for the Colonial declaration which the British Government had just recently sent to me,⁴⁷ and said that this had been drawn up after discussion with the Dominions, whereupon I asked whether it coincided with the ideas General Smuts ⁴⁸ had expressed. Mr. Eden and Lord Halifax both replied that Smuts had been consulted and had agreed to the recent

⁴⁶ For text of United States draft of a declaration by the United Nations on national independence, March 9, 1943, submitted by Secretary Hull to President Roosevelt on March 17, see vol. 1, p. 747.

⁴⁷ On February 4, 1943, the British Ambassador handed to Secretary Hull a draft proposal of a joint declaration of colonial policy noting that while some peoples were far advanced, others were not ready to achieve security and prosperity by themselves, and it was therefore the duty of "parent" or "trustee" states to guide and develop social, economic, and political institutions of the colonial peoples until they were able to discharge the responsibilities of government. It was proposed that regional commissions be established, comprising the "parent" or "trustee" states concerned in the region, as well as other states having strategic or economic interests there, in order to provide effective machinery for consultation and collaboration for the advancement of colonial peoples and the general welfare of mankind. "Parent" or "trustee" states would, however, remain responsible for administration of their territories. (Memorandum of conversation, by the Secretary of State, February 4, 1943, with annex, "Draft of Joint Declaration of Colonial Policy", filed under 500.CC/2-443.)

⁴⁸ Field Marshal Jan Christian Smuts, Prime Minister and Minister for External Affairs and Defense, Union of South Africa.

draft, and that after agreement had been reached between the British and American Governments with regard to the form of Colonial declaration, the British would bring in the Dominions for consultation before final acceptance, and would also desire to consult with the Dutch and perhaps other powers who were directly interested in the subject. I said that I would await the President's final action in this matter, and suggested that the President might bring it up at the luncheon Mr. Eden was having with him today. I said that as far as I was concerned it was my thought that Colonial peoples should be given the opportunity to establish their basis for study and experience in the political and economic field in order that they might start a general forward movement on the part of the peoples themselves with a view carefully to working out the formula for the solution of their own problems in their own way without interference of other countries and without weakening their own position to the extent of becoming a prey to economic or political pressure from other countries.

[Here follow discussions on the possibility of the establishment of a unified French authority which could deal with questions affecting all territories then under French control. The portion of document here omitted is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1943, volume II, page 78.]

At this point Mr. Atherton and Mr. Strang returned with the draft of the statement with regard to the refugee conference which was cleared all around although Mr. Long had asked to have an understanding of one reservation which was that the omission of the reference to pass on the matter eventually to the International Committee on Refugees (Evian Committee) was not to be taken as having been decided one way or the other as to whether this committee would be called upon to take the question under advisement.

I then referred to the Finnish-Russian situation.⁴⁹ I explained that in our dealings with the Finnish situation we had based all of our actions on getting the Finns away from the Germans, and I felt that we had been a restraining factor in keeping the Finns from linking up even more definitely with the Germans than they had up to the present time. We had recently suggested to the Finns our acting as intermediary for the bringing of the Finns and Russians together. I asked whether any questions, military or political, in the present war situation from the British point of view would be affected by such a move. Mr. Eden said that he was in accord with any attempt along these lines; that when the Swedes had spoken to him about the matter, which they did from time to time and as recently as when the Swedish Minister in London recently left to return to his country, he had advised the Swedes to tell the Finns to go direct to the Russians. I said that we were entirely in accord with the British effort to have the Finns go direct to the Russians as we knew the Russians did not care to have any

⁴⁹ See pp. 213 ff.

other nation in such discussions, and I understood that, provided we had not gone further than an attempt to initiate such discussions, Mr. Eden was entirely in favor of our actions.

I was interrupted at this point for a press conference and on my return I informed Mr. Eden and Lord Halifax that I had called attention in my remarks to the press when questioned about my impressions of the British Prime Minister's speech⁵⁰ that the Prime Minister had stressed the necessity for applying ourselves to the primary purpose of the prosecution of the war both in the west and the east. The Foreign Secretary and the Ambassador both agreed that it was a good point to bring out the necessity for considering the prosecution of the war in both the east and the west, and that they themselves had remarked the absence of a reference to China in the text of the speech. I then dwelt on the insistence on the part of China of their desire to participate in the fighting in connection with Burma, and all aspects of the war in Asia, and pointed out my feeling that it was advisable to keep China in the picture and not to lose the value of their cooperation and spirit of resistance in the eastern situation.

I then passed on to the situation in the Near East.⁵¹ I said that I would pass over the questions of protectorates and mandates which would be taken up at a later stage, but that we now have more immediate questions that come into our consideration of our policies toward that area. It has been our hope that Syria and Lebanon would be given a chance to have more liberal governments, but it appears to us now that the British, while probably having the same attitude toward the subject, apparently may have some agreement with de Gaulle by which they would be turning over a large measure of control of those areas to de Gaulle. Mr. Eden said that it was the policy of the British Government to have Syria and Lebanon set up their independence by treaty, probably much along the lines of the Egyptian arrangement, but they had also in mind that if any foreign power is permitted to come into that picture, that foreign power would be France. I said that it would perhaps be well if Mr. Strang would discuss this matter in more detail with Mr. Murray,⁵² and would perhaps give, in so far as possible, a rather fuller exposition of the British attitude toward the subject, to which Mr. Eden readily agreed and suggested that perhaps the Free French were talking along lines not entirely consistent with the British lines and the British policy.

I then turned to the subject of the Committee on Administration of Territories, Europe, which is now meeting in London under the aegis of the British War Office. I said that we had a military

⁵⁰ Radio speech of March 21, 1943, on postwar policy; for text, see *Congressional Record*, vol. 89, pt. 9, p. A1366.

⁵¹ See vol. iv, pp. 1-19.

⁵² Wallace Murray, Adviser on Political Relations.

observer sitting on this Committee in London but that there was not much word which we in the State Department had with regard to these deliberations, and furthermore that there was not much chance of our working with the British Government on political questions with such a method of communication. I raised the question as to whether it would not be possible for both Governments to set up some sort of joint organization in a very small way with not too many officials on it which would have a representative from the British Foreign Office, the Department of State, and the military, in order that we might all function very closely together on subjects relating to political questions having to do with occupied and enemy countries. Mr. Davis at this point said that this was a question which had been discussed in the Security Committee of which he is Chairman, and that there was a real necessity for some sort of intimate cooperation along political lines similar to that now being carried out along military lines between the two Governments. He thought that this sort of organization must necessarily be set up in Washington as the Combined Chiefs of Staff were discussing military questions related to the same areas right here. Mr. Eden brought up the question of discussions along these lines being taken up with the refugee governments and seemed to feel that London was a more convenient place to carry on such discussions than Washington. Mr. Davis and I both expressed the opinion, however, that the first step in such a closer collaboration on political matters should properly be with respect to matters in which there is joint Anglo-American operation, both before the operation is undertaken and after; that this kind of collaboration would go very far toward helping to clarify our relationships with the North African situation, both political and in the economic field, upon which there could be much clearer and closer functioning between the political branches of the two Governments, and that the further question of bringing in other governments could arise as matters relating to their territories came up.

It was decided that Mr. Strang and Mr. Dunn would go into this matter with a view to further exploring the possibilities and reporting to us at a later stage in our conversations.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

*Memorandum by Mr. Harry L. Hopkins, Special Assistant to
President Roosevelt* ^{52a}

[WASHINGTON,] March 22, 1943.

The President stated that he wanted no negotiated armistice after the collapse; that we should insist on total surrender with no commitments to the enemy as to what we would or would not do after this

^{52a} Copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

action. The President stated that he doubted if a peace treaty should be signed for some time after the collapse of Germany and Japan.

Eden raised the question, in a delicate way, as to the President's Constitutional powers, during this interim while we are still technically at war with Germany, to agree to forming an independent Austria, as an example. The President replied that he thought he did have the power without reference to the United States Senate—at any rate, enough power to make the independence of Austria stick. It was clear from Eden's reply that he had some doubt about this. After lunch he told me he thought it a matter of great importance because England, China, Russia and the other United Nations want to be sure of the President's power to reach any agreement which would be binding prior to the actual signing of a peace treaty, which treaty, of course, would have to go to the Senate for confirmation.

We discussed the same situation with regard to East Prussia being turned over to Poland and the President's power to agree on a new eastern boundary line for Poland.

The President told Eden again that he did not like the idea of turning the Baltic States over to Russia and that she would lose great deal of public opinion in this country if she insisted on this action. The President said he thought the old plebiscite was probably a fake and while he had no doubt that the Baltic States would vote to ally themselves with Russia, he thought Russia should take the trouble to go through the motions of getting that done, in the meantime having an agreement with Great Britain and the United States that Russia would control the foreign affairs and their finances until the new plebiscite could be taken. Eden again told the President that he thought Russia was going to be pretty insistent on the Baltic States.

Eden said he hoped the Japanese Mandated Islands would be turned over to us, preferably in outright ownership. The action would be approved by the United Nations. The President has always felt that these islands would be put under some kind of trusteeship, but it becomes clearer all the time that Eden thinks very little of a trusteeship and would rather have the full responsibility in the hands of one country.

Eden stated that in his conference with Hull this morning, Hull had told him he thought Churchill had made a serious mistake in his speech yesterday by not mentioning China amongst the great powers. Both the President and Hull agreed on this point. The President told Eden he thought that China might become a very useful power in the Far East to help police Japan and that he wanted to strengthen China in every possible way. Eden expressed a good deal of doubt about this on the theory that he doubted very much if China could stabilize herself and may well have to go through a

revolution after the war. He said he "did not much like the idea of the Chinese running up and down the Pacific". This was not further pursued but from what Eden said it made me think the British are going to be pretty sticky about their former possessions in the Far East.

Eden is coming to the White House to spend the weekend and will be at lunch on Saturday.^{52b}

I raised the question as to where our armed forces would be expected to be after the fall of Germany and, indeed, during the whole period of our policing the aggressor nations. The President said our armies, of course, would have to be in Germany and Italy and he assumed that the British and Russian troops would be there also. He said that so far as the other strong points of the world that had to be held were concerned, we should split up our troops—the British, for instance, would be in Tunisia or Bizerte and we would be in Dakar and, probably, Formosa. Eden seemed to agree to this although he made no comment in regard to it except to say that he was glad to hear the President say our troops would be in Germany.

*President Roosevelt to the Secretary of State*⁵³

WASHINGTON, March 23, 1943.

DEAR CORDELL: Apropos of our conversation the other afternoon,⁵⁴ I wish you would explore, with the British, the question of what our plan is to be in Germany and Italy during the first few months after Germany's collapse.

I think you had better confer with Stimson about it too.

My thought is if we get a substantial meeting of the minds with the British that we should, then, take it up with the Russians.^{54a}

Cordially yours,

F[RANKLIN] D. R[OSEVELT]

840.50/2088

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] March 27, 1943.

Participants: President Roosevelt, Secretary of State Hull, The Right Honorable Anthony Eden, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, The British Ambassador, Lord

^{52b} March 27.

⁵³ Copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

⁵⁴ See memorandum by Mr. Hopkins dated March 17, p. 25.

^{54a} Secretary Hull in his *Memoirs*, vol. II, p. 1285, states that during the following months the subject was discussed intensively at the State Department with the British and Secretary Stimson and that a project had been drawn up and presented to the Russians at the Moscow Conference in October 1943. For text of the proposal, see vol. I, pp. 720–723. For documents on the administration of Italy presented at the Moscow Conference, see *ibid.*, pp. 715–719.

Halifax, Mr. Strang of the British Foreign Office, Ambassador Winant, Under Secretary Welles and Mr. Harry Hopkins

The President invited Mr. Eden, the British Ambassador and the Assistant Under Secretary in the British Foreign Office, Mr. Strang, and also Secretary Hull, Under Secretary Welles, Ambassador Winant and Mr. Harry Hopkins to a general conference at the White House on March twenty-seventh. In the course of the discussion, there were exchanges of comment on such subjects as the following :

Is China to be one of the four controlling powers after the war, and are we and the British in agreement to this effect? The affirmative view seemed to be the consensus of opinion.

Another question had to do with our joint or respective post-war policies relating to Manchuria, Korea, Formosa and Indochina. The President suggested that a trusteeship be set up for Indochina; that Manchuria and Formosa should be returned to China and that Korea might be placed under an international trusteeship, with China, the United States and one or two other countries participating. As to the disposition of the Japanese mandated islands, the President remarked that they should be internationalized for the purpose of keeping the peace. Mr. Eden indicated that he was favorably impressed with this proposal.

Another question was whether there was a meeting of the minds of the two Governments relative to the "policy of trusteeship" after the war. The President said that he had read a draft on the subject of dependent peoples, which the Secretary of State had handed to him and that it seemed to be all right, with the exception of two or three minor matters which he had noted. I remarked that it contemplated international supervision over all agencies dealing with dependent peoples, et cetera, except in cases of parent governments and their colonies, where it was proposed that international agencies might observe the entire operations of the parent government relating to each colony and make public any and all facts that it would have the public know, et cetera. It was agreed that a copy of this draft might be handed to the British but it was understood that this was not intended to be the final word on the matter.

The question of how to treat Germany after the war was again mentioned and the view expressed was in harmony with the attitude of both the President and Mr. Eden.

The question as to the policy toward France after the war was again touched upon, with no particular conclusions reached.

Something was said about the importance of international bases for the peace organization such as Dakar and Bizerte. There were a few general comments concerning the best procedure for discussion of post-

war civil aviation, shipping and communications, but nothing new was brought out. It was indicated that this Government has set up an interdepartmental committee, which for some weeks has been working on international civil aviation problems and in due time will be ready to confer with the British, the Russian and other representatives of the United Nations. The same thing was said to be true in regard to shipping and communications.

The President spoke at some length in regard to the structure of the United Nations organization.

These were the main topics briefly discussed, with no particular difference of opinion indicated so far as general principles were concerned.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Harry L. Hopkins, Special Assistant to President Roosevelt*⁵⁵

[WASHINGTON,] March 27, 1943.

Subject: Eden Visit—Conference with The President

Anthony Eden
Cordell Hull
Sumner Welles
Viscount Halifax
Mr. Strang

Hull raised the question of the 60 or 70 thousand Jews that are in Bulgaria and are threatened with extermination unless we could get them out and, very urgently, pressed Eden for an answer to the problem. Eden replied that the whole problem of the Jews in Europe is very difficult and that we should move very cautiously about offering to take all Jews out of a country like Bulgaria. If we do that, then the Jews of the world will be wanting us to make similar offers in Poland and Germany. Hitler might well take us up on any such offer and there simply are not enough ships and means of transportation in the world to handle them.

Eden said that the British were ready to take about 60 thousand more Jews to Palestine but the problem of transportation, even from Bulgaria to Palestine is extremely difficult. Furthermore, any such mass movement as that would be very dangerous to security because the Germans would be sure to attempt to put a number of their agents in the group. They have been pretty successful with this technique, both in getting their agents into North and South America.

Eden said that the forthcoming conferences in Bermuda on the whole refugee problem must come to grips with this difficult situation.

⁵⁵ Copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

Eden said he hoped that on our side we would not make too expansive promises which could not be delivered because of lack of shipping.

There was a general discussion about the organization of the United Nations after the war. The President and Welles were very emphatic that the United States could not be a member of any independent regional body such as a European Council; they felt that all the United Nations should be members of one body for the purposes of recommending policy; that this body should be world-wide in scope. 2. That there would be under this body regional councils with similar advisory powers made up of the nations geographically located in the regions; but, finally, that the real decisions should be made by the United States, Great Britain, Russia and China, who would be the powers for many years to come that would have to police the world.

The President was very insistent with Eden that China should be a member, altho it was clear to me that Eden still was not convinced of the wisdom of the procedure. The President feels that China, in any serious conflict of policy with Russia, would undoubtedly line up on our side.

I said that Churchill's speech ⁵⁶ in which he advocated a purely European Council of Nations, had a very unfortunate effect over here. Eden said he was sure Churchill had not meant to exclude the United States and that he rather felt that Churchill spoke on the spur of the moment and that he, Eden, agreed that the United Nations should be organized on a global basis.

The whole idea of the trusteeship of mandated islands, etc. was discussed and the President and Eden seemed to be much closer together than they were at the beginning of their conferences on this policy.

The President made it clear that he did not want a commitment made in advance that all those colonies in the Far East should go back to the countries which owned or controlled them prior to the war. He specifically mentioned Timor, Portugal, Indo-China and France. He suggested that all the specific problems which Mr. Eden had raised in his visit here be referred to the State Department and they asked to start exploratory discussions with the British or with any other country in regard to all of them.

I said I thought it would have a very bad effect, both in England and the United States, if the world got the impression that the United States and England were, together, planning the future of the world without consulting anyone else. Eden agreed to this and said the British were conducting direct conferences on matters that concerned them and Russia and he assumed we would do the same thing.

H[ARRY] L. H[OPKINS]

⁵⁶ Radio speech of March 21, 1943, on postwar policy; for text, see *Congressional Record*, vol. 89, pt. 9, p. A1366.

550.AD1/736

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] March 29, 1943.

[Extracts]

The British Ambassador and Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden called at their request. . . .

The British Ambassador said he was much interested in the draft on dependent peoples, which I had given to the President. He then inquired whether he could in strict confidence show this draft to the ministers of the British dominions. I agreed, adding with emphasis that this draft is not a final proposal or one on which any agreement is expected to be based, but only a draft, to which thought and attention might be given at this stage with the understanding that the President may have further views when the final recommendations are to be drawn up. The Ambassador and Mr. Eden said that they thoroughly understood this.

I again brought up the question of working out agreements for full and equal cooperation of our two Governments in conducting the political affairs behind the lines when and where our joint military forces occupy any enemy territory, et cetera. I said this would include Italy. The Ambassador and Mr. Eden said they would be glad to discuss all phases of this problem, but I gained the impression that the British really want to take the lead in conducting political affairs in Italy.

I then discussed at some length the question of making earnest and friendly representation to the Soviet Government by both Great Britain and the United States to the end that the Russian Government broaden its perspective and show some interest in the post-war world by working more closely with Great Britain, China and this country. I added that many people in this country are stating that Russia is saying almost nothing about her future plans and purposes and that, in fact, Russia will at the end of the war do as she pleases, take what she pleases and confer with nobody. The same people in this country add that this Government is spending between two and three hundred billions of dollars in supplying Russia and Great Britain with immense military supplies and that unless Russia shows some appreciation and speaks out in a spirit of teamwork and cooperation more fully both now and especially after the war, it will be difficult if hostilities should continue for some time to prevail on the American people to continue to furnish supplies to Russia, for example, with the understanding that they would get no recognition and that after the war, Russia would do what she pleases and take what she pleases.

Mr. Eden said that Russia in the meantime was killing Germans, to which I replied that, of course, we all knew this, but that those people who are dissatisfied with the failure of Russia to show any interest or concern about future joint efforts to promote peace and economic rehabilitation based on liberal commercial policies, find that nothing would be gained except that Russia and Great Britain will have succeeded in eliminating Germany. I made it clear that these were but illustrations of the efforts of troublemakers to stir up friction in the future and that while I felt that such efforts would not succeed to incite friction among the Allied governments, these activities might well in the end impede the prosecution of the war, assuming that it may be somewhat long drawn out, since domestic privations and distresses would result in a state of mind among those thus suffering, to follow agitators and critics in the most absurd directions. I closed by saying that it is most vital, assuming that the war is protracted, that the governments of Britain, Russia, China and the United States should tighten up their policies in regard to preventing criticisms of each other by their respective citizens, especially those coming under governmental attention and control. Mr. Eden and the Ambassador readily agreed to the importance of this new precaution.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

*Notes From President Roosevelt's Press Conference of March 30,
1943*^{56a}

Notes from Press Conference #888 held 3-30-43.

THE PRESIDENT: "Mr. Eden has left, and we decided that it was probably better not to give out one of those formal statements by the two of us. And he asked me to just talk to you all informally about it.

We are in entire agreement. We have had series—and he has had series of conferences with a lot of people—the Secretary of State, and his advisers, and the Members of the Senate and the House, and so forth; and he took a little trip to see some of the camps.

We talked about everything—which might be put down as current military and political affairs, and other questions arising out of the war relating to the present and the future. I think I can say for both of us that they disclose very close similarity of outlook on the part of the two governments, and a very fruitful meeting of the minds on all the matters that came under discussion.

We talked about the practical problems that will arise on the surrender of the enemy—problems that will face the governments of the United States, and United Kingdom, and China and Russia, and all

^{56a} Transmitted by President Roosevelt to Mr. Anthony Eden, through the British Embassy, March 30; copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

of the other United Nations, primarily in safeguarding the world from future aggression.

And I think I ought to make it clear—I think you should all make it clear—that these conversations are exploratory. The object of them was *not* to reach final decisions, which are of course impossible at this stage; but to reach a large measure of general agreement on objectives. So as to take time by the forelock, and as a result of these conferences, they will be of great aid in further conferences between all of the United Nations.

I also want to make it very clear that these conferences are by no means confined to the United Kingdom and the United States. They are merely one small part of the long series of conferences between the other United Nations.

We have talked, for example, rather intimately about these various subjects with China and with one or two of the South American Republics. Mr. Eden himself has been to Russia and talked in regard to many of these problems with Mr. Stalin, Mr. Molotov and other members of the Russian government.

I hope and expect that we will be continuing discussions along these lines with the Russian government in the very near future, and with other members of the United Nations. And therefore, these are—you might put it this way—these conversations constitute one method of working toward the unity of the United Nations, which is going along extremely well.

Some people ought to take note of that.

And the other method, of course, is through the more formal gathering, such as we will have next month with the United Nations, in regard to the subject of food, to be followed a little later by a similar one in regard to relief; and possibly a little later by another exploratory conference in regard to finances; and possibly another one in regard to things out of the ground. The food thing will probably include things that grow out of the ground, and the other conference would refer to things that come out from under the surface—minerals, metals, oil, and so forth.

So you see, the thing is progressing in a very satisfactory way.

If some of you go back—some of you can, like myself, go back to 1918, the war came to a rather sudden end in November, 1918. And actually it's a fact that there had been very little work done on the post-war problems before Armistice Day. Well, between Armistice Day and the time that the nations met in Paris early in 1919, everybody was rushing around trying to dig up things.

And the simile I used to Mr. Eden the other day was that—the tempo then seemed to be that of the lady who is told at noon that she is to accompany her husband on a month's trip on the three o'clock

train that afternoon. Well, I have seen ladies trying to pack for a month's trip in three hours. That was a little bit the situation over here, and everywhere else, in making preparations for the Versailles conference. Everybody was rushing around grabbing things out of closets and throwing them into suitcases. Some were not needed at all, and some needed things were left behind.

I have forgotten how many experts we took to Versailles at that time, but everybody who had a 'happy thought', or who thought he was an expert, got a free ride. (laughter)

And that is why I think that this whole method that is going on now is a very valuable thing, in an exploratory way; and incidentally, as I remarked the other day, in the process of getting to know each other.

I would put it—if you want to be didactic and put it in terms of figures, I would say that so far in all of the conferences that we have held with other members of the United Nations—this is not just the British—they come into it too—that we are about 95 percent together. Well, that's an amazing statement. It happens to be true. I wish some people would put that in their pipes and smoke it. (laughter)

So it was a very good conference."

033.4111 Eden, Anthony/29

The British Ambassador (Halifax) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, March 31, 1943.

DEAR MR. HULL: Mr. Eden has telegraphed to me from Ottawa, asking me to convey to you the following message from him:

"On leaving the United States after my brief but most fruitful visit, I wish to express my heartfelt gratitude for the unfailing kindness and open-hearted friendliness with which I have been everywhere received, and in particular for your own most generous welcome. The talks I have had in Washington have shown that we think alike on the problems that face us. I return to London with a new understanding of the policies and ideals of your government and people, and a deepened conviction that close collaboration between us is an indispensable basis for the development of common action by the United Nations now and after the war."

Mr. Eden suggests that, if you see no objection, it might be a good thing to publish the message, but leaves this to your decision.

If you agree, would you arrange to do so, presumably today.

At the same time Mr. Eden asks me to convey to you his warm and special thanks for the ready helpfulness of the members of the State Department to himself and his staff during his visit.

Yours sincerely,

HALIFAX

033.4111 Eden, Anthony/30

The Secretary of State to the British Ambassador (Halifax)

WASHINGTON, March 31, 1943.

DEAR LORD HALIFAX: Thank you for your note of today's date conveying the message from Mr. Eden, which I very much appreciate. I am going to ask you to send him the following reply in the hope that it might reach him before he leaves Canada:

"I said Good-bye to you at the Airport on Tuesday with very real regret. Your presence in Washington and the occasions it offered for exchanges of views has been a very real contribution to the cause we have in common. Thank you for your friendly note. I send with this an expression of warm regards to you and the members of your party who so much contributed to the discussions in Washington."

I remain, dear Mr. Ambassador,

Sincerely yours,

CORDELL HULL

740.0011 E.W. 1939/28755½

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] March 31, 1943.

The Soviet Ambassador called at my request. I said to him that the President and I were desirous of keeping him and his Government informed in every detail about our conversations with Anthony Eden, who has just left. I said to begin with that no agreements were entered into; that the conversations as a rule related to general principles and general ideas and policies with respect to the war or post-war situation; that I found in general there was agreement in principle; and that not one word was said that I would not be glad for Russia and China to know. I stated that I myself had nothing to do with any conversations pertaining to the military side of affairs at this time,—that the President and his military advisers deal with them here.

I said that among general views expressed were that it is all important that the four big nations, Russia, Great Britain, China and the United States, and in fact all the United Nations, must stand together during the war as well as after the war; that no two of them can control the post-war situation, except for a brief period of time at best, without the certainty that all people would feel that the world was again heading straight towards military destruction; that nobody would, therefore, plan ahead in a business way and that people with vision would become utterly discouraged with the world outlook and with their position in the world, with most unfortunate results. I said that with the world drawn so closely together and with its instruments of destruction so extensive it would be no easy undertaking

to preserve world order in the future and that, therefore, any one or even two governments undertaking to control the world along the course of peace, stability, security and prosperity would find it an impossible task within a very few years' time at the least. I said furthermore that such herculean efforts on the part of one or two countries would require permanent armaments by them on such a vast scale as to overburden their own people and hopelessly handicap their whole social and industrial progress. The Ambassador agreed. I further emphasized that I had said to Mr. Eden that it was an indispensable necessity that not two but all of our countries and governments should work together as one person if the war and post-war tasks were to be accomplished to a satisfactory extent. Mr. Eden agreed on this general proposition and while each of us expressed an anxious desire to work with Russia in the future and have Russia work with us, we also agreed that our two countries could and would thus work together as well.

I then remarked that inevitably agitators and trouble-making persons in my country, in Great Britain and in Russia alike perhaps will continue their chief avocation of stirring up trouble behind the military lines in political or social or other matters; that if the war goes on for some time, as it probably may, the populations of our respective countries suffering from their increasing privations and war burdens will be more and more susceptible to the preachments of these agitators. Therefore, in my opinion, it is highly important that each of our governments might well give increasing attention to restraining such activities before they reach a stage where the result would be materially handicapping in one way or another to the prosecution of the war. The Ambassador said he agreed with this view.

I also referred to our discussions with the British in regard to a formula for dealing with dependent peoples in all conditions and in doing so I explained that while, of course, no agreements were made and the entire matter was left open, there was discussion along these lines and up to the point contained in a draft of a plan which I sent to the President, the last draft of which was dated March ninth.⁵⁷ I made it clear that the President may have more advanced views on certain phases than are set out in the draft formula and that he is perfectly free to stand for them when further stages have been reached. Some time was taken in outlining the substance of this draft to the Ambassador.

I remarked that China had indicated during these conversations that she did not want any additional territory in Asia.

The Ambassador asked some questions about India⁵⁸ and I replied that everything practicable and feasible had been said by the Presi-

⁵⁷ Vol. I, p. 747.

⁵⁸ For correspondence regarding the situation in India, see vol. iv, pp. 178 ff.

dent and myself to the British but that, of course, it could not well be made public at this time. I stated that we may probably find Churchill at the peace conference and in any event we cannot have a serious breach, personal or political, with him now even if we were disposed to do so; that in brief we hoped to see a general forward movement around the world relating to an awakening among all dependent peoples and that we further hoped increased attention and aid and encouragement would be given to them by all of the more advanced nations.

There were other general remarks and questions and answers but they were of no unusual significance.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

033.4111 Eden, Anthony/10b : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom
(Matthews)*

WASHINGTON, April 1, 1943.

2019. The following telegram for the personal and confidential information of our Ambassador to the U.S.S.R.⁵⁹ is repeated for your personal and confidential information :

"Mr. Eden left today⁶⁰ for Canada on his way home after a visit of about 2 weeks. You are authorized to convey the following information to the Soviet Government :

The conversations Mr. Eden had here with the President and high officials of this Government provided an exchange of views with regard to such matters as cooperation between the Governments with respect to political questions arising in connection with the prosecution of the war, particularly in enemy territories and territories occupied by the enemy, and methods of insuring discussion and coordination of policies in connection with such military operations especially where the armed forces of the United States and Great Britain have a joint responsibility. As a specific instance, the necessity for coordination of policy as to political developments was applied to the present North African situation.

These discussions brought out very clearly the fact that nothing could be more detrimental to the common war effort than the support by Great Britain and the United States of different political factions or groups in the areas in which British and American military operations are being carried on or are in contemplation.

The conversations also provided an occasion for an exchange of ideas in the most tentative form without any commitments whatever with regard to the general lines along which world security should be organized.

⁵⁹ Adm. William H. Standley.

⁶⁰ Mr. Eden left March 30 ; there was an apparent delay in sending this telegram after it was drafted.

Reference was made also to the forthcoming food conference⁶¹ and the suggestion that this conference would very likely be followed by others on various subjects. In passing, mention was also made of some of the problems which will be necessary to face after the war such as civil aviation and shipping and the assistance which would have to be given to some of the countries in order to restore the tonnage lost by them during the war.

Another subject which came up for discussion in the most general way was the preparation of Colonial territories and dependent peoples for eventual responsibility of self-government.

You may inform the Soviet Government that while there was a full and frank exchange of views during these conversations, they were on the most general lines and that no attempt was made to formulate any decisions or agreements and no commitments whatever were taken by either Government."

HULL

033.4111 Eden, Anthony/34

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] April 24, 1943.

The Brazilian Ambassador⁶² called to see me this afternoon at his request. The Ambassador gave me to read a personal letter which he had received from President Vargas in which the latter stated that the Brazilian Government believed that this Government must have entered into at least some tentative agreements with the British Government during the course of Mr. Eden's visit to Washington and, if that were the case, that the Brazilian Government would like to have as much information as possible with regard to such agreements.

I told the Ambassador that, as I had previously said to him, no agreements of any character were entered into while Mr. Eden was here. I said the visit had been solely for the purpose of exchanging views with regard to present and future problems with which the British and United States Governments would be confronted, and for the purpose of discussing the most practical solutions which could be found for these problems. I said that, as the President had publicly announced, it had been gratifying to discover that the British Government and our own were very much in accord as to policies and solutions. I said that I wished he would make it clear to President Vargas that there was no Government to which the United States Government would more quickly turn for advice and consultation, in the event that it was prepared to enter into agreements of the kind suggested, than to the

⁶¹ For correspondence on the United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture held at Hot Springs, Va., May 18-June 3, 1943, see vol. I, pp. 820 ff.

⁶² Carlos Martins.

Brazilian Government, and that the President of Brazil could further rest assured that it was the desire and purpose of this Government to have the fullest kind of consultation with all of the other nineteen American Republics which were siding with the United Nations in the present war with regard to every aspect of the post-war policy just as soon as this Government found itself in a position to do so with any precision.

The Ambassador said he fully understood the situation and would inform his President in that sense.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

PROBLEMS RELATING TO THE MUTUAL AID PROGRAM; ACQUISITION OF RAW MATERIALS AS RECIPROCAL AID FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM, SOUTHERN RHODESIA, AND BRITISH COLONIES; CONCERN OF THE UNITED STATES OVER BRITISH GOLD AND DOLLAR BALANCES⁶⁴

*Report of Interdepartmental Committee to President Roosevelt on Policy Decisions Relating to Dollar Position of Lend-Lease Countries*⁶⁴

WASHINGTON, January 1, 1943.

A committee consisting of representatives of the Departments of State, Treasury and War, the Office of Lend-Lease Administration and the Board of Economic Warfare, undertook to consider the following four problems:

1. The appropriate level of the gold and dollar balances of the United Kingdom. Should these balances be allowed to increase further or should an effort be made to hold them at approximately the present level or should they be reduced?

2. The desirability of continuing lend-lease exports to South Africa in view of the present size and rate of increase of the gold holdings of that country.⁶⁵

3. The extent to which in the formulation of lend-lease policy for sterling area countries the gold and dollar position of each of these countries should be considered as separate from that of the United Kingdom.

4. In granting lend-lease assistance to countries outside the British Empire, should their holdings of gold and dollar balances be taken into consideration?

⁶⁴ For previous correspondence on mutual aid, see *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. I, pp. 525 ff. and pp. 537 ff.; for related correspondence, see *ibid.*, 1943, vol. I, pp. 1054 ff. and pp. 1099 ff.

⁶⁵ Copy obtained from the Records of the Foreign Economic Administrator in the National Archives.

⁶⁶ See section entitled "Discussions between the United States and the Union of South Africa regarding conclusion of a reciprocal aid agreement and regarding war production in the Union of South Africa," pp. 173 ff.

Recommendations made in this report are based on the recognition that the purpose of the Lend-Lease Act ⁶⁶ is to provide our Allies with the goods and services that they need for the most vigorous prosecution of the war. They are based on the assumption that our arrangements with lend-lease countries should be so conducted as to maintain their gold and dollar balances at a level consistent with the above objective.

1. *The United Kingdom*

The United Kingdom held, as of November 30, 1942, an aggregate of \$928 million of gold and dollar balances as follows:

	(In millions)
Gold	\$702
Dollar balances	226
Total	\$928

This total of \$928 million represents an increase of \$770 million from the low point of May 1941 and an increase of \$430 million since January 1942. Whether or not these holdings will increase in the near future depends on a number of factors within the control of the United States Government such as the volume of lend-lease aid, the volume of United States purchases and the dollar expenditures of and for our troops. It also depends on certain factors largely beyond our control, of which an example is the proposed substantial payment by the United Kingdom to Canada.

Judging the total British position at this time, we conclude that the balances now held by United Kingdom are adequate. In this connection, it will be recalled that in the Spring of 1941 the British suggested that they should have a "minimum working balance of \$600 million required to meet contingencies everywhere".

Recommendation

It is recommended, in the light of present circumstances, that the United Kingdom's gold and dollar balances should not be permitted to be less than about \$600 million nor above about \$1 billion.

2. *The Union of South Africa*

Gold holdings of South Africa have risen from approximately \$220 million in September 1939 to more than \$600 million in November 1942. In addition, South Africa has repurchased about \$160 million of government securities formerly held in the United Kingdom, as well as substantial amounts of gold mining securities.

South Africa's gold production is not expected to diminish greatly below the present all time high of \$500 million per year. Even if gold production were to be drastically curtailed, South Africa would

⁶⁶ March 11, 1941; 55 Stat. 31.

scarcely be hindered in her prosecution of the war because of any shortage of foreign exchange.

Lend-Lease exports to South Africa were unimportant until May 1942. Since then they have increased steadily. In October, 76 percent of United States exports to South Africa were on lend-lease account and 43 percent of the non-military items exported under lend-lease. These goods are lend-leased to Great Britain for the Union of South Africa, but they are shipped directly to the latter country. In the case of non-military goods, a large part is distributed by South African Government through normal commercial channels.

In view of the large gold balances of South Africa, lend-lease aid to that country, considered by itself, cannot be justified on foreign exchange rounds. It has been urged that political considerations make it important that lend-lease aid should be extended. There is, however, evidence to indicate that the Union Government is willing and eager to finance the purchase of war materials with its own resources.

Recommendations

a. It is recommended, as long as South African balances remain at or near their present high levels, lend-lease non-military exports to South Africa on a credit basis, either directly or indirectly through the British, be discontinued and that negotiations to this end be started at once.

b. It is further recommended that a Lend-Lease Agreement with South Africa be negotiated providing for lend-lease military aid to that country and reciprocal aid to the United States in the form of strategic materials.

3. The British Empire and its Parts

The present financial arrangements with the British appear to be rather inconsistent. When the British request that additional lend-lease aid be granted and that they be relieved of the necessity of making various dollar payments, they count only the United Kingdom's gold and dollar balances and most of the dollar receipts of the sterling area as being available. They exclude the gold and dollar holdings of South Africa, Australia, New Zealand and India which together are at least as large as those of the United Kingdom. When, however, they compute the dollar expenditures which must be made, the British count not only the payments which the United Kingdom must make, but also the payments which their Dominions and Possessions, including South Africa must make.

It would seem that the correct procedure is to make lend-lease arrangements either with any part, or with the whole of the sterling area, and to vary the arrangements so as to fit the ability of the part, or the whole, to pay for goods and services. If Great Britain is to

act for the whole Empire, the assets of all the members of the Empire should, it seems, be considered as well as their aggregate net need for foreign exchange. The same would hold for any part of the Empire for which Britain makes lend-lease arrangements.

Recommendation

It is recommended that the United States Treasury initiate and continue discussions with the Financial representatives of South Africa, Australia and New Zealand concerning their respective gold and dollar positions. Whether or not similar procedure should be adopted with British India rests upon the decision of the State Department concerning the expediency of such procedure with India at this time.

4. *Non-British Countries Receiving Lend-Lease Aid*

Thirty-six non-British Empire countries received \$1.5-\$2 billion of lend-lease assistance through November 1942. Among them are countries with substantial gold and dollar holdings.

Recommendation

It is recommended that consideration in the determination of lend-lease policy should be given to the gold and dollar position as well as to all of the relevant factors.

5. *Continuing Review*

In order to implement the policy decided upon concerning the appropriate amount of gold and dollar balances to be held by various countries receiving lend-lease aid, it is necessary to have a closer degree of coordinated effort by the various departments making decisions affecting the dollar position of these countries and to give consideration to the ways in which that policy shall be implemented. It is also necessary to be informed concerning the countries to which lend-lease aid is being granted, either directly or indirectly.

If the balance rises above the upper limit decided upon by the policy committee, the most feasible method of reducing the contribution of the United States seems to be the following:

- (a) Reduction in lend-lease exports of non-military goods.
- (b) Procurement of strategic materials and other non-military supplies as reciprocal aid.
- (c) Receipt as reciprocal aid of sterling to finance expenditures of American Armed Forces abroad.

Recommendation

It is therefore recommended that the Cabinet group appoint a permanent subcommittee under the chairmanship of the Treasury charged with the responsibility of making recommendations to this Cabinet group with respect to the implementation of policies relating to the above problems, and that the Secretary of the Treasury take the

necessary steps to obtain from each of the United Nations the information on their foreign exchange resources needed for the work of the subcommittee.

CORDELL HULL
Secretary of State
 HENRY L. STIMSON
Secretary of War

H. A. WALLACE
Vice President
 D. W. BELL
Acting Secretary of Treasury
 E. R. STETTINIUS, JR.
Lend-Lease Administrator

If you approve of these recommendations we shall be glad if you will so indicate below.

The White House
 Approved: FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

JANUARY 1, 1943

841.24/1738

The United Kingdom Treasury Representative, British Supply Council (Phillips) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Acheson)

WASHINGTON, January 28, 1943.

DEAR MR. ACHESON: I was informed some days ago by the Treasury that it was the intention of the United States Government so to regulate the administration of Lend Lease as to insure that our gold and dollar balances did not rise above \$1000 million or fall below \$600 million. We have not so far had an opportunity of discussing this policy with the interested Departments of the United States Government. The Chancellor⁶⁷ has asked me to represent that no announcement of any such policy should be made to Congress until it has been discussed between us and is a matter of common agreement. I believe, in fact, that it is not the Treasury's intention to announce this policy.

I have already written on this subject to Mr. Stettinius and Mr. Bell, but as I understand that you are about to give evidence before the Congressional Committee on the Lend Lease Bill,⁶⁸ I am taking this opportunity of conveying the Chancellor's request to you also.⁶⁹

Yours sincerely,

F. PHILLIPS

⁶⁷ Sir Kingsley Wood, British Chancellor of the Exchequer.

⁶⁸ Assistant Secretary of State Acheson made statements on behalf of extension of the Lend-Lease Act of March 11, 1941, on February 3 and 4, 1943, before the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives. For texts, see *Extension of Lend-Lease Act: Hearings Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 78th Cong., 1st sess., on H. R. 1501, pp. 81-135.*

⁶⁹ Marginal notation reads: "I spoke to Sir Frederick [Phillips] in person D[ean] A[cheson]".

841.24/2100

Mr. Edward C. Acheson, Economic Adviser on Reciprocal Aid to the Office of Lend Lease Administration, to the Assistant Secretary of State (Acheson)

WASHINGTON, June 21, 1943.

DEAR DEAN: You will recall that several days ago you had a meeting with Messrs. Stettinius, McCloy⁷⁰ and Harriman⁷¹ at which was discussed the matter of urging the British to make available to us the figures which they undoubtedly have with respect to cost of goods and services delivered to us as reciprocal Lend Lease. I attach the memorandum which was the basis of discussion at the meeting referred to.

We would be obliged to have you call the matter to the attention of the British Ambassador⁷² in whatever manner you think is appropriate to accomplish the desired end. If you will inform us when this has been done we will arrange to cable Harriman in order that he may discuss the matter with Sir Kingsley Wood.

I believe that it is generally agreed that:

1. There are some items of aid which, in the nature of things it is extremely difficult to value fairly; such, for instance, as the supplying of valuable information, the use of permanent or semi-permanent camps and air fields, which were turned over in whole or in part to U.S. forces;

2. These items can best be recorded as "out-of-pocket expenses" with no attempt to allocate the value of services rendered by these installations;

3. There is also, I believe, general agreement that it might be well to leave a considerable area of uncertainty in order to prevent too mathematical a comparison of aid given and received;

4. Furthermore, we feel the British should be reassured that while we would like to have the maximum amount of information made available for our confidential use, they will be consulted as to the amount of information which it is desirable from time to time make public.

We think these points might be made clear in your discussion of the subject with the British Ambassador rather than spelled out in the memorandum itself.

Mr. Denby⁷³ and I will be glad to discuss this with you further when we see you tomorrow.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD CAMPION ACHESON

⁷⁰ John J. McCloy, Assistant Secretary of War.

⁷¹ W. Averell Harriman, the President's Special Representative in London, with the rank of Minister, to deal with all matters relating to Lend-Lease for the British Empire.

⁷² Viscount Halifax.

⁷³ Charles Denby, Assistant Lend-Lease Administrator.

[Enclosure—Memorandum]

MONETARY VALUATION OF RECIPROCAL AID

For some time we have weighed the wisdom of placing a monetary valuation on the Reciprocal Aid afforded us by our Allies. A year ago there seemed to be excellent reasons for refraining from valuing this assistance in monetary terms: today those reasons have either ceased to exist or have lost much of their efficacy through subsequent circumstances. Hence, we have now come to the conclusion that much can be gained by making public in a thoroughly understandable fashion the magnitude of the aid we have received, and we most strongly urge our Allies to make available whatever figures they may have accumulated.

Our reason for this alteration in policy is the alteration in the facts surrounding our operation. We now feel that only by a monetary comparison can the American people be convinced that the United Nations are actually pooling their resources. We now feel that a system of accounting in which dollars are placed vis-à-vis quantities opens both our Allies and the Lend-Lease Administration to a charge of evasion. We feel that the considerable interest in monetary value of Reciprocal Aid which has been repeatedly expressed in both houses of Congress may, quite rightly, and very shortly, crystallize into a demand for the data. We consider it only wise to begin now the accumulation of these figures. Finally and most earnestly, we feel that, since the terms of the Master Agreements exclude the possibility of translating the Lend-Lease Reciprocal Aid accounts into a debt, the Congress and the American public not only have the right to know but the duty to learn the magnitude of the sacrifice which our Allies have sustained to further our war effort.

For the foregoing reasons, we are convinced that monetary valuations should be compiled and suggest that, in the furtherance of international amity and in the light of Lend-Lease commitments to Congress, our Allies, through the medium of the August Lend-Lease Report, make public all figures they may deem it wise to disclose. These figures will undoubtedly be estimates. They will bind no one to anything. They will be expressed in terms of the foreign currency without reference to a specific rate of conversion. They will be comparable to Lend-Lease figures which are expressed in dollars and which our Allies neither accept nor reject, since in nature of the Master Agreements the value thus expressed is "charged" against no foreign account.

With this first step, we will have gone a long way to dissipate the mystery and secrecy concerning Reciprocal Aid. We will have demonstrated beyond any doubt that Lend-Lease is no longer a unilateral arrangement. We will have vividly shown that the word

"charity" is wholly inapplicable and that "generosity" is universal among united nations. In subsequent reports to the Congress, we can make a fuller and fuller disclosure, in terms which the man in the street can understand, of the part our Allies have played in strengthening America's hand in the common cause.

JUNE 14, 1943.

800.24/1013

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State
(Acheson)*

[WASHINGTON,] June 25, 1943.

Participants: Sir Frederick Phillips
Mr. Redvers Opie, Counselor, The British Embassy
Mr. Stettinius, Lend-Lease Administrator
Dr. Feis ⁷⁴
Mr. Acheson

Sir Frederick Phillips and Mr. Opie called at their request. They had previously asked me to invite Mr. Stettinius to be present. They referred to a conversation between the British Ambassador and Mr. Harry Hopkins,⁷⁵ in which the latter had strongly urged the importance of the British Government's extending its reciprocal lend-lease to the raw materials which were imported from the British Empire to the United States under public purchase. These materials amounted to about \$200,000,000 a year. Sir Frederick wished to state, as he had already stated to the Treasury which had also made this request to him, the reasons why the British Government found difficulty in acceding to it.

He said that, while the dollar and gold assets of the United Kingdom had grown since the inauguration of the lend-lease program to a point where at the end of 1943 they would amount to approximately \$1,000,000 [*\$1,000,000,000?*] with certain deductions which the British Treasury felt necessary to make to meet liabilities for gold payments, the British current liabilities to other parts of the world would increase during 1943 at the rate of \$3,200,000,000. Against these liabilities, the British Treasury concluded that it had quickly realizable securities in the amount of \$600,000,000. This left the net increase in their liabilities at \$2,600,000,000.

The British Treasury felt that there was imminent danger of a refusal of its other creditors to accept a substantial sterling balance unless one of two courses were followed. The first was to use a part of the million-dollar [*billion-dollar*] gold and dollar assets to make payments on account. The second was to permit those balances to

⁷⁴ Herbert Feis, Adviser on International Economic Affairs.

⁷⁵ Special Assistant to President Roosevelt.

accumulate as a reserve against which such payments might be made when needed. For this reason the British Treasury was very hesitant about agreeing to pay in sterling for the public purchases of raw materials made by this country, since to do so would both increase its sterling liabilities and decrease the accumulation of gold and dollar assets.

Mr. Stettinius and Mr. Acheson explained that in the discussions which they have had with the members of the Congress during the legislation for the extension of lend-lease and during the hearings upon the recent appropriation for lend-lease, the question of payment by the United States for the raw materials purchased by this Government had been repeatedly raised. They explained that the general principle of pooling materials for the conduct of the war was one which the Congress was willing to accept. They explained the highly favorable impression which was made upon the Congress by the extent of the British reciprocal lend-lease to the United States. They explained further that our payment for the imported raw materials purchased by the Government was a matter which it was very difficult, if not impossible, for the Congress to understand. It seemed to the Congress a clear exception to the principle of pooling resources. It involved comparatively speaking a small amount and it continually distracted the attention of the members of Congress from the large amounts of assistance being given us by the British to the one instance where we are requested to pay for materials, part of which were returned to the British through lend-lease. Mr. Stettinius strongly urged that the political effect of the British transferring these materials under reverse lend-lease would far exceed the deleterious effects of the financial outlay and would greatly assist him in maintaining lend-lease assistance at a high level.

Further conversation revealed other grounds for Sir Frederick's concern about this proposal. He asked whether, in the event that notwithstanding their requested action the British balance should continue to grow, this Government would apply continued pressure upon the British Government to keep them at or about the present balance. In other words, he seemed to regard the difficulties presented by the proposal as not limited to those rising from the proposal itself, but also from the point of view of the proposal as a first step in a continued policy of restricting the growth of British balances.

It was explained to Sir Frederick that there undoubtedly would be continued pressure of the sort mentioned by him under the circumstances mentioned by him. But it was also pointed out that, in considering what steps could or should be taken in regard to the growth of the British balance, it would make a great deal of difference whether or not this country was contributing directly to that growth by the purchase of essential imports and whether or not the

British Government was doing everything in its power to furnish reciprocal aid to the United States. In other words, it was made clear to him that no commitment could be made regarding future action but also that, if the balance were increased by our payments for public purchases, the pressure for some sort of reduction of lend-lease would be almost irresistible.

Sir Frederick inquired as to the amounts involved in public purchases, and Mr. Stettinius undertook to provide him with a list. Sir Frederick and Mr. Opie said that they were departing shortly for London where they would discuss this matter with the Chancellor, and that they believed that the discussion had been clarifying and helpful.

Sir Frederick informed us that he had been discussing with the Treasury the matter of British and probably ourselves selling gold in the Middle East as a means of combatting inflation and bringing materials out of hoarding. He also mentioned the British request to the Treasury for silver and lend-lease for India.⁷⁶ These requests amount to four million ounces a month for coinage and 100 million ounces as a reserve for sale upon the market in India in the event the price of silver should threaten to get out of hand. This matter is dormant in the Treasury at the time being, pending the action of Congress upon the so-called Green bill.⁷⁷

DEAN ACHESON

841.24/2039b

The Department of State to the British Embassy

MEMORANDUM

Lord Halifax will remember that Mr. Acheson has earlier discussed with him the question of announcing monetary figures which would, as far as possible, indicate the impressive scope of the reciprocal aid extended to the United States by the United Kingdom. It was felt then that it might be difficult for Congress and the United States public to grasp the extent of reciprocal aid if it is presented to them only in computations with which they are unfamiliar.

Since that conversation, hearings have been held before Committees of both Houses of Congress in connection with the extension of, and appropriations under, the Lend-Lease Act.⁷⁸ The testimony of Major

⁷⁶ For correspondence concerning lend-lease aid to India and reciprocal aid, see vol. iv, pp. 246 ff.

⁷⁷ Reference is to S. 35 introduced on January 7, 1943, by Senator Theodore F. Green of Rhode Island. After emendation in the Senate it passed both Houses of Congress, received Presidential approval on July 12, 1943, and became Public Law 137, an Act to authorize the use for war purposes of silver held or owned by the United States; 57 Stat. 520.

⁷⁸ The Lend-Lease Act was originally passed on March 11, 1941; 55 Stat. 31. It was extended on March 11, 1943; 57 Stat. 20. Appropriations were provided on June 14, 1943; 57 Stat. 151.

Spiegelberg⁷⁹ on the aid given our armed forces in Great Britain aroused great interest, both in Congress and in the country at large. It seems evident that few people had had any real notion of the volume of this aid. There was also expressed, in Congress and in the press, the strong feeling that monetary values should be placed on reciprocal aid, so that its volume could be easily comprehended. It is clear that Congress and the press find it difficult to understand why such estimates can not be provided, and it is feared that failure to provide them may result in suspicion and an atmosphere of mystery which will obscure the success with which United Nations' resources are being pooled.

The Government of the United States hopes, therefore, that the British Government will find it possible to assemble and, to the extent compatible with military security, make public figures with respect to the cost of goods and services delivered as reciprocal Lend-Lease. These figures could be in terms of sterling, without reference to a specific conversion rate. Such estimates will, of course, be impossible in the case of certain types of aid, notably the provision of information, upon which values can be placed only with difficulty, if at all. It would seem desirable, as the figures mentioned above are released, to describe the nature and extent of that aid which is not susceptible of description in precise monetary terms.

It is hoped that the British Government will find it possible to make available such a report at a sufficiently early date so that it could be included in the quarterly report on Lend-Lease operations which will be submitted to Congress in August of this year. Of course no figures on the reciprocal aid received by the United States from the United Kingdom would be released without the fullest discussion with the British Government.

Mr. Averell Harriman has, in the past, discussed this question with Sir Kingsley Wood, and will shortly do so again.

WASHINGTON, June 29, 1943.

841.24/2037

*Memorandum by Mr. Theodore C. Achilles of the Division of European Affairs*⁸⁰

[WASHINGTON,] June 30, 1943.

The principle of the Eden White Paper of September 10, 1941,⁸¹ by which the British Government undertakes not to export, with

⁷⁹ Maj. George A. Spiegelberg, Recorder of the General Purchasing Board in the European Theater, United States Army. For the text of his testimony, see *Extension of Lend-Lease Act: Hearings Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs*, 78th Cong., 1st sess., on H.R. 1501, pp. 49-79.

⁸⁰ Addressed to the Secretary of State and the Assistant Secretary of State (Acheson).

⁸¹ For text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, September 13, 1941, p. 204; Anthony Eden was British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

certain stated exceptions, materials in short supply in the United States which are being received under Lend-Lease,⁸² is regarded both by this Government and by the British Government as essential in combatting the charges that Lend-Lease goods are being used by the British for commercial exports to third countries.

At the same time its operation is considered unsatisfactory by both Governments. From our point of view, the extent of British compliance is questionable. From their point of view, the Paper is an aggravating check-rein on their already reduced exports and "policing" of it involves extensive red tape and a slight reflection on British honor. Each Government is actively considering, from opposing points of view, the possibility of a new statement of policy to take the place of the White Paper.

Mr. Magowan, Board of Trade Minister in the British Embassy, states that the Embassy has had considerable telegraphic correspondence with London and that a proposal for a new declaration is about to be made to us on a very high level. The Office of Lend-Lease Administration is also working on a new declaration but it will not be ready for some time.

If the British Government agrees to this Government's proposal that it furnish as reciprocal aid raw materials from Empire sources in anticipated amounts of some \$200,000,000 annually, the situation will be radically altered. The British would then be justified in asking us for a similar declaration that we would not utilize raw materials obtained as reciprocal aid in exports to third countries.

With each Government supplying raw materials to the other on Lend-Lease terms a simple reciprocal statement of policy that each Government would utilize materials furnished by the other in furtherance of the war effort, in ways which would most efficiently utilize manpower, production capacity and shipping space, and ~~not for commercial advantage~~ should meet the situation. Such an arrangement would ~~probably~~ not require "policing" by either Government.

It is accordingly hoped that the British proposal which is to be made shortly "at a very high level" will not be accepted pending the British Government's acceptance of our request for raw materials as reciprocal aid. You may wish to speak to the President or Mr. Hopkins about it.⁸³

⁸² For correspondence on this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. III, pp. 16-36.

⁸³ A marginal notation by Mr. Acheson indicated his agreement with the suggestion that the Secretary might wish to mention the subject taken up in the final three paragraphs with the President. No record has been found in Department files to indicate that this was done.

811.24/1850a

Memorandum From Mr. Harry Dexter White, Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury (Morgenthau), to the Chief of the Financial Division (Livesey)

WASHINGTON, July 8, 1943.

Please transmit the following cable to Ambassador Winant from the Secretary of the Treasury.⁸⁴

Halifax has informed me that you or Averell Harriman are to discuss with the Chancellor of the Exchequer the advisability of extending the scope of the reciprocal aid program to cover certain U.S. imports from the British Empire.

For your information, the developments to date have been:

An Interdepartmental Committee consisting of representatives of the Departments of State, Treasury and War, the Office of Lend-Lease Administration and the Board of Economic Warfare was established last December to deal with matters concerning our policy of financial assistance to our Allies. Britain's gold and dollar balances are rising and Lend-Lease Administration is very eager for political reasons to have the British agree to the extension of the reciprocal lend-lease program to cover purchases of certain goods being made by the United States in British Empire countries. After considering the matter from all angles, the Interdepartmental Committee decided to explore the possibility of reducing Britain's current dollar receipts during the coming year by \$200-\$300 million through this procedure. On May 27 we wrote a letter to Sir Frederick Phillips⁸⁵ advising him of the Committee's decision and asking him for his views on the subject.

Phillips had informed us prior to his departure for London that Halifax had received a memorandum from London which he would submit to the appropriate Government official upon his return from the Mid-West. Halifax, however, says that Phillips is taking up this matter in London and that he, Halifax, has received a cable to the effect that you or Harriman are to talk to Sir Kingsley Wood about it. I should appreciate anything you can do to speed the British reply.

800.24/1047½

The British Embassy to the Department of State

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have realised for some months that their war-time export policy needs some re-statement. One of the most important public documents on this subject, the White Paper of September, 1941, has proved difficult of administration in detail. Moreover there have been so many developments since that time that its inappropriateness is already a cause of political difficulty in the United Kingdom and threatens to become an

⁸⁴ This message was sent as telegram No. 4206, July 10, midnight, to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom.

⁸⁵ No copy of this letter found in Department files.

increasing embarrassment to Anglo-American relations. Chief of these developments are:—

(1) The United States and the United Kingdom are now co-belligerents in a common war against the Axis powers and are pooling their resources to that end.

(2) Combined organisations have been set up which have as their defined purposes to plan the best and speediest development, expansion and use of the resources under the jurisdiction or control of the two Governments.

(3) As a result of growing pressure upon the resources of manpower, materials and productive capacity, the volume of goods available for export either from the United States or from the United Kingdom has been greatly diminished. The problem facing both countries is now one of meeting the essential requirements of third countries from their joint resources; competition for export markets is no longer an important factor.

The White Paper was conceived and issued in circumstances quite different from those described above, and His Majesty's Government desire to discuss with the United States Government the proposal that a fresh statement of United Kingdom export policy be issued which would maintain the essential principle governing the use of Lend-Lease supplies and at the same time take account of the developments above-mentioned. In particular His Majesty's Government attach importance to the principle that no advantage in world markets shall accrue to either country at the expense of the other by reason of sacrifices made in the interest of the effective prosecution of the war.⁸⁶

WASHINGTON, July 9, 1943.

800.24/1024½

*The British Embassy to the Department of State*⁸⁷

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have been examining the question of their commercial relations with Latin America. The prime concern of His Majesty's Government in Latin America is with the successful prosecution of the war. Concentration upon the war effort has had as in the case of the United States of

⁸⁶ Revision of the British White Paper of September 10, 1941, was a continual subject of discussion on the intra- as well as the inter-governmental levels until the end of the war, although no formal alteration was ever agreed upon. Under date of December 8, 1944, Mr. Harry L. Whitney, Director of the White Paper Policy Staff of the Foreign Economic Administration, compiled a "History of the Administration of the British White Paper of September 10, 1941". On page 5 of his compilation, regarding the draft replies drawn up to answer this *aide-mémoire* of July 9, Mr. Whitney says: "Some of these drafts were tentatively submitted to the British for their opinion but the British did not approve and nothing happened." This compilation is located in the records of the Foreign Economic Administrator in the National Archives.

⁸⁷ Handed to the Secretary of State by the British Ambassador on July 10, 1943.

America the effect of disrupting traditional trade relations. In particular, exports of United Kingdom goods to Latin America have been most severely curtailed; in the case of some commodities they have practically ceased. But if, after the sacrifices of the war, British economic life is to be restored, British long-term commercial interests in Latin America will have to be maintained and developed. His Majesty's Government feel it is of the highest importance that this development should take place with the understanding and sympathy of the United States Government. His Majesty's Government therefore wish the United States Government to be fully informed of what steps they are taking and for what reasons.

If the balance of British payments, on which the British standard of life must depend, is to be restored to equilibrium after the war, it will be essential not merely to re-establish British export trade but to increase it materially above the pre-war level. Some doubts about the re-establishment of the United Kingdom trade position after the war are arising in the minds of British communities in Latin America, of United Kingdom traders generally, and of the Latin Americans themselves. They are impressed by the drying up of British commercial activity. The personnel and members of British diplomatic missions who deal with commercial matters have been diverted from their normal duties to others connected with economic warfare. British nationals formerly employed in South America in trade have been called up for service with the armed forces. All this contributes to create uncertainty whether British policy will not lead to the permanent loss by Great Britain after the war of markets in Latin America.

There has at the same time been an increase in the activities of many United States agencies, both governmental and private, engaged in the promotion of United States exchanges with Latin America. This has given rise to an impression, however false, that there may be some desire on the American side to supplant British traders in their established and traditional markets, not only for the war period but permanently thereafter. Any such impression must clearly involve a risk of friction which His Majesty's Government are most anxious to avoid, and which would run counter to their aim of general collaboration between the United States and themselves in all fields.

His Majesty's Government are well aware that any such impression is unfounded, and that it is not the policy of the United States Government to eliminate British traders from their legitimate markets. They know that the United States Government regard the general extension of post-war trade as the common objective. They believe that the United States Government share with them the view that Great Britain should participate in this expansion in markets generally, including those in Latin America. The meeting of Ministers

of Foreign Affairs at Rio in January, 1942⁸⁸ recommended the development of the natural resources of the American Republics, and indeed these have reached in their economic development a stage where a very considerable expansion appears not only desirable but inevitable. His Majesty's Government have abundant proof that these Republics are as anxious to expand their trade with Great Britain as His Majesty's Government are to expand their trade with them.

While His Majesty's Government will continue to regard the successful prosecution of the war as their prime concern in Latin America or elsewhere, they have accordingly decided to make it clear to the countries of Latin America and to the British communities in them that they retain their commercial interest in these countries. With this end in view His Majesty's Government intend to increase their overseas commercial organisation in preparation for resumption after the war of the work for which it was primarily intended, and for the demands which will be made upon it by those who wish to trade with Great Britain in the post-war period. At the same time they will assist British business firms to conduct advertising designed to keep alive their interest in Latin American markets and the interest of Latin America in British trade connexions. This advertising will, as in the case of advertising by United States firms, support friendly newspapers and serve to support the cause of the United Nations. His Majesty's Government are most anxious in these activities to cooperate closely with the United States authorities.

In the light of the above His Majesty's Government take the opportunity to enquire whether the United States Government would be favourably disposed to the suggestion that instructions analogous to those given recently in respect of Canada,⁸⁹ should be given to American missions, agencies and individuals in Latin America. These might lay down the principle that in all economic matters the underlying policy of both governments is to endeavour to ensure that no advantage in the overseas market shall be accounted to either country at the expense of the other, by reason of sacrifices made in the interest and the effective prosecution of the war, and that no advantage is taken by the nationals of either country at the expense of the other.⁹⁰

WASHINGTON, July 9, 1943.

⁸⁸ For correspondence on the Third Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the American Republics held at Rio de Janeiro, January 15-28, 1942, see *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. v, pp. 6 ff.

⁸⁹ For information regarding Canadian cooperation concerning programming of exports to Latin America, see circular airgram, April 29, printed in vol. v, section entitled "Arrangements regarding the control of exports from the United States".

⁹⁰ Although the Secretary of State in a conversation with the British Ambassador on July 10 promised to give the subject "the most careful attention", no further documents concerning this matter have been found in Department files; memorandum of conversation of July 10 not printed.

811.24/1850a

*Memorandum by the Adviser on International Economic Affairs
(Feis) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Acheson)*

[WASHINGTON,] July 9, 1943.

MR. ACHESON: I think you may want to give some consideration to the text of this cable which White sent over to Livesey for transmittal.⁹¹ It seems to me a rather inadequate presentation of the reasons for our position as we outlined it to Sir Frederick Phillips before his departure. I also call attention to the fact that the cable states "an Interdepartmental Committee . . . was established last December to deal with matters concerning our policy of financial assistance to our Allies". I believe this to be a far broader statement of the jurisdiction of the committee than was the original assignment, if my understanding is correct. Furthermore, the cable does not give our Embassy in London any indication that Stettinius has played the leading part in this whole discussion, but gives the impression that the Treasury has.⁹²

H[ERBERT] F[EIS]

811.24/1850a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, July 10, 1943—midnight.

4207. For the Ambassador and Harriman only. Department's 4206, July 10, midnight.⁹³ Secretary Morgenthau is primarily concerned with the financial aspects of lend-lease policy and his telegram was naturally written from that angle. At the same time the Department and the Office of Lend-Lease Administration attach much broader significance to the request for raw materials as reciprocal aid than his telegram indicates and we trust that the following additional background will place the matter in proper perspective. Incidentally, the mandate of the Interdepartmental Committee was to consider lend-lease policy in relation to the dollar position of lend-lease countries.

After the Treasury requested through Phillips that raw materials be given as reciprocal aid, Harry Hopkins discussed the manner [matter] fully and forcefully in a conversation with Lord Halifax. On June 25 Sir Frederick Phillips and Opie discussed the matter at

⁹¹ For text of cable, see Mr. White's memorandum of July 8 to Mr. Livesey, p. 60.

⁹² Notation on the original reads: "Perhaps the simplest course is to add our own comment to this cable H. F." For comment referred to, see telegram No. 4207, *infra*.

⁹³ See footnote 84, p. 60.

their request with Stettinius, Acheson and Feis and gave the reasons why the British Government found difficulty in acceding to our request. Phillips explained that although the dollar and gold assets of the United Kingdom had grown since inauguration of the lend-lease program until it appeared likely that they would amount to approximately \$1,000,000,000 by the end of 1943, British current liabilities in other parts of the world would increase this year at the rate of \$3,200,000,000. Against these liabilities the British Treasury considered that it had quickly realizable securities amounting to \$600,000,000, leaving a net increase in its liabilities of \$2,600,000,000. The British Treasury feared its other creditors might refuse to accept substantial sterling balances unless either payments in gold or dollars were made on account or those balances were permitted to accumulate as a reserve against which payments might be made when needed. British payments in sterling for raw materials for this country would both increase sterling liabilities and reduce gold and dollar assets.

Stettinius and Acheson explained that in the discussions they had had with members of Congress during the period when the extension of lend-lease was before Congress and during the hearings upon recent lend-lease appropriations,⁹⁴ the question of payment by the United States for raw materials purchased in the British Empire had been repeatedly raised. They explained further that the general principle of pooling materials for the conduct of the war was one which Congress was willing to accept and that the extent of British reciprocal aid to the United States had made a highly favorable impression in Congress. Payment by this Government for raw materials purchased in the British Empire was, however, very difficult, if not impossible, for Congress to understand. It seemed to Congress a striking exception to the principle of pooling resources. The amount involved was comparatively small and it continually distracted the attention of members of Congress from the large amounts of assistance being given us by the British, particularly as part of the raw materials which we buy are returned to the British through lend-lease. Stettinius urged strongly that the political effect of the British transferring these materials under reverse lend-lease would far exceed the financial outlay and would greatly assist him in maintaining lend-lease assistance at a high level.

⁹⁴ For reference to Mr. Acheson's testimony on extension of the Lend-Lease Act, see footnote 68, p. 52; for Mr. Stettinius' testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, see *Extension of Lend-Lease Act: Hearings Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 78th Cong., 1st sess., on H.R. 1501, pp. 1-48, 329-345*. For Mr. Stettinius' testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, see *Extension of the Lend-Lease Act: Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 78th Cong., 1st sess., on S. 813, pp. 1-26, 31*. For Mr. Stettinius' testimony on supplemental lend-lease aid, see *Defense Aid (Lend-Lease) Supplemental Appropriation Bill, 1943: Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, 78th Cong., 1st sess., on H.R. 2753*.

Phillips also inquired whether, if the British balance should continue to grow, even if they furnished us raw materials, this Government would apply continued pressure to keep the balance at approximately the present level. It was explained to him that there undoubtedly would be continued pressure for such action under the circumstances cited by him. It was also pointed out that, in considering what steps could or should be taken with regard to the growth of the British balance, it would make a great deal of difference whether or not this country was contributing directly to that growth by purchasing essential imports and whether or not the British Government was doing everything in its power to furnish us reciprocal aid. In other words, it was made clear to him that no commitment could be made regarding future action but also that the pressure for some reduction of lend-lease would be almost irresistible if the balance continued to be increased by our payments for public purchases. Phillips and Opie said they would discuss the matter with the Chancellor of the Exchequer during their present visit to London.

The foregoing is for your guidance and Harriman's in discussing this matter with the British authorities.

HULL

800.24/1019½ : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, July 14, 1943—10 p. m.

[Received July 14—8:46 p. m.]

4595. To Stettinius and Harriman. Preliminary discussions with British Treasury and War Office have been conducted by Acheson, Harriman Mission and General Purchasing Agent.

Although no official decision yet available we are satisfied from these discussions and conversations between Harriman and the Chancellor personally, that British will furnish a Government statement on cost of reciprocal aid supported by statements upon various issuing branches such as War Office, Air Ministry, Food Ministry, etc.

Issuing branches will categorize statement to fullest possible extent consistent with security following in so far as practicable our wishes in the matter. Complete itemization unobtainable.

Investigation reveals that catalogues or ready reference materials from which prices might be obtained are available for only a small percentage of items currently issued to U.S. forces and these prices are largely out of date. Therefore, any attempt to place prices on individual vouchers, either by us or the British, would involve great difficulty, and a wide margin of error.

Major Benno Schmidt of Clay's⁹⁵ office who left yesterday has participated in discussions. Suggest you call him. Acheson will remain here until assignments completed. Will return with Opie.

WINANT

811.24/1850a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, July 28, 1943—2 p. m.

4523. For the Ambassador from Secretary Morgenthau:

"Referring to my cable no. 4206 of July 10, 1943⁹⁶ I am disappointed that I have not yet had a reply from you. I would appreciate your personally seeing the Chancellor of the Exchequer at your earliest convenience and informing him that I would like a 'yes' or 'no' to the question whether or not they will supply us with between \$200 and \$300 million of raw materials during the coming year in the form of lend-lease in reverse."

From the Secretary

The British Embassy informs us that an early reply is expected and seems to believe that it will be favorable. I should like tomorrow a report on the situation and unless a favorable reply appears to be imminent agree that you should stress the importance of early action. The manner of presentation is left to your discretion, it not being desired to prejudice a favorable answer by demanding an immediate one.⁹⁷

HULL

811.24/1862 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary
of State*

LONDON, July 29, 1943—midnight.

[Received July 30—12:45 a. m.]

4965. For Secretary Morgenthau from the Ambassador. Since your cable 4206, July 10, midnight,⁹⁶ appeared to involve lend-lease matters on which I was not informed and since you stated that Lord Halifax had told you that either I or Harriman was to discuss with the Chancellor of the Exchequer the subject matter, I referred the message to Harriman as he told me he had discussed the situation when in Washington. Last evening I intervened and the question was

⁹⁵ Maj. Gen. Lucius B. Clay, Director of Matériel, U.S. Army.

⁹⁶ See footnote 84, p. 60.

⁹⁷ Marginal notation reads: "(I read this addendum to Secretary Morgenthau over the telephone and got his approval of it.)—D[ean] A[cheson]".

brought up at a late Cabinet meeting. It will be necessary to carry this question before Parliament and trust me to get a favorable answer.

In the meantime the Chancellor of the Exchequer has communicated to me the following reply which will be delivered through the British Embassy in Washington:

"I am sorry to hear from Lord Halifax that you have been disappointed at the length of time which it has taken us to reach a decision on the proposal that we should furnish raw materials under reciprocal aid to the United States. We first learned of this when Dr. White wrote to Sir Frederick Phillips at the beginning of June to say that this idea was being considered among other suggestions by the Inter-Departmental Committee which deals with matters of financial assistance to the Allies. Since then, however, it has been put to us as a formal proposal by the State Department together with other proposals relating to lend-lease and reciprocal aid. These questions are to a large extent inter-linked and have given us a good deal of thought. Not only do they raise large questions of policy, they have also needed a very thorough technical examination. Some delay therefore has been necessary, but I can assure you that I have given the matter my close personal attention throughout. All these questions are now before the Cabinet and I think I can assure you that Lord Halifax will have received instructions from the Cabinet at the beginning of next week on all the outstanding questions which were raised with him by the State Department. These instructions will particularly cover the point you have raised and in a way which I hope you will find satisfactory."

WINANT

800.24/1154

The British Embassy to the Department of State

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

His Majesty's Ambassador left with the Secretary of State on July 10th an *aide-mémoire*⁹⁸ tracing developments since September 1941 which in their view have rendered the White Paper of September 1941 out of date, and stating that they desired to discuss with the United States Government the proposal that a fresh statement of United Kingdom export policy be issued which would maintain the essential principle governing the use of Lend Lease supplies and at the same time take account of the developments mentioned.

2. His Majesty's Government feel that their offer to the United States Government of raw materials as Reciprocal Aid represents a further and vital development which should be taken into account in determining any new statement of policy. They therefore are of opinion that such new statement of policy should be reciprocal. If

⁹⁸ Dated July 9, p. 60.

the United States Government agree, the form adopted might be an exchange of notes. His Majesty's Embassy will be happy to discuss these suggestions further.

3. His Majesty's Government wish to emphasise again the importance which they attach to the principle that no advantage in world markets shall accrue to either country at the expense of the other by reason of sacrifices made in the interest of the effective prosecution of the war. They suggest that this principle should be reaffirmed in the notes which the two Governments may agree to exchange.

WASHINGTON, August 2, 1943.

[Enclosure]

ADDITIONAL POINT FOR ORAL PRESENTATION IN CONNEXION WITH
RECIPROCAL AID AIDE-MÉMOIRE OF AUGUST 2ND

The arrangements described in the *aide-mémoire* will mean a serious additional burden to the financial position of the sterling area already strained by four years of war and in particular to that of the United Kingdom. His Majesty's Embassy will shortly be in a position to hand to the State Department for their confidential information and also that of the Treasury and office of Lend-Lease Administration a paper setting out the facts of the United Kingdom's vast and growing external liabilities and its quite inadequate reserves of gold and dollars against these liabilities, a situation which His Majesty's Government believe is not appreciated in all quarters of the Administration.

800.24/1053

The British Embassy to the Department of State

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

On June 3rd Sir Frederick Phillips received from Mr. White a letter⁹⁹ stating that one of the questions before the Interdepartmental Committee dealing with matters of financial assistance to the Allies was the advisability of bringing within the scope of the Reciprocal Aid Programme purchases of certain goods being made by the United States in British Empire countries. On June 26th Mr. Stettinius sent to Sir Frederick Phillips approximate estimates of the value of purchases by United States government agencies from the British Empire (excluding Canada) of which a copy is attached for convenience of reference.¹

⁹⁹ Not found in Department files.

¹ Not printed.

2. On June 29th Mr. Acheson left with Mr. Opie for His Majesty's Ambassador a memorandum expressing the hope of the United States Government that His Majesty's Government would find it possible to assemble and, to the extent compatible with military security, to make public figures with respect to the cost of goods and services delivered as Reciprocal Lend Lease. The object of these figures would be to indicate the impressive scope of the Reciprocal Aid extended to the United States by the United Kingdom.

3. His Majesty's Government have given careful consideration to these issues. In their view the principle of the unstinted pooling of resources, namely that in a common war all shall give all they can to the common task, which has been adopted by the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom, clearly goes far beyond the sharing of production and raw materials. Lend Lease and Reciprocal Aid form one element in a larger whole and are one illustration of a significant doctrine. It is with the desire to cooperate with the United States Government in the furtherance of this conception of pooled resources and in the confident belief that that Government will do everything possible to the same end, that His Majesty's Government have considered the requests put forward in Washington for the publication of Reciprocal Aid figures and for the supply of raw materials as Reciprocal Aid.

4. As regards the publication of Reciprocal Aid figures, His Majesty's Government have devoted much thought to devising a way in which the object that the United States Government has in mind could be achieved without incurring the dangers which His Majesty's Government have hitherto felt in the publication of figures. Their feeling has been that there is a risk of serious misunderstanding in valuing in terms of money the goods and services provided in the pooling of resources. They have felt that the publication of monetary values involves bringing back the dollar and sterling signs into these transactions and furthermore that it would be difficult to establish comparative values without controversy. Moreover, they have throughout been impressed with the fact that keeping of detailed accounts must involve for them a diversion of man-power from other war duties which they feel they cannot afford.

5. His Majesty's Government understand that the United States War Department issued instructions in June to all theatre Commanders to report all monetary values of Reciprocal Aid received, these instructions to go into force officially on July 1st. For His Majesty's Government to keep values of all items on the lines contemplated by these instructions would require several thousands of clerks and accountants whom they are unable to spare for the purpose. Further, the Reciprocal Aid furnished by His Majesty's Government does not consist of large block shipments centrally procured and centrally

financed but of a wide field of items given in the daily intercourse of the war effort by complete decentralisation of administrative responsibility. Whatever the American forces ask for His Majesty's Government give if they have it and often to the deprivation of the civil population, but they do not enter all these gifts in an exact ledger account.

6. Nevertheless, for the reasons explained in paragraph 3 above, His Majesty's Government are prepared to meet the suggestion that they should announce monetary figures for Reciprocal Aid. They accordingly propose during the week commencing August 1st to present to Parliament a White Paper describing the general principles of Lend Lease and Reciprocal Aid, illustrating the range of help given and containing global valuations for each of the main groups of such services and assistance as can be valued. This paper will set out what His Majesty's Government give to the United States and also what they give to the other United Nations. The contribution is on a very substantial scale especially in the case of Russia. As soon as the White Paper has been presented to Parliament its text will be communicated to the United States Government.

7. It will of course be understood that the White Paper can only deal with the contribution of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, and His Majesty's Government assume that the United States Government is asking Dominion Governments in the sterling area and the Government of India for similar material. In the meantime His Majesty's Government are informing these Governments of the action they themselves are taking.

8. In return for this action on their part His Majesty's Government hope that the War Department will find it possible to withdraw the instruction mentioned above. They hope that the United States Government will understand that for the reasons given in paragraph 5 above, they cannot give itemised valuations of reciprocal aid in the way the War Department's instructions would imply.

9. His Majesty's Government have in the light of the principle of the pooling of resources given the most careful and sympathetic consideration to the more important request made by the United States Government for the supply by His Majesty's Government, as Reciprocal Aid, of raw materials to a total value of about two hundred million dollars a year. On the assumption that the list and valuation accompanying the letter from Mr. Stettinius referred to above represents roughly the effect of what is proposed and that no major item will be added, His Majesty's Government have taken the decisions recorded in the following three paragraphs.

10. His Majesty's Government will supply as Reciprocal Aid and at the expense of the United Kingdom Government the raw materials called for from the United Kingdom, Southern Rhodesia and the

Colonies which are purchased by the United States Government. It is understood that the United States Administration agree that this shall not apply to purchases made through private trade channels. It is proposed that this arrangement shall apply to contracts for the supply of such materials which are made on or after the 1st October, 1943.

11. Australia,² New Zealand,³ South Africa⁴ and India⁵ either have separate reciprocal aid agreements with the United States or are negotiating them. His Majesty's Government therefore suggest that the United States Government may wish to approach directly the Governments of each of these countries. For their part His Majesty's Government will inform the latter of their decision and of their general policy.

12. In addition His Majesty's Government will defray at their own expense the cost of British shipping services for these materials from all parts of the Commonwealth.

WASHINGTON, August 2, 1943.

811.24/1865 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, August 4, 1943—7 p. m.
[Received August 4—2:05 p. m.]

5066. Personal to the Secretary of State. In again pressing this afternoon for an answer to Mr. Morgenthau's query in your message No. 4523, July 28, and following two previous conversations with the Chancellor on this same subject he gave me the impression that he had made satisfactory answers through the Washington Embassy to you. He also told me that Mr. Morgenthau had been informed that he was fully meeting his demands. I answered that we wanted a simple answer of yes or no on the question put to him by Mr. Morgenthau. He then told me that he was making a statement in Parliament tomorrow which would cover all the things Mr. Morgenthau wanted done.

I would appreciate your sending me an immediate reply as to whether a satisfactory answer has already reached the State Depart-

² For text of the agreement with Australia, effected by exchange of notes signed September 3, 1942, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 271.

³ For text of the agreement with New Zealand, effected by exchange of notes signed September 3, 1942, see Executive Agreement Series No. 272.

⁴ For correspondence regarding the conclusion of a reciprocal aid agreement between the United States and the Union of South Africa, see pp. 173 ff.

⁵ For correspondence concerning the consideration of proposal for a lend-lease agreement between the United States and India, see vol. iv, pp. 246 ff.; for related correspondence, see *ibid.*, pp. 283 ff.

ment. I am cabling to ask the same question of Mr. Morgenthau. It is expected that the Parliament will adjourn tomorrow afternoon for the summer recess. If what has been forwarded to Washington is not satisfactory I should know it tonight.

WINANT

811.24/1865 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) ⁶

WASHINGTON, August 4, 1943.

4705. Personal for the Ambassador. Your 5044, August 3,⁷ and 5065,⁸ 5066 August 4, 7 p. m. The Chancellor's reply to Secretary Morgenthau was delivered in an *aide-mémoire* ⁹ from the British Embassy here. In several respects the reply does not meet Secretary Morgenthau's request and these matters he wishes to take up further with the Chancellor. Secretary Morgenthau learned only this afternoon that the Chancellor expected to announce his proposed action on the raw materials question in his statement to Parliament tomorrow. This afternoon Secretary Morgenthau asked Lord Halifax, Sir David Waley,¹⁰ Mr. Stettinius, and Assistant Secretary Acheson to meet with him. Lord Halifax was requested to ask the Chancellor to postpone his statement until Parliament meets again in September for the following reasons:

If the Chancellor announces his action on Secretary Morgenthau's request regarding raw materials on reverse lend lease, Secretary Morgenthau will be questioned about it, which would cause him great embarrassment.¹¹ He cannot say that the proposed action is satisfactory and believes that public discussion will greatly impede negotiations. Among the matters which he wishes to discuss are: the scope of raw materials to be covered; the date at which the arrangement goes into effect; and the arrangements regarding raw materials originating in the Dominions. It was also pointed out to Lord Halifax that the public reaction here to an announcement regarding figures of British reverse lend lease would be much improved if at the same time an announcement could be made on a solution of the

⁶ Marginal notation reads: "Authorized by Messrs Stettinius and Morgenthau D[ean] A[cheson]".

⁷ Not printed.

⁸ Dated August 4, 1943, 7 p. m., not printed.

⁹ Dated August 2, p. 69.

¹⁰ United Kingdom Treasury Representative, British Supply Council, Washington.

¹¹ In telegram No. 5097, August 5, 1943, 11 a. m., the Ambassador in the United Kingdom informed the Secretary of the Treasury that the Chancellor of the Exchequer agreed to withhold the statement he had planned to make to the House of Commons on that day (102.1/8812).

raw materials matter agreeable to both governments. Since the latter is not at a stage where this can be done, it was hoped that the entire statement would be postponed. In any event, Secretary Morgenthau felt strongly that no statement should be made on the raw materials question at this time.

Lord Halifax agreed to convey these views urgently to the Chancellor. Please inform Harriman from Stettinius regarding the above and tell him that Philip Reed¹² participated in the preliminary discussion with Secretary Morgenthau and approved of the views above stated.

HULL

841.24/2046b

The Department of State to the British Embassy

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

The request made of the British Government by the Government of the United States for the provision as reciprocal aid of raw materials from the British Empire to a value of from \$200,000,000 to \$300,000,000 a year was designed to carry the principle of common pooling of the resources of the two countries a substantial step forward toward complete realization. This principle is widely and favorably accepted in the United States and the extent of British reciprocal aid to the United States has made a highly favorable impression. Both informed and partially informed circles, however, both in Washington and elsewhere in the United States, find it difficult to understand, in view of the value of lend-lease aid being extended to the British Empire, why cash payments by the United States Government for raw materials obtained from the British Empire should continue to be necessary. This situation is regarded as a striking exception to the principle of pooling resources.

The proposal set forth in the British *Aide-Mémoire* of August 2, 1943 is a welcome contribution to the purpose mentioned above, although its details seem unduly restrictive.

1. The United States Government has separate reciprocal aid agreements with the governments of Australia and New Zealand, and is negotiating such an agreement with the Government of South Africa. The situation in regard to India is different. The United States Government does not have a reciprocal aid agreement with the Government of India and does not consider that it would be practicable at the present time to conclude such an agreement. The United States Government would, however, be prepared to advise the governments of Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and India of the procure-

¹² Deputy Chief of the Harriman Mission in London.

ment program which it desires be transferred to a reciprocal aid basis, it being understood that such financial arrangements as may be necessary to permit this to be done would be for discussion between the governments of the United Kingdom and the other British Empire governments concerned.

2. Many United States Government contracts for materials from British Empire countries do not terminate until sometime after October 1, 1943. The suggestion of the British Government that the arrangement apply only to contracts made on or after October 1, 1943 would therefore mean that during the immediate future the reciprocal aid extended in the form of raw materials would fall short of the amount deemed desirable. For this reason, the United States Government suggests that all of its raw material contracts in the United Kingdom, Southern Rhodesia and the Colonies either in effect on or signed after July 1, 1943, be brought within the scope of the program and that arrangements be worked out whereby as the need arises, the necessary means of payment would be made available to the United States Commercial Corporation or any other agency designated by the United States Government to pay for any deliveries made on these contracts on or after July 1, 1943. This would permit the two Governments to announce that since July 1, 1943 the United States Government has been receiving without charge and as reciprocal aid all raw materials procured by it in the United Kingdom, Southern Rhodesia and the Colonies.

3. The Embassy's *Aide-Mémoire* states that the decision of the British Government to supply as reciprocal aid the raw materials purchased by the United States Government from the United Kingdom, Southern Rhodesia and the Colonies on contracts signed on or after October 1, 1943, is made on the assumption that the list and valuation accompanying the letter from Mr. Stettinius to the late Sir Frederick Phillips of June 26¹³ "represents roughly the effect of what is proposed and that no major item will be added." This tabulation was submitted to Sir Frederick only as a rough indication of the scope of the contemplated program. It was not meant to be taken as a definitive list of either the quantities or the specific commodities which this Government might wish to bring within the program. It seems desirable because of constantly changing war conditions that like lend-lease, the arrangement be kept as flexible as possible in this respect. The United States Government, therefore, urges that the agreement not be restricted to a particular list of items or quantity thereof.

4. The United States Government appreciates the willingness of the British Government to meet its suggestion that monetary figures

¹³ Letter and its enclosure not printed. Sir Frederick Phillips had died on August 14, 1943.

for reciprocal aid be announced. It is hoped that this publication may be made at an early date, and it is further hoped that subsequent periodic publication may be in such form as will permit the United States War Department either to withdraw or to modify the instructions issued in June 1943, so that it will not be necessary for the War Department to make its own independent evaluation of reciprocal aid received in the United Kingdom, in Southern Rhodesia, or in the colonies.

WASHINGTON, August 18, 1943.

023.1/8-1858

*The British Chancellor of the Exchequer (Wood) to the Secretary of the Treasury (Morgenthau)*¹⁴

[LONDON,] 3 September 1943.

DEAR MR. MORGENTHAU: In my message to you of the 23rd August¹⁵ I said that I would give close personal attention to the *aide-mémoire* on Reciprocal Aid which our Embassy received on the 18th August and would write to you about it. I am now taking advantage of Sir David Waley's return to Washington to send you this personal letter as it seemed to me best that I should acquaint you myself with the position as I see it. In doing so, I know I can count on the ready understanding with which you have approached the problems of my country in the past.

I should first tell you that my Government have now given instructions for the reply to the State Department on the *aide-mémoire* which the Embassy received from them. I think it will be found convenient that our reply should be given orally in the first place; discussions as we both know often prevent misunderstandings. Moreover the representatives of our Departments in Washington will then be competent to settle the administrative procedure for the new arrangements and thus to save time in bringing them into effect. Afterwards, if it suits you, our agreement might be appropriately recorded in an exchange of notes which could be published for the information of our peoples.

When I learned at the beginning of June that you had in mind proposing that raw materials should be given as Reciprocal Aid, I viewed the idea with immediate sympathy. It was a natural development of the pooling of resources between our countries, which is illustrated by the Lend-Lease system, and on behalf of the United Kingdom and the Colonies, I obtained the concurrence of my colleagues to the general principle underlying your proposal.

¹⁴ Copy obtained from the Treasury Department. Receipt of this letter was acknowledged by Mr. Morgenthau on September 20, 1943, in a letter to Sir Kingsley Wood transmitted by Sir David Waley.

¹⁵ No copy found in Department files.

The question of our gold and dollar balances, which I know has been causing you some concern and which I had been hoping to discuss with Sir Frederick Phillips, seems to me a separate question and I can perhaps refer to it more conveniently later in this letter.

As regards the proposals for raw materials, the Governments of Australia and New Zealand have their own Lend-Lease Agreements with the United States Government, and the Union of South Africa is negotiating such an Agreement. While the Government of India have no Agreement, they are giving Reciprocal Aid, they have direct relations on Lend-Lease with the United States Administration and they are, as you know, fiscally independent. The position is therefore that all these Governments will expect to be approached direct on the programme as it affects each one of them and to give their own answer. When the proposal was specifically made to us at the end of June, we naturally told the Dominions and India of our own policy in regard to it. We are, of course, also keeping them informed of the subsequent developments and, while you will appreciate that I cannot speak for them, I am not unhopeful of the attitude which they will take up.

When we received the provisional list of raw materials ¹⁶ I assumed that this was the development of the more tentative suggestions which Dr. White had made to Sir Frederick Phillips at the beginning of June. But we did not regard the list as being more than a good illustration of the scale of the programme contemplated, and I certainly agree with your view that the mutual aid system should be kept flexible and ready to meet changed needs. We are therefore ready to regard our offer as elastic and covering all the procurements by the United States Government of essential requirements for war needs of food-stuffs and raw materials, in so far as they can be supplied from the United Kingdom and the Colonies. Some precision in the programme is necessary for smooth working, but this can no doubt be achieved in the same way as in the case of Lend-Lease, through the submission to us of programmes and requisitions which may vary from time to time and which, I can assure you, we will examine in the same way and with the same desire to help as the Lend-Lease Administration have always shown in dealing with our requirements of United States resources.

As regards the date of the 1st October. This was only suggested by us to give time for the arrangements which would be necessary for the switch-over from direct procurement by the United States Government to procurement by us. It was not our intention that you should complete all your contracts outstanding on that date. We are perfectly ready to make such arrangements as will permit supplies under Reciprocal Aid to commence at the earliest possible date.

¹⁶ Not printed.

On these lines, which will be discussed with the Administration by Sir David Waley and his colleagues, I should expect that a satisfactory arrangement between our two Governments could speedily be made.

It seems to me, however, that the proposal in the *aide-mémoire* that financial reimbursement should be made to the United States Government, retrospectively to the 1st July, for all deliveries covered by the new arrangements which were made between the 1st July and the date on which the new arrangements come into force, has really no place in any scheme for the mutual free exchange of raw materials on Lend-Lease lines. I would suggest that this raises rather the question of the size of our gold and dollar balances, to which I referred earlier in this letter.

Here I should be doing less than justice to the closeness of our relations if I did not write plainly. I understand that Congress takes an interest in these balances and that their apparent growth might give rise to criticism about our receipt of Lend-Lease on the present scale. I suggest that such a criticism may well be due to lack of appreciation of the much greater liabilities against which these reserves are held, of the inexorable growth of the liabilities which is much more rapid than that of the reserves, and of the war circumstances out of which this position has directly developed.

In the North American Continent our financial problem has been largely solved by the generosity of the United States Government and of the Dominion of Canada. In many other parts of the world, however, we have to provide the finance for the war. We can only do this in the main by borrowing local currencies against a credit in sterling to the respective countries, and thus we are incurring unfunded indebtedness on a vast scale. We could not continue this policy indefinitely without having some proportion of liquid assets out of which the more pressing part of the liquid indebtedness could be met if called for from time to time. But our liabilities, which are liabilities of the United Kingdom alone, are several times as great as our reserves, and the disproportion between our reserves and liabilities is also reflected in their growth.

Moreover, the gold and dollar balances, which are shown as United Kingdom balances, are not in fact our reserves alone; they are the pooled reserves of the sterling area. As you know, the members of the sterling area turn over to us their surplus dollar earnings in exchange for sterling credit. But this carries with it an implied obligation on our part to turn back, so far as we can, the sterling into dollars when other parts of the sterling area need them.

Facts such as these can surely seem irrelevant only to those whose attention is concentrated mainly on the balance between the value of Lend-Lease and Reciprocal Aid. But that is not the whole story. We are asking and receiving Lend-Lease aid on the present scale be-

cause our whole resources, physical and financial, are already devoted as far as they possibly can be to the waging of the war and to its equipment. Our whole war effort, which in a common and total war seems to me the only significant concept, will I think you will agree bear comparison with that of any of our Allies; and on the criterion of equality of sacrifice, in the words of your President, we have done our full share.

I cannot honestly believe that once the facts are fully told and the background fully explained any misunderstanding of our position should continue.

You may remember that towards the end of January Sir Frederick Phillips delivered to you a message from me on a proposal that Lend-Lease might be restricted if our reserves rose above a certain figure.¹⁷ It was, I think, on the 15th February that he gave a note to the Treasury briefly explaining the position. It is clear to me that possibly because the discussions on the subject so far have been incomplete, we have not been successful in demonstrating how we view this matter or the principles involved in it. I have therefore given instructions that the particulars in the note which Sir Frederick Phillips gave to the Treasury in February should be brought up to date, and I am arranging that a fuller confidential statement should be delivered to you for your consideration, and for discussions between the representatives of the United States Administration and our representatives in Washington.¹⁸

When you have studied this statement I am sure you will understand me when I say that my Government could not regard it as reasonable that a limit should be placed to our gold and dollar holdings which pays no regard to our liabilities and their growth, or to the war circumstances which have brought about this position, particularly the fact that we have to finance practically the whole of the war expenditure in the Middle East and India. Indeed I feel entitled to hope that when the whole position is discussed and is clear, we may count, while the war circumstances remain as they are at present, upon the continuance of Lend-Lease on its present lines.

Our external financial position naturally gives me ground for concern and in my Budget Speech on the 12th April ¹⁹ I outlined to Parliament the present position. This statement aroused wide interest and Parliament is paying increasing attention to the whole subject; Parliament is aware, for example, that our gold and dollar balances are held against very much larger liabilities which are rapidly increasing. We recognise that it is necessary that we should take steps of various kinds and at different times to discharge some

¹⁷ See Sir Frederick Phillips' letter of January 28 to Mr. Acheson, p. 52.

¹⁸ For a copy of this statement, see memorandum by the British Treasury, September 14, p. 82.

¹⁹ *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 388, col. 938.

of these liabilities, through the use of our gold and dollar balances. I shall welcome a full discussion on the problem and our representatives have instructions to disclose the whole situation to the United States Administration. I cannot say here and now what we shall find it best to do, but I shall keep you informed of the lines on which we are proceeding.

As regards the publication of Reciprocal Aid figures, I think that it is necessary to publish a White Paper here as soon after the re-assembly of Parliament in the latter part of September as is found convenient. Parliament and our people are entitled to know of the magnitude of our effort and of the burden it entails. A copy of the White Paper in its present form has been given confidentially to the United States Treasury and to other representatives of the United States Administration and I shall be glad to consider any suggestions you or others may make on it. Then when we have it in the final form in which I think it should be presented to Parliament, I will arrange that you are given an opportunity of seeing it before it is published.

I have tried in this letter to give you a broad outline of our position, as I see it, without troubling you with unnecessary detail. Even so the letter has perhaps become overlong. Circumstances, however, unfortunately make it impossible for us to sit down together and talk over this important subject. I am particularly anxious that you, who have so clearly understood our financial position in the past and gave us your help at a difficult time, should have a full story and should have it direct and in a personal way from me.

With all good wishes

Yours Sincerely

KINGSLEY WOOD

841.24/2094

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State
(Acheson)*

[WASHINGTON,] September 9, 1943.

Mr. Opie called at his request. He referred to the report appearing in the morning newspaper of Wednesday, September 8, regarding the President's elimination of two sentences from the letter transmitting the August lend-lease report to Congress.²⁰ I had available a

²⁰ This letter from President Roosevelt to Congress transmitting the Eleventh Quarterly Report on Lend-Lease Operations is printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, August 28, 1943, p. 124; for the note concerning the elimination of the two sentences, see *ibid.*, September 11, 1943, p. 168. The two sentences in question read as follows: "The Congress in passing and extending the Lend-Lease Act made it plain that the United States wants no new war debts to jeopardize the coming peace. Victory and a secure peace are the only coin in which we can be repaid."

copy of the *Washington Post*, containing this statement. Mr. Opie asked whether I could throw any light upon this matter and whether it represented a change of policy.

I said that I could add very little to the information given in the report of the President's press conference,²¹ since I have been out of town until Monday²² of this week. As the President had stated to the press, the letter had been printed in the belief that he had seen the document, when in fact he had not. Also, as the President stated, the two sentences in question did not in the President's view "do justice to the whole situation." He was therefore eliminating them from the report.

The letter in question had not been cleared with the Department of State. I was out of town; Mr. Kermit Roosevelt in my office was not shown the letter, as was usually the case; and the Secretary was also away. So far as I knew, no one in the Department had seen it. If I had seen it, I should have objected to the sentences, since, as the President stated, they did not adequately state the situation, whatever the intention of the writer had been. The principles applicable to final settlement, as stated in Article VII,²³ had been the subject of discussion at the time of the making of the agreement, had been discussed in various earlier reports by the President, had been the subject of testimony before Congressional committees, and had been discussed by the Congressional committees. It was obvious that these two sentences did not adequately summarize or describe what had been said.

I did not interpret the President's elimination of these sentences or his remarks at the press conference as altering the provisions of the agreement or the very full discussions of it referred to above. However, I knew nothing more about the situation than appeared in the press, and I did not know of any discussion between the President and the Secretary on this subject. I said that it would seem probable that, if the President had intended to make any change in policy, the matter would have been discussed with the Prime Minister, who was at the White House at the time of this press conference.²⁴

Mr. Opie expressed some apprehension as to speculation which might be aroused in Great Britain regarding this incident, which might adversely affect our negotiations concerning the provision by the United

²¹ For President Roosevelt's comments at his press conference of September 7 on the exclusion of the two sentences, see Samuel I. Rosenman (ed.), *The Tide Turns*, 1943 volume in the series *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt* (New York, Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1950), pp. 374-375.

²² September 6.

²³ Reference is to article VII of the Lend-Lease Agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom, signed at Washington, February 23, 1942. For text, see Executive Agreement Series No. 241, or 56 Stat. (pt. 2) 1433; for correspondence, see *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. 1, pp. 525 ff.

²⁴ Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill, following the First Quebec Conference, August 17-24, 1943, came to the United States and did not begin his return journey to Great Britain until September 12.

Kingdom of raw materials on reverse lend-lease. I expressed the hope that this would not occur.

DEAN ACHESON

890.24/1212½

*Memorandum by the British Treasury*²⁵

THE OVERSEAS ASSETS AND LIABILITIES OF THE UNITED KINGDOM

I. *The Overseas Financial Policy of the United Kingdom.*

1. The passage of the Lend-Lease Act early in 1941²⁶ and the assistance given by Canada from 1942²⁷ onwards have dealt most liberally with the more recent financial requirements of the United Kingdom in North America. These measures are well known and widely appreciated. In most other parts of the world, however, His Majesty's Government have to pay for the war by acquiring local currencies against a liability to repay sterling and are thus incurring unfunded indebtedness on a vast scale. It would not be possible or reasonable to continue this policy indefinitely without having some proportion of liquid assets out of which the more pressing part of the liquid indebtedness could be discharged if called for from time to time. It has, therefore, been our deliberate policy to accumulate a reserve (though, relatively, a small one) against these liabilities—not out of our net external earnings because, of course, there are none—but partly by *ad hoc* capital transactions and partly by holding on to a portion of such current dollars and gold as come our way (mainly from other parts of the Sterling Area) instead of using the whole of them to meet our liabilities. The dollars acquired from other part of the Sterling Area, however, have to be paid for in sterling, which increases our overseas indebtedness. This system has, therefore, the effect of increasing our gross indebtedness but does, at least, mean that we hold something against it. For example, it has seemed to us more advisable to borrow in the course of the year (say) \$3,200 million and retain \$800 million to meet pressing claims, than to borrow \$2,400 million and retain nothing against it.

2. The recent increase in British liquid assets is thus an essential component in a careful (though nevertheless vulnerable) financial

²⁵ Transmitted to the Department of State under a covering letter from the British Minister (Campbell), September 16, 1943.

²⁶ March 11, 1941; 55 Stat. 31.

²⁷ "The Canadian Government announced in January [1942] that sterling funds accumulated by Canada in London were being converted into an interest-free loan for the duration of the war to the amount of \$700 million. It was further announced that as from December 1941 all munitions and war supplies, including food, produced in Canada for the United Kingdom would be an outright gift to the extent of one billion dollars." Quotation is from H. Duncan Hall, *North American Supply* (London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1955), p. 240; for further details, see *ibid.*, pp. 224-242.

policy by which, though with the most dangerous risks to our post-war position, we have managed to finance a vast war expenditure in India, the Middle East and elsewhere—an expenditure which is, of course, vitally essential to the prosecution of the war. To set a limit to our assets while disregarding the growth in our liabilities would tear this delicate system to pieces. Only if we are left free to pursue our existing policy can we hope successfully to finance our vast and essential commitments outside North America.

[Here follows section II, "Statistics Illustrating the Overseas Financial Policy of the United Kingdom". An extended synopsis and some of the statistical material are printed in Hall, *North American Supply*, pages 282–284.]

III. *The Adequacy of the United Kingdom's Quick Reserves.*

16. Having regard to the size of the quick liabilities, it is obvious on any criterion that the quick reserves are seriously inadequate. But there are also certain other considerations which are, in greater or less degree, relevant to this question.

(a) The liabilities are liabilities solely of the United Kingdom and not of any other part of the Sterling Area. But the quick assets cannot be regarded as wholly available for the United Kingdom's requirements. A large part of them has been acquired under the pooling arrangement referred to above by which all parts of the Sterling Area (other than some of the temporary adherents) sell to the United Kingdom for sterling any dollars which they earn in excess of their own small direct requirements. These arrangements carry with them an implied obligation on the U. K., so far as is possible, to provide dollars for other parts of the Sterling Area, which have retained no significant dollar holdings of their own, when subsequently they have a legitimate need for them.

(b) The quick liabilities are the more burdensome because of the disposal of many of the more saleable capital assets, which otherwise would have served as a second line of defence. As the table above shows, the total loss of assets and increase of liabilities so far suffered by the United Kingdom during the war has amounted to 10½ billion dollars. In this respect our position is unique amongst the United Nations. In fact more than 90 per cent of this loss has accrued to the advantage of other members of the United Nations, many of whom have improved their overseas position during the war. The United Kingdom alone has been expected to mortgage the future on a large scale by incurring overseas liabilities. During the earlier period of the war, expenditure in North America was the main cause of the deterioration of the United Kingdom's financial position. More recently her responsibility for meeting the greater part of the local cash expenditures in the whole area of hostilities from Tunis to Burma has been the main influence. At the present time the United

Kingdom's local cash expenditure in Egypt, the Middle East and India, over and above the supplies shipped across the seas, is amounting to some \$2½ billion annually, the greater part of which has to be borrowed from the countries concerned. Between the beginning of the war and the end of 1943, for example, it is estimated that we shall have incurred an indebtedness to India of some \$3,750 million, of which some \$1,200 million will have been used to discharge her Government sterling debt and the balance will remain owing to her.

(c) In judging whether, in spite of the above considerations, the United Kingdom is nevertheless accumulating unnecessarily large quick reserves it is relevant to consider the relationship between the United Kingdom's resources as shown above and those of other members of the United Nations. For example, the gold and dollar reserves of the U.S.S.R., which are not published, are estimated by the United States Treasury at \$1,600 million and those of China at \$750 million. The corresponding figures of France can be put at \$2,875 million, of the Netherlands at \$690 million and Belgium at \$870 million. None of these countries have any significant amount of overseas quick liabilities against these reserves. The figures for the United Kingdom (which in respect of dollars include the whole of the Sterling Area) are at present, as shown above, about \$1,000 million with sterling liabilities seven times this amount against them. The *net* gold reserves of the United States (i.e. after deducting all foreign balances held in United States) are about eighteen times the *gross* reserves of the United Kingdom (i.e. before deducting the sterling foreign balances held in United Kingdom which are seven times as great as the reserves).

17. If, therefore, in spite of a progressive deterioration in her net position, the United Kingdom is in a position, as we hope, to increase her quick reserves above the present figure by retaining certain liquid resources earned outside our balance of trade with the United States instead of applying them forthwith to a reduction of her liabilities, this cannot be judged, in the light of the above considerations, to be a matter for criticism or open to legitimate objection.

[LONDON,] 14 September, 1943.

841.24/2046b

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Theodore C. Achilles of the
Division of European Affairs*

[WASHINGTON,] September 16, 1943.

Participants: Sir David Waley, British Treasury;
Mr. Opie, British Embassy;
Mr. Hall, British Raw Materials Mission;

Dr. White, Treasury;
Mr. Knollenberg, OLLA;²⁸
Mr. Acheson;
Mr. Roosevelt, A-A;²⁹
Mr. Achilles, Eu.

The British representatives called to discuss this Government's *aide-mémoire* of August 18, 1943 concerning the provision of raw materials as reciprocal aid.

Sir David Waley said that the British War Cabinet heartily approved the principle of pooling resources and had been glad to agree in principle to the provision of raw materials as reciprocal aid. There were three points which he wished to mention in connection with our *aide-mémoire*.

First was our statement that the list attached to Mr. Stettinius' letter of June 26, 1943³⁰ should not be considered definitive but merely as indicating the scope of the program. This was entirely agreeable to the British Government.

Second was the date upon which the arrangement would come into operation. The British Government was prepared to bring the arrangement into effect at the earliest practicable date.

Third was the question of making the arrangement retroactive through payment by the British Government for raw materials delivered to the United States Government subsequent to July 1, 1943. He feared that this would not be practicable nor did he consider it consistent with the principle of pooling resources. British financial resources had been severely strained by essential war purchases in every part of the world except the North American continent. Citing Mr. Micawber's³¹ views on the relation of assets and liabilities, he thought that living on overdrafts was regarded in this country as well as in England as not only perilous but not quite respectable and that Mr. Micawber would be amazed at the extent to which His Majesty's Government was living on overdrafts at the present time. A document setting forth in detail the British Government's financial position would be sent this afternoon to the Department, the Treasury and OLLA and he did not wish to go into the matter other than to say that the British Government's liabilities were now some seven times its assets and were increasing five times as fast.

With regard to the procurement of raw materials deliveries as reciprocal aid, he thought the British Government would wish to

²⁸ Bernhard Knollenberg, Senior Deputy Administrator, Office of Lend-Lease Administration.

²⁹ Kermit Roosevelt, Jr., Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State (Acheson).

³⁰ Neither printed.

³¹ Wilkins Micawber, a character in the novel *David Copperfield* by Charles Dickens.

follow in general the procedure followed by the Lend-Lease Administration, (i.e. to pass upon requisitions submitted by us). The British Government would endeavor to expedite action upon requests as sincerely as Lend-Lease had endeavored to do so. He nevertheless foresaw difficulties with the Office of Economic Warfare³² on this point.

Mr. Hall said that he would be glad to discuss procedure with the Office of Economic Warfare but that he anticipated a real difference in principle between the views of that organization and the British Government. The OEW would undoubtedly wish the British Government to provide funds and to leave the rest to OEW. The British Government would much prefer to procure the raw materials itself and transfer them to OEW.

Taking up Sir David's second point Mr. Acheson inquired whether the British Government contemplated that the arrangement would apply to deliveries made after a fixed date or only to deliveries made under contracts concluded after such date. He pointed out that many existing contracts covered a long term. Sir David said that this would have to be worked out with OEW as various contracts might have to be altered or taken over by the British Government but that the latter would endeavor to get the arrangement actually working as rapidly as possible and certainly had no thought, after agreeing in principle, of nullifying the arrangement through providing materials only under contracts concluded at some time in the future. He thought that the problem should be approached in detail, rather than in principle, by the OEW and the Raw Materials Mission with a view to working out a mutually satisfactory arrangement.

Mr. White agreed and suggested that individual items be transferred to a reciprocal aid basis as rapidly as was found practicable without waiting for a fixed date, which was the practice followed when the United Kingdom began to furnish our forces reciprocal aid without waiting for signature of an agreement. Mr. Achilles supported this suggestion, pointing out that one of the reasons we had suggested July 1 rather than October 1 as the effective date of the arrangement was the psychological advantage of announcing that the program had been in effect for some time rather than that it would take effect at some time in the future. He also suggested the possibility of reconciling OEW's natural desire to obtain the raw materials as rapidly as possible with the British Government's fully understandable desire to have control over what was given as recip-

³²The Office of Economic Warfare (OEW) was established July 15, 1943; on September 25, 1943, it was absorbed into the newly organized Foreign Economic Administration, which took over its functions.

recal aid by a system whereby OEW would continue to procure the materials under existing or new contracts but would file requisitions for means of payment for specific purchases against a fund to be set up by the British Government. Sir David observed that OEW had already anticipated some such an arrangement simply by not paying for raw materials delivered in recent weeks.

Sir David said that the British Government had kept the Governments of the Dominions and of India informed of its correspondence with us but had not received their views. He believed that those Governments were waiting for requests from us. The British Government would be prepared to do everything it could to facilitate our obtaining raw materials from the Dominions and India but any bargaining power it might have in dealing with them would be destroyed if, in approaching those Governments, we were to intimate that they should look to the British Government to pay the bill. Conditions vary in the different countries. South Africa could undoubtedly meet the additional expenditure without difficulty. Australia would probably have difficulty and might look to the United Kingdom for at least partial reimbursement. In the case of India he thought that the Government of India would be able to meet a substantial part of the amount without budgetary or political difficulties but that it would look to the United Kingdom for some of it. Dr. White considered that any such arrangements between the United Kingdom and India or the Dominions was no concern of ours. Mr. Acheson referred to the delicacy of discussions with the Government of India concerning lend-lease and reciprocal aid in view of the marked lack of enthusiasm in India for either. He said that the Government of India had wished some written assurance that the amount of reciprocal aid would never exceed the amount of lend-lease aid and referred to the political difficulties which the existence of any such written agreement with any government would present. He nevertheless saw no harm in our advising the Government of India of the procurement program which we wished transferred to a reciprocal aid basis.

It was agreed that the Office of Economic Warfare and the British Raw Materials Mission should be requested to discuss, without delay, the actual procedural problems involved and that this Government would lay the matter before the Governments of the Dominions and of India in the near future. Further consideration would need to be given to the question of retroactive payment for deliveries made since July 1.

841.24/2124

Memorandum by Mr. Kermit Roosevelt, Jr., Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State (Acheson), to the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius)

[WASHINGTON,] October 18, 1943.

MR. STETTINIUS: A meeting was held this morning in the Under Secretary's office at which there were present the following: Messrs. Stettinius, Acheson, Pasvolsky,³³ Atherton,³⁴ Matthews,³⁵ Hickerson,³⁶ Hawkins,³⁷ Stinebower,³⁸ Achilles and Roosevelt. Mr. Berle was invited but was unable to attend.

The meeting was held to discuss three issues in British and American relations growing out of lend-lease. These issues had been set forth by Mr. Acheson in a memorandum circulated to those concerned before the meeting. I attach a copy of Mr. Acheson's memorandum and two documents circulated with it for your files.

The meeting came to the following conclusions:

1. That it was most desirable that the British and ourselves announce as soon as possible the figures on the value of reciprocal aid provided to the United States by the United Kingdom and the Dominions. Mr. Acheson agreed to do everything possible to enable the British to make this announcement by Thursday³⁹ of this week. It was further agreed that this announcement should contain a statement that the British and United States Governments have agreed in principle that reverse lend-lease should be extended to include raw materials purchased by the United States Government, and that details of procedure are now being discussed.

2. It was agreed that in the Department's view it is essential that reciprocal aid of raw materials be worked out, and that any suggestion that might be made by FEA⁴⁰ that the idea be given up should be resisted vigorously by the Department.

3. It was evident that there are differences of opinion within the Department on policy with respect to the British gold and dollar balances. Mr. Acheson drew the attention of the meeting to a draft letter to Mr. Crowley⁴¹ now being circulated among the members of the President's committee on dollar position from Mr. Harry White. It was agreed that there should be a further meeting of those concerned to consider the Department's policy on this question.

4. It was generally felt that the time was inauspicious for an announcement that the Eden-Winant White Paper is being replaced by a mutual declaration of principles, including provisions for the

³³ Leo Pasvolsky, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State.

³⁴ Ray Atherton, Minister to Canada, temporarily in Washington.

³⁵ H. Freeman Matthews, Chief of the Division of European Affairs.

³⁶ John D. Hickerson, Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs.

³⁷ Harry C. Hawkins, Chief of the Division of Commercial Policy and Agreements.

³⁸ Leroy D. Stinebower, Chief of the Division of Economic Studies.

³⁹ October 21.

⁴⁰ Foreign Economic Administration.

⁴¹ Letter not printed. Leo T. Crowley was Foreign Economic Administrator.

programming of export requirements through combined machinery. However, it was also felt that the British would require some definite understanding on this point before going too far in arrangements for raw materials. It was suggested that the solution was to formulate the United States Government's policy on this question and to inform the British, but not to make any formal arrangements for an exchange of notes until somewhat later.

During the meeting Mr. Stettinius also raised the possibility that there would be considerable criticism if it should develop that neither we nor the British were able to give figures indicating the amount of material provided originally to the British under lend-lease which had been sent in turn by the United Kingdom to the Soviet Union under the Protocols.⁴² Mr. Stettinius requested Mr. Roosevelt to take the necessary steps to obtain such figures.

[Enclosure]

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Acheson)

[WASHINGTON,] October 16, 1943.

The British Government proposes to lay before Parliament on Thursday, October 21, unless we intervene to the contrary, a White Paper announcing the figures regarding reverse lend-lease from the British to the United States and also announcing that the British Government will expand reverse lend-lease to include raw materials acquired by the American Government and the British Colonial Empire. The announcement has already been postponed once at the last moment at the request of this Government.

The imminence of this action requires immediate decision as to the position of this Department and of this Government on three major issues closely involved in it. These issues are:

(a) The suggestion which FEA proposes to take up with Mr. Crowley on Monday⁴³ that reverse lend-lease on raw materials is unworkable because of the conditions attached by the British and that it should be abandoned altogether in favor of (b).

(b) A policy advocated by the Treasury of reducing direct lend-lease assistance to the British to the extent of some \$300,000,000 or more for the purpose of reducing the British foreign exchange assets to \$1,000,000,000 in accordance with a memorandum approved by the President last January stating that the above amount should be regarded as the point at which lend-lease aid should be reduced.

(c) An issue which has arisen over the replacement of the Eden White Paper restricting British use of lend-lease materials by a mutual declaration of principles to be followed by both countries in

⁴² For correspondence concerning the continuation of wartime assistance from the United States for the Soviet Union, see pp. 737 ff.

⁴³ October 18.

their disposition of lend-lease or reverse lend-lease materials which each might receive from the other.

A. REVERSE LEND-LEASE OF RAW MATERIALS

Since last May this Government has pushed the British to agree to give us raw materials on reverse lend-lease.⁴⁴ Mr. Stettinius, Mr. Hopkins, and Mr. Morgenthau, as well as officers of the Department, have strongly urged this action upon them. Formal notes have been presented to the United Kingdom Government and to the Governments of the Dominions, the latter within the last two weeks. The British Government has informed us of its agreement in principle and wishes now to announce it.

Discussions as to methods have been undertaken between OEW and the British Raw Materials Mission. In a recent communication the British have unwisely but understandably insisted that the procedure and principles applicable to our acquisition of raw materials on reverse lend-lease should be the same as those applied to them on direct lend-lease including procedures contemplated in the Eden White Paper restricting exports. The OEW authorities regard such procedures as entirely unworkable since they approach the matter solely from the point of view of reducing the British dollar balances. They are now inclined to feel that the whole proposal was a mistake, that it should be abandoned and that the dollar balances should be controlled directly by reducing our lend-lease to the British. While no final view has been given us, I anticipate that this will be the attitude that they will take.

Such an attitude, aside from making the position of the Department entirely untenable, would produce a serious crisis in our relations with the British. While reverse lend-lease of raw materials has an important bearing on the dollar position, both the Department and the Lend-Lease Administration have regarded its principal importance as extending the principle of mutual aid to a new and important field and thus obtaining substantial benefits for the United States and meeting criticisms which have been directed to the failure to obtain these benefits. It has been discussed with the British in these latter terms.

B. BRITISH DOLLAR AND EXCHANGE ASSETS

Last January a memorandum approved by the Cabinet members concerned and the Vice President was approved by the President in

⁴⁴ According to a draft memorandum to President Roosevelt, dated November 17, 1943, drawn up by the Treasury Department and submitted to the Department of State for consideration, discussions with the British concerning raw materials as reciprocal aid were initiated in May by the Treasury Department (841.24/2168).

which it was stated that at that time it appeared that foreign exchange assets between \$600,000,000 and \$1,000,000,000 furnished the British with an ample reserve and that lend-lease policy should be reconsidered if British assets exceeded the top amount. It was contemplated in the memorandum that the policy was subject to review. Mr. White in a current proposal for action points out that the British foreign exchange assets are now \$1.5 billion and are expected to be \$1.7 billion at the end of the year, against which there is a possible deduction of \$315 million. Even though the British gave us reverse lend-lease of raw materials, he estimates that the assets will exceed \$1 billion by \$200-\$300 million by the end of the year and therefore proposes that lend-lease aid shall be reduced by this amount. There is attached a copy of Mr. White's memorandum and also of a memorandum prepared by Mr. Stinebower's division.⁴⁵

The British have filed a comprehensive memorandum pointing out that while their foreign exchange assets have increased, their quick liabilities have increased at a far greater rate and amount. They submit that action calculated to restrict their foreign exchange assets, while their liability increase[s,] would put them in an impossible position. Questions also arise as to whether Mr. White's proposal would achieve the stated purpose, by reason of the fact that the British either might not spend their dollars or that they otherwise would act to stop the accumulation of dollars.

It is plain that the proposed action is of the utmost seriousness; it is one which vitally concerns this Department.

C. SUBSTITUTION OF THE EDEN WHITE PAPER

The Eden White Paper has produced friction between the two countries out of all proportion to any substantial question involved. British exports have sunk to a negligible amount. However, there has been criticism of specific exports both from business men affected and from political sources. This has led to an attempt on our part to supervise the administration of a document which the British have regarded as a declaration to be carried out in good faith by their own Government. The introduction of reverse lend-lease of raw materials has led the British to take the technical position that the Eden White Paper should be applied to us as well as to them but their real position is that it should be replaced by a mutual declaration by both governments which each would supervise in its own country in accordance with broad programs agreed upon through combined machinery.

DEAN ACHESON

⁴⁵ Neither printed.

841.24/2123

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State
(Acheson)*

[WASHINGTON,] October 19, 1943.

Participants: Sir Ronald Campbell, Sir David Waley, Mr. John Magowan.

State Department—A—A—Mr. Acheson, Eu—Mr. Achilles,
A—A—Mr. Roosevelt.

Sir Ronald Campbell together with Sir David Waley and Mr. Magowan called on Mr. Acheson at the latter's request. Mr. Acheson explained that certain recent developments had led the United States Government to conclude that public announcement of the figures on reciprocal aid, of the provision of raw materials as reciprocal aid, and of the replacement of the Eden-Winant White Paper by a bilateral declaration of policy, should be delayed. Mr. Stettinius had informed him that afternoon that this decision had been reached in the light of the forthcoming Congressional investigation of Lend-Lease.⁴⁶ It is the desire of the Administration that this investigation be run through as quickly as possible, and that the charges be answered by high ranking officials who can settle the present questions without the complications that might result from the introduction of new factors into the situation.

Sir David Waley inquired how long this investigation may be expected to last. Mr. Acheson replied that it was hoped under the procedure he had already described, that the investigation could be concluded in two or three weeks. Sir David then said he had not in any case expected to be able to present a White Paper on reciprocal aid much earlier than that; if that schedule could be followed it would mean little if any additional delay so far as the British were concerned. Mr. Acheson said that he was very glad to hear that this was so.

Mr. Magowan then inquired whether it was our intention to cease negotiations on the various problems mentioned by Mr. Acheson until the Congressional investigation should have ended. Mr. Acheson replied that this was not our intention, that we expected to go on with negotiations and hoped to reach a final agreement so that when the time is ripe for the announcement, everything may be ready.

Sir David Waley in response to a question from Mr. Acheson stated that negotiations were going on between OEW and the British Raw Materials Mission, and that a meeting had been held yesterday. He said that little progress was being made and that both sides were

⁴⁶ For text of the pertinent report, see Senate Report No. 10, pt. 12, 78th Cong., 1st sess.

ferociously adamant in their position. Mr. Acheson said that he thought it was a great mistake for these negotiations to be approached primarily in terms of principles. Rather we should concentrate upon the best and most practical methods of accomplishing the goal upon which we have already agreed. With respect to government-to-government contracts there is no difficulty. With respect to other contracts he could see that there might be certain payments which the British would not feel it proper for them to make, such as agents' commissions, etc. He suggested that a satisfactory solution would be for the British to allow us to proceed with our contracts, and submit them to the British for payment with the understanding that the British could audit them and say: This is all right and we will pay it, but this on the other hand does not seem a proper charge for us to pay. Sir David agreed that something along these lines should probably result. He said that until all the Dominions and India have replied to our notes and have agreed in principle on the provision of raw materials as reciprocal aid, it was unlikely that we would make such progress in our negotiations. However, as soon as those replies have been received, he was confident that good will and mutual tolerance would find a way.

The White Paper on reciprocal aid was then discussed. Sir David was most anxious to have an indication as to whether this Government found the proposed White Paper on the whole acceptable. The American members offered a number of minor suggestions. In addition, it was explained that we were unable to obtain agreement to the sentences on the reciprocal aid of raw materials as long as OEW felt it possible that negotiations on this point might be an utter failure. Sir David understood this position and requested that Mr. Acheson write him to the effect that, with the exception of the above-mentioned sentences, the United States Government had no comment that it wished to make upon the White Paper at the present moment.

Mr. Magowan said that he wished to talk further to Mr. Achilles on the substitute for the Eden-Winant White Paper, and hoped that Mr. Acheson would be able to see him on this question by Friday of this present week.⁴⁷

After agreement had been reached on the above points, Sir David Waley indicated that he wished to raise a closely related question. He said that he had heard numerous rumors to the effect that the United States Government was planning to reach a decision with regard to the increased British gold and dollar balances, and that action to decrease these balances might be taken. He pointed out that Secretary Morgenthau is to be in London shortly and that the

⁴⁷ October 22.

Chancellor of the Exchequer⁴⁹ has been planning to talk to Mr. Morgenthau on this whole question. Sir David Waley indicated that it would be most unfortunate and would give rise to a serious misunderstanding and even bitterness, if a decision were to be reached, and action taken unilaterally before the Chancellor of the Exchequer should have had this opportunity to talk the matter over with Mr. Morgenthau. Mr. Acheson said that he was not aware of any likelihood that this Government might make a decision before these conversations had taken place, but that he would be glad to speak to Mr. Stettinius of this. He said that he could quite understand the importance which Sir David would attach to this point.

D[EAN] A[CHESON]

841.24/2186

The Assistant Secretary of State (Acheson) to the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius)

[WASHINGTON,] October 21, 1943.

MR. STETTINIUS: Late yesterday afternoon, the draft instructions to Secretary Morgenthau,⁵⁰ attached to my underlying memorandum, were discussed with Lauchlin Currie,⁵¹ Oscar Cox⁵² and Frank Coe.⁵³ Mr. Currie said that FEA's position was that it felt impelled, in view of the January 1 statement of policy and a recent draft letter from Secretary Morgenthau to Mr. Crowley, to take action or to have some specific decision made which would relieve it of the responsibility for taking immediate action.

I explained that I did not believe that FEA was impelled to take action yet, since no recommendation has been made by the sub-cabinet committee to the President's dollar position committee, but that I did recognize their problem. I suggested that Mr. Crowley and you talk this matter over with the President and recommend to him that the proposed instructions to Mr. Morgenthau be sent, which would put FEA's position in the matter beyond criticism and at the same time would not damage our relations with the British. The FEA representatives agreed.

D[EAN] A[CHESON]

⁴⁹ Sir John Anderson succeeded the late Sir Kingsley Wood on September 24, 1943.

⁵⁰ Not found in Department files.

⁵¹ Deputy Foreign Economic Administrator.

⁵² General Counsel, Foreign Economic Administration.

⁵³ Assistant Foreign Economic Administrator.

[Enclosure]

*Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Acheson) to the
Under Secretary of State (Stettinius)*

[WASHINGTON,] October 21, 1943.

MR. STETTINIUS: On January 1, 1943, the Interdepartmental Committee on the gold and dollar balances of lend-lease countries submitted a report to the President (subsequently approved by him) recommending, "in the light of present circumstances, that the United Kingdom's gold and dollar balances should not be permitted to be less than about \$600 million nor above about \$1 billion". It is clear from the underlined words that it was not the intention of the Committee, or the President, to fix at that time an arbitrary figure which would under all circumstances limit British foreign exchange assets. Any such policy, which would leave out of consideration the growth of liabilities against those assets, would be manifestly unrealistic and unfair.

In recognition of this fact, the British were requested in May, 1943,⁶⁴ to submit for the use of the Interdepartmental Committee a report on their overseas financial problems. On September 14, 1943, the British Treasury submitted a memorandum indicating that:

1) The total quick liabilities of the United Kingdom have increased from approximately \$2 billion on January 1, 1940, to over \$7 billion on June 30, 1943.

2) Their quick assets in the form of gold and dollar balances decreased from \$2.1 billions on January 1, 1940, to practically nothing in the Spring of 1941, and had risen by June 30, 1943, to only \$1.1 billions (as of the present, they stand at roughly \$1.2 billions).

3) Their quick liabilities are currently increasing at a rate of over \$2.5 billions per year; their gold and dollar assets at a rate of only \$.6 to \$.7 billion per year.

No reply has been made by the United States Government to this memorandum, nor has the Interdepartmental Committee met to consider it, although it has been under study in the different departments and agencies concerned. Secretary Morgenthau will be in London before the end of the month, and Sir David Waley has stated that the Chancellor of the Exchequer intends to discuss this matter with him at that time.

The policy of the United States Government has been, and presumably still is, so to conduct its relations with the United Kingdom as, at the very least, not to weaken British participation in the war

⁶⁴ See footnote 44, p. 90.

and in subsequent efforts to establish an enduring peace. Arbitrary, unilateral action upon a matter so essential to British stability, taken without consultation with the British, could not but endanger the success of this policy.

I agree with Mr. Achilles that a comprehensive statement of the types of goods now supplied to the United Kingdom under lend-lease should be prepared at this time, in order to make sure that all are indeed properly lend-leaseable in terms of their contribution to the war effort.⁵⁵ But I feel very strongly that no requisitions should be transferred to cash reimbursable without full consultation with the British.

I suggest further that you recommend to the President that he send instructions, along the lines of the attached draft, to Secretary Morgenthau to guide him in his forthcoming conversations with the Chancellor of the Exchequer.

D[EAN] A[CHESON]

841.24/2120 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul at Algiers (Wiley)*⁵⁶

WASHINGTON, October 22, 1943—midnight.

1946. Please give the following message from the President to Secretary Morgenthau:⁵⁷

"Crowley is prepared to initiate discussions with the British looking toward adoption of recommendations in your draft letter⁵⁸ for reduction of British balances through reduction of civilian goods furnished through lend-lease. In view of the memorandum on British financial position dated September 14, 1943, sent to you by Sir Kingsley Wood I think it would be desirable, if it is convenient, for you to discuss with Sir John Anderson the considerations raised in that memorandum. The matter involved is of importance to both governments. Both governments will wish to consider this matter frankly, giving full consideration to each other's views and striving to reach a mutually satisfactory conclusion. I am confident that you and Sir John Anderson will be able to make substantial progress to this end, and that your report will enable us to reach a sound decision. Pending word from you I have asked Mr. Crowley to defer his proposed action."

STETTINIUS

⁵⁵ Mr. Achilles had made this suggestion in a memorandum, dated October 19, 1943, to the Under Secretary of State (841.24/2127).

⁵⁶ Marginal notations: "OK FDR" and "Approved by Mr. Crowley—D[ean] A[cheson]".

⁵⁷ The Secretary of the Treasury had arrived at Algiers on October 19 on an air tour of the Mediterranean battlefields.

⁵⁸ Not printed.

841.24/2121 : Telegram

The Consul at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, October 23, 1943—6 p. m.

[Received October 24—4:30 a. m.]

1824. For the President from the Secretary of the Treasury.

Your 1946 October 22, 12 p. m. This is in reply to your message, dated October 2 [22] suggesting that I might discuss with Sir John Anderson in London considerations raised in the memorandum on financial position, dated September 14, 1943, sent to me by Sir Kingsley Wood.

I think it would be desirable to reach agreement among the interested Departments of our own Government before taking up the matter with the British. An informal committee, consisting of representatives of the State Department, Lend-Lease, War, Navy, Treasury, and Mr. Crowley's organization, have been, for a long time, considering problems of that character. The draft of proposed letter to Mr. Crowley was submitted to each of the members of that committee for the purpose of obtaining their reaction before making any definite recommendation. I learned, by cable, that there was a difference of view among the American members with respect to the wisdom of taking action such as was indicated in the draft of the proposed letter to Crowley. I had already cabled home that no further action should be taken with respect to the letter until my return.

Inasmuch as there appears to be a difference in view among the members as to the wisest course for us to pursue, I would suggest that we can make progress more effectively if we first attempted to reach agreement among the interested agencies. The British Government has kept us fully informed as to their views on the matter and have supplied us with all the data needed upon which to base a recommendation.

If there is agreement among members of informal committee indicated above and if you approve of their recommendations we can then take it up with British representatives in Washington before taking any final action. There are in Washington several representatives of the British Government who are thoroughly conversant with the problem and who have participated in discussions bearing on matter for many months.

After having read this cable if you still wish me to go to London I will of course be glad to do so but should you wish me to go I think it highly important that I should be instructed to present to Sir John Anderson Treasury viewpoint this matter and the Treasury viewpoint should of course be the administration viewpoint.

Arrive Cairo Monday morning. Planning spend 2 days there. Would appreciate hearing from you at Cairo. [Morgenthau.]⁵⁹

WILEY

841.5151/2002

*Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Acheson)*⁶⁰

[WASHINGTON,] November 2, 1943.

UNITED STATES POLICY ON LIMITATIONS ON BRITISH GOLD AND DOLLAR BALANCES

1. *The Facts.*

In January, 1943 the President approved a recommendation that, in the light of existing conditions, the British gold and dollar balances should be between 600 million and 1 billion dollars. This decision was made without British agreement.

Recently British reserves have exceeded 1 billion dollars; after certain deductions they now stand at 1 billion 200 million, and may be expected to increase at the rate of about 600 million a year. The provision as reciprocal aid of raw materials purchased by the United States Government would decrease this rate by approximately 200 million a year. It should be observed that the increase in British dollar balances is due entirely to the pay of American troops within the Sterling Area.

British short term liabilities, against which the gold and dollar balances are the only reserves, now stand at over 7 billion dollars. They are increasing, largely due to heavy cash expenditures in the Middle East and India, at a rate of about 3 billions a year.

2. *The Treasury Proposal.*

In a draft letter from the Secretary of the Treasury to Mr. Leo Crowley circulated by Mr. Harry White to the members of the Cabinet

⁵⁹ Department's telegram No. 1598, October 25, 1943, 9 p. m., to the Minister in Egypt, transmitted the message that President Roosevelt thought it best for Secretary Morgenthau not to go to London. Meanwhile, there would be continued efforts to reach agreement in Washington. (102.1/9361a)

⁶⁰ Marginal notation reads: "At Mr. Stettinius' request I told Mr. Acheson to handle this matter for the Department at the 11:45 Meeting this morning with Secretary Morgenthau and that Mr. Stettinius would back him up on it because they both see eye to eye on the subject. R[obert] J L[ynch]".

In a memorandum of November 16, 1943, to the Secretary of State, Mr. Stettinius stated that Mr. Acheson's memorandum of November 2 was read at the Interdepartmental meeting at the Treasury Department (841.5151/2001). No record of this meeting has been found in Department files; inquiry at the Treasury Department has indicated no record of this meeting in the Treasury Department files.

sub-committee on the dollar position of lend-lease countries, it is recommended:

“that immediate steps be taken to reduce the amount of civilian goods being lend-leased to the British Government by an amount sufficient to bring Britain’s gold and dollar holdings to a level consistent with the January 1 decision”.

The proposed reduction is estimated at 200 to 300 million dollars.

3. *British Argument.*

The British contend that the increase in their gold and dollar balances does not reflect an improvement of their financial position. On the contrary, their net overseas position is deteriorating at a rate of about \$2.5 billion a year. Some growth of their liquid reserves is, they argue, indispensable to the delicate system by which they finance the war on credit through a large part of the world. To allow such growth could not legitimately be criticized.

4. *Comment on British Argument.*

The British argument appears to be valid. Certainly it is unreasonable to set a hard and fast limit on assets without regard to liabilities. If a man had held \$100 in cash against \$500 in debts, one would not argue that his financial position had improved when he holds \$500 in cash against \$5,000 in debts.

The Soviet is believed to hold gold reserves nearly double the total British gold and dollar holdings, and to have no significant liabilities against them. Yet we have not therefore proposed to reduce lend-lease aid to the Soviet Union.

FEA has already informed the British that certain industrial equipment, the post-war value of which would be significant, would no longer be furnished under straight lend-lease after November 15.⁶¹ This would further reduce the probable rate of increase of their dollar holdings by about \$50 million annually and should eliminate most of the items subject to criticism.

5. *Recommendation.*

It is recommended that the present policy, restricting British gold and dollar resources under a rigid ceiling, be abandoned in favor of a policy which will permit those resources to increase in a given ratio to the short term liabilities against them. It may be that the existing ratio (about 1 : 6 or 7) will be adequate.

⁶¹ According to a memorandum of November 17, 1943, by Mr. Quincy Wright, Consultant to the Foreign Economic Administration, machine tools were the principal items removed from the lend-lease list at this time (841.5151/2013) ; see Hall, *North American Supply*, pp. 280, 406, 438, and 448-449.

A statement setting forth the facts leading to this policy should be prepared for transmission to Congress or the appropriate Congressional committees. This would have to be framed so as not to endanger British credit in areas holding large sterling balances.

841.24/2130 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, November 8, 1943—midnight.

7026. Personal for the Ambassador. Treasury and FEA have considered the proposed British White Paper on reverse lend-lease and have indicated that they do not wish to raise any objection to its publication (your 7622 of November 3⁶²). The President is planning to deliver a report to Congress on the same subject⁶³ at about the same time, and I have promised to give Lord Halifax a draft of this report as soon as possible. We understand that the British propose to issue their paper on November 11.⁶⁴

Negotiations on raw materials had until recently been proceeding slowly due to a difference on principle between FEA and the British Raw Materials Mission. The British wished to follow a procedure similar to lend-lease procedure, whereas FEA wishes to undertake, except in government-to-government contracts, its own procurement, on the understanding that the British would then pay all or such part of each contract as they felt proper. Considerable progress towards agreement has now been made. On dollar balances, there have been some informational discussions with the British. However, the question of what U.S. policy should be is still under consideration between State, Treasury, War Department and FEA. A recommendation should go soon to the President.

STETTINIUS

[On December 8, 1943, at Cairo, Prime Minister Churchill handed to Harry L. Hopkins a composite memorandum relating to the question of British gold and dollar balances. This memorandum consisted of three separate documents drawn up respectively on October 26, November 11, and November 12, 1943. For the text of this composite memorandum, see *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, page 822.]

⁶² Not printed.

⁶³ House Document No. 353, 78th Cong., 1st sess.

⁶⁴ British Cmd. 6483 (1943) : *A Report on Mutual Aid*.

841.5151/2005

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Eugene V. Rostow, Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State (Acheson)

[WASHINGTON,] December 16, 1943.

Participants: Secretary Morgenthau and Mr. Harry D. White of the Treasury Department;
Mr. Stettinius, Mr. Acheson and Mr. Rostow of the State Department;
Mr. Crowley, Mr. Currie, Mr. Oscar Cox and Mr. Coe of the Foreign Economic Administration.

The meeting was held in Secretary Morgenthau's office at his request to consider a memorandum (attached) which had been prepared by the Treasury and had been agreed to by Mr. Crowley. It had not been previously submitted for our consideration. Secretary Morgenthau stated that he was concerned over the failure to carry out certain directives of the President contained in the memorandum of January 1, 1943, on the relationship between lend-lease policy and the financial resources of our Allies, and particularly with reference to Great Britain. He said that he had been "kicked around" for eleven months on this subject and was anxious for decisive action. He had called the meeting because he was desirous of reaching agreement if possible with all the parties concerned before proposing a policy to the President. He did not wish to be unreasonable, and would be glad to afford us time for the consideration of the memorandum. He would cheerfully agree to revise the analytical statements in the beginning of the memorandum. But he warned us that he would be very difficult to persuade if any changes in the recommendations were proposed.

Discussion was had first as to the factual correctness of paragraph 3, in so far as the Lend-Lease Administration was concerned. Mr. Stettinius pointed out that he had taken the initiative more than a year ago, as Lend-Lease Administrator, in seeking to obtain a definitive clarification of lend-lease policy in relation to British and other Allied dollar assets. It was agreed that appropriate revisions would be made in this section of the memorandum to reflect the facts more accurately.

Secretary Morgenthau then stated his views in the following terms: As Administration spokesman at the time of the original hearings on the passage of the Lend-Lease Bill in January, 1941, he had taken a position in Congress which he interpreted as a moral commitment to the effect that in so far as the British could pay for American sup-

plies, they would do so.⁶⁵ He had never changed his testimony, and felt that a continuation of the present trend in British finances would be in some sense a betrayal of his pledge. He was therefore anxious to see to it that the policy of the January 1 directive was strictly carried out, and the British gold and dollar position reduced to a billion dollars.

Mr. Stettinius requested Mr. Acheson to comment. Mr. Acheson said that it was of course well understood that Secretary Morgenthau had taken the lead during 1940 and 1941 to arrange for all possible aid to the British and French Missions, and that he had taken considerable initiative with reference to the Lend-Lease Act. Without going into the content of Secretary Morgenthau's testimony in January, 1941, in detail, its significance had to be considered in the light of other aspects of the legislative history of the Act. Secretary Morgenthau testified almost a year before Pearl Harbor. Our entry into the war, and other developments in the gradual evolution of Lend-Lease policy had worked great changes in our lend-lease program. The President in his quarterly reports to the Congress had made many of these changes clear. The Lend-Lease Agreements with countries receiving Lend-Lease aid set forth principles at variance with Secretary Morgenthau's interpretation of his testimony of January, 1941. These matters were specifically considered and approved by the Committees of Congress at the time the Act was renewed in January and February of 1943, and on the four separate occasions when further appropriations were made for lend-lease purposes.

Now that we are in the war, lend-lease is not regarded as the aid of a neutral to a friendly belligerent. It is an integral and indistinguishable part of our own war effort. It makes no difference to the war as a whole that we send tanks abroad which are manned by Allied soldiers, rather than by our own soldiers. Lend-lease and lend-lease in reverse, it has been emphasized over and over again by the President and by the Committees of Congress, is a device for pooling Allied resources in the war. We no longer think of our lend-lease exports as a part of the British or Soviet war effort. They are a portion of the share of our war production which we devote to the war. The Congress has approved the idea that the costs of the war will be fairly distributed if we pay whatever expenses are necessarily incurred in dollars, and the British pay whatever expenses are necessarily incurred in pounds. The British are devoting to the war as

⁶⁵ See *Lend-Lease Bill*: Hearings Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 77th Cong., 1st sess., on H.R. 1776, pp. 55, 61, 63-65, and 69; and *To Promote the Defense of the United States*: Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 77th Cong., 1st sess., on S. 275, pp. 21, 25, 26, 46, 47, 48, 66, and 70.

large a share of their national income as we are, if not a larger one. Their tax burden and war costs, in relation to population and national income, are as great or greater than our own. For us to request the British, therefore, to pay in dollars for a part of American production used in the war is in effect to shift to the British part of the financial costs which are properly ours. It is incorrect to think of lend-lease, as it has evolved with Congressional approval, as a device for shifting to the American taxpayer part of the British or Russian financial burden of war.

Mr. Crowley sought to define the issues between Mr. Acheson and Mr. Stettinius, on the one hand, and Secretary Morgenthau on the other. It was made clear that Mr. Acheson favored a reconsideration of the directive of January 1, 1943, on the ground that circumstances had substantially changed since that time. He pointed out that the recommendation of January 1, 1943, was "that in the light of present circumstances", lend-lease be regulated so as to keep the British dollar position between \$600 million and \$1 billion. He said that the great rise in British non-dollar obligations during the year, associated with British war expenditures in the area between Suez and Singapore, constituted a change in the circumstances with reference to which the original memorandum was agreed upon. He said that the ceiling policy had proved to be an unnecessary and serious affront to the British, and had outlived its usefulness. Secretary Morgenthau agreed that the ceiling policy would seriously embarrass the British Treasury in its war finances. He regretted the result, he said, but felt it was inevitable in view of his commitment to Congress. Mr. Acheson stated that he favored a changed directive which would eliminate all reference to a ceiling, and would permit the *ad hoc* solution of lend-lease problems which seemed politically or otherwise undesirable on their individual merits. He pointed out that most of the cases listed in paragraph 1 of the Treasury recommendations were already being satisfactorily dealt with. It was not correct to conclude that the President's directive had not been enforced. If the British position was accepted on the \$365 million in gold held for specific gold obligations, the British position was between \$1.2 billion and \$1.3 billion, a figure which would probably be reduced as a consequence of the expansion of British reverse lend-lease for raw materials.

It was agreed that the State Department would consider the Treasury memorandum and prepare its views for a definite submission at a further meeting to be held in Secretary Morgenthau's office on next Tuesday afternoon, December 21.⁶⁶

⁶⁶ No record of such a meeting has been found in Department files; inquiry at the Treasury Department has indicated no record of a meeting on this date in the Treasury Department files.

[Annex]

Draft Memorandum for President Roosevelt ⁶⁷

[WASHINGTON,] December 16, 1943.

1. In January 1943, you approved the following recommendation of a committee consisting of representatives of the Departments of State, Treasury and War, the Office of Lend-Lease Administration and the Board of Economic Warfare.

"It is recommended in the light of present circumstances, that the United Kingdom's gold and dollar balances should not be permitted to be less than about \$600 million nor above about \$1 billion."

2. Notwithstanding the directive, the British Government's liquid dollar exchange assets have continued to rise and are now over \$1,650 million, or \$1,300 million more than at the time the Lend-Lease Bill was presented to Congress in January 1941.

In addition to the gold and dollar holdings of the British Government, residents of the United Kingdom hold \$320 million of private dollar balances and about \$1,150 million of long-term investments in the United States. Of the latter assets, \$500 million are pledged with the R.F.C.⁶⁸ against the \$350 million loan.

3. Within a few months after your directive was issued, a division of opinion developed within the Committee concerning its proper implementation. In these discussions, the Treasury and the Board of Economic Warfare, with the support of the War Department, urged its literal interpretation; the State Department and Lend-Lease, on the other hand, favored a more liberal interpretation.

During the ensuing months, the Treasury and the Board of Economic Warfare pressed for a reduction in civilian lend-lease as a means of implementing your directive, but the State Department and Lend-Lease Administration were reluctant to recommend such a step in the absence of an exhaustive reexamination of our policy of financial assistance to the British and of Britain's over-all international financial position. It was finally agreed to request the British for strategic and other materials as reciprocal aid, estimated likely to amount to \$200-\$300 million during the ensuing year. This proposal was immediately placed before the British. Several months elapsed before the latter agreed to the proposal in principle and even then only after considerable prodding. Several more months have been spent in an endeavor to arrive at methods of implementing the proposal. We are disappointed with the progress made to date and we think there is little reason at present to be hopeful that this device

⁶⁷ Prepared by Mr. Harry Dexter White, Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury.

⁶⁸ Reconstruction Finance Corporation.

will in effect yield anything like the amount needed to carry out your directive.

4. The British Government has strongly objected to a policy which prohibits an increase in their gold and dollar assets. They emphasize that the rise in their holdings of these assets—which may be expected to continue at an annual rate of at least a half billion dollars unless steps are taken to interrupt this trend—is only a fraction of the increase in their short-term indebtedness to overseas countries other than the United States.

They assert first that \$365 million of these liabilities represent a specific claim against an equivalent amount of dollars and that that sum must be subtracted from their total holdings in order to obtain the correct figure of their available gold and dollar reserve.

Secondly, they claim that their short-term sterling liabilities to overseas countries are five times the amount of their gold and dollar holdings and that these liabilities are increasing at a rate of \$2.5 billion a year.

The British claim that they should be permitted to accumulate gold and dollars as a necessary reserve against these growing liabilities. They assert that the continued accumulation of gold and dollars is a prerequisite to the continuation of the policy by which they have managed to finance their war expenditures in India, the Near East and other overseas areas.

Finally, the British fear that their mounting liabilities to overseas countries will place them in a very vulnerable position after the war and jeopardize their chances of a speedy post-war recovery.

5. There is merit, of course, in the British position but we feel that neither Britain's international financial position outside the United States nor its post-war needs were among the considerations which prompted Congress to pass the Lend-Lease Act. In our opinion, Lend-Lease aid to Britain was instituted in order to enable her to obtain those goods and services essential to the prosecution of the war for the purchase of which she lacked the necessary dollars, and that therefore to administer the Act in such a way as to help underwrite Britain's short-term indebtedness to other countries or to improve her post-war financial position is not in accord with Congressional intent. The British concede that this narrower purpose may have been the original objective, but they believe that our entry into the war alters the situation.

It is our view, however, that if we are to administer the Lend-Lease Act so as to provide Britain with more dollars than are required for the purchase of essential war goods and services, Congress should be informed and given an opportunity to indicate its attitude toward such a change in policy.

6. Our interpretation of Congressional intent seems to be supported by the report of the Truman Committee entitled "Outlines of Problems of Conversion from War Production" and submitted to Congress on November 5, 1943.⁶⁹ To quote from page 13 of this document:

"In the latter connection, we should never forget that lend-lease was originally authorized by the Congress, solely because the English and others whom we desired to assist did not have sufficient American exchange to purchase materials needed by them. Lend-Lease was never intended as a device to shift a portion of their war costs to us, but only as a realistic recognition that they did not have the means with which to pay for materials they needed.

"Before authorizing lend-lease, the Congress expressly requested and received assurances that lend-lease assistance would be extended only where the recipient was fully utilizing all of its own resources."⁷⁰

Recommendations

Eleven months have passed since you signed the directive to keep the British balances between \$600 million and \$1,000 million. During this period we have attempted to develop a program designed to keep these balances from rising above that ceiling. To date we have not been successful in securing the necessary cooperation of the British Government for the effective implementation of this objective.

In our opinion, nothing has happened during the past year to warrant a change in the policy laid down in your directive. The considerations which prompted the Committee's recommendation last January appear to us to be as valid today as they were then.

Therefore, unless you indicate to the contrary, we propose to take the following steps to reduce the British balances to within the range indicated in your directive.

1. Discontinue certain transactions which would never have been undertaken except for Britain's acute shortage of dollars, and which experience has shown are opposed by considerable sections of public opinion. Among the transactions which it is proposed to cut are: (a) long-term capital installations; (b) off-shore purchases such as Iceland fish, Caribbean sugar, and oil from outside the U.S.; (c) civilian goods to the Middle East; (d) all goods to South Africa; (e) small requisitions, and (f) certain other controversial civilian items.

2. Since these measures may be insufficient to bring Britain's balances down to the agreed upon maximum of \$1 billion, it is further proposed to have the British pay for as large a proportion of civilian

⁶⁹ Senate Report No. 10, pt. 12, 78th Cong., 1st sess. Senator Harry S. Truman was Chairman of the Senate Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program, usually referred to as the War Investigating Committee.

⁷⁰ In commenting upon this quotation, in a memorandum of December 17, 1943, Assistant Secretary of State Acheson said: "The remarks quoted by the Treasury memorandum (p. 3) from a Truman Committee Report are incorrect, were inserted without hearings in a Report on another subject, and we are informally advised are not to be treated as the final view of the Committee." (841.5151/-2010)

goods obtained in this country as is necessary to help reduce the British Government's gold and dollar holdings to, and keep them at, about \$1 billion.

[Agreement concerning the acquisition by the United States of raw materials as reciprocal aid from the United Kingdom, Southern Rhodesia, and the Colonies was effected by an exchange of notes on December 17 and 27, 1943, between Lauchlin Currie, Deputy Foreign Economic Administrator, and Robert H. Brand of the British Supply Council in North America. The dates set for application of the new agreement were July 1, 1943, for raw materials procured from official sources, and November 11, 1943, for such materials previously purchased under private contracts. (841.24/2169½)]

**DISCONTINUANCE OF DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES
AND THE UNITED KINGDOM REGARDING FEASIBILITY OF A MORE
EXTENSIVE TRADE AGREEMENT AND RELATED DISCUSSIONS WITH
BRITISH DOMINIONS ⁷¹**

611.4131/2647a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, August 19, 1943—6 p. m.

5027. Personal for the Ambassador. You will recall that exploratory discussions were undertaken in 1941 with the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa with a view to determining whether it would be desirable and feasible to conclude trade agreements with the three Dominions and a new and more extensive trade agreement with the United Kingdom. Extensive studies were undertaken by our trade-agreements organization and tentative proposals were submitted to the other countries concerned. The Dominions showed an active interest in bringing the exploratory discussions to a successful conclusion and in pressing the negotiations to completion. From the beginning, however, the discussions have dragged, largely due to an apparent lack of interest or to indecision on the part of the United Kingdom, the latest indication of which is the fact that Stirling ⁷² has been recalled to London for several months.

We are seriously concerned about this situation, particularly because the generally favorable present opportunity to negotiate worthwhile trade agreements will be lost unless agreement is speedily

⁷¹ For previous correspondence, see *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. III, pp. 112 ff. For additional correspondence in 1943 regarding trade relations with Australia, see *post*, pp. 115 ff.

⁷² John A. Stirling, member of the British Board of Trade Delegation in Washington.

reached on the basis for announcement of the negotiations and negotiations are pressed to a conclusion within about the next 6 months. You will appreciate the significance of this timetable.

We have been turning this problem over in our minds but before reaching a decision we should like to have the benefit of your best advice by telegram as to the present situation and attitudes in London and as to the approach you think would be most effective.

In view of the time limitations there will of course be no point in proceeding with this matter unless the British are ready to go forward vigorously and wholeheartedly with these discussions. A half-hearted approach would be tantamount to abandoning them.

In this connection please refer to my telegram of today's date transmitting to you the text of a British Embassy *aide-mémoire* and of our reply⁷³ regarding preliminary conversations on an orderly agenda for article VII discussions. Because of the time limitations above referred to, deferment of a decision regarding the proposed trade agreements until these conversations take place would in all probability make it impractical to proceed with the negotiations even if the British should a month or two from now indicate a desire to do so.

HULL

611.4131/2647: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, August 20, 1943—midnight.

[Received August 21—4:30 a. m.]

5479. For the Secretary and the Under Secretary. Your 5027, August 19, 6 p. m. We agree entirely with you on the importance of resuming and pressing to a conclusion as quickly as possible the negotiations on the proposed trade agreements with Britain and the Dominions.

The Dominions in their talks here in June argued for early negotiations on the trade pacts but Britain wished, before entering on such negotiations, to take up informally its general proposals for implementation of article 7 in the field of commercial policy outlined in Embassy's 4355 of July 2.⁷⁴ The compromise reached was that the trade agreement talks should follow quickly on the opening of talks on the implementation of article 7 with respect to commercial policy. At that time however we were not clear what date would be proposed for opening the talks and there seemed to be some prospect that it would be earlier than September.

⁷³ Telegram No. 5020, August 19, not printed; for British *aide-mémoire*, dated August 4, 1943, and U.S. reply, dated August 17, 1943, see vol. I, pp. 1106 and 1107, respectively.

⁷⁴ Vol. I, p. 1102.

We believe on the basis of personal conversations here in the last 2 years that the reasons for the apparent lack of interest on the part of the United Kingdom in the trade agreements negotiations have been as follows:

(1) In the critical state of the war in 1941 and most of 1942 Foreign Office circles felt that detailed discussions of tariffs on particular commodities in an uncertain and perhaps distant post-war period were somewhat unrealistic.

(2) Since the signing of the Lend-Lease Agreement there has been an increasing interest in post-war international economic reconstruction, but the Foreign Office and Civil Service generally have been in favor of working out agreements on comprehensive lines on the means of implementing article 7 before going into detailed negotiations on tariffs on particular commodities. This started with the working out of proposals on monetary questions, went on to raw material questions and from late last year extended to commercial policy.

(3) The Department of Overseas Trade and the Board of Trade in the last 8 months have concentrated on the construction of a plan for a commercial policy union on lines indicated in Embassy's [*Department's*] 3683, June 14,⁷⁵ based on proposals originally drawn up by James Meade, an economist in the War Cabinet Secretariat. Their interest and that of the Foreign Office are strongly attached to this plan.

(4) Some of the civil servants in the Department of Overseas Trade and the Board of Trade, while recognizing that substantial gains to the postwar export trade of the Dominions would result from the proposed trade pacts, feel that Britain has less direct interest in the U.S. market from the point of view of exports. They are anxious for a reduction of tariffs on a wider basis which would include other countries in which they believe their export prospects to be greater.

(5) There seems to be a feeling, the basis of which cannot be evaluated here, within some Government and export circles that United States business groups are pursuing a more aggressive policy of advertising and selling than is permitted by the British Government to British businessmen with a view to capturing postwar markets in Latin America. This has directed considerable attention to Latin American markets in Government, parliamentary and export trade circles and tends to increase the tendency noted under (4).

(6) Some of the leading civil servants in the Foreign Office, the Department of Overseas Trade, the Board of Trade and the Treasury appear to underestimate greatly the extent to which trade barriers can be reduced by reciprocal trade agreements with us and between us and the Dominions.

Of these reasons the first has ceased to be important; it is difficult to judge the importance of the fifth; but the second, third, fourth and sixth, undoubtedly remain important.

In view of the Department's reply ⁷⁶ (Department's 5020, August 19 ⁷⁷) to the *aide-mémoire* left by Lord Halifax on August 4 ⁷⁸ there

⁷⁵ Vol. I, p. 1100.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 1107.

⁷⁷ Not printed.

⁷⁸ Vol. I, p. 1106.

should be some prospect of reconciling the views outlined under (2) and (3) above with an immediate resumption of trade pact negotiations. As regards the views outlined under (6) it seems possible to demonstrate in appropriate quarters in Whitehall the quantitative importance of the proposed trade pacts as a contribution to the reduction of trade barriers.

To obtain an immediate resumption of the trade agreement negotiations, together with a ministerial directive to the British negotiations [*negotiators*] to reach agreement within 6 months, it will be necessary to convince certain ministerial circles and their chief Civil Service advisors that we regard the early conclusion of the proposed agreements as a vital part of postwar reconstruction measures, that failure to conclude these agreements promptly would nullify in practice all the efforts that were put into the drive to renew the act in Congress, and that there are substantial advantages to be gained from the agreements by Great Britain and the Dominions. It would also be an effective argument here if it could be said that, so far as British views on the implementation of article 7 in respect of commercial policy might involve wider measures than reciprocal trade agreements, it would be difficult for us to ask Congress subsequently for additional powers on commercial policy if we had not used the powers already given. Would you approve the use of this argument?

In regard to the most effective approach there seems to be some advantage in a preliminary informal sounding out here. The prospects could then be reported and if it did not appear that an informal approach would bring adequate results quickly we would suggest that you send an instruction. We believe that considerable support can be gained here among the Government economists and other civil servants who supported our position within the Government during the article 7 negotiations. Much of the hesitation on the trade agreements arises not from a reactionary attitude on trade barriers but from preoccupation with a somewhat different method of approach to commercial policy, an inadequate grasp of the quantitative significance of the proposed trade agreements, and insufficient appreciation of the fact that governmental implementation of trade agreements will be assured in advance while the wider commercial policy plans, however desirable, will be exposed to the hazards of legislative debate and voting.

WINANT

[Specific trade agreement discussions with the British Government continued in abeyance. For informal and exploratory discussions regarding postwar economic policy, see volume I, pages 1099 ff.]

OBJECTIONS BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO PROPOSED ESTABLISHMENT BY THE UNITED STATES OF A CONSULATE AT BAHREIN

125.0046B/a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, February 4, 1943—11 p. m.

840. In view of decision by this Government to construct additional refining facilities at Bahrein involving substantial increase in American personnel and shipping there, the Department desires to establish a consulate at Bahrein. In as much as the foreign affairs of Bahrein are controlled by the British Government please ascertain whether the appropriate British authorities are agreeable to the establishment of the consulate.

HULL

125.0046B/1 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Matthews) to the Secretary
of State*

LONDON, February 8, 1943—6 p. m.

[Received 7:13 p. m.]

1005. We have given the substance of Department's 840 of February 6 [4], 11 p. m., concerning Department's desire to establish a Consulate at Bahrein, to the Foreign Office. Foreign Office states that before replying, it would want to take the matter up with the Government of India. Foreign Office will give definite reply as soon as possible.

MATTHEWS

125.0046B/3 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom
(Matthews)*

WASHINGTON, April 10, 1943—midnight.

2295. Notwithstanding the considerations transmitted in your A-182, March 19, 1 p. m.,⁷⁹ it is desired that you press the Foreign Office vigorously for the necessary permission.

In so doing you should express our recognition of the success which the British have had in maintaining political stability in the Persian

⁷⁹Not printed. In this airgram the Chargé quoted a communication dated March 18, received from the British Foreign Office. This reply explained at some length the exceptional circumstances prevailing in Bahrein and the special position of the British representation. Therefore it was hoped that the United States would not seek to alter the established system under which the British would do everything possible for the satisfaction of American interests and welfare. (125.0046B/3)

Gulf area and explain that we are cognizant of the nature of British relations with the ruler of Bahrein. You should point out, however, that American economic interests have been substantial in Bahrein for some time, that as mentioned in the Department's no. 840, Feb. 4, 11 p. m., they will be increased in the immediate future, and that it seems entirely probable that they will remain of real importance. As a matter of fact, we have been repeatedly and severely criticized for not providing consular facilities for American citizens residing in Bahrein and for American seamen and merchant vessels. You should indicate that, although the viewpoint of the Foreign Office is appreciated, it is considered that the establishment of an American consulate at Bahrein is necessary in view of the importance of American economic interests and the services demanded by American citizens and shipping at that point. In view of the length of time required in present circumstances to get consular personnel and official supplies to Bahrein, we hope the Foreign Office will give us an early and favorable reply to our present request.

HULL

125.0046B/3 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, May 4, 1943—3 p. m.

2804. Department's 2295, April 10, midnight. Please endeavor to expedite Foreign Office's reply to request for permission to establish a consulate at Bahrein.

HULL

125.0046B/5 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, May 5, 1943—9 p. m.

[Received May 5—5:55 p. m.]

3130. Department's 2804, May 4, 3 p. m. Our need for a Consulate at Bahrein was taken up again with Foreign Office in considerable detail on April 12. Foreign Office promptly consulted with Government of India once more. As no reply was forthcoming Foreign Office 2 days ago urged Government of India to expedite its reply. We were assured at Foreign Office today that it will give us an answer just as soon as possible.

WINANT

125.0046B/4 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, May 21, 1943—6 p. m.

3220. Your 3130, May 5, 9 p. m. Please inform the Foreign Office that, in as much as circumstances make it necessary to establish a consulate at Bahrein as soon as possible, a prompt favorable reply to your inquiry would be appreciated.

HULL

125.0046B/6 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary
of State*

LONDON, June 4, 1943—6 p. m.

[Received June 4—5 : 32 p. m.]

3808. Department's 3220, May 21, 6 p. m. Foreign Office regrets not being able to meet our request for opening a Consulate at Bahrein. Its position and certain suggestions for meeting our needs other than by having consular representation at Bahrein are set forth in considerable detail in an informal communication dated June 2 which is being forwarded by airmail.

WINANT

125.0046B/7

*The Counselor of Embassy in the United Kingdom (Matthews) to the
Secretary of State*

No. 9432

LONDON, June 4, 1943.

SIR: I have the honor to refer to the Embassy's telegram no. 3808 of June 4, 6 p. m., and to enclose herewith a copy of the communication dated June 2, 1943,⁸⁰ from the Foreign Office setting forth the reasons why it is felt the Department's request to establish a Consulate at Bahrein cannot be granted, and giving certain suggestions as to how American needs in that area might be met in the absence of a Consulate.

The communications addressed by the Embassy to the Foreign Office on the Department's request to establish a Consulate at Bahrein were, of course, reinforced by oral representations made directly to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Eden, and to the Permanent Under Secretary of State, Sir Alexander Cadogan.

Respectfully yours,

H. FREEMAN MATTHEWS

⁸⁰ Not printed.

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES, CANADA, AND THE UNITED KINGDOM REGARDING INDUSTRIAL DIAMONDS, SIGNED AT LONDON, MARCH 26, 1943

[For text of agreement and notes signed March 26, 1943, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 317, or 57 Stat. (pt. 2) 931.]

ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM APPROVING MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING SIGNED JANUARY 6, 1943, REGARDING APPORTIONING OF AFRICAN ASBESTOS

[For text of arrangement effected by exchange of notes signed at London, April 30, 1943, and text of Memorandum of Understanding, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 332, or 57 Stat. (pt. 2) 1023.]

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM GOVERNING COLLABORATION IN ATOMIC ENERGY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

[For text of agreement signed at Quebec, August 19, 1943, see Department of State Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 2993, or *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements*, vol. 5, p. 1114. Correspondence relating to the First Quebec Conference, August 17-24, 1943, at which this agreement was signed, is scheduled for publication in a subsequent volume of *Foreign Relations*.]

AUSTRALIA

DISCUSSIONS REGARDING TRADE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND AUSTRALIA¹

611.4731/454 : Telegram

The Minister in Australia (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

CANBERRA, February 16, 1943—5 p. m.

[Received February 16—4:25 a. m.]

33. My 32, February 16.² Effective date postponed one day in order to enable Customs Minister, who is a Senator, to make a statement in the Senate tomorrow simultaneous with statement in the House, Senate not sitting today. We have vainly suggested that publicity might be undesirable.

Text of statement being sent in my 34 of today.

JOHNSON

611.4731/455 : Telegram

The Minister in Australia (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

CANBERRA, February 16, 1943—6 p. m.

[Received February 16—9:45 a. m.]

34. My 33, February 16, 5 p. m. Following is text of statement:

"For some years past the United States of America has been according Australia most-favored-foreign-nation treatment on Australian goods imported into America. Australia has not up to the present time reciprocated.

Whilst Australia had only a two column tariff and the general tariff applied to goods from all foreign countries it might be fairly claimed by Australia that all foreign countries were receiving most-favored-foreign-nation treatment. But upon the reinstitutions of a three column tariff in the Australian tariff certain intermediate tariff rates were applied to goods from certain foreign countries, including countries which are now principal European enemies, whilst goods from America remained on the general tariff which is higher than the intermediate tariff. Under present circumstances trading with enemy countries or enemy occupied countries is prohibited.

¹ For previous correspondence concerning exploratory discussions of a trade agreement between the United States and Australia, see *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. III, pp. 112 ff.

² Not printed; it reported information from the Minister of Customs, H. V. Keane, that the Australian Government would grant most-favored-nation treatment to American goods by proclamation by the Governor General, which would become effective within 24 hours of its issuance (611.4731/453).

After the Attorney General and Minister for External Affairs, Dr. H. V. Evatt, KC, MP, returned from his mission abroad last year he represented to the Prime Minister and the Minister of Customs that, having regard to the great material assistance received by Australia from United States of America during a most critical period in our history, it would be right for the Commonwealth to take the initiative so as to remove the existing anomaly. Therefore, without any formal request from the United States of America the Commonwealth Government has decided that the time has now arrived to remove the anomaly. Most-favored-foreign-nation treatment has been accorded to most foreign countries including our European enemies and enemy occupied countries and it is wrong that our principal [ally?] should remain on what might fairly be termed the punitive tariff, i.e. the general tariff. The Government has therefore decided to issue proclamations which in effect accord to the United States of America most-favored-foreign-nation treatment. These proclamations will be issued forthwith and thereby place goods coming from our ally United States of America on the most-favored-tariff accorded to foreign goods."

JOHNSON

611.4731/458a : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Australia (Johnson)

WASHINGTON, March 2, 1943—9 p. m.

96. Your 44, February 26, 11 p. m.³ For your information the following message has been received from Dr. Evatt:

"Personal Message to Mr. Cordell Hull from Dr. H. V. Evatt: Now that Australia has taken action to grant to the United States most-favoured-nation treatment, it is right to let you know that the American Legation in Canberra and officers of your Department in Washington have greatly helped us in bringing this about.

"I know you will gather that this is a spontaneous gesture of deepest appreciation in the direction of the policy of yourself and the President."

The following reply has been sent through the Australian Legation:

"I have received your message in regard to the action taken by Australia whereby the United States is granted most-favored-nation treatment under the Australian tariff. This act is accepted as a symbol of the cordial relations and close cooperation existing between the people and governments of our countries. I am looking forward to the opportunity of expressing to you, upon your arrival in Washington, my personal appreciation of your interest in this matter."

WELLES

³ Not printed; it suggested that Department send a brief message of appreciation to the Australian Government for its proclamation of most-favored-nation treatment of American goods (611.4731/456).

611.4731/468 : Telegram

The Minister in Australia (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

CANBERRA, December 27, 1943—10 a. m.

[Received 11:01 a. m.]

230. (Treaty Division?) Following is text of note dated December 17 initialed Evatt handed me December 24 by Hodgson.⁴

"(1) I have noted the decision of Mr. Hull, conveyed to me through the Australian Minister at Washington⁵ that the United States Government could not sanction the conclusion of the proposed trade agreement between the United States and Australia.

(2) Knowing as I do the keen personal interest Mr. Hull has long taken in the trade program of the United States Department of State I fully appreciate that Mr. Hull has come to this decision with regret.

(3) As you know negotiations for a trade agreement between our respective Governments has been protracted. The first series of conversations was initiated by the Australian Government in 1929. These continued into the Gullett-Moffatt negotiations which unfortunately proved abortive. You are also well aware of the 1937-1938 multilateral conversations when the Australian Government assisted at considerable sacrifice to its own interest in the making of agreements between the United States Government and the Government of Canada and between the United States Government and the Government of the United Kingdom.⁶

(4) It was not only our understanding but a specific condition of our concurrence, that at a later date all three countries concerned would assist Australia in every possible way in the making of an agreement with the United States of America.

(5) The recent series of discussions commenced in 1941 at the suggestion of the United States Secretary of State. It was our understanding at that time that the State Department was eager to achieve an agreement as a practical demonstration of the important possibilities of the trade program. We responded immediately and in July 1941 sent a delegation to America to enter into discussions. These long continued discussions will now have to be terminated.

(6) We had appreciated that owing to local considerations of importance, the negotiations would have to be completed at the latest by January 1944. It was to avoid just the complications due to local American politics—which Mr. Hull has given as the reason for not continuing negotiations—that we had instructed our representatives to pursue the matter actively. Further, we were led to believe that the offers and concessions proposed were satisfactory in principle. There-

⁴ W. R. Hodgson, Australian Secretary of the Department of External Affairs.

⁵ Richard G. Casey.

⁶ For correspondence in 1937 and 1938 regarding trade relations between the United States and Australia, see *Foreign Relations*, 1937, vol. II, pp. 136 ff., and *ibid.*, 1938, vol. II, pp. 120 ff. For correspondence regarding reciprocal trade agreement negotiations between the United States and the United Kingdom, see *ibid.*, 1937, vol. II, pp. 1 ff., and *ibid.*, 1938, vol. II, pp. 1 ff.; for text of agreement, signed November 17, 1938, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 164, or 54 Stat. (pt. 2) 1897. For negotiations between the United States and Canada, see *ibid.*, 1937, vol. II, pp. 160 ff., and *ibid.*, 1938, vol. II, pp. 164 ff.; for text of agreement, signed November 17, 1938, see Executive Agreement Series No. 149, or 53 Stat. (pt. 3) 2348.

fore, we look forward to making an agreement with the United States in the near future.

(7) Further in common with the United States we have regarded such an agreement as being one practical means of implementing article 7 of the mutual aid agreement. We believe that the United States shared our opinion that bilateral negotiation between nations on trade matters which contributed to the elimination of discrimination and to an improved plan of international trade would be an effective illustration of the principles of the Atlantic Charter.⁷

(8) For these reasons we have not been able to understand the attitude recently adopted by the United Kingdom and United States officials discussion article 7 in Washington, that it would not be opportune for these bilateral discussions to be continued. Naturally, we hoped and even expected that [in view] of paragraph 4 the State Department would support us in our view. It was for that reason that I instructed the Australian Minister at Washington to discuss the matter with Mr. Hull and to invite the United States Government to complete negotiations for an agreement.

(9) I should be glad if you would convey my regrets to Mr. Hull that he is not free to complete negotiations and sanction an agreement. At the same time I wish to place on record the fact that the Australian Government had actively pursued these negotiations to the very end, and regrets that for domestic reasons the United States Government is not in a position to enter into a trade agreement with the Commonwealth of Australia."

JOHNSON

611.4731/469 : Telegram

The Minister in Australia (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

CANBERRA, December 28, 1943—1 p. m.

[Received December 28—8:14 a. m.]

231. My telegram No. 230, December 27, 10 a. m. I sought enlightenment from Colonel Hodgson on purport of note and from what he told me I gather that Commonwealth Government has given up any hope of concluding a trade agreement with the United States as it appears to believe that present political trend in the United States would be opposed to conclusion of such an agreement with concessions on wool and meat which are of importance to Australia.

Commonwealth Government is disappointed because it had hoped to conclude such an agreement prior to any general or multilateral agreement under article number 7 which it believes will involve Australia in tariff reductions without any benefits to Australia. Commonwealth Government is disappointed that it has met with nothing but discouragement in matter of trade agreements from United Kingdom in spite of the fact that it has made concessions to aid United Kingdom in seeking trade understandings with the United States

⁷ *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, p. 367.

among which concessions Hodgson names placing United States on most-favored-nation basis in regard to Australian tariffs.

JOHNSON

611.4731/468 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Australia (Johnson)

WASHINGTON, March 24, 1944—7 p. m.

26. If the Legation concurs please send the following note to Mr. Evatt, Minister of External Affairs. If the question of delay in answering Evatt's note should arise, or if it is thought desirable to mention it you may say that this was among the important matters awaiting my attention on my return to Washington.

"In reply to your note of December 17, 1943,⁸ I have been instructed by the Secretary of State to inform you that he shares your regret that it is impracticable at the present time to attempt the negotiation of a reciprocal trade agreement between the United States and Australia. In order to avoid any misunderstanding I have been requested to make the following observations with respect to certain points raised in your note.

"The United States Government initiated the proposal to undertake simultaneously the negotiation of reciprocal trade agreements with the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa because of the complex relationship and interdependence between possible United Kingdom concessions on agricultural products to the United States and possible United States concessions on agricultural products to the Dominions. In conversations between United Kingdom and American officials in October 1943 the United Kingdom Government first made known to the United States Government its position that it would be inadvisable to pursue the project further. It was assumed that the United Kingdom Government had previously made known its position to your government, perhaps at the preceding informal discussions between representatives of the United Kingdom and the British Dominions held in the summer of that year.

"As you observe, the discussions begun in 1941 between the United States and Australian representatives were protracted. The American representatives frequently urged that efforts be made to expedite the matter. They were aware, however, of the difficulties with which the Australian Government was confronted both as a result of war and of local conditions in Australia.

"In paragraph 3 of your note reference is made to the assistance rendered by your government in connection with the negotiations in 1937 and 1938 leading to trade agreements between the United States and the United Kingdom and the United States and Canada. The United States Government is not unmindful of this and appreciates the assistance rendered.

"Paragraph 4, however, appears to be susceptible to the interpretation that my government assumed some obligation to the Australian

⁸ See telegram No. 230, December 27, 1943, 10 a. m., from the Minister in Australia, p. 117.

Government in connection with the trade agreements that the United States negotiated with the United Kingdom and Canada in 1938. Such an interpretation would be correct only in the sense that the Department of State was desirous of negotiating at a propitious time a mutually satisfactory trade agreement with Australia. To implement this desire my government in 1941 initiated the proposal to try to work out mutually satisfactory bases for the simultaneous negotiation of agreements with the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand and South Africa. It is regretted that our efforts did not meet with success.

"With reference to your statement that your government was led to believe that the tentative offers presented by its representatives were satisfactory in principle, I should like to point out, in order to avoid future misunderstanding, that our representatives consistently took the position that it would not be possible to reach a basis for definitive negotiations unless your Government indicated a willingness to consider meeting the tentative American requests or make counter proposals of equivalent value. Our representatives indicated, moreover, that they considered that the tentative offers made by your Government failed to satisfy these requirements.

"I should like to take this occasion to express on behalf of the Secretary of State his appreciation of the immediate response of your Government to his invitation, given in 1941, to send a delegation to Washington to explore the possibility of negotiating a trade agreement. He was particularly gratified that your Government should send on this mission, at a time when the pressure of government work in Australia was extreme, high ranking officials whose services must have been in great demand. The cooperative attitude of these officials was deeply appreciated."

HULL

CANADA

UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA WITH RESPECT TO JURISDICTION OVER PERSONNEL OF UNITED STATES MILITARY FORCES IN CANADA IN CRIMINAL MATTERS

[For information published by the Department of the Army regarding military cooperation between the United States and Canada, see Col. Stanley W. Dziuban, *Military Relations Between the United States and Canada, 1939-1945*, in the series *United States Army in World War II*, issued by the Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1959).]

811.203/252

*Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of
the Division of European Affairs (Hickerson)*

[WASHINGTON,] February 2, 1943.

About a week ago Mr. Pearson, Minister Counselor of the Canadian Legation, informed me that the Canadian Government had instructed the Legation to send us a note, in effect, turning down our offer of last October to contract an agreement with Canada to give the armed forces of each country stationed in the territory of the other complete jurisdiction over its own forces. Mr. Pearson said that before sending us such a note he thought it desirable to inquire orally and informally of me about the degree of importance which we attached to this matter. I told Mr. Pearson at once that I was sure that we attached great importance to it and that we would wish the Canadian Government to reconsider this matter but that I would talk to some of my colleagues and discuss the matter with him further.

After talking to Mr. Yingling of the Legal Adviser's Office about this question I called Mr. Pearson on the telephone on Saturday, January 30, and informed him substantially as follows:

The military departments of the United States Government, particularly the War Department, attach very great importance to this proposed agreement. The United States Government has already reached agreements in this same sense with Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand and other parts of the British Commonwealth.¹ Those agreements are less definite as to reciprocity than our draft to Canada² which was explicit on this point. It seems to us that from every point

¹ See *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. I, pp. 537 ff.

² Not found in Department files.

of view it is desirable to have this agreement and in view of our offer of complete reciprocity to Canada we are surprised and a little perplexed at the Canadian attitude. I went on to say that the War Department has been pressing us constantly for an answer for some time and that we not only hope that the Canadian Government will reconsider this matter but that they will reach a favorable decision as promptly as possible.

I added that it is our view that under International Law our forces would be entitled to jurisdiction over our troops stationed in Canada with the consent of the Canadian Government.

Mr. Pearson said that he would urge the Canadian Government to reconsider this matter.

J[OHN] D. H[ICKERSON]

811.203/341

The Minister in Canada (Atherton) to the Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Hickerson)

OTTAWA, October 5, 1943.

DEAR MR. HICKERSON: When calling upon the Minister of Justice, Mr. St. Laurent, this morning I inquired when we might anticipate that the Canadian Government would take action toward recognizing our exclusive jurisdiction over our armed forces in Canada now that the Supreme Court has rendered its decision.³

Mr. St. Laurent went into considerable detail, pointing out the difference between the practice in Canada and the United States and said that, in view of this fact and of the fact that he had been able so far to obtain jurisdiction for us in incidents which had arisen, the Canadian Government did not plan to take any action in the premises unless pressed to do so by us. As you know, in Canada the civil courts retain jurisdiction over the members of the Canadian armed forces, even in wartime, and it is the policy of the armed services to encourage the assumption of such jurisdiction by the civil courts, whereas in the United States the practice is exactly the opposite.

While Mr. St. Laurent evidenced every willingness to go ahead with the matter should we press for formal recognition by Canada of our exclusive jurisdiction over our troops in Canada, it is plain that the Canadian Government will take no action in the premises unless we press them to do so.

When you have discussed this with those interested, will you let me know whether we should take the matter up formally with the Canadian Government?

Yours sincerely,

RAY ATHERTON

³ Decision of August 3, 1943, *Dominion Law Reports*, 1943 (Toronto, Canada Law Book Co., Ltd., 1943), vol. 4, p. 11.

811.203/341

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Canada (Clark)

No. 95

WASHINGTON, October 26, 1943.

SIR: Reference is made to the Minister's letter of October 5, 1943 to Mr. Hickerson reporting a conversation with the Canadian Minister of Justice, Mr. St. Laurent, concerning jurisdiction over our armed forces in Canada, in the course of which he indicated that the Canadian Government did not plan to take any further action in the matter unless pressed to do so by this Government.

As you are aware, this Government has taken the position that it has the right under international law to exclusive jurisdiction over offenses committed by members of its armed forces in Canada. The Canadian Government agreed with that position in the recent reference of certain questions concerning jurisdiction to the Supreme Court of Canada. While the Court was divided in its views concerning our right to such jurisdiction under Canadian law it did not deny that we have such right under international law and it was unanimously of the opinion that any infirmities in the law of Canada on the subject could be cured by Governmental action.

While the Minister of Justice has been able in certain cases which have been brought to his attention to obtain acquiescence of local prosecuting authorities in the exercise of jurisdiction by service courts over offenses committed by members of our armed forces in Canada in several other cases which have come to the Department's attention jurisdiction was exercised by the local authorities. In still another case which is now pending in Edmonton, Alberta, the Department is informed that although jurisdiction is being exercised by our service authorities the action taken by them is being influenced by requests of the local authorities. But even though the Canadian Government may be able to obtain the acquiescence of the local authorities to the exercise of jurisdiction by our service authorities in all cases which may arise the Department does not consider that it should be necessary in every case in which a member of the armed forces of the United States in Canada is charged with an offense to make the matter the subject of diplomatic procedure.

For the reasons indicated this Government feels that its right to exclusive jurisdiction over offenses with which members of its forces in Canada may be charged should be formally recognized by the Canadian Government and you are requested to take appropriate action to obtain such recognition.

Very truly yours,

For the Acting Secretary of State :
BRECKINRIDGE LONG

811.203/374

*The Canadian Under Secretary of State for External Affairs (Robertson) to the American Ambassador in Canada (Atherton)*⁴

No. 160

OTTAWA, December 27, 1943.

SIR: I have the honour to invite your attention to the correspondence and discussions with regard to the legal position of members of the Armed Forces of the United States of America charged with having committed offences within Canada.

2. I am enclosing copies of an Order-in-Council, P. C. 9694 dated 20th December, 1943,⁵ which defines the legal position of members of the United States Forces in respect to offences committed in this country.

3. You will observe that this Order-in-Council conforms closely to the provisions which were discussed with representatives of your Government, and I have no doubt that they will be satisfactory.

4. Without commenting upon all of the provisions of this Order, I should like to mention several points.

5. You will observe that by virtue of the provisions of Regulations, 2, 3, 5, and 6, United States Service Tribunals are enabled to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over members of the United States Forces within this country. The only cases in which Canadian civil authorities will be able to exercise any jurisdiction over members of the United States Forces are those in which your own Service authorities have refrained from action.

6. The second point is that when a request has been made under the provisions of the Regulations to Canadian civil authorities, normal proceedings cannot be continued in civil courts. The effective working of these arrangements is, therefore, dependent upon the United States Service authorities taking the accused and submitting him to trial before a United States military tribunal. The Canadian Government feels justified in assuming that your authorities will, in all cases, submit any person, who may be surrendered under the provisions of Regulation 6, to trial before a United States military court.

7. The third point to which I should like to invite your attention is that the Regulations enable United States military courts to exercise jurisdiction over certain classes of civilians who are subject to the military and naval law of the United States. The provisions of Regulations 5 and 6 do not apply to such persons and jurisdiction over them is, in fact, concurrent with that of the civilian courts in Canada. Under our constitutional system, the jurisdiction of the civilian court in such circumstances is necessarily paramount, and in the event that it

⁴ Copy transmitted to the Department by the Ambassador in Canada in his despatch No. 481, December 29, 1943; received January 1, 1944.

⁵ Not printed.

is invoked in any case, either by the Attorney-General of Canada or by the Attorney-General of a province, it would be necessary for your military authorities to deliver the accused, notwithstanding that proceedings have been commenced in accordance with the provisions of Regulations 2 and 3. It is assumed that you will give directions to your military commanders to this effect.

8. You will observe that the Regulations, read in conjunction with the Foreign Forces Order 1941,⁶ provide a comprehensive procedural code whereby Canadian authorities are under a legal obligation to do all things which are necessary in fact to enable the jurisdiction conferred by the Regulations to be exercised in an effective manner.

9. An arrangement of this sort presents insurmountable difficulty unless it is based upon effective reciprocity. The legal advisers of the Government, and especially the Judge Advocate General's office, are of the opinion that it would be impracticable for Canadian Service Court to exercise similar jurisdiction in respect of Canadian Forces in the United States of America in the present state of the law in the United States of America. They are convinced that, until some measures similar to those embodied in the legislation now before Congress are enacted, it will be impossible to cope with the complex problems presented in unusual cases in which crimes have been committed by Canadian sailors, soldiers or airmen. It is hoped, therefore, that your Government will endeavor to obtain the necessary legislation.

10. There is a point of practice with regard to Form B⁷ which I venture to bring to your attention. Form B is intended to be a basis for a document to be issued by the United States military and naval authorities. It is intended for service within Canada, and I assume that your authorities would want the finished document to be in a form which would insure its effectiveness. In order to make the scheme work, it is essential that the person summoned should fully understand the consequences of failure to comply with its provisions. It is thought that the documents should be prepared with a foot-note along the following lines:

This summons is issued in accordance with the provisions of a Canadian Order-in-Council, P.C. 9694, December 20, 1943, which makes regulations including the following: (Here might be printed Regulations 9, 10, 11.)

9. (1) Any United States service court, or any commissioned officer of the forces of the United States of America authorized to do so under the laws of the United States, shall have power to require the attendance before such court in Canada of any person whose evidence is required for the purpose of the trial before it of any member of the forces of the United States of America.

⁶ April 15, 1941; Canadian Order-in-Council P.C. 2546.

⁷ Not printed.

(2) If the person whose attendance is so required is a member of the home forces, such attendance shall be obtained by a request in writing made to any appropriate officer of the home forces indicating the place and time at which the attendance of such person is required, and the proper officer of the home forces, subject to the military exigencies of the moment, of which he shall be the sole judge, shall make the appropriate Order for the attendance of such person accordingly.

(3) If the person whose attendance as a witness is required as aforesaid is not a member of the home forces, the officer of the forces of the United States of America authorized to require his attendance may issue a subpoena, in form "B" attached hereto, which may be served by a peace officer or by a Canadian service authority; and any person served with such a subpoena shall attend and give evidence as thereby required upon payment to him of an amount sufficient to cover his necessary travelling expenses going to, staying at and returning from the place at which his attendance is required and an additional amount of \$3.00 a day during his necessary absence from his place of residence for the purpose of such attendance.

10. Any person who, not being a member of the home forces, fails to comply with the provisions of the last preceding section shall be liable to be dealt with by any civil court in the same way as if such failure had followed the service of a subpoena out of such court or such refusal had occurred on a trial therein.

11. Every person other than a member of the forces of the United States of America who attends as a witness before a United States service court shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities as a witness to which he would be entitled if his evidence were being given in proceedings in a Canadian civil court.

Accept [etc.]

N. A. ROBERTSON

811.203/392

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Canada (Atherton)

No. 205

WASHINGTON, February 8, 1944.

SIR: The Department refers to the Embassy's despatch no. 481 of December 29, 1943⁸ enclosing a copy of note no. 160 of December 27, 1943 from the Secretary of State for External Affairs and a copy of its enclosure, Order-in-Council PC 9694, of December 20, 1943 concerning jurisdiction of offenses committed by members of the armed forces of the United States in Canada.

This Government appreciates the cooperation of the Canadian Government in the matter referred to and in general considers the Order-in-Council satisfactory. However, in view of certain comments in the note under reference, the following observations are considered necessary to clarify this Government's position.

Paragraph 6 of the Canadian Government's note states that the Canadian Government feels justified in assuming that the authorities

⁸ See footnote 4, p. 124.

of the United States will, in all cases, submit any person who may be surrendered under the provisions of regulation 6, to trial before a United States Military Court.

As the Canadian Government is aware, this Government considers that under international law members of its armed forces in Canada are immune from the local jurisdiction in criminal matters. Whether a member of such forces, accused of an offense, should be brought to trial before a service court of the United States and if so, the nature of the charge which should be made against him, can only be determined by the authorities of this Government in accordance with its laws. However, as a matter of courtesy this Government does not object to the procedure laid down in regulations 6 and 7, subject to the following understandings:

Under the Articles of War (the act of Congress concerning courts-martial of the United States Army, 10 U.S. Code 1471-1593), no case can be tried by court-martial except after reference of the charges by the appropriate commanding officer to the court for trial. The 70th Article provides that no charge will be referred to a general court-martial until after a thorough and impartial investigation, at which the accused soldier has a right to be present, to cross-examine witnesses against him if they are available, and to offer evidence in his own behalf. All charges of felonies or other grave offenses against our soldiers must be so investigated before they may be tried by court-martial. Less serious charges may be informally investigated in a similar manner. It may be anticipated that, in the majority of cases with which we are concerned, a *prima facie* case will be shown to exist, and the officer exercising court-martial jurisdiction will forthwith refer the charges for trial; but there will undoubtedly be some in which, on the ground of mistaken identity, self-defense, lack of evidence or its unconvincing character, or other good and sufficient reason, that officer will be of opinion that a *prima facie* case does not exist and that a trial is not justified. In such a case it is proposed that the appropriate military officer confer with the local Canadian prosecuting officer and endeavor to reach an agreement as to the proper disposition of the case. If such an agreement cannot be reached, it is suggested that the Canadian prosecuting officer refer the matter to the Attorney General of Canada for his opinion as to whether a trial should be held. Should the Attorney General, after considering the reasons why the United States military authorities think a trial should not be held, nevertheless conclude that a trial is necessary, the appropriate commanding officer will order that the trial proceed.

With reference to paragraph 7 of the Canadian Government's note, it may be stated that while concurrent jurisdiction would ordinarily be understood in the United States to mean that the authority first taking jurisdiction of the case would continue to exercise it, this Government has no objection to the procedure set forth in the Canadian Government's note and will issue appropriate instruction to its military commanders in Canada.

Concerning the comments in paragraph 9 of its note, the Canadian Government is informed that the legislation introduced in the Congress to implement the jurisdiction enjoyed by service courts of friendly foreign forces under the law of the United States, has the Department's active support and it is hoped that the legislation will be enacted in the near future.⁹

This Government appreciates the suggestions contained in paragraph 10 of the note and appropriate instructions will be issued to assure the cooperation of the service authorities of the United States in the matters referred to therein.

Section 2(1) of the regulations defining "member" contains a proviso that in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the regulations the word "member" means a member of the military or naval forces of the United States of America stationed in Canada or in Canada on military or naval duty, who when detained as mentioned therein, is wearing a uniform of such forces. This proviso was probably intended to remove from the operation of paragraphs 5 and 6 of the regulations, civilians attached to the armed forces of the United States in Canada. As worded, however, a member of the military personnel of the United States who is not wearing his uniform when detained appears to be excluded from the provisions of paragraphs 5 and 6 of the regulations. Although it may be improbable that a case of this kind will occur, the possibility exists and this Government could not agree that the status of a member of its armed forces is governed by whether he is in uniform.

You are requested to bring these views to the attention of the Secretary of State for External Affairs by appropriate communication.

The War Department has expressed its appreciation of the assistance of the Embassy in the negotiations concerning jurisdiction over our forces in Canada. The Department adds its commendation, particularly to Mr. Lewis Clark.¹⁰

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:
EDWARD R. STETTINIUS, JR.

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA REGARDING POSTWAR DISPOSITION OF DEFENSE INSTALLATIONS AND FACILITIES

[Effected by exchange of notes signed at Ottawa January 27, 1943. For text of notes, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 391, or 57 Stat. (pt. 2) 1429.]

⁹ H.R. 3241, introduced September 17, 1943, approved June 30, 1944; 58 Stat. 643.

¹⁰ First Secretary and Consul at the American Embassy in Canada.

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA REGARDING PROVINCIAL AND MUNICIPAL TAXATION ON UNITED STATES DEFENSE PROJECTS IN CANADA

[Effected by exchange of notes signed at Ottawa August 6 and 9, 1943. For text of notes, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 339, or 57 Stat. (pt. 2) 1065.]

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA REGARDING SPECIFICATION OF AREAS FOR DRILLING OIL WELLS IN CANADA

[Effected by exchange of notes signed at Ottawa January 18, February 17, and March 13, 1943. For text of notes, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 389, or 57 Stat. (pt. 2) 1420.]

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA REGARDING ACCESS TO ALASKA HIGHWAY

[For text of agreement effected by exchange of notes signed at Ottawa April 10, 1943, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 362, or 57 Stat. (pt. 2) 1274.]

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA ON NAMING THE PROPOSED HIGHWAY FROM DAWSON CREEK, BRITISH COLUMBIA, TO FAIRBANKS, ALASKA, THE "ALASKA HIGHWAY"

[Effected by exchange of notes signed at Washington July 19, 1943. For text of notes, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 331, or 57 Stat. (pt. 2) 1023.]

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA REGARDING LEASE OF WHITE PASS AND YUKON RAILWAY, EFFECTED BY EXCHANGE OF NOTES SIGNED AT OTTAWA FEBRUARY 22 AND 23, 1943

[For text of notes, and Canadian Order in Council P.C. 10067, dated November 6, 1942, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 390, or 57 Stat. (pt. 2) 1423.]

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA REGARDING ESTABLISHMENT AND OPERATION BY UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT OF CERTAIN MILITARY RADIO BROADCASTING STATIONS IN NORTHWEST CANADA

[Effected by exchange of notes signed at Ottawa November 5 and 25, 1943, and January 17, 1944. For text of notes, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 400, or 58 Stat. (pt. 2) 1238.]

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA CONTINUING IN EFFECT THE ARRANGEMENT OF NOVEMBER 29 AND DECEMBER 2, 1940, REGARDING AIR TRANSPORT SERVICES

[Effected by exchange of notes signed at Washington March 4, 1943. For text of notes, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 314, or 57 Stat. (pt. 2) 923.]

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA REGARDING WAIVER OF CLAIMS ARISING AS A RESULT OF COLLISIONS BETWEEN VESSELS OF WAR

[For text of agreement effected by exchange of notes signed at Washington May 25 and 26, 1943, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 330, or 57 Stat. (pt. 2) 1021.]

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA CONCERNING APPLICATION OF AGREEMENT OF MAY 25 AND 26, 1943, REGARDING WAIVER OF CLAIMS ARISING AS RESULT OF COLLISIONS BETWEEN VESSELS OF WAR

[For text of agreement effected by exchange of notes signed at Washington September 3 and November 11, 1943, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 366, or 57 Stat. (pt. 2) 1301.]

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA REGARDING JURISDICTION OVER PRIZES, EFFECTED BY EXCHANGE OF NOTES SIGNED AT WASHINGTON MAY 24 AND AUGUST 13, 1943

[For text of notes, the Canadian Order in Council P.C. 6092, and President Roosevelt's Proclamation of September 27, 1943, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 394, or 58 Stat. (pt. 2) 1210.]

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA REGARDING TEMPORARY RAISING OF LEVEL OF LAKE ST. FRANCIS, CONTINUING IN EFFECT THE AGREEMENT OF NOVEMBER 10, 1941

[Effected by exchange of notes signed at Washington October 5 and 9, 1943. For text of notes, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 377, or 57 Stat. (pt. 2) 1366.]

INDIA

(See Volume IV, pages 178–318.)

IRELAND

EFFORTS OF THE UNITED STATES TO OBTAIN CONCURRENCE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM IN A REQUEST TO IRELAND FOR USE OF HER NAVAL AND AIR FACILITIES IF NEEDED DURING THE WAR¹

711.41D/20

*Memorandum by the Minister in Ireland (Gray) on Recommendations
for the Adoption of a Joint Anglo-American Economic Policy To-
ward Eire Shaped With Reference to Political Considerations²*

INTRODUCTORY

Early in February 1943, the British Representative to Eire, Sir John Maffey, informed me that he and the Canadian High Commissioner, the Honorable John Kearney, were exchanging personal views as to the desirability of recommending to their respective Governments some action designed to improve the position of the members of the British Commonwealth of Nations and if possible of the United Nations also as regards Eire. It was felt that, in the first place, some practical benefits for the Allied war effort might be obtained and, in the second place, that if military advantages were not forthcoming, it was desirable, in order to clarify Eire's position in the post-war period, that her Government be invited to make that position clear without undue delay.

It was suggested that a request be made for what are called "the ports." If the request were acceded to, we should have the much needed facilities. If not, Eire would be definitely on record as having refused a specific request made now for the first time. Otherwise, she might say with truth, "You never asked us for the ports." It was felt that if the record was not made clear, Eire would be in a better position later on to claim benefits to which she was not entitled on the basis of her attitude during the war, especially in view of the contingent of Eire volunteers in the British Army, published reference to whom is now prohibited by Government censorship. It is obvious that, although these volunteers are now regarded as renegades and traitors by the extreme nationalist group, they would probably be claimed as an asset by the Irish Government to obtain post-war ad-

¹For previous correspondence regarding concern of the United States over the position taken by Ireland during the war, see *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. 1, pp. 751 ff.

²Transmitted to the Department by the Minister in Ireland in his despatch No. 625, May 14, 1943, not printed.

vantages unless the position of Eire was more definitely established than it has been.

About the same time, the Canadian High Commissioner gave me the substance of a memorandum which he had addressed to his Government outlining the situation as he saw it, and making certain practical suggestions for a plan of procedure which involved joint action with the United Nations—a plan in which it was thought desirable that the United States Government should act as spokesman—with a general proposal for a joint policy and for some action which would clarify Mr. de Valera's³ position. My personal view was in agreement with the proposal for some such line of action as was suggested, and I expressed myself in favor of recommending to my own Government that, in view of the peculiar and complex nature of the Irish situation, a joint plan and such joint action as might be feasible was desirable.

During the first week in January 1943, Sir John returned from London and told me that the Dominions Office was in accord with the general proposal for a joint Anglo-American policy toward Eire, but had not considered the idea of closely correlating the economic aspects of such a policy with political considerations. He had gained the impression that the military services for the time being at least were resigned to doing without the ports and that it was thought unwise to stir this matter up at the present time inasmuch as Anglo-Irish relations were on the whole as satisfactory as could be expected in view of Irish neutrality. The Canadian Representative gained a similar impression of his Government's attitude.

EXAMINATION OF EXISTING SITUATION

During the time which has since elapsed there has been no change in Eire policy which would indicate that the Eire Government were taking a more realistic view of the situation or intended to pursue a policy actively helpful to the cause of the United Nations, in spite of the evidently minimized risk of such a course. This is significant because a neutrality which might have been dictated by prudence in 1939 and 1940 had become an entirely voluntary and gratuitous neutrality in 1943 and can only be interpreted as a neutrality for material profit or a neutrality insensible to the moral issues of the war.

It seems therefore desirable to review the existing military, political and economic situation in Eire for your consideration to the end that you may have a basis for independent judgment as to whether existing policy toward Eire should be continued or made more drastic in conjunction with Britain and Canada for the attainment of specified ends. It should be clearly understood that your Minister would not recommend any course of action to which the British Government took exception, inasmuch as that Government cannot escape a primary

³ Eamon de Valera, Irish Prime Minister.

responsibility for the consequences of any joint policy which might prove unprofitable. It should also be understood that your Minister appreciates the political situation in the United States which makes an openly proclaimed Anglo-American joint policy toward Eire of doubtful usefulness. Your Minister's memorandum is, as far as practicable, factual and intended to serve the policy making officers of the Government. At the same time, he wishes to point out the dangers of inaction. It is his belief that, generally speaking, a positive policy is to be preferred when dealing with Mr. de Valera. Though there has been no avowed change in Mr. de Valera's policy, the pressure of events has undoubtedly affected him. He has come to believe in an Allied victory, which he doubted as late as our expedition to North Africa⁴ and perhaps later. He has evidently considered the disadvantages of not being one of the United Nations, for he has stated privately that, even if he wanted to, he could not come in now when it was safe, because he would be "mocked at." In his keynote speech on May 8th opening the campaign preliminary to the elections to be held in June, he laid stress on the need for good relations with Britain. But he also laid stress on the issue of Partition and warned that it was the one difference which prevented cooperation with Britain. By curious coincidence, on the following day Mr. Churchill's⁵ letter to Mr. Andrews, the retiring Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, was published, in which he expressed the gratitude of Britain to Northern Ireland for the facilities which made the survival of Britain possible during 1940 and 1941, and assured Northern Ireland that its bond with Britain was unbreakable. This was again followed by a proclamation of the new Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, Sir Basil Brooke, making it clear that union with Britain rather than with Eire was the keystone of Northern Ireland policy and warning Eire that if she wished to maintain happy relations with the North, she must refrain from interfering in Northern affairs. Mr. de Valera at present writing has made no reply, but it has become increasingly clear during the past months that he and his group rely upon the issue of Partition for post-war purposes. For this it prefers the grievance rather than the solution. Nearly a year ago Mr. de Valera stated to an American newspaper man, who asked him if he were not anxious as to Eire's position in the post-war period, that he was not anxious; that he relied on the inevitable falling out of Great Britain and the United States, as a consequence of which he would secure the support of the United States. It has become increasingly apparent that he intends to use the alleged wrong of partition to open this rift and to

⁴ The occupation of French North Africa by Allied forces was begun by landings on November 8, 1942.

⁵ Winston S. Churchill, British Prime Minister.

enlist the sympathies and support of the Irish-American groups to this end.

Recently Mr. Robert Stewart ⁶ has forwarded to me a copy of an able and pertinent memorandum ⁷ prepared by him for the Department, in the course of which he cites what might be regarded as the opening gun of such a campaign—a resolution from The Federation of American Societies for Irish Independence asking that our Congress should insure the independence and unity of Ireland; that is, secure the merger of the Government of Northern Ireland into that of Eire, during the negotiations for peace. The Irish Minister to the United States ⁸ in a recent article in *The New York Times* entitled “The Case for Ireland’s Neutrality” stresses the same note.

The question that now poses itself is whether it is advisable to take any measures to forestall this strategy and at the same time attain or endeavor to attain other desirable ends, and, if it is advisable, to decide what those measures should be and how they should be taken. It would seem that the obvious means of putting pressure upon Eire and discrediting the leadership of the de Valera group, from which trouble is to be expected in the post-war period, is by withholding supplies. The United Nations control the supplies and without injustice have the moral as well as legal right to withhold them in their own interest from separatist nations who refuse to take responsibility for the common survival. More than that, if the association of United Nations has reality, it constitutes a trusteeship of all supply with the obligation to allot it or withhold it for the advancement of United Nations interests. The decision to give or withhold is essentially a joint one.

If we examine the facts as to Eire’s claims to self-sufficiency put forward by the de Valera group and the figures showing Eire imports since the outbreak of the war, we obtain a picture of the situation and of the thus far benevolent attitude of the British Government. Eire produces a surplus of food animals, and coarse wools. She has her own fisheries. She now produces about two-thirds of her required wheat, her oats and barley, her own dairy products, her fruits and vegetables, peat for domestic fuel and an insignificant amount of anthracite coal. She has abundance of limestone for cement manufacture. There is also a small amount of native timber for manufacture and fuel. Everything else, which is practically everything, she imports either as consumers goods or raw materials.

British economic policy toward Eire since the outbreak of war is revealed by the figures for Irish imports from 1938 onward, inasmuch as Britain under normal condition is the main source of Irish supply and, with the advent of war conditions, almost the sole source of essential

⁶ Of the Division of European Affairs.

⁷ Not found in Department files.

⁸ Robert Brennan.

materials. Irish statistics give £41,414,051 of imports for 1938, £43,415,139 for 1939, £46,790,207 for 1940, £29,530,215 in 1941, and £34,663,729 in 1942.

Imports from the United States for 1941 amounted to £2,294,958; in 1942 £3,050,841, and for the first quarter of 1943 £688,908. These figures indicate that United States exports comprised about one-tenth of the total in 1941 and about one-eleventh in 1942. For the same two years there was a total of goods sent to Eire from the United States amounting to £5,345,799 and a total of £1,001,748 received from Eire. These figures make it clear that, in spite of increasingly real and economically planned scarcity in Britain, very generous allotments have been made to Eire. During the last two years of scarcity she has been deprived of only about a fourth of normal requirements.

The Irish Minister for Finance, in presenting his Budget before the Irish Parliament on May 5, 1943, is quoted as saying "visible imports since the beginning of the war had up to March 31 last exceeded visible exports by seventeen and three-tenths million (pounds) in value. This is an achievement on which the trading interests concerned, as well as the State Departments, deserve recognition."

When it is realized that a large percentage of these visible imports were brought to Britain in British ships at a very considerable cost of British lives and thereafter allotted to Eire who made no contribution to the safety of the supply line, the nature of the transaction becomes clear.

This British policy appears to have been inaugurated at the outset of the war in the somewhat optimistic spirit of Chamberlain's conciliation, and was probably continued after the fall of France by reason of well-grounded anxieties as to the position of the Eire Government in the case of German invasion. It was then imperative to appease even at the cost of sacrifice. There was also the possibility that action with regard to naval and air facilities in Eire would become imperative by reason of military necessity and if such action had to be taken, it was desirable that the Irish people should be without economic grievance.

Since the military position has so greatly improved, these reasons for supplying Ireland have lost cogency, but it has been deemed unwise by the British Government to make any sharp break in the existing policy that might give grounds for the charge of punitive coercion. Allotments of coal and petroleum products have been materially reduced, but are still sufficient to maintain the essential transportation services. It has been considered desirable to keep the railways operating in order that Irish live stock and other food exports may be moved to export ports.

⁹ Neville Chamberlain, former British Prime Minister.

Although Eire has no other market for her surplus food products than Britain, it has appeared desirable to allot manufactured goods and certain raw materials in sufficient quantities to maintain a fairly balanced trade. It is probably also true that trade interests in Irish customers on the part of British firms have been influential in procuring liberal allotments for Eire in the absence of any clearly defined governmental policy of withholding supply. It should be noted that under normal conditions Britain obtains only between five and seven per cent. of her food from Eire by value consisting mostly of fresh meat and other foods that are first restricted in times of war stringency. Therefore, Britain in a pinch can do without Irish food, whereas the whole economic system of Eire depends upon imports from Britain. During the recent outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease in Eire, cattle exports were suspended for nine months without noticeable effect on the British food situation.

Of late, economic conditions in Britain, chiefly due to the need of tonnage for war purposes, have begun to bring into force toward Eire a more realistic policy based on the thesis that it was unnecessary, as well as unjust, that Irish standards of living and supply should be maintained at a higher level than that prevailing in Britain and that some adequate return should be obtained for what was given. It should be noted that this new phase of British policy is not in conflict with the conception of a United Nations trusteeship of all supply for the advancement of United Nations interests.

For the first three months of 1943, allotments of coal have been reduced, as compared with the first quarter of 1942, from about 300,000 tons to 250,000, and allotments of petrol from 4,500,000 gallons to 1,750,000. Textiles chiefly for Irish manufacture have been reduced by about two-thirds. It should be noted at this point that Eire cotton mills have been and are sustained principally by importation of American cotton yarns. With the ominously increasing needs for both coal and petroleum products in Britain, it is possible that this new attitude toward Irish supply might result in the not distant future of a total withholding of both coal and oil. The effect of this on Irish economy and especially on Eire's industry, transportation, and distribution systems is not wholly clear, but it would inevitably be serious. The rural population comprising about three-quarters of the whole would be incommoded, but would suffer no serious hardship or serious impairment of its living standards. Eire produces adequate food supplies for its population, though certain articles to which the Irish people are accustomed are in short supply. However, the problem of feeding Dublin's population of five hundred thousand would tax Irish administration severely. Nevertheless, it is a problem which by improvising elementary railway and motor truck services with wood, turf (peat), and anthracite coal as fuel should not prove insoluble. The

possibility of such a situation has recently been discussed by Ministers of State in public addresses and not in a spirit of despair. The sharply diminished imports from Britain during the first quarter of the present year have thus far evoked no publicized resentment against Britain or charge of economic pressure. It is probable that the Irish conscience is uneasy on this point. It serves Britain's book that this should be so. But it is not apparent that the previous generous measure of British supply has had any effect in fostering a favorable view of the cause of the United Nations. It is certain that it has not in any way modified the policy of the Eire Government in a practical manner more favorable to Britain or the Allied cause. Supply seems to be taken as a matter of course—something arranged by an astute Government who have cleverly succeeded in getting things for the Irish people without contributing to the safety of the communications on which the supply depends.

The group which has benefited most from Irish neutrality are the tariff-protected manufacturers who, in spite of difficulties, have generally been able to continue operations on a profitable basis. Presumably, a large percentage of political campaign funds is subscribed to the de Valera Party by this group and its influence in support of the neutrality policy is considerable. The question therefore poses itself whether, if the raw materials needful in Irish manufactures were progressively restricted to the vanishing point, the industrialist group would demand a change of policy. Although the war will be won regardless of any action Eire may or may not take, there are at least three points on which United States and British interests are gravely prejudiced by the policy of the Irish Government, to wit:

1. The withholding of facilities for the protection of sea communications between America and Britain.

2. The maintenance of Axis Missions which are inevitably espionage centers on the borders of Britain, the European bridgehead of the United Nations.

3. The claim on the part of the Irish Prime Minister to *de jure* sovereignty over Northern Ireland, which it is now apparent that he plans to use to the end of creating post-war disagreement between Britain and the United States, if not to foment trouble in Northern Ireland to the detriment of the common war effort.

It is unlikely, in the view of the British Representative and myself, that economic pressure on the industrialist group in itself would result (1) in the Irish Government's ceding air and port facilities to the United Nations or (2) in breaking diplomatic relations with the Axis Powers, but such action might very well prepare the way to these ends by impressing upon both the Irish Government and the Irish people a more realistic sense of their dependence upon and indebtedness to the United Nations for political independence, for economic supply, and for military security. At present there is no general

appreciation of these facts. Such a realization must precede any radical change in State policy.

As to the third point, the de Valera claim to sovereignty over Northern Ireland is a matter for concern to those charged with the maintenance of cooperation and good-will between the United States and the members of the British Commonwealth of Nations. Not only has the protest of the Eire Government against the use of bases in Northern Ireland by American troops, followed by the Eire Government-approved statement of the Cardinal Primate that "British and American troops overrun our country against the will of the Nation" tended to incite anti-American and anti-British feeling, both in Northern Ireland and in Eire, and to encourage I.R.A.¹⁰ outrages, but, as Mr. Robert Stewart points out, there is evidence that the anti-British campaign has already again been carried to the United States by Mr. de Valera's agents.

POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION

If Anglo-American solidarity is to be preserved, both during the war and afterwards, this situation should be met by joint counsel and joint action without undue delay. Measures that would be politically impossible after the war appear now to be possible and, if properly executed, would force the issue and discredit the isolationist non-cooperative group of extreme nationalists in Eire whose political existence constitutes the chief obstacle to a happy and prosperous Ireland enjoying mutually advantageous relations with the British Commonwealth of Nations. It seems desirable that without undue delay the challenge of this group be accepted. It is obviously wiser to accept it on grounds chosen by ourselves and at a moment of our own choosing, than to wait for the Irish Prime Minister to develop his skillful and mischievous intrigue. Whatever the rights and wrongs of partition, it should be clearly understood that a solution on any basis of reason and compromise is not the primary object of the de Valera leadership at this time. The grievance is politically of more importance than the solution. I have recently received direct evidence of this from persons close to the Prime Minister. It is probable that if Eire had joined the other members of the British Commonwealth of Nations in prosecuting the war, the influence of the British Government would have been exerted to end Partition and unite Ulster with the Twenty-six Counties. Inasmuch, however, as the de Valera policy has been not only to remain neutral but progressively to establish Eire as an independent foreign nation, disclaiming association with the neighboring Island, it is obvious that the British Government must and will support the political views of the

¹⁰ Irish Republican Army.

majority in Northern Ireland. Mr. de Valera has definitely put an end to any hope of solving this problem in any predictable future, unless he should reverse his whole political philosophy. *The Manchester Guardian*, the organ of British Liberal opinion and traditional supporter of Irish Home Rule, observes in its issue of April 30, 1943, "One thing the war has done and that is to confirm Partition. So much Eire's neutrality has secured. Ulster needs no longer to base her politics on negations; no section of British (or American) opinion will wish to coerce her to satisfy Mr. de Valera's aspirations."

After enjoying the use of bases in Northern Ireland denied to us by Eire, it is unlikely that American opinion would support the coercion of Ulster. But, if Mr. de Valera has lost his chance to end Partition, he has not lost his power to foment trouble in Northern Ireland among the four hundred thousand Catholic population whom he claims as fellow nationalists, and there is reason to fear that he will continue to exert it unless he is made to realize that to do so will invite economic consequences disadvantageous to his authority and aspirations.

There seem to be several tactical approaches to meeting and forcing the issue before it develops further to our disadvantage. By this is meant action which conveys a sobering warning to Mr. de Valera and provides an educational experience for the Irish people as to their essential dependence on the United Nations. I enumerate four of them as follows:

1. A demand in the name of the United Nations for the lease of air and port facilities for the protection of the Western approaches, on the ground that Eire's supply depends upon United Nations sea-borne transport.

2. A demand that Axis Missions be removed, on the ground that their presence is a menace to United Nations vital interests.

3. A demand that Eire clarify her position toward the British Commonwealth of Nations. Is she in or out?

An unsatisfactory reply to any of these demands would result in the progressive shutting off of raw materials for Irish industries, on the ground that if Eire chooses to exercise her right to an isolationist position, she must assume responsibility for her own supply.

4. Perhaps the most effective manner of meeting the issue from the American political viewpoint would be the enforcement of conscription in Northern Ireland. There is little doubt that American opinion would support a measure which put an end to the escape of Northern Ireland slackers from duties imposed upon American youth. But it must be recognized that there is likelihood of bloodshed in Northern Ireland if conscription should be enforced and the political consequences should be carefully weighed before a decision were taken. It could, however, be truthfully said that new bloodshed could hardly increase the political capital manufactured out of the executions of 1916.

There are difficulties and dangers in all these suggested courses, but they may well be inconsiderable in comparison with those resulting from inaction and postponement to a less favorable time and less auspicious conditions. The important thing from the viewpoint of Anglo-American cooperation is to bring to the notice of the American people the unfair and destructive policy of the de Valera politicians at the time when British and American interests are essentially the same and to obtain a verdict of American disapproval which will remove the pressure of the Irish question from Anglo-American relations. Joint Anglo-American understanding is obviously desirable in the adoption of any of these policies and at least a degree of joint action in the execution.

It appears that a liaison committee representing the British Ministry of Economic Warfare sits with the American Board of Economic Warfare and considers jointly with the American Board the requests made by would-be Irish purchasers for export licenses for the commodities which they desire to purchase. The Ministry of Economic Warfare is therefore cognizant of American licensed exports to Eire. These two agencies for economic warfare acting jointly would seem to constitute the adequate machinery for such correlated economic action as might be approved. It would only remain for the policy-making agencies of the respective Governments to decide on the line to be pursued and delegate the implementing of the decision to the existing Boards of Economic Warfare. It should be made clear that your Minister is not assuming to advise the British Government, but only to suggest to his own Government various procedures by which we might properly assist the British Government in forestalling Irish menace to our mutually friendly and cooperative relations, which are of basic importance if our hope for the future is to be realized.

No important trade interests, either British or American, would be jeopardized by such proposed economic action if indeed it were planned and executed in a spirit of cooperative understanding, for Eire is and must remain primarily a customer of Britain. There is no market for Irish agricultural products, except in Britain, and so Eire must hold that market by buying British. The United States in peace-time finds Eire a logical customer for feeding grains and some manufactured specialties and is a purchaser of Irish specialties such as whiskey, luxury bacon, handmade tweeds, Irish poplins and carpet wool. But it seems desirable that during the war neither Britain nor America should undertake to supplant each other's legitimate trade by supplying to Irish buyers what the other is unable or unwilling to supply, regardless of political considerations. This desirable end a joint trade policy toward Eire would incidentally assure.

It is difficult to frame an objective and dispassionate appraisal of current events at close range and it is possible that the facts set forth above should be otherwise interpreted as pointing to other courses of action. It may be wiser to take no action at all but leave to time and imponderable forces the working out of the problems presented by the Irish situation. But, however attractive the policy of doing nothing may appear, there is an inescapable decision which the United Nations must presently face, to wit: Can Eire as a geographical strategic keystone in the common defense of the British Isles and as the controlling area for the protection of Anglo-American communications again be permitted the right to refuse cooperation in time of crisis and endanger our existence? If it cannot, the choice of the United Nations is between making their decision now while the realistic pressures of war continue, and postponement to the period of post-war loosening of the bonds of common interests.

D[AVID] G[RAY]

DUBLIN, May 14, 1943.

811.34541D/11b

The Secretary of State to President Roosevelt

WASHINGTON, June 29, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have given careful consideration to your memorandum of June 15, 1943¹¹ commenting on and requesting my views on Mr. David Gray's memorandum on Ireland.

It appears to me that without question air and naval facilities in Ireland would be of considerable usefulness to the United Nations war effort. The Department has been informally advised by a high officer of the War Department that these facilities would be enormously useful from a military standpoint. As you know, however, Prime Minister de Valera has repeatedly declared the determination of the Irish Government to remain neutral and has stated that "there can be no question of leasing these ports" or "of handing them over on any condition whatsoever." He has also stated that any attempt by any of the belligerents to bring pressure to bear on the Irish Government to turn over these ports "could only lead to bloodshed." In making these statements, Mr. de Valera has no doubt had principally in mind possible approaches from the British Government. Since our entry into the war, however, suggestions have been made that Ireland might be disposed to lease naval and air facilities to the United States.

There is much merit in the following statement in Mr. Gray's memorandum; indeed this statement is almost unanswerable:

¹¹ Missing from Department files; see Cordell Hull, *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull* (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1948), vol. II, p. 1356.

"If the request were acceded to we should have the much needed facilities. If not, Eire would be definitely on record as having refused a specific request made now for the first time. Otherwise, she might say with truth, 'you never asked us for the ports'".

The Irish and the British have fought one another for seven hundred years. They suspect and distrust one another. Each tries on suitable occasions to obtain the support of the American people and Government against the other. We must be careful, therefore, to be sure that any action which we take in this regard has a sound military basis in the opinion of our own Chiefs of Staff. It seems to me that this is of fundamental importance to make it impossible for anyone to maintain that we took sides with the British against the Irish and "pulled British chestnuts out of the fire."

Ireland is at the back door of the United Kingdom. Happenings inside Ireland are therefore of more immediate and more direct interest to the United Kingdom than to the United States. Therefore, if it should be decided that the American Government undertake a direct approach to the Irish Government concerning the ports, the matter should be discussed with the British Government in advance and the approval of the British Government should be obtained before any action is taken vis-à-vis the Irish.

I enclose a draft letter for your signature to Admiral Leahy¹² requesting the views of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff on the military aspects of this question. It seems preferable that I defer further recommendations in regard to this matter until we have Admiral Leahy's reply.

Faithfully yours,

CORDELL HULL

811.34541D/8-1143

*Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff for President
Roosevelt*^{12a}

[WASHINGTON,] 11 August 1943.

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the military aspects of the acquisition of air and naval bases in Ireland.

2. Air transport and air ferry operations will not be materially improved by acquiring such bases. Air operations by very long range aircraft for the protection of shipping would not be appreciable [*appreciably*] extended in range. In both instances, however, an additional degree of safety and flexibility would be had through the availability of additional fields.

¹² Draft letter not printed; Adm. William D. Leahy was Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.

^{12a} Copy obtained from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

3. Air operations against the European Continent would not be appreciable [*appreciably*] facilitated by use of bases in Eire except that bases for fighter planes in southwest Eire would be of advantage to the theater commander as bases to which he might move his fighter planes to oppose German air attacks on Allied convoys if they should be routed south of Ireland.

4. This air threat together with that of the German submarines operating from bases in western France are now deterrent factors in the routing of seaborne traffic to England through lanes south of Ireland. Air bases will reduce the air threat but naval bases will not materially reduce the existent submarine threat because present bases in southwest England are closer to the Bay of Biscay. However, naval bases will be useful when it is considered safe enough to route convoys south of Ireland and when invasion operations start in western Europe. They can be quickly established with floating equipment.

5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that fighter air bases and naval bases in southern Eire will be strategically valuable to the United Nations when shipping is routed past southern Ireland or when an invasion of western Europe is undertaken.

6. A saving of American lives and the lives of nationals of those countries associated with us in the war, might result from availability of suitable emergency landing fields in Eire, and would result from availability of air and naval bases when it becomes feasible to route convoys south of Ireland.

7. It is recommended that negotiations be conducted without committing the U.S. at this time to a definite program for the establishment of air or naval bases in southern Ireland.

8. A copy of this memorandum is being sent to the Secretary of State, and officers representing the Joint Chiefs of Staff have been designated to consult with him in this matter.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

[GEORGE C. MARSHALL]

Chief of Staff, U.S. Army.

811.34541D/11½

The Secretary of State to President Roosevelt

WASHINGTON, September 13, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: After discussion with representatives of the War and Navy Departments designated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff we have prepared a draft message to be sent by you to Prime Minister de Valera on the question of naval and air bases in Ireland. These representatives say that it is impossible to foresee at this time

just what military value bases in Ireland may have or whether, as the war develops, we would actually wish to use such bases. They believe however that it would be of real assistance now in planning our war strategy to be able to count on the use of these bases if they should at any time be needed. It is in line with this thought that the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their memorandum prepared for you on August 7¹³ recommended that an approach should be made to the Irish Government for permission to use Irish bases in the event such bases should be needed but that we should not make any commitments to establish such bases.

The attached draft message¹⁴ has been prepared in accordance with the suggestions of the representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and has been approved by them. They believe that this approach is preferable to that contained in the draft message prepared by Mr. David Gray while he was in Washington.¹⁵

As I stated in my letter to you on June 29, I believe that, in view of Great Britain's immediate interest, we should take no step in this matter which does not have the full approval of the British Government. I accordingly enclose a draft telegram to Ambassador Winant, quoting the text of the proposed message and asking him to obtain the views of the British Government as soon as possible.

Please let me know whether this draft meets with your approval in order that we may telegraph it at once to Ambassador Winant.¹⁶

Faithfully yours,

CORDELL HULL

841D.01/203 : Telegram

The Minister in Ireland (Gray) to the Secretary of State

DUBLIN, September 13, 1943—8 p. m.
[Received September 14—7:49 p. m.]

117. For the Secretary and Under Secretary. Sir John Maffey, British representative, informed me shortly after my return that his Government required his presence in London to confer and advise regarding a proposed American note to Ireland. I told him that I assumed this to be the proposal and draft¹⁵ which I reported to you before leaving Washington. I made it clear both verbally and in writing that this was no more than a recommendation on which as far as I knew you had not taken action. I said that I therefore felt at liberty to discuss the matter with him and would appreciate his

¹³ Memorandum dated August 11, *supra*.

¹⁴ For text of the proposed message, see telegram No. 5736, September 18, to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, p. 147.

¹⁵ Not found in Department files.

¹⁶ Mr. Hull's letter was returned to him by President Roosevelt with the notation "CH OK FDR", and telegram was sent to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom as No. 5736, September 18, p. 147.

counsel and advice. He suggested that I also consult Kearney, the Canadian High Commissioner, in whom I have confidence. This I have done.

Both these believe that there is more than a reasonable chance of de Valera accepting the offer in question not because he wishes to but because he could not afford to refuse it. I hope this may be so but I cannot subscribe to it as a probability.

I explained that the object of my recommendation was to prevent the Irish partition issue being injected into post-war American politics by de Valera and exploited by the subversive elements in America which tried block preparedness and Lend-Lease in order to oppose your plans for cooperation with the British Commonwealth and other nations. We know these forces are still active and organized. I said that it seemed wiser to spread the facts and our point of view on the record before the attack came and while war conditions existed. Maffey asked me if we wanted a refusal rather than acceptance of the offer if it should be made. I said while I had no authority to speak for you or the President I believed the last thing you wished would be a quarrel; that in long view it was obviously best that Eire should join us on a friendly basis and de Valera be placed in a position where he would be controlled by conference conditions. But I said that I could not believe that there was much chance that he would accept the offer and that it was most desirable that note should be drawn to make the record for the American public. I further said that as he knew de Valera responded to none of the courtesies of diplomatic usage nor to the usual methods of persuasion but that a blunt and just statement of facts even though reciting unpleasant things carried most weight with him. Maffey agreed that this was so.

What will carry most weight with de Valera is that he will understand at once the strategy of the note and that it will forestall a successful appeal to American sympathy.

Maffey pointed out that if the note were sent de Valera would probably reply by saying that as long as the crime of partition lasted he could not be expected to cooperate with the British Commonwealth except on his own terms. This, of course, would be his probable line. It therefore seemed wise in order to forestall the necessity of a reply to his reply to state the American position as to the status of Northern Ireland at the outset and further to make it clear that any change in that status was a matter concerning the parties interest[ed] and not the American Government. I have therefore amended my recommended draft in this respect.

I am sending you by the first air courier this revised draft ¹⁸ containing this and a few immaterial recommendations.

GRAY

¹⁸ Not found in Department files.

811.34541D/11a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, September 18, 1943.

5736. Personal for the Ambassador. By direction of the President, the State Department in collaboration with the War and Navy Departments has for some time been considering the desirability of an approach to the Irish Government on the question of Naval and Air bases in Ireland. It is now proposed that a personal message be sent by the President to Prime Minister de Valera on this subject.

In considering this matter we have kept constantly in mind the fact that, aside from other considerations, Ireland is at the back door of Great Britain and that happenings inside Ireland are of more immediate and more direct interest to Great Britain than to the United States. An approach by the United States might possibly be received more sympathetically than a similar approach by the British Government. In view of Britain's immediate interest, however, we desire to take no step in relation to this matter which does not have the full approval of the British authorities. We have assumed that any Naval and air facilities obtained in Ireland would be available also to British Forces, but we believe it wise in our initial approach to the Irish authorities to be silent on this point.

It is understood that the President and Prime Minister Churchill have discussed this question ¹⁹ and are in agreement that an approach to the Irish authorities is desirable at this time. Before proceeding with the matter, however, we desire that the form of our proposed approach be considered and approved by the authorities in London. Will you therefore take this question up with Eden ²⁰ at once and request the views of the British Government on the proposed message from the President to Prime Minister de Valera. We believe that the time is now ripe to make an approach of this kind and we hope that the British Government will give us its views as soon as possible.

The text of the proposed message reads as follows :

"From the outbreak of war in September 1939 I have watched the efforts of the various smaller neutral nations of Europe to remain aloof from the conflict raging about them. Even when fully aware that their very existence was threatened, these nations still hesitated to join their strength to the forces resisting Axis aggression. They hoped that by refraining from measures of self protection or of assistance to their friends they might be spared. In trying so desperately to escape attack they have actually assisted the Axis forces in overrunning their

¹⁹ At the First Quebec Conference (August 17-24, 1943), or during Mr. Churchill's visit to President Roosevelt at Hyde Park, N.Y., in August, 1943. The records of the Quebec Conference are scheduled for publication in a subsequent volume of *Foreign Relations*.

²⁰ Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

lands. Thus they fell easy prey to Axis duplicity and were swallowed up one after the other without an opportunity for concerted resistance.

Ireland has so far escaped this unhappy fate of these other small 'neutral' nations, only because powerful armed resistance has stood in the conquerors' path.

I recall that shortly after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the German and Italian declarations of war against the United States you made a speech describing the intimate ties which bind our two countries and affirming the friendly sentiments of Ireland toward the United States in the war. In this speech of December 14, 1941 you stated:

'Since this terrible war began our sympathies have gone out to all the suffering peoples who have been dragged into it. Further hundreds of millions have become involved since I spoke at Limerick a fortnight ago. Its extension to the United States of America brings a source of anxiety and sorrow to every part of this land. There is scarcely a family here which has not a member or near relative in that country. In addition to the ties of blood there has been between our two nations a long association of friendship and regard, continuing uninterruptedly from America's own struggle for independence down to our own. The part that American friendship played in helping us to win the freedom that we enjoy in this part of Ireland has been gratefully recognized and acknowledged by our people. It would be unnatural then if we did not sympathize in a special manner with the people of the United States and if we did not feel with them in all the anxieties and trials which this war must bring upon them. For this reason strangers who do not understand our conditions have begun to ask how America's entry into the war will affect our State policy here. We answered that question in advance: the policy of the State remains unchanged. We can only be a friendly neutral.'

You were good enough to have excerpts from your speech transmitted to me through the Irish Minister in Washington. I replied to you at that time as follows:

'I have received, through Mr. Brennan, the Irish Minister in Washington, certain extracts from your speech delivered at Cork on December 14. I note with particular interest your reference to the long association of friendship and regard between our two countries, your expressions of sympathy with the people of the United States in the present conflict and your declaration of friendly neutrality on the part of the Irish Government.

I fully understand the strong desire of Ireland, and the desire of every nation not at war, to avoid active participation in the present struggle. Unfortunately, as the experience of so many nations, including our own, has so clearly demonstrated, the desire to avoid the wave of conquest provides little guarantee of national safety. On the contrary it merely gives to the aggressor the opportunity to choose the moment and manner of attack, sometimes carried out most treacherously.

I cannot let this opportunity pass without repeating what has now become the obvious, namely, that Axis aggression is now being waged on a world-wide scale, that until this aggression has been stopped by force of arms there is no security for any nation, great or small.

These are stern facts which the Irish people may well ponder today, and I feel that the American Government would be failing in its duty of deep friendship if it did not, with the wisdom of its recent experience, underline their vital significance to the Irish Government.

We do not minimize the task before us but I need scarcely tell you of the absolute confidence of the American Government and the American people in the final triumph of the cause for which we are now fighting and our determination to carry the fight through to complete victory. Happily the vast majority of mankind and the preponderance of resources are on our side. The assistance which any nation or any people may give in this struggle merely speeds the day of victory and peace and security for all nations.

Your expressions of gratitude for the long interest of the United States in Irish freedom are appreciated. The policy of the American Government now as in the past contemplates the hope that all the free institutions, liberties and independ-

ence which the Irish people now enjoy may be preserved for the full enjoyment of the future. If freedom and liberty are to be preserved, they must now be defended by the human and material resources of all free nations. Your freedom too is at stake. No longer can it be doubted that the policy of Hitler and his Axis associates is the conquest of the entire world and the enslavement of all mankind.

I have every confidence that the Irish Government and the Irish people, who love liberty and freedom as dearly as we, will know how to meet their responsibilities in the present situation.'

Although the Irish Government in the intervening months has in certain ways demonstrated its friendship for the United States, the fact is that we have done far more for Ireland since the outbreak of war than Ireland has done in return. In the summer of 1940 when Ireland was virtually unarmed and in deadly peril of German aggression 20,000 American rifles were supplied to the Irish Army. The American Government was unable to provide more only because we too were unarmed and were building up our own armament and because we were in addition providing arms and war supplies to those nations which were actively defending themselves against aggression.

More recently the American Red Cross, with the approval of the American Government, has undertaken to send \$500,000 worth of medical supplies to Ireland. Part of these supplies have already been shipped.

Not only arms and medical and other supplies have been provided Ireland from the United States. The American Government in September 1941, in the face of a growing world shipping shortage, made available to the Irish Government by charter two American merchant ships to enable the Irish Government and Irish people to carry to their shores foodstuffs and other supplies of critical necessity.²¹ The chartering of these ships to the Irish Government represented a real sacrifice on the part of this country at a time when shipping space was most badly needed. In making this sacrifice we were motivated by the most friendly considerations and by the sole purpose of helping to prevent suffering and deprivation among the Irish people.

Let us contrast American help to Ireland with the Axis contribution to Irish welfare during the present war. Germany has bombed Irish cities and destroyed Irish lives and property with impunity. A German plane has sunk a ship carrying a cargo of American wheat to Ireland and Axis submarines have sunk other ships carrying supplies to Ireland. Both of the two ships chartered to Ireland by the United States and sailing under the Irish flag have been sunk by Axis submarines. The loss of these ships harms not only Ireland but the United States to whom the vessels belonged, and the whole United Nations war effort.

I believe it is now time, therefore, for Ireland to consider what steps it can take to be of assistance to the United States and the United Nations in bringing the Axis aggressors to their already certain defeat.

I am informed by our highest military and naval experts that it would be helpful to us at this stage in planning our war strategy to know that naval and air bases in Ireland would be available to American forces in the event such facilities should be needed. In the opinion of American experts the use of such facilities would, in certain con-

²¹ For correspondence on this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. III, pp. 215 ff.

tingencies, help to save American lives and the lives of nationals of those countries associated with us in the war.

As you say, there is scarcely a family in Ireland that does not have a member or a near relative in the United States. These Americans of Irish blood and background are loyal American citizens and are making their full contribution to the war in every way. Here at home they are supporting the war effort as loyally as any section of the American population. They are contributing their full share of fighting men for duty in the armed forces overseas. Fighting with these American soldiers of Irish blood as comrades in arms are many tens of thousands of other Irishmen from Great Britain and other countries of the British Commonwealth and including Ireland itself. The opportunity to help save the lives of these men and of all those fighting with them must surely strike a sympathetic chord in the hearts of the people of Ireland and indeed of all Irishmen everywhere.

I therefore ask in the name of the Government of the United States and on behalf of the American armed forces that the Irish Government now agree to grant to the United States, for the duration of the war and six months thereafter, permission to use existing air and naval facilities in Ireland at any time these facilities should be required and also permission to establish and use such other naval and air facilities as may be needed by American forces. I give you the solemn assurance of the Government of the United States that American forces will evacuate Irish soil at the end of the war and that the bases will be returned to the Irish Government.

It is entirely possible that Irish bases may not be needed. Further progress of the war may soon render bases in Ireland of little or no military value to us. In such event we would, of course, not exercise the permission which I now ask to use Irish bases. Nevertheless, it would be of real assistance to us *now* in planning our war strategy to be able to count upon the use of such bases if they should be needed. Whether American forces actually use these bases or not, Ireland would have the satisfaction of having made available to us such of its facilities as we may need to help bring the war to an end as speedily as possible and with the least possible loss of life.

An agreement on the part of the Irish Government to the foregoing effect would for military reasons be kept strictly secret.

The Irish Government, which has thus far remained strictly neutral, may be tempted to believe that, since the United Nations will win the war in any event, Ireland's freedom is therefore amply assured whether or not Ireland offers any contribution to victory. Even if the Irish Government were inclined to pursue such a course, I frankly do not believe that it would be in Ireland's interest to do so.

An agreement to place Irish naval and airbase facilities at the disposal of the American Government, to be used only in the event these facilities are needed, would constitute an historic step in associating Ireland with its traditional friends and in ranging Ireland on the side of right and justice—and victory—in this greatest struggle of all history.

These considerations lead me to hope that your Government will make a favorable reply at an early date."

Please send a copy of this telegram to Mr. Gray at once for his information. The Department will send him instructions about the

delivery of the message upon receipt of word from you that the British Government has approved this message.

HULL

841D.01/203 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Ireland (Gray)

WASHINGTON, September 18, 1943—6 p. m.

103. Personal for the Minister. Your 117, September 13, 8 p. m. We are today telegraphing Ambassador Winant the text of a proposed message from the President to Mr. de Valera ²² with instructions to obtain the views of the British Government as soon as possible. Mr. Winant has also been instructed to send you a copy of this message for your information. This new draft has been prepared in accordance with the suggestions of the War and Navy Departments and has been approved by the President. Upon receipt of word from London that the British Government has approved this message we will telegraph you instructions in regard to its delivery.

For your own background information at this stage, however, it may be added that the War and Navy Departments say that it is impossible to foresee at this time just what military value bases in Ireland may have or whether, as the war develops, we would actually wish to use such bases. They believe however that it would be of real assistance now in planning our war strategy to be able to count on the use of these bases if at any time they should be needed. They have accordingly recommended that an approach be made in confidence to the Irish Government for permission to use Irish bases in the event such bases should be needed but that this Government should not make any commitments to establish such bases. They believe that an approach on this basis is preferable to that contained in the draft message which you prepared while in Washington.²³ The foregoing is for your own information only.

HULL

811.34541D/10a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, September 18, 1943—midnight.

5745. Personal for the Ambassador. I refer to my telegram of today's date regarding the question of naval and air bases in Ireland. It is our understanding that the President has conveyed to the British Government a copy of a draft note to the Irish Government which

²² See *supra*.

²³ Not found in Department files.

had been prepared by Mr. Gray, our Minister to Ireland, while in the United States on consultation recently. The President has approved the message set forth in my telegram of today's date which might be used instead of the earlier draft. It was the President's thought that some parts of the former draft might possibly be incorporated in this new draft but he has no strong views in that respect. The new draft message would in our opinion entirely meet the situation. If, however, the British have any suggestions, we shall, of course, be glad to receive them. You might also add that in addition this new draft has also received the approval of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff.²⁴

HULL

841D.01/204 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, September 19, 1943—10 p. m.
[Received September 19—6:40 p. m.]

6266. Your message No. 5736, September 18, I gave to Mr. Eden today. He explained to me that the matter had been discussed with him before leaving Quebec.²⁴ As I understand, the Prime Minister favors the action recommended but there appeared to be some opposition in the British Cabinet. Some of the members who before the war had favored a united Ireland now feel that if they had succeeded in their support of the South of Ireland in establishing unity that the Southern majority might have persisted in their present neutrality program, and without either the South of Ireland ports or the North of Ireland ports Great Britain would have been destroyed by the German submarine campaign and merchant shipping bombing. Only the day before yesterday the First Sea Lord²⁵ stated this case to both Frank Knox²⁶ and me when we lunched with him at Admiralty House. I happen to know that Attlee²⁷ holds the same opinion and as Dominion Secretary has to do with the South of Ireland.

²⁴ The Department of Defense has supplied information to the effect that no documentary evidence of JCS approval of the new draft has been discovered, but that, since such action would have been consistent with the views already expressed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it is believed probable that approval was given informally by the officers appointed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to consult with the Department of State on the matter.

²⁵ Possibly Albert V. Alexander, First Lord of the Admiralty. The First Sea Lord, Sir Dudley Pound, apparently returned with the Prime Minister from Quebec, arriving in London September 19.

²⁶ U. S. Secretary of the Navy.

²⁷ Clement R. Attlee, British Secretary of State for the Dominions and Deputy Prime Minister; he was succeeded as Secretary of State for the Dominions by Lord Cranborne on September 24, 1943.

Eden felt that the message was perfectly drafted, but he also explained to me that there was a real division in the Cabinet on this issue and that a reply would be delayed until there had been an opportunity for the Prime Minister to state the case in support of the message. He also pointed out that our wish to take the matter up with the de Valera Government directly although perhaps wise and understandable, still ran contrary to the theory that Ireland was an integral part of the British Empire. He appreciated the spirit of the message in our recognition that British Government opinion was a controlling factor in our approach to the problem.

I have just met the Prime Minister at the station. He had a comfortable trip and seemed in good spirits and good health.

WINANT

841D.01/206 : Telegram

The Minister in Ireland (Gray) to the Secretary of State

DUBLIN, September 28, 1943—6 p. m.

[Received 7 : 45 p. m.]

122. Appreciate receipt via Winant of draft of proposed note to de Valera, reference your number 103 dated September 18, 6 p. m., which the Foreign Service officers and I have been studying.

In our view the Army and Navy approach which asks for facilities if and when they may be required invites the rejoinder that until that contingency arises, if it should arise, he, de Valera, cannot reasonably be expected to formulate a decision on so important a change in his policy. Does not this approach inevitably lead us into a position where we get neither the promise of the desired facilities nor the record of a refusal? Furthermore, may not the extremely mild phrasing mislead him as to the American view of his policy which maintains Axis missions in what is essentially our defense zone and opposes our use of military facilities in Northern Ireland? We agree on the following views as to the Irish situation and as to policy regarding it:

1. That de Valera's reiterated insistence on neutrality as something noble in itself and vital to Irish survival, the acceptance of that proposition by a majority of the people who are not permitted public discussion of the question together with the strong anti-British and anti-American bias of the extreme Nationalists to whom he defers make it as certain as human forecast can be that he will never yield facilities except to military force or to that degree of economic and political pressure which would disrupt this following.

2. That strong evidence points to the probability that if pressed directly for military facilities he will reply that while the "crime of partition" continues and while a third of the people in Northern Ireland live in "the terror of a foreign tyranny" he could not lead the Irish people into the war even if he wished to.

3. That it is disadvantageous to us at this time to ignore and waive the grievance of his unfriendly protest against our use of facilities in Northern Ireland as well as the consistently unfriendly attitude of the Government censorship. As long as elements in the Irish Government can exert unfriendly influence without being deprived of supply, the Government is likely to adopt their policy for reasons of internal political expediency.

4. We believe that there is strong evidence that de Valera relies on the grievance of partition as his paramount issue in domestic politics; that he relies on it to gain sympathy in the United States at the peace table; and that he counts on frictions between us and Britain to win support for Eire. There is reason to believe that the subversive American press will be fed from Eire with a formidable anti-partition, anti-British propaganda as the war ends.

The beginning is already under way in certain Irish American newspapers. Since no solution of partition is probable in an appreciable future unless Eire should join us in war and give the requisite guarantees for a common postwar defensive system with Britain, only ceaseless agitation, disorder and growing bitterness are in prospect.

5. Knowing the view of the President held by de Valera and Aiken, his most influential Minister, we feel it is inappropriate that the President should accord him the honor of a personal note, especially since this courtesy will have no influence on him but only strengthen his position with his Cabinet.

I regret that owing to the pressure on you of more important matters you did not have time to explain to me while I was in Washington your appraisal of the effect of Irish pressure groups on Anglo-American relations in the present circumstances. I would gratefully appreciate suggestions for any line of action you thought [*think?*] desirable in which this Mission could assist.

GRAY

841D.01/208 : Telegram

The Minister in Ireland (Gray) to the Secretary of State

DUBLIN, October 1, 1943—8 p. m.
[Received October 2—12:30 p. m.]

124. The feature of the de Valera party Fianna Fail annual convention held on September 28 and 29 were resolutions emphasizing partition as the paramount issue before the country. Reference to my number 122, September 28, 6 p. m.

In his keynote speeches De Valera said: "We have a right to the unity of our country and we have a right to the independent action of our people also." He explained this last as meaning that they would not pay for the ending of partition by giving up neutrality. "We had", he said, "asserted our national right in remaining out of the war. There were people who did not like that attitude. We must look ahead to the time in which efforts might be made to penalize

us because we had taken that attitude. We could meet any crisis if we stood together." He further said: "We will try to do everything we can in order that the wrongs of this partition of our country would be brought to the notice of all those who would have any power to remedy it."

Later he asked authorization to send greetings to friends of Ireland abroad mentioning in particular Archbishop Mannix²⁸ and the organizations that supported the nationalist movement in the United States. I am informed by a reporter present that other speakers advocated terrorist methods to compel attention to the wrongs. These were not printed in the newspapers.

The foregoing confirms the reports and forecasts that we have been transmitting to you. It would be unwise to assume that de Valera does not mean what he says and is not preparing for action against Britain both by stirring up anti-British feeling in America and by agitation here and in Northern Ireland. The possibility of an uprising similar to that of Easter week 1916 must not be ruled out. That succeeded by compelling the British to execute the ring leaders thus making martyrs out of them. In this way American sympathy and support was won. Obtaining political ends by the shedding of sacrificial blood may readily be tried again. The difficulty now is that Britain can not yield on partition and throw over Northern Ireland which has given her facilities nor can we counsel coercion since we too have obtained facilities.

Whatever means de Valera chooses to take, a serious impasse is inevitable. Wise preventative action could probably forestall de Valera's strategy if taken in time, but I can find no evidence of British anxiety over the situation. It must be recalled that the 1916 uprising took the British Government by surprise.

GRAY

841D.01/206 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Ireland (Gray)

WASHINGTON, October 5, 1943—9 p. m.

110. Personal for the Minister. I have received your 122, September 28, with your further suggestions on the proposed message to Ireland.

I believe we are all in full agreement on the purposes to be achieved by the proposed approach both as regards our more immediate military needs and in respect of our longer range relations with Ireland and Great Britain.

It has been my feeling, however, and this is also the President's view, that any approach on this subject must be based on sound

²⁸ Most Rev. Daniel Mannix, Archbishop of Melbourne (Australia).

military grounds approved by the United States Chiefs of Staff. In our discussions with representatives of the Chiefs of Staff, they have very understandably taken the position that any approach which may lead to demands for supplies, military and otherwise, and shipping space must be weighed very carefully in the scales of military advantage. Since it is impossible for them to say now what military value bases in Ireland may have, they insist upon the more limited approach with no commitments on our part at this stage.

We realize that this limited approach may, as you suggest, have certain disadvantages in ignoring such matters as the presence of Axis diplomats in Ireland and the Irish Government's unfriendly protest against the presence of our troops in Northern Ireland. We believe, however, that our approach is even stronger if made in friendliest terms and without reference to our just grievances against Ireland. This approach will leave no doubt that we have done all we can to meet Ireland half way and make it as easy as possible for de Valera to accept our request and assist in the United Nations war effort. If he should grant this limited request, we would not only have the bases but would then be in a much stronger position to ask as a next step the removal of Axis representatives as a necessary security measure. If he refuses, these other matters can then be laid on the record in an appropriate manner together with our proposed note and the Irish reply.

Should the Irish Government reply, as you believe it might, that it cannot give a decision on a question of such importance until bases are actually required, this would of course be regarded by the American Government as a definite refusal. Our draft note makes clear that we need to know *now* in planning our war strategy that we can count on the use of bases in Ireland whenever they may be needed. It is *now* in the planning stage that such assurances must be received if they are to have any value. Appropriate preparations would naturally have to be made in advance for the use of establishment of bases.

Your point that the message should not be addressed to Mr. de Valera personally is well taken. If and when the time comes to deliver the message we should, in line with your suggestion, make clear that it is from the American Government and addressed to the Irish Government. This would not necessarily preclude having the message sent in the name of the President and addressed to de Valera as Prime Minister. Having the message come from the President would of course add his tremendous prestige to the weight of our approach and the form adopted could make clear that the message is addressed to de Valera only in his capacity as head of the Irish Government. Your note transmitting the message might accordingly read as follows: "I am instructed by my Government to deliver to

you in your capacity as Prime Minister of Ireland the following message from the President of the United States." Then would follow the text of the message. When the British have approved the message, we will send you definite instructions in regard to its delivery.

We have not yet received the British Government's views on this matter. Until that time I believe there is nothing further to be done either by yourself or by the Department. The British of course have copies of both drafts and they may well have views as to the manner in which any approach should be made. Their preliminary reaction left some doubts that they will approve the project. We are asking Winant to try to expedite a reply.

We will keep you informed of any developments.

HULL

841D.01/204 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, October 5, 1943—midnight.

6157. Personal for Winant. Department's 5736, September 18 and your 6266, September 19. Could you make discreet inquiries as to when we may expect to receive the British Government's views? As you know the President is personally interested in this matter.

HULL

841D.01/210 : Telegram

The Minister in Ireland (Gray) to the Secretary of State

DUBLIN, October 8, 1943—7 p. m.

[Received October 8—6 p. m.]

128. For the Secretary. Personal. Appreciated reply your clarifying exposition of the Irish note question in your number 110, October 5, 9 p. m. I realize the force of the objection of the military to accepting a commitment to protect Irish cities when they may not need Irish facilities. I am convinced that there is no chance of de Valera saying yes but, of course, you and the service chiefs would be responsible, not I in the case I were wrong. I am sure you and the President are right not to assume that responsibility.

Your suggestion that an evasive reply by de Valera would be regarded as a refusal for the record and that the note in question might be considered as an opening move in the development of a line of action designed to inform the American people of the unfriendly attitude of the Irish Government with a view to forestalling anti-British agitation on the partition question answers our criticism of the military

approach note. I am now entirely in agreement with you that it is the best line to take.

Sir John Maffey says he has not been consulted with regard to the military approach version. The Canadian High Commissioner strongly approves of this latter version and prefers it to the former. He will see Cranborne²⁹ in London shortly.

I am sending Winant a copy of this telegram.

GRAY

841D.01/209 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, October 8, 1943—9 p. m.
[Received October 8—5:45 p. m.]

6849. For the Secretary and Under Secretary.³⁰ In carrying out your wishes in your 6157, October 5, 12 midnight, I found that the matter in question had been raised in a War Cabinet meeting shortly after the Prime Minister's return but that no decisive action had been taken. I asked that it be raised again after receiving your message and although the question was introduced for discussion no decision was reached.

I understand that it will be discussed again this week. I believe my 6266, September 19, 10 p. m. was a correct estimate on the divergent opinions within the Cabinet.

WINANT

841D.01/211 : Telegram

The Minister in Ireland (Gray) to the Secretary of State

DUBLIN, October 14, 1943—7 p. m.
[Received 7:20 p. m.]

132. This appears to be the psychological moment for presenting the proposed Irish note, the subject your 110, October 5, 9 p. m. Anglo-Portuguese arrangement³¹ has profoundly agitated public opinion. However de Valera regards it as a betrayal of Eire by Portugal. . . . De Valera will in all probability continue to adhere to strict neutrality.

²⁹ Lord Cranborne, British Secretary of State for the Dominions.

³⁰ Edward R. Stettinius, Jr.

³¹ On October 12, British Prime Minister Churchill announced in the House of Commons that the Portuguese Government had agreed to grant to the United Kingdom naval facilities in the Azores. For text of agreement, effected by exchange of notes, August 17, 1943, see *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. CXLVI, pp. 447-452.

On restudying the draft of the note in question which you sent via Winant I would recommend no mention of grievances at all. Is it not a mistake in such a friendly treatment as this to raise the question of grievance? Would recommend therefore excision of the passage beginning on page 4 from the words "will know how to meet their responsibilities in the present situation" to the passage on page 6 beginning "I believe it is now time therefore for Ireland."

Repeated to Winant.

GRAY

841D.01/216a : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Ireland (Gray)

WASHINGTON, October 28, 1943—10 p. m.

116. Personal for the Minister. Your 132, October 14. For your information the following is the text of the Department's telegram number 6737, October 27 to Ambassador Winant:

"Since the receipt of your telegram the President has asked us about the present status of this matter and we told him on October 11 of your expectation that a decision would be reached by the British authorities during the week of October 8. From our point of view the proposed approach becomes decreasingly desirable as time goes on. If therefore the British really wish to kill this proposal, their long continued inaction is well calculated to accomplish this end. Have you any further information as to when a decision is likely to be reached?"

STETTINIUS

841D.01/215 : Telegram

The Minister in Ireland (Gray) to the Secretary of State

DUBLIN, November 1, 1943—7 p. m.

[Received 8:48 p. m.]

136. Personal for the Acting Secretary. Appreciate your 116, October 28. The British representative here received instructions last week to go to London early this week for discussion of the note in question. Yesterday, October 31, he received a telegram postponing indefinitely his mission. He believed they might be waiting for Eden's return.

I gain the impression that possibly no one in the British Cabinet except Churchill and Morrison³² appreciate clearly the desirability of placing de Valera on the record from the viewpoint of the American situation. There is little accurate knowledge of de Valera or of his political strategy in British Government circles, and as long

³² Herbert Morrison, British Secretary of State for Home Affairs and Minister for Home Security.

as he is making no immediate trouble the "better not" school of thought in the Cabinet gains ground.

You must also keep in mind that there are powerful trade interests suspicious of American inroads on Eire trade, also the bureaucratic view which is reluctant to recognize Eire as not a dominion and under British tutelage.

From our viewpoint, this seems the time to prepare a case that will protect us against the pressure of subversive groups using the Irish cause for attacks on our Government's postwar policies. As previously reported (reference my telegram No. 124, October 1, 8 p. m.) de Valera asked and received, authorization from his recent party convention to communicate the program for agitation to compel Northern Ireland to join Eire to associations in America which support the Irish cause. Of course, no overt support of the American cause would be permitted in Eire. The crux of the matter as I see it is your appraisal of the embarrassment which these produce. If they are regarded as something likely to prove serious, I would recommend that for the furtherance of American and incidentally British interests also, the President's policy should prevail.

GRAY

841D.01/217 : Telegram

The Minister in Ireland (Gray) to the Secretary of State

DUBLIN, November 9, 1943—noon.

[Received 1:03 p. m.]

141. For the Acting Secretary. Sir John Maffey returning from London told me on November 7 (reference my telegram number 136, November 1, 7 p. m.) that he had been informed that no decision by his Government had yet been taken on the question of the proposed note to Eire. He understood that there was a divergence of views in the Cabinet and that the matter was with the Prime Minister for final decision.

He had gained the impression that political considerations were responsible in part for the divergence of views. Some members of the Government were so strongly anti-de Valera that they would not open the door to him even though assured that he would refuse to come in and join us. They have in mind strong measures after the war. They feel that their constituents would not understand the reasons for offering de Valera an opportunity to gain credit by affording us facilities and that they would lose support. They do not seem to appreciate that a generous offer refused by de Valera would go far toward eliminating him as a trouble-making influence after the war nor will they believe that he has definitely nailed his flag to the mast of neutrality and will under no circumstances whatsoever join with

United States. This irrational obstinacy is his fundamental weakness and should be exploited by United States and not ignored.

They do not understand the American situation and the desirability for weakening Irish extremist opposition to Anglo-American understanding while the war continues instead of later. Nor will they accept the proposition that in the long view, it would be better for England as well as Eire that Eire should join the United Nations even at this late date.

Our view of other forces in the British Government opposing the President in my number 136 above referred to. We who are in Eire think it desirable to work out some concrete compromise joint understanding with a minimum delay which will serve both American and British long-range interests.

GRAY

841D.01/213 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, November 13, 1943—7 p. m.

7184. Personal for the Ambassador. Your 7524, October 30.³⁴ I note your statement that Eden's absence has been a handicap in obtaining a statement of the British Government's views, as Cranborne has seemed reluctant to take it up directly with the Prime Minister. I hope that Eden's return to London will now facilitate an early reply. I also note your report that Cranborne, while not unfriendly to the proposal, said that "any British policy would have to make certain of the security of the British Isles and insure protection for those who had stood with the British in North Ireland". This statement would appear to reveal a certain amount of suspicion on the part of the British that our ultimate purpose in making this proposal may be to use it as a first step toward ending partition. You may assure Eden and the Prime Minister, if you think it desirable, that we are not trying to bring about an end of partition. That is a British-Irish problem which we have not the slightest desire to be dragged into. However, the British are well aware of the attitude and influence of the Irish-American sections of our population and of the absolute certainty that Irish-American groups will inject this issue into American politics and particularly into the question of American-British relations at the end of the war.

We have also sensed in your telegrams some opposition on the part of the British to our taking this matter up at all with the Irish

³⁴ Not printed.

directly, and we were considerably surprised at Eden's comment that our proposed approach to the Irish Government directly on this "ran contrary to the theory that Ireland was an integral part of the British Empire". It is, of course, hardly necessary for us to comment on this except to emphasize that we have not the slightest desire to alter any existing constitutional relationship between Great Britain and Ireland or any relationship which those two Governments may find mutually satisfactory. We feel confident, however, that our proposed approach to the Irish Government would serve an extremely useful purpose not only with regard to our domestic situation and our relations with Ireland but particularly with reference to certain vicious influences which may otherwise be brought to bear on Anglo-American relations after the war. In brief we believe that this approach would serve British interests quite as much as our own, and without any British responsibility in the matter. We do not ask British approval in the sense that they would bear responsibility. We merely wish to know whether they are opposed to this independent approach wholly on our own responsibility.

HULL

841D.01/220 : Telegram

The Minister in Ireland (Gray) to the Secretary of State

DUBLIN, November 23, 1943—2 p. m.

[Received 6 : 52 p. m.]

150. Supplementing my number 141, dated November 9, noon. I gather the impression from confidential sources that there has been no real misunderstanding of our attitude toward partition in London nor apprehension of United States misconception as to Irish Sovereignty versus the Crown but there have been misgivings as to whether the result which we hope to obtain from the note in question will in fact be obtained. There is a fear that by acceptance of this very friendly note or by adroit avoidance of the issue de Valera will gain a standing with us which would defeat the British hope of impairing his prestige by their present policy of forbearance and supply and maneuver us into the position of backing up his claim for the coercion of Ulster.

They would be more inclined to accept this approach, considered as a first step to the desired end, if it were disclosed what second step were contemplated.

They object to the draft which I prepared for two opposed reasons. Though admitting that it was framed on the theory of certain non-acceptance, they fear that taking de Valera publicly to task might have the unexpected effect of exciting sympathy for him in America and exciting a keener resentment against him in England which they

deem undesirable at present for internal political reasons. They do not want their hands forced on Irish policy.

They also fear that the generous invitation to him to share in our victory might tempt him to accept.

I think that there is no doubt, however, that we both want to find the best way to defend ourselves against attack by de Valera on Anglo-American understanding in the post-war period. The major differences between us appear to be as follows: (1) Since the British have got along thus far without help from Eire they do not wish to accept it now with its post-war implications. We, on the other hand, still feel it possible that we might find the ports useful for invasion assembly bases and air fields desirable for air cover. If acceptance unexpectedly did ensue and cooperative assistance were given even at this late date, it would seem to work for a long range conciliation between Eire and Britain which all Liberals should welcome. But as this is properly a British rather than an American concern we are not in a position to urge our view. (2) Britain feels that their generosity toward Eire establishes her record and would prefer to wait till the war ends before taking action. On the other hand if we do not get de Valera on the record as jeopardizing our war effort though entirely dependent on the United Nations for security and supply while the war lasts we should not be in a strong position. Might it not be possible, in conference, to work out our respective policies without prejudice to either side?

The foregoing for the Secretary is confidential.

GRAY

841D.852/17

The Irish Minister (Brennan) to the Secretary of State

The Minister of Ireland presents his compliments to the Honourable the Secretary of State and has the honour to inform him that Irish Shipping Limited of Dublin, are negotiating with States Marine Corporation, 90 Broad Street, New York, N. Y., for the purchase of the s/s *Wolverine*, a vessel of 7997 d.w.t., owned by States Marine Corporation, at present under requisition to the War Shipping Administration and chartered by them.

Application for the approval of the sale of this vessel to Irish Shipping Limited and for its transfer to Irish registry is being made to the United States Maritime Commission by States Marine Corporation, as required by Section 9 of the Shipping Act, 1916,³⁵ as amended.

As the Secretary is no doubt aware, Irish Shipping Limited was established by the Irish Government with a view to providing ship-

³⁵ 39 Stat. 728.

ping facilities for the importation to Ireland of commodities essential to the economic life of the Irish people, because of the impossibility of obtaining these supplies through shipping facilities used prior to the outbreak of the war, and the entire share capital of the Company is held by the Minister for Finance.

In this connection it will be recalled that on the generous initiative of the President, two American vessels—the *West Neris* and the *West Hematite*—were chartered by the United States Maritime Commission to Irish Shipping Limited. Unfortunately, those two vessels, which were trading to United States and Canadian ports carrying cargoes of wheat to Ireland, were lost and it is in order to replace, to some extent, the vital tonnage so lost that Irish Shipping Limited are anxious to purchase the s/s *Wolverine*, so that wheat and other essential supplies may continue to be brought to Ireland.

In view of these circumstances and of the urgent need of Irish Shipping Limited for cargo vessels, the Minister begs to request that the Secretary may be so good as to recommend to the War Shipping Administration that the application above referred to be granted.

WASHINGTON, December 4, 1943.

841D.01/224 : Telegram

The Minister in Ireland (Gray) to the Secretary of State

DUBLIN, December 13, 1943—noon.

[Received 6:15 p. m.]

165. The following draft for a note to the Irish Government is presented for your consideration (reference my No. 162 dated December 7, 1 p. m.³⁶). It is designed to obtain military advantage without making commitments and failing that to put de Valera on record in such a manner as would strengthen our defense against pressure group attempts to involve United States in the partition question. It also avoids the presumed British objection to any proposal from which de Valera might derive a claim to a post war position embarrassing to British interests.

I find that Sir John Maffey is in agreement with me as to this draft and I believe that he would recommend it in principle to his Government if consulted. We both feel that this is a serious situation [the solution?] for which is long overdue and the obvious place to begin in any negotiation leading to strengthening our position as regards Eire. We both believe that an unfavorable answer will be returned but that an important political advantage will have been gained. It should be noted that this draft does not preclude further steps what-

³⁶ Not printed.

ever may be the Irish reply, yet considered by itself it promises profitable results. Forwarding by air courier despatch with facts supporting charge that Axis representations menace our military interests. Draft follows.

"Your Excellency will recall that in your speech at Cork delivered on the 14th of December 1941 you expressed sentiments of special friendship for the American people on the occasion of their entry into the present war and closed by saying, 'The policy of the State remains unchanged. We can only be a friendly neutral.' As you will also recall, extracts of this speech were transmitted to the President by your Minister in Washington and were appreciatively acknowledged.

It has become increasingly apparent that despite your good will and sincere desire that Irish neutrality should operate in favor of neither of the belligerents it has in fact operated and continues to operate in favor of the Axis powers and against the United Nations on whom your security and the maintenance of your national economy depend. One of the gravest and most inequitable results of this situation is the opportunity for highly organized espionage which the geographical position of Eire affords the Axis and denies the United Nations. Situated as you are in close proximity to Britain, divided only by an intangible boundary from Northern Ireland, where are situated important American bases, with continuous traffic to and from both countries, Axis agents enjoy almost unrestricted opportunity for bringing military information of vital importance from England and Northern Ireland into Eire and from there transmitting it by various routes and methods to Germany. No opportunity corresponding to this is open to the United Nations, for the Axis has no military dispositions which may be observed from Eire.

We do not question the good faith of the Irish Government in its efforts to suppress Axis espionage, but existing conditions are such as to make it impossible to suppress. It is naive to assume that Axis agencies have not exploited conditions to the full in Eire as they have in other countries.

As you know from common report, United Nations military operations are in preparation in both Britain and Northern Ireland. It is vital that information from which may be deduced their nature and direction should not reach the enemy. Not only the success of the operations but the lives of thousands of United Nations' soldiers are at stake.

We request you therefore in your own interest, which is essentially bound up with ours, and as an expression of that friendship and good will which you have freely offered us and which we highly appreciate that, without abandoning your neutrality but rather to make it impartial and truly neutral, you take appropriate steps for the recall of the German and Japanese representatives in Eire.

It is hardly necessary to point out that time is of extreme importance and that we trust Your Excellency will favor us with your reply at your early convenience."

This telegram has been coded so that it can be repeated to London if you so instruct.

GRAY

841D.852/15 : Telegram

The Minister in Ireland (Gray) to the Secretary of State

DUBLIN, December 18, 1943—1 p. m.

[Received 1:25 p. m.]

168. I entirely agree with Maritime Commission's decision regarding application for purchase of SS *Wolverine* by Irish Shipping Limited and with Department's approval thereof. Reference your number 133, December 13, 10 p. m.³⁷

In the case of the two American ships chartered to the Irish Government and both lost presumably by enemy action, no protest was made. The first ship vanished without trace or survivors. The second was torpedoed in the morning and survivors reported sighting German submarine the evening before. Protest to all belligerents might have been made in this latter case but was not.

It would seem inadvisable to release any ship to Eire without obtaining a corresponding advantage inasmuch as the Irish Government is releasing nothing for any of the United Nations which entails a sacrifice of Irish interests. It might be pointed out in replying to the Irish note that while the right of the Irish Government to operate chartered ships as it saw fit is not questioned, these ships presumably would not have been lost if operated in United Nations convoys instead of on the faith of German assurances, that the loss was primarily American since it depleted the stock of American tonnage and is not to be measured in money while the war emergency lasts. Our chartering of these ships to Eire have had negligible propaganda value in Ireland as the Government has continuously ignored any obligation to the United States for them. Recently in speaking publicly of the Irish shipping situation, the Irish Minister of Supplies said, "We have lost our two best ships." There was no mention of America.

It would seem from here that the press release to which you refer might be held in abeyance until the matter of a note to de Valera is definitely decided upon. Reference my number 165, December 13, noon, and preceding file relative this subject.

For your information, I have obtained from British sources the following figures relative to Irish shipping. There are under Irish register 15 ships of over 1000 gross tons with a total tonnage of 36,712. Of these, Irish Shipping Limited own 10 which are able to make trans-Atlantic crossing with a total gross tonnage of 29,000. There are also 29 small ships totalling 12,500 tons.

Except for wheat which Eire by now should be growing in adequate quantity for domestic needs but is not, this tonnage should take care of Eire's imperative requirements.

GRAY

³⁷ Not printed.

841D.01/228 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, December 22, 1943—4 p. m.

[Received 7:55 p. m.]

8893. Personal to the Secretary. Your 8004, December 18.³⁸ Department's 7184, November 13, was held by the Embassy until my return and because of the absence of both Eden and the Prime Minister. I explained the British position on this issue to the President in Cairo,³⁹ having taken the matter up at great length with the Prime Minister on my journey out there with him. I understood the President would talk with the Prime Minister on this subject but do not know the results of their discussion.

Since returning here I have taken up your carefully prepared note 7184, November 13, with Eden and have asked for a written reply. I haven't much hope of a favorable reply.

WINANT

841D.852/17

The Secretary of State to the Irish Minister (Brennan)

WASHINGTON, December 29, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. MINISTER: Reference is made to your note dated December 4, 1943 stating that the Irish Shipping Limited, an agency of the Irish Government, has been negotiating with the States Marine Corporation for the purchase of the SS *Wolverine* and that application for approval of the proposed sale was being made to the United States Maritime Commission. Your note requested that the State Department recommend to the War Shipping Administration that the proposed sale be approved.

I have given this matter careful consideration and regret to inform you that for reasons which I am explaining to Mr. de Valera through the American Minister in Ireland I have not been able to make the recommendation which the Irish Government requested. This matter has been discussed with the President who concurs in this decision.

I am informed that the United States Maritime Commission on December 7 denied the application as not being in the best interests of the United States.

Sincerely yours,

CORDELL HULL

³⁸ Not printed.

³⁹ Ambassador Winant was a participant in the First and Second Cairo Conferences, November 22–26, and December 2–7, 1943. For correspondence concerning these conferences, see *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943.

841D.01/228

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt

WASHINGTON, December 29, 1943.

You will recall that on September 18, 1943 we instructed Ambassador Winant to obtain the views of the British Government in regard to our proposed approach to the Irish Government on the question of naval and air bases in Ireland. I now enclose paraphrases of two telegrams, dated December 22, from Ambassador Winant,⁴¹ quoting the British Government's reply on this matter. Mr. Eden expresses the opinion that Mr. de Valera would avoid a direct negative reply to any approach on the question of air and naval bases and would seek to cloud the issue by reiterating his grievances in regard to partition. Mr. Eden believes therefore that our proposed approach "would be likely to give rise to acute difficulties" and suggests that "it would be wiser for the United States Government to postpone for the present the approach to Mr. de Valera which they have had in mind".

In view of the attitude of the British Government, I shall let the matter rest unless you wish to discuss it further with Prime Minister Churchill. I note Mr. Eden's statement that Mr. Churchill spoke to you about this matter on December 7.

841D.852/15 : Telegram*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Ireland (Gray)*

WASHINGTON, December 30, 1943—10 a. m.

136. Please request an appointment with Mr. de Valera and hand him the following note:

"I have the honor to refer to recent efforts of the Irish Government, through its officials in Washington, to obtain additional merchant ships in the United States. Several weeks ago the Irish Shipping Limited, an agency of the Irish Government, entered into negotiations with the States Marine Corporation in New York for the purchase of the SS *Wolverine*, a vessel of approximately 8,000 tons under charter to the United States War Shipping Administration. Application was made to the Maritime Commission for approval of the proposed sale and the Irish Legation in Washington, in a note of December 4, requested the State Department to recommend to the War Shipping Administration that the application be approved.

"I am instructed to inform you that the State Department in consultation with the President has given this matter careful consideration and for the reasons set forth below has been unable to make the recommendation requested by the Irish Government. The United

⁴¹ Telegrams No. 8893, p. 167, and No. 8903, not printed.

States Maritime Commission on December 7 denied the application for the proposed sale as not being in the interests of the United States.

"You will recall that in September 1941, in the face of a growing world shortage of shipping, the American Government made available to the Irish Government by charter two American merchant ships. These two ships have now both been destroyed by Axis submarines. The American Government understands that the *Irish Pine* (formerly the *West Hematite*) sailed from Ireland October 28, 1942 and failed to arrive at its destination and that the *Irish Oak* (formerly *West Neris*) was torpedoed on the morning of May 15, 1943 in open daylight and under conditions of good visibility. Although no definite information seems to be available regarding the precise manner of the sinking of the *Irish Pine*, the torpedoing of the *Irish Oak* appears to have been definitely established, as well as the fact that a German submarine was observed by the crew of the *Irish Oak* some hours prior to the sinking. The sinking of the *Irish Oak*, and of other Irish ships, which you have rightly described as a 'wanton and inexcusable act,' is clearly the work of Axis submarines in their campaign of indiscriminate warfare against all ships whether belligerent or neutral.

"In chartering the *West Hematite* (*Irish Pine*) and the *West Neris* (*Irish Oak*) to the Irish Government the American Government was motivated by the most friendly considerations and by the sole purpose of helping the Irish Government and the Irish people to carry to their shores foodstuffs and other supplies of critical necessity. This, of course, constitutes only a part of the efforts of the American Government since the outbreak of war to assist the Irish people in obtaining needed supplies. The chartering of these ships to the Irish Government represented a real sacrifice on the part of the United States at a time when shipping space was most badly needed. The Irish Government sailed these ships with distinct neutral markings and they carried supplies in no way connected with the war. The action of the Axis submarines in sinking these ships without warning is, therefore, to repeat your own language, a 'wanton and inexcusable act.'

"So far as the American Government is informed, the Irish Government has taken no steps against the Axis Governments and, thus far, has offered no word of protest to the Axis Governments against these wanton acts. These repeated attacks on Irish ships appear to be conclusive proof, if further proof were needed, that the Axis powers are in fact making war upon Ireland while at the same time using Ireland's friendship to the detriment of the United Nations war effort. The loss of the *West Hematite* (*Irish Pine*) and the *West Neris* (*Irish Oak*) has harmed not only Ireland but the United States, to whom those vessels belonged, and the whole United Nations war effort.

"The fact that ships sailing under the Irish flag bear distinct neutral markings and travel fully lighted at night should make them immune from belligerent attack but in reality serves only to make them easy targets for Nazi submarines. Any further ships transferred to the Irish flag would be subjected to these same hazards.

"In view of the foregoing circumstances, it is regretted that the State Department cannot comply with your request that it recommend to the Maritime Commission the approval of the sale now in question."

HULL

841D.01/224 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Ireland (Gray)*⁴²

WASHINGTON, December 30, 1943—9 p. m.

139. Personal for the Minister. We have delayed replying to your 165, December 13, in the hope of hearing from Ambassador Winant with reference to the proposal which we submitted to the British Government last September. We have now received Ambassador Winant's telegrams numbers 8893 and 8903, December 22, transmitting a written reply from Mr. Eden on this subject. The British Government takes the view that de Valera would almost certainly avoid a direct negative reply to our proposed approach and would seek to cloud the issue by reiterating his grievances in regard to partition. Thus they believe that our approach "would be likely to give rise to acute difficulties" and they suggest that "it would be wise for the United States Government to postpone for the present the approach to Mr. de Valera which they have had in mind". We have requested Ambassador Winant to repeat to you his telegrams 8893 and 8903.

We have carefully considered your draft note submitted in your telegram 165, December 13 and believe that this approach might have certain advantages over the earlier proposal. The matter reported in your telegrams 172 and 173 of December 21 and 22⁴³ would of course help to make your suggested approach particularly opportune. This approach, however, would likewise have to be submitted to the British Government in as much as they are more directly concerned than we in any subversive activities in Ireland, the security of the whole British Isles being involved. We are not aware that the British Government has made any efforts to obtain the removal of Axis representatives in Ireland. Unless, and until the British are prepared to go along with us, any representations from us would be open to strong and bitter rebuttal from the Irish.

Nevertheless it is possible, for the reasons which you suggest, that this approach may be more acceptable to the British than the previous proposal. We believe it possible, however, that the British may wish to treat the subject of your 172 as an incident to be handled by itself and not to be used as the basis for a broader approach.

On December 20, we submitted a paraphrase of your 165 to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, asking whether they perceive any objections from a military point of view to this proposed approach if it should

⁴² Repeated to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom as telegram No. 8240 with instructions to repeat to the Minister in Ireland his telegrams Nos. 8893, December 22 (p. 167), and 8903 of the same date (not printed).

⁴³ Neither telegram printed; they reported that the British Government had requested the Irish Government to effect removal from the German Legation in Ireland of the wireless set known to be there (841D.01/225, 227).

be deemed desirable on grounds of general policy. They have now replied that they do not perceive any objections from a military point of view if the approach should be deemed desirable on grounds of general policy.

Please repeat your telegrams 165, 172 and 173 to Ambassador Winant in order that he may give the Department his views.

This telegram is being repeated to London.

HULL

NEW ZEALAND

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND NEW ZEALAND REGARDING JURISDICTION OVER PRIZES

[For text of agreement effected by exchange of notes signed at Wellington November 3, 1942, and January 28, 1943, and President Roosevelt's Proclamation of April 1, 1943, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 454, or 59 Stat. (pt. 2) 1301.]

UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA

DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA REGARDING CONCLUSION OF A RECIPROCAL AID AGREEMENT AND REGARDING WAR PRODUCTION IN THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA

811.24/1737

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Theodore C. Achilles of the Division of European Affairs

[WASHINGTON,] January 13, 1943.

Participants: The South African Minister;¹
Sir Frederick Phillips, British Treasury;
Mr. Acheson;²
Mr. Reams;³
Mr. Achilles.

The South African Minister having previously suggested to the Secretary the conclusion of a reciprocal aid agreement between this Government and his Government, Mr. Acheson requested him to call and gave him copies of the attached draft⁴ and of the attached informal memorandum⁵ indicating our contemplated lend-lease policy with respect to South Africa. In view of the relationship between United States-South Africa lend-lease arrangements and the Empire foreign exchange position, Mr. Acheson invited Sir Frederick Phillips to be present.

Mr. Acheson explained that we would be happy to have a reciprocal aid agreement with South Africa but that, in view of South Africa's strong and improving foreign exchange position, we could see no reason why South Africa should be furnished non-military supplies other than on a cash reimbursable basis and that we believed raw materials obtained for [*from*] South Africa, as well as aid to American forces, should be provided as reciprocal aid. He also said that while it was not contemplated that reciprocal aid should necessarily balance military aid furnished South Africa, it would be desirable to

¹ Ralph William Close.

² Dean Acheson, Assistant Secretary of State.

³ R. Borden Reams, of the Division of European Affairs.

⁴ Not attached to this document, but presumably the same text as the draft printed on p. 193.

⁵ Not attached to this document, but for summary, see telegram No. 9, January 14, 11 p. m., to the Consul at Capetown, *infra*.

review the position at frequent intervals in order to avoid criticism should the difference between the two become too great.

Sir Frederick remarked that both the proposal to provide non-military goods only for cash and the request for raw materials on reverse lend-lease seemed to indicate a departure from previous policy. Mr. Acheson said the arrangement with the Netherlands Government ⁶ is one under which the latter pays cash for non-military items and also furnishes us reciprocal aid. Sir Frederick said that his Government would greatly regret the adoption of any policy implying payment for military aid. He thought this contrary to the trend of lend-lease policy. He also stated that the British Government had furnished the Soviet Government some \$500,000,000 worth of military supplies without payment.

The Minister inquired whether our contemplated lend-lease policy would have any effect upon gold mining in the Union or upon the supply of gold mining machinery from this country. Mr. Acheson impressed upon him that it would not, that our views on the question of gold production in the Union were under consideration in an entirely separate connection, that neither a reciprocal aid agreement nor the adoption of our contemplated lend-lease policy would have any bearing upon that subject.

The Minister said he would study the draft and memorandum and communicate with us again after ascertaining his Government's views.

848A.24/176a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul at Capetown (Denby)

WASHINGTON, January 14, 1943—11 p. m.

9. For the Minister.⁷ The South African Minister has presented to the Department a formal request on the part of his Government for the conclusion of a reciprocal lend-lease agreement. Preliminary discussions began January 13. It is hoped to implement agreement by an exchange of notes along general lines of those concluded with Australia and New Zealand.⁸ However, memorandum containing following points has been handed to the Minister :

1. Political and other considerations make inadvisable the creation of unduly large credits on either side where both countries are able and willing to pay for goods received.

2. While the gold and dollar position of the Union remains at or near its present favorable position, it is thought preferable that all

⁶ For text of agreement signed at Washington July 8, 1942, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 259, or 56 Stat. (pt. 2) 1554.

⁷ Lincoln MacVeagh.

⁸ For correspondence concerning agreements with these countries, see *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. I, pp. 537 ff.

non-military supplies to the Union should be on a cash reimbursable basis.

3. Military supplies should be on reciprocal lend-lease basis and should be balanced as far as possible by aid to American forces abroad and by supplies of raw materials.

4. Lend-lease transactions will be subject to frequent review in order to prevent the building up on either side of unwarranted balances.

HULL

848A.24/180a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul at Capetown (Denby)*⁹

WASHINGTON, February 3, 1943—6 p. m.

19. For the Minister.

1. Since you left Washington the Department and other agencies of this Government have continued their discussions of the problem of war production in South Africa, especially as it is affected by the present volume of gold mining. As you know, they are not interested in the monetary uses of gold or in the quantity of fine ounces produced in the Union; they are concerned only with the fact that the gold mines use labor and materials needed by industries more directly connected with the war effort. For similar reasons American gold mines have been closed by an order of the War Production Board.

2. The mission that was sent by the Board of Economic Warfare to study the supply requirements of the Union believes that a substantial reduction in the present rate at which ore is milled, perhaps 25 percent, could be achieved within a year; this would effect an approximately corresponding saving in the materials needed by the gold mines and a somewhat smaller saving in labor. The mission also believes that such a reduction could be absorbed by the Union economy, if the United States would make available the supplies needed to support the war industries of the Union. We would consider further reductions, possibly to a total of 50 percent, according to the needs of the war effort and the economic position of the Union.

3. You are already familiar with Prime Minister Smuts' attitude on this question. He has definitely refused to consider any agreement by the South African Government to impose a quantitative restriction on gold mining operations, but, according to the BEW¹⁰ mission, he believes that these operations may eventually be reduced by the shortage of necessary supplies, and that a gradual reduction brought about in this way could be absorbed by the Union economy without creating political difficulties.

⁹ Approved by President Roosevelt with notation: "OK FDR".

¹⁰ Board of Economic Warfare.

4. The Department and the other interested agencies of this Government agree that the Union Government should not be pressed to give a formal commitment to curtail gold mining operations, but they are not willing to provide sufficient materials for the maintenance of such operations at current levels. They have accordingly decided to suggest to the British Government that both Governments make available to South Africa the material assistance required to maintain and expand the war industries of the Union, but to indicate at the same time that there will inevitably be a substantial reduction in supplies for other purposes.

5. On October 15 there was a formal meeting of the Board of Economic Warfare, attended by the Vice President,¹² the Secretary of the Navy,¹³ the Under Secretary of War,¹⁴ Assistant Secretary of State Acheson, the Lend-Lease Administrator,¹⁵ and other representatives of the departments and agencies that are members of the Board. The following resolution was adopted:

"WHEREAS, The successful and early conclusion of the war requires the most effective utilization of all the resources of the United States and of the United Nations;

"AND WHEREAS it is believed the Union of South Africa is in a position to lend further aid to the war effort of the United Nations by maximum conversion of its industries to war production;

"NOW THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED, That the Board of Economic Warfare recommends that maximum and rapid conversion of the South African economy to a full war economy be achieved, that the appropriate U.S. agencies assist in such conversion by making available such supplies, within the limits of production and shipping facilities, as are necessary for the further development of South African war industries, and that appropriate administrative measures be taken for carrying out this program aggressively."

The text of this resolution is given only for your confidential information.

6. Pursuant to this resolution, the American Government intends to offer to the Union Government assurances of its best efforts, consistent with other war needs, to furnish the supplies required to support the war effort of South Africa. Among these supplies are materials for the ISCOR¹⁶ extensions, which it is hoped may be ready for shipment early in 1943, instead of late in that year. Supplies for the Union would consist largely of steel, petroleum and related products, machinery, and industrial chemicals. The greater part of these materials would be allocated to the Director General

¹² Henry A. Wallace.

¹³ Frank Knox.

¹⁴ Robert P. Patterson.

¹⁵ Edward R. Stettinius, Jr.

¹⁶ South African Iron and Steel Industrial Corporation, Ltd.

of War Supplies, with smaller quantities to other essential industries, railways, agriculture, etc.

7. Supplies for direct use by the gold mines would be considerably reduced. According to the Transvaal Chamber of Mines, the gold industry could maintain its present level of operations through 1943, if it could acquire about 41,000 tons of supplies from the United States for direct use in gold mining, and if it would draw on its stocks to a point that would leave a 6 month stockpile at the end of the year. According to BEW, the gold industry could maintain present operations through 1943 by using only 13,000 tons of American supplies and by reducing its stockpile position to a 3-month basis. With slightly less than 10,000 tons from the United States, the industry could make a 25 percent reduction in the rate at which ore is milled and have a 3-month stockpile at the end of 1943. We would accordingly expect to furnish not more than 10,000 tons to the gold industry during 1943, and most of this would be delivered toward the end of the year. If there were not during the year a satisfactory reduction in the rate at which ore is milled, a much smaller quantity of supplies would be delivered. This paragraph and the preceding one are for your confidential information.

8. The ability of the United States to furnish these supplies will depend, among other factors, on the shipping situation. The War Shipping Administration can make no definite statement about the availability of shipping space until it has first consulted the British Ministry of War Transport about coordination of shipping from the United States and the United Kingdom to South Africa. This will be done as soon as the supply program has been submitted to Prime Minister Smuts.

9. The list of materials to be supplied by the United States must be accompanied by a schedule of materials which the United Kingdom would also endeavor to furnish to the Union of South Africa during 1943. Consumption goods, for example, should come mainly from the United Kingdom, for only a small quantity has been included in the American list.

10. To regulate the flow of supplies to the Union, it is proposed that there be established in South Africa a Supply Council upon which the United States, the United Kingdom and the Union of South Africa would have equal representation. The Council would consider all Union requirements of materials that must be obtained from overseas. Every effort consistent with the war needs of the United Nations would be made to provide these materials in accordance with schedules accepted by the three Governments concerned. If there should be a deviation from these schedules that was not unanimously approved by the Council, the objecting Government would be released from its obligation to conform to the schedules. The Council should give first

consideration to the needs of the Union war industries, and should approve only minimum quantities of supplies for industries not directly connected with the war effort.

11. We would expect the activities of the Council to cause a substantial reduction in gold mining operations. There are several benefits to be derived from such a reduction. One is the release of manpower and equipment for use in the Union's war industries. The advantages of producing additional quantities of war supplies in South Africa, which is relatively near the areas where the supplies will be used, should outweigh possible objections that the manufacture of these materials can be conducted more economically in the United States and the United Kingdom. Another benefit from a reduction in gold mining operations would be the saving in materials needed by the gold mines, not only the relatively small amounts required from the United States, but the substantial quantities that are obtained in South Africa. Perhaps the most important advantage would be the reduced consumption of coal by the gold mines and related industries. If enough coal were available in South Africa, a large amount of shipping now used for the transportation of coal could be released for other purposes. The present movement of coal to the eastern coast of South America from the United States is 50,000 long tons a month, and from the United Kingdom 70,000 long tons a month. It is estimated that if the Union could, in addition to its present exports, make 120,000 tons of coal available each month for shipment to South America in vessels returning in ballast from the Indian Ocean, the total saving in shipping would amount to 500,000 dead-weight tons. This saving is equivalent to the full-time use of 50 new vessels with a carrying capacity of 10,000 tons each, and the War Shipping Administration states that no greater economy in shipping can be envisaged at the present time, other than the saving which would result from using the Mediterranean route to the East, instead of the route around the Cape of Good Hope. The importance of such an economy cannot be overemphasized, and the War Shipping Administration is most anxious that it should be accomplished at the earliest possible moment. If the increased shipments of coal should cause congestion in the use of railway and port facilities, we will take up with the supply authorities here the question of giving priority to coal over other exports from the Union.

12. In previous discussions with Prime Minister Smuts and John Martin¹⁷ there has probably been too much emphasis on closing the gold mines and too little on developing Union war production. It is therefore hoped that the present offer, which is of a more constructive nature, will be less likely to have political consequences and will

¹⁷ South African Purchasing Commissioner to the United States, temporarily in South Africa.

be more acceptable to the South African Government. The offer has been approved by the President and is to be transmitted in the form of a personal message from him to Prime Minister Smuts. You are requested to deliver this message, orally and in person, directly to the Prime Minister. The message is as follows:

13. "My advisers have taken up with me the increasing difficulties in producing and delivering supplies for the United Nations. I am sure you will agree that all materials produced should be utilized to the maximum extent possible for the direct prosecution of the war, and that the minimum amount possible under the circumstances should be retained for other essential purposes.

14. "The difficulties attendant upon the sending of supplies from this country to the Union of South Africa are apparent, and it is essential that all supplies sent fill a vital need. The considerable and valuable contributions to the war effort made by the production of war supplies and by ship repairing and base metal mining in the Union of South Africa are known and appreciated by the Government of the United States.

15. "This Government is anxious to assist the Union of South Africa to increase the production of those materials and supplies which are required for the war effort of the United Nations. We regard as particularly important an early increase in the quantity of coal available in the Union for shipment to South America, in order to achieve a substantial saving in the use of shipping by the United Nations. The interested agencies of this Government will make every effort consistent with the war needs of the United Nations to send to the Union the supplies necessary to maintain and expand its war industries. It is contemplated that the Union Government would likewise make every effort to expand the industries directly devoted to war purposes, and to increase the amount of its resources available to these industries.

16. "The success of such a plan would depend entirely upon the approval and full cooperation of the South African Government. An expansion of the war industries of the Union would require a readjustment within the Union of available resources, including manpower, equipment, and other facilities. I realize that this could be accomplished only at the expense of those industries which do not contribute directly to the prosecution of the war. The United States Government will endeavor to furnish supplies not only for the direct war needs of the Union, but also for other urgent requirements. However, because of the lack of materials and shipping space, it will not be possible to avoid a substantial reduction of supplies to industries which have only an indirect share in the war effort.

17. "If these ideas meet with your approval a detailed proposal to establish a supply program for South Africa, together with a Supply Council to carry out that program, will be presented to your Government and to the Government of the United Kingdom. I believe that such a program would have the most beneficial results in maintaining the war economy of your country."

18. The British Embassy here is being informed of the President's message, and the substance of this telegram has been forwarded to the

American Embassy in London. If Prime Minister Smuts agrees in principle with this proposal, we expect the next step to be detailed technical discussions concerning the supply requirements of the Union. The British Government will be asked to prepare a schedule of materials to be made available by the United Kingdom to South Africa during 1943. For your information, the Board of Economic Warfare has already prepared a list of supplies to be furnished by the United States. The two schedules must be coordinated with each other and then discussed and approved by the three Governments concerned.

19. In your conversations with Prime Minister Smuts and other representatives of the Union Government you should emphasize that the purpose of the program is to maintain and expand the Union war industries. The only commitments that we expect to ask from the Union Government are (1) an early agreement to increase the available quantities of coal; (2) the establishment of the Supply Council; (3) agreement with the principle that there should be the maximum application of Union resources to direct use in the war effort. Because of the urgent need of shipping space, we hope that the arrangements with respect to coal can be completed first, even though the other points may not have been settled. There should be no specific agreement regarding the gold mines, since the program is not directed primarily at them.

20. We hope that it will not be necessary to discuss at length the question of curtailing gold mining operations, and we suggest that you do not mention the subject first. If the subject is raised, you should make it clear that our interest in the matter is as stated in paragraph 1 of this telegram, but you should not refer to the contents of paragraphs 2, 5, 6, or 7. It is true that the effect of the program will probably be to curtail the operations of the gold mines, but we feel that such a reduction is bound to take place whether or not the program is accepted in its present form. It is most unlikely that this country will be in a position to supply materials for the maintenance of any industry that does not contribute directly to the prosecution of the war.

HULL

848A.24/183 : Telegram

The Consul at Capetown (Denby) to the Secretary of State

CAPETOWN, February 10, 1943—9 p. m.

[Received February 11—3 :10 a. m.]

151. From the Minister.

"The Department's 20, February 3, 7 p. m.¹⁸ I saw the Prime Minister this morning, immediately after arrival from Johannesburg,

¹⁸ Not printed.

and read him the President's message. He asked me for a written copy and I gave him a paraphrase in the form of an *aide-mémoire*. He appeared favorably disposed as regards the desired commitments listed in paragraph 19 of the Department's telegram 22 [19], February 3, 9 [6] p. m.

He said he would inquire into the coal question at once. To show him that compliance might not be difficult, I told him of Sharpstone's¹⁹ information contained in paragraph 2 of telegram 30 of January 20 [19] from Johannesburg^{19a} and of our willingness to consider granting priorities on coal shipments should congestion occur (see paragraph 19 of telegram 22 [19]). He is personally deeply impressed with the magnitude of the submarine menace and understood fully the importance attached to this matter.

In regard to the proposed supply council, he was particularly pleased with the idea that it would be established in South Africa.

He brought up the question of the gold mines, saying that he is forced to look after their needs and that the British are also interested in South African gold production. To this I only said that I supposed that this problem, among other questions of supply, is one of the things the proposed council would be expected to solve and pointed out that the British would be represented on the council as well as the Americans and South Africans. He registered real satisfaction over the fact that no mention of gold mining was made in the President's message.

In general, I stressed the fact that we want to do everything we can for South Africa within the limitations imposed upon us by the war, the successful prosecution of which, moreover, must be his chief aim as well as ours. He promised to let me hear from him soon."

DENBY

848A.24/183a

The Secretary of State to the British Ambassador (Halifax)

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the British Ambassador and has the honor to inform the Ambassador that the American Minister in Pretoria has been instructed to deliver a message from the President to Prime Minister Smuts concerning the question of supplies to the Union of South Africa. It is proposed in the message that goods be supplied in substantial quantities to the essential war industries of the Union; that, if the British and South African Governments agree, a supply council composed of representatives of the three Governments concerned be established in the

¹⁹ David Sharpstone, of Metals Reserve Company, and representative on an economic mission to South Africa.

^{19a} Not printed.

Union to carry out the arrangements to furnish these goods; and that the South African Government agree to utilize the maximum proportion of its resources directly for war purposes.

If this proposal is accepted by the South African Government, and if the British Government should favor a joint consideration with the American Government of the supplies to be furnished to the Union, the Secretary of State hopes that the steps necessary to implement such an arrangement may be discussed by representatives of the three Governments.

WASHINGTON, February 10, 1943.

848A.24/187a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul at Capetown (Denby)

WASHINGTON, February 13, 1943—7 p. m.

28. For the Minister. Note containing summary of President's message delivered to South African Minister on 10th.²⁰ Later in day, in response to his request, he was received by Assistant Secretary of State Acheson. Mr. Close immediately inquired concerning effect of proposal upon gold mines. Mr. Acheson stated we desired to concentrate upon general question of supplies to and production of all South African industries and that effect upon specific industries could be determined when agreement in principle between three governments concerned had been reached. Minister then asked for special directive for certain critical materials urgently needed by gold mines. Mr. Acheson replied that it would be difficult to justify such supplies as a separate question but intimated that justification might be possible as a part of general economic situation in the event proposal found acceptable.

HULL

848A.24/188 : Telegram

The Consul at Capetown (Denby) to the Secretary of State

CAPETOWN, February 19, 1943—3 p. m.

[Received 9:34 p. m.]

186. From the Minister.

"My 151 February 10 from Capetown. The Prime Minister personally handed me this morning a long *aide-mémoire* stating substantially as follows:

1. He thoroughly agrees that all production should be devoted as much as possible to the war effort and as little as possible to other essential aims.

²⁰ Not printed.

However, he would emphasize the importance of gold mining to South Africa, and says that there are limits to the extent to which it can be cut down without jeopardizing the country's war effort. Consequently, while ready to agree with the American and British Governments as to such limits, through the medium of the proposed joint body, he 'feels that there should be a joint understanding in advance that within those limits supplies for South Africa's needs will be made available.'

2. His Government will continue to cooperate fully in meeting increased demands for export coal.

However, availability of railway and other equipment unavoidably obtained from abroad, limits South Africa in this and other production, and if [so?] he pleads for 'most important' additional equipment for the steel industry, now on order and anxiously awaited to cut down South Africa's needs or imports and equivalent shipping.

3. He agrees to the wisdom of setting up a supply program and a joint body to carry it out on conditions acceptable to the three Governments as proposed, and will consider with pleasure and sympathy such detailed proposals as the President may suggest.

The rest of the message expresses thanks to the President and appreciation of his attitude, assurance of agreement with his general point of view, admiration for our contribution to the common cause in the war, especially lend-lease, determination to maintain here a maximum war effort, and a statement that all future supplies requisitioned under priority ratings by the Union Government will, in the latter's estimation, have the vital character referred to by the President. The full text is being forwarded by airgram."²¹

DENBY

848A.24/173 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in the Union of South Africa
(MacVeagh)*

WASHINGTON, February 19, 1943—11 p. m.

32. Delay in answering A-5²² has been due to conversations between this government and the Union of South Africa government concerning restricting Lend-Lease credit transactions exclusively to military aid. Heretofore basis for determining credit Lend-Lease has been contribution to South Africa's war effort of material requested. Recent discussions, however, may restrict credit Lend-Lease to military assistance. Distinction between military and nonmilitary goods is being worked out on an item basis. Finished war material will

²¹ Airgram No. A-60, February 26, 3 p. m., not printed.

²² Dated December 18, 1942, noon, not printed.

continue to be under credit Lend-Lease basis since it will be used directly in the prosecution of the war. It is not possible at this time to determine eligibility for Lend-Lease upon the basis of consumers. This must be determined by the actual end-use of goods whether purchased for the government or for any other consumer. It is unlikely that material for the sustenance of local economy or of industries which in turn sell their product to this country or United Kingdom for cash would be eligible for Lend-Lease aid. We have had no reply to the suggestion made by this government to the South African government for the reduction in the amount of credit Lend-Lease aid to the South African government in view of the favorable trade position of the South African government. Future discussions here between this government and the South African government with reference to Lend-Lease policy will necessarily be delayed until such response is forthcoming. Lend-Lease mission to South Africa, which is on its way, can fully advise as to the extent of discussions prior to their departure and we will keep you currently advised as they may develop.

CORDELL HULL

848A.24/188 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul at Capetown (Denby)

WASHINGTON, March 6, 1943—5 p. m.

44. For the Minister. Your 186, February 19, from Capetown. Prime Minister's reception of President's message seems to us encouraging, since main points of our proposal have been accepted in principle. We do not agree, however, with his suggestion that we make an advance commitment to provide gold mining supplies before there has been a decision concerning the limits to be imposed on gold mining operations. A similar proposal was made here by the South African Minister²³ on the day you delivered the President's message. The South Africans evidently prefer to treat the problem of gold mining separately, but they may not realize that the supply authorities here are less likely to grant allocations for the gold mines if their requirements are presented independently, than if they are presented as part of the total requirements which are necessary for the Union economy. We feel that it is essential to our proposal to consider the needs of the gold mines in relation to the Union requirements as a whole. In that way we should be in a position to know to what extent Union resources were devoted to the war effort, and we should have some basis for determining what quantities of materials we will endeavor to make available for gold mining and for other purposes.

²³ See telegram No. 28, February 13, 7 p. m., to the Consul at Capetown, p. 182.

You are accordingly requested to make clear our view that the question of the gold mines should not be considered separately or in advance, but must be considered together with the other supply problems of South Africa. We shall not be in a position to discuss further details until we have received an answer from the British Embassy concerning the proposed council and supply program. Meanwhile, please forward by telegram any further portions of the Prime Minister's memorandum which you think might be helpful to us.

WELLES

848A.24/195 : Telegram

*The Minister in the Union of South Africa (MacVeagh) to the
Secretary of State*

PRETORIA, March 10, 1943—4 p. m.

[Received March 11—3:48 a. m.]

62. Neither Smuts nor Martin, in talking with me here, has shown any sign of desiring to treat the problems of gold mining separate from the other supply problems of South Africa, or of expecting the proposed council so to treat them. The General in particular has shown a very clear understanding of the purport of the council in this connection. Furthermore, that we make an advance commitment to provide gold mining supplies before there has been a decision concerning the limits to be imposed on gold mining operations does not seem to be precisely what the Prime Minister suggests in his message. There he asks simply for a joint understanding that if and when such limits have been imposed, the supplies allowed thereunder will be made available. His request seems actuated by the fear that after the council has cut orders for gold mining supplies down to the minimum consistent with economic and political stability, other agencies of our Government may restrict actual deliveries and thus bring about a dangerous local situation. Following is the pertinent part of his message:

“He wishes to make it clear to the President that while he is willing to consider how far the gold industry could be reduced and war industries expanded, the essential importance of the gold industry to the Union's internal economy is such that there are limits to the extent to which the gold industry can be cut down without jeopardizing South Africa's war effort. Therefore, while he is ready to agree [to] those limits with the United States and the United Kingdom through the medium of the joint body proposed, he feels that there should be a joint understanding in advance that within those limits supplies for South Africa's needs will be made available.”

It is my impression that though some of his subordinates may be differently inclined, the General himself is not trying to be smart in

this matter, and is taking our proposals not only in the spirit in which they are made, but in the belief that they constitute a hopeful and constructive way out of an embarrassing position of long standing both for him and for us.

MACVEAGH

848A.24/197 : Telegram

The Consul at Capetown (Denby) to the Secretary of State

CAPETOWN, March 16, 1943—5 p. m.

[Received March 17—4:14 a. m.]

288. From the Minister.

"My 283, March 15, 11 p. m. from Capetown.²⁴ As the result of conversations here, the Prime Minister has personally approved my cabling you as follows:

1. I have informed the Prime Minister of your view that supplies for gold mines should be considered together with other supply problems and not separately.

2. The Prime Minister does not object to the above principle. He does not ask for a separate agreement in respect of supplies for any particular category of consumption. His object has been to ensure acceptance of the principle that supplies in general that are considered by him and the Union Government to be essential for the maintenance of the maximum war effort by this country shall be so regarded by United States Government agencies.

3. His special reference to gold mining supplies in his communication of February 19, was due to the uncertainty that has hitherto existed as regards their status and his desire that there should be an understanding recognising their inclusion among other eligible essentials. If paragraph 2 above is acceptable to you the proposal previously referred to for a specific joint understanding in advance concerning gold mining supplies could be regarded as falling away.

4. The Prime Minister realizes that the quantities of all supplies to be released will continue to be subject to limitations and will be dealt with by the proposed joint body.

By way of comment I would say that the General obviously believes his views as above expressed are not only reasonable but mandatory on him as the Prime Minister of a sovereign state, and that I feel it may be important for our future relations that we meet him with some sort of assurances if possible. The Department will note that paragraph 2 omits all mention of gold mining and that paragraph 4 specifically states it as understood that quantities of all supplies will be subject to the proposed Council's decisions. If, as I believe, it is our intention to go on giving at least some supplies to the gold mines, there would appear to be nothing for us to lose in admitting South

²⁴ Not printed.

Africa's right to decide what kinds of things are essential even though we know she will include gold mining in the number, while the generality of such an admission would avoid any dangers involved in an advance commitment regarding gold mining supplies in particular. MacVeagh."

DENBY

848A.24/220 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul at Capetown (Denby)

WASHINGTON, April 7, 1943—10 p. m.

63. For the Minister. Your 372 April 2, 288 March 16 and 283 March 15 from Capetown²⁵ and 62 March 10 from Pretoria. The Department has discussed with the other interested agencies the Prime Minister's views as reported in your telegram, and his cooperative attitude is much appreciated. In view of the political factors involved, and the Prime Minister's concern with the relation between gold mining and the Union economy as a whole, we are prepared to undertake that, if a satisfactory decision is reached concerning a reduction in gold mining operations, we will endeavor to make available the supplies required to maintain the industry within the agreed limits. We feel, as you know, that such a decision should be made jointly by the American, British, and Union Governments, and that any determination of the limits to be imposed on gold mining should take into account the total requirements of the Union, including the maximum possible expansion of its war effort and the needs of its domestic economy. We believe that this is what the Prime Minister means by paragraphs 2 and 4 of your 288 and hope that you will be able to confirm our impression. At the same time it should be made clear that, although we are willing to use our best efforts to furnish supplies for the gold mines within limits approved by the three Governments concerned, our undertaking to do this cannot be regarded as a guarantee or firm commitment, because it will be subject to lack of shipping, shortages of materials, and other factors which are constantly shifting in the interest of the war effort and therefore cannot be predicted. An obligation to provide supplies for any purpose must of course be attended by such reservations.

Please telegraph at once if you should feel that our position will not be satisfactory to the South African Government. Otherwise, you should convey the substance of the foregoing to the Prime Minister or his representatives.

The British have not yet replied to the Department's memorandum concerning the proposed council. If their answer is favorable, and we

²⁵ Telegrams Nos. 372 and 283 not printed.

believe that it will be, it will be necessary to review South African requirements with them. A large amount of information concerning these requirements was assembled last summer by the BEW mission and taken by Price²⁶ to Washington, but we assume that Sharpstone must have copies. There are also the studies of requirements and of gold production made by Lend-Lease, which Gage²⁷ brought with him to South Africa. We suggest that you ask Gage and Sharpstone to examine this material, ascertain whether it has been fully coordinated, reduce it to a form in which it can conveniently be used, determine whether it is recent and comprehensive enough for our present purposes, and send copies of a final report to the Department. We will need a full picture of South African requirements, with allowances made for expansion of those industries which contribute directly to the war and curtailment of those which do not. The precise extent of such expansion or curtailment cannot be decided now, but we must be in a position to take up the entire question of requirements without loss of time when the British answer is received. We are planning to form a committee composed of representatives of the agencies interested in the supply problems of South Africa, and we should accordingly appreciate receiving frequent reports concerning the development of the supply program.

There is particular and urgent interest here in the matter of coal and the important economy that could be effected in the use of shipping if coal could be sent from the Union to South America. We are glad that the Prime Minister is in agreement as to the importance of this question, and we hope that you will obtain as soon as possible from the South African Government a statement of the measures that can be taken to make increased quantities of coal available at Durban.

HULL

848A.24/248

*The American Minister in the Union of South Africa (MacVeagh)
to the South African Prime Minister (Smuts)*²⁸

CAPETOWN, April 15, 1943.

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

The American Minister had the honor to be received today by the Right Honorable, the Prime Minister, and to speak with him regarding supply problems of the Union and the War effort.

²⁶ Hickman Price, Jr., of the Board of Economic Warfare and member of the Requirements Commission in southern Africa.

²⁷ Charles L. Gage, Chief of Foreign Missions, Lend-Lease Administration, Iceland and South Africa.

²⁸ Copy transmitted to the Department by the Minister in the Union of South Africa in his despatch No. 172, April 20; received May 17.

Mr. MacVeagh recalled that following the receipt of the Prime Minister's strictly confidential memorandum of February 19, 1943,²⁹ the American Government had asked him to seek a clarification of the Prime Minister's desire for a "joint understanding in advance" regarding supplies for the gold mines, and that he had been instructed to make clear the American Government's own view that such supplies should not be considered separately from other supply problems. He also recalled that the Prime Minister had then approved a message to the American Government in the following sense:

(1) The Prime Minister has been informed of your view that supplies for gold mines should be considered together with other supply problems and not separately.

(2) He has no objection to the above principle. He does not ask for a separate agreement in respect of supplies for any particular category of consumption. His object has been to insure acceptance of the principle that supplies in general that are considered by him and the Union Government to be essential for the maintenance of the maximum war effort by this country shall be so regarded by United States Government agencies.

(3) The Prime Minister's special reference to gold mining supplies in his communication of the 19th February, was due to the uncertainty that has hitherto existed as regards their status and his desire that there should be an understanding recognising their inclusion among other eligible essentials. If paragraph 2 above is acceptable to the United States Government the proposal previously referred to for a specific joint understanding in advance concerning gold mining supplies could be regarded as falling away.

(4) It is realized by the Prime Minister that the quantities of all supplies to be released will continue to be subject to limitations and will be dealt with by the proposed joint body.

In connection with the above Mr. MacVeagh informed the Prime Minister that he had just received a reply from his Government substantially as follows:

[Here follows substance of telegram No. 63, printed *supra*.]

Mr. MacVeagh said he hoped that the Prime Minister would find the above satisfactory and that he would be able to confirm the understanding of the American Government.

Mr. MacVeagh quoted his Government as wishing to make it perfectly clear that although it is "willing to use its best efforts to furnish supplies for the gold mines within limits approved by the three Governments concerned," its undertaking to do this "cannot be regarded as a guarantee or a firm commitment because it would be subject to lack of shipping, shortages of materials and other factors which are constantly shifting in the interests of the war effort. An obligation to furnish supplies for any purpose must of course be attended by such reservations."

²⁹ For substance of memorandum, see telegram No. 186, February 19, 3 p. m., from the Consul at Capetown, p. 182.

848A.24/236 : Telegram

The Consul at Capetown (Denby) to the Secretary of State

CAPETOWN, April 17, 1943—3 p. m.

[Received April 18—12:47 a. m.]

409. From the Minister.

“Reference to my number 405 April 15, 5 p. m.³⁰ Confirming his satisfaction with the Department’s communication, the Prime Minister has now given me an *aide-mémoire* enclosed in a letter³¹ over his own signature as follows:

‘1. The Prime Minister thanks the American Minister for the *aide-mémoire*³² handed to him on April 15, 1943, following upon their conversation on that day.

2. Field Marshal Smuts appreciates the terms of the further communication from the American Government regarding supplies for South Africa including the references to supplies for the gold mines. He accepts the position as stated therein.

3. This position having been accepted and the questions involved having thus been clarified, the Prime Minister assumes that a full understanding has now been arrived at on the matters which formed the subject of the earlier messages exchanged through the American Minister between the President and myself.

4. The Prime Minister would welcome an early setting up of the suggested joint council representative of the American, British and Union Governments, and would be pleased to know of any specific proposals of the American Government in that respect. The British Government which has already in principal approved of the plan for such a joint body, is being notified of the attitude of the Union Government and the position now reached.

5. Pending the introduction of the contemplated new procedure the Prime Minister presumes, and trusts it will be agreed, that the current procurement of supplies for South Africa will not be interrupted but will proceed in conformity with the broad sense of the general understanding between the respective Governments.’ (End of *aide-mémoire*)

MacVeagh.”

DENBY

848A.24/341

The British Ambassador (Halifax) to the Secretary of State

His Majesty’s Ambassador presents his compliments to the Secretary of State, and has the honour with reference to Mr. Hull’s note of February 10th to inform him that His Majesty’s Government, in the United Kingdom have given careful consideration to the proposals concerning the question of supplies to the Union of South Africa, put

³⁰ Not printed.³¹ Letter not printed.³² *Supra*.

forward in the President's message of February 10th to Field Marshal Smuts.³³ His Majesty's Government have seen the text of the Field Marshal's reply contained in the *aide-mémoire* handed to the United States Minister in the Union on February 19th.³⁴ They are in general agreement with the views expressed by the Prime Minister of the Union in this document.

In regard to the particular proposal, put forward in the President's message, for the establishment of a Supply Council composed of representatives of the Governments of the Union, the United States, and the United Kingdom to consider questions concerning future supplies to South Africa, the United Kingdom Government will gladly cooperate in the setting up and operation of any joint body which may be established in South Africa on conditions agreed between the three interested Governments. The United Kingdom Government, like the Union Government, are ready to give sympathetic consideration to any detailed proposals regarding this joint body, on the lines of the messages exchanged between the President and Field Marshal Smuts, which the United States Government may now wish to put forward.

WASHINGTON, April 24, 1943.

848A.24/259

The South African Legation to the Department of State

MEMORANDUM

I. PROPOSED UNION-U. S. A. RECIPROCAL AID AGREEMENT

The annexure hereto shows in the first column the draft note proposed by the State Department and in the second column the same note showing the amendments which the Union Government desire to be effected.³⁵ The amendments are underlined. There are only two of them.

The first one is omission from paragraph 1(a) of the words "and strategic materials".

Reasons for omission.

(1) The Union Government consider that inclusion in the agreement of strategic materials would be unfair to the Commonwealth countries whose need for exchange, provided by payments for these materials, is great and whose obligations in support of the sterling area are heavy.

³³ See paragraphs 13-17 of telegram No. 19, February 3, 6 p. m., to the Consul at Capetown, p. 175.

³⁴ See telegram No. 186, February 19, 3 p. m., from the Consul at Capetown, p. 182.

³⁵ Only Department of State draft printed. The changes in the South African draft are explained in this memorandum.

(2) The proceeds of the Union Government's surplus gold and raw materials exports are available for the above purposes.

(3) The words "strategic materials", or their equivalent, do not appear in any of the agreements concluded between the U.S.A. and Great Britain, Australia or New Zealand.³⁶ South Africa finds it difficult to deal with questions like these in isolation but prefers to deal with them from the standpoint and with a view to the needs of the Commonwealth as a whole.

The second amendment proposed is to omit from the State Department's note the whole of paragraph 1(d) and to retain paragraph 3(c) of the draft note originally proposed by the Union Government. The Union's draft follows the precedent of the relevant paragraph in the U. S. A.-Australian agreement.

Reasons for omission.

The reason for the suggested change does not constitute an objection to principle, but political and other considerations here make it necessary to avoid undue indefiniteness. South Africa must also take into account the obligations of the Union in respect of aid being afforded directly to the U.K. The Union Government therefore suggests that the retention in their paragraph 3(c) of the words "in such other places as may be determined" would be sufficient to provide for specific agreement in regard to such specific proposals as may be put forward when the need arises.

II. RE MR. ACHESON'S MEMORANDUM

The Union Government have the following comments to offer in connection with the matters raised in Mr. Acheson's memorandum of 12th January, 1943,³⁷ and in the conversation he had with the South African Minister on that date:—

(1) The cash reimbursable proposal is acceptable in principle to the Union Government. The system has in fact already been put into effect by the Office of Lend-Lease Administration some time ago, and it is now in operation in appropriate cases.

(2) The Union Government do not wish to be committed to "frequent reviews". They consider that it would be sufficient and satisfactory to acknowledge the right of either Government to raise the question of their respective positions if and when consideration of this question is thought to be necessary.

(3) The Union Government would be grateful if the question of a refund of previous Lend-Lease credits were not pressed, in view both of the principle and precedent involved and of the Union's attitude regarding the cash reimbursable proposal.

³⁶ For correspondence concerning agreements with these countries, see *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. I, pp. 525 ff. and pp. 537 ff.

³⁷ For summary, see telegram No. 9, January 14, 11 p. m., to the Consul at Capetown, p. 174.

The Union Government in Lend-Lease matters are not concerned with any question of financial advantage but solely with the means of enabling the Union to maintain a maximum war effort while paying due regard to the situation in the same respect of the Commonwealth countries as a whole.

[WASHINGTON,] 26 April, 1943.

[Annex]

Draft Note as Proposed by the Department of State

SIR: As contracting parties to the United Nations Declaration of January 1, 1942, the Governments of the United States of America and the Union of South Africa pledged themselves to employ their full resources, military and economic, against those nations with which they are at war.

In the Agreement of February 23, 1942,³⁸ between the Governments of the United Kingdom and of the United States of America, the provisions and principles of which the Government of the Union of South Africa considers applicable to its relations with the Government of the United States, each contracting Government undertook to provide the other with such articles, services, facilities or information useful in the prosecution of their common war undertaking as each may be in a position to supply.

It is the understanding of the Government of the Union of South Africa that the general principle to be followed in providing such aid is that the war production and war resources of both nations should be used by each, in the ways which most effectively utilize available materials, manpower, production facilities and shipping space.

I now set forth the understanding of the Government of the Union of South Africa of the principles and procedure applicable to the provisions of aid by the Government of the Union of South Africa to the United States and its armed forces and the manner in which such aid will be correlated with the maintenance of those forces by the United States Government.

1. The Government of the Union of South Africa, retaining the right of final decision in each case in the light of its potentialities and responsibilities, will provide the United States or its armed forces with the following types of assistance, as such reciprocal aid, when it is found that they can most effectively be procured in the Union of South Africa.

(a) Military equipment, munitions, military and naval stores, and *strategic materials*;

³⁸ See *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. I, pp. 525 ff.

(b) Other supplies, materials, facilities and services for the United States forces, except for the pay and allowance of such forces, administrative expenses, and such local purchases as its official establishments may make other than through the official establishments of the Government of the Union of South Africa as specified in Paragraph 4.

(c) Supplies, materials and services needed in the construction of military projects, tasks and similar capital works required for the common war effort in the Union of South Africa except for the wages and salaries of United States citizens.

(d) Supplies, materials and services needed in the construction of such military projects, tasks and capital works in territory other than the Union of South Africa or territory of the United States to the extent that the Union of South Africa is a more practicable source of supply than the United States or another of the United Nations.

2. The practical application of the principles formulated in this note, including the procedure by which requests for aid by either Government are made and acted upon, shall be worked out as occasion may require by agreement between the two Governments, acting when possible through their appropriate military or civilian administrative authorities.

3. It is my understanding that all such aid accepted by the President of the United States or his authorized representatives from the Government of the Union of South Africa will be received as a benefit to the United States under the Act of March 11, 1941.³⁹ In so far as circumstances will permit, appropriate record of aid received under this arrangement, except for miscellaneous facilities and services, will be kept by each Government.

If the Government of the United States concurs in the foregoing, I would suggest that the present note and your reply to that effect be regarded as placing on record the understanding of our two Governments in this matter.

I have the honour to be, Sir, et cetera.

848A.24/236 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in the Union of South Africa
(MacVeagh)*

WASHINGTON, June 3, 1943—9 p. m.

111-113. Your 409 April 17 from Capetown.

1. The British note accepting the proposal for the Supply Council was received on April 24. The texts of this note and the original one from the Department to the British Embassy will be forwarded to you in a separate telegram. The interested agencies here are anxious to proceed with the establishment of the Council as soon as possible, and the combined views on our objectives and the nature of the Council are given below. It is hoped that this will be a sufficiently com-

³⁹ Lend-Lease Act, 55 Stat. 31.

prehensive statement to serve as a guide and program in your further negotiations.

2. When the South African Supply Council was originally proposed, it was believed in Washington that the Union Government would not enter any agreement which had expressly to do with a quantitative reduction in gold mining operations. On the other hand, it was hoped that the South Africans would consent to a supply organization which they knew would emphasize the requirements of the war industries at the expense of industries not directly related to the war. The Supply Council was to pass on all orders for materials to be obtained from overseas and, by judicious discrimination, to bring about an expansion of the war industries and a gradual reduction of gold mining.

3. The negotiations, however, have taken a different turn. The Prime Minister's *aide-mémoire* of February 19 indicated that he was willing to consider how far the gold industry could be reduced, and to reach an agreement with the American and British Governments on the extent of the reduction, provided there was a joint understanding in advance that within the agreed limits supplies would be made available. Assurances on this point were given in the Department's telegram no. 63 of April 7. It appears, therefore, that the reduction of gold mining will be the subject of a joint agreement by the three Governments concerned. In that case the reduction will presumably be effected by action of the South African Government, rather than by the activities of the Council. The Council will administer a supply program which has been accepted by the American, British and Union Governments, and in which provision is made for expansion of the South African war effort and maintenance of gold mining on a reduced scale.

4. In these circumstances the functions of the Council will be essentially the same as those of other joint supply groups which have recently been proposed by the British for establishment at Leopoldville and Brazzaville. The Council will aim to agree upon and approve an overall statement of South African import requirements that will reflect the desired role of the various South African industries in the prosecution of the war. This statement will be transmitted to London and Washington for examination by the appropriate supply authorities, and for a final determination in Washington of the actual quantities to be made available and of the sources from which they are to be obtained. The facts on which the statement of requirements will be based will presumably be taken from the Lend-Lease requirements forms number 1 now being prepared in the Union. The Council will consider this information in relation to the objectives of the requirements program and will determine whether further infor-

mation is needed. The Council will revise the basic statement of requirements whenever it becomes necessary to do so. It will provide information concerning the end use of supplies for the Union, and it will determine upon request whether specific orders fall within the program, both with respect to amount and end use. The Council will deal with all types of problems in the requirements field; it will endeavor to reach unanimous conclusions, and it will make recommendations as to policy and action which we are confident will be followed. The decisions on reduction of gold mining and expansion of war industries will be made outside the Council by the three Governments. A more detailed statement of the proposed functions and operation of the Council will be forwarded to you in a separate telegram.

5. In agreement with the interested authorities here, the Department designates you as the American member of the Council. The question of an alternate was considered in Department's 104 of May 28.⁴² You are requested to discuss the nature of the Council, as outlined above in paragraph 4, with the appropriate British and South African authorities and endeavor to obtain their early cooperation in selecting representatives for the Council and arranging as soon as possible for the start of its activities. We suggest that the Council's first task is to examine the information necessary for a statement of total Union requirements. According to your 114 of May 19 from Pretoria,⁴² this work is already in process, and we agree that it should not be interrupted in order to revise the original BEW report.

6. The objectives of the requirements program were stated in the President's message and accepted in the Prime Minister's reply. Our general aim is to provide the supplies essential to the South African economy, in such a way as to promote expansion of the Union war industries and curtailment of activities not directly related to the war effort. At present our particular objectives are as follows, subject to your further recommendations and consideration of telegram 202 of May 15 from Johannesburg:⁴²

A. Coal requirements of the east coast of South America for bunkers, shore depots and inland use are estimated at 160,000 long tons monthly. In the case of Brazil, the United States is responsible for 50,000 tons, including 5,000 for bunkers; the balance of 10,000 tons required for bunkering is moved by Brazilian ships and requirements of 5,000 tons for shore depots are British responsibility. Uruguay's requirements are estimated at 10,000 tons for shore depots and 20,000 tons for inland use; it is the United States' responsibility to move 10,000 tons of the inland requirements. Argentina's requirements are 50,000 tons for inland use, 8,000 tons for shore depots and 7,000 tons for bunkers. Except for 15,000 tons, which it is desirable to move

⁴² Not printed.

regularly from the United States to Argentina in Argentine ships and for an occasional shipment in United States or British vessels to one of the three countries when space is conveniently available, it appears to us highly desirable for South Africa to supply the balance. However, we cannot speak for the British who are responsible for the requirements of shore depots in all three countries and for moving in British controlled vessels that part of the inland requirements of Argentina and Uruguay not met from the United States. We do not include in these requirements any Wankie coal from Rhodesia which because of its price and for other reasons is not acceptable in South America. Our information leads us to believe that no difficulties of either inland transportation or shipping should prevent South Africa handling approximately 140,000 tons of the South American program. It is possible that in the future it may be desirable to meet some of the bunker and railroad requirements of West Africa and North Africa from South Africa but these requirements are British responsibilities and shipping is not believed to be available at present. If in order to meet increased requirements for export of coal it is necessary to divert transportation facilities from other uses, we believe they should be diverted from use in transporting coal to the gold mines. Furthermore, we believe that this objective must be achieved without supplying additional equipment. What do you believe would be the effect on the gold industry if one million tons of coal a year were diverted from consumption by the gold mines to export?

B. An increase in munitions and other manufacturing industries contributing directly to the war effort. Sharpstone, in his cable no. 202 of August 15, 1942,⁴³ reported that the program of the Director General of War Supplies called for an increase of 18,000 Europeans in the next 6 months, and 24,000 in the succeeding 12 months. In view of his further comment that there was no surplus of skilled labor at that time, and in view of the fact that there has been no appreciable transfer of Europeans from gold mining, we presume that this program has not been effected. Sharpstone indicated in the cable cited above that funds might not be made available to the Director General for carrying out his program. The 1943-44 budget figures forwarded to us by Day,⁴⁴ and a remark in his report of February 7 that "defense expenditures have passed their peak" further indicate that this program was abandoned. We shall have further comments on the munitions program in connection with telegram 202 of May 15 from Johannesburg.

C. Increase in agricultural output. We attach very great importance to an increase in food production of the Union. The food requirements of Europeans in other parts of Africa impose a burden both of supply and shipping upon the United States, at a time when the needs of other areas for United States foodstuffs are increasingly great. Moreover, the recent estimates of maize production seem to justify considerable concern regarding the welfare of the native population in Southern and East Africa. If additional agricultural labor is needed to increase output, we should suppose that a substantial further reduction in the number of natives employed by the gold mines before the next planting season would be helpful. Sharpstone, in his cable of August 15, cited above, stated that the Secretary of

⁴³ Not printed.

⁴⁴ Samuel H. Day, Commercial Attaché in the Union of South Africa.

Agriculture estimated the *immediate* need of agriculture for 50,000 natives and more at a later date. We are interested in knowing whether this need has been met by the present limitations upon recruiting activities of the gold mines.

D. Increase in essential civilian industry. In so far as import requirements can be reduced by the further expansion of those industries mentioned in Day's report of March 1 and in the reports of the Agricultural and Requirements Commission, we should suppose that such expansion of secondary industries would be desirable.

E. In order to attain the foregoing objectives, gold mining operations will have to be reduced. We are not yet ready to say precisely how great the reduction should be, but the sole purpose of any reduction would be to divert the maximum quantity of supplies, labor, equipment, and other facilities for use in war industries. The supply agencies in Washington are reluctant to undertake to furnish supplies directly or indirectly for gold mining unless gold mining is curtailed sufficiently to insure a very substantial increase in South Africa's industrial war and agricultural effort. They feel that the furnishing of supplies, however small, is wasteful and permits the continued consumption of larger quantities of militarily important supplies from domestic and other sources.

7. Since it will take some time to complete the Lend-Lease survey, we do not want to wait until then before discussing the reduction of gold mining operations. We should like to have as soon as possible a reliable picture of the relation between gold mining and the war industries in terms of the important supplies which they both need and the labor, equipment, and facilities which they both could use. Comparative estimates of the respective advantages to be derived from different reductions of gold mining operations would be most helpful. It is our understanding that the criterion of reduction should be the quantity of ore milled rather than the amount of fine gold produced, since the milling operations require the use of much labor, equipment, and supplies. When this information is available, we shall be in a position to determine a specific figure of reduction as our minimum objective, and to set a target figure for use in negotiation.

8. You will recall the statement in Department's 44 of March 6 to Pretoria that the gold mining question should not be considered separately or in advance, but together with the other supply problems of the Union. At the same time we should be glad to have the matter settled as soon as possible, and we intend, therefore, to raise the problem of reduction as soon as we have sufficient information concerning the relation between gold mining and the Union war industries. Since the problem is highly controversial, we believe that it should be considered through channels apart from the Council, in order not to complicate or prejudice the status of the Council at its beginning. We should prefer to negotiate the question in Washington, unless you see advantages to conducting the discussions in the Union. In any event, the final decision on the American side will of course be made here.

We should appreciate your detailed comments on this question, as well as on the program as a whole.

9. The question of interim, short term policy towards gold mining was discussed recently in a meeting at the Department attended by representatives of the Office of Lend-Lease Administration, the Board of Economic Warfare, and the War Production Board. There was agreement that, pending a final decision by the American, British, and Union Governments on the future rate of gold mining, no supplies for the mines should be exported to South Africa from the United States except in the most urgent cases. Before considering any special application for gold mining supplies, such as Taper roller bearings, we should want to know the exact stock position of the mines and the estimated requirements for a given period of time at a stated rate of operation. We are reluctant to maintain operations at their present level, but we do not wish to cause so extensive a reduction or so abrupt a stopping of operations as to give the British and South Africans any occasion to feel that the American Government has prejudged the question of reduction and taken unilateral action accordingly.

10. A provision has been inserted in the recently issued British program license which provides that no release certificates may be issued by the British Supply Council in North America for export to South Africa of supplies or equipment to be used directly or indirectly in gold mining. This provision would not preclude BEW from approving the export of supplies to the gold mines in exceptional cases such as those mentioned in paragraph 9. As you know, the BEW, instead of issuing licenses for the export of individual shipments, has granted a general license to the British Supply Council to certify the export of those requirements which fall within the authorized quarterly program. More detailed information regarding this procedure has been posted to you by airmail.

HULL

848A.24/236 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in the Union of South Africa
(MacVeagh)*

WASHINGTON, June 22, 1943—10 p. m.

128. Reference is made to paragraph 4 of Department's telegram no. 111 June 3. In your discussions with Union authorities and United Kingdom representatives on the establishment of the joint supply council please use as a guide the following general statement which sets forth the composite views of the Department and the Lend-Lease Administration:

1. As has been indicated in previous communications, the Council's objective will be to assist the Union Government in its endeavors to

achieve the maximum utilization of the resources of the Union in production for the war effort.

2. It is desired that the Council concern itself with matters of policy affecting the ascertainment of the Union's minimum essential import requirements, the recommendation of sources of supply of those requirements, and the consideration of other matters relating directly to import requirements and imports. Operating functions should be left in the hands of existing operating agencies. For example, the actual work of compiling estimates of essential import requirements and recommending their sources of supply will continue to be done by the Union authorities, advised and assisted by the Lend-Lease Mission and such United Kingdom officials as may be agreed between the Union and the United Kingdom.

3. The Council should have within its purview the Union's total minimum essential import requirements rather than requirements on the United States and the United Kingdom only. This is necessary to insure an integrated overall import program and the full utilization of sources of supply other than the United States and the United Kingdom.

4. It is hoped that the Council will adopt as its own forms for reporting requirements from all sources Lend Lease requirements form 1 and such other forms as may in future be devised by the Lend Lease Administration. Form 1 is so drafted that it could readily be used by the operating agencies in the Union for preparing reports of requirements from any source. If the Council does not adopt form 1, a serious duplication of paper work will result as data on requirements recommended to be supplied in whole or in part by the United States must in any event be prepared on form 1 for the use of the Lend Lease Administration in Washington in presenting claims for supplies for the Union before the United States allocating boards.

5. The Council should review in the light of its objective all requirements data and recommendations as to sources of supply prepared by the operating agencies.

6. It should be clearly understood that the recommendations as to sources of supply made by the operating agencies and approved by the Council can be advisory only. Final decisions in that regard can be made only in Washington and London.

7. Each participating government should appoint one representative and one or more alternates to sit on the Council. Although the Council per se would therefore consist of only three members, it is assumed that there will be no objection to the attendance at the Council's meetings of technical advisers and experts. On the United States side it is assumed that you will wish to have one or more Lend Lease representatives with you at all meetings, and that you might on occasion find desirable the presence of the Commercial Attaché, the Board of Economic Warfare representative, or the War Shipping Administration representative.

8. The representative of the Union Government should be the chairman of the Council, and it is hoped that the Union Government will provide a secretary to keep the minutes and other records of the Council.

9. All decisions of the Council should be unanimous. If a unanimous decision is not reached, the dissenting government should not be bound by any decision taken by the concurring governments.

10. It is essential that the Council's terms of reference and the general pattern of its activities be clearly stated after mutual agreement among the three participating governments. This should not be construed as evidence of any desire in Washington to encumber the Council with inflexible rules of procedure or unnecessary formality. However, if the allocating boards here are to give weight to the Council's approval of the Union's import requirements, they will require definite information with respect to the Council's jurisdiction and procedures.

The foregoing general statement has been approved by the Board of Economic Warfare and the War Production Board. Comments from you, Lend Lease representative, and Sharpstone will be welcome.

The method of review in Washington and London of the requirements reports approved by the Council will be the subject of discussion by representatives of the three interested governments in Washington. You will be kept informed of the progress of those discussions.

Repeated to London.

HULL

848A.24/236 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in the Union of South Africa
(MacVeagh)*

WASHINGTON, June 22, 1943—11 p. m.

129. Reference cable 128 today. If Union Government presses point this Government is willing to agree that Council's approval of requirements be accepted by participating governments as establishing essentiality of requirements. However it must be clearly understood that supplying countries may not be able to provide all approved requirements. Material and shipping shortages and many other factors subject to constant and unpredictable change in interest of war effort have prevented and will prevent supply of requirements of recognized essentiality throughout United Nations. Union cannot expect favored treatment because of existence of Council.

Repeated to London.

HULL

848A.24/319

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Theodore C. Achilles of the
Division of European Affairs*

[WASHINGTON,] June 22, 1943.

During a general conversation Mr. Jordaan ⁴⁵ inquired as to when the Legation might expect to hear further from the Department con-

⁴⁵ J. R. Jordaan, Secretary of the South African Legation.

cerning the reciprocal aid agreement. He was advised that it was still under consideration and that the persons concerned with strategic materials felt strongly that the Union should give such materials to us as reciprocal aid.

He remarked that the Union Government had gone considerably further toward meeting our wishes than the Legation had expected, in view of the fact that Lend-Lease assistance to the Union not merely helped the Union but the British Empire as a whole. In amplification of this statement he said that in the early days of Lend-Lease Secretary Morgenthau had advised the British and Dominion representatives that Lend-Lease extended to the Dominions was designed in part to relieve the strain on the foreign exchange resources of the United Kingdom. On the basis of that position the Union Government had agreed to furnish the United Kingdom Government with the equivalent in gold of all material received by the Union from the United States under Lend-Lease. Upon being questioned further he said that the amounts of gold furnished the United Kingdom under this arrangement were exactly equivalent to the value placed upon Lend-Lease aid received from the United States.

This seems to explain the vague references made by our Legation at Pretoria from time to time to South African payments to the United Kingdom for material received under Lend-Lease.

848A.24/359 : Telegram

The Minister in the Union of South Africa (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State

PRETORIA, August 28, 1943—6 p. m.
[Received 8:50 p. m.]

236. Referring to my telegram No. 235, August 25, 7 p. m.⁴⁶ The following is the draft of the Supply Council's constitution and terms of reference unanimously approved by our meeting. It is being submitted to you for your approval and is also being telegraphed to London by the British High Commissioner here for the approval of his Government.

"Memorandum on proposed constitution, purpose and functions of the Joint Supply Council for the Union of South Africa.

1. The title of the Council shall be: Joint Supply Council for the Union of South Africa.

2. Representation on the Council shall be as follows: Union of South Africa, representative, Dr. H. J. Van der Bijl, Director General of Supplies, alternate, Mr. R. P. Plewman, Deputy Director General of Supplies. United Kingdom, representative, the High Commissioner

⁴⁶ Not printed.

for the United Kingdom (or in his absence the Acting High Commissioner), alternate, H.M. Senior Trade Commissioner (or in his absence the Deputy High Commissioner or a supply official). United States of America, representative, the Minister for the United States of America, alternate, the Commercial Attaché for the United States of America. Experts and other officials may be invited to attend meetings of the Council in an advisory capacity.

3. The chairman of the Council elected at the first meeting of the Council.

4. The Union Government will provide the Secretariat, and arrange for the keeping of minutes and the maintenance of other necessary records.

5. To be authoritative the decisions of the Council must be unanimous. If an unanimous decision is not reached the dissenting government will not be bound by the decision of the concurring governments.

6. It is agreed that the procedure of the Council be flexible and the activities of the Council be not conducted with undue formality.

7. It is agreed that no additional organization be set up by the Union Government to function in regard to supply matters, that the existing supply organizations be maintained as far as possible, and that the functions which the Union High Commissioner in London and the South African Supply Mission in Washington perform in relation to inter-Allied supply machinery in London and Washington be disturbed as little as possible.

8. (a) The Union Government undertake to coordinate through the Council the investigation into the Union's supply requirements and production resources, and to arrange for the Union's over all import requirements (other than finished combat material for direct use by the military) to be coordinated through the Union's representative for review and final approval by the Council (b) The United Kingdom and the United States Governments undertake to coordinate through the Council the activity of any mission or agency in the Union concerned with matters within the competency of the Council (c) The Council shall, when necessary, coordinate information relating to the supply of material (e.g. base minerals) from the Union, and advise in regard to the Union's resources and productive capacity in this connection.

9. Realizing that on matters of broad policy advice of the Council will be particularly valuable to the Union in planning production and estimating requirements, and to the United Kingdom, the U.S. of America and the combined supply boards in considering the urgency and priority to be given to supply requirements, it is agreed that the prime functions of the Council shall be: (a) to examine and give authoritative advice in regard to the importance of the Union's various industries in relation to its national economy, and the extent to which the Union's economic war effort can most usefully be developed in the light of present and probably future conditions, and in relation to the productive resources available, (b) to review and ascertain the Union's over all requirements programs, as prepared by Union authorities, for achieving the best utilization of its resources in the war effort and for the needs of its domestic economy, (c) to determine and approve the Union's essential import requirements within the agreed programs, to review and make a determination regarding any vital or important items of the requirements or presenting or likely to present special dif-

faculty, (d) to review the fulfillment of programs with particular reference to priorities and to special needs, (e) to give authoritative advice or replies to inquiries which may arise in London or in Washington on important aspects of policy relating to Union production or requirements, and (f) to assist the Union Government in furnishing the Union High Commissioner in London and the South African Government Supply Mission in Washington with desirable shipping programs for communication to the appropriate authorities in London and Washington.

10. While it is clearly understood that the determination and approval of requirements by the Council does not carry with it any assurance of supply, and that the final decision as to maximum quantities available to the Union, sources of supply and availability of shipping must be made in London and in Washington, it is agreed that the approval and endorsement by the Council of the essentiality and justification of the Union's requirements will be accepted as authoritative by the supply authorities in the United Kingdom and in the United States of America.

11. It is accepted that supply requirements be based on information contained in the OLLA form (Lend-Lease Requirements Branch form No. 1) in all cases where it is practicable to do so.

12. The Council shall endeavor to concentrate on:—(a) items regarded as vital to Union production or economy, and (b) critical items in regard to which difficulties have arisen or are likely to arise.”

MACVEAGH

848A.24/363 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in the Union of South Africa
(MacVeagh)*

WASHINGTON, September 17, 1943—5 p. m.

173. Your 236, August 28, 237, August 30, and 241, September 1.⁴⁷ Proposed constitution and press announcement of Supply Council are approved by interested authorities here, and you may therefore proceed with establishment of Council along lines specified in your telegrams under reference. You should, however, make sure that provisions of constitution are sufficiently flexible to allow you to appoint some other individual as your alternate in place of Commercial Attaché, in event that you and Department should agree it would be desirable to do this.

Detailed messages will follow concerning position you should take towards gold mining requirements and increased exports of coal.

HULL

⁴⁷ Telegrams Nos. 237 and 241 not printed.

848A.24/359 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in the Union of South Africa
(MacVeagh)*

WASHINGTON, September 18, 1943—10 p. m.

174. Department's 173, September 17.

1. A meeting was held recently, attended by representatives of State, War, WPB,⁴⁸ OLLA,⁴⁹ OEW,⁵⁰ and WSA,⁵¹ to consider Gage's report on gold mining⁵² and discuss question of increased exports of coal from Union. Following represents combined views of interested authorities here on gold mining and its relation to coal. Subject of coal is being covered in separate message.

2. Gage's recommendations, which were accepted on terms outlined in this telegram, are in substance as follows: (A) to satisfy only most critical requirements of gold mines, based on surveys conducted by Supply Council; (B) to initiate no negotiations for reduction in gold mining operations under present conditions of unemployment in the Union and lack of demand for its industrial products; (C) to stimulate South African war production along such lines as to make greatest use of existing plant capacity and of raw materials obtainable in Africa; (D) to review question of gold mining at least semi-annually in order to determine whether conditions have changed.

3. Decision not to press for agreement to curtail gold mining operations is based on conclusion reached in Gage report and in your 163 of June 17⁵³ that, since need of Union manufactured products has declined, it is no longer necessary to divert labor or equipment from gold mines to manufacturing industries. This decision would be open to reconsideration if circumstances should change. We do not recognize present level of gold mining activities as minimum level which must be maintained in order to avoid economic or political difficulties in South Africa, and we are anxious to obtain greater quantities of coal from the Union, even if that should necessitate curtailment of gold mining activities, as to some extent, it probably will.

4. Since we do not intend to undertake negotiations for reduction of gold mining, we do not think it necessary to consider gold mining requirements apart from Supply Council, as suggested in paragraph 8 of Department's 111-113 of June 3. Council should examine need of supplies for gold industry and make recommendations as in case of other South African requirements, but your concurrence in such recommendations must be subject to following conditions.

⁴⁸ War Production Board.

⁴⁹ Office of Lend-Lease Administration.

⁵⁰ Office of Economic Warfare.

⁵¹ War Shipping Administration.

⁵² Dated August 13, 1943; not printed.

⁵³ Not printed.

A. That supplies for gold mines will not hinder increase in coal shipments. Please notify us at once of any such proposed supplies which might interfere with export of coal.

B. That coal program is making satisfactory progress. Supplies for gold mines cannot be considered unless this is the case. We have no desire to bargain for coal with gold mining supplies, and we trust it will not be necessary to do so, but we cannot be in position of furnishing critical materials to a non-war industry unless Union is co-operating fully in what is probably greatest contribution it can make to joint war effort.

C. That only most critical needs of gold mines are to be satisfied. We have no plans to curtail mining activities or to stabilize them at any particular level, but we can provide materials only on minimum basis and therefore expect that present downward trend of operations will continue, at least for some time. For example, we should hope it might be possible to close down marginal mines altogether. Consideration might be given to saving in equipment that could be effected by closing marginal mines and using their equipment in other producing mines.

5. We expect to be fully advised of all discussions about gold mining as they occur, but foregoing conditions are given as prerequisites to your approval of Council's recommendations concerning requirements of gold mines. You should use this information to avert any misunderstanding by British and South Africans of position of American member of Council. If you can satisfy us regarding application of these conditions and of others which may arise later in interest of war effort, then recommendations for gold mining supplies will be treated here on same basis as other Union requirements. In other words, we will try to provide such supplies in accordance with recommendations of the Council in which you concur, but quantities finally delivered will be determined by shortages of materials, and other variable factors which cannot be predicted now. In this connection, reference is made to Department's 63 of April 7 to Capetown, and 129 of June 22 to Pretoria.

6. Please telegraph your detailed comments on foregoing. We hope that solution of gold mining problems can finally be reached along these lines.

HULL

848A.24/372 : Telegram

*The Minister in the Union of South Africa (MacVeagh) to the
Secretary of State*

PRETORIA, September 24, 1943—7 p. m.

[Received 10:18 p. m.]

263. The Department's No. 174 of September 18, 10 p. m. The first meeting of the Supply Council was held yesterday, the 23d, in

Pretoria. General Smuts made a brief address. The South African member was then elected Chairman, and questions of procedure discussed and settled. I informed the Council of my intention of bringing up the problem of increased coal production at an early date, and Lord Harlech⁵⁴ spoke of his Government's interest in South Africa's contribution to the world's food supply. The Chairman mentioned South Africa's need for phosphate fertilizers. No direct reference was made to gold mining, but the Chairman alluded to the necessity of the Council's keeping in mind the intimate relationship between South Africa's potential war production and its economic and political situation, and particularly the existence here of a large public opinion opposed to the war which prevents the Government from doing much that it would otherwise desire. It was agreed that questions to be brought up at the next meeting should be made the subject of preliminary study by the experts available and the meeting called when this should be concluded. I have ascertained from Lord Harlech that he has instructions regarding coal and I have arranged a meeting with him tomorrow to coordinate our ideas. The questions in this connection which I propose to lay before the Council after preliminary studies by our experts are those included in sections 6 and 7 of the Department's telegram number 175 of September 20, 11 p. m.⁵⁵

Since General Smuts is leaving presently for London, and perhaps the United States, I informed him of the acceptance of Gage's proposals in so far as this alters the decision to consider gold mining problems outside the Council, of which I had previously informed him pursuant to paragraph 4 of the Department's telegrams No. 111-113 of June 3 (see my telegram No. 150 of June 9, noon⁵⁵). I made no mention of this in the Council, which will consider all questions of supply as they come up.

With special reference to the Department's No. 175, the instructions in this and the preceding message regarding the conditions to govern my concurrence in gold mining recommendations appear clear to me, but I shall not fail to telegraph immediately any questions or comments which may later appear pertinent or necessary. I fully concur in the desirability of reviewing the gold mining situation periodically, but I would also urge that our success in solving this problem through the medium of the Council will very largely depend on our faithfully accepting its recommendations in principle and consistently basing any refusals to comply, for whatever reason, on critical shortages or other unpredictable war conditions. I feel sure, after consultation with Dr. Van der Bijl, that the South Africans will not object to scrutiny in the Council along the lines the Department has laid down,

⁵⁴ High Commissioner of the United Kingdom in South Africa.

⁵⁵ Not printed.

and that thereafter they will accept any limitations which we may allege to be imposed by our ability to supply, but that their willing cooperation is not likely to survive much further questioning either of their knowledge of their our [*own?*] economy or their understanding of the importance of the war effort. Bitting⁵⁷ and Day agree.

Regarding the coal problem, Sweeney⁵⁸ will answer the cable from OEW referred to in paragraph F of section 7 of the Department's telegram 175, though this question will also come before the Council. His reply will be the result of conference with the general manager of the railways attended by Sweeney, Day and Bitting, and consultation with Shields of the WSA. In this connection, we are glad to answer all queries as best we can, no matter how they come, but perhaps in view of the complexity of the coal supply problem, involving not only the Railway Administration but many other departments of the Government, the Department might consider canalizing all such queries through the Legation for submission to the central machinery of the Council now established.

MACVEAGH

848A.24/397a

*The Department of State to the South African Legation*⁵⁹

MEMORANDUM

The memorandum left with the Department of State by the South African Legation on April 26, 1943⁶⁰ concerning a reciprocal aid agreement has been carefully considered by the Department and other agencies of the United States Government.

The first point raised in that memorandum was the omission of the words "and strategic materials" from paragraph 1(a) of the draft reciprocal aid agreement. In this connection the memorandum cited the fact that the words in question did not appear in the reciprocal aid agreements previously concluded between the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom, Australia or New Zealand and that the Union Government preferred to deal with such questions from the standpoint of the Commonwealth as a whole.

The United States Government and the people of the United States deeply appreciate the aid which the British Commonwealth as a whole and its various members individually have given to the armed forces of the United States. This aid and the spirit in which it has been given are splendid examples of the principle of mutual aid governing

⁵⁷ S. T. Bitting, head of the United States Foreign Economic Administration mission.

⁵⁸ Presumably Harry M. Sweeney of the Board of Economic Warfare.

⁵⁹ Handed by Assistant Secretary of State Acheson to the South African Minister (Close) on October 7.

⁶⁰ *Ante*, p. 191.

our common war effort. It has, however, been for some time the feeling of the United States Government that it would be of mutual interest to carry the principle of mutual aid a step further toward complete realization.

Since the date of the Legation's memorandum, negotiations have been entered into between the United States Government and the Government of the United Kingdom with respect to the furnishing of materials as reciprocal aid and the latter Government has agreed to furnish as reciprocal aid materials imported by the United States Government agencies from the United Kingdom, Southern Rhodesia and the British Colonies. In view of this development, the United States Government is currently advising the Governments of Australia and New Zealand and the Government of India of the procurement programs which it hopes may similarly be transferred to a reciprocal aid basis.

It is hoped therefore that the Government of the Union will find it possible to agree to the inclusion of the words "and strategic materials" in paragraph 1(a) of the proposed reciprocal aid agreement and to extend its reciprocal aid program to include the furnishing, without payment by the United States, of those materials which are imported from the Union of South Africa or from South African sources by agencies of the United States Government.

The present procurement program contemplates the purchase from South African sources by United States Government agencies during the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1943 of the following commodities: asbestos, chrome, concentrates containing copper and lead, corundum, fluorspar, goatskins, manganese and vanadium.

The foregoing is not, and by its nature cannot be, a definitive statement of the specific commodities which the United States Government might wish to bring within the program. It is submitted rather as an indication of the approximate scope of the contemplated program.

The second point raised in the Legation's memorandum was the omission of paragraph 1(d) of the proposed reciprocal aid agreement and the substitution therefor of a paragraph providing that the Union would supply materials and services needed in the construction of military projects, et cetera, only within the Union of South Africa and such other places as might be determined. The effect of this would be to substitute the narrower provisions of the Australian agreement for the somewhat wider provisions of the corresponding paragraph of the United Kingdom, New Zealand and other agreements.

In view of the comparative remoteness of the Union from the present and prospective theaters of active combat, little need is foreseen for the stationing of United States forces in Union territory. It is accordingly believed that the ability of the Union to contribute to

the common war effort would more appropriately be reflected in paragraph 1(d) as originally suggested, providing for reciprocal aid to the extent that the Union is a more practicable source of supply than the United States or another of the United Nations. It is not anticipated that the practical application of this paragraph would prove onerous and it is hoped that the Union Government may see its way clear to agree to it.

If agreement can be reached on the matters above set forth, the United States Government will gladly accept the suggestions made in the memorandum of April 26, 1943, with respect to the matters raised in Mr. Acheson's memorandum of January 12, 1943.⁶¹

The United States Government trusts that the Union Government is in agreement that exports from the United States which are to be paid for in cash should move through private trade channels to the greatest possible extent.

WASHINGTON, October 6, 1943.

800.24/320

The South African Legation to the Department of State

WASHINGTON, 22 October, 1943.

MEMORANDUM

With reference to the State Department's Memorandum handed to the South African Minister on October 6th 1943, concerning the Reciprocal Aid Agreement now under discussion, the Government of the Union of South Africa, in view of Mr. Acheson's special request for a reply within about 14 days, have instructed the Legation to advise the State Department that they are prepared to accept, in principle, the United States proposal that raw materials required for war purposes be supplied on reciprocal aid terms, although there are many questions, for instance, as to procedure, which will still call for consideration.

The Union Government, however, regret that they find themselves unable to accept the proposal that the agreement should enter into force with retrospective effect.

As regards the retention of paragraph 1(d) of the draft Reciprocal Aid Agreement, the Union Government regret to state that their position as outlined in the Legation's Memorandum of April 26th, 1943, in connection with this point, remains unchanged.

The reason for the Union Government's preference for a provision following the relevant U.S.A.-Australian Agreement, as stated at the

⁶¹ For summary of memorandum, see telegram No. 9, January 14, 11 p. m., to the Consul at Capetown, p. 174.

time, was not based on an objection to principle but rather one based on political and other considerations which made it necessary to avoid undue indefiniteness. The Union Government urges that the words "in such other places as may be determined" in the paragraph suggested by them, adequately covers the important objects in view and that this phraseology would be sufficient, in as much as it provides for specific agreement in regard to such specific proposals as may be put forward when the need arises.

In these circumstances the Union Government trust that the United States Government will find it possible to adopt the provision proposed by the Union Government.

Whilst the Union Government is prepared in principle to supply to the United States Government raw materials on reciprocal aid terms as above indicated, they suggest that certain questions of procedure and other matters, cognate to the undertaking, requires further study and formulation.

Among these questions the following occur to the Union Government as being of importance:

(a) It is assumed that procurement in South Africa would be effected by and for the Union Government.

(b) It is assumed that the raw materials to be supplied by the Union Government as reciprocal aid will be those directly necessary for the war effort and called for by official United States requisitions.

(c) Should there be any running contracts which the United States might wish the Union Government to take over, the Union Government propose that such contracts be reserved for separate consideration.

(d) There exist certain stipulations regarding quantities and period which apply in the case of materials obtained under Lend-Lease from the United States of America. The Union Government desire such stipulations to apply in reverse.

The Minister suggests that the matters referred to above, other than of course the acceptance of the principle of reciprocal aid agreed to by the Union Government, might suitably form the subject of discussion between Mr. Acheson and himself at a mutually convenient date.

848A.24/396 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in the Union of South Africa
(MacVeagh)*

WASHINGTON, November 19, 1943—7 p. m.

204. Your 297, 12th.⁶² As you know, we have been carrying on conversations with the South African Legation for nearly a year looking toward conclusion of a reciprocal aid agreement. The Union

⁶² Not printed.

Government has consistently wished to place a very narrow interpretation on what it would furnish as reciprocal aid. On October 6 we advised the Legation, as we had similarly advised the British, Australian, New Zealand and Indian authorities, that we would like to receive raw materials as reciprocal aid in addition to supplies for our forces. On October 22 the Legation replied accepting our raw materials suggestion in principle but raising a number of points of procedure which, in FEA's⁶³ view, would greatly hamper effective procurement. The Union Government declined to meet our position on any of the remaining outstanding points of the agreement.

In view of the exceptionally strong and constantly improving financial position of the Union that Government has little need of Lend-Lease aid and has in fact for some months been receiving on Lend-Lease terms only combat material, civilian items being furnished on a cash reimbursable basis.

On November 6 it was suggested in a friendly way to the South African Minister that there might be political advantages in both countries if an arrangement were made similar to that between this Government and Canada by which each Government pays cash for anything obtained from the other. The proposal was not ill received. The Treasury Department and FEA fully support this suggestion and we intend shortly to give the Legation here a new draft based upon the agreement of November 30, 1942 with Canada.⁶⁴

The foregoing is for your strictly confidential information and guidance. It should not be discussed with the South African authorities unless they raise the matter with you.

HULL

⁶³ Foreign Economic Administration.

⁶⁴ Executive Agreement Series No. 287, or 56 Stat. (pt. 2) 1815.

EASTERN EUROPE

FINLAND

INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES IN FINLAND AND ITS ATTEMPTS TO FACILITATE THE WITHDRAWAL OF FINLAND FROM THE WAR AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION¹

860D.20211/18

The Finnish Chargé (Vahervuori) to the Secretary of State

No. 1

The Chargé d'Affaires a. i. of Finland presents his compliments to His Excellency The Honorable The Secretary of State and has the honor to acknowledge the receipt of His Excellency's note of December 26th, 1942,² which was received at the office of the Finnish Legation on December 28th at 4:30 p. m., regarding His Excellency's initiative to cease immediately the distribution of information of all types by the American Legation in Helsinki to the Finnish public.

His Excellency further requests in the note the Chargé d'Affaires to have stopped immediately any further activities of the Finnish Information Center in New York and of the Finnish Legation's personnel in the field of releases, pamphlets, public addresses, books, et cetera, specifying further that the Finnish Legation is requested hereafter to make or release no statements for public consumption in the United States except such oral statements as may be required to reply to specific inquiries from American press representatives.

Having duly noted the contents of the said note the Chargé d'Affaires has brought the same to the attention of the Finnish Information Center in New York as far as that office is concerned, which, complying with the request, has discontinued its activities as from December 29th.

WASHINGTON, January 2, 1943.

¹ For previous correspondence, see *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. II, pp. 21 ff.

² Not printed, but see telegram No. 240, December 23, 1942, to the Chargé in Finland, *ibid.*, p. 115.

860D.00/1041 : Telegram

The Chargé in Finland (McClintock) to the Secretary of State

HELSINKI, January 8, 1943—6 p. m.
[Received January 8—3:30 p. m.]

31. Source mentioned in my 30 today⁵ said he had recently talked with Professor Voionmaa, Chairman of Diet Foreign Affairs Committee. Voionmaa had earnestly asked him to tell his friends in American Legation that he, Voionmaa, could not too strongly emphasize Finland's increasing realization of need for American friendship and that he would be willing to accept any decision made in Washington as to Finland's fate.

McCLINTOCK

860D.00/1048 : Telegram

The Chargé in Finland (McClintock) to the Secretary of State

HELSINKI, January 11, 1943—2 p. m.
[Received 8:27 p. m.]

51. For Under Secretary. My 50 today.⁶ My talk with Erkko⁷ last night followed immediately after his conference with Marshal Mannerheim.⁸ He said he had specifically asked Marshal what his attitude would be in event of Allied invasion of northern Norway. Mannerheim had not answered this question. Erkko then told me he—Erkko—had recently been approached by high officers of Swedish General Staff with suggestion that Swedes would be willing to occupy northern Finland as compromise move provided Germans would withdraw from that area thus checking any Russian advance toward northern Norway.

Erkko said he thought military position in far north was key to Finland's fate and that one and perhaps last possibility of Finland's exit from war under viable conditions might be tripartite "arrangement" whereby Germans would shorten their front by leaving Finland entirely, Russians remaining on their side of frontier and Swedes taking at least the north of Finland into protective military custody.

This idea seems far fetched but probably reflects growing conviction here that only desperate measures can succeed if Finland is to get out of its war with Russia before Germany goes down. My informant reflected view of Foreign Office official cited in my 16, January 5⁶ in saying that if Finns were to be granted only boundary established by

⁵ A "neutral diplomat with excellent contacts"; telegram not printed.

⁶ Not printed.

⁷ Eljas Erkko, newspaper editor in Helsinki and onetime Finnish Minister for Foreign Affairs.

⁸ Karl Gustav, Baron Mannerheim, Marshal and Commander in Chief of the Finnish Defense Forces.

treaty of Moscow March 12, 1940⁹ they would prefer to die fighting. He went further and said that if this was minimum they could expect they might as well go ahead and take Soroka¹⁰ now.

From this end of the line it seems evident that we are rapidly reaching end of negative phase of our diplomacy in Finland, provided of course a more positive policy suits the Department's books. With jettisoning of Witting,¹¹ Horelli,¹² and Rangell,¹³ Finns will have cleaned much of their Cabinet slate, then will turn to us asking what next. Should we give them merely negative comfort and repeat that it is up to them to figure out their own salvation (your 84, November 21¹⁴), embitterment will be great and temptation to cast all on single hazard of Russian exhaustion before German defeat may prove greater than desire for maintenance of what may seem to them to be our unresponsive friendship. In this connection I recall conclusions set forth in our telegram 1206, December 8,¹⁵ in particular paragraph 9, on need for positive measures if Finns are to be got out of their predicament to our advantage. It seems at least from this angle that it is well worth while attempting to bring them out of German camp and in this connection estimate of Swedish Foreign Minister¹⁶ as set forth in last sentence of Stockholm's 3666, December 24,¹⁷ may indeed be an accurate prediction. The Germans' reaction would depend upon the time element and their own position in the general war.

In the meanwhile I am hewing strictly to the line of your 84 [229], November 21. Last night my only comment to Erkkö was that some tangible proposition from the Finns would be of interest to us but that it was up to them to evolve their new policy. To others I have said that the doors of the Legation are open if they wish to come and our ears are open too.

I have criticized Finns in past for their adherence to a static policy in a dynamic situation. They seem now at long last to be on the move

⁹ The Treaty of Moscow of March 12, 1940, between the Soviet Union and Finland, and its terms and conditions for Finland, are reported in telegrams No. 281 and No. 283, dated March 13, 1940, from the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, *Foreign Relations*, 1940, vol. I, p. 314. For texts of the treaty and protocol, see Finland, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, *The Finnish Blue Book* (Philadelphia-New York, 1940), p. 115, or Department of State *Bulletin*, April 27, 1940, p. 453; or, U.S.S.R. *Sbornik deystvuyushchikh dogovorov, soglasheniy, i konventsiy, zaklyuchennykh s inostrannymi gosudarstvami*, vol. x, p. 11.

¹⁰ Soroka, an important town on the Murmansk-Leningrad railway and White Sea-Baltic Canal, now called Belomorsk.

¹¹ Rolf J. Witting, Finnish Minister for Foreign Affairs.

¹² Toivo J. Horelli, Finnish Minister of Interior.

¹³ Johan W. Rangell, Prime Minister of Finland.

¹⁴ In telegram of January 12, noon, the Chargé in Finland stated: "Reference to 'your 84, November 21' should have been to 'Department's 229' repeated to us in Stockholm's 84." Text of telegram No. 229 is quoted in telegram No. 1015, November 19, 1942, to Stockholm, *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. II, p. 95.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 106.

¹⁶ Christian E. Günther.

¹⁷ *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. II, p. 116.

within the limitations of their desperate position. A word of encouragement from us, a promise of food, almost any positive act, might hasten the day of their abandonment of Germany. A simple authorization to say directly to Marshal Mannerheim from some very high person in our Government that the Atlantic Charter¹⁸ means what it says and is applicable also to Finland might have considerable effect. The Marshal would however ask "what about the Russians?"

McCLINTOCK

740.0011 European War 1939/27143 : Telegram

The Chargé in Finland (McClintock) to the Secretary of State

HELSINKI, January 14, 1943—2 p. m.

[Received 2:17 p. m.]

73. Ivalo's¹⁹ reference to a possible break in relations with us in the event of war between Japan and USSR reported in my 64²⁰ yesterday is the second which has come to our attention (see our 326, May 2²⁰). This harping on Finland's position vis-à-vis United States in case of war between Japan and Russia is curious and in this connection the fact that President Ryti for no apparent reason conferred Finland's highest decoration on Emperor of Japan last July,²¹ as well as Japanese honors conferred here December 5,²² should be kept in mind. I recall also the apparently pointless "message to the Finnish people" sent by Japanese Foreign Minister²³ last February (see our 158, February 27).²⁰

Certainly for the one track minded Finns whose obsession is fear of Russia a Japanese attack on their adversary would be welcome—possibly more welcome than enmity of United States would be feared. It is not impossible that some sort of agreement exists between Finland and Axis foreseeing such contingency. Such a pact would probably not be signed today but it might have been signed in the heady atmosphere of early 1941.

These may be merely straws in the wind, but it is an east wind.

McCLINTOCK

¹⁸ Joint statement by President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Churchill, August 14, 1941, *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, p. 367. The Soviet Union adhered to the Atlantic Charter on September 24, 1941; see *ibid.*, p. 378.

¹⁹ Asko P. Ivalo, Chief of the Political Division in the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

²⁰ Not printed.

²¹ On July 9, 1942, the Tokyo newspaper *Asahi* reported that on July 7 Japanese Emperor Hirohito received a telegram from President Risto H. Ryti of Finland conferring on him the "Finnish Order of the White Rose".

²² In its issue of December 8, 1942, *Asahi* reported that on December 5 Emperor Hirohito sent a message to President Ryti congratulating him on the occasion of Finland's independence day (December 6) and bestowing on him the "Grand Order of the Grand Cordon of the Chrysanthemum".

²³ Shigenori Togo.

811.20260D/16 : Telegram

The Chargé in Finland (McClintock) to the Secretary of State

HELSINKI, January 15, 1943—11 a. m.

[Received January 15—10 a. m.]

75. On two separate occasions in the last week Secretary of Legation²⁴ has been approached by members of Foreign Office with the suggestion that the question of American-Finnish reciprocal propaganda facilities be reopened implying benefit original request for illustrated Finnish language bulletin²⁵ would now receive favorable consideration. There [*They*] were told this was probably a dead issue. See my 15, January 5.²⁶

McCLINTOCK

860D.00/1061 : Telegram

The Chargé in Finland (McClintock) to the Secretary of State

HELSINKI, January 15, 1943—3 p. m.

[Received 8:55 p. m.]

80. I dined last night at home of Witting. In my own view and that of various neutral Chiefs of Mission who were present this dinner was designed as friendly gesture to this Legation on part of Finnish Government before Witting's departure from Foreign Office. Fact we were invited with choice of two dates made this invitation difficult to decline and I learn that the other guests were asked subsequent to our acceptance.

Witting reiterated his stand by argument of Finland's economic dependence on Germany raising his percentages to a new high when he said that Finland now received 94% of its imports either directly from Germany or via German controlled transport system of Europe. He said remaining 6% came from Sweden. This line of talk recalls my 72 yesterday.²⁷

Foreign Minister was bleak as to Finland's prospects for separate peace and said that problem could be likened to that of dividing a triangle into three equal parts which mathematically was impossible. He commenced rather querulous reference to illusions in Washington as to what could be done, but allowed this remark to trail off in a char-

²⁴ The reference is probably to Lewis E. Gleeck, Third Secretary of Legation in Finland.

²⁵ See telegram No. 1039, October 28, 1942, 3 p. m., from the Minister in Finland, *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. II, p. 91.

²⁶ Not printed; the Chargé reported that the Chief of the Political Division of the Finnish Foreign Ministry (Asko P. Ivalo) had told him that the Foreign Office had received considerable criticism as result of the break in publicity relations and had discussed with him the possibility of resuming distribution of publicity material by the respective Legations (811.20260D/15).

²⁷ Not printed.

acteristic mumble. Later, as I was leaving, he said he hoped that I did not think his comments had been "too harsh".

Swiss Minister²⁹ last night was told by Witting that recent reports from Finnish Legation in Washington suggested a considerable shift in American opinion favorable to Finland. He said that it had been estimated that "a 30 to 40 percent change in newspaper opinion" had been noted since return of Minister Schoenfeld³⁰ and attributed this shift to influence of the Minister.

Witting told Minister Egger that he would presently resign and that he was glad to return to affairs of his bank. He added querulously that he was not responsible for policies he had carried out at [apparent omission] as merely national scapegoat. Witting added that question of when he would resign had not been determined and he offered no comment as to who his successor would be. Swiss Minister had heard frequent reports that Kivimäki³¹ would succeed Witting and agreed with me that Kivimäki who had made no secret of his pro-Nazi inclinations could scarcely be regarded as friend of Western democracies.

Swiss Minister seemed inclined to attach some importance to increasing talk of Mannerheim's candidacy for Presidency and said that author mentioned in my 69, January 13,³² was actively leading movement in Social Democratic Party on grounds that Mannerheim was sole candidate who might possibly effect compromise between views of various great belligerents as to Finland. Should Mannerheim become President Egger shared my opinion that Erkkö might probably become his Foreign Minister. Witting last night pooh poohed idea of Mannerheim's candidacy and told Egger that President Ryti and Marshal were in complete agreement on all major policies.

Swedish view of political situation in Finland seems to be on whole pessimistic irrespective of who assumes power following presidential elections. Swedish Minister here Baron Beckfrids³³ though cautious in comment seems to take view that it is now too late to save Finns as if they are not taken over by Russians they will be taken over by Germans. In fact Witting last night told Swiss Minister that if Finland should try to wriggle out of its position through conclusion of separate peace or even armistice this country would become a second Yugoslavia with Germans bombarding Helsinki and instantly occupying the country.

McCLINTOCK

²⁹ Karl Egger.

³⁰ H. F. Arthur Schoenfeld, American Minister to Finland, had left Helsinki for consultation in Washington in mid-December 1942 and did not return to his post.

³¹ Toivo M. Kivimäki, Finnish Minister in Germany.

³² Not printed.

³³ Hans Gustaf, Baron Beck-Friis.

711.60D/137 : Telegram

The Chargé in Finland (McClintock) to the Secretary of State

HELSINKI, January 16, 1943—noon.

[Received 10:55 p. m.]

86. Colonel Woldike³⁴ had an hour's interview with President Ryti yesterday. Meeting was arranged by General Staff and obviously was part of present campaign to show friendliness toward this Legation. Ryti spoke almost entirely on non-political subjects, such as resettlement problems of Finnish Karelians and possibilities of what might have happened if the United States had joined League of Nations.

His most significant remark was that although "2 years ago" he had insisted vehemently on maintaining his own ideas in opposition to certain other leaders he now saw that his views were changing to accord more with theirs. This is first intimation of flexibility in this inflexible man which has come to our attention in a long while.

Ryti reiterated previously expressed General Staff statements that Marshal Mannerheim would like to meet our Military Attaché when Marshal next comes to Helsinki.

McCLINTOCK

860D.01/151 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Finland. (McClintock)

WASHINGTON, January 18, 1943—7 p. m.

13. 1. The Finnish Minister³⁵ called on Mr. Welles³⁶ January 15. He referred to coming Finnish presidential elections and possible candidacies for the presidency and appointments to be made to a new Cabinet. He endeavored to elicit an expression of Mr. Welles' personal opinion as to the candidacy of Mannerheim for the presidency and of various other prominent Finns for positions in the Cabinet. Mr. Welles said he would make absolutely no comment with regard to any individuals in Finland but that he would very definitely express the hope that should a political change take place in Finland, such Government as might ensue therefrom would see clearly the advantage to it in the interests of the people of Finland of having a clear appreciation of Finland's long-range interests, and the value to Finland of a friendly relationship with the United States which could only be predicated upon the modification by Finland of its policy of co-operation with Germany against an ally of the United States.

³⁴ Lt. Col. Aage Woldike, American Military Attaché in Finland.

³⁵ Hjalmar J. Procopé.

³⁶ Sumner Welles, Under Secretary of State.

The Minister inquired whether Mr. Welles had in mind the possibility of Finland making a separate peace with the Soviet Union. Mr. Welles replied that this Government had long since made it clear that overt and effective assistance by Finland to Germany against the Soviet Union could only be regarded by the United States as seriously detrimental to the national interests of this country and that it seemed obvious to him that removal of Finland from the anomalous position in which it now finds itself, namely, one of actual subservience to Germany, would be in the best interests of the Finnish people, since Finland had nothing to expect from Germany except obliteration and could only hope to retain its independence and integrity as a useful member of the family of nations from the victory of those powers which had subscribed to the principles of the Atlantic Charter.

2. No change in press attitude here since Minister Schoenfeld's return and he has made no public statements.

HULL

740.00119 European War 1939/1243 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, January 19, 1943—1 p. m.

[Received 10:55 p. m.]

32. Department's 22, January 11, 10 p. m. to Kuibyshev.³⁷

1. I have received the following telegram from Dooman:³⁸

"(1) Henderson³⁹ and I took advantage of a call which the Swedish Minister⁴⁰ made on us yesterday to discuss paragraph 1 of the Department's telegram under reference. The Minister stated:

(a) He had not during recent months prepared any memorandum for his Government on the subject of Finland.

(b) He had not during recent months until January 13 when the subject of Finland was raised by Lozovski⁴¹ discussed Finland with any Soviet officials.

³⁷ Not printed; it repeated telegram No. 13, January 5, from the Chargé in Finland, in which it was stated that an officer of the Swedish Legation had read to an officer of the American Legation excerpts from a memorandum by the Swedish Minister in the Soviet Union reporting an alleged joint interview by himself and the American Ambassador with a high official of the Soviet Foreign Office regarding possible peace terms upon which the Soviet Union might make peace with Finland (740.00119 European War 1939/1228).

³⁸ Eugene H. Dooman, Counselor of Embassy in the Soviet Union.

³⁹ Loy W. Henderson, who was temporarily serving as Counselor of Embassy in the Soviet Union and was Chargé from October 10, 1942, until the return to Moscow of Ambassador Standley on January 13, 1943.

⁴⁰ Per Vilhelm G. Assarsson.

⁴¹ Solomon Abramovich Lozovsky, Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.

(c) During recent months in a series of telegrams he had been urging his Government to take steps with the purpose of prevailing upon Finland to come to terms with the Soviet Union but thus far had been unable to obtain any reaction from his Government.

(d) In these telegrams he had not stated that he, the American Ambassador, or any member of the American Embassy had discussed Finland with Soviet officials although he had suggested that it would be advisable if he or some representative of the American Government were to endeavor to ascertain the Soviet attitude with regard to Finland.

(2) The Minister stated that at Lozovski's request he had visited the latter on January 13. During the visit Lozovski read to him a protest against a statement alleged to have been made by the Prime Minister of Sweden⁴² over the radio on December 31 in an address to the Social Democrats of Finland. The Prime Minister was stated to have expressed the hope that the Social Democrats of Finland would continue to carry on the struggle until "victory" for Finland had been achieved. The Minister said that he had told Lozovski that he was unaware that his Prime Minister had made the statements credited to him and promised to make inquiries of his Government. According to the Minister Lozovski pointed out that ultimate Soviet victory was certain and that it would be unfortunate for the Finns to follow advice to continue to carry on what was for them a hopeless struggle."

2. I have thus far not discussed Finnish-Soviet relations with any Soviet or foreign diplomatic official in Moscow or Kuibyshev. Unless the Department instructs me to the contrary I am planning, however, to broach the subject in my next conversation with Molotov,⁴³ whom I expect to see later this week, along the lines of the memorandum prepared in the European Division shortly before my departure from Washington and entitled "Our policy towards Finland".⁴⁴

3. I should like to point out certain points of similarity between the statements in the Department's reference telegram alleged to have been made by me and to those contained in paragraph 3 of Kuibyshev's telegram number 1084 December 11, 9 p. m.⁴⁵ The thought has occurred to me that possibly this latter telegram may have been compromised.

STANDLEY

⁴² Per Albin Hansson.

⁴³ Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.

⁴⁴ Memorandum for Ambassador Standley, December 18, 1942, *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. II, p. 112.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 107.

860D.00/1071 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Finland (McClintock) to the Secretary of State*⁴⁶

HELSINKI, January 21, 1943—10 p. m.

[Received January 22—6:50 a. m.]

116. President Ryti asked me to see him this afternoon. He recalled telling Minister Schoenfeld of his desire to see me from time to time and of his willingness to maintain contact with Legation. Having in mind past instances in which Mr. Procopé's impressions of conversations in Department had differed from that of Department, I had prepared a paraphrase of part 1 of your 13, January 18, and during course of our conversation asked President to read it. He thanked me and said he was very glad to have this paraphrase as Mr. Procopé had reported quite differently of his interview on January 15. I summarized orally part 2 of your telegram and also left with President texts of Atlantic Charter⁴⁷ and Declaration of United Nations.⁴⁸

After reading paraphrase President Ryti said that reference to Finland having opportunity to independence and integrity only through victory of United Nations was new element in the diplomatic correspondence of past 18 months. I agreed and expressed purely personal and unofficial opinion that possibly in Atlantic Charter and declaration of United Nations Finland might find formula by which it could get on the right side in this war. I said I had no doubt whatever that Germany was losing and I supposed that various Allies and co-belligerents of Germany were wondering what to do when this defeat became absolute.

Mr. Ryti said he had from the start thought Germany would lose war. However, he hoped that before going Germany would defeat or utterly exhaust Russia. He reemphasized usual clichés of Finland's "separate war" fact that it was fighting in self defense against Russian aggression and that it had no political commitments to Germany.

He said he could tell me in confidence that during past inactive year on Finnish front, Finnish Army had suffered casualties in entire 12 months which were only two-thirds of a single month's casualties during summer of 1941. He said last December all Finnish casualties totalled only 900 which was remarkable for an army numbering several

⁴⁶ In a memorandum of January 23, 1943, commenting on this telegram, L. Randolph Higgs of the Division of European Affairs stated that there were no particularly new elements in the attitude of President Ryti, except perhaps that he seemed to have "a somewhat stronger and possibly new desire to maintain friendly relations with us." Mr. Higgs saw no need for action by the Department unless it might be advisable to approach the Finns anew with the aim of inducing them to negotiate a peace with the Soviet Union. (860D.00/1071)

⁴⁷ Joint statement by President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Churchill, August 14, 1941, *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, p. 367.

⁴⁸ Declaration of January 1, 1942, by the United Nations which subscribed to the Atlantic Charter; for text, see *ibid.*, 1942, vol. I, p. 25.

hundreds of thousands of men holding a front of 1,000 kilometers. He said for their part Russians too had been quiet and pointed to fact that neither in autumn of 1941 nor now when military operations at Leningrad were in active phase had Russians sought to attack on Finnish side of Leningrad front.

President Ryti told me in secrecy—and he ventured hope our codes were safe—that only once during Finland's relationship of co-belligerency with Germany had Germans made request of Finnish Government for renewed defensive [*offensive*] against Russia. This request he said Finns had declined.

As for Finnish policy President Ryti said that it had been, and would continue to be on a day to day basis. He said that Finns could not at all trust Russians or any agreement with them and asked if I knew what Russians and British had agreed to in respect of Baltic States. He said that he had received confidential information of Mr. Eden's agreement with Molotov in Moscow last year⁴⁹ that Baltic States were to be given to USSR. I said I had noted this in his speech at opening of Diet on February 3 last year. I added I was without official information on this point but that I had read in book *How War Came*⁵⁰ whose authors seemed to be close to official sources in Washington, an interesting chapter on Mr. Molotov's visit to London and Washington⁵¹ and that from this account it appeared that it was American influence which had prevented British and Russians agreeing to premature territorial division of post-war Europe. I reminded President that since 1931 official American policy had been non-recognition of transfer of territory by force. I read again, however, Mr. Welles' statement to Mr. Procopé that friendly relations with the United States must be based on modification of Finland's policy of collaboration with Germany. Mr. Ryti seemed quite unmoved by this statement, nor was he impressed at Finland's possibility of "obliteration" at the hands of Germany. He seemed calmly confident that all Finland had to do was sit tight and await a Russian collapse. With typical Finnish egoism, he said at one point in conversation that Finland had probably helped Germany more than would have been the case had it been a formal ally because it had carried on its "defensive war" against Russia with such zeal in 1941. He said that Germany owed more to Finland than Finland to Germany because Finnish Army had kept 25 Russian divisions out of fight against Wehrmacht.

⁴⁹ For correspondence regarding discussions on this subject between the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Anthony Eden, and Soviet officials in Moscow during December 16–22, 1941, see *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, pp. 192–205.

⁵⁰ Forrest Davis and Ernest K. Lindley, *How War Came* (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1942).

⁵¹ For correspondence concerning the visit of Soviet Foreign Commissar Molotov to London and Washington during May and June 1942, see *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. III, pp. 543–599, *passim*.

Returning to President's reference to Finland's "separate war" I said that if one accepted this thesis it had corollary of concept of a separate peace with all the risks that might involve for a small country confronting a great power. I expressed personal opinion that in framework of United Nations, Finland or any other country would have possibility to secure the advantages of a collective peace and would have seat at the conference table.

As for a separate peace Mr. Ryti said that his Government had no contact with the Soviet Government. He had heard through Swedish sources however that persons connected with Soviet Legation in Stockholm regarded all present Finnish leaders as unsuitable and had said that only a completely new government would be acceptable to Moscow. This, President said, would probably mean establishment of a Kuusinen regime⁵² in Helsinki.

Mr. Ryti said that Finland's great hope was that Russia would be beaten. If it was, they could live 20 years in peace. He said, in fact, Russia had already lost one-third of its population and present great offensives were even more exhausting its national strength. He did not think that if Russia were utterly worn out or beaten at end of war the other United Nations would fail to treat Finland fairly. Atlantic Charter seemed to apply to vanquished as well as victors. I replied that many of United Nations were even now represented by governments [in] exile but that I was sure the other United Nations would see to it that they were restored to their territories and rights after the war. So with Russia, even if it were defeated by Germany—which did not seem the case at present—the other United Nations had an obligation to see that Russia, too, was restored. I had impression that President Ryti had never thought of matter in this light.

President Ryti said he was convinced that a strong Germany was essential to welfare of Europe as a counterbalance to Russia. He did not think such a Germany could have a democratic form of government as Germans were not apt to democracy. They had had their Kaisers and might again. The Germans' contribution to civilization had been largely in the realm of "Kultur". Rather surprisingly he said that he knew many German generals who were "gentlemen" but that party people in Germany were of quite a different stripe and he did not like them at all. I had impression he had in back of his mind the idea of a "generals' government" which should oust the Nazis from power in Germany.

⁵² The reference is to Otto Wilhelm Kuusinen, a former Finnish Social Democrat who had become a Soviet citizen, and to the Soviet puppet government of the "Finnish Democratic Republic" set up on November 30, 1939, in Terijoki, of which Kuusinen was Premier and Foreign Minister. See *Foreign Relations*, 1939, vol. I, pp. 1013 ff.

President spoke of a Nordic federation and said he thought it would afford a solution for the four northern countries. Had such a federation been in existence before outbreak of present war and had other three Scandinavian States been as well prepared militarily as Finland they would still be free and neutral today. He went into history of Finland's efforts to organize defensive alliance with Sweden in 1940⁵³ emphasizing it was Russian refusal to countenance this alliance which forced an end to negotiations. He also referred to private attempt of Prime Minister Churchill⁵⁴ to influence Marshal Mannerheim to cease hostilities. I recalled Mr. Churchill's warning to Marshal that Finland might find itself "in same dock with guilty and defeated Nazis" and added that it was ironic that British Government should have had to declare war on Finland⁵⁵ almost on very day that Finnish Army had reached limit of its advance. President said that this was indeed true and that he had considered possibility of Marshal Mannerheim responding more affirmatively to Mr. Churchill by saying openly that Finns did not intend to go further. He said, however, that Marshal had refused to do this on grounds that letter might be published and that in any case it was not an honorable way to deal with Finland's co-belligerent, Germany. I had clear impression, however, that Ryti favored the former course.

President repeated usual Finnish comment that Finns could not bring themselves to believe that Britain was serious in its declaration of war and that they could not think of themselves as being regarded as enemies by British. He said that any day Britain was ready to "declare peace" with Finland he would be glad to do it also.

As for Finland's economic position President said weather this year had been better and it has been possible to plow greater area this autumn than ever before. He was well aware of fact that as Germany's war potential declined, Finland's economic position so far as it was dependent on Germany would decline too. However, he gave me to understand nation was husbanding its resources against that day. We were "too far" away to help Finland with supplies so long as Germans had Petsamo, he added.

President said he would like to show my paraphrase of your 13, January 18, to Foreign Minister and Prime Minister. I asked if he would also be kind enough to show it and appended copies of Atlantic Charter and Declaration of United Nations to Marshal Mannerheim. He said he would and that he thought he would be going to headquarters rather soon to see the Marshal. Baron Manner-

⁵³ See telegrams No. 315, March 20, 1940, from the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, No. 165, March 28, 1940, from the Minister in Finland, and No. 164, April 4, 1940, from the Minister in Sweden, *Foreign Relations*, 1940, vol. I, pp. 318, 322, and 325, respectively.

⁵⁴ British Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill.

⁵⁵ On December 6, 1941, Great Britain declared war on Finland.

heim, he said, had not been in good health of late and his spirits were low because of worry as to his condition. For some weeks he had been running a low grade fever and in addition was bothered by gout and dental trouble. In particular, Marshal was fretful over refusal of certain of tooth cavities to heal following recent operation and insisted this proved his vital force was leaving him. I have heard from General Kekoni ⁵⁶ also that Marshal is not in very good health.

My impressions from this interview are:

1. Procopé did not report his conversation with Mr. Welles on January 15 at all in sense of your 13.

2. President recognizes fact that this telegram embodied a new concept of security for Finland through victory of United Nations but seems so convinced of Russian duplicity and of American willingness to save Finland anyhow, that he thinks he can get the benefits of Atlantic Charter without the presumed liability of signing a document to which USSR is also signatory.

3. Finland's "policy" if it can be called such, seems based on possibility of Soviet exhaustion before German defeat.

4. Finnish Government seeks to lie low with a minimum expenditure of nation's military or economic energy waiting like Micawber for "something to turn up".

McCLINTOCK

740.0011 European War 1939/27519: Telegram

The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

[Extract]

STOCKHOLM, January 26, 1943—midnight.

[Received January 27—9:20 a. m.]

302. When I saw Boheman ⁵⁷ this afternoon (see my 301, January 26, 11 p. m.⁵⁸) he said that Finnish Cabinet Ministers Tanner ⁵⁹ and Fagerholm ⁶⁰ had among other things come here (1) for purpose of sounding Swedish official opinion on German-Russian military situation and for help and advice and (2) to solicit Swedish assistance in improving relations with United States. With respect to (1) they have been frankly told according to Boheman that there is nothing Sweden can do to help Finland in its present difficult position, that problem of how to extricate themselves is one that they will have to solve themselves. Boheman also said that Finns have been warned that labor opinion in Sweden is becoming increasingly hostile to Fin-

⁵⁶ Maj. Gen. Heikki Kekoni, representative in Helsinki of Commander in Chief Mannerheim.

⁵⁷ Erik Boheman, Secretary General of the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

⁵⁸ Not printed.

⁵⁹ Väinö A. Tanner, Finnish Minister of Finance, and leader of the Social Democratic Party of Finland.

⁶⁰ Karl August Fagerholm, Finnish Minister of Social Welfare.

land's war against Russia and that as a political factor this opinion could not be ignored. Sweden shares to full, however, Finnish anxieties as to unknown course and scope of Soviet ambitions. Boheman remarked with some irony that this is first time since war started that any initiative for an exchange of views has come from Finland, that up to present Finnish Government has been exceedingly cool to Sweden in diplomatic and political matters.

JOHNSON

740.0011 European War 1939/27478: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Standley)*

WASHINGTON, January 27, 1943—7 p. m.

47. Our 27, January 13, Kuibyshev.⁶¹ Following are paragraphs 1 and 2 of Stockholm's 285, January 25.⁶¹

"1. In discussing Finland today Soderblom⁶² of Foreign Office said that Swedish Government had heard from its Minister in Kuibyshev that in recent conversation between Molotov and Czechoslovak Minister⁶³ in Moscow, Molotov had indicated his desire to establish peace with Finland. Similar indication was given by Vyshinski⁶⁴ to Turkish Minister in Kuibyshev.⁶⁵ Swedes are very much concerned about Finland and watching coming election with great interest. Soderblom said Swedish Government naturally would not in any way attempt to influence internal politics in Finland but would certainly not look with disfavor upon election of Mannerheim. He mentioned a conversation which Mannerheim had had with Beck-Friis, new Swedish Minister in Helsinki recently in which latter questioned Marshal about his East Karelia order of day.⁶⁶ Marshal is quoted as saying, "Did I really say that?" Soderblom believes Marshal has been sorry about it from very short time after order was issued. One advantage for Finland which Swedes believe would be gained by election of Mannerheim would be Hitler's personal regard for Marshal which would make it very difficult for Hitler to bring himself to carry out a reprisal air attack on Finland should steps be taken toward peace and consequent break with Germany. Soderblom said that Wasastjerna⁶⁷ had last week asked Swedish Government to

⁶¹ Not printed.

⁶² S. J. Soderblom, Chief of the Political Affairs Section of the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

⁶³ Zdenek Fierlinger, the Czechoslovak envoy to the Soviet Union, held the rank of Ambassador.

⁶⁴ Andrey Yanuarevich Vyshinsky, First Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.

⁶⁵ Haydar Aktay, the Turkish envoy to the Soviet Union, held the rank of Ambassador.

⁶⁶ For a report on the Finnish Government's views on an Order of the Day by Marshal Mannerheim respecting Eastern Karelia, see telegram No. 292, July 16, 1941, 1 p. m., from the Minister in Finland, *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. 1, p. 48.

⁶⁷ Jarl A. Wasastjerna, Finnish Minister in Sweden.

take what steps it could toward improving relations between American Government and Finland and said that instructions had in fact been sent to Boström⁶⁸ along those lines. Swedish Government is anxious that Finland's relations with America be improved but Foreign Office believes that steps taken in Finland to this end have been "too obvious".

2. Foreign Office here seems now to be convinced that Germany is suffering irreparable losses in East and that end of war is nearer than could have been imagined 4 months ago. They seem convinced also that Kharkov and Rostov will fall and that considerable areas of Ukraine will return to Russian hands this winter and that loss of any possible oil supplies from Maikop and agricultural products from Eastern Ukraine will be a critical blow to German war effort. Foreign Office is also convinced that Germans will be out of Tunisia before end of February."

Following is Stockholm's 286, January:

"In a conversation yesterday with Madame Kollontay⁶⁹ Soviet Minister, she mentioned increasing anxiety in Swedish Government circles as to possible results for Finland of recent developments on German-Russian front. She said that a few days ago she had been requested informally by Swedish Government to suggest to Moscow advisability of making a public statement declaring that Russia had no aggressive intentions against Finland. She did not say whether suggestion was reported to Moscow but expressed opinion that it was impracticable for her Government to make such a statement at this time. In her view it is also impossible for Soviet Government at present to take any initiative toward separate peace with Finland, such a move is entirely up to Finland. She indicated, however, that Moscow would be receptive to such a suggestion and said that her Government had no desire to invade or to occupy Finland, that it would be prepared to stop at prewar frontiers and from that point start negotiations. I asked her if she meant by these frontiers those prior to or following the winter war and she said that there had been no indication from Moscow on that point.

Neither Stalin nor Molotov, Madame Kollontay said, had ever made any statement of policy which would indicate that Russia desires to annex Finland or impair its status as a sovereign state. She contrasted this attitude regarding Finland with official statements from Moscow regarding Baltic States and it was apparent from her remarks that she has belief Soviet Government will not retire from Estonia and Latvia after war.⁷⁰ She spoke of an independent Poland as a fixed point in Russian post-war policy and added that in Russian point of view Poland must be a strong state.⁷¹ She made no mention of possible frontiers."

HULL

⁶⁸ W. Boström, Swedish Minister in the United States.

⁶⁹ Alexandra Mikhailovna Kollontay, Soviet Minister in Sweden.

⁷⁰ See telegram No. 192, February 22, 4 p. m., from the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, and memorandum of February 23 by Charles E. Bohlen, of the Division of European Affairs, p. 506.

⁷¹ See section entitled "Interest of the United States in the Polish Government in Exile, and in its relations with the Soviet Union," pp. 314 ff.

862.504/787 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Finland (McClintock)

WASHINGTON, January 30, 1943—7 p. m.

16. Following is text of memorandum handed to Counselor of Finnish Legation ⁷² on January 28:

"Information has reached the American Government to the effect that the Nazi invaders of Norway intend to send a number of Norwegians from Norway to Finland to take part in work connected with the shipment of timber products from Finland.⁷³

Any comment which the Finnish Government is able to furnish the American Government in connection with this matter would be of interest, as it is to be noted that any Norwegians going to Finland under such circumstances would be under compulsion from the invaders of their country."

HULL

740.00119 European War 1939/1265 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, January 31, 1943—3 p. m.

[Received February 7—1:45 p. m.]

68. Department's 37, January 21, 3 p. m.⁷⁴ I took occasion on January 29 carefully and in detail to explain to Molotov the immediate considerations involved in American policy toward Finland as outlined in section I (a) of the memorandum and stated that I would appreciate any comments he might wish to make in regard to this policy. Molotov exhibited unusual interest in my statements and interrupted the interpreter frequently to make sure that he understood every point. Upon conclusion he stated that he would bring the considerations advanced to the attention of his Government. Although he gave no specific approval of the policy, from his responsive, cordial and at times affirmative attitude I obtained the impression that subjectively he was in accord with it.

⁷² Risto Solanko.

⁷³ The information was given to the Department by the Norwegian Embassy in a memorandum of January 25. According to this memorandum, Nazi authorities in Norway were planning to send 135 Norwegians to work in Finland, apparently with the intent to send timber to the Nazis at Kirkenes (northern Norway). The Norwegian Government viewed the project as a breach of international law, stating that, "If the Finnish Government tolerate such an undertaking, they become accessories to this crime". The memorandum indicated that American intervention in Helsinki in this matter would be greatly appreciated by the Norwegian Government. (862.504/787)

⁷⁴ Not printed; it instructed Ambassador Standley to approach the Soviet Government as soon as possible in regard to the Finnish problem, using as a basis the Department's memorandum of December 18, 1942, printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. II, p. 112.

Molotov thereupon remarked that he desired to express certain personal views in respect to Soviet-Finnish relations. He stated that the Soviet Union had been forced into war with Finland by reason of Finnish seizures of Soviet territory, and that the Soviet Union had not sought and did not want this war; however, "unfortunately the Finns were still on Soviet territory", and the war must continue. He added that his Government believed the Finns would find it impossible to broaden their participation in the war since they had already exerted too great an effort in correspondence with their existing forces. It was on this point alone that Molotov appeared to question the immediate considerations advanced by me.

In view of the inclination shown by Molotov to discuss the Soviet attitude toward Finland, and of the lack of bitterness expressed by him in his remarks, I considered it a favorable moment to go into the question of the general considerations in American policy toward Finland as set forth in paragraph 1 (b) of the memoranda [*memorandum*].

After I had outlined these considerations Molotov stated that he would bring these views to the attention of his Government. He confirmed in part the basic consideration by remarking "If the Finns withdrew from their partnership with Germany and gave up their territorial gains it would without doubt be to the interest of the Soviet Union and the United Nations" and inquired "How serious are the grounds to believe that the Finns wish to withdraw". There was no doubt that Molotov was considerably interested in the turn in which the discussion had taken. I stated that in my opinion there were indications that the Finnish Government believed that it might be advisable to terminate its conflict with Russia. Molotov inquired whether I or the American Government had information as to the nature of the Finnish conditions for such a withdrawal. I replied in the negative. Molotov then carefully reviewed the statements made by me listing specifically:

1. The immediate considerations of the American Government for the maintenance of American-Finnish relations.
2. The advantages to the Soviet Union, the United Nations and certain neutrals of a Finnish withdrawal from the war.
3. The existence of certain indications that Finland might be prevailed upon for the withdrawal from the war "under certain conditions".

After reiterating that the Soviet Government did not wish war with Finland, Molotov again stated that he would refer my views to his Government.

STANDLEY

860D.4061 Motion Pictures/90 : Telegram

The Chargé in Finland (McClintock) to the Secretary of State

HELSINKI, February 2, 1943—4 p. m.

[Received February 2—1 : 53 p. m.]

188. After protracted conversations in Foreign Office and elsewhere we have secured consent of the Finnish Licensing Board to importation of nine additional American feature pictures making use of licenses not availed of United Artists representative in Finland Adams Films.

It will be quite impossible to take advantage of this opportunity unless there is raw film with which to print copies.⁷⁵ We have had repeated inquiries from American motion picture representatives and from Finnish Film Chamber as to when raw film may be expected but thus far have been without enlightenment since your telegram 226, November 16.⁷⁶ If Department or Legation in Stockholm have any more definite information as to when we may expect to receive raw film I should much appreciate an immediate [reply?].

Repeated to Stockholm.

McCLINTOCK

862.504/787 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Finland (McClintock)

WASHINGTON, February 6, 1943—5 p. m.

22. Procopé called on the Under Secretary on February 4 to present the Finnish Government's memorandum⁷⁷ replying to the memorandum referred to in the Department's 16, January 30.

Mr. Welles stated that the only implication to be drawn from the document was that the Finnish Government was lending itself to the utilization in Finland of Norwegian slave labor sent for the purpose of undertaking work of benefit to the German Government; that it was incredible that the Finnish Government could expect the United States Government to believe that under present conditions in Norway

⁷⁵ Distributors of American films in Finland had been provided with 79,000 feet of raw positive film.

⁷⁶ Not printed, but see telegrams Nos. 1068, November 5, 1942, and 1074, November 7, 1942, from the Minister in Finland, *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. II, pp. 92 and 93, respectively.

⁷⁷ Not printed; it stated that the Finnish Government had approved about 150 visa applications of Norwegians desiring to proceed to lumbering camps in northern Finland but that the Swedish Government had refused to grant visas for transit through Sweden. According to this memorandum, the Finnish Government was planning to inquire of each Norwegian citizen in the group whether he was proceeding to Finland "voluntarily" or "under compulsion", and that those saying they were under compulsion would be free to accept asylum as political refugees. The general labor shortage in Finland for seasonal lumbering operations was mentioned in connection with Finland's approval of the visa applications. (862.504/802)

the Norwegians to be sent into Finland could be expected to make truthful statements to the Finnish authorities as to their proceeding to Finnish territory voluntarily; that this Government knew only too well how this sort of operation was conducted by the Germans; that if a Norwegian were told that his family in Norway would suffer reprisals if he did not go to work in Finland he would in all probability go and for the same reasons would allege that he was going voluntarily; that this intended procedure was on a par with the policy which the Germans had pursued in other occupied European states in order to get slave labor.

Mr. Welles said that he wished to make it very clear to Mr. Procopé that actions of this kind by the Finnish Government could only have the most serious and prejudicial effects upon American public opinion which was already gravely exercised with regard to the policy which the Finnish Government had been pursuing; that such a case as this could only be regarded as one more instance of Finland's lending itself to the most outrageous forms of German policy.

HULL

740.0011 European War 1939/28089

*The Finnish Legation to the Department of State*⁷⁸

MEMORANDUM

In the conversation between Mr. Welles and Mr. Procopé on January fifteenth 1943 the relations between Finland and the Soviet Union and their future outlook were referred to. On account of this, the Government of Finland wish to draw attention to the following points:

1) The reasons for the state of war still existing between Finland and the Soviet Union are the breaking of treaties and the acts of aggression against Finland undertaken by the Soviet Union. In 1939 Finland alone had to carry on the defensive struggle against this great Power whose aggression was condemned not only by the universal opinion but also by the League of Nations.⁷⁹ The ulti-

⁷⁸ Handed to the Under Secretary of State by the Finnish Minister on February 11, with the request that Mr. Welles give special attention to the last paragraph.

In a memorandum to Mr. Welles, February 13, the Acting Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Atherton) observed that the Legation's memorandum was apparently intended to justify their present policy and that it revealed that "Finland is not yet disposed to enter into peace negotiations with the Soviet Union". (740.0011 European War 1939/28089)

⁷⁹ For correspondence on the outbreak of war between Finland and the Soviet Union in 1939, see *Foreign Relations*, 1939, vol. I, pp. 952 ff. For the resolution of the Council of the League of Nations condemning the Soviet Union for its aggression against Finland, see telegram No. 322, December 13, 1939, from the Consul General at Geneva, *Foreign Relations*, The Soviet Union, 1933-1939, p. 803.

mate aim of this aggression was to destroy the independence of Finland. This is also proved by the fact that the Soviet Government established a bolshevistic puppet Government which was meant to rule the whole of Finland. Further the Moscow Government having signed a "peace treaty" with this puppet Government⁸⁰ went, on account of this "treaty", as far as to ignore at the beginning of the war the legal Government of the Republic of Finland.

After the signing of Peace in Moscow Finland concentrated all her strength upon the reconstruction of the country. She was not however left in peace to carry on this work. The Soviet Union charged Finland with new political demands exceeding the clauses of the Moscow Peace Treaty as for instance demands concerning military transit. At the same time the Russian Government interfering with the internal affairs of Finland and by causing domestic disturbances tried to lead the course of events in Finland to the same end as that achieved in the Baltic countries.⁸¹ Simultaneously the Soviet Union continued their military preparations beyond Finland's eastern borders on a large scale constructing a great number of railroads and airfields for which there was no local need. Everything indicated that a new aggression was under preparation.

Indeed, such an aggression did occur. On the very day of the outbreak of war between Germany and the Soviet Union the Soviet Air Force bombed purely Finnish targets. There was no reply to the diplomatic representations made by the Finnish Government on account of this attack. On June 25th, 1941, the Russian forces began systematic, aggressive operations against Finnish territory. Finland had thus once more become the object of aggression and was compelled again to resort to armed self-defense.

2) The Government of Finland do realize that Finland has to establish satisfactory relations with her eastern neighbour. So far, however, there are no signs to indicate that the aggressor as regards his political attitude would have given up his aims towards Finland nor strategically changed his aggressive activities.

WASHINGTON, February 8, 1943.

⁸⁰ The Treaty of Mutual Assistance and Friendship between the Soviet Union and the Finnish Democratic Republic was signed in Moscow on December 2, 1939, and took effect the same day; for text, see *Izvestiya*, December 3, 1939; for summary, see telegram No. 1005, December 3, 1939, from the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, *Foreign Relations*, 1939, vol. I, p. 1018.

⁸¹ For correspondence concerning the forcible occupation of the Baltic States and their incorporation into the Soviet Union, see *ibid.*, 1940, vol. I, pp. 357 ff.

740.00119 European War 1939/1278: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

KUIBYSHEV (MOSCOW), February 8, 1943—7 p. m.

[Received 10:20 p. m.]

131. My 68, January 31, 3 p. m. from Moscow and 112 of February 6, 1 p. m.⁸² The Czechoslovak Ambassador, who is often considered here to be a mouthpiece of the Soviet Government, has stated that there is much talk in Kuibyshev with regard to the possibility of Finland's withdrawal from the war, that in December Molotov had questioned him on the subject and had appeared very interested in it. He spoke of the possible conditions of such a withdrawal and said that any peace overtures would have to come from a third power. When asked what power he had in mind he replied the United States or Sweden. I am not sure that the Ambassador, who called by appointment, was expressing merely personal views or those reflecting those of the Soviet Government.

STANDLEY

740.00119 European War 1939/1279: Telegram

The Chargé in Finland (McClintock) to the Secretary of State

HELSINKI, February 9, 1943—2 p. m.

[Received February 9—1:46 p. m.]

226. We are told that the Finnish language broadcast from Moscow⁸³ last week stated that Helsinki would not be bombed by the Soviet Air Force as the Americans had interceded on the behalf of Finland and were arranging peace between the Soviet Union and this country.

MCCLINTOCK

860D.00/1126: Telegram

The Chargé in Finland (McClintock) to the Secretary of State

HELSINKI, February 11, 1943—11 a. m.

[Received 12:50 p. m.]

242. Tikander⁸⁴ yesterday spent two and half hours with Paasikivi⁸⁵ who described in detail his negotiations with Molotov and Stalin before and after Winter War. Paasikivi seemed to be completely assured that he could negotiate compromise peace with Soviet

⁸² Latter not printed.⁸³ By the Government-controlled Radio Moscow.⁸⁴ Wuho Tikander.⁸⁵ Juho K. Paasikivi, Finnish industrial financier, who was the last Minister of Finland to the Soviet Union (1940-41) prior to the outbreak of war.

Government. However, he emphasized that public opinion in Finland was not yet ripe for this change and accordingly he felt Ryti would be best interim President.⁸⁶ He inferred clearly that when time became propitious he himself would welcome Presidency identifying his candidacy with a policy of *rapprochement* with Russia. Like many others he seemed to regard Ryti as "expendable".

Paasikivi seemed to think that Mannerheim's candidacy⁸⁷ was being pushed on theory that Mannerheim was best qualified to bring about *rapprochement* with Great Britain as if this were more important than influencing official opinion in Washington. He agreed with all observers that Ryti was sufficiently opportunistic to stand with any side either for his own or derivatively Finland's good.

McCLINTOCK

740.00119 European War 1939/1281 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Standley)

WASHINGTON, February 13, 1943—7 p. m.

90. Your 148, February 11, 5 p. m.⁸⁸ We do not believe that it is desirable for you to seek at this time a special interview with Molotov in order to raise again the Finnish question. However, if on your return to Moscow you will see him on other matters there is no objection, on the basis of his statement to you that he was referring our views to his Government, to your asking him what the reaction of his Government had been to your previous conversations. Should Molotov inquire whether this Government has any knowledge of the attitude of the Finnish Government towards the possibility of peace negotiations, you may reply that we have not sounded out the Finnish Government and that we would prefer not to express an opinion as to the possible reaction of the Finnish Government to such a sounding until we have had an opportunity to study the results of the Finnish elections scheduled for February 15. If he is interested in our views as to the possible reaction of the Finnish Government to an approach on this subject, we should be glad to communicate our views to him as soon as we have been able to formulate them.

⁸⁶ A national election for the Presidency of Finland was to be held on February 15, 1943; on that day the electoral college reelected President Ryti by a vote of 269 out of 300.

⁸⁷ On election day, February 15, Helsinki newspapers published a message from Marshal Mannerheim declining a nomination as candidate for President which had been made by Agrarian Party electors, and stating: "I have not given my consent to this candidature about which I had not been asked."

⁸⁸ Not printed; in this telegram Ambassador Standley reported that Molotov would advise his Government on the United States policy toward Finland; the Ambassador inquired whether the Department wished him to endeavor to obtain Soviet approval for that policy.

For your information only: The Swedish Government is showing great interest in the possibilities inherent in this situation and a disposition to do everything that it can to further peace negotiations between the Soviet Union and Finland. They, however, also wish to await the results of the Finnish elections before forming a definite opinion as to the advisability of approaching the Finns at this time.

HULL

740.0011 European War 1939/28089: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Finland (McClintock)

WASHINGTON, February 13, 1943—8 p. m.

31. We sent by messenger today to the Finnish Legation a memorandum in regard to its memorandum⁸⁹ referred to in our 28, February 12 to Helsinki and our 179 to Stockholm.⁹⁰ Our memorandum reads, in paraphrase, as follows:

"We have carefully considered the Finnish Legation's memorandum dated February 8, 1943 and especially the last paragraph thereof⁹¹ in accordance with Mr. Procopé's oral request when he handed the memorandum to Mr. Welles on February 11.

"We note that paragraph numbered 1 of the Legation's memorandum reiterates the Finnish Government's views as to the inception of the war in which Finland and the USSR are now engaged.

"We find, however, nothing in the memorandum to indicate that Finland has taken or proposes to take any steps to end its 'cobelligerency' with our enemies. The views of the American Government with regard to this matter have been made abundantly clear to the Finnish Government on a number of occasions in the past.

"If the Legation's memorandum is intended to have any other purpose or significance than to reiterate the Finnish Government's views as to the inception of the war between Finland and the USSR, the Finnish Government is requested to make clear to the American Government the intended purpose and significance in order that appropriate consideration may be given to the matter."

Foregoing is for your information only and not for other use. Repeated to Stockholm as our no. 187.

HULL

⁸⁹ The Finnish Legation's memorandum of February 8, p. 232.

⁹⁰ Neither printed.

⁹¹ In his telegram No. 262, February 14, 11 a. m., the Chargé in Finland reported that President Ryti himself was the author of this paragraph (740.0011 EW-1939/27919).

860D.00/1148 : Telegram

The Chargé in Finland (McClintock) to the Secretary of State

HELSINKI, February 18, 1943—1 p. m.
[Received February 18—12: 35 p. m.]

298. Source mentioned in my 297 today ⁹² said that during conversation with Prime Minister Rangell he was closely questioned as to American peace aims and what we proposed to do after the war was won. Rangell stressed this [*his*] interest in whether United States could exert effective influence on Soviet Government.

McCLINTOCK

740.0011 European War 1939/28081 : Telegram

The Chargé in Finland (McClintock) to the Secretary of State

HELSINKI, February 19, 1943—noon.
[Received 7: 15 p. m.]

311. For the Under Secretary. Albin Johnson spent more than 2 hours with President Ryti yesterday. He said President had given him several oral messages for President Roosevelt and seemed at first inclined to deliver these personally. I said that this was quite unobjectionable from our point of view but that war was moving rapidly and perhaps it would be more useful if he could tell me what President Ryti had in mind to tell President Roosevelt as if anything happened to Johnson en route to Washington or if our strategic plans were activated before his arrival the messages might come too late. Accordingly, here are the oral points made by President Ryti for transmission to President Roosevelt by Albin Johnson:

1. President Ryti sent his most cordial good wishes to President Roosevelt and stressed his satisfaction on seeing the principles and practices of the New Deal continue through the reelection of President Roosevelt to a third term.

2. President Ryti wanted to know what President Roosevelt thought of the Swedish Army taking that portion of Finnish Lapland now under German occupation into protective military custody. In particular, he wanted to know what Soviet Government would think of such an arrangement. He said that Finnish Government was discussing this question at present with Swedish Government. In this connection, I recall first paragraph my 51, January 11.

3. President Ryti said there are now seven German divisions in Finland. Johnson had impression they numbered around 100,000 men in all. Contrary to other reports which have reached us, Ryti insisted they were all first line troops. He confirmed reports mentioned in my 276, February 15 and 310 today ⁹³ that Germans were

⁹² The source cited in this telegram was Albin Johnson, International News Service correspondent in Finland.

⁹³ Neither printed.

withdrawing forces from Finland and suggested that German army might eventually leave this country entirely for purpose of concentrating military strength "inside the German fortress". This possibility sharpened President Ryti's interest in Russian intentions.

4. President asked that President Roosevelt give consideration to following possible armistice terms:

- (a). Finnish Army to withdraw to 1939 frontier.
- (b). Those areas now under Finnish military occupation—largely eastern Karelia—to remain a demilitarized zone, a sort of no man's land.
- (c). Finland is ready to give up its dreams of a so-called "strategic frontier".

5. President Ryti gave Johnson a map for President Roosevelt which he said was a Russian map showing the boundaries of the Finland which Soviet Government proposed to establish under its puppet Kuusinen regime in late 1939. Johnson was impressed by fact that this map gave Finland all of Soviet eastern Karelia but did not seem to grasp the point that such a "greater Finland" was to have been organized under Soviet auspices with a Communist government and thus the assimilation of eastern Karelia under such a government would have been merely the extension not of Finland into Soviet Karelia but of Soviet Karelia into Finland.

The foregoing were the oral messages to President Roosevelt. President Ryti apparently has been giving considerable thought to the Atlantic Charter since my conversation with him on January 21 and questioned Johnson about the Charter. The President said that he subscribed entirely to principles of Charter but did not see how Finland could adhere to it without going to war against Germany which would not be "honorable". I suggested to Johnson that article 1 of Declaration of United Nations provides a way out.

Johnson urged on President Ryti idea suggested in seventh paragraph of my 116, January 12 [27], namely the benefits of a collective peace as contrasted with risks of a separate peace and thought that on this point the President was changing his mind. He said Ryti frankly admitted that his past policy had been mistaken and had impression that President whom he judged to be "a cold fish" was carefully calculating how and when to effect his change in policy. Ryti told Johnson that Finnish Government stood entirely behind declaration of Social Democratic Party as set forth in my 281, February 16,⁹⁴ which of course is not surprising since Tanner, the leader of party, was the man who put Ryti back in office.

⁹⁴ Not printed; this telegram described the declaration published in the press February 16, by the Finnish Social Democratic Party Council, as supporting the concept of "separate war" against the Soviet Union while announcing a policy which aimed at eventual withdrawal from the war when Finland's security would be guaranteed. The declaration also called for a strengthening of relations with the other Nordic States and with the United States. (860D.00/-1141)

President Ryti emphasized question of food but seemed already to be thinking along the lines of previous suggestions that we might be in position to feed the Finns in return for a change in policy. Please see my 179, February 1.⁹⁵ Ryti characteristically added that Finns could have taken Soroka at any time and still could do so.

Johnson said he had distinct impression from President that question of reestablishment of consular relations⁹⁶ with United States and information services had been solved by a "formula" and that possibly Procopé was discussing these matters with you. I may add parenthetically that Johnson himself has been spreading idea here that we are prone to reestablish consular relations and resume publicity activities as a sign of good will toward the Finns. I told Johnson I thought these were details which would have to be worked out after more basic principles were agreed upon and I would add that should we reestablish consular relations before these people have effected a change of policy as well as of heart we should lose a highly effective bargaining point.

During their long conversation Johnson and Ryti discussed Hitler, Ryti recalling the only time he had met the Fuehrer which was on occasion of Hitler's visit to Finland on June 4 last year.⁹⁷ Ryti said he had asked Hitler why Germans did not make peace with British. Hitler made a wry face and said he would make peace any time but British simply did not want it. Hitler complained to Ryti that he had ordered "Baedeker bombings"⁹⁸ on various historical towns of England only with greatest reluctance and as a reprisal for British bombings of Cologne. Ryti told Johnson that Marshal Mannerheim had arrived in the capital and was to dine with him last night. Mannerheim will have conferences with various leaders here today. I have a strong hunch that Marshal is consulting with Government on what sort of reply to make to memorandum of February 13 as transmitt[ed] in your 31, February 13. The Marshal's likewise undoubtedly counseling on constitution of a next Cabinet.

McCLINTOCK

⁹⁵ Not printed.

⁹⁶ American-Finnish consular relations were broken in 1942 with the closing of United States consular offices in Finland on July 15, and of Finnish Consulates in the United States on August 1. See telegrams No. 142, July 15, 1942, to the Minister in Finland, and No. 596, July 21, 1942, from the Minister in Finland, *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. II, pp. 68 and 73, respectively.

⁹⁷ See the memorandum by Under Secretary of State Welles, June 5, 1942, *ibid.*, p. 63.

⁹⁸ An expression used to characterize indiscriminate bombings resulting in destruction or damage to cathedrals and other historic buildings, the reference being to the well-known Baedeker guidebooks.

740.00119 European War 1939/1301 : Telegram

The Chargé in Finland (McClintock) to the Secretary of State

HELSINKI, February 20, 1943—2 p. m.

[Received February 20—1:35 p. m.]

320. Source mentioned my 319 today⁹⁹ had long conversation with Paasikivi whom he found much concerned over immediate necessity of making peace with Soviet Union. Paasikivi said that Finland missed its opportunity when it did not make overtures for peace last autumn when such overtures would have had more tangible value to Russians than now when Soviet armies were winning all along Eastern Front.

Paasikivi who characterized himself as "one of the two percent in Finland who think we can get along with the Russians" said that in his opinion Finland must terminate its war with Union of Soviet Socialist Republics within a month or 6 weeks. He said situation was analogous to that in autumn of 1939 when Finland could have remained at peace had it not been so stubborn in negotiations which he and Tanner conducted as plenipotentiaries in Moscow. Paasikivi professed at that time to have counseled a more moderate line but was overruled presumably by Tanner and Erkko. He said so [*also?*] at present time if Finnish haggled and stuck stubbornly to their demands they had a very good chance of losing everything.

Paasikivi was much interested in Atlantic Charter as providing a way out for Finland and asked the same question as had Ryti (see my 311, yesterday) on how Finland could adhere without going to war with Germany. Johnson who had been provided with a copy of Declaration of United Nations showed Paasikivi possibilities implicit in article 1. Paasikivi said he would take Declaration of United Nations with him when he calls on Ryti today to counsel on foreign policy. I had impression that Finnish Government has at last begun actively to think of implications of Atlantic Charter and Declaration of United Nations as they bear on immediate problem here.

Paasikivi displayed considerable interest in our Lease Lend Act¹ and mentioned Turkey as receiving Lease Lend assistance. He seemed to think however that it was necessary to be one of United Nations in order to get Lease Lend benefits and I do not think Johnson corrected this misapprehension. I shall find occasion however to make it clear that any nation whose defense is determined by the President to be vital to the defense of United States is eligible to Lease Lend aid.

Johnson recalled one additional element of his conversation with President Ryti as reported in my 311 yesterday adding Ryti had said that in any future settlement with USSR Finland would be willing to

⁹⁹ Albin Johnson; telegram not printed.

¹ Approved March 11, 1941; 55 Stat. 31.

recognize Russian strategic interests in certain Finnish islands of Gulf of Finland nearest to Kronstadt by which I infer he had in mind Seiskari, Lavansaari and Peninsula. Johnson even got impression that if pressed Ryti would be willing to relinquish Koivisto Line² although this would seem automatically to make the defense of Viipuri impossible.

McCLINTOCK

740.0011 European War 1939/28033: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Finland (McClintock)

WASHINGTON, February 20, 1943—7 p. m.

35. 1. Please call upon Ryti as soon as possible to leave with him a memorandum³ in the following sense:

The American Government has not been unaware that for many months certain Finnish authorities have been intimidating and even taking drastic action against such Finns as have been inclined to maintain friendly relations with American officials and the United States. There is substantial evidence that these actions on the part of the Finnish officials concerned resulted from German pressure. It is understood that in the case of at least one individual, action has been taken against him⁴ by Finnish authorities on the basis of what amounts to his admitted preference for American to German friendships and that this was "injurious to Finland."

It goes without saying that as far, at least, as the American Government is concerned, the Finnish Government is free to impose such restrictions upon the contacts of its citizens with foreign officials as it may deem necessary. However, if those restrictions are imposed under the circumstances and for the reasons heretofore applicable, the American Government is unable to see how it can logically be maintained by the Finnish Government that it is engaged in a "separate war."

It is the understanding of the American Government that some aspects of this anomalous situation have recently been or shortly will be brought to the attention of President Ryti. The American Government is bringing its views on this subject to his attention in order

² A proposed Finnish-Soviet frontier through Koivisto, or Björkö, suggested by the Soviet Government on October 14, 1939. See telegram No. 288, October 26, 1939, from the Minister in Finland, *Foreign Relations*, 1939, vol. I, p. 980; also, John H. Wuorinen (ed.), *Finland and World War II, 1939-1944* (New York, Ronald Press Co., 1948), p. 57.

³ With respect to this memorandum for President Ryti, an officer of the Division of European Affairs advised the Secretary of State in a memorandum of February 20 that the message had the "aim of possibly saving the life of a person who has been a consistent and valuable friend to us." (740.0011 European War 1939/28033)

⁴ This reference is to the confirmation by Finland's highest military court of the death sentence passed on Maj. Max von Hellens of the Finnish Army, convicted in November 1942 for having given information on German military forces in the Soviet Union to an American military attaché in Finland.

that he may give them such weight as he deems appropriate under the circumstances.⁵

2. Foregoing has reference to your 315, February 19.⁶ However, we feel unable to be more specific with the Finnish Government in our references to that case. Hence, in whatever discussion arises from the memorandum, you should be guided accordingly.

3. If Ryti should turn the conversation to broader questions of policy we think it best at this time for you to adopt a negative attitude and merely undertake to report to us any statements he may care to make.

HULL

740.00119 European War 1939/1304: Telegram

The Chargé in Finland (McClintock) to the Secretary of State

HELSINKI, February 23, 1943—noon.

[Received 7:19 p. m.]

327. Swiss Minister called on me this morning. He was on a fishing trip and seemed interested to know whether Finns were actively promoting idea of an armistice. He said that he had impression that soundings were going on in Stockholm⁷ with this in view and that Russian Legation there had indicated that Soviet Government was interested in armistice with Finland at present time but that this time was very short: in other words, Finns must cease hostilities within immediate future.

Swiss Minister said his impression was that neither public nor governmental opinion in this country was sufficiently prepared for an armistice and that many of common people still naively regarded retention of Soviet Karelia as a definite war aim. (We do not entirely agree with this view and feel that most Finns are anxious for peace and regard Soviet Karelia as useful more for bargaining purposes

⁵ A petition for clemency for Major von Hellens was sent to President Ryti, and although he upheld the court's decision, Von Hellens was not executed. A second American note to Ryti on March 4, 1943, warned that execution of Von Hellens would "most seriously affect" future relations between the United States and Finland. (740.0011 European War 1939/28700) The case apparently came up for re-examination by Finnish authorities about mid-March. Von Hellen's life was spared, and Swedish press reports in September 1944 stated that, upon the request of the Soviet Control Commission in Finland, Major Von Hellens had been released from prison.

⁶ Not printed.

⁷ The reference possibly was to a reported effort by Väinö Tanner to establish contact with the British through the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs with the aim of normalizing Finnish-British relations prior to requesting Sweden to mediate between Finland and the Soviet Union. The British reportedly did not respond to Tanner. For a Finnish account, see Wuorinen, *Finland and World War II, 1939-1944*, p. 151.

than for anything else.) He said in the Government various Ministers thought so rigidly and with such lack of imagination that he could not see how they could change their minds rapidly enough to take advantage of present Russian disposition to peace if indeed such disposition existed.

Swiss Minister said he had had Tanner for lunch the other day and had asked him "When will Finland be willing to get out of its war?[""] Tanner replied "At once—provided the Americans feed us and send us an army of 50,000 men to protect us from the Russians."

Repeated to Stockholm for the Minister.

McCLINTOCK

740.00119 European War 1939/1430

*Memorandum by Mr. L. Randolph Higgs of the Division of European Affairs to the Secretary of State*⁸

[WASHINGTON,] February 25, 1943.

MR. SECRETARY: Mr. Kingsbury Smith, INS correspondent covering the Department, came in this morning and handed me the attached memorandum of a conversation which he had yesterday afternoon with Mr. Toivola, a Counselor of the Finnish Legation. I confined my remarks to Mr. Smith with respect to the memorandum to saying that the memorandum had some very interesting aspects and that I greatly appreciated his courtesy in furnishing it to me.

With respect to the Finnish Legation's alleged cable to Helsinki "suggesting five points as a possible solution of Finland's present difficulties" it would seem that while such a solution might have been possible in the late summer or early fall of 1941, the Soviet Union would probably be cold to any suggestions along these lines under present circumstances, as such a solution would leave Finnish armed forces astride the southern end of the Murmansk Railroad and supply lines through Soviet Karelia to Leningrad. It is also thought unlikely that the Soviet Union would consider for a moment any solution which would recognize even temporarily any Finnish claim on Soviet Karelia.

The penultimate and antepenultimate paragraphs of Mr. Smith's memorandum also have their interest. I have taken the liberty of bringing these aspects of the memorandum to the special attention of Colonel Sands, War Department Liaison Officer.

⁸ Copies sent to Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles, Assistant Secretary of State Adolf A. Berle, Jr., and James Clement Dunn, the Adviser on Political Relations.

[Annex]

Memorandum by Mr. Kingsbury Smith, of International News Service, to Mr. L. Randolph Higgs of the Division of European Affairs

[WASHINGTON,] February 25, 1943.

Mr. Toivola called me Wednesday afternoon ¹⁰ and inquired whether he could see me for a few minutes on a matter of importance. I met him at the Mayflower Hotel. He said Mr. Welles' statement to the press on Tuesday ¹¹ had created a great deal of interest and considerable excitement at the Legation. He wished to advise me of the action taken by the Legation as a result of the statement. He emphasized that the information he was about to give me was not for publication in any way, but was for the confidential knowledge of myself and "my friends" at the Department.

The Legation, he said, had sent a cable to the Foreign Office in Helsinki suggesting five points as a possible solution of Finland's present difficulties. These five points were:

1—That Finland declare its intention of withdrawing from further participation in the war;

2—That Finland announce it will engage in no further military operations of an offensive character;

3—That Finland state it is unable to eject by force the German divisions on its soil, but that it will not assist them in any military operations;

4—That Finland announce it intends to maintain its present defensive lines pending a final peace settlement with the Russians;

5—That if a reasonable settlement cannot be achieved with the Russians, Finland should declare its intention to leave up to the United Nations peace conference the question of what should constitute a just frontier line with Russia.

Toivola asked whether I thought this action on the part of the Legation would meet with the approval of the State Department. I said I thought it probably would; that the Department, in my opinion, would be pleased with any action Finland took to withdraw from the war.

Toivola said he thought it was most important that no publicity be given to the Legation's action because the Germans might make it difficult for Helsinki if they thought Finland was reacting to American pressure.

¹⁰ February 24.

¹¹ In a statement to the press on February 23, 1943, Under Secretary of State Welles said that he hoped Finland would cease giving military aid to Germany and that American-Finnish friendship and understanding should make it clear that the United States hoped Finland would cease providing effective aid to those nations at war with the United Nations; for text, see the *New York Times*, February 24, 1943, p. 6, col. 5.

The Germans, he said, are a funny people. They are almost like children. We feel they are prepared to recognize Finland's right to independence of action, providing they think Finland is not reacting to American pressure.

Toivola also said that three "very important" people had been in contact with the Legation during the day. Each inquired whether the Legation had any information indicating that a separate peace between Germany and Russia was imminent. One of the parties was described by Toivola as having very close contacts with high American military authorities. That party intimated that our military people were extremely concerned over the danger of a separate peace between Germany and Russia. Toivola declined to reveal the names of the three people.

He said the Legation had been very impressed by the inquiries. He also thought that Helsinki was concerned over the danger of such a possibility; and that this concern might have a very direct bearing on the fact that the Finnish leaders apparently were now giving serious thought to the question of a separate peace. "The Germans sold us out once, and we know they would not hesitate to do so again."

He reiterated that Finland is not pro-Nazi, and never has been so. He said that even Witting had told him on one occasion that Finland could not trust the Germans.

660D.6231/147 : Telegram

The Chargé in Finland (McClintock) to the Secretary of State

[Extracts]

HELSINKI, March 2, 1943.

[Received March 2—11:07 p. m.]

366. Papers today publish following statement issued by Minister Rainer von Fieandt¹² heading Finnish delegation Finnish-German negotiations commencing here today.

"Last year's Finnish-German trade based on quota agreement signed February 13, 1942¹³ supplemented by agreements of June 9th and August 18th.¹⁴ Close of year additional agreement concluded regarding provisional trade adjustment during first quarter 1943. Negotiations opening today concern current year's trade.

To describe development our trade with Germany last year I first want say few words regarding our exports. Total value our ex-

¹² Deputy Director General of Nordiska Föreningsbanken, who held the honorary rank of Minister.

¹³ See telegram No. 122, February 14, 1942, from the Minister in Finland, *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. II, p. 39.

¹⁴ For reports on these two agreements, see telegrams No. 482, June 10, 1942, and No. 692, August 20, 1942, from the Minister in Finland, *ibid.*, pp. 66 and 79, respectively.

ports last year 5,477,000,000 marks whereof Germany's share 3,511,000,000 or 64%. Principal exports to Germany comprised our natural export articles, wood goods and woodworking industry products.

Total value our imports last year 11,709,000,000 marks whereof 8,420,000,000 or 72% from Germany. List commodities obtained from Germany comprises almost without exception all most essential goods. Total value for us vitally important grain and cereal products exceeded considerably billion marks, fully 100% coming from Germany. Mineral fuels, textile materials and products represent next billion mark import group. Examination various textile items discloses over 90% most items represents Germany's share. Next group comprises iron, steel and products thereof, Germany's share this group also exceeding billion marks. Above list could be continued but it is enough mention additionally certain to us particularly important commodities such as tanning, dye extracts, fertilizers, various chemicals, hides, leather goods, buna rubber and products thereof.

Above clearly demonstrates extent 1942 Finnish-German trade and its decisive significance to us.

McCLINTOCK

860D.00/1185 : Telegram

The Chargé in Finland (McClintock) to the Secretary of State

HELSINKI, March 5, 1943—noon.

[Received 10:08 p. m.]

380. Erkko last night confirmed report in my 361, March 1,¹⁵ that Kivimaki had been on the carpet before Ribbentrop¹⁶ as result of Social Democratic manifesto reported in my 281, February 16.¹⁷ He said that in addition to threat of suspending trade negotiations Ribbentrop had menaced Kivimaki with possibility of a separate peace between Russia and Germany with resultant consequences for Finland. Erkko confirmed our impression that following Ribbentrop's representation the tone of Finnish press has become distinctly less pro-American and more pro-German. I commented to Erkko that it was strange that statement on Finland by Mr. Welles of February 23 had gone entirely without editorial comment in Finnish press although a week earlier I was sure every paper in Helsinki would have published a leading article on the statement. Erkko implies this was due to dictate of censorship. If additional evidence of "German pressure" were needed a more glaring example would be hard to find.

¹⁵ Not printed.

¹⁶ Joachim von Ribbentrop, German Foreign Minister.

¹⁷ Not printed, but see footnote 94, p. 238.

I am informed from reliable source that Ryti was at first determined to keep Rangell as Prime Minister but as he himself told me yesterday (see my 376, March 4¹⁸) the Diet refused to stomach Rangell. My informant states that Hakkila¹⁹ was then asked to form a government for the purpose of "sabotaging the foreign policy of Social Democrats as stated in their manifesto". I think this a not unlikely possibility in view of Hakkila's reactionary views and the fact that Germans by this time had made their wants known. . . .

McCLINTOCK

740.00119 European War 1939/1281 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Standley)*

WASHINGTON, March 9, 1943—10 p. m.

126. Your 68, January 30 [31], and 148, February 11.²⁰ You are requested to seek an interview with Molotov and reverting to your conversation of January 29 with him regarding Finnish-Soviet relations you should point out to him that during the process of the formation of the new Government in Finland²¹ we had had no opportunity to obtain an answer to his inquiry as to how serious are the grounds for believing that the Finns wish to withdraw from the war. This Government is prepared to estimate the political thinking of the new Finnish Cabinet particularly with regard to peace but it would be helpful in preparing our instructions for our Minister in Helsinki if I might know for my own personal guidance whether if the Finns are seeking peace the Soviet Government would accept the United States as an intermediary to work for direct discussions between the Finnish and Soviet Governments up to the point where they are in secret bilateral negotiations.

Please make it clear that should the Soviet Government feel that there is any other way in which the United States Government can be helpful in this problem we would appreciate receiving its suggestions with regard thereto.

The chief interest of the United States in connection with this question is its belief that the withdrawal of Finland from the war would result in concrete and material advantages to the Soviet Union and to the nations associated with the Soviet Union. I wish to emphasize the fact that the information sought is for the secret information of the United States and not for communication to the Finnish

¹⁸ Not printed.

¹⁹ Väinö P. Hakkila, President of the Finnish Diet.

²⁰ Latter not printed.

²¹ Edwin J. Linkomies was appointed Prime Minister of Finland on March 5, 1943, with a new Cabinet which included four new heads of Ministries, among whom was C. Henrik Ramsay as Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Government. If the reply of the Soviet Government to the question above set forth is in the affirmative, it will be the effort of this Government to persuade the Finnish Government to agree to the proposal and to indicate to this Government the general nature of the terms upon which it would be willing to undertake the secret negotiations suggested.

WELLES

860D.4061 Motion Pictures/94 : Telegram

The Chargé in Finland (McClintock) to the Secretary of State

HELSINKI, March 10, 1943—1 p. m.

[Received 2:04 p. m.]

410. Personal for Hugh Cumming.²⁴ I should be most obliged if you would kindly ascertain what has happened to the question of raw motion picture film for use in Finland. I hesitate to send another official telegram to Department as we have sent so many without any appreciable effect. As my 252, February 12²⁵—the last despairing cry on this question—indicated Department has gone on record here with “firm commitment” to supply minimum legitimate needs of Finnish film industry but thus far we have not made much promise [*progress?*] in honoring this commitment.

If raw film could be sent at this particular time when German Secretary of International Film Union is in Helsinki busily trying to establish a ban on American films it would be most opportune. I have reason to believe that we could break the pro-German Finnish Film Union if given raw film and I also can assure you that new American feature pictures will soon not be shown in this country if we do not have raw positive film with which to print copies.

I hope this does not sound too querulous but I have fought a very long fight with so far only verbal ammunition and if Department does not intend to follow through on this question I shall stop talking.

If whoever is entrusted with this question has the file in bottom of his box would you be kind enough to see that it gets to the top and is acted upon.²⁶ Thanks and regards.

McCLINTOCK

²⁴ Hugh S. Cumming, Jr., Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs.

²⁵ Not printed.

²⁶ The Department, in telegram No. 44, March 13, informed the Chargé that shipment of raw film had been delayed since August 1942 because of a lack of means to transship it, a problem which lay outside the Department's control, and that film would be shipped “by first available means”. (860D.4061 Motion Pictures/94)

740.00119 European War 1939/1329 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, March 13, 1943—4 p. m.
[Received March 14—12: 12 p. m.]

155. For the Acting Secretary. Our [*Your*] 126, March 9, 10 p. m. After referring to our conversation of [January] 29²⁷ I read to Molotov last evening a carefully prepared statement setting forth all the considerations contained in your telegram. Molotov at first stated that the answer to your proposal would depend on the attitude of the present Finnish Government and asked me how the American Government evaluated that attitude; specifically whether there were any indications that the Finns desired to withdraw from the war and initiate negotiations. I replied that we had not sounded out the present Finnish Government on the matter and therefore had no definite information; that as I had stated we were prepared to do so but we thought it would be helpful if we knew for our personal guidance whether if we obtained indications that the Finns desired peace the Soviet Government would accept the United States as an intermediary. I added that in my opinion there must be some basis for the belief that the Finns desired peace otherwise any [*my?*] Government would not have made the proposal to act as intermediary. Molotov then stated "he was, of course, interested in the proposal; however, to judge whether it would be advisable to adopt a positive decision in the matter it was necessary to ascertain whether there are any prospects of success". He repeatedly expressed interest in our evaluation of the Finnish desire to withdraw from the war and I stated that I would seek your views on this question.

Molotov promised to inform his Government of your proposal and to communicate with me again.

Throughout the conversation he made no mention whatsoever in regard to the conditions of peace.

STANDLEY

660D.6231/151 : Telegram

The Chargé in Finland (McClintock) to the Secretary of State

HELSINKI, March 15, 1943.
[Received March 15—11: 10 a. m.]

428. Local press March 14 announcing conclusion Finnish-German 1943 trade agreement together with supplementary agreements covering goods exchange with Belgium, Netherlands, Norway "guaran-

²⁷ Reference is apparently to the conversation reported in Ambassador Standley's telegram No. 68, January 31, p. 229.

teeing Finnish food supply through German deliveries until next harvest" published following statement by Von Fieandt, head of Finnish delegation:

"Present agreement's significance apparent remembering last year 72% Finnish imports came from Germany, 64% exports went to Germany besides which trade with Norway, Netherlands, Belgium totalled 3% of imports, 8% of exports.

Well-known fact small country's production always comparatively one-sided this particularly true Finland's case because geographic, climatic conditions. Nevertheless, our products essential for other countries. In order import needed textile, raw material, wood, wool we must export cellulose, in order produce cellulose must have foreign coal, coal mines again require our pitprops thus Finland and customers complete each other words fullest sense.

Concluding present agreement both countries strive best ability meet other signatory's reasonable requirements. Germany undertakes supply vital commodities practically same quantities as last year though we unable off pay [*pay off or*] even reduce clearing debt. Can assure Finland her side does everything maintain exports essential maintenance our trade balance. My opinion our trade Germany current year within agreements framework promises develop satisfactorily as last year.

Needless say cooperation between Finnish German trade delegations been pleasant cordial as always."

McCLINTOCK

740.00119 European War 1939/1348a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Finland (McClintock)

WASHINGTON, March 19, 1943—6 p. m.

43. Please call on the Minister of Foreign Affairs and remind him that we have received no communication from him on the subject of whether Finland intends to continue its policy of collaboration with the enemies of the United States. You should say that the urgency and importance of the matter impel me to inquire if the Finnish Government is disposed to accept the good offices of the United States Government in establishing contact between the Finnish Government and the Soviet Government with a view to the initiation of discussions between them for the cessation of hostilities and the restoration of peace. You may say to Dr. Ramsay that I feel the moment is appropriate for the Finnish Government to give me a definite indication of its view on this proposal for the reason that with the establishment of the new Cabinet in Helsinki we consider it necessary to know, without equivocation, whether the Finnish Government places enough reliance on the goodwill of the American Government and people for the people of Finland to warrant our rendering them this assistance. You may add that I am convinced that the Finnish Government should give careful consideration to the possibility that no

further opportunity is likely to arise for such a display of interest and goodwill in behalf of the Finnish people if my present proposal does not commend itself to the Finnish authorities. If Dr. Ramsay inquires what reason we may have to think that the Soviet Government is prepared to institute direct conversations with the Finnish Government at the instance of the United States you may say to him that we have no reason to expect that the Soviet Government would not be willing to examine such a proposal if brought forward by the United States. You should make it clear as above indicated that the present proposal has reference only to bringing the two Governments into contact in the hope that the United States can contribute thereby to the restoration of peaceful relations between the two peoples.

Please tell the Foreign Minister that we should like to have his Government's reply at the earliest possible date.²⁸

HULL

740.00119 European War 1939/1349 : Telegram

The Chargé in Finland (McClintock) to the Secretary of State

HELSINKI, March 20, 1943—4 p. m.

[Received 10:19 p. m.]

453. Your 43 yesterday. With my 450 today²⁹ in view I sought an immediate interview with Dr. Ramsay before his reply to your memorandum of February 13 had been encoded. I embodied all except the last two sentences of the first paragraph of your 43 in an *aide-mémoire* which was a very close paraphrase of your telegram. I saw Ramsay at 3 p. m. The Foreign Minister upon reading *aide-mémoire* said this was a matter of utmost importance but that he would refrain from comment other than that he could very definitely assure me that he and the entire Finnish people were willing to trust in the good will of the American Government and people. He said that Finland was a democratic country and the Councils of State functioned slowly and that accordingly he did not think an immediate answer to this message would be forthcoming but he promised to expedite a reply. I had impression that Finnish Government will give us a response within the next week. Ramsay asked how long Mr. Eden would remain in the United States.³⁰ I said I was uninformed on this point.

²⁸ In telegram No. 156, March 19, to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, the Department informed the Ambassador of the substance of this message to the Finnish Foreign Minister and instructed Admiral Standley to tell Molotov about the American action (740.00119 EW 1939/1348a (suppl.)).

²⁹ Not printed; it reported that the Foreign Minister had drafted a reply to the American note of February 13, and that it was in the process of being encoded (711.60D/177).

³⁰ The British Foreign Secretary arrived in the United States on March 12 for "a general exchange of views with the United States Government on all aspects of the war situation." See Department of State *Bulletin*, March 13, 1943, p. 216. For correspondence regarding Mr. Eden's visit, see *ante*, pp. 1 ff.

Ramsay said his reply to your memorandum of February 13 had been sent this morning when he was talking to me and gave me the impression that he did not intend to modify that note.³¹ I asked him if this communication embodied idea of peace for Finland at this time and he said "No".

I told the Foreign Minister that in my opinion irrespective of what Procopé had been instructed to say in reply to your memorandum of February 13 this present *aide-mémoire* cast a new light on the question because the Secretary of State had indicated that the American Government was ready to extend its good offices for purpose of establishing contact between the Finnish and Soviet Governments. I said I was confident that this time there would be no lamentable misunderstanding as to the nature of this offer as had occurred on August 18, 1941³² adding orally the views embodied in last two sentences first paragraph of your telegram. Ramsay said he clearly understood import of our *aide-mémoire* and made notes of what he thought the essential elements: (1) the readiness of American Government to extend good offices; (2) the present goodwill of American Government and people which the Government and people of Finland he said were disposed to trust; and (3) the fact that should this opportunity not be taken it might not again occur. I added that from our point of view the most important element was for Finland to stop helping our enemies. He replied that on this point his Government and mine saw differently.

Ramsay said that there were numerous "practical difficulties" in the way of concluding a separate peace with Russia and he likened it to yacht racing where the question of time was an important factor—when to tack or when not to come about. I observed that there was a new weather mark and that it might be time to come about. The Foreign Minister said he did not think that economic aspect of leaving Germany was so important and I had impression he did not regard threat of possible German military reprisals as grave. He said, however, that principal difficulty was that Finns simply could not trust Russians and their experience of Winter War and interim between that conflict and present war had amply confirmed their distrust of Soviet intentions. He said that what his Government feared would be that following the conclusion of a peace even under American auspices they would find that every few months or so Soviet Government would make fresh demands for concessions on the part of Fin-

³¹ The note was handed to the Under Secretary of State by the Finnish Minister on March 23, 1943; it repeated substantially the position of the Finnish Government with respect to its policy toward the Soviet Union and to its search for security for Finnish democratic institutions, as stated in previous communications to the United States Government. (740.0011 EW 1939/28840)

³² On that date the Finnish Minister was informed by the Department of Soviet readiness to discuss peace terms with Finland. See memorandum by the Under Secretary of State, August 18, 1941, *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, p. 56.

land. He expressed doubt whether American Government could prevent Soviet Government from following such a policy and said rather than accept such a situation it was better to go on fighting. I said that speaking purely personally I did not think that American Government could afford to take moral responsibility of assisting the two parties to reach a peace and then countenance the later gobbling up of Finland by the Soviet Union. We had signed the Atlantic Charter and intended to see it meant what it said. Ramsay agreed that the question of military guarantees was not to be considered and said that even if we were disposed to extend guarantees they could not be made effective against Russia. The possibility of military guarantees from Sweden he dismissed with contempt.

My outstanding impression of interview is that Ramsay is more worried as to *bona fides* of Russian intentions than he is of possible German reprisal.

On leaving I stressed again my feeling that time was of the essence. Ramsay replied that it might take at least 76 hours or longer to work out a reply and as I left said "the Finns are a slow thinking people. It takes time to get support for a new policy."

McCLINTOCK

740.00119 European War 1939/1352: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, March 21, 1943—noon.

[Received 4:42 p. m.]

185. My 155, March 13, 4 p. m. I called on Molotov last evening at his request. He referred to our conversation of March 12 at which he stated that I had requested advice as to the attitude of the Soviet Government in regard to a proposal that the American Government act as intermediary between the Soviet and Finnish Governments "for the purpose of ascertaining the possibility of a separate peace" and, reading from a prepared statement he stated in translation substantially as follows:

"By virtue of the Anglo-Soviet Treaty of May 26, 1942,³³ neither Government may conduct negotiations with Germany or its Allies except by mutual agreement. The Soviet Government has requested

³³ The Treaty of Alliance in the War against Hitlerite Germany and Her Associates in Europe, and Collaboration and Mutual Assistance thereafter, between Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Soviet Union, was signed in London on May 26, 1942. For text, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. cccv, p. 353; see also telegrams Nos. 2897, May 24, 1942, and 2922, May 26, 1942, from the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. III, pp. 558 and 564, respectively.

the opinion of the British Government in regard to the matter and is awaiting a reply. In principle the Soviet Government considers that negotiations with the Finnish Government are admissible. However, the Soviet Government has no reason to expect positive results from the negotiations. The present Finnish leaders violated the peaceful relations existing between the Soviet Union and Finland. The Soviet Government has no information which would lead it to believe that Finland can break away from Germany, desires to do so, or is willing to offer conditions which would be acceptable to the Soviet Union.

"I will keep you informed of subsequent developments in this respect. Please advise your Government of what I have stated to you."

I had not received your 156 of March 18, 5 p. m.,³⁴ prior to my conversation with Molotov and I shall not communicate its substance to him pending further instructions.

STANDLEY

701.60D11/505

*The Under Secretary of State (Welles) to the Finnish Minister
(Procopé)*

WASHINGTON, March 23, 1943.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of March 13, 1943³⁵ concerning the recognition of Captain Holger Gröndahl, newly appointed Military Attaché at the Legation of Finland, to be also in charge of naval matters at the Legation.

A copy of the Minister's note was referred to the Navy Department, and a reply has now been received in which the Navy Department states as follows:

"In view of the Finnish Government's agreement to accept an American Naval Officer as Naval Attaché to the Legation at Helsinki with residence there, in addition to the Assistant Naval Attaché accredited to Finland but resident in Stockholm, the Navy Department agrees to the acceptance of Captain Holger Gröndahl to be in charge of naval matters in Washington."

Accept [etc.]

For the Secretary of State:
SUMNER WELLES

³⁴Not printed; but see telegram No. 43, March 19, 6 p. m., to the Chargé in Finland, p. 250, the substance of which was cabled to Moscow as telegram No. 156.

³⁵This note approved the request to appoint an American Naval Attaché to the United States Legation in Finland and confirmed the view that the Finnish Government desired to enlarge contact between the American and Finnish naval establishments.

740.00119 European War 1939/1426

*The Finnish Minister for Foreign Affairs (Ramsay) to the American Chargé in Finland (McClintock)*³⁶

HELSINKI, March 24, 1943.

DEAR MR. MCCLINTOCK: I am very grateful for the benevolent communication of H. E. the Secretary of State which you conveyed to me on March 20th.

I highly appreciate this token of good will of the American Government and the American people, which have long been manifest to the Finnish people and in which they believe.

For the consideration of the proposal contained in the communication of the Secretary of State it would be of the utmost importance to me to receive any available information in the possession of the American Government as to the basis on which the suggested conversations would be initiated.

Yours very sincerely,

HENRIK RAMSAY

740.00119 European War 1939/1364: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, March 26, 1943—5 p. m.

[Received March 27—4: 10 p. m.]

215. My 185, March 21, noon. Molotov requested to see me this evening. He referred to our conversation of March 20³⁷ and again reading from a prepared statement he stated that an answer had been received from the British Government³⁸ to the effect that the latter did not object to the proposed negotiations. After repeating in full the statements made on March 20 as reported in my reference telegram he stated in translation substantially as follows:

³⁶ Copy transmitted to the Department by the Chargé in Finland in his despatch No. 2569, March 24; received April 21. The text of this letter was cabled to the Department by the Chargé in his telegram No. 470, March 24, 4 p. m., with the comment that he had told the Finnish Foreign Minister that he thought the language of the Secretary of State's communication was quite clear in its reference to the possibility of American good offices for the purpose of establishing contact between the Finnish and Soviet Governments (740.00119 European War 1939/1356).

³⁷ See telegram No. 185, March 21, noon, from the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, p. 253.

³⁸ British Prime Minister Churchill, in reply to a telegram from Soviet Premier Stalin, dated March 15, had cabled Stalin on March 20 to the effect that while the latter could "best judge of how much military value it would be in the struggle against the Germans to get Finland out of the war," Churchill thought that it would release "more Soviet divisions than German divisions for use elsewhere." See Winston S. Churchill, *The Hinge of Fate*, vol. iv, pp. 751-752. The substance of this British reply was communicated to Under Secretary of State Welles on April 3, 1943, by Sir Ronald I. Campbell, British Minister in the United States (740.00119 EW 1939/1376½).

"The Soviet Government must warn the Government of the United States that it does not find it possible to take the initiative in the question under discussion. However, it desires to communicate to it, exclusively for the information of the American Government, its point of view in respect to the minimum terms that it would be prepared to accept in negotiations looking for a separate peace. These terms are as follows:

- (1) Immediate severance of Finland from Germany and removal of German troops from Finland.
- (2) Restitution of the Soviet-Finnish treaty of 1940 with all the consequences arising therefrom.
- (3) Demobilization of the Finnish Army and transformation thereof to peace time status.
- (4) Recompensation for at least one half of the damage caused to the Soviet Union by Finland in the present war.

Since Finland violated its treaty of peace with the Soviet Union the Soviet Government could demand of Finland full recompensation for damages caused by Finland and complete disarmament of Finland. However, the Soviet Government does not desire to take vengeance on Finland and for this reason does not lay down these terms."

After careful checking the above terms I informed Molotov that I would inform my Government immediately of our conversations.

STANDLEY

740.00119 European War 1939/1366

*Memorandum by the Acting Chief of the Division of European Affairs
(Atherton)* ³⁹

Recent telegrams from Helsinki furnish ample evidence that the peace terms set forth in Moscow's 215, March 26, would not be acceptable in the present military situation to the Finnish Government.

The two points which seem to be entirely unacceptable from the Finnish point of view are (1) restitution of the Soviet-Finnish Treaty of 1940 and (2) *with all the consequences arising therefrom*. The phrase "with all the consequences arising therefrom" obviously refers to the period between the Moscow Treaty of March 1940 and the date of the German attack on the Soviet Union during which period the Finns consider that they were subjected to continuous and intolerable extortion represented by such facts as the Russian right of transit of arms, munitions and men to the leased area at Hangö, the completion of the Salla railroad, demilitarization of the Aaland Islands and the installation of Soviet consuls there with supervisory powers in the Aaland Islands, the establishment of a Consulate at Petsamo for alleged ⁴⁰ espionage purposes, the pressure exerted for the control of

³⁹ Addressed to Under Secretary of State Welles and the Secretary of State. The memorandum is not dated, but was received by Mr. Welles on March 29, 1943.

⁴⁰ By the Finns.

the Petsamo nickel mines, the carrying on and financing of internal subversive activities and insistence upon the right of subversive organizations in Finland to operate freely under the aegis of the Soviet Union. There were numerous instances of discourteous and offensive interference and conduct by official Soviet representatives in Finland. The insistence of the Soviet Government on its own interpretation of the boundary in the neighborhood of the industrial center at Enso to the detriment of vital Finnish industry and power resources was another example of the Soviet attitude during the period between the wars.

Even the restitution of the Soviet-Finnish Treaty of 1940 would almost certainly not be acceptable to Finland as this provides for the leasing of Hangö which the Finns construe as being a threat to them and not a protection for Leningrad. The treaty also provides that the historic Finnish city of Viborg be left in Soviet territory. This city has transcendent significance in the history of Finland besides being of vital importance from a strategic defense point of view. The territory transferred to the Soviet Union under this Treaty comprised about ten percent of all Finnish territory and of Finnish industrial and agricultural wealth. Out of this transfer arose the question of the rehabilitation of about 450,000 Finnish citizens, about fifteen percent of the population. Many of these evacuees have now returned to their original homesteads and to evacuate them again would create an internal political problem which no Finnish Government would care to face.

(2) The question of compensation for damage caused the Soviet Union in the present war is one of unlimited possibilities. Finland is economically prostrate at the present time and to be additionally burdened with tremendous payments of war indemnity would be more probably than she could bear.

The Finns would construe the terms outlined in the telegram under reference as deliberately designed to destroy their national existence and would undoubtedly prefer to perish in resistance rather than to accept them.

Since we are convinced that the Finns would not accept terms of the character outlined by Molotov it would obviously serve no useful purpose to let them know that the Soviet Government has such conditions in store for them. *In view of the importance to the war effort of the withdrawal of Finland* we believe that we should not let this matter drop without endeavoring to make an effort to obtain from the Soviet Government terms which might at least offer a promise of resulting in the initiation of conversations between the Russians and the Finns.

The attached draft of a telegram has been prepared with this end in view. Minister Schoenfeld concurs.

RAY ATHERTON

[Annex]

Draft Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Thompson), at Moscow ⁴¹

WASHINGTON, March 30, 1943.

For the Ambassador. Your 215, March 26, and your 219, March 29.⁴² We have given the statements made by Molotov to you and embodying the Soviet terms the most careful consideration and we still regard it as of the highest importance that no opportunity be neglected to bring the Soviet and Finnish Governments into direct contact for the purpose of hastening Finland's withdrawal from the war.

Please, therefore, seek an early interview with Molotov and outline to him the results of our sounding out of the Finnish Government as set forth in our telegram 174 of March 27,⁴³ and state that you have also been instructed by your Government to inform him as follows:

1. We appreciate the confidence which the Soviet Government has shown by making known for our exclusive information the terms which it would be prepared to accept in negotiations looking to a separate peace with Finland.

2. We are inclined to agree with the view previously expressed by Molotov that such terms would not be considered by the Finnish Government as a practical basis for negotiations.

3. In view of the immediate and far-reaching advantages which we believe would accrue not only to the Soviet Union but to the entire prosecution of the war against our common enemy from the abandonment by Finland of its association with Nazi Germany and the restoration of peace between Finland and the Soviet Union, we hope that efforts can be continued to find a formula which would offer a basis for early and direct negotiations between the Finnish and Soviet Governments.

4. We would accordingly appreciate Mr. Molotov's suggestions as to the reply which we might now make to the Finnish Foreign Minister's inquiry ⁴⁴ set forth in our 174 of March 27.

If you perceive no objection you may hand him for his convenience a memorandum containing the substance of the four numbered paragraphs set forth above.

⁴¹ A marginal notation on this draft by the Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs, reads: "This telegram not sent. One was despatched on March 31, 1943. This draft should nevertheless be filed for reference." For the telegram of March 31, see *infra*.

⁴² Latter not printed.

⁴³ Not printed; it recounted the latest exchanges in Helsinki between Ramsay and McClintock, instructed Ambassador Standley to inform Molotov of them, and stated that the American Government would welcome Molotov's suggestions as to what it should tell the Finns in regard to a basis for negotiations between Finland and the Soviet Union (740.00119 European War 1939/1356).

⁴⁴ Of March 24, p. 255.

740.00119 European War 1939/1366 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Thompson), at Moscow ⁴⁵

WASHINGTON, March 31, 1943—5 p. m.

183. For the Ambassador. Your 219, March 29.⁴⁶ In view of your 215, March 26, we feel that we should avoid acting as an intermediary so far as terms are concerned and that at least for the present we should confine the use of our good offices to an endeavor to bring about direct contact between the two Governments.

Please, therefore, unless you perceive some objection thereto, seek an early interview with Molotov, outline to him the results of our sounding out of the Finnish Government as set forth in our telegram 174, March 27,⁴⁷ and state that you have been instructed to inform him as follows:

1. We feel that we can be more helpful at the present time if we limit our good offices to efforts to bring about direct contact between the Soviet and Finnish Governments and if we do not undertake to act as an intermediary in exchanging information with regard to possible peace terms.

2. We, therefore, do not intend to make any reply to the inquiry of the Finnish Foreign Minister with regard to the basis on which the conversations would be conducted.

3. We would like to be in a position to reply to the Finnish Foreign Minister that while we cannot undertake to extend our good offices beyond endeavors to arrange for direct contact between the two Governments, in the event the Finnish Government is prepared to participate in a direct and confidential exchange of views with the Soviet Government, the Soviet Government for its part would be similarly disposed.

4. We would appreciate learning whether such a reply on our part at Helsinki would be agreeable to the Soviet Government.

5. We appreciate the confidence which the Soviet Government has shown by making known for our exclusive information the terms which it would be prepared to accept in negotiations looking to a separate peace with Finland.

6. In view of the immediate and far-reaching advantages which we believe would accrue not only to the Soviet Union but to the entire prosecution of the war against the common enemy from the abandonment by Finland of its association with Germany and the restoration of peace with the Soviet Union it is our earnest hope that the contact which we are endeavoring to bring about between the two Governments can be effected and will lead to fruitful results.

You may hand Molotov for his convenience a memorandum containing the substance of the six numbered paragraphs set forth above.

HULL

⁴⁵ A notation by the Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs, attached to this telegram, reads: "We have redrafted this telegram so that we believe the present text conforms with the wishes of Mr. Welles."

⁴⁶ Not printed.

⁴⁷ See footnote 43, p. 258.

740.00119 European War 1939/1374 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, April 3, 1943—noon.

[Received 3:18 p. m.]

242. Your 183, March 31, 5 p. m. I outlined to Molotov last evening the considerations set forth in your 174, March 27⁴⁸ and gave him a memorandum containing paragraphs numbers 1 to 6 of the telegram under reference. Molotov inquired whether the American Government had given consideration as to how contact would be arranged between the Soviet and Finnish Governments if such contact were considered advisable by both parties. I stated that although I had not received advice on this question I felt sure that my Government had some practicable plan in mind. Molotov asked whether it was intended that he should understand from the information furnished that the Finnish Government desired to establish contact with the Soviet Government and initiate negotiations. I replied that according to my information the question of actual contact had not been raised with the Finnish Government, that we apparently proposed to take up this question but desired first to ascertain whether in the event the Finnish Government were prepared to participate in a direct exchange of views the Soviet Government would be similarly disposed. Molotov stated he would consult with his Government and communicate again with me.

Molotov asked whether we had any definite information, aside from the indirect information referred to, that the Finns were interested in the restoration of peace. I replied that the fact that the Finnish Foreign Minister had inquired as to possible basis of the proposed conversations gave me to believe that the Finnish [leaders?] are definitely interested.

Molotov recalled that the American Government was aware of the Soviet minimum terms and inquired [whether] in the estimation of the American Government such terms would be acceptable to the Finns or whether the Finns would be able to propose terms that would be acceptable to the Russians. I stated that it was my personal opinion that if we had thought that the Soviet terms were totally impossible, we probably would not be pursuing the matter any further and that we must feel that there was a possible basis for negotiations.

In conclusion I emphasized the great importance we gave to the question of the abandonment by Finland of its association with Germany. Molotov replied that "this was certainly desirable".

STANDLEY

⁴⁸ See footnote 43, p. 258.

740.00119 European War 1939/1381 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, April 6, 1943—noon.

[Received April 7—1:15 p. m.]

252. My 242, April 3, noon. I called on Molotov last evening at his request. He presented me with *aide-mémoire* which states in paraphrase translation as follows:

"The Soviet Government is grateful to the American Government for information transmitted on April 2 by Ambassador Standley to Molotov regarding the conversations between the American Chargé d'Affaires at Helsinki and the Finnish Minister of Foreign Affairs concerning the proposal of the American Government to act as intermediary in establishing direct contact between the Soviet and Finnish Governments for discussing questions relative to the conclusion of a separate peace.

The Soviet Government has also studied the memorandum of the American Government of April 2 and deems it necessary to state as follows. With reference to the proposal concerned in the memorandum to the effect that the American Government desired to be in a position to reply to the Finnish Government that if the Finnish Government were prepared to participate in a direct and confidential exchange of views with the Soviet Government the Soviet Government for its part would be similarly disposed, the Soviet Government wishes to refer to the statement made on March 20 by Mr. Molotov to Ambassador Standley to the effect that the Soviet Government had no reason to suppose that Finland could break away from Germany or was prepared to offer the Soviet Union peace terms which would be acceptable to it. The Soviet Government, therefore, has no reason to believe that direct contact between the Finnish and Soviet Governments will lead to positive results under present condition.

The Soviet Government would be able to express its agreement to the desire of the American Government set forth above if the Soviet Government could receive information which would permit it to believe that the minimum conditions for the conclusion of peace with Finland, conveyed to the American Government on March 27, were acceptable to Finland."

In the ensuing conversation I recalled that the Soviet terms were given me exclusively for the information of my Government and remarked that by implication the present Soviet memo might be construed to mean that we should communicate these views to the Finnish Government.

Molotov inquired whether my Government desired to do this. Referring to my memo of April 2, I replied that this was obviously not the case but added that in view of the nature of the Soviet reply my Government might now consider the situation in a different light. Molotov then [proceeded?] carefully and explained that since the Soviet Government did not wish to show any indication of taking the

initiative in the question of peace overtures and since it had no reason to believe that the Finns desired peace, were prepared to accept the Soviet conditions or to offer terms which would be acceptable to the Soviet Government, it had communicated its terms for the exclusive information of the American Government; however, if the Soviet Government could obtain definite information to the effect that the Finns were prepared to accept the Soviet minimum terms then there would be no objection to their being communicated to the Finnish Government.

It would seem to me that the Soviet reply, if accepted, would place us in the position we wish to avoid, i.e., acting as an intermediary so far as exchanging information with regard to peace terms.

STANDLEY

740.00119 European War 1939/1380 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Finland (McClintock)

WASHINGTON, April 8, 1943—2 a. m.

55. Your 524, April 7, 5 p. m.⁴⁹ Keep us closely informed of further developments. If you see no objection to such a procedure you are authorized to inform the Finnish Government that these reports have come to your attention and to ask for its comments thereon. If you are given to understand that the true situation is substantially as reported in your telegram under reference you are authorized to state that if the Finnish Government accepts any further German demands limiting its freedom of action, the Finnish Government must understand clearly the resulting consequences upon relations with the United States as a member of the United Nations dedicated as we are to the prosecution of the war to the final defeat of the Axis Powers and the countries associated with them.⁵⁰

HULL

⁴⁹ This telegram, and also the Chargé's telegram No. 530 of April 8, midnight (neither printed), summarized several incidents which indicated measures of German pressure on Finland, including the departures for Berlin of Finnish Foreign Minister Ramsay on March 25, after an "imperative summons", and of the German Minister to Finland, Wipert von Blücher, on April 5 or 6, and threats by Von Ribbentrop of German "military action" (740.00119 European War 1939/1380, 1385). Ramsay saw Von Ribbentrop on March 26, and was presented in unequivocal terms with Germany's political demands on Finland: that the Finnish Government clearly reject the United States offer of good offices so as to end any possibility of a repetition of the American action, and that Finland give Germany a guarantee that no separate peace would be made by Finland without German agreement thereto. See accounts of these developments given in Wipert von Blücher, *Gesandter zwischen Diktatur und Demokratie* (Wiesbaden, 1951), pp. 330 ff., and in Wuorinen, *Finland and World War II, 1939-1944*, p. 153. See also the last paragraph of telegram No. 805, June 21, noon, from the Chargé in Finland, *post*, p. 281.

⁵⁰ The same day McClintock delivered a note to this effect to Foreign Minister Ramsay.

740.00119 European War 1939/1381 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Standley)*

WASHINGTON, April 9, 1943—5 p. m.

210. In view of the contents of the Soviet memorandum handed to you by Molotov and reported in your telegram number 252, April 6, we believe that you should not seek on your own initiative a further interview with Molotov on the subject. However, when you have occasion again to talk with Molotov you may tell him that this Government is taking no further steps with a view to facilitating direct contact between the Soviet and Finnish Governments since the Soviet Government apparently does not believe that such contact would yield any positive results in the absence of some indication, which this Government is unable to furnish, of Finnish willingness to accept the Soviet terms as a basis for negotiations. You will make it clear that we have not sounded out the Finnish Government with regard to terms, but have consistently confined our good offices to endeavors to facilitate the establishment of direct contact between the two Governments.

For your confidential information only. In our telegram 183, March 31, 5 p. m. to you we avoided any specific comment on the Soviet terms because we still hoped that direct contact between the Finnish and Soviet Governments might possibly lay the ground work for fruitful negotiations. We at no time contemplated acting as intermediary for the transmission of these terms to the Finnish Government since it was obvious that they would be unacceptable to the Finnish Government and if suggested prior to the opening of the negotiations would serve merely to strengthen the Finnish ties with Nazi Germany and to increase Finnish determination to pursue the war with the Soviet Union to the bitter end.

HULL

740.00119 European War 1939/1381 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Standley)*

WASHINGTON, April 9, 1943—7 p. m.

212. 1. We have received a number of reliable reports that the German Government apparently seriously alarmed at rumors of the possibility of a Finnish withdrawal from the war has recently begun to assert strong pressure on the Finnish Government in order to force from the Finns a promise not even to discuss with any foreign government the question of possibilities of a separate peace between Finland and the Soviet Union. You should seek an immediate interview

with Molotov and convey to him the above reports for the exclusive information of his Government.

2. At the same time you should carry out the instructions contained in our no. 210, April 9, 5 p. m.

HULL

740.00119 European War 1939/1356: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Finland (McClintock)

WASHINGTON, April 9, 1943—8 p. m.

58. 1. Our efforts in connection with the possible negotiation of a Finnish-Soviet peace treaty have been confined solely to a proposal looking to the establishment of direct contact between the Soviet and Finnish Governments in order that they themselves might then negotiate. We have at no time considered acting as an intermediary for the purpose of transmitting information regarding possible peace terms, and therefore we cannot satisfy Ramsay's condition reported in your 470, March 24,⁵¹ for his consideration of our proposal.

2. Please prepare in appropriate form a reply in the foregoing sense to Dr. Ramsay's communication referred to.⁵²

3. Strictly for your guidance and information only:

(a) We feel it would be most inadvisable for you to lead the Finns to expect to be offered by the Soviet Union peace terms materially better than those contained in the Moscow Peace of 1940.

(b) In the present circumstances of strong German pressure on Finland you must seek to combat this pressure by means other than holding out to the Finns the possibility of any Soviet willingness to negotiate peace. This can probably only be done, we feel, by taking the line set forth in our 55, April 8.

HULL

740.00119 European War 1939/1393: Telegram

The Chargé in Finland (McClintock) to the Secretary of State

HELSINKI, April 10, 1943—6 p. m.

[Received April 11—5:29 a. m.]

542. My 541 today.⁵³ The following *aide-mémoire* dated April 10 was handed me by the Finnish Foreign Minister at 4 p. m.

1. "The Finnish Government have carefully considered the memorandum of the Legation of the United States of America, dated March 20th.⁵⁴

⁵¹ Not printed; but see letter of March 24 from the Finnish Foreign Minister to the Chargé in Finland, p. 255.

⁵² The Chargé left a note to this effect with the Finnish Foreign Minister on April 10 (740.00119 European War 1939/1392).

⁵³ Not printed.

⁵⁴ See telegram No. 43, March 19, 6 p. m., to the Chargé in Finland, p. 250.

2. "The Finnish Government have not been able to find any indication, nor have they received any information tending to prove that the initiation of the suggested conversations with the Government of the USSR would, in the prevailing circumstances, lead to lasting guarantees for the future of Finland for which Finland is fighting, with great sacrifices, since 1939. The Finnish people have, therefore, no other way than to continue their war of defense until the maintenance of the independence, freedom and democratic institutions of Finland is safeguarded and the menace to Finland has been removed. Consequently the Finnish Government is not in a position to enter into the suggested conversations.

3. "Appreciating the good will of the American Government towards Finland the Finnish Government wish to reassure the American Government that it is their sincere desire to maintain the friendly relations between Finland and the United States.["]

McCLINTOCK

740.00119 European War 1939/1398 : Telegram

The Chargé in Finland (McClintock) to the Secretary of State

HELSINKI, April 12, 1943—11 a. m.

[Received 1:10 p. m.]

547. Following the recent crisis in our relations with Finland as recounted in our telegrams of the past few days it may be useful to set forth certain impressions as seen from this end of the line:

1. German pressure on Finland had two aims, first to prevent the conclusion of a separate peace, which seemed imminent because of your tender of good offices on March 20th, and, second, to prevent a recurrence of this possibility by forcing Finland definitely into the Axis alliance.

2. The Germans have won their first objective hands down. They would have won it in any event following the delivery of my note to Dr. Ramsay on the 10th embodying the first paragraph of your 58, April 9, as the Finnish Government was not at all prepared to undergo the grave risk of German reprisal if it was not informed as to what might be the bases for a peace with the Soviet Union. In fact our note of the 10th paradoxically assisted the Finnish Government to meet the German demand as it removed the last lingering hope here that there might have been a chance at this time of concluding a separate peace on terms favorable to Finland.

3. Our own policy seems to have undergone a change from the time your 43, March 19 was sent and the time your 58 was drafted. On March 19 I was instructed to say that you knew of no reason to suppose that the Soviet Government was not disposed to examine a proposal to commence peace negotiations; on April 9, I was instructed to combat German pressure by "means other than holding out to the Finns the possibility of any Soviet willingness to negotiate peace".

4. The present German demand for the formal accession of Finland to the Axis pact⁵⁵ will probably meet with Finnish refusal. This refusal will be based on the consistent Finnish policy not to enter into political engagements with Germany. Our threat as expressed in the note I left with Ramsay on the 8th and to which I made pointed reference both to him and to Ryti on the 10th, as indicated in my 540 and 541,⁵⁶ will serve to strengthen Finnish resolve not to accede to the German demand. About the last diplomatic tool we have left is the deeply-felt desire of the Finnish Government and people to retain, as they think, or regain, as we think, friendly relations with the United States.

5. My outstanding impression from your telegrams since March 19 is that you are "preparing the record" against the time when Finland will be forced to cede at least the Moscow peace frontiers, if not more, to the USSR, with consequent frantic appeals on the part of Finland and probably Sweden to the Atlantic Charter. You then presumably expect to be in a position to say to Finland that it was given its chance and did not take it.

6. By Mr. Welles' definition friendly relations cannot be restored with Finland unless and until Finland ceases its collaboration with Germany. Finland cannot cease its collaboration with Germany unless it ends its war with the USSR. No one in Finland is at present disposed to end the war with Russia on the terms of the Treaty of Moscow of March 12, 1940; and indeed on the basis of paragraph 3-b of your 58 it does not appear that the Soviet Government, for its part, is disposed to end hostilities. Logically, therefore, Finland's war with Russia and consequently its collaboration with Germany will continue and our relations will remain unfriendly.

7. If in the light of your wider view of the situation and your more ample knowledge you can correct any misapprehension in the conclusions set forth above or add any comment which will bring them into sharper focus, I should welcome an indication of your opinion.

McCLINTOCK

740.00119 European War 1939/1381 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Standley)

WASHINGTON, April 12, 1943—9 p. m.

227. Reference Department's telegrams 210 and 212, April 9. When

⁵⁵ The tripartite pact between Germany, Italy, and Japan was signed in Berlin on September 27, 1940; for text, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. cciv, p. 386, or Department of State, *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945*, series D, vol. xi, p. 204. For the negotiations of this treaty, see *Foreign Relations*, 1940, vol. i, pp. 633 ff.

⁵⁶ Neither printed.

you see Molotov you may after talking with him along the lines suggested in the telegrams under reference:

1. Refer to your conversation with him of January 29 in which you outlined our policies with regard to Finland;

2. Remind him that two important considerations which have prompted us thus far to maintain diplomatic relations with Finland after our entry into the war have been (a) our hope that through our diplomatic contacts we might be helpful in effecting the withdrawal of Finland from her war against the Soviet Union, and (b) our belief that fear on the part of the Finnish authorities lest we sever relations with Finland has served as a deterrent to any inclination which they might have to increase aid to Germany, particularly aid of a military character on the northern front;

3-a. Point out that the attitude of the Finnish Government which at present is under increased German pressure has so altered the situation as to bring us to the definite conclusion that further efforts on our part to bring about direct contact between the Finnish and Soviet Governments are at least for the time being useless.

3-b. Furthermore we are convinced that under the generally altered situation the maintenance of diplomatic relations with Finland will no longer serve to the extent that it has in the past as a deterrent to Finnish aid to Germany.

4. This Government therefore purposes to discontinue diplomatic relations with Finland by the withdrawal of its diplomatic representation in Helsinki. (Consular representation has already been withdrawn.) You may add however, that having in mind immediate military considerations you are authorized to transmit to your Government any views that the Soviet Government may wish to convey for the early consideration of this Government.

HULL

740.00119 European War 1939/1408: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, April 12, 1943—midnight.

[Received April 14—6:41 a. m.]

290. I called on Mr. Molotov this afternoon to communicate to him the contents of the Department's telegram of April 9⁵⁷ relative to the Food Conference.⁵⁸ I then took occasion to outline to him the considerations set forth in the Department's 210 April 9 which was not received until April 11. I had informed him on April 10 of the

⁵⁷ Not printed.

⁵⁸ For correspondence concerning this Conference, see vol. I, pp. 820 ff.

contents of Department's most immediate 212, April 9, which was received on April 10.

Molotov referred to the statement contained in the latter part of Department's 126, March 9, as conveyed to him by me on March 12, to the effect that "it would be the effort of the American Government to persuade the Finnish Government to agree to the proposal and to indicate to the American Government the general nature of the terms upon which it would be willing to undertake the negotiations" and to the statement contained in my memo of April 2 (see my 242, April 3) to the effect that the American Government felt that it could be more helpful if it limited its good offices to efforts to bring about direct contact between the Soviet and Finnish Governments and if it did not undertake to act as intermediary in exchanging information with respect to peace terms; therefore it did not intend to make any reply to the Finnish inquiry with respect to the basis on which the conversations would be conducted. He remarked that whereas the American Government had at first proposed to act as intermediary up to a point where the Soviet and Finnish Governments were in direct contact and to ascertain the general nature of the Finnish terms it subsequently changed its position by proposing to limit its good offices to the bringing about of direct contact. Molotov asked the reason for the change in our position in this respect.

I stated it was my understanding that my Government all along had proposed to confine its good offices to an endeavor to bring about such contact and that it has not undertaken to act as intermediary in transmitting peace terms.

Molotov stated that the Soviet Government still considered it inadvisable to enter into direct contact with the Finnish Government unless there were a likelihood of positive results. He added that such a move would be harmful to the Allies as well. I remarked that although the Soviet Government had possibly misunderstood the exact role my Government desired to play in its endeavors to bring about peace between the Soviet and Finnish Governments the present communication from the Department appeared to indicate that both the American and Soviet Governments now felt alike, that is that it would be inadvisable to endeavor to establish direct contact if it appeared that such contact would not yield positive results. I informed Molotov that I would communicate his views to the Department.

During the conversation I could not help but feel that Molotov was endeavoring to prevail upon me to admit that the Soviet terms were considered by my Government to be unacceptable to the Finns and that this was the principal reason for our decision not to pursue the matter any further. He appeared to be conscious of the fact that I was not able to be frank with him. My position therefore was most uncomfortable.

*The Secretary of State to President Roosevelt*⁵⁹

WASHINGTON, April 19, 1943.

As you will recall, in recent discussions with Finnish Government with a view to arranging contact between Finns and Soviets, we had unmistakable evidence that Germans learning of our approaches brought increased pressure on Finns not to enter into any discussions with us with a view to any contact with Soviet Government. We also gathered impression Finns were greatly influenced by such German pressure. These impressions led us to believe no further advantage in continuing relations with Finns because of impossibility of accomplishing two principal objectives we had had in mind in continuing such relations, (a) the hope that we might bring about cessation of hostilities between Finns and Soviets, and (b) that presence of our diplomatic representation in Helsinki would be deterrent to Finnish acceptance of German pressure for cooperation with Germany.

In order to avoid losing any advantages which might result from continuing relations if there were any advantages in such continuation which in the opinion of the Soviet Government might affect their military situation, we had Standley ask the Soviets their opinion in that respect. Standley now reports⁶⁰ Molotov stated Soviet Government considers rupture of Finnish-American diplomatic relations would be advantageous to both Soviets and United States. Molotov raised the question of whether Procopé should not be sent home and whether he had communicated information to the Japanese.

We see no course now to pursue other than to proceed to the discontinuance of our diplomatic relations with Finland, based upon increased German pressure and lessening of Finnish freedom of action, but before proceeding, I shall await final word from you.

[HULL]

*President Roosevelt to the Secretary of State*⁶¹

[APRIL 20, 1943.]

Fully approve your suggestion in regard to Finland. In spite of our former sympathy for them when attacked by Russia and our con-

⁵⁹ Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y. As of April 19, 1943, President Roosevelt was en route to Monterrey, Mexico, where he delivered an address in connection with a visit to the President of Mexico.

⁶⁰ Ambassador Standley informed the Department in his telegram No. 305, April 15, 2 p. m., that Foreign Commissar Molotov had told him that "in the opinion of the Soviet Government it would be advisable from the point of view of our common interests . . . to discontinue American diplomatic relations with Finland as a means of putting pressure on the Finnish Government." (740.00119 European War 1939/1414)

⁶¹ President Roosevelt was at the time in Mexico. Copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y. A copy of this telegram was received in the Department on April 20 at 7:26 p. m. A paraphrase is filed under 740.00119 European War 1939/1436.

tinued sympathy for their national independence they have played both ends against the middle for the past two years and their present government has in effect greatly helped the Nazis who are using Finland to carry on the war against Russia.

[ROOSEVELT]

124.60D3/324a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Finland (McClintock)

WASHINGTON, April 21, 1943—5 p. m.

69. West⁶² and all American employees of the Legation (except one American code clerk whom you may select to remain with you) are hereby transferred to Stockholm and should proceed immediately. Transportation and per diem themselves and their families and transportation effects to Stockholm authorized in accordance travel regulations chargeable Transportation Foreign Service. These transfers not at request nor for convenience of any persons concerned.

It is important that all should proceed within 48 hours if possible and that no one should delay departure to settle personal affairs and pack effects.

Telegraph urgently probable dates departure and also when actually left Helsinki.⁶³

HULL

124.60D/99a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Finland (McClintock)

WASHINGTON, April 23, 1943—2 p. m.

72. 1. In view of the recent evidence of German domination of Finnish foreign policy, we have decided to withdraw our diplomatic representation from Finland and in pursuance of this decision you should deliver a memorandum to the Foreign Minister in the sense indicated in paragraph 4 below.

2. We should like to take this action as soon as possible, but if you feel it necessary to delay the delivery of the memorandum either to consult us on administrative details of the resulting situation or to give us your comments on the general basis of the action, you may do so for a reasonable period. Please cable urgently the date and if possible the hour you propose to deliver the memorandum.

⁶² G. Lybrook West, Jr., Third Secretary of Legation.

⁶³ In telegrams No. 588, April 22, midnight, and No. 592, April 23, 5 p. m., the Chargé informed the Department of the arrangements for departure from the Legation at Helsinki (124.60D3/325, 328). Except for the Chargé and two members of the staff, all left by air for Stockholm on April 23 and 24. The American Legation in Sweden was kept informed of these developments and was instructed to advise the Swedish Government accordingly.

3. We believe our instruction no. 333 of October 28, 1941⁶⁴ and subsequent instructions in the same connection adequately cover questions of turning over to the Swiss Legation, disposition of local employees, and related matters. As to you, we should prefer, if it is subsequently possible, to assign you to Stockholm for the time being to take charge of reporting from there on Finnish matters. If, however, for family or health reasons, you have a strong desire to return to the United States, we will give your desires most sympathetic consideration within the possibilities of future developments.

4. Substance of memorandum:

This Government was among the first to recognize the independence of Finland.⁶⁵ The American people have long admired and have viewed most sympathetically the spirit in which the Finnish people have maintained their democratic institutions and preserved their national independence. It was in keeping with this sympathy that on repeated occasions during the past two years we intimated to the Finnish Government that in our view its policy of cooperation with Nazi Germany was bound to jeopardize Finnish freedom of action. The policy of the Finnish Government however has continued to be one of cooperation and collaboration with Germany and has inevitably resulted in a progressive German domination of Finnish action.

We have now been forced reluctantly to the conclusion that the freedom of action of the Finnish Government is reduced to such an extent as to make it impossible to continue diplomatic relations with Finland. Consequently the Finnish Government is informed that American diplomatic representation in Finland is being withdrawn.

The Swiss Government is being asked to take over our interests in Finland at once.

5. When you deliver the memorandum to Ramsay you should inform him that we intend to issue a release to the press containing the substance of the memorandum.

6. You should also inform the Foreign Minister that pending the departure of the Finnish Legation here we intend for the time being at least, provided you are given reciprocal treatment, to permit the Finnish Legation here to communicate in plain language directly with Helsinki on necessary matters and that we do not intend to impose further special restrictions upon their personal movements and local communications in this country.

7. After you have set the hour for delivery of the memorandum you should repeat to Stockholm paragraphs 1, 4, 5, and 6, above with our instructions to call upon Swedish Foreign Office at a suitable time

⁶⁴ Not printed.

⁶⁵ Finland declared its independence from Russia on December 6, 1917, which act was approved by the Soviet Russian Government on January 4, 1918. *De facto* recognition of the new Finnish Government by the United States was extended on May 7, 1919; an American Minister Plenipotentiary was appointed on May 24, 1919, and *de jure* recognition by the United States was acknowledged on January 12, 1920. See *Foreign Relations*, 1919, vol. II, pp. 215, 219, and 220-227.

not less than one hour after your scheduled appointment with Ramsay and apprise Swedish Government orally and in confidence of our action.

HULL

711.60D/207

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] April 24, 1943.

The Soviet Ambassador⁶⁶ called to see me this afternoon. I informed the Ambassador that this Government would make public the breaking of relations between the United States and Finland in the immediate future, and that if the note conveying that communication to the Finnish Government could not be delivered tomorrow, Easter Sunday, on account of the holiday, it would be delivered on the following day and a public statement would then be made in Washington with regard to the reasons therefor.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

124.60D/100a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Finland (McClintock)

WASHINGTON, April 24, 1943—8 p. m.

74. You will delay action contemplated in my 72, April 23, 2 p. m. until further instructions. Please acknowledge receipt of this message immediately stating whether it was received in time.⁶⁷

HULL

711.60D/198a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Finland (McClintock)

WASHINGTON, April 26, 1943—9 p. m.

75. Your 597 April 26.⁶⁸ We realize the uncertainty which our recent instructions must have caused you as to our immediate course of action. Our decision to break relations with Finland was based upon considerations applicable only to Finland. The postponement

⁶⁶ Maxim Maximovich Litvinov.

⁶⁷ In telegram No. 595, April 25, 10 a. m., the Chargé acknowledged receipt of the telegram and said that he would cancel the appointment with the Finnish Foreign Minister scheduled for that same day (124.60D/101).

⁶⁸ Not printed: McClintock stated he was "entirely in the dark" as to the motives behind the sending of telegram No. 74, April 24, *supra*. He reported that in Finland "the hope is almost universally expressed that by some miracle the Legation will remain in Helsinki." The Chargé also advised that, if indeed relations were broken, there would very likely be a Finnish military offensive against Soroka (Belomorsk) on the Murmansk-Leningrad railway. (124.60D/102)

of our action was to prevent German propaganda and diplomacy linking our Finnish policy with other international developments in Eastern Europe.⁶⁹

We shall cable you the result of our reflections in the light of the new situation probably the end of the week.

HULL

860D.00/1257

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] May 1, 1943.

The Minister of Finland called to see me this afternoon after having telephoned daily since last week for an appointment. The Minister said that he was without information from his Government, that he was deeply concerned with regard to the present situation and would be grateful for any information I could give him.

I limited myself to reiterating statements already made to the Finnish Government by this Government through Mr. McClintock in Helsinki and I said it was a matter of deep regret to me personally that the Finnish Government had refused to avail itself of the offer made by this Government and that of course it was obvious that the reply of the Government of Finland was due to the fact that it was no longer a free agent but was acting completely under German influence. I said it was obvious that in such a situation as this relations between our two countries could not be of service to the interests of either country.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

740.00119 European War 1939/1441 : Telegram

The Chargé in Finland (McClintock) to the Secretary of State

HELSINKI, May 6, 1943—10 a. m.

[Received 3 p. m.]

643. 1. Announcement by BBC⁷⁰ yesterday that Ambassador Davies⁷¹ was leaving for Moscow possibly with end in view of arranging meeting between President Roosevelt and Stalin prompts me to

⁶⁹ The developments referred to were the decision, and consequences thereof, by the Soviet Government to break diplomatic relations with the Polish (London) Government on April 25, 1943, a decision which Soviet Ambassador Litvinov communicated to the Under Secretary of State on April 24. See memorandum by the Under Secretary of State, April 24, and telegram from the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt, April 25, pp. 389 and 390, respectively.

⁷⁰ British Broadcasting Corporation.

⁷¹ Joseph E. Davies, former American Ambassador to the Soviet Union (1937-1938), visited Moscow on a special mission for President Roosevelt between May 19 and 29, 1943; for correspondence on this subject, see pp. 646-665, *passim*.

wonder if there might be still a slight chance of getting Finland out of its "separate war".

2. The objective of our diplomacy in Eastern Europe I believe is to do everything possible to detach the Axis satellites from Germany. Our attempt so far as Finland is concerned was characterized largely by use of negative means and our one recent positive measure, our tender of good offices of March 20, went no further than strictly technical definition of what "good offices" are. Our other pressure consisted largely of threats, warnings and admonishment. We have failed to detach Finland from Germany by these measures and we shall have slight chance of success unless Finnish Government sees a chance of getting out of its "separate war" with some frontier less unfavorable than that of the Treaty of Moscow of March 12, 1940.

3. In absence of comment from you on analysis of situation expressed in my 547, April 12, I am inclined to believe conclusions set forth herein come fairly close to truth.

4. It is accordingly with no great expectation that anything can be done but with the conviction that it is my duty to pursue our diplomatic objective here to very end that I offer following suggestions:

a. If Mr. Davies' visit to Moscow presents least chance for discussion of how to end war between Finland and USSR to our advantage, I think we or Soviet Government might offer Finnish Government one more chance. As my recent telegrams have indicated, certain members of Finnish Government possibly believe that by midsummer a new approach might be made directly to Soviet Government (my 576, April 19⁷²).

b. To have any chance of acceptance, Soviet peace terms should offer Finland at least something better than Treaty of Moscow. Hangö is today, as it was in autumn of 1939, the crucial issue. If USSR could relinquish its claim to Hangö, a start might be made in peace conversations.

c. You and Russian Government can better judge than I the relative advantage of breaking up Axis consortium as balanced against the advantage to Russia of regaining 1940 boundary of Finland or even taking over entire country. (In latter case we had better get out of here now.) On basis of my own on-the-spot observation, however, the Russian occupation of Hangö was singularly ineffective in bottling the mouth of Gulf of Finland in 1941.

d. Should peace talks result, Germany might occupy Finland. This would itself be an advantage to us in causing a diversion of German force and creating fresh lack of confidence among the satellite states.

5. If these views commend themselves to you in the light of your knowledge of the possibilities (and as always it is what Russia intends

⁷² Not printed.

which is finally controlling in this situation), I think it might be worth your while to instruct me very secretly to sound Ryti and Mannerheim as to their views on the question of peace. I might recall in this connection the oral proposals sent to President Roosevelt by President Ryti by Albin Johnson as summarized in my 311, February 19. I would most certainly emphasize that if Ryti sent Ramsay again to Berlin to tell all to Ribbentrop, the password of the Casablanca Conference⁷³ would automatically apply to Finland.

6. If President Ryti were disposed to take this last chance of keeping our friendship by stopping Finland's collaboration with Germany which can only be done by concluding peace with Russia, he might be persuaded to set forth his terms in writing for consideration of President Roosevelt and Premier Stalin. Such terms would probably have to be delivered by some personal emissary as the Finns, as I have reported on several occasions, think rightly or wrongly that the Germans have broken the codes of this Mission.

McCLINTOCK

740.00119 European War 1939/1441 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Finland (McClintock)

WASHINGTON, May 7, 1943—6 p. m.

81. In view of the definite character of the reply which Ramsay gave you on April 10, we feel we have no satisfactory grounds for reopening with the Soviets the matter referred to in your 643, May 6. Conversely we know of no new developments from the Russian side which would justify our reopening the matter with the Finns. Accordingly, while we feel your suggestions in principle are well made, present circumstances are not such that we feel in a position to act on them.

With regard to your reference to responsibility on our part we do not feel that, in view of Ramsay's reply, the maintenance of the present position involves any responsibility on our part for future developments but at the same time it may continue to have some restraining influence on the Finns.⁷⁴

HULL

⁷³ Conference between President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Churchill, January 14–25, 1943. The Chargé's reference to the "password" of the Conference was presumably intended to stand for the term "unconditional surrender", which the American and British leaders determined would be imposed on Germany, Italy, and Japan.

The records of the Casablanca Conference are scheduled for publication in a subsequent volume of *Foreign Relations*.

⁷⁴ In his telegram No. 659, May 8, 5 p. m. (740.00119 EW39/1444) the Chargé disclaimed having mentioned or referred to "responsibility on our part for future developments" in his telegram No. 643, *supra*.

860D.00/1226: Telegram

The Chargé in Finland (McClintock) to the Secretary of State

HELSINKI, May 11, 1943—3 p. m.

[Received 10:18 p. m.]

664. Marshal Mannerheim asked me to see him at 11:30 this morning.

The Marshal quite belied in his appearance and vitality the fairly dubious report I had from the General cited in my 647, May 7.⁷⁵ As our conversation revealed General Kekoni was also one hundred percent wrong in suggesting that Baron Mannerheim had been kept in ignorance of the Finnish Government's intentions. The Marshal was more thin than when I last saw him but he seemed fully to have regained his health and his mind was clear as a bell. He wore two decorations: one the Finnish Liberty Cross and the other the decoration pinned on him by Hitler on June 4 last year.⁷⁶

I told Baron Mannerheim that I had wanted to see him because as he knew our relations had recently deteriorated and I wished to have his impressions on Finland's position. I was very careful in the light of your 81, May 7 not to give any impression that I thought anything could be done to improve relations.

The Marshal said he was very glad to see me and several times during the course of an interview which lasted more than an hour said he hoped I would stay on in Finland. He said he was not a diplomat and was accustomed "not to hide his thoughts" and that he would talk with entire candor.

I found the Marshal engrossed with the stock Finnish theme that present war with Russia is but a continuation of the Winter War. He went back into the history of that conflict and the interim between the two wars. His discussion of British and French offers of military assistance in 1939 and 40; of the position of Sweden; and of circumstances surrounding the granting by Finland of the transit agreement to Germany in September 1940⁷⁷ will be related in a secret despatch⁷⁸ as completing the diplomatic history of that period.

As for recent events in which our present interest lies the Marshal made no effort to conceal fact that Finland had been subjected to the

⁷⁵ Not printed; General Kekoni, Marshal Mannerheim's representative in Helsinki, had described the Marshal's health in pessimistic terms (860D.00/1225).

⁷⁶ Hitler had visited Finland on June 4, 1942, on the occasion of Field Marshal Mannerheim's 75th birthday, at which time he bestowed on Mannerheim the Grand Cross Order of the German Eagle, in gold. See also memorandum by the Under Secretary of State, June 5, 1942, *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. II, p. 63.

⁷⁷ The German-Finnish agreement for German troop transit through Finland to Norway was signed on September 22, 1940; see telegram 1232, September 25, 1940, from the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, and telegram No. 416, September 26, 1940, from the Minister in Finland, *Foreign Relations*, 1940, vol. I, pp. 346 and 347, respectively. For text of the agreement, see *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945*, series D. vol. XI, p. 149.

⁷⁸ Not printed.

most strenuous German pressure. For that matter, he said, Finland had been subject to the most strenuous American pressure. He seemed to have in mind the possibility of a declaration of war. He professed not to know why we had exerted this pressure or had now reduced Legation to its present skeletal condition. I gave him my usual answer about our feeling that Finnish Government was no longer a free agent as instanced by Ramsay's flight to Berlin. Marshal Mannerheim replied to my comment that it was certainly not pleasing to us to have Finnish Foreign Minister make a clean breast to Ribbentrop of our most secret conversations that in any case the Germans "had other means of finding out what was going on". I said in any event Washington had ample proof that the Finnish Government was not a free agent.

Marshal Mannerheim said that our tender of good offices of March 20 as redefined by your note to Ramsay of April 10 had been nothing more than "an offer to resume the game of the cat playing with the mouse".

As for German pressure Marshal Mannerheim said categorically that the Germans had never threatened military occupation of Finland. He said rather grimly that he would resist occupation from whatever quarter it came. When I remarked that in my opinion the Finnish army was perhaps the best small army in the world the old gentleman beamed and said it "almost" was. For a moment he was carried away with pride and on the point of describing its military strength but checked himself and said that since I would be reporting this interview he could not tell me what he would like to.

When I again brought the conversation back to the question of German pressure the Marshal confirmed as I have reported that the Finnish Government had declined a German request for a treaty pledging no separate peace. He said "we will continue with Germany only so long as our interests are in common and no longer. After that—the Germans may try to force us but they might not find it altogether easy to do." I had the very positive impression that the Marshal thought himself able to deal with any German military threat.

Marshal Mannerheim was most bitter at British policy and said there was no difference at all between the detestable German view of the position of small states vis-à-vis the great powers and the present British view. I said that Mr. Churchill's last speech did not give me that impression. The Marshal asked if I could get him a copy which I shall try to do. He seemed as convinced as President Ryti that the British have "sold" Finland and the Baltic States to the USSR. Like Ryti and other leaders here he had a different feeling about us and thought we were the only idealistic great power. In consequence he did not see how the United States could stand idly

by and see the rights of small states which only sought to mind their own business and live at peace trampled on by cynical great states. At one time he referred ironically to our "noble" allies. I said that in attempting to assess the degree of "nobility" of one's allies or comrades in arms he might be walking on dangerous ground.

The Marshal brought up his much criticized order of the day of July 11, 1941,⁷⁹ and said he had been misquoted. He had not referred to "Suursuomi"—greater Finland—but to "Suurisuoimi"—big Finland—and there was a difference. He said he would be grateful if [I] would set this right for the record. He pointed out that he had been careful to keep the administration of Soviet Karelia in his own hands and gave me the impression he did not regard this conquest as more than a temporary necessity. He confided that he had been furious when the Finnish newspapers dubbed Petroskoi "Aanislinna" and called the River Svir "Syvari".⁸⁰ He said he had indeed pledged his soldiers 24 years ago to offer the brother Karelians in Soviet territory a chance to join their kinfolk; but the occupation of this territory had been for military reasons alone. He stressed he had not cut American communications via the Murmansk Railroad with the rest of Russia. I said he had at least effectively cut that line at Petroskoi and had thus given the people at Leningrad a bad time. The Marshal did not deny this but emphasized again that he had not cut our line of communications. He said, "I choose not to advance to the White Sea".

I said in any case I thought Finland would have to found its security on some sound political basis rather than on a strategical basis. The Marshal admitted that Finland's strategical situation was "somewhat exposed".

From his frequent references to "that terrible treaty of Moscow" I gained the certain conviction that the Marshal does not contemplate for a moment any peace with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics which would reestablish the terms of that treaty. His policy may be summed up briefly in a determination to utilize the relationship of co-belligerency with Germany for the last ounce of support it will give Finland against Russia and then to rely on Finland's own fighting strength to see her through. We, as justice-loving Americans, ought in his opinion to leave Finland alone and understand the enormous difficulties of his country's position.

As I left Marshal Mannerheim said he hoped I could "influence" my Government. I said I was merely a young Chargé d'Affaires left

⁷⁹ See telegram No. 292, July 16, 1941, from the Minister in Finland, *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, p. 48.

⁸⁰ "Petroskoi" was the Finnish term for the Russian city of Petrozavodsk in Soviet Karelia; however, the use of the name "Aanislinna" (a Finnish term, "castle on Lake Aanis", or Lake Onega) became popular in Finland after the Finnish Army had occupied Petrozavodsk. The name "Syvari" was simply the traditional Finnish equivalent of the Russian name "Svir."

here as the last of the Legation, but that I was free to report the truth and the truth had its own influence.

McCLINTOCK

860D.00/1248 : Telegram

The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

STOCKHOLM, June 2, 1943—5 p. m.

[Received 5:37 p. m.]

1749. Counselor of Soviet Legation, Iartsev, who spent 5 years in Soviet Legation, Helsinki, prior to Winter War made following statements to officer of Legation:

There is no difference between present Finnish Government and last one. There is little possibility of parliamentary opposition to seize control of Government. Financial power of Ryti, party organization of Tanner, and industrial power of Walden⁸¹ cannot be challenged by any leaders of parliamentary opposition. Suggestions that others might oust present Government if they had assurances from Soviets regarding peace terms are therefore out of question.

Finns have high regard for relations with United States but should be made to realize that America insists their disassociating themselves from Germany and this can be done only by complete removal of American Legation from Helsinki.

While Soviet Government has not admitted right of Baltic States to independence it has repeatedly stated that Finland and Poland would be independent after war.

While above remarks were made in informal conversation believe they are significant because Iartsev is reputedly considered principal expert on Finnish affairs in Stockholm Soviet Legation and probably important reporter to Moscow on this subject.

JOHNSON

711.60D/232 : Telegram

The Chargé in Finland (McClintock) to the Secretary of State

HELSINKI, June 3, 1943—11 a. m.

[Received 1:39 p. m.]

784. The Swiss Minister last night told me he and his wife had lunched alone with President and Mrs. Ryti on June 1. Mr. Egger said he had asked the President about relations with the United States. Ryti replied that Finland could do nothing; that its fate rested with the decision of the great powers. As for the United States it might,

⁸¹ Gen. Karl R. Walden, Finnish Minister of Defense.

if it wanted to please the Russians, acquiesce in the USSR doing what it wished with Finland. The President concluded by saying "The Americans have offered us only words. The Germans have given us bread". In this brief description you have a precisely accurate picture of the frame of mind which now dominates the makers of policy in this country.

McCLINTOCK

740.0011 European War/29771 : Telegram

The Chargé in Finland (McClintock) to the Secretary of State

HELSINKI, June 11, 1943—11 a. m.

[Received 11:51 a. m.]

789. An official of the Political Section of the Foreign Office last night told me that the Germans had proposed to the Finnish High Command that the Finnish SS battalion⁸³ whose return to Finland was recounted in my 749 and 751, June 3, 753, June 4,⁸⁴ should enter into active service in the far north, cooperating with the Finnish battalion now attached to Dietl's⁸⁵ army in summer operations against Murmansk.

This demand according to my informant was categorically refused by Marshal Mannerheim. Troops of the disbanded Finnish SS battalion who are subject to active service will be called into the Finnish Army but (see last sentence my 759, June 5)⁸⁶ those not so subject are free to re-enlist in the Waffen-SS in Germany if they so desire.⁸⁷

My source said that recently the Germans had requested the Finns to undertake "greater activity" on the Karelian Isthmus but this demand also had met with refusal.

McCLINTOCK

⁸³ From the beginning of the Nazi-Soviet conflict in the summer of 1941, Finland had maintained in service in the Soviet Union, along with the German Waffen-SS (combat units of the SS, or Schutzstaffel, military Elite Corps of the Nazi Party), a special voluntary battalion of soldiers known as the Finnish SS battalion.

⁸⁴ None printed.

⁸⁵ Col. Gen. Eduard Dietl, Commander of the German Army in North Finland.

⁸⁶ Not printed.

⁸⁷ In his telegram No. 507, April 3, the Chargé in Finland reported he had learned "on good authority" that Finland had informed Germany "that no further recruitment will be permitted for the Finnish SS Battalion now on the Caucasus front and that when the present term of enlistment of these soldiers expires on May 1, the Finnish Government requests their return to Finland for active duty in the Finnish Army." (740.00119 European War 1939/1372)

740.0011 European War 1939/29868: Telegram

The Chargé in Finland (McClintock) to the Secretary of State

HELSINKI, June 21, 1943—noon.

[Received June 22—1:10 a. m.]

805. The Foreign Minister asked me to see him this morning.

Dr. Ramsay said he wanted to discuss certain aspects of our relations and added the comment which he repeated throughout the interview that "others had sowed the wind and he had to reap the whirlwind".

I said I was glad he had asked me to call as reports had reached me of a new crisis in Finnish-German relations (see my 802, June 19⁸⁸). The Minister confirmed the fact his Government was under renewed German pressure but said he thought the departure of the German Minister⁸⁹ and his wife had been merely for Blücher's annual vacation. He said frankly the grain question was still causing difficulty and that the Germans had not yet answered the Finnish request for an additional 30,000 tons (see my 783, June 10⁹⁰). I observed that Finland's "Vapenbroder" were pretty tough people to deal with and that the way they were treating their cobelligerent at this time was an example of German methods. Ramsay replied that at least in the question of grain it was largely a matter of "technical difficulties".

The Minister then came to the point of his discussion. He said the question of the Finnish SS battalion (see my 789, June 11 and previous telegrams) was causing trouble and that he wanted me to know in advance that some of these troops would reenlist and return to Germany. The Government had not wanted them to follow such a course but it was "necessary[".] He insisted, however, that those men who preferred to stay in Finland could freely do so and that there was no element of compulsion in offering new enlistment to them. I said it passed my comprehension why any SS men should want to go back after their costly experience on the Eastern Front but Ramsay said some of the boys "liked" it. He gave me the positive impression that the German Government had demanded the return of the Finnish SS battalion and when I asked if there would be any attempt to recruit new volunteers he said that question had not yet

⁸⁸ Not printed; the crisis referred to arose in part from the reported demand by the German Government that Finnish forces participate in an offensive on the Leningrad front, and also from German pressure applied at the time (740.0011 EW 1939/29855).

⁸⁹ The German Minister to Finland, Wipert von Blücher, left for Berlin on June 8, 1943; he returned, leaving Berlin on August 11 for Helsinki.

⁹⁰ Not printed.

been decided. Reenlistment of the present SS battalion would commence around the first of July.⁹¹

The Minister in response to my question admitted his Government was under present German pressure to issue a declaration of joint solidarity with Germany in the war and a statement of resolve to seek no separate peace. I inquired what policy he intended to follow in this matter. He replied he could make no statement but his Government had stood up to the Germans before on this issue and implied he would like now to resist the demand. I said I hoped for Finland's sake he would do so as if Finland had resisted before when the Germans seemed to be winning there was all the more reason to resist now when they were most certainly losing the war.

Ramsay uttered the usual expression of hope that I would remain in Finland and added the typical comment that "America could do a great deal to help us" (see paragraph 3, my 753, June 4).⁹² I replied I had heard this on all sides in Finland but that few Finns seemed to realize that in return for help we expected a little help in return. Finland on the contrary had persisted in keeping on the German side. I was pessimistic as to what we could do now to help Finland or why indeed we should help Finland.

I told the Foreign Minister I was glad to have his comments on the situation as it developed as it was better to get these reports from the front rather than the back door. I said however, that although his explanation about the SS battalion would perhaps be understood by my Government, which believed as he knew that the Finnish Government was not a free agent, it would create a bad impression among the American people and he could expect additional unfavorable publicity for Finland from the forthcoming SS reenlistment. He demurred that at the time the SS bog [*boys?*] enlisted 2 years ago it was "historically necessary" and that although he had to suffer the consequences of the decision made at that time he could not criticise the men who made it. I said in any case it seemed singularly poor policy to send the Finnish volunteers to the SS for as he knew Himmler's⁹³ organization was one of the most hated bodies of men in the world. It also seemed singular that the head of Finland's university should be the active organizer of recruitment for the SS.

I asked him what Mannerheim thought about all this. Ramsay made a wry face. My conclusions are these:

⁹¹ In telegram No. 893, July 13, the Chargé in Finland reported that the Finnish press had published an official announcement that soldiers serving with the SS battalion "have been incorporated in Finnish Army". (740.0011 European War 1939/30115)

⁹² Not printed.

⁹³ Heinrich Himmler, Commander in Chief of the Schutzstaffel and Chief of the German police.

1. Finland is under new and severe German pressure at the present time. Supply of food and other essentials probably forms the basic weapon in the German arsenal but the Finns are also fearful of such conversations as that reported in my 803 yesterday.^{93a}

2. Part if not all of the Finnish SS battalion will soon return to Germany. I am almost certain that recruitment for fresh SS troops will also be made in Finland. The Germans are undoubtedly more interested in the propaganda than the military value of these men, and our own propaganda should seek to counteract theirs.

3. More serious German demands are being pressed on Finland. They include the question of a statement of joint solidarity and they might possibly include a demand for more active military cooperation on the part of the Finns. However, I much doubt if Mannerheim and Ryti are willing to resume the offensive.

4. I think Ramsay has our note April 8⁹⁴ much on his mind although he made no reference to it. Possibly if you were to instruct me to call on Ryti to refresh his memory of this note it might be useful in combatting German pressure at this time. However, on the basis of the analyses set forth in my 547, April 12, and 753, June 4, I am not sanguine as to our prospects of attaining measureably positive results although Ramsay gave me the impression that he would resist German demands so far as possible.⁹⁵ As he put it "We have to proceed by degrees". Nevertheless the very fact he dared to discuss Finnish-German relations with me on his own initiative speaks something for his desire to retain our potential friendship.

McCLINTOCK

740.0011 European War 1939/29868 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Finland (McClintock)

WASHINGTON, June 24, 1943—6 p. m.

102. We found your 805, June 21, of interest but wish to avoid any action at this time which would have effect of again projecting us into the "Finnish problem." Hence you should not call on Ryti as suggested in paragraph numbered 4 of your telegram. However, as we continue to feel that your note of April 8 referred to is in full effect you may in your conversations make appropriate reference thereto.

HULL

^{93a} *Post*, p. 667.

⁹⁴ See telegram No. 55, April 8, 2 a. m., to the Chargé in Finland, p. 262.

⁹⁵ In telegram No. 2055, July 3, 9 p. m., the Minister in Sweden indicated that the Finnish Government was actively resisting German pressure (740.00119 European War 1939/1528).

740.00119 European War 1939/1522: Telegram

The Chargé in Finland (McClintock) to the Secretary of State

[Extracts]

HELSINKI, June 25, 1943—10 a. m.

[Received 12:54 p. m.]

819. With reference to my most secret telegram 810, June 23,⁹⁶ which will be transmitted by direct cable from London it is of interest to report a conversation with Erkkö relating to last time Finns made a direct approach to Russians seeking peace. This was in January and February 1940 when Erkkö was head of Finnish Legation in Stockholm.⁹⁷

The former Foreign Minister said the first Soviet demands in January 1940 did not include cession of Viborg by Finland. They did, however, include lease of Hangö. At that time Finnish Government and particularly Marshal Mannerheim were so confident following results of Suomussalmi, and other battles that they flatly rejected Soviet offer. Then final great Russian offensive on Karelian Isthmus began and with its increasing impetus Soviet political demands became more imperative. By first of March they included all terms later incorporated in Treaty of Moscow except demand for the salient at Salla; and Finnish Government was finally given a 24 hour ultimatum which was answered with only minutes to spare. Negotiations by this time were being handled through intermediary of Swedish Foreign Minister.⁹⁸

History may not repeat itself but fact Russians did not at first regard Viborg as an essential concession by Finland in 1940 seems instructive.

Repeated to Stockholm.

McCLINTOCK

121.5460D/100a: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Finland (McClintock)

WASHINGTON, July 10, 1943—9 p. m.

112. A memorandum reading as follows is being handed today to the Finnish Minister:

⁹⁶ Not printed; it reported that according to an unofficial Finnish source the Foreign Minister was considering the possibility of making direct contact with the Soviet Government to feel out the prospects for peace (740.00119 EW 1939/1518).

⁹⁷ For correspondence on the events leading to Soviet-Finnish peace negotiations in early 1940, see *Foreign Relations*, 1940, vol. I, pp. 269 ff.

⁹⁸ Christian Günther.

"All personnel of the offices of the American Military and of the American Naval Attaché in Helsinki have been withdrawn by the American Government as, under present circumstances, there does not appear to be an adequate basis for contact between Finnish and American armed forces of the character involved in the further maintenance of Military and Naval Attachés in the capitals of the respective countries.

It would therefore be appreciated if the Finnish Government would withdraw at the earliest possible moment Captain Grondahl and Lieutenant Stenback and any other Finnish nationals employed in the office of the Finnish Military Attaché in Washington, and if such personnel would immediately cease their official activities in the United States.

The Department of State will be of all appropriate assistance to the Finnish Legation in arranging the departure of these officials from the United States."

The Minister is being informed orally that no political significance is to be attached to the timing of the Department's action in this matter, that our action represents merely an effort to bring into line with present conditions the scope of the activities of the Finnish Legation in Washington, and that it is not our intention to give any publicity to this action. You may repeat this information orally to the Foreign Office.⁹⁹

Please also address an appropriate communication to the Foreign Office informing it of the formal withdrawal of all remaining personnel of the offices of the American Military and Naval attachés accredited to the Finnish Government, effective immediately, and inform Stockholm of your action.

HULL

701.60D11/582½

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle)

[WASHINGTON.] July 22, 1943.

The Finnish Minister came in, at his request.

He said that, in conformity with our request, he has discontinued the work of the Finnish Military and Naval Attachés, and the only other Finnish national employed in the office of the Military Attaché.

The Minister said that he had not yet decided exactly what to do with them, and angled slightly for an expression of opinion on my part that they might as well be kept here, or nearby, because "we

⁹⁹ In a note dated July 12, 1943, the Chargé in Finland informed the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the United States Government's decision and requested that the names of Lt. Col. Aage Woldike, Comdr. Walter L. Heiberg, and Lt. Allan L. Rice be deleted from the Finnish Diplomatic List (121.5460D/-104).

might need them here later and might need our own Military Attaché in Helsinki later." I said I could not see that far ahead, and that I thought it would be well for him to get them out pretty soon.

A[DOLF] A. B[ERLE]. JR.

711.60D/259 : Telegram

The Chargé in Finland (McClintock) to the Secretary of State

HELSINKI, July 30, 1943—3 p. m.

[Received July 31—12:45 a. m.]

964. I requested an interview of the Foreign Minister this afternoon.

I told Dr. Ramsay that I wanted to see him before leaving for Stockholm as there were always topics of mutual interest to discuss and the war had been moving along considerably since we had last met. I said I had asked for an interview before seeing the communiqué reported in my 962 today¹ but that I had had the feeling that something would be forthcoming along that line and wondered if the new grain agreement was only for grain.

The Minister replied that the agreement provided for the shipment of 60,000 tons of rye to Finland before October first. He was unable to tell me the other details of the agreement as the head of the Finnish Delegation, Professor Osara,² had not yet returned from Berlin. However, he could assure me there had been no political discussions and no political commitments on the part of Finland. "The Germans gave us 60,000 tons of rye: we gave them nothing." I interjected "Except staying on with them in the War."

In consequence of this new windfall it would be possible to increase the bread ration and it would probably be restored to the former basis by August 15, said Dr. Ramsay. Negotiations would be resumed in October for further supplies but I had the impression that the Minister was not at all sure what Finland would get at that time, and that this question would depend on Finland's constancy in remaining beside Germany.

Turning to Finnish-American relations Dr. Ramsay said he had had a long discussion with his colleagues in the Government as to the mean-

¹ Not printed; it reported that during Finnish-German trade negotiations at Berlin, July 21-29, an agreement was reached on Finnish-German trade for the second half of 1943, and that provision of Finnish supply requirements till new harvest was secured (860D.24/218). The accord included the signing of a "Second Protocol" to the basic German-Finnish trade treaty of March 24, 1934; for text of the protocol, see Finland, Treaty Series, 1943, No. 8, p. 43; for text of the 1934 treaty, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. cXLIX, p. 343.

² Nils A. Osara, Finnish Assistant Minister of Supply.

ing of Secretary Hull's comment to the press on the 26th.³ He himself took "marginal case" to mean Finland was near the verge but not on the other side of it. I said I thought the expression might be taken either way and that perhaps the Secretary's remarks might not be unrelated to the note I left with him on April 8.

On this point the Minister said he had had this note much in mind, and that "now it was purely a hypothetical case" he could tell me that he had wondered whether the terms of the note would have applied if Finland had given in on the question of the return of the SS troops, particularly since the SS question was not "a new matter". I said I was very glad the SS question had remained purely hypothetical but that conceivably the terms of my note might have applied. I had been encouraged at the time, however, to see that the Finnish Government was returning a negative answer to Germany on an even more important question.⁴

Ramsay said in any case "no one had the moral right to ask unconditional surrender of Finland". I replied we were not asking anything of Finland any more, except that, of course, my note of April 8 should be kept in mind. I supposed the ones who were more interested in asking "Unconditional Surrender" of Finland were the Russians.

McCLINTOCK

760D.61/1665 : Telegram

The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

STOCKHOLM, August 3, 1943—2 p. m.

[Received 2:54 p. m.]

2393. Last night McClintock and Cunningham⁵ saw First Secretary of Soviet Legation Vinogradov⁶ who, apparently in absence of Counselor Iartsev who is in Moscow for consultation, is keeping an eye on Finland for local Soviet Legation.

Vinogradov expressed view that it would be impossible for Finnish Government to conclude a separate peace with U.S.S.R. as long as

³ The reference is to the following questions and answers in the Secretary's press conference of that day:

"Question: Mr. Secretary, does the unconditional surrender doctrine apply to Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria? Are they considered a part of the Axis in the sense that they too must surrender unconditionally?"

"Answer: I would refer that question for confirmation to the War Department and the President, the Commander-in-Chief. The question would certainly be raised against any and all countries that have declared war at any time against the United Nations. I imagine that all nations who have thus far declared war to be in the same group, or numerous other groups such as the one to which you refer.

"Question: Presumably then, Sir, it would apply to Finland.

"Answer: I would not undertake to go into those marginal cases offhand."

⁴ See footnote 87, p. 280.

⁵ H. Francis Cunningham, Jr., Third Secretary of Legation in Sweden.

⁶ Konstantin Fedorovich Vinogradov, First Secretary of the Soviet Legation in Sweden.

German troops were in Finland; and that following departure of German forces it would be "very late" for Finland to reach a separate peace. However, he seemed to feel his Government would be willing to listen to Finnish peace proposals provided they came directly through contact established either here or in Washington.

Vinogradov expressed personal opinion that if Finland and Rumania did not shortly make peace with U.S.S.R. they would be overrun by Soviet forces and implied that this would mean engulfment of these two countries. He said no one could imagine numerical strength of Red Army at present time and thought it far in excess of the theoretical 10% of Soviet population. He implied that Red Army's strength is in neighborhood of 30 million men.

Vinogradov said Mme. Kollontay's⁷ condition has recently grown worse.

JOHNSON

740.00119 European War 1939/1560 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, August 4, 1943.

[Received August 5—8:43 a. m.]

1017. Soviet press August 4 published Tass⁸ denial reading as follows:

"On July 31 the Swedish paper *Aftontidningen* published an article on Soviet peace conditions with Finland. The conditions in this article reportedly made known by a Soviet diplomat are: the 1940 boundaries on the Karelian Isthmus and the 1939 boundaries in the other regions.

Tass is authorized to state that this announcement is an invention of the feverish imagination of the *Aftontidningen* and without any foundation."

STANDLEY

740.0011 European War 1939/30558 : Telegram

The Chargé in Finland (McClintock) to the Secretary of State

HELSINKI, August 5, 1943—10 a. m.

[Received August 6—9:10 a. m.]

975. The Foreign Minister asked me to see him this morning.

1. Dr. Ramsay opened the discussion by inquiring my impressions of Sweden following my 4-day visit to Stockholm. I replied it seemed to be generally believed in Sweden that German transit through that

⁷ Alexandra Mikhailovna Kollontay, Soviet Minister to Sweden.

⁸ Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union, official communications agency of the Soviet Government.

country would shortly be terminated.⁹ The Minister said he had the same impression but professed not to know when the transit agreement would be denounced (his private secretary before I entered had told me his chief thought it might be a question of 2 or 3 months). I said I was entirely without official knowledge and had not discussed the matter with Minister Johnson, but I did have the feeling that German transit through Sweden might stop at any time as otherwise the Swedish Government would not have called up the greatest number of troops on record. When the transit did cease Finland would be in the limelight as the Germans would have only two remaining lines of communication: one, across the Skagerrak from Denmark to Norway and the other through Finland.

2. The Foreign Minister said he had had these aspects of the matter well in mind, that events were moving rapidly and that "Finland might have to make some quick decisions". He then came to the main object of the interview which in brief was whether the United States was still interested in helping Finland out of its war.

3. Dr. Ramsay opened with the comment "You want us to end our cobelligerency with Germany". I replied we had tried for almost two years to get Finland away from this perilous association but we were not trying any more after negative response he had given to our *aide-mémoire* of March 20. I recalled that your offer on that date had clearly indicated that it was not one which would be tendered again. The Minister said he knew that very well and that he expected no initiative from the United States in any further effort to extract Finland from the war. However, he wondered, and wanted my personal opinion, whether you might be willing to tell the Finnish Government whether now would be a good time to approach the Soviet Government directly with a view to making peace or whether Finland should wait a little longer. All he wanted was some friendly advice from Washington on "when" not "how". He thought the question of getting in direct contact with the Russians was one he could easily arrange and added the comment he thought the Soviet Government would prefer that there be no intermediaries.

4. With the Department's 102, June 24, and 120, July 30,¹⁰ in mind I replied my impression was that you were not greatly interested in the Finnish problem. For a long and laborious period you had sought without success to get Finland out of the war and very possibly had no

⁹ Agreement by Sweden to grant Germany the right of German troops and matériel to transit through Sweden was made on June 21, 1940, when the Swedish Riksdag complied with the German request. For diplomatic exchanges between the Swedish and German Governments on this question prior to the agreement, see *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945*, series D, vol. ix, pp. 596 and 619. Termination of the agreement was in fact announced by the Swedish Government on August 5, 1943, specifying that transport of war supplies would end on August 15, and of troops on August 20.

¹⁰ Latter telegram not printed.

particular interest now when or how Finland reached a conclusion of hostilities with Russia. Nevertheless the Minister's inquiry was of the utmost importance—at least for Finland—and I should not fail to report it to you. If he wanted my personal opinion it was that I doubted if any reaction would be forthcoming from Washington, but that I could of course be mistaken.

5. Dr. Ramsay said that while he realized perhaps the chances of even such restricted assistance from the United States at this time were "90% against and only 10% for" he, nevertheless, in examining all the possibilities would like to explore this one as well. It would be of the greatest help to him in approaching the Russians, if that became necessary (and clearly he thought it was necessary), to have some indication from us whether or not the time was ripe.

6. The Minister asked me what our relationship to Russia was, evidently with a view to conditioning Russia's attitude toward Finland. I replied we were Allies of the U.S.S.R. and that naturally we cooperated more completely with our Allies than with nations outside that association.

7. Dr. Ramsay said in concluding the interview that he did not want me to get the impression he was on the point of making peace "but he had to consider all the possibilities and it might be necessary to act quickly". In other words his informal request boils down to this: "Is the American Government willing to tell the Finnish Government that now or some later date is the most propitious time to make peace?"

8. As for peace terms the Minister made no very specific comment but did say the article in the Stockholm paper *Aftontidningen* July 31 was not a Finnish trial balloon and that the terms mentioned therein, including the retention by the USSR of the 1940 frontier in Karelia would be quite unacceptable to Finland (please see last paragraph my 942, July 28¹²).

9. The Minister made little reference to Germany but in saying once more (my 964, July 30) that he had my note of April 8 constantly in mind did remark that without reference to the Cabinet he had categorically refused a German demand for the admission of 1000 Norwegian laborers into Lapland. This request, which he said originated with the German authorities in Norway, had been turned down at the end of May. He admitted that a German demand for increased transit facilities, particularly in the event of an Allied invasion of Norway, would place Finland in a highly difficult position in the light of my note of April 8 (my 961, July 30¹²) but averred that no intimation had yet been received from the Germans that such increased facilities were desired. As for the German position in the war he had heard this

¹² Not printed.

morning of the defeat at Orel, wondered at the quiescence of the Luftwaffe and gave me the general impression that he was at last convinced Germany was heading for certain and possibly speedy defeat.

10. My impressions are these.

(a) The Finnish Government has reached the conclusion it must reach a separate peace with Russia.

(b) The immediate question is one of timing: "Shall we approach the USSR now or later?"

(c) A qualified hope is entertained that we may be willing to render one last service, in at least informing the Finnish Government whether we think the time is ripe for peace talks and when that time may be.

(d) The Finnish Government realizes it must conduct the negotiations alone.

(e) The Finnish Government is not prepared to make peace on the basis of the boundary of the treaty of Moscow.

(f) The Finnish Government is willing to run the risk of German reprisal as being less than the risk of staying on with a beaten "co-belligerent" and facing a victorious USSR.

11. I told the Minister I did not at all know if any reply would be forthcoming to my report of our conversation but that if anything developed I would let him know. Although his inquiry may have been inspired by the telegram mentioned in the Department's 121, August 2,¹³ Dr. Ramsay made no reference to that message.

McCLINTOCK

740.0011 European War 1939/30558 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Finland (McClintock)

WASHINGTON, August 11, 1943—4 p. m.

126. Your 975, August 5. Please call on the Foreign Minister and hand him a paraphrase of the following *aide-mémoire*:¹⁴

Replying to Dr. Ramsay's request for the opinion of the American Government as to the advisability, in terms of time, of the Finnish Government initiating peace negotiations with the U.S.S.R. the American Government, in principle, does not find itself able to add anything on the subject of Finland's association with Germany to the statements which it has officially communicated to the Finnish Government over the course of the past 2 years. End *aide-mémoire*.

We approve the line which you took in your conversation with Ramsay and you should continue to follow it in subsequent conversations unless instructed otherwise.

HULL

¹³ Not printed.

¹⁴ This message was approved by President Roosevelt on August 10, 1943. It was delivered to the Finnish Foreign Minister on August 12.

740.00119 European War 1939/1583 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, August 17, 1943—3 p. m.

[Received August 18—9:07 a. m.]

1103. Your 672, August 11, 3 p. m.¹⁵ I informed Molotov last evening of the possibility of a Finnish peace approach. Molotov remarked that Finns should have made this move long ago and added that there was no use for the present Finnish Government to approach the Soviet Government.

STANDLEY

760D.61/1672 : Telegram

The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

STOCKHOLM, August 27, 1943—4 p. m.

[Received 5:54 p. m.]

2709. McClintock last night met Vinogradov at latter's request. See my 2393, August 3, 2 p. m.

Vinogradov asked McClintock's opinion as to the *bona fides* of a Finnish desire to conclude peace with USSR but answered his own question by saying "We don't believe the Finns want peace. In any case, we are not interested".

McClintock replied that on first count he thought Mr. Vinogradov was mistaken; Finns very much wanted peace and in his opinion would agree at once to stop fighting if they were assured of a boundary similar to that of 1939 with possible rectifications on Karelian Isthmus in favor of Russia. However, retention of Viborg and Hangö by Finland were still basic points. As for Vinogradov's comment that his Government was not interested McClintock was unable to make any comment other than that to him it still seemed of interest from a Russian point of view to pry open Axis structure by getting satellite states away from Germany.

Vinogradov, who said on several occasions that he had been studying dossier on Finland and seemed obviously to be speaking under instructions, three times emphasized his Government was not interested in peace with Finland. He said, "Perhaps we shall consider Finnish proposals when they come under a white flag at front".

Paraphrase to Helsinki by courier.

JOHNSON

¹⁵ Not printed; it instructed the Ambassador to inform Foreign Commissar Molotov of a possible approach by Finland to the Soviet Government for peace negotiations (740.00119 European War 1939/1582a).

740.0011 European War 1939/30990a

*The Secretary of State to Admiral William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff
to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy*

WASHINGTON, September 1, 1943.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL LEAHY: In conversations which I am reliably informed were undertaken with the knowledge and authorization of the Finnish Minister for Foreign Affairs,¹⁶ a Finnish diplomatic official is reported to have made a proposal¹⁷ to this Government of the following general character:

If Finland could have any satisfactory assurances that such a step would not mean its ultimate destruction as a nation, it would be willing by the beginning of September to cut off supplies to the German troops in the north of Finland, thus condemning the latter to eventual exhaustion and destruction. The Finnish Government would like a reaction to this proposal.

The Finnish official who put forth this proposal stated that the American Government was in error in thinking that the Finnish Government was unwilling to contribute whatever it could to the liberation of Europe. Finland's position, according to this official, was simply: The great part of Finland's food supply came from Germany and the Germans by deliberately preventing Finland from building up stocks kept it in a position of day by day dependence on German shipments. In these circumstances the Germans were in a position to create at any time and within the space of a few days almost insurmountable food difficulties for the Finnish people and they would not be slow to punish in this manner any demonstration of political independence on the Finnish side. This situation, however, would last only until the end of August or beginning of September at which time enough grain would be available from Finland's own harvest to tide the country over for some time and the day by day dependence on the Germans would be temporarily removed. It was for this reason, therefore, that the above proposal could be made.

In a further conversation subsequent to the presentation of the original proposal set forth above the Finnish representative explained that when he said his Government would be prepared to "cut off" the

¹⁶ Conversations had been going on for some time in Lisbon between the American Counselor of Legation in Portugal, George Kennan, and the Finnish Chargé there, Taavi Pohjanpalo. The Department was informed by Minister in Sweden Herschel Johnson, in his telegram No. 2676, August 24, that the Finnish Minister in Sweden, Gripenberg, had said that Foreign Minister Ramsay had authorized the Finnish Chargé in Portugal to undertake these conversations looking toward a possible Finnish exit from the war (760D.61/1671). Mr. Gripenberg had replaced Jarl A. Wasastjerna as Finnish Minister to Sweden on April 15, 1943.

¹⁷ The form of this Finnish proposal was worked out at a meeting between Kennan and Pohjanpalo early in August, and was reported to the Secretary of State in a letter from Kennan dated August 10.

German troops in Finland, he did not mean that those troops would not be given an opportunity to return peacefully to Germany through Finland, if they wished to do so. It meant that the Finns would refuse, as of a certain date, to permit these troops to be supplied or reinforced from Germany. This would place them in the same position as that of the German troops in Northern Norway (in view of the recent Swedish declaration)¹⁸ and the Germans would presumably be compelled to withdraw them. He also said that the Finnish Government would doubtless wish to make its offer contingent on Allied entry into Northern Norway, since in the absence of such an entry it would be impossible to get supplies to Finland from the outside world and the country would remain at the mercy of the Germans. It was pointed out to him that it was out of the question that our military authorities should consent to reveal in the course of such conversation anything whatsoever concerning our military plans. He agreed to this but expressed the hope that perhaps some arrangements could still be made with the United Nations which while not binding the latter to any specific military action, would become operative if and when Northern Norway were liberated from the Germans.

It seems to me that Allied interest in this proposal may depend for the greater part upon its military aspects. Accordingly, before going further into the political implications of the proposal, I should greatly appreciate receiving an indication from you as to whether the proposal has any substantial military interest in connection with the prosecution of the war.

I may add by way of background that in the present situation in which the Finnish Government finds itself, it may feel that the best solution for its present political difficulties would be a landing by American or even British troops in Finland. The Finns might calculate that such a landing would serve the dual purpose of ejecting or assisting in the ejection of German troops now in Finland and offer some insurance against the entry of Russian troops into Finland. If this is true, the Finnish proposal might well be found upon further exploration to contain the requirement that American or British troops land in Northern Finland and Northern Norway and that Soviet troops would not make such a landing an occasion for operations against Finnish territory. Aside from these considerations, the Finnish proposal might be found of interest and importance in connection with any military operations which might be undertaken by Allied forces anywhere in the Scandinavian area and upon the continued neutrality of Sweden.

Sincerely yours,

CORDELL HULL

¹⁸ For termination of the German-Swedish transit agreement, see footnote 9, p. 289.

740.00119 European War 1939/1641: Telegram

The Chargé in Finland (McClintock) to the Secretary of State

HELSINKI, September 6, 1943—11 a. m.

[Received 7:20 p. m.]

1071. During my recent trip to Stockholm the Yugoslav Chargé¹⁹ told me he had recently had a long conversation with Soviet Chargé, Semenov,²⁰ on question of possible peace terms for Finland. Russian Chargé quoted an alleged statement of Peter the Great to effect that "Viborg is the cushion of Petersburg"²¹ and said that he thought Soviet Government would insist on retention of Viborg as a condition of peace with Finland but might be willing to give up Hangö. This is the first time I have heard of any Russian disposition to relinquish this port but such an intention, if true, would go far to allay opinion in Sweden and might make it difficult for a Finnish Government to refuse a peace embodying the retention of Hangö by the Finns. On other hand loss of Viborg as suggested in my 942, July 28²² would gravely cripple economy of eastern Finland and as indicated in my 305, February 18²² would have severe domestic repercussions following [*compelling?*] another evacuation of the 450,000 Karelians and their forced quartering on the rest of the Finnish population.

Repeated to Stockholm as my 280, today.

McCLINTOCK

740.0011 European War 1939/31337

Admiral William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, 7 September 1943.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Replying to your letter of 1 September 1943, inquiring as to the military aspects of the proposal of a Finnish diplomatic official, the following are the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

According to the latest estimates of Axis strength on the Finnish front the German forces total seven divisions and the Finnish, thirteen divisions and seven brigades. These are containing a Russian force estimated at approximately 450,000 men and two hundred planes.

Inasmuch as the Finnish proposal would permit the withdrawal from Finland of the seven German divisions, aggregating about 150,-

¹⁹ Nicola Naditch, Yugoslav Counselor of Legation and Chargé in Sweden.

²⁰ Vladimir Semenovitch Semenov, Soviet Chargé in Sweden.

²¹ In a peace settlement concluded with Sweden at Nystad (Uusikaupunki), Finland, on August 31, 1721, Tsar Peter the Great acquired for Russia the province of Vyborg (Viipuri) as a protective strip to the northern approaches of St. Petersburg, and other territory in Karelia.

²² Not printed.

000 men, for use on other fronts, the number of Russian troops that would be available for use elsewhere would be correspondingly decreased to about 300,000. This number would be still further decreased if the Russians should divert forces for the military occupation of Finland.

The suggestions of the Finnish representative that his Government would doubtless wish to make the offer contingent on Allied entry into northern Norway, proposes a commitment that, as implied in your letter, should not be accepted by the United States. As to the further suggestion of the employment of Anglo-American troops for the dual purpose of assisting in the ejection of German troops from Finland and affording insurance against Russian entry into that country, it may be said that, aside from other weighty objections to such action, the task suggested would be impracticable from a military standpoint. Logistic factors alone would preclude its accomplishment.

The Finnish front at present is relatively quiet. Russia is in the best position to evaluate the military benefit to Allied strength that would result from the withdrawal of Finland from the war, and it is also the Power most directly concerned in the solution of the question. Such influence as the United States may be able to exert in the determination of a formula for that solution, must be derived from sources other than that of Anglo-American military intervention in Finland.²³

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

WILLIAM D. LEAHY

760D.61/1674: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, September 9, 1943—4 p. m.

[Received September 10—1:27 p. m.]

1316. The September issue of *War and the Working Class* publishes the first chapter of a forthcoming book by O. Kuusinen²⁴ the Finnish Communist which will be called *Finland Unmasked*. In the first chapter entitled "Sources of Finland's Anti-Soviet Policy" Kuusinen follows the orthodox Soviet line regarding Finland. Finnish foreign policy he writes has been consistently anti-Soviet and Finland has always cultivated those countries which were most hostile to the Soviet

²³ In a letter to Admiral Leahy, September 25, the Secretary of State informed him that the Finnish Government was being informed through the Finnish Minister in Stockholm that the United States Government could not, from a military standpoint, meet the requirements of the Finnish proposal.

²⁴ Kuusinen was at the time a member of the Soviet Communist Party's Central Committee; he had been a member of the Presidium, Executive Committee of the Communist International, until the announcement of the Comintern's dissolution on May 22, 1943.

Union. Finland's enmity to the Soviet Union results from a special brand of chauvinism which was carefully inculcated after the Bolshevik revolution. The leading advocates of this chauvinism including reactionary bourgeois circles and the ruling plutocratic classes and their agents, the bourgeois press, the Schutz Corps, and Army officers professed to be opposed to everything Russian but in fact had been loyal subjects of the Tsar and continued to cooperate with White Guardists after the revolution.

Finnish chauvinism was based on the desire of the ruling plutocracy to oppress and exploit the working masses and its realization that this could only be accomplished with foreign aid. This assistance was first obtained from the Tsarist Government and the Kerensky Government. The Bolsheviks advocated the independence of Finland (Stalin's statement in November 1917 to this effect is quoted)²⁵ but the Finnish *bourgeoisie* fearing a people's movement sought German support and embarked on an adventurous policy toward the Soviet Union under the slogan "Finland's war of liberation against the Russian yoke". The second source of Finnish chauvinism was the greed of the Finnish plutocrats particularly the lumber, paper and pulp interests and the Helsinki banks who cast envious eyes on the natural timber reserves of Soviet Karelia and finances freebooting expeditions organized by Mannerheim to seize this territory. "These are the sources of the anti-Soviet chauvinism of the Finnish Government." The chapter concludes, "From the very beginning it was in reality chauvinism of the Fascist stamp".

Unlike most articles now appearing in the Soviet press Kuusinen employs the old anti-capitalistic jargon of the Comintern and draws liberally on the rich invective of the Russian language to describe ruling circles in Finland.

STANDLEY

740.0011 European War 1939/31338

*The Finnish Minister for Foreign Affairs (Ramsay) to the Secretary of State*²⁶

[HELSINKI, undated.]

Finland greatly appreciates her present friendly relations with the United States of America, and for her part she is firmly decided to do

²⁵ In a speech to a meeting of members of the Finnish Social Democratic Party held in Helsinki on November 14, 1917, Iosif V. Stalin, then People's Commissar of Nationalities in the Soviet Russian Government, called for "self-determination" and "freedom" for the Finnish people. See I. V. Stalin, *Sochineniya* [Works], vol. iv, pp. 3-4.

²⁶ Handed to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson) on September 10 by the Finnish Minister in Sweden (Gripenberg) and forwarded to the Secretary with covering letter of same date received September 21. Mr. Gripenberg stated that this communication was related to the Kennan-Pohjanpalo conversations in Lisbon (see footnote 16, p. 293).

everything in her power to maintain and develop these friendly relations.

If a landing of American troops in Northern Norway would cause military operations affecting Finnish territory, Finland, in conformity with her attitude as pointed out above, would *not* consider such operations as directed against Finnish troops. The Finnish Army would consequently abstain from any military operations against the United States of America, just as Finland expects that possible American military operations in Finnish territory would not be directed against Finnish troops or Finnish civilians.

As soon as such a landing would actually have taken place, Finland would immediately inform Germany that she is not going to fight the United States of America and simultaneously she would start negotiations for the purpose of the German troops being withdrawn from Finnish territory.

The possible military operations above referred to would probably lead to parts of Northern Finland being threatened by a Soviet Russian invasion. Under no conditions could Finland be a passive spectator of a Russian advance across her frontiers undertaken in connexion with these military operations, nor could she tolerate a previously agreed upon advance of Soviet troops into Finnish territory. The withdrawal of the German troops presupposes that they should be replaced by other military forces for the protection of the frontier between Northern Finland and Russia. Such other military forces could be provided only by the United States of America or possibly by Sweden after an agreement with Soviet-Russia that Northern Finland should in this way be neutralized or pacified.

Under above mentioned conditions Finland is thus ready to contribute to a peaceful neutralization or pacification of Northern Finland, provided always that this area as well as every part of it would be protected against a Russian penetration.

During the coming autumn months Finland's own reserves of food stuffs will gradually diminish. It can be estimated that after the 1st of December Finland would each month need from abroad the following quantities: 30,000 tons of wheat, 2,000 tons of fats, 4,000 tons of sugar.

In addition, certain consumption goods are needed such as clothes, shoes, textiles, lubricating oils as well as motor fuel for agricultural purposes and forestry work.

[Unsigned]

760D.61/1675 : Telegram

The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

STOCKHOLM, September 14, 1943—7 p. m.
[Received September 15—12: 13 a.m.]

2945. Boheman told me this afternoon in confidence that the Finns about 3 weeks ago through Soviet Chargé d'Affaires in Stockholm made a bid for peace with Russia on basis of 1939 frontiers but leaving all islands in Gulf of Finland in Soviet possession, and offering rectification of frontier in Karelian Isthmus, exact line not specified. Boheman said he was not at liberty to tell me channel of communication between Finns and Soviet Legation. No reply or acknowledgment has yet been received from Moscow.²⁷

JOHNSON

740.00119 European War 1939/1745 : Telegram

The Chargé in Finland (McClintock) to the Secretary of State

HELSINKI, September 18, 1943—3 p. m.
[Received 10: 53 p. m.]

1116. The Foreign Minister asked me to call on him this morning.

1. He thanked me for copy of Secretary Hull's speech²⁸ which I had given him (paragraph 2 my 1108, September 16²⁹) and asked if he could have a copy for President Ryti whom he was to see at noon. Dr. Ramsay stressed his intense admiration for the speech, its clarity, and fact his Government was in complete accord with principles set forth therein. He said there was nothing in speech Finland did not subscribe to. I asked if Finland also subscribed to preamble in which Mr. Hull stressed that paramount aim of our foreign policy was to defeat our enemies, including Hitler, as quickly as possible.

2. Dr. Ramsay said he had been particularly interested to see Mr. Hull's reference to the "area of common interest" of United Nations in creating "an effective system of international cooperation for maintenance of peace" and said this brought up a point which had worried his Government: to what extent Soviet Government considered itself bound by principles of Atlantic Charter. He produced from his dossier a report citing issue number 20 of the *Bulletin of International*

²⁷ In telegram No. 1138, September 29, 4 p. m., the Chargé in Finland reported that the Finnish Government early in August established direct contact with the Soviet Government with a view to concluding peace but that the Soviet Government turned down the terms proposed by the Finns as "preposterous" (740.00119 European War 1939/1791).

²⁸ On September 12, the Secretary of State gave a radio address entitled "Our Foreign Policy in the Framework of Our National Interests"; see Department of State *Bulletin*, September 18, 1943, p. 173.

²⁹ Not printed.

*News*³⁰ of October 4, 1941, quoting Ambassador Maiski³¹ as saying at a meeting of the "Inter Allied Council" at London on September 24, 1941, that Russia accepted principles of Atlantic Charter but with certain modifications and reservations. I replied I did not know source of this report or whether *Bulletin of International News* was written in Berlin or a United Nations capital; but that important point to note was that subsequently, on January 1, 1942, and without reservation, Soviet Government had signed Declaration of United Nations, which was our instrument of alliance with Russia, and had thus expressly affirmed its support of the principles of the Atlantic Charter. I have sent the Foreign Minister a copy of the Declaration of the United Nations.

3. With reference to the Atlantic Charter of which Dr. Ramsay had a copy I underlined first clause of article 6 and observed that in the extensive discussion of the Charter which I had seen in Finland no one seemed to have noted these very important eight words.³² Dr. Ramsay who is a great underliner himself, in turn heavily underscored this clause.

3a. In the most frank and lengthy discussion I have yet had with the Foreign Minister he went over every aspect of the problem of how Finland could get peace with Russia. As suggested in my 975³³ the Finnish Government has reached the decision it must come to peace but professes to have only a very rudimentary idea of how to achieve it.

4. Recalling Department's 126, August 11, I emphasized that in following his exposition I should not wish him to get the idea that my Government was interested in assisting Finland to work out peace with Russia and Dr. Ramsay said he clearly understood this and that we were "talking off the record".

5. The Foreign Minister said frankly he did not have the slightest idea what terms Russia might be willing to offer Finland or indeed if Russia contemplated offering any terms at all. He thought the Russian position was that Finland should come directly to Moscow with proposals but that this was dangerous as the Finns would incur German wrath without at the same time having any assurance that their proposals would lead to serious peace discussions. He said between such terms as those of the Treaty of Moscow of March 12, 1940, and terms involving territorial adjustments on the Karelian Isthmus in favor of Russia there was a wide latitude along which at some point it might be possible to find ground for agreement. As

³⁰ The *Bulletin of International News* was published by the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London between 1924 and 1945; thereafter it was replaced by *The World Today*.

³¹ Ivan Mikhailovich Maisky, Soviet Ambassador in the United Kingdom.

³² The first clause of article 6 referred to reads: "after the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny"; see *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, p. 367.

³³ Dated August 5, p. 288.

before he said the retention of Viborg and Hangö were vital for Finland but (see my 1071 September 6) he gave me the impression that relinquishment of a Russian claim to Hangö would make it difficult for the Finnish Government to refuse peace. However, faced with absolute silence in the Kremlin the Finnish Government, while wanting to talk peace, stood hesitating.

6. I said I had the impression that the Russians might be in a position to say that so long as German troops occupied one-third of Finland, and while Finnish troops stood deep in Russian territory, there was no reason to discuss peace. I asked, "Are you prepared to get the Germans out of Finland as a prerequisite to peace?"

7. Dr. Ramsay replied "We are".

8. However, later in the discussion he qualified this remark by saying that Finland could not well accept the risk of such reprisal as the Germans had wreaked on Italy if it did not have a fairly authentic idea of what peace terms the Russians would be willing to discuss. In other words in return for forcing the Germans out of Finland the Finnish Government would expect a reasonable chance of being able to sit down successfully at the conference table with the U.S.S.R. It would also presumably expect, if it removed the obstacle to the maintenance of friendly relations with U.S.—Finnish collaboration with Germany—to rely on at least a modicum of American good will with a view to obtaining a peace embodying the principles set forth by Secretary Hull in his speech of September 12. Dr. Ramsay did not formulate these ideas quite so specifically in the course of a rambling discussion of pros and cons but his thinking will certainly come to this if he and particularly Ryti ever set it down on paper.

9. Dr. Ramsay said it was absolutely basic that if Finland actually came to armed conflict with German forces in Finland no Soviet forces should come to "assist" in repulsing the common enemy.

10. In summary.

(a) As was to be expected the Finnish Government hails Secretary Hull's enunciation of principles as a mandate of possible salvation. It doubts if Russian agreement with these principles is either complete or sincere.

(b) The Finnish Government very much wants peace but fears the Soviet Government is not interested (see Stockholm's 2709, August 27).

(c) The Finnish Government may be willing to run the risk of getting the Germans out but only if it has assurances from somewhere, either Moscow or Washington or both, that this risk will be compensated for by prompt peace with Russia on acceptable terms.

(d) Finnish peace terms, as I have previously pointed out, absolutely exclude the cession of Hangö and only to a slightly less extent the loss of Viborg. Beyond these two basic points there is room for

agreement. Finnish seizures of Soviet territory would *ipso facto* be relinquished.

(e) It would not be surprising if the Finnish Government made one last approach in Washington seeking to meet us on the basis of Mr. Welles' definition of the only way American friendship can be regained. Such approach might be along these lines: "We will stop our collaboration with the Germans if you will help us find peace with Russia."

11. With the Department's 132, August 19,³⁴ in mind I took particular pains throughout the interview to stress to the Foreign Minister my feeling that you were not interested in Finnish peace attempts at this time and that your last word had been said in our *aide-mémoire* of March 20.

12. I think the civil departments of the Finnish Government, and especially Ramsay, Linkomies and Ryti might actually be prepared to give the Germans their walking papers if the Soviet Government would offer Finland a tolerable peace. I had impression this morning, however, that Marshal Mannerheim is not being closely consulted; and as to army opinion I refer to paragraph 5 my 1078, September 9.³⁵

McCLINTOCK

740.00119 European War 1939/1938 : Telegram

The Chargé in Finland (McClintock) to the Secretary of State

HELSINKI, November 3, 1943—11 a. m.

[Received 2:20 p. m.]

1224. I called on the Foreign Minister this morning at his suggestion.

Dr. Ramsay was unfeignedly disturbed and downcast over the communiqués from the Moscow Conference.³⁶ He said the general

³⁴ Not printed; it instructed the Legation in Finland to "take no action and say nothing which any Finn could interpret as encouragement to a Finnish peace at this time." (740.00119 European War 1939/1582)

³⁵ Not printed; this paragraph stated in part that, "The professional officers corps [of the Finnish Army] is incensed at the thought of giving up ground in Soviet Karelia", and that the army's top leadership, including Marshal Mannerheim, estimated the military position to be so strong as to make the cost too high to the Russians to force "another Moscow peace". (740.00119 European War 1939/1674)

³⁶ On conclusion of the Moscow Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States, held October 18-November 1, 1943, the Governments of these three States, together with the Government of China, released, on November 1, a "Declaration of Four Nations on General Security" which pledged the Allies "to continue hostilities against those Axis powers with which they respectively are at war until such powers have laid down their arms on the basis of unconditional surrender . . ." For text of this and other communiqués issued by the Conference, see vol. I, pp. 703 ff., and Department of State *Bulletin*, November 6, 1943, pp. 308-311.

reaction in Finland was one of pessimism. He assented to my view that much of a constructive nature had been accomplished with a view to the future peaceful organization of Europe and the world but said that "although an angel of heaven might feel very pleased about the long range prospects we here in Finland cannot but be anxious."

Specifically the Foreign Minister was worried about two points: 1, was Finland an "Axis power" within the definition of the Moscow communiqués? 2, Would the terms of unconditional surrender also be applied to Finland?

I said it was not in my province to define the Moscow communiqués and that the language to me seemed quite clear. Furthermore, definitions might be dangerous. Ramsay himself seemed to feel that the answers to both his questions were affirmative. He referred with deep gloom to the fate of Finland in the event of unconditional surrender to Russia, and felt that the fact that this surrender might also be collective so far as the British Empire was concerned would not avail in preventing the Soviet Government from doing more or less what it wished in this country. He said wistfully that to read the Four Power Accord in Moscow in terms of strict logic it might almost have been better if Finland were also at war with the United States and China since thus there would be these two additional powers at the peace table when Finland's fate was decided.

In discussing the fate of Bulgaria the Minister said he supposed since the USSR was not at war with that country terms of unconditional surrender would be applied by the United States and Great Britain.

Conversely in the case of Finland unconditional surrender would be demanded by Russia and Britain.

Dr. Ramsay wondered if Finland were also a "satellite state" within the meaning of the Moscow Conference. I said in my own view it certainly was, as it would be difficult to imagine a country which had invited military occupation by a number of German divisions and which publicly proclaimed its economic, if not its political dependence on Germany, not being in fact as well as in name a satellite state. I pointed to a map on his wall and observed also that the Finnish Army was now further east than the Wehrmacht.

My outstanding impression of the Foreign Minister was that of a man staring at defeat.

McCLINTOCK

740.00119 European War 1939/1963 : Telegram

The Chargé in Finland (McClintock) to the Secretary of State

HELSINKI, November 16, 1943—3 p. m.

[Received 8:45 p. m.]

1274. 1. From an absolutely authentic source I have complete confirmation of report set forth in my 1271, yesterday ⁴⁰ of Ramsay's exposition on foreign policy to the Diet Foreign Affairs Committee. A few highlights can be added:

Kivimaki was so vehement in his exhortation to follow the German line that at last the Agrarian leader and former Minister of Education, Hannula, asked him if it might not be better "if Minister Kivimaki looked after Finnish interests in Berlin rather than German interests in Helsinki".

Gripenberg confined his remarks to speaking of Finnish relations with Sweden and Swedish foreign policy in general. His most noteworthy remark was that he "was glad that Sweden was now pursuing a policy of improving relations with the USSR".

Ramsay prior to the last meeting of the Diet committee had a private confab with the Diet deputies of his own Swedish Peoples Party and gave them the same talk he had given the Foreign Affairs Committee. His colleagues took a vote and said that if he or the Government followed the pro-German line advocated by the Minister he could count on complete non-support from his party.

No resolution will be taken by the Foreign Affairs Committee on Ramsay's statement pending a study by a five-man subcommittee and its recommendations. Three members of the subcommittee are Hackzell, who has been consistently pro-German, Osterholm, who is pro-United Nations, and Reinikka, Associate Minister of Finance, an Agrarian and a Karelian who is an opportunist. At this moment it appears likely that the sub-committee will return a report counseling caution and rejecting the idea of adopting a more pro-German policy. If the Foreign Affairs Committee as a whole adopts such a report and carries it either to the President or the Government, as is permitted under the constitution, it is held that Ramsay's policy will be rejected by the Diet.

2. The Prime Minister is meeting tonight with the leaders of the various political parties. This meeting, however, may be in connection with foreign policy or it may have to do with the reported pending resignation of Fagerholm whose services are wanted by the State Alcohol Monopoly, one of whose key men has just been given an important military post. If Fagerholm goes he will, according to my

⁴⁰ Not printed; it reported that Ramsay had told the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Finnish Diet that Finland was facing unconditional surrender to the United Nations, and that the nation's only alternative was to follow a policy of stricter collaboration with Germany (740.00119 European War 1939/1961).

information, be replaced by Aaltonen, Secretary of the Social Democratic Party who is hundred per cent Tanner's man. It is urged in some quarters that the appointment of such a man in replacement of Fagerholm so soon after the latter's pro-Norwegian and pro-Danish utterances will have an unfortunate effect as seeming to confirm what the Russians claim about the "Tanner clique" in Finland.

3. In this fairly murky atmosphere, except for the clear light of what policy Ramsay has urged the Foreign Affairs Committee to adopt, I intend, unless the Department instructs me otherwise, to imply that my sudden transfer to Stockholm⁴¹ may not be unconnected with Ramsay's advocacy of playing up to the Germans. This would have the effect of forestalling the inevitable Finnish reaction "you are throwing us to the Russians" by a new variation "You are throwing yourselves at the Germans".

McCLINTOCK

740.00119 European War 1939/1986a: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Standley)*

WASHINGTON, November 17, 1943—3 p. m.

1225. For your information, Helsinki reports that Finnish press "accurately representing Finnish people" is united in denunciation of terms of unconditional surrender for Finland and "resolve to fight on to the end", rather than accept such terms.⁴²

HULL

740.00119 European War 1939/1963: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Finland (McClintock)

WASHINGTON, November 17, 1943—9 p. m.

161. In reply to questions from the press we are stating that your transfer from Helsinki is purely routine, has no political implication and has been under consideration for some time. We are pointing out that you are being replaced by a third secretary now assigned to Stockholm.⁴³ Your 1274, November 16, paragraph 3.

HULL

⁴¹ The transfer of Chargé McClintock from Helsinki to another post, probably Stockholm, had been under consideration by the Department since September.

⁴² The BBC's broadcast of November 15, 1943, had quoted the Soviet Red Army newspaper, *Krasnaya Zvezda*, to the effect that Finland must surrender unconditionally.

⁴³ In telegrams No. 172 and No. 1361, both dated December 13, 1943, the Department informed the Legations at Helsinki and Stockholm, respectively, that Edmund A. Gullion, then serving as Third Secretary of Embassy in the United Kingdom, had been designated Third Secretary of Legation in Finland to succeed McClintock as Chargé on or about January 1, 1944 (123 West, G. Lybrook/127).

740.0011 European War 1939/31952: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson)

WASHINGTON, November 20, 1943—8 p. m.

1261. Please call on Boheman and inform him as follows (your 3613 and 3726, November 5, and 15, respectively ⁴⁴):

We fully appreciate the Swedish interest in these matters and are desirous of keeping him and his Government as fully informed as possible. However, as there were no "secret agreements" reached in Moscow and he undoubtedly has a complete set of the published texts of the Moscow agreements, there is nothing more we can say, beyond what I said to the Senate and House on November 18 ⁴⁵ (you should furnish Boheman the text of that statement).

We realized that "interpretations" by "informed circles" etc. of the Moscow documents and the relationship thereof to the Atlantic Charter are and will be numerous and varied. We recommend that the utmost caution be exercised in accepting such "interpretations" as expressions of the official views of this Government unless they are clearly authorized statements of competent officials of this Government.

With particular reference to the position of Finland with respect to the Atlantic Charter and the Moscow agreements, which position we recognize as being of especial interest to Sweden, I stated in my press conference on November 15 that as far as this Government was concerned there was nothing new in our relations with Finland.

Briefly, our policy toward Finland is that the problem of Finland is one of the many problems yet to be settled in due course within the framework of the Atlantic Charter and in the light of the further development of the Moscow documents, and that it is not a special or separate problem. The conclusion would appear inescapable, however, that Finland's contributions to German military operations will be taken into account.

HULL

⁴⁴ Neither printed; these telegrams reported some criticism by the Secretary General of the Swedish Foreign Ministry, Boheman, of the Moscow Conference declarations and of the Four Nation Declaration there on November 1, 1943. He expressed his concern as to the effect of the demand for "unconditional surrender" of the Axis Powers, especially his hope that this demand did not apply to Finland.

⁴⁵ On that day the Secretary of State delivered an address before a joint session of both Houses of Congress regarding the results of the Moscow Conference; see Department of State *Bulletin*, November 20, 1943, p. 341.

740.00119 European War 1939/1980 : Telegram

The Chargé in Finland (McClintock) to the Secretary of State

HELSINKI, November 23, 1943—11 a. m.

[Received 6:25 p. m.]

1293. I called on the Foreign Minister this morning to pay my respects before leaving for Stockholm tomorrow on courier trip mentioned in my 1234, November 4.⁴⁶

Dr. Ramsay expressed regret at my transfer to Stockholm and said that although Cumming had told Procopé that it was "purely routine" the fact remained that I was being replaced by an officer junior in rank. He said that I "had occupied an important post from the Finnish point of view" and dwelt on my past experience here since before the Winter War. I replied that this was one of the reasons why it was perhaps better that I should depart, as neither I nor my Government regarded my position here as important and thus, with my departure, a false impression would be corrected. The Finns, with the exception of Dr. Ramsay, were, as he knew, prone to imagine that Minister Schoenfeld or even I could produce salvation out of a silk hat whereas in reality salvation for Finland depended on far more basic factors. Dr. Ramsay commented that I had "at least done a very good job from the American point of view".

The Minister then said that possibly I had noticed a rumor about town to the effect that the Government in full session had recently voted to follow a more pro-German line (Cf. my 1283, November 19⁴⁶). I said I had heard this report and also accounts of what counsel he and Ministers Kivimaki and Gripenberg had offered the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Diet. Dr. Ramsay did not attempt to deny that Kivimaki had urged the line reported in my 1271, November 15⁴⁶ and 1274, November 16 but did say he could tell me that there was no word of truth in the rumor that the Government had decided to adopt a more pro-German policy. He said the Cabinet meeting of November 17 had been for discussion only and no formal vote had been taken. However, the consensus of the meeting was that Finland should adhere to the policy it had consistently followed since the outbreak of the present war and that "no new agreements with Germany should be entered into".

I said I was glad to hear this, particularly in the light of my note of April 8 this year.

In response to my inquiry, the Minister said that the Germans had agreed to give Finland the 60,000 tons of grain mentioned in my 1266,

⁴⁶ Not printed.

November 13⁴⁹ and that the first 32,000 tons were now on the way. Of the total shipment 50,000 tons would be rye and 10,000 wheat. Furthermore, the Germans were to send 8,000 tons of sugar. I asked if the Finns had met the very low price terms demanded by Minister Schnurre⁵⁰ in the trade negotiations commenced but not concluded early this month (my 1253, November 10⁵¹). Dr. Ramsay gave no direct reply but said that Minister of Supply Osara would leave on November 25 for Berlin to sign the definitive agreement.

Dr. Ramsay said he had asked President Ryti yesterday if he might not tell me that, despite frequent "propaganda" claims to the contrary, the Finnish Army during the present war had never fired a shell at Leningrad nor dropped a bomb on that city. He said the President had caused a special investigation to be made following Russian radio claims of Finnish aggression on Leningrad and that the result had been as he stated. I said if he wished, I should be glad to report the President's comment.

Although the factual account in my 1283, November 19 must be modified in view of the Foreign Minister's statement that the Cabinet had not decided to follow a more pro-German line, I do not feel that the analysis set forth in that telegram requires amendment. When I asked the Foreign Minister if, after the Diet Foreign Affairs Committee made its recommendations, the Government would be compelled to follow those recommendations, Dr. Ramsay said that under the constitution the Government was not bound to do so. He said "They ask me to make the quickest possible peace. To them the important word is 'quickest'. To me the important word is 'possible'."

McCLINTOCK

811.20260D/20

Memorandum by Mr. L. Randolph Higgs, of the Division of European Affairs, to Mr. James C. Dunn, Adviser on Political Relations

[WASHINGTON,] November 26, 1943.

MR. DUNN: Reference is made to your memorandum of November 25th⁵² regarding propaganda to Finland.

⁴⁹ Not printed.

⁵⁰ Karl Schnurre, Minister Extraordinary, head of a division in the Economic Policy Department of the German Foreign Ministry.

⁵¹ Not printed; it reported that during November 3-9, 1943, talks were held in Helsinki between the Finnish Government and a German trade delegation, headed by Schnurre, and that the negotiations would be resumed later in Berlin where a protocol would be signed (660D.6231/159).

⁵² Not printed; it advised that Mr. Michael Wright, First Secretary of the British Embassy, had inquired in behalf of the British Foreign Office "whether it might be appropriate for British and American broadcasting to Finland to be 'toughened'." (811.20260D/20)

I. For several months OWI⁵³ propaganda directives on Finland have been to the following effect:

- (a) No threats and no promises.
- (b) Emphasis on the increasing isolation of Finland resulting from Finland's collaboration with Germany.
- (c) Factual presentation of news illustrating the steady declination of Nazi military power, and the widespread nature of Nazi terrorism in Axis-held Europe.

It has not been felt that this Government could honestly promise the Finns that if they discontinue their collaboration with Germany they could obtain the sort of peace which they would consider reasonable and just. From a propaganda point of view it has been calculated that it would be a bad line to threaten the Finns that if they did not discontinue their collaboration immediately, they will be severely punished, for the reason that we are unable to say that if they do discontinue such collaboration they will receive what they would consider just and reasonable treatment. In the absence of such promises, the threats tend only to increase the Finns' unity and determination to continue and even increase their military collaboration with Germany. This is clearly illustrated by recent reports from our Legation at Helsinki to the effect that the assumption there that the terms of unconditional surrender apply to Finland led to a decision by the Finnish Government to follow a more pro-German line, as they felt that unconditional surrender would mean their national extermination against which all Finns would fight as long as physically possible. Hence the calculation that a "tougher" propaganda line to Finland would defeat its own purpose.

Under the circumstances it is felt that the main emphasis of our propaganda to Finland would be most effective if confined to points to (b) and (c) above. Such a line envisages the Finns drawing their own conclusions as to the effect on the Finnish position of their continued collaboration with Germany in the face of steadily declining German military power.

II. This Government is not committed to the imposition of unconditional surrender on Finland, and it is not clear that there is any legal *obligation* under the Four Power Declaration for either Britain or the USSR to impose such terms on Finland. (It seems to be a fact that Finland is not a signatory to the Tripartite pact and hence it is not an "Axis Power", though it may be an Axis "satellite").

Despite the position of this Government with respect to the foregoing, the British Political Warfare Executive, Weekly Directive for BBC Finnish Services, November 6-12, 1943, states that our line to Finland must be as follows:

⁵³ Office of War Information.

[“]We stress that there can be no getting around unconditional surrender. There is absolute agreement between Britain, America and Russia on this. Any Finn who still thinks his country can hope to profit from differences between the Three Powers on this issue, is living in a fool’s paradise. The fact that the USA is not at war with Finland makes no difference to the application of the formula of unconditional surrender.”

The question may be raised as to the propriety of British propaganda speaking for the American Government in this regard, especially in view of the Secretary’s Press Conference statement on November 15th to the effect that there was nothing new in our relations with Finland as a result of the Moscow Conference. If you agree, you might wish to inform Mr. Wright to that effect.

III. In summary, we do not recommend any change in the present American propaganda line to Finland in view of, (a) Official policy of this Government toward Finland; (b) We do not believe that a “tougher” line would be good propaganda under the circumstances.⁵⁴

740.00119 European War 1939/2031 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson)

WASHINGTON, December 7, 1943—8 p. m.

1332. British Embassy here has acquainted us with reports from Mallet⁵⁵ regarding conversations he has recently had with Boheman and Kollontay regarding Finland and from which we get the impression that Boheman is actively exploring the possibility of a Finnish-Soviet peace. Boheman stated he was in almost daily consultation with Kollontay and was delighted to find “both sides are being quite remarkably reasonable”. He said he did not wish to say more because he felt at the present stage the less said the better and it was most important there should be no gossip or publicity. Mallet had the impression he may intend to visit Helsinki before long.

Mallet also reports that in a conversation which he had with Kollontay she said that she regarded the idea of a trial of Finnish leaders as war criminals⁵⁶ as absurd and on the contrary thought that Manerheim at heart [was] anti-German and, as he would be needed to head the Finnish army in driving Germans from Finland, thought that it would be a great mistake to insist on his overthrow as part of the

⁵⁴ A reply along the lines recommended in this memorandum was telephoned to Mr. Wright on December 10 by H. Freeman Matthews, Chief of the Division of European Affairs, who had noted at the end of this memorandum: “I agree.” (811.20260D/21)

⁵⁵ Victor A. L. Mallet, British Minister in Sweden.

⁵⁶ On November 15, the British Broadcasting Company had broadcast excerpts from the Soviet newspaper, *Krasnaya Zvezda*, which demanded punishment for Finnish as well as for Nazi and Fascist leaders branded as war criminals.

armistice terms. In her opinion the first step should be the disappearance of Tanner and next the reappearance of Paasikivi and a visit by him or some other suitable representative to Moscow. Ryti would eventually have to resign. Kollontay seemed to understand the undesirability of a Soviet military occupation of Finland and talked as if this were not intended.⁵⁷ She said that Finland would have to give up Karelia, but there was no question of Russia annexing all Finland. She was noncommittal regarding Hangö and said that with respect to the Aaland Islands, all her Government wanted was neutralization of the Islands as before. She did not expect any sudden developments because of the Finnish slow-moving temperament but thought that matters were steadily moving in the right direction.

It is not our intention to take any initiative at this time in this matter and you should not open the subject yourself with either the Swedes or the Russians; nor do we feel it advisable that Legation at Helsinki be apprised of these reports. We should of course, however, wish to receive any information regarding the foregoing which may come to your attention.

HULL

740.0011 European War 1939/32330½ : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, December 17, 1943—noon.

1419. Personal for the Ambassador. I have been most interested in the contents of your 2199 and 2200, December 12⁵⁸ and I hope that

⁵⁷ At the Conference of Prime Minister Churchill, Premier Stalin, and President Roosevelt at Tehran during November 28–December 1, 1943, Stalin had said that to allay Finnish fears of Soviet intentions toward Finland the Soviet Government had instructed Madame Kollontay to inform the Swedish Government, ostensibly for the information of the Finns, that the Russians "had no designs on the independence of Finland, if Finland by its behaviour did not force Russia to do so." See *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943*, p. 590. Further evidence that Madame Kollontay had been so instructed was reported by the American Minister in Sweden in his telegram No. 3977, December 8, in which he stated that the Soviet Minister had said Russia did not want to destroy Finland (760D.61/1691).

⁵⁸ In these two telegrams, and also in his telegram No. 2231 of December 15, 1943, Ambassador Harriman informed the Department of conversations with the Swedish Minister in the Soviet Union, Assarsson, concerning the Swedish Government's attitude and possible plans on the problem of getting Finland out of the war. The Swedes felt that Hangö might not be an insurmountable obstacle, since "in December 1941 Stalin had told Eden he would agree to accept Petsamo in exchange for the lease of Hangö." The Finns insisted on getting an agreement that Russian troops would not enter Finland to aid in expelling the Germans, and they wanted to initiate peace negotiations on the basis of the 1939 frontiers, with some adjustments in favor of the Soviet Union. (740.0011 European War 1939/32330½, 32330½, 32347½)

you will continue to report fully any further conversations you may have with the Swedish Minister regarding this important matter. The Swedes are vitally concerned in the future status of Finland and accordingly have an equally vital interest in getting Finland out of the war as soon as possible. I think, therefore, that we may count on the Swedes to overlook no opportunity and to follow up vigorously any possibility of bringing about a settlement. All the information which comes to me here from various sources seems to bear this out. As a matter of fact we have recently learned through Herschel Johnson and through the British that the Swedish Foreign Office is secretly making very active explorations with both Soviet and Finnish representatives in Stockholm and I have no reason to believe that the Swedes will not in their own interests continue to search actively for a solution in a matter they consider so vital to them.

On the other hand our own past efforts have been barren of result and our status as an Ally of the Soviet Union makes our position in the matter somewhat delicate. Accordingly I agree with you that initiatives in this matter should continue to come from the Swedes rather than from us. Hence I have telegraphed to Johnson⁶⁰ a full account of your conversation with Assarsson and instructed him to inform Boheman, Secretary General of the Swedish Foreign Office, in strictest confidence to that effect and to say that "he will of course appreciate our position in this matter as an Ally of the USSR and that any initiative to the end suggested by the Swedish Minister must be entirely on the responsibility of the Swedish Government. Likewise on the questions of the initiation of peace negotiations between Finland and the Soviet Union and the basis for such negotiations it has been and is the position of this Government that these are matters solely for the decision of the Finnish Government and that this Government can accept no responsibility with respect to either question." Johnson was also instructed to say to Boheman that regarding the question of Finnish collaboration with Germany responsibility for such collaboration must continue to rest with the Finnish Government.

It seems to me under all the circumstances this is as far as we should go now and that it would be better from many standpoints if you did not at this time initiate any discussions regarding the matter with Molotov or any Soviet officials. I shall, of course, continue to keep in close touch with developments through reports from you and Johnson so that no opportunity to be of help may be overlooked. A factor which I have in mind in this connection are reports from Finland that currently dominant Finnish circles are moving towards

⁶⁰ Telegram No. 1381, December 17, noon, to the Minister in Sweden, not printed.

Germany as an alternative to what they have recently been led to believe might be the imposition upon them by the Soviet Union of "unconditional surrender" or other peace terms unacceptable to them.

HULL

860D.24/224 : Telegram

The Chargé in Finland (McClintock) to the Secretary of State

HELSINKI, December 23, 1943.

[Received December 24—9:47 a. m.]

1363. Following FNB ⁶¹ communiqué published today:

"Agreement was reached on Tuesday ⁶² between Finnish and German Government commissions for prolongation of validity of trade agreement between Finland and Germany till end of 1944 and for temporary arrangement of trade exchange between two countries during first 2 months of 1944. Grain deliveries agreed upon already in November as well as certain other vital foodstuffs supplies safeguard Finland's supply situation in these fields until next harvest. Deliveries of these products have been in progress already for some time. As to exports from Finland agreement was definitely reached regarding timber exports during 1944. Final negotiations regarding trade between Finland and Germany in 1944 will commence early in February.

Minister Osara who yesterday returned from journey connected with these negotiations emphasizes to Finnish News Bureau friendly spirit in which negotiations between Germany and Finland also this time took place. An indication of this is provided by quantities of grain which our country receives.

Should remember that grain quantities obtained from Germany suffice provide normal distribution of grain supplies only if local grain reaches trade in accordance with plan".

McCLINTOCK

⁶¹ Finnish News Bureau (Finska Nyhets Byrån).

⁶² A third protocol, signed in Berlin December 21, 1943, prolonging the German-Finnish trade agreement, became effective on December 30; for text, see Finland, Treaty Series, 1943, No. 10, p. 51.

POLAND

INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE POLISH GOVERNMENT IN EXILE, AND IN ITS RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION¹

740.0011 European War 1939/26924½

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Welles)

[WASHINGTON,] January 4, 1943.

General Sikorski,² the Polish Prime Minister, accompanied by the Polish Ambassador,³ called to see me this afternoon by arrangement.

REFUGEES

The Prime Minister spoke briefly of his trip to Mexico⁴ where he said he found nothing but evidences of the strongest sympathy and support for the United States and for the cause of the United Nations, and said that he wished to express his warm felicitations to this Government for the complete success of its policy in establishing intimate and friendly relations and collaboration with Mexico. He stated that he had reached a very satisfactory agreement with the Mexican Government covering the admission into Mexico of Polish refugees and added that the Polish Ambassador would conclude his conversations with Dr. Berle⁵ covering the question of credits to be advanced by this Government to Poland in order that Poland might be able to care for her refugees during the war period.

POLISH FUNDS IN THE UNITED STATES

General Sikorski then urged that arrangements be made to speed up the granting to his Government of the remaining 7½ millions of the 12½ millions of credits authorized by the President last April⁶ and which sums were to be made available, he said, during the 12-month period after the date of authorization by the President. He said that he was urging speed in this matter in view of the fact that

¹ Continued from *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. III, pp. 100-212.

² Gen. Wladyslaw Sikorski, Prime Minister of the Polish Government in Exile, at London.

³ Jan Ciechanowski.

⁴ General Sikorski had interrupted his visit in the United States with a visit to Mexico City, December 27, 1942-January 1, 1943.

⁵ Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State.

⁶ See telegram No. 2291, May 21, 1942, to the Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile, at London, *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. III, p. 147.

the major part of the money required was for sabotage airplane expeditions from England into Poland and of course the winter season was the only period in which this operation could be successfully carried out. He stated that in the last two weeks four flights had been successfully undertaken to Poland from England and 36 parachutists had been dropped in Poland from these airplanes.

LIAISON WITH THE WAR DEPARTMENT

He stated that his conversations with General Marshall⁷ and the members of the General Staff in Washington could not have been more completely satisfactory and that a continuing liaison was now provided for which would make available to our own War Department the fullest measure of Polish military intelligence and which would also enable the General Staffs of both Governments to maintain continuing and close cooperation.

TERRITORIAL RECTIFICATIONS, BOUNDARY ADJUSTMENTS, POLITICAL DESIDERATA

The Prime Minister then said that he had inundated me with memorandums during the weeks of his visit to the United States for which he apologized and said that he would be very glad to hear the views of this Government with regard to the aspirations set forth and the considerations advanced in the memorandums in question.

I replied by saying that I felt we should for convenience' sake divide our conversation into two general headings: the first heading to deal with the questions of territorial rectifications, boundary adjustments, and political desiderata set forth in the memorandums which General Sikorski had given me; and second, the question of the letter which the Prime Minister had asked the President to give him before his departure and which the President had stated that he would hand to the Prime Minister.

With regard to the first heading, I said that the views and considerations of the Polish Government which had been given me in such detail by General Sikorski had been of the utmost value to the Government of the United States and had naturally been given the most careful and friendly study and consideration. I said that it was of the greatest value to the United States to have at this stage so clear an exposition of the point of view of the Polish Government and that obviously detailed information of this character regarding the desires of the governments so closely associated with us as the Polish Government was in the highest degree helpful.

I stated, however, that as the President had already informed General Sikorski, this Government was not prepared to make any

⁷ Gen. George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army.

commitment at this period with regard to territorial or boundary adjustments to be undertaken by the United Nations after the close of the war. For that reason, I said, I was not prepared to make any commitment whatever with regard to the desires of the Polish Government covering the western, southern, or eastern frontiers of the future Poland when Poland was once more reconstituted. I said, however, that it was perfectly clear already to General Sikorski from his conversation with the President that the President was deeply concerned in the restoration in the future after Germany had been defeated of a strong and independent Poland, and that the view had already been made clear to General Sikorski that this Government did not believe the Polish Corridor afforded any practicable solution in the interest of the Polish people or in the interest of European and world peace and stability. I stated that if the Government of the United States now, however, undertook to make commitments with regard to future territorial adjustments to Poland it would be doing so without agreement or even prior consultation with other members of the United Nations vitally interested in this question and would thereby greatly prejudice the objective which this Government had in mind, namely, the closest and most friendly understanding and agreement between all of the United Nations both during the war period and in the postwar period. Furthermore, I said that if the Government of the United States made such commitments in the case of Poland, it would immediately be called upon to make similar commitments in the case of many of the other United Nations now occupied by the Axis powers. For all of these reasons, I said, it was impossible for this Government at this point to do more than make it entirely clear to the Polish Government that the Government of the United States had as one of its war objectives the reconstitution of a strong and independent Poland, but believed that the precise details of frontiers and territorial adjustments should be left for a future time when such matters could be determined by common agreement on the part of all of the United Nations concerned in this matter.

General Sikorski said he fully understood the point of view of this Government and desired to raise no question with regard thereto. He said, however, that he wanted to make one point very clear and that was that he believed that the question of Poland's eastern frontier was a question which was in the nature of a precedent in so far as the relations of the United States and the Soviet Union were concerned. He stated that if at this stage Stalin were definitely informed that the Government of the United States would not agree to the submerging of eastern and southern Poland in the future Soviet Union, Stalin would accede to that point of view without any material difficulty since intrinsically the territory involved was of no great importance

to Stalin. But, General Sikorski went on to say, if no opposition to such imposition on the part of Stalin were evidenced now, he will take it for granted that neither the United States nor Great Britain are going to lift a finger to prevent the domination at the close of the war of most of eastern and southern Europe by the Soviet Union, and the imperialistic ambitions of the Soviet Union will be greatly accelerated and enhanced as the result of any present failure on the part of the United States to make its views known.

I inquired of General Sikorski whether any further conversations had taken place in London between the Soviet Ambassador⁸ and the Polish Foreign Minister⁹ with regard to the eastern frontier of Poland and he replied that these questions were still under desultory discussion but that every time the Soviet Government made known its views in this regard, the proposed rectification of the Polish eastern frontier became very much larger than the "slight rectification" which Stalin himself had mentioned to General Sikorski when the latter was last in Moscow.¹⁰

General Sikorski then inquired whether he could understand that this Government officially favored a federation or union of eastern European states, including Poland. I replied that as I had endeavored in a previous conversation to make clear, certain officials of this Government were studying very carefully the possibility of the creation of an eastern European union of which Poland could be a member, but that so far as I knew, the matter had not been discussed with the President and I could not therefore give him any indication about such an objective officially favored by this Government.

General Sikorski then read to me a telegram which he had just received from the Polish Ambassador at Ankara¹¹ stating that the relations between Poland and Turkey had never been so close or understanding as they now were and that the Turkish Government desired the Polish Government to know that Turkey was very strongly in favor of an eastern European union running from Poland in the north down to Turkey in the south of which, to use the Turkish Government's phrase, "Poland would be the anchor in the north and Turkey the anchor in the south".

I stated that this information was very interesting to me but that I felt it necessary for me to say that in my judgment such a plan, if understood in the terms used by Turkey, would without the slightest shadow of a doubt create the utmost measure of suspicion in the minds of the Soviet Union and could only be interpreted by the Soviet Union

⁸ Ivan Mikhailovich Maisky.

⁹ Count Edward Raczynski.

¹⁰ Prime Minister Sikorski had conferred in Moscow with Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union (Premier), early in December 1941. See *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. 1, pp. 264-268.

¹¹ Michal Sokolnicki.

as a *cordon sanitaire* of a purely military character directed squarely against the Soviet Union. I said that the creation of such a federative union which would have under its control the Dardanelles and access to the Black Sea would inevitably be regarded by Stalin as a direct threat to the future security of the Soviet Union and would result, in my judgment, in the most bitter and consistent opposition to any federative project of this character on the part of Russia.

General Sikorski said that he was forced to agree with my point of view. I added that in so far as the views of the officials of this Government were concerned, the views which favored the creation of an eastern European federated union were based solely on the belief that the economic prosperity of the nations involved would be greatly enhanced as the result of such a union and that such a union would offer opportunities for the development of natural resources which otherwise could not be achieved. It was further believed that for these reasons the political stability of the region in question would likewise be safeguarded.

PRESIDENT'S LETTER

I then said with regard to the letter which the President had said he would give to General Sikorski ¹² that I had not yet submitted any suggested draft to the President and that before doing so I wished to ascertain whether the views of this Department as to the nature of the letter in question would be satisfactory to General Sikorski. I then read to him a draft which had been prepared. General Sikorski listened very attentively and made merely one suggestion, namely, that specific reference be made to the continuing resistance to Germany of the Polish armed forces.

I said that of course I was very happy to include an additional phrase to that effect.

The Prime Minister made no other suggestions for changes in the draft as prepared and stated that he was completely satisfied with the draft which I had read to him and that such a letter if given to him by the President would be of the greatest value and encouragement to the Polish Government.

I told the Prime Minister that the President hoped to be able to receive him tomorrow, Tuesday. General Sikorski said that he was planning to leave Washington on Thursday night for New York with the intention of returning immediately thereafter to London.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

¹² On December 4, 1942, the Polish Prime Minister had handed to the Under Secretary the draft of a letter which he proposed that President Roosevelt address to him before his departure from the United States; for draft of proposed letter, see *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. III, p. 202.

740.0011 European War 1939/27001a

The Under Secretary of State (Welles) to President Roosevelt

WASHINGTON, January 5, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: When the Prime Minister of Poland had lunch with you he asked that you let him have before he left the United States a letter from you indicating your desire that Poland be reconstituted. You said that you would give him such a letter.

I am submitting herewith a suggested letter from you to be given to General Sikorski. The Secretary of State has read and approves this letter but suggests that the letter should be regarded as confidential.

General Sikorski is planning to leave Washington on his way back to London Thursday night.¹³ If this letter is satisfactory to you, will you sign it and have it sent to me so that I may give it to General Sikorski before he leaves the city.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

SUMNER WELLES

[Enclosure]

*Draft Letter From President Roosevelt to the Polish Prime Minister (Sikorski)*¹⁴

MY DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER: Prior to your departure from the United States I wish to express to Your Excellency my appreciation for your courtesy in affording me the opportunity of discussing again with you the many complex problems relating to the prosecution of the war against the common enemy. It has been a source of great satisfaction to me that we have been able to discuss with complete frankness and sincerity not only these problems, but also the equally vital questions which will arise following the achievement of victory. You have outlined to me in full detail the views of your Government concerning the organization of the future Polish state and its role in the European community of nations.

In an effort to build a solid foundation for a lasting peace in eastern Europe based upon careful considerations of political, ethnic, and economic factors, the United States Government desires to encourage the countries of Eastern Europe to continue to make careful studies of their mutual problems to determine points of agreement and disagreement in order that they may be in a position to present a plan under which lasting relationships would be assured. The United States Government would then be prepared to participate in efforts to reach

¹³ January 7.

¹⁴ A copy of this letter obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y., has the following notation: "Signed original of this letter sent to Hon. Sumner Welles for delivery."

a constructive and final solution of the Eastern European problem within the framework of a general world settlement.

I need hardly assure you of the determination of the United States Government that Poland be reestablished. This is implicit in Article 3 of the Atlantic Charter and the Declaration of the United Nations.¹⁵ The views of this Government moreover reflect the warm sympathy which the American people have always felt toward the people of Poland in their age-long struggle freely to organize their national life.

The magnificent and continuing resistance of the Polish armed forces and people to the German enemy in occupation of their country, and the Polish contribution to the prosecution of the war testify to the inextinguishable vitality of the Polish nation and constitute the best guarantee for the re-emergence of a strong and independent Poland.

Believe me

Yours very sincerely,

740.0011 European War 1939/270033

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] January 6, 1943.

The Polish Ambassador called to see me this morning. He came with an urgent request from the Polish Prime Minister that the letter addressed to him by the President¹⁶ (which he had not yet received and which I handed to the Ambassador while he was with me) be amended so that where the phrase "a strong and independent Poland" was employed, there be added the words "capable of effective defense and capable of economic development".

I told the Ambassador that inasmuch as the President had already signed the letter which I was handing to the Ambassador for the Prime Minister, I thought it was too late to suggest that any amendments be made. I said that the suggestion made involved a question of high principle inasmuch as the phrase "capable of effective defense" would seem to imply that the Polish Government intended to undertake, as soon as it was reconstituted, a program of rearmament which was entirely counter to the objectives of this Government. I said it was the hope and policy of this Government that the world of the future would depend upon international organization for security, and not upon a new rearmament of all the world powers. With re-

¹⁵ For text of the Atlantic Charter, see joint statement by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, August 14, 1941, *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, p. 367; for text of the United Nations Declaration, January 1, 1942, see *ibid.*, 1942, vol. I, p. 25, or Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 236.

¹⁶ *Supra*.

gard to the other part of the suggested amendment, I said that there was implicit throughout the President's letter the desire of this Government that Poland be afforded every opportunity to develop her resources and to improve her national economy. For that reason, I said, I did not feel able to convey the suggestion to the President.

The Ambassador stated that he was wholly in accord with my point and that he had argued in that sense with the Prime Minister. He said he was confident that the Prime Minister would be more than willing to accept the reply I had made and that he would be wholly satisfied with the letter as signed by the President.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

760C.61/1-643

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Elbridge Durbrow of the
Division of European Affairs*

[WASHINGTON,] January 6, 1943.

Subject: Postwar Polish-Soviet Borders.

The following is a summary of a conversation I had today with Mr. Arlet, Counselor, and Mr. Lepkowski, First Secretary of the Polish Embassy.

Mr. Arlet, who has recently transferred from Kuibyshev to Washington, discussed at length the accusations made by the Soviet Government against the Polish food distribution delegates who were accused of sabotage. Mr. Arlet himself was accused of being the chief instigator in the Embassy of these alleged espionage activities, and the Soviet authorities asked for his recall from Kuibyshev.

I discussed with him the question of the refusal of the Soviet authorities to permit Polish Jews, White Russians and Ukrainians to leave the Soviet Union because they are considered by the Soviet Government to be Soviet citizens. Mr. Arlet confirmed the information that has already been received by the Department that the Soviet Government has steadfastly held to this contention that these persons are Soviet citizens on the basis of the plebiscites held in 1939,¹⁷ and for that reason the Soviet Government will not permit them to leave the country.

I asked Mr. Arlet for his ideas as to the motives of the Soviet Government in adopting this policy. He replied that he thought there were two reasons: (1) that the Soviet authorities desired to keep in the Soviet Union all former Polish citizens of White Russian, Ukrainian and Jewish race in order that, on ethnical grounds, the Soviets could hold that eastern Poland ethnically was part of Soviet White Russia

¹⁷ See note of October 23, 1939, from the Polish Ambassador, and footnote 16, *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, pp. 209, 210.

and the Soviet Ukraine and thus annex these territories in the peace settlement; (2) that by refusing to allow these persons to depart from the U.S.S.R. as Soviet citizens, the Soviet Government would embarrass the Polish Government and would reduce considerably the population of any future Polish State to be set up after the war.

In view of this policy I asked Mr. Arlet whether he thought that the Soviet Government was going to insist upon annexing all or part of eastern Poland and whether he thought that the Polish Government might be willing to cede this territory, which is not as a general rule of great economic importance, provided that Poland was given compensation in the West. Mr. Arlet spoke with considerable feeling when he stated that no Polish Government would last over night if it should indicate that it was prepared to give up any former Polish territory. He stated that it was not the question of the value of this territory from the economic point of view, but it was a matter of principle. He pointed out that although a good part of eastern Poland is not rich in economic or agricultural resources this area is one of the principal Polish sources of wood, and the southern area in the Ukraine includes some of the richest wheat land in the country. Mr. Arlet stated that the Soviet Union had no real need for these areas, that their annexation to the U.S.S.R. was not vital to Soviet economy or security but that on the other hand the areas were vital to Poland, and their loss would be detrimental to the economic life of Poland.

In regard to this question Mr. Arlet pointed out that in the Polish-Soviet agreement made by the Sikorski Government in 1941¹⁸ the Soviet Union had agreed to consider null and void the Von Ribbentrop-Molotov agreements of 1939¹⁹ and that since these agreements provided for the annexation of eastern Poland to the Soviet Union the Soviet Government in denouncing these agreements had denounced its claims to eastern Poland. Mr. Arlet stated that although there was no question that Poland should be given additional territories in the West, i.e. East Prussia and part of Pomerania as well as Upper Silesia, the Polish Government could not accept any arrangement which gave these territories to Poland in compensation for the loss of any eastern territories to the U.S.S.R.

¹⁸ Signed at London, July 30, 1941; for text, see Republic of Poland, *Polish-Soviet Relations, 1918-1943, Official Documents*, pp. 107-108; see also telegram No. 3292, July 30, 1941, from the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, *Foreign Relations, 1941*, vol. I, p. 243.

¹⁹ The Soviet-German Non-Aggression Treaty, with secret additional protocol, was signed at Moscow, August 23, 1939; for text, see Department of State, *Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1948), pp. 76-78; or *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945*, series D, vol. VII, pp. 245-247. The German-Soviet Boundary and Friendship Treaty, with secret additional protocols, was signed at Moscow, September 28, 1939; for text, see *ibid.*, vol. VIII, pp. 164-167. The supplementary protocol provided for in this treaty describing the Polish boundary in detail was signed at Moscow, October 4, 1939; for text, see *ibid.*, p. 208.

861.012/214 : Telegram

*The Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile (Biddle) to the Secretary of State*²⁰

LONDON, January 28, 1943—midnight.

[Received January 29—6:32 a. m.]

Polish Series [No.] 3. Following are the main points of Soviet Embassy's note dated January 16, 1943 to the Polish Government,²¹ regarding the citizenship of former inhabitants of western districts of the Ukraine and Bielo-Russian Soviet republics:

Referring to exchange of communications during period 1941-42 in connection therewith, the note stated (a) that the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs had informed the Polish Embassy in a note dated December 1, 1941,²² (1) that according to decree of the Supreme Soviet Council dated November 29, 1939²³ and to the "Soviet citizenship act" of August 19, 1938, all inhabitants of the aforementioned districts who were therein at the time of their incorporation (November 1-2, 1939) in the Soviet Union had acquired Soviet citizenship; and (2) that the Soviet Government was prepared by way of exception to consider as Polish citizens such persons of Polish nationality who lived in the aforementioned districts on November 1-2, 1939; (b) that the People's Commissariat was compelled to state that notwithstanding the Soviet Government's thus manifested good intentions, the Polish Government had adopted a negative attitude regarding the above statement; (c) that it declined to take the necessary steps; (d) that it had made demands contrary to the sovereign rights of the Soviet Union in those districts; (e) that therefore the People's Commissariat in behalf of the Soviet Government took occasion to inform the Polish Government that the statement included in the note of December 1, 1941, regarding readiness to treat some categories of persons of Polish nationality on exceptional basis should be considered null and void; that the question of non-application of the decrees of Soviet citizenship to such persons no longer existed.

In its reply, the Polish Government sent a note dated January 26, 1943 to the Soviet Embassy²⁴ pointing out (a) that in the note dated December 9, '41,²⁵ of the Polish Ambassador at Kuibyshev,²⁶ the Polish Government had indicated its refusal to accept the note of the People's

²⁰ The substance of this telegram was repeated to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union in telegram No. 88, February 12, after it became apparent from the Ambassador's telegram No. 138, February 9 (p. 330), that he had not received full information on the subject from the Polish Chargé.

²¹ *Polish-Soviet Relations, 1918-1943, Official Documents*, p. 170.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 165.

²³ For text of the decree of November 29, 1939, concerning the acquisition of Soviet citizenship, see *ibid.*, p. 104.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 172.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 166.

²⁶ Stanislaw Kot.

Commissariat dated December 1, '41, on grounds that withdrawal of the right of Polish nationality constituted the exclusive and inalienable right contained in the sovereignty of the Polish state; (b) that in the course of the past year the categories of Poles mentioned as dwelling in the Soviet Union had been treated in accordance with their rights as Polish nationals; (c) that the Soviet Government's present decision to annul the declaration contained in its note of December 1, '41 was incompatible with the spirit of the Polish-Soviet agreement of July 30, '41 and of the mutual declaration of the two Governments dated December 4, '41;²⁷ (d) that it should be borne in mind that the Soviet Government had undertaken, according to point 1 of the additional protocol attached to the Polish-Soviet agreement of July 30, '41, to set at liberty all Polish nationals detained under any pretext whatever on Soviet territory; (e) that imposition of Soviet nationality on the Polish nationals constituted a unilateral decision incompatible with international law as defined in the fourth Hague convention of 1907,²⁸ and with the terms of the Atlantic Charter to which the Soviet Union had adhered.

In handing me copies of the aforementioned exchange of notes, the Polish Foreign Minister said it had recently been indicated informally to the Polish Embassy in Kuibyshev that the Soviet Government's present decision meant (a) that the Government considered there were no more Polish citizens in Soviet Russia; (b) a cessation of relief distribution among the Poles; and (c) eventual conscription of the Poles. The Minister would greatly appreciate your communicating the substance of these notes to Ambassador Ciechanowski. Meanwhile the Minister would, he said, instruct Ciechanowski to ask us to exercise our good offices at this juncture to the extent of asking the Soviet Government whether it intended to refuse the Polish authorities the right to continue distributing relief among the Poles on Soviet territory. I am preliminarily inclined to interpret this recent Soviet note in the nature of a "chantage" and in such light (a) as a warning to Sikorski that it is with Moscow and not with Washington and London that he should discuss the question of Poland's eastern frontiers, and (b) as pressure on him to come to Moscow to settle the question with Stalin. In this connection Sikorski receives secret information today that the Russians are hinting that Stalin may be prepared for his part to make certain concessions to Sikorski. Sikorski is willing to meet with Stalin, but he feels that until the ground is prepared for

²⁷ The Polish-Soviet Declaration of Friendship and Mutual Assistance, signed at Moscow, December 4, 1941; for text, see telegram No. 2018, December 6, 1941, from the Chargé in the Soviet Union, *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, p. 266.

²⁸ Convention on Laws and Customs of War on Land, signed at The Hague October 18, 1907, *ibid.*, 1907, pt. 2, p. 1204.

him it would be a tactical error to do so, especially at a moment when Stalin is riding the wave of military successes.

[BIDDLE]

760C.61/1009

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] January 30, 1943.

The Polish Ambassador called to see me this morning urgently at his request. The Ambassador handed me the memorandum attached herewith the contents of which he said had already been communicated to Ambassador Biddle in London.

The Ambassador read the memorandum to me. I said that of course the issue raised was one of the utmost importance and could the Ambassador throw any light upon it.

The Ambassador then read to me a portion of a telegram he had just received before coming to see me and which had not been completely deciphered. This telegram stated that a further communication had been received by the Polish Government from the Soviet Government stating that in as much as the Polish Government was unwilling to recognize the sovereignty of "White Ruthenia and the western Ukraine" as Russian, the Soviet Government would no longer agree to recognize Polish nationals in the Soviet Union as other than of Soviet nationality in as much as all Polish citizens in the Soviet Union came from western [*eastern?*] Poland.

The Ambassador stated that this was tantamount to a declaration by the Soviet Union that it was returning to the terms of the Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement of 1939 and was completely disregarding the Soviet-Polish agreement of 1941. The Ambassador went on to say that he was afraid that it was an indication that in view of the great Russian victories of the past two months, the Soviet Government believed that it would be able to continue into Poland on its way to Germany and that for that reason it desired to have no Polish Government nor any Soviet-Polish commitments to bother about when it got that far.

I stated that I would like to have any further information from the Ambassador which might be contained in the telegram which had not yet been deciphered.²⁹ I also said that in view of the gravity of

²⁹ On January 31, the Polish Ambassador addressed a letter (760C.61/1-3143) to the Under Secretary of State enclosing a memorandum regarding the telegram from Raczynski, which described the Soviet-Polish exchange of notes of January 16 and 26, 1943, and added that late information from Kuibyshev indicated that the Soviet Government was beginning to take the first steps toward carrying out "its new attitude defined in its note of January 16th, 1943." On February 3, 1943, the Polish Ambassador sent another memorandum to Mr. Welles reporting additional information from Kuibyshev regarding Soviet treatment of Polish citizens in the Soviet Union.

this question, I would wish to lay it before the President in order to ascertain what his wishes might be. I said I would see the Ambassador again about the matter not later than the middle of next week.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

[Annex]

Memorandum on Polish-Soviet Relations

Count Raczyński informed the Polish Ambassador that through Ambassador Biddle he has transmitted to the Secretary of State texts of a Soviet note of January 16th, 1943, and of the reply of the Polish Government of January 26th, concerning the sudden decision of the USSR. henceforth to treat all the Polish deportees remaining in Russia as Soviet citizens, pretexting that these Poles originate from the Polish Eastern confines which are part of the USSR. This decision is entirely contrary to the Polish-Soviet agreement of July 30, 1941, and, if maintained, would show that the Soviet Government intends to revert to the Molotoff-Ribbentrop agreement of September 28, 1939.

According to the latest information received by the Polish Government from Kuybishev, the Soviet Government intends to draw all the practical consequences from this situation which it has thus created, to prevent the continuation of the evacuation of the families of Polish soldiers evacuated from Russia, solemnly promised by the USSR. Government, likewise to prevent the Polish Government from continuing to carry on its relief program among the Polish deportees in Russia. Count Raczyński regards this new move on the part of the Soviet Government as an attempt at pressure on the Polish Government and a proof of the general stiffening of the attitude of the Soviet Government as a result of the recent Russian military successes.

Mr. Romer, Polish Ambassador to Kuybishev, who is at present on a short stay in London, is immediately returning to his post in order to try to ascertain the real motives which have prompted the Soviet Government thus to endanger the friendly Polish-Soviet relations so laboriously built up by General Sikorski and the Polish Government.

The Polish Government certainly cannot accept any such illegal decision of the Soviet Government. There being no possibility of compromise on this issue, the Polish Government will refuse to yield to pressure on the part of the Soviet Government. The Polish Government is of the opinion that this attempt on the part of the Soviets creates a most dangerous precedent in regard to the fate of all nations at present under German occupation, and is moreover contrary to the principles in defense of which the United Nations are fighting.

General Sikorski, on behalf of the Polish Government, has instructed the Ambassador to present this case to the Secretary of State, to draw his attention to its seriousness and urgency, and to ask that the support of the U.S. Government should be given to the endeavors of the Polish Government in Moscow, at first possibly in the form of a strongly expressed interest and anxiety regarding the threat of stopping the distribution of American relief for the Poles in the USSR., a measure, which could not fail to arouse public indignation in the camp of the United Nations.

JANUARY 30, 1943.

840.48 Refugees/3482

The Secretary of State to the Polish Ambassador (Ciechanowski)

WASHINGTON, February 5, 1943.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to refer to the preliminary conversations which you have carried on with officials of this Department relative to the arrangements being made between the Polish and Mexican Governments³⁰ to receive in Mexico a substantial number of Polish refugees from the Middle Eastern area.

It is understood, in this connection, that the Mexican Government has agreed in principle to receive for the duration of the war up to a maximum of 28,000 Polish refugees from the Middle Eastern area. While it is further understood that the final details regarding the probable number of such refugees to be sent to Mexico have not been settled and that no definite detailed plan has so far been worked out for the reception and care of these persons in Mexico, there are set forth below the arrangements which the United States Government is willing to make in order to facilitate the transportation and care of these Polish nationals from the Middle Eastern area:

1. The United States Government will place to the account of the Polish Government the sum of three million dollars for the purpose of transporting and caring for these Polish refugees in Mexico. It is believed that this sum will be sufficient to meet the necessary expenses involved during the first year of the proposed plan since it is understood that the number of Polish refugees to be sent to Mexico during that period will in all probability be between three and five thousand. In the event that, on the basis of experience gained in handling the first groups of Polish refugees in Mexico, it is learned that further sums are needed or additional controls are advisable, the matter will again be discussed.

2. The release of funds from this account for the use of the Polish Government in connection with the transportation to and the care of these refugees in Mexico would be based on specific estimates of

³⁰ See memorandum by the Under Secretary of State, January 4, p. 314.

quarterly requirements drawn up by the Polish authorities which would be submitted for approval to the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations.

3. While the expenses for the care and transportation of these Polish refugees arriving in the United States would be covered by the Polish Government from such funds, the Office of Relief and Rehabilitation Operations would cooperate with the Polish officials and with officials of the State Department for the reception and transportation of these refugees to Mexico.

4. The Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations will make arrangements to assign an experienced Relief Administrator to the United States Embassy in Mexico City for the purpose of advising and assisting in the plan for the reception, care and location of these refugees. The Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations will also provide such additional American personnel as may be required to assist the Polish Government in the technical supervision of this work.

5. In order to assist in this work the Polish Government should employ such additional personnel as the American Advisor shall recommend for the purpose of administering the project. The salaries of such additional personnel shall be met by the Polish Government from the above-mentioned funds provided by the United States Government.

6. It is clearly understood that the arrangements between the Mexican and Polish Governments concerning the conditions for the entry into Mexico and the subsequent repatriation of these Polish refugees are entirely matters between these Governments, the United States Government assuming no responsibility in respect thereto.

It would be appreciated if you could confirm whether the above stipulations are satisfactory to the Polish Government.³¹

Accept [etc.]

CORDELL HULL

760C.61/2-543

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] February 5, 1943.

The Ambassador of Poland called to see me this evening at my request.

I told the Ambassador that I had twice discussed with the President the communications and memoranda which the Ambassador had been good enough to send me ³² by instruction of General Sikorski, concerning the reported intention of the Soviet Government that all Polish citizens within the Soviet Union at the present time would henceforth be automatically regarded as Soviet and not Polish nationals. I said

³¹ In a note of February 22, the Polish Ambassador informed the Secretary of State that the Polish Government had instructed him to say that "they accept with gratitude the stipulations contained in the above mentioned note". (840.48 Refugees/3615)

³² See footnote 29, p. 325.

that the President was fully cognizant of the very great importance of this question and all that it involved. I went on to say that the President had asked me to let the Ambassador know that he would be glad to receive Mr. Ciechanowski about the middle or latter part of next week. The President had also asked me to make it clear to the Polish Government that it was necessary for the Polish Government "to keep its shirt on" and that while, of course, this Government's sympathetic and friendly interest in Poland and its desire to see Poland reestablished as a powerful European state had already been officially made known to the Polish Government through the President's recent letter to General Sikorski, this Government must remain the only judge of what it could do to be helpful in a question of this kind and, even more, the moment which would be most propitious for rendering its assistance. I concluded by saying that the Ambassador could rest assured that every possible consideration would be given to the views set forth by the Polish Government and to the requests formulated.

The Ambassador seemed to understand the circumstances fully and expressed great appreciation of the President's message.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

760C.61/2-843

*The Polish Ambassador (Ciechanowski) to the Under Secretary of State (Welles)*³³

WASHINGTON, February 8, 1943.

DEAR MR. WELLES: Enclosed I am sending you a telegraphic message which I received from General Sikorski this morning in reply to my telegram after our last conversation on February fifth.

I am [etc.]

J. CIECHANOWSKI

[Enclosure]

The Polish Prime Minister (Sikorski) to the Polish Ambassador in the United States (Ciechanowski)

1) General Sikorski expresses his thanks to the President for his friendly understanding of the gravity of the situation created in Polish-Soviet relations by the sudden and illegal decision of the Soviet Government to withdraw Polish citizenship of the Polish deportees in Soviet Russia.

2) The General lays great hope in the President's intervention in this matter and realizes that the choice of time and method for this intervention must be entirely left to the President's decision.

³³ A copy of this message was sent promptly by the Under Secretary to President Roosevelt.

3) At the same time, General Sikorski takes the liberty to point out the importance of the element of time. It appears to him inevitable that delay in defining an appropriate attitude on the part of the United States and Great Britain cannot fail to encourage the creation of accomplished facts detrimental to Poland's rights and interests and difficult to readjust in the future.

4) The Polish Government will remain calm being aware that this new attempt on the part of the Soviet Government to exercise pressure on the Polish Government must be regarded as a direct result of the present military successes of the Red Army which may be of a temporary nature.

5) Soviet tactics at present consist in depriving the Polish deportees of relief and in treating them as hostages—in anticipation that such action would undoubtedly arouse the Polish community.

This action has as its ultimate purpose to prepare the way for pressure on the Polish Government with regard to the problem of Poland's Eastern boundaries.

It makes the situation of the Polish Government especially difficult at a time when it has to encourage the population in occupied Poland to keep up its heroic resistance to German pressure and to German promises to renounce all terrorism in exchange for collaboration of the Polish population in the struggle against "the Polish [*Soviet?*] danger".

6) The refusal to grant permits to leave the USSR. to the families of Polish officers and enlisted men, as well as orphans, and the threat to deprive them of further relief, causes great bitterness particularly in the ranks of the Polish Army in the Middle East and may seriously affect its morale.

WASHINGTON, February 8, 1943.

760C.61/995 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

KUIBYSHEV (Moscow), February 9, 1943—2 p. m.
[Received February 10—12: 15 a. m.]

138. The Polish Chargé d'Affaires³⁴ informed me yesterday that there has been no change or improvement in Polish-Soviet relations.³⁵ He stated somewhat resignedly that the Soviet Government was still adamant in respect to the release of Polish officers, the evacuation of

³⁴ Henryk Sokolnicki.

³⁵ See telegram Polish Series No. 3, January 28, midnight, from the Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile, and footnote 20, p. 323.

Polish women and children and its policy toward Polish Jews. He said that Polish citizens are now being conscripted into the Red Army in spite of the protests of the Polish Embassy.

STANDLEY

760C.61/2-1343

*The Polish Ambassador (Ciechanowski) to President Roosevelt*³⁶

WASHINGTON, February 13, 1943.

MR. PRESIDENT: Acting on instructions cabled to me by Prime Minister General Sikorski today, I have the honor to submit to you the telegraphic text of a letter addressed to Prime Minister Churchill concerning the crisis which has now arisen in Polish-Soviet relations. The text as received by me in General Sikorski's cable is as follows:

"The staunch and uncompromising attitude of Poland, unique among the countries of the European continent, drew upon her the most cruel and inhuman reprisals of the enemy and did not protect her from grave wrongs inflicted by her Eastern neighbor who only joined the Camp of fighting Democracies after the war had already lasted for nearly two years and did not do so on his own initiative.

"The Polish Government, acting in close understanding with the British Government, showed its readiness to disregard these wrongs in the name of solidarity in the fight against the common enemy and being desirous to lay the foundations for friendly cooperation between the two countries after final victory.

"The agreement between the Polish and the Soviet Governments, signed in London on July 30, 1941, was the expression of this attitude on the part of Poland. This agreement was complemented by a declaration made on the same day in the House of Commons by Foreign Secretary Eden³⁷ in which, among other things, he stated that the British Government did not recognize any territorial changes brought about in Poland after August, 1939.

"The Polish Government continues faithfully to fulfill its signed obligations and takes every opportunity to show its readiness to collaborate with the Government of the USSR on a basis not merely restricted to Polish-Soviet relations, but on a larger, general European basis. On the other hand, the Soviet Government departs from the terms of its signed agreement in essential matters and in matters of principle.

"INSTANCES. Interruption of recruitment to the Polish Army already in the Spring of 1942, contrary to the resolutions of the agreement of July 30, 1941. The attitude adopted by the Soviet Government with regard to Polish citizenship, which the Soviet Government attempted formerly to limit and which it finally now refuses to recognize in respect of all Polish citizens in the USSR.

³⁶ Handed to the Under Secretary of State by the Polish Ambassador on February 15, with the request that it be given to the President.

³⁷ *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 373, col. 1502.

"On this basis the Soviet authorities have at present started the recruiting of Polish citizens to the Soviet army and have ordered the final disruption of Polish relief activities.

"The above mentioned measures taken by the Soviet authorities are contrary to international law and to the letter and spirit of the Polish-Soviet agreement, and must be regarded as an unfriendly act towards a co-belligerent nation fighting in defense of a common cause in the name of principles commonly accepted and declared.

"The difficulties thus provoked by the Soviets and the lack of appropriate reaction on the part of the great Allies are causing serious uneasiness and ferment in Poland and have deeply affected the spirit of the Polish Army. The families of numerous Polish soldiers are still in the USSR. The evacuation of these families from Soviet Russia has now been entirely stopped by the Soviet authorities.

"Mr. Tadeusz Romer, Polish Ambassador to the USSR., who was spending a few days in London for the purpose of direct contact with the Polish Government, has left for Kuybishev bearing a personal letter from Prime Minister General Sikorski to Premier Stalin, as one more attempt at a friendly settlement of mutual relations.

"The letter of Prime Minister General Sikorski to Premier Churchill ends with an appeal for his immediate intervention in Moscow in order to prevent the creation of further accomplished facts on the part of the Soviets and to safeguard the most fundamental rights of Allied Poland, among others, her inalienable right to protect her own citizens and to assist them in their urgent need."

Accept [etc.]

[JAN CIECHANOWSKI]

740.00119 European War 1939/1289 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, February 15, 1943—9 p. m.

[Received February 15—7:25 p. m.]

1172. In conversation with Sir Alexander Cadogan²⁸ I referred to reports widely circulating here of growing friction between the Polish Government and the Soviet Union and he confirmed the mutual lack of cordiality. The recent Russian decision depriving Poles from former Russian-occupied Poland of their Polish nationality, rations and the protection of their Government is causing much distress and incidentally is creating uneasiness among Polish troops serving with the British in the Middle East many of whose families have been left in Russia. This severe measure may in part be "retaliation" for what the Russians consider to be the "chauvinistic" attitude shown by Sikorski recently, Cadogan thinks. There are many reports, he said, that Sikorski presented during his visit to the United States a plan which included rather extensive territorial gains

²⁸ British Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

for postwar Poland (with East Prussia and a frontier on the Oder) and that this plan received general approval in Washington. Cadogan does not believe we gave approval of any frontiers to Sikorski but that is what he is saying, and his general rather "patronizing" attitude toward the exiled Allied Governments here and assurances that he had defended their interests at Washington, have created a considerable stir in London. The other exiled Allied Governments and the Russians, he said, are somewhat resentful. At any rate knowledge of the friction between the Polish and Russian Governments has caused the Czechs to decline further discussions for developing any sort of a Czech-Polish federation.

Cadogan sees little or any chance of any early possibility of Finland being able to withdraw from the war³⁹ or any likelihood that the Russians are much interested in obtaining such withdrawal.

MATTHEWS

760C.61/2-1743

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] February 17, 1943.

The Polish Ambassador called to see me this morning at his request.

The Ambassador told me that he wished to report to me his conversation yesterday with the President when the President received him in order that he might make reply to the messages sent to the President by General Sikorski regarding the recent action of the Soviet Government in declaring all Polish refugees within Soviet territory to be Soviet nationals.

The Ambassador said that the President, as always, had received him most sympathetically and had expressed the desire of this Government to do anything it could to be of help. The President had stated, however, that the matter would have to be handled very carefully inasmuch as the President was unwilling to take any action which could be misconstrued as an interference on the part of this Government in domestic questions in the Soviet Union.

The President had stated that he would immediately consult Mr. Churchill as to the possibility of some friendly joint representations being made by the British and American Governments.

The Ambassador then said that the President had asked him if he had any suggestions. The Ambassador had replied that he felt that, in the first place, this Government had recently, as had the

³⁹ For correspondence concerning the relations between Finland and the Soviet Union, and the attempts made to obtain the withdrawal of Finland from the war against the Soviet Union, see pp. 213 ff.

British Government, taken too much the position that it was anxious to find out what the Soviet Government planned to do, and that a better trading position would be for this Government to maintain the position that its own policy with regard to principles was unalterable, thus creating a "stone wall" against which the Soviet Government would knock its head and be obliged, on Soviet initiative, to ask for an opportunity of discussion with the British and American Governments.

The Ambassador said further to the President that on several occasions either the President or responsible officials of this Government had publicly stated that the United States would not recognize territorial changes brought about by force and that it would enter into no commitments with regard to territorial changes during the war, believing that such adjustments should be solved at the end of the war. The Ambassador had said that if the President would now reiterate this statement in a public manner it would create the kind of a situation in which the Soviet Government would be obliged to come to us rather than for us to go to the Soviet Government. The Ambassador said the President had asked him to discuss this with me and to make specific suggestions as to what should be said.

I told the Ambassador that I would be very glad to look up the references which he had in mind and then lay the matter before the President for his further consideration.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

760C.61/996 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, February 17, 1943—6 p. m.
[Received February 17—3:50 p. m.]

1221. Embassy's 1172, February 15, 9 p. m. One of the higher ranking officials of the Foreign Office responsible for Soviet and eastern European matters has told us that Clark Kerr,⁴⁰ who is awaiting favorable weather for his return to Moscow, has been instructed to investigate on his return the report that the Poles are no longer permitted to carry on relief work among Poles in the Soviet Union. The Soviet authorities, according to this report, put a stop to this relief work about the same time that they informed the Poles that they would no longer regard as Polish citizens those Poles who, in the autumn of 1939, were living in Soviet-occupied Poland. If Clark

⁴⁰ Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, British Ambassador in the Soviet Union.

Kerr finds that this relief work has actually been stopped, he is to see Ambassador Standley and, after consultation with Ambassador Standley, report such recommendations to the Foreign Office as he thinks might be generally helpful.

According to this same Foreign Office official Clark Kerr has been further requested to sound out Soviet officials, as soon as a favorable opportunity for doing so arises, on the question of a federation of eastern and central European states. When Eden was in Moscow in the winter of 1941,⁴¹ and when Molotov was in London in the spring of 1942,⁴² this subject was broached by the British. On both occasions Soviet officials shied away from any discussion of it by saying that they feared that such a federation would be aimed not against Germany but against the Soviet Union. This probably is still the attitude of the Soviet Government but the Foreign Office, according to our informant, thinks it would be well to determine as soon as possible just how the Soviet Government views such a scheme so that it can be decided whether the idea of a federation should at this time be encouraged or dropped. In any event, this Foreign Office official continued, he feels that any plan for a federation sponsored by the Poles would fare badly because of the rather general, current feeling of suspicion and resentment toward the Poles among the Russians and others who would be immediately affected by such a proposal.

While this same Foreign Office official felt that the replacement in Moscow of Kot by Romer,⁴³ whom he regards as better qualified by experience and temperament, might lead to some improvement in Soviet-Polish relations, he was afraid that the tone of what he termed "the Polish opposition press" in London would continue to be a disturbing factor in these relations. These Polish language newspapers are edited and supported by that Polish element in London which is opposed to Sikorski, and opposed to him primarily because of his policy of *rapprochement* with the Soviet Union. In these newspapers articles continually appear which reflect suspicion of the Soviet Government. The Soviet Embassy complained to the Foreign Office about these articles not so long ago. When Sikorski was told of the complaint by the Foreign Office he replied that as he was a firm believer in a free press he could do nothing about the matter.

MATTHEWS

⁴¹ Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, was in Moscow December 16-22, 1941; for correspondence on his visit, see *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, pp. 192-205.

⁴² For correspondence concerning the visit of the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, to London and Washington during May and June 1942, see *ibid.*, 1942, vol. III, pp. 543-599, *passim*.

⁴³ Tadeusz Romer succeeded Stanislaw Kot as Polish Ambassador in the Soviet Union in October 1942.

760C.61/1006

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] February 19, 1943.

The Polish Ambassador called to see me this afternoon at his urgent request. The Ambassador handed me the document attached herewith⁴⁴ and indicated that the date of February 7, mentioned as the date when the Soviet Ambassador to the governments in exile in London handed this communication to the Polish Foreign Minister, should be February 17.

The Ambassador requested that I transmit this communication to the President and I said I would be glad to do so.⁴⁵

The Ambassador reminded me that the so-called "Peoples' Assemblies" mentioned in the Soviet communication had been constituted in the following manner:

When the Soviet Union invaded Eastern Poland, after the German onslaught on Western Poland, the Soviet military commanders and political commissars who accompanied them had in their possession lists of the inhabitants of each district of Eastern Poland. In each district one or two hundred of the leading anti-communist members of the so-called capitalistic groups were executed and the leading members of the population believed to be unsympathetic to the Soviet Union were rounded up for eventual deportation from Soviet territory; thereafter a carefully prepared list of leading communist sympathizers were ordered to form themselves into a "Peoples' Assembly" and then were told to adopt unanimously a resolution previously prepared for them expressing the hope that the community in which they lived would be permitted to be incorporated in the Soviet territory. The Ambassador said that this was the only procedure adopted by which the so-called Peoples' Assemblies were permitted to voice their "freely expressed will".

I told the Ambassador that in my judgment, since Mr. Eden was due to arrive next week and in view of Mr. Churchill's illness, it would probably be better to discuss this entire problem with the British Government through Mr. Eden upon his arrival.⁴⁶

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

⁴⁴ Not printed; it was copy of a note handed to the Polish Foreign Minister on February 17 by the Soviet Ambassador to the Allied Governments in Exile, at London. The Soviet note sharply rejected the Polish note of January 26, which had protested the imposition of Soviet citizenship on Poles in Soviet-occupied eastern Poland. The text of the Soviet note of February 17, with the translation varying somewhat from that in the document referred to here, is printed in *Polish-Soviet Relations, 1918-1943, Official Documents*, p. 173.

⁴⁵ The Under Secretary transmitted the note to President Roosevelt on February 19.

⁴⁶ No record has been found of any discussion of this aspect of Polish-Soviet relations in conversations of United States officials with Anthony Eden during his visit to Washington, March 12-30, 1943.

760C.61/998 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, March 2, 1943—midnight.

[Received March 2—10:55 p. m.]

1533. I inquired of Mr. Eden this afternoon whether there was any foundation of fact to the *New York Times* story of a suggested plebiscite to solve Polish and Russian difficulties (Department's telegram No. 1315, March 1, midnight ⁴⁷). He replied categorically that Clark Kerr had no instructions whatsoever to make any such proposal. He said that the British Ambassador's instructions are merely to do what he can in a general way to try and improve Soviet-Polish relations. I asked whether the statement issued this morning by the Soviet news agency ⁴⁸ would, in his opinion, create further serious difficulties between those two countries and he replied that it was too early yet to tell. He did not seem, however, unduly perturbed at the moment. He remarked that the Poles must bear some of the responsibility for their present state of relations with the Russians in view of the amount of indiscriminate talking in which they have been indulging.

MATTHEWS

760C.61/1000 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, March 3, 1943—4 p. m.

[Received 9:17 p. m.]

1536. We were told at the Foreign Office today that Clark Kerr had reported that when Stalin received Romer on February 26 ⁴⁹ the question of Soviet-Polish frontiers was, among other things, discussed. While the respective Soviet and Polish positions were maintained, it was agreed that public discussion of the question should be avoided. On receiving this message from Clark Kerr, Foreign Office says it had the Censorship Bureau send private and confidential memoranda to the editors of London and leading provincial newspapers, including foreign language newspapers, requesting that they refrain from discussing the subject of Soviet-Polish frontiers and

⁴⁷ Not printed; it instructed the Embassy in London to endeavor to ascertain whether Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, British Ambassador in the Soviet Union, had "been instructed to make any such concrete proposal." (760C.61/996)

⁴⁸ Tass.

⁴⁹ For excerpts from the conversation of the Polish Ambassador in the Soviet Union with Stalin and Molotov at the Kremlin during the night of February 26-27, see *Polish-Soviet Relations, 1918-1943, Official Documents*, pp. 217-225.

limit themselves merely to publishing without comment any statements on the subject that might be issued by the Soviet Government or Polish Government. Soviet and Polish representatives in London have been informed of this action by the Foreign Office.

Clark Kerr also reported that when Stalin and Romer met on February 26, Stalin suggested that negotiations be opened between the Soviet and Polish Governments on the question of the citizenship of Poles who were living in Soviet-occupied Poland in 1939.

MATTHEWS

740.0011 European War 1939/28755

The Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile (Biddle) to the Secretary of State

[Polish Series] No. 270

LONDON, March 3, 1943.

[Received March 30.]

SIR: Referring to General Sikorski's *New York Times*' interview of February 20,⁵⁰ concerning certain causes for growing Polish-Russian friction; and to my Despatch Polish Series No. 230 of November 9, 1942,⁵¹ reporting General Sikorski's disclosure as to his concern over the political activities of Russian officers and agents dropped by parachute into Poland and his protest in regard thereto to the Russian authorities, I have the honor herein to report the following strictly confidential disclosures made by a leading officer of the Polish Government-directed Underground Organisation,* who has recently arrived in London, concerning (a) activities of the "Government-directed Underground" in Poland, and its growing concern over Russia's potential aims in Poland; (b) the structure and activities of the Communist-guided underground movement in Poland and its subtle attempts to "liquidate" the "Government-directed Underground" and to ferment revolution. My informant stated, at the outset, that the "Government-directed Underground" was well organized and determined in its purpose. At the time that General Sikorski had signed the Polish-Russian Agreement (July 1941), the Organisation had taken a realistic view of the matter, appreciating the necessity of forming a solid Allied Front against Enemy No. 1, Germany; that it had, therefore, communicated to Sikorski its approval as to the principle of the Agreement. Recently, however, his compatriots had become fully aware of Russian disloyalty as

⁵⁰ See *New York Times*, February 22, 1943, p. 13, col. 1.

⁵¹ *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. III, p. 197.

*Organised and directed by the Polish Government immediately following and since the cessation of the Polish-German conflict in Poland. In order to identify it in the reader's mind as against other underground elements hereinafter mentioned, I shall describe it as the "Government-directed Underground". [Footnote in the original.]

Allies as well as to the spirit and terms of this Agreement. Moreover, his compatriots were becoming increasingly concerned over the implications of Moscow-directed activities in certain parts of the country. In fact, conditions had now reached the point where it was necessary that the "Government-directed Underground" had to contend with the following elements:

Partisans.

"Partisan Bands": these consisted mainly of Russian prisoners of war, who had broken prison camp and subsequently hidden in the woods at the time of the German advance in the summer of '42. Subsequently, these bands had been joined by many young Jews who had escaped the Ghettos. The strength of the bands had been further augmented by young peasant boys who had been kidnapped by the Partisans and forced to cooperate with them. These bands operated under the leadership of Russian officers flown in by Russian planes and dropped by parachute. Their hiding places and bases of operation were the forest lands which lay in the area between Siedlce and Pulawy, and in the forests which lay directly East of the Bug River. These bands were neither numerous nor powerful, but widely dispersed and powerful enough to provoke German reprisals vis-à-vis the Polish population and the "Government-directed Underground". On this account the Organization's Commander-in-Chief, in his Underground Press Reports, frequently ascribed to "Partisans" sabotage which his own organization had conducted, in order to avoid reprisals.

Polish Workers' Party.

This was a movement, separate from the Partisans, which was inspired and directed by the Polish Communist Party, whose leaders, in some cases were Russians, in others, Polish Communists of the international order of mentality, who took their orders from the Comintern.⁵² The Polish Workers' Party, organised for the purpose of establishing a front against the Germans, had its own military detachments and its own Underground. While the Party was neither numerous nor powerful it was widely spread throughout the Gouvernement General. The Party recruited its strength from among the working masses, most of whom joined because of its patriotic appeal, and without knowing the forward-looking political purpose of its Communist leaders. This was the restoration of a powerful Poland as the Seventeenth Republic of the U.S.S.R. The Party claimed to be Catholic and Nationalist; it denied any Communist connections or collaboration with Communists.

⁵² The Third (Communist) International, founded by the Bolsheviks at Moscow in March 1919.

The Polish Communist Party.

As above stated, the Polish Communist Party inspired and directed the activities of the Polish Workers' Party. The Communist Party, my informant said, maintained great secrecy as to its membership and its headquarters. It had undergone no expansion since the outbreak of the war, but now had its own underground newspapers. Moreover, through the Polish Workers' Party and the latter's underground organisation, the Polish Communist Party was a constant thorn in the side of my informant's "Government-directed Underground". Members of the Polish Workers' Party, on orders from their leaders, were constantly attempting to make contact with the members of my informant's Organisation. In this connection, experience had shown that whenever the former had succeeded in forming such contact, the Workers' Party members promptly appealed for cooperation between the two organisations, and tried to obtain the names and addresses of the members of my informant's organisation. In each case, wherein this information had been imparted, the leaders of the Workers' Party had taken steps to denounce to the Gestapo⁵⁴ those, whose names and addresses they had thus obtained. This had become such a danger to the "Government-directed Underground" that it had been found essential to expel anyone immediately who had been contacted by the Workers' Party. He and his associates, my informant said, were now "on to the game". It was now clear that the leaders of the Workers' Party aimed to obtain a membership list of the "Government-directed Underground" in order to denounce the people concerned, either to the Gestapo or, in event of a Russian invasion, to the N.K.W.D.⁵⁵ The foregoing, together with detection and reprisals by the Gestapo now comprised the greatest dangers for the "Government-directed Underground".

Official Emissaries of the Comintern.

These came by parachute from time to time in an effort to make contact with the Commander-in-Chief, officers and delegates of my informant's "Government-directed Underground". They, as in the case of the aforescribed Communist leaders in Poland, aimed at obtaining the names and addresses of the organisation's membership. Thus far, however, they have failed to make the desired contacts.

Discernible Traces of the "Russian Hand".

My informant went on to say that due to the aforementioned dangers, he and his associates had to exercise great care in their contacts with Poles outside their own Organisation. Fortunately, however,

⁵⁴ The German Secret State Police (Geheime Staatspolizei).

⁵⁵ N.K.V.D., the Secret Police of the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs of the Soviet Union.

they had learned to recognize the "Russian hand" by the line the agent adopted in his approach. It usually ran approximately as follows:—

- (a) He wanted to see a powerful, progressive and democratic post-war Poland;
- (b) He wanted a big Poland reaching to the Oder;
- (However, my informant said, there was never a word regarding Poland's Eastern Frontier).
- (c) He was not opposed to the Rightists; he was "with" all categories of Poles, and he sought close contact and cooperation with all;
- (d) He wanted a post-war Poland in close collaboration with Russia;
- (e) He urged open sabotage and a revolution at once.

Attitude of People in General to the Partisans and Polish Workers' Party.

My informant said that the Socialists (P.P.S.⁵⁶), even to a greater extent than the Rightists, were bitterly opposed to collaboration with the Partisans or the Workers' Party.

"Government-Directed Underground's" Present Predicament.

As a result of the foregoing examples of Russian disloyalty, both as Allies and to the Polish-Russian Agreement, my informant continued, a "horrible situation" had developed in Poland. Moreover, the "Government-directed Underground" had become deeply concerned lest it be considered here as disloyal to Polish-British relations, if it were to take measures against the aforementioned Russian activities.

Resultant Delicacy of General Sikorski's Political Position.

My informant further disclosed that the aforementioned examples of Russian disloyalty to the terms and spirit of the Polish-Russian Agreement together with the implications of Russia's claim that all Poles now in Russia were Russian citizens, had served to place General Sikorski's political position in a delicate light. My informant was aware, moreover, that this was the case not only with public opinion in Poland, but also with the forces in Scotland and in the Middle East.

My informant had already discerned a sense of restiveness among the circles here, which had rallied behind General Sosnkowski's⁵⁷ opposition to the signing of the Agreement in the terms in which it was written. Public opinion in Poland was well aware that General Sosnkowski's resignation from the Cabinet was due to the stand he

⁵⁶ Polska Partia Socjalistyczna.

⁵⁷ Gen. Kazimierz Sosnkowski resigned as Deputy Prime Minister of the Polish Government in Exile on July 26, 1941, in protest against the signing of the Polish-Soviet Agreement.

had taken regarding the terms of this Agreement—and in this, besides his heroic leadership during the war in Poland, lay his strength. On the other hand, Sikorski's sterling qualities and courageous, determined leadership in the continued struggle to restore Poland's independence were greatly appreciated. The Poles, both inside and outside Poland, now looked hopefully to him to lead them out of the aforescribed predicament.

My informant concluded by emphasising that he and his associates "at home" were deeply worried lest any measures they might take against the aforementioned Russian "subversive activities" be construed both in London and in Washington as contrary to the spirit of the United Nations' Front. He was, therefore, most anxious that we understand the predicament in which the "Government-directed Underground" was being placed by what it conscientiously considered deliberate subversive activities directed from Moscow.

Respectfully yours,

A. J. DREXEL BIDDLE, JR.

760C.61/1006 : Telegram

The Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile (Biddle) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, March 6, 1943—4 p. m.

[Received 8:03 p. m.]

Polish Series [No.] 7. For the President, the Secretary and the Under Secretary. Referring my cable Polish Series number 3, January 28, midnight, and my despatches Polish Series 262, January 20 and 267, February 15,⁵⁸ Sikorski states that the recent meeting⁵⁹ between Polish Ambassador Romer and M. Stalin entailed discussion of six main points in the following light:

(1) In response to Romer's suggestion that his Government was prepared immediately to take measures to destroy all railway and highway bridges in Poland over which supplies are carried to the German forces in Russia, M. Stalin expressed his appreciation but said he did not think the moment yet ripe for such action. He would bear this in mind and would keep in touch with the Ambassador on the subject.

(2) Romer had informed him that the approximately 200,000 Poles which had been enrolled by force in the German Army had indicated their willingness to go over at a given moment to the Russian side if assured they could fight as a unit alongside the Red army. In reply, M. Stalin said he would want them to be dispersed in detachments among the Red army. Sikorski told me that in response to his Ambassador's report on this point, he had requested the Ambassador to state his desire that the matter be regulated by the terms

⁵⁸ Despatches not printed.

⁵⁹ On February 26, 1943.

of the Russian-Polish Military Convention of August 1941.⁶⁰ (Sikorski, usually more of a realist vis-à-vis Russia than many of his compatriots, said he felt that this question was open to compromise; that his and the Russian Government, however, would have to make a record of their legal rights in the matter.)

(3) Romer raised the general question of Polish citizenship. In response, M. Stalin stated that he would leave it open to all Poles who happened to be in the eastern area of Poland at the time of the plebiscite of November 1 and 2, 1939, to opt for Polish nationality, adding that those who so opted might leave Russia eventually via Iran. He thereupon gave Molotov instructions in this sense.

(4) Regarding welfare for Poles in Russia, M. Stalin suggested that a way might be found whereby Polish relief could be distributed according to Russian laws. (Sikorski said that he and his associates were preliminarily inclined to regard this as a vague suggestion with a very limited objective. This point, he added, was now being negotiated.)

(5) M. Stalin urged a truce in the press controversy. (Sikorski considered this suggestion encouraging in light of its indication of Russian concern over repercussions in the United States and Britain.)

(6) Romer's raising of the frontier question had met only with a polite but cold reception.

Summing up his Government's opinion of the Russian attitude, Sikorski said that M. Stalin appeared to be offering small practical concessions as a *quid pro quo* for concessions in matters of principle by the Polish Government. As to matters of principle, he added, the latter had to stand firm.

Sikorski went on to say that Ambassador Romer had just reported his definite impression that Moscow had two alternative forward-looking views regarding Poland: (a) Stalin's view envisaging a strong independent Poland; and (b) Molotov's envisaging Poland as the one seventh [*seventeenth?*] [Soviet] Socialist Republic.

As forecast in my aforementioned cable, Sikorski's political position is under tense fire from the Polish Armed Forces both in Scotland and the Middle East, as well as from opposition circles in London and from the "home front" in Poland. It was due to this pressure, as well as to exaggerated rumors, deliberately circulated by the Russian Embassy here, alleging Polish territorial aspirations, in Russia, that in defence both of his own and his Government's position, Sikorski had given his interview to the *New York Times* on February 20. Notwithstanding continued pressure from Polish quarters, I find Sikorski philosophical, and confident he can handle this aspect.

He deeply appreciated the President's message sent him through Polish Ambassador, and asked me to tell the President that he had greeted it with full comprehension.

[BIDDLE]

⁶⁰ A military agreement between the Polish High Command and the Soviet High Command was signed at Moscow on August 14, 1941; for text, see *Polish-Soviet Relations, 1918-1943, Official Documents*, p. 126.

840.48 Refugees/3649

The Polish Ambassador (Ciechanowski) to the Secretary of State

The Ambassador of Poland presents his compliments to the Secretary of State and acting upon instructions of his Government has the honor to give the Government of the United States an assurance to the effect that all Polish citizens who became refugees as a result of the war and found or are finding refuge on the territory of the United States of America, will be readmitted to Poland after the war when conditions permit and no obstacles will be placed in the way of their return by the Polish Government.

WASHINGTON, March 9, 1943.

No. 738/SZ-202.

760C.61/1007: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, March 9, 1943—5 p. m.

[Received March 10—2:36 a. m.]

137. Shortly before my departure from Kuibyshev the Polish Chargé d'Affaires informed Mr. Page⁶¹ that the Soviet authorities had resumed their practice of arresting Polish relief agents and in spite of the protests of the Embassy conscription of Polish citizens in the Red army was continuing, in fact increasing. Refusal to be inducted he stated was considered treason and punishable by exile or death. Mr. Page was subsequently informed that the Polish Embassy was experiencing difficulties and annoyances on the part of the internal police and that various members of the Embassy were seriously alarmed over the possibility of a rupture in Soviet-Polish relations and over their personal safety. He was informally asked by a minor official in the Polish Embassy whether the American Embassy would come to the assistance of the Polish Embassy in such an event.

Upon my arrival in Moscow I was informed by the British Ambassador that the Soviet authorities in Kuibyshev had closed down the radio transmitter presumably used by the Polish Embassy to communicate with its relief representatives in the field and that the Polish Chargé fearing additional interference in the internal work of the Embassy had requested the British Embassy to take over the Polish Embassy and Polish interests should eventualities so warrant. I have also been informed by Roullard⁶² that the Soviet authorities have recently seized all Polish relief supplies stored at Murmansk.

⁶¹ Edward Page, Jr., Second Secretary of Embassy and Consul in the Soviet Union.

⁶² Lt. Comdr. George D. Roullard, Assistant Naval Attaché and Assistant Naval Attaché for Air in the Soviet Union.

In response to a question relative to the distribution of relief supplies to Polish citizens in the Soviet Union (Department's 119, February 24, 8 p. m.⁶³), the Chargé states that although the Polish authorities in the Soviet Union were experiencing increasing difficulties regarding the actual transport and distribution of supplies, relief was still being distributed among Polish nationals whom the Soviet Government considered to be Soviet citizens. He added that such supplies were even being distributed among Polish Jews, Ruthenians, and Ukrainians whom the Soviet Government had considered Soviet citizens for some time. He stated that since the question of the citizenship of Polish nationals in the Soviet Union was not closed and since his Government "supported by Mr. Churchill and the President" still hoped to reach a satisfactory solution of the matter with the Soviet Government he was of the opinion that it would be advisable to continue the shipment of relief supplies from America for the time being. He later requested, however, that no report of his conversation be made to the Department until I had had an opportunity to discuss the matter with the Polish Ambassador in Moscow.

The Polish Ambassador informed me on March 7 of his recent conversation with Stalin. He stated that after Molotov had refused to discuss with him questions relative to Polish citizenship Stalin had summoned him in the middle of the night and in a 3-hour conversation at which Molotov was present had suggested that he initiate negotiations with Molotov concerning (a) the cessation of hostile propaganda and polemic in the Soviet and Polish press, (b) the desirability of coming to an understanding on the citizenship question. In this respect Stalin suggested that only those Poles actually born in the eastern provinces be considered Soviet citizens and those others who happened to be there at the time of Soviet occupation be considered Polish citizens. He intimated that the Soviet Government might favorably entertain a proposal that the Polish citizens concerned should have the right to opt for Polish or Russian citizenship, (c) the frontier question.

The Polish Ambassador described his conversation with Stalin as friendly and satisfactory especially since Stalin did not appear to consider the citizenship question a closed matter. He expressed the belief that the Kremlin did not wish a rift in Soviet-Polish relations or a continuance of exchanges of polemics which would have an unfavorable impression on foreign opinion. He stated that he was remaining in Moscow about 3 weeks in order to carry on his negotiations with Molotov which he expected to initiate this week. He suggested that I discuss the question of Soviet-Polish relations with the British Ambassador and that we bring the influence of our Governments to

⁶³ Not printed.

bear with the view to improving these relations. I stated that I would talk with Clark Kerr and seek the advice of my Government in the premises.

In respect to the question of relief shipments the Ambassador strongly recommended that they be continued for the following reasons: (a) The supplies will cause Molotov to refuse to carry on the important negotiations envisaged or to postpone them since one of the main reasons for the negotiations was the problem of relief shipments.

Clark Kerr who had also been advised of the Romer-Stalin conversation has informed me that the Polish Ambassador advised him that although he departed from the Kremlin with a feeling of encouragement he in no way felt assured that there would be any change in the Soviet attitude toward Poland.

Viewed from here and taking into consideration recent developments in Soviet foreign policy I believe that we should be exceedingly circumspect in formulating our policy with respect to the present issues at stake between the Polish and Soviet Governments. American intercession or even expressed interest on behalf of Poland at this time might well have far-reaching repercussions on Soviet-American relations even if we were to base our actions as we have done in the past on humanitarian grounds or on the expressed belief that a display of a generous attitude on the part of the Soviet Government would further the joint war effort by promoting a greater spirit of confidence between two of the United Nations. Furthermore it is quite possible that any action on our part at this time might cause a worsening of Soviet-Polish relations. From various sources here I am informed that it is precisely because of the fact that Sikorski took his problem[s] to Washington before discussing them with Stalin that Soviet-Polish relations have deteriorated to their present stage. Furthermore the exchange of notes reported in Department's 88, February 12 ⁶⁴ leads me to believe that the present militant Soviet Government has decided to force at this time the issue of the Polish eastern frontiers and that it would not hesitate to use bludgeon tactics to solve this question to its satisfaction. So far as we can judge the Soviet Government has the full support of the Russian people on this issue. In this connection the Embassy has received indications that under certain conditions the Polish Government might be willing to recognize the 1941 frontiers at this time were it not for the fact that it is convinced that the Polish people would not now accept such a move. For this reason it is endeavoring to postpone this question until the peace settlement.

Since there may be considerations in respect to Polish-Soviet relations of which I am not aware, such as matters discussed between the

⁶⁴ Not printed, but see footnote 20, p. 323.

President and Sikorski, I would appreciate receiving any information and instructions the Department may find it possible to send me in the premises.

STANDLEY

760C.61/1010 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, March 10, 1943—11 a. m.

[Received March 18—5:35 p. m.]

175. The following telegram has been received from Kuibyshev.

123. March 10, 4 p. m. For the Ambassador.

1. Assuming that you have not already received from Polish Ambassador information with regard to recent developments in the Soviet-Polish controversy, you may be interested to have the following given me in strictest confidence by Polish Counselor: ⁶⁵

a. Although Soviet Government was presumably aware of Polish Government's Declaration of February 25 ⁶⁶ when Polish Ambassador had his interview with Stalin on February 25, it was agreed at the interview that the two Governments would refrain from making further declarations which would tend to aggravate relations between them, and that effort would be made to find basis of discussion with a view to the eventual resolving of the controversy. The Soviet statement published on March 2, ⁶⁷ therefore, came as a great shock to Poles.

b. Although Counselor affects to be optimistic with regard to eventual outcomes, believing as he does that Soviet Government cannot afford (because of probable adverse repercussions in United States and Britain) to take any extreme measure such as to sever relations with Poland he did not disguise his alarm over consequences of successive repressive acts by Soviet Government against Polish nationals in Soviet Union. He enumerated first, the denial of transport facilities to numerous food and clothing depots maintained by Polish agencies in Soviet Union, resulting in inability of depots to function and in deterioration of their stocks; second, directors of Polish schools, orphanages and hospitals in Soviet Union are being replaced by Soviet nationals; and third, large number of Polish nationals who had refused to accept Soviet nationality have been imprisoned and otherwise harshly treated. Counselor has sent three notes since March 1 to Foreign Office protesting against such arrests. The concluding paragraph of the third note, of which he has given me a copy, reads "As the accuracy of the foregoing information is beyond doubt, and being persuaded that the local authorities at Kirov and Kuibyshev are employing methods of coercion which are in contradiction with the intentions of the central authorities, the Embassy is compelled to protest in the strongest possible manner against the creation of *faits accomplis* of this character["]".

2. Colleagues with whom I have talked generally take an optimistic view over the short haul, a view I share. Although both Russia and

⁶⁵ Henryk Sokolnicki.

⁶⁶ *Polish-Soviet Relations. 1918-1943, Official Documents*, p. 207.

⁶⁷ For text of the Soviet Declaration of March 1, 1943, see *ibid.*, p. 208.

Poland can be expected for time being to maintain uncompromising attitudes and in case of latter to adopt provocative tactics, so long as the territory in controversy is under enemy occupation it would benefit neither country to take a definitive and conclusive position having detrimental effects on Allied unity and from which it could not readily retreat. With regard to possible developments over the long haul I have noticed tendency among some colleagues to urge the need for taking a "realistic" view and for support by United States and Britain of Soviet position on the ground that the latter nations will not feel disposed to intervene by force whatever the merits of the Polish case might be. It strikes me that this view if adopted by American and British Governments before end of the war and before it would be possible to examine a complicated issue in an objective and rational manner would be certain to be Banquo's ghost in efforts to formulate effective post-war system of collective security.

3. I feel sure that Department would be interested to have your views on this subject along with all the information you may have available.

STANDLEY

760C.61/1007 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Second Secretary of Embassy in Moscow (Thompson)

WASHINGTON, March 11, 1943—10 p. m.

131. With reference to your 137, March 9, 5 p. m., Department concurs that it would be inadvisable at this time for you to intercede in any effort to bring about improvement in Polish-Soviet relations since the Soviets and Poles are endeavoring to iron out their difficulties themselves.

In view, however, of importance of these questions please keep the Department currently informed of developments in the negotiations.

In regard to relief supplies Department has been informed that there are sufficient supplies in Tehran earmarked for Poles in the Soviet Union to cover any possible shipment which can be made during the next 6 months over the overburdened transportation system. When these supplies have been sufficiently depleted to warrant further shipments the question will then be reopened.

WELLES

760C.61/1018

*The Polish Prime Minister (Sikorski) to President Roosevelt*⁶⁸

[LONDON,] March 16, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I am writing to thank you, Mr. President, most sincerely for your message,⁶⁹ which I received through our Ambassador in Washington.

Both the Polish Government and myself have the highest regard for your viewpoint and we are prepared to do all in our power in order to prevent the breaking off of Poland's relations with Soviet Russia if only we are met with good will and some response on the other side. Meanwhile, however, as you know, the situation has deteriorated still further since my return from the United States.

I would like, therefore, on behalf of my Government to describe to you, Mr. President, the difficult position in which the latest Russian declarations have placed us. We are expected to fight side by side with Russia at a time when the Soviet Government are making claims to one half of our territory and to one third of the people of Poland, and when in their note of January 16th, 1943,⁷⁰ they once more insist on the Ribbentrop-Molotov line. The Soviet Government is invoking for this policy the Atlantic Charter, which is to justify their present imperialist designs. The denial to Poles, forcibly deported to the U.S.S.R., of all rights, including the right to live, completes the measure of their affliction. The men, women and children concerned are on the verge of physical exhaustion. The interruption of all humanitarian activities organised for the benefit of the deportees with the generous help of the United States would be tantamount to a condemnation to death.

Many of the Polish soldiers, airmen and sailors have relatives in the U.S.S.R. or in that part of Poland to which Russia—our Ally—is making her unprecedented claims, contrary to all the principles proclaimed by the United Nations and it requires great efforts on my part to keep their feelings under control.

On February 27th, the Polish Ambassador in Moscow had a three hour conversation with M. Stalin, who appeared somewhat less exacting than it might have been expected from previous semi-official Soviet enunciations. I am afraid, however, that we cannot rely on

⁶⁸ Sent to President Roosevelt by the Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile, at London, with a covering letter dated March 17, 1943, which read in part: "As to Russian attitude towards him [General Sikorski], I doubt whether Moscow would press its campaign against him personally to the point of causing his political downfall—for Moscow would more than likely figure that it would result in his replacement by someone far less realistic and more violently anti-Moscow." (760C.61/1018)

⁶⁹ See the third paragraph of the Polish Ambassador's letter of April 4, to President Roosevelt, p. 365.

⁷⁰ See telegram Polish Series No. 3, January 28, midnight, from the Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile, p. 323.

vague assurances that there is no enmity in Russia towards Poland, but that we must take into account the hostile manifestations of Soviet policy consistently conducted by M. Molotov.

The Polish people suffered beyond measure in this war. It would be an incomprehensible wrong, if at a time when the development of war is taking a turn to the advantage of the Allies, the Polish people were to realise, that the imperialist claims of Allied Russia are to be met at the expense of Poland.

At this distressing time I find support in your friendship and your understanding, Mr. President, which you expressed so often towards my country and myself. I believe that the solid front of the United Nations will be maintained and that acting together the British and American Governments will find the means to confirm their solidarity with us.

In this connection I take the liberty to make the suggestion that the Governments of the United States and Great Britain may agree, either publicly or by means of notes addressed to the Governments of the United Nations, to reaffirm the principle of non-recognition by them of any accomplished facts, effected after September the 1st, 1939, on the occupied territories of States, belonging to the United Nations.

The confirmation of this principle would strengthen the position of Poland during the diplomatic negotiations, which the Polish Government are conducting at the present time in Moscow. The publication of such a declaration would, moreover, find a favourable echo throughout the Continent of Europe, especially in the countries adjoining the U.S.S.R., and supply a valuable counter-weight to German propaganda and German agitation on behalf of the war effort of the Axis Powers, which are exploiting Soviet territorial claims against Poland for their own purposes.

Believe me,

Yours very sincerely,

SIKORSKI

760C.61/1011 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, March 18, 1943—7 p. m.

[Received midnight.]

179. Department's 131, March 11, 10 p. m. The Polish Ambassador has advised me of his conversation with Molotov on March 9¹¹ during which he protested against the following recent actions of the Soviet Government.

¹¹ For excerpts from Ambassador Romer's conversation with Foreign Commissar Molotov at the Kremlin, March 9, 1943, see *Polish-Soviet Relations, 1918-1943, Official Documents*, pp. 225-235.

1. Continued arrests of Embassy relief representatives. An additional 21 agents this year for reasons unknown to the Polish Embassy.
2. Effectuation of the citizenship terms of the Soviet [note] of January 16. Hundreds of Polish citizens are being forced to accept Soviet citizenship. Refusal results in arrest and some cases of Poles being beaten or deprived of food have been reported.
3. Refusal to permit families of Polish soldiers serving abroad to leave the Soviet Union.
4. Sovietization of Polish welfare institutions, orphanages, homes for invalids and schools.

Romer stated that Molotov had flatly refused to entertain his representation in the premises. He added that he hoped to continue his discussions in a few days and declared that unless there was an immediate cessation of the persecution of the Poles it would be impossible for him to remain here any longer as Ambassador. Upon inquiry I outlined the present position of my Government in regard to Polish-Soviet relations. He stated that he would keep me informed of his negotiations and if no satisfactory solution seemed likely he would ask that we and the British consider the advisability of bringing our influences to bear on the Soviet Government.

STANDLEY

760C.61/1012 : Telegram

The Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile (Biddle) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, March 19, 1943—midnight.
[Received March 20—12:10 a. m.]

Polish Series [No.] 8. Reference my Polish Series No. 7, March 16 [6], 4 p. m., regarding part of conversation between Stalin and Polish Ambassador Romer dealing with question of granting Polish deportees choice between Polish and Russian citizenship, Sikorski expresses serious concern over further deterioration of Polish-Russian relations as indicated by message just received from Ambassador Romer. Following are the main points thereof:

(a) While Romer was negotiating with Molotov and associates the Soviet authorities were attempting to force Polish citizens to accept Soviet passports. Those who refused, and these were in the majority, were being arrested, kept without food and beaten. For example, in Kirov about 200 Polish citizens were arrested for refusing to accept Soviet passports and some of them instantly condemned to 2 years' imprisonment. Moreover, the Soviet authorities rarely, if ever, tried to ascertain the places of birth of the Poles.

(b) In view of these steadily multiplying conditions, and in event of unfavorable outcome from his forthcoming talks with Molotov, Romer suggested that the Polish Government appeal for more ener-

getic support of the United States and British Governments.⁷² He was confident of effective results from such support.

(c) Romer feared that in case all other means proved unsuccessful, he would be obliged to advise his Government to break diplomatic relations with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. However, he sincerely hoped this might be avoided in view of its potential bearing on the United Nations war effort and, among other factors, the position of the Poles in Russia.

(d) Romer suggested that his Government send strong note to Russian Ambassador Bogomolov here, protesting against the imposition of Soviet citizenship on Poles, as well as against the taking over of Polish properties, asylums, hostels, et cetera, by the Russian authorities.

In requesting that I apprise you of the foregoing and of his opinion that the situation was rapidly becoming more serious, Sikorski expressed his earnest hope that we and the British might see our way clear to strengthen Romer's hand in his forthcoming conversations with Molotov.

[BIDDLE]

760C.61/3-2243

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Henderson)

[WASHINGTON,] March 22, 1943.

The Polish Ambassador called upon me this morning. He said that he had come to request an appointment with the Secretary on the earliest possible date since his Government had requested him to deliver personally to Mr. Hull a communication.

The Ambassador handed me the attached note dated March 20, 1943⁷³ and stated that this was the communication which he was instructed to give to the Secretary and to discuss with him. He was giving it to me to transmit to the Secretary in order that the Secretary might acquaint himself with its contents before their conversation.

He would also inform the Secretary orally during the coming interview that his Government had instructed him to state categorically that it had been at no time prepared and was not at present prepared to make any concessions whatsoever which might threaten the territorial integrity of Poland or deprive Polish citizens of their right to Polish citizenship.

⁷² Acting upon instructions from his Government, Ambassador Ciechanowski on March 22 presented a note, dated March 20, which declared that "only an immediate and energetic intervention undertaken in Moscow by the Governments of the United States and Great Britain would have the desired effect" of forestalling a failure in Polish-Soviet negotiations with all the "undesirable effects it could not fail to have upon the unity of the United Nations." (760C.61/1014)

⁷³ Not printed, but see footnote 72, above.

The Ambassador also gave me the attached document prepared by the Polish Embassy entitled "Memorandum on Polish-Soviet Relations and their bearing on Soviet-United Nations relationship".⁷⁴ He said he would appreciate it if this document would be shown to the Secretary and if a copy of it would be sent to the President. He also promised to send me, and he did so later in the day, a further memorandum on Polish-Soviet relations⁷⁵ which he also desired to have sent to the President and to be marked as memorandum number 1. A copy of this memorandum is also attached hereto.

During our conversation he handed me another document entitled "Memorandum on the Origin of the 'Curzon Line'"⁷⁶ which he said might be of assistance to the press section of the Department. He thought that this memorandum might help to clear up certain misconceptions with regard to the so-called "Curzon Line".

The Ambassador said that he was particularly perturbed regarding the attitude which the Soviet Government is showing at present towards Poland. He felt that only through intervention on the part of the United States and Great Britain could any change in that attitude be effected. The Soviet Government in his opinion had the impression that the failure of Great Britain and the United States to intervene on behalf of Poland was indicative that those two countries had lost interest in Poland and were willing to allow the Soviet Union to do what it wished in Eastern Europe. He feared if the Soviet Union continued to remain adamant that the Polish Army, which is becoming extremely restive, would lose all respect for General Sikorski and that General Sikorski's position with members of the Polish Council would be seriously undermined. There are more than three hundred thousand Poles in Poland who are organized and prepared to arise in revolt at a signal from the Polish Government. These Poles are sworn to oppose every threat to Polish territorial integrity regardless of the direction from which it might arise. They are already beginning to inquire what attitude they should take in case Soviet forces should again enter the Polish frontier. The Germans have been clever in deporting to those parts of Poland which are claimed by the Soviet Union large numbers of Polish patriots. There is a danger that these Poles, many of whom are armed may actively oppose the Soviet entrance into Poland if the situation remains unchanged.

The Ambassador referred to an article which appeared according to his understanding in the *Chicago Tribune* of yesterday and to

⁷⁴ *Post*, p. 358.

⁷⁵ *Infra*.

⁷⁶ Not printed; for an account of the note of July 10, 1920, from the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Curzon) to the Soviet Government delineating the "Curzon Line", see *Foreign Relations*, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, vol. XIII, pp. 793-794.

another article recently published in the *New York Herald Tribune*. These articles indicate that the President has been persuaded by Eden to acquiesce to Soviet claims in Eastern Europe. The Ambassador said that he could not believe that these allegations were true. I told him that I had no information regarding the conversations which had taken place between the President and Mr. Eden.

The Ambassador said he would also like to inquire during his conversation with the Secretary what the attitude of the American Government might be in case the Soviet Government should sever relations with the Polish Government and towards a Polish request that the American Government take over Polish affairs in the Soviet Union.

760C.61/1014

Memorandum on Polish-Soviet Relations ⁷⁷

I. The Polish Ambassador has continuously informed the Department of State of all the developments in Polish-Soviet relations since the signing of the Polish-Soviet agreement on July 30th, 1941, to the present moment.

II. The following conclusions emerge from this factual documentation:

a) Both as regards the Baltic States and Poland, the USSR has been and is pursuing a policy aiming at the annexation of these countries,

b) this policy has been carefully thought out and prepared with a view of creating the impression that the populations of the countries in question desire their incorporation in the USSR,

c) in her attempt to create this illusion calculated to impress British and American public opinion,—the USSR has largely benefited by her successful defense, by the ignorance of Soviet mentality and methods which characterizes British and American public opinion, by the traditional secrecy with which all Soviet internal affairs are surrounded, by the fact that at the time when Soviet Russia alleges to have carried out “popular consultations” during her occupation of these countries, she was allied to Nazi Germany and her activities in those countries were practically outside any possible control on the part of the Allied Powers,

d) since that time, however, reliable information has become available which proves that:

- 1) no acceptable popular consultations had taken place,
- 2) Soviet military and political authorities ruthlessly terrorized the population of these countries and deported millions of men, women and children to Russia and applied mass sovietization in those areas entirely disregarding all international laws defining the rights of an occupying power.

⁷⁷ Forwarded by the Polish Ambassador with a covering personal note on March 22, 1943, to the Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs, Loy W. Henderson.

3) During the occupation of the above mentioned countries, intense communisation was forcibly being introduced.

III. Ever since Germany's attack on the USSR, Soviet Russian diplomacy and her widespread and intensive propaganda in Great Britain and the United States have diligently tended to prepare the way for the territorial claims recently openly put forward by the Soviet Government.

In putting forward her demands the USSR has, as far as diplomacy is concerned, made use of gradually increasing pressure on the Polish Government and the British and U.S. Government, and of methods of virtual blackmail (second front, insufficient support etc.), while her propaganda, methodically conducted by means of newspaper articles, radio broadcasts and speeches, maps and by other means,—has mostly taken the form of familiarizing British and American public opinion with Russia's allegedly inalienable rights to these territories with the obvious aim of taking full advantage of ignorance and war enthusiasm for Russia's part in the war to obtain the tacit recognition and acceptance of unilaterally created accomplished facts.

Soviet Russia has been singularly assisted in this work by numerous American and British propagandists who for various reasons have seen fit to espouse her cause in their respective countries.

IV. Having prepared the background, the Soviets launched their territorial claims after having informed the Polish Government of their decision to withdraw the right of Polish citizenship of the Polish citizens deported by them to the USSR at the time of the Soviet occupation of Eastern Poland. The incredible reason given in the said note of January 16th, 1943, was the refusal of the Polish Government to recognize the sovereign rights of the USSR to these Polish territories, termed in the note as the territories of Western Ukraina and White Ruthenia.

This novel method of procedure contrary to all laws and usages governing international relations, requires no comment,—and is clearly inadmissible.

V. The Polish Government had "bona fide" concluded the agreement with the USSR of July 30, 1941, disregarding the Soviet attack on Poland of September 17th, 1939, which had finally crippled her resistance in her defense against Germany, and shelving all the unspeakable wrongs inflicted by the Soviet Government on the Polish population.

In doing so the Polish Government proved its farsighted statesmanship and its determination to remain actively solidary with Poland's Ally Great Britain in the war and to place the vital issue of future peaceful collaboration between European nations above all other matters.

In the opening paragraph of this Polish-Soviet agreement the high contracting parties agreed to regard the German-Soviet agreement partitioning Poland's territory as no longer operative. Logically therefore Poland was entitled to regard that the Polish-Soviet agreement restored the "status quo ante" of the territorial delimitation of Poland's Eastern boundaries fixed by virtue of the Riga Treaty of March 18th, 1921,⁷⁸ and recognized by the Allied Powers on March 15, 1923.⁷⁹

Ever since July 1941, however, the USSR Government has taken every opportunity to place in doubt these legally established Polish boundaries and has gone out of its way to bring pressure to bear upon the Polish Government, by means inadmissible in normal relations between civilized countries, and contrary to the specific terms of the Atlantic Charter and of the Declaration signed by the United Nations, to both of which the USSR is a signatory.

The documentary evidence supplied by the Polish Government to the Department of State contains numerous instances of bad faith on the part of the Soviet Government in its dealings with the Polish Government and definite instances of non-fulfilment by the Soviet Government of its signed obligations.

VI. It must be reluctantly admitted that the Soviet Government is interpreting the lack of any direct reaction to Soviet claims on Poland on the part of the Chief Allies, as a proof of their indifference and even decision not to support Poland's legitimate territorial rights.

This has served to encourage the USSR in the belief that Poland was isolated, that she could not count upon the firm support of the principal United Nations, and has convinced the Soviets that they could pursue their policy of territorial annexation without encountering any opposition.

VII. As a result of the facts enumerated above the situation has at present reached a climax which threatens to force a rupture between Soviet Russia and Poland. It is probable, on the basis of certain indications, that the USSR will try to set up (provisionally on its own territory),—a communist Polish puppet government (similar to that which she prepared when she invaded Poland in 1920) with a view to its establishment on Polish territory as soon as the Soviet army reaches Poland.

VIII. From the legal viewpoint the case for Poland is unassailable:

a) The Eastern frontiers of Poland have been definitely established in a freely negotiated treaty with Soviet Russia signed at Riga on March 18th, 1921;

b) these boundaries have been duly recognized by all sovereign States;

⁷⁸ Treaty of peace between Poland, Russia, and the Ukraine, signed at Riga, March 18, 1921; for text, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. vi, p. 123.

⁷⁹ See *Foreign Relations*, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, vol. XIII, p. 795.

c) they have never been questioned by the USSR in the course of the peace period until the present time;

d) the populations of these territories have never expressed any desire to have these territories incorporated in the USSR although there were 37 Ukrainian representatives of this territory in the Polish Parliament;

e) the USSR claim is definitely contrary to agreements signed with Poland and especially to the Atlantic Charter and the Declaration of the United Nations.

IX. In the case of Poland, an active member of the United Nations, the first Nation who actively opposed German aggression, the only one who has not had one single Quisling, one who has succeeded in maintaining under most difficult conditions uninterrupted contact with its nation and can rightly claim to represent it,—the conduct of the USSR, herself one of the four fighting United Nations, must be regarded as an open challenge to the principles laid down for the United Nations Concept.

In the light of this fact, and considering that the USSR is a totalitarian communist Dictatorship whose basic principles and policies have never in the past shown any tendency towards democratic principles and ideals, her present attitude towards Poland is highly symptomatic and probably constitutes merely a test case aimed at the disruption of United Nations' ideology.

If the USSR were to succeed in her designs to subject Poland or part of Poland, the way would be opened for her to further territorial demands by means of blackmail, based on her present part in the war.

X. Poland has an army of over 80,000 men at present in the final stages of training in the Middle East. The families of these soldiers, contrary to a solemn promise given by the Soviet Government, have been prevented from leaving Russia and are virtually held as hostages in the USSR and are being forced by beatings and starvation to "accept" Soviet citizenship.

It would seem that preservation of the morale and fighting spirit of this reserve army, so conveniently placed, is of direct interest to the United Nations effort. Recent developments in Polish-Soviet relations directly endanger the morale of these Polish soldiers and the ferment already noticeable among them is a matter of grave concern to the Polish Government and to General Sikorski, Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Armed Forces. Dissatisfaction will inevitably also spread to the Polish Army, Airforce and Navy in Great Britain.

General Sikorski has succeeded under most difficult conditions in organizing guerilla detachments and army units in Poland proper. This force is secretly preparing for the eleventh hour and counts several hundred thousand men who will become most useful to the United Nations war effort at the decisive period of the war. Their

reliability and consequently the possibility of using them as a considerable organized force against Germany will undoubtedly depend on the attitude of the USSR to Poland.

These pregnant military considerations cannot be lightly brushed aside by the United States and Great Britain.

Finally, some consideration should be given to the position of General Sikorski himself. He initiated and carried out his policy of friendly collaboration with Russia in the face of considerable opposition both within his government and on the part of some important groups of Polish public opinion. He persevered, on the understanding that his policy was approved and would receive the necessary support on the part of the British and the U.S. Governments.

It is becoming increasingly probable that only firm and active American and British support by means of effective interventions in Moscow can allow him to maintain his undisputed authority in Poland and among the Polish people abroad and the Polish Armed Forces, and enable General Sikorski to pursue his policy towards the USSR.

MARCH 22, 1943.

760C.61/1014

*Memorandum on Polish-Soviet Relations and Their Bearing on Soviet-United Nations Relationship*⁸⁰

A survey of facts pertaining to the development of Polish-Soviet relations leads to the following conclusions:

1) Soviet Russia's claims to Polish territory are contrary to signed agreements and treaties and to the principles declared in the Atlantic Charter and the Declaration of the United Nations.

2) As far as the USSR is concerned, her territorial claims are a test case intended to prove the sincerity of these principles and the degree of importance attached by the Democratic Powers to their maintenance.

3) Failure on the part of the Principal United Nations to support these principles can result in the serious danger of disruption of the United Nations unity, the loss of faith in the sincerity of the declared United Nations war aims and slogans among the armed forces and the populations of the invaded and oppressed countries.

4) The loss of faith and hope among those Nations, coupled with constant and exclusive German propaganda exhorting them to join Germany in fighting the Soviet Communist menace, may have grave results. It may lead to despair, internal strife, anarchy and com-

⁸⁰ Handed to the Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Henderson) by Ambassador Ciechanowski on March 22, 1943.

munism. (The Soviets are continuously spreading communist propaganda in those countries by means of radio broadcasts and agents).

5) The argument spread by the Soviets that opposition by the Principal United Nations to Soviet territorial claims might result in the conclusion of a separate Soviet-German peace should be entirely rejected.

6) While the possibility of the conclusion of such a separate peace should not be entirely disregarded if Germany were to offer the USSR adequate territorial and other advantages at an appropriate time, this rather remote possibility could not be prevented by a passive attitude towards Soviet territorial claims on the part of the United States and Great Britain or, in fact, by anything the two Powers might or might not do at present. On the contrary, the danger of such an eventuality would be enhanced by any tacit or expressed recognition of USSR claims on German occupied territories.

To those who understand the intricacies of Russian mentality it is clear that the pressure for such recognition will rather tend to increase in proportion to the development of a tendency on the part of Stalin to a separate peace. Stalin's realism, based on peasant logic, spurs him to preserve a free hand in all his dealings at all cost and by all the means at his disposal. Rightly or wrongly he has probably gained the certainty that the United States and Great Britain will never fight against Russia. At present, still at an undecided phase of the war, the territories he covets are held by Germany. He may obtain them from Germany by conquest or by concession in a separate peace. As a distrustful realist hitherto unimpressed by the military power of the United States and Great Britain, he most probably admits that the defeat and surrender of Germany may not be complete and unconditional. He may likewise be apprehensive as regards the possibility of an Anglo-American negotiated peace with Germany in the case of an unduly long war. In all and every eventuality he aims at ensuring his gains.

If the United Nations are victorious,—the advanced recognition of his territorial aspirations would insure him against future negotiations and bargaining within the United Nations camp.

In case of a negotiated peace, such advanced recognition would force the United Nations to register his claims on Germany as one of their joint peace aims.

Advanced recognition of Stalin's territorial claims by the principal Allies would be especially useful to him, and in fact might encourage him, if at a given moment and in favorable circumstances, he were contemplating the conclusion of a separate peace. If Germany, unburdened in the East by the conclusion of such a peace were not finally defeated by the United Nations, his territorial gains conceded by Germany would have been already sanctioned by the Allies and

would thus be recognized by both sides. If Germany were completely defeated after a German-Soviet separate peace, he could still count on retaining his territorial gains, previously recognized by the Allies.

7) Stalin's realism appears to be frequently misinterpreted.

That realism forces him, above all else, to reckon with the United States and with American public opinion, while, at the same time, it prompts him to take fullest advantage of his temporarily unique position as the foremost actively fighting Power in the United Nations camp.

As such, his conduct and tactics in relation to the Allies will be calculated to make the most of his advantages within the limits dictated to him by cunning and by the necessity to obtain all the help and support without which he can neither hope to continue fighting on so large a scale, to feed his population or to rebuild his devastated country.

How greatly he reckons with the United States and American public opinion which Soviet propaganda has done so much to gain, is amply proved by his immediate favorable reaction to Ambassador Standley's press statement on Lend-Lease services.⁶¹

8) Every serious expert on Soviet Russian mentality certainly knows that Russian realism can only be influenced by a like display of realism.

Contrary to German realism which only reacts to directly applied force, Russian realism will react to a definitely worded statement and will be influenced by strong realistic arguments.

It should always be remembered that Russians suffer from a deep inferiority complex which is especially apparent in their dealings with persons of Western civilization and particularly with Anglo-Saxons and Americans. Like many shy persons, Russians frequently adopt an overbearing and exacting attitude to cover their inferiority complex. In reality this defense can be easily broken through.

9) At this psychological moment in American-Soviet relations their entire future depends on the firm reassertion by the United States Government that it will not sacrifice its principles to Soviet imperialism.

MARCH 22, 1943.

⁶¹ See telegram No. 139, March 9, 7 p. m., from the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, p. 631.

760C.61/1013 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, March 22, 1943—9 p. m.

[Received March 23—9:28 a. m.]

191. The Polish Ambassador informed Clark Kerr and me today that in his last interview with Molotov on March 19 [18]⁸² the Foreign Commissar had categorically refused to enter into any further discussions on pending Soviet-Polish problems; that in reporting accordingly to his Government he had urged that no action be taken which might create a rupture in Soviet-Polish relations and that he believed that the Polish Government was consulting the British and American Governments on the matter. Romer was inclined to feel that a joint appeal on behalf of the Poles made to Stalin by the British and American Governments or separate appeals was the only solution that might ease the present situation. Both Clark Kerr and I advised Romer that we could, of course, take no action pending further instructions. Romer stated that he would probably endeavor to see Stalin again as a final effort.

In discussing the possibility of arriving at a compromise by an agreement on the part of the Poles to discuss the frontier question if Molotov would continue the citizenship negotiations Romer felt that to make such an agreement was tantamount to accepting the Soviet position in regard to the frontiers.

STANDLEY

760C.61/3-2343

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] March 23, 1943.

The Ambassador of Poland called at his request and proceeded to hand me a communication, a copy of which is hereto attached,⁸³ referring to alleged measures being applied by the Soviet Government to the Polish relief organization in Soviet Russia. The Ambassador emphasized the subject matter of the communication and elaborated on it to some extent. When he concluded, I said that, according to information conveyed to me by Mr. Loy Henderson of the European Division after talking with the Ambassador yesterday, it was my understanding that the Ambassador had this same question up with the President, and that in accordance with the Ambassador's state-

⁸² For excerpts from Ambassador Romer's conversation with Molotov at the Kremlin on March 18, 1943, see *Polish-Soviet Relations, 1918-1943, Official Documents*, pp. 235-245.

⁸³ Polish note of March 20 not printed, but see footnote 72, p. 352.

ment to Mr. Henderson, the President had said in substance that he sympathized with the Polish complaints and would endeavor to do something about the matter, but that he would have to select his own time and method of doing it. I stated that, while I sympathized very earnestly with the Polish complaint, about the most effective thing that I might be able to do at the moment would be to bring the essential facts once again to the attention of the President. In reply, the Ambassador indicated that the President had said that little or nothing could be done through ordinary diplomatic channels, to which I agreed. The Ambassador went on to say that it was important to invoke diplomatic intervention in this connection for the reason that while the Soviets might offer a rebuff or a refusal, they would probably receive Polish officials and discuss the matter with them. I again discounted this to a substantial extent, but said that all phases of the matter would be kept in mind.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

760C.61/1014

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Henderson)

[WASHINGTON,] March 26, 1943.

The Polish Ambassador came in to see me today at noon at his request. He handed me the attached memorandum, No. 3 "On the Urgency of the British and American Reaction to U.S.S.R. Territorial Demands"⁸⁴ and asked that it be given to the Secretary so that it may be placed in the dossier with the two memoranda which he had sent to the Secretary on March 22.

The Ambassador said that a telegram had arrived at the Embassy just before his departure and was being decoded. It would appear from this telegram that the Soviet Government was increasing the use of terror in order to force the Poles in the Soviet Union to take out Soviet citizenship. Another telegram was being decoded from General Sikorski. In the decoded sections of this telegram General Sikorski took the position that the situation regarding Poland and the Soviet Union was likely to become hopeless unless the President personally would intervene with Stalin. The Ambassador said that the instructions to him in that telegram may render it necessary for him to ask within the next few days to call upon the President again.

The Ambassador asked whether the Secretary had been able as yet

⁸⁴ Not printed; this memorandum was essentially a further exposition of the Polish position set forth in the memorandum of March 22, p. 354, and advocated "an energetic intervention in Moscow on the part of Great Britain and the United States, backed by a firmly worded and unequivocal restatement of their non-recognition policies and the reaffirmation of the principles of the Atlantic Charter and United Nations Declaration,—even if it is not fully effective." (760C.61/1014)

to take up this matter with the President. I told him that I thought that an opportunity for the discussion of this problem between the Secretary and the President had not arisen. I was not, however, quite certain. The Ambassador stressed the urgency of this matter and said that it was important that if any effective action was to be taken by the American Government, such action should be taken at the earliest possible moment. The Ambassador said that he was almost in a desperate position here since the propaganda was more and more to the effect that the American and British Governments had already agreed at least in principle to the cession of Eastern Poland to the Soviet Union. It was his understanding that when Mr. Eden recently made a talk to a number of Congressmen, one of the Congressmen asked him what kind of answer could be given to his Polish-American constituents who were insisting that the United States should not approve the annexation of Eastern Poland by the Soviet Union. Mr. Eden was said to have replied that "it might be pointed out that Poland will of course receive territorial compensation".

The Ambassador said that the American people are being misled with regard to what is going on in the Soviet Union. It was reported to him in confidence for instance that Senator Thomas of Utah, who is an extremely intelligent Senator and who has had much interest in foreign affairs, had recently remarked that he had begun to believe that the Soviet Government must be made up of fine and liberal men; that the Soviet Government had been able to make a generous and humanitarian gesture which the American Government had thus far not made—that is, it had granted Soviet citizenship to the refugees who had sought protection from the Nazis in Soviet territory.

L[OY] W. H[ENDERSON]

760C.61/1015 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, April 3, 1943—2 p. m.

[Received 11 p. m.]

244. My 191, March 22, 9 p. m. The Polish Ambassador gave me yesterday a memorandum dated March 31,⁸⁵ which he stated had been furnished the Polish Ambassadors in Washington and London to assist them in their consultations with the American and British Governments on the present aspect of Polish-Soviet relations. I assume that the Department is aware of the contents of this memorandum. Romer said that it was his impression that the American and British

⁸⁵ For summary of this memorandum, see telegram No. 255, April 6, 8 p. m., from the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, p. 369.

Governments would issue instructions to their representatives in Moscow to discuss this question ⁸⁶ with the Soviet Government. He added that his instructions were to take no further action at this time but to avoid creating any appearance of a definite break in his relations with the Soviet authorities. I stated that I had received no instructions in regard to the matter and as I had previously informed him I could therefore take no action.

The British Ambassador subsequently called on me for the purpose of discussing possible action in connection with the Polish memorandum a copy of which had also been furnished him. I told him of my conversation with Romer and in answer to a question as to what he proposed to do he stated that he felt that his Government would expect some expression of opinion from him in regard to the question and that he was inclined to act in accordance with Romer's suggestion that the British and American Governments endeavor to bring their influence to bear on behalf of the Poles especially since he felt that the terms contained in the memorandum were reasonable and that they might well be accepted as the basis for further discussions between the Polish and Soviet Governments. Clark Kerr seemed to think that it might help if I informed my Government that I had similar views.

I consider that the terms of the memorandum should constitute a reasonable basis for further discussions between the Polish and Soviet Governments. I feel that the Poles have gone as far as they possibly can to come to an understanding with the Russians and I realize what a harmful impression the revaluation [*revelation*] of the true facts concerning the situation of the Poles in the Soviet Union would have upon world opinion and our united effort. I am therefore inclined to recommend that it might be advisable for the American and British Governments to intercede on behalf of Poland. With respect to any possible intercession I feel that care must be taken by us to forestall the British at a later date from shifting to us for our concern alone an extremely irritating problem in Soviet foreign relations. In view of past experiences I am convinced that little can be accomplished unless the question is taken up direct with Stalin.

The Department's instructions are requested.⁸⁷

STANDLEY

⁸⁶ The question referred to concerned the process of the Sovietization of Polish citizens and institutions in the Soviet Union.

⁸⁷ In telegram No. 197, April 5, the Department instructed the Ambassador to telegraph a paraphrase of the text of the memorandum or a careful summary of its pertinent points.

760C.61/1018

The Polish Ambassador (Ciechanowski) to President Roosevelt

WASHINGTON, April 4, 1943.

MR. PRESIDENT: I have the honor to refer to the decision of the USSR Government to withdraw the Polish citizenship of Polish citizens deported to Russia during the period of Soviet occupation of Polish Eastern territories which, as stated in the note of the Soviet Government dated January 16, 1943, has been taken in view of the Polish Government's refusal to recognize Soviet sovereignty over Poland's Eastern territories described in the note as "Western Ukraina" and "Western White Ruthenia".

In the course of February and March, acting on instructions of my Government, I had the honor to inform you through the intermediacy of the Secretary of State and the Under Secretary of State about the crisis reached in Polish-Soviet relations as a result of this decision on the part of the USSR Government. I was privileged personally to explain the situation to you when I had the honor of being received by you on February 16, 1943.⁸⁸

On February 5, 1943, the Under Secretary of State told me that you had instructed him to inform me that you realized the gravity of the situation, that you requested me to ask General Sikorski that the Polish Government should preserve a calm attitude pending the intervention which you intended to undertake at a time and in a manner which you would personally determine. I communicated this decision to General Sikorski.

On February 16th, when I had the honor of being received by you I had the privilege of informing you of all the developments of the Polish-Soviet crisis, and of communicating to you the reply of General Sikorski, who had instructed me to express his gratitude, his assurance that the Polish Government would preserve the calm attitude you had recommended and to draw your attention to the urgency of the situation, in view of the fact that the Soviet Government was applying ruthless measures to enforce Soviet citizenship on Polish citizens and was creating accomplished facts which would be difficult to retract in the future.

You very kindly told me that you realized the gravity of these facts and that you would communicate at once with Prime Minister Churchill with a view to undertaking an intervention in Moscow.

We further discussed the possibility of a restatement of the United States' policy of non-recognition of territorial changes brought about in wartime by force or threat of force, and, at your request, I discussed this subject with the Under Secretary of State on February 17th and wrote to him some suggestions on February 18th.

⁸⁸ See memorandum by the Under Secretary of State, February 17, p. 333.

Since that time I have kept the Secretary of State and Mr. Welles informed of the rapid and ominous further developments in Polish-Soviet relations and of the conversations of Mr. Romer, Polish Ambassador to the USSR, with Premier Stalin and later with Mr. Molotov. These conversations, which have been continuing in Moscow for over a month, clearly show that the USSR Government has no intention of making any concessions in its arbitrary interpretation of the rights of citizenship, that it is decided to disrupt and to liquidate our Relief organizations, to uphold its refusal to allow the previously promised evacuation of some 30,000 persons constituting the families of the Polish soldiers evacuated to the Middle East, and of 60,000 Polish children.

While keeping up the pretense of negotiations, the Soviet authorities are simultaneously proceeding with the liquidation of all Polish Relief centers, of Polish schools and orphanages, are arresting Polish welfare employees, school teachers and confiscating the storehouses and the American relief supplies which they contain. At the same time, under threat of arrest, and by means of beatings, starvation and ejection from their dwellings, they are forcing our citizens to surrender their Polish passports and to accept Soviet citizenship documents. According to the latest information they are actually attempting to force some employees of the Polish Embassy and their families to accept Soviet passports. Polish citizens who succeeded in applying personally at the Polish Embassy have been arrested when leaving the building.

In view of these facts which require no comment, General Sikorski informs me that he is convinced that only your kind support, in the form of an urgent intervention with Premier Stalin, may still save the situation and justify his ceaseless and patient efforts to pursue his steadfast policy aimed at friendly Polish-Soviet relations. Moreover, he feels that the lack of a tangible proof of support on the part of the United States Government and of the British Government serves to encourage the USSR Government in the belief that they can safely pursue their action without risking any protest on the part of the Principal United Nations.

General Sikorski has instructed me to assure you, Mr. President, that he firmly believes that you will not abandon Poland in this very serious situation in which she appears to have been selected by the USSR as a test case of the application in practice of the principles proclaimed by the United Nations. He has instructed Ambassador Romer to do his utmost to keep up for a time the fiction of further conversations pending your intervention.

General Sikorski is aware, however, that the USSR Government is doing all it can to provoke a break of Ambassador Romer's conversations and will most probably try to place the responsibility for it

on the Polish Government, and that the present tension cannot be indefinitely maintained without very serious consequences. He requests me once more to appeal to you for an intervention with Premier Stalin, which alone can change the situation. He asks me to stress the urgency of this intervention and indeed to emphasize that in all probability this is the last moment for an effective intervention.

General Sikorski has also laid the facts before Prime Minister Churchill and has asked him to act without delay.

In view of the gravity of the situation and of its very serious consequences which unfortunately affect not only Polish-Soviet relations, but likewise cannot fail to affect the Polish war effort, the unparalleled resistance to Germany in Poland proper, and, in fact, may react on the unity of the United Nations as a whole,—I take the liberty of asking you, Mr. President, to let me have your answer to General Sikorski's appeal as soon as possible.

Accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my highest consideration.
[File copy not signed]

760C.61/4-643

*Memorandum by the Polish Ambassador (Ciechanowski)*⁸⁹

Count Raczyński informed the Polish Ambassador by cable from London on April 5th, that on March 29th, 1943, the Polish Foreign Minister addressed a note to Ambassador Bogomolov,⁹⁰ strongly protesting against the enforced imposition of Soviet citizenship on Polish citizens in the USSR. Count Raczyński further stressed in the note the Polish Government's refusal to recognize acts by means of which the sovereign rights of the Polish State are being violated, and that it reserves the right to question in the future all factual conditions—both in regard to the general aspect of matters, as in matters pertaining to individual cases of citizens, resulting from the above mentioned attitude of the USSR Government.

Count Raczyński emphasized the contradiction of the Soviet attitude with the Polish-Soviet agreement of July 30, 1941, as well as the fact that the Soviet regulation on citizenship issues from the Soviet-German treaties of 1939. Considering that this regulation is based on one of the said Soviet-German treaties, it must have lost its validity from the moment of the German aggression on Russia.

In view of the liquidation and taking over by the Soviet administration, contrary to formal assurances previously given by the Soviet Government, of the relief and welfare institutions of the Polish Em-

⁸⁹ Left with the Under Secretary of State on April 6, 1943.

⁹⁰ For text of the Polish note of March 29, 1943, see *Polish-Soviet Relations, 1918-1943, Official Documents*, p. 175.

bassy,—the Polish Government formally and energetically protests against the enforced sovietization of these Polish institutions and reserves its right to claim the return of all the property of the Polish State now being confiscated and to demand full payment of damages for the losses sustained.

APRIL 5, 1943.

760C.61/1016 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, April 5, 1943—8 p. m.

[Received April 5—7 p. m.]

2409. We were told at the Foreign Office today that twice last week Raczyński called to tell Cadogan about Polish grievances against Soviet officials. According to Raczyński, the Soviets continue to arrest Poles in the Soviet Union who are trying to do relief work there among Polish refugees; to treat as Soviet citizens those Poles who in 1939 were living in the part of Poland then occupied by the Soviets; and to publish in the press in the Soviet Union and in the Soviet war news published here in London items unfriendly to the Polish Government. The items particularly objected to are those dealing with Soviet territorial claims.

Consideration is now being given, we were told further at the Foreign Office, either to requesting Ambassador Maisky to call at the Foreign Office, or having Clark Kerr call on Stalin, with a view to inducing the Soviet Government to desist from measures straining Soviet-Polish relations, and especially, to avoid raising any territorial issues at this time.

WINANT

760C.61/4-643

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Welles)

[WASHINGTON,] April 6, 1943.

The Polish Ambassador called to see me this morning at his request. The Ambassador referred to the urgent letter he had sent me last night transmitting a letter to the President.⁹¹ He said that he had received two urgent cables from his Government impressing upon him the great urgency with which the Polish Government viewed the problem presented for the President's consideration in this letter, and

⁹¹ Letter of April 4, p. 365.

asking him to do everything possible to get a reply from the President without delay.

I explained to the Ambassador that the President had been away from Washington and had only returned this morning and that it had been impossible consequently before now to transmit this letter from the Ambassador to the President. I reminded the Ambassador of what the Secretary of State had said to him with regard to these matters in his recent conversations with him and added that the Ambassador need hardly be told once more that the President had these matters very much in mind but that, as the President had said on several occasions both to General Sikorski and to the Ambassador, the President must himself determine when and how his interest in the Polish situation could be helpfully indicated to the Soviet Government.

The Ambassador said that General Sikorski was only able to maintain morale among the Polish forces in the Middle East and in the Polish organization in occupied Poland if he were able to give them assurances that both the United States and the British Governments had made representations in Moscow against the treatment accorded Polish citizens within the Soviet Union.

I said it seemed to me that the question was one of whether the Polish Government desired representations to be made merely for the sake of having them made, or whether it desired representations to be made with the hope that they might achieve some useful purpose. If the latter were the case, I said I felt that General Sikorski and the Ambassador would both agree that the President should be permitted to determine for himself how he could be most helpful in this question. I added that as soon as the President had had an opportunity of studying the documents transmitted to him by the Polish Government, I would be glad to inform the Ambassador of the reply which the President might feel able to make.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

760C.61/1017: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, April 6, 1943—8 p. m.

[Received (April 7?)—1:05 p. m.]

255. Your 197, April 5, 6 p. m.⁹² Summary of memorandum as follows:

Polish-Soviet conversations were discontinued March 18 when Molotov refused to terminate even for the duration of negotiations the Sovietization of Polish citizens and institutions in the Soviet Union.

⁹² Not printed, but see footnote 87, p. 364.

The Polish Government has sent to V. M. Molotov two notes of protest in the premises.

The Polish Government does not see how it can further hide from Polish and world public opinion the true situation in the Soviet Union as affecting the Poles. It fully realizes the harmful impression for the Allies the revelation of these facts would have on world opinion and especially on countries oppressed by Germany. It has therefore decided before making final decision to consult the British and American Governments in order to study with them possibilities and conditions of their intercession in Moscow.

To be acceptable, this intercession should endeavor to establish the following points.

(1) The small number of persons whose Polish citizenship has been recognized by the Soviet Government such as inhabitants of the western and central provinces of Poland who were in 1939 in eastern Poland are not included in the intercession and will continue to be under the care of the Polish Embassy.

(2) The question of citizenship of all other Poles in the Soviet Union who were Polish citizens up to September 1939, is left open for the time being.

(3) Among those persons mentioned in paragraph (b) [(2)?] the following should have the right to leave Russia.

- (a) Orphans and children for whom parents cannot provide a living.
- (b) Families whose supporters are outside of Russia.
- (c) Certain agreed upon persons.

An international or American organization such as the Red Cross to be established to take care of the departure of the above-mentioned persons and of those remaining who up to now have been receiving aid from the Polish Embassy. Such organization to take over all Polish welfare work in the Soviet Union.

STANDLEY

760C.61/4-843

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] April 8, 1943.

The Polish Ambassador called to see me this afternoon at his request. The Ambassador spoke of his conversation with the President today, of which the President had already informed me. The gist of it was that the Ambassador was authorized to inform General Sikorski in confidence that the President was sending in the near future to Moscow a special representative⁹³ of his entire confidence

⁹³ This refers to the visit by Mr. Joseph E. Davies to the Soviet Union in May 1943. By that time Soviet-Polish relations had been discontinued; for the apparently limited efforts then possible to Mr. Davies, see telegram No. 337, May 21, 10 a. m., to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, and telegrams No. 540, May 27, 1 p. m., and No. 915, July 21, 3 p. m., from the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, pp. 650, 656, and 680, respectively.

and that this representative in the course of his conversations with Stalin would be authorized and instructed to do what might be possible on behalf of the Polish refugees within the Soviet Union, and in the interest of an improvement in Soviet-Polish relations.

The Ambassador likewise handed me a telegram he had just received from his Foreign Minister which is attached herewith.

[Annex]

Memorandum by the Polish Ambassador (Ciechanowski)

The Polish Ambassador received on the afternoon of April 8th, the following information from Count Raczynski:

Mr. Romer, the Polish Ambassador in Russia, informed the Polish Foreign Minister that on April 2nd, Mr. Novikov,⁹⁴ acting on instructions from Mr. Molotov, informed Mr. Romer that the Soviet Government would apply to the Polish citizens the interpretation of citizenship according to the Soviet regulation as defined in the regulations of the Soviet Russian and Soviet Ukrainian civil code,⁹⁵ which regard the permanent place of residence, coupled with occupation and property, or with a locality as chief center of occupation, as facts and circumstances on the basis of which "inhabitant" will be defined.

As a result, local Soviet authorities have allegedly received orders to adapt themselves to this interpretation and to retract regulations hitherto applied which might be contrary to this interpretation. (This cannot be regarded as acceptable in its application to Polish territory.)

Mr. Novikov added that Ambassador Romer's suggestion that he should issue Polish passports to the group of citizens regarded by both sides as indisputably Polish in the framework of the above definitions, would be taken into consideration.

Ambassador Romer informs the Polish Foreign Minister that, regardless of this communication, all the Polish Welfare Centers have been taken over by the Soviets. The relief supplies contained in all the storehouses have been placed under arrest.

The arrested "men of trust" for relief of the Polish Embassy are accused of: (a) enemy activity, (b) noncompliance with passport regulations, (c) criminal offense.

A belated group of 110 persons, members of families of the military already evacuated, have been ordered sent out to Iran.

⁹⁴ Kirill Vasilyevich Novikov, Chief of the Second European Section of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.

⁹⁵ For these provisions, see *Polish-Soviet Relations, 1918-1943, Official Documents*, p. 177.

Ambassador Romer sums up these new facts, together with the above declaration of Mr. Novikov given in reply to the Ambassador's interventions, as follows:

Ambassador Romer has reason to know that the Soviet Government foresees that an Anglo-American intervention may be pending. Having already attained all their aims in the way of destroying the Polish Relief organization, and having almost completed the forced sovietization of Polish citizens,—the Soviets now tend to create the illusion that they are applying less severe methods and drastic action.

Ambassador Romer is of the opinion that this attitude increases the absolute necessity and urgency of immediate intervention on behalf of Poland on the part of the United States and British Governments.

The above facts prove that such an intervention would be effective and also that it is absolutely necessary from the viewpoint of counter-acting Soviet tactics and saving the population and what will be possible to save of the relief organization, likewise to persuade the Soviets to admit further evacuation of Polish citizens.

APRIL 8, 1943.

760C.61/4-943

Memorandum by Mr. Elbridge Durbrow of the Division of European Affairs ⁹⁶

[WASHINGTON,] April 9, 1943.

While the attached despatch from Ambassador Biddle ⁹⁷ reporting the Polish Government's point of view of the internal situation of Poland should be evaluated as being solely from Polish sources, the information contained therein relative to the difficulties between the Polish Government's underground and the Soviet Government's underground in Poland is of interest.

According to these Polish reports, Communist partisans in Poland, which allegedly are composed of escaped Russian prisoners of war and Polish Communists under the direction of Soviet officers dropped by parachutes, are endeavoring to undermine and cause the liquidation of the Polish Government-in-Exile's underground groups. The method used is apparently to identify the Polish Government's underground members and expose them to the Gestapo. Furthermore the pro-Soviet partisans are apparently adopting the same tactics as those in Yugoslavia, that is to carry on sabotage and other activities at the present time rather than waiting until a more favorable opportunity arises to act.

⁹⁶ Addressed to the Chief of the Division (Atherton), the Assistant Chief of the Division (Henderson), and the Adviser on Political Relations (Dunn).

⁹⁷ Despatch Polish Series No. 270, March 3, p. 338.

In connection with the activities of the Soviet partisans in Poland who have apparently been advised to carry on extensive sabotage activities at the present time in order to weaken the German war effort, it is interesting to recall that according to reports received from the Polish Ambassador in Kuibyshev he recently suggested to Stalin that, if the Soviet authorities thought it would be necessary, General Sikorski could have his underground organization carry on extensive sabotage activities such as blowing up bridges and disrupting transportation in general. Mr. Stalin replied that he did not think the time was opportune to avail himself of the activities of these persons but he would keep it in mind.

These alleged Soviet activities tie in with the program sponsored by the newly launched Polish paper in Moscow *Free Poland* and indicate that the Soviet Government is at least keeping the way open to establishing a Communist Poland if it should prove advantageous. The attached clipping from the *New York Times*⁹⁸ quoting from a recent issue of *Free Poland* is of interest in this connection. It is particularly significant that *Free Poland* in a recent issue stated that it supports the Polish-Soviet Agreement of 1941 as a basis for future relations. It will be remembered that to all intents and purposes the Soviet Government has broken all the stipulations in that Agreement except that they still maintain diplomatic relations.

These indications point to the possibility that the Soviet Government may desire to cause a break with the Polish Government-in-Exile and set up a Moscow-controlled "Free Poland".

ELBRIDGE DUSBROW

*President Roosevelt to the Polish Prime Minister (Sikorski)*⁹⁹

WASHINGTON, April 12, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER: Thank you for your kind letter of March 16, 1943 which was forwarded to me through Ambassador Biddle.

I have given careful attention to the information contained in your letter, which in general conforms to that which I have received from your Ambassador. Since your last visit Mr. Ciechanowski has been keeping me currently informed with regard to developments in the relations of Poland with the Soviet Union, and I am asking to be kept informed of the developing situation.

I agree with you that it is important that the solid front of the United Nations be maintained and am glad that both you and the

⁹⁸ Not attached to file copy.

⁹⁹ Copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y. This letter was enclosed in instruction No. 53, April 14, to the Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile, for delivery to General Sikorski (760C.61/1018).

Polish Government are prepared to do all in your power to prevent any rupture of Polish relations with the Soviet Union. It is the purpose also of the American Government to do all that it properly can to promote unity among these nations in the prosecution of the war and in preparing for the peace.

You may be sure I am bearing constantly in mind the problems referred to in your letter in order that I may decide what course of action would be most helpful to pursue in the interests of Poland and of all the United Nations.

Sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

740.0011 European War 1939/28983 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

KUIBYSHEV (Moscow), April 14, 1943—6 p. m.

[Received 8:25 p. m.]

317. The following items of military interest are reported:

1. Polish Military Attaché¹ informs me that the Soviet military authorities are in process of organizing military units composed of refugees from Poland who are regarded by the Soviet Government as Soviet nationals.

2. Foreign Military Attachés in Kuibyshev state that the Soviet Government is now organizing and training a special army of occupation which will eventually number 1,500,000 men; that this army is being recruited from those of the lowest age liable to conscription; and that the army will not be used to replace regular forces until enemy territory is occupied. Some color is lent this report by the fact that there have recently been observed in the streets of Kuibyshev groups of recent conscripts marching in ranks who did not appear to be over 16 years of age.

Repeated to Moscow.

STANDLEY

760C.61/4-1443

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Elbridge Durbrow of the Division of European Affairs

[WASHINGTON,] April 14, 1943.

Mr. Kwapiszewski, the Counselor Minister of the Polish Embassy, called this morning to report that he had received accurate information that the German short wave radio for the last two days has been

¹ Lt. Col. Tadeusz Rudnicki.

giving great prominence to the following story regarding the discovery by the German authorities near Smolensk of a mass grave where thousands (the Germans indicated that the figures may reach ten thousand) of Polish officers who were buried after having been executed by the Soviet authorities in 1940.

According to Mr. Kwapiszewski's version of the German propaganda report the officers were buried with their uniforms on and with papers and identification tags intact, four deep in a plot 28 by 16 meters. The Germans claim that the bodies were in sufficiently well-preserved condition so that they may be identified individually. The Germans report that the grave was found near the GPU² Recreation Center in a small town near Smolensk, and they allege that a delegation of Poles from Warsaw has been sent to Smolensk to verify the facts as given.

Although Mr. Kwapiszewski stated that of course the entire story might have been concocted out of thin air, he is afraid that there may be very serious repercussions inside Poland and among the Polish forces in the Near East who were recently released from the Soviet Union to assist the British.

Some credence was given by Mr. Kwapiszewski to the possibility that the report might be true since, as is well known, the Polish authorities in the USSR had been endeavoring for over a year to ascertain from the Soviet authorities the whereabouts of some five to eight thousand Polish officers whom the Polish authorities feel certain were captured by the Soviet Military authorities in 1939. The Soviet authorities indicated they did not know of any such large group of officers.

Mr. Kwapiszewski stated that whether or not the report is true, if the Germans can convince the Polish delegation which is reportedly now on its way to Smolensk that these are really Polish officers executed by the GPU there would be serious repercussions in Poland and among the troops in the Middle East. He indicated that if the Germans had really found a mass grave of Polish officers they have decided to release the information at this time in connection with an all-out offensive against the Soviets this summer and hope to release this story to obtain the cooperation of the Poles in Poland and possibly even to arm Poles to carry on an active fight against the Soviets.

ELBRIDGE DUSBROW

² Secret Police of the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs of the Soviet Union.

740.0011 European War 1939/29008 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, April 15, 1943.
[Received 11:15 a. m.]

2357. Berlin DAD³ release April 14 states:

Polish officers shot by GPU spring 1940 have been exhumed in Katyn Forest 20 kilometers west Smolensk.⁴ Identification papers found in officers' uniforms will facilitate their identity. Three large common graves have already been opened, one contains bodies 4,000 assassinated officers, other 5,000-6,000 bodies. Tests have revealed existence at least two other common graves, but impossible estimate number bodies therein. Polish delegation has arrived and been convinced mass murder Polish officers perpetrated spring 1940.

HARRISON

760C.61/1087

*Communiqué of the Minister of National Defense of the Polish Government in Exile, at London*⁵

APRIL 17, 1943.

The Polish Minister of National Defense, Lt. General Marian Kukiel, has issued the following communiqué concerning the Polish officers missing in the U.S.S.R.

On the 17th of September 1940 the official organ of the Red Army, the *Red Star* stated that during the fighting which took place after the 17th of September 1939, 181,000 Polish prisoners of war were taken by the Soviets; the number of regular officers and those of the reserve among them amounted to about 10,000.

According to information in possession of the Polish Government, three large camps of Polish prisoners were set up in the U.S.S.R. in November 1939:

1. in Kozielsk—East of Smolensk
2. in Starobielsk—near Kharkov, and
3. in Ostashkow—near Kalinin, where police and military police were concentrated.

³ Presumably Dienst aus Deutschland, German News Service.

⁴ A "Select Committee to Conduct an Investigation of the Facts, Evidence and Circumstances of the Katyn Forest Massacre" was unanimously authorized under House Resolution 390, 82d Cong., 1st sess., on September 18, 1951. Hearings were held by the Committee between October 11, 1951, and November 14, 1952, in Washington, Chicago, London, and Frankfurt, Germany. The text of the hearings, with accompanying documents, entitled *The Katyn Forest Massacre*, was published in 7 parts (2362 pages) (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1952). In part 4 there is reproduced the complete text of the volume, *Polish-Soviet Relations, 1918-1943, Official Documents*.

⁵ Copy transmitted to the Department by the Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile in his despatch Polish Series No. 308, April 30.

At the beginning of 1940 the camp authorities informed the prisoners in all three camps, that the liquidation of all camps was about to take place, and that prisoners of war would be allowed to return to their families, and for this purpose, it was alleged, lists of places to which individual prisoners would like to go after their release were made. At that time there were:

1. about 5,000 people in Kozielsk, among them about 4,500 officers;
2. about 3,920 people in Starobielsk, among them about 100 civilians, the rest were officers who included about 400 medical officers;
3. about 6,570 people in Ostashkov, among them about 380 officers.

On the 5th of April 1940 began the liquidation of these camps and groups of 60 to 300 were removed from them every few days, until the middle of May. From Kozielsk they were sent in the direction of Smolensk. Only about 400 people were moved from all the three camps in June 1940 to Griazoviec in the Vologda Oblast.

When after the conclusion of the Polish-Soviet Treaty of the 30th of July 1941 and the signing of the military agreement of the 14th August 1941, the Polish Government proceeded to form the Polish Army in U.S.S.R., it was to be expected that the officers from the above mentioned camps would form above all the cadres of higher and lower commanders of the rising Army. A group of Polish officers from Griazoviec arrived to join the Polish units in Buzuluk at the end of August 1941, not one officer however appeared from among those deported in another direction from Kozielsk, Starobielsk and Ostashkov. In all therefore about 8,300 were missing, not counting another 7,000 composed of N.C.O.'s, soldiers and civilians, who were in those camps at the time of their liquidation.

Ambassador Kot and General Anders,⁶ perturbed by this state of affairs, addressed themselves to the appropriate responsible Soviet authorities with inquiries and representations about the fate of Polish officers from the above mentioned camps. In a conversation with M. Vyshinsky, People's Vice-Commissar for Foreign Affairs on the 6th of October 1941, Ambassador Kot asked what had happened to the missing officers. M. Vyshinski answered, that all the prisoners of war had been freed from the camps and therefore must be at liberty.

In October and November, Ambassador Kot mentioned several times in his conversations with Premier Stalin, M. Molotov and M. Vyshinsky, the question of prisoners of war and insisted upon being supplied with lists of them, which were kept by the Soviet Government very carefully and in great detail.

⁶ Lt. Gen. Wladislaw Anders, in command of Polish Forces in the Soviet Union.

Premier Sikorski during his visit to Moscow on the 3rd of December 1941, also intervened in a conversation with Premier Stalin for the liberation of all Polish prisoners of war, and not having been supplied by the Soviet authorities with their lists, he handed in to Premier Stalin on this occasion, a complete list of Polish officers to the number of 3,845, which their former fellow-prisoners succeeded in compiling. Premier Stalin assured General Sikorski that the amnesty was of a general and universal character and affected both the military and the civilians, and that the Soviet Government has freed all Polish officers. On the 18th of March 1942 General Anders handed in to Premier Stalin a supplementary list of 800 officers. Nevertheless not one of the officers mentioned in either of these lists has been returned to the Polish Army.

Apart from the interventions in Moscow and Kuibyshev, the question of the fate of Polish prisoners of war was the subject of several interviews between Minister Raczynski and Ambassador Bogomolov. [On January 28, 1942, Minister Raczynski, in the name of the Polish Government, handed a Note⁷ to Soviet Ambassador Bogomolov,]⁸ drawing his attention once again to the painful fact that the many thousand Polish officers had still not been found.

Ambassador Bogomolov informed Minister Raczynski on the 13th March 1942,⁹ that in accordance with the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of U.S.S.R. of the 12th of August 1941, and in accordance with the statements of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the 8th and 19th November 1941 the amnesty had been fully carried out, and that it related both to the civilians and the military.

On the 19th May 1942 Ambassador Kot sent to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs a memorandum in which he expressed his regret at the refusal with which his request for a list of prisoners was met and his concern as to their fate, stressing the high value these officers would have in military operations against Germany.

Never did either the Polish Government or the Polish Embassy in Kuibyshev receive an answer, as to the whereabouts of the missing officers and other prisoners who had been deported from the three above mentioned camps.

We have become used to the lies of German propaganda and we understand the purpose behind its latest revelations. Faced however with abundant and detailed German information concerning the discovery near Smolensk of many thousand bodies of Polish officers, and categorical statement that they were murdered by the Soviet authorities in the spring of 1940, the necessity has arisen that the mass graves

⁷ *Polish-Soviet Relations, 1918-1943, Official Documents*, p. 116.

⁸ The bracketed words, missing from the text in the file copy of the document, are from a slightly variant translation of the communiqué printed *ibid.*, p. 119.

⁹ For text of the Ambassador's note, see *ibid.*, p. 118.

which have been discovered should be investigated and the facts quoted, verified by a proper international body, such as the International Red Cross. The Polish Government has therefore approached this institution with a view of their sending a delegation to the place where the massacre of the Polish prisoners of war is said to have taken place.¹⁰

760C.61/1022 : Telegram

The Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile (Biddle) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, April 17, 1943—6 p. m.
[Received April 17—4:40 p. m.]

Polish Series [No.] 16. Reference my despatch Polish Series No. 158, June 2, 1942¹¹ regarding missing Polish officers in Russia, and my telegram Polish Series No. 8, [March] 19, midnight, Sikorski expressed his concern over the growing animosity throughout the Polish Armed Forces against Russia provoked by Moscow's now widely known insistence in its note of January 16, 1943, upon the Ribbentrop-Molotov line and the denial of citizenship to the Poles forcibly deported to the Soviet Union. His apprehension on this score has considerably increased as a result of the German radio broadcasts of past few days announcing the discovery in the Smolensk area of the graves of some 8,000 Polish officers which the broadcasts claim to have been shot by Soviet authorities in the spring of 1940.

Sikorski says that the German assertions thus far made regarding this "ghastly story" unfortunately corroborate his information received through Polish intelligence channels. In fact he and his associates had concluded from these reports that the Soviet authorities had "murdered" the Polish officers at the time of France's defeat in the belief that Germany was on the eve of victory. In view of these German allegations and their potential effect upon the Polish Armed Forces, Sikorski had Lieutenant General Kukiel, Minister of National Defense, yesterday issue a communiqué setting forth in effect (a) the fruitless attempts made by himself and his Government to ascertain from the Soviet authorities the whereabouts of the missing Polish officers, and (b) stating that although the Polish Government had become accustomed to the lies of German propaganda and understood the purpose of its recent revelations, the situation called for an investigation of the graves and verification of the "detailed informa-

¹⁰ For description of the correspondence between the Polish Government in Exile and the International Red Cross in connection with the Polish request for an investigation, see *The Katyn Forest Massacre*, pt. 4, pp. 750-753, and pt. 6, pp. 1723-1724.

¹¹ *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. III, p. 150.

tion" alleged by the Germans by a proper international body, such as the International Red Cross.

I am aware that the Polish authorities granted little, if any, credence to the statement issued by the Soviet Information Bureau on April 15¹² labelling the German allegations as slanderous fabrications aimed at covering up their own unprecedented crimes and stating that these allegations left no doubt as to the tragic fate of the former Polish prisoners of war who in 1941 having been engaged in construction work in the Smolensk region had fallen into the hands of the Germans following the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from that area.

[BIDDLE]

760C.61/1023 : Telegram

The Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile (Biddle) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, April 17, 1943—7 p. m.

[Received 8:33 p. m.]

Polish Series [No.] 17. My No. 16, April 17, 6 p. m. Sikorski states that in recent conversation, Mr. Churchill indicated willingness to lend his good offices at an appropriate moment in an effort to strengthen Ambassador Romer's hand in his current conversations with the Soviet authorities; that Mr. Churchill would immediately consider the form this support should take.

Sikorski also gained the impression that in this connection Mr. Churchill intended to consult the President with perhaps even a view to ascertaining our willingness to take like steps. Sikorski earnestly hoped we might see our way clear to lend our support in this matter, for he felt confident as to the effectiveness of such a move. Moreover, he felt that in considering the timing of any move which we or the British might make in the matter, it was well to bear in mind that the situation was going rapidly from bad to worse.

As to what he hoped to attain in the current talks with the Soviet authorities, the following were respectively his maximum and minimum: (a) Withdrawal of the Soviet note of January 16 last; or, in event of the Soviet Government's refusal to consider this point, (b) evacuation of largest possible number of families and children of the various categories, and the direction of relief and welfare of the Poles remaining either by the Polish welfare organization or by an international body.

¹² For a summary of this statement, see telegram No. 322, April 19, from the Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union, p. 382; for complete text, see *The Katyn Forest Massacre*, pt. 6, pp. 1720-1721.

Mr. Churchill's reported expression of willingness to lend his good offices was given before the Polish action of issuing the communiqué referred to in my 16 of April 17, 6 p. m.

[BIDDLE]

760C.61/1087

*Statement Issued by the Polish Government in Exile, at London, on April 17, 1943*¹³

There is no Pole who would not be deeply shocked by the news of the discovery near Smolensk in a common grave of massacred bodies of the Polish officers missing in the U.S.S.R. and of the mass execution of which they have become victims, news of which is being given the widest publicity by German propaganda. The Polish Government has instructed their representative in Switzerland to request the International Red Cross in Geneva to send a delegation which would investigate on the spot the true state of affairs. It is to be desired that the findings of this protecting institution, which is to be entrusted with the task of clarifying the matter and of establishing responsibility, should be issued without delay.

At the same time, however, the Polish Government, on behalf of the Polish nation, denies to the Germans the right to draw from a crime which they ascribe to others arguments in their own defence. The profoundly hypocritical indignation of the German propaganda will not succeed in concealing from the world the many cruel, repeated, and still lasting crimes committed on the Polish people.

The Polish Government recalls such facts as: The removal of Polish officers from prisoner-of-war camps in the Reich and the subsequent shooting of them for political offences alleged to have been committed before the war; mass arrests of reserve officers subsequently deported to concentration camps to die a slow death. From Cracow and the neighbouring district alone 6,000 were deported in June 1942; the compulsory enlistment into the German Army of Polish war prisoners from territories illegally incorporated into the Reich; the forcible conscription of about 200,000 Poles from the same territories, and the execution of the families of those who managed to escape; the massacre of one-and-a-half million people by executions and in concentration camps; the recent imprisonment of 80,000 people of military age, officers and men, and the torturing and murdering of them in the camps of Majdanek and Tremblinka.

It is not to enable the Germans to lay impudent claims to appear in the role of defenders of Christianity and the European civilization that Poland is making immense sacrifices and fighting and enduring

¹³ Copy transmitted to the Department by the Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile in his despatch Polish Series No. 308, April 30. The statement was released to the London press on April 18.

immeasurable sufferings. The blood of Polish soldiers and Polish citizens, wherever shed cries for expiation before the conscience of the free peoples of the world. The Polish Government deny the right to exploit all the crimes committed against Polish citizens for political maneuvers by whoever is guilty of these crimes.

740.00116 European War 1939/876 : Telegram

The Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Page) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, April 19, 1943—5 p. m.

[Received April 20—5:15 p. m.]

322. On April 16 the Soviet press carried a Sov[iet] Inform[ation] Buro statement denying a recent accusation attributed to Goebbels¹⁴ concerning an alleged mass execution of Polish officers by Soviet organs in the region of Smolensk in the spring of 1940. The denial stated that the German accusation was made in an endeavor to cover German atrocities and maintained that now there is no doubt as to the tragic fate of the former Polish prisoners who were in Smolensk in the fall of 1941 and who fell into German hands.

Pravda of April 19 carried a leading front page editorial entitled "The Polish collaborators of F. O." which attacked certain Polish Government circles and especially the Polish Ministry of National Defense for giving credence to the German accusation and for asking the assistance of the International Red Cross in "investigating something that never happened". Many references are made to statements previously published in the Soviet Press on German atrocities in Poland and on "the odious lies regarding Bolshevik brutalities in Lwow". The editorial concludes: "The Polish people will cast aside the Hitlerite slander on the fraternal Soviet people. But those Poles who are inclined to accept the Hitlerite falsifications support them and who are prepared to collaborate with the Hitlerite butchers of the Polish people will go down in history as of Hitler. The Polish people will turn away from them as from any person collaborating with the accursed enemy of Poland".¹⁵

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¹⁴ Josef Goebbels, German Minister of Propaganda, 1933-45.

¹⁵ In telegram No. 327, April 20, the Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union reported a statement by the Soviet official news agency Tass that this editorial "fully reflects the position of the leading Soviet circles in regard to the question". (740.00116 European War 1939/881)

740.00116 European War 1939/878 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, April 19, 1943—7 p. m.

[Received 11:40 p. m.]

2447. An examination of the unusually extensive publicity now being given in the press and over the radio by the German propaganda machine to the reported discovery in occupied Russia of the bodies of numerous Polish officers (my telegram No. 2357 of April 15) reveals the following as the possible objectives thereof:

1. The worsening of the relations between the Polish Government at London and the Soviet authorities by the introduction of this further contention between them.

2. The arousing of feelings among the Poles and the Ukrainians in the general government (of Poland) where a most violent anti-Soviet campaign on the basis of the alleged discovery is in progress with a view to ensuring quiet and even some cooperation in these important rear areas at the approach of the season for the spring offensive.

3. The giving of a new impetus to the anti-Soviet campaign in Allied-occupied and neutral countries of Europe by the projection of this mass atrocity allegation with special emphasis in residual Czechoslovakia and the other countries of southeastern Europe.

4. The discrediting among European peoples of American and British support of the Soviet Union in so far as possible in connection with the German propaganda thesis that the logical outcome [of] Anglo-American policy is the surrender of the European Continent to Soviet control.

5. Appeal to circles in the United States and Great Britain thought to be anti-Soviet to such a degree as to be likely to oppose present and postwar cooperation between their Governments and the Soviet Union.

6. It is apparent that the German authorities have been aware for some months of the presence of the bodies of the Polish officers near Smolensk and that they have built up a detailed propaganda program thereon. Consequently the timing of the campaign for release at this particular moment would apparently indicate that it is intended primarily to lessen if possible western support of the Soviet Union at this juncture in the war.

HARRISON

760C.61/4-2143

*Statement Issued by the Polish Government in Exile, at London, on April 20, 1943*¹⁶

In a communiqué issued by the Polish Government, following a meeting of the Cabinet on March 18, it was stated that the Cabinet took note of a report from authoritative quarters in Poland containing expression of the fact that the entire country stood in solidarity with the declarations made by the Polish Government concerning the Eastern frontiers as well as the relations with the Soviet Union.

On March 28, the underground paper, *Rzeczpospolita Polska* (*Polish Republic*), contained the following declaration on this subject by the political representatives in Poland:

"The political representatives in Poland are in complete solidarity with the attitude taken by the Government concerning the Eastern frontiers of Poland as expressed in the Cabinet's resolution of February 25, 1943, and also as expressed in the Polish Telegraph Agency communiqué of March 5, 1943.

"Despite the fact that by the agreement of August 1939 the Soviets divided Poland between Germany and Russia, and despite the fact that they thus made impossible any effective defense against the German invasion, the Polish nation is prepared to live on good neighborly terms with the Soviets provided the Soviets recognize without reservation Poland's pre-1939 Eastern Frontiers, as defined in the Riga Treaty, and do not interfere in Poland's internal affairs. The whole Polish nation unanimously and steadfastly maintains the view that the pre-1939 Eastern frontiers of Poland are to remain inviolate."

760C.61/4-2143

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] April 21, 1943.

The British Ambassador¹⁷ called at his request. He handed me an *aide-mémoire* (a copy attached)¹⁸ relating to the deterioration of Polish-Soviet relations. The Ambassador said that this was only a preliminary reference to the matter and that he expected within a very few days to receive a somewhat more elaborate statement from his Government, at which time he would desire to discuss it with me in its various phases. I was about to commence some discussion of the subject, when he said that he was not ready to go into it at this time. I indicated to him that the President might be prepared within another one or two weeks to make some direct approach, such as the British Prime Minister is considering, and that I would be glad to

¹⁶ Copy transmitted to the Department by the Polish Ambassador on April 21, 1943.

¹⁷ Viscount Halifax.

¹⁸ Not printed, but see point 2 in telegram of April 25 from the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt, p. 390.

keep in touch with the Ambassador with respect to the matter. I added that, in my opinion, approaches would have to be made by the British Prime Minister and the President direct, or in effect direct, to Mr. Stalin.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

760C.61/1029 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, April 21, 1943—2 p. m.

[Received 4:48 p. m.]

2766. We learn at the Foreign Office this afternoon in strict confidence that within the next few days the British intend to approach our Government to suggest a joint or parallel *démarche* in high quarters at Moscow in the hope of bringing about some improvement in Russo-Polish relations. We understand that the thought of making this suggestion is quite apart from and originated prior to the recent bitter exchange on the question of the fate of the 8,000 Polish officers. The Foreign Office believes that a British and American appeal to Moscow on grounds of the need for unity among the United Nations and the fact that the continuance of the present bitter relations between the Poles and the Russians is only playing the German game may have some effect and might lead to some relaxation of the present Russian attitude toward the Poles within its territory. (Incidentally the Foreign Office feels that the measures taken against such Poles since January are motivated largely by Russian desire to reinforce and give expression to her territorial aspirations with respect to eastern Poland.) It is emphasized that not only are the Polish armed forces in this country affected by a continuance of the present Russian attitude but the Polish troops in the Middle East totalling approximately 100,000 who are now fully equipped and will prove to be a valuable armed force, are becoming increasingly dissatisfied.

There also remains the question of the possible evacuation from Russia, and the Russian attitude with respect thereto is not known, of several hundred thousand Poles, the possibilities of transporting them and their ultimate destination.

As to the German propaganda story of the 8,000 officers the Foreign Office inclines to the view, while not unsympathetic to Sikorski's position and the fact that the Poles had never been able to learn the whereabouts of the officers in question, that a mistake was made in swallowing the German bait and particularly the appeal to the International Red Cross to investigate. It seems strange, says the Foreign Office, whatever the fate of the officers in question, that the Germans

who had long been in Smolensk should suddenly have just now discovered the 8,000 graves and be prepared with the identity cards of the alleged victims all in order. Unfortunate as the incident is in stimulating anti-Russian feeling among the Poles and anti-Polish feeling at Moscow as a result of the Polish communiqué, the Foreign Office takes the view that it is now too late to do anything to remedy this particular incident. Any Anglo-American move at Moscow should, in its opinion, concentrate on the need to bring about some early improvement.

WINANT

760C.61/1031 : Telegram

The Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile (Biddle) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, April 23, 1943—7 p. m.

[Received 11:43 p. m.]

Polish Series [No.] 19. Reference my 16, April 17, 6 p. m., and my 17, April 17, 7 p. m. Drawing my attention to *Pravda's* attack of April 19 on the Polish Government, Soviet Ambassador Bogomolov stated that the latter's April 16 [17] communiqué and its appeal for International Red Cross investigation into allegations by Berlin radio broadcasts concerning Russian massacre of Polish officers had aroused a storm of indignation in USSR. Characterizing the Polish Government's attitude as provocative and unreasonable, he held that by this action, and by the Polish National Council's April 17 announcement declaring its disbelief of the Soviet Government's motives in shooting Alter and Ehrlich,¹⁹ the Polish leaders had been inexcusably trapped in the net of the Nazi *provocateurs*; that their actions could be regarded only as open support of this sinister Nazi invention. The Nazi "stunt" was so clumsy that in his opinion it would not have been attempted had the ground not already been carefully prepared by the "Alter and Ehrlich" agitation. He went on to say that the continued provocative tone of the *Papieżnrumlo*²⁰ Polish press, for example *Dziennik Polski's* recently published article, under Rome dateline, alleging the Soviet authorities were preparing a French government

¹⁹ Wiktor Alter and Henryk Ehrlich, former residents of Warsaw and Lublin, and leaders of the Jewish Socialist movement in Poland, had been arrested and imprisoned by Soviet authorities in Kuibyshev on December 3, 1941, where they were reported to be correspondents of the *Jewish Daily Forward* of New York. They were executed in December 1942 on charges that they were Nazi agents. For the note of March 8, 1943, from the Polish Foreign Minister to the Soviet Ambassador in the United Kingdom, protesting the executions, and the Soviet note of March 31, 1943, rejecting the protest, see *Polish-Soviet Relations, 1918-1943, Official Documents*, pp. 178-180.

²⁰ Apparently garbled.

under Torres²¹ to put into France at the psychological moment, was not helpful in the present situation. He was aware of the Polish leaders' annoyance over "certain questions" still under discussion in Moscow, but he could not understand why they would permit themselves to go so far as to have issued the aforementioned communiqué. Only the Nazis could profit by this action. For it was clear that these foul Nazi allegations were aimed at fomenting dissension between the United States, Britain and Russia: at invigorating the anti-Soviet crusade; at erasing traces of the crimes committed by the Nazis themselves against the Polish prisoners of war.

I gained the impression from the Ambassador's aforecited and other remarks that Moscow is concerned over the potential effect of the German allegations and the appurtenant Polish communiqué upon British and especially American opinion.

In conversation with Sikorski, he referred to the Soviet denials and characterized them as vague, and attempts to cover up this grim example of current-day Russia's reversion to the methods of Ivan the Terrible. Even when he had questioned Stalin concerning the whereabouts of the "missing officers", in course of their Moscow talks in December 1941, Sikorski had gained the definite impression from the former's marked evasiveness that he was aware of what had befallen these officers at the hands of the Russian authorities. Sikorski thereupon cited the following additional circumstantial evidence. In their evacuation in spring 1940 of the three prison camps originally occupied by Polish officers, the Soviet authorities had sent (a) a comparatively few to another camp in Eastern Russia wherefrom they were liberated in July 1941; and (b) the rest, some eight to ten thousand, to an unknown destination, later understood to have been the area west of Smolensk. In this connection the present Minister of Justice Komarnicki, who was one of the group sent to Eastern Russia, had been informed by several officers of the other group that the Soviet authorities had indicated Smolensk as their probable destination. Furthermore, at the outset all the Polish officers had been permitted to correspond with their families in Western as well as Eastern Poland. This correspondence, except in the case of the group sent to Eastern Russia, had ceased in the spring of 1940.

Sikorski had addressed a note to Ambassador Bogomolov dated April 21 [20]²² requesting a clearer than hitherto explanation of the situation. Furthermore, in response to a request from the chief of the "underground" in Poland, the General had just sent him a directive to maintain quiet concerning the German allegations; to bear in mind that the Germans were enemy number one and that everything must be done towards their defeat. As regards his Govern-

²¹ Maurice Thorez, French Communist leader.

²² *Polish-Soviet Relations, 1918-1943, Official Documents*, p. 123.

ment's appeal for International Red Cross intervention, Sikorski emphasized that it was made previous to a similar request by the Duke of Saxe [Saxe-] Coburg de Gotha, head of the German Red Cross.

Discussing the Polish press, Sikorski concurred with my personal observation that further polemics might react on his own personal position. He could accordingly instruct Minister of Information not [Kot] to "soft pedal" the tone of the Polish press and to give a directive to Polish speakers as well as the press to adopt a line to effect that "regardless of whether or not the German allegations were true, the Germans could be counted upon to paint the picture to suit their own purpose".

Referring to the continued German broadcasts, Sikorski went on to say that according to the German broadcasts, the Polish commission from Warsaw and Krakow consisting of Goetel, member of the Polish Academy; Surgeon Colonel Gorczycki, medical director of Polish Red Cross and formerly chief of personnel of army medical corps; the representative of the Archbishop of Krakow, Canon Jasinski; and a member of the Warsaw Municipal Council, after having visited the scene of the tragedy had issued a cautious statement to effect that they considered the officers had died in spring 1940. Furthermore, Sikorski added, the broadcasts had hinted (a) that this commission's statement was based on examinations of documents and diaries which had ended in spring 1940; and (b) that the Germans intended making a ballistic examination of the bullets in the bodies of the Poles. Admitting that Berlin's timing of this propaganda campaign could hardly have been more cunningly devised for the purpose of boosting Germany's anti-Bolshevik crusade, Sikorski said he looked for the German Government to go to full length in seeking international investigation; it was not inconceivable that it might even invite British and American representatives for this purpose.

WINANT

760C.61/1032 : Telegram

The Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile (Biddle) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, April 24, 1943—3 p. m.

[Received 6:55 p. m.]

Polish Series [No.] 21. Supplementing my 19, April 23, 7 p. m. Discussing growing intensity with which the Germans are plugging their anti-Bolshevik campaign both by press and radio, Sikorski said it was significant in connection therewith that Nazi terroristic tactics had suddenly shown a marked decrease throughout Poland, except against the Jews; that following the killing in Warsaw of Gestapo

authority Hoffman,²³ the Germans, contrary to their usual practice, did not take reprisals; and that the Germans recently permitted shipments of medical supplies from a neutral country into Poland.

Sikorski went on to say Ambassador Romer recently reported that the Soviet authorities had authorized the Polish Embassy to issue passports to those Polish citizens about whom there was no dispute. As to whether this move might be taken to indicate (a) a more accommodating tendency on part of the Soviet Government, or (b) a minor concession possibly confined to Poles in Russia who had their relatives here and in the Middle East, remained to be seen. Sikorski believes that it does not affect the Soviet Government's principal contention set forth in its note of January 16, 1943.

Experience has to my mind shown that Moscow has in effect two policies: A winter one whereby Moscow on a wave of military successes attempts to settle major questions affecting Russia's forward looking interests, and a summer one whereby Moscow becomes more accommodating in attitude. There are signs that we are again approaching this latter policy, and I feel that if the Polish Government would confine its efforts to settling behind closed doors its outstanding questions with Moscow, and would cease trying its various cases in the press, thus affecting Moscow's prestige, the Polish Government might conceivably benefit from Russia's summer policy.

[BIDDLE]

760C.61/4-2443

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] April 24, 1943.

The Soviet Ambassador²⁴ called to see me this afternoon at his request. The Ambassador said that he had just received an urgent and private message addressed by Mr. Stalin to the President and since he knew the President was away, he had come to give it to me with the request that it be transmitted to the President as rapidly as possible. The Ambassador then gave me the message addressed to the President, together with a copy thereof. The copy is attached herewith.²⁵

After I had read the message, I said to the Ambassador that inasmuch as the message was addressed by Mr. Stalin to the President, I would not make any official comment upon the message at this time

²³ The Polish Government in Exile announced on April 21 that Kurt Hoffman, head of the German Labor Exchange in Warsaw, had been shot and killed by Polish patriots.

²⁴ Maxim Maximovich Litvinov.

²⁵ Text quoted in telegram from the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt, April 25, *infra*. The original of the message is filed under 760C.61/4-2143.

since any official comment should, of course, be made by the President himself. I said, however, that speaking quite unofficially and personally to the Ambassador, I desired to express my very deep regret that matters had come to this pass. I said that I did not need to explain to the Ambassador that the step which the Soviet Government had determined to take in breaking relations with the Polish Government would have very profound repercussions upon public opinion in this country and that implications would be drawn therefrom which, of course, were obvious to the Ambassador, but which I hoped and believed were not intended by the Soviet Government. The Ambassador said that he fully realized this and that he himself regretted that this should be the case.

The Ambassador then went on to say that the investigation of the alleged murder of Polish officers which the Polish Government had suggested should be undertaken by the International Red Cross would obviously be held in German territory and would obviously be completely controlled by the local German authorities. He said the suggestion made played directly into the hands of the Hitlerite government and was intolerable for that reason to the Soviet Government. The Ambassador said, however, that the Poles always behaved this way and that "there was no helping them".

I went on to say that I was all the more surprised at this development in view of what I had always understood was a very satisfactory personal relationship which had been created between Mr. Stalin and General Sikorski. The Ambassador said that was in fact the case and that when General Sikorski was in Washington only a short time ago the latter had told the Ambassador of his great satisfaction with his conversations with Mr. Stalin. The Ambassador concluded by saying that, as I had already been informed, it was the policy of the Soviet Government at the conclusion of the war to see the reestablishment of a "strong Poland" and that the step now taken did not in any sense imply any change of policy on the part of the Soviet Union.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

760C.61/4-2443 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to President Roosevelt*²⁶

WASHINGTON, April 25, 1943.

I have just received from Ambassador Litvinoff the following private and confidential message dated April 21st addressed to you by

²⁶ The President was absent from Washington on a tour of war plants and military bases. On April 25 he was at Fort Riley, Junction City, Kansas.

Stalin indicating that the Soviet Government has broken relations with the Polish Government-In-Exile. The text of Stalin's message to you follows:

"The recent conduct of the Polish Government towards the Soviet Union is regarded by the Soviet Government as absolutely abnormal and contrary to all rules and standards governing relations between allied countries.

The campaign of calumny against the Soviet Union, initiated by the German fascists regarding the Polish officers they themselves slaughtered in the Smolensk area, on German-occupied territory, was immediately taken up by the Sikorski government and inflated in every possible way by the official Polish press. The Sikorski government, far from taking a stand against the vile fascist slander of the Soviet Union, did not even see fit to ask the Soviet government for information or explanations.

The Hitlerite authorities, after perpetrating an atrocious crime against the Polish officers, are now engaged upon an investigation farce for the staging of which they have enlisted the help of certain pro-fascist Polish elements picked up by them in occupied Poland, where everything is under Hitler's heel and where honest Poles dare not lift their voices in public.

The governments of Sikorski and Hitler have involved in these "investigations" the International Red Cross which is compelled to take part, under conditions of a terroristic regime with its gallows and mass extermination of a peaceful population, in this investigation farce, under the stage management of Hitler. It should be clear that such "investigations", carried out, moreover, behind the Soviet Government's back, cannot inspire confidence in persons of any integrity.

The fact that this campaign against the Soviet Union was launched simultaneously in the German and the Polish press, and is being conducted along similar lines, does not leave any room for doubt that there is contact and collusion between Hitler, the enemy of the Allies, and the Sikorski government in the conduct of the campaign.

At a time when the peoples of the Soviet Union are shedding their blood in the bitter struggle against Hitlerite Germany and straining every effort to rout the common foe of all liberty-loving democratic countries, the government of Mr. Sikorski, pandering to Hitler's tyranny, is dealing a treacherous blow to the Soviet Union.

All these circumstances force the Soviet Government to infer that the present government of Poland, having fallen into the path of collusion with the Hitler government, has actually discontinued relations of alliance with the U.S.S.R. and assumed a hostile attitude toward the Soviet Union.

In view of these circumstances the Soviet Government has come to the conclusion of the necessity for breaking relations with the present Polish government.

I deem it necessary to inform you of the above and trust that the Government of the United States will realize the inevitability of the step which the Soviet Government has been compelled to take."

In considering this matter the following are the more important developments with respect to Soviet-Polish relations which have taken place during your absence:

1. On April 14 the Polish Minister in the absence from Washington of the Ambassador brought to the attention of the Department the charges made by German propaganda agencies to the effect that the Germans had discovered near Smolensk a mass grave containing the bodies of some 10,000 Polish officers executed by the Russians in 1940. The Minister under instructions while acknowledging that the story might well be a fabrication on the part of the Germans, said that the Polish Government could not fail to take note of the allegations since it had for over a year and one-half been endeavoring to ascertain without success from the Soviet authorities the whereabouts of approximately 8,000 Polish officers known to have been captured by the Red Army in 1939. He also pointed out that in December 1941 the Polish Prime Minister himself had taken up with Stalin and Molotov the whereabouts of the missing Polish officers and advised this Government of the evasive reply received.

2. Lord Halifax on April 21 handed me an *aide-mémoire*²⁷ indicating that because of the recent grave deterioration of Polish-Soviet relations there was a danger of serious trouble among the Polish armed forces abroad particularly those in the Middle East. It stated that Mr. Churchill was considering sending a message to Stalin. The draft text of this message, together with further information on recent developments and on the action which the British Government would like to take, would be communicated to the United States Government shortly with a view to ascertaining whether we would wish to make a similar approach to the Soviet Government.

The Ambassador said then that the *aide-mémoire* was only a preliminary reference and that he expected in a few days to receive a somewhat more elaborate statement from his Government. Lord Halifax has not yet taken up the matter in detail.

3. In connection with the statement in paragraph 4 of Mr. Stalin's message indicating that the International Red Cross has been "compelled" to take part in the investigations carried out behind the back of the Soviet Government, it should be pointed out that the American Consul in a telegram from Geneva dated April 22, 6 p. m.²⁷ stated that he had been informed that the International Red Cross Committee had communicated on April 22 to the Polish and German Governments that the International Red Cross was prepared to propose the designation of neutral experts to conduct an investigation provided "all parties concerned" request it to do so (special reference to the Soviet Union as a party concerned was made therein).

²⁷ Not printed.

4. The Department of State has thus far had no intimation from any source other than Stalin's message quoted above that the Soviet Government contemplates breaking relations with the Polish Government.²⁸

5. I am endeavoring to delay action in the Finnish matter²⁹ until you return, in view of the foregoing developments.

[File copy not signed]

760C.61/4-2543 : Telegram

The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt

LONDON, April 25, 1943.

284. Former Naval Person³⁰ to President Roosevelt. I understand that Stalin has repeated to you his message to me of April 21st about Poland.³¹

My two immediately following messages contain my reply.

As you see, I am now going to follow these up with a fuller message appealing to Stalin to cooperate with us in getting as many Poles as possible out of Russia. Halifax has already spoken to Hull about this. I shall be sending you a further message on this subject.

Message from Prime Minister to Premier Stalin begins:

"Ambassador Maisky delivered your message to me last night. We shall certainly oppose rigorously any 'investigation' by the International Red Cross or any other body in any territory under German authority. Such investigation would be a fraud and its conclusions reached by terrorism. Mr. Eden is seeing Sikorski today and will press him as strongly as possible to withdraw all countenance from any investigation under Nazi auspices. Also we should never approve of any parley with the Germans or contact with them of any kind whatever, and we shall press this point upon our Polish allies.

"I will wire you later how Sikorski reacts to the above points. His position is one of great difficulty. Far from being pro-German or in league with them, he is in danger of being overthrown by Poles who consider he has not stood up sufficiently for his people against the Soviets. If he should go, we should only get somebody worse. I hope therefore that your decision to 'interrupt' relations is to be read in the sense of a final warning rather than of a break and that it will not be made public at any rate till every other plan has been tried. The public announcement of a break would do the greatest possible harm in the United States where the Poles are numerous and influential.

²⁸ In a message of April 27 to the Secretary of State, President Roosevelt told him "I am getting less worried over Polish situation." (740.00119 European War 1939/1464)

²⁹ For correspondence concerning U.S. attempts to facilitate the withdrawal of Finland from the war against the Soviet Union, see pp. 213 ff.

³⁰ Code name for Prime Minister Churchill.

³¹ See *supra*.

"I had drafted a telegram to you yesterday asking you to consider allowing more Poles and Polish dependents to go into Persia. This would allay the rising discontent of the Polish Army formed there, and would enable me to influence the Polish Government to act in conformity with our common interests and against the common foe. I have deferred sending this telegram in consequence of yours to me in the hopes the situation may clear. April 24, 1943." First message ends.

Message from Prime Minister to Premier Stalin personal and secret.

"Mr. Eden saw General Sikorski yesterday evening. Sikorski stated that so far from synchronising his appeal to the Red Cross with that of the Germans his Government took the initiative without knowing what line the Germans would take. In fact, the Germans acted after hearing the Polish broadcast announcement. Sikorski also told Eden that his Government had simultaneously approached Monsieur Bogomolov³² on the subject. Sikorski emphasised that previously he had several times raised this question of the missing officers with the Soviet Government and once with you personally. On his instructions the Polish Minister of Information in his broadcasts has reacted strongly against German propaganda and this has brought an angry German reply.

"As a result of Eden's strong representations Sikorski has undertaken not to press request for Red Cross investigation and will so inform the Red Cross authorities in Berne. He will also restrain Polish press from polemics. In this connection I am examining possibility of silencing those Polish papers in this country which attack the Soviet Government and at the same time attack Sikorski for trying to work with the Soviet Government.

"In view of Sikorski's undertaking I would now urge you to abandon idea of any interruption of relations.

"I have reflected further on this matter and I am more than ever convinced that it can only assist our enemies, if there is a break between the Soviet and Polish Governments. German propaganda has produced this story precisely in order to make a rift in the ranks of the United Nations and to lend some semblance of reality to its new attempts to persuade the world that the interests of Europe and the smaller nations are being defended by Germany against the great extra-European powers, namely, the USSR, the USA, and the British Empire.

"I know General Sikorski well and I am convinced that no contacts or understanding could exist between him or his government and our common enemy, against whom he has led the Poles in bitter and uncompromising resistance. His appeal to the International Red Cross was clearly a mistake though I am convinced it was not made in collusion with the Germans.

"Now that we have, I hope, cleared up the issue raised in your telegram to me, I want to revert to the proposals contained in my draft telegram to which I referred in my message of the 24th April, I shall therefore, shortly be sending you this earlier message in its original form. If we two were able to arrange this matter of getting these

³² See the Polish note of April 20, 1943, *Polish-Soviet Relations, 1918-1943, Official Documents*, p. 123.

Poles out of the Soviet Union it would be easier for Sikorski to withdraw entirely from the position he has been forced by his public opinion to adopt. I hope you will help me to achieve this. April 25, 1943."

760C.61/4-2643 : Telegram

The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt

LONDON [undated.] ³³

285. Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt. I repeat to you herewith the reply I have just received to my telegram which I forwarded to you in my number 284.³⁴ I shall be glad of your views.

Begins Premier Stalin to Premier Churchill personal and most secret. Kremlin April 25th.

"I received your message concerning the Polish affairs. Many thanks for your interest in the matter. I would like, however, to point out that the interruption of relations with the Polish Government is already decided and today V M Molotov delivered a note to this effect. Such action was demanded by my colleagues as the Polish official press is ceaselessly pursuing and even daily expanding its campaign hostile to the USSR. I was obliged also to take into account the public opinion of the Soviet Union which is deeply indignant at the ingratitude and treachery of the Polish Government.

"With regard to the publication of the Soviet document concerning the interruption of relations with the Polish Government, I am sorry to say that such publication cannot be avoided."

President Roosevelt to the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union (Stalin) ³⁵

WASHINGTON, April 26, 1943—1:30 p. m.

Your telegram was received by me while on my inspection trip ³⁶ out West. Your problem is well understood by me but I do hope that in this present situation you can find means to label your action as a suspension of conversations with the Polish Government-in-exile rather than a complete severance of diplomatic relations.

In my opinion Sikorski has in no way acted with the Hitler gang

³³ A pencilled note on the file copy reads: "about April 26, 43".

³⁴ *Supra*.

³⁵ Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y. Secretary of State Hull stated in his *Memoirs* (vol. II, p. 1268): "The President cabled me with reference to Stalin's message, suggesting we send an immediate message to Stalin in his name, requesting the Soviet leader not to create a formal rupture of relations with Poland. I dispatched this message to Moscow on the morning of April 26." The Ambassador in the Soviet Union reported to the Department that he transmitted the President's message for Stalin to Molotov on April 27, 1943 (760C.61/1049). A copy of this telegram was also sent to Prime Minister Churchill.

³⁶ See footnote 26, p. 390.

but instead he has made a mistake in taking up this particular matter with the International Red Cross. Also Churchill will find ways and means, I am inclined to think, of getting the Polish Government in London to act in the future with more common sense.

If I can help in any way, please let me know, particularly with reference to looking after any Poles which you may desire to send out of the Soviet Union.

In the United States, incidentally, I have several million Poles, a great many of them being in the Navy and Army. All of them are bitter against the Nazis, and the situation would not be helped by the knowledge of a complete diplomatic break between yourself and Sikorski.

ROOSEVELT

760C.61/4-2643

*Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by Mr. Elbridge Durbrow
of the Division of European Affairs*

[WASHINGTON,] April 26, 1943.

I was just told in the strictest confidence by a Secretary of the British Embassy that a telegram had just been received from the British Ambassador in Moscow the general tenor of which was that he felt that the Soviet Government had broken with the Poles primarily because they were trying to cover up their guilt in connection with the Smolensk affair.

The Secretary of the Embassy asked me particularly to make sure that the source of this information was kept absolutely confidential.

ELBRIDGE DURBROW

760C.61/1035 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary
of State*

Moscow, April 26, 1943—6 p. m.

[Received April 27—noon.]

354. My 350, April 26, 2 p. m.³⁷

1. The Polish Ambassador informed me this morning that he was requested to call at the Kremlin last night at midnight where he was read by Molotov a note³⁸ accusing the Polish Government of conspiring with Hitler in connection with the recent campaign against the Soviet Union over the Polish officers alleged to have been mur-

³⁷ Not printed.

³⁸ For text of the Soviet note, dated April 25, 1943, see *Polish-Soviet Relations, 1918-1943, Official Documents*, p. 245.

dered at Smolensk and stating that as a result "the Soviet Government had decided to discontinue its relations with the Polish Government."

The Ambassador said that he refused to accept the note from Molotov declaring that he could not do so because of the insulting language in which it was couched and also because it did not represent the true facts; that he then asked Molotov for permission to return to Kuibyshev to make arrangements for the departure of himself and his staff and that Molotov said that he should take this matter up with the Foreign Office.

The Ambassador stated that about 2 a. m. a messenger delivered to him at his hotel a note from the Foreign Office³⁹ and that he found it to be identical to the one read to him by Molotov. He gave me a translation of the note.

2. Molotov requested me to call this afternoon. Clark Kerr was leaving as I arrived and said in passing "Try to persuade him to postpone the publication of the note. This is madness—I've been trying to for the last hour but am afraid I was unsuccessful."

Molotov advised me of a message dated April 21 addressed to the President and Churchill regarding Polish-Soviet relations which he said was delivered in the absence of the President and Mr. Hull, to Mr. Welles on the 24th.⁴⁰ He said that this message was almost identical to the note which he was "forced" to give to Romer last night, and was sent to the President in order to explain the position of the Soviet Government in respect to the present controversy. He added that he was confident that the American Government would understand the Soviet position. He then read the note.⁴¹

In reply to my query Molotov stated that no answer had been received from the President to Stalin's message. I explained the President's absence as reason for no reply and stated that I felt sure that the President would be greatly disturbed at this turn of events. Learning that the note would be published this evening I stated that, speaking without instruction, I felt sure that the American and British Governments had been examining the question of Polish-Soviet relations hoping to find some solution which would make the present rupture in relations unnecessary and that I sincerely hoped that the publication of the note could be postponed long enough to permit a thorough examination of the question.

Molotov stated that the slanderous campaign against the Soviet Union in which Poland was playing hand in hand with Germany had been dragging on, in fact increasing in intensity, for 2 weeks, that the

³⁹ For the note of April 26, 1943, by which Ambassador Romer refused to accept this later presentation of the Soviet note, see *Polish-Soviet Relations, 1918-1943*, *Official Documents*, p. 246.

⁴⁰ See telegram of April 25 from the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt, p. 390.

⁴¹ A translation of the note, furnished by Mr. Molotov, was transmitted to the Department by the Ambassador in the Soviet Union in his despatch No. 107, May 6, 1943, not printed.

Soviet Government had shown the maximum patience, that public opinion in the Soviet Union was extremely indignant and that the Soviet Government could not ignore its public. For that reason it had decided to publish the note and it was hoped that the American Government would understand its position. Again speaking personally I said that it was impossible for me to believe that the Poles were conspiring with Germany and again I endeavored to prevail upon Molotov to hold up publication at least until the President had had an opportunity to reply to Stalin's message. He was adamant maintaining that no Government with any self-respect could postpone even for a few days its decision to take action.

Since I understand that the tenor of the note has already been conveyed to the Department and since I assume that it will be published at home I am consequently not telegraphing it.

I am informed that Lozovski⁴² read the note to the Chiefs of Mission in Kuibyshev today.

Several days ago the Polish Ambassador in commenting on the worsened state of Polish-Soviet relations requested the Embassy to take over the Polish Embassy's confidential files in case of a rupture in relations. I told him that I could not do so without instructions from the Department and suggested that he request that the Polish Embassy in Washington take up this question with the Department. He has not broached the subject since.

Department's instructions requested.⁴³

STANDLEY

760C.61/1038 : Telegram

The Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile (Biddle) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, April 27, 1943—8 p. m.
[Received April 27—6: 16 p. m.]

Polish Series [No.] 24. My 23, April 26.⁴⁴ I have just seen General Sikorski who tells me that Ambassador Romer reported to him yesterday that at a meeting early yesterday morning Molotov had read to him the substance of the Russian Government's note notifying the Polish Government of its decision to sever relations. Romer reported further that he refused to accept the note.

Sikorski also states that a further telegram from Romer received today reports that Molotov subsequently sent the note to the Polish Embassy and that after studying it Romer found that contrary to his

⁴² Solomon Abramovich Lozovsky, Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.

⁴³ No reply to this telegram has been found in Department files.

⁴⁴ Not printed.

original impression the Soviet Government uses the term "suspend" relations instead of "sever". Romer is consequently of the opinion that the door may thus still be open for discussion.

Sikorski states further that on Saturday ⁴⁵ he met with Mr. Eden who informed him that M. Stalin had wired Mr. Churchill that the Soviet Government would break relations with the Polish Government unless General Sikorski would personally publicly deny the German allegations regarding the fate of the Polish officers near Smolensk and withdraw his request of the International Red Cross for investigation. Sikorski says he told Eden he could not comply with those conditions but he was willing for Mr. Churchill to inform M. Stalin that he would "soft pedal" the Polish press regarding the missing officers, that he would not press for the International Red Cross investigation, but that he desired that the Russians should permit the evacuation of certain categories of Poles from Russia. He states he was assured that such message would be sent. The next development was the Soviet Government's note to Ambassador Romer.

Sikorski tells me the matter has been fully discussed by the Polish Cabinet today and his Government proposes, subject to Mr. Churchill's approval, to issue a statement which he describes as "firm, dignified and polite". While the text is still in Polish,⁴⁶ he tells me it is on the following lines: (a) A résumé of Polish-Russian relations since the Polish-Russian agreement of 1941; (b) notwithstanding difficulties caused the Polish Government by a lack of clear information concerning the fate of the missing Polish officers, the Polish Government wished to maintain good relations with the Soviet Government; (c) the Poles had received information from Polish sources regarding these officers previous to the German allegations; (d) a denial of collaboration with the Nazis in connection either with the allegations or the request for International Red Cross investigation; (e) it is the Polish Government's policy to defend the interests of Poland and its citizens and to strengthen the solidarity of the common front against the enemy.

Sikorski states he is quite uncertain what is behind the Soviet move. He believes it may be (a) a move calculated to force the present or a reconstructed Polish Government to pay a stiff price for resumption of relations or (b) a long entertained idea of seeking a pretext favorable to Moscow for breaking with the Polish Government. The use of the term "suspend" in the recent note supports the first theory. On the other hand he believes the following considerations support the second theory: (1) The Soviet Government have been building up Drobner, formerly a radical leftist of Krakow, as a possible

⁴⁵ April 24.

⁴⁶ For translation of this Polish statement of April 28, 1943, see *Polish-Soviet Relations, 1918-1943, Official Documents*, p. 247.

leader of some sort of national committee, as they threatened during the Polish-Russian negotiations in the summer of 1941; (2) the creation of a Polish-Communist armed force under General Rogoszewski; (3) the publication of the Polish-Communist paper *Wolna Polska*.⁴⁹ He feels certain in any case that the Soviet Government's decision to suspend its relations with the Polish Government at this time was motivated primarily by its belief that it should adopt an offensive rather than a defensive action to divert attention from the alleged massacre of Polish officers and the suggested investigation by the International Red Cross.

[BIDDLE]

760C.61/1047 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, April 28, 1943—9 p. m.

[Received April 29—6:49 p. m.]

366. For the President and the Secretary. I want you to know that in my conversation with Molotov (see my 350, April 26)⁵⁰ which took place at 5 p. m. on the day before the receipt of the President's message to Stalin, I beseeched him most earnestly for almost an hour to withhold publication of the Polish note until the President had had an opportunity to reply to Stalin's message. I explained that the President had been absent from Washington and in all sincerity expressed the hope that a delay in publication even for 2 or 3 days to give the President a chance to communicate with Stalin might have an important bearing on the unfortunate developments. Molotov, however, was as intransigent as I am informed he had been just previously with the British Ambassador. I later learned that the note had been read at about the same time to the Chiefs of Mission in Kuibyshev and released to the press.

I now realize that the policy of the Kremlin had been predetermined before my interview with Molotov and that an intercession on my part or that of the British Ambassador could have been of no avail. From what I can gather here, it would seem that any hopes for reconciliation were apparently destroyed today upon the publication of an article in *Izvestiya* by Wanda Wasilevskaya, the so-called chairman of the Union of Polish Patriots,⁵¹ editor of *Wolna Polska* and incidentally the alleged wife of Kornechuk, newly appointed

⁴⁹ A Soviet monthly published in the Polish language, edited by Wanda Wasilewska.

⁵⁰ Not printed, but see telegram No. 354, April 26, 6 p. m., p. 396.

⁵¹ A Soviet-sponsored organization of Communist-inclined Poles in the Soviet Union.

Vice Commissar of Foreign Affairs.⁵² This article which was entitled "The Polish Patriots are against the Government of General Sikorski", maintained in no uncertain terms that the Polish Government in London, a hangover from Rydz-Smigly's⁵³ "Government of Poland's September defeat" was neither chosen by nor representative of the Polish people and that it is now controlled by Hitlerite elements. The leadership of its army under General Anders is accused of anti-Semitism, chauvinism, anti-Sovietism and even cowardice for "refusing to fight and withdrawing its forces from the Soviet Union". Its diplomatic representation in the Soviet Union is charged with robbing the Polish exiles of money and supplies. Its links with Berlin are stated to be as evident as its imperialistic intentions to Soviet territories. The article concludes that the Union of Polish Patriots has requested the organization on Soviet soil of Polish units "which would not sit for months in tents but would proceed to the front to fight shoulder to shoulder with the Red army". I am telegraphing a more complete summary of the article.

It is perhaps significant that whereas at first the foreign correspondents here were obliged to use the phrase "suspension of relations" later Soviet censors permitted them to refer to the development as a "break" or "rupture" in relations. However, it is the consensus here that the publication of the aforementioned article has now definitely closed the door to any *rapprochement* between the present Polish Government and Moscow.

Many qualified observers here anticipate in the near future the formation on Soviet soil probably as an offspring of the Union of Polish Patriots and as such a satellite of the Soviet Government of "Free Polish Government" which would maintain that it alone represented the real Polish people of German-occupied Poland and not the "reactionary" *émigré* Polish circles abroad. Although quite possible, I am not convinced that such an estimate is sound. Firstly, doubt whether the realistic Kremlin has forgotten its abortive attempt prematurely to organize and publicize the Terijoki Government at the beginning of the Finnish War.⁵⁴ Secondly, there are apparently no Polish leaders here of sufficient stature to the Polish people to make such a government popular. The formation of an organization similar to the French National Committee in London would appear more convincing. In any event I believe we should be prepared for some

⁵² Alexander Yevdokimovich Korneichuk, whose appointment had been announced on March 23, 1943.

⁵³ Edward Smigly-Rydz, Marshal of Poland, Inspector General of the Army, 1936-39. He was Head of the Government of Poland at the outbreak of war in 1939.

⁵⁴ The "Democratic Republic of Finland" was a puppet government set up by the Soviet Union at Terijoki under Otto W. Kuusinen as President early in December 1939. For correspondence regarding relations between the Soviet Union and Finland, and the Winter War of 1939-40, see *Foreign Relations*, 1939, vol. 1, pp. 952 ff., and *ibid.*, 1940, vol. 1, pp. 269 ff.

move in this direction whether it be in the form of a Free Polish Government Union or Committee and realize that any such organization on Soviet soil must be completely under Soviet dominance. By the same token a similar development in relations to any Slavic or bordering country outside the 1941 Soviet frontiers which does not vouchsafe the policy of the Soviet Union is possible.

The nucleus of any European Government can be found in the Soviet Union and especially those governments in which the Soviet Union has geographic or strategic interests.

It has occurred to me that we may be faced with a turnabout in European history. In 1918 Western Europe attempted to set up a *cordon sanitaire* to protect it from the influence of bolshevism. Might not now the Kremlin envisage the formation of a belt of pro-Soviet States to protect it from the influences of the West?

STANDLEY

701.60C61/43 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, April 28, 1943—midnight.

[Received April 29—8:40 p. m.]

369. I am informed that the Soviet authorities thus far are maintaining a very correct, in fact sympathetic, attitude toward the Polish Embassy staff here. It has freedom of movement and communications, even in use of codes. It is departing today from Kuibyshev and thence after assembling of personnel to Ashkhabad by train.⁵⁵

STANDLEY

760C.61/4-2943

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Elbridge Durbrow of the Division of European Affairs

[WASHINGTON,] April 29, 1943.

Participants: Mr. Kwapiszewski, Counselor of the Polish Embassy, Mr. Loy W. Henderson, Assistant Chief, Eu,⁵⁶ and Mr. Elbridge Durbrow, Eu.

Mr. Kwapiszewski, in the absence of the Ambassador from Washington, called to inform Mr. Henderson that he had just received a

⁵⁵ In telegram No. 411, May 7, 2 p. m., the Ambassador reported that he had learned from Kuibyshev that the Polish Embassy personnel had left Kuibyshev for Ashkhabad on May 6, and that the British Embassy had taken "provisional" charge of Polish Embassy property (701.60C61/45). Ambassador Standley had already reported on April 28 that American Embassy officials at Kuibyshev had informed him that the British Embassy had accepted for safe keeping the confidential files of the Polish Embassy (701.60C61/42).

⁵⁶ Division of European Affairs.

message from his Government instructing him to approach the Department requesting that the United States Government take over Polish interests in the USSR.

Mr. Kwapiszewski stated that he called first to informally bring this matter to the attention of the Department and to ask to whom he might present the formal note on this subject. He explained that according to his information Mr. Eden had informed General Sikorski that he felt it would be preferable to have the United States Government take over Polish interests in the USSR since the British Government was acting as intermediary in efforts to bring about a reestablishment of normal relations.

Mr. Henderson stated that he understood that the British had already taken over the custody of the archives and the property of the Polish Embassy in the USSR and wondered whether the Polish Government contemplated that we take over these interests or whether they desired us to represent them further. Mr. Kwapiszewski replied that it was his understanding that his Government hoped that we could take over the archives and property of the Polish Embassy as well as the protection of the interests of Polish citizens in the USSR.

Mr. Henderson asked whether the Polish Government had any information as to whether the Soviet Government would be agreeable to our taking over Polish interests. Mr. Kwapiszewski replied that he had no information on this subject.

Mr. Henderson told Mr. Kwapiszewski that he would call him later to let him know who in the Department would be prepared to receive the note.

ELBRIDGE DUSBROW

760C.61/1063 : Telegram

The Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile (Biddle) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, May 1, 1943—8 p. m.

[Received May 1—5:33 p. m.]

Polish Series [No.] 27. Sikorski states that Mr. Eden disclosed yesterday that Moscow was insisting upon Sikorski's personally making a public statement that he was withdrawing his Government's request for an International Red Cross investigation. He explained to Mr. Eden that he could not do so. He had suggested, however, as an alternative, that the BBC⁵⁷ be permitted to broadcast a statement by the "Polish Telegraph Agency" to effect that it had been learned that the Polish Government regarded its appeal to the International Red Cross to have lapsed, following the latter's reply explaining the

⁵⁷ British Broadcasting Corporation.

difficulties in the way of complying with the Polish request for an investigation. According to Sikorski, Mr. Eden accepted this suggestion and the aforementioned statement was accordingly broadcast last night.

Whether this form of statement satisfied Moscow's request remains to be seen. The only indication thus far of Moscow's reaction in the matter is a biting criticism in today's *Daily Worker* by the "Diplomatic Correspondent" describing the aforementioned statement as an "impudent gesture at the United Nations", and "a piece of somewhat shop-soiled political ventriloquism".

Sikorski feels that the British Government is not apt to receive Moscow's official reaction either to the aforementioned statement or to the Polish Government's statement of April 28 before Sunday or Monday.

[BIDDLE]

760C.61/1064 : Telegram

The Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile (Biddle) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, May 2, 1943—8 p. m.

[Received May 2—8 p. m.]

Polish Series [No.] 28. In lengthy conversation with Russian Ambassador Bogomolov, the greater part of his remarks took the form of a tirade against (a) the provocative tone of the Polish press since he had assumed duties here; (b) the attitude of the Polish Government in general, and of the "viciously anti-Soviet element" thereof in particular.

Evaluating the implications both of his comments and of the continued brutal tone both of the Moscow press and of the Moscow-inspired press here, I have the impression:

1, that Moscow had prepared its case against the Polish Government at the time of or perhaps even previous to the despatch of the Russian note of January 16, 1943, which in effect declared all Poles in the USSR Soviet Citizens;

2, that Moscow had been merely awaiting a pretext which it might turn to the advantage of its own forward looking interests;

3, that, from the Russian standpoint, the fundamental issues involved go beyond even the question of the Polish-Russian frontiers, and include other Russian postwar "security frontier" aspirations in the "middle zone";

4, that Moscow intends to make the most of the present political crisis with a view to gaining Washington's and London's consent to

its envisaged territorial "claims", at a time when, according to the Polish authorities, Moscow reportedly considers that both we and the British would be "reluctant to offend Moscow"; (it was not insignificant, in this connection, that in its stiff note suspending diplomatic relations with the Polish Government, Moscow took the opportunity to state publicly and officially for the first time that it considered Polish Ukraine, White Russia and Lithuania as already a part of the Soviet Union).

Holding that the situation called for a reconstruction of the Polish Government, Bogomolov pointedly denied that Moscow had in mind the formation of a "Polish National Committee" on Russian soil. He considered there were sufficient Poles here from among whom a "more reasonable and realistic" government than the present one might be formed here. If the present crisis, he added, led to the removal from the Polish Government of the "fifth columnists" which constantly threatened the solidarity of the United Nations, the situation would have netted a victory for the latter, rather than for Dr. Goebbels.

In this connection, I gained the impression that his indignation is directed particularly at Minister of Post War Reconstruction Seyda and at Minister of Information Kot, formerly Ambassador to Moscow. Bogomolov indicated his suspicion that the request for International Red Cross investigation was conceived by Kot, and that he had written the text of the communiqué concerned. (I am aware of Kot's responsibility in this connection, and am informed by Sikorski's closest associates that after Kot had written the communiqué he succeeded in influencing Sikorski over the telephone, at moment when latter was tired and ill, to permit him to release it; that when, on second thought, Sikorski had wished to withdraw it, it was already in hands of the press.)

In this connection, and with a view to the future, I have made clear to Sikorski that it was my personal opinion that this "diplomatic blunder" had offered Moscow a pretext for coming to grips with his Government; that the fact that the latter had failed to consult with either Washington or London or both before releasing the communiqué, had unfortunately created the impression in my mind to effect that when his Government was making trouble it preferred not to consult us; when it got into trouble it looked to us to get it out. In accepting these remarks as my personal reaction he assured me that he greeted them with full comprehension.

[BIDDLE]

760C.61/1065: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, May 3, 1943—1 p. m.

[Received May 3—10:10 a. m.]

3050. Sunday evening⁵⁸ Strang⁵⁹ called me to tell me that the Polish Ambassador was leaving Kuibyshev and that the Poles had asked the British to take over their interests which the British refused to do on the ground that they were negotiating. The Poles then, I understand from Strang, asked us to take over their interests which he told me the Poles said we were unwilling to do. Strang suggested to Eden, who was at his country place, that Eden ask the Prime Minister to cable the President suggesting that we reverse our position. Eden had replied to Strang on the telephone by instructing him to ask my advice. I suggested that they cable all the facts to Washington and that Lord Halifax⁶⁰ take up the matter with you.

The British naturally do not wish the Poles to ask the Swiss in particular or the Swedes or other Allied refugee governments to act for Polish interests in this situation. I told Strang I realized they were confronted with a serious problem but that I felt our strength lay in joint action to bring about a *rapprochement* between the Russians and the Poles and that I did not feel with the limited information I had, I could recommend to you that we represent the Poles in Kuibyshev and that the British do the negotiating. I recognize, however, that to keep the Poles satisfied we must find a constructive formula to protect their interests in Russia if they are to follow our advice.

Strang told me he would ask Halifax to tell you that I had suggested he take up this problem directly with you.

I understand that Maisky told the Prime Minister that the Russians had no intention of setting up an independent Polish Government in Russia and that the Foreign Office believes Maisky would not have made this statement without being so informed by his Government.

WINANT

⁵⁸ May 2.

⁵⁹ William Strang, British Assistant Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

⁶⁰ British Ambassador in the United States.

704.60C61/53

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] May 3, 1943.

The British Ambassador called at his request and handed me an *aide-mémoire* (copy attached),⁶¹ in which the British urged this Government to agree to look after the interests of Poland at Moscow pending the reestablishment of diplomatic relations between those Governments. The Ambassador read the *aide-mémoire* and when he reached the end of the first paragraph, in which the British Government said it was not in a position to perform this function, I said that this likewise well expresses the situation of the United States.

I then added that both our Governments should be in a position at all times to exert their best efforts and influence to restore relations between Russia and Poland; that this influence is liable to be impaired, as the British *aide-mémoire* well states, if one of our Governments agrees to represent the interests of Poland at Moscow. I stated that the Russians, being a very suspicious people, were not favorably disposed toward this policy in any respect and that it would be easy for either the British or this Government to jeopardize its good standing with Russia, which is all-important to maintain for the present and the future as well. I went on to say that our two Governments can do much more for Poland and what is of even more importance for the United Nations' cause by exercising our fullest influence, not only to restore relations between Russia and Poland, but also to persuade Russia that she simply must desist from this sort of flare-up from time to time in the future. I added that the recent Polish-Russian diplomatic break has done great injury to the Allied cause and that to avoid a repetition of it is the most important problem presented now and if Russia can be persuaded to see these broader aspects of the situation in which she and all the United Nations are alike vitally interested, the more or less personal matters between Poland and Russia will almost automatically iron themselves out. In any event, this first broad step is the most important step that can be taken from the standpoint of the differences between Russia and Poland. I said further that Great Britain and the United States should exert themselves to the utmost to solve this paramount question; that in the meantime Poland would have virtually no interests to be looked after and that if she did she would be coming to Great Britain and the United States just as she has frequently done in the past to point out her troubles with Russia and urge both Great Britain and the United States to aid her in getting them solved with the result that each of our Governments would do the best possible without, of course, making ourselves partisans of either side. In these

⁶¹ Not printed.

circumstances, I said that it seemed to me that the Polish Government should quickly see that this Government, as well as the Government of Great Britain, can render much more valuable service first to the general cause and second to Poland herself without running the risk of jeopardizing their standing and influence with Russia by either Government agreeing to look after the interests of Poland at Moscow in a formal sense. I said that, of course, this Government like that of Great Britain is most desirous of being of every feasible service to the Poles both as a government and a people and expects to see a new Poland reconstituted at the end of the war.

I promised the British Ambassador that I would confer with the President and let him know the President's views in this regard. I do [*did*] so and later spoke with the Ambassador over the telephone and said that the President was in harmony with the views expressed by me to the Ambassador and set out hereinbefore. The Ambassador said that he would send this message to his Government. He did not undertake to argue it. He made very feeble efforts at the beginning of our earlier conversation to press the British viewpoint, but the first paragraph of the *aide-mémoire* was most difficult for him to get over.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

760C.61/5-443

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] May 4, 1943.

The Polish Ambassador called to see me this morning. The Ambassador inquired with regard to recent developments in the Polish-Russian controversy insofar as the activities of the American and British Governments were concerned. I replied that General Sikorski was fully informed of all developments and I gave the Ambassador a brief summary of the highlights of the past few days.

The Ambassador had brought with him three copies of the *Information Bulletin* published by the Soviet Embassy during the past week which contained vituperative attacks upon the Polish Government and particularly upon the person of General Sikorski. The Ambassador said he did not feel that he could permit these attacks to go on any longer without a reply from the Polish Embassy in Washington. I stated that if the Ambassador undertook to enter into polemics of this character and to add fuel to an already too brightly burning controversy, he would literally be doing everything that he could to jeopardize the efforts of the American and British Governments to bring about a satisfactory solution of this dispute. I urged him, at least for the time being, to refrain from entering into the field

of published refutations which could only exacerbate the bitter feeling already existing. I told the Ambassador that the British Government had urged the Soviet Ambassador in London, as well as the Polish Government in exile, to avoid publications of this character and that it was my understanding that both sides had agreed to adopt this suggestion. I said I hoped the Soviet Ambassador in Washington would follow the same course. The Ambassador agreed to adopt my suggestion and to refrain from any published rejoinders to the Soviet publications.

The Ambassador handed me the memorandum attached herewith⁶² regarding the present members of the Polish Government in London as a means of proving that the members of the Government were neither fascist nor reactionary.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

760C.61/2034½

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Elbridge Durbrow of the
Division of European Affairs*

[WASHINGTON,] May 4, 1943.

A Secretary of the British Embassy showed me in the strictest confidence paraphrases of telegrams from the Foreign Office which indicated that despite the conversation Mr. Churchill had with the Soviet Ambassador on April 29, the Soviet Embassy's news bulletin *Soviet War News* published on April 30 a copy of Wanda Wasilewska's article in *Izvestia* as well as an objectionable broadcast to the Poles. The message went on to indicate that the Prime Minister had sent for Mr. Maisky and complained in the strongest terms of this development.

In the course of this discussion Mr. Maisky stated that the Soviet Government did not have the intention of setting up an alternative Polish Government in Moscow. (The British Secretary added that as far as he knows no assurances to this effect have been received by Mr. Churchill direct from Mr. Stalin.) The Ambassador added that on the other hand the Soviet Government would not renew relations with the present Polish Government. When asked what he meant by this Mr. Maisky replied that the Soviet Government would be prepared to deal with General Sikorski and Count Raczynski but that there would have to be a reconstitution of the present Polish Government.

In another telegram referring to instructions sent to Clark Kerr, the British Ambassador in Moscow, the Foreign Office stated that if

⁶² Not printed; the memorandum, headed "The Polish Government is neither fascist nor reactionary", contains descriptive notes regarding the political views of President Wladislaw Raczewicz and the members of the Polish Cabinet.

the Soviet Government agreed to the proposals set forth in those instructions it was hoped that the United States Government would help the British in dealing with the formidable refugee problem with which the British would be confronted in the Middle Eastern area.

The British Secretary also showed me a copy of the Foreign Office's telegram of May 2 which formed the basis of the *aide-mémoire* which Lord Halifax handed to the Secretary yesterday.⁶³ In this connection it is pertinent to quote the last paragraph of Lord Halifax's instructions which he did not incorporate in his *aide-mémoire* to the Secretary:

"It will not escape you that we are in the most difficult position. The Poles have a special claim on us since we have treaty alliance with them⁶⁴ and it was on their behalf that we entered the war. Although their International behaviour is sometimes unwise they have gallantry and [are] our allies and we are very reluctant to let them down. On the other hand, to assume the protection of their interests in the Soviet Union would be to place a very heavy strain upon our relations with the Soviet Union."

In discussing the question of the representation of Polish interests in the Soviet Union I stated that I did not see how any good would be served by either the British or ourselves undertaking such representation since any move of this kind would indicate to the outside world that the break was final and would play even more heavily into the hands of German propagandists. I pointed out that I personally doubt whether the Soviet Government would permit anyone to represent Polish interests in the Soviet Union if for no other reason than that they do not consider that there are any Poles now in the USSR. I added that I felt that the main problem for all the United Nations was to endeavor to use their best influence to heal the breach rather than to try to protect individual interests of Polish citizens.

ELBRIDGE DUSBROW

760C.61/2017

The Polish Prime Minister (Sikorski) to President Roosevelt

[LONDON,] May 4, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I wish to thank you very sincerely for the kind interest you have shown in our problem during the last few days, as well as for your letter,⁶⁵ which the United States Ambassador handed to me.

⁶³ Not printed; but see the memorandum by the Secretary of State, May 3, p. 407.

⁶⁴ For text of the treaty of mutual assistance between the United Kingdom and Poland, signed at London, August 25, 1939, see British Cmd. 6106, Misc. No. 9 (1939), p. 37.

⁶⁵ Letter of April 12, p. 373.

You may well imagine that it was with great regret that I and my Government were faced, the other day, with the Soviet Government's decision to break off, or suspend, diplomatic relations. Our invitation to the International Red Cross to investigate the circumstances of the death of thousands of Polish officers, recently brought to light by the Germans, may be criticised in some quarters. However, in view of the fact that many Poles, both here and in the Middle East, had near relatives or comrades-in-arms who had been killed in that neighbourhood, it was very difficult for us to ignore the news. I trust that you realize that this action on the part of the Soviet Government was not a sudden or isolated one, but the climax in a sequel of events all directed against the Polish nation and the Polish Government.

You will recall that on December 1st, 1941,⁶⁶ the Soviet Government already initiated the policy of depriving some of the deportees of their Polish citizenship, linking this activity closely with the problem of the Soviet-Polish borders. This was directed in the first place against Polish citizens belonging to the national or racial minorities. At the beginning this policy was somewhat shy and it coincided exactly with the moment when I arrived in the U.S.S.R. in 1941 to pay a friendly visit to Mr. Stalin.

A campaign against myself and my Government was already planned at that early date. It is not for other reason that a so-called "Committee of Polish patriots"⁶⁷ was formed which published a paper entitled *Free Poland*. Simultaneously there was being prepared a small military detachment of Polish Communists in the Red Army. Needless to say that those "Polish patriots" are unknown in Poland and of no importance whatsoever.

The policy of depriving deportees of their Polish citizenship reached its climax on January 16th, 1943, when Polish citizenship was withdrawn from every deportee regardless of his nationality or the part of Poland from which he came, so that even persons coming from the western borders of the country were to be considered Soviet citizens. Besides this policy and that of fostering attacks against myself and my Government, there have been other facts, the most notorious of which was the execution of Ehrlich and Alter.

Then a demand was made for the Molotov-Ribbentrop line as a boundary between the future Poland and Russia. This, of course, would have meant the beginning of the end of Poland as an independent state.

I fear that what the Soviet Government wants is a Polish Communist Government which would offer them Poland as a Soviet satellite state.

⁶⁶ For text of the note of December 1, 1941, from the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union to the Polish Embassy, see *Polish-Soviet Relations, 1918-1943, Official Documents*, p. 165.

⁶⁷ A group of Polish Communists in the Soviet Union which later became the "Union of Polish Patriots".

In view of the tremendous sacrifices which our people are making daily in Poland, and the achievements of Poland's Armed Forces on many battlefields, it was outrageous to announce to the world that I and my Government were conniving with the Nazi régime.

I trust that you, Mr. President, will also understand our anxiety at the present moment with regard to the scores of thousands who are still in Russia and that you will not refuse your help in protecting them and securing their departure from the Soviet Union.

I want you to know, Mr. President, that in spite of this record we are determined to work together with our Allies, including our Russian neighbours, with a view to bringing the war in Europe to a victorious close as soon as possible. No one realises better than we do that Goebbels's propaganda has taken advantage of recent events.

My Government and I are only too anxious to do everything in our power to re-establish the United Front against our common enemy within the shortest possible time, and I feel hopeful that with the help of yourself and Mr. Churchill this will be speedily achieved.

I also feel, however, that if this is to be done within the near future certain impediments should be removed. In the first place the Soviet authorities should allow the tens of thousands of Polish soldiers' families, including tens of thousands of Polish children and orphans, to leave Soviet territory. We also ask for the release of men fit to carry arms, and, in conclusion, that the welfare and relief work for Polish citizens in the U.S.S.R. who were deported after 1939 should be continued until they are able to return to their homes in Poland.

I hope you will find these demands reasonable; they are dictated by humanitarian reasons and by our desire to strengthen our Armed Forces.

Once again may I thank you, Mr. President, on behalf of my Government and on my own for all the understanding and help which you have given us consistently in these difficult days.

Believe me, Mr. President

Yours very sincerely

SIKORSKI

760C.61/1071 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, May 5, 1943—3 p. m.

[Received 9:54 p. m.]

405. Parker, *New York Times* correspondent, has informed me that in reply to two questions on Polish-Soviet relations submitted to

the Kremlin on May 4 he has received the following letter from Stalin:

"Dear Mr. Parker: On May 3 I received your two questions concerning Soviet-Polish relations. Here are my answers:

1. *Question*: Does the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic desire to see a strong and independent Poland after the defeat of Hitler's Germany?

Answer: Unquestionably it does.

2. *Question*: On what fundaments is it your opinion that the relation between Poland and the U.S.S.R. should be based after the war.

Answer: Upon the fundament of solid, good neighborly relations or should the Polish people so desire upon the fundament of an alliance against the German[s] as the chief enemies of the Soviet Union and Poland.

With respect

(Signed) J. Stalin."

Parker's full comments on the letter were [telegraphed?] to the *New York Times* this evening.⁶⁸

STANDLEY

760C.61/1073 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, May 6, 1943—8 p. m.
[Received May 6—5:23 p. m.]

3163. The Foreign Office, while avoiding any tendency toward optimism that the Polish-Soviet break is one that can easily be patched up, considers Stalin's reply to the questions submitted to him jointly by the *New York Times* and the *London Times* to be decidedly helpful. Sikorski's answering statement⁶⁹ which he issued somewhat on the spur of the moment upon the insistence of the *New York Times*, Strang says "might have been worse". The Poles when asked why they did not wait and give the wording of any public statement issued more careful thought informed the Foreign Office that any such delay would have necessitated consultation with various members of their Government which would probably have rendered any statement which finally emerged from the heat of discussion less conciliatory than Sikorski's declaration for the *New York Times*.

Strang says there is still no solution to Poland's search for a protecting power though thought is now being given to the possibility

⁶⁸ The text of Premier Stalin's letter to Mr. Parker was published in the *New York Times* of May 6, 1943; Parker's comments in connection with it appeared in the *New York Times* of May 7 and May 8.

⁶⁹ See telegram Polish Series No. 30, May 6, 10 p. m., from the Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile, *infra*.

of selecting either Canada or Australia or the two jointly. If the exploration of this possibility proves negative, Norway or Holland may take on the job. One difficulty is the question of adequate personnel at Moscow in view of the volume of detailed work that may be involved. Another important practical problem, Strang said, is to find a formula of just who are Poles to be "protected" in view of the wide divergence on this question between the Soviet and Polish Governments. He said at any rate he understood that Romer and his Embassy have been given an additional week to prepare for their departure and one should not entirely exclude the possibility of patching the matter up before the Polish Embassy actually departs. As to possible Polish action to facilitate a settlement, he said that Sikorski might be willing to make some changes in his Government though it was difficult to do this under pressure. He added that as a matter of fact most of the violent Polish Russophobes were in the ranks of the opposition to Sikorski's Government. Incidentally, he added that the break with Russia had strengthened Sikorski's position internally with his own people.

Strang seemed resigned to our decision that it would be inadvisable for the United States to assume the role of protecting power and made no comment other than to indicate he was not surprised.

WINANT

760C.61/1075: Telegram

The Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile (Biddle) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, May 6, 1943—10 p. m.

[Received May 7—11:30 p. m.]

Polish Series [No.] 30. In reply to M. Stalin's statement which I understand was carried in the *New York Times* this morning to effect that (a) the Soviet Government unquestionably desired to see a strong and independent post-war Poland; and (b) in his opinion Polish-Russian post-war relations should be founded upon mutual reserve [*respect?*] and good neighborly relations, or, in the event the Polish people so desired, upon the basis of a mutual assistance alliance against the Germans, Sikorski has released the following statement:

"Premier Stalin's words correspond to the opinion he expressed to me during my stay in Moscow in December 1941. Indeed, the Germans have been for ages the common and implacable enemy of both the Poles and the Russians. The Polish nation wants, of course, to continue its friendly relations with Soviet Russia and base them on an alliance directed against Germany. It is however difficult for me not to be restrained even in the face of such a favorable declaration

by Premier Stalin, at the very moment when the Polish Ambassador is leaving Russia and the masses of Polish populations in the U.S.S.R. are left without the care and assistance of their Government. Yet despite this and many other facts, the Polish Government is ready to give a positive answer to any Soviet initiative which will coincide with the interests of the Polish Republic, as defined in our common declaration of December 4, 1941, and in my speech of May 4, 1943."⁷⁰ (Latter includes expectation of release by Soviet authorities of tens of thousands of members of Polish soldiers' families, Polish children and orphans and all Poles fit to bear arms, and continuation of welfare and relief work for Polish citizens in Russia.)

Sikorski tells me he was notified at 1:30 this morning by the London *Times* office of M. Stalin's statement. He immediately drew up the foregoing reply and after consultation with the British Foreign Office released it in the hope it would reach *New York Times* office in time also to be included in this morning's edition.

In commenting to me on Stalin's statement, Sikorski said his first reaction was that it might seem to offer some hope for reknitting relations but that in fact it threw no new light on Russia's policy and did not touch on any of the concrete problems that had given rise to the break in relations.

[BIDDLE]

760C.61/1079 : Telegram

The Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile (Biddle) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, May 8, 1943—4 p. m.

[Received May 8—1:15 p. m.]

Polish Series [No.] 31. My 30, May 6, 10 p. m. Sikorski informs me British Government yesterday received a letter from Soviet Government indicating willingness for a settlement of the Polish-Russian rupture but emphasizing that this would not be possible unless there were changes in the Polish Government and in the attitude of the Polish press and propaganda.

Sikorski states that in conveying substance of this letter to him the British authorities expressed the hope that he might see his way clear to making a contribution towards mending the break in relations. Sikorski replied that he would consult his associates with that end in view.

Sikorski states further that en route from this conference to his office he was greeted by headlines in the afternoon papers featuring

⁷⁰ A translation of Sikorski's address in commemoration of Poland's National Day (anniversary of the Constitution of May 3, 1791), broadcast to Poland by the B.B.C. on May 4, 1943, was transmitted to the Department by Ambassador Biddle in despatch Polish Series No. 313, May 8, 1943, not printed.

Vice Commissar for Foreign Affairs Vishinski's charges that the Poles in Russia had engaged in espionage and that the Polish Government had refused to permit the Polish forces in Russia to fight shoulder to shoulder with the Red army.⁷¹ Annoyed that in these times of strict censorship the British press should thus have been permitted to feature such charges, Sikorski immediately addressed a letter to Mr. Eden expressing his regrets on the above score and indicating his surprise as well as regret that, after Stalin had appeared to wish to raise the dispute to a higher plane of discussion, Vishinski should have been allowed to resort to such tactics. It had only served to make an already difficult situation more difficult for him (Sikorski).

Indeed, Sikorski continued, the charges were such that his Government felt that in due justice to itself it was compelled to issue a reply which took the form of a statement by Count Raczynski, Polish Foreign Minister, carried in today's press stating (1) that the evacuation of the Polish Army from the U.S.S.R. was not intended by the Polish Government but should be attributed to the Soviet Government which had at the time indicated its inability to provide the necessary food and equipment; and (2) that the charges of espionage in favor of Germany were "fantastic".⁷²

Sikorski states that in drawing up his statement Raczynski had strict instructions to keep it on a dignified plane but not to sacrifice any matters of substance.

[BIDDLE]

760C.61/1080 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, May 8, 1943—11 p. m.

[Received May 9—8:30 p. m.]

415. The British Ambassador has informed me of his conversation with Stalin last night stating that the Department would be advised in full by his Foreign Office.⁷³ I am consequently not reporting our conversation in detail. Of especial interest he stated that Stalin did not seem to attribute too great importance to the Polish break and

⁷¹ Mr. Vishinsky's statement, made to British and American press representatives in Moscow on May 6, 1943, was published in the *New York Times* of May 8, 1943, and in the *Information Bulletin*, issued by the Soviet Embassy in the United States, dated May 11, 1943.

⁷² Copy of the full text of the statement by the Polish Foreign Minister was transmitted to the Department by the Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile in his despatch No. 314, May 8, not printed. It was published in the *New York Times* of May 8, 1943.

⁷³ No such communication found in Department files.

though apparently not holding Sikorski in high regard claiming him to be weak and susceptible to influences of the pro-German elements in the Polish Government was inclined to accept him as the leader of a reconstituted Polish Government provided Churchill and the President so desired. A change in the top position of the Polish Government, however, was a prerequisite of a resumption in relations.

Clark Kerr stated that the British had taken over Polish interests for the time being although they considered it impractical to take any active part in day to day matters while engaged in the broader aspects of the dispute. For this reason it had been proposed that the Canadians or Australians who had little to do here should take over this work. Although the Canadians had refused it was still hoped that the Australians would accept the responsibility.

In my conversation with Molotov on May 6 I stated that speaking entirely personally and without instructions if there were anything I could transmit to my Government with a view to regularizing the present unfortunate state of Soviet-Polish relations I hoped that he would not hesitate to call on me. Speaking without bitterness Molotov replied that the position of the Soviet Government was explained in Stalin's letter to Parker ⁷⁴ which defined the Soviet basis of Soviet-Polish relations, that the Soviet Government had only good intentions vis-à-vis Poland and desired to do anything that would be in the common interests and further the common effort of the Allies provided, of course, that the interests of the Soviet Union were reserved. However, he added as a personal comment he doubted that it would be possible to come to terms with the present Polish Government.

STANDLEY

760C.61/1084 : Telegram

The Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile (Biddle) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, May 10, 1943—10 p. m.

[Received May 10—6 p. m.]

Polish Series [No.] 34. Supplementing my 31, May 8, 4 p. m. In conversation with Sikorski today, he said in connection with the problem of working out the reestablishment of Soviet-Polish relations that he and his Government had been encouraged by a number of sources to hold steadfastly to the attitude of not sacrificing matters of substance, notably by M. Huseyin Orbay, the Turkish Ambassador to Great Britain (who recently also told me that his countrymen would

⁷⁴ See telegram No. 405, May 5, 3 p. m., from the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, p. 412.

be looking with anxiety at the outcome of the current Polish-Russian controversy, and that he hoped the Allies would not withhold support from the Poles), and by officials of the Greek and Yugoslav Governments here. Their attitude in brief, Sikorski said, was that this was a "test case".

King Haakon ⁷⁵ also told me in strict confidence that members of his predominantly socialist government had become so disturbed by these events (the King used the term "communist-shy") that he had felt it necessary to try to bring their attitude into better perspective.

[BIDDLE]

704.60C61/5 : Telegram

The Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile (Biddle) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, May 10, 1943—midnight.

[Received May 10—8:44 p. m.]

Polish Series [No.] 35. After frankly telling me that the British Government hesitated to accede to his request that the British Ambassador in Kuibyshev be allowed to protect Polish interests in Russia, Sikorski asked me to express his earnest hope that we might see our way clear to permit our Ambassador to assume at least the nominal protection of Polish interests. The reason, he said, for the use of the word "nominal" was because he felt that our Embassy might not be sufficiently staffed to undertake all aspects of the task involved.

He wondered whether in event of our favorable consideration of his request our Ambassador might appoint someone to assume control of the Polish stores already established; 35 percent of the supplies and 90 percent of the clothing apparel had originated in the United States.

The problems he expected to arise in the near future were "the evacuation of two categories of Poles": (a) The Poles about whose nationality there was no dispute particularly those from western Poland who found themselves in eastern Poland at the time of the Russian 1939 plebiscite; and (b) the families of officers and soldiers. He said that the Polish forces in the Middle East and those here whose families are in Russia were already clamoring for information as to who is to take over the protection of Polish interests.

In the circumstances he urged me to express his sincere hope that we would give favorable consideration to his most earnest request.

[BIDDLE]

⁷⁵ Haakon VII, King of Norway.

760C.61/1089 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, May 12, 1943—11 p. m.

[Received May 13—3 a. m.]

3309. Late this afternoon I talked with Eden. He told me he had seen Maisky and that Maisky seemed much more reasonable in discussing the Russian-Polish situation. Eden told Maisky he understood Sikorski planned to go to the Middle East to review his troops. That he, Eden, approved of this trip, that while there he hoped Sikorski might be able to find individuals who would fit into the present Polish Government. Eden told Maisky that the British Government could not at this time force a reorganization of the Polish Government. He also told Maisky that changes in the Polish Government would take time. Maisky did not appear to object to this position.

WINANT

706.60C41/10 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile (Biddle), at London

WASHINGTON, May 14, 1943—2 p. m.

3079. With reference to your 35, May 10, midnight, the Department has been informed by the British Embassy that the British Government has consented to take over temporarily the representation of Polish interests in the Soviet Union and has so informed the Soviet Government.

When the question of the representation of Polish interests in the Soviet Union was brought informally to the attention of the Department by the Polish Embassy and also by Lord Halifax they were informed that this Government was anxious to avoid any action indicating that we regarded the rupture in relations as other than merely temporary and it was our belief that we would be in a better position to act in endeavoring to heal the Polish-Soviet breach if we were not simultaneously representing Polish interests in the Soviet Union.

Since the British have followed up their initial action in taking over the archives by assuming temporarily the representation of Polish interests you may, in your discretion, inform General Sikorski of the reasons for our reluctance to take over Polish interests and explain that we feel that the question has been satisfactorily disposed of for the time being.

HULL

706.60C41/11 : Telegram

*The Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile (Biddle) to the
Secretary of State*

LONDON, May 15, 1943—midnight.

[Received May 16—4:22 a. m.]

Polish Series [No.] 36. I have just explained your position to General Sikorski in the sense of your 3079, May 14, 2 p. m. In response he said the British Government had just informed him that for similar reasons British Government had considered it advisable to have the Chief of the Australian Mission in Kuibyshev ⁷⁶ assume protection of Polish interests.⁷⁷ He was grateful to the Australians but naturally disappointed that it was not the British representative who was undertaking the task.

He emphasized his opinion that it was most important that we and the British render the Australian Mission firm support in its task. Any signs of weakness at this time would only serve to encourage what he considered was Russia's desire to use the Polish-Russian situation as a stepping stone for Communist infiltration not only in the middle zone but also in the western part of the Continent. While he was deeply aware of his responsibility to his own nation and to his Allies and would accordingly place no obstacle in the way of healing the breach in Polish-Russian relations, he finds little if any ground for hope for reestablishment of relations.

He went on to say that yesterday the Counselor of the Polish Embassy to Great Britain ⁷⁸ had been approached by an American friend of Maisky with the following conditions for a renewal of relations: (a) A reconstructed government with emphasis on the necessity of replacing Minister for Information Kot; (b) suppression of the Polish press; (c) tranquilization of the anti-Soviet attitude of the Polish forces here and in the Middle East.

When the foregoing was communicated to Sikorski he instructed Kulski to reply to his informant along the following lines as though it were his own reaction: In reply to (a) that in his private opinion the replacement of Kot and/or others by men of a more pro-Soviet frame of mind might possibly be brought about if M. Molotov in turn were replaced by someone less anti-Polish than himself; that this would be only a question of equal treatment; in reply to (b) that he was aware that the Polish press had already altered its tone; in reply

⁷⁶ William Slater, Australian Minister in the Soviet Union.

⁷⁷ In telegram No. 326, May 18, 7 p. m., the Department notified the Ambassador in the Soviet Union that it had been informally advised by the British that the Australian Government had consented, subject to Soviet approval, to take over the representation of Polish interests in the Soviet Union (706.60C47/1).

⁷⁸ Wladislaw Kulski.

to (c) that he was aware that Sikorski had already given orders to that effect; in fact Sikorski planned to go to the Middle East shortly in order personally to see to it that his orders were carried out.

Sikorski has just been informed by a usually reliable source that Maisky's agents were already preparing a brochure severely attacking the various members of the Polish Government. This, he said, did not give much hope for an amelioration in the attitude of the Russian Embassies here which were constantly envisaged [*endeavoring?*] through directions to the *Daily Worker* and other Communist Party organs here to diminish the authority and prestige of the Polish Government.

[BIDDLE]

760C.61/2025½

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Elbridge Durbrow of the
Division of European Affairs*

[WASHINGTON,] May 17, 1943.

Mr. Russell ⁷⁹ informed me today that the British Government was somewhat alarmed by the report that a Polish Legion was to be formed in the USSR from former Poles domiciled in the Eastern provinces of Poland ⁸⁰ and had instructed their Ambassador in Moscow to discuss this question with the Soviet Government. The British Government stated that it could not understand how a separate Polish Legion could be formed of Polish citizens since the Soviet Government had recently stated that there were no longer any Polish citizens in the USSR.

Furthermore, the British Government asked its Ambassador in Moscow to ask for a clarification from the Soviet Government as to the purpose for which the Union of Polish Patriots had been set up in the USSR.* The Ambassador was instructed to bring to the attention of the Soviet Government the fact that the recognition of this Polish Committee was similar to the action taken during the last war in recognizing a Czech Committee in London ⁸¹ prior to the granting of full recognition to the Czech Government and to point out to the Soviet Government that the recognition of this Committee was not in conformity with the assurances given by Mr. Stalin to Mr. Churchill

⁷⁹ John W. Russell, Second Secretary of the British Embassy in the United States.

⁸⁰ The Polish Ambassador, in a personal letter of May 13 to the Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs, had called attention to this action (760C.61/1099).

*This organization was referred to in Moscow press despatches on May 13, 1943. [Footnote in the original memorandum.]

⁸¹ For recognition by the United States of the Czecho-Slovak National Council on September 3, 1918, see telegram to the Ambassador in Japan, September 3, 1918, *Foreign Relations*, 1918, supp. 1, vol. 1, p. 824.

that the Soviet Government did not intend to set up a rival Polish Government in the USSR.

In regard to British efforts being made to heal the breach in diplomatic relations Mr. Russell stated that the British Government at the present time was endeavoring to use its influence to heal the breach ⁸² and at the same time to obtain the consent of the Soviet Government to secure the departure from the USSR of members of the families of the Polish armed forces as well as other categories of Polish citizens, particularly those who were formerly domiciled west of the Molotov-Ribbentrop line, and Polish orphans.

Mr. Russell added that it was his understanding that the British Government was discussing the question of the evacuation of certain categories of Poles at the same time it was endeavoring to heal the breach in order to keep the entire question open.

ELBRIDGE DUSBROW

706.60C47/4

The Australian Minister for External Affairs (Evatt) to the Secretary of State ⁸³

WASHINGTON, May 21, 1943.

DEAR MR. CORDELL HULL: For your most confidential information, a new arrangement has been come to by which Australia will take over the representation of Polish interests in the U.S.S.R. This arrangement was made between the Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill and myself, with the fullest consent of the British Government. The arrangement was stated by the Prime Minister to be "entirely agreeable" to the President.

M. Molotov has now indicated his consent. No publication whatever is to be made for the present.

In the course of the statement, the Australian representative at Moscow said "the proposal of Australia is made solely with the desire to promote the common interests of the United Nations and is animated by a warm admiration for the peoples of Soviet Russia and Poland alike". I feel it my duty to let you know.

Yours sincerely,

H. V. EVATT

⁸² In a memorandum of May 20 (760C.61/20254), Mr. Durbrow recorded that Mr. Donald Hall, First Secretary of the British Embassy, had shown him copies of telegrams from the British Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the British Foreign Office. In a telegram of May 17, the British Ambassador had expressed hope that in his efforts to heal the breach in Polish-Soviet relations he could count upon the assistance of the American Ambassador, but had added that unfortunately the American Ambassador had so far not received any instructions in this regard.

⁸³ This letter was written by the Australian Minister for External Affairs while he was at the Australian Legation in Washington.

861.012/217 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, May 23, 1943—3 p. m.

[Received May 26—2 p. m.]

510. The British Ambassador has informed me of the following answers Molotov gave to him to questions raised regarding the Union of Polish Patriots and the new Polish Legion.

1. With respect to the statement that the Legion would be recruited mainly from Poles formerly living in the eastern provinces Molotov endeavored to explain that there was a distinction between nationality and citizenship and that while recruits would be drawn largely from persons who had been living in the western Ukraine and White Russia these persons, though Polish by nationality, were in fact Soviet citizens. He saw nothing incongruous in this.

2. In answer to a question whether the Union of Polish Patriots resembled the Czech or French National Committees Molotov replied emphatically in the negative, insisting that there was no similarity whatsoever. He also denied that the Union could be regarded as a competing Polish authority in the Soviet Union and stated that the activities of the Union would be purely a matter of internal policy and in no way connected with Soviet foreign policy. Maisky has confirmed this to Eden.

3. In reply to a question as to where was the dividing line between the Union's activities and those of the Government in charge of Polish interests he stated that there was no room for misunderstanding or conflict, that the line was sharply drawn, that the term "Soviet citizen" embraced all those domiciled in western Ukraine and White Russia and that the question of Polish citizenship was quite a different one. He said that it was true that no common ground had been reached with the Polish Government on this question but that the Soviet Union adhered to its position that Polish nationals evacuated from western Poland to Western White Russia remained Poles regardless of their extraction. These nationals were in general from German-occupied Poland. There were, however, some borderline cases which were subject to discussion.

4. Molotov took pains to emphasize that his Government had published the aims of the Union for the specific purpose of forestalling and dispelling any misgivings that might arise in regard to it.

STANDLEY

840.48 Refugees/3877

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Elbridge Durbrow of the
Division of European Affairs*

[WASHINGTON,] June 2, 1943.

Mr. Donald Hall called today at his request to inform the Department that a telegram had been received from the Foreign Office expressing the hope that, in compliance with the agreement between the President and Mr. Churchill, instructions had been sent to Admiral Standley requesting that he support the British Ambassador's efforts in Moscow to reach an agreement with the Soviet Government to permit the evacuation of certain categories of Polish citizens, particularly relatives of the armed forces of Poland and Polish orphans.

Mr. Hall stated that during the Prime Minister's visit ⁸⁴ he had received from the Foreign Office a telegram suggesting that he take up with the President the question of American support of the British position in regard to the evacuation of Poles from the USSR and that the President and Mr. Hopkins ⁸⁵ had agreed to send appropriate instructions to Admiral Standley.

In this connection Mr. Hall stated that Sir Ronald Campbell ⁸⁶ hoped to call on the Secretary today or tomorrow in order to ascertain whether such instructions had been sent so that he could reply to the latest telegram from the Foreign Office asking for information on this subject.

Mr. Hall suggested that the Secretary might be informed of the proposed visit of Sir Ronald Campbell and that if the Secretary could not see him that I might be in a position to give him an answer to this inquiry.

I informed Mr. Hall that I had no information on this subject but would take up the matter with the appropriate officials of the Department.

ELBRIDGE DURBROW

760C.61/2045

*The Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile (Biddle) to the
Under Secretary of State (Welles)*

LONDON, June 2, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: In the belief that it may be of interest and possibly helpful in connection with problems arising from the

⁸⁴ The records of the Third Washington Conference, May 12-25, 1943, between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, are scheduled for publication in a subsequent volume of *Foreign Relations*.

⁸⁵ Harry L. Hopkins, Special Assistant to President Roosevelt.

⁸⁶ British Minister in the United States.

suspension of Polish-Russian relations, I beg to mention the following thoughts which have occurred to me, and which might possibly correspond to General Sikorski's views.

In the first place, it now seems clear that the three main points upon which Moscow would insist as conditions for a resumption of relations are: 1/ changes in the composition of the Polish Government; 2/ suppression of part, and a friendly attitude of the remaining section of the Polish press; 3/ tranquilization of the anti-Soviet attitude of the Polish armed forces both here and in the Middle East.

As regards the first condition, it might, in my opinion, be possible for Sikorski to meet this without impairing the dignity and prestige of the Polish position* provided (a) he carried it out by stages over an extended period, say 6 to 8 weeks, and (b) the changes were effected on the pretext both of differences in matters of internal policy, and of the General's belief that a "change of guard" is from time to time a wholesome move.†

Furthermore, by proceeding thus Sikorski would be the less likely to appear to be acting under direct pressure from Moscow.

It seems to me, moreover, that provided this procedure were conducted quietly, with a minimum of publicity, and provided the Russians were sincerely willing to accept the fulfilment of the foregoing, among other conditions, as a basis for the renewal of relations, the way might thus possibly have been cleared for a resumption, perhaps by late Summer—early Fall.

In talks with General Sikorski, previous to his very recent departure for the Middle East, where he expects to remain about six weeks, I gained the impression that he was inclined to keep an open mind in the matter. I therefore believe that if he could be brought to feel reasonably sure of obtaining effective results from the application of a formula somewhat along the above suggested lines, he might give it his favorable consideration.

As regards the Russian conditions for a resumption of relations, both Russian Ambassadors Maisky and Bogomolov, in their conversations respectively with Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Jan Masaryk and with me, concurred in their insistence upon the reconstruction of the Polish Government. In comparing their statements on this

*In further regard to the question of a change in the composition of the Polish Government, I have long felt that Sikorski would do well to replace at least several of his Cabinet Ministers. I have in mind particularly Minister for Information Kot, and Minister without Portfolio, in charge of the Department of Post-War Planning, Marian Seyda. For your further information, the attached memorandum contains additional details on this score. [Footnote in the original. Attached memorandum not printed.]

†"change of guard" is an expression conceived and used by the late Marshal Pilsudski and subsequently used by other Polish leaders, to explain to the people changes they were making in the composition of their respective Governments. [Footnote in the original.]

aspect, however, I note a difference in detail. Bogomolov insisted upon a "replacement of the Sikorski Government" by one which would be friendly and more realistic towards the USSR; Maisky told Masaryk he considered that his Government might find its way clear to working with Sikorski and Raczyński; that they were more realistic than other members of the Polish Government. I am inclined to feel that Maisky's statement corresponds more than Bogomolov's with the terms upon which Moscow might be willing to settle. In appraising the difference between the statements of the two Ambassadors, I am inclined to ascribe Bogomolov's more drastic tone partly to the quarrelsome relations which he has personally experienced with the Poles over recent months.

As regards the Polish press, the two Ambassadors were in effect alike in insisting upon its suppression except for one official organ.

As regards the question of tranquilizing the openly anti-Soviet attitude of the Polish armed forces, here again the Ambassadors differed, for, I believe, the same reasons as above cited. Maisky said there would have to be a tranquilization of the anti-Soviet attitude among the Polish armed forces both here and in the Middle East, and the elimination of the sources of inspiration of this attitude, in view of the long-range as well as of the immediate bearing thereof on Polish-Russian relations. Bogomolov, for his part, said that the Polish military authorities would have to rid the army of the "militantly anti-Soviet, Pilsudski-ist officers" from the forces both here and in the Middle East.

As regards the frontier question, Maisky said this might best be left for discussion later on, or even after the war. Bogomolov said this was a closed question as far as those parts of Soviet White Russia and Soviet Ukraine which had formed part of pre-war Poland, were concerned.

With warmest regards and my every good wish,

Faithfully yours,

ANTHONY BIDDLE, JR.

760C.61/2022 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, June 4, 1943—1 p. m.

[Received 3:54 p. m.]

596. The British Ambassador on three occasions has asked me whether I had received any instructions from my Government relative to the taking of action jointly with him in regard to the Polish situa-

tion. He indicated that he had been informed that I would receive such instructions and appeared disturbed at my reply in the negative.

STANDLEY

President Roosevelt to the Polish Prime Minister (Sikorski) ⁸⁷

WASHINGTON, June 7, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER: Thank you for your kind letter of May 4 which I have read with deep interest.

I need hardly assure you that I have been following with concern the developments in the Eastern European situation and desire to do what may appear to be most effective in healing on an equitable basis what I trust is only a temporary suspension of United Nations' unity.

I was particularly gratified to have your assurances that you and your Government are anxious to do everything in your power to re-establish the united front against our common enemy and to work together with the other United Nations, including the Soviet Union, with a view to bringing the war to a victorious conclusion.

On its part the United States Government will continue to cooperate with your Government and all the Governments of the United Nations in attempting to bring about maximum understanding among these nations in order that the full weight of our armed forces may be brought to bear against our common enemy and thus hasten victory and a lasting peace based on justice and goodwill.

Sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

760C.61/2056

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt

[WASHINGTON,] June 9, 1943.

Sir Ronald Campbell, Minister Counselor of the British Embassy, called at the Department today under instructions from his Government to ask that this Government support the efforts of the British Ambassador in Moscow to induce the Soviet Government to consent to the evacuation of certain categories of Polish citizens from the Soviet Union.

The Minister indicated that the British Government had instructed the British Ambassador in Moscow to request the agreement of the

⁸⁷ Copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y. A notation in the margin reads: "Signed original of this letter sent to the Office of the Secy. State."

Soviet Government to the evacuation of the following categories of Polish civilians in the order named:

1. Relatives and members of the Polish armed forces already abroad.
2. Poles whose domicile was west of the Molotov-Ribbentrop line of 1939 (the line dividing Poland between Germany and the Soviet Union).
3. Polish orphans.

No previous discussion of this proposed approach to the Soviet Government has come to the attention of the Department of State.

Sir Ronald Campbell was informed that this request would be laid before the President for his consideration.

In connection with this request it is felt that if you are in agreement that it would be advisable at this time to send instructions to Admiral Standley regarding the Polish-Soviet dispute, the best course to pursue would be to collaborate with the British in this matter but to approach the problem from a broader base.

It is still felt that while collaborating with the British it would be advisable to present an American solution to the problem, the practical aspects of which are outlined beginning with the last paragraph on page 3 of the telegram to Mr. Churchill which was drafted some time ago but which apparently was not sent. For convenient reference a copy of this telegram is attached.⁸⁸

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

760C.61/2022: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Standley)*⁸⁹

WASHINGTON, June 12, 1943—9 p. m.

427. With reference to your 596, June 4, 1 p. m., the President agrees in principle that we should synchronize our efforts with the British in an endeavor to resolve the Polish-Soviet dispute. It is felt, however, that the problem should be broached from a broader base than the present British proposals.

The Department has not instructed you heretofore to take up this question with the Soviet Government since it was hoped that the breach might be healed. In view of the continued break in relations and in view of the extreme importance placed on the question of the necessity for unity among all United Nations in achieving the primary objective before us—the defeat of our common enemy—it is now felt

⁸⁸ Draft telegram not printed, but see telegram No. 427, June 12, to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, *infra*.

⁸⁹ Quoted in telegram No. 3663 on the same date to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom.

that an effort should be made to bring the Soviet and Polish Governments together again.

If you concur please consult with your British colleague to ascertain whether he agrees that the approach set forth below may not offer a more far-reaching solution of the question :

The Department feels that the principal object of any attempted solution of this question should be the formal resumption of diplomatic relations on a sound basis under which the grievances of the past would not be permitted to plague the future.

It is believed that an attempt at solution of the practical problems which would lead to a resumption of relations should be approached on the following broad basis which from a study of recent Polish-Soviet relations would, it is felt, eliminate the principal defects in the July 1941 agreement.

1. One of the major defects in the 1941 agreement as supplemented by informal agreements was the setting up of what amounted to an extraterritorial apparatus of a foreign government functioning in the Soviet Union. It is believed, therefore, that a more workable solution could be reached if the Poles would agree to permit relief and welfare work to be carried on by Soviet organizations with, of course, the understanding that Polish citizens would receive treatment no less favorable than that granted to Soviet citizens in similar circumstances. If the Poles would agree to this, the Russians on their part might be prepared to permit Polish citizens in the Soviet Union to have contact with appropriate Polish consular officers.

2. With regard to the question of citizenship, which must be resolved before any just or lasting resumption of relations can be brought about, it might be more practical and helpful to approach this problem on the following broad lines in order to avoid any reference to the territorial question which must of necessity be eliminated from any discussions at this time :

- (a) The Russians and Poles should permit the non-racial Poles to opt for Polish or Soviet citizenship.
- (b) All racial Poles who were domiciled in Poland on September 1, 1939 should be recognized by the Soviet Government as Polish citizens and would, therefore, not be called upon to opt.

3. Particular importance should be placed on the problem of evacuating from the Soviet Union Polish citizens who have close relatives abroad, especially those who are members of the immediate families of men in the Polish armed forces. Similarly every effort should be made for the evacuation, as soon as suitable arrangements can be made for their care elsewhere, of Polish orphans and other Polish children who cannot be properly cared for in the Soviet Union.

4. The question of recruiting for the Polish armed forces, which is an essential problem in the furtherance of the prosecution of the war, might well be taken up subsequently, provided it appears that agreement can be reached on the other fundamental questions.

In presenting such proposals to the Soviets emphasis should be placed on the obvious necessity of doing everything possible to close our ranks and thus bring our full and combined weight to bear in prosecution of the war. If during conversations relating to this subject, the question of a change in the Polish Government should be raised it should be made clear that since this Government follows a policy of noninterference in the internal affairs of any of the United Nations, it cannot bring any pressure on the Polish Government in this respect either directly or indirectly and could not look with favor on any proposal that we interfere in Poland's internal affairs.

This telegram has been repeated to Ambassador Winant for his confidential information in order that he may be informed of the Department's views on this question in the event that Clark Kerr should seek instructions in this connection and Eden wish to raise the subject with Ambassador Winant.

The Polish Government has as yet not been consulted in this matter.

Before taking up this question with the Soviets, the Department would appreciate having the benefit of your ideas on the suggested approach as well as those of your British colleague.

HULL

760C.61/2022 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Standley)*⁹⁰

WASHINGTON, June 12, 1943—10 p. m.

428. With reference to my immediately preceding telegram regarding the Polish-Soviet dispute it is perhaps pertinent to point out for your information that it is the Department's understanding that the British proposals envisage only efforts to obtain the consent of the Soviet Government to the evacuation of the following categories of Polish civilians in the order of importance indicated:

1. Close relatives of Polish armed forces already abroad.
2. Poles whose domicile was west of 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop line.
3. Polish orphans.

In this connection it is not clear here whether the British approach contemplates requesting the release of only those Poles in categories 1 and 3 who were domiciled west of the 1939 line or whether it envisages all Polish civilians who fall into these categories.

⁹⁰ Quoted in telegram No. 3663 on the same date to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom.

The Department feels that if this summary of the British proposal is correct, category 2 should in any case not be used as a basis of discussion since it automatically brings up the frontier question which it is felt must not be discussed at this time.

HULL

760C.61/2045a

The Under Secretary of State (Welles) to the Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile (Biddle), at London

WASHINGTON, June 16, 1943.

MY DEAR AMBASSADOR: I have received and read your most interesting letter in regard to the present situation of the Soviet-Polish diplomatic break. I fully share your views as to the importance of doing everything we can to bring about a restoration of diplomatic relations between the Soviet and Polish Governments on a firm and lasting basis.

The suggestions which you make in your letter as to the possible means of bringing this about, based on your intimate contacts in London with the representatives of both the Soviet Union and Poland, have been given the most careful study here.

We have of course followed closely the Soviet-Polish controversy and have come to the conclusion that any restoration of relations must be of such a character as to provide an elimination of as many as possible of the factors which were responsible for the present breach. We are quite firm, however, in our determination not to be a party to any discussions of future frontiers at the present stage of the war.

We have received the same impression as yourself that the immediate desire of the Soviet Government is to bring about a change in the composition of the Polish Government-in-exile. While some changes might prove advantageous after the restoration of relations, on the basis indicated above, we do not feel that it would be proper for us to bring pressure on Sikorski to change the composition of the Polish Government in order to satisfy the Soviet Government. In our opinion it would be unfortunate for a precedent to be established under which the government of one United Nation could successfully force changes in the composition of another government of the United Nations.

We are endeavoring to work out with the British some form of joint approach which will offer the best possibility of an equitable solution of the Polish-Soviet dispute and you will be informed when we have arrived at some common ground with them.

Believe me,

Yours very sincerely,

SUMNER WELLES

760C.61/6-1843

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division
of European Affairs (Henderson)*

[WASHINGTON,] June 18, 1943.

The Polish Ambassador came in to see me this morning at his request. He said that he was extremely disturbed about the lack of progress which had been made towards bringing about a *rapprochement* between the Polish and Soviet Governments. He had just received a telegram from his Foreign Minister in London stating that Eden had informed the Foreign Minister that thus far the American Government had failed to cooperate with the British Government in endeavors to induce the Soviet Government to assume a more friendly attitude with regard to the Polish Government.

The Ambassador stated that he was somewhat surprised to hear this since it had been his understanding that Mr. Davies had taken up the Polish question while in Moscow. He asked whether to my knowledge Mr. Davies discussed this matter. I told the Ambassador that I could not reply to his question since Mr. Davies went to the Soviet Union as a representative of the President; that such conversations as he had there were on behalf of the President; and that I had no knowledge whatsoever of the character of these conversations.

The Ambassador said that his Foreign Minister had requested him again to approach the American Government with regard to the Polish-Soviet difficulties and to stress to the American Government the importance of some kind of an approach by the American Government to the Soviet Government in the nearest possible future on the subject of Polish-Soviet relations. It was the opinion of the Polish Government that if it would be possible for the British and American Governments to approach the Soviet Government jointly in this matter, their *démarche* might have some possibility of success.

I told the Polish Ambassador that I would bring his statement to the attention of the appropriate officials of the Department.

LOY W. HENDERSON

760C.61/2047 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary
of State*

Moscow, June 18, 1943—1 p. m.

[Received 11 : 13 p. m.]

689. Department's 427, June 12, 9 p. m. I thoroughly agree that we should synchronize our efforts with the British in an endeavor to

solve the Soviet-Polish dispute but feel that we should consider this question more realistically before any approach is made to the Soviet Government. The Department's telegram under reference appears to me to be based too strongly on the Polish desiderata and does not take into sufficient account the basic Soviet reasons for the breach in relations. At the same time the Department apparently believes that the Soviet Government can be prevailed upon to resume relations with the present Polish Government when as I have reported (see my 415, May 8, 11 p. m.) there seems to be every indication that it will categorically refuse to do so. In discussing the Department's telegram with Clark Kerr I find that we both feel that unless we are willing to discuss the basic reasons for the break (the composition of the Polish Government and the question of frontiers) no useful purpose will be served by an approach here on the broad basis suggested by the Department. The main purpose of our endeavors is obviously to bring the two Governments together again and we do not believe that this can be achieved unless agreement is reached on at least one of the two principal Soviet reasons for the dispute.

The British Ambassador and I are in substantial agreement that the time has not come for action here on so broad a basis as that set forth in the Department's telegram and that the only hope of progress lies in a step by step approach. We believe that for our immediate purposes the Department's suggested approach goes too far in that it touches upon the important question of citizenship which we feel reasonably sure the Soviet Government will not be willing to discuss at this stage unless the frontier question is considered and which if brought up now might give the Russians pretext to turn their backs on our representations.

We feel that our first preoccupation must be to prevail upon General Sikorsky to eliminate from his Government those elements whose presence in it make harmony with the Soviet Government impossible. We both understand the reluctance of our Governments to interfere in the internal affairs of another of the United Nations under normal circumstances but we believe that the present situation is not normal and not subject to normal treatment.

The British Ambassador and I therefore wish to submit the following views in which we are in accord:

1. The American and British Governments should discuss with General Sikorsky the subject of the resumption of Polish-Soviet relations and endeavor to ascertain whether he would be willing to choose an appropriate moment to make changes in his Cabinet. We both feel that our Government[s] should endeavor to persuade Sikorsky to examine this question realistically.

2. The relief of Poles in the Soviet Union should for the present time be left in the hands of Soviet agencies (see my 678, June 18⁹¹) although it is doubtful that any effective aid will be rendered the Poles by this action. We doubt that Polish Consuls will be admitted into the Soviet Union even after the resumption of relations but we feel that this question should be left to the Poles to work out with the Russians when the time comes.

3. Since the question of citizenship is closely connected with the frontier problem we feel that it is entirely too delicate a matter to be raised at this stage.

4. While point 1 is being worked out we might with some hope of success approach the Soviet Government with respect to the question of the evacuation of certain categories of Poles from the Soviet Union. The first group (close relatives) mentioned in the Department's telegram No. 428 of June 12 should present no insuperable difficulties. I believe that the evacuation of the second group (Poles domiciled west of 1939 frontier) would certainly stir up the question of boundaries and should be avoided at this time. The British Ambassador does not share my views on this point and believes that this group might be safely included in our representations. The third (orphans and children) we feel we might take up on humanitarian grounds and especially now with some force inasmuch as our two Governments are doing all they can to ship food to this country and every mouth that can be removed to eat elsewhere will ease the food problem here.

The British Ambassador and I agree that the recruiting of Poles should not be discussed at this stage but should be left for subsequent negotiations. In this connection see my 678, June 18.

STANDLEY

760C.61/2047: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Standley)*

WASHINGTON, June 29, 1943—2 p. m.

497. The Department has given careful consideration to the suggestions contained in your 689, June 18, 1 p. m., for the solution of the Polish-Soviet dispute and appreciates fully your apprehension that the Department's tentative proposals may not lead to an immediate resolution of the many and complex problems involved.

It is felt, however, that this dispute is so fundamental in connection with bringing, if possible, the full weight of all the United Nations to bear on the prosecution of the war against our common enemies and in solving on a permanent and equitable basis the complex post-war problems that every effort should be made at this time to set forth our conception of the basic problems involved and to try to resolve

⁹¹ Not printed; it transmitted to the Department the texts of letters exchanged between the first Congress of the Union of Polish Patriots (the Soviet-organized group of Poles in the Soviet Union), which had opened in Moscow on June 8, 1943, and Stalin, as reported in *Pravda* of June 17, 1943 (760C.61/2048).

the fundamental questions at issue, even though initial success might not be achieved.

On the basis of information available to the Department it appears that one of the principal reasons which induced the Soviet Government to break with the Poles may have been the desire to make it clear to all neighboring governments that their continued existence will depend upon the degree of their willingness to accede to Soviet demands upon them and to adopt [*adapt?*] their foreign policies to those of the Soviet Union.

Because of the far-reaching repercussions which would undoubtedly ensue from any move on our part to bring pressure on the Polish Government to change the composition of its Cabinet, it is felt that we should endeavor to resolve the dispute on a just and equitable basis without attempting to induce the Polish Government to accede to the Soviet request for changes in the Sikorski Cabinet.

While there may be certain members of the Polish Cabinet whose elimination might eventually contribute to a fuller degree of cooperation between the two Governments, the Department feels that any such changes should follow the restoration of relations rather than be brought about under pressure at this time. If this procedure is not followed an unfortunate precedent would be established which should be avoided at all costs. Furthermore, in view of the many factors which led to the break and which for the most part involved unilateral nullification by the Russians of the Polish-Soviet Agreement of 1941, it is believed that it would be difficult to find a representative Polish governing group who could replace the Sikorski Government and who would be as willing as the present Government to try to reach an accord with the Soviet Government.

In the Department's view the Soviet Government would, in all probability, not consider a changed Polish Cabinet as favorable to the Soviet Union unless it would be prepared either directly or indirectly to acquiesce in Soviet claims to Eastern Poland.

Therefore, considering the Department's consistently held position that no discussion of frontier problems should take place at this stage of the war, it is felt that in approaching the Soviet-Polish dispute every effort should be made to eliminate therefrom any question involving frontiers.

It was with these fundamental considerations in mind that the Department drew up its proposed approach for the settlement of the dispute.

After a careful analysis of your proposals and those of the Department, we feel that we cannot concur in your suggestion that our proposals are based too strongly on the Polish desiderata. The Department's approach was not intended as a compromise, but it was

considered to offer a plan for settling the dispute on a basis as just and permanent as the difficult situation permits. It is felt, on the contrary, that our plans call for far-reaching Polish concessions regarding which the Polish Government is certain to make strong objections. For instance, under the Department's proposal for the distribution of relief the Poles would be compelled to depend on the good faith of the Russians to carry out equitably and effectively this work and not use this lever as a political instrument, with only the limited control of Polish consuls as a possible check. Moreover, the Poles will undoubtedly be reluctant to accept the option proposal for non-racial Poles, since the Soviet Government if it so desires could resort to numerous means of pressure to cause these persons to opt in a manner favorable to it.

The Soviet Government, under the Department's proposals, is not being asked to make any concessions under the basic Soviet-Polish accord of 1941. By not deviating from our position that no discussion of frontier problems should take place at this time and by refraining from bringing pressure on the Polish Government to make changes in its Cabinet at this moment, we are simply not furthering Soviet demands in these directions.

In regard to your suggestion of a step by step approach to the problem, it is felt that such a plan does not resolve the fundamental question of citizenship. Unless this question, which was brought about by the unilateral action of the Soviet Government, is disposed of satisfactorily it would appear that little of a constructive nature can be accomplished, since according to present Soviet views there are no Poles in the Soviet Union and therefore there is no problem of Polish relief or evacuation. In this connection the Department's proposal for the settlement of this question has the distinct advantage that it does not involve the frontier dispute.

In further regard to the proposed step by step approach we believe that even though this might result in a limited alleviation of the situation, it cannot lead to a basic *rapprochement* unless it is conducted in such a manner as to bring about a gradual and complete capitulation of the Polish Government to basic Soviet demands.

While it is realized, as indicated above, that the Department's proposals may not result in an immediate resumption of relations, it is felt that such an approach to the problem, even if unsuccessful, will at least make clear our position as to the principles upon which we feel that understanding between the United Nations should be based. Furthermore, it would be helpful if the Soviet Government could bring itself to view this matter primarily in the light of its importance in the prosecution of the war and the settlement of the complex post-war problems on a just and equitable basis.

Please advise the Department whether, in view of the above explanations of the motivating factors underlying the Department's proposed approach, you still feel that it would be inadvisable for you to take up the question with the Soviet Government along the lines indicated in the Department's 427, June 12, 9 p. m.

You may, of course, discuss the matter further with your British colleague.

Repeated to Ambassador Winant together with a copy of your telegram⁹² for his confidential information in the event that the British Government raises the question with him.

HULL

811.458 Poland/55 : Telegram

*The Polish Prime Minister (Sikorski) to President Roosevelt*⁹³

GIBRALTAR, July 4, 1943—1:30 a. m.

[Received 11:29 p. m.]

CO/5255. I wish today, the Fourth of July, to pay my sincere homage to the Great American Nation, especially as I am spending it as a guest of the Governor at Gibraltar, where I have met some of your officers. I am convinced that under you, Mr. President, the inspired leader of the American Nation, and in close collaboration with Great Britain, the victory will soon come to the United Nations. This victory will not only crush the enemy but also bring into being your principles of freedom and justice.⁹⁴

[SIKORSKI]

760C.61/2053 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, July 5, 1943—9 p. m.

[Received 11:45 p. m.]

799. Department's 496 [497], June 29, 2 p. m. I have given careful study to the considerations set forth in the Department's telegram and have discussed the question in detail with the British Ambassador

⁹² Both telegrams quoted in telegram No. 3953 of the same date to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom.

⁹³ Despatched by the Governor of Gibraltar, Lt. Gen. Sir Frank N. Mason MacFarlane.

⁹⁴ At noon (London time) on July 5, Ambassador Biddle sent the following telegram to Washington: "For the President, the Secretary and the Under Secretary. British Air Ministry informs me General Sikorski, his daughter, Madame Lesznowska, and his Chief of Staff, General Klemetski, met their death by plane accident at Gibraltar yesterday." (860C.002/319)

who has also received additional instructions which have been repeated to Washington and presumably communicated to the Department. In view of the motivating factors underlying the Department's approach to the problem which now contain new considerations I feel that we may well take up this question with the Soviet Government along the following lines.

1. The fundamental basis for the approach should be along the lines indicated in the Department's 427 of June 12 and 497 of June 29; that is, the necessity for unity among the United Nations. The main objective should be the formal resumption of diplomatic relations, endeavoring at the same time to remove as many grievances of the past as possible.

2. No attempt should be made at this time to induce the Polish Government to make changes in its government. If upon discussing the general terms of *rapprochement* the Soviet Government should raise the question of the reconstitution of the Polish Cabinet the basic policy of the American Government as outlined in the Department's telegrams should be clearly explained. I understand that the British are now in substantial agreement with this approach.

3. The question of relief and evacuation of Polish citizens should be discussed along the lines of paragraphs 1 and 3 of the Department's 427 of June 12 and I anticipate some success in view of the following developments:

The Soviet authorities have informed the Australian Chargé d'Affaires that:

- a. A special organization has been set up to provide for the relief of Polish refugees in the Soviet Union, that this organization has taken over various depots in the provinces and that it is administering them in cooperation with a committee selected by the Polish refugees themselves. The Chargé has been promised frequent reports on the operation of the depot and the welfare of the refugees.

- b. A group of 300 Polish orphans in Ashkhabad whom Molotov is stated to have assured Romer would be permitted to leave the Soviet Union will be allowed to depart as soon as arrangements are made for their reception abroad. Twenty adult Poles will also be permitted to accompany the children.

- c. The Soviet Government will now permit publication in the press of an announcement that the Australian Legation has taken over Polish interests. (This announcement appeared in the Soviet press on July 3.)

In view of these developments I am inclined to believe that the Soviet Government may be prone to consider questions of Polish relief and evacuation of certain groups of Polish citizens sympathetically. Indeed I was told yesterday by the British Ambassador that Stalin in a message to Churchill dated May 6 maintained that the Soviet Government would not object to the evacuation of certain categories of Polish citizens in the Soviet Union. It is therefore not my understanding that the Soviet Government maintains that "there

are no Poles in the Soviet Union and therefore there is no problem of Polish relief or evacuation. On the contrary there are indications that racial Poles are considered by the Soviet Government to be Polish citizens. Consequently I feel that progress can be made in this field and that by its exploitation a basis may possibly be laid for a more friendly understanding between the Polish and Soviet Governments preliminary to a formal resumption of relations.⁹⁵

4. Both the British Ambassador and I strongly advise that the fundamental question of citizenship must be avoided in the present preliminary conversations as outlined above since we feel sure that if advanced by us it will unquestionably lead to discussions of frontier problems which we will refuse to countenance and a deadlock in the negotiations will result.

I realize, of course, that this approach does not solve one of the fundamental questions of the rupture, that of citizenship. In my opinion this question whether approached from a racial point of view or not still revolves around the frontier problem which the Department is not prepared to discuss. This question now appears to be the only point at issue between the approaches proposed by the Department and the Embassy.

The proposed "step by step approach" was advanced with a view to building up confidence between the Polish and the Soviet Governments and a hope of prevailing upon the Soviet Government "to view the matter primarily in the light of its importance in the prosecution of the war". Under present circumstances I feel we have little chance of prevailing upon the Soviet Government to bring itself to view the question in "the light of a settlement of the complex postwar problems on a just and equitable basis". At the same time I feel that we must always be vigilant and prepared fully to support the Poles should it become evident that a gradual capitulation of the Polish Government to the basic demands of the Soviet Government was being maneuvered.

It is quite likely, of course, that during the course of the envisaged conversations an appropriate occasion might arise for my Government to make clear its position as to the principles upon which it feels that understanding between the United Nations should be based.

The Department's immediate instructions are requested on the advisability of proceeding along the lines set forth in the numbered paragraphs 1 to 4.

STANDLEY

⁹⁵ In telegram No. 1100, August 17, noon, the Ambassador in the Soviet Union reported that the Australian Chargé had advised him as follows: "(1) The Soviet authorities have permitted a Polish orphanage consisting of 303 children and about 10 adults to depart from Soviet Union for Tehran. (2) From letters received from Polish citizens in the provinces, it would appear that the relief depots are in actual operation and supplies are being distributed to Polish refugees." (760C.61/2089)

860C.002/328

*Memorandum by the Polish Ambassador (Ciechanowski)*⁹⁶

WASHINGTON, July 7, 1943.

The Polish Ambassador informed the Secretary of State that he had received today the following urgent telegram from Count Raczynski, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland:

"Information is being received by the Polish Government in London directly from Poland that news of the death of Prime Minister General Sikorski is causing depression bordering on despair among the Polish people. There appears to be urgent need of raising the spirit in Poland. In view of the enormous personal authority and popularity of President Roosevelt in Poland, Count Raczynski asks, on behalf of the Polish Government, whether the President would very kindly agree to make a suitable declaration referring to the death of General Sikorski and stressing his faith that the Polish people will follow General Sikorski's leadership by continuing their united and unbroken resistance in their struggle to regain Poland's independence and for the triumph of the principles for which the United Nations are fighting and suffering."

The Polish Ambassador added that General Sikorski had succeeded in fully organizing Poland's underground army which, together with the entire nation, regarded him as their military and political leader in their organized struggle against the enemy.

760C.61/2053 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley)*⁹⁷

WASHINGTON, July 10, 1943—2 p. m.

548. The Department appreciates the force of the argument contained in your 799, July 5, 9 p. m., that the raising of the citizenship question might make negotiations more difficult. It feels, however, that the United States Government cannot remain silent in the face

⁹⁶ Handed to the Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs on July 7, with a request for an opportunity to discuss the contents of the memorandum with the Secretary of State at the Secretary's earliest convenience. An appointment was arranged for the Ambassador to see the Secretary at 12:30 p. m. on the following day. The Secretary recorded in a memorandum dated July 8, that he had replied to the Polish Ambassador's request for a statement by the President that he thought it would be all right to lay such a suggestion before the President, with the approval of the State Department, and that he believed the President would be in accord (860C.002/330). For text of President Roosevelt's message to President Raczewicz on July 9, in response to this appeal, see Department of State *Bulletin*, July 10, 1943, p. 20.

⁹⁷ Quoted in telegram No. 4184, on the same date to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom.

of an action taken by the Soviet Government which has the effect of unilaterally forcing hundreds of thousands of citizens of another United Nation, at present weakened as the result of war, to become Soviet citizens regardless of what the desire of the persons affected might be.

It is realized that the Soviet authorities will probably continue to insist that on the basis of the plebiscites of 1939 all the inhabitants of the territories of Eastern Poland lost their claim to Polish citizenship and became Soviet citizens; that as a gesture of good will they were willing, following the Polish-Soviet Agreement of 1941, to regard as Polish citizens persons of Polish blood from this area; that such willingness on their part had no legal force and did not actually change the citizenship status of these persons at least so long as they remained on Soviet soil. This Soviet contention is weakened by the fact that the 1941 Polish-Soviet Agreement which granted amnesty to "all Polish citizens" without any qualification, contained no indication that the Soviet Government continued to consider Poles in the Soviet Union from these territories to be Soviet instead of Polish citizens and by the fact that immediately following the conclusion of the Agreement the Soviet Government permitted Polish authorities in the Soviet Union to treat these persons as Polish citizens.

Note is taken of your understanding expressed in sub section C of your telegram under reference that the Soviet Government does not maintain that there are no Poles in the Soviet Union. So far as the Department is aware the Soviet authorities have never abandoned the position taken in their note of January 16, 1943 to the Polish Government⁹⁸ which in effect was an announcement that all Poles in the Soviet Union who were in the territories of Eastern Poland in the fall of 1939 are Soviet citizens. Although Marshal Stalin indicated to Mr. Churchill that he might be willing to permit certain categories of Poles to leave the Soviet Union, he has made no statement so far as the Department can ascertain which would indicate that he did not consider these Poles by blood to be Soviet nationals.

Although we hope that we can avoid entering into polemics with the Soviet Government with regard to the citizenship question we nevertheless feel that an approach should be made with regard to this question along the lines indicated in previous telegrams in a friendly yet firm manner.

We realize that if the question of citizenship is raised the Soviet Government may advance the question of frontiers. We believe, furthermore, that the Soviet authorities may introduce the frontier question in case any approach is made to them which might offer the

⁹⁸ See telegram Polish Series No. 3, January 28, midnight, from the Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile, p. 323.

possibility of a real *rapprochement* between the Polish and Soviet Governments. We do not feel, however, that fear that the question might be raised should deter us from pursuing a course which in our opinion is in the interest of the war effort and of postwar cooperation. We are of the opinion that we are in a position to meet the frontier question if pressed by the Soviet Government, in a frank manner which would not give offense if the Soviet Government displays the spirit of cooperation which we have a right to expect of a fellow member of the United Nations.

In case during the discussions the Soviet Government should advance the question of frontiers we may point out that the United States Government does not feel that at this time, when the energies of the United Nations should be concentrated upon the winning of the war, controversies with regard to future boundaries should be permitted to develop; that we are convinced that the liquidation of differences with regard to boundaries, unless such differences may be settled amicably and without friction between the governments concerned, should await the termination of the war and be included in the general postwar settlement. We may stress the fact that the solving of the citizenship problem along the lines suggested by us need not in any way weaken or prejudice the claim of either the Soviet Union or Poland to the territories under dispute. Our suggestions on the subject of citizenship relate to human beings—not to land or property. We feel that the unfortunate persons resident in Polish territory in the fall of 1939 who were uprooted from their homes as a result of the war and who now find themselves in the Soviet Union should at least be given the opportunity of deciding the country of which they desire to be citizens. If consideration of this kind is shown to these war victims it will strengthen their own morale and will cause peoples throughout the world to have increased confidence in the interest of the United Nations in the welfare and happiness of persons who are in their power.

We do not of course desire that the prolonged conversations which may follow our proposals with regard to citizenship should interfere with any plans for the evacuation of special categories of Poles. It is our suggestion therefore that when making the basic approach outlined by the Department you make it clear that in our opinion the evacuation of certain groups of Poles should not await a more basic settlement of the Polish-Soviet disagreement. You may emphasize the fact that in our opinion a generous attitude on the part of the Soviet Government reflected in the immediate evacuation of certain groups of Poles will not only represent a concrete contribution to the united war effort but will also assist in the creation of a more favor-

able atmosphere for the reestablishment of diplomatic relations between Poland and the Soviet Union on a basis which will make possible an era of real friendship between the two countries.

It is felt, in view of the sudden death of General Sikorski, that it is even more imperative that we immediately take steps to make it clear to the Soviet authorities that we desire to assist in bringing about the resumption of relations between the Soviet Government and the Polish Government-in-exile. If in attempting to bring this about we do not approach the problem in its fundamentals we might give the impression, particularly in view of our long silence and the changed situation in the composition of the Polish Cabinet, that we have changed our attitude toward the Polish Government.

We have communicated our ideas in this matter to the British Embassy here and this telegram has been repeated to Ambassador Winant in the event that Mr. Eden should desire to take up the matter with him.

We hope that with as little delay as possible you and the British Ambassador will be able to agree upon and make an approach to Stalin along the lines suggested by us.⁹⁹ When you reach an agreement with the British Ambassador please telegraph as early as possible when you are to see Stalin in order that our proposed approach can be explained simultaneously to the Polish Government.¹

HULL

860C.515/108 : Telegram

The Consul General at Algiers (Wiley) to the Secretary of State

ALGIERS, July 10, 1943—10 p. m.

[Received July 11—12:50 a. m.]

1246. From Murphy.² Stefan Michalski, representative of Bank of Poland, called on me today to inform me confidentially that he has now reached an agreement with Couve de Murville³ for release

⁹⁹ In telegram No. 857, July 13, 5 p. m., the Ambassador in the Soviet Union stated that he and the British Ambassador had agreed to make the approach along the lines suggested by the Department. He added that Stalin was then at the front, and might not return for some time, so that there might be some delay in seeing him. (760C.61/2063)

¹ In telegram No. 1049, August 11, 11 a. m., the Ambassador in the Soviet Union reported that he had just been informed that Stalin would receive the British Ambassador and himself that evening (760C.61/2081).

² Robert D. Murphy, Chief Civil Affairs Officer at Algiers; American Political Adviser on the staff of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater; Personal Representative of President Roosevelt in North Africa, with the personal rank of Minister.

³ Maurice Couve de Murville, Finance Commissioner, French Committee of National Liberation, which was constituted on June 3, 1943.

of gold of Bank of Poland ⁴ as well as miscellaneous assets, jewelry, etc., which he states are still stored at Kayes, Senegal.

He particularly wishes to know whether the United States will cooperate in the shipment of the gold and other assets, amounting to a total of approximately 65 tons, to the United States.

I should be grateful for your prompt instructions in this regard. He inquired particularly whether shipment by an American naval vessel would be possible.

Repeated to Dakar. [Murphy.]

WILEY

760C.61/2068b : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile (Biddle), at London ⁵

WASHINGTON, July 19, 1943—6 p. m.

Polish Series No. 16. As you are aware, the Department has for some time been working out with Admiral Standley and the British Government a formula for a joint British-American approach to the Soviet Government with the ultimate view of assisting in reestablishing Polish-Soviet relations on a firm and lasting basis.

Substantial agreement has been reached between the American and British Governments on this question and Admiral Standley and the British Ambassador in Moscow plan in the near future to request an interview with Stalin for the purpose of presenting our suggested solutions to the Polish-Soviet dispute. Admiral Standley will inform the Department as soon as possible of the date of the interview with Stalin in order that the Polish Government may be advised simultaneously of the joint proposals.

The Department's instructions to Admiral Standley outlining the proposed solution of the problem have been repeated to Ambassador Winant ⁶ for his confidential information in the event that the British Government during the working out of the arrangements should desire to discuss details with him.

⁴ The Bank of Poland had deposited some 64 million dollars worth of gold reserves in the Bank of France, which, on the eve of the German occupation of France, had removed its funds to French West Africa. The Polish Government in Exile wished to reclaim the gold, and the Polish Embassy in the United States, in a note dated November 11, 1942, requested United States aid in persuading the French to release it and then transporting it to the United States where it would be more accessible (860C.51/1504). Mr. Michalski had been in French Africa for several months, locating the gold and negotiating with French officials for its release.

⁵ Repeated on the same date to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union as No. 584.

⁶ See the following telegrams to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union: No. 427, June 12, p. 428; No. 428, June 12, p. 430; No. 497, June 29, p. 434; and No. 548, July 10, p. 440.

For your strictly confidential information and in order that you may be cognizant of the background of the proposals you should obtain from Ambassador Winant copies of these messages. To complete your background on the question the next following telegram to you will repeat Admiral Standley's replies to the Department's last two telegrams to him on this subject.

Upon the receipt of further instructions indicating the date the approach is to be made to the Soviet Government you will deliver the following *aide-mémoire* to the Polish Government⁷ which has so far not been informed of the Department's proposals:

"The Government of the United States as a member of the United Nations and as a cobelligerent of Poland and of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is deeply concerned over the differences which have arisen between the Governments of these two countries and which have resulted in a breach of diplomatic relations between them. In the opinion of the Government of the United States the absence of friendly relations between the Polish and Soviet Governments is injurious to the common war effort in that it disrupts the unity of the United Nations, it lends encouragement to the endeavors of the enemy to create and intensify differences among the United Nations, it tends to strengthen those forces throughout the world which contend that prolonged cooperation among the United Nations during and after the war period is impossible, and it distracts the minds of millions of persons who should be concentrating all their energies upon the winning of the war.

The American Government therefore feels that it should not fail to take any steps which might assist in settling the differences between the Polish and Soviet Governments, might lead to the reestablishment of relations between the two Governments on a firm, equitable and lasting basis, and might lay the groundwork for friendly post-war cooperation. The Government of the United States has therefore instructed the United States Ambassador at Moscow to approach the Soviet Government with the suggestions set forth below in the hope that these suggestions may be of material aid in eliminating some of the differences which exist at the present time between the Polish and Soviet Governments.

1. All racial Poles in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics who were domiciled in Poland on September 1, 1939 to be immediately recognized by the Soviet Government as Polish citizens.

2. The Polish and Soviet Governments to permit all non-racial Poles in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics who were domi-

⁷ In telegram Polish Series No. 23, August 11, midnight, the Department informed the Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile that the American and British Ambassadors in the Soviet Union were to see Premier Stalin that evening, and instructed Ambassador Biddle to deliver the *aide-mémoire* at the earliest possible moment (760C.61/2068b suppl.). Biddle accordingly presented the *aide-mémoire* to Polish Foreign Minister Tadeusz Romer the following morning at 10:30. (Mr. Romer succeeded Count Raczynski as Foreign Minister on July 14, 1943, when Prime Minister Stanislaw Mikolajczyk formed the new Government, after the death of General Sikorski.)

ciled in Poland on September 1, 1939 to opt for Polish or Soviet citizenship.

3. All racial Poles and non-racial Poles who opt for Polish citizenship and who have close relatives abroad, especially those who are members of the immediate families of the men in the Polish armed forces outside the Soviet Union, to be permitted to leave the Soviet Union as soon as possible.

4. Similarly every effort to be made to evacuate abroad Polish orphans and other Polish children as soon as suitable arrangements can be made for their care in areas further removed from the war zones.

5. In order that the Polish citizens in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics may receive the relief supplies sent from the United States and elsewhere, the Polish Government to agree to permit relief and welfare work to be carried on by Soviet organizations, with the understanding that Polish citizens are to receive treatment no less favorable than that granted to Soviet citizens under similar circumstances.

6. To enable Polish citizens to have the facilities which are customarily available to foreigners in all countries, the Soviet Government to grant the right to the Polish Government to establish consulates in those areas in the Soviet Union where large numbers of Polish citizens are located, the latter to be accorded the usual right of access to their consular officials."

In presenting the *aide-mémoire* you may stress orally that after careful study of the question the United States Government feels that its suggestions, if accepted in the friendly spirit in which they are made, offer a possibility of bringing about as normal and permanent a relationship as the difficult situation permits.

If the Polish Government should raise serious objections to any of the proposals, particularly to points 2 and 5, you may state that it is felt that the Polish Government after studying the proposals will agree that they eliminate the principal elements of friction in the Polish-Soviet Agreement of 1941 and are of such a nature that if they are accepted by both sides in a spirit of mutual confidence they can form the basis for the establishment of an enduring relationship.

You may also point out that the proposals do not involve in any way the question of frontiers which is a matter we feel is not subject to discussion at this time and which is not germane to the principal questions involved—the legitimate rights of individuals and the restoration of United Nations unity in order to attain the fullest possible cooperation in the prosecution of the war against our common enemy.

Furthermore, it would be advisable to inform the Polish authorities that it is felt that the question of recruiting in the Soviet Union for the Polish armed forces should be taken up subsequently.

You should give particular stress to the fact that we feel that any conversations which may follow our proposals with regard to citizen-

ship should not interfere with any plans agreed to by the Soviet Government for the immediate evacuation of special categories of Poles.

In presenting the *aide-mémoire* you may indicate that it is the Department's understanding that the British Government has informed its Ambassador in Moscow that if the Russians inquire of him as to the British attitude on the position taken by us, he may state that his Government fully shares and supports the views of the United States.

Please keep Ambassador Winant informed.

Repeated to Moscow.

HULL

860C.01/649 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, July 20, 1943—6 p. m.

[Received July 21—6:25 a. m.]

4715. For the Secretary and Under Secretary. After sending you my 4526, July 10,^s I asked Mr. Eden if at a later date he could give me a more detailed and considered judgment on the new Polish Government. I have just received the following letter from him which I think you will find of particular interest as representing the British Government's view:

"When you came to see me on the 14th of July I promised to let you have a short statement about the Polish political situation. As you will have gathered, the formation of the new Polish Government which was announced in the press on the 15th of July was not achieved without considerable difficulties. These difficulties arose chiefly out of the question of the constitutional relationship between the President, the Commanders-in-Chief and the Prime Minister and were connected with the problem of the interpretation to be placed upon those articles of the Polish Constitution of 1935 which dealt with that relationship. The 1935 Constitution, which was adopted at the end of the Pilsudski era, placed far-reaching powers in the hands of the President of the Republic. The Polish Democratic and Left Wing parties have never willingly accepted this aspect of the Constitution and when the Polish Government was first reconstituted in France at the end of 1939 an understanding was reached that the President would not exercise his full prerogatives during the period of emigration.

^sIn this telegram Ambassador Winant reported as follows: "Today Mr. Eden told me that in his opinion the reorganization of the Polish Government was reasonably good. He said that Biddle's influence had been most helpful. Everybody here including the Allied Governments recognize the tragic loss of General Sikorski." (860C.01/647)

Under the Constitution, the President of the Republic is empowered in time of war to nominate his own successor. President Raczkiewicz had himself been so nominated by his predecessor, President Mościcki,¹⁰ and he in his turn had nominated as his eventual successor General Sosnkowski. The President also enjoys under the Constitution the power to appoint and dismiss the Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Armed Forces. It was in the exercise of this power that President Raczkiewicz decided shortly after General Sikorski's death to nominate General Sosnkowski to succeed him in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief.¹¹ In taking this decision he was primarily influenced by the need of stabilizing opinion in the Polish Armed Forces both here and in the Middle East, whose discipline and loyalty he felt might be seriously affected if there were a long delay.

This decision was not pleasing to the Left Wing parties and in particular to M. Mikolajczyk himself who, as Deputy Prime Minister under General Sikorski, became Acting Prime Minister on the latter's death. He felt that adequate arrangements should be made to ensure that the Commander-in-Chief did not occupy too commanding a position which he might welcome. In addition to commanding the Polish Armed Forces he also directed the underground military movement in Poland. He would have preferred that an [*no?*] appointment be made to the post of Commander-in-Chief or that at least, if one were made, the man chosen should be someone less influential than General Sosnkowski. M. Mikolajczyk was undoubtedly influenced by the wish to ensure that his party and those of like mind should retain their influence in Poland itself against the day of the Polish Government's return to their country.

These considerations led M. Mikolajczyk to inform the President that he was unable to accept office as Prime Minister and form a government unless means could be found of limiting the authority of the Commander-in-Chief. After protracted discussions, it appears that satisfactory arrangements to this end have been made and M. Mikolajczyk has succeeded in forming an all party Government of National Union in which representatives of his own Party (the Peasant Party) and the Socialist Party, predominate. This Government seems to us as satisfactory as can be hoped for. Its democratic character, and the fact that M. Mikolajczyk has pledged it to continue General Sikorski's policy, suggest that it should not be unduly provocative of Soviet-Russian susceptibilities. It should also be in a position to command the loyalty both of the Polish Armed Forces abroad and of the vast majority of Poles in Poland itself and to ensure the maintenance of the resistance movement inside the country. From the military point of view, the choice of General Sosnkowski also appears to have a good deal to commend it. He is the senior general in the Polish Army, whose loyalty he is believed to command. It is true that he was an ardent follower of Pilsudski, and that he opposed General Sikorski's action in signing the treaty with Soviet Russia in

¹⁰ Ignacz Mościcki, President of Poland, June 1, 1926–September 30, 1939. Wladislaw Raczkiewicz was appointed President of Poland by President Mościcki's decree of September 17, 1939, and began his term on September 30, 1939.

¹¹ In telegram Polish Series No. 45, July 9, 10 p. m., the Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile reported President Raczkiewicz's appointment of General Sosnkowski as Commander in Chief and the opposition voiced by Mikolajczyk (860C.002/325).

July 1941. However if, as appears to be the case, adequate measures have been taken to ensure that he is subordinated to the Government as a whole, this aspect should assume less importance."

WINANT

760C.61/2074 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, July 26, 1943—2 p. m.

[Received July 27—1:50 a. m.]

944. Department's 584, July 19, 6 p. m.,¹² paragraph 6. Department's 427 of June 12 on which the Embassy's approach is to be based makes no specific mention of the establishment of Polish Consulates in those areas in the Soviet Union where large numbers of Polish citizens are located. In view of the reluctance and in general refusal of the Soviet authorities to permit the opening of Consulates in the Soviet Union and the continual difficulties experienced by the former Polish delegates in the provinces, I do not believe that the Soviet Government will permit the opening of Polish Consulates and I fear that an approach containing such a proposal will weaken our case. I consider it more advisable when raising the question of welfare and relief to suggest that Polish citizens be permitted to have contact with appropriate Polish consular officers, presumably consular officers attached to the Polish Diplomatic Mission. The question of actual contact with the Poles in the provinces should be, I believe, worked out at a later date after relations are resumed. The Department's instructions are urgently requested.¹³

STANDLEY

760C.61/2088

The Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile (Biddle) to the Secretary of State

[Polish Series] No. 370

LONDON, August 10, 1943.

[Received August 18.]

SIR: I have the honor to forward the attached copies of a confidential *Aide-Mémoire*¹⁴ handed me by Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs Romer.

¹² See footnote 5, p. 444.

¹³ In telegram Polish Series No. 20, July 28, 9 p. m., the Ambassador was instructed to substitute the following text for paragraph 6: "6. To permit Polish citizens to have access to appropriate Polish consular officers." (760C.61/2068b)

¹⁴ Dated August 5, not printed.

The Minister drew my attention to that part of the *Aide-Mémoire* which stated that simultaneously with the news received from Poland regarding mass murders of Poles by the Germans, alarming information had been received concerning the activities in Poland of the Soviet-inspired elements. The Minister went on to point out that numerous parachutists from the USSR and Soviet prisoners of war escaped from German camps had gathered in groups and, under the pretext of fighting against the German occupying forces, looted and committed murder among the local populations. What was more, by committing irresponsible and wanton acts of sabotage, they had brought about bloodshed and ever-increasing German reprisals in all Polish provinces from east to west.

The Minister furthermore drew my attention to that part which stated that information received from Poland seldom concerned fights between these Soviet "guerillas" and the army of occupation; that the murders committed by both parties and the subsequent reprisals were mainly directed against the Polish population; that the similarity in the information received from various points throughout Polish territory gave one food for thought. (This recalls to mind the substance of a confidential report given me in March, 1943, by a young Polish member of the underground organization who had then recently reached London from his country. See my despatch Polish Series No. 270, March 3, 1943, regarding my informant's report on the activities of the "Partisans" and of Soviet agents attempting to penetrate the underground organization through the Polish Workers Party, established through the subtle inspiration of Soviet agents in Poland). The Minister went on to point out that in this *Aide-Mémoire* his Government had ventured to make certain suggestions: (a) that our Government, and if possible jointly with the British Government, draw the attention of the Soviet Government to the aforementioned reported conditions, and request it to do all in its power to rectify this state of affairs; (b) that our Government, and if possible jointly with the British Government, agree to grant technical facilities needed to transmit to Poland an appeal of the Polish Government warning the population not to permit themselves to be induced to a premature uprising, and to beware of non-responsible elements which might attempt to incite them thereto.

Respectfully yours,

A. J. DREXEL BIDDLE, JR.

760C.61/2087

*Memorandum by the British Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Clark Kerr)*¹⁵

As the Soviet Government are aware, His Majesty's Government are greatly concerned to promote and to maintain solidarity between the United Nations and have recently been considering whether they could make any constructive proposals regarding the improvement of Soviet-Polish relations and the removal of possible causes of friction between the two Governments. This seems to them to be all the more important on account of the unhappy death of General Sikorski. His Majesty's Government have been imposing, and will continue to impose, upon the foreign newspapers published in the United Kingdom a control which will have, they hope, the effect of putting an end to discussion in the press of controversial issues affecting inter-allied relations.

It will be remembered that in his message of the 6th May to Mr. Churchill, Marshal Stalin said that the Soviet Government had never put obstacles in the way of the departure from the U.S.S.R. of Polish subjects and the families of Polish troops evacuated to Iran. In the light of this assurance, His Majesty's Government have been in consultation with the United States Government about the possibilities and advantages of such an evacuation. The two Governments have been considering whether, by the evacuation of certain categories of Poles, it would not be possible to lighten the burden of the Soviet Government in feeding and maintaining on its territory a considerable foreign population, and, at the same time, to mitigate the hardship of separation for a large number of Polish families. Such a result could, in the opinion of both the British and the United States Governments, serve only to strengthen and improve relations between the peoples of Poland and the Soviet Union.

With this end in view, His Majesty's Government wish to bring to the attention of the Soviet Government proposals for the evacuation of certain categories of Poles to the Middle East whence they would subsequently be dispersed to those destinations where they could be most suitably accommodated or employed in the interests of the common war effort. The categories in question are as follows:

(1) The families of all Polish troops who were not evacuated with their men folk in 1942, and also the families of those Polish troops who, although they have never been in this country, are at present

¹⁵ Presented on August 11 by the British Ambassador during a conversation at the Kremlin in which Premier Stalin, Mr. Molotov, and the British and American Ambassadors participated. Copy transmitted to the Department by the American Ambassador in the Soviet Union in his despatch No. 228, August 24; received September 23.

serving in the Polish forces in other parts of the world. It is believed that this category would not be likely to exceed 30,000 people;

(2) Polish orphans whose numbers are uncertain;

(3) The families of Polish civilians at present outside the U.S.S.R.;

(4) Certain Polish technicians and the personnel of the former Polish welfare organizations, who would together amount to something over 5,000.

The evacuation would be spread over such a period as might prove to be appropriate and necessary.

It is understood that His Majesty's Australian Legation, as the representative of Polish interests in the U.S.S.R., would be prepared to supply lists of the persons comprised in the categories enumerated above, and would also discuss with the competent Soviet authorities the most satisfactory arrangements for their evacuation.

Finally, it is suggested that the Soviet Government would be well advised to consider the evacuation of Polish nationals from Western Poland, whose nationality is not in dispute.

His Majesty's Government are of the opinion that the foregoing proposals would, by reducing the number of Polish refugees in this country, go a long way towards putting an end to the present abnormal conditions which, in their view, can only serve to aggravate relations between two of the United Nations. The disappearance of these abnormal conditions would, it is felt, help to restore mutual confidence and render more easy an eventual resumption of friendly relations between the two Governments. Such a solution by putting an end to inter-allied differences, would at once deprive the Axis propaganda machine of a fruitful field of exploitation and would assist in re-establishing that harmony between the United Nations which is so necessary for the solution of common problems both during the war and after it.

760C.61/2084 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, August 12, 1943—6 p. m.

[Received August 13—6:21 p. m.]

1070. My 1049, August 11, 11 a. m.¹⁶ Stalin received the British Ambassador and myself at 8 o'clock last evening at the Kremlin. After the preliminary amenities Clark Kerr read a prepared statement which in general embodied the views set forth in the first two

¹⁶ Not printed, but see footnote 1, p. 443.

paragraphs of the *aide-mémoire* contained in section 2 of the Department's 584, July 19, 6 p. m.¹⁷

I stated that I was in full accord with the views expressed by the British Ambassador. Clark [Kerr] then caused to be read a translation of a memorandum¹⁸ which he stated set forth certain views of his Government with respect to the Polish-Soviet dispute. This memorandum, the contents of which I assume have been made known to the Department, dealt with (1) measures taken in England to control foreign newspapers published in the United Kingdom and (2) proposals for the evacuation of certain categories of Poles from the Soviet Union, and after signifying the accord of my Government with the views expressed by the British Ambassador I stated that my Government felt there were other considerations involved which must be solved before any just or lasting resumption of Polish-Soviet relations could be brought about. These considerations, I stated, were set forth in an *aide-mémoire* which I had had prepared. I requested the interpreter to read a translation of the sections there upon citizenship and Polish welfare and relief in the Soviet Union. (The *aide-mémoire* in question contained the suggestions set forth in the Department's 427 of June 12¹⁹ relative to (1) the basis for the approach, (2) relief and welfare, (3) citizenship, and (4) evacuation.) Since the British Ambassador's memorandum had covered the question of evacuation along lines almost identical to those proposed by the Department I did not touch orally upon this matter. After the sections notes [noted] had been read Clark Kerr stated that his Government subscribed in full to the views contained in my *aide-mémoire*.

Stalin thereupon requested that the British and the American documents be made available for study by the Soviet authorities. The documents were left with him. The British Ambassador asked whether there would be further opportunity to discuss the question with him. Stalin replied that he was unable to give a definite answer since his presence might again be required at the front. However, he stated that in his absence Molotov would be empowered to discuss the question.

The British Ambassador and I were prepared to come to grips in an oral discussion with Stalin on the question. Stalin and Molotov, however, made no comment whatsoever on the proposals submitted by us. The atmosphere during the conversation was friendly.

STANDLEY

¹⁷ See footnote 5, p. 444.

¹⁸ *Supra*.

¹⁹ *Ante*, p. 428.

860C.515/109: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Algiers (Wiley)

WASHINGTON, August 16, 1943—11 p. m.

1517. For Murphy. Your 1246, July 10, 10 p. m. You may inform Michalski that the United States Government is prepared to facilitate the shipment of the gold to this country at the risk and expense of the Polish Government; subject to the approval of the Navy Department, the shipment could be made by Naval vessel.

Pursuant to the Provisional Regulations issued under the Gold Reserve Act of 1934,²⁰ there are two procedures available for the importation of the gold. It may be imported under Section 40 of the Provisional Regulations²¹ if the Polish Government desires that the gold be sold to the United States, and in that case the requirements of Section 40 should be observed. If the Polish Government desires, on the other hand, to hold the gold in this country, it should be placed under earmark in an appropriate account at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York in the name of the Bank of Poland or of the Government of Poland.²² The Bank of Poland has an earmarked gold account with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York in which this gold would be deposited. If the gold is to be held under earmark, it should be consigned to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. The latter holds a license issued by the Secretary of the Treasury whereby it is authorized to import gold to be held under earmark for foreign central banks and foreign governments.

Section 40 of the Provisional Regulations provides that the mints are authorized to purchase only such imported gold as has been in customs custody throughout the time it has been within the customs limits of the continental United States, and subject also to stated requirements as to notation upon formal entry and as to the filing of a relevant affidavit.

HULL

²⁰ Approved January 30, 1934; 48 Stat. 337.

²¹ Treasury Department, Office of the Secretary, *Provisional Regulations Issued Under the Gold Reserve Act of 1934 as Amended to April 15, 1942* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1943), p. 18.

²² In telegram No. 1471, August 23, 6 p. m., Mr. Murphy reported that Mr. Michalski had stated that the Polish Government wished to have the gold held in New York under earmark and would select that procedure for entering the gold into the United States (860C.515/110).

760C.61/2087 : Telegram

The Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile (Biddle) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, August 17, 1943—9 p. m.

[Received 9 : 58 p. m.]

Polish Series [No.] 57. Your 16, July 19, 6 p. m., regarding a proposed approach to the Soviet authorities in connection with Polish-Russian relations, and my 55, August 12, 4 p. m.²³ reporting having informed Foreign Minister Romer of the foregoing.

Minister Romer wishes me to express his and his Government's profound appreciation of this very friendly and constructive move on our part. He states that his Government finds the proposals in our approach acceptable in principle, but that it is apprehensive lest difficulties be encountered (*a*) regarding the control of the distribution of welfare, which his Government feels should, in justice to all categories of Polish refugees concerned, be either under the Polish Embassy in event of reestablishment of Polish-Russian relations, or under the Australian or other Allied Mission; (*b*) in defining the difference between racial and non-racial Poles; and (*c*) regarding the mention, in connection with the latter, of "Poles who opt for Polish citizenship". This, it was felt, might raise the frontier question.

Romer pointed out that the foregoing were in effect his Government's preliminary reactions to the proposals concerned. His Government would, in event of a favorable attitude on part of M. Stalin, inform us more definitely of its views in regard to these proposals.

Romer wanted us to know that he had requested postponement of today's National Council meeting at which he was to have delivered his first formal statement of Polish foreign affairs. He had done this, he said, in order to avoid the risk of giving the Russians any possible pretext for antagonism at this stage of our conversations in Moscow.

[BIDDLE]

760C.61/2091

The Polish Ambassador (Ciechanowski) to the Secretary of State

Acting on instructions of the Polish Government, the Polish Ambassador has the honor to submit to the Secretary of State the following text of a confidential *Aide-Mémoire* concerning an announcement from Moscow to the effect that the first division formed by the USSR. Government under the aegis of the so-called "Union of Polish Patriots"

²³ Not printed.

in the USSR. is now being sent for active duty on the Soviet-German front:

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

1) According to an agency telegram from Moscow dated August 28, 1943, the first division formed in the USSR under the aegis of the so-called "Union of Polish Patriots" is being sent to the Soviet-German front.

In view of this information the Polish Government renews all the reservations formulated in its note of May 17, 1943, against the organization by the Soviet Government without either the knowledge or the consent of the Polish Government, of military formations bearing Polish names and with the participation of Polish citizens, which infringe the sovereign rights of Poland and violate the Polish-Soviet agreements of July 30 and August 14, 1941,²⁴ as well as the basic obligations of citizens to their State.

The Polish Government has no doubt that in the fight against the common enemy even those Polish citizens, whose fate is now being illegally decided by a foreign authority, will distinguish themselves through their personal courage.

2) The Polish Government, which is not only in its own eyes but also in the eyes of all the United Nations the only recognized authority duly entitled to take decisions involving the life and blood of Polish citizens,—has in the course of the last four years unhesitatingly directed and continues to direct the armed war effort of the regular Polish Armed Forces fighting under the Polish national flag, a war effort undertaken in the spirit of the greatest sacrifice and unceasingly carried on at the side of Poland's Allies on land, on sea and in the air against the German invader.

The Polish Government likewise unceasingly directs the organized underground active and passive resistance of occupied Poland. In the abnormal situation, highly dangerous for the common cause which has been created as a result of the conduct of the Soviet Government, referred to in p. 1 of this *Aide-Mémoire*,²⁵ the Polish Government is forced emphatically to draw the attention of the U.S. Government to the consequences issuing from the real character of and the aims for which these military formations were created by the Soviet Government under a Polish name.

3) The officers' cadres of the above formations alleged by the Soviets as composed of Polish volunteers, consist mostly of Russian officers;

²⁴ *Polish-Soviet Relations, 1918-1943, Official Documents*, pp. 107 and 126, respectively.

²⁵ See section 1).

many of the soldiers are Poles previously deported to the USSR, as well as prisoners of war and Poles forcibly inducted in the German army who have escaped from the German ranks. There is no doubt that these Poles are being incorporated to these formations if not in all cases under direct Soviet pressure resulting from the characteristic Soviet way of living and system, then at least under the influence of the impression created by the apparent national Polish character of the formations.

Under war conditions prevailing on the Eastern European front the fighting strength which these formations may constitute has obviously no practical importance to Soviet Russia. Therefore it can be concluded that their importance consists primarily in their role of a political instrument which the USSR. Government desires them to assume, similarly as to the so-called "Union of Polish Patriots" in the event of the entry of the Red Army on Polish territory.

4) It appears superfluous to prove how strong a reaction will be created in the Polish community—both in Poland under German occupation, as abroad, by the state of things described in p. 3,²⁶ which is so basically contradictory to the principles for which, according to the Atlantic Charter, all the United Nations should fight.

Nevertheless the Polish Government, conscious of the importance of United Nations solidarity at the present crucial phase of the war, and in its sincere desire to ease Polish-Russian relations, is determined to do its utmost in order to restrain the Polish people, and especially the Polish press, from statements too emphatically expressing such natural reactions.

These endeavors on the part of the Polish Government would, however, be of little avail if at the same time propaganda of Soviet origin tending to publicize at the cost of the real Polish war effort the activities of these allegedly Polish military formations in the USSR,—created in reality in order to serve communistic aims,—were to be allowed freely to develop in Allied countries.

The Polish Government is confident that, with the friendly understanding which it has always hitherto shown, the U.S. Government will take this situation into consideration and will use its influence in order to restrain the dissemination of such propaganda of foreign origin detrimental to the real Polish war effort.

WASHINGTON, September 2, 1943.

No. 49-Sow/SZ-t/251.

²⁶ See section 3).

800.0146/161a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, September 4, 1943—midnight.

5417. For Ambassador Biddle. It is evident that some uneasiness exists in the minds of the refugee governments and authorities and their respective countries over the question of the possible establishment of military government in those countries. As there is every intention of having those governments and constituted authorities participate to the extent practicable in the function of maintaining law and order and in the administration of the liberated areas it has seemed desirable to make a public statement to that effect. This Government proposes therefore to issue an identic statement on liberated areas with the British Government on September 15. The British Foreign Office plans to communicate the text of this statement to the exiled governments in London on September 13 and you are requested to concert with the Foreign Office and arrange for a simultaneous approach. The text of the statement reads as follows:²⁷

"1. The Governments of the United States and United Kingdom, necessarily by reason of their military operations in enemy territory, must assume the major responsibility for the administration of enemy territories conquered by their forces in pursuance of the war against the Axis.

"2. The Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom, while continuing to exercise supreme military authority in liberated areas pending the defeat of the enemy, will be agreeable to the policy of the governments and constituted authorities of the United Nations in their respective liberated countries proceeding with the function of maintaining law and order with such assistance by the Allied authorities as may be necessary, subject always to military requirements.

"Conversations and arrangements with the government of those countries have already been in progress for some time on these aspects of the mutual interests involved."

HULL

²⁷ This text was agreed upon at a meeting of the First Quebec Conference on August 22, 1943; it was decided that the statement should be conveyed to the Soviet Government and China and the refugee governments directly concerned, and then released for publication. Later, however, it was decided to postpone publication of the statement. For additional details, see *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943*, p. 382, footnote 4. The records of the First Quebec Conference are scheduled for publication in a subsequent volume of *Foreign Relations*.

760C.61/20994

Memorandum by Mr. Elbridge Durbrow of the Division of European Affairs

[WASHINGTON,] September 6, 1943.

Reference is made to the Polish Government's *aide-mémoire* of September 2 protesting the action reputedly taken by the Soviet Government in sending into battle with the Red Army the Polish division formed in the USSR under Soviet auspices. While there would appear to be no justification in international practice for one government to form an armed force on its territory ostensibly composed of nationals of another state and to send this force into battle under the flag of that foreign state without the latter's consent, it is believed that the following review of the previous difficulties encountered by the Polish Government in establishing a Polish Army in the USSR may be of particular interest for background purposes.

It will be recalled that one of the principal difficulties which arose after relations were reestablished between Poland and the Soviet Union in July 1941 was the question of recruiting, equipping, feeding and clothing the Polish Army in the Soviet Union. Particular reference is made in this connection to the statement made by Vyshinski, Soviet Vice Commissar for Foreign Affairs, to the Anglo-American press in Moscow on May 6, 1943.²⁸ In view of the manner in which Mr. Vyshinski's statement was given out it received considerable attention in the United States and Great Britain and enhanced the belief disseminated by leftwing elements in the United States that the Polish Army in the USSR although fully armed and ready for battle categorically refused to fight against the Germans, and therefore these troops were summarily evacuated from the Soviet Union. A marked copy of Vyshinski's remarks is attached for convenient reference.

When this statement was made it was checked against official information available to the Department and it was found that in general, although the figures and dates given by Vyshinski were more or less accurate, the reasons for the evacuation of the Polish Army to the Middle East did not conform to the facts as we knew them. I recently received in strictest confidence an evaluation of the Vyshinski remarks made by the British Foreign Office on May 8, a copy of which is attached.²⁹ A comparison of the two attached documents confirms the original impression gained in the Department that the Vyshinski statement was to say the least very inaccurate.

²⁸ The text of Mr. Vyshinsky's statement was printed in the *Information Bulletin*, issued by the Soviet Embassy in the United States, May 11, 1943, and also in the *New York Times*, May 8, 1943.

²⁹ Not printed.

The general tenor of Vyshinski's statement endeavors to prove that the Soviet Government did everything in its power to feed, arm and clothe the Polish units in the USSR but that despite these efforts "the question of the participation of Polish troops in common with Soviet troops in the struggle against Hitlerite Germany was removed from the order of the day by the Polish Government"; that is, the Polish units were withdrawn from the USSR on the insistence of the Polish Government.

In contradiction to Vyshinski's contentions the Foreign Office report, which is confirmed by additional information in the Department's files,³⁰ indicates clearly that although the entire blame cannot be placed on the Soviet Government the principal difficulties arose from the fact that for various reasons the Soviet authorities were unable to furnish sufficient food supplies for the 96,000 Polish troops which it was agreed by Stalin and Sikorski in December 1941 would be recruited to form the Polish Army in the USSR and that the Soviet authorities, moreover, were unable to equip fully these divisions as they had undertaken to do. In view of these difficulties the Soviet Government in March 1942 informed the commanding Polish General in the USSR that his Army would have to be limited to 44,000 men and that the surplus force of some 30,000 would have to be evacuated to the Middle East. This was agreed to and the troops departed immediately.

In regard to the evacuation of the remaining 44,000 Polish troops in the Soviet Union which Vyshinski erroneously indicates was done on the insistence of the Polish Government it is of particular interest to note in the Foreign Office report that in June 1942 Molotov on instructions from Stalin took the initiative in this matter and asked the British Ambassador in Moscow whether in view of the German advance on Cairo and Alexandria the British Government would like to have made available to them in the Middle East these remaining Polish troops in order that they might be equipped by the British Government and used in that area. This Soviet proposal was accepted by the British and Polish Governments and the troops were evacuated to the Middle East in September 1942 where they have since been rehabilitated and armed and are now under the direct orders of the British High Command.

This particular example of Soviet technique in clearing its record on controversial matters regardless of the apparent facts might well be borne in mind in evaluating Soviet propaganda.

ELBRIDGE DUBROW

³⁰ See despatch Polish Series No. 137, March 30, 1942, from the Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile, *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. III, p. 133.

711.62114A/38a: Airgram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, September 10, 1943—6 p. m.

A-339. American Interests—Germany. It is reported that two American officers from Oflag IX A/Z were forced to go to Katyn.³¹ Request Swiss to report any information they may be able to obtain in the premises without approaching the German authorities.

HULL

760C.61/2116

*The People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union
to the American Embassy in the Soviet Union*³²

[Translation]

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

On August 11, 1943, the American Ambassador, Mr. Standley, and the British Ambassador, Mr. Kerr, made to the President of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, J. V. Stalin, a joint statement concerning Soviet-Polish relations,³³ submitting at the same time in the name of their Governments *aide-mémoires* on this subject. In the joint statement it was pointed out that the Governments of the United States and of Great Britain were alarmed at the differences which have separated the Governments of the USSR and of Poland, since these differences were harmful to the common war efforts and were capable of disrupting the unity of the United Nations and of encouraging the enemy. In this statement the Ambassadors of the United States and Great Britain submit to the Soviet Government a proposal to adopt certain measures which, in the opinion of the American and British Governments, will lay the foundations not only for the resumption of normal relations between the

³¹ The two officers were Lt. Col. John H. Van Vliet, Jr., senior American officer at Oflag IX A/Z, a prisoner of war camp at Rothenburg, Germany, and Capt. Donald B. Stewart, both of the U. S. Army. For Lieutenant Colonel Van Vliet's testimony before the Select Committee to Conduct an Investigation of the Facts, Evidence and Circumstances of the Katyn Forest Massacre, see the Committee's *Hearings*, 82d Cong., 1st and 2d sessions, pt. 2, pp. 32-73. For Captain Stewart's testimony, see *ibid.*, pt. 1, pp. 2-29.

³² Sent to the Chargé in the Soviet Union by the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs with a covering note dated September 27. Copy transmitted to the Department by the Chargé in his despatch No. 281, October 4; received November 3.

³³ Not printed; it embodied the views set forth in the first two paragraphs of the *aide-mémoire* contained in telegram Polish Series No. 16, July 19, to the Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile, p. 444.

Soviet and Polish Governments on an equitable and lasting basis, but for friendly, neighborly cooperation after the war.

[Here follow contents of (1) the American *aide-mémoire*, which followed the lines set forth in Department's telegram No. 427, June 12, 9 p. m., printed on page 428, and (2) the British memorandum, printed on page 451.]

The Soviet Government duly appreciates the motives guiding the Governments of the United States of America and Great Britain in the matter of regularizing Soviet-Polish relations. The Soviet Government, however, cannot fail to express its regret that at the same time they did not make use of their influence in order to prevent acts of the Polish Government hostile to the Soviet Union and injurious to the cause of unity among the United Nations which obliged the Soviet Government to take the decision to interrupt diplomatic relations with the Polish Government.

The Soviet Government has always sought friendly relations with the Polish Government, being certain that the peoples of the Soviet Union and of Poland were in fact interested in friendly and close Soviet-Polish relations, particularly in the face of the common enemy, Hitlerite Germany.

However, good will toward the maintenance and strengthening of Soviet-Polish relations was not displayed on the part of the Polish Government. It is well known that the Polish Government took a position completely at variance with such relations on a number of important questions, including those questions to which the Governments of the United States of America and Great Britain have now given their attention in the statements made to the Soviet Government on August 11, 1943, and the solution of which, in their opinion, would lay the foundations not only for the resumption of normal relations between the Soviet and Polish Governments on an equitable and lasting basis, but for friendly, neighborly cooperation after the war.

The Soviet Government does not share the foregoing opinion concerning the significance of these questions and considers it necessary to draw the attention of the Government of the United States of America to the fact that the disruption of normal diplomatic relations between the USSR and Poland was directly connected not with these questions but with the generally hostile direction of the policies of the Polish Government in relation to the USSR, which found its specific expression in the attempt of the Polish Government to use the German fascist provocation concerning the Polish officers killed by the Hitlerites in the Smolensk District for the purpose of wringing from the Soviet Union territorial concessions at the expense of the interests of the Soviet Ukraine, Soviet Belorussia, and Soviet Lithuania.

It is impossible not to draw attention to the fact that the British and American proposals almost coincide with the pretensions of the Polish Government formulated by General Sikorski, notably in his speech of May 4, 1943, and at present supported by the Polish Premier, Mikolaiczuk, which refer in demagogic fashion to the necessity for "liberating" and evacuating from the Soviet Union "unfortunate" Polish citizens. This type of statement is lacking in any foundation whatsoever and cannot be considered other than as an insulting attack against the Soviet Union to which the Soviet Government does not consider it necessary to react.

Referring to the questions raised in the above-mentioned *aide-mémoires*, the Soviet Government considers it necessary to communicate the following:

1. *Concerning Polish relief and welfare work in the Soviet Union.*

In the first place it is necessary to note that the establishment in the Soviet Union of agencies of the Polish Embassy to extend assistance to Polish citizens was not at all the cause for misunderstandings between the Soviet and Polish Governments, as is stated in the proposal in the note of the American Government. If one is to speak of such misunderstandings, the reason for them was not the establishment of such organizations, but the fact that the Polish agencies and a number of their personnel and trusted representatives, instead of honestly doing their duty and fulfilling their obligations for cooperation with the Soviet authorities, embarked on espionage activities which were inimical to the Soviet Union.

It is well known that the Soviet Government from the very beginning of the resumption of Soviet-Polish relations in the summer of 1941 systematically gave its most energetic assistance to the Polish Government on a wide scale in organizing material assistance for Polish citizens evacuated from areas occupied by the German invaders. In permitting the establishment in twenty important cities throughout the entire Soviet Union of agencies of the Polish Embassy, which in actual fact were consular agencies, and furthermore in permitting the creation of an extensive network of more than 400 trusted representatives, the Soviet Government adopted measures which were altogether unprecedented in the manner in which the Soviet Government met the Polish wishes and which went far beyond the framework of customary diplomatic practice. The Soviet Government also put into effect a series of important financial and economic measures for the purpose of extending relief to indigent Polish citizens, such as the granting of a 100,000,000 ruble interest free loan, in addition to an interest free loan in the amount of 300,000,000 rubles for the formation and requirements of the Polish Army on Soviet territory.

It is further necessary to state that with the assistance of the Soviet authorities there were opened in the USSR 589 Polish welfare institutions (popular dining rooms, children's crèches, children's homes, homes for the incapacitated and invalids, etc.) for the maintenance of which special reserves of food and clothing were set aside; various privileges were accorded such as even a special railway tariff on goods destined for Polish nationals. And this colossal assistance to the Poles was carried out by the Soviet Union at a time when the Soviet Union was exerting all its forces to repulse the attack of 240 divisions of the Axis powers.

All this makes completely indisputable the fact of assistance of every kind on the part of the Soviet Government and of local Soviet authorities in developing the matter of assistance to Polish citizens. Meanwhile the Polish agencies, many of their personnel and trusted representatives, as well as a number of responsible members of the former Polish Embassy in the USSR, answered all these measures of the Soviet authorities with black ingratitude, embarking on espionage activities hostile to the Soviet Union. This is a fact which is attested by documentary evidence such as the records of judicial investigations and court decisions.

These are the real and not the imaginary grounds for those "misunderstandings" which are mentioned in the *aide-mémoire* of the Government of the United States of America dated August 11, 1943.

It is therefore entirely understandable that it is impossible to link the question of these "misunderstandings" to the question of the organization of relief for Polish nationals and to the question of the forms and methods of extending such relief. It is apparent that the causes of these misunderstandings do not lie in this plane at all. They lie in the fundamentally hostile policy of the Polish Government toward the USSR.

With reference to the proposal of the Government of the United States of America for the concentration of all matters pertaining to the relief of Polish citizens in the hands of Soviet organizations, that is exactly the manner in which relief for Polish citizens is organized in the USSR at the present time. To the foregoing it is necessary to add that Poles who were evacuated to regions in the rear of the USSR, in addition to the relief extended to them on an equal basis with all Soviet citizens, receive additional relief through a specially created system of Soviet institutions which look after Poles evacuated to regions in the Soviet rear. The submission of this proposal by the American Government is evidently explained by the insufficient information thus far at its disposal.

2. *Citizenship.*

All former Polish citizens who resided in the western regions of the Ukrainian and Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republics at the time of the admission of these regions into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (November 1–2, 1939) acquired Soviet nationality by virtue of the freely expressed will of the population of these regions and on the basis of the laws for the incorporation of the Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics through their reunion with the Ukrainian and Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republics, adopted by the Supreme Council of the USSR on November 1–2, 1939, and also on the basis of the decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the USSR of November 29, 1939, and in accordance with the “Law Concerning Soviet Citizenship” of August 19, 1938.

[Here follow texts of the laws of November 1 and 2, 1939, which are printed, together with the decree of November 29, 1939, in *Polish-Soviet Relations, 1918–1943, Official Documents*, pages 102–105. See also *Foreign Relations*, 1941, volume I, page 210, footnote 16.]

Consequently, the inclusion of the Western Ukraine within the Soviet Union and its reunion with the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, as well as the inclusion of Western Belorussia in the USSR and its reunion with the Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic is the result of the free will of the peoples of the Soviet Union and of the peoples of the Western Ukraine and of Western Belorussia and became the law of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as of November 1–2, 1939.

In the same way the question of the territorial status of the Western Ukraine and of Western Belorussia and the citizenship of persons who were residents of these territories was fully decided at that time. The Soviet Government cannot agree with the considerations set forth in the *aide-mémoire* of the Government of the United States in favor of some other decision of this question with relation to separate categories of Polish citizens, in as much as such a decision would be a violation of the laws of the USSR. It is impossible, of course, to agree with arguments such as those advanced to the effect that all persons of Polish nationality who were formerly Polish citizens and are now in the Soviet Union should be recognized as Polish citizens because they formerly were domiciled in Poland. Does the Government of the United States of America consider as Polish citizens Poles who formerly were domiciled in Poland, but who at the present time are domiciled in the United States of America, any more than the British Government recognizes as French citizens Frenchmen who are domiciled, for instance, in Canada? It is clear that the question of citizenship cannot be decided from the point of view of the former

citizenship or place of residence of these or other persons but must be decided on the basis of the laws in effect in the given country.

With reference to persons who were not residents of the Western Ukraine or of Western Belorussia who found themselves on Soviet territory because of war conditions, the Soviet Government has never raised and does not raise the question of their recognition as Soviet citizens against their will. These persons have always been allowed and are being allowed the full possibility of deciding for themselves the country of which they wish to be citizens.

In view of the foregoing the proposals of the American Government set forth in paragraphs (a) and (b) of section 2 of the *aide-mémoire* of August 11 are inadmissible for the Soviet Government.

3. *The evacuation of Polish citizens from the Soviet Union.*

As the Governments of Great Britain and the United States know, the Soviet Government, guided by its good will, in due course met the wishes of the Polish Government and permitted the evacuation from the Soviet Union, apart from 75,491 Polish troops, of 37,756 members of their families, among whom were also a considerable number of Soviet citizens. The Soviet Government on several occasions has stated and states again that from the side of the Soviet Government no obstacles were placed in the way of the departure from the Soviet Union of Polish citizens in the USSR, the number of which was not large, or of the families of Polish soldiers who have been evacuated to Iran. There are, furthermore, no obstacles with regard to this category of persons at the present time.

With reference to the statement of the Government of the United States of America to the effect that "Polish children cannot be properly cared for" in the Soviet Union, it is entirely apparent that such an assertion is based on unreliable information.

In its *aide-mémoire* the British Government, in considering the question of steps for the improvement of Soviet-Polish relations and the removal of possible causes of friction in these relations, declares that it has been imposing and will continue to impose upon the foreign newspapers published in the United Kingdom a control which, it hopes, will have the effect of putting an end to discussion in the press of controversial issues affecting inter-Allied relations. The Soviet Government cannot fail to express serious doubt concerning the effectiveness of measures of this kind on the part of the British Government, since the measures taken thus far, judging by the unceasing hostile campaign against the Soviet Union in certain parts of the Polish press, have led to no positive results whatsoever.

The Soviet Government shares the opinion of the Governments of Great Britain and the United States of America concerning the great

importance of the resumption of friendly relations between the Soviet Government and the Polish Government. The Soviet Government, however, for the reasons set forth above, cannot agree that the task of reestablishing Soviet-Polish relations can be resolved on the basis of the proposals presented to the Soviet Government by the Governments of the United States of America and Great Britain in their *aide-mémoires* of August 11, 1943.

860C.48/914 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Hamilton) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, September 30, 1943—1 p. m.

[Received October 2—5 : 16 p. m.]

1496. On September 29 the Australian Chargé³⁴ who is in charge of Polish interests here told me that in the course of recent discussion with Vice Commissar Korneichuk on subject of Polish relief, Korneichuk mentioned that consignments of stores for Polish relief had since the Polish Embassy left the Soviet Union stopped coming; that Korneichuk made it clear that the resumption of such consignments was not being asked for by Soviet authorities but that if shipments were started again, such action would be welcomed; that the foregoing was communicated by Australian Chargé to his Government; that his Government had suggested to the Polish Government that shipment of relief stores to the Soviet Union be resumed, such supplies to be distributed to Soviet authorities and to be consigned to whatever points Soviet Government might designate.

Foregoing information may be useful to Department for background in case Australian Legation in Washington or Polish Embassy there approach the Department in the matter:

HAMILTON

760C.61/2104

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] October 6, 1943.

The Polish Ambassador called at his request. He handed me a confidential memorandum, a copy of which is attached,³⁵ and then went over it section by section emphasizing each point. I exhibited suitable interest; said that there was nothing new in the attitude of

³⁴ Sir Frank Keith Officer.

³⁵ *Infra.*

this Government with respect to the Polish situation and that fullest attention would be given his memorandum.³⁶

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

740.0011 EW'39/31460½

Memorandum by the Polish Ambassador (Ciechanowski)

I—While the war is entering its final and decisive phase, the Polish Government, fully conscious of great sacrifices and of the unfaltering attitude of the Polish Nation, confident of the forces that the Polish Nation can still muster to a larger extent than any other occupied European nation for the struggle against the German foe—on Polish soil as well as abroad,—is firmly determined to face the great dangers and difficulties which still lie ahead for Poland.

As to the attitude of the Polish Nation at this crucial moment, the true sentiments of the population inside the occupied country are expressed in a resolution of August 15, 1943, adopted in Warsaw by the four leading political parties, text of which was handed to the American Ambassador to the Polish Government in London.³⁷

The armed forces at the disposal of the Polish Government consist of the airforce and the navy, both of which have been continuously active in the war, as well as of land forces, which are in readiness for action.

II—The Polish Government views with deep satisfaction the strengthening of Anglo-American relations as a fact of utmost importance to the future welfare of the world and reiterates the assurances of full solidarity of Poland with the Anglo-Saxon Powers, as well as its confidence in their cooperation in the defense of Poland's lawful rights and interests.

III—In particular, the Polish Government is fully aware of the need of understanding between the Anglo-Saxon Powers and the Soviet Union,—an understanding towards which Poland has never ceased to strive despite the attitude of the Soviet Government and its claims, by no means directed against Poland alone,—which do not

³⁶ Secretary Hull left Washington the next day for the Conference of Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union, which took place at Moscow, October 18–November 1, 1943. For correspondence on this Conference, see vol. I, pp. 513 ff.

³⁷ The text of the "Declaration of the Political Agreement Between the Four Political Parties Forming the Polish Home Political Representation," signed on August 15, 1943, was handed by the Polish Foreign Minister to the Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile and forwarded by him to the Department in despatch Polish Series No. 432, October 6. The Declaration, which enumerated the war aims and postwar objectives of the four parties stated that they would "cooperate in Poland, in the Polish Home Political Representation, in the Council of National Unity, and possibly, in the Council of the Republic," and would "collaborate in full solidarity with the Delegate of the Polish Government in London." (860C.00/924)

contribute to the creation of confidence, so indispensable for a durable reconciliation.

The readiness of the Soviet Government to support generously the revindication by Poland of some territories belonging to Germany in view of inducing Poland to forfeit the Eastern half of her territory to the USSR,—can be interpreted as an intention on the part of the Soviet Government to subordinate the whole of Poland and to use it as a spring board for subjugation of Central Europe and Germany.

In the estimation of the Polish Government, the reestablishment of normal diplomatic Polish-Soviet relations, brought about by the firm action of the Governments of the United States and Great Britain, would be the test of the good will of Soviet Russia for durable collaboration with the Anglo-Saxon Powers on the broadest basis in war, and later in peace. Such action should eliminate the settlement at this time of frontier problems—in accordance with the views expressed by the Secretary of State—and should be based on the minimum program submitted to Premier Stalin on August 11, 1943, by the American and British Ambassadors. This would open the possibility of further direct Polish-Soviet conversations, with American and British assistance, aiming at the solution of the remaining most urgent difficulties. Since the Polish Government is firmly determined to defend the territorial integrity of Poland in the East, the question of frontiers should be postponed to a later date.

IV—Anxious to maintain good neighborly Polish-Soviet relations in the future, the Polish Government would deem undesirable either temporary or partial occupation of Polish territories by the Soviet armies. However, if such occupation were unavoidably to take place as a result of military operations against Germany,—it must be dependent upon a previous Polish-Soviet understanding, based on the reestablishment of mutual relations. If such understanding does not take place, one should reckon with an open attempt of the Soviet Government to communize Poland using for that purpose the “Union of Polish Patriots”, headed by Wanda Wasilewska, and the military units commanded by Colonel Berling,³⁸ as well as by means of extermination or deportation of all the leading and nationally conscious Polish elements. Such action on the part of the Soviet Government would unavoidably cause a desperate self-defense on the part of the population of Poland; in the fifth year of unceasing and uncompromised resistance of the Polish people against Germany, it would be a dire tragedy not only for Poland, but for the entire community of the United Nations.

³⁸ Lt. Col. Zigmund Berling became head of the Polish armed forces in the Soviet Union after the break in Polish-Soviet relations on April 25, 1943. He was promoted to Major General on August 10, 1943.

In the face of this danger the Polish Government feels compelled to appeal to the American and British Governments for a guarantee of independence and integrity of the Polish territory and for security of its inhabitants.

However, should the entrance of Soviet troops on Polish territory take place as a result of the adjustment of relations and agreement between Poland and Soviet Russia, then—in conformity with the principle established at the Quebec Conference³⁹—the right to take over the administration of the country by sovereign Polish Government authorities should be guaranteed. To safeguard such a guarantee, American-British troops, or at least the necessary detachments of such troops, should be stationed on the territory of Poland to prevent Polish-Soviet friction, and especially to protect the population against eventual Soviet reprisals.

V—The Polish Government desires to begin negotiations with the United States and British Governments regarding Polish participation in the occupation of Germany.

The Polish Government anticipates the occupation by Polish troops and Polish administration of the Eastern provinces of Germany which, as a result of this war, are going to be ceded to Poland.

However, in other adjoining regions of Eastern Germany, which are of special importance to the safety of Poland, particularly in the initial, most difficult post-war period,—Inter-Allied occupation, with the participation of Poland, should take place.

VI—The Polish Government upholds in principle the program of federation in Central Europe without entering into details at the present time, but emphasizes that this program is not directed against Soviet Russia or her interests.

The Polish Government temporarily considers the satellite countries like: Roumania, Hungary and Slovakia, from the viewpoint of necessities and pace of war with Germany in which, like Italy, they still can render services to the United Nations. In the above countries the Polish Government has at its disposal Polish refugees and considerable influence. The Polish Government could not be indifferent to the occupation of those countries by Soviet troops, as such occupation would mean the encirclement of Poland by countries under Soviet control. The policy of the Czechoslovak Government is already influenced by Soviet Russia.

³⁹ The First Quebec Conference, between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, with their advisers, was held August 17–24, 1943. For the statement on administration of liberated areas, adopted at the Conference on August 22, see telegram No. 5417, September 4, midnight, to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, p. 458.

The Polish Government maintains its reservations against the alliance of Czechoslovakia with the USSR as planned by Mr. Beneš.⁴⁰ Nevertheless, in case of a permanent adjustment of Polish-Soviet relations, the Polish Government expresses its readiness to participate in a general security pact which, besides the directly interested countries of Eastern Europe, would also comprise Soviet Russia and the Anglo-Saxon Powers.

VII—The Polish Government announces that it is interested in the work of the Mediterranean Commission.⁴¹ This interest is motivated by the anticipated use of Polish Armed Forces also in this part of Europe.

In Italy the following problems are of special concern to the Polish Government: Polish refugees, Poles forcibly inducted into the German army who either deserted or were taken prisoners, as well as the problem of the Holy See.

The Polish Government is anxious to have more precise information regarding membership and jurisdiction of the Mediterranean Commission.

Anticipating that countries of Central Europe will not be included in the above Commission and because of the increasing importance of those countries in the strategy of the United Nations, the Polish Government suggests the establishment of a separate Commission of Central European countries—with the participation of Poland.

VIII—The Polish Government suggests the creation of an official Inter-Allied body for problems of general strategy in Europe in which Poland would participate. Such participation is justified by the numerical strength of the Polish Armed Forces as well as by the matters to be discussed. The latter should include all matters directly concerning Poland: use in action of the Polish Armed Forces, their speedy access to Poland, supply of weapons to the underground army in Poland for the purpose of armed insurrection against the Germans, decision as to the date and conditions of such insurrection in coordination with the general operational plans.

[WASHINGTON,] October 6, 1943.

⁴⁰ A treaty of friendship, mutual assistance, and post-war collaboration between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union was signed at Moscow on December 12, 1943. For text, see *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. CXLV, p. 238.

⁴¹ The Mediterranean Commission (Political-Military Commission), composed of representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union, was set up September 4, 1943, the day after the armistice with Italy was signed, to deal with economic and political questions touching Italy and the entire Mediterranean basin. For correspondence connected with the creation and work of the Commission, see vol. I, pp. 782 ff.

740.0011 European War 1939/31666

The Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile (Biddle) to the Secretary of State

[Polish Series] No. 437

LONDON, October 14, 1943.

[Received October 22.]

SIR: I have the honor to report the main points of my very recent conversation with Polish Prime Minister Mikolajczyk.

Reference to reply of Joint Chiefs of Staff to Polish General Staff's request for equipment for "Underground" forces.

The Prime Minister referred to a secret report which the Polish General Staff had just received from the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington, to effect that current circumstances prevented the latter's making any definite commitment, at this time, as to a large-scale supply of arms and ammunition to the "Underground" organization in Poland.

The Prime Minister said that, while the Joint Chiefs of Staff's communication had explained the circumstances which prevented the aforementioned commitment, he and his associates in the Government were deeply disappointed to learn of the impossibility of making early deliveries of the "Underground's" requirements.

Polish Government's examination of situation now confronting "Underground" organization; conclusions drawn.

Together with a representative of the "Underground" forces (at present in London), he and his associates, the Prime Minister continued, had examined all aspects of the situation that now confronted that organization. As a result, the following conclusions had been drawn: *a*) that in response to a question put to the meeting as to what instructions should be given the Commander in Chief of the "Underground" regarding orders he in turn should issue, in event of a Russian entry into Poland, it was decided that he should instruct his organization "to lay low and refrain from coming to grips with the Russians["];* *b*) that the Polish "Underground" must eventually—

*In this connection Mikolajczyk said that should the Russians succeed in forcing a German withdrawal to some line in Poland and should the Poles accordingly find themselves confronted with Russians again on their soil, the situation would be a dangerous one indeed for his compatriots. There was a real dread of this among the Poles, and he was apprehensive lest, notwithstanding the aforementioned orders to the C-in-C of the "Underground", there might be skirmishes in various sections of the country between the Russians and Poles, which would undoubtedly prove costly to the Polish communities concerned. This possibility had given rise to the deepest concern in his and the minds of his associates. This, in turn, had raised the question as to what measures might be taken to provide for the safety of the Polish people in case of a sudden entry by the Russians. Would it be possible to send an Anglo-American Commission to Poland in order to assure a just and decent treatment of the Poles? This, Mikolajczyk thought, provided, of course, it met with Russian agreement, might possibly prove helpful in an emergency. [Footnote in the original.]

and certainly in advance of a possible Russian entry into Poland—rise up against the Germans. This would be necessary for the following reasons: 1) in order that the “Underground” render its potentially valuable assistance towards delaying the Germans, in event the German retreat extended over Polish territory. In this connection, Mikolajczyk said that to delay a German withdrawal in front of advancing Russian forces would be to render the Russians effective service, in the nature of that rendered by the Russian guerilla forces on Russian territory. Furthermore, he said, and no less important, was the possibility that this delaying action by the Poles might prove the decisive factor in favor of the Western Democracies, in event of a close race between the Russians and the forces of the Western Democracies to reach Germany; 2) to avoid the possible—even probable—subsequent reaction on part of public opinion in the Allied Democracies to effect that the Poles had not shown a sufficiently vigorous, hence effective resistance to the Germans. In this connection, Mikolajczyk said it would be more than likely that the Russians would be quick to spot any signs of such reaction and to exploit them in their own interests; 3) to minimize the possibility of rendering the Russians a pretext for deporting Poles en masse into Siberia and other remote areas in Russia on the ground that the latter had failed to render the Russian forces assistance by rising up against the Germans.

Mikolajczyk's remarks to British Foreign Secretary that whether or not the “Underground” received the tools they would nevertheless rise up against the Germans.

Of connected bearing, he had recently told the British Foreign Secretary that if the “Underground” did not receive the tools, it would fight the Germans anyway; that unfortunately without sufficiently adequate weapons the loss of Polish blood would, of course, be all the greater, and the efforts the less effective.

In this connection, the unhappy question had passed through his mind as to what posterity might say if it read that the Poles had fought but had not received from their allies the required tools, when they had notified the latter of their desire to rise against the Germans.

[Here follows section in which the Prime Minister expressed apprehension concerning the possibility that the Allied Military Command had been reluctant to supply the Polish Underground with arms and ammunition for fear they would be turned against the Russians. He stated that on the other hand reports from Poland indicated that Russian “partisans” in Poland were killing Poles and not Germans, but that the information had not been released, in the interests of preserving the unity of the United Nations front. He deplored “a reported tendency in the United States to play down the Polish case.”]

Polish Government's views as expressed to the British Foreign Secretary by Polish Foreign Minister, regarding Polish interest in connection with Three-Power Conference.

Mikolajczyk went on to say that in expressing his Government's views to the British Foreign Secretary as to Polish interests in connection with the Three-Power Conference,⁴² M. Romer, Polish Foreign Minister, had made two main points: (a) that his Government earnestly hoped that the Russian Government would agree to an early renewal of diplomatic relations; that the Polish Government would be inclined to regard this in the nature of a test of the Russian Government's good will towards Poland; and, (b) that his Government hoped that the Russian Government would agree not to discuss frontier questions until after the war.

The British Foreign Secretary had asked M. Romer whether he thought there was any likelihood of any members of the Polish Government's willingness to concede Russia its desired "security frontier" in Eastern Poland, provided Poland, in turn, were to acquire East Prussia and a part of Upper Silesia. In response, M. Romer had stated that no Polish Government in exile could possibly entertain such ideas. These were matters which would have to be left to the Polish people to decide. Supposing, M. Romer had asked, the Polish people did decide in favor of such a formula, did the British Foreign Secretary think that the Allies would be prepared to guarantee the rest of Poland. In reply, the British Secretary had said in effect that this was a question concerning which he would not wish to speculate at this time.

At this point Mikolajczyk said that, as regards the possibility of Poland's acquiring a part of East Prussia and Upper Silesia, he had just been informed that Dr. Rawitzki,† prominent in the "Free Germany" movement in Britain, was now engaged in writing a book showing how Germany might avoid giving up any part or all of these two territories. If the British censors permitted the publication and distribution of this book in Britain, Mikolajczyk added, it would hardly seem consistent with the views frequently expressed by British official circles, concerning the desirability of Poland's acquiring East Prussia and part of Upper Silesia.

Serious consideration of plan envisaging "the dropping" of the Government into Poland in near future.

In concluding his remarks, Mikolajczyk told me that he and his associates were seriously considering making a formal request of the

⁴² The Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers.

†See my despatch No. 409 (Polish Series) dated September 18, 1943 and enclosure thereto. [Footnote in the original. Despatch not printed.]

Allies to facilitate his Government's being "dropped" from planes into Poland in the near future. He and his associates thought that the situation had become so serious for Poland that it might be well for them to be with their people in their trying hour. He was confident that the people would welcome this move, and equally confident that the presence of himself and his associates would serve to rally the forces of resistance at the moment of their uprising against the Germans. He was just about, he said, to attend a Cabinet meeting at which this matter would be discussed in further detail. Moreover, he would keep me posted. Should this plan eventually be carried out, he would hope that we and the British might see our way clear towards sending, perhaps, liaison officers to serve near the Government and the authorities of the "Underground".

Respectfully yours,

A. J. DREXEL BIDDLE, JR.

*The Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile (Biddle) to President Roosevelt*⁴³

LONDON, October 18, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: On several occasions recently Polish Prime Minister Mikolajczyk has asked me whether I thought you might find it convenient to receive him at some time in the not distant future. I told him the first time he asked that I was confident that you would be glad to see him, and that if he wished me to enquire discreetly as to what would be the best time I should be glad to do so. He has accordingly just asked me to ascertain whether you might find it possible to receive him at some date in late November—early December. If so he would immediately make preparations to arrive in Washington about that time.

You may possibly remember him as having accompanied General Sikorski on his first visit to you at the White House. At that time Mikolajczyk was Deputy Prime Minister with the portfolio of Minister of the Interior. Having long played a prominent role in the Polish Peasant Party, he has come to be regarded as the Party's chief representative outside the country. He has broadened perceptibly in perspective during the past four years, and might today be considered middle road in political outlook. Moreover he takes a considerable pride in claiming to represent continuity in policies conceived and pursued by the late General.

He is a great admirer of yours, and I know it would mean a great deal to him if he were afforded the opportunity of having a talk with

⁴³ Copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

you. In the event that you may see your way clear to set a date, I should send you well in advance of his departure an outline of the main points which he might be expected to bring up in the course of discussion.

With warmest regards, and my every good wish, I am

Yours faithfully,

TONY BIDDLE, JR.

740.0011 Moscow/91 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Acting Secretary of State

[Extract]

Moscow, October 29, 1943—midnight.

[Received October 31—7:30 p. m.]

1784. Delam⁴⁴ No. 42.⁴⁵ For the President and the Acting Secretary from the Secretary.

The Conference then turned to the consideration of the question of Poland. Eden stated that it was a matter of great regret to the British Government that no diplomatic relations existed between the Soviet Union and Poland, both members of the United Nations. He said that if there was any contribution which this conference could make for the reestablishment of those relations he was prepared to do what he could. He mentioned that the Combined Chiefs of Staff had recently received a request from the Polish Government to supply arms to the Polish underground movement for the purpose of carrying on sabotage and other activities against the German occupation forces but that no decision had been reached on this request because of the desire of the British Government to consult with the Soviet Government.

Molotov said that on any question of supplying arms to the Poles the most important aspect was whether those arms would fall into reliable hands. He said that from the Soviet point of view the relations with Poland or any Polish Government were very important since Poland was a neighboring state and that therefore it was one

⁴⁴ The designation assigned to a series of telegrams to the Department from the American Delegation at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers.

⁴⁵ This telegram reported the session of the Moscow Conference on October 29. Only the portion of the proceedings concerned with the Polish problem is printed here. For a full account of the proceedings, see vol. I, pp. 662-670. Except for a brief conversation on October 24 between Cordell Hull and Anthony Eden regarding the manner of approach to Molotov in connection with the Polish question (see memorandum by the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, October 24, *ibid.*, p. 622), the record does not indicate that the Polish question was discussed at any other Conference meeting.

which concerned primarily the Soviet and Polish Governments. He stated that the Soviet Government stood definitely for the independence of Poland but it also desired to see a Polish Government which entertained friendly feelings towards the Soviet Government. He added that it was precisely this element which was lacking in the Polish Government in exile. He went on to say there were other nations through no fault of the Soviet Union which did not maintain relations with them but in the case of Poland he felt that it was a matter of direct concern to Poland and the Soviet Union.

I then said that when neighbors fell out without going into the causes of the dispute we nevertheless felt entitled to express the hope that these differences would be composed and the two neighbors would resume friendly relations. Molotov said his Government felt exactly the same in regard to Poland. I then pointed out that in the U.S. we had groups who were very friendly towards Poland and others who were very friendly towards the Soviet Union and that their only desire was to see relations established.

Eden agreed with my observations and said that their position was even more difficult since the British Government had treaties with both Poland and the Soviet Union. He went on to say that the Polish Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister just before his departure from London had expressed the desire to establish friendly relations with the Soviet Union. Molotov said that the Soviet Government had not been informed of this desire and he merely wished to add that the Polish Division on the German front was fighting heroically against the common enemy.

Eden then pointed out that there would be other Polish divisions engaged in our common struggle and that any delay in their participation was due to the British belief that these troops were insufficiently trained and not to any lack of desire on the part of the Polish military leaders.

HARRIMAN

President Roosevelt to the Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile (Biddle), at London ⁴⁶

WASHINGTON, November 8, 1943.

DEAR TONY: Thank you very much for your letter of October 18 regarding Prime Minister Mikolajczyk's desire to visit me in Washington.

⁴⁶ Copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y. A notation in the margin reads: "Signed original of this letter sent to the Office of the Under Secy. State for delivery."

I remember the Prime Minister very well from his previous visit here, and I am looking forward to having the pleasure of seeing him again particularly since I feel it is most desirable when possible to maintain personal contacts between the various leaders of the United Nations.

While I am anxious to see the Prime Minister at the earliest convenient time, I have a rather full schedule for the next two months. Consequently I should prefer, if the Prime Minister is agreeable, to receive him sometime subsequent to the reopening of Congress after the Christmas holidays. I would appreciate it, therefore, if you could explain this to the Prime Minister and ascertain whether it would be convenient for him to delay his visit to Washington until sometime after January 15.

Very sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

760C.61/11-1743

The Polish Ambassador (Ciechanowski) to the Adviser on Political Relations (Dunn) ⁴⁷

WASHINGTON, November 17, 1943.

MY DEAR JIMMY: I deeply regret that the Secretary of State has not yet found time to receive me in connection with the results of the Moscow Conference and that, according to your secretary, you are likewise too busy to see me. I am especially anxious to have the opportunity of a frank talk with you after reading the press reports of the Secretary's two press conferences of November 15th and 16th. I have no means of ascertaining whether the Secretary's statements have been accurately reported by the press, but these press reports are causing me grave apprehension regarding Poland.

While the Secretary's statements, as reported by the press, to the effect that the formula applied to Italy on geographical and political self-determination is to be regarded as a pattern to be applied to all liberated nations, gives me a feeling of relief, his further comments,

⁴⁷ The letter was delivered to the Department by Michal Kwapiszewski, Minister Counselor of the Polish Embassy. As Mr. Dunn was temporarily absent from the Department, the letter was at Mr. Kwapiszewski's request forwarded to the Secretary of State. In a memorandum of November 17, 1943, the Under Secretary of State, Edward R. Stettinius, recommended to Cecil W. Gray, of the office of the Secretary: "The matter is rather urgent. I have mentioned it to the Secretary and I think if you could squeeze the Ambassador in for a fifteen-minute appointment either Friday or Saturday it would be wise because of the pressing nature of the Polish matter at the moment." In another note to Mr. Gray on November 18, H. Freeman Matthews, Chief of the Division of European Affairs, stated: "This is pretty bitter stuff—and not one word of gratitude for Moscow Conf. or one word against the Nazis! I think the Secretary should look at this just before seeing the Pole."

according to press reports, particularly those of the conference of November 16th, have aroused my deep concern.

The interpretation of the vital and immediate problem of military occupation of territories as they are being liberated, appears to justify the anxieties of the Polish Government that the USA is willing to admit the occupation of Polish territory *exclusively* by Soviet forces, without the participation, in some form at least, of American, British and Polish forces.

You know the truth of the situation too well for me to have to stress the fundamental difference between the disinterested occupation of any territory by American or British forces, without Soviet participation, and an occupation exclusively by the Soviets, of Poland or part of Poland in view of clearly stated Soviet annexationist claims on Poland. This matter is all the more serious when one recalls the conduct of the Soviet authorities on Polish territory after their invasion on September 17, 1939, and in the course of their occupation until the German attack on Russia on June 22, 1941. At that time the Soviets partitioned Poland in agreement with Germany and carried out a ruthless denationalization and sovietization of that territory, applying methods of extermination and deporting about a million and a half of leading and nationally conscious Polish elements.

According to the Joint Four Nation Declaration signed in Moscow ⁴⁸ (par. 6), as well as from the press reports of the two last press conferences of the Secretary of State,—no steps appear to have been taken to ensure the reestablishment by the Polish Government of civil administration in Poland as the liberation of Poland's territory will proceed. On the contrary, the press reports of the Secretary of State's yesterday's press conference quote him as having expressed the opinion that the administration of the occupied territory will be taken over by the military authority of the Allied Power which will be the first to enter such territory in the course of war operations. In Poland's case this would mean that the Soviet military command will be empowered exclusively to take over the administration of occupied Polish territory.

On the basis of past tragic experience, as well as of our intimate knowledge of Soviet methods, this would be equivalent to delivering Poland to the USSR for immediate and complete sovietization.

The press reports further state that after the termination of such military occupation, the temporarily suspended application of the principles of the Atlantic Charter would take place. One of the expressions of this belated application of these principles would be the right of the population freely to express by popular vote or plebiscite its will regarding its national allegiance and form of government.

⁴⁸ For text, see vol. I, p. 755.

In the case of Poland, after a considerable time of uncontrolled Soviet occupation, such application of principles would remain but an empty wish. One cannot hold a plebiscite on a cemetery and, undoubtedly, by that time Poland would have virtually become a cemetery. Moreover, free expression by popular vote in a sovietized country is a contradiction in terms and totally out of the question.

How can one persuade the Polish people,—whose splendid resistance, unique of its kind, to enemy pressure in this war, and whose behavior, has given to Poland the distinction of being the only European country without a Quisling,—that they are to be treated worse than Ethiopia and Italy. The Negus has already taken over his liberated country and its administration, while in Italy, although she was one of the leading Axis Powers, the local Italian civil administration is already allowed to function.

I must return once more to the unfortunate wording of Paragraph 6 of the Joint Four Nation Declaration of Moscow. In this Paragraph it is said: "That after the termination of hostilities they (the signatories) will not employ their military forces within the territories of other states except for the purposes envisaged in this declaration and after joint consultation."

This wording clearly implies that while hostilities are still in progress, the occupying power may use its forces for purposes not envisaged in the Declaration and without any previous consultation with the three remaining nations.

For Poland this creates a situation of the gravest peril when viewed in the light of the occupation of Poland exclusively by the forces of the USSR. The fact that the USSR Government refuses to resume diplomatic relations with the Polish Government, further aggravates this situation.

To sum up the apprehensions which I consider it my duty to communicate to you without delay, I admit that I still lack your official interpretation regarding the dangerous wording of Paragraph 6 of this Declaration, as well as your authoritative version of the Secretary's remarks at his press conferences. However, if my interpretation, based on that of the press, is correct, I must regretfully say that the situation of Poland and, for that matter, of other European countries, must be regarded as extremely serious inasmuch as it appears that they are being surrendered to the mercy of the Soviets rather than encouraged to expect the liberation repeatedly promised them in the Atlantic Charter, the Declaration of the United Nations, and so many other more specific statements on the part of the Governments of the United States and Great Britain, guaranteeing the restoration of their independent existence.

I am sure that in view of the urgency of the situation which my country faces at this moment, you will forgive my insistence on trying to find the means of bringing these considerations to your immediate attention. I should be most grateful if you would communicate them to the Secretary of State and if I could be given the earliest opportunity of discussing them with you and of being received by the Secretary of State.

I am,

Yours ever

JAN CIECHANOWSKI

760C.61/21194 : Telegram

The Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile (Biddle) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, November 17, 1943—6 p. m.

[Received 8:33 p. m.]

Polish Series [No.] 82. For the President and the Secretary. Polish Foreign Minister Romer has requested me to transmit to you the communication and memorandum quoted below. A similar communication has been addressed to Mr. Churchill.

"London, 16th November, 1943. Mr. President: The Polish Foreign Minister has today handed to Ambassador Biddle my memorandum, concerning Polish-Soviet relations and has requested that it be transmitted to you through his intermediary.

I am anxious besides to present to you orally certain alternatives for the solution of existing difficulties and should be grateful if you could give me the opportunity of doing so.

I am prepared to undertake at any moment and with absolute discretion the necessary journey.

Please believe me to be, Mr. President, sincerely yours, S. Mikołajczyk, Prime Minister of Poland.

Confidential memorandum.

In the course of his last conversation with Mr. Cordell Hull on October 6, before Mr. Hull's departure for Moscow, the Polish Ambassador, M. Ciechanowski, placed before him a memorandum in which the Polish Government, endowed with the full confidence of the Polish people at home, gave expression to the complete trust placed in the United States and Great Britain by the Polish people and the Polish Government. In this memorandum an appeal was made for guarantees and the safeguarding of the right of the Allied Polish Government to assure administration on Polish territory immediately after its liberation from German occupation, and also for the safeguarding of life and property of the Polish population in the event of the march of Soviet troops into Poland. At the same time an appeal was made for intervention which would bring about the resumption of Polish-Soviet relations, which, in the present circumstances, has become a matter of particular urgency.

The unwillingness of the Polish Government to enter into discussions on frontier questions is based on the following considerations:

1. Poland, who entered the war in 1939 in defense of her territory, has never given up the fight and has not produced any Quisling, is fully entitled to expect that she will emerge from this war without reduction of her territory.

2. Eastern Poland which is the object of Soviet claims extends to half of the territory of the Polish Republic. It contains important centres of Polish national life. It is closely knitted with Poland by ties of tradition, civilization and culture. The Polish population which has resided there for centuries forms a relative majority of the population of these lands. On the other hand, the lower density of their population and their possibilities of economic development furnish Poland with a socially sound means of solving the problem of the over-population of her western and southern provinces.

3. The Polish Government could not see their way to enter a discussion on the subject of territorial concessions above all for the reason that such a discussion in the absence of effective guarantees of Poland's independence and security on the part of the United States and Great Britain would be sure to lead further and further to ever new demands.

The attribution to Poland of Eastern Prussia, Danzig, Opole Silesia⁴⁹ and the straightening and shortening of the Polish western frontier are in any case dictated by the need to provide for the stability of future peace, the disarmament of Germany and the security of Poland and other countries of Central Europe. The transfer to Poland of these territories cannot therefore be treated fairly as an object of compensation for the cession to the U.S.S.R. of Eastern Poland which for reasons adduced above does by no means represent to the U.S.S.R. a value comparable to that which it has for Poland. The attempt made to prejudge the fate of Polish eastern territories by means of a popular vote organized under Soviet occupation by the occupying authorities is without any value either political or legal.

It would be equally impossible to obtain a genuine expression of the will of the population inhabiting these territories in view of the ruthless methods applied there today and those which have been applied in the past by consecutive occupants.

Recalling the confidential memorandum handed over to Mr. Hull before his departure for the Moscow Conference, the Polish Government gives below a main outline of instructions which have been issued recently to the underground organization in Poland.⁵⁰

A rising in Poland against Germany is being planned to break out at a moment mutually agreed upon with our Allies either before or at the very moment of the entry of Soviet troops into Poland.

⁴⁹ Upper Silesia.

⁵⁰ The text of the "Instructions for Poland Established by the Polish Cabinet Meeting" was handed by Polish Prime Minister Mikolajczyk to Ambassador Biddle, who transmitted it to the Department in despatch Polish Series No. 463, November 16; not printed.

In accordance with the principles adopted in Quebec, the Polish Government is entitled to exert sovereign authority over Polish lands as they are liberated from the enemy.

Consequently, in case the entry of Soviet troops into Poland takes place after the reestablishment of Polish-Soviet relations, the Polish Government would be anxious, as it has already informed the American Government, to return immediately to Poland together with the Commander-in-Chief ⁵¹ and to cooperate there in the further struggle against Germany.

The entry of Soviet troops on Polish territory without previous resumption of Polish-Soviet relations would force the Polish Government to undertake political action against the violation of Polish sovereignty whilst the Polish local administration and army in Poland would have to continue to work underground. In that case the Polish Government foresees the use of measures of self-defense wherever such measures are rendered indispensable by Soviet methods of terror and extermination of Polish citizens.

The Moscow Conference has not brought the question of the resumption of Polish-Soviet relations nearer a satisfactory conclusion. In the meantime, the situation on the eastern front indicates that Soviet troops may be expected soon to cross the borders of Poland. The Polish Government has, moreover, reasons to fear that in present conditions the life and property of Polish citizens may be exposed to danger after the entry of Soviet troops into Poland and the imposing on the country of Soviet administration. In that case, desperate reaction of the Polish community may be expected following the violation of the principle adopted in Quebec assuring to the United Nations their liberty and their own administration.

The principles foreseen in the case of Italy by the Moscow Conference ⁵² could by no means be satisfactory for Poland. The administration carried out in Poland by a commander of Soviet troops even with the cooperation of American and British liaison officers would place Poland, an Allied country, on the same level as Italy, an enemy country; in practice the cooperation of a limited number of American and British liaison officers could not be a safeguard for the interests of the Polish population in the territories occupied by Soviet troops.

In this situation the Polish Government addresses a pressing appeal to President Roosevelt to intervene with Marshal Stalin with the view to restoring Polish-Soviet relations, safeguarding the interests of the Polish state and the life and property of its citizens after the Soviet troops have entered Poland.

Polish airmen, sailors and soldiers, in carrying out the fight against the common enemy, must be assured that their families will be restored to them and that they can expect to return to a free and independent homeland. London, November 16th, 1943."

The outline of instructions recently issued to the underground organization in Poland, as referred to in the foregoing memorandum,

⁵¹ Gen. Kazimierz Sosnkowski.

⁵² For text of the "Declaration Regarding Italy," November 1, 1943, see vol. I, p. 759.

has today been transmitted to the Navy Department with the request that a copy be brought to the Department's attention.⁵³

[BIDDLE]

760C.61/2120

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] November 19, 1943.

The Polish Ambassador called at his request and before giving him a chance to talk I proceeded to receive him in a thoroughly friendly manner and to express regret at returning to find Polish attacks on the Four-Nations Declaration when this agreement means everything to Poland in the future. I brought this out very clearly by reciting the provisions of the Declaration. I expressed further regret at Polish agitation in this country of a thoroughly unfriendly nature in other ways besides the condemning of the Four-Nations Declaration. I made it clear to him that I had emphasized and reemphasized at Moscow my friendly and earnest interest in his country and urged Mr. Molotov to find a basis for reestablishing diplomatic relations between the two countries. I said that it was only through this course of friendly discussion and conference that we could probably get Polish and Russian difficulties worked out. I made some references to statements in my address of yesterday⁵⁴ explanatory of this Government's attitude toward the discussions at Moscow, the Four-Nations Declaration and the Italian Declaration, et cetera, and added that I had made it clear to the Russians that I was not undertaking to pass on the merits of the differences between Russia and Poland, but that mine was an earnest appeal for the two countries to get back on speaking terms. I said that I preferred not to make any commitments about any phases of the merits of the Polish and Russian controversy. Once diplomatic relations were reestablished, ways could be found to work out and adjust their differences. I stated to the Ambassador that if I should undertake to make commitments on any controversial question, it would probably be misinterpreted, not by him but by others after he makes his report to his Government.

The Ambassador handed me a communication for President Roosevelt and requested me to send it to him. He then handed me a confidential communication, a copy of which is hereto attached,⁵⁵ relating

⁵³ Copy was transmitted to the Department by the Navy Department on November 17; filed under 860C.20/116.

⁵⁴ For address of November 18 by the Secretary of State before Congress regarding the Moscow Conference, see Department of State *Bulletin*, November 20, 1943, p. 341.

⁵⁵ These two communications are, except for a few minor changes in wording, the same as those quoted in telegram No. 82, November 17, from the Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile, *supra*.

to a proposed plan for the Prime Minister of Poland and his associates to call on the President, Mr. Churchill and Mr. Stalin at an early date. I said that I did not believe that that would be possible since they would be busily engaged with military matters of great urgency wherever they might be, whether at home or abroad. He urged me to send the communications to the President and I said again that I was not making any commitments but would give attention to his request.

I finally emphasized that it was sufficient for him and his Government to know what I had attempted to do at the Moscow conference to aid Poland and Russia to resume diplomatic relations and added that as a friend of Poland I would continue to watch every opportunity, just as I did at Moscow, to be of service to both Governments along the lines already mentioned.

He at least went away in good humor.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

760C.61/21194 : Telegram

The Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile (Biddle) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, November 20, 1943—5 p. m.

[Received November 20—2:47 p. m.]

Polish Series [No.] 84. For the President and the Secretary. At their urgent request I called on Prime Minister Mikolajczyk and Foreign Minister Romer today. They requested me to supplement Mikolajczyk's letter to the President, given in my 82, November 17, 6 p. m., by an "urgent" message to the President and the Secretary to effect that the Polish Government was insistent on being consulted in advance of any decisions that might be taken involving Polish interests. Decisions without full consultation with the Polish Government upon which the "underground" in Poland staked its hopes, they emphasized, would undoubtedly lead to a serious crisis in that quarter. Besides it would be bound to create a crisis in Polish circles here and also in the Middle East. One could not exclude, moreover, the possibility of serious repercussions among the Americans of Polish origin and extraction. Even a man condemned to death, Mikolajczyk interjected, was granted a last word before the court.

Romer went on to say that Mr. Eden had in mind advancing a formula which, as near as he could understand, envisaged dividing Poland into regions in which respectively the military administration of the "liberating forces" and the Polish Government might function. It was only logical to suppose that whatever formulae were advanced would meet with counterproposals and the Polish Government considered it of utmost importance that its representative be on hand

at the time of these discussions. Besides they would like to know also the American reactions and views as well as those of the British.

In conclusion Mikolajczyk said that in urging that the President receive him he could assure me that he would guard his presence at any given place in secrecy; that he realized the difficulties confronting the western Allies at this point, and that he wanted to be as helpful as possible in the matter. In this latter connection, he said, there were things he could present orally that he could not at this time put in writing.

[BIDDLE]

760C.61/21194 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile (Biddle), at London

WASHINGTON, November 25, 1943—1 p. m.

[Polish Series No.] 38. The pertinent parts of the communications received by you from the Polish Government contained in your 82, November 17, 6 p. m. have been transmitted to the President.

When the Polish Ambassador called on November 19 he displayed an extremely agitated state of mind which undoubtedly reflects that of the Polish Government which seems to feel itself in a desperate position. In an effort to calm the Ambassador I made it clear to him that I had emphasized at Moscow my friendly and earnest interest in his country and urged Mr. Molotov to find a basis for resuming diplomatic relations. I also expressed the hope that should diplomatic relations be reestablished ways could be found to adjust the differences between the two countries. I added that as a friend of Poland I would continue to watch every opportunity, just as I did at Moscow, to be of service to both Governments.

Having in mind certain unfriendly statements published here which cast doubts upon the effectiveness of the Moscow declarations and which I have reason to believe may have been inspired by the Polish Embassy, I expressed my regret that such a hostile attitude toward the Four-Nation Declaration was apparently being adopted by the Polish authorities when this agreement means so much to the future Poland. I likewise indicated to the Ambassador my regret at short-sighted Polish agitation in this country of a thoroughly unfriendly nature which had manifested itself in other ways than condemning the Four-Nation Declaration.

Although I have transmitted to the President Premier Mikolajczyk's request to visit him I explained to the Ambassador that I did not believe it would be possible for the President to receive the Prime

Minister since the President and Mr. Churchill will be busily engaged in military matters of great urgency.

Since the President has so far not indicated what reply should be made to the latest request of Premier Mikolajczyk it is suggested that you confine any remarks you may make to him to those I made to the Ambassador.

In view of the extremely agitated and almost unreasoning attitude of the Ambassador here and Polish officials in London, informal efforts are being made to convince the Poles, official and unofficial, that they must take a calmer outlook and not alienate public sympathy for their cause by undue agitation or public outbursts regarding our policy. I wish you to exert all your influence to this same end.

For your personal and private information I have suggested to the President ⁵⁶ that with the approach of the Red Army to Polish territory it would appear that every friendly opportunity should be taken to bring about a resumption of Polish-Soviet diplomatic relations. I have also suggested that if this should not be possible for the moment we should use all our influence to persuade the Polish Government to give instructions to its underground army to begin, at an appropriate moment, a full-fledged attack on the Germans and thus assist the Red Army in its struggle against our common enemy. We feel that the Polish Government should recognize that if they adopt this policy the British and ourselves will be in a better position to convince the Soviet Government that the Polish Government desires to shorten the war by making this material contribution on the Eastern front.

HULL

760C.61/2119½ : Telegram

The Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile (Biddle) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, November 27, 1943—9 p. m.

[Received 11:59 p. m.]

Polish Series [No.] 86. I conveyed the substance of the second paragraph of your 38, November 25, 1 p. m., to Prime Minister Mikolajczyk this morning.

I also stressed the importance of a calmer attitude on the part of interested Polish circles regarding the Moscow Declaration. Mikolajczyk assured me he had sought to make it clear to leaders of

⁵⁶ For a memorandum of November 23, 1943, from Secretary Hull to President Roosevelt, giving "a rather full summary of developments" concerning Poland, see *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, p. 381.

Polish opinion that anything other than a calm attitude at this point would only be embarrassing to the Polish Government.

However, with regard to the attitude of the Polish language press in the U.S., he said the problem was complicated. *Rada Polonia*⁵⁷ regarded the Polish Government favorably and as recently as September 17 had declared its support of the Government. There was on the other hand a group identified with *Nowy Swiat*⁵⁸ which was opposed to the Polish Government. Thus, when the latter group raised questions which engaged the sympathetic interest of all categories of Americans of Polish extraction and origin, this put the former group in an embarrassing position and produced a situation that was difficult to control.

As regards your fourth paragraph, I recently conveyed to Mikolajczyk a message contained in letter from the President dated November 8 to effect that the President would be glad to receive Mikolajczyk about January 15. The President's letter was in reply to my letter of October 18 in which I said that Mikolajczyk hoped the President could receive him before Christmas. As regards the more recently expressed desire of Mikolajczyk to visit the President and British Prime Minister, as quoted in my 82, November 17, 6 p. m., Mikolajczyk told me this morning that the British Foreign Office had said it believed that the President and Mr. Churchill would be so engaged in the discussion of military matters that it would be difficult for the Prime Minister to receive him.

In this connection, Mikolajczyk said he and his associates considered that the matter of instructions to the Polish underground was a military question and further that military decisions taken at the present Conference⁵⁹ would undoubtedly decide the political future. He added that they regarded American Army policy in a totally different light from that of the Russian Army. They felt that the Americans would hope to go home at the earliest moment whereas the Russians would more than likely take a different view. He and his associates felt that as far west, as the Russian armies marched, just so far would Russia's western frontier develop. They were inclined to look for this issue to be raised for decision at the present Conference.

With regard to the final paragraph of your telegram, please refer to my despatches Nos. 437 of October 14, and 463 of November 16⁶⁰ for the Polish Government's instructions to the "underground" in

⁵⁷ The *Rada Polonii Amerykanskiej* ("Polish Council"), located in Chicago, Illinois, was composed of representatives of Polish organizations in the United States.

⁵⁸ New York Polish-language daily newspaper.

⁵⁹ i.e., the Tehran Conference; the records of this Conference are printed in *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943.

⁶⁰ Latter not printed, but see footnote 50, p. 482.

Poland regarding rising against the Germans. Mikolajczyk remarked to me this morning that those instructions had been issued notwithstanding the fact that the British authorities here had discontinued the aerial despatch of munitions and other supplies to the "underground" in Poland. The British, he said, had explained that this was due to bad weather and to a lack of planes. He could not, however, escape the impression that the discontinuance was attributable to "political reasons". He went on to say that the Polish underground had little alternative other than to rise against the Germans. The position, however, was one of the greatest difficulty in view of the apparent Russian game vis-à-vis the Polish underground. The following facts would illustrate his meaning. The Soviet Embassy here had recently launched *Trybuna Polska*, a Communist paper in the Polish language, which incidentally was being played up by *Izvestiya* and *Pravda*. It had already attacked the Polish Government on the alleged grounds that the Polish underground had been instructed to shoot the Communists in Poland. At the same time, Mikolajczyk continued, the Russians were dropping pamphlets in Poland threatening the Poles with reprisals from the Russian forces on their entrance into Poland because of the "underground's" failure to rise when the Russians had urged them to do so. This, he said, was clearly a case of preparing public opinion and creating justification for eventually shooting down these Poles. In the circumstances, the Polish underground found itself in a most unhappy predicament.

[BIDDLE]

760C.61/2129

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of
European Affairs (Matthews)*

[WASHINGTON,] December 14, 1943.

The Polish Ambassador called this afternoon at his request, and left with me, under instructions from his government, he said, the attached memorandum which he requested be brought to the personal attention of the Secretary. The memorandum records suspicions on the part of the Polish government with regard to charges from Soviet and Communist sources that the Polish underground organizations are, under instructions from the Polish government, preparing a massacre of Communists in Poland. These charges, the Ambassador said, foreshadow in the mind of the Polish government attacks against the Polish underground on the entry of Soviet forces into Poland unless some prior understanding is reached between the Polish government and the Soviet government. The Ambassador offered no evidence to substantiate his government's suspicions, but insisted that no such

instructions had been given the Polish underground. He referred in this connection, to the summary of instructions actually given transmitted to the Department through Ambassador Biddle.⁶¹

The Ambassador next remarked that his government fully appreciated the friendly efforts on the part of our Government to bring about resumption of diplomatic relations between the U.S.S.R. and Poland. He felt that, in view of the urgency of the question as the Soviet army approaches the Polish frontier, some additional step might be taken. This step might assume the form, he said, of a communication to the Soviet government to the effect that this Government regards the present Polish government as constitutional and legitimate, and has no intention of recognizing any puppet regime of whatever character might be set up. I made no comment other than to ask if he really thought such a gesture would assist in bringing about an improvement in relations between Poland and the U.S.S.R., and he admitted scepticism on this point.

The Ambassador then said there was a minor matter on which he thought we might help. The British government, he said, has agreed to give guidance to the British press and British broadcasters in the sense that wherever reference to Polish frontiers is necessary they be referred to as "Poland's 1939 frontiers" rather than "the former frontiers" of Poland. He said that he hoped we might give some similar background guidance to our press, and that such terminology seemed in full agreement with the American position that frontiers are not to be settled until after the termination of hostilities. I said that I would be very glad to look into the matter. He then made the significant remark that while he "had no illusions that Poland would ever be reconstituted with its 1939 frontiers" he did feel that for the record she was entitled not to consider the question as one already disposed of.

The Ambassador then took up two minor questions of personnel about which I suggested he send the Department a written communication.

He seemed in a much calmer frame of mind than the last time I saw him shortly after the Moscow Conference.

H. FREEMAN MATTHEWS

[Annex]

Memorandum by the Polish Ambassador (Ciechanowski)

The Polish Ambassador has been informed by Mr. Romer, the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, that, following the Soviet press and the communist paper, published in London in Polish called

⁶¹ See footnote 50, p. 482.

"Trybuna Polska", the secret Soviet radio station "Kościuszko" in its broadcasts now attacks the Polish Government, the Delegate of the Polish Government in Poland and the four main Polish political parties of Poland, insinuating that, allegedly by order of the Polish Government, the Polish underground organizations are preparing a massacre of communists in Poland.

This methodical attack on the part of Soviet official propaganda is highly characteristic and typical of Soviet methods.

The Polish Government foresees that these attacks and insinuations are intended to form a basis on which the Soviets will seek to justify reprisals against the Polish party leaders and leaders of the Polish underground,—reprisals which they will probably apply as soon as the Soviet armed forces enter Poland.

The Polish Ambassador is reminded by Mr. Romer that, regardless of the activities continually carried on by Soviet agents and parachutists in Poland, in a way clearly hostile to the Polish underground,—the Polish Government has never given any orders to the Polish underground organization to fight these Soviet agents, and has limited itself merely to numerous interventions and warnings addressed to the Soviet Government and,—after the rupture of Polish-Soviet relations by the Soviets,—has continued to inform the Allied Governments of these activities.

The Polish Government has informed the British Government about this new form of anti-Polish Soviet propaganda, and has instructed the Polish Ambassador to draw the attention of the Secretary of State to this activity, which the Polish Government regards as a dangerous manifestation of probable Soviet intentions should the entry of Soviet armed forces into Poland take place without a preliminary understanding between the Polish Government and the USSR Government.

DECEMBER 13, 1943.

033.60C11/61½ : Telegram

The Chargé Near the Polish Government in Exile (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, December 18, 1943—5 p. m.
[Received December 18—2: 15 p. m.]

[Polish Series No.] 91. For the President and the Secretary. Referring to the President's letter of November 8 to Ambassador Biddle regarding the Polish Prime Minister's desire to visit the President, Mr. Mikolajczyk states in a letter of today's date that he desires to express his most sincere thanks to the President for his very kind

invitation and to say that he will plan to arrive in Washington on January 15.

[SCHOENFELD]

760C.61/2127 : Telegram

The Chargé Near the Polish Government in Exile (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, December 24, 1943—5 p. m.

[Received December 24—4: 53 p. m.]

Polish Series [No.] 92. Prime Minister Mikolajczyk informs me that in recent conversations, Eden has indicated to him that at the Tehran Conference Molotov indicated willingness to work out the question of the resumption of Soviet-Polish relations. Molotov's idea was that this might be accomplished through Polish adherence to the recently concluded Czechoslovak-Soviet Pact of Friendship, Mutual Assistance and Postwar Cooperation (reported in my Czechoslovak Series 16, December 13⁶²).

Molotov was also reported as taking the position that the Soviet Government objected strongly to General Sosnkowski as Commander in Chief of the Polish forces and the implication was that a change was desirable there.

Eden did not press Mikolajczyk for any decisions at this time. On the contrary he suggested that before coming to any decisions he wait until Mr. Churchill's return to London about mid-January.

On this point Eden touched on the question of the possible postponement of the date of Mikolajczyk's contemplated trip to the United States (referred to in my 91, December 18, 5 p. m.). Mikolajczyk stressed the importance he attaches to keeping to the schedule of his visit but I understand the British may inquire whether a later date will be equally convenient to the President.

Mikolajczyk's disposition is not only to withhold decisions until he sees Churchill but also until he has been in Washington.

[SCHOENFELD]

760C.61/2131

The Chargé Near the Polish Government in Exile (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State

[Polish Series] No. 487

LONDON, December 24, 1943.

[Received January 3, 1944.]

SIR: Referring to my telegram No. 92 of December 24, 5 p. m., regarding the question of possible resumption of Soviet-Polish rela-

⁶² *Post*, p. 726.

tions, I have the honor to report that I yesterday had a conversation on this subject with Mr. Tadeusz Romer, the Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Mr. Romer referred to recent Polish conversations with Mr. Eden following his return from the Middle East and said that Mr. Eden had indicated that the Soviet Government was disposed to see Polish-Soviet relations restored, and that he had gained the distinct impression that the Soviet Union was not aiming at a Communist Poland.

Mr. Eden had also indicated that the Russians were particularly concerned regarding the treatment of Soviet parachutists who had landed in Poland and their shooting by members of the Polish Underground organization. Mr. Romer said he had told Mr. Eden that the Polish authorities had given no such orders to the Underground in Poland, despite the fact that the activities of Soviet parachutists had led to severe reprisals by the Germans on the Polish population. The Germans had, for example, destroyed whole villages as a result of their activities.

Mr. Romer went on to say that the whole question of coordinating the activities of Russian parachutists and the Polish Underground had been the subject of conversations between Soviet and Polish officials in the past. He had taken up the matter last February when he was still Polish Ambassador at Moscow, and had in fact made a special trip to London and flown back to Moscow with concrete proposals. The discussions had, however, led to no result.

The Poles, Mr. Romer continued, had every intention of maintaining the struggle against the Germans. They had no desire to clash with the Russians. To avoid this he thought it was essential that some arrangement be worked out before the Russian forces actually reached Poland.

At the suggestion of Mr. Eden, the Polish Government was now drawing up its views on the matter for submission to the British in order that they might take it up with the Russians.

I enquired of Mr. Romer how he envisaged the actual procedure for restoring relations. He was vague in his answer and said that the matter might develop out of the presentation by the British of Polish views regarding relations between the Polish Underground and the Russians. There were many difficulties but it might be possible to work out something, leaving the question of frontiers for later on.

I remarked that the problem of Polish-Soviet relations thus appeared to be in movement and enquired whether he felt encouraged. He said that "encouraged" was too strong a word, but he was not without hope that progress might be made.

Mr. Romer then said there was one thing which caused him some disquiet. Ambassador Ciechanowski had reported that the author-

ities in Washington thought it desirable to leave to the British the active conduct of negotiations with the Soviets regarding resumption of Polish-Soviet relations. He recognized that there might be technical or tactical reasons for this, but he personally felt some disquiet lest the Russians interpret this as meaning that the United States was disinteresting itself in the question. He was confident that this was not the case but was fearful that the Russians might think so. He knew the Russians and felt they were particularly interested in our attitude toward them. He stressed that this in no way applied as criticism. He had felt, however, that he should mention his disquiet.

Respectfully yours,

RUDOLF E. SCHOENFELD

033.60C11/64b

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt

[WASHINGTON,] December 27, 1943.

The British Embassy this morning informed us that Mr. Eden has had a talk with the Prime Minister of Poland and has explained to him something of the attitude of the Soviet Government as expressed during the Moscow Conference toward the Polish Government and the question of resumption of relations with that Government. Mr. Eden is anxious to have the Prime Minister of Poland have a further talk with Mr. Churchill if possible before Mikolajczyk comes to Washington for his visit with you. As Mr. Churchill will not be back in London before the middle of January this would entail a postponement of Mikolajczyk's visit to Washington now set for January 15. Mr. Eden of course would not wish to make any suggestion toward postponement of the Polish Prime Minister's visit to you unless he were certain that you would be entirely in accord with any such suggestion.

As far as I can see it would appear desirable for Mikolajczyk to talk with Churchill if possible before coming to Washington. Will you let me know whether you have any objection to the postponement of this visit in order that I may so inform Mr. Eden.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

860C.002/12-2743 : Telegram

The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt

LONDON, 27 December 1943—6:37 p. m.

523. 1. I understand you have invited Polish Prime Minister to visit Washington, arriving January 15. Would you very kindly con-

sider whether this visit could not be postponed for a month or 6 weeks? This would enable me to see the Poles before they leave. If they come over to you with no sort of agreement, is there not a danger of their becoming the centre of Polish enthusiasm, much of which is likely to be anti-Russian and may this not cost them dear? I am sure you will not mind my making this suggestion.

*President Roosevelt to the British Prime Minister (Churchill)*⁶³

WASHINGTON, December 28, 1943.

429. I agree absolutely with your 523, in regard to the postponement of the Polish Prime Minister's visit to Washington until after you have had an opportunity to see him. I am sending him a message accordingly.

ROOSEVELT

860C.515/111

*The Polish Ambassador (Ciechanowski) to the Secretary of State*⁶⁴

819/SZ-10

WASHINGTON, December 28, 1943.

SIR: During the past three years I have had the honor of informing you, on several occasions, with regard to the Polish gold which had been shipped to French West Africa and had been lost to the control of the Bank of Poland.

Lately, Mr. Michalski, Manager of the Bank of Poland, who, thanks to the assistance of the Department of State, proceeded to Algiers at the beginning of 1943, had the opportunity of negotiating with the French authorities in Algiers. I have been informed that these negotiations resulted in the signing of an agreement between the Bank of Poland and the French National Liberation Committee on December 17th, 1943. In accordance with the terms of this agreement, the Polish gold in question is to be repossessed by the Bank of Poland and concurrently the suit which has been instituted in New York against the Bank of France is to be discontinued and the attachment of Bank of France assets resulting from such suit vacated.

In view of the sympathetic consideration which the Department of State and the Treasury Department have given to the position of the Bank of Poland in this matter, it gives me particular pleasure

⁶³ Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N. Y.

⁶⁴ This note was acknowledged on January 19, 1944.

to advise you of this development and I would be grateful if you would inform the Secretary of the Treasury thereof.

Accept [etc.]

J. CIECHANOWSKI

033.60C11/61c: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé Near the Polish Government in Exile (Schoenfeld), at London

WASHINGTON, December 28, 1943—9 p. m.

[Polish Series No.] 40. Please deliver the following message from the President to Prime Minister Mikolajczyk:

"In view of recent developments Prime Minister Churchill has suggested that he believes it might be advisable for you to postpone your trip to Washington until you have had an opportunity to talk with him.

As I feel that you too will wish to have such an opportunity for a personal discussion with Mr. Churchill I have informed him that I too think it best to have a postponement. I am sure that you will concur in this decision, and I am looking forward to the pleasure of seeing you as soon as your talks with him are finished."

HULL

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

REPORTS ON DEVELOPMENTS OF SIGNIFICANCE CONCERNING SOVIET RELATIONS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES, ESPECIALLY WITH THE UNITED STATES¹

740.0011 European War 1939/26973

*Memorandum by Mr. Charles E. Bohlen of the Division of European
Affairs*²

[WASHINGTON,] January 7, 1943.

I would like again to emphasize the importance of keeping the Soviet Union fully informed in regard to our policies and intentions in North Africa. The one time we did so which was now a month ago³ the results were very encouraging, and as you will recall Molotov told Henderson that the Soviet Government was entirely satisfied with our policy in North Africa in regard to Darlan.⁴ Since that date, December 7, we have passed on no information whatsoever to the Soviet Government, whereas the British have on two different occasions, of which the attached telegram from Kuibyshev reports the latest,⁵ given Molotov a full account of the situation as viewed by the British Government.

If the Soviet Government obtains any impression that we are deliberately leaving them out in regard to North Africa while the British are keeping them fully informed, the Soviet Government may tend to view the entire situation through British eyes and we will almost certainly lose the good start that was made when Hender-

¹ Continued from *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. III, pp. 406-489.

² Addressed to the Assistant Chief (Reber) and the Acting Chief (Atherton) of the Division of European Affairs, and to the Adviser on Political Relations (Dunn).

³ The discussion between the Chargé in the Soviet Union (Henderson) and the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, in regard to American policy in North Africa occurred on December 15, 1942. For correspondence pertaining to this conversation, see telegram No. 620, December 9, 1942, to the Chargé in the Soviet Union, and telegrams No. 1082, December 11, 1942, from Kuibyshev, and No. 537, December 15, 1942, from Moscow, *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. III, pp. 482, 483, and 484, respectively. For correspondence regarding the situation in North Africa, see *ibid.*, vol. II, pp. 224 ff.

⁴ Adm. Jean François Darlan, Vice President of the French Council of Ministers, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Navy, and Defense of the Vichy Government of France from February 1941. On December 1, 1942, he assumed the powers of Chief of State in French Africa "as representative of Marshal Pétain, who is at present a prisoner," describing himself as the High Commissioner for the French Empire. He was assassinated on December 24, 1942.

⁵ Telegram No. 19, January 5, 2 p. m., from the Chargé in the Soviet Union, not printed.

son saw Molotov. Furthermore, a great deal of the criticism of the Darlan arrangement and our policy in North Africa has come in this country and in England from groups who are responsive, to say the least, to the views of the Soviet Government. If we can continue to keep the Soviet Government informed and in general agreement with us in regard to North Africa, sooner or later Soviet approval will have its effect on the views of left wing groups which heretofore have been critical of our policy.

I feel, therefore, that it is very important particularly now that the Ambassador is back⁶ that we should send some information to the Ambassador for transmission to the Soviet Government.⁷

861.246/3 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, January 22, 1943—5 p. m.

[Received January 24—11:26 p. m.]

49. The reinstitution of shoulder insignia in the Red army (Kuibyshev's 34, January 9, 1 p. m., to the Department⁸) has been the sub-

⁶ Adm. William H. Standley had returned to Moscow from a trip to the United States, and had a conversation with Molotov on January 13; see memorandum by the Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union, January 13, p. 617.

⁷ The Department sent information regarding conditions and developments in North Africa in telegram No. 19, January 9, which Ambassador Standley gave to Molotov during his conversation of January 13. The telegram concluded: "In its relations with General Giraud [Commander in Chief of the French forces in North Africa] the United States Government has been influenced by the primary necessities of the military situation and the accomplishments of its supreme objective, namely the defeat of the Axis powers. In the achievement of that objective it welcomes the cooperation of all elements of French resistance. The American military authorities are dealing with the French authorities in North Africa under General Giraud upon the basis of the aid and support which those authorities have undertaken to furnish the forces of the United Nations. This Gov't desires wholeheartedly to support and maintain French administration in the French territories on the basis of their contribution to the military effort and to the restoration of the traditions of the French people." (740.0011 European War 1939/26973)

⁸ Not printed; it reported "*Volzhskaya Kommuna* of January 8 published detailed regulations introducing and defining shoulder strap insignia for the Red army, which apparently are to be quite elaborate." (861.246/2)

On January 3, *Pravda* had reported that the People's Commissariat of Defense had petitioned Mikhail Ivanovich Kalinin, President (Chairman) of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Soviet Union, for the institution of shoulder insignia for the Red army. By ukaz of January 6, the Presidium granted the petition. The Commissariat of Defense, in its order No. 25 of January 15, prescribed the introduction of the new insignia and alterations in the uniforms of the Red army.

Another ukaz of the Presidium of the Supreme Council, published in *Pravda* on February 16, established the use of shoulder insignia for the Navy, and the *Volzhskaya Kommuna* of Kuibyshev on the following day announced the order of the Commissar of the Navy, Nikolay Gerasimovich Kuznetsov, directing all naval personnel to transfer to the wearing of shoulder insignia between February 18 and 25.

ject of a certain amount of editorial comment in the Soviet press and it is believed that a summary of some of this may be of interest to the Department. It has also occasioned considerable discussion among foreign observers here so that a brief statement of our views in this connection may also be pertinent.

[Here follows report of the editorial comment by the Soviet press on the reinstitution of shoulder insignia in the Red army.]

The main direct significance of the new institution is believed to lie in the fact that it is a further step toward increasing and consolidating the efficiency, morale and prestige of the Red army. Since the outbreak of the Soviet-German hostilities more and more has been written in the Soviet press to compare and link together the heroic resistance to aggression which has been offered by the Red forces with past glories of the Russian armies. It is interesting to note that not only armies of earlier centuries but also soldiers of the last world war are included in the latter category.

In our view the reestablishment of shoulder insignia reflects the desire to revivify the continuity of military tradition in order that the Red army may share fully therein. It is a mark of Stalin's confidence in the Red army and also may be regarded as constituting an earned reward. In some foreign quarters the question has been raised whether the step may be interpreted as a victory of the army over the party. It is our belief that this is not and could not by any means be the case under existing circumstances. It is possible, however, that among orthodox or old line revolutionaries in the party the move would be unwelcome. The predominant element, interested primarily in improving efficiency methods throughout all walks of Soviet life, would unquestionably endorse it and has evidently done so.

Apart from its immediate military significance, this further indication of the tendency toward crystallizing the distinction between the ordinary soldier and the officer is scarcely in consonance with one of the fundamental principles of party ideology. There would, of course, be insufficient warrant for affirming that we have thus been presented with special evidence of modification in this principle, but the tendency herein described, which has to some extent been paralleled by a similar trend in the industrial field, may not be without general meaning rather broader in scope than simply the providing of more definitive insignia for all army ranks.

STANDLEY

[Ambassador Standley and the British Counselor and Chargé in the Soviet Union, Herbert Lacy Bagge, saw Premier Stalin on the night of January 26-27, to present to him a joint message from President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill

describing the decisions reached by them at their conference at Casablanca. The records of the Casablanca Conference are scheduled for publication in a subsequent volume of *Foreign Relations*. The remainder of this interview is described in William H. Standley and Arthur A. Ageton, *Admiral Ambassador to Russia* (Chicago, 1955), pages 327-328.]

093.112/491 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, January 28, 1943—6 p. m.
[Received January 29—2:18 p. m.]

67. For the President. In view of the lifting of the siege of Leningrad and the successful defense of Stalingrad, I believe that it would be a fine gesture on the part of the United States Government especially at this time if I were to offer to decorate with appropriate American awards certain outstanding members of Soviet armed forces. It has been suggested to me by my Military and Naval Attachés⁹ that awards to approximately 20 army and 10 naval officers and men as designated by the Soviet Government would be appropriate at this time. If you approve, please inform me what army and navy awards I may offer for presentation when I discuss this matter with the Soviet Government.¹⁰

The British have previously decorated members of the Soviet armed forces.

STANDLEY

711.61/2-343

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Elbridge Durbrow of the Division of European Affairs

[WASHINGTON,] February 3, 1943.

The following is an outline of a conversation I had with Mr. Joseph E. Davies¹¹ regarding our attitude vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.

After discussing at some length the difficulties which Admiral Standley had had in connection with the visit of Wendell Willkie to

⁹ Brig. Gen. Joseph A. Michela, and Rear Adm. Jack Harlan Duncan, respectively.

¹⁰ President Roosevelt and the Navy and War Departments approved this suggestion. After some lapse of time, Ambassador Standley began to discuss details with Soviet officials for presentations which took place on June 22.

¹¹ Ambassador to the Soviet Union during 1937 and part of 1938.

Moscow¹² in which Mr. Davies expressed complete sympathy with Admiral Standley in this regard, he asked me whether I had read his declaration which appeared in the press last Sunday.¹³ When I replied that I had read the declaration he stated, "I'm afraid I'm out on a limb". He added, however, that he felt that because of the position he has already taken in regard to the Soviet Union it was incumbent upon him to make such a declaration particularly regarding the trustworthiness of Stalin, in order to counteract the all too prevalent feeling among a large group of the American public, especially big-business men, to the effect that under no circumstances could we place any trust in the Soviet word.

Mr. Davies added that although he had not been in touch with affairs regarding the Soviet Union for the last six months except through the newspapers, and although he realized that his somewhat exaggerated statement was not borne out by known facts, he nevertheless felt that it would be in the best interest of the United States to endeavor at this time to attempt to reach a more basic understanding with the Soviet Union and if possible to eliminate the mutual suspicions that have been prevalent in our relations for the past 25 years.

Mr. Davies then asked whether I felt that it would be possible to bring about a better basis of understanding between our two countries. I replied that I felt that every effort should be made to reach a more practical, sound, and realistic understanding with the Soviet Government based on a realistic approach to the problem and that if such an understanding could be reached it would be mutually beneficial and permit more satisfactory cooperation to exist not only in regard to post war problems but also in regard to the prosecution of the war. I added that although I personally was very much in favor of bending every effort to this end, I nevertheless felt that this was not an easy problem to solve, particularly in view of the deep-seated suspicions on both sides and the record of the Soviet Government in regard to sworn commitments which it had made during the past 25 years. I cited as examples the non-aggression pacts which the Soviet Union had contracted with its neighbors, Finland,¹⁴ the Baltic States,¹⁵ and

¹² Reports on the visit of Wendell L. Willkie, Personal Representative of President Roosevelt in the Soviet Union during September 1942, are printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. III, pp. 637-653, *passim*.

¹³ For Mr. Davies' press statement made in New York on his way back from Hollywood to Washington, see *New York Times*, January 30, 1943, p. 8, col. 2.

¹⁴ For correspondence regarding the concern of the United States over Soviet demands on Finland and the outbreak of the Winter War, see *Foreign Relations*, 1939, vol. I, pp. 952 ff.

¹⁵ For correspondence on the pressure by the Soviet Union upon the Baltic States compelling them to conclude pacts of mutual assistance, see *Foreign Relations*, The Soviet Union, 1933-1939, pp. 934 ff.

Poland,¹⁶ which for various reasons had been broken by the Soviet Government. Mr. Davies agreed but added that he felt that if we did not reach such a basic agreement we would be in for another war in the not too distant future and this time against the Soviet Union.

In this connection, Mr. Davies stated that he felt that there were four possibilities open to us:

1. A basic understanding and full cooperation between the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain.
2. Cooperation and understanding between the United States and the Soviet Union.
3. Each of the three countries acting independently of one another.
4. Cooperation and understanding between Great Britain and the Soviet Union, more or less in opposition to the United States.

Mr. Davies stated that he feared that the latter possibility would most likely take place unless we were able to prevent it and reach the understanding with the Soviet Government that he hopes for. He cited in this connection the 20 year mutual assistance pact between Great Britain and the Soviet Union of 1942¹⁷ and stated that it was his belief that the British are bending every effort to reach a satisfactory basis of understanding and cooperation with the Soviet Union and are approaching this problem in a very realistic light even to the extent of conceding at this time territorial changes favorable to the Soviet Union. He added that last year he had a talk with Lord Halifax¹⁸ in which he gained the impression that during Mr. Eden's visit to Moscow in December 1941¹⁹ the latter had given serious consideration to recognizing the Soviet claims to the Baltic States and eastern Poland.

In the latter connection Mr. Davies stated that although he was an idealist he hoped that he was a practical idealist and, therefore, felt that in order to show our good will and make a concrete effort to reach a basic understanding with the Soviet Government, as a practical

¹⁶ For correspondence on the intervention of the Soviet Union in Poland in September 1939, see *Foreign Relations*, 1939, vol. I, pp. 428 ff.

¹⁷ The Treaty of Alliance in the War against Hitlerite Germany and Her Associates in Europe, and Collaboration and Mutual Assistance thereafter, between Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Soviet Union was signed at London on May 26, 1942. For text, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. CCIV, p. 353; for draft of treaty and subsequent changes, see telegrams No. 2897, May 24, 1942, and No. 2922, May 26, 1942, from the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. III, pp. 558 and 564, respectively. For correspondence regarding conversations leading to the conclusion of this treaty, see *ibid.*, pp. 490-566, *passim*.

¹⁸ Viscount Halifax, British Ambassador in the United States.

¹⁹ For correspondence on the visit of Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, for discussions with Stalin, December 16-22, 1941, see *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, pp. 192-205.

matter we should at this time concur in the Soviet contention that the Baltic States and eastern Poland form part of the Soviet Union. Mr. Davies added that he felt that these areas were of great strategic importance to the Soviet Union and therefore they should be permitted to retain them.

I pointed out that although I realized that the Soviet Government has steadfastly maintained that these areas had been legally incorporated in the Soviet Union, I could not concur that they were of great strategic importance to that country. I explained that there were no strategic frontiers of any importance between the Rhine and the Urals and that, therefore, a slight rectification of the frontiers between Poland and the Soviet Union would not be of great strategic importance. In regard to the Baltic States I expressed the view that although the possession of these states by the Soviet Union²⁰ would give them a "larger window on the sea" this window would open onto an inland sea and that from a naval point of view the possession of naval bases on this sea would not, in view of the vulnerability of service craft to land craft, be of great strategic importance. Mr. Davies agreed that although this might be true he still felt that in order to reach a basic understanding with the Soviet Union it might be advisable for the United States to accede to these Soviet requests.

I replied that there was another possibility that if a workable plan of collective security was set up in Europe and throughout the world the Soviet Union would not have any fears of attack from the west and therefore would not have any need to obtain strategic areas on its western frontiers and that since the Soviet Union had no reasonable right to demand additional territory per se, it might be persuaded to drop its claims to these areas of eastern Europe.

Getting back to the advantages of reaching a basic agreement with the Soviet Union Mr. Davies stated that last autumn he had many talks with Ambassador Litvinoff²¹ during one of which he had discussed with him the Comintern.²² According to Mr. Davies, Ambassador Litvinoff replied that he could assure Mr. Davies that at no time in recent years has the Soviet Government had any official or other contacts with the Comintern except on rare occasions when a Soviet official may have received a courtesy call from officials attached to that organization. Mr. Davies felt that on the basis of this assurance it might be possible to convince the Soviet Union that in its own interest it would be advantageous to liquidate the Comintern and its

²⁰ For correspondence on the forcible occupation of the Baltic States and their incorporation into the Soviet Union, see *Foreign Relations*, 1940, vol. I, pp. 357 ff.

²¹ Maxim Maximovich Litvinov, Soviet Ambassador in the United States.

²² The Third (Communist) International, founded by the Bolsheviks at Moscow in March 1919.

organizations abroad. I replied that I felt that any basic agreement with the Soviet Union would have to include a very concrete and definite understanding that the activities of the Comintern would have to be liquidated but added that the statement made by Ambassador Litvinoff was the same argument he had used for years whenever anyone discussed the Comintern with him. Although the activities of the Comintern ²³ had been carried on in various degrees since 1933 when the United States recognized the Soviet Union,²⁴ Mr. Litvinoff had steadfastly stated that the Soviet Government had no connection whatsoever with that organization. This, of course, could not be accepted as a fact.

Mr. Davies in a very frank frame of mind stated that he had been "very lucky" in the attitude which he had deliberately adopted regarding the Soviet Union. He added that predicting international events and trends was really a matter of speculation and that he had been lucky in his speculation on the Soviet Union while Mr. Kennedy ²⁵ had been unlucky in his speculations while he was Ambassador to the Court of St. James. In expanding this theme to some length Mr. Davies explained that because of his lucky predictions regarding the Soviet Union and particularly the prowess of the Red Army he had gained the reputation of being an expert on the Soviet Union. He stated that while he had endeavored to the best of his ability to learn all he could about that country during his comparatively short stay there he realized fully that he did not have a complete and basic knowledge of the country. He stated that because of this fact he felt that at the present time, particularly in connection with his statement of last Sunday regarding the trustworthiness of Stalin, he was "whistling by the graveyard" since he realized that in making such a prediction he was going contrary to the facts of the past but felt that it was necessary to make such a statement in order to try to prepare the ground for a basic understanding. He explained that for this reason he had desired to discuss this question with me since I have been in more recent touch with official information regarding the Soviet Union than he had. He added that because of his reputation as an expert on the Soviet Union the President and Mr. Harry Hopkins ²⁶ had asked him on several occasions to advise them in regard to our policy toward the Soviet Union. He, therefore, had been giving careful consideration to the question which he first raised as to the possi-

²³ Concerning these activities and the protest to the Soviet Union by the United States at the time of the Seventh Congress of the Communist International, see *Foreign Relations, The Soviet Union, 1933-1939*, pp. 218 ff.

²⁴ For correspondence regarding the recognition by the United States of the Soviet Union on November 16, 1933, see *ibid.*, pp. 1 ff.

²⁵ Joseph P. Kennedy, American Ambassador in the United Kingdom, 1938-41.

²⁶ Special Assistant to President Roosevelt; chairman of the President's Soviet Protocol Committee.

bility of endeavoring at this time to reach a basic understanding with the Soviet Government which would eliminate the mutual suspicions on both sides and make it possible to win the peace on a sound basis which would eliminate as far as possible the recurrence of another world war.

740.0011 European War 1939/27729 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

KUIBYSHEV (Moscow), February 3, 1943—4 p. m.
[Received February 4—11:45 a. m.]

103. A neutral colleague has informed me that a member of the Bulgarian Legation here recently told him that while the strong Russo-ophile sentiment in Bulgaria would not permit the sending of Bulgarian troops to aid the Germans on the Russian front, the Bulgarian Army would as a matter of course fight side by side with the Axis forces in the event of the opening of a second front anywhere else on the Continent.

STANDLEY

740.0011 European War 1939/27993a : Telegram

*President Roosevelt to the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union (Stalin)*²⁷

WASHINGTON, February 4, 1943.

As Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States of America, I congratulate you on the brilliant victory at Stalingrad of the armies under your supreme command. The one hundred and sixty-two days of epic battle for the city which has forever honored your name and the decisive result which all Americans are celebrating today will remain one of the proudest chapters in this war of the peoples united against Nazism and its emulators.

The commanders and fighters of your armies at the front and the men and women who have supported them in factory and field have combined not only to cover with glory their country's arms, but to inspire by their example fresh determination among all the United Nations to bend every energy to bring about the final defeat and unconditional surrender of the common enemy.

[FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT]

²⁷ This telegram, and Stalin's acknowledgment of February 5, were printed on the front page of the *Kuibyshev Volzhskaya Kommuna* for February 6, 1943, without comment.

861.415/74: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

KUIBYSHEV (Moscow), February 22, 1943—4 p. m.

[Received February 23—10:45 a. m.]

192. *Volzhskaya Kommuna*, February 21, published the slogans in connection with the celebration on February 23 of Red Army Day. These mainly praise the army, urge it to greater endeavors, and exhort the people to support the army in every possible way. One slogan, "hailing" Russians appears, as follows: "Long live the victory of the Anglo-Soviet-American Military Alliance over the German-Fascist enslavers, the vile enemies of mankind!" The customary irredentist slogan appears: "Brothers and sisters! Russians, Ukrainians, White Russians, Moldavians, Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians, and Karelians, who have temporarily fallen under the yoke of the German-Fascist villains! The hour of your liberation is drawing near. Mercilessly annihilate the Fascist aggressors, fan the flame of the popular guerrilla movement!" Although 49 slogans are prepared by the Central Committee of the Communist Party, only two of them refer to the party in any way.

STANDLEY

861.415/80

*Memorandum by Mr. Charles E. Bohlen of the Division of European Affairs*²⁸

[WASHINGTON,] February 23, 1943.

The order of the day²⁹ issued by Stalin as Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet armed forces in honor of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Red Army stands out sharply against the background of generous and unstinted praise which American and British officials including the King and the President sent to the Soviet Government on the same occasion.³⁰ In his order of the day Stalin, in contrast to his November 6 speech,³¹ made no mention of the United Nations as a group nor of the United States or Great Britain. He omits any reference to the aid, direct or indirect, which the Soviet armed forces have received from the United States and Great Britain in the war and states that

²⁸ Addressed to the Acting Chief of the Division (Atherton) and the Adviser on Political Relations (Dunn).

²⁹ See telegram No. 203, February 24, 4 p.m., from the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, *infra*.

³⁰ For a press statement by Secretary of State Hull, and a message from President Roosevelt to Stalin, February 22, see Department of State *Bulletin*, February 27, 1943, p. 184. Stalin acknowledged the President's felicitations on February 24.

³¹ Stalin's speech of November 6, 1942, on the XXV anniversary of the October Revolution, was reported in telegram No. 438, November 8, from the Chargé in the Soviet Union, *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. III, p. 475.

"in view of the absence of a second front the Red Army alone is bearing the whole weight of the war". He furthermore attributes specifically the increase in Soviet equipment which has now given the Red Army superiority over the Germans to the efforts of the Soviet peoples.

Throughout his order of the day Stalin in conformity with his previous utterances characterizes the war aims of the Soviet armies as the liberation of Soviet soil and peoples (in which he includes Latvians, Lithuanians, and Estonians) from the German invader. The war arose, according to Stalin, as a result of the German breach of the non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union ³² which in his words "compelled the Red Army to launch a campaign to defend its native land against the German invader and to drive him from the border of our country".

It is perhaps too soon to state definitely the political import of Stalin's order of the day. It will be of particular interest to observe whether his reference to the second front sets off in the Soviet press and the Communist press abroad a new campaign, with all its attendant bitterness, against the United States and Great Britain on this issue. However, the following points should be noted in regard to this order of the day taken by itself:

1. Stalin has chosen to present the war against Nazi-Germany as exclusively a Soviet-German affair the origin of which was merely the German attack in June 1941.

2. He by implication divests himself of any obligations for assistance rendered to Russia by her allies or associates in this war.

3. The only positive war aim of the Soviet Government which emerges from this particular statement is the liberation of Soviet soil.

It is of course likely that the harsh implications of this order will be softened in the replies and press reactions to the messages of congratulations sent by representatives of the United Nations.

861.415/75 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

KUIBYSHEV (Moscow), February 24, 1943—4 p. m.
[Received February 25—11:16 a. m.]

203. 1. The most important feature of the celebration of the 25th anniversary of the Red army was Stalin's order No. 25 [95] of February 23, a translation of which will be sent by mail.³³

³² Signed at Moscow on August 23, 1939; for text, see *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945*, series D, vol. VII (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1956), pp. 245-247.

³³ Transmitted to the Department by the Ambassador in his despatch No. 65, March 19; received April 24. For substance of Stalin's order for this day in the previous year, see telegram No. 163, February 24, 1942, 3 a. m., from the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. III, p. 416.

The noteworthy points in Stalin's order would appear to be:

(a) Repeated emphasis on the non-aggressive character of the Red army and on the fact that it is fighting only to liberate Soviet soil and not to conquer foreign territory. Stalin's reference to the Red army "following the German Army up to the western boundaries" of the Soviet Union is considered of unusual interest in that it is believed to be the first public statement made in regard to future Red army plans. However, mention of German occupation of White Russia, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Moldavia, and Karelia immediately after reference to commencement of the liberation of the Soviet Ukraine is evidence that the Kremlin has not renounced its 1941 frontiers and still considers the Baltic States, as well as parts of Poland, Finland and Rumania³⁴ as Soviet soil.

(b) One brief and incidental reference to the absence of a second front, in Europe, which has obligated the Red army to carry alone the burden of war.

(c) The complete absence of any references to the United States, Great Britain, or other Allies. Although comments are made on the increased production of armaments in the Soviet Union as an important factor contributing to the recent successes of the Red army, no mention whatsoever is made of American or British military supplies to the Soviet Union.

(d) A spirit of optimism, apparently based on reliance in the army and in the belief that time is on Russia's side, this spirit is tempered, however, by the realization that hard fighting still lies ahead.

(e) Admonition to the Red army not to be carried away by its successes and not to become arrogant.

2. With the exception noted below, no celebrations of the anniversary in Kuibyshev were open to foreign officials and no parade took place.

3. A formal dinner, presided over by Marshal Shaposhnikov,³⁵ was tendered to the Military Attachés on the evening of February 23. American and British military and naval representatives in Moscow were invited and were brought here on a special train. The Japanese Military Attachés, as well as Lozovski,³⁶ Zarubin,³⁷ and other Foreign Office officials were present.

I am informed that the dinner was unusually conservative and reserved in character, especially in comparison with other Soviet state banquets. No toasts were offered or open references made to the military successes of the Red army. In fact the absence of bravado or even jubilation, and the presence of a spirit of studied dignity,

³⁴ For correspondence concerning the activities of the Soviet Union in the Balkans and the seizure of Bessarabia, see *Foreign Relations*, 1940, vol. I, pp. 444 ff.

³⁵ Boris Mikhailovich Shaposhnikov, Marshal of the Soviet Union since May 7, 1940, Assistant People's Commissar for Defense.

³⁶ Solomon Abramovich Lozovsky, Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs.

³⁷ Georgy Nikolayevich Zarubin, Chief of the American Section of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs.

formality and abstinence, prevailed during the dinner. Documentary films were shown after the dinner and the evening terminated at 11:30.

I took occasion to transmit to Shaposhnikov an informal note expressing my congratulations and admiration of the fighting qualities of the Red army.

[The last section of this telegram, numbered 206 and filed under 861.415/76, which described some of the messages received on this occasion from foreign leaders and officials, is not printed.]

STANDLEY

740.0011 European War 1939/28434 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, March 10, 1943—4 p. m.

[Received March 11—1:43 p. m.]

143. For the President, the Secretary, and the Under Secretary. In my last conversation with Stalin on January 26, I stated that I would ask to see him upon my return to Moscow. Before doing so I should like to receive your views on some of the matters I propose to discuss with him and in this connection I desire to review some of the recent developments in Soviet policy particularly insofar as they concern the United States.

In my opinion present Soviet policy is based upon the principle of maintaining a completely independent position at least until the end of the war and of avoiding any commitments which would prejudice a later determination of Soviet aims. This policy may well be motivated by domestic considerations as well as by those of foreign policy.

I have little doubt that there is divided counsel in the ruling Soviet circles and it may be convenient for Stalin to defer any decision on proposals advocated by various groups within the Soviet Government. For example the army is considered by many observers here to be one of the centers of Soviet "isolationism" and any deviation from that policy at this time when the army is flushed with its success might have far-reaching repercussions. Stalin's becoming a marshal³⁸ may be an indication that for the present he is associating himself with this group and its policy.

Moreover present Soviet policy has the advantage of leaving the Government free to determine its policy until such time in the future as some of the important factors upon which this decision must be

³⁸ See telegram No. 177-178, March 18, 2 p. m., from the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, p. 513.

based will have become more clear. Among these may be mentioned the sincerity of Anglo-America [*sic*] which there appears to be genuine doubts in this country; the military and economic strength of the Soviet Union at the end of the war relative to that of the other great powers in the Far Eastern situation; and finally the degree to which the United Nations will remain united at the end of the war and the extent to which they are willing to go to establish a practical political system in Europe which will offer real economic political and military security to the Soviet Union.

In the meantime the Soviet Government has clearly indicated that its minimum aims include the restoration of its 1941 frontiers which may in itself be indication of its lack of faith in the ability of the United Nations to provide for its security.

The agitation for a second front has coincided well with the Soviet policy of isolation for it provides a ready excuse for any military failures, gives the Russian people the impression that Russia is fighting and winning the war single handed and should need arise it would provide a basis for a charge of betrayal.

In its relations with the United States, so far as the Embassy is aware, the Soviet Government has whenever possible consistently refrained from making any concessions that would in any way hamper it from later following a policy opposed to ours. It has continued to base its relations with us upon a trading basis although because of the fact that we are giving much and asking little this has not always been clear. I am becoming convinced that we can only deal with them on a bargaining basis for our continuing to accede freely to their requests while agreeing to pay an additional price for every small request we make seems to arouse suspicion of our motives in the Oriental Russian mind rather than to build confidence.

Despite occasional grudging concessions the Soviet Government has withheld vital military and other information that would be of assistance to the United States in its prosecution of the war against the common enemy. This applies not only to information about the Russian Army the withholding of which may be understandable but also applies to information about the German Army and its methods and weapons. The reluctance to give this information which might result in the saving of many American lives and be of material assistance in our military effort seems to me to be inexcusable.

Following the recent Soviet military successes it would appear that the Soviet policy of minimum collaboration is becoming more pronounced and among others the following specific instances may be cited: The delay in replying to my request for information on the usefulness of Lend-Lease aid ³⁹ (so far as I am aware the Soviet

³⁹ For correspondence on this subject, see pp. 737 ff.

people have never been informed of the contribution of the American people to Soviet relief funds and have no conception of the extent to which military supplies have been furnished by the United States and Great Britain ⁴⁰); the indication that the Russians intend to exact the highest possible price for information on their synthetic rubber process, the difficulties and delays in obtaining permission for an American plane to enter the Soviet Union, the failure to reply to my request for an amelioration of the situation of the interned American bomber crew,⁴¹ the failure to provide adequate information upon the treatment of burns (see my 99, February 19 ⁴²), the refusal to allow the American Typhus Commission to enter the Soviet Union; the failure to reply to my inquiry on the rehabilitation program, et cetera; and similar difficulties experienced by the British as reported in my 131 and 138 of March 9.⁴³

I believe that there is great danger that this policy will eventually lead to a reaction in the United States and Great Britain from the present attitude of friendly and wholehearted cooperation with the Soviet Union and that this reaction will strengthen the bonds of those elements in the Soviet Government who are suspicious of our intentions or who advocate a policy of opposition to us and I would like to emphasize this danger in my conversation with Stalin. I propose to put the matter on the basis that I had come to the Soviet Union with two purposes in mind, namely, to further the flow of supplies and to promote friendly relations between our two countries. I should say, however, that although those continue to be my objectives I feel that the time has come when I must report to my Government the failure of my efforts in the second of these two objectives. I should point out that whereas my Government has actively encouraged the development of a friendly feeling in the United States toward the Soviet Union, his Government had prevented the Soviet people from even knowing that this friendly feeling existed. I should say that this could scarcely fail to make Americans suspicious of the ultimate objectives of the Soviet Union and I should express my concern that elements in the United States opposed to the Soviet Union might make capital of this attitude on the part of the Soviet Government. I should then stress the need for cooperation and to prepare for the difficult post-war period.

I feel sure that in answer to such an approach Stalin would inquire as to the specific questions on which I felt that the Soviet Government

⁴⁰ Remarks made by Ambassador Standley on March 8, 1943, to American correspondents in Moscow in this vein were reported in his telegram No. 139, March 9, 7 p. m., p. 631.

⁴¹ For correspondence regarding the conditions of interned American airmen forced down inside the Soviet Union, see pp. 613-736, *passim*.

⁴² Not printed.

⁴³ *Post*, p. 630.

had not cooperated and I should like to be prepared to give him a comprehensive list. I should emphasize the supply freely, and not on a basis of purchase, of information concerning the common enemy and the withholding of information from the Russian people of the friendliness of the American people toward them and of the assistance which we have given them. I would appreciate receiving any directive you may wish to give me in this matter.

STANDLEY

740.0011 European War 1939/28525 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, March 15, 1943—6 p. m.

[Received 10 p. m.]

167. American correspondents who recently visited Kharkov state that although the city had been under martial law during the German occupation, the Germans had also attempted to set up a Ukrainian civil government with the assistance of Ukrainian refugees and Ukrainian-speaking Germans brought in for that purpose. The first government was headed by a professor from the Kharkov University but he and many of his colleagues were later shot by the Germans for failure to cooperate satisfactorily. A Ukrainian newspaper was also published but by the end of the German occupation it had dropped all semblance of independence and had become an organ of the occupying authorities. One correspondent said that while the Germans in general did not appear to have done much to win over the civil population the success which their half-hearted effort to arouse Ukrainian nationalist feeling did achieve indicated that this feeling was still very strong and the failure of the German scheme seems to have been caused by the fact that while the Ukrainians were prepared to set up a separate government they were not willing that it be used as an instrument of German exploitation.

The correspondents stated that the Germans had systematically destroyed educational and scientific institutions. They gained the impression during their short visit that many civilians had been killed by the Germans and it was evident that the Russians were already engaged in a purge of those guilty of collaborating with the occupying authorities.⁴⁴ They were told that the population had been reduced to about 300,000 but they believe that it is actually much less. They were told that 100,000 workers had been sent to Germany.

⁴⁴ For correspondence concerning the trial and sentencing of Russian accomplices of German war criminals by Soviet authorities in regained territories, see pp. 845 ff.

The railroads, electricity, water, gas and sewage systems were all out of operation and there seemed to be little prospect of their early restoration. Most of the larger buildings had been destroyed and one correspondent expressed the opinion that if Kharkov is typical of cities which have been under German occupation it will be 20 years before European Russia can be fully restored. The Germans appear to have operated very few factories in Kharkov but much equipment was shipped to Germany.

STANDLEY

861.00/11984 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, March 18, 1943—2 p. m.
[Received 11:45 p. m.]

177-178. The appointment of Stalin to the rank of marshal as reported in the press of March 7th has of course been widely commented upon in leading editorials and news items consisting mainly in accounts of meetings in factories, farms, army units, et cetera. In general the press has taken the line that Stalin was given the title as a reward for his military services to his country and for his leadership during the Five-Year Plan in developing in Russia a powerful economic base for its military strength. The majority of editorial comment credited Stalin with perfecting Red army strategy, planning the Stalingrad campaign, developing and training the Red army's officers, and providing it with the finest modern equipment.

The appointment appears to be taken in Kuibyshev diplomatic circles as merely reflecting Stalin's decision to assume military rank. It is not regarded as particularly important unless also possibly indicating his wish to give evidence by it of the welding of army and party.

Some observers in Moscow are inclined to attribute more significance to the appointment and have offered the following views:

1. Like the institution of the shoulder insignias reported in my 49, January 22, the appointment may well be another step toward increasing the prestige of the army and it's not impossible that Stalin in accepting military rank for the first time has taken this means to indicate that he has complete confidence in the loyalty and ability of his military leaders.

[Here follow comments in regard to the significance of possible internal reactions to this event.]

4. From an external point of view I refer to my 143, March 10, in which I stated that some observers here consider that the army

which may now dominate the Kremlin advocates a foreign policy of voluntary and proud isolation; that it is distrustful of other governments and that it feels that it must rely only on its own strength in providing for the security of the Soviet Union. As I have reported there are evidences that this group does not hold the American and British armies in high regard and it would seem likely that it will maintain its present policy of minimum collaboration with the United Nations at least in the absence of powerful second front on the European Continent. I have found few observers here who are willing to admit that real collaboration is likely even upon such an eventuality or in the post-war period irrespective of what internal influences guide the destinies of this country.

STANDLEY

740.0011 European War 1939/28434 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Standley)*

WASHINGTON, March 18, 1943—9 p. m.

152. Your 143, March 10, 4 p. m. We are grateful for the helpful analysis of Soviet policies set forth in the first two sections⁴⁵ of your telegram under reference and appreciate the situation outlined in section 3.⁴⁶ Nevertheless, we are inclined to believe that it would not be opportune just now when Stalin is undoubtedly preoccupied with the critical military situation to endeavor to enter into a discussion with him of the character proposed.

HULL

123 Lewis, James W./74 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary
of State*

KUIBYSHEV (Moscow), April 21, 1943—5 p. m.

[Received 5:50 p. m.]

333. In my last conversation with Molotov I raised the question of exit visas for the Soviet wives⁴⁷ of Lewis and Raymond⁴⁸ and pointed

⁴⁵ The first six paragraphs.

⁴⁶ The next three paragraphs.

⁴⁷ Persistent efforts to gain exit visas for Soviet spouses of American citizens had attained some successful results during 1941; see *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, pp. 931-992, *passim*. For references to this long-standing problem before 1941, see *ibid.*, p. 931, footnote 15.

⁴⁸ James W. Lewis and Ellsworth L. Raymond, clerks at the American Embassy in the Soviet Union.

out that their applications have been pending for 6 months. Molotov replied that this was a matter for the Supreme Soviet and indicated that the Foreign Office was not interested in the matter. I understand that the British Ambassador⁴⁹ received a similar reply to his representations on behalf of the Soviet wives of members of his staff.

Both Raymond and Lewis are anxious that the children their wives are expecting be born outside the Soviet Union. The only further action short of some kind of retaliation which it would appear possible for me to take here would be to appeal to Kalinin or Stalin. I should be glad to receive any instructions which the Department may care to give me in the premises.⁵⁰

STANDLEY

123 Standley, William H./144 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

KUIBYSHEV (Moscow), April 21, 1943—7 p. m.
[Received 10 p. m.]

335. I intend to return to Moscow in a few days and in the future I expect to spend most of my time there.⁵¹ Lozovski informs me that the question of the return of the Diplomatic Corps and Foreign Office to Moscow will not be decided until the military situation has become more clear but that the Chief of the American Section⁵² will remain in Moscow as long as I do. Because of our shortage of personnel, I feel obliged to consolidate as much of the work as possible in one place and Calder⁵³ and several members of the staff will shortly proceed to Moscow. To the extent that the Foreign Office permits, all matters will be handled in Moscow except visa, passport, protocol and general consular questions. It is requested that telegrams be routed accordingly.

Pending the decision of the Foreign Office, we will be obliged to maintain both houses⁵⁴ in Kuibyshev and particularly in view of the fact that most of the Diplomatic Corps is remaining in Kuibyshev for

⁴⁹ Sir Archibald Clark Kerr.

⁵⁰ Mrs. Alexandra P. V. Lewis renounced Soviet citizenship on May 15, and was ordered to leave the Soviet Union before June 16. The Department authorized by telegram of June 1 that Lewis, his wife, and child should proceed to Tehran as soon as possible. They departed by airplane on June 7.

⁵¹ The necessity for the removal of the American Embassy from Moscow to Kuibyshev in October 1941, is explained in *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, pp. 907-911.

⁵² Georgy Nikolayevich Zarubin.

⁵³ Bland A. Calder, First Secretary of Embassy and Consul in the Soviet Union.

⁵⁴ These properties were referred to as the Nekrasovskaya building and Sadovaya premises.

the present, the officer in charge in Kuibyshev will incur heavy expenses for entertainment and maintenance of the establishment there. As from March 31, Thompson ⁵⁵ has ceased to draw the special cost of living allowance of \$2400 per annum allotted to him to meet expenses incurred in maintaining to [*the?*] Embassy office in Moscow. I therefore recommend that either this allotment be transferred to the officer in charge at Kuibyshev or that a representation allowance be granted to this officer. I plan for the present to leave Perkins ⁵⁶ in charge in Kuibyshev.

STANDLEY

701.611/1181

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] April 24, 1943.

The Soviet Ambassador called to see me this afternoon. I asked the Ambassador with regard to his approaching return to Moscow and he said he had no idea how long he would remain there. He said that his own situation here had become intolerable because of the fact that he had no information from his Government and no instructions and that he was consequently placed in a position where he was occupying an important post but was doing no real work. He said he could not continue any longer that way and for that reason he would have to reach an understanding directly with his Government.⁵⁷

The Ambassador asked general questions with regard to the progress of military developments in Tunisia. He stated that he had no information whatever as to the aviation situation in Germany and expressed the belief that the Germans would make an all-out drive again against Russia this summer. The Ambassador, however, seemed on the whole more confident and more optimistic than I had seen him at any time previously.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

⁵⁵ Llewellyn E. Thompson, Jr., Second Secretary of Embassy and Consul, in charge of the staff remaining in Moscow after the removal of the Embassy to Kuibyshev.

⁵⁶ Warwick Perkins, First Secretary of Embassy and Consul in the Soviet Union.

⁵⁷ On April 20, 1943, Litvinov had had a conversation with Assistant Secretary of State Adolf A. Berle, Jr., who wrote that "to my very great surprise, he said he had certain diplomatic matters to talk out with his Government. He did not see eye to eye with them in certain matters, and since he was not merely 'an executive', he wanted to discuss them directly with the people at home." (701.6111/1180)

800.00B International Red Day/246 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, April 26, 1943—4 p. m.
[Received April 27—12:13 p. m.]

352. The Soviet press for April 25 published 53 slogans for May Day. The usual word "lozung" was not used being replaced by the word "[prizyv]", a call or summons. The leading editorial in *Pravda* for April 26 commented on these slogans.

The slogans in the main constitute appeals to the Red army and the civilian population to bend every effort to defeat the "German-Fascist" forces and expel them from the territories of the Soviet Union. The guard units of the army, the border forces, and the partisans were among the fighting forces specifically mentioned. That solicitude for families of military service personnel is "our concern for" was reiterated. Only four slogans are primarily international. These are as follows:

1. An appeal to the conquered peoples of Europe to rise in struggle against the Hitler tyranny.
2. A summons to "oppressed brother Slavs" to broaden their fight against "the Hitlerite imperialists the deadly enemies of Slavdom" and hailing the "militant unity of the Slavic peoples."
3. A salute to the victory of the Anglo-Soviet-American "fighting union" over the German Fascist enslavers.
4. A tribute to the "valiant Anglo-American troops, destroying the German-Italian Fascists in North Africa."

Indications of Soviet frontier conceptions are supplied by slogan number 27 which refers to the Baltic peoples, the Moldavians, the Karelians as "brothers" who have "temporarily fallen under the yoke of the German Fascist scoundrels". As in February the list of slogans closes with the command "forward to the destruction of the German occupiers and their expulsion from the borders of our Fatherland".

Pravda's comments on the slogans went slightly further than usual in the Soviet press in acknowledging the joint character of the struggle against Hitlerism. Stating that "the struggle of progressive humanity against Hitlerite tyranny is being conducted by the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition" the editorial referred to the fact that the Allies have expelled the Axis from Libya and are now driving it from Tunisia, the last strong point of the Italian-German coalition on the African Continent.

At the same time the editorial declared that the Soviet resistance to the Germans had given the Allies time to marshal their forces and that this winter's Soviet campaign had marked the turning point of the war.

The slogans are nationalistic in character and made relatively slight concession to the revolutionary tradition. Thus the term "toilers" was usual and May Day was referred to as the "day of inspection of the toilers fighting forces" but the appeal to toilers of the world to unite against the "German Fascist usurpers" as well as the absence of appeals to oppressed classes in other countries including Germany may be significant.

Moreover the great majority of toilers [*slogans?*] were local in interest and constituted appeals for promoting efficiency in military operations and in war production.

STANDLEY

123 Hirshfield, Louis M./54 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Standley)

WASHINGTON, May 1, 1943—8 p. m.

273. Embassy's 328, April 19, 6 p. m.⁵⁸ The position of the Department in regard to Hirshfield's⁵⁹ desire to marry Mela B. Savine, a Soviet employee of the Embassy, is similar to the policy adopted in the cases of Lewis, Raymond, and others. This is that the Department will not refuse permission for Hirshfield to marry a Soviet citizen but he must submit his resignation as a Foreign Service clerk and be prepared after a reasonable period of time to depart from the Soviet Union with or without his wife.

In view of the information contained in your 333, April 21, 5 p. m., regarding the unwillingness of the Soviet Foreign Office to take any steps to facilitate the granting of exit visas for the Soviet wives of Lewis and Raymond you are authorized the next time you have occasion to see Stalin to take up this question with him. Hirshfield and Mrs. Savine might, therefore, prefer to postpone their marriage until you have had an opportunity to discuss the general question of Soviet wives of American employees with Stalin since Hirshfield might be faced with the prospect of leaving the Soviet Union unaccompanied by his wife if Stalin should adopt a negative attitude and the Soviet Government should continue to refuse to permit the wives to leave the country.

The Department is disturbed at the situation with regard to Lewis and Raymond since it cannot permit them to continue on the Embassy staff for an indefinite period and on the other hand it is reluctant to order them to depart without their families. It therefore hopes that

⁵⁸ Not printed.

⁵⁹ Louis M. Hirshfield, a clerk in the American Embassy.

you can prevail upon Stalin to adopt a reasonable attitude with regard to this question.

HULL

701.6111/1179 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Standley)*

WASHINGTON, May 1, 1943—10 p. m.

275. Your 374 [371], April 30, 11 a. m.⁶⁰ Litvinoff is officially returning to Moscow for consultation with his Government. He is leaving Madame Litvinoff here in the United States. In private conversations with members of the Department he has expressed disillusionment with the fact that he is at an important post with little work to do since his Government has neither sent him any instructions nor kept him informed of its policies.

HULL

800.00B International Red Day/257½ : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary
of State*

Moscow, May 2, 1943—11 a. m.

388. Stalin issued his May First order of the day as Commander in Chief and Marshal of the Soviet Union.⁶¹ The order goes considerably further than any previous official statement by Stalin or other Soviet leaders in acknowledging the contribution made by England and America to the joint struggle against Hitlerism.

In the order Stalin:

1. Greets the armed forces, the partisans, workers, peasants, intellectuals in the name of the Soviet Government and the Bolshevik Party.

2. Assesses the military situation in the light of the Soviet winter campaign and the Allied military operations. The winter campaign demonstrated the growth of the Red army's offensive power relative to that of the Germans who failed at Kharkov despite the transfer of some 30 new divisions from Western Europe, to gain revenge for Stalingrad.

"Simultaneously, the victorious troops of our Allies smashed the Italo-German troops in the area of Libya and Tripoli, cleared those

⁶⁰ Not printed; it reported that Litvinov's return had been announced in Moscow and inquired whether the Department knew why he was returning.

⁶¹ To compare the May Day order for 1942, see telegram No. 351, May 2, 1942, from the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. III, p. 439.

regions of the enemy and now continue to destroy them in the Tunis area, while the valiant Anglo-American air forces strike crushing blows at the military-industrial centers of Germany and Italy, presaging the establishment of a second front in Europe against the Italo-German Fascists.

"Thus, the blow at the enemy from the East by the Red army has for the first time during the war been merged with a blow from the West—by the troops of our Allies—into a single stroke."

3. States that the results of the military operations has been creation of the necessary conditions for victory over Hitlerite Germany, which has been plunged into a serious crisis.

Firstly, the Fascists acknowledge this crisis by admitting that Blitzkrieg tactics are no longer possible, that the war has assumed a protracted character. The Fascists now boast of escaping encirclement in North Africa or at Demyansk, instead of flaunting their lightning offensives.

Secondly, the Fascists admit their plight by peace feelers.⁶² Their hopes of making a separate peace either with England and America or with the Soviet Union are doomed, however, to failure. Peace can come to Europe only after the unconditional surrender of Hitlerite Germany.

4. Warns that although Hitlerite Germany thus faces a catastrophe, that catastrophe is not yet at hand, and will be effected only after stern trials and great efforts by the armies both of the Soviet Union and "our Allies."

5. Calls therefore for redoubled effort from both front and rear. He cites as an example of the contribution of the rear the donation drive of last winter, yielding more than 7 billion rubles. He praises the army for its successes, but reminds it that it is inadmissible to rest on previous achievement.

6. Issues orders to troops and commanders as groups and as members of the Red army as a whole, and to the Partisans, to observe strictest discipline, work ceaselessly to master the military arts, consolidate and extend the winter gains, and to allow the enemy no rest.

7. Concludes with slogans hailing the Fatherland, the Army, the Fleet and the Partisans and again demanding "death to the German usurpers."

STANDLEY

⁶² For correspondence concerning reports of attempts by the Axis Powers to make a separate peace with an opponent, see pp. 613-736, *passim*, and vol. I, pp. 484 ff.

123 Standley, William H./152

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to President Roosevelt*⁶³

Moscow, May 3, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I wish to inform you of a decision I have reached and one that has already been transmitted verbally to the Secretary of State by Mr. Dooman⁶⁴ who recently returned to Washington from this post.

I do not wish to spend another winter here as Ambassador to the Soviet Union.

As you must know I have always been ready to serve you or make any sacrifice for my country, just as so many of our young men are doing, if it were to my country's interest to do so. By the same reasoning I am not willing to attempt to continue service in a position where it can be better rendered by someone else.

I accepted the invitation to come here as your Ambassador believing that the military effort was of paramount importance and that diplomacy would remain in the background for the duration of the war. In such an event I felt that I could render effective service. But the time is rapidly approaching if not already here when plans will be in the making for peace discussions and the post war period. In the development of these plans, the interests of our country require that you have in Moscow as your Ambassador one who does not only enjoy your complete confidence but who is also skilled by training and long experience in the field of diplomacy and international affairs. I do not feel that I have this training and time and circumstances will not permit negotiations by special representatives.

I can and will if you desire give you many and good reasons why I should not remain here beyond this fall but for the desired objective suffice it to say that acceleration of waning strength due to declining years and the rigorous winter here compel me to request that I be not required to remain in Moscow later than October 10, 1943.

I would appreciate your bringing this letter to the attention of Secretary Hull in order that the necessary arrangements may be made for my recall.

With the utmost loyalty and respect,

W. H. STANDLEY

⁶³ Transmitted to the Department by the Ambassador in the Soviet Union in his despatch No. 113, May 11; received May 31, and forwarded to the President.

⁶⁴ Eugene H. Dooman, Counselor of Embassy in the Soviet Union to February 16, 1943, with honorary rank of Minister.

711.61/891½

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] May 7, 1943.

The Soviet Ambassador called to see me this afternoon in order to say good-by before he left. The Ambassador said he wanted to talk with me completely off the record and asked that no official record be made of this conversation.

The Ambassador said that he had told me in an earlier conversation which we had had some two weeks ago of the insuperable difficulties which he had encountered in carrying out his mission in Washington as a result of the lack of any effective contact with his own Government. He said the real truth of the matter was that the very confidential and apparently influential relationship which he had enjoyed with Stalin until 1939⁶⁵ was non-existent today. He said that his successor as Foreign Commissar had removed from the Foreign Commissariat every important official who had any experience with the outside world and any personal knowledge of the United States or of the Western democracies. He did not believe that his messages were received by Stalin—in any event none of his recommendations had been adopted, and he himself was completely bereft of any information as to the policy or plans of his own Government. He said that he had even been forbidden by his Government to appear in public or to make any public speeches.

The result of this situation, the Ambassador said, was that the Soviet Union was misinterpreted to the people of the United States and he was shorn of any power to attempt to remedy that situation.

The Ambassador emphasized in very clearcut and blunt terms the fact that Stalin was entirely unaware of the fact that public opinion in the United States was a determining factor in the creation of governmental policy. He himself had time and again tried to persuade him that public opinion must be reckoned with, but Stalin had apparently paid no attention whatever to the recommendations which he had sent in this regard.

Mr. Litvinov then went on to say that in his judgment the future peace of the world depended very largely upon understanding and cooperation between the Soviet Union and the United States. He said that without the achievement of this, he did not believe that any international organization was conceivable or that the peace of the world could possibly be maintained. He said that the way things were now going, he did not see any prospect of the achievement of

⁶⁵ For correspondence concerning the replacement on May 3, 1939, of Litvinov by Molotov as People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, see *Foreign Relations, The Soviet Union, 1933-1939*, pp. 757-761.

that kind of understanding and cooperation. He said it was for this reason that he had insisted that he be permitted to return to Moscow where he intended to do his utmost to persuade Stalin that the policy which Mr. Litvinov had in mind should be followed in the interest of the Soviet Union itself. He said he was far from optimistic as to the outcome of his impending mission and that he doubted very much that he would be permitted to return to Washington.

I told the Ambassador that I was very deeply impressed by what he had said to me. I said I hoped that his mission would prove to be successful since I shared in very large measure the views which he had expressed to me. I said I did not have to reiterate to him the views which I knew the President had already expressed to him, namely, the President's desire to meet with and to talk personally with Stalin. I said I hoped that arrangements could be made. The Ambassador said that he was in the highest degree doubtful that this arrangement could be carried out. He said the trouble in Russia today was that everything centered in one individual, namely, Stalin himself. He said it was in his mind inconceivable that Stalin could absent himself from Moscow for more than three days as a maximum period, and that the President's view that a place for meeting could be set which would only require Stalin's absence from Moscow for seven days was erroneous since Mr. Litvinov thought that more than that time would inevitably be required and that even the seven days mentioned by the President was, he feared, beyond the power of Stalin to work out.

The Ambassador had no knowledge, at least so he said, of the views of his Government with regard to the post-war period with regard to international organization or with regard to territorial questions. He spoke of his own individual views with regard to the post-war period, especially in connection with the kind of government which must be established in the European countries if a peaceful world was to be obtained. He said it seemed to him that the United Nations, if a United Nations organization could be set up, would have to demand the exclusion from governments in Europe of fascist-minded, anti-democratic individuals. I said that if this thesis was carried out, its logical conclusion would seem to me to be that this would give rise to continued intervention by the major powers of the United Nations organization in the internal affairs of every one of the smaller powers. I said I did not have to remind the Ambassador of the strong opposition on the part of the American Government and people to the acceptance of the thesis that foreign intervention in the domestic concerns of other peoples was admissible. I said of course it was the view of this Government that the civilized world could not again agree to permit the creation in any nation of the type of government

which we now saw in Germany, in Italy and in Japan but that I thought that objective could be reached in other ways and that I personally had much faith in the benefits which would be derived from the establishment of the principle that all nations members of a United Nations organization must be privileged to afford their peoples the right of free speech, of free assembly, of freedom of worship and of freedom of information. It seemed to me, I said, that these safeguards would in all human probability make it impossible for the inhabitants of any nation to follow the course which the German people had followed in the last ten years. I was somewhat surprised to have the Ambassador reply that he believed his Government would be wholly in accord with the establishment of some general principle of this character. He added that he believed the trend of events in the Soviet Union lay in that direction insofar as the Soviet Government itself was concerned. He emphasized the fact that the Soviet constitution was in a true sense of the word an exceedingly democratic constitution.

When the Ambassador left I told him I hoped very sincerely that he would return to Washington and that the outcome of his efforts in Moscow would be wholly successful.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

123 Hirshfield, Louis M./55 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, May 10, 1943—1 p. m.

[Received 10:24 p. m.]

422. Department's 273, May 1, 8 p. m. In my conversation of May 6 with Molotov I inquired whether a personal appeal to Kalinin or even Stalin might assist in expediting action on the long pending cases of the Soviet spouses of the American citizens in question. Molotov apparently did not favor such a course. As a counter-proposal he stated that he personally would endeavor to help me. Page discussed the question yesterday with Zarubin who promised to assist in every way possible. I sense a changed attitude on the part of the Foreign Office in regard to this vexing question and I am inclined to believe that we may now get action in the not too distant future.⁶⁶

STANDLEY

⁶⁶ Through 1943 Louis Hirshfield remained in the Soviet Union and on June 18 married Mrs. Savine. Ellsworth Raymond and his wife and baby went to Tehran in the early autumn; he resigned from the Foreign Service effective March 15, 1944. See also footnote 50, p. 515.

740.00114 European War 1939/3327

*The Secretary of State to Mr. Max Huber, President of the International Red Cross Committee*⁶⁷

WASHINGTON, May 11, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. HUBER: I have received your letter of February 26, 1943,⁶⁸ in which you ask that this Government consider the possibility of approaching the Soviet Government with a view to inducing that Government to grant to the prisoners of war in its power the benefits of the humanitarian provisions analogous to those which have been adopted by other belligerents.⁶⁹

I fully appreciate the high humanitarian sentiments which have motivated your request. As you know, the Government of the United States, which is a party to and whose representatives assisted in the drafting of the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention of 1929,⁷⁰ has always been actively interested in the universal acceptance and observance of the provisions of that Convention. On various occasions it has suggested to belligerent governments that they reaffirm their intention to apply the Convention, or, in case they are not parties thereto, that they nevertheless observe its provisions, and that such application or observance be extended to cover civilian internees as well as prisoners of war. This Government has, toward that end, approached the Soviet Government.⁷¹ The Soviet Government announced its intention reciprocally to observe the provisions of the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907.⁷² That Convention establishes a general rule of humane conduct toward prisoners, although it is deficient in providing that precise procedure and those guarantees of observance which the Geneva Convention provides. The Soviet Government has not so far come to the conclusion to announce its adherence to the latter Convention. Under these circumstances I hope you will appreciate the inability of this Government to take action as you request, at this time.

Sincerely yours,

CORDELL HULL

⁶⁷ This letter was sent in care of the American consular officer in charge at Geneva, Switzerland.

⁶⁸ Not printed.

⁶⁹ In telegram No. 223, March 30, 2 p. m., the Ambassador in the Soviet Union reported that in reply to his note of March 25 to Molotov in regard to the treatment of prisoners of war, he had been informed that "this question does not interest the Soviet Government at the present time." (740.00114 European War 1939/3319)

⁷⁰ Signed July 27, 1929; for text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1929, vol. I, p. 336, or League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. cxviii, p. 343.

⁷¹ For correspondence concerning efforts by the United States to persuade the Soviet Union to adhere to the Geneva Convention of 1929, see *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, pp. 1005 ff.

⁷² Signed October 18, 1907; for text, see *ibid.*, 1907, pt. 2, p. 1204, or 36 Stat. (pt. 2) 2277.

861.00/12010 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, May 13, 1943.

[Received May 14—4:43 a. m.]

440. Third All-Slav Congress in Moscow.⁷³ The Third All-Slav Congress held in Moscow on May 9th received almost the entire space in *Pravda* for May 10th.

Pravda printed an account of the meeting, the appeal of the Congress to the Slavs of the world and a leading editorial thereon, and the speeches of the Soviet and other delegates, with their photographs.

The description of the meeting emphasized the representative character of the assemblage, its symbolism of the unity of world Slavdom against Fascist Germany, and the timeliness of such a meeting on the eve of decisive battles.

The meeting was opened by Lt. General Alexander Gundorov, chairman of the All Slav Committee. His request that the assemblage rise in honor of Slavs who have fallen in the struggle against Fascist aggression underlined the central theme of the gathering.

The meeting issued an "appeal to the oppressed Slavs of Europe" and sent messages to Premier Stalin, Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt in the foregoing order. These messages hailed the contribution of Soviet, British and American forces to the anti-Hitler cause.

[Here follows listing of some foreign organizations which sent messages to this Congress and the names of many speakers who delivered addresses.]

The message adopted by the Congress was in essence a summons to activization of the anti-Hitler struggle of the European Slavs. While stressing the role of the Soviet Union in stemming the German tide, it enthusiastically noted the growing Anglo-American contribution to this struggle.

The appeal made the following points: (1) It noted the favorable developments in the strategic situation since the last Slavic Congress, and called attention to the contributions not only of the three leaders of the democratic coalition, but also of the embattled Slavs. (2) Saluted the Slavic forces of the Soviets, Yugoslavia, Poland, and Czechoslovakia now fighting Hitler. (3) Declared that the grave

⁷³ The II All-Slav Congress had been held in Moscow April 4-5, 1942; see telegram No. 292, April 8, 1942, from the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. III, p. 433.

crisis now experienced by Hitlerite Germany is leading the Germans to intensify their oppression of the Slavs and stressed in this connection the carrying into German slave labor of hundreds of thousands of Slavs. (4) Appealed to all Slav peoples, including the Bulgarians and Macedonians, the Slovaks and Carpatho-Ruthenians to resist labor conscription and total mobilization and to organize partisan warfare. It appealed for unity of all resistance groups regardless of ancestry, religion or party affiliation. (5) Repeated the above summons to battle with reference to individual Slavic peoples. Czechs were urged to intensify sabotage, Slovaks to desert from German units, Poles to spurn traitors advocating passivity, Bulgars to refuse to be drawn into war against Russia. Bulgarian soldiers in Yugoslavia, Macedonia and Greece were urged to desert to the partisans.

The leading editorial entitled "Slavs, to arms" paraphrased the appeal.

The speeches as reported made certain points of possible interest. In general, they emphasized the role of the Soviet Union in the struggle against Hitlerism but several of them contained generous references to Anglo-American operations. An important sub-theme was the historic partnership of Russian and other Slavs in a common effort against German encroachments.

Colonel Svoboda⁷⁴ noted that the first foreign hero of the Soviet Union was a fallen member of the Czechoslovak unit in the Soviet Union, Yarosh. He urged Czechoslovak workers to sabotage production and soldiers to take up arms. He referred briefly to the period of the fall of 1938 and the spring of 1939.

The two Polish speakers, Wasilewska⁷⁵ and Colonel Berling,⁷⁶ hailed the establishment of the Polish Division, to fight under the Piast "eagle of combat with the Germans". They referred bitterly to Polish advocates of inactivity and to traitors serving the Germans.

Kolas,⁷⁷ the White Russian representative, in speaking of frontiers, used the expression "from Bialystok to the Vitebsk region".

Tomov, the Bulgarian, declared: "History has eternally linked Bulgaria and Russia." He referred to the Russians as the "Liberators" of the Bulgarians, and Germany as "our age-old enemy".

⁷⁴ Col. Vladimir Svoboda, Commander of the Czechoslovak military unit in the Soviet Union.

⁷⁵ Wanda Lvovna Wasilewska, head of the Union of Polish Patriots, sponsored by the Soviet Union, which held its first Congress in Moscow on June 8, 1943; wife of Alexander Yevdokimovich Korneichuk, an Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union in 1943.

⁷⁶ Lt. Col. Zigmund Berling became head of the Polish Army in the Soviet Union after the break in Polish-Soviet relations on April 25, 1943; Commander of the Kosciuszko Division, the first Red unit formed in the Soviet Union on May 18, 1943; promoted by Stalin to Major General on August 10, 1943.

⁷⁷ Yakub Kolas, a prominent Soviet leader.

Metropolitan Nikolai⁷⁹ repeated his characterization of Hitler—"the most evil enemy of Christianity". He cited German destruction of 7 churches in Sychevka, of 15 in Rzhev, and concluded his speech by asserting that the Russian Orthodox Church blessed the Slavic warriors.

STANDLEY

125.0061/273

*Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Henderson)*⁸⁰

[WASHINGTON,] May 18, 1943.

You will note that although we permit Soviet consular officers including those in California to travel freely the Soviet Government continues to refuse to permit our Consul General in Vladivostok⁸¹ to travel outside that city except on trips to the Embassy in Moscow or Kuibyshev.

Prior to June 22, 1941 we had established a regime of reciprocity with regard to treatment of consular officers. Upon the insistence of Ambassador Oumansky⁸² in July 1941 restrictions upon the travel of Soviet consular officers in this country were unconditionally lifted.⁸³ Our generous gesture has not had any effect, it will be noted, upon the Soviet authorities and their treatment of our consular officers in the Soviet Union.

L[OY] W. H[ENDERSON]

⁷⁹ Nikolay Yarushevich, Metropolitan of Kiev and Galich, Exarch of the Ukraine, in charge of the affairs of the Moscow Patriarchate before the election of a Patriarch in September 1943. See telegram No. 443, November 9, 1942, from the Chargé in the Soviet Union, *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. III, p. 476.

⁸⁰ Addressed to the Acting Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Ather-ton) and the Adviser on Political Relations (Dunn).

⁸¹ Angus I. Ward.

⁸² Konstantin Alexandrovich Umansky was Soviet Ambassador in the United States, 1939-42.

⁸³ The adoption of the policy of reciprocity in the control of travel is explained in telegrams No. 991, May 17, 1941, from the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, No. 745, May 28, 1941, to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, and the note of June 7, 1941, to the Soviet Ambassador, *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, pp. 881 and 883. The removal of travel restrictions by the United States was announced in a note of July 23, 1941, to Ambassador Umansky, *ibid.*, p. 902. Some further information on this subject is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, October 24, 1948, p. 525, and *ibid.*, March 24, 1952, p. 452.

760F.62/1985

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] May 18, 1943.

President Beneš⁸⁴ called at his request. After the usual exchange of courtesies I said that, speaking in strict confidence, I had recently decided, in answer to a question from another Governmental agency regarding property matters, that I considered the Munich Agreement⁸⁵ as conceived in fraud and in the utmost bad faith and that, therefore, it is null and void. He was gratified to learn of this view. I made clear to him that this had no connection whatever with the declaration of the British and Russians, et al, with respect to a reversal of their position on the Munich Agreement. Dr. Beneš seemed immensely pleased to hear this. I said that it was not a difficult decision for me to make for the reason that I had been decidedly opposed to the Chamberlain⁸⁶ appeasement policy in connection with the Munich incident.

I then brought up the Russian situation in the friendliest spirit toward Russia and urged the necessity for fuller and most friendly conference with Mr. Stalin on the question of prevailing on him to abandon his aloofness, secretiveness and suspicion and bring his Government more into the world family of nations in the way of international relations and international cooperation along the lines that other Governments like Great Britain and the United States are preaching. Dr. Beneš agreed thoroughly and added he was going to meet Stalin for a conference within a few weeks.

I then said that if Russia would definitely and finally prohibit any further activities under the direction of the Third Internationale in the various nations of the world such as the South American nations, the United States and others, that single act alone would go further than all else to restore the most agreeable friendly relations between the people of Russia and other nations. Dr. Beneš said he agreed and that he was going to urge this step definitely on Mr. Stalin. He then added that the Russian plan is to do away with the Third Internationale activities, of which I complained, as soon as the war is over

⁸⁴ Edward Beneš, President of the Czechoslovak Government in Exile, at London. President Beneš was on a wartime visit to the United States and Canada between May 8 and June 9. For his own descriptions of several meetings with the President and high officials of the government, see *Memoirs of Dr. Eduard Beneš* (London, 1954), pp. 180-187, and 193-196. Corresponding American records of these meetings are not in the files of the Department of State nor in the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library at Hyde Park, New York.

⁸⁵ Signed on September 29, 1938, between Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and Italy; for text, see *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945*, series D, vol. II (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1949), p. 1014, or *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939*, Third Series, vol. II (London, His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1949), p. 627. For correspondence regarding the German-Czechoslovak crisis, see *Foreign Relations, 1938*, vol. I, pp. 483 ff.

⁸⁶ Neville Chamberlain, British Prime Minister, 1937-40.

and to cooperate with other countries. To this I replied that it might be too late to unify the important nations of the world behind a suitable post-war program, especially with respect to Russia. I illustrated by saying that if today this Government and Great Britain should announce that they would make known their ideas and purposes with respect to certain basic questions such as keeping the peace and commercial policy only at the end of the war, this might well prove fatal to the setting up and maintenance of a suitable post-war international organization. For this very reason it was even more important that Russia proclaim this policy of suppressing communistic agitation under the Third Internationale in other countries now instead of at the end of the war. Dr. Beneš said that he could understand and fully approve this viewpoint and that he would press this home when he reached Moscow.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

701.6112/85

Memorandum by Mr. Charles E. Bohlen of the Division of European Affairs ⁸⁷

[WASHINGTON,] May 19, 1943.

The appointment of Oumansky as Minister to Mexico ⁸⁸ appears to be more than merely a routine diplomatic assignment. Mr. Oumansky's personality, method of doing business and general attitude towards the United States is sufficiently known to the Department to require no elaboration. He cannot under any circumstances be considered a friend of the United States.

His appointment to Mexico might be in connection with the fact that, according to available information, Mexico is the center for Comintern directed activities in the Western Hemisphere and in particular for the Communist controlled *émigré*, political groups such as the Freies Deutschland group.⁸⁹

Since his return to the Soviet Union Oumansky, although still retaining a post in the Foreign Office, has been head of the Tass news agency and closely connected with the work of the Soviet Information Bureau. It may well be that his appointment as Minister to Mexico is more in connection with his recent work with Soviet pub-

⁸⁷ Addressed to the Acting Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Ather-ton), and to the Adviser on Political Relations (Dunn).

⁸⁸ The Soviet press for May 18 announced the appointment of Umansky as Minister to Mexico while retaining his former rank of Ambassador.

⁸⁹ Headquarters of this Free Germany group were in Mexico City. In 1943, Heinrich Mann, anti-Fascist German writer of Los Angeles, California, was honorary president; Ludwig Renn was president; and Paul Merker was secretary. See airgram No. A-34, November 24, 1:55 p. m., to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, p. 602.

licity and propaganda institutions than with his past experience as a Soviet diplomat.⁹⁰

He will undoubtedly while in Mexico utilize his left-wing contacts in the United States.

CHARLES E. BOHLEN

800.00B Communist International/243 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, May 23, 1943.

[Received May 25—12:37 a. m.]

514. *Pravda* for May 22 published resolution of Presidium of Executive Committee of Communist International recommending dissolution that organization⁹¹ and releasing sections of Comintern from duties issuing from regulations and decisions of Communist International.

Resolution outlines briefly role of Comintern world affairs since 1919. Comintern assisted in formation genuine workers' parties and helped expose Fascist preparations for present war.

However, it points out it has been clear for years that historical and other differences between different areas of world constitute insurmountable obstacles to direction of working class movement of various countries by one international center.

War accentuated differences in situation of various countries. Workers and all honorable people in countries of Hitlerite bloc must do all they can to overthrow their government's order to insure defeat of Hitler and prepare future international friendship based on equality. These tasks can best be fulfilled by the vanguard of the workers movement in each separate country. In support of this position it recalls resolution to this general effect of Seventh Congress of Comintern as well as decision of the United States Communist Party to leave Comintern in November 1940.⁹²

Moreover, states resolution, Communists have ever [*never?*] been tradition bound. They hold that organizational forms must be

⁹⁰ In a memorandum of August 2, 1943, Philip W. Bonsal, Chief of the Division of the American Republics, requested Joseph F. McGurk, Assistant Chief of the Division, to bring to his attention any information regarding the activities of the Soviet Mission in Mexico. "The large size of this Mission and the small amount of legitimate business between Mexico and the Soviets renders it important that we keep close watch on these people. If necessary, please stimulate the Ambassador's [George S. Messersmith] reporting." (701.6112/103)

⁹¹ The Presidium took the decision to dissolve the Communist International on May 15, and this resolution was published in *Pravda* on May 22.

⁹² The Communist Party took action on November 16, 1940, to withdraw from the Communist International to obviate the necessity of registering under the Anti-Subversive Activities Act (Voorhis Act), approved October 17, 1940; 54 Stat. 1201. See the *New York Times*, November 17, 1940, p. 9, col. 1.

abandoned when they have fulfilled their historic functions. First International⁹³ for example ceased to exist after it had laid foundations of workers parties in Europe, America.

In addition to the above considerations resolution cites growth in political maturity of Communist Party and its cadres in various countries and requests made during war by number of sections for dissolution of Comintern. It being impossible under present conditions to call a Congress the Executive Committee undertook to suggest resolution of dissolution for ratification by sections.

Resolution concludes by appealing to supporters of Comintern to concentrate all their strength for defeat German Fascists.

[Here follows list of names of the members of the Presidium who signed the resolution.]

Complete text by mail.

STANDLEY

800.00B Communist International/242 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

[Extracts]

LONDON, May 24, 1943—midnight.

[Received May 24—11 : 59 p. m.]

3577. Personal to the Secretary. We inquired of Sir Alexander Cadogan⁹⁴ this afternoon his impressions with regard to the dissolution of the Comintern. The British, he said, had had no previous indication that such a move was under contemplation nor had any suggestions been made by them that the "chloroforming" of the Comintern would be constructive. He considers Saturday's announcement, however, as a highly important step in the right direction: while there is of course no guarantee that the Comintern may not be revived or something similar set up in the future should it suit Russian purposes, the interment at this time of this widely hated and sinister organization must be interpreted as a sign of a real desire on the part of Stalin and his Government to cooperate with friendly countries in the reconstruction of Europe. The skeptics may say that the Comintern was dead anyway but he feels that Moscow's gesture is of real significance as a symbol of Russian desire publicly to renounce any subversive aims in the post war era. Cadogan likewise feels that to the extent the Comintern in its early aims for world wide

⁹³ Originally the International Working-Men's Association founded in London in 1864, and dissolved at Philadelphia in 1876.

⁹⁴ British Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs since 1938.

revolution represented a measure of defense in a military sense, so its dissolution is a sign of Russian confidence in themselves and a feeling that this dubious and outworn weapon is no longer needed. He thought the *Times* editorial this morning (Embassy's telegram No. 3566, 24th ⁹⁵) was a good summing up of the significance of the step.

Clark Kerr has telegraphed, Cadogan went on, that the reasons behind Saturday's announcement were internal as well as external. As to the former, it represented a desire on the part of those connected with the Comintern, now long languishing and ignored, to give themselves the satisfaction of a dramatic and dignified suicide. It was a recognition on their part too that their organization had no visible future in a world where Russian patriotism and a new won self-confidence is to mean frank cooperation on the basis of equality with other nations and not a resort to backstairs endeavors to attain Russian ends by international sabotage and revolution.

During our conversation ⁹⁶ I asked him about the dissolution of the Comintern. He told me that the action had been agreed upon before Ambassador Davies reached Moscow.⁹⁷ He said that Lenin's ⁹⁸ reason for forming the International in 1919 was due to two motivations: (1), the action of the governments against Russia following the cessation of hostilities in 1918 and, (2), a genuine belief in a world wide revolutionary movement and a desire on the part of the Russians to provide a general staff to guide that movement. Maisky told me that the movement had been practically moribund for the last half dozen years, that the 1935 meeting of the International in Moscow would not have been called if it had not been for Ambassador Bullitt's ⁹⁹ violent objection to the meeting which was resented by the Russians and resulted in contrary action. He told me that when he was in Moscow at the time of Eden's visit a year ago last Christmas the question was under discussion but no decision had been reached. He said that Stalin and his advisers had realized that a Nationalist world was more complicated than had been originally thought, that the setting up of a headquarters staff which attempted to establish cooperative action in such widely different areas as Africa and the

⁹⁵ Not printed.

⁹⁶ Ambassador Winant had luncheon at noon on May 24 with the Soviet Ambassador, Ivan Mikhallovich Maisky.

⁹⁷ Joseph E. Davies visited Moscow May 19-29, 1943, on a special mission for President Roosevelt; see pp. 646-661, *passim*.

⁹⁸ Vladimir Ilyich Lenin (Ulyanov), leader of the Bolshevik revolution of October 1917, and President of the Council of People's Commissars of the subsequent Soviet government until his death on January 21, 1924.

⁹⁹ William C. Bullitt, Ambassador in the Soviet Union, 1933-36. For correspondence regarding his attitude before the opening of the VII Congress of the Communist International in Moscow in 1935, see *Foreign Relations, The Soviet Union, 1933-1939*, pp. 220-228.

Balkans and China and South America made difficulties for their nationalist government which were impossible to coordinate and which injured rather than helped the Soviet Union. He hoped that the discontinuance of the Comintern would have a favorable reaction both in the United States and in the British Empire. I told him I thought that although there were skeptics in both the United States and Britain the general consensus of opinion in both countries would react favorably to the Russian position. His chief concern was the establishment of a second front across the Channel based on England.

WINANT

800.00B Communist International/247 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, May 25, 1943—1 p. m.

[Received 11:40 p. m.]

524. The announcement of the intention to dissolve the Communist International constitutes in my opinion a step of first rate importance. While it is generally believed here that the Comintern has not been active on any large scale since the beginning of the war it will be recalled that as recently as February 22, 1943, it was made clear that it was still functioning as an organization. (See Kuibyshev's 196, February 23, 6 [3] p. m.¹)

There has been no editorial comment on the announcement and in the absence of any lead our Soviet contacts are reluctant to discuss the matter. The general reaction, however, appears to be that it is a gesture toward cooperation and a mark of confidence by the Soviet Government in its Allies. The disclosure of the decision of the Communist Party of the US to leave the Comintern in November 1940 came as a surprise as this does not appear to have been generally known here.

With respect to the effect of this action abroad it may be well [*well be*] that it will serve to stimulate the growth of the Communist parties in Britain and the US by removing the stigma of foreign control. On the other hand Communists in these countries long trained to look to Moscow for guidance will no doubt tend to continue to follow Soviet policy as publicly expressed.

Some observers here have pointed out that this action is likely also to be welcomed by Japan and that it should have the effect of facilitating the maintenance of good relations with that country. If ac-

¹ Not printed.

cepted at its face value it would destroy the ideological basis of the Anti-Comintern Pact.²

The Soviet Union now enjoys an unprecedented popularity in Britain and the US and I have little doubt also in the countries of devastated Europe. This admiration has been well earned by the heroic resistance of the Soviet people and the Red army and this in turn will be associated in the minds of many people with the Soviet system. This admiration which is felt by all classes of people would not always benefit by Soviet representation by a particular national Communist group. Moreover, it may be expected that following the war there will be upheavals and intense and bitter political strife in many countries throughout the world in which the Communist parties of those countries will be involved—in many cases unsuccessfully and possibly in a manner not to the best interests of the USSR. To my mind the Soviet Union stands to gain from publicly disassociating itself from responsibility for them and thus increasing its freedom of action.

I believe that [for] some time the Comintern has been basically an agency of Soviet national policy rather than of world international revolution and that this policy will be furthered rather than hindered by this action. To say this, however, is not to belittle the importance of this development in Soviet-American relations, which I believe we should welcome. I feel this the more strongly as on the occasion of my trip to the U.S. last winter I told Litvinov that I thought that the Comintern was one of the greatest problems in the relations between the Soviet Union and the U.S.

STANDLEY

800.00B Communist International/250 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Standley)*

WASHINGTON, May 25, 1943—7 p. m.

356. The following is an excerpt from the Radio Bulletin of May 24, 1943:

“At his press conference today, Secretary was asked to comment on the decision of the Comintern to dissolve. Secretary replied, ‘The

² Originally signed at Berlin between Germany and Japan on November 25, 1936. For text, see *Reichsgesetzblatt*, Teil II, January 15, 1937, p. 28; or, the unofficial translation from the Japanese text, *Foreign Relations*, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. II, p. 153. A secret additional agreement is published in *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918–1945*, series D, vol. I, p. 734, footnote 2a. The ceremonies which attended the signing of the Protocol renewing the pact among Germany, Italy, Japan, Hungary, Manchukuo, and Spain, took place in Berlin on November 25, 1941, at which time several other nations acceded to it. See telegram No. 4175, November 25, 1941, from the Chargé in Germany, *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. IV, p. 1025. The text of this Protocol is in *Reichsgesetzblatt*, 1942, Teil II, pp. 126–127.

dissolution of the Communist International is welcome news. The elimination of that organization from international life and the cessation of the type of activity in which that organization has in the past engaged are certain to promote a greater degree of trust among the United Nations and to contribute very greatly to the wholehearted cooperation necessary for the winning of the war and for successful post-war undertakings.' Asked if he cared to say whether the United States had been influential in any degree in bringing it about, Secretary said he is not undertaking to discuss that at this time."

HULL

741.6111/71 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, May 28, 1943—4 p. m.

[Received May 28—9:43 a. m.]

547. The luncheon given by Molotov on May 26 on the occasion of the anniversary of the Soviet-British Treaty³ was marked by an unusual atmosphere of cordiality and friendship toward both the American and British representatives present not only on the part of Molotov but also of the other Soviet officials. Toasts were offered to the President, King George, Stalin, Churchill, Kalinin and the ranking guests. In his speech Molotov stressed the usefulness and importance now and after the war of the principles laid down in the Treaty and stated that as Stalin and the President were in full agreement therewith the Treaty could not help but serve the welfare of the world for years to come. Although he did not say so in so many words I distinctly obtained the opinion from the totality of his remarks during and after the luncheon that he wished to convey the impression that the Soviet Government had every intention to live up to the terms of the Treaty and to collaborate with Great Britain and the U.S. now and in the postwar period.

Considerable amusement was caused by the coincidence that the British Ambassador and I had prepared speeches on the same allegorical theme likening the Treaty to a newborn child whose parents had guarded it with loving care yet with some trepidation as to whether it would grow to sturdy manhood. We were proud to say that the child's growth had exceeded the fondest expectations and that there was now no question but that it would grow to sturdy and useful manhood.

In conversations which members of my staff had with some of the Soviet officials the Second Front was brought up not with an attitude of accusation toward America and Britain as has so often happened

³ See footnote 17, p. 502.

in the past but rather with honest genuine concern. This fact gave me the impression that the Soviets now believe that we are doing everything in our power to open a Second Front as soon as possible and that they are anxious only that something be done to lighten the blow they expect will come in the near future.

STANDLEY

800.00B Communist International/264 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, May 29, 1943.

[Received May 31—1:06 a. m.]

565. King has furnished me with an authorized translation of his letter to [from] Stalin. It reads as follows:

"Mr. Harold King, Reuters chief correspondent in the USSR. Dear Mr. King: I have received your request to answer a question referring to the dissolution of the Communist International. I am sending you my answer.

Question: 'British comment on the decision to wind up the Comintern has been very favorable. What is the Soviet view of this matter and of its bearing on future international relations?'

Answer: 'The dissolution of the Communist International is proper and timely because it facilitates the organization of the common onslaught of all freedom loving nations against the common enemy—Hitlerism.'

The dissolution of the Communist International is proper because:

(a) It exposes the lie of the Hitlerites to the effect that 'Moscow' allegedly intends to intervene in the life of other nations and to 'Bolshevize' them. An end is now being put to this lie.

(b) It exposes the calumny of the adversaries of communism within the labor movement to the effect that Communist Parties in various countries are allegedly acting not in the interest of their people but on orders from outside. An end is now being put to this calumny too.

(c) It facilitates the work of patriots in freedom loving countries for uniting the progressive forces of their respective countries, regardless of party or religious faith, into a single camp of national liberation—for unfolding the struggle against fascism.

(d) It facilitates the work of patriots of all countries for uniting all freedom loving peoples into a single international camp for the fight against the menace of the world domination by Hitlerism thus clearing the way to the future organization of a companionship of nations based upon their equality.

I think that all these circumstances taken together will result in a further strengthening of the United front of the Allies and other United Nations in their fight for victory over Hitlerite tyranny.

I feel that the dissolution of the Communist International is perfectly timely because it is exactly now, when the Fascist beast is

exerting its last strength—that it is necessary to organize the common onslaught of freedom loving countries to finish off this beast and to deliver the people from Fascist oppression.

With respect (Signed) J. Stalin.”

STANDLEY

800.00B Communist International/266 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State

ANKARA, May 31, 1943—midnight.

[Received June 1—1:35 a. m.]

996. The news of the dissolution of the Third International has created wide speculation in the Turkish press and occasioned considerable comment among Turkish Government officials. Both the press and Turkish officialdom appear inclined to question the sincerity of the announcement. While editorial comment has been restrained in line with the Government's policy of fostering friendly relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union the views expressed to me by high Government officials in private conversations are uniform in attributing Stalin's action to a desire to meet the political and military needs of the moment rather than to an irrevocable decision to abandon a program of world revolution. They have pointed out the importance of the move in paving the way for closer cooperation with the United States and Britain, particularly the former. The more thoughtful among high Government officials seem disposed to await developments in the hope that the action taken by Stalin is the forerunner of a definitive change in Soviet foreign policy and that developments in the near future will dissipate all suspicion that the move was merely one of expediency. Even these officials, however, express the view that were Soviet imperialism to replace the program of world revolution the danger to Turkish interests would be enhanced rather than decreased in that the menace of communism within Turkey is much less than the threat to Turkish interests which would result from Soviet imperialism.

Since the end of the Tunisian campaign which carried with it the conviction in Turkish Government circles of an ultimate Allied victory there has been unmistakable evidence of a recognition of Turkish dependence on the United States and Britain to safeguard Turkish interests as against suspected Soviet ambitions not only in respect of the Straits but of the Balkans as well.

STEINHARDT

093.112/518 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, June 7, 1943—noon.

[Received June 9—10:23 a. m.]

614. The presentation of decorations to members of the Soviet armed forces will probably take place in the near future. On this occasion I propose to make the following remarks. I should be glad to receive any suggestions the Department may care to make.⁴

"I have come here today to transmit to members of the Red army, the Red navy and the Red air force, decorations bestowed upon them by the Government of the United States in recognition of their outstanding accomplishments in the struggle against our common enemy. I consider it a great honor and privilege to have the opportunity of doing this. I know that the recipients of these decorations will not feel the less honored when I say that through them my Government and the American people desire to pay a tribute to all of the armed forces of the Soviet Union and to the civilian population whose steadfast courage has contributed so much to your success. This is not a hollow formality but a deeply sincere expression of the great admiration and gratitude that my countrymen feel toward you.⁵

I believe that the quality of the Red army and navy that has evoked our greatest admiration and has done the most to confound the enemy has been your unshakeable determination. Regardless of the circumstances, no matter how great the odds you have refused to admit defeat. Early in the struggle the Germans learned to their cost that it was not enough to cut off the members of a Red army unit from their comrades for they either fought their way back or continued the struggle behind the lines—sometimes to the last man. No matter how many times the Germans announced that your forces had been crushed, no matter how they drew the lines on their maps at headquarters, they found that wherever there was a Red soldier there was a determined and implacable enemy. Also when on paper the Germans had captured a Soviet city—and on paper the Germans have won the war many times—they found that Soviet cities did not fall in accordance with the rules of their textbooks and that a long and bitter struggle lay ahead.

The Germans did not learn this lesson easily. Sevastopol and Leningrad should have taught them but when the Axis armies appeared before Stalingrad Hitler was so forgetful of this lesson that he boastfully counted Stalingrad as his. I don't think that Hitler will make any more boasts of this sort. This quality of iron determination

⁴ In telegram No. 436, June 14, 7 p. m., the Ambassador was informed that the Department had no suggestions to make and entirely approved these remarks.

⁵ At the presentation of the decorations on June 22 (see telegram No. 721, June 23, 8 p. m., from the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, p. 546), the following paragraph was here interpolated: "Today the Soviet Union enters upon its third year of war for it was just two years ago today that the treacherous attack upon you was launched. Your achievements during the past two years constitute a record in which freedom loving peoples throughout the world take pride." (093.112/535)

expressed in the wise leadership of Marshal Stalin—expressed in the courage of the individual soldier, sailor or flyer—expressed in the heroism of the partisans—expressed in the glorious records of cities that would not surrender—this quality cost the Axis dearly and delayed and confused their plans. The defenders of Sevastopol share in the glory of Stalingrad for they contributed valiantly to that victory.

On the international scale the same relationship applies for we are all engaged against a common enemy. Just as Stalingrad contributed to the victory in North Africa, so that victory and the heavy blows that the Axis is receiving from the air will contribute to the victories to come.

I think it is not vain to hope that from this comradeship in arms will develop a lasting collaboration, for we have much in common besides a hated enemy. That is something the Axis propaganda machine tends to forget when it attempts to emphasize our differences. Such differences as we have arise chiefly out of method. Our fundamental purposes are the same. We, together with our Allies desire a secure and lasting peace. We all aim at the creation of conditions whereby men can work and build not just for a class and not for the benefit of a self-styled 'master race' but for the good of the people as a whole. We have already shown that we are willing and able to cooperate in the first task in the building of such a world—the destruction of fascism. I am confident that we will be equally successful in tasks of the future.["]

STANDLEY

711.61/905

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] June 9, 1943.

The Soviet Chargé d'Affaires⁶ called at my request and after expressing my pleasure in seeing him, I asked him whether he had any news of Ambassador Litvinov since naturally we had a very high regard for him and wanted to see him back in this country. He said the Ambassador had gone home on official business, that he was in Moscow now and that he knew he was well.

I then told the Chargé d'Affaires that during the Ambassador's absence he should feel free to come and see me or other members of the Department on any occasion when we might be helpful in strengthening the important and warm relations that exist between the two countries and in promoting our common effort.

I said that I had asked him to come in in order to hand him the third Lend-lease Protocol. He said it was a very opportune moment since he could send it textually by the Russian delegates to the Food

⁶ Andrey Andreyevich Gromyko.

Conference⁷ who were leaving tomorrow morning at four o'clock. He then went on to say that the Russian delegation was departing well satisfied with the meeting at Hot Springs. They felt that not only had they been given every opportunity to collaborate but that also they were getting out of the Conference itself more than they had hoped. He warmly congratulated me on the organization of the conference by the American officials. I told the Chargé d'Affaires that many of these men had attended four or more conferences with me principally in connection with South American affairs and they too would share my satisfaction in hearing the Chargé d'Affaires' statement. I added that we felt that the cooperation evidenced by the Russian delegation had been most helpful. He replied that the Soviet delegates felt that the organizational experience which they had obtained from the conference would be of value to them in future conferences.

I asked the Chargé d'Affaires regarding the military situation in the Soviet Union. He replied that they were expecting the opening of a German offensive at any moment. They were not as yet certain regarding the point which might be the center of this offensive. I told him that the United States Government desired to be of every possible help to the Soviet Union at this critical time.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

123 Standley, William H./153

The Secretary of State to President Roosevelt

WASHINGTON, June 9, 1943.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: As suggested by you I am enclosing herewith a draft of a proposed reply to Admiral Standley's letter to you of May 3.

I have devoted much thought to the problem of a successor to Admiral Standley and have decided to recommend Mr. Averell Harriman⁸ for this position. I feel that with his experience and background and with the contacts which he has both in the Soviet Union and in the United States he would be the logical person for this post. I have no other name to suggest at this time.

Faithfully yours,

CORDELL HULL

⁷ The United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture had been held at Hot Springs, Virginia, between May 18 and June 3, 1943; for correspondence concerning the Conference, see vol. I, pp. 820 ff. For a press statement on the summation of the results, see Department of State *Bulletin*, June 5, 1943, pp. 497-500.

⁸ Representative in London of the Combined Production and Resources Board, lend-lease coordinator, and sometimes a special representative of President Roosevelt.

[Enclosure]

*Draft Letter From President Roosevelt to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) **

DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: I am always pleased to receive letters from you as it gives me so much comfort to know that the relations of the United States with the Soviet Union are in such capable hands with you in Moscow. It has caused me some disturbance, however, to learn from your letter of May 3 that you feel that you should not spend another winter in the Soviet Union and that you would like to be relieved of your duties there as Ambassador sometime before October 10.

I am well aware of the public spirit which prompted you to accept the post in Moscow and to serve there in spite of the rigorous climate and of the living conditions which must be trying.

Although I regret your decision to retire, I can nevertheless understand it, and I shall begin at once to look for someone with the necessary qualifications to succeed you.

I wish to assure you again of my full confidence in you and to express my appreciation of the able and effective manner in which you are representing the United States in a country the friendship of which is so important to us at the present time.

Very sincerely yours,

800.00B Communist International/281 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, June 11, 1943.

[Received June 13—4:15 a. m.]

647. My 514, May 23. *Pravda* for June 10 publishes on its first page an announcement by the Presidium of the Executive Committee of the Communist International stating that its recommendation for the dissolution of the Communist International dated May 15 and published as reported by the Embassy on May 22nd has now been approved by the Communist parties of the following countries: Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Great Britain, Hungary, Germany, Ireland, Spain, Italy, Canada, China, Colombia, Mexico, Rumania, Syria, Uruguay, Finland, France, Czechoslovakia, Chile, Switzerland, Sweden, Yugoslavia, Union of South Africa.

* There is no record of the date on which this letter was sent to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, but he mentioned receipt of it in his telegram No. 1254, September 2, 5 p. m., p. 574.

The approval of the recommendations by the following organizations was also announced: The All Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) of the USSR, the Labor Party of Poland, the United Socialist Party of Catalonia, the Revolutionary Communist Union of Cuba, the Communist International of Youth.

The announcement continued as follows:

"Not a single one of the existing sections of the Communist International raised objections to the proposal of the Presidium of the Executive Committee.

In view of this situation the Presidium of the Executive Committee of the Communist International:

1. Declares that the proposed dissolution of the Communist International has been approved unanimously by the existing sections of the Communist International which were in a position to communicate their decisions (including the most important sections).

2. Considers as abolished from June 10, 1943, the Executive Committee of the Communist International, the Presidium and Secretariat of the Executive Committee and also the International Control Commission.¹⁰

3. Instructs commissions consisting of Dimitrov¹¹ (Chairman), Manuïlski,¹² Pieck¹³ and Erkoli¹⁴ with administering the liquidation of the affairs, organs, apparatus and property of the Communist International. Signed G. Dimitrov, June 9, 1943."

STANDLEY

740.00113 E.W. 1939/1018½

Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Henderson) to the Acting Chief of the Division (Atherton)

[WASHINGTON,] June 11, 1943.

MR. ATHERTON: We feel that it is extremely important that the property in this country owned by persons in the enemy-occupied territories should be administered by United States agencies who

¹⁰ The wartime headquarters of the Communist International at the moment of dissolution were in Ufa. In telegram No. 840, July 10, Ambassador Standley notified the Department that the "*Communist International* number 5-6 announces cessation of publication in conformity with the dissolution of the Comintern." (800.00B Communist International/308)

¹¹ Georgy Dimitrov, Bulgarian Communist, who had been elected General Secretary of the Executive Committee of the Communist International at the VII Congress in Moscow in 1935; the nominal head of the Comintern.

¹² Dmitry Zakharovich Manuïlsky, prominent Communist Party leader in the Soviet Union and member of the Executive Committee of the Communist International.

¹³ Wilhelm Pieck, German Communist, former Reichstag Deputy from Berlin, and member of the Executive Committee of the Communist International.

¹⁴ Ercole Ercoli (Palmiro Togliatti), leader of the Italian Communist Party and member of the Executive Committee of the Communist International.

should also represent the foreign owners. We also strongly feel that the governments-in-exile as well as the Soviet Government have no right with respect to this property other than to consult with the Alien Property Custodian and the Treasury with respect to action affecting the property of their nationals. So far as those portions of Poland and the Baltic States which are claimed by the Soviet Government are concerned, we should make it clear at once if the Soviet Government should approach us with regard to the property of persons in that territory that we cannot accept suggestions from the Soviet Government with regard to the administering or disposition of property of persons in occupied Soviet territory except that territory which we recognize as Soviet. If we show the slightest weakness and equivocation in this regard the Soviet Government will at once bring tremendous pressure on us and in the end our relations will be more unfavorably affected than they would be if we display firmness at the outset.

LOY W. HENDERSON

711.6111/12 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, June 12, 1943—8 p. m.

[Received June 14—9:58 a. m.]

654. My 547, May 28, 4 p. m. The luncheon given by Molotov on June 11 in honor of the Soviet-American Agreement¹⁵ was also characterized by an unusual spirit of friendliness and good cheer. The Soviet guests present appeared much more open and willing freely to converse than has been the case on previous formal gatherings. The underlying motive in most of the toasts and in subsequent private conversation with Soviet officials was that of collaboration now and in the postwar period and I sensed a greater spirit of sincerity on the part of our Soviet hosts than I have witnessed before. The leading editorials in *Pravda* and *Izvestiya* of June 11 which are summarized in the immediately following telegram¹⁶ stressed throughout the significance of the American-Soviet Agreement as the basis for united action and collaboration between our two countries now and in the

¹⁵ Signed at Washington June 11, 1942; for text of the agreement and exchange of notes, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 253, or 56 Stat. (pt. 2) 1500, or Department of State *Bulletin*, June 13, 1942, p. 531. See also the bracketed note, *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. III, p. 708.

¹⁶ Not printed; in this telegram Ambassador Standley reported the conclusion of the *Izvestiya* editorial as stating that the "Soviet-American agreement of June 11, 1942, as well as the Anglo-Soviet treaty of May 26, 1942, are the cornerstones underlying the foundations of victory and the edifice of a peace to be constructed by the friendly and united collaboration of the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition." (711.6111/13)

postwar period and may have had some influence in animating the spirit that prevailed at the luncheon. For as I am aware these editorials were unprecedented in their expressions of friendship and good will toward the United States and went much further than those published on the anniversary of the British treaty (see my 537, May 26¹⁷).

In his opening remarks Molotov stated that in spite of the great economic difficulties now being experienced by the Soviet State the Russian people were always finding new strength to support their army and to continue the struggle against Hitler; that in their victories the Lend-Lease Agreement had played an important part; that on the basis of the London and Washington agreements success had been achieved, victory would be attained and a firm foundation would be laid for common collaboration with America, Britain and other freedom loving nations in the postwar period.

I took occasion briefly to review the Lend-Lease picture from the time of the Harriman Mission¹⁸ up to the present day. I stated that the Lend-Lease Act¹⁹ evidenced an intent on the part of the U.S. to mobilize in the Allied cause its every possible resource manpower, sea power and military and industrial strength; it also evidenced a determination to ally these resources to the struggle and to continue with its Allies until the purpose of the war had been accomplished, namely the establishment hope of a world in which man could live without fear. I concluded that the attainment of this purpose would require united effort of all Allied Nations not only now but during the postwar period and I defined the American-Soviet Agreement as a confirmation of our mutual interest in this collaboration. The British Ambassador again took pains to support my remarks.

Toasts were offered to the President, Churchill, and Stalin, the ranking guests present, to the Red Cross and to the armed forces of the three countries.

STANDLEY

[For the second anniversary of the Nazi attack on the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, President Roosevelt sent a message to Premier Stalin, and Secretary of State Hull made a statement at a press conference on June 21, 1943. The texts are published in Department of State *Bulletin*, June 26, 1943, page 596.]

¹⁷ Not printed.

¹⁸ W. Averell Harriman, Special Representative of President Roosevelt, and Chairman of the Special Mission to the Soviet Union, with a British counterpart led by Lord Beaverbrook, held conferences in Moscow, September 29–October 1, 1941. For correspondence concerning this Mission, see *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. 1, pp. 825–851, *passim*.

¹⁹ Approved March 11, 1941; 55 Stat. 31.

093.112/520 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, June 23, 1943—8 p. m.

[Received June 24—10:50 a. m.]

721. The ceremonies in connection with the presentation of American decorations²⁰ took place yesterday at 5 p. m., in the Kremlin. The Soviet officials present included Molotov, Litvinov, Lozovsky, Kuznetsov,²¹ General Golikov,²² Lieut. General of Aviation Falaleyev,²³ and other representatives of the Foreign Office and the Soviet Armed Forces. I was accompanied by my service Attachés, with assistants, General Faymonville²⁴ and staff, Capt. Rickenbacker²⁵ and staff, Mr. Sulzberger²⁶ and Mr. Reston²⁷ and Embassy secretaries. Molotov had informed me that since all the members of the Soviet Armed Forces who had been chosen to receive the decorations were absent from Moscow the actual presentation would follow with the procedure adopted some weeks ago on the occasion of the presentation of the British awards; that is, the decorations would be presented to Molotov for transmission to the recipients.

After the guests had been introduced and assembled in Molotov's reception room I made the remarks contained in my 614, June 7, noon. Molotov replied by thanking me in the name of the Soviet Government for the warm feelings expressed by me of the Government and the people of the US in relation to the Soviet Union, its armies, navy and air force. He stated that in view of military exigencies it was not possible for the recipients of the awards to be present; however he felt

²⁰ The awards presented included 20 Distinguished Service Crosses and 20 Distinguished Service Medals for personnel of the Red Army, and 10 Navy Crosses and 10 Distinguished Service Medals for personnel of the Red Navy.

²¹ Admiral of the Fleet Nikolay Gerasimovich Kuznetsov, People's Commissar of the Navy.

²² Col. Gen. Filip Ivanovich Golikov, Chief of the Soviet Military Mission to the United States in 1941 (see telegram No. 907, July 17, to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, and memorandum of August 8, by the Secretary of State, *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, pp. 795 and 818, respectively); at this time in active command on the Voronezh Front.

²³ Colonel General of Aviation, later Marshal, Fedor Yakovlevich Falaleyev, member of the Staff of the Military High Command (Stavka) under Stalin.

²⁴ Brig. Gen. Philip R. Faymonville, head of the American Supply Mission in the Soviet Union, Lend-Lease representative.

²⁵ Capt. Edward V. Rickenbacker, aviation authority, who made a brief visit to the Soviet Union; see telegrams No. 701, June 21, and No. 800, July 5, from the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, pp. 668 and 675, respectively.

²⁶ Arthur H. Sulzberger of the *New York Times*, visiting in Moscow as special representative of the American Red Cross; see telegrams No. 545, May 27, and No. 815, July 6, from the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, pp. 656 and 676, respectively.

²⁷ James B. Reston, a correspondent of the *New York Times*, visiting in Moscow with Mr. Sulzberger as a special representative of the American Red Cross.

he could express their feelings of sincere appreciation of the decorations awarded to them by the friendly American Government that they would be proud of the award and endeavor to multiply their services to their country in the cause of liberation. He referred to the joint power of the armed forces of the Soviet Union, America and Britain over the enemy and stated that millions of people were living in a deep confidence that the time was not far distant when the enemy would feel the crushing weight of joint attack of the Allies. "In battle with our common enemy our military cooperation will be strengthened and it will solidify the foundation of our victory and our postwar collaboration together with all freedom loving people."

Following the presentation of awards refreshments were served. The occasion was marked by an atmosphere of real cordiality and Soviet-American friendship. The Soviet press on the following day gave unusually wide coverage to the ceremonies, approximately half the first pages of *Pravda* and *Izvestiya* being devoted to them.

STANDLEY

861.85/264 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, June 23, 1943—midnight.

[Received June 23—10:30 p. m.]

725. In conversation with Molotov yesterday I inquired as to the situation in regard to the seizure by the Japanese of the Soviet ships in the Pacific. Molotov stated that the Japanese Ambassador had been invited to Moscow to discuss this question and that the Japanese had promised to release the *Ingune* [*Ingul*] and the *Kamenets Podolsk*.²⁸ I questioned the value of the Japanese promises. Molotov making a gesture of derision remarked that the Russians knew the Japanese well enough not to place too great a reliance on Japanese promises. He added that as the ships had been seized illegally the Soviet Government would insist upon their release.

Ward has reported that he is informed that the vessels are already released.²⁹

STANDLEY

²⁸ These vessels were former American merchant ships acquired by the Soviet Union under Lend-Lease provisions: *Ingul*, formerly *Pacific Oak*; *Kamenets Podolsk*, formerly *Vermar*.

²⁹ In telegram No. 795, July 3, 11 a. m., Ambassador Standley reported that although these ships had been released, the Japanese had now seized another. Molotov had commented that "the Japanese are always seizing something that does not belong to them." (861.85/266)

740.0011 European War 1939/29912 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, June 24, 1943—1 p. m.

[Received June 25—9:40 a. m.]

734. The Soviet press for June 22 carried a Sovinformburo³⁰ communication covering the entire first page of the paper and entitled "Two Years of the Patriotic War of the Soviet Union". The announcement was apparently considered to be of such importance that *Pravda* which now ordinarily does not appear on Tuesdays was published.

The communiqué makes the following points.

1. German military might has been undermined by Soviet resistance during 2 years of war. German successes are explained in part by unpreparedness of Allies in first year, to furnish "significant and speedy" help to the Soviets; and by the sudden and unprovoked character of German attack catching Soviets unmobilized. The absence of a second front in the summer of 1942 again permitted full German concentration on the Soviet front. The second front question is also raised in connection with the German Kharkov offensive this spring.

Losses of Germany and her Allies for the 2 years of war are given as 6,400,000 officers and men killed or captured as well as 56,000 guns, 42,000 tanks, 43,000 aircraft. Corresponding Soviet figures are 4,200,000 killed and missing, 35,000 guns, 30,000 tanks and 23,000 aircraft. As a result of Stalingrad and other defeats Germany was unable this spring to conduct offensive operations against the Red army.

The Germans having suffered a series of defeats on the Soviet front and in North Africa in recent months are now forced to talk of a "war of position". They are driven to extreme measures in the mobilization of their own and the occupied countries manpower reserves. Their industrial production is declining. A powerful factor in this development is Allied bombing.

2. Germany's political isolation has become pronounced. Germany's authority among her Allies has declined, and her attempts to split the anti-Hitler coalition have failed.

3. The Red army's strength has grown while that of the German Army has been declining. The section making this point declares that Soviet industry is producing "all that it, the army, needs".

4. The international position of the Soviet Union is firmer than ever and the "fighting unity" of the USSR, England and the U.S.A. has been strengthened.

³⁰ Soviet Information Bureau.

Hitler-Germany's attempts to destroy this unity have collapsed. Regarding the Anglo-Soviet treaty the communiqué states that under war conditions a year is a long enough period to test the viability of a treaty.

"Experience has shown that during this period our relations with England under the alliance have improved."

The Soviet-American Lend-Lease Agreement has "in full measure" proven itself. "Our Allies" are furnishing ever increasing aid in munitions and supplies. In this connection the Allied North African efforts and their European bombing operations are referred to again. At the same time reference is made to the "immeasurable" aid being rendered by the Soviet Union to Allies by its binding of 200 German and 30 other Axis divisions on the Soviet front.

5. The second front question is the focus of the communiqué's final section which states that "everything now depends upon how our Allies utilize the favorable conditions for the establishment of a second front on the European Continent for without a second front, victory over Hitlerite Germany is impossible".

In conclusion the communiqué expresses the hope that what happened in 1942 when the absence of a second front saved Germany will not recur. Failure to establish a second front would mean millions of casualties; its creation would lead to a speedy conclusion of the war.

STANDLEY

121.5461/195: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, July 10, 1943—1 p. m.
[Received July 12—10:07 p. m.]

839. About 2 weeks ago General Michela informed me that in view of the lack of cooperation of the Soviet military authorities in furnishing him with military information and of their persistent delays in arranging for him to visit the front, whereas the Chief of the British Military Mission³¹ had been accorded two trips to the front within the last few months, he considered that his usefulness in Moscow as Military Attaché was at an end. He consequently had decided to ask for his recall. I requested that he withhold any such action until I had discussed the political implications of such a step with Molotov.

On June 26 I informed Molotov of Michela's desire to ask for his recall and outlined the reasons therefor. I stated that I felt that the recall of my Military Attaché in such circumstances might have

³¹ Lt. Gen. Sir Giffard Le Quesne Martel.

unfortunate repercussions in the United States and might result in unfavorable public comment. I said that I felt I would be derelict if I did not make an effort to avoid such a development.

Molotov replied that he was unaware of this situation adding that it was his understanding that the British and American military representatives were being accorded similar treatment. He offered to look into the matter immediately.

On June 28, Michela was requested to call on Marshal Vasilevsky, the Chief of Staff, with whom he had a very satisfactory conversation. Vasilevsky promised him considerably more cooperation than had been forthcoming in the past and authorized General Dubinin, Assistant Chief of Staff, to work out the details with Michela. In a subsequent conversation with Dubinin on June 30 Michela outlined instances of Soviet non-cooperation and was informed that steps would be taken to rectify the points at issue. In connection with one of the points, namely Michela's objection to the Soviet practice of taking up purely military matters not connected with Lend-Lease through General Faymonville, Dubinin requested that the Soviet authorities be advised in writing as to the exact status of both General Faymonville and General Michela in respect to such matters. Michela informed Dubinin that he would discuss this question with me.

In view of General Dubinin's request I am sending a communication along the following lines to Molotov:

"I have the honor to refer to a conversation held on June 20 [30] between Brigadier General Michela, Military Attaché of the Embassy, and Major General Dubinin, Assistant Chief of Staff of the Red army, in which I am informed that General Michela was requested by General Dubinin that the appropriate Soviet authorities be advised in writing with respect to the exact status of Brigadier General Faymonville, Chief of the United States Supply Mission, in relation to Brigadier General Michela.

Since both Generals Faymonville and Michela are integral parts of the American Embassy, I feel that it is incumbent upon me to endeavor to remove any misunderstanding that may exist in the minds of the Soviet authorities in respect to the exact status of these two officers. With this in view, I am quoting herewith the pertinent section of instructions sent to General Faymonville on December 12, 1942, by the office of Lend-Lease Administration. These instructions are still binding.

'The function of the United States Supply Mission in the USSR is to represent in that country the office of Lend-Lease Administration. In performance of this function the U.S. Supply Mission shall concern itself with the problems of supply to the Soviet Union under the terms of the Lend-Lease Act and other such related agreements and protocols which have been or are subsequently to be agreed upon by the United States and the Soviet Union.'

It would seem clear from the aforementioned instructions, and I have so interpreted it, that General Michela in his capacity as Military Attaché is the representative of the War Department of the U.S. in the Soviet Union and that General Faymonville in his capacity

as Chief of the Supply Mission is the representative of the Office of Lend-Lease Administration in the Soviet Union and of that organization alone. Consequently, it would appear to me that all questions [in] which the War Department is the agency primarily interested should be referred by the Soviet authorities to General Michela and all questions relative to Lend-Lease material and supplies coming to the Soviet Union should be referred to General Faymonville.

I would appreciate it if you would cause the Soviet authorities who are interested in the above matter to be informed accordingly."

STANDLEY

711.61/909 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, July 13, 1943—4 p. m.

[Received July 14—11 : 38 p. m.]

859. As an indication of the increased cooperative spirit now being displayed by the Soviet authorities, I wish to report that my Naval Attaché has just returned from a visit to the ports of Astrakhan and Baku where he was shown every consideration and courtesy and given an opportunity to inspect Soviet naval installations in those areas.

STANDLEY

861.857/59a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley)

WASHINGTON, July 13, 1943—9 p. m.

554. Personal for the Ambassador. I asked the Soviet Chargé to call on July 12 to inform him that we had just been notified by the Navy Department that an American submarine had recently sunk a Soviet trawler by mistake in the Aleutian area. I showed him the brief report received from the Secretary of the Navy which stated that 2 of the crew of the trawler had been killed and 12 survivors taken aboard the submarine to be landed at some undesignated port in the Aleutians area.

I expressed to him the profound regret of this Government to the tragic occurrence and promised to convey to him the full details when all the facts were received from the Navy Department.³² I have also

³² The full details of this incident were furnished by the Navy Department on July 19, July 23, and August 9 to the Office of the Naval Attaché of the Soviet Union, which appeared to be satisfied with the information received (861.857/62).

sent a note to the Soviet Chargé ³⁴ embodying a formal expression of this Government's regret at this unfortunate accident.

The next time you have occasion to see Mr. Molotov please reiterate to him the profound regret and distress of this Government over this matter.³⁵

HULL

862.01/299 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

[Extract] ³⁶

Moscow, July 22, 1943.

[Received July 23—3:38 p. m.]

922. Second half, our 923.³⁴ *Pravda* July 21 devoted its entire third page to publication of manifesto of National Committee Free Germany to German Army and German people. It is announced that manifesto appeared in first number of magazine *Freies Deutschland* published by (Free Germany) Committee. Facsimiles of pages this publication date[d] July 19th and of 33 signatures to manifesto published.

Introduction states manifesto was drafted by convention in Moscow on July 12 and 13 consisting of representative Germans of all social groups, religious, political convictions, including delegates from AT German prisoners' camps in Soviet Union. Group included former members of Reichstag. This convention decided to form (Free Germany) Committee and elected as President poet Erich Weinert; First Vice President Major Karl Hetz;³⁷ Second Vice President Lieut. Heinrich Graf von Einsiedel.³⁸ Text of manifesto amounts to summons to rebellion against Hitler addressed to German Army and home front.

STANDLEY

³⁴ Not printed.

³⁵ In telegram No. 930, July 24, 10 a. m., the Ambassador reported that he had expressed regrets to Molotov on July 23, which he accepted "in good spirit." (861.857/60)

³⁶ The part omitted is an outline summary of the manifesto of the Free Germany Committee, founded in Moscow on July 12, 1943, and disbanded on November 5, 1945. English translations of the manifesto are available in the *Moscow News*, July 23, the *London Times*, July 23, p. 3, and the *New York Times*, August 1, p. 17.

³⁷ Headquarters Staff, 371st Infantry Division, German Army; an engineer from Königsberg.

³⁸ In 3d Squadron, 3d Fighter Group; from Berlin.

740.0011 European War 1939/30310 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, July 23, 1943—9 a. m.

[Received 7:36 p. m.]

924. *Pravda* for July 22 published prominently a Tass³⁹ despatch from New York utilizing American newspaper statements regarding the Sicilian operations in such a manner as to minimize their significance especially in comparison with developments on the Russian front.⁴⁰ The item reports that many American papers state that these operations despite their brilliant success "are not a second front which is necessary for the speedy destruction of Hitlerism". This statement is supported by quotations from the *New York Sun*, the *Dallas Morning News*, the *San Francisco Chronicle* and the *New York Post* which argue that the Sicilian successes show that a real second front is possible now and advocate its immediate opening as the only way to shorten the war.

STANDLEY

862.01/300 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, July 23, 1943—10 a. m.

[Received 8:51 p. m.]

925. The announcement of the formation of a "Free Germany" Committee came as a surprise to observers here. The first reaction to it, however, is that it is chiefly a propaganda move and as such is likely to be of considerable importance. The political implications are not overlooked but it is believed that in this respect it may be considered as a move in national foreign policy rather than in the field of world revolution. The inclusion of Pieck in the signers of the manifesto is thought to be unfortunate as throwing doubt on the matter and providing an opening for Axis propaganda.

I assume that we were not informed in advance that such a move was contemplated and it may thus be taken as an indication that the Soviet Union intends to pursue an independent policy and at least so far as Eastern and Central Europe is concerned to play a leading role.

³⁹ Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union, official communications agency of the Soviet Government.

⁴⁰ Ambassador Standley had already pointed out in his telegram No. 907, July 21, 10 a. m., that American press statements on the Allied Sicilian campaign were being printed "in such fashion as to constitute a Soviet comment on the significance of the operation." (740.0011 European War 1939/30271.)

In this connection it is probably not unrelated to the independence of British and American policy toward France and Italy.

Irrespective of the motives underlying this action it seems clear that its timing is an indication of Soviet confidence in the military situation.

STANDLEY

860N.01/93 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, July 23, 1943—noon.

[Received 8:29 p. m.]

927. Soviet press for July 22 carried extensive accounts of a meeting of the Presidia of the Supreme Soviets and Soviets of People's Commissars of the Latvian, Lithuanian and Estonian S.S. Republics dedicated to the third anniversary of the pronouncement of Soviet power in the Baltic States.⁴¹ Greetings were extended to Stalin which read in part as follows: The people of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania swear to you our father and friend, leader and teacher that they are ready for any sacrifice and will not lay down their arms until the last Hitlerite is destroyed in our Soviet fatherland. Messages were also sent to the people of the Baltic States recalling the benefits of the year under Soviet rule and urging the various classes of the population to revolt, commit sabotage and struggle against the German invaders.

STANDLEY

⁴¹ In telegram No. 916, July 22, 8 a. m., Ambassador Standley reported upon a spate of articles then appearing in the Soviet press, remarking that they "reiterate in the most forceful terms yet noticed in the Soviet press the Soviet contention that the Baltic States were and will be integral parts of the Soviet Union." (860N.01/92) Near the end of the year, in telegram No. 2321, December 24, 10 a. m., the Embassy commented upon an article written by Justas Paleckis, President of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic, which appeared in issue No. 14 (December 15, 1943) of *War and the Working Class*: "The unusually sharp and at times violent tone of this article, together with the fact that the Soviet press has recently published a number of accounts of pro-Soviet meetings in the United States among Americans of Baltic origin, is probably preparation for the moment, which may not be far off, when the Soviet armies reach the Baltic countries. The Soviet Government presumably anticipating certain difficulties before world opinion over this question is therefore re-emphasizing the Soviet position on the Baltic States and is laying down in advance the propaganda line to deal with any critics of its policy." (860N.01/98)

865.00/2108 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, July 30, 1943—4 p. m.

[Received July 31—8:14 a. m.]

977. For the President and the Secretary. Ilya Ehrenburg⁴² told AP correspondent Cassidy⁴³ today that the President's disavowal of the OWI⁴⁴ broadcast attacking Badoglio⁴⁵ and the King of Italy had seriously disturbed Moscow.⁴⁶ He said that the Tass despatch reporting this incident had not yet been published as they wished to avoid stirring up public opinion but he intimated that the Soviet Government might ask for an explanation. He was very frank and tended to be bitter about the failure of Great Britain and the United States to consult with the Soviet Government on such questions. He said that the Russians felt they had a right to be consulted as they had been fighting Italians on this front for some time and that the fact that Germany was so heavily engaged in Russia that it could not support Italy was one of the main reasons for Mussolini's downfall.

Ehrenburg said that the Russians had understood the use of Darlan because of military necessity and had not protested because the North African affair was to them a relatively unimportant question.⁴⁷ Dealing with Badoglio, however, he said was a question of major importance. He asked whether this indicated that we would eventually be prepared to deal with Goering⁴⁸ in Germany.

Cassidy pointed out that the President had in his speech reiterated our demand for the unconditional surrender of Italy. Cassidy then referred to the "Free Germany" movement, to which Ehrenburg replied in effect that two could play at this game and that this was the Soviet answer in advance to any attempt to extend the "Darlan" policy to Europe.

I am not aware of the extent to which Ehrenburg may be reflecting the attitude of the Soviet Government. I am also not aware of the extent to which we and the British may have informed the Soviet authorities of our plans in respect to Italy, especially with reference to such matters as what regime we expect to function in Italy during the period of the military occupation and the manner in which and the degree to which we shall permit that regime to discharge govern-

⁴² Ilya Grigoryevich Ehrenburg, a Soviet literary figure and journalist.

⁴³ Henry Cassidy, Associated Press correspondent in Moscow.

⁴⁴ Office of War Information.

⁴⁵ Marshal Pietro Badoglio had succeeded Benito Mussolini as Prime Minister of Italy on July 25, 1943.

⁴⁶ For President Roosevelt's address broadcast from the White House on July 28, see Department of State *Bulletin*, July 31, 1943, p. 57.

⁴⁷ See memorandum of January 7 by Mr. Charles E. Bohlen, p. 497.

⁴⁸ Reichsmarshal Hermann Wilhelm Göring, designated successor to Hitler, Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe, President of the German Reichstag, etc.

mental and general administrative functions. I realize that there may be compelling reasons why we should desire to leave decision regarding such matters with the appropriate authorities of the countries whose armed forces are actually carrying on military operations in Italy. I have in mind also the fact that the Soviet Government has as yet declined to enter into general discussions on an overall basis as evidenced by Stalin's decision not to attend the Casablanca Conference. Nevertheless, I feel obliged to point out the great importance of everything feasible being done as the campaign in Italy progresses and as other military operations ensue to avert developments which would give the Soviet Government plausible ground for believing or affirming that a sufficiently cooperative attitude had not been shown toward the Soviet Government.

The communication to the Soviet Government of information in regard to our Government's plans and intentions is, of course, only one step in a possible program of coordination of policies and the Department and other agencies of the Government may have in mind additional steps toward that end.⁴⁹

I have no knowledge of the policies and procedure which our Government is following other than as reflected in the press and public statements. I am, therefore, making the foregoing comments in the dark. The British or the American Governments may already have established procedures for keeping the Soviet Government currently informed on the subject under discussion. If not, I feel that the most serious consideration should be given to establishing a procedure whereby such information will be promptly and currently communicated to the Soviet Government through me or through such channels as you and the President may deem most appropriate.

STANDLEY

701.0061/65 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, July 30, 1943—5 p. m.

[Received July 31—2:38 a. m.]

978. Foreign Office has just orally advised the Embassy that the Diplomatic Corps at Kuibyshev will return to Moscow within a month.

⁴⁹ For text of an *aide-mémoire* to be handed to Molotov setting forth the plans for an armistice with Italy and inviting comments from the Soviet Government, see telegram No. 637, August 3, 2 p. m., to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, vol. II, p. 344. For correspondence concerning the overthrow of the Fascist regime, and the surrender and recognition of Italy as a co-belligerent, see *ibid.*, pp. 314 ff.

When asked whether this decision was to be regarded as confidential until announced Embassy informed that Foreign Office was today advising the Diplomatic Corps.

STANDLEY

862.01/300 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Standley)*

WASHINGTON, July 30, 1943—10 p. m.

626. Reference your 925, July 23, 10 a. m. In view of the importance attached by the Department to the establishment of the Free Germany Committee⁵⁰ in Moscow and of the possible far-reaching repercussions from this move please keep the Department currently informed of any developments indicating the nature of Soviet interest in the Committee as well as of any indications that similar other European national groups have been or are being formed in the Soviet Union.

The following background information gives rise to the belief that perhaps the establishment of the Committee was not primarily and solely a move in psychological warfare and that it might be part of a concerted plan which the Soviet authorities have been building up for some time and is connected with the establishment of the Union of Polish Patriots,⁵¹ the dissolution of the Comintern, and other moves made or contemplated with regard to various European countries:

1. The paragraph in Stalin's Order of the Day of November 6, 1942⁵² in which he states that "we have no such task as the annihilation of every organized military force in Germany"⁵³ But the Hitlerite army can and must be destroyed."

2. An article in the New York *Daily Worker* of December 13, 1943 [1942] entitled "There is a Way Out", quoting a Moscow broadcast in the German language which was almost a paraphrase of the Free Germany manifesto of July 21, 1943. This article appealed to "all Germans from workers to noblemen, from the private to the general" to turn on the Hitlerites and bring about the salvation of Germany.

3. Reports which have appeared in Communist papers in this country in January and February 1943 of an alleged clandestine meeting in the Rhineland which also issued an appeal to Germans similar to

⁵⁰ In telegram No. 591, July 22, 9 p. m., the Department had already asked the Embassy for "all available information and comment" on this new development (862.01/318c).

⁵¹ The first congress of this organization of Communist-sympathetic Poles, sponsored by the Soviet Union, opened in Moscow on June 8, 1943, and exchanged letters with Stalin as reported in *Pravda*, June 17.

⁵² For comments on the speech by Stalin on this day, see telegram No. 438, November 8, 1942, from the Chargé in the Soviet Union, *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. III, p. 475.

⁵³ Omission indicated in the original telegram.

the Moscow manifesto. This Rhineland conference was reported only in Communist papers which maintained that they had heard of it through broadcasts from a secret German station.

4. Indications given by Stalin and other Soviet officials (i.e. Stalin's Order of the Day, May 1, 1943 ⁵⁴) emphasizing that they desire only the liquidation of Hitlerites, apparently meaning the closest collaborators of Hitler.

HULL

861.01/2273 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, August 2, 1943—3 p. m.
[Received August 3—11:07 a. m.]

999. Today on the occasion of the third anniversary of the formation of the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic a long article was published in *Pravda* which closely resembles those published on the anniversary of the entrance of the Baltic States in the Soviet Union (see my 916, July 22, 8 a. m.⁵⁵). The alleged terrible conditions in Bessarabia before its incorporation into the Moldavian Republic are compared with the prosperity brought to the region by Soviet rule. Greetings are addressed to Stalin and the Red army. The article ends with the words "Moldavia was and will be Soviet."

STANDLEY

701.0061/67 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, August 3, 1943—5 p. m.
[Received August 3—3:05 p. m.]

1010. My 978, July 30, 5 p. m. Present indications are that Soviet authorities will begin moving Diplomatic Corps back to Moscow within a few days. This development raises question of giving notice on two houses leased by Embassy in Kuibyshev; also question of desirability of leaving consular office there provided Soviet Government should give its assent. While have some doubt of advisability of bringing up question of consular representation at this time and in particular of the continued usefulness of office in Kuibyshev, the

⁵⁴ See telegram No. 388, May 2, 11 a. m., from the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, p. 519.

⁵⁵ Not printed, but see footnote 41, p. 534.

Department may wish to give consideration to this aspect of matter. Instructions are requested.⁵⁶

STANDLEY

862.01/330 : Telegram

The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

STOCKHOLM, August 4, 1943—8 p. m.

[Received August 5—2:56 a. m.]

2422. In a general talk this morning with Boheman⁵⁷ he mentioned formation in Moscow of a "Free German Committee". He said that speaking personally it seemed to him evident that Moscow does not share entirely views of Anglo-Saxon powers regarding future course to be pursued toward a defeated Germany. Boheman appears to regard formation of this Committee as having considerable significance. He inclines to opinion that Stalin does not want a military occupation of Germany either by Russia or by Anglo-Saxon powers or by all three and that he likewise does not want Germany to be reduced to anarchy but only wishes destruction of Hitler and Nazis. If this supposition is true he thinks motives may be various and suggested following as probable:

(a) That Stalin and his closest associates in high place in Russia would not desire a Communist Germany such as might result from anarchic conditions in that country in event of complete military and economic collapse, as a Communist Germany would inevitably become closely identified with Russia and due to superior German education, organizational ability and technical knowledge there might be strong tendency for shift of power from Moscow to Berlin. At least Berlin would be gravitational center in such a Communist union between the two countries that might offer a serious challenge to Kremlin's supremacy.

(b) He inclines to belief that Stalin does not want German industrial machinery completely destroyed as he would strongly desire an alternative to complete dependence on American industry for rehabilitation of Russia.

Boheman has always held strong anti-Nazi views and makes no attempt privately to conceal his satisfaction at military course of war. Future of Germany, however, and what may be Anglo-Saxon policy toward that country after defeat is a matter of great concern

⁵⁶ Mr. Charles E. Bohlen of the Division of European Affairs in a memorandum of August 11, indicated that it was unlikely that Soviet policy would permit the retention of a consular establishment at Kuibyshev. Such would be of doubtful usefulness in any event, because Kuibyshev was "neither a seaport, an industrial center nor one of the larger cities of the Soviet Union". He recommended the removal to Moscow of the entire Mission located in Kuibyshev. (701.0061/67) Instructions to this effect were sent to the Ambassador in telegram No. 698, August 16, 10 p. m. (125.0061/274).

⁵⁷ Erik Boheman, Secretary General of the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

and worry to him as it must be in fact to all responsible Swedes. Boheman said that speaking entirely personally he does not believe a prolonged military occupation of Germany if such should be the plan would have satisfactory results for us. He realizes enormous difficulty of German problem and of necessity if possible of avoiding Germany's becoming moving factor in a third world war but he does not believe there is any practical possibility through prolonged military occupation by Allies of educating German people to point where they would become reliable member of European society of nations or morally accept their defeat. Such an occupation in his view would eventually produce very result we would try to avoid. Boheman regards with apparent pessimism idea that any measures which may be taken toward defeated Germany would offer effective guarantee against ultimate resurgence of military spirit and desire for revenge. I suggested to him that we would probably be strong enough if necessary to take measures which would make impossible physical resurgence of Germany. Boheman fully realizes that fact, but said that measures necessary to effect such a result as that would be of a nature to cause Allied nations themselves to lose their own souls and would be completely incompatible with level of culture and idealism of Anglo-Saxon peoples. He evidently regards physical reduction of Germany to impotence either permanently or for indefinite period as a moral impossibility for Allied Powers.

JOHNSON

124.61/263 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, August 10, 1943—3 p. m.

[Received 9:15 p. m.]

1038. My number 1010, August 3, 5 p. m. Kuibyshev advises that office there will be closed August 14.⁵⁸

STANDLEY

740.0011 European War 1939/30635 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, August 10, 1943—7 p. m.

[Received August 11—10:11 a. m.]

1043. The campaign for a second front is now in full swing. The article published in *War and the Working Class* reported in the Em-

⁵⁸ All of the staff at Kuibyshev except one person, who was to come later, arrived in Moscow by special diplomatic train on August 16, 1943.

bassy's telegram No. 1027, August 6,⁵⁹ contains little that is new on this subject but the arguments are more bluntly stated than in the past. This is probably the strongest article on this subject that has yet appeared in the Soviet press.

The special communiqué of the Soviet Information Bureau published August 7 summarized the results of the recent fighting and concluded "The successful military operations of the Red army have chained to the Soviet-German front all the main forces of the Hitlerite army, deprived the German Command of the possibility of freely maneuvering its troops and thus have created even more favorable conditions for the development of active offensive military operations of our Allies on the Continent of Europe."

Pravda of August 8 carries a long article which draws a parallel between the situation now and that which existed in August 1918 and after stating that in the last war the enemy could have been defeated at least 6 or 7 months earlier the author writes: "The events of 1918 have much to teach us. The lessons of 1918 confirm that the choice of the most fortunate moment for striking the decisive blow at the enemy is of supreme importance. To delay means to permit the enemy to recover, to prolong the sufferings of millions of inhabitants of the occupied countries and to compel mankind to shed new torrents of blood when success can be attained with much less sacrifice."

In addition to the foregoing the Embassy has received reports that party speakers at political and factory meetings are taking an even stronger line than the press.

The Embassy has no possibility of determining the motives which actuate the Soviet Government in pressing this campaign. It must be admitted that it is not unreasonable to suppose that the Soviet Government believes that the invasion of the Continent of Europe is feasible and is sincere in the declaration of its conviction that the war can be ended this year by such invasion. In this connection General Martel, the head of the British Military Mission here, stated in conversation with a member of my staff on August 7 that in his opinion the Germans are stretched to the limit. He said that on the Orel-Kharkov front they had only one division in reserve and that although the Germans are fighting well he thought it possible that the war might end this year.

Although some weight must be given to the fact that the Soviet Government has always shown a predilection for conducting foreign affairs through the medium of the press the obvious disadvantages in this case make it unlikely that such a method would be used in the absence of very strong reasons therefor.

⁵⁹ Not printed; it summarized the article in *Pravda* of August 6 which had appeared in the August 1 issue of *War and the Working Class* (740.0011 European War 1939/30583).

While admitting that the Soviet Government may feel justified in believing that the time is now ripe for a second front, it is difficult to believe that it really thinks that by a press campaign it can cause the United States and Great Britain to change in any fundamental way military plans which presumably have already been determined. This is more true because of the abortive attempt of last year.

The second front campaign of 1942 was made against the background of the Red army reeling from the powerful blows it had received, the good faith of Britain and America not tested, Lend-Lease supplies slow in arriving and the shipping outlook black, the food situation grave and army and civilian morale shaken. The Soviet leaders would have been imprudent had they not taken all possible measures to prepare for disastrous reverses. Today the Soviet people are tired from the long strain of war but they are encouraged by the conviction of eventual victory and by the successes of the Red army. Military prospects are bright and the Soviet regime is internally probably more secure than at any time in its history. Such a press campaign is therefore less necessary both for political and for internal reasons than was the case last year and there is greater reason to believe that its motives are political.

Considered together with the tendency while giving publicity thereto to minimize the importance of Allied successes in Sicily and the unusual efforts to dramatize recent Soviet successes the second front campaign creates in the minds of the Soviet public and doubtless of many people abroad the impression that the United States and Great Britain are guilty of bad faith and that the Soviet Union is winning the war with little assistance from its Allies.⁹⁰ This had the advantage of shifting to the Allies the blame for the continuing burdens of the war. It also prepares the ground for a strong stand in the field of foreign policy. To the extent that people believe that the Soviet Union carried the major burden of winning the war and that the United States and Great Britain withheld assistance which they could have given, they will be the more inclined to support a claim that the Soviet Union should have the greatest voice in determining the peace. This may be of particular importance with respect to the population of the enemy-occupied territories.

Furthermore the United States and Great Britain have acquired a considerable amount of good will with the Soviet people for their assistance both in the form of military action and of supplies and food.

⁹⁰ In telegram No. 665, August 9, 6 p. m., the Department asked for full translation of portions of the article published in *Pravda* (see footnote 59, p. 561) which contained "Soviet accusations that Russia's allies have failed to live up to their obligations in regard to the opening of a second front". The Department further stated, "At this particular moment the press work of the Embassy is of extreme importance as it constitutes the most reliable source for such information regarding Soviet foreign and internal policies." (740.0011 European War 1939/30583)

This, together with the generally good press which we have had for some time, has created a situation in which the Soviet Government is to some extent committed to collaboration with us. Observers differ as to the extent to which the Soviet regime considers its own public opinion but there can be little doubt that in wartime it does exert considerable influence. If the implication of bad faith is believed the second front campaign will tend to offset this good will and restore to the Soviet Government its freedom of action. (It would, for example, strengthen the hands of the Soviet Government if it desired to resist any pressure from us for assistance against Japan after the defeat of Germany.)

It should be noted that even if the Soviet Government does in fact have political motives in conducting the second front campaign these may or may not be aggressive in intent. Conscious of its great power the Soviet Union may desire to achieve a position in Europe or elsewhere which its leaders realize will bring it into conflict with the United States and Great Britain or it may plan an eventual return to the program of world revolution. On the other hand there appears to be a deep-rooted suspicion of Great Britain and to a lesser extent of the United States and there are some indications that the Soviet leaders are alarmed and somewhat resentful at the closeness of Anglo-American collaboration while unwilling to engage in full collaboration themselves. Recent events have probably increased rather than diminished these suspicions. Thus the political motives of the Soviet Government in this campaign may be defensive.

In the Embassy's opinion, however, it is more likely that the Soviet Government has not yet determined its postwar policy and that to the extent that the second front campaign is a political move it is an effort of the Soviet Government with its habitual realism to prepare itself for any eventuality.

STANDLEY

861.001/11 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, August 13, 1943—1 p. m.

[Received 8:33 p. m.]

1075. Stalin appeared last night ⁶¹ to be in excellent condition bronzed, rested, alert and vigorous. He stated that he expected soon to return to the front where he said he preferred to be since he could be out in the open and was not obliged to sit in office all day. He was in fine humor and conversed amicably about conditions on Russian

⁶¹ Night of August 11-12.

and Sicilian fronts. He stated that Kharkov would probably be taken in a few days; however the Germans were fighting fiercely and refused to surrender or to give up uncontested even a foot of territory. I pointed out in addition to the Germans we were faced by a similar type of enemy in the Pacific and referred to recent radio reports of the fighting at Buna where the Japanese preferred death to surrender. The British Ambassador also compared the fighting at Catania to conditions at Kharkov described by Stalin. Stalin appeared to be fairly well informed of the Sicilian operations and aware of their magnitude. He made no mention of second front. I showed him some excellent OWI photos of the Ploesti raid⁶² which have just been received and he seem[ed] to be impressed with the importance of this operation.

STANDLEY

701.6111/1202: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, August 16, 1943—8 p. m.

[Received 9:10 p. m.]

1098. For the President and the Secretary. Molotov requested me to call this evening. He stated that the Soviet Government had decided to retain Litvinov in Moscow where his services were urgently needed as Assistant Commissar for Foreign Affairs.⁶³ I stated that Litvinov would be missed in Washington, that I felt sure my Government would regret his recall but that I fully realized the need for his services here.

Molotov then stated that the Soviet Government desired to appoint Andrei Gromyko the present Soviet Chargé d'Affaires as Ambassador and requested me to obtain the agreement of my Government. He said that Gromyko had been twice in charge of the Soviet Embassy in Washington, that he had ably fulfilled his duties and that the Soviet Government felt sure that he would fulfill his functions as Ambassador satisfactorily.⁶⁴ Molotov promised to furnish me with

⁶² A raid on the oil fields at Ploesti, Rumania, by 175 airplanes occurred on August 1.

⁶³ Likewise the Soviet Ambassador to the United Kingdom (Maisky) was to be retained in Moscow, and his appointment as an Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs had been announced in the Soviet press on July 28. He was to be replaced as Ambassador by the young and inexperienced Fedor Tarasovich Gousev, but Molotov had explained to the British that, because of a shortage of senior officials, "they would have to nominate as Ambassador the best of the junior material that was coming along in the Soviet Foreign Office, and from that angle had selected Mr. Gousev." (701.6141/45)

⁶⁴ In telegram No. 721, August 20, 1 p. m., Ambassador Standley was instructed to inform Molotov that the appointment of Gromyko as Soviet Ambassador to the United States would be "entirely acceptable to this Government." (701.6111/-1205)

a biography of Gromyko which I shall transmit as soon as it is received.⁶⁵

STANDLEY

740.0011 European War 1939/30817 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, August 21, 1943—noon.

[Received August 22—noon.]

1134. I visited Stalingrad yesterday with various members of my staff. My party was met at the airfield by the mayor of city and high local and military authorities who personally conducted us through the razed city and explained the outstanding points of interest. The majority of municipal buildings, dwellings, means of communications were in general, reduced to piles of rubble, the Stalingrad tractor (tank) factory was completely ruined, in fact the city was in far worse condition than I had expected to find it and it is hard to believe that it will be possible to rebuild it at least at present rate for many years. Reconstruction and rehabilitation had been initiated but I was not impressed at progress made except in clearing streets. Very little attempt had been made to house the population which now numbers 200,000 and suffering will surely be great this coming winter. There appeared to be sufficient foodstuffs in city and I was told that considerable quantities of American supplies had been sent there. I saw one truck filled with crates of American canned meat products.

An informal lunch had been arranged at which toast[s] were offered to the President, Churchill and Stalin, American people and Soviet-American friendship and collaboration now and after war. Atmosphere of entire visit was very friendly and I sensed feeling of real appreciation of our contributions of foodstuffs and other supplies to the population. The American Army and military successes in Sicily were toasted, no reference made to second front.

I was deeply impressed at what I saw in heroic city which in my mind will always remain as a testimonial of courage and unflinching tenacity in face of terrible sufferings and hardships, of the Russian Army and people in their war against German invaders.

Dr. Michael⁶⁶ remained in Stalingrad where he hopes to make extended tour of area and return by train.

STANDLEY

⁶⁵ This information was transmitted in telegram No. 1104, August 17, 4 p. m., from the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, not printed.

⁶⁶ Louis G. Michael, Agricultural Attaché of the American Embassy in the Soviet Union.

740.0011 B.W. 1939/30906 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, August 27, 1943—7 p. m.

[Received August 28—1:05 a. m.]

1203. Following information was obtained by a reliable source from two different Soviet individuals who have been at the central front, one in German occupied territory for a considerable period, the other in an emergency field hospital directly behind the lines. The two do not know each other and the main points developed in following text were stated by both in conversations separately.

1. Virtually none but American automotive equipment (trucks and jeeps) seen at front in use by Red army.

2. A very large part of the food being supplied to Soviet troops at front is of American origin. American food is also being used to feed the hungry populace in newly reconquered territory at least for emergency rations.

3. It is stated by both informants that there is no question in the minds of the soldiers and others at the front and of those emerging from German control that American help to the Soviet Union is substantial.

4. In the German occupied area there is much methodical killing of the populace by the German forces often for reasons which the Russian people do not understand unless it is for pure ruthlessness. The killings are explained by the Germans [and?] the reasons given are: (1) cooperation with guerrillas; (2) Jewish blood; (3) past connections with the Communist Party or with the Soviet Government; (4) families of soldiers fighting in the Soviet armed forces. Killings are especially great when Germans are about to evacuate an area at which time they leave special troops to defend the area to the last minute. In carrying out executions of persons and last minute destruction of property these special German forces in many cases lose their own lives.

5. Russians observe that Germans are exceedingly well disciplined and that there are practically no traitors among them, a fact which Russians recognize as an exceedingly effective phase of the Hitlerite system. On the other hand, in German occupied regions there are numbers of Russian traitors among whom surprisingly are some young people brought up under the Soviet system.

6. When Soviets reconquer a region they conduct a rather extensive purge of such traitors.⁶⁷ Hence, as a result of killing during military operations, killings by Germans during occupation and purges by

⁶⁷ See pp. 845 ff.

Soviets on reconquering areas considerable numbers of the populace are wiped out.

7. There was some treachery in the Red army in first part of war. Several high ranking officers surrendered their regiments to the Germans needlessly. One Russian Colonel Namiw [*sic*] Vlasov⁶⁸ has organized a Russian army in the German occupied territory to fight against Soviets. It consists mostly of Ukrainians. This army is now actively fighting on the German side and prisoners from it have been taken by Red army. Its troops wear a German uniform with a special star insignia.

8. One of the two individuals mentioned above reports seeing in German occupied territory one of the lethal chambers or death wagons, news of which has appeared several times in Soviet press. Consists of motor truck with enclosed body into which exhaust fumes are turned asphyxiating victims during transport to place of burial.

STANDLEY

740.0011 European War 1939/30916 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, August 28, 1943—11 a. m.

[Received August 30—9:37 a. m.]

1208. For Secretary and the President. Reference Stalin's messages to the President dated August 22⁶⁹ and 24.⁷⁰ It is my judgement that the proposal (to create a military-political commission of representatives of the three countries—the USA, Great Britain and the USSR—for the consideration of questions regarding negotiations with governments falling out with Germany) and to meet in Sicily should be accepted and motivated at once. The agitation for a second front in Europe which originated with the communiqué⁷¹ issued in Washington after the visit of Mr. Molotov in June of last year⁷² has continued in a more or less virulent form ever since and while in recent months I have heard no references to the second front from the officials with whom I have been thrown in contact, the press continues to refer to the second front and to the fact that because of the lack of a

⁶⁸ Lt. Gen. Andrey Andreyevich Vlasov had fought against the Germans around Kiev, Moscow, and Leningrad before his army was surrounded on the Volkhov front. After hiding awhile in forests, he surrendered to the Germans in August 1942. His outlook had become strongly anti-Stalinist and pro-Russian nationalist, and the Germans began to make use of him in 1943, but not with full effectiveness because of an indecisive and inconsistent policy.

⁶⁹ Vol. II, p. 353.

⁷⁰ Portions of this message are printed in vol. I, pp. 782 and 783.

⁷¹ See press release issued by the White House on June 11, 1942, *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. III, p. 593.

⁷² For correspondence concerning negotiations on the occasion of the visit of Mr. Molotov in Washington (May 29–June 4, 1942), see *ibid.*, pp. 566–593, *passim*.

second front the Red army is suffering unnecessary losses. I hear from all sides reports that the civilians are still echoing the old song about the second front. For some time there have also been critical statements in press and criticisms from the general public of the fact that Soviet Russia has not been brought into the various conferences which have been held by Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill. There has been an obvious ignoring or playing down of the importance, to the Russian operations, of the bombing of industries in Germany and France and other occupied countries, and of campaigns in North Africa and Sicily. All of these happenings have led to a rather unanimous belief among the press and the representatives of other foreign countries here that Anglo-American relations with Soviet Union here are steadily deteriorating. Although Mr. Molotov in making the announcement of the recall of Maisky and Litvinov emphasized fact that their recall was necessitated by the need for their advice in Moscow and that there was a dearth in the Soviet headquarters of advisers who had their breadth of knowledge and experience which would qualify them to advise Premier Stalin in his relations with the USA and the British Empire, the press and foreign representatives are still of opinion and belief that this action on part of the Soviet Government was a confirmation of the deterioration of Soviet-Anglo-American relations. It is my opinion that estimates of the deterioration of Soviet-Anglo-American relations are all wrong and there is a trend and an indication that the Soviet Government desires discussions but it is obvious that before collaboration can be had discussions must be entered into. I believe that recall of Maisky and Litvinov indicates an intent on the part of Soviet Government to engage in these pre-postwar discussions and that their presence here in Moscow will be to the advantage of Allied cause. It is my opinion that prompt acceptance of the proposal to set up this committee will have the effect of counteracting the various rumors and beliefs based on these rumors and will go a long way toward assuring Soviet authorities that we are really serious in our desire to have them cooperate and collaborate with us.

Furthermore it will assure the Soviets that we seek and want their assistance in the various conferences which must and will be held in connection with the settlement and construction of the occupied countries of Europe and will obviate the possibility of the Soviets setting up backfire committees in Moscow.

STANDLEY

701.6111/1207 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, August 29, 1943—2 p. m.

[Received August 30—5:25 a. m.]

1219. I was requested to call at Foreign Office last evening to discuss the question of the transmission of credentials to Gromyko. Vyshinski stated that in view of the unfavorable time factor the Soviet Government proposed following course:

(1)—The original signed credentials would be presented to me.

(2)—The Embassy would telegraph a true reading thereof to Department with a statement that they had been presented and verified.

(3)—The Foreign Office would telegraph a true reading to Gromyko who would present a copy thereof to the President. This copy, if so desired, could be compared with the text sent by the Embassy. On the basis of this copy Gromyko's status as Ambassador would be accepted.

(4)—The Embassy would send the signed copy to the Department by the air mail.

Before taking the proposed action Vyshinski stated that the Foreign Office desire to obtain the Department's approval. I said that I would advise the Department immediately of our conversation and request instructions.⁷³

I took occasion to impress upon Vyshinski that if the Soviet Government had shown more cooperation to establish regular and expeditious air communications between Moscow and Washington present matter would not have arisen. I added that I would do all I could to help in this particular matter.⁷⁴

STANDLEY

⁷³ In telegram No. 769, August 30, 7 p. m., the Department declared that it had no objection to this suggested procedure.

⁷⁴ Letters of credence for Andrey Andreyevich Gromyko, and letters of recall for Litvinov, dated September 7, were telegraphed by Ambassador Standley on the following day; the original letters reached the Department on October 8. Gromyko presented his copies of the letters to President Roosevelt at 12:45 p. m. on October 4.

711.61/912a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Standley)*

WASHINGTON, August 30, 1943—11 p. m.

773. In connection with press reports of Mr. Welles' resignation as Under Secretary,⁷⁵ there has been in certain newspapers here an attempt to attribute his resignation to a difference in opinion on policy in regard to the Soviet Union. This campaign has charged the Department of State with anti-Soviet views and has culminated in Drew Pearson's column in the *Washington Post*⁷⁶ which asserted that if Mr. Welles left there would be no one in the State Department who was sincerely interested in the development of good relations with the Soviet Union.

In view of the obviously harmful nature of such deliberately false statements, I took occasion on August 27 during a call by the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires to draw his attention to the Pearson article. I said that while, of course, the utter untruth of such statements was well known to the officials of both our Governments, nevertheless they might have an injurious effect upon the attitude of uninformed persons in the United States, in the Soviet Union and in other countries where they might be circulated. I added that deliberately false statements of this character would be sure to be seized upon by our enemies and broadcast widely throughout Europe for the purpose of arousing misunderstanding and suspicion between our countries. I referred to my statement at the press conference on that day which you will have seen in the radio bulletin concerning the pernicious effect of this type of false publicity which was little more than the lending of aid and comfort to the enemy. I told the Chargé d'Affaires that I knew that the officials of both our Governments who were working together so wholeheartedly in the prosecution of the war will use every opportunity to expose and correct all such malicious and harmful untruths as were contained in the Pearson article which would only be designed to create suspicion and disturb the friendly relations between our two countries.

Mr. Gromyko showed himself to be in sympathy with the tenure [*tenor*] of my remarks and readily agreed with me that our two Governments should make every effort to expose and correct false and infamous statements designed to injure our relations. He also agreed with my statement that the officials of both our Governments, and

⁷⁵ Formal announcement of the resignation of Sumner Welles was not made by the White House to the press until September 25 (see Department of State Bulletin, September 25, 1943, p. 208), although his resignation, together with an explanatory letter, was submitted to the President on August 16. An account of the circumstances of the resignation is presented in *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, vol. II, pp. 1227-1231, 1256.

⁷⁶ Issue for August 27, 1943.

particularly those handling foreign affairs, are doing everything possible to promote and preserve the cordial and friendly relations now existing between our two countries and to continue on the basis of the fullest cooperation in the prosecution of the war.

I hope you will find occasion during your conversations with Soviet officials, and in particular with Molotov, to discuss this question along the above lines.⁷⁷

For your information, in view of the continuance of false and harmful statements regarding Soviet-American relations in certain sections of the press, at my press conference today I authorized the following statement for direct quotation :

"I do not ordinarily take notice of attacks made either on the State Department or myself. When these attacks, however, concern our relations with an Allied government, I must take notice of them. I am informed that recently Drew Pearson published over the radio and in the press the charge that I and other high officials in the State Department are opposed to the Soviet Government and that we actually wish the Soviet Union to be bled white. I desire to brand these statements as monstrous and diabolical falsehoods."

I referred the attention of the correspondents to a statement I had made last Friday⁷⁸ to the generally harmful and destructive effect of malicious and untrue statements concerning the relations of this Government with our Allies and said that I had hoped that that general observation would be heeded by the few commentators and correspondents who were inclined to overlook the harm done to our foreign relations by such statements.

HULL

862.01/379 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, September 1, 1943—noon.
[Received September 4—8:10 p. m.]

1240. A careful study of the precedings [*proceedings*] of the Free Germany conference held in Moscow July 12 and 13 which were reported *in extenso* in my telegrams numbers 1009, August 3, 1099, August 17, 1191, August 27, and 1212, August 27 [28],⁷⁹ reveals that the basic appeal of conference is overthrow Hitler government and end war and thereby save Germany as a strong free State. This thread runs through all speeches. The propaganda approach extremely effec-

⁷⁷ Ambassador Standley had an opportunity on September 7 to discuss the content of this telegram with Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Vyshinsky.

⁷⁸ August 27.

⁷⁹ None printed.

tive the outlook for German victory hopeless; unless Hitler's leadership is repudiated and regime overthrown, the outlook for Germany is likewise hopeless. But if Hitler and the Nazis are abandoned there is promise of a new free democratic Germany supported by force of repentant and converted but not disarmed army. Choice of speakers at conference excellent; spokesmen for all groups about whom a serious resistance movement might grow up participated—labor, middle class, church and army. Nazi ideology in all its phases was dissected and its basic tenets condemned and rejected; barrenness of Hitler's promises ascribed in stirring language. No doubt was left that this movement rejected Nazi and Fascist concepts in their entirety.

Available evidence does not indicate degree to which the movement has been fostered by Soviet Government. It is intimated in Soviet press that impulse came from groups of German prisoners of war. In any event plans for convening conference were made by Erich Weinert an acknowledged Communist. Soviet Government facilitated the holding of conference at Moscow and had given considerable publicity to the proceedings both in Soviet press and on the screen. Therefore appears reasonable to conclude that position taken by conference represents the present Soviet attitude toward post-war role of Germany.

It is conceivable of course that Soviet Government is merely exploiting Committee for propaganda purposes to weaken German resistance and hasten Germany's collapse and that its ideas about post-war Germany are entirely at variance with those expressed at that conference. Notwithstanding its apparent sponsorship of movement Soviet Government has not committed itself in any way to program or given the movement official support.

There is nothing in conference proceedings to indicate the movement is nucleus for post-war regime in Germany or that any of members of Committee are men of sufficient stature to form or participate in post-war government.

It may be significant as an indication of Soviet policy toward Germany that two of the avowed Communists at conference Pieck and Bredel⁸⁰ emphasized that a free and independent Germany could exist only if German people disassociate from Hitler before end of war and that if they clung to Nazis tend [*to the end?*] the results would be catastrophic and military occupation for long time would ensue.

Basic weakness in propaganda appeal of National Committee was probably correctly stated by Count von Einsiedel: Fact that Com-

⁸⁰ Willy Bredel, German Communist from 1920, with varied career, a propaganda specialist among German prisoners of war in the Soviet Union and a radio commentator in Moscow in 1943.

mittee was organized and is operating in Soviet Union. This permits German propaganda to play on all the prejudices, fears, hatred of bolshevism and bolshevization of Germany which it has carefully cultivated for a decade. Many Germans will feel even without promptings of German propaganda that Committee can only be tool in hands of Soviets.

Yet program for Free Germany which is set forth in manifesto and was enlarged upon by the speakers at conference contains much that can command support both in Germany [and] among United Nations. It incorporates four freedoms and closely follows many principles of Atlantic Charter.⁸¹ Questionable and controversial proposals were introduced by some speakers, such as plan for preserving Wehrmacht intact as a fighting force and dream of new Germany which would be strong and powerful. These concepts will probably have high propaganda value in Germany and in Wehrmacht but run counter to views held by some United Nations.

Embassy is not aware whether any efforts have been made to create similar movement among German prisoners and refugees in United States and Great Britain. Fostering of collaboration between Free Germany Committee in USA, Britain and Russia, in absence of basic agreement between these countries on their general policy toward Germany would of course be dangerous politically. At present time Free Germany Committee here has in Embassy's opinion perhaps chiefly propaganda value. If it were supported by association with similar movements in Britain and America, however, it might attain greater stature and significance than it now has.

While Soviet officials have not mentioned the matter to me there are indications that Soviet Government was surprised by violent reaction in British and particularly the American press to the announcement of Committee's formation. It apparently sees in this reaction evidence of strong undercurrent of anti-Soviet feeling in U.S.A. and Britain and indication that we do not fully recognize legitimate Soviet interests in European affairs and perhaps desire to exclude Russia so far as possible from European settlement. In these circumstances we have choice of at least three possible attitudes toward Free Germany Committee:

1. We may oppose Committee. We could officially ignore its existence and allow the Soviet Government to assume that our Government approves the position taken in American press. We could as a Government actively indicate our displeasure at the formation of Committee and its activities. We might be successful in our opposition; if not we would have permitted Soviets to take more active steps than any other Government has so far taken in organizing resistance movement in Germany. This would tend to strengthen Soviet posi-

⁸¹ Joint statement by President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Churchill, August 14, 1941, *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, p. 367.

tion in any subsequent discussions regarding Germany and its future. This course would mean there had arisen in relations between Soviet Union and U.S.A. a cause of disagreement.

2. A second course of action which our Government might adopt would be to sponsor formation of a comparable organization of German prisoners or refugees in U.S.A. to cooperate with Moscow Committee. This policy would be open to objections previously stated unless there were first worked between the U.S.A. and Soviet Union agreement as to basic policy toward Germany.

3. Third course which our Government [might] adopt would be to endeavor for propaganda purposes to select and sponsor a contribution to common war cause parts of Committee's programs as we can accept.

The Embassy has not overlooked possibility that in permitting formation of Free Germany Committee Soviet Government may have been motivated by considerations mentioned my 925 of July 23, 10 a. m. Notwithstanding the possible undesirable political implications however I feel that we should examine carefully any possibilities which the movement may offer toward weakening resistance in Germany hastening collapse of Nazi regime and shortening war. I therefore suggest that serious consideration be given to ways and means for realizing from the U.S.A. and Great Britain those aspects of propaganda appeal of Free Germany Committee which our Government can support, while taking precautions to ensure against acquisition be [by] Committee of undesirable political stature. I suggest that effect of common appeal from Germans in U.S.A., Britain and Soviet Union on morale of German Army and fear might be very considerable. At same time such move might open further avenue to closer cooperation with the Soviet Government in laying the foundations for the post-war world.

STANDLEY

123 Standley, William H./168: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, September 2, 1943—5 p. m.

[Received September 2—1:05 p. m.]

1254. Personal for the Secretary. Reference my letter to you of May 3,⁸² enclosing a copy of a letter to the President.⁸³ As you are doubtless aware, the President wrote me some time ago signifying his assent that I return home this fall, not to return to Moscow. I would, therefore, appreciate it if you cause appropriate instructions to be issued to me so that I may return to Washington leaving here early in October. You may wish to recall me for consultation and

⁸² Not printed.

⁸³ *Ante*, p. 521.

to announce my resignation at a later date. On the other hand, you may desire to make public my resignation before my departure from Moscow. I shall leave this decision with you and the President and whatever course you may decide to take will be entirely acceptable to me.

As stated in my letter to you, I desire to have Secretary Page⁸⁴ return to Washington with me and I would appreciate it if appropriate travel instructions were also issued to him.

STANDLEY

862.01/379

*Memorandum by Mr. Charles E. Bohlen, Assistant Chief of the
Division of European Affairs*⁸⁵

[WASHINGTON,] September 7, 1943.

The recommendations as to possible courses of action which we might adopt in connection with the establishment of the Free German Committee in Moscow outlined by Admiral Standley in the attached telegram⁸⁶ in effect contain their own answer when he says that in the absence of any basic agreement on the policy of the Soviet Government it would be dangerous politically at the present time to encourage similar movements among German prisoners in the United States and Great Britain. I believe this applies to all of the recommendations.

In the absence of an agreement on general policy towards Germany with the Soviet Government it would be highly undesirable for us to take any official notice either for or against the Committee in Moscow. If and when a three power meeting on the foreign minister level occurs an opportunity will be presented to endeavor to work out some common understanding in regard to Germany which would permit consideration of the points raised in Admiral Standley's telegram. Until we find out whether or not we can reach such an understanding we should not, in my opinion, take any official action in regard to the establishment of the Free German Committee in Moscow.

As you are aware the significance and possible effect of this Committee has received extensive study not only in the Department but in other branches of the Government as well.

C. E. BOHLEN

⁸⁴ Edward Page, Jr., Second Secretary of Embassy.

⁸⁵ Addressed to H. Freeman Matthews, Chief of the Division of European Affairs, and to James C. Dunn, Adviser on Political Relations. On September 13 Mr. Dunn made the following notation in the margin: "I agree with this memo. Please hold for the delegation to the Tripartite Conf."

⁸⁶ Telegram No. 1240, September 1, noon, p. 571.

740.0011 European War 1939/31055 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, September 7, 1943—midnight.

[Received September 8—3:45 p. m.]

1293. During a call which Hamilton⁸⁷ made on the Belgian Ambassador⁸⁸ on September 3 the Belgian Ambassador made the following comments:

The Soviet Government is endeavoring to create the impression in the minds of the peoples of Europe and in the minds of the American and British peoples that the Soviet Union is chiefly responsible for the defeat of Hitlerism and that the Soviet Union is the leader in championing liberation of the countries now oppressed by Nazi occupation. Toward creating such an impression the Soviet Government is utilizing the second front theme with its consistent emphasis on the fact that the Soviet armies are engaging and containing the greater part of the German armies. It is also utilizing the difference between the recognition afforded by the American and British Governments to the French Committee of National Liberation and the less conditional recognition accorded by the Soviet Government. The Belgian Ambassador does not regard Soviet propaganda and the fact that they are engaging in such propaganda as matters of importance. He emphasized, however, that if such propaganda should be successful in causing the oppressed peoples of Europe and especially the British and American peoples to adopt what he called an "inferiority attitude" toward the Soviet Union that would be a serious matter. When questioned as to what he meant by an inferiority attitude the Ambassador stated that he meant an attitude of attributing to the Soviet Government a greater responsibility for the defeat of Hitlerism than all of the facts of the case warranted. He said that all the facts of the case included items such as the conclusion by the Soviet Union with Germany of a non-Aggression Pact in 1939 and the significance of that action to the outbreak of the war; the fact that the British, the French, the Belgians and other governments had substantial armies in the western part of Europe for many months and that during that period the Soviet Union did not open a second front against Germany. The Ambassador referred also to the adverse effect on the German military situation of the North African campaign, the Italian campaign and the Allied bombing of German

⁸⁷ Maxwell M. Hamilton, Counselor of Embassy in the Soviet Union, with the rank of Minister.

⁸⁸ Victor Robert van den Kerchove.

military and industrial centers all of which has a beneficial effect upon the Soviet military position. He spoke appreciatively of what he termed the solid facts embodied in Prime Minister Churchill's recent Quebec address and said that some of the real facts in the situation were handled very well in that speech. The Ambassador emphasized his view that it was important that the American and British peoples and governments not acquire an inferiority attitude toward the Soviet Government. When asked whether he thought there was danger of such a development in the U.S., Hamilton replied in the negative. Hamilton said that the American Government and the American people believed wholeheartedly in making every reasonable and practicable effort toward bringing about greater collaboration with the Soviet Union. The Ambassador expressed concurrence in this attitude. When he pressed again the question of possible adoption by the American people of an attitude of inferiority or of attributing to the Soviet Union a greater measure of success for the defeat of Nazism than was warranted or of blaming their own Government for not having done more in the way of meeting Soviet desires than it had done Hamilton commented that while the American people liked to criticize their own Government and in fact some of them rather enjoyed hearing foreigners criticize it, the American people when given the facts as they are in addresses such as those of the British Prime Minister and of the President, and when they saw evidences which are constantly being given them that their Government is endeavoring in good faith and with sincerity to collaborate with the Soviet Union, can be counted upon without any question to see the whole situation in proper perspective.

STANDLEY

123 Standley, William H./170 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, September 8, 1943.

[Received September 9—10:30 a. m.]

1306. At request of Columbia Broadcasting System correspondent in Moscow, I will make following statement tonight, if arrangements can be made here:

"We Americans here in Moscow got a great thrill tonight as we watched the rockets announcing the splendid Soviet victory of Stalino⁸⁹—particularly when we realized that this celebration coin-

⁸⁹ Stalino, 13 other cities, and the complete liberation of the Donets Basin received 20 salvoes from 224 guns in Moscow on September 8.

cided with the announcement of the armistice in Italy. It must be a source of great gratification to free men everywhere to know that the forces fighting for freedom and liberty are gaining successes from every direction and that these efforts are going forward with increasing momentum. I know that I speak for you my fellow countrymen when I extend my congratulations to the Red army for their great victory in the Don Basin. I know that I speak for the Russian people in extending congratulations to the men of the Allied forces whose sacrifices and skill have resulted in the complete surrender of Italy.⁹⁰ A victory for one of the United Nations is a victory for all the United Nations."

STANDLEY

093.612/21d

The Secretary of State to the Chargé of the Soviet Union (Gromyko)

WASHINGTON, September 9, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES: I have received your very courteous note of September 6, 1943⁹¹ informing me that as a token of friendship between the peoples of the United States and the Soviet Union the Soviet Government desires to award certain orders and medals to outstanding representatives of the Armed Forces and Merchant Marine of the United States. You ask whether the proposal is acceptable to this Government.

In reply I wish to express the appreciation of my Government for this most friendly gesture and state that the matter has been submitted to the appropriate military authorities for their approval. I look forward to communicating to you their reply in the very near future.

Sincerely yours,

CORDELL HULL

811.51/6246a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley)

WASHINGTON, September 11, 1943—11 p. m.

836. The Secretary of the Treasury⁹² today made a request through the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires here that some fairly well-known official

⁹⁰ On the next day, in telegram No. 1319, Ambassador Standley drew attention to the relatively little space in the Soviet press on the capitulation of Italy, where the emphasis was very heavy on the Soviet contribution to it: "The basic conditions for the collapse of Italy were created by the heavy Italian and German losses on the Russian front which facilitated the Allied North African victories." (740.0011 European War 1939/31092)

⁹¹ Not printed.

⁹² Henry Morgenthau, Jr.

of the Soviet Government meet Mr. Morgenthau at Fairbanks, Alaska, and make a statement for use by the Secretary of the Treasury in connection with the present war bond campaign in the United States. Mr. Morgenthau requested that this statement express the interest of the people in Russia in the production of war equipment for use in the offensive against Germany and indicate the necessity for Americans and all peoples of the United Nations to buy war bonds to provide funds for the production of more equipment for this purpose.

The Secretary of the Treasury has asked that you be informed that he has made this request through the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires here. Mr. Morgenthau in connection with the war bond campaign will be on the Pacific Coast within a few days and could easily arrange to fly to Fairbanks to meet the Soviet official for the purpose indicated above.

HULL

123 Standley, William H./181 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Standley)*

WASHINGTON, September 15, 1943—7 p. m.

854. Personal for the Ambassador. Department's 811, September 9 [8], 9 [7] p. m.⁹³ The President has asked me to tell you that he believes it would be extremely valuable for the American delegation to the Three-Power Conference, which is to open in Moscow in early October, to have the benefit of your advice before its departure from the United States. You are, therefore, requested to return home at the earliest practicable moment.⁹⁴ Please inform the Department as soon as possible of the exact date of your departure in order that an appointment might be made concerning your resignation and the appointment of your successor. In the light of your 1329, September 11, 10 a. m.,⁹⁵ Page will be instructed to accompany you to the United States.

HULL

⁹³ Not printed; it informed the Ambassador that President Roosevelt had approved his departure from Moscow early in October (123 Standley, William H./172).

⁹⁴ Ambassador Standley relinquished charge of the Embassy and, accompanied by Mr. Page, left by airplane on the morning of September 18 for Washington by way of Tehran. He began his conferences upon his return with a visit to the Secretary of State on September 25.

⁹⁵ Not printed; in this telegram the Ambassador explained the desirability of having Mr. Page return temporarily for the "real assistance" he would be "in making my reports to the Department and to the President." (123 Standley, William H./173)

862.01/407 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Hamilton) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, September 21, 1943—midnight.

[Received September 22—10:52 a. m.]

1428. The formation of the Union of German Officers and its adherence to the Free German[y] National Committee should materially increase the effect of the propaganda directed by the Committee to the German Army and the German people.⁹⁶ The Committee as constituted in July contained no officer above the rank of major. The formation of the Union of German Officers, the acceptance by this organization of the program of the National Committee and the inclusion of several high ranking officers in the Executive Committee of the Free German Movement should tend to remove much of the doubt concerning the sincerity and independence of the Committee which undoubtedly existed at the time of its formation in the minds of the soldiers and particularly of the officers of the German Army and thereby increase opposition to the Nazi regime within the ranks of the Wehrmacht.

The Embassy yesterday brought to the attention of the Foreign Office the fact that the 10 issues of *Free Germany* have now appeared and again requested that they be supplied to the Embassy regularly. The Chief of the American Section of the Foreign Office stated that he would endeavor to supply copies of the publications to the Embassy more promptly in the future.

HAMILTON

811.51/6269a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union (Hamilton)

WASHINGTON, September 22, 1943—7 p. m.

890. From Secretary Morgenthau for Marshal Stalin. Please accept my grateful thanks for your message to the American people on the subject of war bonds which was read today over the American radio by General Belaeu.⁹⁷ It will, I am sure, bring home to every-

⁹⁶ A meeting had been held near Moscow on September 11 and 12, 1943, attended by more than 100 delegates from five officers' prison camps, who founded the Union of German Officers and decided to adhere to the program of the Free Germany National Committee. General of Artillery Walter von Seydlitz, commander of the 51st Army Corps, was elected unanimously as President. On the 14th, the membership of the Free Germany National Committee was increased by the addition of nine members from the Union of German Officers, and the Executive Committee was enlarged by the inclusion of three members from the Union.

⁹⁷ Maj. Gen. Alexander Ivanovich Belyayev was Chairman of the Soviet Purchasing Commission in the United States. Stalin's message was published in the *New York Times*, September 23, 1943, p. 1, col. 2.

one in this country the importance of wholehearted support of those measures necessary adequately to finance the arms and munitions with which the victory of our United Nations is to be achieved. [Morgenthau.]

HULL

123 Harriman, W. Averell/26 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Hamilton) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, September 30, 1943—4 p. m.

[Received 8:49 p. m.]

1502. Personal for the Secretary. Your 904, September 25, 3 p. m.⁹⁸ Vyshinski called me to the Foreign Office this afternoon and asked me to inform the President that the appointment of Mr. Harriman as American Ambassador to the Soviet Union is acceptable to the Soviet Government, that the Soviet Government welcomes the appointment and that the Soviet Government will be glad to see Mr. Harriman as Ambassador.⁹⁹

HAMILTON

123 Standley, William H./192

President Roosevelt to the Ambassador to the Soviet Union
(Standley)¹

WASHINGTON, October 1, 1943.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL: It is with real regret that I accept your resignation as Ambassador to the Soviet Union. During your term of office, as well as during your distinguished naval career, you have rendered valuable service to your country and I feel that you have greatly contributed to the cause for which we are fighting and also to the high purpose which led you to accept the position as Ambassador, namely, full and friendly cooperation and understanding between your country and the Soviet Union now and after the war.

⁹⁸ Not printed; it advised that the President desired to know whether the appointment of W. Averell Harriman as American Ambassador to the Soviet Union would be acceptable to the Soviet Government (123 Standley, William H./194).

⁹⁹ The United States Senate confirmed the nomination of Mr. Harriman as Ambassador on October 7. On October 23, he presented his letters of credence to Kalinin and assumed charge of the Embassy. In a letter from London, July 5, to President Roosevelt, he had declared: "As you know, I am a confirmed optimist in our relations with Russia because of my conviction that Stalin wants, if obtainable, a firm understanding with you and America more than anything else—after the destruction of Hitler. He sees Russia's reconstruction and security more soundly based on it than on any alternative. He is a man of simple purposes and, although he may use devious means in attempting to accomplish them, he does not deviate from his long run objectives."

¹ Ambassador Standley was in Washington at this time, making his final reports.

I know that you are always ready to serve your country and to make any sacrifice for it. Your willingness to accept the post of Ambassador to the Soviet Union after having so loyally served your country for over half a century is witness to that. However, in view of the personal considerations set forth in your letter of resignation I do not feel that I can place any obstacle in the way of your wishes to retire.

In accepting your resignation, I want you to know how deeply appreciative I am of the faithful and valued services you have rendered your country and on your personal loyalty to me.

With kindest regards,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

851.01/3038 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Hamilton) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, October 5, 1943.

[Received October 6—11:16 a. m.]

1532. Moscow papers for October 5 announced the appointment of Aleksandr Efremovich Bogomolov as Plenipotentiary Representative of the Soviet Government to the French Committee of National Liberation.²

HAMILTON

711.61/938

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] October 6, 1943.

The Soviet Ambassador called at his request. He said that he had merely called to pay his respects for the first time since becoming Ambassador.

I thanked him and then proceeded to thank him strongly for his statement made to the President upon presentation of his credentials. He then spoke for two or three minutes along the line that there is no serious divergence of interest between the Soviet Union and the United States; that their main interests are common, and that there are no questions which can not be settled amicably and without serious difficulty. I echoed and reechoed this point of view. He concluded by saying that he felt the relations between our two countries would be better in the future than in the past, et cetera.

His remarks were encouraging compared to those of his predecessors.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

² For correspondence regarding the concern of the United States over the disunity in French North Africa and recognition of the administrative authority of the French Committee of National Liberation, see vol. II, pp. 23 ff.

811.00B/2161

*The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (Hoover) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle)*³

WASHINGTON, October 8, 1943.

DEAR MR. BERLE: In connection with the current campaign by the Communist Party for the establishment of a "Second Front" in Europe, Communist Party members in labor unions in one section of the country have been instructed to write letters to parents of boys in the armed forces urging the establishment of a "Second Front" with the argument that delay in opening one now will only serve to keep their boys away from home for a longer time and that the longer the war lasts the greater will be the possibility that the war will end in defeat. In these letters the parents of the boys in the armed forces are urged to write letters to the White House demanding a "Second Front."

A member of the National Committee of the Communist Party in issuing the foregoing instructions to Communist members of labor unions has stated that the parents had to be "sold" on the "Second Front" with those arguments because if they, the parents, have any intelligence at all they will realize that tremendous casualties will result as soon as the "Second Front" is opened.

Sincerely yours,

J. EDGAR HOOVER

860F.01/506 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Hamilton) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, October 22, 1943—11 a. m.

[Received 8:30 p. m.]

1675. Reference Embassy's No. 1670, October 21.⁴ The extensive coverage of the Sixth Plenary Session of the All-Slav Committee⁵ by the Soviet press probably indicates the increasing importance attached by the Soviet Government to the All-Slav movement. The last reports of a Plenary Session of the All-Slav Committee, which appeared in the Soviet daily press for February 4, 1943, were extremely brief. The [session] only recently concluded has received almost as much publicity as previous accounts of congresses or general meetings of the All-Slav Committee.

³ Mr. Berle sent a copy of this letter on October 9 to the White House for the President because "it will be of interest."

⁴ Not printed.

⁵ This Session met in Moscow October 16-17. An extensive account of the meeting, and of seven important messages coming from it, was published in *Pravda* on October 18, 1943.

The contents of this latest All-Slav Committee propaganda is also significant. It goes further than previous utterances of the Soviet press in conferring upon Stalin and the Soviet Union the leadership of the Slavs of Europe. This is indicated by the reference to Stalin as the "military leader, father and friend of the Slavic peoples".

The Plenary Session also carried further the tendency to see in the Union of Polish Patriots and the Polish troops now fighting on the Soviet front the potential leaders of a new Poland. While *Pravda* for September 1 quoted General Berling, commander of the Polish forces in the USSR, to the effect that these Poles intended to return to Poland and call to account those responsible for the misfortunes of their country, the message from the Sixth Plenary Session to the First Polish Corps says: "It devolves upon you to lay the foundation of a new Poland" and exhorts the Polish troops to be worthy of this "great historic mission".

Finally, the messages of the Sixth Plenary Session emphasize the role of the Soviet Union as leader of the Slav's fight for freedom against Hitler. Unlike the third All-Slav meeting in May (see Embassy's 440, May 13) the Plenary Session sent no message, so far as published accounts reveal, to Roosevelt and Churchill. Moreover, it explicitly states that the Soviet Union has borne the "chief burden" of the struggle and has contributed more than "any other of the United Nations".

Thus in general the Sixth Plenary Session in its expressions comes closer than any other Soviet statements published during the war to Pan-Slavism of the old type with Russia claiming leadership of the Slavic world.⁶ It is significant that at the time when the Three-Power-Conference⁷ is beginning its work in Moscow the All-Slav Committee should assert so unmistakably Soviet aspirations to leadership of the Slavic peoples.

HAMILTON

⁶ In a memorandum of October 29, 1943, Mr. Elbridge Durbrow of the Division of European Affairs observed that "In view of the increased importance given to the activities of the Moscow All Slav Committee it would appear that the Soviet authorities are keeping this channel open in order, if they so desire, to use the Pan-Slav movement and the partisan groups operating in the Balkans to gain substantial control, if not complete political control, over these countries. . . . This change in strategy has apparently been adopted by the Soviet authorities not only to divorce themselves from the onus attached to the Comintern, but there are indications that they felt after some twenty years experience that the purely international class ties appealed to by the Comintern were far weaker than nationalist ties." (860F.01/512½)

⁷ For correspondence concerning the Moscow Conference of the three Foreign Ministers, October 18–November 1, 1943, see vol. I, pp. 513 ff.

701.6111/1226 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, October 26, 1943.

[Received October 27—1:08 p. m.]

1734. Personal for Soviet Ambassador. Have just read digest reported here on your radio address October 21st.⁸ It is an important contribution toward establishment of mutual understanding and friendship between the people of our two countries. May I send you my congratulations.

HARRIMAN

740.0011 European War 1939/31788 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, November 1, 1943.

[Received November 2—2:48 p. m.]

1804. The 54 slogans formulated by the Central Committee of the Communist Party in connection with the forthcoming November 7 celebrations which are published in the Moscow papers for October 30, call for continued unremitting efforts to hasten victory and expel the German invader from Soviet soil.⁹ All branches of the armed forces are urged to strike down and destroy the enemy. The slogan for the infantry includes the following directive: "Surround and capture the German occupants but if they refuse to surrender destroy them."

An appeal is directed to the "brothers and sisters, Russians, Ukrainians, Belo-Russians, Moldavians, Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians, Karelians temporarily under the yoke of the German Fascist scoundrels. The hour of delivery is coming. Fan the flame of the Partisan movement of all the peoples. Kill the German scoundrels. Aid the Red army with all your strength.["] Increased production is urged in separate appeals to munition workers and those producing tanks, planes, petroleum, coal, metals, motors, to workers in the building trades, textile workers and workers in the food and light industries. The railway workers are asked to strengthen their discipline. There are also separate slogans for water transport workers, agricultural

⁸ The text of the radio address by Ambassador Gromyko is printed in the *New York Times*, October 22, 1943, p. 10, col. 2.

⁹ To compare the slogans with the 52 slogans for the XXV anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, see telegram No. 967, October 31, 1942, 4 p. m., from the Chargé in the Soviet Union, *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. III, p. 471.

and the Soviet intelligentsia. Several of these appeals stress the need for providing adequate supplies not only for the front but also for the rear and for reconstruction in the liberated regions.

Five of slogans addressed to groups outside the Soviet Union are quoted in translation:

(4) Greetings to the peoples of Europe fighting against Hitler imperialism. Patriots of European countries rise up in armed struggle for your liberation from the Fascist yoke. Overthrow the Hitler tyranny.

(5) Subjugated Slav brothers. Fan wide the flame of peoples' war against German oppressors the mortal foes of Slavism. Long live the armed struggle of the Slav peoples against the Hitler imperialists.

(6) Long live the victory of the Anglo-Soviet-American military alliance over the evil enemies of humanity, the German Fascist enslavers. All of the forces and military might of the freedom loving nations for the most rapid destruction of Hitlerite Germany.

(7) And long live the valiant Anglo-American troops battling against the German Fascists on Italian territory.

(8) Greetings to the Anglo-American aviators who are striking blows at the vital centers of Fascist Germany.

HARRIMAN

740.0011 Moscow/138: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Acting Secretary of State

Moscow, November 4, 1943.

[Received November 5—2:32 p. m.]

1837. In view of the helpful attitude of the British and American correspondents in Moscow during the Conference, I saw them today. I opened the conference by explaining that I did not intend to go into the general results or significance of the Conference since this has been fully and properly covered by the Secretary himself at his press conference here.¹⁰ I added that I was only going to try to give them an impression of the work which I and the Embassy staff expect to carry on here. I then handed to the press the following written statement prepared in conjunction with General Deane on the establishment and work of the United States Military Mission here:¹¹

Mr. Harriman's statement: "We have just completed the establishment and organization of a United States Military Mission in Moscow. The purpose of the Mission is to make possible the closest military

¹⁰ For text of the Anglo-Soviet-American communiqué of November 1 on the Tripartite Conference in Moscow, see vol. I, p. 741.

¹¹ For the proposal to establish the American Military Mission in the Soviet Union, and its acceptance, see telegram No. 934, October 1, 1 p. m., to the Chargé in the Soviet Union, p. 704.

collaboration between the United States and the Soviet Union. Since the United States Forces in Europe are operating on a combined basis with the British forces, there will naturally be close contact with the British Military Mission here. Thus, machinery now exists through which cooperative action may be effected quickly between the military staffs of the three countries.

The Mission is headed by Major General John R. Deane who will act under instructions from the United States Chief of Staff in Washington and under my direction. General Deane has been United States Secretary of the Combined Chiefs of Staff until his assignment here. Before that, he was Secretary of the War Department General Staff.

The Mission merges the activities of all American Armed Forces. It includes Army, Navy and Supply Divisions. For the present, the Army Division is headed by Brigadier General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, an Air Corps officer of considerable combat experience. The Navy Division is headed by Commodore C. E. Olsen, who came here directly from the Planning and Operations Section of Admiral King's¹² staff. Brigadier General S. P. Spalding is in charge of the Supply Division of the Mission which will handle all Lend-Lease activities in Moscow. He has served on the Munitions Assignments Board in Washington since its establishment and was directly concerned with arranging the Russian supply program. Shipping matters will also be handled by the Mission.

In the past, military collaboration in Moscow between the three countries has been difficult, because there has been no one in Moscow who could act as a direct representative of the United States Chiefs of Staff. To correct this, arrangements have been made to provide for the closest possible relationship between the Military Mission and the military and naval authorities in Washington.

During the recent Tripartite Conference there were full and frank discussions between the military representatives of the three countries. As the war approaches its inevitable climax and the Soviet, British and American forces converge on Germany, there will be an increasing need for coordinated effort. This necessarily will call for quick decisions. The establishment of the American Military Mission sets up machinery in Moscow through which coordination can be accomplished.["]

I then added the following statement.

2 ["I would like to start by saying that I have always been a consistent optimist in the development of our relations with the Soviet Union. I expected the Conference to be a success. But I am deeply gratified to see agreement reached on so many subjects and with such speed.

The Conference has opened here a number of subjects on which it has been agreed discussion should be continued between ourselves, the British and the Soviet Union.

¹² Adm. Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief, U.S. Navy, and Chief of Naval Operations.

I have given out a statement on the establishment of the Military Mission in Moscow. I think it explains how we will operate in dealing with military and supply problems in the common war effort.

In addition, there were, of course, many political and economic subjects explored by the Conference. Some of them will be dealt with on a tripartite basis in Moscow through, to quote the communiqué of the Conference, 'continuing when necessary tripartite consultations between the three Governments in the respective capitals through existing diplomatic channels'. This means I will be working closely on these matters with Mr. Molotov and Sir Archibald Clark Kerr.

At the Conference views were frankly exchanged on subjects where our respective attitudes had not been fully crystallized. These discussions helped to clarify our own thinking. All of this is profoundly encouraging.

Some problems are of immediate importance, some others deal with the postwar period. Here again, some of these postwar problems must be dealt with promptly, whereas others relate to long-range plans.

We will have to take these matters up in the order of their priority bearing in mind the immediate demands of the war. The war comes first and everything we do now must be concentrated on hastening the day of final victory.

As you have seen from the communiqué of the Conference the three countries have agreed to work together to promote the welfare of the peoples of their respective countries.

One matter I think deserves the greatest possible consideration at this time is the assistance the United States can give to the Soviet Union in rehabilitation of devastated areas and in repairing other dislocations caused by the war. Here again the war must have first priority in our use of American productive capacity and available shipping, but there is one thing we can do now without interfering with war production. We can work on the development of programs, plan and detailed designs. This will materially shorten the time when equipment needed from the United States can be made available.

The American people have the greatest of sympathy for the Russian people [who?] also have suffered so much, and it is in their hearts to attempt to be of the greatest assistance. We will have the plan to produce greatest assistance. We will have the plans to produce machinery and equipment needed by the Soviet Union and in so doing we will help our own people to convert from war to peace production.

These are some of the problems that will be absorbing the interest of myself and the staff of the Embassy.

I am glad that Mr. Charles E. Bohlen, Assistant Chief of the European Division of the State Department, who came with Secretary Hull as a member of the United States Delegation, is to remain here as First Secretary. He attended the meetings of the Conference and so will be of great help to Mr. Hamilton, our Minister-Counselor, and myself in carrying on some of the matters started by the Conference. Mr. Samuel Spewack came with me as an Attaché of the Embassy to promote interchange of information between our two countries. I think everyone agrees that it is of vital importance to have the greatest possible understanding between the peoples of our two countries."

I have made arrangements to have these two statements made available to the Soviet Press for such use as they may desire to make of them.

HARRIMAN

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to President Roosevelt*¹³

Moscow, November 5, 1943

Personal for the President. Now that I have had a chance to take a long breath I thought you would want from me a review of the more important impressions of the Soviet attitude we got in and outside of the Conference room. Certain of the doubts which some people have had regarding Soviet intentions are now laid to rest. On the other hand the character of certain real difficulties that exist has been more sharply defined.

(1) The Soviet Government before they agreed to the Conference had evidently decided that they would take a shot at working together with the British and ourselves in dealing with war and postwar problems. On the whole the Soviets are delighted with the way the Conference went and it has strengthened their tentative decision. It was interesting to watch how Molotov expanded as the days passed. As he began to realize more and more that we had not come with a united front against him and were ready to expose frankly our preliminary thoughts, he showed increasing enjoyment in being admitted for the first time into the councils as a full member with the British and ourselves. Before the Conference I doubt if they had any intention of allowing the inclusion of China as an original signatory of the Four-Nation Declaration.¹⁴ Their acceptance of China is a clear indication that they are genuinely satisfied with the way things went and are ready to make important concessions to further the new intimacy. On the other hand it cannot be assumed that this policy is already so set that we can take liberties with them.

(2) They were unquestionably chagrined by the British and our attitude re Turkey and to a lesser extent regarding Sweden. Eden's¹⁵ final understanding with them on Turkey helped to offset their early disappointment but they are expectantly hopeful that we will join in this agreement at an early date. I am convinced, however, that only

¹³ Copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y. This telegram was sent in six parts between November 4, 2:10 p.m., and November 5, 2:38 p.m., and was received in Washington on November 6, except for the fourth part (numbered paragraphs 4 and 5), which finally came in on November 9, 1:55 p.m.

¹⁴ For text, see vol. I, p. 755.

¹⁵ Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

Turkey's entry into the war will satisfy them. Without coming to Moscow it is hard to appreciate how differently they view the war from the British and ourselves. The Russians have the primitive view that they have suffered and bled to destroy Hitler and see no reason why the Turks should not do the same if it can help shorten the war. They honestly believe that the entry of Turkey will force the Germans to move a considerable number of divisions from the Eastern front. In posing this demand they are entirely indifferent to any moral or actual obligation to assist the Turks in fighting the Germans. Our attitude in this regard is inexplicable to them. The Russians feel that only if the Turks actively fight against Germany now are they entitled to any consideration in the post-war scheme of things. To a somewhat modified degree they feel the same way about the Swedes. In addition to the military value of the entry of these countries into the war, they believe that closing in on Germany from all sides will hasten the deterioration of enemy morale.

The early misunderstanding about the ships was a disappointment.¹⁶ They feel all right about it now, provided some definite conclusion is reached in the near future. The above were the only two matters of importance not concluded in principle to their satisfaction. (Your cable accepting the Soviet proposal regarding Turkey has arrived just as I was dispatching this message to you, and will, I know, be tremendously well received.)

(3) The Soviets accepted the explanation of our military plans but our whole permanent relations depend in a large measure on their satisfaction in the future with our military operations. It is impossible to over-emphasize the importance they place strategically on the initiation of the so-called "second front" next spring. An invitation to the next military conference is, I believe, essential if the seeds sown at this Conference are to germinate. It is clear they never like to be faced with Anglo-American decisions already taken. If they are asked to the conference they will expect to participate during the consultative stage. It is obvious that this will be to some extent a nuisance and time consuming, but from the long view it will be, in my judgement, well worthwhile. It is important to invite Molotov as well as the military staff. His position as second to Stalin is more apparent than on my previous visits. A subsequent brief meeting with Stalin himself is still of the highest importance, and I feel that every effort should be continued to find a way to bring this about. I expect to cable you further on this subject. It would be helpful in this connection if you could inform me of your decision regarding the invitation to the military conference.

¹⁶ This reference is in regard to the question of the allocation of the Italian warships and merchantmen among the Allies, and the share of these ships to go to the Soviet Union.

(4) Their attitude toward Germany as revealed at the Conference is fundamentally satisfactory. There is of course no doubt that they are bent on the complete destruction of Hitler and Nazism. They are ready to deal with Germany on the basis of a three-way responsibility. Our difficulties with them, if any, will be that their present intent toward Germany is tougher than we have in mind, particularly in regard to the magnitude of reparations.¹⁷ Their measure of Germany's capacity to pay reparations in goods and services appears to be based on the concept that the Germans are not entitled to a postwar standard of living higher than the Russians. They definitely did not exclude the possibility of an enforced dismemberment of Germany and are certainly determined to make sure that there will be no military threat from that quarter in any foreseeable future. They convinced me that any public references coming from Moscow or from the Free Germany Committee showing friendliness to the German people is just propaganda to weaken German resistance.

(5) Their flirtation with the French Committee appears to have cooled off as a result of their satisfaction with their new intimacy with the British and ourselves. It may of course be revived if the development of these new relationships is not to their satisfaction.

(6) Although Soviet territorial questions were never raised at the Conference, it can only be inferred that the Soviet Government expects to stand firmly on the position they have already taken in regard to their 1941 frontiers. I believe they have the impression that this has been tacitly accepted by the British, and the fact that we did not bring up the issue may have given them the impression that we would not raise serious objection in the future.

(7) The problem of Poland is even tougher than we believed. They regard the present Polish Government-in-exile as hostile, and therefore completely unacceptable to them. They are determined to recognize only a Polish Government that will be a wholeheartedly friendly neighbor. On the other hand, Molotov told me definitely that they were willing to have a strong independent Poland, giving expression to whatever social and political system the Polish people wanted. They gave us no indication during the Conference that they were interested in the extension of the Soviet system. I take this with some reservation, particularly if it proves to be the only way they can get the kind of relationships they demand from their western border states.

¹⁷ A translation of an article by the economist, Academician Eugene Varga, entitled "The Reparation of Damage by Hitlerite Germany and Her Accomplices," was sent to the Department in despatch No. 22 of November 2, 1943 (not printed). This article, which set forth in detail the current attitude in the Soviet Union on the question of reparations from Germany, was printed, among other places, in *War and the Working Class*, No. 10 (October 15, 1943).

They are determined to have no semblance of the old "cordon sanitaire" concept in Eastern Europe.¹⁸ Molotov told me that the relations they expect to establish with the border countries did not preclude equally friendly relationships with the British and ourselves. In the Conference, however, it was indicated that although they would keep us informed they would take unilateral action in respect to these countries in the establishment of relations satisfactory to themselves. It is my feeling that this rigid attitude may well be tempered in proportion to their increasing confidence in their relations with the British and ourselves in the establishment of overall world security. Although Finland came up only indirectly in our discussions, we sensed a bitter and uncompromising attitude toward her.¹⁹ As to the states west of the areas bordering on the Soviet Union, they appear fully prepared to cooperate with the British and ourselves in working out problems involved, provided they are given full partnership in the decisions.

(8) The discussions on Iran were only on a staff level. One never gets very far on this level in dealing with the Soviets. Although they accepted an unpublished resolution reaffirming their fidelity to their treaty obligations toward Iran, we got no clarification of their real attitude.²⁰ Because this subject was left to the end, Eden decided not to insist that it be thrashed out in the main Conference.

(9) I will leave a report about the Far East till I see you. As far as it went, it was entirely satisfactory.

(10) I cannot leave this review of the Conference without speaking of the Secretary.²¹ His dignity and determination and sincerity in presenting our attitude toward the preservation of world peace and world conditions compatible with it profoundly impressed the Soviet officials. I cannot over-emphasize the important contribution his presence made toward the favorable outcome of the Conference.

¹⁸ The displeasure of the Soviet Union with "all kinds of artificial plans for the creation of federations of the states of Central and Eastern Europe," especially as advocated by the governments in exile of these states, was plainly stated in the article, "On the Results of the Moscow Conference," in the November 1, 1943, issue of *War and the Working Class*: "It is likewise clear that under the guise of federations it is proposed to revive the policy of the notorious 'cordon sanitaire' directed against the Soviet Union." (740.0011 Moscow/182) See also a report on the *Izvestiya* editorial of November 18, in telegram No. 2009, November 22, from the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, p. 600.

¹⁹ For correspondence concerning the interest of the United States in Finland and in its relations with the Soviet Union, see pp. 213 ff.

²⁰ For correspondence on the relations of the Soviet Union with Iran, see vol. iv, pp. 319 ff., *passim*.

²¹ Secretary of State Cordell Hull.

(11) Anthony ²² did a first class job. He supported the Secretary faithfully whenever occasion required. Ismay ²³ and Deane worked as a team and so did the rest of our delegations.

[HARRIMAN]

760N.61/83 : Telegram

The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

STOCKHOLM, November 5, 1943—4 p. m.

[Received 6:45 p. m.]

3619. Reactions of Baltic leaders in Stockholm to Moscow communiqué vary according to individual expectations entertained by these men before and during Conference.

Those who expected no announcements of definite decisions regarding future of Baltic States (they include more experienced political leaders and diplomats) find encouragement on following grounds.

First, chances of a Russo-German agreement attended by a German abandonment of Baltic States to Russia have been lessened if not eliminated.

Second, while Baltic exiles remain convinced that Stalin's policy still aims at domination of Eastern Europe and, according to some, eventually world, they perceive in his willingness to make some temporary concessions to American and British principles a possible avenue by which Baltic States can escape complete Soviet domination. Soviet participation in European Advisory Commission ²⁴ to be established in London is cited as evidence that for some time at least Soviets will cooperate, however cynically, with western powers.

Third, though the strategic consideration motivating declaration regarding Austria ²⁵ and Austria's good fortune in succumbing to what is now losing side are appreciated, one Baltic leader expressed opinion that recognition of Austria's independence rights constitutes an important precedent for an eventual decision regarding future of Baltic States whose loss of independence is stated to have had many features in common with German absorption of Austria.

Those Baltic exiles who expected, despite announcements and indication to contrary, Moscow Conferees to announce definite and favorable decision regarding Baltic States were of course disappointed. They and their less optimistic colleagues agree, however, that deferment of a favorable decision until anticipated Soviet reoccupation of their

²² Anthony Eden.

²³ Maj. Gen. Sir Hastings Ismay, Chief of Staff to the British Minister of Defence (a post held concurrently by Prime Minister Churchill), and member of the British Mission.

²⁴ This Commission to consider all problems affecting the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union was provided for at the Moscow Conference; see vol. I, p. 756. For its organization in London and its early operation, see *ibid.*, pp. 782 ff.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 761.

countries will be tantamount to an adverse decision. On basis of past Soviet actions in their countries, particularly eleventh hour wholesale deportation measures carried out during Soviet evacuation of area in 1941, they are convinced that once Soviets have re-occupied Baltic States they will by deportation and execution eliminate anti-Russian element and replace it with Russian or pro-Russian elements. Thus in a very short time Soviets will be able with confidence to agree to or even to urge a plebiscite to determine wishes of population regarding incorporation into Soviet Union.

A feature of communiqué which some find alarming is omission of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania from list of countries and areas to which Germans will be sent and tried for their atrocities. Inferences drawn therefrom are that Baltic States are considered as "invaded parts of Soviet Union" and that western democracies have thus expressed tacit agreement with Soviet contention that Baltic States are legally part of USSR.

A practical problem which communiqué presents active Baltic leaders is its omission of any very specific statements which may be used to counter contention of German propaganda that Moscow Conference affords latest and most conclusive evidence that Baltic States have been abandoned to Russians. As illustrated in Legation's despatch 2242 of September 29²⁶ Baltic underground periodicals strongly emphasize all signs of Anglo-American benevolences towards Baltic States. Leaders now feel that their ammunition is running low and that their countrymen's will to resist is thereby impaired.

JOHNSON

861.001/13 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Acting Secretary of State

Moscow, November 7, 1943—4 p. m.

[Received November 8—1:20 p. m.]

1871. Personal for the President and Acting Secretary. Assume you have seen full text of Stalin's speech last night.²⁷ I regard it in general as highly satisfactory.²⁸ In dealing with general relations

²⁶ Not printed; it reported the first issue of the periodical *Päris Eesti* on political affairs in Estonia, and transmitted a copy (8601.00/541).

²⁷ Speech made in celebration of the XXVI anniversary of the Bolshevik (October 1917) Revolution. To compare substance of the speech made by Stalin on November 6, 1942, see telegram No. 438, November 8, 1942, from the Chargé in the Soviet Union, *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. III, p. 475.

²⁸ In conversation with Solomon Abramovich Lozovsky, Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, on November 17, Harriman "expressed appreciation for the credit given by Stalin to the Allied air bombardments in his November 6 speech and explained that recognition of the value of bombing was much appreciated by our Air Force." (740.0011 European War 1939/32812)

with Russia's Allies he accurately reflects the spirit of the Conference whose decisions he refers to as "historic". The most important part of his speech deals with the military situation in which, after giving unusual recognition to the contribution to their military success of our combined operations in the Mediterranean, bombing of Germany and supplies he says:

"Naturally the present operations of the Allied armies in the south of Europe can not as yet be considered a second front. But it is nevertheless something in the nature of a second front. Of course the opening up of a real second front in Europe, which is not behind the mountains (meaning not far off), will appreciably hasten the victory over Hitlerite Germany and will further strengthen the comradeship in arms of the Allied States."

Stalin thus tells the Soviet people that the second front is not far off.

HARRIMAN

861.415/90 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, November 8, 1943—11 a. m.

[Received November 9—9:30 p. m.]

1875. The reception given by Mr. Molotov last evening on the occasion of the twenty-sixth anniversary of the Revolution²⁹ was a brilliant [affair?] and was carried out on a scale comparable to or perhaps surpassing similar functions given before the war. There were approximately 500 guests among whom were most members of the political high ranking army and navy officers and many outstanding Soviet personalities. All ranking officers of the Foreign Office were present in their new full dress uniforms. Few members of the Diplomatic Corps were able to comply with the Foreign Office suggestion that they wear full dress as there have been no formal functions here since the beginning of the war. Despite the ceremonial nature of the occasion there prevailed an atmosphere of friendly informality which was particularly noticeable so far as the British and ourselves were concerned. Although they were treated with politeness the isolation of the Japanese were very evident. The attitude of the Russians might be described by saying that they were in

²⁹ Anniversary messages were sent on November 6 by President Roosevelt to Kalinin, and by Acting Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., to Molotov, who acknowledged receipt on November 15; for texts, see Department of State *Bulletin*, November 6, 1943, p. 313, and *ibid.*, November 20, 1943, p. 374, respectively.

a jubilant mood over the successes of the Red army and that carrying out the spirit of the Moscow Conference they wished to include us in their celebration as friends.

HARRIMAN

103.9166/6854 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, November 9, 1943—10 a. m.

[Received November 10—12:39 p. m.]

1879. Division of Current Information Liaison for OWI for Sherwood,³⁰ Kuhn,³¹ Warburg³² from Spewack.^{32a} Following information may be useful: I had a long and frank talk with Ilya Ehrenburg who has been spending a great deal of time at the front and in reoccupied areas.

As you know he represents European intellectual circle, but he is able reporter. Before outlining his attitude I would like to emphasize certain basic facts.

First of all, Russian people are war weary. "Shortening the war" is not an official line created in a Government office. It is expression of the will of the people. This doesn't mean they will settle for less than total victory. But they are not getting enough to eat. Their homes are cold. They hang in clusters from the street cars. They can't buy clothes, shoes or any civilian goods. They work long hours and they have been through 20-odd years of successive crises. And there's the stark fact there isn't a family that hasn't lost someone or doesn't fear the loss of these left. It is because of this war weariness that camouflage is being taken off buildings, that street lights are brighter, that new army and diplomatic uniforms are resplendent, that guns boom and fireworks flare as each important victory is announced.

People are being given a foretaste of peace and victory. They can't wait for war to end. Against this background here is Ehrenburg's view of what the Russians really feel about the Conference. He thinks that it will be regarded generally as a "marriage of convenience" which can be built into genuine relationship. He believes

³⁰ Robert E. Sherwood, Director of Overseas Operations, Overseas Operations Branch, Office of War Information.

³¹ Ferdinand Kuhn, Deputy Director, United Nations Information Policy, Overseas Operations Branch, Office of War Information.

³² James P. Warburg, Deputy Director, Psychological Warfare Policy, Overseas Operations Branch, Office of War Information.

^{32a} Samuel Spewack, Press Attaché at the Embassy in the Soviet Union.

that they will want to know why the Red army can cross the Dnieper and we can't cross the Channel.

It must be remembered that no one has told them publicly of the difficulties of amphibious operations. Furthermore, according to Ehrenburg, there is feeling if we really wanted to crack the West Wall and end the war this year we would.

While events will settle that debate, it seems to me that there's a dangerous issue involved that goes beyond any official proclamations. When we do move there may be a large section of Russia firmly believing we waited to the last possible moment and let Russia bleed.

Ehrenburg advanced many arguments for his views. We had found North Africa and Sicily easier than we had anticipated. Hence we must be wrong again. That is if our motives are pure which he doubts.

Please remember I'm reporting his version of what people feel. Russians have been told their leaders are satisfied with our plans. The Conference is a success and is proclaimed as such. The Government has published extensive foreign despatches in the last few days. There is every indication of the desire of the Government to speed alliance by widespread internal propaganda.

But according to Ehrenburg the average Russian's idea of American participation in the war is what he sees—fine trucks, planes and Spam. Ehrenburg says there isn't much interest in operations in Italy except wonder what takes us so long.

Of course some of this will undoubtedly change if Government continues to publish more stuff from abroad.

But we have truly enormous pioneering job to do.

In assembling our material for this country it seems to us we must always bear Russian background in mind. For example, they are most impressed by actual combat on a large scale, ground or air. It's only natural when they are participating in gigantic war that they'll scoff at what they consider diversions.

We must be careful in telling our story of production to eliminate any note of bragging. Their answer to miracle stories about Willow Run or Kaiser is that they moved airplane factory and workers by train to a barren field and 4 days later planes were being assembled by workers without food or homes.

Their scientists and engineers are perfectly willing exchange information but they're not in mood of late twenties when they regarded us as master mechanics and their teachers.

National pride has penetrated all professions and they're in the "greatest country, greatest people in world" mood which in view of victories is understandable.

Therefore, they're not inclined to accept stories or pictures which imply we are wonderful. For even when we can legitimately boast, their answer is that if they hadn't squandered millions men and machines, if they were in our geographic position in this war, they would have accomplished greater miracles.

Program we are discussing takes this attitude into consideration.

Please remember this: We may break down official reluctance to allow us direct contact with people and organizations. We may improve transport and communications. But we are going to operate with unspeakable telephone service and fantastic shortage of clerical personnel. Everything takes enormous time. I have no typist. We need elementary help as well as key personnel from Washington or London. We will need immediately basic equipment such as mimeograph machines, typewriters, two cars, truck, and patience. [Spewack.]

HARRIMAN

740.0011 European War 1939/31868 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, November 9, 1943.

[Received November 10—5:04 p. m.]

1888. In his order of the day of November 7 which is addressed to the men and officers of the Red army and the Red fleet the Partisans and the workers of the Soviet Union Stalin reviews the successes of Soviet arms during the past year which he says have led to the reconquest of two-thirds of the Soviet lands which had been invaded by the Germans and have liberated tens of millions of Soviet people from the German yoke. He estimates German losses on the eastern front during the past year at more than 4 million officers and men of whom not less than 1,800,000 were killed. The picked divisions of the German Fascist army found an inglorious end on the Soviet front. "Together with them were buried forever the Hitlerite plans for world domination and the enslavement of nations." The German army is still fighting stubbornly but its fighting spirit was broken at Stalingrad. Now the Germans fear encirclement and when threatened with it flee, abandoning their weapons and their wounded on the battlefields. In the offensive battles of the past year the Red army has been enriched by experience in conducting modern warfare. "The

Red army has become the most powerful and well tempered of modern armies."

Stalin pays tribute to the military contribution of the Anglo-American armies. "The victories of the Red army" he says "have further strengthened the international position of the Soviet Union. The offensive of our army was supported by the military activities of the Allied armies in North Africa on the Italian Islands and in the south of Italy. The air forces of our Allies have subjected the industrial centers of Germany to serious bombardment. There is no doubt that the blows of the Red army against the German troops from the east supported by the blows of the main forces of the Allies from the west will lead to the destruction of the military power of Hitlerite Germans and to the complete victory of the anti-Hitlerite coalition."

Stalin praises the steady flow of supplies from all parts of the country to the front which has enabled the Red army to achieve its great victories and states that the Soviet people are successfully rehabilitating the liberated areas and utilizing their resources for the needs of the front. He warns that heavy fighting still lies ahead and that there must be no relaxation of effort until final victory is achieved. "How the enemy will fight with special frenzy for every little patch of occupied territory for every step of our army forward brings nearer the hour of settlement with the Germans for the evil deeds committed by them on our soil.

"The struggle for final victory over the German Fascist invaders demands from the army and the people still greater efforts and new exploits."

Stalin calls on the lower ranks of the armed forces to perfect their skill in battle, to carry out precisely the orders of their commanders and to preserve model order and firm discipline; on the officers to perfect their leadership in battle and their conduct of combined operations, to establish themselves firmly in newly won positions and to pursue the enemy forces relentlessly; on the whole Red army resolutely to smash the enemy's defenses to pursue him day and night, to give him no opportunity to dig in on new lines, to cut his communications, to surround his troops and to destroy and capture his manpower and equipment; on the partisans to arouse the civil population to arms struggle against the Germans, to increase assistance to the advancing Red army, to destroy the enemy's headquarters, to save Soviet citizens from death and deportation to Germany and mercilessly to destroy the German villains.

[HARRIMAN]

711.61/950 : Telegram

*The People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union
(Molotov) to the Secretary of State*

[Translation]

Moscow [undated].

[Received November 17, 1943—4:01 a. m.]

The decade which has elapsed since the establishment of Soviet-American diplomatic relations³³ has demonstrated that the relations between our countries are based on a strong foundation and that they completely correspond to the interests of our peoples. The common struggle against Hitlerite Germany has even more firmly cemented our relations and furthered the growth of mutual understanding and confidence between our countries and the development of Soviet-American military cooperation. The recent Moscow Conference has demonstrated that Soviet-American relations possess all the elements to develop successfully the conditions necessary for shortening the period of the war and for the establishment of a durable and long peace in the interests of all freedom-loving peoples.

V. MOLOTOV

761.00/359 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary
of State*

Moscow, November 22, 1943.

[Received November 23—3:45 p. m.]

2009. *Izvestiya* for November 18 published an editorial entitled "On the Question of Federations of 'Small' States in Europe". The editorial occupied more than a quarter of the space on page 3.

The editorial began by referring to the favorable and extensive treatment of the Moscow Conference decisions in the Anglo-American press noting that this treatment indicates that these decisions correctly reflected the mood of the broad masses in the Allied countries.

It is impossible however not to notice false notes in this chorus. Certain commentators are arriving at arbitrary conclusions and conjectures which do not correspond to reality. In this connection the

³³ For correspondence concerning the negotiations and agreements by which relations were established between the United States and the Soviet Union, see *Foreign Relations, The Soviet Union, 1933-1939*, pp. 1 ff.

For a telegram sent on the occasion of this tenth anniversary by Secretary Hull to Mr. Molotov, dated November 15, 1943, see Department of State *Bulletin*, November 20, 1943, p. 373.

For this occasion the newspaper *Izvestiya* on November 16 published a cordial, leading article on the "strengthening of Soviet-American friendship". A two-column front page editorial appeared in *Pravda* on the following day.

editorial referred to recent statement of the London weeklies *New Statesman* for November 10 and *Economist* for November 11 regarding the question of federations of small powers in postwar Europe. These weeklies are cited as deducing from the Moscow Conference Declaration on Austria that Russia no longer objected to all groupings of Central and Eastern European States.

Declaring that neither the Declaration on Austria nor any other decisions of the Moscow Conference give the slightest ground for such conclusions, the editorial stated that these conclusions are the product of their authors' imagination. It then proceeds to set forth the "Soviet point of view" regarding the question of federations of small states in Europe. This point of view which proceeds not from abstract and theoretical but from concrete and realistic assumptions recognizes the importance of the liberation of small states and the restoration of their independence and sovereignty in the reconstruction of Europe and the establishment of a firm peace. However, it is necessary to consider the concrete situation which will obtain after the war's conclusion in regard to these states. It is obvious that all European relationship will be in a state of flux. The small states will require a "definite time" in which to adapt themselves to the new situation created as a result of the war both as regards the settling of their internal problems and the determination of their relations with other states. In the latter there should be no external pressure on these countries impelling them toward this or that grouping of states.

At the Moscow Conference the Soviet delegation proceeding from above principles stated clearly that premature and possibly artificial incorporation of small countries in theoretically planned groupings would be pregnant with dangers both for these countries themselves and for the future peaceful development of Europe. The editorial declares that such an important step as federating with another country possibly involving a partial renunciation of sovereignty is admissible only as a result of a free and deliberate expression of the people's will.

From these considerations flow several important conclusions. Firstly, the emigrant governments of countries occupied by the Germans not having close enough links with their peoples cannot express the true will of their peoples regarding such an important question as federation. Secondly, even new governments established immediately after the war in the countries now occupied very probably will not have sufficient authority to undertake the solution of the federation question without risking violating the will of the people and thus bringing about various complications. Thirdly, it cannot be doubted that consideration of the federation question can assume a more fruitful character only after the postwar situation has settled down and

the small countries have gained the necessary calm and confidence in their independence.

The Soviet Union's view that at present it is premature to foster the establishment of any sort of federations "does not exclude the readiness of the Soviet Union in good time to study this question anew in the light of the experience of postwar collaboration with the other United Nations and taking into account the conditions of the postwar."

The editorial adds that two other basic aspects of the Soviet point of view must be mentioned. Above all it would be especially unjust if small countries which had been satellites of Germany should as a result of this or that federation be placed under as favorable conditions as small countries which had experienced aggression on the part of the enemy particularly on the part of the same satellite countries. The satellite countries of Hitlerite Germany must not escape the consequences of their participation in Hitler's and Mussolini's crimes. Moreover, the Soviet point of view categorically rejects all attempts to revive the policy of the "cordon sanitaire" of which some of the federation projects are forms.

The editorial concludes by suggesting that the authors of such articles as are herein referred to all [have?] the good will to go along with the Moscow Conference "the basis of which as is well known consists in friendly collaboration of England and the United States with the Soviet Union".

HARRIMAN

862.01/498a : Airgram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, November 24, 1943—1:55 p. m.

A-34. The following is sent as background material which may be helpful to you in observing and evaluating the "Free German" movement in your area.

This movement has made its appearance in many places. The first Committee was organized in Mexico City in 1942, and has been very active among the Germans of the western hemisphere.³⁴ It has branches or active supporters in most of the important centers of German population, except Argentina and Chile, where the rival group "Das Andere Deutschland" has stood out against it, and in the United States, where its influence has been inhibited from a variety of causes. Even in the United States, it has had covert support from

³⁴ See memorandum of May 19, by Mr. Charles E. Bohlen of the Division of European Affairs, p. 530.

an organization of American citizens, "The German-American Emergency Conference", headed by the late Dr. Kurt Rosenfeld, former left-wing politician.

The leaders of the Mexico City group are Ludwig Renn and Paul Merker, both Communists, and other active members are Bodo Uhse, Bruno Frei, Egon Erwin Kisch, Otto Katz, Georg Stibi, and Anna Seghers, most of whom are Communists. A monthly publication, *Freies Deutschland*, appears to have a wide circulation, and publishes articles of good quality by Thomas Mann, Heinrich Mann, Lion Feuchtwanger, Franz Werfel, Oscar Maria Graf, and many other well-known writers, although these persons are not necessarily Communists, or even Communist sympathizers. The whole movement is known to have connections in Moscow as evidenced by postal intercepts and other information.

The facts of the formation of the National Committee of Free Germany in Moscow on July 12, 1943, are too well-known to require repetition. The only political figures in the group are Communists, who will presumably dominate it. This development has undoubtedly been supported by the Soviet Government as a means of psychological warfare, and possibly also as a means of exercising pressure on the United States and Great Britain. To an indeterminate degree, it may be a reflection of the Soviet attitude towards the future of Germany. Its suggestion that Germany will be allowed to retain an army after Hitler is overthrown, and the formation of the German Officers' Union, represent a play to win over the German armed forces.

Subsequently, on September 24, 1943, there was formed a Committee of Free Germany in London. This event received a good deal of publicity, but the number of persons supporting it seems to be small. The leading spirits appear to be Dr. Robert Kuczynski, Wilhelm Koenen, Karl Becker, and Hans Fladung, all Communists. Other participants are Dr. Karl Rawitsky and Frau Adele Schreiber, Social-Democrats, and Dr. August Weber of the former State Party. The Social-Democrats are not outstanding, and they participated over the vigorous opposition of their own party and trade union groups. Press accounts state that the organization was prompted and inspired by the establishment of the Moscow Committee. The group received no encouragement or support from the British Government and such early strength as it had seems to have been somewhat weakened by events.

Reports from Bern indicate that a National Committee of Free Germany has been established in Switzerland, though its organizers are not yet known. Two issues of a clandestine publication called *Freies Deutschland* have appeared in Switzerland to date, in which the "Committee" claims affiliation with the Moscow group. The edi-

tors of this publication are rumored to be Wolfgang Langhof and Reinhold Stekel.

Stockholm has reported that attempts are being made to form a Committee of Free Germany in Sweden, but that approaches made by German Communists to German Social-Democrats have borne no fruit thus far. A committee appears actually to have been formed, but no public announcement has been made to date. The membership is believed to include Max Hodann as President and Walter Steitz, Alfred Peyser, and Paul Peschke. Not all are Communists, but the movement is entirely of Communist inspiration.

In the United States, a similar attempt is under way. There are in this country very few German Communists, certainly none of any stature. The current proposal appears to stem from Paul Hagen (Karl Frank) who is Research Director of the American Friends of German Freedom. Hagen was originally a Communist, but left the Party some years ago, and founded a small group called "Neu Beginnen". His constant aim seems to have been to bring together the extreme Left, i.e., the Communists, and the moderate Left, the Social-Democrats. So far, he has had no success. In his present effort, he is actively aided by General Julius Deutsch, the Austrian Social-Democrat, who is more or less of a Pan-German. All approaches by Hagen and Deutsch to the numerous German Social-Democrats here have been rebuffed.

These Committees, wherever formed or projected, show the same pattern of Communist inspiration, and all of them more or less openly acknowledge the leadership of the Moscow group. They have failed to win any important support among German Social-Democrats or other moderate Democratic elements, although the gaining of such support or cooperation is not to be excluded as a future possibility. The Social-Democratic elements in the United States, and to a lesser extent in England, Sweden, and Switzerland show some signs of preparation for forming their own organization in conjunction with elements more to the Center.

The Department is following all these developments closely. While the Department is anxious to activate all anti-Nazi Germans, it does not believe, on the one hand, that the groups thus far formed are dependably democratic and aim at the same goals as the United States, nor, on the other hand, does it wish to encourage anything in the nature of a rival group which might create a rift in our good relations with Russia.

The attitude of the Soviet Union towards the future of Germany, as shown at the Moscow Conference, seemed to indicate a distinct shift away from the "Free German" committees. However, it is perhaps too early to judge the final effect of the Moscow Conference on

the various Committees outlined above. The Committee at Moscow has received little publicity since the Conference. It is logical to suppose that the decisions reached at Moscow will weaken the position and influence of the Committee there, and of the German Officers' Union, except as purely propaganda organizations.³⁵ It is believed that they can scarcely continue to hold out to the German Army the hope for its reconstitution after Hitler's overthrow. The Department will be particularly interested to be kept informed of the degree to which the various "Free German" Committees are affected by the declarations issued at Moscow and the spirit of cooperation developed by the three Powers there.

Please continue to report all developments with the foregoing in mind.

HULL

740.0011 European War 1939/32118: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, November 30, 1943—noon.

[Received December 1—4: 30 p. m.]

2086. On November 26 the American press correspondents returned from a trip to Kiev arranged for the foreign press correspondents by the Press Section of the Foreign Office. The following report is intended to supplement the accounts of their trip that presumably have been carried in the American press.

So far as the correspondents could ascertain, the Germans do not appear to have made any serious efforts to win over the population. On the contrary, they seem to have endeavored to destroy Ukrainian culture and traditions and to Germanize the population. Ukrainian cultural objects and libraries were destroyed or removed. Two newspapers were published, one in Ukrainian and one in German. The special shops that were open were restricted to Germans and many discriminatory measures were taken which showed a complete disregard for the feelings of the people. The local population was allowed to attend the opera only on certain designated nights and was excluded from certain areas of the city. The Germans issued and compelled the use of script. The bread ration during the German occupation was 200 grams per day for workers and 100 grams for dependents.

³⁵ Ambassador Harriman stated to President Roosevelt in a telegram of November 5 (*ante*, p. 589) that he has been convinced that "any public references coming from Moscow or from the Free Germany Committee showing friendliness to the German people is just propaganda to weaken German resistance."

The correspondents gained the impression that greater efforts were made to win over the peasants and as a result of this, and in some cases through fear of the partisans, many rural areas were virtually unmolested by the Germans during the whole period of the occupation.

The Soviet censor has not allowed the correspondents to report the public hanging of two German soldiers that took place while they were in Kiev.³⁶ The authorities seemed anxious, however, to impress upon them atrocities committed by the Germans and they were shown a ravine where 60,000 Kiev Jews were said to have been shot. Before leaving the city the Germans forced the Russians to exhume and burn these bodies and the correspondents talked to three men who said they had been obliged to assist in this gruesome task.

[Here follows a description of the damaged condition of Kiev, and of the early attempts to reestablish normal life in that city.]

HARRIMAN

740.0011 European War 1939/32269 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, December 9, 1943—2 p. m.

[Received 11:30 p. m.]

2164. The Soviet press reports of publicity given throughout the Soviet Union to the Tehran Conference³⁷ strongly indicate that the Government has utilized the enthusiasm engendered by the Conference as an aid in its continuing campaign for increased war production. The accounts of meetings in factories throughout country report that the workers pledged by doubled effort to help realize plan adopted at the Conference.

Other indications of the interweaving of Conference with the war production drive are furnished by factory director A. Elyan's statement in *Izvestiya*, December 8, that workers of his factory would answer the Tehran declarations with renewed efforts and *Izvestiya's* editorial of same date exhorting workers to greater effort.

Press, December 9, devoted even more space than on preceding day to similar material.

Izvestiya gave over a quarter of front page to accounts of factory meetings. These were headed "Still more planes, tanks, armaments and munitions to the Red army." A subhead stated that Soviet peo-

³⁶ See telegram No. 2172, December 10, 2 p. m., from the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, p. 845.

³⁷ For documentation on the conferences between President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and Premier Stalin, with their advisers, at Tehran between November 28 and December 1, 1943, see *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943.

ple was answering decisions of the leaders of the three Allied Powers with new feats of labor.

This presentation of the Conference to Soviet people indicates the Government is taking energetic measures to guard against any possible slackening of effort which might be engendered by optimistic reactions to Conference. There is also suggestion in this attitude of a desire to remind Soviet people that the achievement of victory still requires an all out effort on their part.

HARRIMAN

740.0011 European War 1939/32291 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, December 10, 1943.

[Received December 11—6:07 p. m.]

2174. The Moscow newspapers for December 10th devote 13 column inches to continued reactions of the American press to the Tehran Conference.³⁸ An "observer" of the *New York Herald Tribune* is quoted as stating that the Conference gives the peoples of these United Nations a clearer conception of the Allies' war aims consisting not only in crushing the enemy but also in establishing a just and firm peace. Sulzberger is quoted in the *New York Times* as writing from Cairo that the Iranian problem, which recently had been "subject to censorship", was liquidated by the declaration on Iran³⁹ which testifies to the honorable fulfillment of the great powers' promises to respect the integrity of small countries. Sulzberger also reportedly noted that the Soviet Union considers it essential to prevent the establishment of a *cordon sanitaire* under the mask of an Eastern European Federation dominated by the Poles. The Cairo correspondent of the *New York Herald Tribune* is reported as believing that the cordial relations established among Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill regarding political problems answers the cynics who stated that Americans cannot cooperate with the Russians. His remarks about the sensational improvement in Russian-American relations brought about by settling the second front question and his statement that in the political

³⁸ Ambassador Harriman had sent an earlier indication concerning the avid interest of the Soviet press in the reaction and comments of American newspapers and prominent persons upon the Tehran Conference. He also sent a full summary of the leading article in *War and the Working Class* of December 14, 1943, which appraised the Conference as "the greatest diplomatic event of the war, which will have an enormous influence not only on the progress of the war itself but also on the peace settlement." (740.0011 E.W.1939/32281, 32443)

³⁹ Signed at Tehran, December 1, 1943; for text, see *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943*, p. 646, or Senate Document No. 123, 81st Cong., 1st sess., or *A Decade of American Foreign Policy, Basic Documents, 1941-1949* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1950), p. 23.

sphere it is presumed that no bloc will be established in Eastern and Central Europe which could threaten the security of the USSR are summarized.

In a brief despatch dated December 8th from New York the *Washington Post* is quoted as stating that the Tehran Conference still further strengthens the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition by coordination Allied strategy with the planning of peace. The *Baltimore Sun* reportedly believes that the Conference strengthens Allied unity and assures German defeat.

HARRIMAN

861.9111/457 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, December 14, 1943—1 p. m.

[Received December 15—10 a. m.]

2214. For the Secretary and Under Secretary. It is my intention by this cable to inaugurate a monthly report commenting on and interpreting the more important developments in Soviet policy as reflected by editorials and leading articles in the press. In the scheme of things in Soviet Russia, Government opinions and policies are developed and explained to the people through the press.

We are of course sending daily and monthly digests of the Soviet press, but as these are in great detail and without interpretation I feel they can be of value only to those who have sufficient time and interest to study them currently.

I suggest that this new cable series be made available to the White House, to the members of the Cabinet, and to such other members of the administration as you consider advisable. In order that the series may be made most useful I would appreciate comment.

Report Begins. The Soviet press reveals the revolutionary change in attitude of the Soviet Government toward the United States and Great Britain.

"Historic decisions" was the favorite headline on Tehran. In effect, Stalin has proclaimed that the Soviet Union has strong fast allies; that the three nations accept one another as equal partners in war and in the peace to follow.

This wasn't put in so many words, but the implications were clear.

Following the Moscow Conference there was general satisfaction, even enthusiasm. But there was a note of caution, too. In the blunt words of the authoritative *War and the Working Class* of November 15, the significance of the Conference would depend on the speed and tempo with which the military decisions were carried out by Russia's allies. Unusual credit was given to the Allied air offensive against

Germany, and to the Allied military effort in general, but the fact that Russia was bearing the brunt of the war was still stressed.

There are, however, no reservations and no note of caution in the press reaction to the Tehran Conference.

It was taken for granted that steps had been taken to shorten the war. This was a hope after the Moscow Conference. Now it has become a certainty.

The wholehearted editorial approval was embroidered with accounts of meetings in factories and at collective farms at which Stalin was hailed as the one who, having left the country for the first time since the Revolution, had brought home great benefits to the people—the new understanding with the United States and Great Britain to end the war quickly, recognition of the Soviet Union as a world power of first importance, and above all assurance of a secure future in a world friendly to them. In return, party members at organized meetings exhorted workers and peasants to give Stalin more factory and farm production. Thus the new association with the United States and Great Britain has been woven into the fabric of people's consciousness as a basic policy of the Soviet Government.

The fact that these meetings were organized is evidence of the importance the Soviet Government attaches to the job of selling its people this policy. The fact that Stalin is hailed publicly as the father of the policy gives it the highest official seal of approval. On the other hand the genuine enthusiasm for the new unity between the Allies has not up to the present modified the Soviet attitude towards individual European problems.

The following are the other principal points of Soviet Government policy stressed in the press during the month of November:

1. The Soviet Government continues to regard the frontiers of 1941 as a closed issue guaranteed by the Red army alone.

2. Soviet opposition to federations in Eastern Europe was bluntly stated by *Izvestiya*.

3. The implementation of the Moscow Declaration on Italy⁴⁰ was emphasized as the most important immediate political task, thus justifying the appointment of Vyshinski, senior Vice Commissar for Foreign Affairs, as the Soviet representative on the Advisory Council on Italy.⁴¹ Articles in the press showed that the Soviet Government considers the right of Communist parties to function freely an integral part of the establishment of democracy in postwar Europe.

4. The criticism of the Polish Government in Exile continued while the Polish divisions operating with the Red army received much favorable publicity.

5. The press reminded neutral states of the service their neutrality was rendering to the enemy, but the strong emphasis on Turkey's entry

⁴⁰ Vol. I, p. 759.

⁴¹ The creation of this Council was provided for at the Moscow Conference; see *ibid.*, p. 758. For its organization and early operation, see vol. II, pp. 402 ff.

into the war just after the Moscow Conference was not followed up during the latter part of November.

6. Finland was treated by the press and in special lectures as a full-fledged vassal of Germany whose rulers should share equally with the Nazis their impending fate.

7. No comment was given to the Free German Committee in the Soviet press, but evidences of German atrocities against inhabitants of liberated areas were widely publicized.

8. Following up the inclusion of China in the Four-Nation Declaration, the press has given more attention to events in the Far East than in previous months and has revealed more clearly than heretofore with thinly disguised satisfaction the conviction that Japan was doomed to overwhelming defeat. An article in the navy paper *Red Fleet* bracketed Japan and Finland as examples of states which, while not at war individually with all members of the United Nations, were nevertheless within the category of common enemies of the United Nations.

9. On the home front the dominating theme continued to be patriotism and the development of national spirit in which socialism has become merely one aspect of Soviet life. Stalin's warning in his November 6 speech on the anniversary of the Revolution that despite victories complacency or slackening of effort would be a crime against the country, was utilized as a spur to production in industry and agriculture and to arouse all people to greater effort.

10. The role of the party in the war effort received greater attention than previously. It was revealed that 1,200,000 new members had been added to the party since 1940 totaling now 4,600,000.

11. The publicity given to letters to Stalin on his anniversary speech from leaders of all religions further demonstrates the intention of the Soviet Government to recognize religion as a factor in national life.⁴²

HARRIMAN

861.00/12040 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, December 17, 1943.

[Received December 18—2:40 p. m.]

2258. A decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet dated December 16 announced the postponement of elections to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR until December 1944 and the prolongation of the powers of the Supreme Soviet for that period.⁴³

HARRIMAN

⁴² For correspondence on the reestablishment of the patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church, and religious conditions in the Soviet Union, see pp. 855 ff.

⁴³ These elections had been previously postponed; see telegram No. 1081, December 11, 1942, 6 p. m., from the Chargé in the Soviet Union, *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. III, p. 483. On December 26, 1943, the announcement by the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic was published which also postponed until December 1944 the elections to the provincial and local councils of the Workers Deputies in that republic.

861.48/2740 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, December 20, 1943.

[Received December 22—2:34 p. m.]

2281. *Pravda* for December 20th cites a statement by Edward Carter⁴⁴ to the effect that during 1944 Russian War Relief intends to send supplies valued at 21 million dollars to the Soviet Union against a value of 16 million dollars this year.⁴⁵ It states that in the first 10 months of 1943 various medical supplies, clothing and food-stuffs to a value of 10¼ million dollars have been shipped to the Soviet Union.

HARRIMAN

860N.00/241a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)

WASHINGTON, December 23, 1943—5 p. m.

1449. Despatches this morning quote the Soviet paper *War and Working Class* as raising the question about the status of the Baltic States and condemning some individuals or persons in this country, who may or may not know anything about the subject, for alleged adverse comment on the Baltic boundary question to the Soviet Government.⁴⁶ This sort of controversy without any reference to its merits in any way, if kept up now and during the war by individuals in both countries will in the first place accomplish nothing good for either country, but what is much worse, it will play into the hands of the trouble-makers in this country with damaging effects on the splendid relations now existing between the two countries, and above all upon the great international cooperative movement and programs

⁴⁴ Edward C. Carter was president of the American Society for Russian Relief, Inc. (formerly Russian War Relief, Inc.), New York, N.Y.

⁴⁵ A handwritten notation on this telegram by Mr. Eldred D. Kuppinger, Assistant Chief of the Special Division, states that these figures were checked with the President's War Relief Control Board, which indicated that they were accurate and that they included contributions in kind as well as in cash.

⁴⁶ This article, written by Yustas Ignovich Paletskis (Paleckis), the President (Chairman) of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic, appeared in issue No. 14, December 15, 1943, of the periodical. A summary of its contents was sent by Ambassador Harriman in telegram No. 2321, December 24 (not printed). In the Embassy's comment it was pointed out that "The unusually sharp and at times violent tone of this article . . . is probably preparation for the moment, which may not be far off, when the Soviet armies reach the Baltic countries. The Soviet Government presumably anticipating certain difficulties before world opinion over this question is therefore re-emphasizing the Soviet position in the Baltic States and is laying down in advance the propaganda line to deal with any critics of its policy." (860N.01/98)

that are being carried forward by our and other nations and which must at all hazards be carried forward to a successful goal. This subject was not mentioned by anybody at Moscow and furthermore this Government and the British Government, I believe, have said that any and all boundary questions—and there are more than 30 in Europe—must necessarily await the termination of the fighting. The result is that nobody interested in the Baltic or other similar questions would suffer the least prejudice either way by pursuing the policy announced by the British and the United States Governments of awaiting the end of the fighting with respect to all such controversies. If you can tactfully get this view before the Soviet Government, it would be calculated to avoid what may soon become serious crimination and recrimination among irresponsible elements in this country, and perhaps in Russia, which would soon grow out of ordinary proportions.

HULL

093.612/25

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador of the Soviet Union
(Gromyko)*

WASHINGTON, December 30, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: I wish to refer to your notes of September 6 and October 11⁴⁷ regarding the desire of the Soviet Government to award a number of orders and medals to outstanding members of the armed forces and the Merchant Marine of the United States.

As I informed you on September 9, the Department submitted the matter to the appropriate military authorities of the United States Government for their approval. The Department has now received replies from the War and Navy Departments and the War Shipping Administration in which are contained lists of the Army, Navy, and Merchant Marine personnel who have been nominated to receive the awards so kindly offered by your Government. I am enclosing herewith copies of these lists.⁴⁸

The Department will communicate with the Embassy in the near future regarding the arrangements which will be made for the presentation of the awards.⁴⁹

Sincerely yours,

CORDELL HULL

⁴⁷ Neither printed; in the latter note the Soviet Government, in response to an inquiry of September 30, specified the orders and classes of medals it proposed to confer upon 25 men of the U.S. Army and Air Forces, upon 15 men of the Navy, and upon 10 officers and seamen of the Merchant Marine (093.612/26).

⁴⁸ Not printed.

⁴⁹ A further delay ensued in the presentation of the Soviet awards to United States personnel, while the policy of their acceptance was considered and the possible appropriate recipients were designated. The first awards were conferred on April 11, 1944.

860N.00/242: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, January 3, 1944—9 a. m.

[Received January 4—11:25 a. m.]

1. Personal for the Secretary. Friday evening I had an opportunity to explain to Molotov some of your views on the article on the Baltic States in the recent issue of *War and the Working Class* (referred to in your 1449, December 23, 5 p. m.).

I did not register objection to the fact that the question of the Baltic States was discussed in this article but limited criticism to the fact that the article involved directly or indirectly the Government of the United States and groups within the United States in such a manner as to lead to acrimonious public discussion in the United States which would react unfavorably to the growing solidarity between our two countries.

I referred specifically to your conversation with Molotov during the Moscow Conference⁵⁰ on the subject of public polemics and stated that you hoped he would continue to keep this matter in mind.

Molotov replied that he had not read the article in question but that he fully understood and sympathized with what you had in mind.

I also delivered to him without making further comment your message to the Greek Prime Minister.⁵¹

HARRIMAN

DISCUSSIONS RELATING TO POLICIES AND PROBLEMS, AND MISSIONS CONCERNED WITH THE PROSECUTION OF THE WAR, BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION, AT TIMES WITH BRITISH PARTICIPATION⁵²

*Treatment of Merchant Seamen in the Northern Ports of the Soviet Union; *Internment of American Bomber Crews in the Soviet Union; *Mission of General Bradley: Alaska-Siberia Airplane Ferry; Rumors of Possible Separate Peace Between Germany and the Soviet Union; Consideration of Ways to Improve Communications and Exchange of Information; Prospects of Cooperation With the Soviet Union on Post-war Policies; *Problem of a Second Front in Western Europe; Difficulties in Arranging for Convoys to Northern Ports of the Soviet Union; Ambassador Standley's Press Statement of March 8; Journey of Joseph E. Davies Carrying a Secret Message to Stalin; Visits of Sulzberger and Rickenbacker to Moscow; Czech Desire To Negotiate a Treaty With the Soviet Union; Establishment of a United States Military Mission at Moscow; Visit of Donald M. Nelson to the Soviet Union

⁵⁰ See memorandum of conversation, October 29, 1943, vol. I, p. 670.

⁵¹ Emmanuel J. Tsouderos.

⁵² Continued from *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. III, pp. 490-684. (The subtitles which are identical with those in the 1942 volume are here preceded by an asterisk.)

196.6/14681

Memorandum by Mr. G. Frederick Reinhardt of the Division of European Affairs

[WASHINGTON,] January 1, 1943.

Mr. Erich Nielsen of the War Shipping Administration asked me to attend a meeting on December 29 with Messrs. Scott and Hart of the British Merchant Shipping Mission to discuss the informal offer made by the Soviet Government to the British and American Governments to provide the officers and crews of British and American merchant ships in north Russian ports with certain ruble bonuses.

Mr. Nielsen said that the War Shipping Administration was of course in principle opposed to the payments of bonuses to American seamen by foreign governments but pointed out that in the present case the rubles to be provided the American and British seamen would have a very limited purchasing power in the Russian ports and absolutely none elsewhere, and that the ruble bonus proposed by the Soviet Government appeared to be the only feasible solution of the exchange problem,⁵³ although it in fact was tantamount to giving the seamen concerned a cheese sandwich with one glass of vodka a day. I confirmed Mr. Nielsen's estimate of the economic situation in Archangel and Murmansk and said that at the request of our Embassy in Kuibyshev we had instructed it to postpone informing the Soviet Government of our acceptance⁵⁴ of its proposal⁵⁵ in the hope of finding some solution of the problem which would be acceptable to the British as well as ourselves and thus avoid possible friction between British and American seamen in those ports.

Messrs. Scott and Hart evidenced an understanding of the problem and said they thought it might be possible to induce London to accept the Soviet proposal. In this connection they suggested that further discussion of the matter be postponed until the arrival in Washington of the British Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, who is expected to arrive in the near future on his way back to Moscow from London. They expressed the opinion that if the Ambassador approved, London would undoubtedly withdraw its objections. I stated that from our point of view it would also be better to postpone the matter pending Admiral Standley's⁵⁶ and Commander

⁵³ A special exchange rate for diplomats of 12 rubles for \$1 (British rate, 48 rubles for £1) went into effect on March 18, 1941. See telegrams No. 538, March 19, 1941, and No. 707, April 8, 1941, from the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, pp. 871 and 875, respectively. The unrealistic official rate of exchange had been fixed at about 5.3 rubles for \$1.

⁵⁴ See telegram No. 1121, December 21, 1942, from the Chargé in the Soviet Union, *ibid.*, 1942, vol. III, p. 678.

⁵⁵ See telegram No. 881, October 13, 1942, from the Chargé in the Soviet Union, *ibid.*, p. 654.

⁵⁶ Rear Adm. William H. Standley, American Ambassador in the Soviet Union.

Frankel's ⁵⁷ arrival in the Soviet Union because of their interest and responsibility in the matter.

Moscow Embassy Files : Lot F-96

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chargé in the Soviet Union
(Dooman)*

KUIBYSHEV, January 5, 1943.

Major McCabe ⁵⁸ brought to my attention this morning the report which Doctor Lang ⁵⁹ had made with regard to the physical condition of the five American Army aviators now interned near Molotov,⁶⁰ and I informed Major McCabe that I would be glad to represent to the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs the great desirability of transferring the aviators from Molotov to some point within the Soviet Union where the climate is more temperate than it is at Molotov, and the need for finding some work which would occupy the time and attention of the fliers. In view of the probability that considerable time would pass before the Soviet Government would come to a decision on any such questions, I suggested the desirability of asking that the Soviet Government permit the fliers to make a short visit either to Moscow or to Kuibyshev. Major McCabe was of the opinion that it would be desirable to make the representation which I had proposed.

Accordingly I called this afternoon on Mr. Zarubin ⁶¹ and made to him a statement along the lines above outlined. Mr. Zarubin replied that the questions of transferring the fliers from Molotov to any other point and of finding work for them seemed to him to lie within the jurisdiction of the military authorities, and he asked whether the matter could not be taken up by the Military Attaché,⁶² upon his return to Moscow, with the Soviet military authorities. I said that while I saw no reason to object to any such action on the part of the Military Attaché and would indeed suggest that he also approach the appropriate Soviet authorities, I could not admit that the welfare of our aviators was not a matter of concern to the Embassy. Mr. Zarubin said that he would of course take note of my requests and would refer them to the Soviet military authorities. He expressed

⁵⁷ Samuel B. Frankel, Assistant Naval Attaché and Assistant Naval Attaché for Air in the Soviet Union.

⁵⁸ Maj. Robert E. McCabe, Assistant Military Attaché in the Soviet Union.

⁵⁹ Lt. Comdr. Frederick R. Lang, Assistant Naval Attaché and Assistant Naval Attaché for Air in the Soviet Union.

⁶⁰ Interned at Okhansk near the city of Molotov, formerly called Perm.

⁶¹ Georgy Nikolayevich Zarubin, Chief of the American Section of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs.

⁶² Brig. Gen. Joseph A. Michela.

considerable interest in the proposal that the aviators be allowed to come to Moscow or Kuibyshev for a visit, and he said that he would communicate with me as soon as a decision had been taken in the matter.

E[UGENE] H. D[OOMAN]

Moscow Embassy Files : Lot F-96

The American Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union (Molotov)

No. L-27

Moscow, January 10, 1943.

EXCELLENCY : I have the honor to inform you that I have been instructed to deliver the following message, dated January 8, 1943, from President Roosevelt to Premier Stalin.

"After reading your reply to my radio concerning the Far East,⁶³ I am afraid I did not make myself clear. As I previously explained reference South Caucasus,⁶⁴ it is not practicable to send heavy bombers to Russia at this time other than in existing organized units. Our proposal regarding the one hundred planes referred to a situation which would occur if hostilities were actually to break out between Japan and Russia.

"Under such conditions, we calculated that by regrouping our air units in the Pacific theatre, one hundred planes in organized units could be concentrated in Eastern Siberia because their action as well as your battle there would enable us to reduce our air strength elsewhere in the Pacific theatre.

"My radio was intended to be in the nature of anticipatory protective planning against a possibility only.

"The immediate action recommended was in reference to the survey and discussions by General Bradley⁶⁵ with Soviet officials.

"Only by such preliminary survey and advance planning will it be possible to render reasonably prompt assistance in the event of an outbreak of hostilities in Siberia. I should like to send General Marshall⁶⁶ to Moscow for a visit in the very near future, and if this can be arranged, I hope that you will be able to discuss this matter with him at that time.

"He will be able to tell you about the current situation in Africa and also about planned operations for balance of this year in all war

⁶³ Premier Stalin replied to President Roosevelt's message of December 30, 1942, on January 5, 1943. For President Roosevelt's message to Stalin, see note No. L-26, January 1, 1943, from the Chargé in the Soviet Union to Foreign Commissar Molotov, *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. III, p. 683; for Stalin's reply of January 5, 1943, see Department of Defense, *The Entry of the Soviet Union Into the War Against Japan: Military Plans, 1941-1945*, p. 14.

⁶⁴ See note No. L-22, December 17, 1942, from the Chargé in the Soviet Union to Foreign Commissar Molotov, *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. III, p. 677.

⁶⁵ Maj. Gen. Follett Bradley had arrived in Moscow in August 1942, as leader of a special air mission to the Soviet Union with the personal rank of Minister. He returned to the United States for consultation in November.

⁶⁶ Gen. George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army.

theatres. I think this will be very helpful and he will have the latest news.

"Meanwhile I would appreciate an early reply to my proposal of December 30 that General Bradley and his party proceed without delay to the Far East for survey and staff discussions.

"My deep appreciation for the continuing advances of your armies. The principle of attrition of the enemy forces on all fronts is beginning to work."

Accept [etc.]

For the Ambassador :
LLEWELLYN E. THOMPSON, JR.
Secretary of Embassy

Moscow Embassy Files : Lot F-96

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Edward Page, Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union

[Moscow,] January 13, 1943.

Participants: Mr. Molotov, Commissar for Foreign Affairs
The American Ambassador
Mr. Page, Second Secretary of Embassy
Mr. Pavlov, Interpreter

1. The Ambassador opened the conversation by commenting in general on his thirty thousand mile trip to and from the United States and of his visits to Eritrea and Tashkent. He remarked that he was especially impressed with the great economic and agricultural developments in Uzbekistan and stated that he hoped to visit that area at a later date.

[Here follow references to the Ambassador's appreciation for Soviet courtesies, and other details.]

2. The Ambassador expressed his appreciation of the courtesy of the Soviet Foreign Office in furnishing the Embassy with copies of communications sent to the President by Mr. Stalin through Mr. Litvinov.⁶⁷ He explained that since he left the United States on December 20 he was out of touch with certain phases of recent American-Soviet relations and added that he would appreciate being brought up to date in respect to the status of the Bradley survey flight as proposed by the President. Mr. Molotov replied that he would furnish the Ambassador with a copy of Mr. Stalin's message to the President of January 13, sent through Mr. Litvinov, which would fully explain the situation. A copy of this message, received today, is attached.⁶⁸

⁶⁷ Maxim Maximovich Litvinov, Soviet Ambassador in the United States.

⁶⁸ *Infra.*

3. The Ambassador stated that he wished to discuss the question of the American bomber crew now interned at Okhansk. He said that Dr. Lang who had recently visited the men had reported that they were being well treated and that their physical condition was good; however, their mental condition was not good and this could mainly be attributed to the fact that the men had nothing to do. The Ambassador requested that the Soviet authorities arrange for the five members of the crew to participate in some useful professional work under parole in the Soviet Union. Mr. Molotov inquired into the nature of such work. The Ambassador stated that the men might well be used in aircraft assembly or related work, that they could be usefully employed in the office of the Military Attaché in Moscow. He added, as an afterthought, that they of course could even be released and permitted to return to the United States. Mr. Molotov smiled and stated that he would speak to the appropriate Soviet authorities in regard to the question raised by the Ambassador.

4. The Ambassador read to Mr. Molotov a paraphrase of telegram number 16 of January 8, 10 p. m. from the Department⁶⁹ regarding the operation of the southern section of the Iranian Railroad by the United States Army and stated that his government had expressed the hope that the Soviet Government would at an early date notify the Iranian Government of its position in regard to the transfer. He added that he understood that the Soviet Government was aware of the transfer plan and was in favor of it. Mr. Molotov stated that the Iranian Government was quite correct in believing that under the Anglo-Soviet-Iranian Treaty of Alliance⁷⁰ it should have Soviet consent to the plan to transfer operations to the American Army, but added that the American-British agreement regarding the actual transfer was not entirely clear to him. He asked the Ambassador exactly what the plan envisaged; for example, would American personnel operate the entire railroad replacing former Iranian personnel; would such personnel be military or civilian; for what term or duration would American operation be in effect; have Britain and the United States agreed on all details of the transfer; is the transfer plan secret or has it been made public. The Ambassador stated that he assumed that Mr. Smirnov, the Soviet Ambassador in Iran, had been fully informed of the transfer and the details thereof and had reported accordingly to his government. Mr. Molotov replied that Mr. Smirnov had indeed sent in some information on the transfer.

⁶⁹ Vol. iv, p. 438.

⁷⁰ Signed at Tehran on January 29, 1942; for text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, March 21, 1942, p. 249, or British Cmd. 6335, Persia No. 1 (1942). For correspondence regarding the reservations of the United States with respect to this treaty, see *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. iv, pp. 263 ff.

The Ambassador stated that he was not fully conversant with all the details of the transfer but that it was his understanding that American Army units under General Connolly⁷¹ would operate the southern section of the railroad, together with other transport routes and points on the Persian Gulf for the duration of the war and for the express purpose of increasing and expediting the shipment of supplies to Russia; that General Connolly had informed him that the carrying capacity of the road could be increased five-fold. Mr. Molotov stated that he would look into the question of Soviet notification to the Government of Iran and communicate again with the Ambassador.

5. The Ambassador briefly outlined to Mr. Molotov the Department's telegram number 19 of January 9, 1 p. m.,⁷² regarding the situation in North Africa and left with him in the form of a memo a paraphrase of the telegram. Mr. Molotov thanked the Ambassador for the information.

6. The Ambassador stated that he desired to have an interview with Mr. Stalin in order to convey to him certain personal messages from the President pertaining to the possible use of heavy arm bombardment units and the necessity for conferences and discussions as to the course of action when Germany is defeated, etc. He added that he had promised to bring Mr. Stalin some good American tobacco which he was doing and that an admirer in the United States had sent with the Ambassador a smoking set and another admirer in Asmara had sent with him a lighter. Mr. Molotov stated that he would inform Mr. Stalin of the Ambassador's wishes and would communicate with him.

7. The Ambassador stated that after his conversations with the President he felt sure that the presence in Moscow of special representatives of the President would not be required in the future and that future diplomatic representations would be handled by the Ambassador. In order to further this procedure, the Ambassador stated that he proposed to spend most of his time in Moscow. Mr. Molotov signified his approval of this proposal.

8. In conclusion Mr. Molotov commented briefly on the present Soviet military situation stating that although it was "not bad" the enemy was still deep in Soviet territory. However, he said that the Soviet public felt confident that Germany could and would be defeated. In reply to questions as to the situation in the United States the Ambassador stated that war production was satisfactory—for

⁷¹ Maj. Gen. Donald H. Connolly, commanding Persian Gulf Service Command from October 1942.

⁷² See footnote 7, p. 498.

example, forty-nine thousand planes had been produced in 1942 and there was reason to believe that this number would be doubled in 1943; that the American public was most anxious to get on with the war; and that the political situation was somewhat unsatisfactory since it was complicated by certain groups in the United States demanding of the Administration a statement of post-war policies. The Ambassador remarked that such a statement should be avoided at this time since it was impossible to know what situation or circumstances would prevail when the war terminated. Mr. Molotov appeared to acquiesce in this view. Mr. Molotov remarked that the slowing down of the African campaign had caused some disappointment in the Soviet Union and expressed the hope that the American advance would soon re-commence. The Ambassador stated that according to the information he had the American ground units had gotten ahead of their air support and that there would be certain delays until sufficient air installations had been constructed in order to assure the American Army of this support.

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*The People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union
(Molotov) to the American Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Standley)*

[Translation]⁷⁴

Moscow, January 13, 1943.

MR. AMBASSADOR: I wish to inform you herewith of the following message from Premier I. V. Stalin to President Franklin D. Roosevelt.

"I wish to express to you my appreciation for your decision to send to the Soviet Union 200 transport airplanes.⁷⁵

"With regard to the despatch of bombardment air units to the Far East I have already explained in former messages that we do not need air units but airplanes without aviators since we have more than sufficient aviators of our own. This in the first place. Secondly, we do not need your help in airplanes in the Far East where the U.S.S.R. is not in a state of war, but on the German-Soviet front where the need for air assistance is especially sharp.

"Your proposal that General Bradley should inspect Russian military objectives in the Far East and in other parts of the Soviet Union has caused perplexity. It is surely known that Russian military objectives can only be inspected by Russian inspectors just as American

⁷⁴ File translation revised by the editors.

⁷⁵ See note No. L-28, January 10, from the Ambassador in the Soviet Union to Foreign Commissar Molotov, p. 740.

military objectives can be inspected only by American inspectors. In this regard it is impossible to permit any kind of obscurity.⁷⁶

"With respect to General Marshall's trip to the U.S.S.R. I must say that the mission of General Marshall is not entirely clear to me. Please explain to me the object and tasks of this trip in order that I may seriously take the question under consideration and give you my answer.

"My colleagues are perplexed over the fact that operations in North Africa " have slowed up and that they have slowed up, one is saying, not for a short period but for a long time. Could I not receive from you some explanation of this question."

I have telegraphed the above message to Mr. Litvinov for transmission to Mr. Franklin D. Roosevelt.

Please accept [etc.]

V. MOLOTOV

740.00119 European War 1939/1244 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, January 21, 1943—5 p. m.

[Received 7:30 p. m.]

491. Italian officers furloughed home late December report having seen Christmas furlough orders German officers and men in which possessors instructed not report back to units in Russia but at specifically designated centers in Reich and France in event armistice concluded in meantime with Russia.

Reliable source reported on return here from Madrid that about mid-December serious people there were discussing (with little justification he thought) a separate German-Russian peace liberating German troops which by their pressure on Spanish frontier would cause Spain to grant them passage.

Zurich Consulate reports January 15 that German agents spreading rumors locally of possible early Russo-German understanding enabling Germany to concentrate efforts in West.

Legation note: Although quite possible Germany has at no time renounced hope separate peace with Russia and even may have been

⁷⁶The following statement appears in Department of Defense, *The Entry of the Soviet Union into the War Against Japan: Military Plans, 1941-1945*, p. 16: "As a result of this reply, the Bradley survey was called off. For the time being consideration of using air bases in Siberia for bombing missions against Japan was dropped. The Soviet attitude also made unlikely the possibility of establishing in the near future a northern route of approach to Japan via the Aleutians, the Kamchatka Peninsula, and the Kurile Islands. Nevertheless, the potential use of the northern route remained a factor in United States military planning."

⁷⁷For correspondence regarding the situation in North Africa, see vol. 11, pp. 23 ff.

making periodic soundings to that end the recurrence after several months interruption of stories of separate peace possibilities is interesting. Perhaps in order to bolster home and front morale for a month or so German official propaganda felt need to use insinuation in furlough orders of separate peace possibilities. Also possible that rumors in Spain and in Switzerland are simply part of German war of nerves against those countries. No other similar reports have recently come to attention of Legation.

HARRISON

861.4061 Motion Pictures/29 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, January 26, 1943—3 p. m.

[Received January 27—8:23 a. m.]

58. We have had discussions with the Soviet authorities with regard to the exchange of motion pictures and I consider it to be important that we take advantage of the good start that has been made by supplying at least a few films with the least possible delay. While I realize that, apart from newsreels, we shall have to rely upon sea transport for the supply of films I request that as an exceptional measure General George⁷⁸ be asked to arrange high air priority for six documentary films which should be obtained by Begg⁷⁹ through the Office of War Information. These should be lavenders or fine grain duplicating negatives of outstanding pictures on the following subjects: war training, production of war material, industry, agriculture, surgery, education and mining.

STANDLEY

740.00119 European War 1939/1274 : Telegram

The Chargé in Finland (McClintock) to the Secretary of State

HELSINKI, February 8, 1943—11 a. m.

[Received 2:39 p. m.]

221. French Military Attaché⁸⁰ last night told me that he had learned from number of sources that Ribbentrop⁸¹ is cherishing hope of a separate compromise peace between Germany and Russia on

⁷⁸ Maj. Gen. Harold Lee George, Commanding General, Air Transport Command, U.S. Army Air Forces.

⁷⁹ John M. Begg, Assistant Chief of the Division of Cultural Relations.

⁸⁰ Lt. Col. P. Ollivier.

⁸¹ Joachim von Ribbentrop, German Minister for Foreign Affairs.

terms of restoring to Russia frontiers it had when Hitler attacked in June 1941. Basis for his hope was said to be that protagonists of 1939 Soviet-Nazi Non-Aggression Pact⁸² were still in power in both countries and thus might return to their former association. When I remarked that this reasoning seemed to leave out the consideration that in meantime an immense war had intervened, my informant said that this was true but one could never tell what Russians thought.

McCLINTOCK

861.00/11975: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

KUIBYSHEV (MOSCOW), February 12, 1943—11 a. m.

[Received 9:28 p. m.]

151. I have been impressed by the unanimity of opinion among those of my colleagues who represent the states contiguous to the Soviet Union with respect to Soviet post war foreign policy. Although all agree that full and friendly cooperation with the outside world would assuredly serve the economic, social and political interests of this country, they are seemingly doubtful that such a policy is likely to be followed. For example, the Afghan Ambassador⁸³ expressed to me the opinion that although the Russians and British had formally agreed to work together in close and friendly collaboration for a period of 20 years after the war, he personally would not be surprised to find the Russians disregarding this agreement within 6 months or even 6 days—if it were in their interest to do so. He described Russian foreign policy as completely Machiavellian and maintained that “the Soviet system makes real cooperation impossible.” The Iranian Ambassador⁸⁴ remarked to me that “all of us” must expect continuing difficulties with the Russian “enfant gâté” and appeared to be very doubtful of Soviet cooperation after the war. Although he admitted that Stalin had assured him that the Soviet Union had no territorial aspirations in Iran and had promised that the Soviet troops would leave Iran upon the cessation of hostilities, he remarked with some cynicism “l'appétit vient en mangeant” and he did not appear to place much faith in Stalin's expressions of intentions. As I have previously reported, the Turkish Chargé is skeptical of Soviet postwar collaboration and of Stalin's desire wholeheartedly to enter

⁸² Signed at Moscow on August 23, 1939; for text, see Department of State, *Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941*, pp. 76-78, or *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945*, series D, vol. VII (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1956), pp. 245-247.

⁸³ Sultan Akhmed Khan.

⁸⁴ Mohamed Saed.

into a world union of nations. Although he has not been as outspoken, I feel sure that the Polish Chargé⁸⁵ shares these views. Of all the neighboring representatives, the Chinese have not thus far [expressed?] opinions on this question.

STANDLEY

861.24/1293 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, February 26, 1943—midnight.

[Received February 26—11:55 p. m.]

1452. We were told at the Foreign Office today that Foreign Office was not surprised that no mention was made of Allied aid to Russia in Stalin's February 23 order of the day.⁸⁶ As Soviets only on rare occasions make mention of Allied aid, it could hardly be expected in the view of the Foreign Office, that that would be done on the 25th anniversary of the Red army. Some significance is, however, attached by the Foreign Office to the reference in the order of the day to the absence of a second front in Europe and to the statement that the Red army is bearing the whole burden of the war. Of late, the Foreign Office points out, statements by the Soviets to this effect have been on the increase. Foreign Office believes that this indicates that Soviets are preparing to renew agitation on a rather big scale for a second front in Europe.

MATTHEWS

740.0011 European War 1939/28300 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Matthews) to the Secretary of State*⁸⁷

LONDON, March 2, 1943—midnight.

[Received March 3—7:30 p. m.]

1530. I called on Mr. Eden⁸⁸ this afternoon to ask the results of his conversation with Maisky⁸⁹ on current British difficulties with the Russians, particularly the question of basing British air squadrons

⁸⁵ Henryk Sokolnicki.

⁸⁶ See telegram No. 203, February 24, 4 p. m., from the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, p. 507.

⁸⁷ The text of this telegram, except for the memoranda, was repeated by the Department in telegram No. 118, March 6, 5 p. m., to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union with the indication that the texts of the memoranda would no doubt be made available to him by the British Ambassador, Sir Archibald Clark Kerr.

⁸⁸ Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

⁸⁹ Ivan Mikhailovich Maisky, Soviet Ambassador in the United Kingdom.

in north Russia for convoy protection. He told me that he had summarized his talk in a memorandum for the War Cabinet a copy of which he gave me together with his two memoranda handed Maisky on February 26, all of which I quote below for the Department's strictly confidential information. As stated in Eden's memorandum, Maisky made no comment in reply except to ask a minor point of detail. No specific indication, it will be noted, was given in Mr. Eden's War Cabinet memorandum that failure of the Soviet Government to accede to the British request for the basing of air squadrons in the north would necessarily result in reopening the whole Russian convoy question with the United States Government. Mr. Eden told me, however, that he had mentioned this to Maisky and that he would so inform Clark Kerr. The latter has been instructed to raise the question with Molotov along the lines of Eden's memoranda to Maisky.

I told Mr. Eden that I should, of course, be much interested to learn the results of British representations on this question and he promised to let me know.

The texts of the three memoranda follow:

I. EDEN'S MEMORANDUM FOR THE WAR CABINET

"I asked the Soviet Ambassador to come to see me this afternoon, when I said that I had a serious communication to make to him about the despatch of our Hampden squadrons to north Russia. We had been much perturbed to receive his message suggesting that instead of despatching the squadrons we should deliver the aeroplanes to the Russians and that they should provide the required air protection. For a variety of reasons this proposal was not acceptable. I then gave His Excellency the attached memorandum to read (Annex 1).

2. When Mr. Maisky had finished, I told him we attached great importance to this matter and reminded him of the losses which we had suffered on these northern convoys. I gave His Excellency the attached list containing details on these losses (Annex 2). Finally I said that the matter had been fully considered by the Chiefs of Staff and the Cabinet and that, if the Soviet Government felt unable to meet us, then we should have no alternative but to re-examine the whole question of the despatch of future convoys.

3. The Ambassador made no comment in reply, nor at any point during his reading of the document, except to ask for the location of the Measuring Set mentioned on page 2 of the memorandum. His Excellency said that he would report my observations to his Government."

"Annex No. 1.

In the Soviet Ambassador's communication of the 24th of February he informed me that the Soviet Government now suggest that the agreed proposal for the despatch of British squadrons to north Russia to provide air protection for convoys should be cancelled, and that the Soviet Government should itself provide the required air protection. The Soviet Government further suggest that the British aircraft in-

volved should be transferred to north Russia without the British personnel. This suggestion is based upon a lack of accommodation for the personnel.

The air protection of convoys depends upon a complicated procedure and requires considerable training and experience. A complete understanding between the naval and air forces involved is essential. The Soviet air personnel have no experience of British procedure covering enemy sighting reports, communications, codes and 'shadowing' and 'homing' methods. Direct communication between aircraft and naval escorts is, of course, an essential part of the convoy escort procedure. Apart from language difficulties, it would take many months for British and Soviet personnel to attain a satisfactory standard of mutual cooperation in this intricate kind of operation. For these reasons the suggestions that the Soviet forces could provide the necessary protection or that the Soviet authorities should exercise operational control of the British air squadrons sent to north Russia are clearly impracticable.

In these circumstances the additional air protection which is indispensable for the safety of the convoys must be provided by British squadrons under British operational control, if it is to be of any real use. The Soviet Ambassador has also intimated that the number of British personnel proposed to be sent is, in the Soviet Government's view, excessive. His Majesty's Government cannot agree that the efficient protection of the convoys should be impeded by attempts to operate the squadrons with fewer men than experience has proved essential. It is true that a smaller number were sent to north Russia last year, but this force was only designed to cover a single convoy. The present proposal is to cover a period of 5 or 6 months.

His Majesty's Government find it impossible to believe that the Soviet authorities are unable to provide accommodation for 760 officers and men in all. They feel confident that on consideration of the above arguments, which in their view are unanswerable, the Soviet Government will withdraw their proposals and give their final agreement to the British proposals for the operation of the British air squadrons in north Russia under British operational command as originally agreed.

In addition, His Majesty's Government must draw attention to the fact that the Soviet authorities are taking certain measures which must seriously jeopardize the safe passage of convoys.

For example, the Soviet authorities have sealed up and prevented the operation of the Measuring Set, the purpose of which is to interfere with the signals of the enemy aircraft shadowing the convoys, and thus prevent the attacking forces reaching them. The Soviet authorities have done this on the ground that certain permits for the introduction of the set into the Soviet Union have not been obtained. The set has been under trial for a considerable period and it is particularly important that it should be used for the current convoy. It is at this moment that the Soviet authorities on purely technical grounds choose to prevent the use of the set in the joint Anglo-Soviet interest. His Majesty's Government request that this set should be immediately released for use in order that it may be available for the convoy which should be reaching north Russia within a few days.

A still more serious interference with arrangements for the operation of the convoy is however the Soviet order that two out of four W/T transmitters at Polyarnoe and up to three transmitters at Archangel are to be closed down on the technical ground that no official permission for their operation has been obtained from Moscow. The facts are that these sets have been in use many months, and that the Soviet civil authorities have been fully informed in regard to their installation. The loss of these W/T transmitters would involve:

(a) A most serious loss in intelligence derived from enemy wireless. A large amount of enemy W/T traffic is intercepted at Polyarnoe both by British and Soviet stations and retransmitted to the British naval authorities in the United Kingdom. This will either have to cease or be greatly diminished. Moreover, direction finding bearings will be received if at all too late to have any value for immediate operational purposes.

(b) Serious difficulty in maintaining routine communications between the British naval authorities in the United Kingdom and north Russia and between British warships protecting convoys and the British naval authorities in north Russia. This would have a crippling effect on the whole of our communications connected with the routing and protection of the convoys.

(c) A reduction in the number of transmitters requested by the Soviet authorities would also most seriously interfere with communication with the British Ministry of War Transport on the subject of the administration of the convoys.

It is therefore essential that the full number of transmitters at present at Polyarnoe and Archangel should be allowed to continue in use. His Majesty's Government request that immediate instructions to this effect may be given to the Soviet authorities concerned.

Additional transmitters are now on passage to north Russia for communication between the bases from which the Royal Air Force aircraft will operate and between the bases and the aircraft themselves. These additional transmitters will be essential for the operation of the squadrons and it is requested that no impediment be put in the way of their installation and operation.

The Soviet Government have moreover in recent weeks introduced a series of vexatious formalities in connection with the landing and examination of British Government stores and official mail intended for the use of the British Naval and Ministry of War Transport personnel at north Russian ports and members of other British missions in the USSR. Similar vexatious formalities, restricting the day to day movements from ship to shore and vice versa of British personnel, have also been introduced. These formalities seriously interfere with the efficient and speedy execution by the British personnel in question of the work assigned to them in the organization of the convoy system. Such restrictions would not be imposed in the case of Soviet stores or personnel landing in the United Kingdom. Moreover, additional difficulties have been created by the action of the Soviet authorities in restricting the issue of Soviet visas to personnel whom the British authorities consider to be essential in north Russia for the efficient execution of the duties which have to be performed in connection with the operation of the convoy system. His Majesty's Gov-

ernment, who are responsible for the running and escorting of the convoys carrying supplies to north Russia for the Soviet forces, consider it essential that their proposals in regard to the operation of British air squadrons from north Russia should be accepted by the Soviet Government in their entirety and that no further difficulties should be created by the Soviet authorities concerned in respect of the other matters mentioned.

Annex No. 2.

Since the north Russian convoys began, we have lost in the course of them 2 cruisers, 10 destroyers and 6 other warships and 74 merchant vessels.

The number of Royal Navy officers and men killed on the north Russian route exceeds a thousand, besides those wounded and taken prisoner.

Merchant Navy figures of killed exceed five hundred, the wounded and those suffering from exposure probably exceed a thousand."

MATTHEWS

861.24/1317a : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley)

WASHINGTON, March 8, 1943—midnight.

125. A United Press report alleges you have stated in press interview that the Russian people have not knowledge of Lend-Lease,⁹⁰ Red Cross, and other incidental services rendered to Russia by this country. Please telegraph substance of any such remarks, if made.⁹¹

WELLES

861.24/1335

Memorandum of Press Conference of March 9, 1943, by the Chief of the Division of Current Information (McDermott)

Opening the press conference, Mr. Welles said he could imagine what the correspondents' questions were going to be this morning but he would go through the form of asking.

A correspondent then asked if Mr. Welles had any comment. In reply, Mr. Welles made the following comment for which permission was given to use as a direct quotation: "I have cabled Ambassador Standley asking him to let us have the text of what remarks he may have made. I have not yet received a reply and for that reason, until I have received a reply from the Ambassador, I am not going to comment in any detail on what was said, or alleged to have been said. I

⁹⁰ The Lend-Lease Act was approved March 11, 1941; 55 Stat. 31. For correspondence on Lend-Lease assistance furnished to the Soviet Union, see pp. 737 ff.

⁹¹ See telegram No. 139, March 9, 7 p. m., from the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, p. 631.

think I should make it clear, however, that whatever was said in this reported press conference was said without prior consultation with or reference to this Government. The understanding which exists between the United Nations in this great enterprise in which they are joined for the purpose of defeating utterly the Axis tyrannies and for the purpose of insuring the security and the liberties of the peoples of the United Nations would not be worth very much if it was not based upon complete trust and understanding between all of them. I believe that that understanding and trust exists and I am perfectly confident that anything that Ambassador Standley may have said could not have been intended to and did not cast any doubt on that trust and understanding. For the time being, I am going to limit myself to that brief statement."

A correspondent asked if Mr. Welles would care to make any comment on the Vice President's⁹² statement that the United Nations should avoid double-crossing Russia. The Acting Secretary said he had read the speech⁹³ of the Vice President and it seemed to him that the intention of the Vice President was very clear and any comment from him was unnecessary but he thought any questions the correspondents might have on that or other portions of the speech should be addressed to Vice President Wallace.

M. J. McDERMOTT

861.24/1341

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] March 9, 1943.

The Soviet Ambassador called to see me this afternoon at my request. The Ambassador asked me if I had any news with regard to Admiral Standley's statements to the press yesterday. I said that I had no reply as yet from Admiral Standley to the message I had sent him asking for a report on the statements which he had made, and that all I could say on the subject had been said to my press conference today. The Ambassador said that he had, of course, read the text of my remarks. The Ambassador had in his pocket a long list showing the publication in the Moscow press, both *Pravda* and the *Red Star*, of statements and speeches by officials of this Government showing the amount of assistance being furnished by the United States to the Soviet Government. The Ambassador read to me some excerpts from these newspaper publications.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

⁹² Henry A. Wallace.

⁹³ Speech delivered at Columbus, Ohio, on March 8, 1943; for text, see *Congressional Record*, vol. 89, pt. 9, p. A1087.

740.0011 European War 1939/28388 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary
of State*

Moscow, March 9, 1943—11 a. m.

[Received 1:15 p. m.]

131. Department's 118, March 6, 5 p. m.⁹⁴ The British Ambassador has shown me the full texts of the memoranda in question as well as a recent note from Molotov⁹⁵ in reply to certain British representations in the premises. This note stated that the Soviet Government adhered to its position in regard to the basing British air squadrons in north Russia and the protection of convoys, and in every instance accused the British of failing strictly to abide by their original agreements with the Soviet Government.

From my observation of the situation, the British have probably failed on various occasions strictly to live up to the letter of their agreements, thus justifying to some extent the Soviet grievances. However, it appears certain that the absence of a real spirit of cooperation on the part of Soviet officialdom in the north, and the presence of the obstructionist tactics and the petty annoyances so common in this country are also contributing factors in the present British-Soviet difficulties.

Clark Kerr appeared quite worried in regard to the situation and not at all optimistic in regard to future British-Soviet relations.

STANDLEY

741.61/994 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary
of State*

Moscow, March 9, 1943—6 p. m.

[Received March 9—4:55 p. m.]

138. The British Ambassador informed me that shortly after his return here he had an interview with Stalin in which he contrasted the freedom of movement and contacts enjoyed by Maisky in London to his isolated position in Moscow where, during his tenure of office, he had been totally deprived of the opportunity freely to associate with Soviet public figures or to visit Soviet institutions. To each of these statements he stated that "Stalin answered with a grunt".

⁹⁴ See footnote 87, p. 624.

⁹⁵ See telegram No. 1728, March 10, 9 p. m., from the Chargé in the United Kingdom, p. 633.

Clark Kerr then commented on the lack of cooperation of the Soviet authorities in exchanging military information and on their refusal to permit the majority of the British military mission to visit the front, pointing out that when certain of the mission were given this permission the occasion was heralded in advance as a very special event which turned out in fact to be a dress parade rather than a serious tour in which real military information was gathered. The Ambassador then advised Stalin that various changes were being made in his mission and that he hoped that upon the arrival of the new personnel the Russians would exhibit a more generous attitude in regard to the release of information. Stalin replied "certainly this would be done".

STANDLEY

861.24/1310 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, March 9, 1943—7 p. m.

[Received March 10—1:10 a. m.]

139. Yesterday in a press conference I made remarks along the following lines to the Moscow correspondents and stated that I could be quoted :⁹⁶

(1) Ever since I have been in the Soviet Union I have been carefully looking for recognition in the Russian press of the fact that the Russians are getting material aid from the United States not only through Lend-Lease but also the Red Cross and American Russian Relief. I have thus far failed to find any real acknowledgment in the press of this fact.

(2) There is no question that the American public knows that relief and other supplies are coming to the Soviet Union. However, the Russian people apparently do not realize this. It is not fair to mislead the American people who are giving millions of dollars and think that they are aiding the Russian people when at the same time the Russian people do not realize that this aid is coming from the American people. The American people are doing this out of friendship for the Russian people but the Russian people are not aware of this fact.

(3) Question: Why have the Soviet authorities not informed the people of this aid? The Soviet authorities seem to be endeavoring to create the impression at home as well as abroad that they are fighting

⁹⁶ The Ambassador's account of this statement and the circumstances in which it was made are published in William H. Standley and Arthur A. Ageton, *Admiral Ambassador to Russia* (Chicago, 1955), pp. 240-249.

the war alone and with their own resources rather than to acknowledge aid from anyone else.

(A) [4] Question: What is the present status of Lend-Lease legislation? I have heard that the new Lend-Lease bill has passed the Foreign Affairs Committee but as those who [are?] familiar with American legislative procedure know there is a long way from the Foreign Affairs Committee to the actual enactment.⁹⁷ Congress is rather sensitive; it is generous and big hearted so long as it feels that it is helping someone. But give it the idea that it is not—there might be an entirely different story.

(5) Question: Is there any change in the situation with respect to the exchange of military information? There is no obvious change in the Russian attitude regarding the exchange of information on the conduct the war.

I have been subsequently informed that the correspondents' despatches on the conference were passed late last night after considerable consultation and delay, that the Soviet censors appeared quite apprehensive and crestfallen and that it is likely that the authority of some high ranking official in the Soviet Government, possibly Molotov, was obtained before the despatches were released.

As I have informed the Department (see my 126, February 8, 6 p. m.⁹⁸) I have been endeavoring for more time and without success to obtain information on Lend-Lease benefits in the Soviet Union. I have discussed this question with Molotov, Vyshinski,⁹⁹ and Lozovski¹ and have emphasized the importance of releasing this information in the United States in view of pending Lend-Lease legislation.

I realize that my remarks may well cause displeasure to the Soviet Government and that there may be reverberations. The Department may wish to state that I was speaking in a personal capacity and that it was not consulted. However, I do not feel that we should sit back and continue to accept the ingratitude of the leaders of this country, especially insofar as relief supplies from the American people are concerned and I hope that my remarks may help clear the air by emphasizing to the Russian Government that we are not satisfied with their policy in this respect.

STANDLEY

⁹⁷ The Lend-Lease Extension Act was approved on March 11, 1943; 57 Stat. 20.

⁹⁸ Not printed.

⁹⁹ Andrey Yanuaryevich Vyshinski, First Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs.

¹ Solomon Abramovich Lozovsky, Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs.

740.0011 European War 1939/28442: Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, March 10, 1943—9 p. m.

[Received March 11—12: 18 a. m.]

1728. My telegram No. 1665, March 8, 9 p. m.² The text of the Soviet memorandum which Sargent has just sent me reads as follows:

"Secret. The Soviet Government, after taking cognizance of the memorandum delivered by the British Government on the 26th February, 1943,³ and giving careful consideration to all the questions contained therein, deems it necessary to state as follows:

(1) The Soviet Government has already informed the British Government that in view of the extreme difficulties of accommodating the personnel of British air squadrons in the Murmansk area, where air raids are unceasing, it considers the sending of the British air squadrons to this area unpracticable, inasmuch as the Soviet Government is able and ready itself to provide aerial protection of convoys with all the means at its disposal. The Soviet Government deems it necessary to confirm once more its former statement on the subject, avoiding any polemics on this question in a tone incompatible with our common interests.

With regard to the statement in the British memorandum that it is necessary to secure full coordination between the naval and air forces taking part in the operations, it is sufficient to mention that this task has so far been successfully carried out by the Soviet air forces, and its adequate fulfillment in the future can be fully secured. It cannot be again said [*gainsaid?*] that the Soviet air force has had great experience in operations for the protection of British convoys and all relative technical questions (methods of reporting the discovery of the enemy, signalling, et cetera) can be satisfactorily settled by the respective Soviet military authorities together with the British representatives.

It should be pointed out that the British air force in question would have to operate from Soviet territory and, in the first place, in Soviet zones. Consequently, the British air force first of all would have to combine its activities with the Soviet system of air protection and with the Soviet naval vessels and submarines which happened to be within the region of its operations. It is obvious also that the operations of the British air force in question would require, in a certain degree, protection from Soviet fighter planes, with which there would

² Not printed; it reported that Sir Orme Sargent, Deputy Under Secretary of State in the British Foreign Office, had indicated that the question of convoys would soon be considered with the United States, perhaps "on the highest level", and that "the British wish to take the position that the materials to be convoyed are here and ready if the Russians wish to come and transport them themselves; further that the British are even willing to provide the ships (though not the crews or the escort vessels)." (740.0011 European War 1939/-28372)

³ See telegram No. 1530, March 2, midnight, from the Chargé in the United Kingdom, p. 624.

have to be the closest possible cooperation in combined operations. This task, of course, would be much more successfully fulfilled if all the aircraft were manned by Soviet personnel.

It goes without saying that if the British Government would find it possible to put at the disposal of the Soviet naval command, which has now no lack of pilots, aircraft specially earmarked for transfer to Murmansk, without British personnel, then the question of the protection of convoys would be settled still more satisfactorily.

(2) The Soviet Government cannot agree with the statement made in the memorandum that the Soviet authorities are taking certain measures which would create a serious threat to the safe passage of convoys. On the contrary, the Soviet authorities have been taking and are taking all possible measures for facilitating the arrival of convoys to the northern ports of the USSR.

With regard to the sealing of the Measuring Set, it should be pointed out that this set, which was brought at the beginning of last summer and has been in use ever since, was imported into the USSR in infringement of the existing customs rules of the USSR. A respective act was made on the 18th February, 1943, by the Chief of the Murmansk Customs House, and the British representatives were officially informed of it.

A warning must be given that the Soviet authorities cannot overlook the infringement of the established rules. However, desiring to meet halfway the request of the British Government and in order to help the successful protection of the convoys, the Soviet Government gave instructions to reconsider this question and grant to the British naval authorities permission to use the Measuring Set, [on?] condition of the coordination of its work with the Soviet naval authorities in the north.

In regard to the British radio stations in the Soviet northern ports, it has been established that, in accordance with the request of the representative of the British naval mission, Commodore Courtenay, the Soviet naval authorities on the 7th March, 1942, gave permission to install eight British radio transmitters in Murmansk, Polazmaya [*Polyarnoye*] and Archangel. Hereby was exactly stated the limits of power for every transmitter. The British naval mission, however, without the consent of the Soviet authorities, increased the power of its transmitters, and in certain cases multiplied the original power several times. In connection with this, on the 22nd of February, 1943, the People's Commissariat of the Navy gave instructions to the respective authorities to propose to the British representatives of the naval mission in the north to reduce the power of its radio transmitters, i.e., to bring them into conformity with the power—strength agreed upon at the beginning. The Naval Commissariat, however, has not yet given instructions to close down these transmitters. Simultaneously, it was pointed out that, if the British representatives considered it necessary to increase the power of their radio transmitters, they should apply on this question to the Soviet Naval Command for the necessary permission.

The Soviet Government would like to bring to the knowledge of the British Government that the above decisions of the Soviet naval authorities are based on the rules in operation in the Soviet Union, according to which not a single foreign radio station can be opened

on the territory of the USSR without special permission of the competent authorities.

Taking into account the request of the British Government, the Soviet Government gave instructions that the desire of the British naval mission for a certain increase of power for the registered British radio transmitters necessary for the operation of the convoy system should, as far as possible, receive consideration on the part of the Soviet naval authorities.

(3) On the vexatious formalities mentioned in the memorandum concerning the method of disembarkation, control of British Government goods, mail, et cetera, the Soviet Government is not quite clear what is meant by the memorandum. If on this question certain concrete facts could be submitted confirming the existence of certain vexatious formalities, the Soviet Government is prepared to give instructions to remove them or possibly to modify the established rules.

Insofar as in the British memorandum are also mentioned formalities concerning the control of official and ordinary post passing through the northern ports, the Soviet Government would like to call the attention of the British Government to the following infringements on the part of British personnel:

For instance, in August 1942, on the British boat *Trumble* there were brought into the U.S.S.R. 22 postal packages; on the 26th August, 1942, on the boat 1-30, 23 packages; on the 18th November, 1942, 70 packages—all without the necessary permit of the Soviet authorities. The British Embassy was duly informed about these infringements of the Soviet rules and in certain cases, desiring to meet the request of the Embassy, exceptions were made and the post was allowed to go through without the necessary documents. On this question the Foreign Commissariat sent to the British Embassy letters on the 31st August, 1942, the 7th September, 1942, 8th December, 1942, and the 19th, December, 1942. The Soviet Government therefore, is entitled to expect that the British Government will give the necessary instructions to the respective British authorities to adhere to the existing rules of the U.S.S.R. on this matter and not to infringe them.

The Soviet Government is of the opinion that in the practice of collaboration and joint work of the Soviet and British military authorities it is desirable and unavoidable that certain mutual concessions and exceptions should be made, whether on the question of visas, or receipt and despatch of post, or customs regulations, etc. The Soviet Government, however, believes that both governments must accept as a fundamental principle to honour the rules and regulations established in the other's country and correspondingly instruct its subjects, including representatives of military authorities, to comply strictly with this principle. Moscow, March 3, 1943."⁴

MATTHEWS

⁴ The difficulties faced in getting convoys through to the Soviet Union by the northern route were discussed between British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Anthony Eden, at this time in Washington, and President Roosevelt, as well as by Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill and the President by cables. In view of existing conditions, the British Prime Minister communicated the joint decision to Premier Stalin on March 30, 1943, that convoys would now be stopped, nor could they probably be resumed before early September. See Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War: The Hinge of Fate* (Boston, 1950), pp. 752-755; *ibid.*, *Closing the Ring* (Boston, 1951), pp. 256-258.

861.24/1325 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, March 11, 1943—4 p. m.
[Received March 12—2:50 p. m.]

145. My 139, March 9, 7 p. m. I called on Molotov last night at my request to inform him of the contents of the Department's 122, March 8.⁵ Upon conclusion I asked him whether he had any matter he wished to bring up. Molotov stated he desired to discuss my recent press conference. He said that he did not question my right to make the remarks attributed to me but speaking frankly he did not agree with me.

Molotov then stated that the Soviet press publishes all statements made in America and England on military aid to the Soviet Union; that the Soviet public knows from first hand in form made available by American leaders what aid is coming from America; that both he and Stalin had expressed their gratitude on a number of occasions for the material assistance rendered; and that both the Soviet Government and people did not underestimate the importance and significance of that assistance. He stated that his Government did not consider it advisable to emphasize in the press the importance of the assistance since such a move would attract the attention of the Axis and result in increased pressure on the convoys.

I stated that my press interview was an informal affair in which in discussing the general situation here the question of American relief supplies came up; that I had remarked in passing that I had seen no evidence in the Soviet press concerning the receipt or distribution of American relief supplies not from Lend-Lease aid and that I was somewhat perturbed at this fact since I knew that the American people were digging down into their pockets out of sheer good will and friendship for the Russian people and were getting no recognition therefor. I said that I had made no assertion that the supplies were not being distributed. Molotov reverted to his contention that the Soviet public was aware of the receipt of Lend-Lease aid stating that the man in the street knew by heart the number of tanks and planes received from America. I said unfortunately my enforced isolated position prevented me from having contacts with the Soviet public or from knowing its thoughts.

Molotov then asked me whether I made a distinction between Lend-Lease aid of the value of approximately \$2 billion and relief supplies amounting to the insignificant figure of about 10 million. I replied in the affirmative stating that as Lend-Lease was a business transaction between the two governments, relief supplies were a

⁵ Not printed.

charitable manifestation of good will and friendship on the part of the American people and for this reason assumed considerable importance in my estimation.

In regard to the former I reminded Molotov of my thus far unsuccessful attempts to obtain information on the benefits of Lend-Lease in the Soviet Union, remarking that in so far as I was aware the only definite information we had on the subject was Stalin's reply to Cassidy last fall.⁶ Molotov questioned the wisdom of accepting in March the Stalin-Cassidy letter of October since he opined that it had now lost its actual significance. I replied that with nothing else to go on and with the Lend-Lease question now before the American Congress and people I could not believe that it had lost all its importance. I remarked that newspapermen returning from the front, as well as General Hurley,⁷ have informed me that they had seen no evidence there of American tanks or planes. Molotov expressed surprise and stated that it was probable that Hurley and the press had visited sectors at which American equipment was not being used, that he was sure that such equipment was in use on other sectors.

Throughout the conversation, which was on a very friendly plane and devoid of any spirit of asperity or wrangling, Molotov, while emphasizing that the Soviet public had been kept advised of Lend-Lease aid and was grateful to America therefor, made no claim to the fact that there had been any publicity in the Soviet Union, or that the Soviet public was aware of the extent of American Russian relief or Red Cross supplies coming here. I, on the other hand, pointed out that I was personally interested in that question, since it was a matter of mutual good will and friendship between the Russian and American people and that my remark to the press had been animated by that thought alone. I stated that far more importance was given to my remarks than necessary and that I regretted the misinterpretation that had been placed upon them and the resulting uncalled for publicity.

In conclusion I stated that I hoped that my remarks would not have a detrimental effect on American-Soviet relations. Molotov stated "No, I do not believe so; perhaps they will have a useful effect in America".

⁶ For Premier Stalin's reply of October 3, 1942, to Henry Cassidy, the Associated Press correspondent in Moscow, see telegram No. 858, October 6, 1942, from the First Secretary of Embassy at Kuibyshev, *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. III, p. 461.

⁷ For report of a conversation between Premier Stalin and Maj. Gen. Patrick J. Hurley, Special Representative of President Roosevelt, see telegram No. 464, November 15, 1942, 7 p. m., from the Chargé in the Soviet Union, *ibid.*, p. 655; see also telegram No. 523, December 8, 1942, 8 p. m., from the Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union, for General Hurley's report of his visit to the Stalingrad front, and telegram No. 464, December 29, 1942, 6 p. m., from the Minister in Iran, for General Hurley's report on his inspection of the Caucasus front, *ibid.*, pp. 668 and 679, respectively.

I can only attribute the meaning of this remark to Molotov's realization that perhaps public sentiment at that time in America is too emotionally inclined toward the Soviet Union and that possibly a dash of cold water might be beneficial.

I have carefully refused to amplify or further discuss my remarks except with Molotov. If I had realized the repercussions of my comments I certainly would not have stated them without consulting the Department. Once made, however, and after noting the repercussions I am impressed at the conflagration caused by such a small spark and I cannot help feeling that when there is so much inflammable tinder about, it is well to expose it to air before it becomes too late. For this reason from my isolated position here I do not believe that my remarks will have an ill effect in the long run. On the contrary they may well help in placing our relations with Russia on a more realistic basis which in my opinion could contribute to closer understanding and good will now and in the postwar period.

STANDLEY

740.0011 European War 1939/28325

Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Henderson) to the Acting Chief of the Division (Ather-ton)

[WASHINGTON,] March 15, 1943.

MR. ATHERTON: You will recall that I introduced Captain Mirles, of the Free French Squadron in the Soviet Union, to you. The mother of Captain Mirles was Russian and he should be regarded as extremely pro-Russian and to an extent pro-Soviet. I considered him as an exceptional[ly] fine type of French Army officer.

You will note that in his talk with Mr. Gallman⁸ he said that "Citizens in general in Russia . . .⁹ know nothing about the efforts we and the British have made and are making to send equipment to Russia". Captain Mirles, who works closely with Soviet Army officers, told me the same thing with greater emphasis. In my own mind I am absolutely convinced that he is right. It would appear that since the Ambassador's statement to the press, for the first time in fifteen months Soviet officials are acknowledging the helpfulness of British and American supplies.¹⁰

⁸ Waldemar J. Gallman, First Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union. The conversation was reported in his despatch No. 7734, February 16; not printed.

⁹ Omission indicated in the original memorandum.

¹⁰ Public recognition of the value of American assistance was given by Ambassador Litvinov at a luncheon on March 11 with the Executive Staff of the Lend-Lease Administration (Embassy of the Soviet Union, *Information Bulletin*, No. 26, March 13, 1943, p. 1) and in the Soviet press by publication of several statements by the Lend-Lease Administrator, Edward R. Stettinius, Jr. See *infra*, and *New York Times*, March 11, 1943, p. 3, col. 1, and March 15, 1943, p. 4, col. 5.

800.24/624 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, March 15, 1943—5 p. m.

[Received March 15—4:31 p. m.]

166. *Pravda* of March 15 devotes practically half its foreign news page to a Tass¹¹ despatch from Washington dated March 11 containing Stettinius report on the fulfillment of the Lend Lease Act. This despatch constitutes by far the most comprehensive account of Lend Lease activities that has yet appeared in the Soviet press.

Eden's recent statement before a Washington press conference is also widely covered.

STANDLEY

[The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Anthony Eden, visited in Washington between March 12 and 30, 1943. A detailed account of discussions with him concerning relations with the Soviet Union and Germany, and consideration of future policy toward them, are in the memorandum of March 16 by Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles, printed on page 19.]

861.24/1354 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, March 22, 1943—10 p. m.

[Received March 23—12:10 p. m.]

192. My 139, March 9, 7 p. m. On January 21 in conversation with Khavinson Director of Tass I referred to the large contributions made by the American people to Russian relief and Red Cross as distinct from Lend-Lease aid and expressed my concern lest the Russian people were not cognizant of this expression of American friendship and sympathy. I have also spoken to Lozovski informally on the same theme.

So far as I am aware there has been no reference whatsoever in the Soviet press either before or after my press conference under reference to American-Russian relief or Red Cross supplies coming to this country and I can find no real evidence that the Soviet public in general has any knowledge that such relief exists. The Consul Gen-

¹¹ Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union, official communication agency of the Soviet Government.

eral in Vladivostok ¹² informs me that he has no knowledge that relief supplies medicinal or otherwise are being distributed to the civilian population of his area, that he was unaware that relief supplies from abroad were being sent to the Soviet Union and that although American food products and small quantities of American shoes and clothing appear in local shops from time to time such goods are not referred to or identified as relief supplies and are sold at prices approximately the same as the state shop prices for like Soviet goods. He also states that no American medicines or hospital supplies have been made available for the needs of the civilian population of his area.

The American representative in Murmansk reports that insofar as he is aware the population of that area does not know that relief supplies are arriving from America; in any case such supplies are not being distributed free of charge. From Archangel I am informed that the population of that area believes that everything arriving from abroad is being paid for by the Soviet Union and that Britain and the United States are growing rich at Russia's expense. The few Soviet contacts accessible to the Embassy in Moscow and Kuibyshev are not aware of American civilian relief supplies and in general the impression seems to prevail in these circles that all supplies sent to Russia from abroad are being paid for.

The only real evidence I have obtained of American relief actually in Russian hands was furnished me by a Czech liaison officer who informed me that American cigarettes are occasionally distributed among Soviet troops. He gave me a sample package of these cigarettes, "Wings" by brand, which had enclosed under its cellophane cover a card depicting American workers shoving forward a tank and containing the words "Solidarity Greetings from American Workers from the Front Line Fighters' Fund of the International Workers Order".

I am informed, however, by Scovell ¹³ that it is his understanding that American relief supplies are handled through the Russian Red Cross and that they are probably distributed only in those areas where they are most needed. It is therefore likely that I would have no information as to the actual distribution.

The fact remains, however, that the Soviet public at large is not aware of the relief.

I have been advised that on several occasions recently Soviet censors have not permitted American correspondents to state in their despatches that there has been no reference in the Soviet press to American

¹² Angus I. Ward.

¹³ Robert J. Scovell, Assistant Director of the American Red Cross in the Soviet Union.

relief or Red Cross supplies coming to this country. For example, the following sentence was stricken out of a broadcast to the United States recent[ly] made by an American radio commentator in Moscow: "The Russian people also have no idea of the scope of such American and British organizations such as the aid to Russia and the Red Cross. They know virtually nothing of the tremendous personal interest the people of the United States and other Allied nations are taking in their problems."

It is not unlikely that the Soviet Government is guided in its internal policy relative to the recognition of relief from abroad by an inordinate pride which makes it insufferable to admit especially to the Russian people that it is unable adequately to provide for them with the enormous resources at its disposal and that it is accepting charity from abroad and from "capitalist countries" which according to the Kremlin have never been friendly disposed to the Russian people.

It seems to me that the Russian-American relief organization is only working at 50% in efficiency since, while it is undoubtedly popularizing the Soviet Union in the United States, it is failing by reason of internal policy here to develop reciprocal friendly feeling among the Russian people toward America. Such organizations can greatly contribute to better understanding between two nations and if properly guided can be of real value in obtaining those postwar objectives which we are endeavoring to realize.

In view of the basic sensitiveness of the Soviet Government in respect to the question of relief, I fear that it might be inadvisable to attempt to do anything to correct this unfortunate situation at this time. However, I feel that the Department should be fully advised of it.

STANDLEY

196.6/1500 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State*¹⁴

Moscow, March 26, 1943—5 p. m.

[Received March 27—4:26 a. m.]

212. Department's 414, December 15.¹⁵ I have received a letter dated January 27 from Admiral Land stating in effect that the British Shipping Mission in Washington has protested the action of the War

¹⁴ The substance of this telegram was sent in a letter of April 2, 1943, by Assistant Secretary of State Breckinridge Long to Rear Adm. Emory S. Land, War Shipping Administrator.

¹⁵ *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. III, p. 676.

Shipping Administration in accepting the offer of the Soviet Government on the ground that British and American seamen should be treated on a common basis and that the British are unwilling to accept the offer¹⁶ because of: (1) Objection in principle to payments of gratuities by a foreign Government (2) the fact that the Soviet proposal makes no provision for British crane ship crews in north Russia or for survivors of lost ships.

Land states that British suggest that the British Ambassador and myself jointly refuse the offer and at the same time urge the Soviet Government to extend the diplomatic exchange rate to British and American crews. He requested my views on "whether in view of the foregoing it is more desirable to endeavor to maintain a common policy with the British in this matter or independently to accept the Soviet offer; and any other recommendations I may care to make."

Please inform Land that I have just received his letter and suggest to him that because of great delays in communications further correspondence be addressed to the Department for transmission by cable to me.

Subject to the Department's approval also advise him that I regard it as essential that we maintain a common policy with Britain in this matter; that although I feel that the most reasonable and practical solution is the extension of the diplomatic exchange rate, in view of the repeated categoric refusal of the Soviet Government to agree to this suggestion it would appear that the maintenance of such a common policy could be more easily realized by the acceptance of the Soviet proposal by the British and ourselves. In this event I feel sure that the Soviet authorities could be prevailed upon to extend similar provisions to survivors and crane ship crews. I do not believe that it would be advisable to refuse the Soviet offer outright unless we have some workable alternative to present which is likely to be accepted by the Soviet Government. From past experience I do not believe that the diplomatic exchange rate constitutes such an alternative. I am primarily interested in obtaining some fair and workable treatment for our seamen in the north and if the Soviet proposal is acceptable to the War Shipping Administration it would seem that such an objective might be attained [*attained?*] by adopting it. I, therefore, suggest that the Board endeavor to prevail upon the British to accept this compromise proposal and thus attain common treatment and a common Anglo-American policy.

STANDLEY

¹⁶ See memorandum of January 1, 1943, by Mr. G. Frederick Reinhardt, p. 614.

740.00114A Pacific War/384 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, March 29, 1943—3 p. m.

[Received March 30—9:55 a. m.]

220. Reference Secretary Stimson's¹⁷ letter of November 16, 1942, and Department's reply thereto¹⁸ concerning interned bomber crew.

I have discussed this question on a number of occasions with Molotov. Am now informed by my Military Attaché that the Soviet military authorities have advised him that the crew would be moved shortly to Ashkhabad and that there they would be permitted to engage in useful professional work with the Soviet civil air fleet.

I intend to send a member of the Embassy staff together with a doctor to visit the crew in the near future.

Please advise War Department.

STANDLEY

861.4061 Motion Pictures/40 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, March 31, 1943—1 p. m.

[Received April 3—3:51 p. m.]

225. I am forwarding by airmail a report¹⁹ on the exchange of information between the United States and the Soviet Union of which the following is a summary:

Upon my return to Moscow in January I called on the heads of the Soviet Film Industry, Voks,²⁰ Tass (news agency) and the Soviet Broadcasting Center—explaining my desire and plans to further the development of friendly relations by an exchange of information which would make the peoples of our two countries better acquainted with each other and with their respective institutions. I asked them to cooperate with Commander Young²¹ whom I had brought to Moscow to explore the situation and assist in this work. I emphasized that this should be a two way affair and outlined the contributions which we were prepared to make. The Soviet authorities were par-

¹⁷ Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War.

¹⁸ Neither printed; but see telegram No. 508, November 30, 1942, from the Chargé in the Soviet Union, *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. III, p. 664.

¹⁹ Despatch No. 78, April 7, not printed.

²⁰ All Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries.

²¹ Comdr. John C. Young, Assistant Naval Attaché for public relations at the American Embassy in the Soviet Union.

ticularly gratified at the arrangements I had been able to make with the cooperation of General George²² for the transportation of material by air to and from the United States.

During a meeting previous to the above held with Mr. Lozovsky, Vice Commissar of Foreign Affairs in Kuibyshev, he responded to my proposed program and stated that he was not only grateful but would challenge me in this exchange. He stated further that they would attempt to outdo any effort we would make. Even though they expressed their desire to cooperate the results have not been wholly satisfactory. The present situation with respect to the three major [media] dissemination of information is in brief as follows:

Motion Pictures.

Greatest success has been achieved in the exchange of motion pictures and this field offers the greatest promise for future development. We have delivered to the Soviets 35 issues of United Newsreel²³ and excerpts from these have been incorporated into the regular Soviet newsreel. Sixteen Soviet newsreels have been forwarded by air to the United States. We have arranged screenings of American feature pictures for the Soviet Film Committee and are informed that contracts for the public display of eight such pictures are under negotiation. We have also forwarded to the United States Soviet films concerning the war and arrangements have been made between the United States military and naval authorities for the exchange of training films.²⁴ Our greatest present difficulty in transportation is not from America to Tehran but between Tehran and Moscow which is the Soviet responsibility.

Press.

Space given to American news in the Soviet press is satisfactory compared to that given other countries but leaves much to be desired. Glossy prints are being supplied to Tass and some have been published. Copies are also supplied to Voks through which they receive limited distribution. Arrangements are being made to install for Tass a radio-photo trans-receiver. We understand that press telegrams are being exchanged by Office of War Information and the Soviet Information Bureau but we get no information of this from the Soviet

²² Maj. Gen. Harold Lee George, Commanding General, Air Transport Command, U.S. Army Air Forces.

²³ Since January 1, 1943; prior thereto only three United Newsreels had been received in the Soviet Union.

²⁴ Ambassador Standley, in his despatch No. 78, April 7, concluded: "It will thus be seen that considerable progress has been made in the exchange of motion pictures and I believe that we can accomplish more in this field than in any other to increase the knowledge and understanding of the United States in the Soviet Union." (861.4061 Motion Pictures/45)

authorities here. We are supplying Tass with microfilms of American newspapers.²⁵

Radio.

We are arranging to supply the Soviet broadcasting authorities with recordings of American music. We are informed that they have declined to use radio recorded programs in Russian which were prepared in London by the British. The Soviet Government has not replied to our request for permission to send an Office of War Information representative to Moscow to conduct propaganda broadcasts directed to Germany in German. Some American news is broadcast on the Soviet radio—generally items taken from the press—and facilities are provided for representatives of NBC²⁶ and Columbia systems to broadcast to the United States.

Although I consider our present program to be well worth while, the Soviet authorities are not satisfactorily carrying out their part of this exchange for better relations. From the survey made, however, I do not believe that we can make much further progress unless the matter is taken up with high authorities in an effort to reach an agreement to have this work handled by an agency especially equipped to do so. The dissemination of information in the Soviet Union is completely controlled and centralized and the slightest deviation from the prescribed course is a matter of high policy. Our present contacts, the heads of press films and radio, are obviously going as far as their official directives permit and I have not felt it desirable from a political point of view to take the matter up with higher authorities.

The present Soviet attitude is indicated by the fact that despite the efforts of the British Ambassador, the representatives of the British Ministry of Information have not been allowed to operate in Moscow but are obliged to carry on their work in Kuibyshev.

If the Department feels that it would be expedient to press the Russians in this matter and that such a course is desirable, I shall discuss the situation with Scherbakov, head of the "Soviet Information Bureau" and with Molotov. If these high Soviet authorities are favorably inclined, I would suggest that the Office of War Information, as a preliminary to establishing an office here, be asked to send

²⁵ Ambassador Standley stated in his despatch No. 78, April 7: "Space given in the Soviet press to American news is satisfactory compared to that given to other countries but cannot be considered adequate and the disparity between the publicity which the Soviet Union receives in the United States and the meager publicity which we receive here is most striking. . . . While the tone of the Soviet press cannot be said to be unfriendly toward the United States and has greatly improved during the past year there is no noticeable effort to create or even admit of a friendly feeling toward the United States and most news items consist of communiqués or reports of speeches and statements by American officials." (861.4061 Motion Pictures/45)

²⁶ National Broadcasting Company.

a high official of the calibre of Mr. Sherwood ²⁷ or Mr. Carroll ²⁸ of London to Moscow to consult with us and decide upon a definite program.

I should appreciate receiving an indication of the Department's views.

STANDLEY

740.0011 European War 1939/28969 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, April 13, 1943—3 p. m.

[Received 9:23 p. m.]

297. The Military Attaché informs me that the Soviet military authorities have made a start toward providing him with information concerning the enemy. So far this has been confined to the identification and disposition of German troops but the Soviets have agreed in principle to Michela's request that information be furnished on German tanks, air corps weapons and equipment, and tactics.

STANDLEY

121.861/137 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley)

WASHINGTON, April 13, 1943—5 p. m.

229. Personal for the Ambassador. The President is planning in 2 or 3 weeks to send former Ambassador Davies ²⁹ to the Soviet Union in order to deliver an important and secret message to Stalin. Although while in the Soviet Union Mr. Davies will be carrying out orders received directly from the President he will nevertheless be under instructions to report to you immediately upon his arrival. I am sure that you and he will cooperate fully.

Please, therefore, seek an early interview with Molotov, inform him of the President's plan, and ask if it would be agreeable to Stalin for you to present Mr. Davies to him in about a month.³⁰

²⁷ Robert E. Sherwood, Director of Overseas Operations, Overseas Operations Branch, Office of War Information.

²⁸ Wallace Carroll, Deputy Director, Propaganda Warfare, European, Overseas Operations Branch, Office of War Information.

²⁹ Joseph E. Davies was Ambassador in the Soviet Union during 1937 and part of 1938.

³⁰ In telegram No. 321, April 16, 4 p. m., Ambassador Standley informed the Department that Molotov had told him that "Stalin will, of course, receive Mr. Davies at any time the President so desires." Mr. Davies and his companions arrived in Moscow on May 19.

You will be advised of Mr. Davies' travel plans ³¹ immediately after the receipt of the Soviet reply.

HULL

196.6/15173

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. G. Frederick Reinhardt of the
Division of European Affairs*

[WASHINGTON,] April 22, 1943.

Participants: Erich Nielsen, War Shipping Administration
Mr. William Hart, British Merchant Shipping Mission
G. F. Reinhardt, State Department.

The meeting was called by Mr. Nielsen for the purpose of discussing with Mr. Hart, Admiral Standley's most recent telegram, Moscow's 212, March 26, 5 p. m., on the subject of the Soviet offer to advance certain sums of rubles to American and British seamen in North Russian ports.

After some discussion on the subject, Mr. Hart agreed to transmit to London the substance of Ambassador Standley's most recent message and to encourage his principals to agree to a joint Anglo-American acceptance of the Soviet offer with the understanding that any moneys given by the Soviet Government for distribution to American and British seamen would be given to American and British shipping representatives or the masters of the individual ships and not distributed directly by Soviet officials to the seamen concerned.

Mr. Hart promised to inform us as soon as he had received an indication of London's reaction to this suggestion.

861.24/14743

*The Consul General at Vladivostok (Ward) to the Ambassador in the
Soviet Union (Standley)*

[Extract]

VLADIVOSTOK, May 5, 1943.

DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: Some weeks ago there were comments in the Soviet press and on the foreign radio regarding statements made

³¹ The personnel of the group to go with Mr. Davies was set originally at 6 and, with the airplane crew, at 13 in all. A total grant of \$25,000 was made available for the trip from the Emergency Fund for the President, of which not to exceed \$5,000 could be used for objects of a "confidential nature, including such entertainment as in your [Davies'] discretion may be necessary." A per diem not to exceed \$25 a day for about 6 weeks was considered essential for the members of the party "in view of the high cost of living and the adverse exchange situation which exists in the Soviet Union." (121.861/138a, 140a, 140b)

by you at Moscow indicating that in your opinion the Soviet people in general are not aware of the extent of Lend-Lease aid to the Soviet Union. I agree with you in this matter. Notwithstanding that Vladivostok is the port of entry and transshipment of the overwhelming volume of Lend-Lease supplies shipped transpacific to the Soviet Union I find that even the people here are almost totally ignorant of the significance and terms of Lend-Lease and have only the haziest conception of the volume of this aid. The belief is so common here as to be almost universal that all aid received by the Soviet Union from the United States is paid for in cash at the time of purchase or shipment. I hear voiced so frequently as to cause me to believe that it is inspired the statement that the Soviet purchases in the United States constitute such good business for our capitalists that the American people have no desire to see an early victory over Germany and Italy. I feel that the Soviet Government is negligent in not (1) explaining the terms and functioning of Lend-Lease to its people, (2) giving them a clearer conception of the volume of Lend-Lease.³²

Since I am unaware of the background of your recent statements regarding Lend-Lease aid to the Soviet Union, and as periodicals and newspapers received from home indicate that Lend-Lease aid to the Soviet Union is a matter of considerable controversy in the United States, it did not seem proper for me at the time or even now to express any formal opinion on the Soviet attitude in this area toward Lend-Lease unless such opinion is solicited by the Department or the Embassy, in view of which I am addressing this letter to you as a personal communication.³³

I hope that you will not fail to call on me formally or informally at any time for such information as I may be able to give on any subject that may be of interest to you. You will realize, I am certain, that our sources of information here are very limited (due to the close surveillance under which each of us lives) and there are many subjects on which we either have no information or can only obtain information after considerable maneuvering and delay.

With best wishes, I am
Sincerely,

WARD

³² Most of this paragraph was repeated to the Department by the Ambassador in the Soviet Union in his telegram No. 520, May 24, 4 p. m., not printed.

³³ See also telegram No. 638, June 9, 9 p. m., from the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, p. 760.

811.79661/68 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, May 14, 1943—1 p. m.

[Received May 15—2:03 a. m.]

446. Department's 283, May 5, 7 p. m., and 256, April 27, 4 p. m.³⁴ I took occasion last evening to discuss with Molotov air communications between the Soviet Union and America. I referred to the proposed establishment of a British airline through the Near East into Russia³⁵ and in reply Molotov said that the British and Russians had thus far been unable to come to any definite agreement on the question; that the Russians still could not obtain a clear picture as to what the British had in mind. I emphasized the unsatisfactory state of air communications between Moscow and Tehran and proposed that an American airline be established between the two cities by extending the present American facilities in Tehran into Russia. Molotov stated that up to the present time there did not appear to exist a need for a regular Moscow-Tehran air service—that if such a need developed the Soviet Government would take steps to improve the existing facilities. He intimated that it might be advisable to come to some definite agreement in respect to air services, accommodations, courier, etc., between the United States and the Soviet Union but seemed to insist that the Moscow-Tehran section of an American-Russian line be under Soviet control and operation.

In case the Department desires to enter into any such a formal agreement I would appreciate receiving an indication of its views on the matter.

I also discussed at length the possibilities of the Alsib³⁶ route as a vital link in communications. Molotov admitted that the route had "practicable possibilities" which he promised to have studied by the Soviet air authorities. I advised him of the Department's desire to have shipped monthly by this route Soviet publications up to 100 lbs. in weight. Molotov said that he would cause the entire question to be examined and would communicate with me again.

I also told Molotov that I wished to visit the Ural industrial area, Alma Ata and Tashkent and that the Navy Department had offered

³⁴ Neither printed.

³⁵ The Department had informed Ambassador Standley in telegram No. 283, May 5, 7 p. m., that it was expected that "the British will be requesting permission from the Soviet authorities to operate a service from Tehran into Russia." The Ambassador was instructed within his own discretion "to take up with the Soviet Government the question of a paralleling American service, in the establishment of which the War Department is now very much interested." (841.79661/9)

³⁶ Alaska-Siberia.

to make available to me a plane for my private use in the Soviet Union. Molotov replied that it would be quite agreeable for me to make the suggested tour in an American airplane. I explained that this question was pretty much a personal matter but that I considered the Alsib and African air services as of the utmost importance not only now but after the war.

I continue to believe that the establishment of regular and rapid air communications between the United States and Russia is of the utmost importance not only in connection with our common war effort but also as a means of endeavoring to bring about closer postwar collaboration. I therefore suggest that the Department discuss this question in detail with the interested American authorities and keep me fully advised of any development.

I pointed out that General Burns³⁷ had been authorized to return by the Alsib route and had been instructed to investigate the possibility of increasing the amount of supplies coming over it. He should be in a position to discuss this question on his return to Washington.

STANDLEY

[In telegram No. 501, May 22, 1 p. m., (121.861/160) Ambassador Standley reported that on May 20 he had presented Mr. Davies to the Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Molotov. Arrangements were at once made for Davies to see Premier Stalin at 9 p. m. that evening. At this interview Davies presented to Stalin the letter he had brought with him from President Roosevelt, dated May 5. The text of this letter is printed in *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, page 3. See also telegram No. 498, May 21, 4 p. m., from the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, *ibid.*, page 5.]

861.404/497b : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Standley)

WASHINGTON, May 21, 1943—10 a. m.

337. For Ambassador Davies.

1. A delegation of the Union of Orthodox Rabbis of the United States introduced by Congressman Bloom³⁸ has informed us as follows:

(a) About 500 rabbinical students, deans, and rabbis of the great Talmudical Academies of Poland are now refugees in the Soviet Union for the most part in Central Asia.

³⁷ Maj. Gen. James H. Burns, Executive, Munitions Assignments Board, United States and Great Britain, Washington, temporarily visiting in the Soviet Union.

³⁸ Sol Bloom, Member of the House of Representatives from New York.

(b) The orthodox Jews of the United States consider these rabbis and students as "the hope and future of Israel" and are extremely anxious that they should be able to go to some locality where they may be cared for and be able to resume their studies and cultural work.

(c) Five hundred visas to Mexico have been assured the Jews in question by the Polish Government by virtue of an agreement between it and the Government of Mexico.

(d) The Jewish people would be eternally grateful if you while in the Soviet Union could take the matter up on an humanitarian basis with the appropriate Soviet officials and obtain their consent to permit this Jewish group to proceed to Iran where visa and transportation arrangements to the country of final entry could be arranged for them. On different occasions the Soviet Government has evidenced by its release of like persons that it does not desire to hold religious refugees of this type. They furthermore fully guarantee the financial status of this group and will never permit members of it to become public charges.

2. In view of the situation outlined above it is felt that you might find an occasion to discuss this matter with the appropriate Soviet authorities. It is believed that if the Soviet Government would be able to accede to the wishes of the orthodox rabbis the effect upon Jewish opinion in the United States with regard to the Soviet Union would be beneficial.

3. We are inclined to believe that this whole matter could be handled in such a manner as to prevent you and this Government from becoming involved in any objectionable way in the present Polish-Soviet controversy.

4. If the Soviet Government expresses a willingness to permit this group to go to Iran the matter could then be taken up with the Iranian and Mexican Governments.

5. Department's telegram number 338³⁹ will contain the list and addresses of the members of the group in question.

HULL

121.861/159 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, May 22, 1943—8 p. m.
[Received May 23—6:50 p. m.]

502. At a conference immediately following his arrival here Mr. Davies delivered a lecture to the press correspondents here on the disservice they would be rendering their countries if any of them criticized the Soviet Union. I fear that this and other remarks made at the

³⁹ Dated May 22, not printed.

time were the main cause for an unfortunate event which I feel I must now report to the Department.

At a formal press conference last evening ⁴⁰ Mr. Davies furnished the American and British correspondents with certain on the record information of an unimportant nature regarding his interview with Stalin. He refused to discuss in any detail the President's letter to Stalin and was evasive in replying to questions as to whether I was present when the letter was transmitted or whether he was aware of its contents. The conference was then placed off the record.

A correspondent asked Mr. Davies whether he had discussed with Stalin the question of American-Russian cooperation and specifically that of supplying our Military and Naval Attachés ⁴¹ with information which would contribute toward the saving of lives of American soldiers and sailors. Mr. Davies replied in the negative, adding that full cooperation already existed and that the Russian authorities were furnishing the American Government with all the military information it desired but that from fear of leaks on the part of subordinate officials this information was only given to top men. Reynolds ⁴² immediately took issue stating that Generals Arnold ⁴³ and Eisenhower ⁴⁴ had informed him that such information was not being received. He enquired who Davies meant by the top and Davies replied the President and the Prime Minister. A protracted and exceedingly bitter controversy on the subject of Soviet cooperation ensued between the majority of the press on one side and Davies on the other in which I fear unconsidered remarks were made and tempers almost lost. Davies adopted a violently pro-Russian attitude and as much as accused the correspondents of treason to their country and playing into the hands of Hitler by their "picking up pins, by their criticizing the Soviet Union, by their listening to criticism from subordinate officials". Gilmore ⁴⁵ referred to the "Kick me, I like it, school of thought" in connection with the Soviet Union and asked whether Davies was an advocate thereof. Davies thereupon sermonized on the need for tolerance and for greater faith in Russia, on the countless complaints without naming them which the Soviets could make against us and on the great harm anyone would do his country if he presumed to criticize the Soviet Union. He interjected,

⁴⁰ For a detailed description of this press conference, see *Admiral Ambassador to Russia*, pp. 370-372.

⁴¹ Brig. Gen. Joseph A. Michela and Rear Adm. Jack H. Duncan, respectively.

⁴² Quentin Reynolds, war correspondent in Moscow.

⁴³ Gen. Henry H. Arnold, Commanding General, Army Air Forces; member, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Combined Chiefs of Staff of the United States and Great Britain.

⁴⁴ Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Allied Commander in Chief, North Africa, since November 8, 1942.

⁴⁵ Eddy L. K. Gilmore, Associated Press correspondent in Moscow.

however, that my statement of March 9 [8] ⁴⁶ had in the long run had a good effect but warned that "too much of this is not good".

The atmosphere of the conference was very strained and hostile and on several occasions I feared that some untoward incident might arise. As an aftermath I understand that the correspondents here with few exceptions are up in arms against Davies and are questioning the wisdom of sending here a man with such intolerant views.

STANDLEY

121.861/162 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, May 25, 1943—3 p. m.

[Received May 26—11:24 a. m.]

527. Stalin entertained Davies at formal dinner in the Kremlin on Sunday night.⁴⁷ Among those present were Molotov, Voroshilov,⁴⁸ Beriia,⁴⁹ Mikoyan,⁵⁰ the British Ambassador and myself together with General Burns and Faymonville⁵¹ and a large part of my staff. In general the dinner was marked by the usual abundance of food and wine but was notable for the absence of spontaneous cordiality or genuine good humor. Stalin's greetings were pleasant but unenthusiastic and later his movements appeared heavy as if the occasion were no relief from the general load he is carrying. Only when he left his place at the table and advanced to drink a personal toast with the American Military Attaché was the evening brightened by any gesture which went beyond the bounds of formal courtesy. The remarks of Molotov who acted as toast master were perfunctory and awakened only indifferent support on the part of his various Russian colleagues present. Applause on all sides was notably weak. The occasion failed to develop congenial conversations between the Russians and their foreign guests and it appeared that the whole entertainment was somewhat forced. It was the dullest Kremlin dinner I have ever attended and while an atmosphere of reserved friend-

⁴⁶ See telegram no. 139, March 9, 7 p. m., from the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, p. 631.

⁴⁷ May 28.

⁴⁸ Kliment Yefremovich Voroshilov, Vice Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, member of the State Defense Committee, and Marshal of the Soviet Union since 1935.

⁴⁹ Lavrenty Pavlovich Beriia, People's Commissar for Internal Affairs, and member of the State Defense Committee.

⁵⁰ Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan, People's Commissar for Foreign Trade, Vice Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, and member of the State Defense Committee.

⁵¹ Brig. Gen. Philip R. Faymonville, head of the American Supply Mission, Lend-Lease representative in the Soviet Union.

liness on the part of the Russians prevailed most of them including Stalin appeared bored.

Molotov proposed the initial toast to American-Soviet solidarity and in laudatory terms greeted Davies as a real friend of the USSR who had greatly contributed to closer friendly relations between our two countries. Davies replied with a long oration on the horrors of war, the glories of Stalingrad and the greatness of the Soviet armies, peoples and leaders. He proposed that Stalingrad be left in ruins as a monument of the atrocities of the Germans and that the new city be erected 5 miles up or down the river. I felt that Davies over-did his attempts to impress the Russians of his sincerity and love for them and that his speech was much too long. Molotov then spoke on the friendly relations and the unity of effort and cooperation in the prosecution of the war existing among the Allies and proposed a toast to the President, Churchill and Stalin.

I replied stating that Davies was a symbol of the friendship toward the Soviet Union, of the American people and their President that friendship and cooperation was a "two-way street" and that ever since I had been in the Soviet Union I had made it my purpose to develop the flow of traffic on this street. I proposed a toast to unity of effort and purpose and close collaboration now and in the post-war period. The British Ambassador thereupon took occasion pointedly to support my remarks in respect to collaboration and post-war unity. Stalin then toasted the Allied military forces following which the American Military Attaché rose and toasted the Red army. Molotov then offered a personal toast to me which I returned by proposing a personal toast to the continuance of our friendly personal relations. Shortly afterwards Davies proposed a toast to Litvinov who responded by commenting on Davies' fine work in helping the American people better to understand the Soviet Union. He stated that Davies was in effect also an envoy of the Soviet Union in Washington. The remainder of the toasts were worthy of no special comment.

Before the dinner had terminated the guests were asked to come to the motion picture hall to see "Mission to Moscow". All the Americans present who expressed an opinion to me felt that the film was received with rather glum curiosity and doubted if the Hollywood treatment of events described in Davies' book ⁵² met with the general approval of the Russians. They successfully refrained from favorable [*unfavorable?*] comment while the film was being shown but Stalin was heard to grunt once or twice. The glaring discrepancies must have provoked considerable resentment among the Soviet officials present. Its abject flattery of everything Russian and the ill-advised introduction of unpleasant events in Soviet internal history that I am

⁵² Joseph E. Davies, *Mission to Moscow* (Simon and Schuster; New York, 1941).

inclined to think the Kremlin would prefer to forget makes me believe that the Russians will not desire to give publicity to the film at least in its present form. In any event I feel that the film will not contribute to better understanding between the two countries.

STANDLEY

811.71261/15 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Standley)*

WASHINGTON, May 26, 1943—8 p. m.

364. Post Office Department states that no regular mails to the U.S.S.R. have been dispatched from New York since February 26, 1943 due to difficulties with the route used. Please inquire of appropriate Soviet authorities as to possibility of shipping mails via Pacific route from the United States to Vladivostok, including the mails to be sent onward to Moscow, such shipments to be made on vessels registered under the Soviet flag prior to entry of United States into the war.⁵³ Post Office Department also states mails are not heavy. Only some 400 bags, the accumulation of past 2 months, are now awaiting dispatching.

In Department's estimation it seems highly desirable to maintain satisfactory mail connections between the United States and the U.S.S.R. and you are requested to take the matter up immediately with the Soviet authorities, and to press as strongly as you may deem advisable for an early solution of the problem. It is imperative that definite assurances be obtained that such mails will not be subject to seizure, tampering, etc. by the Japanese.

Please telegraph result of your representations.

If result is not satisfactory please give your opinion regarding the advisability of using the Persian Gulf route.

HULL

[Mr. Davies reported in telegram No. 539, May 27, 1943, from Moscow that Premier Stalin had handed him at the Kremlin the reply to President Roosevelt's letter of May 5, 1943, to be delivered personally to the President. For texts of Roosevelt's letter and Stalin's reply, see *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, pages 3 and 6, respectively.]

⁵³ The Navy Department had observed that recently more of the old registered ships of the Soviet Union were being put on the Pacific route, apparently because "there is less danger of the Japanese seizing the old registered Russian ships than there is in their seizing the ships which we have furnished to Russia." (811.71261/15)

861.404/499 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, May 27, 1943—1 p. m.

[Received 7:17 p. m.]

540. From Davies. "Ambassador Standley showed me your cable ⁵⁴ with reference to Congressman Bloom's request. After talking matter over, Ambassador Standley suggested that I should broach matter to Stalin and Molotov if occasion permitted; and place it on personal and not official ground. Last night at Kremlin I found that occasion. I suggested that unless there were some features which the Polish controversy had induced and which made it impossible or impolitic I believed it would be to their interest to aid this religious group of Jewish people for the effect it would have in confirming impression of free public opinion of the world that Soviets were always desirous of aiding persecuted racial minorities. Handled matter carefully as per your instruction. It was received with apparently friendly interest. Stalin asked Molotov to look into facts. I made point to stress to both that this was entirely out of my bailiwick and an exclusively diplomatic matter for Ambassador Standley and that I was only bringing it up at his request; but that now I would advise Ambassador Standley of our discussion and that he would doubtless take up the matter with Molotov if they felt they could do anything consistent with their position and without in any manner bringing us into their controversy with the Poles." ⁵⁵

STANDLEY

811.91261/374 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, May 27, 1943—5 p. m.

[Received 8:42 p. m.]

545. Attention Under Secretary Welles from Davies. Referring your cable Sulzberger.⁵⁶ Personally took matter up with Stalin and Molotov last night at Kremlin and went as far as I could. Hope it will be effective. For obvious reasons proprieties could not press it

⁵⁴ No. 337, May 21, 10 a. m., p. 650.

⁵⁵ See memorandum of June 18 by the Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs, p. 432; for correspondence on the interest of the United States in Poland and its relations with the Soviet Union, see pp. 314 ff.

⁵⁶ The Under Secretary of State had requested Mr. Davies to seek an interview with Premier Stalin for Arthur H. Sulzberger, publisher of the *New York Times* and a director of the American Red Cross, who planned to visit the Soviet Union in a few weeks.

but am confident enlisted their interest. Mission here could not have been more satisfactory. They all have greatest admiration and respect for President and feel kindly toward us which was translated into their expressions of consideration for me. Leaving for home directly. [Davies.]

STANDLEY

121.861/165 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, May 29, 1943—11 a. m.

[Received 6:30 p. m.]

555. For the Secretary and the President. Davies and Burns departed this morning via Alaska. Passengers on General Burns' plane in addition to his party were Commander Young, Dr. Waldron,⁵⁷ Major Osman, Captain Beck and Associated Press correspondent Gilmore. The two airplanes are easily distinguishable as Davies has painted on the bow of his plane in large letters in English and Russian the words "Mission to Moscow". The obvious effort of Davies to publicize *Mission to Moscow* while on a serious and vital official mission of the President has already been noted here and if carried back to the United States may, I fear, cause criticism which will detract from the President's high purpose.

STANDLEY

*Mr. Joseph E. Davies, Special Representative of President Roosevelt, to the President*⁵⁸

Moscow, May 29, 1943.⁵⁹

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Supplementary to the report which I am making to you orally, I beg leave to submit the following general observations as to conditions which I found in the Soviet Union.

I. THE MILITARY SITUATION

A. *The Soviet Government's view as I interpret it from discussions with high officials and members of the Diplomatic Corps.*

1. Hitler's power has been greatly diminished but he has still a very strong army and great potential which he will employ in a desperate all-out effort against Russia this summer.

⁵⁷ Maj. John F. Waldron, U.S. Army Medical Corps, attached to the American Lend-Lease Supply Mission.

⁵⁸ Copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

⁵⁹ This is the date on the document, although Mr. Davies left Moscow at 6:25 a. m. on this day, and some of the description in it obviously is later.

2. The Tunisian campaign and other pending second front plans have relieved the pressure somewhat on the Russian front. They also have affected Hitler's plans and have given him pause. Reliance is placed upon the Allied offensive this summer to relieve violent pressure which they are sure is coming.

3. Hitler's attack will be directed through the center at Voronezh. Its purpose is to encircle Moscow and take it from the rear, or possibly the attack will be diverted to an effort to take the oil fields of the Caucasus. The desperate defense which Germany is making at Kuban and Novorossiisk is cited as evidence that Hitler has not yet abandoned the use of these bridgeheads as "jumping off spots" for the oil fields.

4. The object of the attack will be primarily to destroy the Red Army, to drive the Government from Moscow, to destroy it if possible, to undermine morale, and enforce a victor's peace and secure oil desperately needed.

5. They have a quiet confidence that they can again successfully resist attack. They express an "indomitable" purpose to fight through to the end.

B. My Own Inferences and Conclusions.

1. If Britain and the United States fail to "deliver" on the western front in Europe this summer, it will have far reaching effects upon the Soviets that will be effective both on their attitude in the prosecution of this war and in their participation in the reconstruction of peace.

2. They will carry their war into Germany if it is a part of a concerted plan, and if carried on simultaneously by the Allies. Otherwise they will stop at their western boundary and be content with driving the invader out of their territory, if they can do so.

3. "The legacy of suspicion" is still very strong. The belief exists in some quarters that the United Nations want a weakened Russia at the peace table and a Red Army that is bled white.

4. I found some indications of an appeasement group in Russia. They advocate Russian withdrawal into itself, no further acceptance of lend lease, in order that it may not be hampered by any obligations after it has won the war.

5. On this trip I have seen much of the territory east of Moscow, along the Trans-Siberian Railway, in the Urals, and far into the eastern regions of Siberia. From what I have seen, I am more than ever convinced that Hitler cannot conquer Russia. The immensity of the territory, its resources, the vigor of its people and their morale, in my opinion, doom Hitler to failure in Russia. The vast expanses of tillable land, its fertility, its high state of cultivation and the extent of the agricultural resources to the east of Moscow for 2,000 miles

and more are most impressive. No less so are the vigor and power of the great new industrial cities and plants in the Urals and even in remote Siberia. It is much beyond anything that I had expected.

6. I have the very distinct impression that the leaders of this Government and the people have found themselves and are engrained with new and deep self-confidence. They feel secure in their ability to preserve their Army intact and to protect and maintain their Government and their country, quite independent of anything save themselves and their vast territory and their own strength.

II. THE POLITICAL EXTERNAL SITUATION

In my opinion:

A. They will quietly insist upon a return of their old boundaries as a restitution of an ancient wrong.

B. They will not be over-tolerant of non-realistic assumptions (as they term it), of Polish importance and of alleged fallacious Polish arguments. They are going to take back what they considered was wrongfully taken from them. This will be modified by consideration for England, somewhat; but only on the surface.

C. Their present disposition as the situation now stands is scrupulously to stay out of any interference with internal political affairs of other Governments. This is not for the reason assigned for the dissolution of the Comintern; but to have a "live and let live" good neighbor policy with the world if that is possible.

D. They insist that they have no further territorial aspirations, including specifically Iran.

E. They want a peaceful world; they believe that all nations of the earth will be so depleted after this war that all energies will be required to restore the earth and its peoples for a long time to come. But they will be alert to the possibility that they may have to "go it alone".

F. As to Germany, they are prepared to go the limit with the Allies in making it impossible for her again to break the peace of the earth.

G. They want a strong Poland and are prepared to recognize a strong, but not "reactionary", state, but they will not relinquish the Curzon Line.⁶⁰

⁶⁰ For information regarding the origin of the Curzon Line, and for a description of it, see *Foreign Relations*, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, vol. XIII, pp. 793-794. Further information on this subject is in H. W. V. Temperley, *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris* (London, 1924), vol. VI, pp. 233-283, and summary descriptions in S. Konovalov, *Russo-Polish Relations, An Historical Survey* (London, 1945), pp. 33-38, 57-63.

H. They would not look with favor on the use of Polish divisions on a second front in Yugoslavia. There is strong assertion in some quarters that Mikhailovitch⁶¹ is an Italian stooge. There are rumors that he is dead or is in the custody of Nedich.⁶² There is undoubtedly sympathy for the partisans but under present conditions there would be no active aid extended by them as long as England is interested. They place great reliance upon the May 26, 1942 treaty with Great Britain.⁶³ Their one regret is, as Molotov said on the occasion of the celebration of its first anniversary, that it was not entered into many years ago.

I. Their attitude toward England is cordial and strong.

I [J]. Their attitude toward the United States is appreciative and favorable.

III. THE DIPLOMATIC SITUATION

A. The Soviet attitude from what little I could see seemed to be cool both to China and Japan.

B. I was impressed with the power, capacity and good judgment with which the British had conducted and are conducting their relations with the U.S.S.R. They are doing many things to create good will and better mutual understanding. They are doing a good selling job. Their Ministry of Information is publishing a paper in the Russian language which is undoubtedly helping the United Nations effort. Their Ambassador and their officers apparently are getting along with the Soviet officials with signal success. Even their differences are conducted in a spirit of great good temper and a fine tolerance in disposition.

C. As to the particular mission I was engaged upon, I believe that the result thereof has been completely successful.⁶⁴

Respectfully,

JOSEPH E. DAVIES

⁶¹ Gen. Dragolyub (Drazha) Mihailovich, Minister of Army, Navy, and Air Force in the Yugoslav Government in Exile, leading guerrilla resistance (Chetniks) inside Yugoslavia. See vol. II, section under Yugoslavia entitled "Concern of the United States regarding disunity among Yugoslav resistance forces".

⁶² Gen. Milan Nedich, Premier of a puppet government for Serbia at Belgrade from September 1941.

⁶³ Treaty of Alliance in the War against Hitlerite Germany and Her Associates in Europe, and Collaboration and Mutual Assistance Thereafter, signed in London between Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Soviet Union. For text, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. CCIV, p. 353; for correspondence, see *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. III, pp. 490-566, *passim*.

⁶⁴ With respect to the particular mission of Mr. Davies, see *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, pp. 3-7.

811.79661/68 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Standley)*

WASHINGTON, May 31, 1943—8 p. m.

387. Your 446, May 14, 1 p. m. Department would appreciate learning whether in your opinion Molotov in intimating "that it might be advisable to come to some definite agreement in respect to air services, accommodations, couriers, et cetera, between the United States and the Soviet Union" was referring to an agreement relating to airlines from the Soviet Union to the United States through Iran and Africa or whether he had in mind agreements relating to other possible air routes. Did you understand that Molotov had in mind an agreement covering the period of the war or one which might also extend into post-war?

The Department is somewhat at a loss to understand Molotov's view that there does not exist a need for a regular Moscow-Tehran air service, particularly since that is the one sector of the route between the United States and Russia on which a bottleneck exists. A check of recent pouch despatches to Russia indicates that an average of 40 days is required for mail to reach Russia from the United States and that over half of this time is required to transit the Tehran-Moscow sector. Official mail from Russia to the United States has a better record but still half of the transit time is consumed on the Russia-Tehran sector. You might stress these facts when next you talk to Molotov.

HULL

121.861/168 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary
of State*

Moscow, June 1, 1943—3 p. m.

[Received 10:45 p. m.]

581. There follows herewith a brief account of the most important known phases of Mr. Davies' visit to Moscow:

May 10 [19], arrival met by Vice Commissar Dekanosov,⁶⁵ Chiefs of American and Protocol Sections of Foreign Office,⁶⁶ Ambassador and members of Embassy staff.

Press conference at Embassy (see 491, May 20).⁶⁷

⁶⁵ Vladimir Georgiyevich Dekanozov, Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs.

⁶⁶ Georgy Nikolayevich Zarubin and Fedor Fedorovich Molochkov, respectively.

⁶⁷ Not printed.

May 20 presented to Molotov and Stalin by Ambassador.
(See 498, and 501 of May 21, 22.⁶⁸)

May 21 appointments with Voroshilov and Vyshinski. Press conference (see 502, May 22).

May 23 Kremlin dinner (see 527, May 25).

May 24 appointment with Ulrich,⁶⁹ Kalinin⁷⁰ and Mikoyan.

May 26 attended luncheon given by Molotov on occasion of the anniversary of the Soviet-British treaty (see 547 of May 28).⁷¹

Interview with Stalin (see 539, May 27).⁷²

May 28 press conference.

Interview with Molotov.

May 29 departure (see 555, May 29).

With the exception of the initial conversations with Molotov and Stalin I was not present during Mr. Davies' other interviews with prominent Soviet officials. I am consequently unable to report on the tenor of his conversations since he did not inform me what transpired.

The press conference of May 28 in comparison to that of May 21 took place in an atmosphere of cordiality. Davies refused to comment on the contents of Stalin's reply to the President stating merely that "there was every indication that Stalin was in agreement with the contents of the President's letter". He expressed the opinion that by the end of 1943 the Soviet Army and Government would be intact, that what Hitler could not attain in 41 and 42 he surely could not attain in 43. He said that Stalin had expressed satisfaction that the President and Churchill were working so closely together. In conclusion he congratulated the correspondents on the fine work they were doing here and stated that he had only the kindest feelings toward them.

STANDLEY

811.71261/16: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, June 2, 1943—2 p. m.

[Received June 3—3:25 p. m.]

587. Department's 364, May 26, 8 p. m. I outlined to Molotov the considerations contained in the reference telegram, stressed the desirability of maintaining and improving mail communications between

⁶⁸ See bracketed note, p. 650.

⁶⁹ Vasily Vasilyevich Ulrikh (Ulrich), chairman of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the Soviet Union.

⁷⁰ Mikhail Ivanovich Kalinin, chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Soviet Union.

⁷¹ *Ante*, p. 536.

⁷² See bracketed note, p. 655.

the United States and the Soviet Union and strongly pressed for an early solution of that problem.⁷³ I left with him a note on the subject. Molotov stated that he would have the question examined and would communicate again with me.

STANDLEY

811.79661/69: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, June 2, 1943—3 p. m.

[Received June 3—5:27 p. m.]

588. Department's 387, May 31, 8 p. m. I took occasion yesterday again to discuss the question of air communications with Molotov and specifically the points raised in the Department's telegram. Regarding the definite agreement referred to in our May 13 conversation ⁷⁴ Molotov stated that what he had in mind was a written agreement to establish a "joint" American-Soviet Company presumably similar to the former Deruluft Company ⁷⁵ which would operate an air service between the Soviet Union and the United States via Africa and Iran. I stated that although I would recommend to my Government that definite proposals be submitted to the Soviet Government covering this question it might well be impossible to establish any type of commercial service at the present time since the military authorities were now operating the airlines in Africa and the Near East. It is my understanding that Molotov had in mind only an agreement covering the war period.

Regarding agreement on other possible air routes and particular[ly] the Alsib route, Molotov states that this question had not come up but that if the American Government desired to submit definite proposals thereon the Soviet Government would of course be ready to take them under consideration.

I suggest that the Department take the question of coming to some definite agreement with the Soviet Government on the African and Alsib routes under consideration and that appropriate instructions be issued to me. I would appreciate learning whether the Soviet

⁷³ At times the Soviet Embassy in Washington raised the subject of slowness of transmission of its diplomatic cables to Moscow as sent through commercial companies usually without knowing the nature of the technical difficulties temporarily encountered.

⁷⁴ See telegram No. 446, May 14, 1 p. m., from the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, p. 649.

⁷⁵ The German-Russian Air Transport Co.

Government is still availing itself of the courier facilities across Africa offered to it last summer or whether Soviet couriers are now proceeding via Alaska only.

Molotov expressed surprise that delays and difficulties had been encountered in sending mail and personnel over the Moscow-Tehran sector and stated that he thoroughly agreed that the present unsatisfactory situations should be remedied.

I also brought up again the question of sending Soviet publications over the Alsib route (Department's 256 of April 27 ⁷⁶), and he promised to pursue the matter.

STANDLEY

811.79661/71 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

KUIBYSHEV (Moscow), June 7, 1943—8 p. m.
[Received June 9—11:45 a. m.]

616. My 446, May 14, 1 p. m. While in Washington last fall I discussed with Bureau of Aeronautics a plan to provide me with a suitably equipped plane for my personal use in the Soviet Union and I was given to understand that such a plane would be furnished me if permission as to its use was obtained from the Soviet Government. In the course of my recent conversations with Stalin (my 605 [608], June 5, 2 p. m.⁷⁶) I requested and I received permission to bring in and base in Moscow a private plane. The Navy Department has now informed me that the plane will be ready to depart presumably via Siberia about June 15. The Naval Attaché is requesting information regarding its characteristics, crew list, etc.

The Department may wish to utilize this plane to send here my Counselor or other members of the Embassy staff now ready to travel. If Sulzberger desires to travel via the Alsib route, please offer him the facilities of the plane.

I consider Stalin's granting me permission to base a private plane here as a real concession and one that may greatly assist in the establishment of better air communications between the two countries.

STANDLEY

⁷⁶ Not printed.

811.71261/17 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, June 8, 1943—11 a. m.

[Received June 9—10:05 a. m.]

617. Department's 364, May 26, 8 p. m., and Embassy's 587, June 2, 2 p. m. In reply to Embassy's note in question Foreign Office has now replied that the Soviet Government cannot guarantee that U.S. mails will not be seized by the Japs since inspection by the Japs of Soviet ships registered under the Soviet flag before the entry of the U.S. into the war may take place.

Although I took pains to stress to Molotov the importance of maintaining satisfactory mail communications between the U.S. and the Soviet Union the tenor of the Soviet reply leads me to believe that the Soviet authorities are not interested in utilizing the Pacific route for this purpose.

I can only suggest that steps be taken to use the slower yet safer Persian Gulf route. Since the mail in question is not heavy I should think that arrangements could be made to truck the mail from Iran into the Soviet Union via Tabriz or Ashkhabad. The Department may wish to discuss with General Connolly the question of forwarding freight mail from Iranian points to Russian railheads.

STANDLEY

121.861/170a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley)

WASHINGTON, June 10, 1943—9 p. m.

415. Unless you perceive some objection thereto please address a communication to Mr. Molotov the text of which should be somewhat as follows:

"The Secretary of State has requested that I convey to you his appreciation of the courtesy which Mr. Stalin and you and other members of the Soviet Government, as well as Soviet civil and military officials, displayed to Mr. Joseph E. Davies and his party while they were in the Soviet Union. The Secretary has asked me to add that the reports which Mr. Davies brought back with him together with those which have been received from the United States Embassy in Moscow have strengthened his conviction that the United States and the Soviet Union are entering an era of cooperation which promises to be of benefit not only to these two countries but also to other countries struggling against the Axis aggressors."

HULL

811.79661/73 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, June 12, 1943—9 a. m.

[Received 8:45 p. m.]

648. My 149, February 11, 6 p. m.,⁷⁷ and 588, June 2, 3 p. m.

1. In view of the unusually favorable climatic conditions particularly for year round service, the availability of accommodations throughout the route and the ease for the Soviet Government to connect up with the Air Transport Command Service at Tehran I recommend that immediate steps be taken to come to a formal written understanding with the Soviet Government with respect to the establishment of a Moscow-Washington air service with definite scheduled flights.

With this in mind I wish to offer the following proposals.

A. Both Governments agree to establish and maintain a scheduled bi-monthly service, the Moscow-Tehran section of which is to be operated by the Soviet Government and the Tehran-Washington section by the American Government.

B. 75% of the passenger and cargo capacity of the bi-monthly planes used on the Soviet section of this service to be reserved for the official use of the American Government.

C. 15% of the passenger and cargo capacity of the bi-monthly planes used on the American section of the service to be reserved for the official use of the Soviet Government.

D. Either contracting party shall release to the other unwanted cargo or passenger space for any one trip. Release of such space does not obligate the other contracting party to release similar space for any subsequent trip.

E. Conditions permitting, planes will depart on schedule every 2 weeks from each terminal point and each of the contracting parties agree[s] to use every effort to maintain this service regularly and on time schedule.

F. The American Government agrees to put at the disposal of the Soviet Government for the duration of the war two Douglas transport planes (C-47 type) for use on the Soviet section.

G. This agreement will continue in force until a date to be agreed upon by the two Governments.

In view of the time element the dependency on a third or fourth power for terminal facilities at Tehran, the possibility of complication and conflicts which might arise with the British out of flying over British territory, I feel that this service should be limited to the duration of the war.

⁷⁷ Not printed.

2. The advantages of the Alsib route as a means of regular communication between the United States and the Soviet Union over the African route are evident. The Soviets are increasingly utilizing this route for their own officials traveling between the two countries. In view of the post-war possibilities of this route and particularly the fact that it does not traverse foreign territory I strongly recommend that as a means of improving and increasing the communications between the two countries a proposal be made to the Soviet Government that a formal agreement establishing a scheduled service on this route be entered into. This agreement might follow the considerations set forth above in paragraphs A-E with the exception that the reservation for passenger and cargo capacity be made at 50% for each of the contracting parties. We might also consider the advisability of placing at the disposal of the Russians several transport planes for use on the Soviet section.

3. I would appreciate receiving the Department's views on this question.

STANDLEY

740.00119 European War 1939/1515 : Telegram

The Chargé in Finland (McClintock) to the Secretary of State

HELSINKI, June 20, 1943—11 a. m.

[Received 1:51 p. m.]

803. With reference to my 802, June 19,⁷⁸ Erkko⁷⁹ told me last April secret conversations had taken place in Sweden between Madame Kollontay⁸⁰ and German Minister, Thomsen, who had with him two other Germans of high rank but whom Erkko could not identify. Soviet Minister was accompanied by a Counselor of Legation whose name as I recall it was Nikotin.⁸¹

According to my informant conversations lasted several days and began around April 18. Among topics discussed were establishment of an autonomous Ukrainian state as a buffer between Germany and U.S.S.R., the reaching of a separate peace between the two countries and disposition of Baltic States to Russia.

Erkko said he thought Allies had got wind of these talks and connected them with sudden flight of British Minister⁸² from Stockholm to London at about that time. At all events he said when Germans sought to continue conversations with Kollontay she blandly

⁷⁸ Not printed.

⁷⁹ Eljas Erkko, newspaper editor in Helsinki, and former Minister for Foreign Affairs.

⁸⁰ Alexandra Mikhailovna Kollontay, Soviet Minister in Sweden.

⁸¹ Probably reference is to the commercial representative, Mikhail Artemyevich Nikitin.

⁸² Victor A. L. Mallet.

informed them they should read Stalin's order of the day of May 1⁸³ in which he derided notion of a separate peace.

I have no means of checking truth of this story⁸⁴ but Erkkö quite sincerely believes it and I do not doubt he has communicated it to members of Finnish Government.

Repeated to Stockholm.

McCLINTOCK

811.2361/13: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, June 21, 1943—1 p. m.

[Received 1:23 p. m.]

701. The distinguished flyer Captain Eddie Rickenbacker⁸⁵ arrived in Kuibyshev on Saturday June 19 without any prior notification and reached Moscow the following morning. He is travelling in a personal military plane (C-87) accompanied by Colonel Nuckols of General Arnold's staff, Major Sherry of General Eisenhower's staff and Dr. Dahl a private physician. Rickenbacker has informed [me] that visas and other arrangements for his entry into the Soviet Union were taken care of in Washington 6 weeks ago by himself personally through Stettinius,⁸⁶ General Belayev⁸⁷ and Litvinov. His instructions which were issued by Stimson do not mention travel to the Soviet Union. I understand that Litvinov had furnished him with letters of introduction to the Soviet representatives in Tehran and Chungking from whom he received every courtesy and cooperation. Apparently the Russians had complete knowledge of his movements. He was met at the airfield by representatives of the Commissariat for Defense and prior reservations had been made for his party at the

⁸³ The essential passages were reported by the Ambassador in the Soviet Union in telegram No. 388, May 2, 11 a. m., p. 519.

⁸⁴ In telegram No. 690, June 18, midnight, Ambassador Standley had reported from Moscow a denial by the Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union (Tass) of reports from Sweden that German-Soviet peace negotiations had recently been held in Stockholm, which had been broken off "because of disagreement regarding territorial problems." (740.00119 European War 1939/1514) Mr. Charles E. Bohlen of the Division of European Affairs wrote in a memorandum of June 24: "The Department has no evidence of any kind to lend to the conclusion that the Soviet Union will not remain an active member of the United Nations until the military defeat of Germany. However, it is too strong to state that the State Department is 'convinced' of this fact if only for the reason that a dictatorship responsive in the last analysis to the views of one man is of necessity unpredictable. There is nothing in the immediate objective circumstances which would make it to the advantage of the Soviet Government to conclude a separate peace with Germany." (740.0011 EW 1939/29898½)

⁸⁵ Edward V. Rickenbacker, aviation expert, president, general manager, and director of Eastern Air Lines, Inc.

⁸⁶ Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Lend-Lease Administrator.

⁸⁷ Maj. Gen. Alexander Ivanovich Belyayev, chairman of the Soviet Purchasing Commission in the United States.

National Hotel. The British also had advance notice of the visit. The first advice the Embassy received however as to his arrival was obtained from Kuibyshev late in the evening preceding the day of his arrival.

Rickenbacker desires to obtain here certain military information concerning the use of military Lend-Lease supplies. He desires to call on Molotov and Stalin, to visit certain Soviet military enterprises and to make a trip to the front. In the absence of any information or instructions from the Department I am making every effort to further the desires of Captain Rickenbacker and I have requested my Military Attaché to assist him in every way possible.

STANDLEY

811.79661/74 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, June 23, 1943—3 p. m.

[Received June 24—11:30 a. m.]

716. My immediately following, No. 717, June 23, 4 p. m.,⁸⁸ transmitting requests for visas for five employees of Soviet Purchasing Commission who intend to proceed via Alaska route.

The Soviet Government is now frequently using the Alaska route to transport diplomats, officials, couriers and diplomatic mail to the United States and Canada. Although American air transport facilities are utilized from Fairbanks onwards my requests to make Soviet air facilities available on a reciprocal basis for corresponding categories of Americans proceeding to Moscow have met with no response and I have not been encouraged to believe that such privileges will be granted as long as American air facilities from Alaska onwards continue to be freely available to Soviet personnel. The opening of this service to American official personnel proceeding to and from Moscow and to official mail would in large measure end our long standing communications difficulties. Unless the Department is planning to submit definite proposals along the lines suggested in my 648, June 12, 9 a. m., I strongly suggest that the Department consider the advisability of replying to requests for further visas for travel by the Alaska route by stating that it will be glad to authorize such visas provided the Soviet Government will extend reciprocal facilities for Americans proceeding to the Soviet Union.

A reply is requested to my 588, June 2, 3 p. m., with respect to use by Soviet couriers of air services via North Africa.

STANDLEY

⁸⁸ Not printed.

760F.61/99

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] June 28, 1943.

The British Ambassador called to see me this morning at his request.

Lord Halifax handed me the *aide-mémoire* attached herewith⁹¹ covering a recent conversation between Dr. Benes⁹² and Mr. Eden concerning the desire of Dr. Benes to negotiate a treaty with the Soviet Government when he visits Moscow in the immediate future and reporting that Dr. Benes had alleged that his desire in this regard received favorable reactions during the time of his recent visit to Washington.⁹³

Lord Halifax said that Mr. Eden was very much embarrassed by this development inasmuch as the British Government and the Soviet Government reached a definitive agreement during the time of Mr. Molotov's visit to London last year⁹⁴ that neither Government would enter into any treaty with the smaller European countries covering post-war adjustments until after the conclusion of the war. Mr. Eden was very anxious to know whether the United States Government had in fact expressed any approval of Dr. Benes' intentions as above indicated.

I called for the memoranda of my own conversations with Dr. Benes and confirmed from them my recollection that Dr. Benes never mentioned to me any desire on his part to enter into a treaty with the Soviet Union but merely the desire on his part to reach an "understanding" with Stalin concerning the position of Czechoslovakia in Europe and especially with regard to Eastern Europe in the post-war period. I said that I would try to find out whether anything different had been said by Dr. Benes to Secretary Hull or the President⁹⁵ and that I would inform the Ambassador accordingly.

⁹¹ Not printed.

⁹² Edward Beneš, President of the Czechoslovak National Committee in London, 1939-45.

⁹³ This visit was between May 12 and 19, 1943.

⁹⁴ For correspondence concerning the visit of Molotov to London and Washington during May and June 1942, see *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. III, pp. 542-596, *passim*.

⁹⁵ In a memorandum of August 24, 1943, prepared by an officer of the Division of European Affairs, it is stated that the Division made an examination of detailed memoranda by Secretary of State Hull, Under Secretary of State Welles, and Assistant Secretary of State Adolf A. Berle, Jr., of their conversations with Dr. Beneš. "They contained *no reference whatever* to any proposed treaty between the Soviet and Czechoslovak governments, though naturally much of the conversation concerned in one way or another the relations with the USSR.

"The proposed treaty came to the attention of the officers of the European Division only through Viscount Halifax's conversation with Mr. Welles and the subsequent developments. We believed at that time that such a treaty would be a step backward in our efforts toward international understanding . . . We have no reason to suppose that either the Secretary or Mr. Welles at any time have had any 'favorable reactions' to the project." (760F.61/108)

Lord Halifax said that Mr. Eden thought it would be perfectly appropriate and in fact desirable if some joint declaration with regard to the position of Czechoslovakia could be announced during the time of Dr. Benes' visit to Moscow but that this of course would be very different from the conclusion of a formal treaty.

[Here follows discussion concerning the possibility of Great Britain's offering to the United States the use of additional British bases for postwar policing purposes.]

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

811.79661/73 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Standley)*

WASHINGTON, June 28, 1943—9 p. m.

490. Your 588, June 2, 3 p. m., and 648, June 12, 9 a. m. If the following meets with your approval you may take appropriate action with the Soviet authorities, otherwise communicate your views to the Department.

Regarding paragraph 1 of your 588. The possibility of establishing a "joint" American-Soviet company to operate an air service between the two countries via Africa and Iran presents difficulties probably involving considerable delay. First, Extensive negotiations might be required to obtain consent of third party countries en route. Second, Your preliminary reply to Molotov was correct in that service over this route is of important military character and any attempt to set up a joint quasi-commercial company possibly could not be justified at this time, particularly since Soviet participation along the entire route would add very little to the operations of our own Air Transport Command between the United States and Cairo or Tehran.

This Government is desirous, however, of entering into a definite agreement for regular service over this route, whereby the A.T.C. would operate between the United States and Tehran, connecting at the latter point with a Soviet service into Kuibyshev or Moscow.

With respect to paragraph 1 only of your 648. This has been cleared with our military authorities. The Department agrees with your detailed proposal, and the military authorities concur, with the following exceptions:

1: Agreeable.

A. The service should be on a weekly basis in each direction with arrangements made for connections at Tehran on specific days. The service to be an official one only.

B. Our previous informal agreement with the Soviets established accommodations for us on the basis of two to one and this practice

should be continued. The Department suggests that space be reserved each week on planes in and out of Russia for two officers of the American Government, who may be couriers, plus their personal baggage. The weight of each of these passengers including their baggage to be calculated at 250 pounds. In addition, we request 750 pounds of mail and cargo space on each plane into Russia, and 500 pounds outbound, for the use of the Embassy. When weather or other factors disrupt plane schedules, then proportionately larger accommodations and more space should be provided on the next plane to take care of any accumulations.

C. In return, A. T. C. planes will reserve space on each trip for one Soviet official, who may be a courier, plus his personal baggage. From Tehran to the United States we are prepared to reserve 375 pounds per trip for Russian cargo and mail, with 250 pounds reserved for this purpose on the return trip.

D. If either government does not use its passenger space then it should have the privilege of utilizing that weight/space for mail and cargo purposes. In the event that there are neither passengers, nor mail nor cargo to occupy all the allotted space then each government agrees to release its unused space to the other, without obligation on the part of the recipient to release similar space on any subsequent trip.

E. Agreeable, except that the schedule should be weekly.

F. It is understood that the Soviet is receiving a large quantity of C-47 airplanes, and therefore it should be unnecessary for us to supply any additional aircraft for use on the Soviet sector.

G. The Department concurs.

2. You may advise the Soviet authorities that the Department is deeply interested in concluding also an arrangement with the Russians for the Alsib route, since it would open up a new and more direct avenue of communication beneficial to both countries. For your strictly confidential information this phase is being discussed with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and we shall advise you further as promptly as possible.⁹⁶

HULL

811.79661/74 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Standley)*

WASHINGTON, July 1, 1943—9 p. m.

508. Your 716, June 23, 3 p. m. In view of the last paragraph of Department's number 490, June 28, 9 p. m., the Department does not consider it desirable to attempt at this time to achieve reciprocity in

⁹⁶ See telegram No. 648, August 5, 10 p. m., to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, p. 681.

connection with Soviet officials proceeding to the United States via Alaska. However, in order to regularize this increasing traffic and to prevent the unannounced arrival in Alaska of Soviet aircraft and personnel en route to the United States or Canada, please communicate the following information to the Soviet Foreign Office:

1. Permission for Soviet aircraft to fly in transit through Alaska en route to the United States or Canada must be requested by the Soviet Government through regular diplomatic channels either through the American Embassy in Moscow or through the Soviet Embassy in Washington. The Soviet request should be accompanied by the customary information giving description of the plane, flight plan from Siberia to Alaska, expected time and place of arrival in Alaska, the names of the crew and passengers. The Department upon receipt of requests of this nature will undertake to clear with the appropriate military authorities.

2. Applications for visas for Soviet personnel intending to proceed through Alaska should state that the point of entry into the United States is to be Alaska. These applications will then be submitted by the Embassy to the Department in the usual manner. When the visa is issued, it should bear the Embassy's notation "valid for travel via Alaska". The purpose of these requirements is to prevent in the future the unannounced and unauthorized entry of Soviet aircraft and Soviet citizens into Alaska which has recently been increasing. You may point out to the Soviet authorities that these requirements in regard to aircraft and passengers are for the purpose of insuring the safety of the plane itself as well as to avoid the inevitable delays and confusion which are sure to accompany a failure to observe these requirements.

The new procedure does not, of course, apply to ferry pilots and members of the Soviet ferrying service proceeding on official business between Siberia and Alaska.

HULL

811.79661/75: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, July 3, 1943—noon.

[Received July 5—3:45 p.m.]

796. Department's 490, June 28, 9 p. m. I informed Molotov yesterday of the desire of my Government to enter into a formal agreement with a view to establishing a Moscow-Tehran-Washington air service with definite scheduled flights and left with him a memorandum containing the proposals set forth in my 648 of June 12 as amended by the Department's telegram under reference. Molotov stated he

would cause the matter to be studied and communicate again with me.⁹⁷

STANDLEY

740.00119 European War 1939/1528 : Telegram

The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

STOCKHOLM, July 3, 1943—9 p. m.

[Received July 3—7:40 p. m.]

2055. McClintock⁹⁸ who has just arrived on courier trip wishes to report that last night Swedish Minister to Helsinki⁹⁹ said that so far as his Government knew there was no truth in story reported in Helsinki's 803, June 20, 11 a. m., of secret conversations between the Soviet and German Ministers¹ here last April.² However, Baron Beck-Friis said that recently President Ryti³ had intimated to him his belief that such conversations had taken place. Beck-Friis suggested that possibly the Germans were propagating the story in Finland as part of their "war of nerves" to keep the Finns on the path of co-belligerency.⁴

McClintock observed that if this were true the Germans were creating precisely an opposite effect as Ramsay's⁵ policy had somewhat altered since he began to think a Soviet-German peace more than a remote possibility.

Code text to Helsinki by courier.

JOHNSON

⁹⁷ The Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs, Loy W. Henderson, in a memorandum of July 30, addressed to Assistant Secretary of State Berle, recommended that "before proceeding to negotiate with the Soviet Government with a view to the establishment of an American commercial air service into the Soviet Union, it would be advisable to await Molotov's reply to Ambassador Standley's memorandum of July 2 as well as the results of the studies with respect to the Alsib route at present being carried on by the Joint Chiefs of Staff." (811.79661/96)

⁹⁸ Robert M. McClintock, American Chargé in Finland.

⁹⁹ Hans Gustaf, Baron Beck-Friis.

¹ Alexandra Kollontay and Hans Thomsen, respectively.

² The Chief of the Political Affairs Section of the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, S. J. Söderblom, who was reputed to know the members of the Soviet Legation most intimately, was reported in telegram No. 2199 from Stockholm, July 14, to be convinced that "there is no foundation for these reports." (740.00119 European War 1939/1533)

³ Risto Ryti, President of the Republic of Finland.

⁴ For correspondence regarding the interest of the United States in Finland and in its possible withdrawal from war with the Soviet Union, see pp. 213 ff.

⁵ C. Henrik Ramsay, Finnish Minister for Foreign Affairs.

811.2361/17 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, July 5, 1943—10 a. m.

[Received July 6—12:45 a. m.]

800. Captain Eddie Rickenbacker departed July 2 for Tehran but was forced to return because of engine trouble. It now appears that it will be necessary to bring in a new engine from Cairo and I have made preliminary arrangements for an American plane to bring one here.⁶

Thus far during Rickenbacker's visit here he has inspected an air field in the vicinity of Moscow where P-39's were being tested and has made a trip to the front where he visited three air combat units. He stated that American equipment, principally P-39's and A-20's were being used at these units, that although he was impressed by the spirit and fighting qualities of the Soviet aviators he was struck by their low technical skill and knowledge of the American equipment. He said that one of the first recommendations on returning to Washington would be the immediate despatch here of American instructors and technicians. I have endeavored to explain the Russian reluctance to receive such help.

Although I understand that certain misgivings were caused in the War Department at Rickenbacker's trip to the Soviet Union and proposed visit to Ankara I can report that he has been cordially received by the Russians and in my mind he will leave this country with a more unbiased and healthy understanding of our problems here than the usual run of special representatives. So far as I am aware he has thus far not discussed the alleged reasons for his mission here, i.e., the question of air bases. With the exception of a few minutes chat with Molotov at the presentation of the American decorations⁷ and luncheon with Litvinov he has seen no important Soviet officials.

In many respects Rickenbacker's mission remains a mystery to me especially its Washington inception, the secrecy with which it is clothed, the vague and undefined character of its objectives and the fact that he asks to be unaccompanied by any American officials on his visits.

I assume that the Department is equally in the dark, otherwise I feel sure it would have advised me accordingly.

The only possible discordant note in the visit thus far has been a rather heated discussion which took place between Rickenbacker on

⁶ In telegram No. 865, July 15, 1 p. m., Ambassador Standley reported that Captain Rickenbacker had left on that day for Tehran (811.2361/24).

⁷ See telegram No. 721, June 23, 8 p. m., from the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, p. 546.

one hand and the British Ambassador and Arthur Sulzberger on the other on the question of operation of International Airways in the post-war period. Due to illness I was not present at this discussion but I am informed that Rickenbacker was not hesitant in his criticisms and animadversions of the selfish role he anticipated the British would play in their endeavors to control many of the principal airways of the world after the war.

STANDLEY

811.91261/396 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, July 6, 1943—7 p. m.

[Received July 7—12:35 p. m.]

815. In conversation with Molotov on June 22nd I informed him that Mr. Sulzberger had expressed a desire to have an interview with Marshal Stalin. I explained that Sulzberger, as owner and publisher of the *New York Times*, was a very important and influential personage in the U.S.; that he had the support of the President in coming to Moscow and that it had occurred to me that Stalin might desire to see him. I find that through an oversight this matter was not reported to the Department at the time.⁸

I took Sulzberger to call on Molotov yesterday so that he might express his appreciation for the courtesies extended to him by the Soviet authorities during his visit here. He explained to Molotov that although he had come here ostensibly in his capacity as member of the Central Committee of the Red Cross nonetheless he could not divorce himself from his position as publisher of the *New York Times* and that in this capacity his visit had been of especially great value to him. Also in this capacity he stated that he hoped to have an opportunity before departing to see Stalin. Molotov replied that unfortunately Stalin had gone to the front and would not return for some time.

Sulzberger appears to have made a fine impression upon the Russians with whom he has been in contact and I do not believe that Stalin's failure to see him should be taken personally. He expects to leave Moscow as soon as transportation is available.⁹ I will then send in a full report¹⁰ on his activities here. I may say at this time, however, that I believe that his visit has been definitely worthwhile.

STANDLEY

⁸ Ambassador Standley had actually reported this matter in telegram No. 720, June 23, 7 p. m.; not printed.

⁹ Mr. Sulzberger left Moscow on July 12.

¹⁰ Not printed.

760F.61/101 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, July 16, 1943—midnight.

[Received July 17—12:23 a. m.]

Czechoslovakian Series No. 7. For the President, the Secretary, and the Under Secretary. Referring to my despatch 66, June 16¹¹ (paragraph 3 page 2) regarding Dr. Beneš' proposed trip to Moscow and his hopes of making a mutual assistance treaty with Russia somewhat along lines of Anglo-Russian Treaty, Dr. Beneš informs me that he is postponing his trip to Moscow for the present.

He tells me that before going to Washington he informed the British authorities of his hopes to negotiate a treaty with Russia and they signified their approval but that on his return he found they had undergone a change of mind. According to Dr. Beneš, the British explained that in view of Poland's suspended relations with Russia, they preferred that he postpone his Moscow visit, at least until there were some signs of improvement in those relations, since his visit to Moscow at this time might be construed by the Poles as taking advantage of their present adverse position vis-à-vis Russia and since any Czechoslovak-Russian treaty such as he envisaged might prejudice Poland's position by leaving her isolated.

Dr. Beneš adds that since the British authorities' approval originally was subsequent to the rupture of Polish-Russian relations he was somewhat puzzled by this change of attitude and in searching for a reason he has come to the conclusion that it is not unrelated to the following situation: The Russians some time ago made soundings with the Yugoslav Government regarding postwar political cooperation. The British had at the same time been conducting conversations along similar lines with the Greeks. On learning of the Russian soundings, the British proposed to Moscow that their respective conversations be postponed until a more opportune time. The Soviet Government agreed to this proposal. But according to Dr. Beneš, while the British considered that this understanding was general in its application, the Soviet Government considered that it applied only to their respective conversations with the Greeks and the Yugoslavs, and as a result the Russians are finding it difficult to

¹¹ Not printed.

see why there should be any postponement in negotiations for a Czechoslovak-Soviet treaty.¹²

Dr. Beneš adds that while he wants to take no steps which might conflict with the views of the British Government, he feels the latter may possibly have failed to give realistic consideration to certain angles. For example, as much as he would like to see an early Polish-Russian *rapprochement*, he does not think that this can be expected for several months to come. Events since General Sikorski's untimely end¹³ suggest that the new Polish Government will require some time to become stabilized. If recent Polish inter-party struggles for position lead to further unsettled conditions within the Government, and in his opinion this seems likely, he fears this will not advance the task of healing the Polish-Russian breach. He would not want Czechoslovakia's position vis-à-vis Russia to become dependent on the state of Polish-Russian relations. He states he has worked diligently to bring his Government's position up to the point where it can effect a constructive agreement with Russia and he feels such an agreement could serve as a model of relationship between Russia and the states in the middle zone. Viewed in this light, he believes it could be a constructive influence in general and an advantage to Poland in particular.

As regards his own feelings concerning an early departure for Moscow Dr. Beneš states he would wish to delay it for a time in view of General Sikorski's death. The British however envisage a delay of several months. In the circumstances the date of his visit is altogether uncertain but he hopes to proceed with conversations with the Russians with a view to eventual conclusion of the envisaged agreement.

WINANT

861.248/287

Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Hickerson)

[WASHINGTON,] July 17, 1943.

MR. SECRETARY: I was in Fairbanks, Alaska, on July 11 during a visit of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense, United States and

¹² In an *aide-mémoire* of June 27, the British Ambassador in the United States (Lord Halifax) explained that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Eden) had told Molotov in London in 1942 that it was deemed undesirable for their Governments to conclude "treaties covering the post-war period with the smaller Allies, since this might give rise to competition." After his return to Moscow, "Molotov sent Mr. Eden a message through the Soviet Ambassador saying that the Soviet Government agreed to abide by this self-denying ordinance." (760F.61/99)

¹³ Gen. Wladyslaw Sikorski, Prime Minister of the Polish Government in Exile at London, died in an airplane accident on July 4, 1943, near Gibraltar.

Canada,¹⁴ and I saw a great deal of the activities in connection with the ferry route for delivering planes to Siberia.

As you know, the planes are manufactured and equipped in the United States (including Russian insignia) and flown by American Army officers to Fairbanks. In Fairbanks Soviet pilots take over the planes and fly them to Siberia. After leaving Fairbanks the Russian pilots call at Nome or Galena, Alaska, for fueling. They then take off for Welkal, [*Velkal*] Siberia, where they are delivered to other Soviet pilots.

I saw a considerable number of planes in Fairbanks with the red star insignia. I counted 15 fighter planes (P-39's—the Bell Aircobra) and 11 medium bombers (the North American B-25 or Billy Mitchell). I saw a large number of Russian pilots at the port of Fairbanks and talked to several of them.

On the night of July 11 I had an extended conversation with Colonel Machin, the Soviet officer in charge of the ferry detail in Fairbanks. Colonel Machin speaks little English but understands some and did not speak French so we talked through an interpreter. A young Captain in the United States Engineers acted as interpreter for us, assisted by a young Soviet woman who is employed by the ferry detail.

Colonel Machin said that during the month of June he took delivery of 320 U.S. military planes at Fairbanks. He said that the schedule of deliveries called for 400 and that with his present force he could handle 500 planes a month.¹⁵ (A United States Army Air Force officer at Fairbanks, Colonel Kitchenman, in a subsequent conversation with me stated that he believed these figures were correct and that Colonel Machin's present staff could actually handle 500 planes per month. This is of considerable importance because of the fact that we had heard from a variety of sources that we are delivering planes in Fairbanks faster than the Russians can take delivery. Apparently this is not correct.)

Colonel Machin informed me that his detail flies the planes as far as Welkal where they are turned over to another group which flies another leg of the route across Siberia toward the front. A separate detail flies each leg and the pilots thus fly constantly over the same route. There are approximately 100 members of the Soviet ferry detail in Fairbanks each night; most of these are of course pilots.

Colonel Machin said that 95 percent of all planes taken over in Fairbanks safely reach their destination. I asked whether he meant Welkal or the front and he replied that he meant the concentration center near the front. He was generous in his praise of the American

¹⁴ Mr. Hickerson was Secretary of the United States Section of the Board.

¹⁵ See telegram No. 841, July 10, 2 p. m., from the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, p. 766.

planes, especially the P-39 (Aircobra) which he said was "wonderful" for use against the Fokke Wulf and against ground troops and tanks; he also praised highly the B-25 medium bomber.

[Here follow two paragraphs descriptive of the living conditions and associations of the pilots in Fairbanks.]

J[OHN] D. H[ICKERSON]

861.404/502 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, July 21, 1943—3 p. m.

[Received July 22—7:29 a. m.]

915. Department's 562, July 14, 7 p. m.¹⁶ Question reviewed with Foreign Office yesterday. Chief of American Division stated that he personally was working on the problem but that because of many errors in spelling of names, inadequate addresses and frequent changes in addresses without advice as to new addresses, he had been able to make but little progress with the list and he felt that it would be some time before the Soviet authorities would be able to locate even a part of the persons in question. He said that the general question of the policy of the Soviet Government regarding permission for the group to leave the Soviet Union was still undecided but he hoped to have an answer to this question in the near future.¹⁷

STANDLEY

811.79661/80 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, July 30, 1943—8 p. m.

[Received July 31—9:25 p. m.]

980. Department's 490, June 28, 9 p. m., last sentence in regard to Alsib route.

1. I should appreciate being informed of present status of this matter.

2. As of interest in consideration which the appropriate agencies of the American Government are giving to this matter, the informa-

¹⁶ Not printed, but see the Ambassador's telegram No. 540, May 27, 1 p. m., p. 656.

¹⁷ Near the end of the year the question of the evacuation from the Soviet Union of this group of rabbis and Jewish students remained unresolved. The Embassy in Moscow had kept in touch with the Australian Legation, as the representative of Polish interests in the Soviet Union, and also intended to inquire of the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs directly regarding any developments in this matter.

tion given me by pilots who flew my plane to Moscow over Alsib route¹⁸ is that the air fields on this route are in general good for maintaining regular scheduled service. Also use of planes with a flying radius of 2,000 or more miles would be helpful. The installation of radio aids would facilitate flying. The air fields are at present spaced that no leg of the route for the existing Russian Ferry Service is longer than 800 miles. At some points the only facilities for passengers are those provided at air fields for Russian pilots. All such facilities are in some respects primitive but tolerable and could be improved with little expense.

3. I hope consideration of matter by our Government may be expedited and that American Government may soon be in position to formulate concrete proposal for presentation thereof to Soviet Government at early date. I can not too much stress importance which I attach to improving means of communication between the United States and Russia.

STANDLEY

811.79661/80 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Standley)*

WASHINGTON, August 5, 1943—10 p. m.

648. Your 980, July 30, 8 p. m. As stated in the last paragraph of Department's 490 of June 28, the matter of the Alsib route was referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Department is now in receipt of a letter from the Joint Chiefs of Staff dated July 31, which represents the combined views of the War and Navy Departments and in which the Department is in full accord. A paraphrase of the pertinent parts of the letter under reference follows:

Begin paraphrase:

From a military point of view the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that there would be a distinct advantage in consummating an agreement whereby American air transport operations would be permitted, at least on the basis of one round trip per week between Seattle or Fairbanks and Moscow via the Alsib route. Our military authorities are prepared to operate such a service now.

In the event that the Department of State finds it necessary or desirable to offer the Soviet Union reciprocal privileges, the Joint Chiefs of Staff perceive no military objection to having the Soviets improve their existing air transport services to Fairbanks, or in extending it to Seattle over a route to the west of all Canadian territory. As to trip frequencies, the schedules of the two services should be balanced and technical details should be subject to mutually satisfactory arrangements between the services performing the operations.

¹⁸ The airplane for the personal use of the Ambassador arrived in Moscow on July 22.

In the event that the Soviet Government is not willing to allow American military planes to operate as far as Moscow, then it is suggested that an agreement be reached if possible whereby our planes be permitted to operate at least as far as Chita or Irkutsk. *End phrase.*

You are instructed to begin negotiations with the Soviet Government on the basis of the foregoing, but without any reference to the Chiefs of Staff. You should transmit the proposal in a formal written communication and telegraph Soviet reply in full. Reference second paragraph of quotation, and in view of previous Soviet attitude regarding reciprocity, there is no objection to offering the Soviets reciprocal privileges along the line approved by the Chiefs of Staff. Naturally, the matter contained in last quoted paragraph should be reserved for possible future communication.

The Department shares your views on the importance of improving communications between the United States and Russia. While the present proposal looks to the establishment of a military service only, it should be borne in mind that it is a first, but important, step to the establishment of regular commercial services between the two countries after the war.

HULL

740.00119 European War 1939/1568 : Telegram

The Chargé in Finland (McClintock) to the Secretary of State

HELSINKI, August 10, 1943—2 p. m.

[Received 2:43 p. m.]

999. This morning I found both the Swiss Military Attaché¹⁹ and the Secretary-Archivist²⁰ inclined to place considerable credence in new rumors here of an impending separate peace between Germany and the USSR. It was urged that recent Russian radio broadcasts, the *Pravda* article complaining of the lack of a real second front,²¹ and the formation of the "Free German Committee" were evidence of increasing lack of confidence between the western Allies and the Soviet Union; and that it would be to Russian advantage to occupy without hindrance the territories Germany would offer in return for peace rather than to fight for them.

The Finns for their part seem again seriously concerned at the possibility of a separate Russian-German peace and may be inclined to connect reports to that effect with current rumors of a German intention to withdraw from Finland.

McCLINTOCK

¹⁹ Maj. William Lüthi.

²⁰ Arthur Wegmüller.

²¹ Concerning this article, see telegram No. 1043, August 10, 7 p. m., from the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, p. 560.

740.00111 European War 1939/714 : Telegram

The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

STOCKHOLM, August 10, 1943—7 p. m.

[Received 10:30 p. m.]

2501. I was informed yesterday by Boheman²² that a telegram from Swedish Minister in Rome²³ reported that German reinforcements of both men and material in northern Italy are enormous; that they are "pouring everything they have into Italy". Boheman said that large numbers of troops from both Norway and Denmark have been sent south. I tried to draw him out on subject matter reported my 2473, August 7, 7 p. m.,²⁴ but he said that he simply did not know. He is inclined to believe that Hitler, although under eclipse, is not entirely pushed aside and attributes partly to him personally decision to send strong reinforcements to Italy. As far as German generals are concerned he is convinced they would make peace at once with anybody but, of course, on terms. There are many stories current in Stockholm of a possible separate peace between Russia and Germany and there is noticeable a growing anxiety regarding position of Finland and possibility that it may be occupied by Russian troops thus bringing these latter to Swedish frontiers. This anxiety is also to be found in official circles and is giving concern to Foreign Office. Boheman confirms reports of growing despair and desperation in Germany. Swedes both official and private who are well informed about Germany express opinion that German position is in fact so desperate that the end cannot be long staved off.

JOHNSON

811.7461/20 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, August 11, 1943—1 p. m.

[Received 10 p. m.]

1051. In the course of a conversation with Hamilton²⁵ on another subject Vyshinski said he would be grateful for anything the Embassy could do to facilitate the conclusion of the negotiations for the estab-

²² Erik Boheman, Secretary General of the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

²³ Joen Lagerberg.

²⁴ Not printed; it transmitted information received from sources considered to be reliable that "German generals are now completely in control of situations in Germany with Hitler entirely pushed aside. Generals are intensely pre-occupied now with desire to effect peace with Russia." (740.00111 European War 1939/712)

²⁵ Maxwell M. Hamilton, who became Counselor of Embassy with the rank of Minister on July 22.

lishment of direct radio telephone service between the Soviet Union and the United States.

Vyshinski was informed that the Embassy's last record of the negotiations was that some difficulty had been encountered because of the desire of the Soviet Government that the agreement be signed by the United States Government rather than the company concerned.²⁶ He replied that the Soviet Government was prepared to conclude the agreement with the company but that the present difficulty had arisen over the classification of conversations as between what constituted private and governmental calls. He said there was no difficulty on the Soviet side but that the American company could not itself decide the question, which is a matter of American governmental regulations and it apparently had been unable to obtain a decision from the Government.²⁷

Vyshinski was informed that the Embassy would endeavor to ascertain the present status of the matter.

STANDLEY

761.62/1011

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] August 12, 1943.

The Minister of Sweden²⁸ called to see me this morning at his request having been away for three weeks on a vacation.

The Minister discussed in general terms the present situation in Germany and in Italy and expressed the belief that the situation in Germany was fast reaching the cracking point. I told him I knew that some of his own officials in Stockholm were beginning to get reports of this character.

The Minister said he was continuously disquieted by reason of the persistent rumors that the Soviet Union would make a separate peace with Germany. I said that of course in critical days like these rumors of every kind and description persisted, but that in the present case I need hardly remind him that the Soviet Union was a signatory of the United Nations Declaration²⁹ which pledged all of the United Nations not to enter into a separate armistice or peace. I added that from recent information which had come to me I was inclining to the

²⁶ The arrangements were being discussed with the Long Lines Department of the American Telephone and Telegraph Co., New York, N.Y.

²⁷ In telegram No. 706, August 17, 9 p. m., the Department replied that, with regard to the classes of calls to be allowed, "it is not believed that there will be any particular difficulties in reaching an agreement with the Soviet authorities with regard to this matter." 811.7461/20)

²⁸ Wollmar Filip Boström.

²⁹ Signed on January 1, 1942, *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. I, p. 25.

belief that the Soviet Government was tending towards a policy of international cooperation which Stalin and his associates were beginning to think would be far more conducive to the interests of the Soviet Union in the post-war period than the policy of isolation and withdrawal which they had pursued in the years up to 1939. The Minister said he hoped this would prove to be the case since he regarded the issue under discussion as the biggest issue before the world today, the satisfactory answer to which involved continued independence and security for every small power of Europe.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

811.79661/84 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, August 13, 1943—8 p. m.

[Received 10:15 p. m.]

1084. Department's 648, August 5, 10 p. m. I presented a formal note to Vyshinski last evening outlining the proposals in question. Vyshinski referred to the "technical difficulties" of the Alsib route. I stated that my Government was submitting the proposal with the hope that negotiations between the two Governments might be initiated in the near future. Vyshinski stated that he would take the note under advisement.

STANDLEY

196.6/1500 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley)

WASHINGTON, August 14, 1943—8 p. m.

692. Your 212, March 26, 1943, 5 p. m. The Department has been informed by Admiral Land that your proposals have been discussed with the British Shipping Mission in Washington, who have informed him as follows:

The proposals have been accepted by the Ministry of War Transport, and the Foreign Office is instructing the British Ambassador that, acting in conjunction with you, he should intimate that the Soviet offer of spending money for crews would be accepted if put forward officially by the Soviet authorities providing that actual distributions would be made by WSA and MWT^{29a} representatives. The British Ambassador is instructed also to ask the Soviet authorities to give consideration to the position of crane ships and survivors in the hope

^{29a} War Shipping Administration and Ministry of War Transport, respectively.

that the official offer may make special provision for these cases. He is not to ask for the diplomatic rate of exchange for these cases, and the position is to be reviewed jointly, if necessary, in the light of the Soviet offer when made.

The Ministry of War Transport believes it is important that equal treatment in North Russian ports be received by British and American crews. As soon as the Soviet offer of spending money for crews has been accepted, the Ministry would therefore be agreeable to adopting your proposal that no further advances should be made at the diplomatic rate by either WSA or MWT, but that in case drawings in excess of the Soviet gratuities are made both should charge their crews at the official rate. If the Soviet offer fails to provide adequately for crews on crane ships or for survivors, the Ministry of War Transport points out that it may be necessary for them to make special arrangements, probably including advances at the diplomatic rate.

Acting in coordination with the British Ambassador, you may in your discretion inform the Soviet authorities that this Government is prepared to accept the proposal set forth in your 1070, December 9, 1942.³⁰

HULL

862.01/354 : Telegram

The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

STOCKHOLM, August 14, 1943—10 p. m.

[Received August 15—12:07 p. m.]

2553. In a private conversation yesterday with Boheman I endeavored again to draw out any knowledge he might have regarding Russo-German contacts (see my 2422, August 4, 8 p. m., 2473, August 7, 7 p. m.³¹ and 2501, August 10, 7 p. m.). Boheman said he did not have any precise knowledge and could only give opinions based on analysis of information available and what seemed to him probable in light of common sense. He does not believe in any possibility of a separate peace between present regimes in Germany and Russia but thinks it highly probable contacts have been made between anonymous emissaries representing military and that German military has sounded Stalin as to whether Germany could have peace if Poland and Russia were evacuated. He thinks it possible that such feelers may not have had from Stalin same answer of "unconditional surrender" given by Anglo-Saxon powers. He said that if I didn't object he

³⁰ *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. III, p. 674.

³¹ Neither printed; but see footnote 24, p. 683.

would like to expand a little on his personal ideas. He asked me to look at situation from Stalin's point of view—how could he in light of Russia's interests be pleased or easy with an indefinite Anglo-Saxon military occupation of Germany? With reference to question as to whether Hitler or generals wield final effective power at present in Germany he suggested that generals are in ultimate control but that they keep Hitler in power because if Germany must go to bottom they want him to be on top to bear blame. If they could be assured of saving Germany he would be sacked at once but as long as they keep him they cannot maintain him entirely as a puppet; he must have power to make decisions so that blame will fall on his head for failure. Dilemma of generals is that there is no point of hope to which they can look under formula of unconditional surrender. Boheman remarked that war is now in an acutely critical stage and that in his personal view it is vitally important for future of Europe that Anglo-Saxon powers make some clear cut declaration of their planned policy for Germany which will say something more than to propose unconditional surrender. Alternative may be that generals can come to terms with Stalin which may not involve total abasement of Germany. Boheman is of personal opinion which I have reported previously that Stalin does not desire a long occupation of Germany nor necessarily a Communist Germany but that what he wants is a weak democratic Germany not controlled by Anglo-Saxon powers.

I learned yesterday from a reliable source that about 3 weeks ago two Germans arrived by plane from Berlin, one a bona fide wine salesman who had made many previous visits to Sweden to sell wine to Swedish monopoly and other a commercial traveler. They stayed at a Stockholm hotel where they were joined in evening by two men with whom they remained for several hours. These men were trailed by Swedish Secret Police back to Soviet Legation which they entered in early hours of morning. Two Germans returned to Berlin next day and came back within a week. They stayed at same hotel, were seen by two Russians who were again trailed by Secret Police back to Soviet Legation, Germans returning to Berlin next day. When I was talking to Boheman I mentioned this information and his reaction was such that I have no doubt it is true and that he knew of it. I have no reason to believe that Swedish Secret Police have any knowledge of what was discussed between four men and it is highly improbable that they do know. Police were not able to establish identity of two men who returned to Russian Legation.

JOHNSON

196.6/1576 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Standley)*

WASHINGTON, August 26, 1943—7 p. m.

779. Department's 692, August 14, 1943, 8 p. m. The Navy Department has communicated with the Department with regard to the payment of gratuities to members of Naval gun crews serving on merchant ships. Presumably no such payments have been made since your telegram 881, October 13, 1942, 3 p. m.,³² and Navy has been so informed.

The Department desires to emphasize that its acceptance of the Soviet proposal to furnish rubles does not apply to Naval personnel.

The Department would appreciate any information available as to when the practice of paying gratuities actually ceased and the extent to which members of the Naval gun crews may have received gratuities. The Navy Department contemplates requesting the return of any money received by the gun crews. The Department would appreciate an expression of your views with reference to the possible return of this money to the Soviet authorities.³³

The Navy Department points out the acceptance of gratuities by members of the Naval service is contrary to Article I, Section 9, Clause 8, of the Constitution, and states further that members of the Naval service engaged in the conveying of cargo to Murmansk and Archangel have ample reward in the knowledge that their service is of assistance to the Russian armed forces.

HULL

811.2361/28 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary
of State*

Moscow, August 30, 1943.

[Received September 1—1:19 p. m.]

1224. *Pravda* of August 30 carried a Tass report from Khabarovsk which reads in translation as follows:

"An American military airplane landed on August 12 on the territory of Kamchatka. According to a statement of the crew of the airplane the latter had participated that day in a raid of American

³² *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. III, p. 654.³³ See telegram No. 1250, September 2, noon, from the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, p. 689.

aircraft on Japanese military bases in the region of the Kurile Islands and made a forced landing on Soviet territory because of engine trouble.³⁴

On the basis of international law the American plane and its crew have been interned by the Soviet authorities.”³⁵

STANDLEY

196.6/1586 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, September 2, 1943—noon.

[Received 2:50 p. m.]

1250. Department's 779, August 31 [26], 7 p. m. Commander Frankel³⁶ states that he understands that gratuities were not paid to crews of any ships that left United States after June 1942 and that some of the vessels leaving prior to that time did not receive payments. He states that payments were made to captains of the ships in form of dollar drafts on American banks and the captains were free to distribute proceeds among crews as they saw fit. Upon their return to the USA, Frankel thinks that in some cases payments may have been made to armed guard crews but that this would have been done unofficially and receipts would not have been obtained.

In view of the indirect method of payment, the difficulty if not impossibility of determining what payments have been made and fact that return of money to Soviet authorities would probably arouse some resentment on their part, I recommend that attempt to refund not be made at this time.

STANDLEY

³⁴ The Consul General at Vladivostok, Angus I. Ward, informed the Department in his telegram No. 32, August 20, sent also to the Embassy in the Soviet Union, that a B-24 bomber had made a forced landing on August 12 at Kalakhtyrka Lake near Petropavlovsk on Kamchatka Peninsula. The cause for landing was damaged motors while returning to base at Adak Island in the Aleutians from a bombing mission to Paramushiro and Shimushi Islands of the Kuril chain. The Diplomatic Agent of the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, Semen Petrovich Dyukharyev, told Ward that the crew of 11 officers and men, 3 of whom were wounded or injured, had been interned near Petropavlovsk. (811.2361/25) In his later telegram No. 36, September 5, Ward stated that Sgt. Thomas Ring had died on September 1 from injuries sustained in the crash landing (811.2361/29).

³⁵ In a note of September 20, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs let the Embassy know that the 10 interned crew members had been transferred for residence to the city of Yangi Yul, the station for which was Kaufmanskaya, 28 kilometers southward from Tashken (811.2361/31).

³⁶ Comdr. Samuel B. Frankel, Assistant Naval Attaché and Assistant Naval Attaché for Air in the Soviet Union.

740.00119 European War 1939/1643 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, September 6, 1943—3 p. m.
[Received September 6—2:15 p. m.]

5502. From Tittmann,³⁷ [No.] 176, September 1. There is a report in the Vatican to the effect that Ribbentrop has been in Moscow for the past 8 days endeavoring to bring about a Russo-German peace. Hitler it is said has thus far refused all conditions proposed by the Soviets and negotiations seem to have failed. The report sounds fantastic and I would not send it on were it not for the fact that it comes from a hitherto reliable source.³⁸ It is also an indication of the extreme nervousness that prevails in Vatican circles at the present time. [Tittmann.]

HARRISON

811.79661/94 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, September 14, 1943—4 p. m.
[Received September 15—9:25 p. m.]

1351. As you know we now have before the Soviet Government two proposals for improving air communication between the United States and the Soviet Union. The first such proposal was presented on July 2, 1943, and envisages a service via North Africa and Iran in which the United States would operate the Washington-Tehran leg and the Soviet Union would operate the Tehran-Moscow leg. The Soviet Government has as yet given no indication of its attitude toward this proposal. The second proposal was presented on August 11 [12], 1943, and involves the operation by the United States of a service from Washington to Moscow via the Alaska-Siberia route and a reciprocal service operated by the Soviet Government. The Soviet Government has made no reply to this proposal. While I believe that the first proposal if accepted by the Soviet Government would result in some improvement in the situation I do not believe that it would meet all present needs.

I believe that relations between the United States and the Soviet Union are now so important that there is urgent need of prompt and

³⁷ Harold H. Tittmann, Jr., assistant to Mr. Myron C. Taylor, Personal Representative of President Roosevelt to Pope Pius XII at the Vatican, to whom this telegram was shown at the Department of State.

³⁸ A similar report about Ribbentrop's presence in Moscow, received from Spanish sources, was sent in airgram No. A-131 from the American Legation in Tangier on August 26, 1943. The Counselor of Legation considered the report to be preposterous. (740.00119 European War 1939/1635)

regular communication between them.³⁹ I therefore consider that there is warrant now for establishing a direct governmental airplane service between Washington and Moscow with planes proceeding from Washington once every 2 weeks on a through trip to Moscow. The Soviet Government could of course be offered reciprocal rights in respect to operating a similar service from Moscow to Washington. I estimate that such a United States service from Washington to Moscow and return would require probably two planes of the C-87 type.

The British Government regards the provision of air service for maintaining official contacts with British governmental representation here as an important part of the war effort. They are endeavoring to obtain Soviet assent to a previously existing service. I regard similar provision by the United States of air service as a definite part of the war effort.

I recommend that if the Soviet Government does not give at an early date a favorable response to our proposal for the establishment of a service via the Alaska-Siberian route the American Government press the Soviet Government for assent to the prompt inauguration of an official through service between Washington and Moscow as outlined above.⁴⁰

STANDLEY

811.20261/212 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, September 14, 1943—5 p. m.
[Received September 17—2:18 p. m.]

1352. 1. In my telegram 225, March 31, 1943, I recommended that a competent expert be sent to the Soviet Union to consult with me and make appropriate recommendations regarding our Government's efforts in the field of informational and cultural activities.

As almost 6 months have now elapsed since my telegram of March 31 I believe that the Department will be interested in the situation as

³⁹ In connection with the making of special arrangements for Andrey Andreyevich Gromyko to present his letters of credence as Ambassador of the Soviet Union to the United States, see telegram No. 1219, August 29, 2 p. m., from the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, p. 569.

⁴⁰ During a conversation in the Kremlin on December 25, 1943, at 7 p. m., Foreign Commissar Molotov handed to W. Averell Harriman, then the American Ambassador, a memorandum wherein it was stated: "In so far as the establishment of air communications between our countries along the route Moscow-Teheran-Washington is concerned there is no objection from the Soviet side to the renewal of conversations on this question between the representatives of the Chief Administration of the Civil Air Fleet of the U.S.S.R. and the corresponding American representatives in Moscow for the conclusion of an agreement on the basis of reciprocity."

it now exists here. An important feature of that situation is the activity of various other governments and I shall therefore first outline what those governments are doing.

[Here follows description of the functioning of the British establishment in the Soviet Union, the success of the first year of publication of the Russian language weekly *Britansky Soyuznik* (British Ally), the plans for publication of the periodical *British Chronicle* every 2 months in Russian, and the lesser propaganda activities of the Chinese, French, and Czechoslovak Missions.]

2. Since my telegram of March 31 the Embassy has continued its work in the field of informational and cultural activities along the lines set forth in that telegram. American news continues to receive more space in the Soviet press than the news of any other foreign council [*country*]. Notwithstanding that fact and taking into account all factors in the situation it seems to me that the time has now come when we could usefully expand our activities here. Obviously such expansion would require additional personnel, substantial expenditure of funds and a definite agreement with the United States military authorities that transportation by air would be furnished for the sending to the Soviet Union of the material and personnel essential to the carrying out of such activities. The British Government has shown by its preparedness to utilize air transport for such purpose and by the assignment of a considerable number of highly trained personnel to this work that it regards such activity as an important part of the war effort. I also so regard it.

I doubt whether the Department of State, the Office of War Information or any agency of the American Government has at present available for sending to Moscow any large number of specially trained personnel. If the personnel in this field were to be substantially increased it would probably have to be recruited from a number of agencies and from civilian life.

As the Department is aware there are a number of factors which need to be given special attention in formulating a program of cultural and informational activity in the Soviet Union. In the Soviet Union these factors include the centralized control by the Government of all agencies of information and propaganda and the usual importance attached by the Government to the shaping of public opinion. Any significant foreign propaganda activities or what the Soviet Government may regard as such may thus become matters of high policy. It should of course be borne in mind that any American cultural or informational program in the Soviet Union should be based squarely upon the actualities of American life and thought. If it does not portray an accurate picture of American opinion and

life the Soviet Government will readily detect that fact and the net result will be distinctly harmful to the cause of good relations between the two countries. In the United States there are various schools of thought with regard to some aspects of the Soviet system and the ideas underlying it. Care should be taken to avoid stressing in any informational activity on the part of our Government any particular American school of thought in such a way as to provoke internal controversy in the United States and impair the unity of desire on the part of the American people as a whole to go forward with a program of collaboration with the Soviet Union.

In the light of the foregoing I make recommendations as follows:

First. I believe we should continue actively in our program of exchange of motion pictures and of supplying news pictures to the Soviet press. In this program I believe that we have been more successful than the British.

Second. I believe that we should expand materially our present program of supplying printed matter to Soviet agencies here. At present the Embassy receives two copies of OWI clip sheets containing speech excerpts, special articles, etc. I recommend that the Embassy be furnished with 50 copies of such material. The Embassy could use to advantage 10 additional sets of the magazines now received *Life* and *Time*. Material descriptive of the American war effort including sets of the best American war posters would also be useful.

Third. I believe that our Government should send to this Embassy for distribution copies of the best American fictional and scholarly works.

Fourth. I believe that immediate attention should be given to the question of publishing in Russian text in the United States by the American Government or under governmental auspices of a serious magazine which could be sent by airmail for distribution here. It is our thought that such a magazine could usefully include scientific articles, historical articles, articles on social welfare, cultural matters, child problems, industrial development and in general serious subjects of a non-controversial character.

Fifth. As an alternative or possibly as supplement to the publication of a serious magazine such as suggested in the preceding paragraph I believe that consideration should be given to publication in the United States of an illustrated magazine with text in Russian perhaps along the lines of *En Guardia* and sending it to the Embassy for distribution in the Soviet Union.

The question whether our Government should endeavor to publish in Russian text a newspaper in Moscow for distribution in the Soviet Union is one which presents greater difficulties than the program outlined above. It would require the working out in advance with the Soviet Government of arrangements for distribution and the sending to Moscow of a special staff for that purpose. I think that before

definite decision is reached it would be advisable that a specially qualified person be sent here to survey the field and endeavor to effect any needed arrangements with the Soviet authorities.

Aside from such staff as might be needed to inaugurate publication of a newspaper here I estimate that the Embassy would need for the expanded program which I have outlined above two additional officers who might be appointed from the auxiliary service and one additional stenographer. The officers should have a good command of the Russian language. I believe that the Division of Cultural Relations could adequately and appropriately undertake direction and supervision of this program. The assistance and cooperation of other governmental agencies especially the Office of War Information would of course be needed.

I feel that we could put into effect all of the five recommendations which I have made without prior consultation with the Soviet authorities with the exception of the fourth and fifth recommendations. If the Department approves the fourth and fifth recommendations and desires to proceed therewith I should be instructed prior to actual arrangements for publication to take the matter up with the Soviet authorities and to endeavor to obtain a Soviet distributing agency here.

Whether the Soviet Government would be willing to permit the American Embassy to undertake the distribution through a Soviet agency of specially prepared magazines along the lines described in my fourth and fifth recommendations or to embark on the publication of a newspaper cannot be definitely stated in advance of presenting the matters to the Soviet Government. In this connection it is the Embassy's understanding that about the time the British started publication of the *Britanski Soyuznik* here the British Government removed the ban on publication of the *Daily Worker* in London; also that the Soviet Embassy in London prints 50,000 copies of its propaganda publication. Although officers of the British Embassy here claim that there is no connection between British publication activities in Russia and Soviet publication activities in London the fact that the British Government has an authority which it has used on occasion in reference to Soviet publication activities in London may not be unrelated in fact to British publication activities in Russia.

I believe that the present is as opportune a time as we shall have to inaugurate an expanded and informational program here along the lines set forth in this telegram. With the passage of time the opportunities are likely to diminish. I therefore urge prompt consideration and early decision.

STANDLEY

740.00119 European War 1939/1720 : Telegram

The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

STOCKHOLM, September 14, 1943—10 p. m.

[Received September 15—2:49 a. m.]

2949. Background of Japanese peace efforts reported in my 2630, August 20, 6 p. m.,⁴¹ has now become known to Hungarian informant here from same source.

April 30 this year Germans through Japanese offered peace to Stalin on following conditions:

- (1) Frontier of 1939 (river San).
- (2) Ukrainian agriculture to be developed for Germany—German corridor to Ukraine or autonomy for Ukraine.
- (3) Bessarabia to be returned to Russia.
- (4) Odessa become free harbor city.
- (5) Whole Near East except Turkey but including Egypt to become Soviet sphere of interest; however Mosul oil fields to be at Germany's disposal.
- (6) India to be split into Japanese and Soviet spheres of influence.

Japs declared themselves ready to guarantee fulfillment of conditions which might be agreed upon for Russo-German reconciliation.

Russian official circles were divided in their view of above proposal:

Stalin favored the agreement. Japs are convinced that 3 months ago Stalin had Hitler's autographed photo on his desk in Kremlin and made laudatory remarks on Germany and on German Army. Also in favor of proposal were Zhukov,⁴² Shaponikov,⁴³ Voronov,⁴⁴ plus [*who is?*] commander of artillery, People's Commissar for Interior, and large part of Communist Party.

A larger part of Stalin's co-workers including Maisky, Molotov, Litvinov, Timoshenko⁴⁵ and Budenny⁴⁶ were against agreement with Germany and opposed it energetically.

⁴¹ Not printed; it reported that, according to a Hungarian report from a diplomatic source in Ankara, "In recent months Japanese have been feverishly active trying to initiate peace negotiations between Russians and Germans." (740.00119 European War 1939/1599) Another report of Japanese activities to end the war between Germany and the Soviet Union came from Helsinki on June 26; and a Tass denial of any such discussions was published in Moscow on July 17.

⁴² Marshal Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov, member of the Stavka, the military High Command group, in general charge of military activity in the western operational zone.

⁴³ Marshal Boris Mikhailovich Shaposhnikov, Assistant People's Commissar for Defense.

⁴⁴ Marshal Nikolay Nikolayevich Voronov, member of the Stavka, specialist and commander of artillery.

⁴⁵ Marshal Semen Konstantinovich Timoshenko, member of the Stavka, helped to coordinate the successful summer offensive in 1943 in the region of Kursk and Orel.

⁴⁶ Marshal Semen Mikhailovich Budenny, Assistant People's Commissar for Defense, cavalry specialist, trainer of reserve troops.

Discussions through Japs were suspended when Stalin asked for pause to think over matter until end of August. This would allow time for him to observe results of summer offensive.

As reported in my 2630 Russians declared no discussion possible while Hitler remains in power and German Army still uncrushed.

JOHNSON

761.94/1440

*The Embassy of the Soviet Union to the Department of State*⁴⁷

The Soviet Government considers it necessary to convey to the United States Government the following confidential information. On September 10th, Japanese Ambassador in Moscow, Mr. Sato called on the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, V. M. Molotov and informed him that the Japanese Government, with the purpose of improving of the relations existing between the USSR and Japan, would like to send to Moscow a high official who would directly represent the Japanese Government. This Extraordinary Envoy of the Japanese Government would come to Moscow together with his suite and then, after an exchange of opinions with the Soviet representatives would continue the trip to Western Europe through Turkey. Answering the questions put by V. M. Molotov for the purpose of clarification of Mr. Sato's statement, the latter said further that the above-mentioned mission intends to proceed through Turkey to the Balkans, then to Hungary, Austria, Germany, Switzerland and France, and to confer with prominent people in those countries. Then on its way to Japan the mission intends to come back to Moscow where it will have again opportunity to make an exchange of opinions with the Soviet representatives. The Ambassador made it clear that the conversations of the Extraordinary Envoy in Moscow would touch upon many questions in which Japan and the USSR are concerned, but at the same time they would also touch upon the general and very important circumstances existing at the present time in which both countries are concerned, and that since this mission would have an opportunity to visit the countries which are at war with the Soviet Union, this would be in the interests not alone of Japan.

On September 13, V. M. Molotov on behalf of the Soviet Government gave an answer to the statement made by Japanese Ambassador Mr. Sato. The Soviet Government stated in its answer that in spite

⁴⁷ Handed to the Secretary of State by the Soviet Chargé on September 16. In a letter to the Soviet Chargé on September 25, the Secretary asked that Foreign Commissar Molotov be informed of the appreciation of the U.S. Government for his having this information made available to it.

of lack of definiteness of the Japanese Government's proposal the Soviet Government has no doubt that the sending of the Japanese Extraordinary Envoy to Moscow with the purpose of continuation of his trip through Turkey to Europe and then his returning to Moscow on his way to Japan cannot be considered otherwise than as an attempt of mediation between the USSR, and the countries which are at war with the USSR, with the purpose of preparation of ground for armistice or peace between them. Mr. Molotov told the Japanese Ambassador further that the Soviet Government considers that any possibility of armistice or peace with the Hitlerite Germany and her satellites in Europe is absolutely out of the question, and that in view of this the Soviet Government declines the proposal of the Japanese Government stated by the Ambassador Sato on this September 10th.

The Soviet Government transmitting this information to the United States Government considers it necessary to mention that the above proposal of Mr. Sato is the first attempt of the Japanese Government, since the beginning of the war, to take upon itself a mediatory part between the Soviet Government and the Hitlerite Germany.

SEPTEMBER 14, 1943.

811.7461/21 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Hamilton) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, September 21, 1943—1 p. m.
[Received September 21—12:10 p. m.]

1409. Department's 706, August 17, 9 p. m.⁴⁸ During a call on the chief of the American Section of the Foreign Office on September 20 in regard to other matters an officer of Embassy was informed that arrangements for direct radio telephone communication between the United States and the Soviet Union had been completed and that the service had been inaugurated today.⁴⁹

HAMILTON

⁴⁸ See footnote 27, p. 684.

⁴⁹ The Department was advised by the American Telephone and Telegraph Co. that the radio telephone circuit would start on September 22, and that for the time being the circuit would be open each day from 9 to 11 a. m., eastern war time.

In connection with means of communication, Lt. Comdr. E. W. Jensen of the Office of Naval Intelligence called attention to the fact that "radio telephone service can be unscrambled and, therefore, considerable caution is necessary in its use." (811.7461/21)

811.2361/34: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Hamilton) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, September 24, 1943—11 p. m.

[Received September 24(25)—9:30 a. m.]

1456. Vyshinsky asked me to call at the Foreign Office at 8 o'clock tonight at which time he read to me a statement to the following effect:

The Soviet Government desires to inform the American Embassy that on September 12 three American planes flew over Kamchatka and were forced to land because of engine trouble. Later on the same day four additional American planes flew over Kamchatka. Soviet planes went up and caused the American planes to land. The crews of the planes have been interned in accordance with International Law. The Soviet Government desires that the American Government take steps to prevent repetition of such occurrences and requests that the Embassy communicate the foregoing to the United States Government.

After reading the statement Vyshinsky said that he wished to draw attention to the facts that there had been two previous occasions on which American planes had landed in the Soviet Far East, namely, in April 1942 and August 1942 [1943].⁵⁰

I told Vyshinsky that I would communicate the foregoing promptly to my Government.

Vyshinsky said that the Soviet Government had not yet received the names of the personnel of the American planes and that upon receipt thereof the names would be communicated to the Embassy. In reply to my question whether the planes were Army or Navy planes he stated that he did not know and added that communications between Moscow and the Soviet Far East were bad.

Vyshinsky did not give me any written record of what he said. His manner while direct was friendly.

HAMILTON

740.00119 European War 1939/1997

The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

No. 2244

STOCKHOLM, September 29, 1943.

[Received October 30.]

SIR: I have the honor to submit herewith the substance of a conversation which took place recently between Mr. Konstantin Vino-

⁵⁰ With respect to these landings, see Embassy's telegrams No. 126, April 24, 1942, 2 p. m., *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. III, p. 545, first paragraph on p. 548, and No. 1224, August 30, 1943, *ante*, p. 688.

gradov, First Secretary of the Soviet Legation at Stockholm, and a member of my staff.

During the course of the conversation, the subject of the rumored peace negotiations between Germany and the U.S.S.R. was mentioned. Reference was made to the numerous articles about this matter which had appeared in the Swedish press. Rumors in circulation to the effect that peace conversations between Germany and the U.S.S.R. had taken place in Stockholm were also touched upon in the conversation.

Mr. Vinogradov's reaction to this matter was most interesting, particularly in view of the repeated reports in the Swedish press according to which the U.S.S.R. was alleged to be taking a somewhat lenient attitude in respect to possible peace conditions for Germany. While he did not say in so many words that German peace feelers had reached the Soviet Legation at Stockholm, his remarks implied that this had actually been the case. He referred vaguely to individuals who had tried to act as "agents" and "intermediaries" for Germany, and to efforts made by such persons to approach the Soviet Legation in behalf of Germany. He also intimated that attempts of this kind had been made by Axis Legations in Stockholm with which the Soviet Legation was on friendly terms. In this connection particular mention was made of the Bulgarian Legation in Stockholm.

Mr. Vinogradov stated that in all of these instances the reply of the Soviet Legation had been:

"No! No! And again No! We do not want to have anything to do with matters of this kind. The only thing that we will listen to from Germany is an offer of 'complete capitulation'."

He went on to say that it would not be in the interest of the U.S.S.R. to make peace with Germany on any other terms. He referred in particular to the tremendous efforts that were now being made by the United Nations to bring Germany to its knees. The second front, he said, would soon be an established fact whereupon Germany would be brought into a much more difficult position. Moreover, there would be absolutely no point in giving consideration to a separate peace with Germany at this time when the victorious Soviet armies were rapidly regaining the U.S.S.R. territory that had been overrun by the Germans.

In view of the fact that Mr. Vinogradov in all previous conversations has been evasive and that he usually is very close-mouthed, limiting his replies to quotations from speeches by Stalin or Molotov, there is reason to believe that the foregoing remarks may be the result of instructions from Moscow. This question has probably been asked members of the Soviet Legation so frequently of late that instructions were necessary.

Respectfully yours,

HERSCHEL V. JOHNSON

*The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt*⁵¹

LONDON, 31 September [1 October?] 1943.

429. Former Naval Person^{51a} to President Roosevelt. I send you herewith a telegram we have received from Molotov last week, and the answer I have now sent. The running of these four convoys will be a great strain to us and also a valuable boon to them. We therefore thought it right to put before him the ill usage of our people, only a few hundred during their stay in North Russia.

You will see that I have taken for granted the fact that you would wish to participate in the convoys, as so much of your stuff is waiting to be shipped and of your extreme regret at the time when we had to abandon the convoys.

Following is text of telegram from H. M. Ambassador, Moscow, referred to. *Begins:*

"M. Molotov sent for me on the evening of Sept 21st to hand me a long memorandum about convoys.

"After recapitulating the substance of M. Molotov's communication to Sir O. Sargent of Aug 25th and of reply sent to him on Sept 6th, the memorandum stated that the Soviet Government had naturally borne in mind the proviso contained in the Prime Minister's message of March 30th to Stalin,⁵² but that reasons given by His Majesty's Government for non resumption of convoys were not supported by facts. The Soviet Government wishes to remind His Majesty's Government:

(1) of the statement contained in joint message of Aug 19th from the Prime Minister and President Roosevelt about 'Life-belt'⁵³ that the submarines of Germany abandoned the Northern Atlantic and were concentrating on the southern route; and

(2) of the claim in joint statement issued by MOI⁵⁴ and United States Bureau of Military Information on Sept 11th regarding naval losses in August that the enemy had not attempted to attack cargo ships in the northern part of the Atlantic and that the chances of attacks on submarines had been comparatively rare.

"These facts prove that navigation conditions in North Atlantic since May have not been dangerous for convoys proceeding to northern ports of Soviet Union.

"This more favourable position, the increased naval strength of the Allies and the elimination of the Italian fleet which allowed the convoys to pass through the Mediterranean instead of around the Cape and thus set free escort ships for northern route, made a further postponement of convoys quite unjustifiable. The resumption was more

⁵¹ Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

^{51a} Code name for Prime Minister Churchill.

⁵² See footnote 4, p. 635.

⁵³ Code designation used for operations undertaken against Portuguese islands in the Atlantic Ocean.

⁵⁴ The British Ministry of Information.

necessary since the Soviet Union had this year received by the northern route less than one-third of last year's supplies (249,097 tons as against 764,337 tons).

"His Majesty's Government's references to the inadequate carrying capacity of Persian railways in northern zone only made resumption of convoys more necessary, as had been pointed out in Soviet memorandum of Aug 25th and the Soviet Government therefore maintained that in deciding the question of resumption of convoys, due weight should be given to this factor, which is of the gravest importance for the whole question of Soviet supplies.

"In view of the above circumstances and of the fact that the Soviet armies were now for the third successive month undertaking wide and most strenuous offensive on almost the whole German front for the success of which every intensification and increase in supply of armaments and other material was important the Soviet Government insisted upon the urgent resumption of convoys and expected His Majesty[']s Government to take all necessary measures within the next few days.

"Molotov made it clear that the Soviet Government attached very great importance to the matter and in handing me this memorandum he repeated orally all its arguments which I countered with the obvious replies, reminding him of the unhappy fate of our convoys last summer owing to the presence of German capital ships in Norwegian fjords. If we were able to dispose satisfactorily of German fleet, I said that I thought convoys would be resumed without delay."
Ends.

Following is text of telegram I have just sent to Stalin.⁵⁵ *Begins:*

"I have received your request for the reopening of the convoys to North Russia. I and all my colleagues are most anxious to help you and the valiant armies you lead to the utmost of our ability. I do not therefore reply to the various controversial points made in Monsieur Molotov's communication. Since June 22, 1941, we have always done our best in spite of our own heavy burdens to help you defend your own country against the cruel invasion of the Hitlerite gang, and we have never ceased to acknowledge and proclaim the great advantages that have come to us from the splendid victories you have won, and from the deadly blows you have dealt the German armies.

"For the last 4 days, I have been working with the Admiralty to make a plan for sending a few [*new*] series of convoys to North Russia. This entails very great difficulties:

"First, the Battle of the Atlantic has begun again. The U-boats have set about us with a new kind of acoustic torpedo, which has proved effective against the escorting vessels when hunting U-boats.

"Secondly, we are at very full stretch in the Mediterranean, building up an army in Italy of about 600,000 men by the end of November, and also trying to take full advantage of the Italian collapse in the Aegean Islands and the Balkan Peninsula.

"Thirdly, we have to provide for our share of the war against

⁵⁵ This telegram is dated October 1, 1943.

Japan, in which the United States are greatly interested, and whose people would be offended if we were lukewarm.

"Notwithstanding the above, it is a very great pleasure to me to tell you that we are planning to sail a series of four convoys to North Russia in November, December, January, and February, each of which will consist of approximately 35 ships, British and American. Convoys may be [sailed in two halves] to meet operational requirements. The first convoy will leave the United Kingdom about November 12, arriving North Russia 10 days later; subsequent convoys at about 20 [28] day intervals. We intend to withdraw as many as possible of the merchant vessels now in North Russia towards the end of October and the remainder with returning convoy escorts.

"However, I must put it on record that this is no contract or bargain, but rather a declaration of our solemn and earnest resolve. On this basis I have ordered the necessary measures to be taken for the sending of these 4 convoys of 35 ships.

"The Foreign Office and the Admiralty however request me to put before you for your personal attention, hoping indeed that your own eye may look at it, the following representations about the difficulties we have experienced in North Russia.

"If we are to resume the convoys we shall have to reinforce our establishments in North Russia, which have been reduced in numbers since last March. The present numbers of naval personnel are below what is necessary, even for our present requirements, owing to men having to be sent home without relief. Your civil authorities have refused us all visas for men to go to North Russia even to relieve those who are seriously overdue for relief. Monsieur Molotov has pressed His Majesty's Government to agree that the number of British Service personnel in North Russia should not exceed that of the Soviet Service personnel and trade delegation in this country. We have been unable to accept this proposal, since their work in [is] quite dissimilar and the number of men needed for war operations cannot be determined in such an unpractical way. Secondly, as we have already informed the Soviet Government, we must ask to be the judges of the personnel required to carry out operations for which we are responsible. Mr. Eden has already given his assurance that the greatest care will be taken to limit the numbers strictly to the minimum.

"I must therefore ask you to agree to the immediate grant of visas for the additional personnel now required and for your assurance that you will not in future withhold visas when we find it necessary to ask for them in connection with the assistance that we are giving you in North Russia. I emphasize that of about 170 naval personnel at present in the north over 150 should have been relieved some months ago but Soviet visas have been withheld. The state of health of these men, who are unaccustomed to the climatic and other conditions, makes it very necessary to relieve them without further delay.

"We should also wish to send the small medical unit for Archangel to which your authorities agreed, but for which the necessary visas have not been granted. Please remember that we may have heavy casualties.

"I must also ask your help in remedying the conditions under which our service personnel and seamen at present find themselves in North Russia. These men are of course engaged in operations against the enemy in our joint interest and chiefly to bring Allied supplies to your country. They are, I am sure you will admit, in a wholly different position from ordinary individuals proceeding to Russian territory. Yet they are subjected by your authorities to the following restrictions, which seem to me inappropriate for men sent by an ally to carry out operations of the greatest interest to the Soviet Union:

(a) No one may land from one of H. M. ships or from a British merchant ship except by a Soviet boat in the presence of a Soviet official and after examination of documents on each occasion.

(b) No one from a British warship is allowed to proceed alongside a British merchantman without the Soviet authorities being informed beforehand. This even applies to the British Admiral in charge.

(c) British officers and men are required to obtain special passes before they can go from ship to shore or between two British shore stations. These passes are often much delayed, with consequent dislocation of the work in hand.

(d) No stores, luggage, or mail for this operational force may be landed except in the presence of a Soviet official, and numerous formalities are required for the shipment of all stores and mail.

(e) Private Service mail is subjected to censorship, although for an operational force of this kind censorship should, in our view, be left in the hands of British Service authorities.

["The imposition of these restrictions makes an impression upon officers and men alike which is bad for Anglo-Soviet relations, and would be deeply injurious if Parliament got to hear of it. The cumulative effect of these formalities has been most hampering to the efficient performance of the men's duties, and on more than one occasion to urgent and important operations. No such restrictions are placed upon Soviet personnel here.

["We have already proposed to Monsieur Molotov that as regards offences against Soviet law committed by personnel of the Services and of the ships of the convoys, they should be handed over to the British Service authorities to deal with. There have been a few such cases, no doubt, partially at any rate due to the rigorous conditions of service in the north.

["I trust indeed, Monsieur Stalin, that you will find it possible to have these difficulties smoothed out in a friendly spirit, so that we may each help each other, and the common cause, to the utmost of our strength.[""]⁵⁶

⁵⁶ The reply by Stalin on October 13, which so offended Prime Minister Churchill, his reactions to it, and the report by British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Eden of his important conversation on October 21 with Stalin and Molotov at the time of the Moscow Conference of the three Foreign Ministers, in consequence of which the arrangements were completed for the resumption of supply convoys in November by the northern route to the Soviet Union, are described in Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War: Closing the Ring* (Boston, 1951), pp. 266-276.

811.2361/37 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Hamilton) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, October 1, 1943—11 a. m.

[Received October 4—10:58 a. m.]

1506. In a conversation on September 29 with the Chief of the American Section of the Foreign Office inquiry was made whether any information had yet been received concerning the crews of the seven American planes which landed recently on Kamchatka. We were informed that the Soviet authorities there had been asked to provide the names of the crew members and information concerning their welfare but that no reply had yet been received and that we would be informed as soon as the information was forthcoming.⁵⁷

HAMILTON

861.20/585a : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union (Hamilton)

WASHINGTON, October 1, 1943—1 p. m.

934. 1. In order more closely to coordinate the work of the American military representatives in Moscow including those functions carried on by the American Supply Mission and to establish closer liaison between the Soviet and American military authorities, the President desires to appoint a Military Mission to be attached to the American Embassy and to work under the supervision of the Ambassador. The Mission will be headed by Major General John R. Deane who up to the present time has been U.S. Secretary of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington. General Deane will be in a position to keep the appropriate Soviet authorities advised of current and future American strategic plans and developments. The functions now being performed by the American Supply Mission in Moscow will be coordinated in the Military Mission under the direction of Brigadier General Sidney Spalding, up to recently Assistant to the Executive of the Munitions Assignments Board, who will be appointed a member of the Mission and will replace General Faymonville. Brigadier General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, U.S. Army Air Force, will also be a member of the Mission to handle air matters. It is planned to appoint a Naval officer as a member of the Mission. It is proposed to recall the Military and Naval Attachés and not to appoint successors for the time being. Those members of the staff of the Military

⁵⁷ Later on October 1, the Chief of the American Section (Zarubin) told Mr. Hamilton that all crew members were alive and well. On October 8 the names of the crew members, written phonetically in Russian, were supplied by the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs.

and Naval Attachés who remain in Moscow will be incorporated into the Mission. Those members of General Faymonville's staff who remain in Moscow will also be incorporated into the Mission. A limited number of additional officers will be appointed as the need may arise.

It is the belief of the United States Government that the establishment and maintenance of a Military Mission in Moscow of the composition described above is essential for the proper handling of military, naval, and supply questions and will be a distinct contribution to the war effort. The Mission will be kept currently informed of all decisions and plans of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and of all supply questions and will thus be in a position to advise the Soviet Government in the premises.⁵⁸

2. Please seek an immediate occasion to discuss this question with Molotov and to obtain the agreement of the Soviet Government to the establishment of such a Mission.⁵⁹ If you so desire you may leave with him a memorandum on the question outlining the considerations set forth in section 1. You may explain to Molotov that Mr. Harriman desires Generals Deane, Spalding, and Vandenberg to proceed with him to Moscow. General Deane has already been designated by the President as Military Observer to the forthcoming conference. The acceptance of the Soviet Government of the Mission is therefore extremely urgent.

3. For your information: (a) It is thought best not to bring up the question of housing and office quarters for the Mission at this time but to postpone this matter until the Mission arrives in Moscow; (b) Faymonville and Michela are being recalled immediately and are being instructed to meet Mr. Harriman's party in Cairo early in October.

BERLE

196.6/1595 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Hamilton) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, October 2, 1943—10 a. m.

[Received 2:40 p. m.]

1513. Your 692, August 14, 8 p. m. The Embassy has received an *aide-mémoire* from the Foreign Office which states that the Soviet

⁵⁸ For the statement to the press on November 4 by Ambassador W. Averell Harriman on the establishment and work of this mission, see paragraphs 2-5 of his telegram No. 1837, November 4, p. 586.

⁵⁹ The Chargé saw Mr. Molotov at 1:30 a. m. on October 3 and carried out these instructions. Mr. Molotov undertook to discuss the proposals within the Soviet Government, and believed that the reply would be favorable. At his direction, Mr. Vyshinsky informed the Chargé during the evening of the same day that the establishment of this mission was acceptable.

Government is prepared to establish a system of payments of specified sums in Soviet currency to seamen on American vessels delivering cargo at Soviet ports. For each such trip it is proposed to pay 1,000 rubles to each senior officer, 600 rubles to each intermediate and junior officer, and 300 rubles to each seaman. The note adds that these sums are to assure the possibility for members of the crew to pay personal expenses while ashore. It is further proposed to pay similar bonuses to sailors rescued from sunken vessels carrying cargoes destined for the Soviet Union.

The system of payment would be a distribution of funds to be made by the representative of the WSA in the particular port according to lists certified by the captain of the vessel or in the case of payments to seamen rescued from sunken vessels from lists certified by the representative of the WSA. The certified lists would be turned over to the representative of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade at the respective ports who would turn over to the WSA representative the sums due for payment. Finally the *aide-mémoire* proposes if the overall suggestion is satisfactory to the Government of the United States to put the system into force as of September 1.

The British Embassy has also received an *aide-mémoire* which makes practically an identical suggestion. The proposal to the British includes bonuses for crane ship crews which is unnecessary in the case of the United States. This *aide-mémoire* also states that regardless of the outcome of the present negotiations any payment of rubles to personnel of British vessels at any rate of exchange other than the official rate of the Government bank of the USSR will be considered as an infringement of Soviet financial law with all the consequences arising therefrom.

Furthermore the note to the British specifies only a "single" payment for any given voyage. While the note to this Embassy does not make an identical statement the same meaning is implied in "payments of definite sums . . .⁶⁰ for each trip." This wording does not take into account cases arising from long layovers in port such as have occurred during the past summer and might conceivably occur again next summer. Since in such a contingency the specified sums would be wholly inadequate it is suggested that the Soviet proposal be accepted with a reservation of continued negotiation on cases arising from long layovers.⁶¹ Thus it would be possible to establish at once

⁶⁰ Omission indicated in the original telegram.

⁶¹ Acceptance of the offer from the Soviet Government was suggested in a letter of October 12 from Assistant Secretary of State Breckinridge Long to Rear Adm. Emory S. Land, War Shipping Administrator (196.6/1595). The Embassy in Moscow was informed by telegram No. 1292, November 27, that the War Shipping Administration had accepted this proposal (196.6/1619).

the payments for vessels now operating without prejudice to particular cases which may arise.

The British Embassy is making a similar recommendation to London.

HAMILTON

103.9168/784 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Hamilton) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, October 5, 1943—1 p. m.

[Received October 6—8 p. m.]

1534. From Faymonville to Stettinius.

1. Following comments refer to cable from you and Douglas⁶² on morale of American seamen in north Russian ports.

2. Principal causes of discontent are desire for additional personal privileges, difficulties in procuring food and clothing and uncertainty as to length of stay in Russian waters.

3. Seamen have one-day shore privileges and those on good conduct can obtain privileges as often as every other day. Russians have provided a club and shore entertainment which although limited exceeds the amount of entertain[ment] provided for Russian population. Privileges to seamen are extended by ships' masters under general supervision of Assistant Naval Attaché and Soviet authorities limit privileges only by general police regulations. I believe that all practicable privileges are being extended to seamen and recommend no change in system.

4. As to clothing much has been worn out during 9 months since departure from home ports. Additional clothing has been furnished from ships' stores which are now low. Under direction of Assistant Naval Attaché additional clothing has been furnished from stocks of survivors' reserve. I recommend no change. Food has been drawn from ships' stores which have been much depleted. Food also furnished under direction of Soviet naval authorities in amounts which correspond generally to amounts furnished vessels of Red navy. I have stated [to the Commissar of?] Foreign Trade that amounts furnished from Soviet sources are considered inadequate and have asked for improvement in supply of fresh vegetables, meats, milk and sugar. I have also asked for increased supplies toilet articles and soap. Commissar has promised improve supply wherever possible

⁶² Lewis W. Douglas, Deputy War Shipping Administrator.

and has increased supply of fresh vegetables. To meet immediate needs Major Kangas⁶³ has taken to northern ports all available toilet articles in American Supply Mission but amount is inadequate to satisfy requirements.

5. Food and other American stocks for survivors are now north bound from Persian Gulf to Archangel and if necessary can be diverted by Naval Attaché for seamen's use. I recommend that this matter remain in hands of Naval Attaché.

6. Although I expect an improvement in variety and amount of food furnished to American seamen from Soviet sources I do not believe Soviet naval authorities will permit conspicuous disparity between levels of supplies furnished from Soviet sources to American seamen and food supplies furnished to Soviet naval crews. When, however, food received from Soviet sources is supplemented by American imported food from survivors' stores and from naval sources the subsistence level of our crews is so high that complaints are not warranted.

6. Uncertainty as to length of stay is unavoidable and no departure date should be announced until firm decision has been reached to withdraw. Change of crews has been suggested but this seems impracticable and is not recommended. Only return of ships to American waters will clear up all causes of discontent and meanwhile I shall seek assistance of Soviet Commissariats whenever required. [Faymonville.]

HAMILTON

740.00119 European War 1939/1893 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, October 11, 1943—3 p. m.

[Received 5:34 p. m.]

6370. Confidential reports received early last week which may have sufficient basis to merit attention and checking against those from other sources and against future developments, predicted German approach to Moscow with proposals for separate German-Russian peace.

Nazi Party leads in this movement sponsored by Himmler,⁶⁴ Bor-

⁶³ Maj. Oliver J. Kangas, member of the Supply Division of the American Military Mission in the Soviet Union.

⁶⁴ Heinrich Himmler, Commander in Chief of the Nazi Black Guards (Schutzstaffel), Chief of the German Police, Reich and Prussian Minister of the Interior.

mann,⁶⁵ Goebbels,⁶⁶ Görhlitzer⁶⁷ and Goering,⁶⁸ last named at instance of Russophile generals. Military circles increasingly favor it.

Germans would be prepared to evacuate all occupied Russian territory, all Baltic States and Balkan districts and abandon Finland. Japan mentioned as intermediary.

Startling is statement that Hitler is being debated by Nazis themselves as possible sacrificial goat and that he is unaware of debates taking place on subject.

Leading Nazis are now convinced that unless cessation hostilities with Russia achieved they and their regime are lost. On other hand freed of Russian menace they would wipe out England, inflicting long promised vengeance and would smash Allies in Italy. Development their policies and plans from these premises simplicity itself it is interesting to compare foregoing with Stockholm quotations 8th from *Social Demokraten* and with reported simultaneous Ankara version (not published here) of alleged Nazi-Russian exploratory conversations. In these press reports surrender of Hitler idea is attributed to Russian origin rather than to Nazis themselves.

The alleged party deliberations, as reported to this Legation, were timed with headlong German retreat toward Dnieper when Germans retained confidence ability stand on Dnieper line evidently expecting Soviet halt offensive for at least 2 months. Thus Germans still maintained advantage of occupation Russian territory and Nazis felt able propose terms containing elements of generous compromise. If such considerations inspired Nazis in their alleged councils Russian surprise attack, week-end, and advance across strategic points on Dnieper must have filled them with consternation and indignation.

Without placing complete credence either in reports received here in confidence or in published stories at Stockholm and Ankara it would not be unreasonable to suspect that Nazi party leaders now contemplate their situation with some measure of desperation and may actually be thinking along lines indicated. There is even possibility that they had launched trial balloon.

HARRISON

⁶⁵ Martin Bormann, Reichsleiter (highest rank) of the National Socialist German Workers' (Nazi) Party.

⁶⁶ Josef Goebbels, Reich Minister of Propaganda.

⁶⁷ Artur Görhlitzer, Deputy District Leader (Gauleiter) of Berlin; Prussian State Councilor.

⁶⁸ Hermann Wilhelm Göring, Field Marshal, Reich Minister for Air, Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe, etc.

740.0011 European War 1939/31891

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chargé in the Soviet Union
(Hamilton)*⁶⁹

Moscow, October 12, 1943.

[Participants:] Mr. Donald M. Nelson ⁷⁰
Mr. Molotov
Mr. Hamilton
Mr. Edwin A. Locke ⁷¹

On October 11 the Embassy got in touch with Mr. Molotov's private secretary and asked for an appointment for Mr. Nelson to call on Mr. Molotov. Some hours later Mr. Molotov's secretary telephoned and said that Mr. Molotov would be glad to see Mr. Nelson at any time which would suit Mr. Nelson's convenience. (Note: The unusual character of this reply is indicative of the Soviet official attitude of special friendliness and courtesy toward Mr. Nelson). The appointment was arranged for three o'clock on October 12. Mr. Nelson was accompanied by his assistant, Mr. Edwin A. Locke.

The conversation between Mr. Nelson and Mr. Molotov lasted for one hour and a quarter. It was conducted through Mr. Molotov's interpreter.

Mr. Nelson referred to the fact that he had visited Stalingrad on his way to Moscow and said that he had been tremendously impressed by what he saw there, not only the destruction brought by the war and the evidence of the heroic struggle of the Russian people but also and particularly by the spirit of hope and determination which characterized the people of Stalingrad and the manifestations as exemplified in their factories of their determination to live with hope in the present and the future. Mr. Nelson referred also to the ways in which he considered the Russian people and the American people had similarities and strong bonds of mutual interest. He mentioned especially that as a business man and speaking as such he thought that there was a great future in the exchange of goods between Russia and the United States, that the United States had a great surplus of capital equipment, that Russia needed this equipment, and that Russia had supplies which the United States needed. Mr. Nelson emphasized that the characters of our two peoples made it natural that there should develop friendship between them. He expressed the view also that the self-interest of each country lay in the same direction, and that

⁶⁹ Transmitted to the Department by the Chargé in the Soviet Union in his despatch No. 309, October 21; received November 12.

⁷⁰ Chairman of the War Production Board.

⁷¹ Assistant to Mr. Nelson.

self-interest could and should lay a firm foundation for collaboration between our two countries.

Mr. Molotov made suitable comments in reply to Mr. Nelson's observations. After the conversation had proceeded for some time, Mr. Molotov asked, at an appropriate point, whether Mr. Nelson thought that Russia could count on receiving from the United States after the war machinery and capital equipment. Mr. Nelson replied that he could not make any promises on the subject but that speaking as a business man it was his firm hope that the interests of the United States and the interests of the Soviet Union would develop along such common lines that American machinery and equipment would be sent to the Soviet Union. He said that naturally American business men would look on the Soviet Union as furnishing a market for such equipment. He expressed the personal conviction that our two countries should work in such a way that a mutually profitable interchange of goods would take place.

At another point in the conversation Mr. Molotov asked whether Mr. Nelson thought that there could be worked out a satisfactory financial basis for an interchange of goods between the Soviet Union and the United States. Mr. Nelson replied that he was glad to give his own opinion on that point. He then restated in somewhat different terms the idea which he had previously expressed that the economies of our respective countries were supplementary and complementary and that he thought there could be and should be worked out ways for the interchange of goods. Mr. Molotov again asked whether Mr. Nelson thought that there could be worked out a financial basis for such an interchange and Mr. Nelson made substantially the reply which he had made before. During the course of the conversation Mr. Nelson referred to the fact that the United States had built up a tremendous war machine, that its manufacturing output was great, that the industry was now devoted to war production, that while the American people could continue to turn their energies to war production if they had to, they did not wish to do that. Mr. Nelson said that he wanted to see our productive facilities turned to peace time endeavor and to producing things which would contribute to the betterment of the lives of our peoples.

Mr. Molotov expressed agreement and went on to comment in regard to the need of peoples being given intelligent leadership. He said that that was a proper function of government and of government leaders. He cited Germany as an illustration and said that Hitler and Hitlerism had lead [*led*] the German people astray. Mr. Nelson said that he was of course not an expert on this matter but that during his lifetime he had seen the German people first under the

Kaiser and then under Hitler embark on programs of acquisitiveness and foreign conquest. Mr. Nelson asked how Mr. Molotov explained the fact that the German prisoners which were being taken by American troops were so sullen and had an attitude that they were defeated this time because they had made mistakes but that they would, as soon as able, try again and would be successful. Mr. Nelson said that these German soldiers were not officers but were men in the ranks. He said that the soldiers seemed to be thoroughly imbued with the Hitlerite idea of battle and conquest. He said that he wondered whether Hitler created the present state of mind of the German people or whether the German people created Hitler. He said that historically the German people had been known for their desire to seize other people's belongings and other people's territories.

Mr. Molotov commented that naturally the German people had something to do with the evolution of a Hitler just as Hitler had something to do with the present attitude of the German people. He said that the German people at present were filled with poison and that there was needed intelligent leadership to permit the German people to get rid of the poison and that this would take a long time. Mr. Nelson commented that possibly Mr. Molotov was right and that a leadership could be found which was capable of leading the German people away from their past traits of acquisitiveness and conquest but that he did not know whether this was feasible or not.

Mr. Molotov said that the first task was to defeat the Germans thoroughly, to kill off as many Hitlers and Hitlerites as possible, and then for the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union to formulate a common program on how to deal with Germany. Mr. Molotov said that Germany was an international problem. Mr. Molotov indicated that there would have to be collaboration between the three Governments to accomplish the desired end. Mr. Nelson expressed his hearty agreement.

Toward the end of the call Mr. Nelson said that he would like very much to meet Premier Stalin if that were possible. Mr. Hamilton said that the President would very much like to have Mr. Nelson have the opportunity of meeting Marshal Stalin. Mr. Molotov said that he would bring the matter to Marshal Stalin's attention.

The call ended with mutual expressions of friendliness. As Mr. Nelson was leaving he noted the model of a tank near the entry to Mr. Molotov's room and exchanged a number of observations with Mr. Molotov in regard to tanks and tank production.

The call was marked throughout by cordiality and friendliness on the part both of Mr. Molotov and of Mr. Nelson.

740.0011 European War 1939/31891

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chargé in the Soviet Union
(Hamilton)*⁷²

Moscow, October 16, 1943.

On October 15 at 8:30 p. m. I accompanied Mr. Donald M. Nelson in a call which he made on Marshal Stalin. The Marshal received us alone, the only other person present being his interpreter.

The call lasted for one and one-half hours.

During the first fifteen or twenty minutes, Marshal Stalin confined his remarks to brief, matter-of-fact comments on what Mr. Nelson had said. There were at times periods of silence. Thereafter, throughout the remainder of the conversation Marshal Stalin talked more, laughed, and exhibited definite interest.

Mr. Nelson covered much the same ground, though in different form and language, as during his talk with Mr. Molotov on October 12.

In connection with Mr. Nelson's comment to the effect that in his judgment the American people and the Russian people should get along well together and there should be developed large trade between the United States and the Soviet Union, Marshal Stalin said that the Soviet people liked Americans better than the people of other countries and preferred American products, though expensive, to the products of other countries, because of the high quality of those products. Marshal Stalin said that there was no reason for there arising between the United States and the Soviet Union conflicts of interests.

When Mr. Nelson said that the United States, after the war, would have surplus capital equipment and could easily supply the urgent needs which the Soviet Union would have in rehabilitating its country and its industry, Marshal Stalin stated that the Soviet Government could use certain specified quantities of locomotives and several other commodities. Mr. Nelson made note of the quantities and the commodities (see attached secret list ⁷³) and said that it would be easy for United States production, taking into account what we would have available at the end of the war, to supply these needs. He said that the only item mentioned by Marshal Stalin which might present any difficulty was the locomotives. Marshal Stalin said that the figures he gave represented simply an initial order or need. Marshal Stalin asked whether the United States would have a surplus for export of machine tools. Mr. Nelson replied in the affirmative. In reply to

⁷² Transmitted to the Department by the Chargé in the Soviet Union in his despatch No. 309, October 21; received November 12.

⁷³ This brief list specified 10,000 locomotives; 50,000 railroad cars, including flat cars; 30,000 kilometers of rails; and 300,000 to 400,000 kilowatts of steam and hydro capacity.

further inquiry, Mr. Nelson said that the United States would not have a surplus of consumer goods.

Marshal Stalin asked whether the Soviet Union could purchase from the United States on credit. Mr. Nelson replied that in his individual judgment an arrangement could be worked out whereby, during the first years after the war when the Soviet Union's income would be less and when its expenditures for rehabilitation would be comparatively great, payments to be made by the Soviet Union could be small and later gradually increased as the Soviet Union gained in economic strength and income. Marshal Stalin appeared to be greatly interested in this idea and in obtaining United States goods on credit.

During the conversation Mr. Nelson advanced as his own personal idea the suggestion that there be appointed a group of American business men to meet with representatives of the Soviet Government to study and work out a plan for a peace time exchange of goods between the United States and the Soviet Union. Marshal Stalin said with indication of approval that this represented a business-like and direct approach by Mr. Nelson. Marshal Stalin inquired whether Mr. Nelson's idea was that there should be a joint commission of Americans and Russians and whether such a commission should be established immediately. Mr. Nelson replied in the affirmative on both points.

Several times Marshal Stalin stated that the Soviet Government could be definitely counted upon to pay its obligations.⁷⁴ He said that the Soviet Government would not make "token" payments as many other Governments had done after they had incurred obligations. This comment brought forth a general laugh but Marshal Stalin's repetition of the comment showed definitely that he intended it to be taken seriously. Mr. Nelson said that as soon as he got back to the United States he would present to the President this idea of a joint American-Russian commission to be established with a view to formulating a plan for future exchange of goods between the Soviet Union and the United States. Marshal Stalin expressed his definite approval.

At several points during the conversation Marshal Stalin said that the Soviet Government would be glad to assist Mr. Nelson in any way while he was here. He said that no difficulties would arise in connection with Mr. Nelson's desire to leave by the Siberian-Alaska route. He said that this was the safest route.

⁷⁴ For the earlier failure of negotiations in regard to claims and credits between the United States and the Soviet Union, see *Foreign Relations, The Soviet Union, 1933-1939*, pp. 166 ff., and particularly the statement to the press on January 31, 1935, by Secretary of State Hull, p. 172.

The conversation was carried out in an atmosphere of friendliness. At the outset, Mr. Nelson presented Marshal Stalin with three pipes and a can of Mr. Nelson's favorite tobacco which Marshal Stalin accepted with an expression of thanks.

811.2361/42 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Hamilton) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, October 19, 1943—10 a. m.

[Received October 20—8:21 a. m.]

1642. My 1636, October 19, 5 a. m. [*p. m.*].⁷⁵ Mr. Nelson's 10-day stay in Moscow was marked by extreme cordiality and exceptional cooperation on the part of all the Soviet officials with whom he came in contact. On the morning after his arrival he visited an exhibit of captured German trophies and in the afternoon was received by Mikoyan, Commissar of Foreign Trade. During this meeting Mr. Nelson expressed his pleasure at visiting the Soviet Union and stated that he hoped to be able to see anything which the Soviet Government felt would be of interest to him and desired to show him. Mikoyan replied that Mr. Nelson would be shown anything in the Soviet Union he wished to see and designated an official of the Commissariat for Foreign Trade to work out a program with Mr. Nelson's assistant. A list on [*of*] plants in which Mr. Nelson was interested was subsequently submitted and he was taken on trips to all types of plants represented on this list which are located in the Moscow area. It was also suggested by the Russians that he visit other factories in neighboring cities of the type in which he had expressed an interest but he felt that he had obtained an adequate idea of Russian production and methods from the plants seen in Moscow and that trips outside the city were not essential.

During his stay in Moscow Mr. Nelson visited factories manufacturing trucks, light machine guns, Stormovik bombers, small arms, airplane motors and electrolytic copper. He was taken on a motor trip around Moscow, a tour through the Kremlin, a tour of the Moscow subway system and a boat trip on the Moscow Volga Canal. On October 12 Mr. Nelson was the guest of Mikoyan at a formal banquet at the Spiridonovka Guest House attended by 40 guests. On October 14 a large reception was given for him at the Embassy at Spaso⁷⁶ which was attended by some 20 Soviet officials including Mikoyan, Vyshinski, Litvinoff and four Soviet generals. The chiefs of the diplomatic missions in Moscow and their military attachés and the American correspondents here were also guests at the Spaso reception.

⁷⁵ Not printed.

⁷⁶ Spaso House, residence of the American Ambassador in Moscow.

On all his visits Mr. Nelson was accompanied by an officer from the staff of either the Embassy, the Military Attaché, the Naval Attaché or the Supply Mission.

In addition to several long talks with Mikoyan Mr. Nelson was received by both Stalin and Molotov and had conversations with them of more than an hour each.

On his trip back to the U.S. via the Alsib route Mr. Nelson plans to visit a four-engine bomber factory and synthetic rubber plant at **Kazan**, the steel plants at Magnitogorsk and a fighter factory at Novosibirsk.

The hospitality displayed by the Russians during Mr. Nelson's visit was probably primarily a personal tribute to him for the substantial part he has played providing material assistance to the Soviet Union and the Red army. He was also considered a symbol of the resourcefulness, ingenuity, and vastness of American industrial production which has made such an impressive record in the past 2 years. The attention paid him likewise reflects the deep interest of the highest Soviet leaders in questions of [apparent omission].

HAMILTON

811.2361/39: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)

WASHINGTON, October 20, 1943—midnight.

1040. It is suggested that the Embassy take up informally with the Soviet authorities the question of permission for a representative of the Embassy to visit as soon as convenient the internees mentioned in your 1567, October 8, 2 p. m.,⁷⁷ and those referred to in your 1424, September 21, 11 p. m.⁷⁸ In this connection it may be mentioned that it would be desirable to have an American doctor accompany the representative on his visit.

In case permission is granted for the visit the Department desires to have for transmittal to the War Department information along the lines mentioned in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Department's 193, April 28 [*May 2*], 1942, noon [*6 p. m.*], to Kuibyshev.⁷⁹

STETTINIUS

⁷⁷ Not printed, but see telegram No. 1506, October 1, 11 a. m., from the Chargé in the Soviet Union, and footnote 57, p. 704.

⁷⁸ Not printed, but see telegram No. 1224, August 30, from the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, p. 688. In telegram No. 1731, October 26, 6 a. m., the Ambassador reported that a note of October 23 from the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs stated that the crew members of the seven airplanes which had landed on the Kamchatka Peninsula on September 12, had been sent to Vrevskaya, a station on the railroad 52 kilometers southward from Tashkent, near the city of Yangi Yul, for permanent residence (811.2361/44).

⁷⁹ *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. III, p. 550.

760F.61/110: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, October 23, 1943—1 p. m.

[Received October 24—2:29 a. m.]

1703. The Embassy has received a note from the Foreign Office stating that recently negotiations have taken place between the Soviet Government and the Czechoslovak Government concerning the conclusion of a Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance and Post-War Cooperation. Both Governments have agreed to the draft of the treaty.^{79a} The Foreign Office has provided the Embassy with a copy of the draft treaty the terms of which will be communicated to the Department as soon as the translation is completed.⁸⁰

HARRIMAN

740.0011 Moscow/70: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, October 26, 1943—1 p. m.

[Received October 27—11:45 a. m.]

1741. Delam⁸¹ 29. For the Acting Secretary of State from the Secretary.⁸² Reference Embassy's 1724, October 25, noon,⁸³ and Delam's 22 of October 25.⁸⁴ The presentation of the text of the proposed Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty before the Conference and the plan for its signature here at a very early date may give rise to the supposition that this project has been endorsed by the three Governments participating in the Conference.

If the announcement of this threat [*treaty*] in the United States should lead to queries concerning the attitude of the American Government, the Department may wish to reply that it is a matter of common knowledge that the negotiations between the Soviet and

^{79a} For note of October 23 from the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, and enclosure, the draft text of this treaty, see vol. I, p. 744.

⁸⁰ Transmitted to the Department by the Minister Counselor in the Soviet Union in his despatch No. 6, October 25; not printed.

⁸¹ The designation assigned to a series of telegrams sent by the American delegation to the Moscow Conference to the Department of State.

⁸² Secretary of State Cordell Hull was attending the Conference of the three Foreign Ministers in Moscow.

⁸³ Not printed.

⁸⁴ Not printed, but see the summary of the Sixth Plenary Meeting of the Moscow Conference on October 24, 1943, 3 p. m., vol. I, p. 624.

Czechoslovak Governments have been in course for many months. It might also be mentioned that the text of the treaty had been agreed to before the present Three Power Meeting. There has therefore been no occasion for an expression of any views on the part of this Government.

I think, however, that any comment should be made entirely on the basis of Departmental view without reference to communications from me on the subject. [Hull.]

HARRIMAN

103.9166/6687 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, October 28, 1943—9 a. m.

[Received October 29—1:10 p. m.]

1760. (For OWI for Sherwood,⁸⁵ Kuhn,⁸⁶ from Spewack.⁸⁷) We plan to issue daily in Russian, American news bulletin in mimeographed form. For this we must have fairly full news file from London.

In addition we plan handsomely published monthly magazine in Russian. This should contain state papers and speeches, authoritative articles on war, science, agriculture, industry, music, theatre, painting and motion pictures. It should have copious and arresting photographs and reproductions. Obviously magazine must be published in Washington.

Distribution of both bulletin and magazine is first of all aimed at Soviet leaders and officials. In addition, we [are] asking and hope to get permission to distribute to libraries, clubs and individuals.

Transportation and communications will be difficult problems, but above all else we must have thorough and understanding cooperation from Washington.

I cannot emphasize too strongly that conditions and attitudes change rapidly here.

Therefore I suggest that first of all man in Washington be designated by Kuhn who will not only supervise magazine when we get

⁸⁵ Robert E. Sherwood, Director of Overseas Operations, Overseas Operations Branch, Office of War Information.

⁸⁶ Ferdinand Kuhn, Deputy Director, United Nations Information Policy, Overseas Operations Branch, Office of War Information.

⁸⁷ Samuel Spewack, Press Attaché at the Embassy in the Soviet Union.

general approval, but will personally and meticulously follow thru on each and every request we make from here.

Prompt replies to cables are imperative. Both equipment and material asked for must be checked by one responsible man so as to eliminate possible confusion.

Undoubtedly we will be met by suspicion and procrastination here at times. We can't afford unnecessary delays on our side.

[Here follow five paragraphs concerned with the obtaining of sufficient and competent personnel.]

Your reactions to foregoing will be appreciated as well as authorization to proceed with discussions along lines indicated. [Spewack.]

HARRIMAN

760F.61/113 : Telegram

The Minister to the Czechoslovak Government in Exile (Biddle) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, November 3, 1943—9 p. m.

[Received 10:28 p. m.]

Czechoslovak Series [No.] 12. My 7, July 16, midnight. In conversation yesterday President Beneš said he was highly gratified with the reported results of Moscow Conference and that they had even exceeded his hopes.

He told me that as regards Czechoslovakia, it had been unanimously agreed that he should proceed with the conclusion of the proposed Czechoslovak-Soviet agreement and he asked me to express to you his deep appreciation of the comprehending attitude you had shown when this matter came up for discussion.⁸⁸ He said he expected to leave London for Moscow early next week in order to complete the agreement.⁸⁹

[BIDDLE]

⁸⁸ The Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty was discussed at the Sixth Meeting of the Moscow Conference, October 24, 1943, and the text of the proposed treaty was printed as Document No. 43 of the Conference. See vol. I, pp. 624 and 744, respectively.

⁸⁹ In a memorandum of October 30, 1943, Edward Page, Jr., Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union, at the time in the Department for consultation, noted that the negotiations in connection with the conclusion of this treaty "appeared to be part of the same pattern in present Soviet policy to extend Soviet predominance over eastern Europe and the Balkans." (760F.61/116)

Moscow Embassy Files : Lot F-135

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the First Secretary of Embassy in
the Soviet Union (Bohlen)*

[Extract]

[Moscow,] November 5, 1943.

Participants: The American Ambassador; Mr. Bohlen.
Mr. V. M. Molotov; Mr. Berezhevskiy.⁹¹

The Ambassador then said that it had been generally understood at the [Moscow] Conference that the United States Chief of Staff was very anxious to have General Deane establish the closest contact with the Soviet General Staff which would be of great assistance in coordinating military plans and would undoubtedly contribute to the shortening of the war. He pointed out that General Deane had the absolute confidence of General Marshall and was not here as a Military Attaché but as a representative of the United States General Staff to assist in the prosecution of the war. Mr. Molotov expressed himself in complete agreement with the Ambassador and promised to speak to Stalin at the first opportunity in order to place General Deane in personal contact with a responsible officer of the Soviet General Staff.

The Ambassador said that along the same lines he thought it very important that General Vandenberg, one of our leading Air Staff Officers and a distinguished pilot in his own right, establish contact with the Soviet Air Staff to exchange information in regard to German air tactics and strength. It would likewise be valuable for General Vandenberg to be able to visit advance fighter squadrons in order to ascertain the use which the Soviet pilots were making of American fighter aircraft and also to obtain information as to the type of fighter best suited to Soviet needs since the old type of fighters were going out of production and new ones were coming in. Mr. Molotov again promised to do everything that he could to assist in both of these suggestions.

The Ambassador then mentioned briefly the question of the shipment by the Soviet Union of medical and other supplies to American prisoners of war in Japan,⁹² but added that he believed there were some new developments in that situation. Mr. Molotov promised to do everything he could to expedite the matter.

⁹¹ Valentin Mikhailovich Berezhevskiy, interpreter.

⁹² For correspondence on this subject, see pp. 799 ff.

The Ambassador, in concluding, referred to the good care and hospitality which the Soviet authorities had accorded our interned aviators but suggested that we did not wish to impose upon that hospitality too long. Mr. Molotov laughed and replied that he thought this matter would become "apparent in the future"⁹⁸ and that the Soviet Government was prepared to do anything it could to improve their condition and their "fate". The Ambassador pointed out that he did not wish to pursue the matter further since probably the less said the better, but it was a subject dear to the hearts of our soldiers. Mr. Molotov replied that it was dear not only to the hearts of our soldiers.

103.9166/6687 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, November 10, 1943—7 p. m.

1190. Personal from Sherwood, OWI. Your 1760 from Spewack very helpful, thanks. Your plans dovetail in general with ideas we discussed here in October.

The magazine project involves many difficulties, however. Transportation which is so uncertain and slow is the main obstacle. Is it possible for the Embassy to give us any assurance of being able to ship such a magazine? Suggest you reexamine possibility of printing deliberately unpretentious illustrated weekly or bi-weekly in Russian as a possible alternative, using radiophoto material and cable.

The suggestion made by you of a daily news bulletin for officials is excellent and in order to make news service useful to you we are doing our utmost here. We are striving toward the goal of prompt delivery of eight to ten thousand words daily consisting of full texts of important documents or speeches, confidential summary, flash news and roundup of editorials. The elapse of some weeks or even months may take place before we can get adequate relay time over Algiers radio and we are able to build up adequate communications.

[Here follows discussion concerning personnel possibilities.]

[Sherwood]

STETTINIUS

⁹⁸ See memorandum by the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, December 31, p. 735.

811.2361/47 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, November 23, 1943—9 a. m.

[Received 10:58 p. m.]

2021. Embassy's 1731, October 26, 6 a. m.⁹⁴ Arrangements have been made for Dr. Waldron to proceed by air to visit the interned bomber crews and he hopes to proceed within a few days.

A letter signed by Maj. Richard D. Salter⁹⁵ dated October 11 was received by the Embassy on November 25 [20]. He states all personnel are well and are receiving excellent care but that they are very anxious to talk with an American representative.

HARRIMAN

196.6/1621 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, November 23, 1943—10 a. m.

[Received 5:04 p. m.]

2022. Embassy's 1513, October 2, 10 p. m. [*a. m.*]. The British Embassy in Moscow has received instructions to accept the Soviet proposal as outlined in the telegram under reference, if the United States also accepts it, and with the reservation recommended by both Embassies for continued negotiation on cases arising from long lay-overs. In view of the expected early arrival of a convoy in northern ports the British are anxious that similar replies to the Soviet offer be made as soon as possible.

HARRIMAN

740.0011 European War 1939/31891

Memorandum by Mr. Elbridge Durbrow, of the Division of European Affairs

[WASHINGTON,] November 29, 1943.

While there is no doubt that it will be in the interest of the United States both politically and economically to assist the Soviet Union in every way possible to rebuild its industry after the war and assist in rehabilitating that country, and while there is no question, as Mr. Nelson stated to Mr. Stalin, that we would have a surplus of capital

⁹⁴ See footnote 78, p. 716.

⁹⁵ U.S. Army Air Corps; leader of the group of bomber air crews interned at Yangi Yul.

equipment which could be sold to the Soviet Union, I am afraid that on the basis of careful studies made by an Interdepartmental Committee working on this subject it will be most difficult to increase our trade with the Soviet Union.⁹⁶ While the Soviet need for capital as well as consumers' goods will be almost overwhelming and while the sale of such goods to the Soviet Union would assist in keeping up American industrial activity after the war, there are unfortunately very few goods produced which we can purchase in order to give the necessary purchasing power to the Soviet Union to buy large quantities of American products.

Contrary to the general belief on this subject the United States and the Soviet Union are not complementary countries since there are very few products produced in the U.S.S.R. which we can take in exchange for American goods.

After extensive studies by the Interdepartmental Committee it became clear that we could not increase our purchases from the U.S.S.R. by more than six or seven times the highest amount purchased prior to the war which averaged about twenty-five million dollars a year. The Committee in endeavoring to explore all possibilities for increasing Soviet-American trade took into consideration Soviet purchasing power obtained from direct sales, triangular trade, tourist expenditures and gold shipments.

In considering the possibility of extending credits to the U.S.S.R. to assist in rehabilitating Soviet industry during the first years after the war, the Committee came to the conclusion that such credits if they were to be repaid in a reasonable time—ten to twenty years—could not exceed two hundred million dollars.

It will be seen therefore that extreme caution must be taken in order to avoid false impressions being created regarding the possibilities of postwar trade with the Soviet Union.

ELBRIDGE DUSBROW

811.111 Diplomatic 61/872a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, December 6, 1943—noon.

1347. The War Department has informed the Department that difficulties have arisen in regard to the residence at Fairbanks, Alaska, of wives and children of Soviet military and civilian officials connected with the Soviet Purchasing Commission and Aircraft Ferrying Serv-

⁹⁶ For consideration of the nature of postwar trade with the Soviet Union by the Interdepartmental Committee, see the memorandum of October 28, 1942, by Mr. Durbrow, *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. III, p. 764.

ice.⁹⁷ From an original group of approximately 33 Soviet personnel permanently stationed at Fairbanks, the War Department reports there are now 123 civilian employees, not including children but including an unspecified number of women, and 30 to 50 military personnel stationed there. In addition accommodations must be provided for 150 to 175 transients who may be in Fairbanks at one time.

In Fairbanks there is a serious shortage of housing facilities and food. Because of climatic conditions special housing with insulation and heat must be provided and because of transportation and communication difficulties adequate food supplies present a special problem. Wives and dependents of United States Army and civilian personnel are not permitted to proceed to Alaska and the War Department has pointed out that the presence there of Soviet wives and children creates hard feelings and may even lead to serious incidents.

In the light of the above you are instructed to inform the Soviet Government that it is regretted that visas cannot be granted to wives and children of Soviet personnel stationed in Alaska for residence there and that visas granted to Soviet citizens traveling via Alaska have been and will be valid in Alaska only for the time necessary in transit.

In regard to the arrangement (reference Department's 514, October 15, 1942, 6 p. m. to Kuibyshev⁹⁸) whereby no objection was contemplated to the landing and departure without passports and visas of the Soviet mission, pilots, and other Soviet technical personnel in Alaska, it was never contemplated in the original arrangement under reference that wives and children of Soviet personnel stationed in Alaska would proceed there without passports and visas and of course they should not do so in the future.

You will also request the Soviet authorities to inform their personnel in the United States who may in the future be transferred for duty to Alaska that their wives and children will not be expected to accompany or to join them. In this connection War Department has reported the arrival at Fairbanks in October of 5 families (total 10 persons) of Soviet Army officers there. They were among persons

⁹⁷ This situation had been brought to the attention of the Department on October 22, 1943. After some preliminary consideration of ways to forestall the further influx of Soviet wives and children into Fairbanks, and even to persuade the return home of most of those who had already arrived contrary to original intentions, it was agreed upon "not to take any action until the Conference in Moscow had terminated." The problem arose again upon receipt of telegram No. 1912, November 11, from the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, wherein it was stated that the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs had asked for the issuance of Alaskan visas to Soviet wives and three children for residence there. (811.111 Diplomatic 61/890, 815)

⁹⁸ Not printed, but see telegram No. 323, August 22, 1942, from the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, and footnote 22, *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. III, pp. 720 and 721, respectively.

mentioned in your 1462, September 25, noon,⁹⁹ and no indication was given that these families were to remain in Alaska.

In your approach to the Foreign Office you should take up the question of wives and children of Soviet personnel already in Alaska and say that it would be appreciated if steps could be taken to withdraw them as soon as conveniently possible.

You may cite as reasons for this action as much of paragraphs 1 and 2 above as you deem advisable. The Department has also informed the Soviet Embassy in Washington of the above and requested its cooperation.

For your confidential information the War Department has reported that one or two rather serious incidents have already occurred involving American and Soviet personnel at Fairbanks which the Army believes attributable to the presence of Soviet wives.

Henceforth you will place the following words on all visas granted to Soviet citizens for transit via Alaska: "Valid for single journey via Alaska where bearer is not to remain beyond minimum necessary transit period."

HULL

861.4061 Motion Pictures/71 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, December 8, 1943—10 a. m.

[Received 8:29 p. m.]

2147. The Embassy understands that several months ago the British Embassy officially requested permission of the Soviet Government to open a motion picture theater in Moscow for exclusive showing of British pictures. The Soviet Government does not appear to have taken any action on this request and the British Embassy is not optimistic of its success. British official has approached Spewack unofficially, however, with suggestion that proposed motion picture theater be made a joint venture of the British and ourselves. (Department's airgrams No. A-15, August 28, and A-27, November 4.¹)

Spewack has independently discussed matter informally with Soviet film authorities who appear to be favorably disposed toward opening of a motion picture theater in Moscow for the exclusive showing of English speaking pictures. They have in mind a theater under Soviet management. They do not yet have authority to make any definite proposals but have informed Spewack that they expect to be able to do so soon.

HARRIMAN

⁹⁹ Not printed.

¹ Neither printed.

760F.61/116 : Telegram

*The Chargé Near the Czechoslovak Government in Exile (Schoenfeld)
to the Secretary of State*[Extracts]²

LONDON, December 13, 1943.

[Received December 13—7:05 p. m.]

Czecho [No.] 16. Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty of friendship, mutual assistance and postwar cooperation which was signed at Moscow yesterday consists of 6 articles and a protocol. Advance draft of the treaty was forwarded to Department with despatch 87 of December 6.³

Today's *Daily Worker* carried an article by Dr. Ripka, Czechoslovak Foreign Minister,⁴ in which he states that the Soviet-Czechoslovak pact, aimed at German aggression, has fulfilled the long-standing desire of the Czechoslovak people for a direct alliance with the Soviet Union. He refers to the idea of friendly alliance as "fixed in the political outlook of the Czechoslovak people" and states that unlike the Western countries, Czechoslovakia did not look upon the Bolshevik Revolution as an obstacle against Russia's return to Europe. He mentions that in his memorandum to President Wilson in 1917 Professor Masaryk⁵ rightly estimated the great change in Russia when he wrote "The Bolsheviks will remain in power longer than their adversaries assume" and added "All the small nations in the east need a strong Russia, because they are otherwise at the mercy of the Germans and Austrians." That, Dr. Ripka states, has remained the guiding principle of Czechoslovak foreign policy from 1917 up to the present day but not for selfish reasons only.

Continuing, he states "It is of course true that if Russia and Britain do not participate in European affairs the Czechoslovak dam, deeply wedging in the Germans, would be the first to be swept away in the German flood. But it is equally true that the Germans must, as Bismarck said, and as Hitler has shown, first be the masters of Prague if they are then to be also masters of Warsaw, Belgrade, Paris, Brussels and of course also of Kharkov and Smolensk." So, he states, although the Soviet-Czechoslovak pact answers the real

² A summary of the provisions of the treaty between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union, and of a protocol, has been omitted; for texts, see Department of State, *Documents and State Papers*, vol. I, No. 4, pp. 228-229, or *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. CXLV, p. 238. For statement issued by the Department on December 13 upon the signature of this treaty, see Department of State *Bulletin*, December 18, 1943, p. 439.

³ Not printed.

⁴ Hubert Ripka was at this time the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

⁵ Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk, first President of the Czechoslovak Republic, 1918-1935.

interests of Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union, it also serves general European interests.

"Thus," he claims, "this agreement deliberately conceived in accordance with the British-Soviet Treaty of Alliance—also met with understanding at the Three-Power Conference in Moscow."⁶

He also sees in the agreement "the first constructive foundation for the alliance of the powerful USSR with the other central European nations" and refers with strong approval to the protocol of the treaty which envisages the possibility of similar agreements with those neighbors (particularly Poland) who may desire it.

For these reasons, he concludes, all those who do not wish to see German domination over Europe sincerely welcome the pact, for "they rightly look upon it not only as the main instrument for stemming the march of Pan-Germanism at the outset but also as a constructive element for ensuring peace and security for the whole of Europe[?].

Dr. Ripka told me this noon that this article is a summary of an exposition which he is to make before the Czechoslovak National Council day after tomorrow and that its publication by the *Daily Worker* before he had delivered it is somewhat embarrassing. He added that it is substantially accurate.

[SCHOENFELD]

760F.6111/45 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, December 15, 1943—5 p. m.

[Received 9:50 p. m.]

8710. While the Department is of course aware of the background of the Russian-Czech Treaty it may find following statements of a Foreign Office official of interest:

Beneš broached to the British Government last May his desire for a treaty with Russia. The British told Beneš that they did not look with much favor on the plan, firstly, because of the previous statements by the Czech and Polish Governments that the two countries would form a bloc and cooperate fully, and coming directly after the severance of Russian-Polish diplomatic relations, and secondly, because the British did not view favorably bilateral treaties and in fact were proposing to the Russians that a "self-denying ordinance" be agreed to by the Russians and the British, an ordinance that neither country would conclude bilateral treaties with small Allied powers.⁷

⁶ See telegram No. 1741, October 26, 1 p. m., from the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, and footnote 84, p. 717.

⁷ See footnote 12, p. 678.

In connection with this second point, the British felt that bilateral treaties would be endless in number once one was made, and secondly, that they probably could be a nuisance in the long run.

Beneš went ahead and it appeared that the Russians were anxious for such a treaty, but Beneš finally said that he would await the decision on the "self-denying ordinance".

At Moscow the matter was of course discussed in conference.

With regard to the ordinance, the British saw that the Russians did not wish to enter into any such agreement and accordingly withdrew their objections, with the result that either country could make bilateral treaties if it chose. Parenthetically, the Foreign Office official said that the British Government did not have any such intentions.

Although the Soviet Government has said that it does not favor confederations,⁸ this new treaty does not fall into that class as there are no such limitations of sovereignty as would be included in a confederation.

Insofar as the reactions on Soviet-Polish relations are concerned the Foreign Office official does not believe that the treaty and protocol will facilitate them, but on the other hand it certainly would not impede them, and might ease the tension.

Another higher Foreign Office official concerned with Russian matters said that the Soviet Government must be very gratified to have this first definite agreement with one of its neighbors in an area which it regards as of vital importance to it.

WINANT

860F.001/163 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, December 18, 1943—2 p. m.

[Received December 20—8:50 p. m.]

2264. For the President and the Secretary of State. I had a long talk yesterday with Beneš alone which will be resumed Monday.⁹

1. Beneš is elated over his reception, the conclusion of the treaty and the free and intimate character of his conversations with Stalin and Molotov.

2. It is not too strong to say that he is thrilled at the change in attitude of the Soviets as compared with his 20 years previous experience and specifically his last visit in 1935.¹⁰ As a result of their evident sense of security and self-confidence, modesty and calm have

⁸ See footnote 18, p. 592.

⁹ See the Ambassador's telegram No. 2284, *infra*.

¹⁰ President Beneš was in Moscow June 9-11, 1935, for discussions concerning the peace of Europe and joint security efforts.

taken the place of their previous aggressiveness and excitability. In Beneš' view their self-confidence is based on their feeling that their leadership of the Russian people is now secure. The revolution is at last accomplished. Soviet Russia is strong and consolidated for war and for peace. A vigorous nationalism has emerged linked with Russia's past—Russia for Russians and not a base for international revolution. The Bolshevizing of other countries is no longer an objective. The determination to participate as a powerful nation in world affairs has taken its place.

3. Stalin expressed to Beneš great satisfaction in the new relationships with the U.S. and Britain. Stalin had been much impressed with the President and felt that complete agreement had been reached with him at Tehran¹¹ on all questions not of course in detail but in approach. He gave Beneš the impression that he now felt entirely at ease with the President. Many questions were still unsettled but Stalin indicated confidence that as the result of the over-all understanding mutually satisfactory solutions could be worked out.

Stalin liked and respected Churchill, particularly as a fighting man, one of the personalities who had made the approaching victory possible. But he realized that Churchill at times found it difficult to throw off British nineteenth century imperialism. In addition there were more specific and historical issues between Russia and Britain still to be solved.

In spite of greater sympathy with the United States, Stalin was determined to build a triangular relationship with Britain and the United States and would not play one country against the other. This policy would not preclude bilateral understandings between any two of the three countries on matters of peculiar interest.

Beneš is convinced from the manner in which Stalin expressed himself that he spoke with full sincerity and without reservation. Stalin told Beneš in general terms only of the matters discussed at Tehran. Beneš did not ask for further details and was satisfied the interests of Czechoslovakia were fully protected.

4. As to the treaty, Beneš expressed appreciation of the help the United States had given in supporting his efforts to work it out.

The treaty, he explained, would attain its fullest value only with the inclusion of Poland, to which the President had given his support. Through the three cornered relationship, security could be [garbled groups] Stalin had asked him about the London Polish Government, both individually and collectively. He had told Stalin of his talk

¹¹ For documentation on the conference between President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and Premier Stalin, with their advisers, at Tehran, November 28–December 1, 1943, see *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943*.

with Mikolajczyk ¹² in London before his departure. Mikolajczyk had shown great suspicion over Soviet intents to Bolshevize Poland and even include it in the Soviet Union. Mikolajczyk had bluntly asked Beneš whether his visit to Moscow would result in Czechoslovakia becoming one of the Soviet republics. When told of this Stalin abruptly sat up in his chair and said "What fools these people are". Stalin told Beneš he wanted to establish relations with a Polish government but only if he could be sure they would be lasting this time. In answer to Stalin's inquiry he discussed frankly the personalities in the Polish Government. Stalin was surprised to learn that Mikolajczyk was peasant born and representative of land-owning class. Stalin asked whether it might be possible to get the democratic elements to form government divorced from the reactionaries. Beneš explained that such a government would not have sufficient authority in Poland and would be as impotent as the Yugoslav Government at Cairo.

Beneš told me in strictest confidence the modifications in Soviet frontier claims which, as we know Stalin is prepared to make.

I then asked Beneš what he thought would be the course of events. He said perhaps the only possibility would be to await liberation of Poland, at which time a representative government would arise with which the Soviets could deal. He said he was sure that the Red army would enter Poland with instructions to gain the good will of the Polish people and no attempt would be made to Sovietize Poland. I explained our concern that not all Poles would welcome the Red army under present conditions, and that there might be conflicts from the Polish side, particularly if encouraged by Government in London. In any event the Red army would not have the assistance of the Polish underground. Beneš freely admitted the validity of this concern but expressed pessimism that anything could be accomplished. I asked him if he knew that Eden had had more satisfactory talks with Mikolajczyk prior to his departure for Cairo. He had not heard of these conversations and said that this altered his views. I urged him not to be defeatist and to keep an open mind until he had had opportunity to discuss the matter with Eden. He said that he would cooperate fully with Mr. Eden and believed that the assurance he could bring to the Poles as the result of his talks with Stalin might well be of real value.

HARRIMAN

¹² Stanislaw Mikolajczyk became Prime Minister of the Polish Government in Exile at London on July 14, 1943, after the death of General Sikorski.

860F.001/164 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, December 20, 1943—5 p. m.
[Received December 22—5:07 a. m.]

2284. For the President and the Secretary of State. Supplementing my 2264, December 18, 2 p. m. I saw Beneš again this morning for about an hour and a half during which time he talked almost continuously about his further conversations with Stalin and other impressions here.

(1) *Poland.*

(a) His treaty with Russia would not be complete until Poland was a signatory even if this had to await the conclusion of hostilities with Germany and the establishment of a new government from within.

(b) From further talks with Stalin he was satisfied that a *rap-prochement* between the Soviet Government and the London Polish Government might be effected if Mikolajczyk and the more democratic elements would seek it with sincerity and determination to work with the Soviet Union provided of course that the irreconcilable reactionaries were eliminated. It would be helpful if Witos,¹³ now in Moscow, a member of the Peasant Party and a brother of the former Polish Peasant Party leader,¹⁴ could be brought into the Government. Reconciliation between the Polish military forces fighting on the Russian front and those with the British should also be brought about. The Poles need have no fears of any Soviet intent to Sovietize Poland or to dominate her internal policies.

(c) He told me in the greatest secrecy that Stalin had been more precise about the modification of his frontier demands. He was willing to leave with the Poles Przemyśl in the south and Białystok in the territory in the north. Beneš showed me a map of a possible Polish state which appeared to follow the Curzon line¹⁵ to the east, included east Prussia except for Königsberg and the area north, and bounded on the west by the Oder. He told me that he would explain the above to Eden and would talk in general to the Poles and in more detail if it appeared useful.

I explained to Beneš that the United States Government, as of course he already knew, could not be involved in Polish-Russian

¹³ Andrzej Witos, a member of the Presidium of the Congress of the Union of Polish Patriots held in Moscow in June 1943.

¹⁴ Wincenty Witos.

¹⁵ See footnote 60, p. 659.

boundary questions until the peace negotiations and that although we would like to see a *rapprochement* between the Polish and Soviet Government primarily for military reasons we could not take part in any way in negotiations for the reconstruction of the Government to suit the Soviets.

(2) *Czech-Soviet understandings.*

Beneš explained that he had come to a complete agreement with Stalin on all questions,¹⁶ specifically mentioned the following:

(a) Recognition of Czechoslovak territory on the basis of pre-Munich.

(b) Approval by the Soviet Government of the transfer of the German population from the Sudetenland and an exchange with Hungary of the Slovak and Hungarian populations.

(c) Non-interference by the Soviet Government in internal affairs within Czechoslovakia and agreement by the Soviet Government to accord the Ruthenians on the Soviet side of the Carpathians full minority rights.

(d) Beneš stated categorically that he was convinced that there would be no attempt from within Russia to interfere in Czech internal affairs. He had seen Czech Communist leaders now in Moscow who expressed their willingness to join on their return to Czechoslovakia a government under Beneš' leadership for the purpose of reconstructing a strong nationalist state. He said that in his many talks with different Soviet officials it had frequently been repeated that the Soviet Government had no desire to foster a Communist revolution in Czechoslovakia or in fact in any other European country, but desired stability and strong representative governments.

(3) *Yugoslavia.*

Stalin had told Beneš that he believed in a continuation of the Yugoslav federation. He was not averse to the King but did not like his present government. He was sympathetic with Tito¹⁷ and Ribar¹⁸ but was open-minded and would not interfere in the natural development of internal politics within the country.

(4) *Bulgaria.*

Stalin was sympathetic with the Bulgarian people but had no patience with the present government. He was not optimistic that

¹⁶ In telegram No. 2316, December 23, Ambassador Harriman reported that Beneš had told reporters at a press conference that "he considered his trip to the Soviet Union the crowning step in Czechoslovakia's struggle for independence." (860F.001/166) A few days later the Ambassador reported in telegram No. 2353, December 29, that Beneš had wired back to Stalin, after leaving Moscow, expressing confidence "that the cooperation of our peoples will constantly become deeper and stronger". (860F.001/168)

¹⁷ Marshal Tito (Josip Broz), a Yugoslav Communist, who emerged during the war as leader of the Yugoslav Partisans.

¹⁸ Ivan Ribar, elected in December 1943 President of the Presidium of the Anti-Fascist Council for National Liberation of Yugoslavia (Avnoj), the Partisan government formed on November 29, 1943; Chief of State.

Bulgaria could be induced to withdraw from the war at the present time. In reply to Beneš' direct question Stalin said that he had no territorial ambitions toward Bulgaria nor beyond the 1941 frontier anywhere in the Balkans or Turkey. The matter of the Dardanelles should be worked out on an international basis.

(5) *Finland.*

Stalin had indicated clearly that he would be glad to make peace with Finland on the basis of the March 1940 treaty but expressed himself bitterly against the Finns and considered them stupid in not throwing off their affiliation with Germany.

(6) *Confederations.*

Beneš said he considered Stalin's aversion to formation of confederations at the present time as reasonable. He did not however believe that the Soviet Government would object to the subject being considered at an appropriate time although Beneš himself thought the importance of confederations was being overemphasized. He believed that with solid political settlement, economic matters could readily find their solution without formal organization.

(7) Beneš said Stalin repeated his great satisfaction over his association with the President and the Prime Minister, explained in more detail how much he respected the President's concepts and expressed his belief that with the Prime Minister's broadminded integrity a satisfactory solution could be found to Anglo-Soviet differences of approach to some of the less important issues. Stalin had repeatedly expressed his confidence in the settlement of world problems under the leadership of the four great powers. He had spoken favorably of the inclusion of China as one of them and had specifically stated that Japan must be destroyed.

HARRIMAN

760F.6111/54 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, December 21, 1943.

[Received December 22—7:40 p. m.]

2287. Moscow papers for December 21st report that on December 20th Beneš presented to Molotov a number of Czechoslovak decorations for Soviet officers including Marshal Vasilevski.¹⁹ The speeches of Beneš and Molotov on this occasion are published. Beneš expressed his admiration for the Red army and his hopes for further successes and final victory over the enemy. Molotov expressed his

¹⁹ Alexander Mikhailovich Vasilevsky, Assistant People's Commissar of Defense and Chief of the Army General Staff.

appreciation for the awards and with reference to the Soviet-Czechoslovak Treaty stated that it had strengthened the friendship between the two peoples for a long period and that it would serve to concentrate the forces of the two peoples in the struggle with the common enemy and for close friendly collaboration in postwar Europe.

HARRIMAN

760F.61/120 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, December 23, 1943.

[Received December 24—12:30 p. m.]

2317. Moscow papers for December 23 announce that the exchange of ratifications of the Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty²⁰ took place at the Kremlin on December 22. During the day Beneš visited the All Slav Committee and delivered a speech on the significance of the unity of the Slavs in battle for the future of the Slav peoples.²¹

In the evening Stalin gave a dinner at the Kremlin for Beneš which was attended by all members of the Politburo and a number of Soviet Generals.

HARRIMAN

103.9168/1528n : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)

WASHINGTON, December 23, 1943—7 p. m.

1451. From Knollenberg²² by McPherson²³ for Spalding.

1. According our advice serious rail and port congestion at northern Russian ports is threatened. Only 350 tons per ship daily against minimum requirement of 500 tons daily was average discharge of JW-54 A. Only with considerable help from ships' crews was this accomplished. Labor shortage seems to be main difficulty.

²⁰ This treaty had been ratified by the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Soviet Union and by the President of the Czechoslovak Republic on December 20.

²¹ The Department commented in telegram No. 1440, December 21, to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union: "Although the Polish Government has thus far withheld comments on the Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaty the Polish Prime Minister has informed Schoenfeld that his preliminary trend of thought is to the effect that in principle the Polish Government might be willing to entertain the idea of such an arrangement with the Soviets provided that it formed part of a system of general security and that Poland had similar arrangements with the Western powers." (800.00 Summaries/5g)

²² Bernhard Knollenberg, Executive Adviser to the Administrator, Office of Lend-Lease Administration (consolidated into the Foreign Economic Administration after September 1943).

²³ Presumably W. S. McPherson, Assistant Deputy Administrator for Shipping Services, War Shipping Administration.

2. Larger cargoes being carried by succeeding convoys, with greater proportion of heavy lifts, and discharge and turnaround of these ships will therefore be a much greater problem.

3. Prompt clearing up of present congestion is causing us great concern and we hope that concrete steps will be taken to improve the organization of the work and to increase the labor supply. A discussion of this matter at earliest opportunity with Mikoyan is urged.

4. Discussion now under way regarding possible need for setting back arrival dates of JW-56 and JW-57 due to possible discharge difficulties—this for your private information. It might not be possible for operational reasons to dispatch JW-57 to Russia if any such change in scheduling appears necessary.

5. On assumption that original convoy schedule will be maintained we are continuing to operate but in order to convince operational authorities definite word regarding concrete measures to improve situation will be necessary.

6. We suggest that you may want to visit northern ports and discuss situation with Frankel. Extremely valuable would be a report from you. [Knollenberg.]

HULL

Moscow Embassy Files : Lot F-96

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)

[Moscow,] December 31, 1943.

[Participants:] The American Ambassador, Mr. Harriman
Mr. C. E. Bohlen
The Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs,
Mr. V. M. Molotov
Mr. Berezhkov, interpreter

I expressed appreciation to Mr. Molotov for the courtesies and facilities afforded Dr. Waldron on his recent visit to the camp of the sixty-one interned American aviators at Tashkent.²⁴ Mr. Molotov asked how they were getting on. I explained that the Soviet Major

²⁴ In a 4-page memorandum of this date, Dr. Waldron recorded the discussion of his visit to these interned flyers with Ambassador Harriman and three military officers at the Ambassador's residence in Spaso House. Dr. Waldron had left Moscow on November 14, but bad weather caused his travel to Tashkent to take 21 days. After his visit with the aviators, his return trip took only 3 days, flying in "a general's plane which had gone to Tashkent to collect some apples". Most of the conversation concerned the well-nigh primitive conditions under which the flyers were living, although it was recognized that "the Russians were giving them the best attention they could". The local authorities in turn had complained that there had been two attempts made to escape, but the officers and men had thereafter promised not to make a further attempt for 6 months.

Yunov who had been put in charge two months ago, the four women interpreters, and the doctor who had arrived about a month ago were doing all they could to look after them. I said that thanks to the character of the American Major Salter in command, the morale of the men up to the present was still good but that they were urgently in need of certain American supplies such as uniforms, shoes, medicines, toilet articles, and a few small objects of personal luxuries such as chocolate and cigarettes. I told Mr. Molotov that these supplies were available in Tehran and requested him to obtain permission for them to be sent in either by airplane or by truck.

Mr. Molotov immediately agreed to this and said he would make available a Soviet plane for this purpose. I then said it would be useful to have an American doctor go in with these supplies in order to show the Soviet doctor in the camp how to use the American medicines. Molotov also agreed to permit an American doctor to go in with the medical supplies. He likewise did not make objection to the sending of a radio receiver for personal use at the camp. I remarked that one of these men who had been injured in landing had had an operation and that his condition was such that it would be well to permit him to leave the country with the plane. Mr. Molotov voiced no objection but gave no specific approval to this suggestion.

Mr. Molotov then remarked humorously that "try as they would", the Soviet Government were still unable to find the first group of American aviators who had been interned in the U.S.S.R.²⁵ I pointed out to him that, as he had noted, I was only requesting supplies for a temporary period since I did not anticipate that the present interned aviators would have a very long stay in the Soviet Union. I pointed out to him in this connection that although they were very grateful for the kind treatment accorded to them by the Soviet authorities, it was nevertheless somewhat difficult for them to understand why they should be kept in the Soviet Union which they regarded as an ally of the United States. I said therefore that if their stay was prolonged, their morale would undoubtedly be affected. Mr. Molotov agreed and said that he did not believe that these aviators would be forced to "sit" in Tashkent for a year. It was quite clear from Molotov's remarks and attitude that the Soviet Government intends to let these aviators "escape".

²⁵ Llewellyn E. Thompson, Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union, wrote in a memorandum of October 26, 1943: "In March 1943, the Foreign Office stated that they [the crew members interned at Okhansk; see telegram No. 220, March 29, 3 p. m., from the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, p. 643] were being removed to Ashkhabad, where they would be given an opportunity to do some useful work. Shortly after this, we learned that the crew had escaped under conditions which suggested that the Soviet authorities had taken some pains to make possible. So far as I am aware, the Soviet authorities have made no mention of the matter nor has the Embassy." See also the last paragraph of the memorandum of November 5, by Mr. Charles E. Bohlen, p. 720.

THE CONTINUATION OF WARTIME ASSISTANCE FROM THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOVIET UNION²⁶

861.24/1238

Memorandum by President Roosevelt to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, January 6, 1943.

I understand both the Army and Navy are definitely of the opinion that Russian continuance as a major factor in the war is of cardinal importance, and therefore it must be a basic factor in our strategy to provide her with the maximum amount of supplies that can be delivered to her ports. I fully indorse this concept.

The present Second Protocol agreement with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics²⁷ terminates in large part by the end of this fiscal year. I have therefore taken steps to ascertain Soviet needs for a Third Protocol covering the period July 1, 1943, to June 30, 1944. As soon as these needs have been received, I intend to ask the various interested agencies as to the degree to which they may be met.

In the meantime, I am asking the various interested agencies that in executing the Second Protocol and in planning their overall programs to the end of the fiscal year 1944, the necessity of meeting Soviet needs in accordance with the above strategical viewpoint must be regarded as a matter of paramount importance.

It is planned to make the Third Protocol offering a joint one by the United States and the United Kingdom, to be drawn up by substantially the same procedure and formula as the Second Protocol.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

861.24/1234b : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Thompson)*²⁸

WASHINGTON, January 7, 1943—7 a. m.

12. From Stettinius²⁹ to Faymonville.³⁰ We have informed Litvinov³¹ that the time is at hand to initiate the Third Protocol. Soviet requirements for the period July 1, 1943 to June 30, 1944 are desired. Presentation of these should be grouped to correspond as nearly as

²⁶ Continued from *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. III, pp. 684-757.

²⁷ The Second (Washington) Protocol was signed on October 6, 1942, and is printed in Department of State, *Soviet Supply Protocols* (Washington, Government Printing Office, n.d.), p. 15.

²⁸ Llewellyn E. Thompson, Jr., Second Secretary of Embassy and Consul in the Soviet Union, was in charge of the group remaining in Moscow after the removal of the Embassy to Kuibyshev.

²⁹ Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Lend-Lease Administrator.

³⁰ Brig. Gen. Philip R. Faymonville, head of the United States Supply Mission in the Soviet Union; Lend-Lease Representative.

³¹ Maxim Maximovich Litvinov, Soviet Ambassador in the United States.

possible to the Second Protocol categories. Planning here will be aided by promptness in as much as production schedules are now being set up well in advance. Alloy steel requirements are especially urgent. [Stettinius.]

HULL

861.24/1230 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, January 8, 1943—midnight.

[Received January 8—midnight.]

208. For Ambassador Winant³² from Harriman.³³ Can you give me any information about the proposed agreement with the Russians for exchange of secret military inventions?³⁴ Lyttelton's³⁵ staff is pressing me for an answer to whether the British are free to disclose to the Russians information which is jointly British and American. In fact so much of what we do is joint with the British that their agreement with the Russians amounts to little without our consent or participation.

Please advise as to how soon action is likely.³⁶ If it is to be delayed, I will suggest to the British that they discuss with the American military and naval authorities obtaining consent to divulging joint information. [Harriman.]

MATTHEWS

³² John G. Winant, Ambassador to the United Kingdom, was in Washington at the time.

³³ W. Averell Harriman, Representative in London of the Combined Production and Resources Board (Lend-Lease Coordinator).

³⁴ This reference is to discussions held among United States officials, and between them and the British, regarding a proposed agreement with the Soviet Union by the United States, and possibly also conjointly with the United Kingdom, for the exchange of information on military inventions and devices. Such an agreement was to be similar to that already in effect between the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, with certain modifications. For previous correspondence on this matter see despatch No. 6107, October 28, 1942, from the Chargé in the United Kingdom, and memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs, December 17, 1942, *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. III, pp. 738 and 753, respectively. Also, see a later consideration of the subject in a memorandum by Mr. Elbridge Durbrow of the Division of European Affairs, December 23, 1943, *post*, p. 794.

³⁵ Capt. Oliver Lyttelton, British Minister of Production.

³⁶ In telegram No. 243, January 9, 1943, 6 p. m. (861.24/1230), the Department informed Mr. Harriman that a letter dated December 31, 1942, explaining the United States position, had left Washington by "courier-carried air pouch a few days ago" for London. No copy of this letter has been found in Department files.

861.24/1221 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Thompson), at Moscow

WASHINGTON, January 9, 1943—5 p. m.

20. "For Faymonville from Stettinius.

1. Concerning your cables 548³⁷ and 559,³⁸ General Connolly³⁹ has sent us full report. Great difficulty has been encountered in unloading and forwarding cargo, he states. Ships have been idle and awaiting berth for as long as 2 months in some cases. The ability to remove cargo from docks and forward by railroad or truck is now the limiting factor. Most difficult are the heavier steels. At present we have large quantities on hand and forwarding cannot be accomplished. In order to accomplish the three objectives below, General Connolly was instructed to divert low-priority cargoes for temporary storage elsewhere:

- (1) Avoidance of congestion so that maximum amount of cargo may be forwarded to Russia.
- (2) In order that their higher priority cargo might be forwarded with maximum despatch, allow prompt berthing of arriving ships.
- (3) Very badly needed idle ships should be released for the Soviet and other essential programs, particularly in North Africa and Southwestern Pacific. Nearest and most suitable unloading and storage facilities were at Karachi.

2. Both in Tehran and Basra, General Connolly consulted with local Soviet officials, but they evidently did not understand the urgency of releasing shipping and were unable to assist in selecting cargo of low priority. As a result, General Connolly selected heavy steel of types already accumulated in dumps and on ships in excess of available clearance capacity. Carrying a total of 19,303 tons of miscellaneous steel and pipe, nine ships have been diverted to Karachi, approximate breakdown of which follows: 3,753 tons sheet steel, 3,277 tons steel plate, 3,888 strip steel, 77 tons steel bars, 77 tons steel surgical, 77 tons steel rail, 988 tons pipe, 319 tons steel joints and 7,042 miscellaneous steel. Approximately 1,000 tons of miscellaneous steel was stored at Abadan in addition. May find it necessary to divert to Karachi some 11,000 tons additional Soviet low-priority cargoes.

³⁷ Dated December 20, 1942, 3 p. m., *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. III, p. 755; it reported that Assistant People's Commissar of Foreign Trade Alexey Dmitriyevich Krutikov had protested vigorously about conditions in Iranian ports where Lend-Lease supplies were transshipped.

³⁸ Not printed.

³⁹ Maj. Gen. Donald H. Connolly, Commanding General of the Persian Gulf Service Command.

3. Our assurance has been given to Belyaev⁴⁰ that the cargo diverted to Karachi is for temporary storage only and will not be available for use by any other country. Whenever it is given higher priority for forwarding than cargoes coming from America or in Persian Gulf dumps, it will be returned to Persian Gulf at Russian request. In case Persian Gulf ports are still congested at that time, this may necessitate reduction in cargoes from America by amount forwarded from Karachi. General Connolly will call forward Karachi material in priority designated by Soviet representatives if unused forwarding capacity in Persia should develop.

4. Within a few months, if the anticipated improvement in Persian Gulf facilities should take place, difficulties of this kind should be overcome.⁴¹ In Persia, American troops are arriving for operation of railroad and ports, locomotives and other equipment are arriving and more troops are on way.

5. In his difficult and delicate task, we urge that Soviet representatives in Persia cooperate fully with General Connolly. To further the flow of supplies it is his and our wish to do everything humanly possible."

HULL

Moscow Embassy Files : Lot F-96

The American Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union (Molotov)

No. L-28

Moscow, January 10, 1943.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to inform you that I have been instructed to deliver the following message, dated January 9, 1943, from President Roosevelt to Premier Stalin.⁴²

⁴⁰ Maj. Gen. Alexander Ivanovich Belyayev, Chairman of the Soviet Purchasing Commission in the United States, which had been established on February 27, 1942.

⁴¹ The details of these problems of port facilities, storage, and transshipment and the solutions provided therefor, are discussed at some length in T. H. Vail Motter, *The Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia*, in the series *United States Army in World War II: The Middle East Theater* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1952), pp. 208-210, 380 ff., and 403-416. The arrangements between the United States and the Governments of the United Kingdom, Iran, and the Soviet Union for American supply operations through Iran derived from implementing the provisions of the Anglo-Soviet-Iranian Treaty of Alliance of 1942 (printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, March 21, 1942, p. 249). See *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. iv, pp. 311 ff., and *ibid.*, vol. iii, pp. 728-729; also, see Motter, *The Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia*, pp. 175-192. Arrangements reached in 1943 are discussed in *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. iv, pp. 437 ff.

⁴² Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin, President (Chairman) of the Council of People's Commissars since May 6, 1941, and People's Commissar of Defense since July 19, 1941.

"I have arranged that two hundred C-47 transport planes be assigned to you in 1943 beginning in January.

"Your mission here is being advised of the dates of delivery by months.

"I am going to do everything I can to give you another one hundred but you can definitely count on the two hundred planes referred to above."

Accept [etc.]

For the Ambassador :
LLEWELLYN E. THOMPSON, JR.
Secretary of Embassy

894.6363/408

The Secretary of State to Senator Francis Maloney, of Connecticut

WASHINGTON, January 19, 1943.

MY DEAR SENATOR MALONEY: Thank you for your inquiry of December 30,⁴³ about the rumor that the Soviet Union is diverting lend-lease petroleum products to Japan as an act of appeasement.⁴⁴

I take pleasure in enclosing a copy of my recent letter on this subject to Mr. Stettinius, whose answer to your question I have read and approve.⁴⁵

Appropriate assurances from the Soviet Government have been received on this matter.

Sincerely yours,

CORDELL HULL

⁴³ Not printed; Senator Maloney, on December 30, 1942, had sent letters to Lend-Lease Administrator Stettinius and to Secretary of State Hull reporting that an official of the Socony Vacuum Company had stated that Russia was supplying oil and gas to Japan as an "appeasement act", and asking if the Government had any knowledge of such an arrangement and if the Soviet Government had given assurances to the United States against any such diversion of supplies.

⁴⁴ A marginal notation by Max W. Thornburg, Petroleum Adviser and Special Assistant to Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles, on the file copy of this letter states, "It might not be amiss to mention that Japan *does* produce a relatively small quantity of oil in the Russian portion of Sakhalin Island. This is not a 'diversion of lend-lease aid' but comes to the same thing in the end." Mr. Thornburg was referring to the oil concessions originally granted to a Japanese oil company by the Soviet-Japanese Convention of January 20, 1925 (League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. xxxiv, p. 31). In August 1939 the People's Commissariat of Fuel Industry elaborated on and reaffirmed certain of the arrangements with the Japanese; see *Izvestiya*, August 12, 1939.

⁴⁵ A similar reply to another congressional inquiry was made by the Department on May 8, 1943, to Senator Edward H. Moore of Oklahoma, who had requested information for an appropriate reply to Oklahoma State Representative Clarence Tankersley, regarding alleged commercial exchanges between the Soviet Union and Japan (861.24/1414).

[Enclosure]

The Secretary of State to the Lend-Lease Administrator (Stettinius)

WASHINGTON, January 8, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. STETTINIUS: I have seen Senator Maloney's letter to you of December 30, 1942, and the proposed reply for your signature.⁴⁶ I wish to assure you, as you were informally assured during October, when you consulted members of the Department, that on the basis of careful enquiries, we have no reason to believe that the report to which the Senator refers is or has been true, and that we perceive no objection from the point of view of the foreign relations of the United States to the continuance of the use of the Pacific route for Soviet lend-lease shipments.

Sincerely yours,

CORDELL HULL

861.24/1252a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Standley)*

WASHINGTON, January 19, 1943—midnight.

35. Stettinius sends following for Faymonville.

We would like to have you inform us from time to time of your estimate of possible changes to be given basic classes of commodities in shipping priority. This would aid us in planning production and arranging for shipping stores, if you can give us this information. Last Autumn, for example, there was shift to food which caused considerable accumulation of other items in full production and shortages of certain classes of foods, which Soviets wanted, were not anticipated. In March or April, can it be expected that food priorities will suddenly be lowered? What classes of items are likely to replace food if this happens? At the present time 57 mm. AT guns⁴⁷ and American tanks are practically eliminated from shipping priorities. Is it likely this condition will continue? Sudden request for 18,000 tons of caustic soda is given top shipping priority, although chemicals are hardly being moved. At end of January industrial equipment is called for in large quantities after months of small shipments. Your estimates of future trends would be invaluable but at the same time we appreciate that you cannot be omniscient. [Stettinius.]

HULL

⁴⁶ On January 15, 1943, Mr. Stettinius informed Secretary Hull that he had replied to Senator Maloney.

⁴⁷ 57-millimeter anti-tank guns.

861.24/1259 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

[Extracts]

Moscow, February 2, 1943—2 p. m.

[Received February 3—7:18 a. m.]

74. To Stettinius from Faymonville.

1. Refer to your 35, January 19, midnight. Commissar⁴⁸ regrets that it has been necessary to submit sudden and unexpected requests for industrial equipment and for some chemicals. He states that all such requests are for munitions industry and are caused by unexpected army demands which in turn result from changes in battle requirements. He has promised to keep me informed of probable changes in priorities in classes of cargo. Specifically he expects no change in present high priority of food products. He foresees a possible sudden demand for farm machinery and seed when additional regions of the Ukraine are reoccupied. He also foresees a probable requirement for coal mining equipment when the enemy is cleaned out of the Don basin. In my own opinion we should also be ready to meet demands for higher priorities in railway equipment.

2. Commissar states that Soviet industry will probably require apparatus and equipment as a result of the present exchange of information between Soviet and American Synthetic Rubber Commissions.⁴⁹ All such requirements for machinery and apparatus will be treated like other Lend-Lease requests and will be handed to you by General Belyaev.

4. Krutikov congratulates you on your speech summarizing Lend-Lease shipments⁵⁰ and only regrets that a considerable portion of the cargoes did not reach the Soviet Union. [Faymonville.]

STANDLEY

⁴⁸ Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan, People's Commissar for Foreign Trade, and Vice President (Vice Chairman) of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union. In subsequent documents Mikoyan is frequently referred to simply as "Commissar".

⁴⁹ The American Synthetic Rubber Commission, headed by E. W. Pittman, arrived in Moscow in December 1942 to examine Soviet synthetic rubber processes and products, in accordance with an earlier American-Soviet arrangement.

⁵⁰ On January 21, Mr. Stettinius released to the Office of War Information a report on Lend-Lease supplies to the Soviet Union; see the *New York Times*, January 21, 1943, p. 1. In telegram No. 151, March 9, the Department asked the Embassy in Kuibyshev to send back a full translation of the Stettinius statement as reported in *Pravda* on January 23 (861.24/1249). The Embassy replied in telegram No. 247, March 11, 9 a. m., p. 752.

861.24/1268 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

KUIBYSHEV (Moscow), February 6, 1943—6 p. m.

[Received February 7—3:50 p. m.]

116. My 108, February 4, [3] 4 p. m.⁵¹ After outlining to Vyshinski⁵² yesterday the developments in the United States leading up to the appointment of the Pittman synthetic rubber mission, i.e., the Baruch report,⁵³ the intensified public and press demands for action in the field of synthetic rubber investigation and production and the resulting repercussions in Congress, I strongly emphasized the bad effect that would be created in the United States if Pittman should return home without accomplishing the purpose of his mission. I alluded to unfortunate political repercussions that might well have influence upon the pending Lend-Lease appropriation bill and I urged that the Soviet Government do everything possible to help Pittman and to expedite action. Vyshinski promised to look into the matter immediately.

STANDLEY

861.24/1278a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Thompson), at Moscow

WASHINGTON, February 11, 1943—6 p. m.

82. "From Stettinius for Faymonville. Representatives of U.S.S.R. here have asked that we provide in lump form 80 percent of their sugar requirements. Lump sugar is no longer produced and American consumers cannot obtain it, nor do the American Armed Forces purchase it in substantial quantities. The renewal of production will be necessary to meet the requirement and considerable difficulty in meeting Soviet requirements will result. Likewise, more waste in shipping space takes place from shipping this form of sugar. It is not our purpose to supply any amount of the sugar requirements in lump form unless you can inform us of specific reasons of great urgency which the Russians may set forth as making this necessary."

HULL

⁵¹ Not printed.⁵² Andrey Yanuaryevich Vyshinsky, First Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, and Vice President (Vice Chairman) of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union.⁵³ President Roosevelt's Special Rubber Committee, headed by Bernard M. Baruch and including Karl T. Compton and James B. Conant, was appointed on August 3, 1942, to make a survey of United States rubber needs. On September 10, 1942, the Committee made a 20,000-word report to the President on the situation.

861.24/1275 : Telegram

*The Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Thompson)
to the Secretary of State*Moscow, February 13, 1943—3 p. m.
[Received February 14—2: 15 p. m.]

91. From Faymonville for Stettinius.

1. I have informed Commissar of the general contents of your cable 56, January 30, 1 a. m.⁵⁴ He understands but regrets the necessity for diversion and states that present situation is in no sense the result of hoarding propensities. He feels that the cause of present difficulties was your decision to withhold ships from northern route in early summer.⁵⁵ He states that this decision upset shipments by changing routings and, therefore, caused a revision of priorities. Shipments of steel were extremely important during the summer and fall, but had to be superseded in priority by absolute necessities and indispensable items which would have been received through northern ports under former plans, but which were dammed up by the changes in priorities. He notes that ships which were loaded in July are arriving at Soviet ports only this month.

2. Commissar foresees that pipe will be urgently needed for repair of Caucasus installation and warns that shipment of pipe from us may soon receive a much higher priority.

Repeated to Kuibyshev. [Faymonville.]

THOMPSON

861.24/1280 : Telegram

*The Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Thompson)
to the Secretary of State*

[Extracts]

Moscow, February 17, 1943—3 p. m.
[Received 8:32 p. m.]

96. To Stettinius from Faymonville.

4. First shipment of Soviet synthetic rubber tires was sunk. Second shipment is already en route and you will soon be informed of name of ship.

⁵⁴ Not printed; it reported urgent requirements for steel pipe in American industry and the unwillingness of the Soviet Purchasing Commission to release some of its stocks of pipe which were awaiting later shipment, delayed because of other Soviet priorities, and which seemed to be a case where Soviet representatives were "hoarding items which cannot be shipped and are still asking for more." (861.24/1253a)

⁵⁵ For correspondence on the difficulties of maintaining convoys on the northern route to the Soviet Union and on measures taken to develop alternate routes, see pp. 624-700, *passim*, and telegram No. 20, January 9, 5 p. m., p. 739.

5. Has Soviet Government promised you a definite quantity of bristles as reverse Lend-Lease cargo to United States in 1943?

6. It is essential to have at least a portion of Soviet sugar requirements in the form of lump sugar. This is Commissar's answer to the subject matter of your cable 82, February 11, 6 p. m. General Belyaev will inform you soon of the percentage which is considered an absolute minimum to be shipped in lump form. This percentage will be less than the 80% originally requested. Commissar explains that lump sugar is to meet army needs and that sugar in other form is not practicable for use on present active fronts where kitchens are lacking, transportation of even small sized containers of bulk material is not practicable and troops must carry individual rations.

7. Trial cargo of apatite concentrates will be shipped to America in accordance with your cable 86, February 13, 10 p. m.⁵⁶

9. Krutikov reports progress on third protocol but cannot state date of submission. Are you working currently with Belyaev on third protocol. If so cable me subject headings on which you have reached substantial agreement as to quantities. [Faymonville.]

THOMPSON

861.24/1286

The Assistant Secretary of State (Acheson) to the Lend-Lease Administrator (Stettinius)

WASHINGTON, February 19, 1943.

DEAR ED: Replying to your letter of February 6,⁵⁷ I can tell you only that we have under consideration a draft of a reciprocal lend-lease agreement with China.⁵⁸ Owing to the complexity of the fiscal and other financial questions involved we have not yet been able to clear this draft with the Army, or the Treasury. The suggestion has not yet been discussed with the Chinese.

Therefore, I see no possibility at the present for a public announcement any more explicit than that I made in my testimony before the Foreign Affairs Committee. You may remember that, in reply to a question as to whether reciprocal lend-lease agreements have been concluded with China and Russia, I told Mr. Mundt⁵⁹ that it is

⁵⁶ Not printed; according to this telegram, the Defense Supplies Corporation (a United States Government concern) was considering a request for trial cargo of 7,000 tons of the concentrates, with "no present prospects of large requirements." (861.24/1278b)

⁵⁷ Not printed.

⁵⁸ Not printed; this draft was the same, except for a few minor changes, as that handed to the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs on May 15; see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, China, p. 538.

⁵⁹ Karl E. Mundt, Representative in Congress from South Dakota.

contemplated that a reciprocal aid agreement will be concluded with one of the countries he named.

So far as the Soviet is concerned, it is my feeling that circumstances are not such as to justify the conclusion of a reciprocal lend-lease agreement at present. No United States forces are serving in the Soviet German front and the Soviet Union is not at war with Japan, so the provisions of the usual reciprocal aid agreement would not be applicable. Strategic materials being furnished by the U.S.S.R. to the United States are covered by contract of September 12, 1941⁶⁰ between Defense Supplies Corporation and Amtorg Trading Corporation,⁶¹ and any change in this procedure seems undesirable.

Sincerely yours,

DEAN ACHESON

861.24/1289b : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Standley)*

WASHINGTON, February 23, 1943—4 a. m.

99. For Faymonville from Stettinius. In view of termination of supply of aluminum from the United Kingdom, the following indicates action taken on Soviet request for additional aluminum from the United States:

For the first quarter of 1943, the President has granted an additional 3,500 long tons above Protocol commitments which will consist of 1,300 long tons of ingot and 2,200 long tons of sheet. During the first quarter the United States will thereby supply a total of 9,500 long tons. During the second quarter the United States will supply about 5,500 long tons to complete Protocol commitments. The President has made no decision on the Russian request for additional aluminum above the Protocol commitment in the second quarter. You will be informed as soon as decision has been reached.

Repeated to London. [Stettinius.]

HULL

861.24/1295c : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Standley)*

WASHINGTON, February 26, 1943—10 p. m.

109. The following message from Stettinius is for Faymonville. According to information given by the Russian Purchasing Commission, further shipments of M4A2 and M3A1 tanks will not be made.

⁶⁰ Not printed.

⁶¹ Official purchasing and sales agency of the Soviet Union in the United States, New York, N.Y.

In a reply which has been sent to the Commission it is stated that it is now our understanding that the USSR, during the period covered by the Second Protocol, does not expect that any additional tanks will be furnished, and that accordingly corresponding steps are being taken to curtail production. It is also necessary in order that future production plans may be made that, as soon as practicable, information be requested as to whether, during the Third Protocol, any tanks will be desired. According to the Ordnance Department it is of great urgency that a statement of future requirements of tanks be obtained. This is necessary in order to provide the least possible disruption to production lines, with its attendant general dislocation of production, and unemployment. This information has been given to the Commission. We hope that everything possible will be done as speedily as possible in order to clarify future requirements. [Stettinius.]

BERLE

861.24/1294 : Telegram

*The Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Thompson)
to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, February 27, 1943—3 p. m.

[Received 5 : 35 p. m.]

110. From Faymonville for Stettinius. Our ships at northern ports must be provided with homeward cargo and ballast for navigational reasons rather than according to foreign trade preferences. Enough cargo must be furnished to provide normal sailing conditions. Thus condenser intakes must be held below water in rough weather and in the case of the *Jefferson Myers* 5,000 tons were estimated necessary to accomplish this. In spite of warnings reiterated over 18 months, ships with bronze instead of steel propellers are being sent to northern ports. Enough cargo must therefore be furnished to keep bronze propellers 4 feet below ice to avoid serious damage from bent propellers. For these and other reasons and in accordance with Harriman's instructions I have continued to urge Soviet authorities to provide adequate cargo for our ships at northern ports. I have not pressed for shipments of apatite. This refers to your cable 103, February 23, 11 p. m.⁶² The trial cargo mentioned in your cable 86, February 13, 10 p. m.⁶³ is now being prepared and will be sent unless you cancel. Outbound cargoes on American ships have been limited by several restrictions and suitable ballast is not easily obtainable. It may therefore be necessary for Defense Supplies to accept cargoes of low priority. The securing of cargoes and the dispatch of our ships

⁶² Not printed.

⁶³ Not printed, but see footnote 56, p. 745.

from White Sea ports has been extremely well handled by Lt. Commander George D. Roullard, United States Navy representative of War Shipping Administration.⁶⁴ [Faymonville.]

THOMPSON

861.24/1291 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, February 27, 1943—6 p. m.

1282. "For Harriman from Stettinius. Reference your 1391,⁶⁵ full U.S. commitment for duraluminum has already been met. Nevertheless, more duraluminum sheets have been and will continue to be supplied to meet Soviet requests and in pro rata satisfaction of aluminum ingot commitment. The increase we referred to is 1,300 tons aluminum ingots and 2,200 tons duraluminum sheets over and above total U.S. commitment for both duraluminum and aluminum."

BERLE

861.24/1298 : Telegram

The Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Thompson) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, March 2, 1943—noon.

[Received 6:16 p. m.]

114. To Stettinius from Faymonville.

1. Third Protocol is now being finished and will be submitted in next few days. This is Commissar's reply to subject matter of your paragraph 1, cable 97, February 20, 8 p. m.⁶⁵ Especial attention is being given to details of steel requirements.

2. More than 8 days ago General Belyaev is believed to have handed you details of food requirements for year ending July 1944. Commissar thinks that questions in your cable 111, February 27, 7 p. m.⁶⁵ must have been drafted before receipt of Soviet food estimates. Cable me if new food estimates are still unsufficiently detailed.

3. As a result of recommendations of Mr. Makeyev, Chief of Soviet Rubber Mission in America,⁶⁶ Commissar will ask for several industrial items for rubber industry. Actual transactions will be handled

⁶⁴ Lt. Comdr. George D. Roullard, Assistant Naval Attaché and Assistant Naval Attaché for Air in the Soviet Union.

⁶⁵ Not printed.

⁶⁶ Peter Sergeyevich Makeyev, also Assistant People's Commissar of Rubber Industry.

entirely by General Belyaev. Our American Rubber Commission after noteworthy success here ⁶⁹ has left Moscow.

4. Continuation of monthly deliveries of 200 tractors is desired. This refers to your cable 106, February 25, midnight.⁷⁰ No additional tractors or other agricultural machines are desired, but Commissar is most anxious for quick delivery of spare parts for Soviet tractors. He states that many of these spare parts are common to Soviet type and to older American type tractors, and that Soviet Purchasing Commission has necessary specifications for desired parts.

5. President's action in making available first quarter aluminum was warmly appreciated by Commissar who hopes it will also be possible to increase second quarter deliveries. This refers to your cable 99, February 23, 4 a. m. [Faymonville.]

THOMPSON

861.24/1304 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, March 5, 1943—midnight.

[Received March 6—2 a. m.]

1618. To Stettinius from Harriman. Oshins⁷¹ and Ladejinsky⁷² have been talking with me regarding undoubted extreme grain shortage in Russia and particularly difficulties on redeveloping production in recently reoccupied territory. They emphasize undoubted acute shortage of tractors.

We have discussed here informally with British whether they would ship immediately in early convoys some of their own production of Fordson tractors. Indications are that they might agree to make the sacrifice if Russians urge it, particularly if we would help by some replacement to them from the United States later on in the year.

Have the Russians in Washington discussed with you this need for tractors and if so have they given it high priority? Please answer urgently as time is of the essence if anything is to be done this season.

The discussions here are so tentative I must caution you not to mention them to the Russians. [Harriman.]

MATTHEWS

⁶⁹ In his telegram No. 130, March 8, 5 p. m., Ambassador Standley remarked that "‘noteworthy success’ does not accord with statements made to me by Pittman. Suggest that no use be made of this impression until Pittman and his associates arrive in Washington and are consulted in regard to the results of their Mission here." (861.24/1307)

⁷⁰ Not printed.

⁷¹ Robert L. Oshins, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of Agriculture.

⁷² Wolf I. Ladejinsky, agricultural economist in the Department of Agriculture.

861.24/1304 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom
(Matthews)*

WASHINGTON, March 8, 1943—5 p. m.

1460. "From Stettinius for Harriman. Regarding your no. 1618, we have asked Faymonville whether we should anticipate request for agricultural tractors. In reply, he states that the Commissar, Mikoyan, desires no agricultural tractors, although he will shortly request spare parts to complete Soviet tractors, these parts being similar to those used in older American types. It is our understanding therefore that for this season the agricultural tractor question has been closed."

WELLES

861.24/1343

*Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by Mr. G. Frederick
Reinhardt of the Division of European Affairs*

[WASHINGTON,] March 10, 1943.

Mr. Graves⁷³ said he was telephoning to provide the Department with the following information with respect to the alleged Soviet reaction, reported in today's press, to Admiral Standley's recent press conference⁷⁴ on the subject of Lend-Lease and other aid to the Soviet Union. Mr. Graves stated that the Federal Communications Commission monitors had intercepted a broadcast from Moscow on March 9 read at dictation speed (therefore, presumably for publication in provincial journals) of an article by Mr. Stettinius which has appeared in the current issue of the *American Magazine*⁷⁵ in this country on the subject of Lend-Lease and was published in *Izvestia* on the same day. He stated further that FCC has no information to confirm press reports that Moscow radio had broadcast Mr. Stettinius' earlier statement of January 21 or any other subsequent statement and said that the article which was broadcast dealt particularly with deliveries of food and not armaments or munitions. Mr. Graves said that in as much as the article which was broadcast was only published the same day in this country in *American Magazine* it did not seem reasonable to describe it as a possible reaction to Admiral Standley's press conference.

⁷³ Harold Graves of the Foreign Intelligence Service, Federal Communications Commission.

⁷⁴ See telegram No. 139, March 9, 7 p. m., from the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, p. 631.

⁷⁵ The article referred to is, "Where Is All Our Food Going?", which appeared in *The American Magazine* for April 1943, p. 28.

Subsequently, the FCC monitor intercepted an instruction from Moscow radio to the provincial papers ordering them to withhold the material previously broadcast for publication, pending an editorial revision which would be forthcoming from Moscow. Mr. Graves stated that FCC would carefully follow this matter with a view to ascertaining whether such a revision would actually be made or whether the instruction was in fact intended to definitively withhold the article from publication.

I thanked Mr. Graves for his courtesy and assured him that the Department would be interested to receive any more information on the subject which might become available.

861.24/1318: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Dooman) to the Secretary of State

KUIBYSHEV (Moscow), March 11, 1943—9 a. m.

[Received 1: 15 p. m.]

247. Department's 151, March 9, 9 p. m.⁷⁶ Following is a translation of the article in full: "

"Statement by Stettinius

Washington, January 21 (Tass⁷⁸)

Stettinius, the Lend-Lease Administrator, has made the following statement:

In [1942] the United States achieved considerable success with regard to the delivery of armament and other materials to the Soviet Union on the basis of the Lend-Lease law. We are not yet able to send as much as we would wish or as much as the Soviet Army needs. Moreover, part of what we sent has been lost en route. However, deliveries on the basis of the above law, although made slowly at the beginning, have now increased greatly. They continue to increase despite the shortage of merchant ships and despite enemy attacks on the difficult routes leading to Russia. In November 1942, deliveries to the Soviet Union reached a new high. Exports to Russia in November, 1942, exceeded 13 times those of January, 1942. War material constituted two-thirds of the value of the materials shipped in November. The rest were industrial materials for Soviet war plants and foodstuffs. By January 1, 1943, the United States had sent to the Soviet Union on the basis of the Lend-Lease law more than 3,200 tanks, 2,600 airplanes, 81,000 trucks and other military automobiles. England had sent to Russia more than 2,600 tanks and more than 2,000 airplanes. England is delivering this armament on the basis of the Lend-Lease principle. American deliveries of foodstuffs to the Soviet Union are increasing rapidly in importance. Up to the present the

⁷⁶ Not printed, but see footnote 50, p. 743.

⁷⁷ This text, as translated from the Russian version, is substantially the same as that printed in the *New York Times*, January 21, 1943, p. 1.

⁷⁸ Telegraphic Agency of the Soviet Union, an official communications agency attached to the Council of People's Commissars.

people of the Soviet Union have conducted their remarkable struggle against the Nazis mainly with their own armament. However, the aid rendered to Russia is increasing to considerable proportions. In 1943 it will increase even more.[⁷⁹]

DOOMAN

861.24/1326 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, March 12, 1943—4 p. m.

[Received March 12—3:48 p. m.]

150. The Soviet press of March 12 gave wide coverage to Tass despatches from the United States press [of] Stettinius' statement of March 7 regarding Lend-Lease supplies to Russia⁸⁰ was carried in considerable detail and included many figures on supplies sent up to February 1.

Stettinius' recent radio speech on the necessity of creating an army of 8,200,000 was published at some length as well as the Vice President's recent address in Columbus.⁸¹ No reference to the Soviet Union was contained in the Tass version of Wallace's speech.

The passage of the Lend-Lease Bill in the House of Representatives⁸² was also prominently carried.

STANDLEY

861.24/1400

Memorandum by Mr. Kermit Roosevelt, Jr., of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of State (Acheson), to Mr. Thomas K. Finletter, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] March 16, 1943.

MR. FINLETTER: At the meeting in General Wesson's⁸³ office this week the following points were raised which might be of interest to you.

⁷⁹ For some comparative statistics on aid given to Allied governments by the United States, see W. H. McNeill, *Survey of International Affairs, 1939-1946: America, Britain, and Russia* (Oxford University Press, 1953), pp. 238 and 444.

⁸⁰ See the *New York Times*, March 8, 1943, p. 19; for complete text, see the *Congressional Record*, vol. 89, pt. 2, p. 1700. See also the Eighth Quarterly Report to Congress (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1943), summary of which is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, March 20, 1943, p. 230.

⁸¹ Address delivered at Columbus, Ohio, on March 8, 1943; for text, see *Congressional Record*, vol. 89, pt. 9, p. A1087.

⁸² The House passed the Lend-Lease extension act on March 10, 1943, followed by the Senate on March 11. Upon President Roosevelt's signature the same day it became law; 57 Stat. 20.

⁸³ Maj. Gen. C. M. Wesson, Senior Assistant Administrator for U.S.S.R. Supply, Office of Lend-Lease Administration.

With regard to the oil drilling and other equipment needed by the Soviets to restore production in the Caucasian fields, it was pointed out that it is very difficult to handle this program piecemeal. The War Production Board and other agencies concerned are reluctant to grant high priorities on individual requests when it is possible that the Russians will later present further demands of even greater urgency.

It was pointed out that the Soviets must necessarily make individual requests before they are able to formulate an over-all program if they are to receive any equipment without prolonged delay. At the moment they cannot accurately forecast the over-all needs since they do not know the condition of the equipment the Germans left behind when they retreated. However, it was felt that their requests could be more effectively presented if even a very rough over-all program were to be prepared. This situation is to be explained to Soviet representatives.

It is planned that a number of American engineers will be sent to Russia to assist in setting up and in operating various of the plants, such as the tire and gasoline plants,⁸⁴ which are going to Russia under lend-lease. American companies will not send men over unless there are good guarantees from the Soviet Government that these men will be provided with food, housing, medical care, et cetera. General Wesson is to discuss this problem with Soviet representatives shortly.

KERMIT ROOSEVELT, JR.

861.24/1364 : Telegram

The Consul General at Vladivostok (Ward) to the Secretary of State

VLADIVOSTOK, March 29, 1943—11 a. m.

[Received March 30—10:22 a. m.]

8. During mid-August 1942 I was informed by an unofficial source that Japan was selling crude rubber to the Soviet Union and this information has been repeated to me from time to time by other unofficial sources, but I have been able to obtain no evidence definitely confirming this information nor have I been able to ascertain the quantity involved or whether the shipments entered the Soviet Union through Vladivostok or some other Soviet far eastern port or by land over the Manchukuo frontier. Since early October I have heard repeatedly from unofficial sources that Japan is selling light duty tires to the Soviet Union and that some of these tires are in use on passenger automobiles at Vladivostok. Several informants allege that during the past 5 to 6 months they have seen new tires of Japanese manu-

⁸⁴ See telegram No. 518, May 24, 2 p. m., from the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, p. 758.

facture on passenger cars in Vladivostok and one informant alleges that he has seen new tires bearing the brand of a Yokohama tire company. One informant now alleges that he has learned that the Soviet Government purchased half a million tires from Japan in September 1942. Neither [garbled]⁸⁵ or any American member of my staff has identified any tire in Vladivostok during recent months as of Japanese manufacture.

I have seen no raw rubber in the port since the summer of 1941 and while I have seen a hundred tons or more of heavy duty tires stocked in sheds in the port within the past 4 months all that I was able to approach sufficiently close to identify were of United States manufacture. Since I am accorded access to the port only rarely and on those occasions my movements are restricted to definite areas and I am constantly under close surveillance I have no opportunity to observe most of the goods stored therein.

Information requested in Department's 7 of March 24⁸⁶ will be cabled if obtainable.

WARD

861.77/4453 : Telegram

The Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Page) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, April 19, 1943—6 p. m.

[Received April 20—12: 10 p. m.]

323. The Soviet press on April 16 published a decree of the Supreme Soviet⁸⁷ reading in substance as follows:

1. All Soviet railways are placed under martial law.
2. All railroad workers are mobilized and frozen to their work.
3. The responsibility of all railroad workers for delinquencies is on the same basis as that of Red army personnel.
4. Delinquencies shall be examined by railroad military tribunals according to martial law.
5. Workers guilty of delinquencies shall be discharged and sent to the front in punishment brigades if they are not subject to more severe penalties. The People's Commissar for Railways⁸⁸ and the chiefs of all railways shall be responsible for a strict observance of the discipline regulations.

⁸⁵ The name of a diplomatic officer was probably intended here; presumably the name was that of Warwick Perkins, then First Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union assigned as Administrative Officer and Chief of the Consular Section in the Embassy.

⁸⁶ This telegram read: "Please cable any available information as to dates and tonnages of arrivals of rubber in Vladivostok from Japan or occupied territories during last 12 months." (861.24/1363a)

⁸⁷ The Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Soviet Union issued this decree on April 15, 1943.

⁸⁸ Lazar Moiseyevich Kaganovich.

The press for April 17 carried leading editorials on the decree and published accounts of meetings of railway workers in which enthusiasm over the new regulations was expressed. The editorials stressed the military and economic significance of the railroads in time of war and the necessity for iron discipline. They pointed out that although only a small minority of the workers were not conscientiously fulfilling their duties no violation[s] of discipline whatsoever are permissible.

PAGE

861.24/1412b : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, April 24, 1943—1 p. m.

2609. For Harriman from Wheeler.⁸⁹ At the London round-table discussion on the Russian food situation in which you participated, you indicated that lend-lease food shipments to the Soviet Union have risen to the top of the priority list. It was suggested that perhaps other factors than immediate urgent need for food are responsible for the Soviet emphasis upon such shipments. With this in mind I have discussed the matter with lend-lease officials in Washington. Their considered view is that there is only one reason that induced the Soviet representatives to raise food shipments to the top of the priority list, namely, the stringent food situation in the Soviet Union. [Wheeler.]

HULL

861.24/1410 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, April 24, 1943—8 p. m.

[Received 9 : 50 p. m.]

348. To Hopkins⁹⁰ from Burns.⁹¹ Admiral Standley and I called on Molotov; later Faymonville and I called on Mikoyan. Both officials expressed deep appreciation for aid which United States is sending to Soviet Union. Mikoyan greatly regrets closing of northern route as the cargo en route especially aviation fuel is urgently needed here and strategic plans have been drafted which depend upon the availability of this fuel. To compensate for loss of northern ports

⁸⁹ Leslie A. Wheeler, Director of the Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations, Department of Agriculture.

⁹⁰ Harry L. Hopkins, Special Assistant to President Roosevelt and Chairman of the President's Soviet Protocol Committee.

⁹¹ Maj. Gen James H. Burns, Executive, Munitions Assignments Board, United States and Great Britain, Washington; temporarily visiting in the Soviet Union.

Mikoyan believes that trans-Pacific route should be used to greater extent. He, therefore, especially requests that the United States transfer to Soviet registry 6 or 7 tankers and 20 cargo ships in addition to those already promised. [Burns.]

STANDLEY

861.24/1426

The Chairman of the Government Purchasing Commission of the Soviet Union in the United States (Belyaev) to the Acting Executive of the Munitions Assignments Board (Spalding)

WASHINGTON, April 29, 1943.

DEAR GENERAL SPALDING: In view of recommendations made by various United States government agencies that details be specified with regard to some items of the Third Program ⁹² recently submitted to your Government by my Government, I am sending to you herewith a list embodying these changes, additions and some of the details requested.⁹³

Again I would like to emphasize that all equipment, requisitions for which have been approved by the United States Government during the Second Protocol period, but delivery of which extends beyond the term of this Second Protocol, should be delivered during the period of the Third Protocol in excess of the items specified in the Third Program.

I hope that this supplement will receive the favorable consideration of your Government.

Sincerely yours

A. I. BELYAEV
Major General, U.S.S.R. Army

861.24/1425a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley)

WASHINGTON, April 30, 1943—6 p. m.

268. "From Spalding for Burns. It would appear most desirable to ferry as many airplanes as possible via Alaska, in view of the great saving of time in delivery and the difficulties (including effort to disassemble and assemble) of shipping by water. In formulating

⁹² The draft of a Third Protocol on supplies for the Soviet Union.

⁹³ List not printed; the United States draft proposals on aid for the Soviet Union under the Third Protocol, based on requirements submitted by the Soviet Government, were passed to the Secretary of State on March 26, 1943, and subsequently transmitted to Soviet authorities for their review.

plans, it would be very helpful to have information regarding future planned capacity of the route and possibility of expansion."⁹⁴

HULL

861.24/1432 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, May 6, 1943—midnight.

[Received May 7—3:15 p. m.]

407. To Stettinius from Faymonville. During personal inspection at Vladivostok, Major Olson⁹⁵ was told that Vladivostok and neighboring ports can handle 300,000 tons of cargo monthly during the summer. During winter can handle 230,000 tons per month. At present are handling 200,000 tons monthly. Maximum of 35 ships can be accommodated at one time at Vladivostok with maximum depth water along side dock 35 feet, minimum 25 feet. Monthly capacity Petropavlovsk, Nikolayevsk estimated at 50,000 tons. Nogayeva can handle total of 75,000 tons between 15th of May and 15th of December. Latter three ports all badly in need of cranes. [Faymonville.]

STANDLEY

861.24/1473 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, May 24, 1943—2 p. m.

[Received May 25—4:40 p. m.]

518. Personal for the President and Secretary [from Davies].⁹⁶ Last night Stalin handed to me a memorandum which reads in close paraphrase as follows:

"1. The expediting of shipment to the Soviet Union of equipment for the four oil refinery plants ordered in the United States.

Soviet orders placed with American firms for delivery to the Soviet Union of equipment for the four oil refinery plants complete with all the auxiliary equipment have been approved by the American Government.

The production of all the equipment in accordance with the Soviet specifications accepted by the American firms for the four plants

⁹⁴ For correspondence on the question of the use of the Alaska-Siberia route for ferrying airplanes and as an improved means of communications, see pp. 616-723, *passim*.

⁹⁵ Maj. Clinton L. Olson, U.S. Army, assigned to the United States Supply Mission (Faymonville Mission) in the Soviet Union.

⁹⁶ Joseph E. Davies was in Moscow on a special visit to Stalin for President Roosevelt between May 19 and 29; for correspondence concerning this visit, see pp. 646-665, *passim*.

mentioned above is to be completed before the end of June as it is provided for by the terms of delivery.

All the equipment to be transferred to ports and the loading on Soviet ships completed not later than July for plants numbers 1 and 2 and not later than August for plants numbers 3 and 4.

2. The increasing of delivery of components for aviation gasoline.

It is necessary to increase the shipment to the Soviet Union [of high?] octane components for aviation gasolines—iso octane or alky benzine—in every way so that beginning from June to the end of 1943 the monthly shipment to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics from the United States of America may amount to not less than 22 to 25,000 tons of components.

3. Airplanes.

It is necessary that as many pursuit planes as possible be sent in an expeditious manner using to this effect every supply route.”

He stated that this memorandum was given to me by reason of our previous conversation. At that time he had said that there were three vital military necessities which he most needed for his military defense now. Hitler’s summer Russian offensive, he believed, might be most violent and desperate. When he first mentioned these necessities I told him that while it was out of my bailiwick I would be glad to take the matter up with you. Accordingly I conferred with Ambassador Standley and thereafter with General Burns, General Faymonville and through Admiral Standley with General Michela⁹⁷ and they are all of the opinion that we should join in a recommendation to you to require immediate priority to secure as speedy compliance with these requests as physically possible.

The emphasis placed on the requests on both occasions indicates to me that great importance is attached to this matter. It would be helpful for me here if I could receive prompt acknowledgment setting forth your personal interest and disposition and anything that you could say consistent with your other commitments and your own judgment.

Will be leaving here shortly, immediately after receipt of formal reply to your letter.⁹⁸ Proceeding direct home, respectfully and hastily. Davies.

STANDLEY

⁹⁷ Brig. Gen. Joseph A. Michela, Military Attaché in the Soviet Union.

⁹⁸ Reference is to President Roosevelt’s letter of May 5, 1943, to Premier Stalin, and Stalin’s reply; both letters are printed in *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943*, pp. 3 and 6, respectively.

861.24/1525a

The Assistant Secretary of State (Acheson) to the Lend-Lease Administrator (Stettinius)

WASHINGTON, June 7, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. STETTINIUS: As you are aware, on June 9, 1943 the draft of the Third Soviet Protocol together with statements of the offerings from the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States will be formally transmitted to the Soviet Government for its consideration and acceptance through its representatives in London, Ottawa and Washington.⁹⁹

Since the Protocol and the statements of offerings are merely being submitted confidentially to the Soviet Government for study and comment, it is of course important that no publicity whatsoever be given to this event. I think you should know that we have informally given assurances to the British and Canadian Governments that this Government will give no publicity at all to the matter until the Protocol is finally signed in London at some later date.

Sincerely yours,

DEAN ACHESON

861.24/1526a

The Secretary of State to the Chargé of the Soviet Union (Gromyko)

WASHINGTON, June 9, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES: The financing of the United States offerings, contained in the Proposed Third Soviet Protocol, are contingent on the passage of the Lend-Lease Appropriation Bill by the Congress. No difficulty is expected to be encountered in the passage of the bill,¹ and it is hoped to be able to inform you in the near future that the appropriation legislation has been enacted.

Sincerely yours,

[CORDELL HULL]

861.24/1518: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, June 9, 1943—9 p. m.

[Received June 10—1:25 p. m.]

638. The following telegram has been received from Vladivostok.

"53, June 3, 1 p. m. The appearance of the President's message to

⁹⁹ The draft was formally handed to the Soviet Chargé in Washington, Andrey Andreyevich Gromyko, on June 9, 1943.

¹ The bill, "Defense Aid Supplemental Act, 1943", became law on June 14, 1943; 57 Stat. 151.

Congress on Lend-Lease² in the May 30 issue of local newspaper *Krasnoe Znamya*³ under a Tass date line of May 25 from Washington plus opportunities to meet more Soviet citizens during the past several days than I met during the preceding 4 or 5 months has given me an unusual chance to discuss Lend-Lease.

The people are highly impressed by the fact that almost 26% of all Lend-Lease supplies have been sent to the Soviet Union. They are not however impressed in a like degree by the money value \$1,822,000,000 which when converted into terms of Soviet currency at the official rate of exchange amounts to less than [*than*] 10,000,000,000 rubles, which latter figure is equivalent to approximately 50,000 tons of black bread (now 200 rubles the kilo on the open market). Their reasoning and computation are faulty of course, particularly since they apply the official rate of exchange and the unofficial price of bread in the same computation but are interesting in that the result shows that dollar figures lose a great deal of their value when presented to persons living in an artificial exchange and economic structure.

I have thus far failed to find one local Soviet citizen having or admitting knowledge of the terms of Lend-Lease. All persons with whom I have discussed this subject are of the opinion that either Lend-Lease supplies for the Soviet Union are paid for in cash or kind or that the expression Lend-Lease is simply one used to identify loans advanced by the United States to cover supplies sent by us to our Allies. There exists in the minds of all local Soviet citizens with whom I have discussed Lend-Lease the belief that Lend-Lease is a big business monopoly administered for gain by the United States Government at the expense of its Allies.

Practically all Lend-Lease supplies shipped to the west but the dribbles, particularly food, which remains here are sufficient to make the local populace aware of the benefits of American aid. The food situation here is worse today than at any other time since I came here in January, 1941, there being almost a complete dearth of foodstuffs produced locally and in nearby regions. The statement made by local people and which comes to my ears from time to time to the effect that if it were not for aid from the United States they would be starving is not without justification.

Department not informed. Ward."

STANDLEY

[An exchange of telegrams on the occasion of the first anniversary of the signing of the Mutual Aid Agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union took place on June 11, 1943, between Secretary of State Hull and People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Molotov. The texts of the telegrams are printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, June 12, 1943, pages 514-515. Messages were also exchanged between President Roosevelt and Mr. Kalinin, President of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Soviet Union; for texts of these messages, see *ibid.*, June 19, 1943, pages 543-544.]

² On May 25, 1943, President Roosevelt sent a message to Congress urging passage of the Lend-Lease appropriations bill; see the *New York Times*, May 26, 1943, p. 15. The Soviet central press published the message on May 28.

³ The *Red Banner*, official Soviet newspaper in Vladivostok.

861.24/1535

The Assistant Secretary of State (Acheson) to the Lend-Lease Administrator (Stettinius)

WASHINGTON, June 17, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. STETTINIUS: Your letter of June 5, 1943 ⁴ enclosing a revised draft of the proposed agreement concerning American engineers and technicians assigned to the installation of Lend-Lease products in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has been received. I am glad to inform you that this draft is entirely acceptable to the State Department.

With respect to the point at issue over short wave radios for American engineers in the Soviet Union, the European Division does not feel that we should press the matter if the Soviet Union is reluctant to let them have such radios. The European Division points out the importance that the Soviet Union attaches to governmental censorship of news from the outside world. Private Soviet citizens are not allowed to own short wave radios, and if American engineers scattered throughout the country should have them, it would be impossible for measures to be taken to prevent Soviet citizens from listening to foreign broadcasts or to prevent those engineers from telling their Soviet friends what they had heard themselves. The possession by American engineers of short wave radios is almost certain to lead to charges of espionage or of the carrying on of propaganda adverse to Soviet interests. Therefore, the decision as to which, if any, American engineers are to be permitted to have short wave radios should, unless the Soviet Government is perfectly willing to have it otherwise, be left to the discretion of the Soviet authorities on the spot.

Sincerely yours,

DEAN ACHESON

Moscow Embassy Files : Lot F-96

The American Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union (Molotov)

Moscow, June 17, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. MOLOTOV: I have the honor to inform you that I have been requested to transmit the following message dated June 16 from President Roosevelt to Premier Stalin:

⁴Not printed.

SECRET AND PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT TO
PREMIER STALIN

"I have given instructions that you are to receive during the remainder of 1943 the following additional planes over the new Protocol Agreement:

"78 B-25 bombers,
"600 P-40-N fighters.

"We have no fighters that are more maneuverable than the P-40-N type which was used with excellent results in the recent fighting in Tunisia. This plane proved to be our best protection against dive bombers. It also proved to be highly useful in covering low level strafing attacks of the P-39's.

We will be in a position to furnish you in November with a shipping schedule covering the last half of the protocol year as we will by that time have again reviewed the aircraft situation."

I would appreciate it if you would transmit the above message to Premier Stalin.

Sincerely,

[File copy not signed]

Moscow Embassy Files : Lot F-96

The American Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union (Molotov)

Moscow, June 17, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. MOLOTOV: I have the honor to inform you that I have been requested to transmit the following message dated June 16 from President Roosevelt to Premier Stalin:

SECRET AND PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT TO
PREMIER STALIN

"I wish to reply herewith to your special request in connection with the supply of aluminum.

"In July, August and September the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will receive from Canada and the United States the following shipments: (Long tons) Primary aluminum, 5,000 tons per month; Secondary aluminum, 1,000 tons per month.

"The secondary aluminum is of a high quality and we use it in the construction of airplanes.

"The monthly shipments of primary aluminum which is 1,000 tons over the agreement for 4,000 tons as contained in the Protocol may possibly make it necessary that succeeding shipments after September will have to be cut down in compensation. I hope that this will not be necessary. I regret that due to a shortage of primary aluminum we find it impossible to increase the Protocol Agreement amount. The secondary aluminum is, however, an additional offering. We will inform you again within the next two months regarding the schedule of shipments for October, November and December. We

will also try to give you information on shipments for the rest of the protocol year at the same time."

I would appreciate it if you would transmit the above message to Premier Stalin.

Sincerely,

[File copy not signed]

861.24/1555 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, June 29, 1943—10 p. m.

[Received July 1—11:25 a. m.]

761. To Stettinius from Faymonville.

1. Two subjects are considered by Mikoyan and highest officials of Soviet Government to be of special importance and Mikoyan requests your assistance in securing immediate favorable action.

2. First subject is hydroelectric station equipment which has been under discussion for past 18 months. Mikoyan states that hydroelectric station equipment is necessary for successful operation of munitions industry in Urals and Central Asia. He states that WOB⁵ ordered execution of preparatory work on these Soviet requisitions. Mikoyan's assistants in Washington inform him that since Lend-Lease Administration now refuses approval for inclusion in Third Protocol work is at a standstill. Mikoyan assures you that no matter what terms you may approve for Third Protocol and no matter what tonnage becomes available for Soviet shipments, equipment for hydroelectric stations will still have highest priority and will positively be loaded ahead of all other cargo. Mikoyan further states that if you have difficulty in securing necessary metal, it will be possible to reach an agreement whereby Soviet Government will consent to decrease metal deliveries to extent necessary to furnish the metal reserve necessary for hydroelectric station program. He therefore asks for immediate approval of requisitions and immediate issue of orders to proceed with procurement.

3. Second item requiring immediate action is barges and tugs for use on Caspian Sea. Order concerns 22 oil barges tonnage 42,000 tons; 20 dry cargo barges tonnage 38,000 tons; and 7 tugs. Mikoyan states that Admiral Vickery⁶ in December 1942 confirmed prior agreements to the effect that six assembled barges of the same type as are being prepared for United States be turned over to Soviet Government under Lend-Lease. Mikoyan understands that delivery of first barges was to commence in June 1943 and subsequent deliveries at rate of three

⁵ Presumably WPB (War Production Board) was intended.

⁶ Rear Adm. Howard L. Vickery, Deputy War Shipping Administrator.

units monthly. In April Mr. Hopkins requested Commissar to include barge requirements in requests for Third Protocol and this was done. But Mikoyan now understands that even now no barges have been definitely assigned to Soviet Union and no decision has been reached as to furnishing barges. Mikoyan states that barges are absolutely essential for transit operations in connection with munitions arriving through Iran. He states that former Caspian fleet has suffered severely from enemy action, that railways cannot be further overloaded and that new carrying capacity must be obtained from United States. Construction within Soviet Union at local ship yards [he] states to be impractical because they are already overloaded with munitions work but assembly of American-made parts can be successfully accomplished. If shortage of metals is reason for delay Commissar says he will consider same arrangements as for electric station equipment: Decreasing Soviet allotments by the amounts necessary to furnish metals required for barges and tugs.

4. Mikoyan asks that these requests be brought to the attention of Major General James H. Burns in connection with Commissar's last conversation with General Burns. At the time of General Burns' departure from the Soviet Union,⁷ Commissar did not know of unfavorable action on these two subjects.⁸ [Faymonville.]

STANDLEY

861.24/1582

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] July 8, 1943.

The Soviet Chargé d'Affaires⁹ called at his request and handed me a document entitled "The Proposed Third Protocol" (copy attached).¹⁰

I said that I would take the matter up with the appropriate officials who are handling the entire supply question and urge early and favorable action. I suggested that his technical people here might desire to take this up with our technical people in charge of this matter. The Chargé said he would notify them that they might do so.

⁷ General Burns left Moscow on May 29.

⁸ In telegram No. 527, July 6, 10 p. m., the Department informed Ambassador Standley that the request for hydroelectric stations had been approved for all 21 power units. No mention was made, however, of the Soviet request for barges and tug boats.

⁹ A. A. Gromyko.

¹⁰ Not printed; copy of the document is filed separately under 861.24/1393. The Soviet request for changes in the proposed Protocol included the following: To raise the total tonnage of supplies for 1943-44 from 4,500,000 short tons to 6,000,000 short tons; to modify somewhat the overall loads to be carried across the various sea lanes; to supply certain kinds of naval vessels; and to make some textual changes with regard to shipping commitments so as to anticipate unforeseen changes in those commitments resulting from technical or other difficulties.

The Chargé said that Mr. Litvinov was at home resting the last he had heard. He spoke as though he were planning to return here at some later time.¹¹

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

861.24/1572 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, July 10, 1943—2 p. m.

[Received 11 : 24 p. m.]

841. For Stettinius from Faymonville.

1. Capacity of Siberian route for delivery of American planes was again discussed with Commissar. He still believes that Soviet ferry pilots can fly away from Fairbanks any number of planes offered. This includes all types of planes. His impression is that delays in delivery occur prior to arrival of planes at Fairbanks and that Soviet pilots in Alaska are ready to remove at a faster rate than at present.

2. Commissar believes that supply of spare parts under Third Protocol must be made in ratios considerably higher than under Second Protocol. This applies both to pursuit planes and bombers. Commissar says that experience has shown the need for much greater quantities of pistons, piston rings and bearings and that extra deliveries of these items are urgently needed now. He also asks immediate supply of greater quantities of maintenance tools appropriate for aviation repair bases for all types of American planes delivered to Soviet Union. [Faymonville.]

STANDLEY

861.24/1578 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, July 14, 1943—10 a. m.

[Received 10 : 45 p. m.]

861. For Stettinius from Faymonville.

1. First shipment of oil refinery installation is only now arriving at Vladivostok. This is Commissar's answer to question raised in your paragraph 3, cable 527, July 6, 10 p. m.¹² He states that construction machinery which is to be used in clearing work and foundation digging is accompanying first shipments of oil machinery. He promises further information on state of site preparation.

¹¹ For circumstances surrounding Ambassador Litvinov's absence from Washington, see memorandum by the Under Secretary of State, May 7, p. 522.

¹² Not printed.

2. News of approval of hydroelectric machinery projects was warmly welcomed and Commissar has instructed his representative in U.S. to furnish all possible assistance in speeding up deliveries.

3. Regardless of amounts of medicines furnished by American Red Cross and Russian War Relief¹³ and regardless of differences of opinion about unit prices, Commissar stated that quantities requested in section 6 of Third Protocol are still desired. He admits that Soviet medical authorities who prepared list may have been unfamiliar with unit prices in U.S.

4. Reference delivery of tanks under Third Protocol, Commissar says that American offer of M4A2 tanks is gladly accepted. Additional American offer of deliveries after July 1, 1944, under a possible fourth protocol is under consideration. Simultaneously with acceptance of American offer of tanks under Third Protocol, Commissar states that he also accepted through Soviet Torgpred¹⁴ in London the British offer of 3000 tanks assuming that 1000 would be British Valentines and that remainder of British offer would be filled by shipment of 2000 additional tanks M4A2 obtained by British from British contracts with American factories. [Faymonville.]

STANDLEY

861.24/1581 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, July 14, 1943—4 p. m.

[Received July 15—3 a. m.]

854. For Stettinius from Faymonville.

1. Returning from Food Conference¹⁵ Krutikov brought American replies to Soviet requests for shipment of Lend-Lease supplies under Third Protocol. These replies according to Commissar have been carefully examined by Soviet Government. He states that he is expressing the urgent wish of Soviet Government in asking you to assist in improving the terms of the Third Protocol offer.

2. Commissar notes that offers of Lend-Lease freight in U.S. fall short of Soviet requests by a million tons; further that it is proposed to find ocean transportation for only 4½ million tons of the cargoes offered in U.S. thus providing for little more than half of the Soviet requests which he states are all urgent requirements.

¹³ A voluntary citizens' relief agency in the United States for the Soviet people, which was renamed the American Society for Russian Relief, Inc., in 1942 and registered with the President's War Relief Control Board on September 28, 1942.

¹⁴ A contraction for the Russian term, *Torgovoye predstavitelstvo*, meaning "trade representation."

¹⁵ The United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture, held at Hot Springs, Virginia, May 18–June 3, 1943. For correspondence concerning the Conference, see vol. I, pp. 820 ff.

3. He says that Soviet Government had grounds for expecting that greater tonnage would be offered to transport the Third Protocol items because of at least five factors: (1st) Need for supporting Russian front is greater than ever before; (2nd) situation with regard to availability of tonnage has been stated by American authorities to be much improved; (3rd) ship construction is proceeding far more satisfactorily than in the past; (4th) losses from enemy submarines are less than had been expected; (5th) new shipping lanes now permit shortening routes and therefore permit shipment of greater aggregate tonnages than under Second Protocol.

4. Commissar states that Soviet Government cannot agree that the figures proposed in American reply to Soviet requests represent the most practicable solution of delivery problems under Third Protocol. After thoroughly considering various limiting factors the Soviet Government asks that it be permitted to choose 6 million tons from among the Lend-Lease items offered and that the American Government agree that the 6 million tons will actually be transported to Soviet Union. Soviet Government feels that American Government will not find it too difficult to agree to this proposal.

5. Examining details of American reply on Third Protocol Commissar states that Soviet Government finds it impossible to understand several points of which he enumerates two and adds remark on third point as follows. First point: Proposed shipments through Persian Gulf are far less than expected and far less than actual possibilities permit. Commissar states that when northern convoys were abandoned Soviet Government was promised by Churchill ¹⁶ that tonnage through Iran in August 1943 would amount to 240,000 tons and would be increased in succeeding months. For this reason Soviet Government has made its plans to receive through Iran approximately 210,000 to 215,000 tons of Lend-Lease supplies from U.S. and 20,000 to 30,000 tons from Great Britain monthly beginning with August. Commissar states that American representatives responsible for conveyance through Iran have in fact arranged to transport the amounts promised by Churchill. In this connection Commissar warmly praised the work of Persian Gulf Service Command. Commissar quotes General Connolly's estimate of 193,000 tons which can be shipped monthly through Iran to which he says must be added the airplanes flown away and the trucks which not only move under their own power but carry Lend-Lease supplies as well making total required ships tonnage arriving in Persian Gulf at least equal to that promised by the Prime Minister. Soviet Government feels that it is unwise to fail to use Iranian facilities to maximum extent and notes that facilities will accommodate nearly twice the tonnage contemplated in American reply on Third Protocol. Soviet Government has received

¹⁶ Winston S. Churchill, British Prime Minister.

information that Commissioner Hendrickson¹⁷ at Basra has been informed from his headquarters in Washington that he need expect only 135,000 tons of Lend-Lease supplies monthly through Persian Gulf including airplanes which will be delivered to Soviet Union by air, trucks themselves carry additional freight. This information indicates American expectation that less than 100,000 tons will move through Iran monthly whereas General Connolly has made preparations for twice this amount. Commissar states that not only Soviet Government but also American and Soviet representatives in the south were astounded at the failure to make full use of Iranian facilities, he fears that in spite of the precise wording of American reply there may still be some misunderstanding about the actual possibilities and about the excellent preparatory work accomplished by General Connolly. He feels that it is entirely practicable for 215,000 tons of Lend-Lease supplies to arrive at Persian Gulf ports monthly and to be successfully transhipped to Soviet Union.

6. Second point: Soviet Government especially desires review of action disapproving request for mine layers and sub chasers. Commissar states that these items can be delivered under their own power and do not require ship tonnage and that it should therefore be easy for deliveries of these items to be improved. He has been informed that shortages of materials and manpower have caused difficulties in construction of mine layers and sub chasers but hopes that American Government will succeed in overcoming these difficulties. He states that Soviet Government will consider need for mine layers and sub chasers most urgent and adds that action on these two items should not prejudice favorable action on Caspian barges and tugs which are greatly desired.

7. Third point. Commissar added that Soviet Government is greatly disappointed that request for full number of Aircobras has not been granted and hopes that improved production will permit increasing number of Aircobras for Soviet Union. [Faymonville.]

STANDLEY

861.24/1572: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Standley)*

WASHINGTON, July 16, 1943—6 p. m.

570. "From Stettinius for Faymonville. In reply your 841, July 10, 1st paragraph. By consultation with Russian representatives here we have arranged existing schedules for Alsib.¹⁸ Main factors in

¹⁷ Roy F. Hendrickson, Director of the War Food Administration and Food Distribution Administration, Department of Agriculture, and member of the President's Soviet Protocol Committee.

¹⁸ Alaska-Siberia route for ferrying airplanes.

negotiations are availability of Russian pilots and climatic conditions. Assuming there are no winterization problems, Air Transport Command says that all U.S.S.R. destined aircraft can be absorbed in August by Alsib. We do not anticipate winterization difficulties.

In reply second paragraph.

Spare parts will be furnished in accordance with U.S. standards as set forth in Revision B of Joint Aircraft Committee¹⁹ case 1850, according to statement in Third Protocol. The above-mentioned schedules are equal to or in excess of the amounts offered. The filing of specific requests by Purchasing Commission with U.S. Air Forces will be awaited."

HULL

861.24/1582

*The Department of State to the Embassy of the Soviet Union*²⁰

MEMORANDUM

The Government of the United States has carefully considered the proposals of the Soviet Government in regard to the Third Protocol as submitted by the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires on July 8, 1943.

The United States agrees to increase its commitment for shipments by the Atlantic from 150,000 short tons per month to an average of 200,000 short tons per month if such capacity by this route proves to be available to the United States. Furthermore, if future conditions permit, the United States agrees to increase this amount as the overall circumstances justify.

The United States agrees to base its assistance to Soviet tonnage in the Pacific on the understanding that the turnaround is of 90 days duration instead of 75 days duration, as stipulated in the original offer. It is desired to point out that, with the help of United States shipping, the Soviet fleet has moved by way of the Pacific during the months of April, May and June an average of approximately 250,000 short tons per month and the July expectations exceed 250,000 short tons. Unless there are other limiting factors, it would therefore seem practical for the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to move by way of the Pacific the 2,700,000 short tons contemplated in the Third Protocol offering.

With reference to the question of vessels, both naval and otherwise, further consideration will be given.

¹⁹ Probably one of the intergovernmental committees operating under the Combined Production and Resources Board, of which the United States, Great Britain, and Canada were members after June 1942. See S. M. Rosen, *The Combined Boards of the Second World War* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1951), pp. 131 ff.

²⁰ This memorandum had been approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the War Shipping Administration, and the Lend-Lease Administration. It was handed on July 23 to Soviet Chargé Gromyko by Assistant Secretary of State Acheson.

With reference to the question of the omission of certain wording in Articles 2 and 5,²¹ it is desired to emphasize that the Government of the United States is not only willing but is very anxious to render the assistance outlined. The Soviet Government may rest assured that these provisions will not be invoked unless war developments definitely require it.

WASHINGTON, July 23, 1943.

861.24/1581 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Standley)*

WASHINGTON, July 25, 1943—5 p. m.

601. From Stettinius for Faymonville.

1. Secretary of State July 23 delivered reply to Soviet Embassy incorporating answers to questions similar to those Krutikov gave you. This is with reference to your 854, July 14, 4 p. m.

[Here follows summary of the memorandum of July 23 to the Soviet Embassy, printed *supra*.]

2. The following is for your information : The Atlantic commitment remains general and is not allocated as between the Persian Gulf route and the northern route. Specific commitment for northern route is prevented by convoy problems. United States and British intend to use Persian Gulf capacity fully as reported monthly by General Connolly. Subsequent shipments may increase above commitments if opportunity permits but commitments cannot presently be based on expectations which may prove overly optimistic. Vessels from Pacific route may have to use some part of Persian Gulf capacity during period of freezing of straits or if other hindrances develop and it should also be borne in mind that Persian Gulf may have to carry majority of Atlantic commitment if convoy difficulties again arise as seriously as last season. [Stettinius.]

HULL

²¹ These two articles concern possible changes in shipping priorities and in supplies available due to decisive factors and conditions caused by war or other exigencies ; see Department of State, *Soviet Supply Protocols* (Washington, Government Printing Office), pp. 51 and 52.

861.24/1602 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, July 30, 1943—10 a. m.

[Received 7:30 p. m.]

971. For Stettinius from Faymonville. Commissar says Soviet Government desires to emphasize the importance of actually loading aboard west coast ships during August the cargo on August schedule presented to you by General Belyaev. He says Soviet Government considers this a "life and death matter". He fears that August loading program may fail because permission denied for shipment to our west coast of high priority cargo as long as quantities of low priority cargo remain at ports. His view is that Soviet cargo now at west coast ports was shipped there because it was most available from production lines when shipment was made and he feels that it should not block westward shipment of higher priority cargo needed for August shipment. He regards figures in your paragraph 3 of cable 577, July 17, 9 p. m.,²² as entirely too small to permit shipment of August program and reminds that on July 26 there were in west coast harbors of United States 23 Soviet dry cargo ships with 151,500 tons capacity and 4 tankers with 29,000 tons capacity and that in addition 24 Soviet ships with 170,000 tons capacity are on way to American west coast ports and will arrive there before August 10. Commissar asks that urgency of August shipping program be made clear to General Wesson and General Gross²³ and several times repeated for your information the important effect which August shipping program will have on the course of war. [Faymonville.]

STANDLEY

861.24/1602 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley)

WASHINGTON, August 4, 1943—midnight.

646. From Stettinius for Faymonville. Your telegram no. 971 of July 30. In the West Coast area cargo on hand has recently accumulated to such an extent as to cause serious congestion in the port, rail and storage facilities and the traffic authorities were concerned about congestion. In order to ease the transportation situation it became necessary to take steps to reduce this backlog, not only for the benefit of this country but also for the Soviets. In order to force

²² Not printed.

²³ Maj. Gen. C. P. Gross, Chief of Transportation, Services of Supply, War Department.

the lifting of a reasonable amount of the backlog, action was taken to permit the shipment from the east only of goods of higher priority. While this policy is being carried out, the situation is being watched very carefully and sympathetic consideration is being given to genuine priorities for the Soviet. All goods being moved are regulated in accordance with the availability of the vessels. The congestion which previously existed is now being eliminated and the entire movement will shortly be in a much more fluid condition. At this time, results of this program are believed to be satisfactory with respect to availability of both higher priority items and total quantities of cargo. The maintenance of a stockpile any larger than the standard presently planned is precluded by the physical limitations of the West Coast area. The following is for your information: In the West Coast area practically all cargo on hand was originally sent there at the request of Soviet authorities and was originally planned for inclusion in loading schedules. The situation is being carefully watched by us and arrangements are being made to meet a realistic ship schedule for shipments of higher priority cargo. [Stettinius.]

HULL

861.24/1620 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, August 11, 1943—9 a. m.
[Received 7:55 p. m.]

1046. For Stettinius from Faymonville.

1. Continuing discussion of convoy routes Commissar says that Soviet Government is most anxious to utilize favorable autumn conditions for inward shipments through north Russian ports. He again refers to Churchill's promise to resume northern shipping in September and believes that this promise must have been made in accordance with the desires and plans of the United States Government. Commissar says he has heard of no preparations for northern convoys such as would be expected in August if deliveries are to begin through northern routes in September. He strongly emphasized the extreme need for northern deliveries and believes that time is already ripe for taking practical steps to assure September deliveries through north Russia.²⁴

2. Discussing shipments through Soviet Far East Commissar says that monthly tonnage 275,000 would be possible if shipping conditions were normal. But obstacles interposed by Japan, other causes of delay, and desirability of delivering cargo at several Soviet ports make

²⁴ For references to background information on the northern and other sea routes to the Soviet Union, see footnotes 41 and 55, pp. 740 and 745, respectively.

shipping conditions abnormal. Commissar feels that August freight program may fail because of lack of ships and has instructed General Belyaev to ask for transfer of four or five additional ships during August. He asks your approval and support for this request.

3. Great need for alcohol was pointed out by Commissar. Alcohol needed immediately for munitions industry. Belyaev has asked for alcohol for tankers *Apsheon* and *Moskva* but has received reply that insufficient storage tanks exist on west coast to permit transfer of this quantity of alcohol. Commissar understands that desired quantity of alcohol actually exists and that you approve delivery. He therefore urgently requests that practical means of getting alcohol into tankers be devised in order to permit delivery of these highly necessary stocks. [Faymonville.]

STANDLEY

861.24/1620 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Standley)*

WASHINGTON, August 16, 1943—11 p. m.

699. From Stettinius for Faymonville. See paragraph 2 of your telegram 1046²⁵ for reference. Statements by the Commissar about various factors in the Pacific shipping situation are well understood by officials in the United States. During August there has been no lack of ships; rather the case is that loadings are expected to be unusually heavy in August. However, weakness in the schedule is apparent for September, and active and sympathetic consideration is therefore being given to the Soviet request for the transfer of four or five additional ships during September.

Paragraph 3 is the reference. The *Apsheon*, a tanker fully loaded with cargo of alcohol, sailed from San Francisco August 12. Another tanker, *Moskva*, is enroute to the United States. By the time the vessel is ready the cargo is expected to be available for loading. There are expected two small tankers during the latter part of this month for alcohol loading. At the time the tankers present for loading it is expected the desired quantities will be available. There is expected at the end of the month the tanker *Tuapse* and the cargo will be assembled as quickly as possible. Delivery before September 10 of cargo cannot be assured. Such delivery is dependent upon prompt loading of the *Moskva* since storage facilities for one large tanker load at a time exist. Material must be transported from Midwest and South to these tanks. There cannot be any holding of tank cars under load, and upon arrival at destination they must be discharged promptly.

²⁵ *Supra*.

Thorough examination of West Coast tank facilities was made early this spring and arrangements for the terminal presently used were made after considerable work; no other facilities are obtainable. Furthermore, there is no shortage of alcohol, but the physical limitations involved in the use of tank cars and tank storage make it impossible to establish a better schedule of deliveries as outlined herewith. [Stettinius.]

HULL

861.24/1632 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, August 27, 1943—2 p. m.
[Received August 28—10:50 a. m.]

1194. For Stettinius from Faymonville. Krutikov informs me that Soviet Government has decided to address to British Government, request that immediate steps be taken to renew shipping by convoy to north Russian ports, reminding British Government of Churchill's promise that northern convoys would be resumed in September. Krutikov dwelt at some length on following points: (1st) Cargoes arriving on northern convoys are made effective on battlefronts far more easily than cargoes arriving by other routes; (2nd) arrangements for transportation within Soviet Union from northern ports are better than at any time in past; (3rd) approaching season appears to be favorable for northern convoys; (4th) risk involved is now less than at any previous time; (5th) last year the lapse of 3 months without northern convoys seriously deranged supply of munitions to the front. This year, though dangers are less, 6 months have already elapsed without shipments and need for entry of munitions through northern ports is correspondingly greater. Krutikov then stated that since the United States Government has been associated with the British Government in northern convoys, it would be appreciated if the American Government would take necessary steps to open the northern convoy route from September 1st. Your assistance is asked in assuring that the period of idleness in north Russian ports shall not be further prolonged. [Faymonville.]

STANDLEY

861.24/1653

*The Embassy of the Soviet Union to the Department of State*²⁶

MEMORANDUM

Below is the answer of the Soviet Government to the proposals made by the Government of the United States regarding the Third Protocol:

"In view of the fact that the U.S. Government does not agree to make available shipping space trading under the U.S. flag in excess of 2,400,000 short tons for U.S. shipment to the Soviet Union under the Third Protocol through the Atlantic Ocean, the Soviet Government, with the purpose of reconciling of the amount of deliveries with available shipping facilities, agrees to decrease the Program of supplies under the Third Protocol proposed by the United States Government from 7,080,000 tons to 5,600,000 tons, including 500,000 tons of stocks and carryovers, by decreasing the quantities of the following items/in short tons/:

- a/ Wheat and flour 700,000 tons (including deliveries from Canada) instead of 1,680,000 tons.
- b/ Concentrated foods 177,000 tons instead of 252,000 tons.
- c/ Ferrous metals 500,000 tons instead of 710,000 tons.
- d/ Petroleum products 360,000 tons instead of 565,000 tons.
- e/ Various chemicals 9,200 tons instead of 18,800 tons.

At the same time the Soviet Government agrees to the above-mentioned decrease in the deliveries of the petroleum products on the provision that the Government of Great Britain will continue deliveries of aviation gasoline to the USSR from Iran at the rate of 10,000 tons per month during the Third Protocol period and the U.S. Government will replace these deliveries to England out of its own supplies without decreasing the above-mentioned amount of petroleum product deliveries to the USSR from the United States of America.

The Government of the USSR, agreeing to decrease the program of deliveries under the Third Protocol, is relying upon the assurance of the U.S. Government that the United States agrees to increase the aforementioned amount of deliveries if conditions permit and circumstances justify it in future."

WASHINGTON, September 1, 1943.

²⁶ Handed on September 1 to the Secretary of State by Mr. Gromyko, who had succeeded Mr. Litvinov as Ambassador of the Soviet Union on August 22, 1943.

861.852/33 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, September 7, 1943—3 p. m.
[Received September 8—10:55 a. m.]

1283. To Stettinius from Faymonville.

1. Has final decision been taken on five ships to be transferred to Soviet registry during September? Commissar believes that it is great importance to effect transfer without delay.

2. Because of shipping delays which Krutikov says will result in accumulations of freight ports during October, Commissar asks that you approve project for transfer of five additional ships to Soviet flag during October.²⁷ [Faymonville.]

STANDLEY

861.24/1648 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, September 7, 1943—5 p. m.
[Received September 7—3:45 p. m.]

1285. From Faymonville to Stettinius.

1. Soviet Government requested 16 hydroelectric stations. Commissar understands that 11 stations approved but that application for 5 stations aggregating 211,000 kilowatts either disapproved or not yet approved.²⁸ Commissar explains that local construction work for the 5 stations has long since begun. His words follow:

“Enormous amounts of energy and resources have already been devoted to these five projects. These stations are for regions which possess important munitions industry but no coal and the stations are absolutely essential. If it is not possible to deliver the equipment for these stations before June 30, 1944 then at least consider at once the question of approving the projects for delivery during second half of 1944 so that work can be begun in America immediately.”

²⁷ In telegram No. 818, September 9, 1943, Lend-Lease Administrator Stettinius replied as follows:

“1. It has been found impossible to grant the request in your 1283 although it has received serious sympathetic consideration.

“2. The transfer is arranged of a tanker having capacity of 55,000 barrels. Although no decision yet made the possibility of a further transfer of a 75,000 barrel tanker is under consideration and study.” (861.852/33)

²⁸ For earlier details on this matter, see telegram No. 761, June 29, 10 p. m., from the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, and footnote 8, pp. 764 and 765, respectively.

Commissar personally asks your assistance in expediting approval of entire hydroelectric project which he considers of critical importance. [Faymonville.]

STANDLEY

861.24/1664 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, September 14, 1943—8 p. m.
[Received September 15—9 : 45 a. m.]

1360. From Faymonville for Stettinius. Commissar regrets unfavorable action on project to transfer five ships to Soviet flag in September and five ships October. He repeats that this tonnage is necessary to accomplish minimum indispensable shipments during present favorable situation on Pacific Ocean. In addition he repeated five reasons for immediate action. These reasons were transmitted to you in my paragraph 3 cable 854, July 1 : 34 p. m. [July 14, 4 p. m.] Commissar has learned from assistants in America that rumors are afloat there to the effect that Russians are poor sailors, that Russians have made inadequate use of shipping tonnage transferred to Soviet flag, that is too late to make use of additional ships on trans-Pacific route before ports freeze up and there is no real requirement for additional transfer of ships. Commissar greatly incensed at rumors and denies that any such allegations are true. He fears that action in denying ships may have been influenced by unfavourable Washington opinion of Soviet seamanship and repeats that unfavourable opinion is unwarranted. [Faymonville.]

STANDLEY

861.24/1679a

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

No. 3178

WASHINGTON, September 22, 1943.

SIR: Reference is made to the Department's instructions nos. 2797 of June 11, 1943, and 2993 of August 4, 1943,²⁹ in connection with the proposed Third Protocol between the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics covering the military supplies, raw materials, industrial equipment and food to be made available to the Soviet Union during the period July 1, 1943, to June 30, 1944.

²⁹ Neither printed.

There are enclosed five copies of the final draft of the United States Schedule of Supplies and Shipments.³⁰ This document supersedes and excludes all materials sent you heretofore and is the exact text of the United States Schedule which is to appear in the Third Soviet Protocol.

You will note that the text of the covering Protocol to be signed by the four Governments is the identical text transmitted to you in the Department's instruction no. 2797 of June 11, 1943. The text of the United States Schedule of Supplies and Shipments, however, has been modified to include all changes agreed to by the responsible American and Soviet authorities since the time the original offering was made. Copies of this document have been conveyed to the appropriate British and Canadian authorities in Washington.

You are authorized to sign the Third Soviet Protocol on behalf of this Government at the earliest possible date. Following signature of the Protocol you should transmit to the Department for its records the original official copy for the United States Government.

The Department is of the opinion that the publicity to be given the Protocol at the time of signature should be handled in London and has so informed the British authorities in Washington. In this connection it is important that the announcement should state explicitly that the date of signature has in no way affected the flow of supplies to the Soviet Union which has been continuous since the expiration of the Second Protocol on June 30, 1943. Mention might also be properly made of the fact of Canada's participation for the first time. Prior to the release of an announcement the concurrence of all parties to the Protocol should of course be obtained. It is requested in this connection that you provide the Department with a copy of the announcement agreed upon.

Very truly yours,

CORDELL HULL

861.8591/94

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. G. Frederick Reinhardt of the
Division of European Affairs*

[WASHINGTON,] September 30, 1943.

Participants: Mr. Harry Hopkins, Mr. Acheson, of the Department of State, and other members of the President's Soviet Protocol Committee.

During the course of the Committee meeting, the subject of Soviet ship movements in the Pacific Ocean was discussed. The United States Government has already provided the Soviet Government with sixty-seven (67) American ships and there is now pending a Soviet

³⁰ Not printed.

request for at least five (5) additional ships. It was apparent from the Report of the Sub-Committee on Shipping that shipments to the Soviet Union by way of the Pacific during October would be greatly reduced, because of the current lack of balances in ship positions.

Mr. Hopkins stated that our naval authorities were concerned with the lengthy turn-around in this traffic and were most anxious to obtain more information about the movements of these ships.

Mr. McPherson³¹ of the War Shipping Administration explained why there was reason for unusually long turn-around periods in this traffic: because of such problems as ice and the necessity to lighten the draught of the larger vessels to enable them to pass through Tartary Straits. He agreed, however, that turn-arounds of one hundred and forty (140) days appear to defy such explanation.

Mr. Hopkins suggested that because of the very great importance of this matter to the successful fulfillment of our protocol undertakings the question of lack of information on Soviet ship movements in the Pacific, particularly with respect to ex-American ships, should be taken up with the Russians at the forthcoming Three Power Conversations.³²

861.24/1695 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Hamilton) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, October 20, 1943.

[Received October 21—11:35 a. m.]

1660. Moscow papers for October 20 carry on the front page the announcement of the signing in London on October 19 of the third agreement for furnishing supplies to the Soviet Union by representatives of the Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada and the Soviet Union in accordance with which the first three Governments undertake to supply the Soviet Union with armaments, equipment, supplies and foodstuffs. The announcement notes that two previous agreements of this character have been signed, the first in Moscow in October '41 and the second in Washington in October '42 and that the present agreement is a continuation of existing obligations,³³ except that Canada is participating as a signatory

³¹ W. S. McPherson, Assistant Deputy Administrator for Shipping Services, War Shipping Administration.

³² The Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union was held October 18–November 1, 1943. For correspondence concerning the Conference, see vol. I, pp. 513 ff.

³³ The First (Moscow) Protocol was signed on October 2, 1941, and the Second (Washington) Protocol was signed on October 6, 1942. Texts of all these Protocols are printed in Department of State, *Soviet Supply Protocols*, pp. 3, 15, and 51. The announcement made at the time of signature of the Third (London) Protocol is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, October 23, 1943, p. 272.

for the first time although supplies from Canada have in the past constituted a part of the obligations of the United Kingdom and in some cases part of the obligations of the United States. The term of the second agreement the announcement states expired on June 30 but "although the third agreement has only now been signed its provisions have been in effect for the past 3 months and the stream of supplies of all kinds to the Soviet Union has not been interrupted."

HAMILTON

Moscow Embassy Files, Lot F-135

Memorandum of Conversation, by the First Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Bohlen)

[Moscow,] November 5, 1943.

Participants: The American Ambassador;³⁴ Mr. Bohlen.
Mr. Mikoyan, Commissar for Foreign Trade;
Soviet interpreter.

The Ambassador said that he wanted to have a preliminary discussion with Mr. Mikoyan on certain questions which would arise in the immediate and more distant future. He realized that Mr. Mikoyan was fully preoccupied with questions relating to the immediate prosecution of the war but he thought that it was perhaps not too soon to give some preliminary consideration to the Soviet needs for the reconstruction of its economy after the war. He added that of course it was hard to draw a sharp distinction between supplies for the prosecution of the war which were coming in under Lend-Lease and those which in future might relate primarily to post-war reconstruction.

Mr. Mikoyan replied that he was very glad to discuss any of these questions with the Ambassador and he could say that with the progressive liberation of additional territory by the Red Army the Soviet needs for certain types of equipment had increased and would continue to do so. He referred particularly to the immediate need of equipment and materials to re-establish the railway system, metallurgical plants, coal mines, and electric power stations, all of which he said were directly related to the problems of supplying the Soviet armies. He said that machine tools would also be necessary.

The Ambassador inquired whether the types of equipment Mr. Mikoyan referred to had been covered by the recently signed third protocol or whether additional items would be necessary, to which Mr. Mikoyan replied that some items were already included but that certainly additional requests would have to be made. He said in this connection that the extra \$300,000,000 worth of orders in the third

³⁴ W. Averell Harriman, who had arrived in Moscow in October 1943 to succeed Admiral Standley.

protocol would be insufficient. He emphasized the Soviet need for additional tonnage. The Ambassador added that he was quite prepared to help Mr. Mikoyan in regard to any matters of this character which were particularly urgent with a view to obtaining the quickest possible action in Washington.

Mr. Mikoyan then inquired whether the Soviet Union could count on an increase in tonnage from the United States. The Ambassador pointed out in this connection that he thought the request for larger ships could be more readily met in Washington than for smaller vessels of which there was a definite shortage.

In reply to Mr. Mikoyan's inquiry as to whether the Ambassador had in mind the immediate restoration of war damage or the general reestablishment of Soviet economy after the war, the Ambassador explained in considerable detail the exact legal status of the Lend-Lease Act which by law could only be used to supply equipment and material for the duration of the war and which were obviously directly related to its conduct. He pointed out that while he knew the President and the Lend-Lease officials in Washington were disposed to give a reasonably broad interpretation to this aspect of the Act, it was nonetheless in the interests of both countries to endeavor honestly to keep within the meaning of the Act. Lend-Lease would undoubtedly become an important political question in next year's elections and the Ambassador was confident that the support of both parties could be obtained provided the work of Lend-Lease could be honestly and clearly presented. He added that he knew the American people were very desirous of assisting in the reconstruction of the Soviet Union after the war and that it might be possible now to begin to discuss the question of future credits and financial assistance for that purpose. He went on to say that with this in mind he was prepared at Mr. Mikoyan's convenience to discuss any or all aspects of the question and he wondered whether it might not be profitable at some time in the future to consider the desirability of American engineers coming to the Soviet Union to ascertain the exact designs and other details of the desired equipment in order to save time. He pointed out in this regard that aside from the sympathy of the American people it would be in the self-interest of the United States to be able to afford full employment during the period of transition from war-time to peace-time economy.

Mr. Mikoyan said that Mr. Hopkins had already had some conversations with Mr. Lukashev³⁵ of the Soviet Purchasing Commission in Washington on the question of post-war reconstruction and had suggested the formation of a special committee to discuss the matter. Mr. Hopkins had said in his conversation that American industrialists

³⁵ Konstantin Ignatyevich Lukashev, Vice Chairman of the Government Purchasing Commission of the Soviet Union in the United States.

were interested to know whether the Soviet Government intended to place large orders in the United States or whether it intended to use European sources of supply. Mr. Mikoyan emphasized that, all other things being equal, the Soviet Government preferred American equipment both because of its quality and because of its standardization to any European equipment either British or German. He added, however, that there were certain conditions which necessarily affected Soviet orders, namely financing, that is credit terms and prices. In regard to the latter, Mr. Mikoyan said he expected that prices would go down.

(Mr. Mikoyan seemed surprised that the Ambassador had not been informed of Mr. Hopkins's conversations in Washington.) The Ambassador said that before his departure he had discussed this question with the President and Mr. Hopkins and was familiar with their general attitude on the subject. He went on to say that he felt that he could be of some assistance in expediting consideration of any urgent matters which would properly fall under Lend-Lease and that General Spalding was here for the same purpose to discuss with any of Mr. Mikoyan's staff the most expeditious way of handling Soviet requests.

The Ambassador said he wished to speak on another subject, namely the question of whether in Mr. Mikoyan's opinion there would be any possibility of Soviet vessels and American vessels turned over to the Soviet Government lying idle as a result of ice conditions in the Pacific this winter. He said that the United States shipping authorities consider that any attempt to utilize these ships on the Persian Gulf run would take them out of position, in view of the length of the voyage, for operation on the Pacific route in the spring. However, if the Soviet authorities found that they could not operate all these ships in the Pacific during the coming winter it might be well to discuss their possible utilization elsewhere in the common cause, but of course on short runs which would permit their return to the Pacific in the spring. The Ambassador added that the personal preference of the United States shipping authorities was that these ships be fully utilized in their present operations in the Pacific, but he was merely inquiring in order to make sure that no urgently needed shipping would lie idle.

Mr. Mikoyan replied emphatically that in his opinion there was no danger of any interruption or delays in navigation on the Pacific this winter. He pointed out that Vladivostok is kept free of ice all winter and that last year the only difficulties had been in the navigation of La Pérouse Straits. Last year difficulties had been encountered because of the fact that the Soviet authorities had only two small ice breakers whereas this year they would have three large ice breakers (including one received from the United States) and two smaller

ones, which in his opinion would without question assure uninterrupted navigation on the Pacific route.

Replying to the Ambassador's inquiry Mr. Mikoyan said that he did not fear any interference by the Japanese in the future; that whereas several months ago two of their ships had been held by the Japanese for approximately two months, recently only one ship, the *Novorossisk*, had been held up for but a few hours with the most superficial examination of the ship. He went on to say that he believed the continuing victories of the Red Army were having a salutary effect on the Japanese in this respect. He promised to keep the Ambassador in touch with any developments in regard to this question.

The Ambassador then stated that he would be interested to ascertain the attitude of the Soviet Government toward UNRRA³⁶ and particularly as to how the Soviet Government envisaged the question of relief and rehabilitation as affecting the Soviet Union and its relationship to other possible channels for post-war assistance. Mr. Mikoyan replied that the Soviet Union was quite prepared to collaborate in the work of UNRRA and that a Soviet delegation was leaving the next day to participate in the conference. So far as he was aware there were no questions in regard to this matter in which there was disagreement.

The Ambassador explained that he had in mind three aspects of the general problem of post-war rehabilitation: (1) the general administrative set-up which would be considered at the UNRRA conference;³⁷ (2) the contribution of the various countries in this work; and (3) the receipt of war relief by the various countries needing it. Mr. Mikoyan replied that the Soviet Government had not yet reached the stage of considering the manner of receiving assistance. The Ambassador emphasized in this connection that the question of relief and future assistance was quite outside of the present operation of Lend-Lease.

The Ambassador then stated that it was possible that in future the United States would be in a position to increase its deliveries of aluminum to the Soviet Union and he wished to know in what form the Soviet Government would like to receive this aluminum, whether in ingots or only in fabricated form. Mr. Mikoyan said that they would be very glad indeed to receive increased aluminum supplies in any form but that ingots would be satisfactory since the Soviet

³⁶ The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), an international agency created by the signing of an agreement at the White House on November 9, 1943, by 44 United Nations and other nations associated with them in the war, to furnish aid and relief to areas liberated from the enemy by the armed forces of the United Nations; for correspondence leading to the signing of the agreement, see vol. I, pp. 851 ff.

³⁷ The first conference of UNRRA was held in Atlantic City between November 9 and December 1, 1943. The Soviet Union was represented by Mikhail Alexeyevich Menshikov of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade.

aluminum rolling mills were not overcharged as only three of them had been in the actual war zone. The Ambassador suggested, and Mr. Mikoyan agreed, that General Spalding and Mr. Krutikov should work out the details of a definite request in regard to aluminum.

After mentioning that he was glad to have learned that the first shipment of locomotives was on its way to North Russia, the Ambassador turned to the suggestions for the transit of matériel to China via the Persian Gulf. Mr. Mikoyan stated that there were difficulties in the way of realization of this scheme and seemed indisposed to pursue the matter further.

Mr. Mikoyan then announced that five trawlers had arrived at North Russian ports safely and that six submarine chasers with Soviet crews had arrived via the Panama Canal and the Atlantic Ocean without loss.

The Ambassador then spoke of his intention to ask Mr. Molotov to arrange for General Vandenberg,³⁸ who was an air officer on General Arnold's³⁹ staff, to visit advance fighter squadrons in order to ascertain what type of fighters would be most suitable for Soviet needs since, as Mr. Mikoyan was aware, the type and number of fighter aircraft to be delivered under the third protocol in the last six months of its operation were as yet undetermined. Mr. Mikoyan said he would do what he could to help in this matter.

The Ambassador then inquired whether the 40,000 tons of Italian merchant shipping which the Soviet Government had requested at the Conference⁴⁰ would be sufficient to cover Soviet shipping needs in the Black Sea. Mr. Mikoyan replied that it was hard to say. The losses had been heavy and the Soviet need in respect of shipping in the Black Sea was great. He added, however, that the Italian ships requested would be a help in meeting the situation. The Ambassador observed that he had merely wished to find out whether there were any urgent needs over and above the 40,000 tons requested of Italian shipping for the Black Sea, and that while he could not make any definite statement in regard to these Italian ships he knew it was receiving sympathetic consideration in Washington. He added that he felt that if and when the Dardanelles were opened up it might be well to have a preliminary idea of Soviet needs in general in the Black Sea. Mr. Mikoyan said that he would discuss the matter with the Soviet shipping authorities and would let the Ambassador know if they had any urgent requests apart from the Italian ships.

In conclusion the Ambassador reiterated his desire to be of any assistance in expediting consideration in Washington of any urgent

³⁸ Brig. Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Deputy Chief of Air Staff, U.S. Army Air Forces.

³⁹ Gen. Henry H. Arnold, Commanding General, U.S. Army Air Forces.

⁴⁰ The Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers.

Soviet requests and his willingness to discuss with Mr. Mikoyan at the latter's convenience matters relating to post-war reconstruction in the Soviet Union.

861.24/1704 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, November 9, 1943—11 a. m.

[Received November 10—10:46 a. m.]

1880. For Hopkins and the Under Secretary.⁴¹ One of the formal discussions of the question of American participation in postwar reconstruction of the Soviet Union would be initiated in Moscow between the Soviet Government and our Embassy.

This subject came up in my call on Mikoyan last week. I was somewhat embarrassed to learn from him for the first time that you had discussed this question with Lukashev and had suggested the formation of some kind of a committee to study it. Mikoyan seemed surprised that I had not been informed. Please advise me the substance of this talk and as the Soviet officials in Washington cable their Government at once of discussions with you I suggest that you likewise keep me currently informed.

I am sure you appreciate how necessary it is to have clearly defined procedures and arrangements in all of our dealings with the Soviet Government and I believe we should reach a decision promptly as to the procedure to be followed in dealing with this important subject.

I do not know whether the committee you had in mind was to be an interdepartmental coordinating committee to formulate general plans and obtain the necessary approvals or whether it was to be a committee to handle negotiations with the Soviet Government. If it is to be a committee to negotiate I would view it with some concern based on my experience in London as well as our experience in Moscow with special committees.

It is my view that there are many advantages in having these matters under instructions from Washington initiated, and free [*the?*] general arrangements negotiated by me and the staff here with such additional assistance as may from time to time be needed. I believe we are in a better position to find out what the Soviet Government really wants and the kind of arrangements that would be most satisfactory to both sides. It is important that we be reasonably sure that equipment now being asked for under Lend-Lease be really for the war and not postwar and that particular requests for postwar which we might be willing from time to time to put into production

⁴¹ Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., who became Under Secretary of State on October 4, 1943, succeeding Sumner Welles.

before the end of the war should come under different financial arrangements than Lend-Lease. I am confident that we will be on a relationship with the Soviet officials here by which a reasonable opinion can be formed on this aspect of the requests if you will keep us informed of the details and any doubts you may have in Washington as to their current requests.

Molotov and Mikoyan both indicated that they liked American equipment better than that available from any other country but they believe that our prices will be high. The terms of credit under which this will be financed will have an important bearing on the extent to which they will purchase American equipment. There is no doubt they want to do the maximum amount business that is possible with us but they are going to be tough in their trading. I believe that a better deal from our standpoint can be made in Moscow. We are dealing here with the authoritative policy Soviet officials.

We must not lose sight also of the fact that this subject is of great importance in our overall relations with the Soviet Government.

Of course detailed arrangements and the actual placing of orders would have to be done by the Soviet Purchasing Mission in the United States under an overall general agreement previously made.

I hope that you and Stettinius can thrash this matter out with the others concerned to the end that a policy and procedure be agreed upon in Washington in the near future. I would appreciate being currently consulted in order that you may have my reactions for what they are worth before a conclusion is reached.

HARRIMAN

861.24/1704 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, November 12, 1943—9 p. m.

1206. Personal for Ambassador from Under Secretary. I have discussed with Harry⁴² the question of talks with Soviet officials on American participation in postwar reconstruction referred to in your 1880, November 9, 11 a. m. He knows of no discussions on this subject.

Don Nelson⁴³ told me he had touched on this question with Stalin and had discussed it at length with you. He added that he had the

⁴² Harry L. Hopkins.

⁴³ Donald M. Nelson, Chairman of the War Production Board, discussed postwar reconstruction problems with Foreign Minister Molotov on October 12 and with Premier Stalin on October 15; for details of these conversations, see memoranda of October 12 and October 16 by the Chargé in the Soviet Union, pp. 710 and 713, respectively. Regarding discussions on this subject at the Moscow Foreign Ministers Conference in October, see telegram No. 1837, November 4, from the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, p. 586.

impression you were in favor of his ideas. He assured me, however, that he had not discussed the question with the Soviets here, but he has written a memorandum⁴⁴ to the President on the subject.

I am keeping this question in mind and will inform you of any further developments. [Stettinius.]

HULL

861.24/1706 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, November 13, 1943—10 a. m.

[Received 10:20 p. m.]

1934. Personal for Under Secretary. Your 1206, November 12, 9 p. m. Bohlen who was with me when I saw Mikoyan confirms that Mikoyan definitely stated that Lukashev had reported a talk with Harry and described it in some detail.

I told Nelson I was delighted that he had indicated to Stalin and Mikoyan our desire to participate in Russian post-war construction but that I thought it should be initiated through Government channels in first instance and not through businessman's committee as he had suggested. See Embassy's 1677, October 22, noon⁴⁵ which Hamilton sent regarding Nelson's Moscow talks and our reactions here. Glad you will keep me informed.

HARRIMAN

861.24/1707 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, November 16, 1943—4 p. m.

[Received November 17—1:50 a. m.]

1964. Personal for the Under Secretary. Reference Embassy's 1677, October 22;⁴⁶ 1880, November 9, and 1934, November 13. I hope you will review the above telegrams referring to the question of aid to the Soviet Union during reconstruction, together with Nelson's discussions.

I am not sure I have made it clear that this question of reconstruction is considered by the Soviet Government as, next to the war, the most important political as well as economic problem that confronts

⁴⁴ Not found in Department files or in the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library at Hyde Park, N.Y.

⁴⁵ Not printed, but see the memoranda by the Chargé in the Soviet Union of October 12 and 16, pp. 710 and 713, respectively.

⁴⁶ Not printed.

them. Our participation in reconstruction is an important and integral part of our diplomatic dealings with them and it is therefore in my judgment essential that the negotiations be handled under the direction of those dealing with our overall relations with the Soviet Union and not be a new independent agency or group. I would appreciate your giving me the benefit of any preliminary ideas that are being developed on this subject.

HARRIMAN

861.24/1714

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius)

[WASHINGTON,] November 25, 1943.

Ambassador Gromyko telephoned to inform me that General Belyaev will not return to Washington as he has been given an assignment along military lines in the Soviet Union. He informed me that Lieutenant General Ludenko [*Rudenko*] will come to Washington to be the head of the Soviet Government Purchasing Commission. Until his arrival, Mr. Constantin Lukashev will be in charge.

E[DWARD] S[TETTINIUS]

861.5018/98 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, November 30, 1943—10 a. m.

[Received December 1—4:20 p. m.]

2082. Reference Embassy's 2025, November 23, noon, and 2068, November 29, 2 p. m.⁴⁷ So far as the Embassy has been able to ascertain the reduction in the bread ration⁴⁸ has been applied throughout the Soviet Union. This action has not been referred to in the Soviet press however and we understand that foreign correspondents have not been allowed to report it on the ground that to do so would give aid and comfort to the enemy. There has been considerable speculation here as to the reasons which impelled the Soviet Government to take such a drastic step at this time.⁴⁹

Keyed up as the Russian people are by the successes of the Red army and the prospects of an early victory, it is not believed that the re-

⁴⁷ Neither printed.

⁴⁸ The reduction of the daily bread ration effective on November 21, was reported by Ambassador Harriman in telegram No. 1995, November 20, 1 p. m. The reduction affected all ration categories in varying amounts. In telegram No. 2025, the Ambassador said that printed notices announced the measure as being temporary, but did not specify for how long (861.5018/96, 95).

⁴⁹ See telegram No. 2609, April 24, 1 p. m., to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, p. 756.

duction will seriously affect morale for the present. Moreover, the reduction does not of itself directly affect large portions of the population such as the farmers and the army although it is possible that measures have been or will be taken affecting these groups. Its severity is mitigated by an unusually large potato crop (see Embassy's telegram 1791, October 30, 11 a. m.⁵⁰). Nevertheless, the cumulative long-range effect of the reduction upon a population that lives chiefly on bread, that has long been undernourished, and that is suffering severely from the strain of the war is potentially serious. It seems reasonable to suppose that the Soviet Government would take such a step only for important reasons.⁵¹

The Embassy estimates the saving in grain that will result from the reduction in rations in the uninvaded territory of the Soviet Union to be about 1½ million metric tons from now until the end of July when the next harvest will be made.

As reported in the Embassy's telegram number 1617, October 15, 10 a. m.,⁵⁰ it is estimated that the grain situation in the uninvaded territory of the Soviet Union is not materially worse than that which pertained in this area in 1942. Field production in 1943 is in fact estimated to have been greater than in 1942 but losses from delayed harvesting and threshing may have resulted in a slightly smaller production available for consumption this year than in '42. It should be noted that the margin of error in an estimate of this kind is very great. A normal margin of error might easily account for a difference of 1½ million tons between the 1942 and the 1943 supplies of grain. If there has been this error in the estimates made by the Embassy the reason for the Soviet Government's action in reducing the bread ration would be explained.

If on the other hand the Embassy's estimates are accurate or err in the other direction the reason for the cut must be sought in something other than present scarcity as compared with the amount available last year.

At the time the reduction in rations was announced in Moscow it was stated at some distributing points here that the reduction was being made to permit the feeding of reoccupied territory. The Embassy has in preparation a study of the food situation in the Soviet Union and expects shortly to telegraph a report on this subject. Preliminary estimates indicate however that the reoccupation up to

⁵⁰ Not printed.

⁵¹ The increasingly tight food situation in the Soviet Union was mentioned again by Ambassador Harriman in telegram No. 2216, December 14, 3 p. m. A Soviet authority admitted that "it is no secret that Soviet people are in great need of food" and that "there would have been no bread ration cut unless there had been real need for it." Shipment of food from the United States in full accord with the supply protocol was declared to be absolutely necessary. (861.5018/102)

the present of Soviet territory has probably not worsened the food situation of the country as a whole. Assuming the correctness of these estimates there would seem to be no need for the Soviet Government to accumulate a reserve of grain to permit the feeding of territory which has already been reoccupied. There remains however the question of territory which the Red army expects to occupy before the next harvest. The Germans will have had more time in which to remove stocks from such territory than was the case in the areas already liberated. Also if areas such as Poland and the Baltic States are included in such territories there might naturally be expected in those areas a greater shortage of grain supplies than in the grain-producing areas farther to the south. The explanation given at Moscow distributing points would thus appear logical when applied to the Baltic States and eastern Poland. It is obvious that a Red army bringing bread into such areas would have an important political effect favorable to the Soviet Union. Regardless of plans for the eventual supplying of liberated areas from United Nations sources the political reaction of the population to the treatment they receive immediately following the entry of Soviet forces would undoubtedly not be ignored by the Soviet authorities.

Other possible reasons for the action of the Soviet Government are that it may be designed to build up a special reserve for the spring months when the food situation is normally especially stringent; to stimulate gifts of grain from collective farms; to facilitate governmental grain procurements; to make a saving made possible by the large potato crop; and to replenish army stocks that may have been depleted.

Whatever may be the reasons or the motives that impelled the Soviet Government to reduce the ration an effect will be to increase the longing of the Soviet people for peace and for a maximum effort by the British and American armed forces to achieve complete victory and a speedy termination of the war.

The foregoing comments are necessarily largely speculative but they may supplement estimates and items available to the Government from other sources.⁵²

Inform Agriculture.

HARRIMAN

⁵² The Consul General at Vladivostok, Angus I. Ward, reported in his telegram No. 38, May 17, 10 a. m., that the "local food supply situation which is usually at its worst in May, is worse today than any other time in the 28 months I have been here". (861.00/12016) The Ambassador in the Soviet Union relayed a later review from Ward in telegram No. 741, June 25, 3 p. m., in which the latter had stated that the "food situation deteriorated [to a] new low level". The less favored strata of the population were obliged to piece out their food supply "with grass and herb roots and young tree leaves" while it was feared that many children "will not survive until potato harvest". (861.00/12018)

861.24/1369½

Memorandum by Mr. Elbridge Durbrow of the Division of European Affairs ⁵³

[WASHINGTON,] December 8, 1943.

Mr. John Russell ⁵⁴ of the British Embassy called yesterday to make inquiry as to the latest developments in the matter of exchanging technical information of a military nature between the United States and the Soviet Union.⁵⁵

Mr. Russell stated that the British Embassy had recently received requests to expedite, if possible, United States agreement on this question and stated that the British hoped we could press this matter and draw up a tripartite agreement for the exchange of information.⁵⁶ Mr. Russell promised to bring me informally a proposed draft of this agreement.

Last evening Mr. Russell introduced me to a civilian expert of the Admiralty ⁵⁷ who is in the United States for the purpose of discussing with the Combined Chiefs of Staff the working out of an agreement for the exchange of technical information of a military nature with the Soviet Union.

Both the expert and Mr. Russell expressed the hope that immediate consideration could be given to this question by the Department and indicated that they are also pressing for immediate consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. They explained that because of the political implications and postwar trade matters involved in the exchange of technical information they felt that this question should receive the approval of the political branch as well as the military branch of the Government.

In explaining the reasons for the desire to reach an agreement as soon as possible the expert showed me a paper he had drawn up indicating the advantages to be gained by giving technical information to the Soviets. In this connection he indicated that since the Moscow and

⁵³ Addressed to H. Freeman Matthews, Chief of the Division of European Affairs, and James C. Dunn, Adviser on Political Relations.

⁵⁴ John W. Russell, Second Secretary of the British Embassy.

⁵⁵ For previous correspondence on this matter, see despatch No. 6107, October 28, 1942, from the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, and memorandum of December 17, 1942, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs, *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. III, pp. 738 and 753, respectively; also telegram No. 208, January 8, 1943, midnight, from the Chargé in the United Kingdom, *ante*, p. 738.

⁵⁶ See *aide-mémoire* of October 6 from the British Embassy, vol. I, p. 544.

⁵⁷ Patrick M. S. Blackett, Director of Naval Operational Research at the Admiralty.

Tehran Conferences⁵⁸ the British Government felt that the chances of the Soviet Union joining in the war against Japan had been increased but that they could not take this step until they had built up their technical military equipment in the Far East which could be done most rapidly by the United States and Great Britain furnishing them some of our latest technical developments. Furthermore, he indicated that it was felt that if we should make available to the Soviet authorities all technical and military information except certain specified items which for security or other reasons could not be disclosed, it was hoped that the Soviet authorities would make available to the American and British Armies detailed information on their experience gained in large land operations. He felt that this information was most necessary in connection with the invasion plans.

I promised to take the question up immediately and inform him in the matter.

ELBRIDGE DUSBROW

P. S. Since dictating this memorandum I have found the attached memoranda⁵⁹ indicating the reasons why this matter was not followed up last year.

In view of the friendly atmosphere of cooperation now prevailing after the Moscow and Tehran Conferences I feel it would be advisable to make a serious effort to reach an agreement with the Soviets regarding the exchange of technical information whether we immediately receive concrete information from them or not. I understand that a lot of the information which was considered to be secret a year ago has already fallen into the hands of the enemy but as yet we have not released this information to our Soviet Allies and there is no reason now why we should not make this available to them. This question is closely related to postwar use of patents and possible licensing arrangements with Soviet organizations for the manufacture of American products. Heretofore the Soviet authorities have been reluctant to sign licensing agreements and have, as a rule, endeavored to copy American equipment after purchasing a few models. It might be appropriate in connection with the exchange of military information to drive an opening wedge for an agreement covering licensing in connection with postwar trade. E. D.

⁵⁸ For documentation on the Tripartite Conference in Moscow, October 18–November 1, 1943, see vol. I, pp. 513 ff.; on the Tehran Conference, see *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943*.

⁵⁹ Memorandum of December 17, 1942, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1942*, vol. III, p. 753; others not printed.

861.24/1369

Memorandum by Mr. Elbridge Durbrow of the Division of European Affairs ⁶⁰

[WASHINGTON,] December 23, 1943.

Mr. Barkley ⁶¹ of the British Embassy called yesterday and handed me the attached draft of a proposed agreement ⁶² between the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union covering the exchange of secret technical military information.

As indicated in my previous memorandum on this subject the British are pressing us to conclude such an agreement and have indicated that they feel that the following advantages would ensue therefrom:

1. Under the present arrangement with us and their bi-lateral agreement with the Soviet Union the British have to constantly consult the United States prior to turning over to the Soviets secret information on military devices of common development which causes considerable delay.

2. They feel that there are many secret military devices which a year ago were not known to the enemy but which have since fallen into their hands and therefore, since they are known to the enemy there should be no reason why they should not be made known to our ally.

3. In discussing this question with Mr. Blackett, a civilian technical adviser with the British Admiralty now in the United States, he indicated that British military experts were of the opinion that if we should make available in time many of the secret military devices which are not now available to the Soviet Government, they could be put into production and installed in eastern Siberia and thus put the Soviet Army in a better position to join in the fight against Japan and also make them more willing to do so.

4. As the British Government feels that even though we may not receive full and equal information from the Soviet Government covering their secret military devices, we will at least assist the Soviets in making it easier to "kill more Germans" and also further convince them of our sincerity in desiring to cooperate with them.

The Embassy has indicated that the British General Staff is taking up this question through the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington but hopes that the Department can indicate that it is favorably inclined to drawing up some such agreement.

It is not entirely clear why the British Government proposes the conclusion of a tripartite agreement on this subject instead of encouraging the United States Government to draw up a bi-lateral agreement similar to the one they have with the Soviet Government.

⁶⁰ Addressed to H. Freeman Matthews, Chief of the Division of European Affairs, and James C. Dunn, Adviser on Political Relations.

⁶¹ R. E. Barclay, First Secretary of the British Embassy.

⁶² Not printed.

I gained the impression, however, that the British Government is pressing for the tripartite agreement since they have found in actual practice that the escape clause in their present agreement with the Soviet Government has proved somewhat embarrassing. The escape clause now in effect between the two governments provides that each shall furnish all secret information on military devices to the other except in certain cases when reasons must be given for not disclosing the information.

In this connection, it will be noted in the attached draft agreement that the escape clause in Article 2 provides three reasons for withholding information from the other parties.⁶³ Mr. Barkley reading from a telegram discussing this question indicated that the British Government thought that the proposed escape clause would be more satisfactory than the one in the present British-Soviet agreement, since it contains three exceptions and if a tripartite agreement is concluded the escape clause could be invoked in certain instances without having to specify which one of the three exceptions applied to a particular device in question. In this manner the British Government apparently hopes to avoid having to give specific reasons in each case when it is deemed imperative not to exchange technical military information.

There is a possibility that since many of the technical military devices being used by the British and American forces are of common development the British Government may feel that in cases where it is deemed inadvisable to exchange information with Soviets, part if not all of the onus for this refusal can be placed upon the American Government.

Article 4 of the proposed agreement covers the use of technical information and data after the termination of hostilities. The proposed article is very general and, considering the completely different policy in regard to patents, royalties and licenses in the Soviet Union, it does not, because of its general nature, appear to give adequate protection to American firms against the use of trade secrets and patented devices after the termination of hostilities.

⁶³ Article 2 specified the three reasons as follows:

"(i) because the weapon, process or device is of such particular secrecy that the Government concerned considers that it should only be employed under certain limited conditions;

(ii) because the existence, employment or effect of the weapon, process or device is unknown to the common enemy, and the Government concerned considers that in order to prevent premature disclosure to them the information should be withheld until it can be used with the greatest possible effect against them;

(iii) because the weapon, process or device is in such an early stage of development that its disclosure would not in the opinion of the Government concerned be of use to the other contracting Governments in the war against the common enemy."

Under present conditions many American firms have, despite the somewhat general patent protection clause in the Master Lend-Lease Agreement, been reluctant to turn over specific technical details for use by the Soviet Government since they are apprehensive lest this information, which in many cases involves trade secrets, will be used to produce goods commercially which will compete with American goods in the world market after the war.

In this connection under the present arrangement with the War and Navy Departments requests by Soviet agencies for specific information regarding the manufacture or operations of the devices developed by American firms, are passed on from a military secret point of view by the War and Navy Departments and then the Department of State has addressed a letter to the firm in question along the lines of the attached letter to the Caterpillar Tractor Company, dated June 26, 1943.⁶⁴

It will be noted from the enclosure to the attached letter that the firm is told that in making available any such information "the Soviet Government must make such arrangements as may be necessary with the patentees or the original manufacturers of the given devices, for the reproduction or use of any features of such given devices, guaranteeing to such manufacturers or patentees a right to establish a claim against the Soviet Government for entire and reasonable compensation for such reproduction . . ."⁶⁵

It is felt that the wording of this paragraph might mislead American firms into the belief that the United States Government has some arrangements with the Soviet Government assuring that patentees will be protected after the termination of hostilities. There apparently is no such arrangement. It has been the experience in the past that it is difficult if not impossible for foreign firms to obtain adequate and complete protection for their patents used in the Soviet Union.

In view of the above it would seem advisable if an agreement for the exchange of secret military information with the Soviet Union is concluded, it should contain a more specific article giving greater assurance to American firms regarding the use of their patents or trade secrets after the termination of hostilities. If it should not be deemed advisable to incorporate this in the specific military secret agreement, it is felt that this question should nevertheless be covered simultaneously in a separate exchange of notes.

If such an arrangement is made not only would the Department be in a better position to give assurances to American firms that they

⁶⁴ Not printed.

⁶⁵ Omission indicated in the original memorandum.

would receive some patent protection in the Soviet Union after the termination of hostilities but also American firms might, in the interests of the war effort, be more willing during the war to make available to the Soviet Government various trade secrets and patented devices which up until the present time they have been reluctant to divulge.

Recently the Soviet Purchasing Commission in Washington and Soviet organizations in Moscow have asked for very specific information covering the manufacture of American products which, although they might be used during the war, could also be manufactured subsequent to the termination of hostilities for commercial use. In view of the possibility that this type of request will increase it is felt that this question should be considered most fully in connection with any agreement we might make with the Soviet Government for the exchange of military information during the war.

As an indication of the type of detailed information requested by Soviet organizations there is also attached a copy of a letter dated November 24, 1943 to the Caterpillar Tractor Company.⁶⁶ An official of the company discussing this letter indicated that the requests covered every possible detail regarding the manufacture of Caterpillar Tractors including heat treatment processes, et cetera. This official indicated that while his company was willing to assist the Red Army in every way in its fight against our common enemy they could not make effective use of this detailed information during the war but might be in a position to use it in the manufacture of commercial tractors after the termination of hostilities. Because of this possibility the Caterpillar official indicated that he did not believe his company would feel free to comply fully with the Soviet request.

If it should be decided to conclude the proposed tripartite agreement and incorporate therein an article giving further protection to American firms, this might be done by making provision therein for licensing contracts to cover the manufacture of the specific device after the war or the Soviet Government might purchase the right to exploit the patent or trade secret for a lump sum rather than to try to work out a royalty arrangement. It is understood that Amtorg in New York has in recent years been willing to purchase such rights in order to overcome the reluctance of American firms to "take their chances" with patent arrangements in the Soviet Union.

While it is believed advisable to take all necessary steps to assure that the Soviet authorities will receive information which they may need in the prosecution of the war it is not clear, for the following

⁶⁶ Not printed.

reasons, whether the conclusion of the tripartite agreement would in fact accomplish this end:

1. It is understood that under Lend-Lease we are furnishing the Red Army with all material and devices which it may require in its fight against the Germans.

2. If instead of furnishing the Red Army the various devices we should give them detailed information regarding the manufacture of these devices it is not certain that the necessary plant facilities could be constructed during the war to make effective use of them against the enemy.

3. As far as is known, the Soviet Government has not indicated that it desires to conclude an agreement for the exchange of secret military information. It may, therefore, be assumed that they feel that they are obtaining under present arrangements all important military devices available in the United States.

4. The possibility cannot be excluded that the British have suggested the conclusion of the tripartite agreement since they are not satisfied with their present arrangements with the Soviet Government on this question and hoped to effect a change by bringing us into the picture.

ELBRIDGE DUSBROW

861.24/1717: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, January 4, 1944.

[Received 4:15 p. m.]

9. Crowley's⁶⁷ statement regarding Lend-Lease supplies to Soviet Union in first 10 months of '43 receives 4 inches in Washington despatch dated January 2d in Moscow newspapers for January 3. Total figure of three billion five hundred and fifty thousand dollars, and breakdown into war, industrial and food supplies are given. Crowley is quoted to effect that growth of aid is indicated by fact 63 percent more supplies furnished Soviet Union first 10 months of '43 than in whole of '42. Supplying of 7,000 planes, more than to any other country, is reported. Figures are given for tanks, machine guns, trucks, automobiles, field telephones and mileage of field telephone wire.

HARRIMAN

⁶⁷Leo T. Crowley, Administrator of the Foreign Economic Administration, with which the Office of Lend-Lease Administration had been merged as of September 25, 1943.

EFFORTS TO ARRANGE WITH THE SOVIET UNION FOR THE ACCEPTANCE AND ONWARD SHIPMENT OF RELIEF SUPPLIES AND MAIL FOR THE BENEFIT OF PRISONERS OF WAR AND INTERNED CIVILIANS IN JAPANESE-CONTROLLED TERRITORY

740.00114 Pacific War/127a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Standley)*

WASHINGTON, January 18, 1943—6 p. m.

41. This Government and the American Red Cross have been endeavoring to devise a means by which Americans and other United Nations nationals in Japanese custody in the Far East might be furnished urgently needed supplies to supplement the rations which it is the responsibility of the Japanese to furnish according to the provisions of the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention⁶⁸ which both Governments have agreed reciprocally to apply to prisoners of war and civilian internees.⁶⁹ Differences in dietary habits and standards of living require such supplementation and in addition climatic conditions and illness make it imperative that certain medical supplies which the Japanese cannot or will not furnish be made available to these people.

The Japanese Government has refused to agree to several proposals involving the use of specially designated neutral ships to carry such supplies and the only means of transporting supplies at present is on the exchange ships. Space limitations and lapse of time between trips make this means of supply entirely inadequate.

The suggestion has been made that it might be possible to arrange for the shipment of small quantities of supplies as fill-in cargo on ships sailing between the American west coast and the Soviet Union for accumulation at Vladivostok and eventual onward transmission over Soviet railways for delivery to the Japanese at the border of Manchuria or other Japanese controlled territory.

In your discretion please approach the appropriate Soviet officials informally in this matter stressing the desperate situation of the United Nations nationals in Japanese custody and the factors mentioned above which prompt the Department to propose this possible method of transporting supplies. There are thought to be approximately 100,000 United Nations nationals in the Far East to whom it is desired to send medical and supplemental food supplies. The interested Governments would like to send a total of about 1200 tons

⁶⁸ International Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, signed at Geneva on July 27, 1929; for text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1929, vol. 1, p. 336, or 47 Stat. (pt. 2) 2021.

⁶⁹ Of the 100,000 United Nations nationals in Japanese custody, it was estimated that there were about 33,000 Americans.

of supplies per month but if sufficient ship and rail space is unavailable will, of course, be willing to send smaller quantities.

Before inquiring of the Japanese Government whether it would accept supplies in Manchuria for distribution to United Nations nationals in its custody, the Department would like to know whether the Soviet Government would in principle approve the proposal.

Please report action taken.

HULL

740.00114 Pacific War/138 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

KUIBYSHEV (Moscow), February 6, 1943—8 p. m.
[Received February 7—3:50 p. m.]

118. Department's 41, January 18. I outlined to Vyshinski⁷⁰ on February 5 the considerations set forth in the Department's telegram and left with him an *aide-mémoire* on the question. Vyshinski promised to bring the proposal immediately to the attention of his Government. I requested an expeditious reply, stressing the desperate situation of the United Nations nationals in Japanese custody.

STANDLEY

740.00114A P.W./4-1243 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, April 12, 1943—6 p. m.
[Received 8:50 p. m.]

288. My 118, February 16 [6], 8 p. m., from Kuibyshev. I took occasion on Saturday⁷¹ to press Molotov⁷² for a reply to my *aide-mémoire*. He stated the question was being studied by the Commissariat for Foreign Trade and he had no information he could convey to me at this time. He asked whether it would be feasible to send such supplies to Murmansk and Archangel for onward rail shipment to the Far East and I replied I would consult my Government on this point.

⁷⁰ Andrey Yanuaryevich Vyshinsky, First Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.

⁷¹ April 10.

⁷² Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.

I understand convoys have been stopped to the northern ports.⁷³ Consequently I do not see how we can reply in the affirmative to this query and I suggest we state that in view of the more advantageous shipping conditions in the Pacific at present it would be preferable to make such shipments by that route, at least until such a time as the North Atlantic and Arctic shipping situation is more propitious.

STANDLEY

740.00114 Pacific War/193 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Standley)*

WASHINGTON, April 17, 1943—7 p. m.

205. Department's 41, January 18, and your 288, [April] 12th. You are requested to transmit a communication in the following sense to the Soviet Government:

"The Government of the United States and the American Red Cross have endeavored for many months to devise a means whereby, in cooperation with the Japanese authorities, the urgent need of American nationals held in the Far East for mail and relief supplies might be met. The American Ambassador in an *Aide-Mémoire* left at the Soviet Foreign Office on February 5, 1943, submitted a proposal which envisaged the shipment of relief supplies on Soviet vessels to Vladivostok for onward transmission into Japanese-controlled territory. However, neither this Government nor the American Red Cross has made this proposal to the Japanese, but instead has endeavored to arrange for the movement of supplies across the Pacific in neutral or American vessels or airplanes to a convenient point designated by the Japanese where such supplies could be picked up by the Japanese for onward shipment into Japan and Japanese-controlled territory. In response to the latest proposal of this character a communication in the following sense has been received from the Japanese Government through Swiss channels:⁷⁴

'Japanese Government not opposed in principle to sending packages and correspondence to American prisoners of war and civilian internees in Japan and Japanese-controlled territories but entrance neutral ships in waters where military operation taking place cannot be authorized. Japanese Government ready, however, to examine possibility relieving present situation if American Government disposed to send to Vladivostok packages and correspondence for American internees either by land across Siberia or by Soviet ship.'

The Government of the United States is not aware by what means the Japanese may propose to move relief supplies from Vladivostok

⁷³ For correspondence concerning the difficulties of maintaining convoys on the northern route to ports in the Soviet Union, see pp. 624-703, *passim*.

⁷⁴ The United States proposal was contained in telegram No. 2868, December 19, 1942, to the Minister in Switzerland (*Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. 1, p. 839), and had been relayed to the Japanese Government by the Swiss Legation in Tokyo on December 23. The Japanese reply here paraphrased had been transmitted to the Department by the Minister in Switzerland in telegram No. 2179, April 7, 1943, p. 1019.

into Japan and Japanese-controlled areas. Before inquiring in this regard, however, it is necessary to know the Soviet Government's views on this question. If the Soviet Government should agree in principle to the proposal under consideration, the agreement will not be considered as committing the Soviet Government definitely to any course of action, pending ascertainment from the Japanese Government of the method it proposes to employ for movement of supplies either by land or sea from Vladivostok to Japanese-controlled areas and clearance of such a proposal with the Soviet Government.

The Government of the United States hopes that an expression of the Soviet Government's views concerning this matter will be communicated to this Government at the earliest possible date."

HULL

740.00114 Pacific War/193 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Standley)*

WASHINGTON, May 4, 1943—6 p. m.

280. Reference Department's 205, April 17, 7 p. m., to Kuibyshev regarding shipment via Soviet territory of relief supplies for prisoners of war and civilian internees in Japanese hands. Department is informed by British Embassy that British Government has expressed certain views on this subject to its Ambassador ⁷⁵ and instructed him to call on you. It is also understood that the Canadian Government has communicated with its Minister ⁷⁶ in the same connection. Please have in mind in your conversations with those officials and for guidance in your approach to the Soviet authorities (1) in any arrangement which may be obtained with the Soviet and Japanese Governments for the shipment of relief supplies, this Government would of course invite the British, Canadian and other Allied Governments to participate therein for the benefit of their nationals in Japanese hands, (2) the Department's 205 purposely avoided suggestion of a route through Soviet territory for the passage of the supplies and any mention of quantity so as to avoid a negative reply on a single proposal and to leave the question open for the Soviet Government to make some offer, and (3) it would seem to Department to be injudicious for the British and Canadian representatives likewise to approach the Soviet Government on the matter, since such action might be interpreted by that Government as concerted.

HULL

⁷⁵ Sir Archibald Clark Kerr.

⁷⁶ L. Dana Wilgress.

740.00114A Pacific War/434 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, May 8, 1943—midnight.

[Received May 9—7:40 p. m.]

416. Department's 205, April 17, to Kuibyshev. I emphasized to Mikoyan⁷⁷ yesterday the desire of my Government to find a means to meet the urgent needs of American nationals under Jap detention, outlining to him the considerations set forth in my note to the Foreign Office. He stated that he had discussed the matter with Molotov and that Molotov had promised to give me answer to my note in a few days.

I have today received a note from Molotov stating that "the Soviet Government expresses its readiness to render assistance to the Government of the United States in transporting supplies or correspondence to American citizens who are in territory controlled by the Japanese either as war prisoners or as internees on condition naturally that there is reached a suitable understanding on this question between the American and Japanese Governments.[""]

STANDLEY

740.00114A Pacific War/434 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley)

WASHINGTON, May 26, 1943—9 p. m.

365. American interests—Japan. Following message was sent on May 18 to American Legation at Bern.⁷⁸

"Please request Swiss Government in reference to your 2179, April 7,⁷⁹ to present to Japanese Government a communication in the following sense:

"The Soviet Government has expressed to the United States Government a readiness to extend assistance in arranging for the movement of relief supplies and mail to American prisoners of war and civilian internees in Japanese-controlled areas subject to the condition that the United States and Japanese Governments reach a suitable understanding on this question.

The Government of the United States now inquires by what means the Japanese Government proposes that supplies sent from the United States to Vladivostok shall be moved from Vladivostok to Japan or Japanese-controlled

⁷⁷ Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan, People's Commissar for Foreign Trade of the Soviet Union.

⁷⁸ The quoted telegram was sent to Bern as No. 1187. Its contents were communicated by the Swiss to the Japanese Government in Tokyo on May 26. On July 5, in telegram No. 1582, the Department asked the Swiss Government to try to obtain an early reply to the original inquiry.

⁷⁹ *Post*, p. 1019.

territories. It is hoped that arrangements can be made to ship from 1200 to 1500 weight tons of food, clothing and medical supplies per month for distribution to American and other Allied prisoners of war and civilian internees in Japanese custody.' " 80

Please inform Soviet Government text of above message.

With a view to the possible expedition of consideration of such proposals as the Japanese Government may make in connection with the movement of supplies to American and Allied nationals detained by the Japanese, Department would like to know whether the Soviet Government has any objection to the use of any one or more of the several alternative routes which the Japanese Government would ordinarily be expected to propose for movement of supplies from Vladivostok to Japan and Japanese-controlled territories. Will you, therefore, in your discretion, approach the Soviet Foreign Office in an effort to ascertain its views in the premises.

HULL

740.00114A Pacific War/496 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, June 9, 1943—2 p. m.

[Received 7 : 39 p. m.]

630. Department's 365, May 26, 9 p. m., last paragraph. Foreign Office states that a reply to the question concerning the several alternate routes for the movement of supplies to American and Allied nationals detained by the Japs will be given as soon as the American Government receives an answer from the Japanese Government on the question.

STANDLEY

740.00114A Pacific War/496 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley)

WASHINGTON, July 7, 1943—6 p. m.

531. Your 630, June 9, 2 p. m. After referring to previous communications in regard to the Soviet Government's kind cooperation

⁸⁰ According to Mr. Maurice Pate, Director of Prisoners of War Relief at the American Red Cross in Washington, the latest information available on May 19, 1943, indicated that there were in Japanese custody as prisoners of war and interned civilians: "(1) 32,500 white Americans, (2) an estimated 70,000 white British Empire nationals, (3) an estimated 15,000 white Dutch nationals, (4) an estimated 40,000 Filipinos and (5) an estimated 40,000 British nationals of Asiatic blood." He expressed the view that the Filipinos and the British nationals of Asiatic blood may have been liberated by Japan, or might be ineligible to receive relief supplies for other reasons. (711.94114 Supplies/22)

in agreeing to permit relief supplies for American prisoners and civilian internees in Japanese custody to transit the Soviet Union, you are requested to present to the Soviet authorities a communication in the following sense:

"Official reports received by the United States Government within the past few weeks indicate that the death rate among American prisoners of war in Japanese custody is alarmingly high. A large number of the deaths have been caused by diseases which competent medical opinion believes could have been cured or controlled if proper medicinals and vitamin products were available to the American doctors attached to the prison camps. In order that the abnormal rate of death may be reduced, it has become imperative that medical supplies be made available at the earliest possible time.

As the Soviet Government is aware, the Japanese Government has agreed to receive and distribute relief supplies sent through the Soviet Union and intended for distribution to American prisoners and civilian internees in Japanese hands. In view thereof and the fact that the Soviet Government has kindly expressed its willingness to permit the shipment of such supplies through the Soviet Union when suitable arrangements for their reception by the Japanese authorities shall have been reached, the United States Government would be grateful if the Soviet Government would allow the American Red Cross to create a modest stockpile of essential medical supplies at Vladivostok or at some other point in the Soviet Union near to the border of Japanese-controlled territory, in order that such supplies may be readily available for immediate shipment into Japan or Japanese-controlled areas as soon as suitable arrangements in this regard are completed. If the Soviet Government is willing to permit the accumulation of a small stockpile of medical supplies for this purpose at a convenient point in the Soviet Union, the Government of the United States proposes to arrange for the shipment of small amounts of such supplies by air or on the Soviet vessels proceeding to Vladivostok, whichever may be found feasible at the time."

Please endeavor to obtain an urgent reply.

HULL

740.00114A Pacific War/551a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Standley)*⁸¹

WASHINGTON, July 17, 1943.

578. Death rate amongst our prisoners of war in Far East makes it imperative that all possible steps be taken to expedite the shipment of medical and concentrated food supplies for their relief.

⁸¹ Since this telegram was sent uncoded, telegram No. 579, July 17, 10 p. m. (740.00114A Pacific War/496), contained the initial references to previous communications, which were to the Department's telegrams No. 41, January 18, 6 p. m. (p. 799), and No. 365, May 26, 9 p. m. (p. 803); the Ambassador's telegram No. 630, June 9, 2 p. m. (p. 804); and the Department's telegram No. 531, July 7, 6 p. m., *supra*.

As Japanese Government has stated its willingness to give consideration to United States Government's proposal that such supplies be sent to Japan via the Soviet Union and as the Soviet Government has kindly expressed its readiness to render assistance provided a suitable understanding in the matter were reached between Japanese and United States Governments, we feel justified in asking the Soviet Government to be good enough to discuss urgently with the Japanese Government ways and means mutually satisfactory to those Governments by which supplies furnished by the United States Government might be speedily shipped to Japan. The United States Government is willing to lay those supplies down on Soviet territory wherever the Soviet Government, after discussion with the Japanese Government, considers they could best be transhipped to Japan. The United States Government is prepared to use air or sea transport, whichever is most feasible in the circumstances.

The Swiss Government representing American interests in Japan is being requested to inform the Japanese Government of this approach to the Soviet Government with the request that the Japanese Government concert with the Soviet Government in working out a mutually satisfactory route and means of shipment of such supplies.

In view of the evident urgent need of our prisoners of war for medicines which Japan may not be in a position promptly to supply, Department would be grateful if Soviet Government would find it possible to handle this request on an urgent basis.

HULL

711.94114A/16 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, July 21, 1943—9 a. m.

[Received July 21—6:56 a. m.]

905. Department's 578, July 17. Matter taken up with Foreign Office today and urgency for expeditious action stressed. Please advise Embassy what quantities of medical supplies and concentrated foods it is now proposed to send.

In view of obstructions and delays usually encountered in connection with the entry of American aircraft into the Soviet Union and the obvious reluctance of the Soviet authorities to permit American planes to enter the Soviet Far East I feel that it would be more expeditious in the long run to ship the supplies by Soviet vessels to Vladivostok or directly to such Japanese ports as would be agreed upon by the two Governments.

STANDLEY

711.94114A/19: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, July 21, 1943—noon.

[Received July 22—7:31 a. m.]

912. Department's 531, July 7, 6 p. m. In reply to an urgent communication to Molotov dated July 9 outlining the considerations set forth in the Department's telegram I have received a note dated July 20 stating in effect that since the point in the Soviet Union from which the medical supplies in question will be sent to Japan is not yet known the Soviet Government considers the creation of a stockpile as premature; that as soon as the question regarding the routing of the supplies is decided upon the Soviet Government "if it should prove necessary" will permit the accumulation of essential medical supplies at a suitable point in the Soviet Union prior to their shipment to Japan.

Based on conversation reported in my 905 of July 21 I interpret the phrase "if it should prove necessary" to mean that the Soviet authorities prefer shipments from the U.S. directly to Japan on Soviet vessels thus avoiding the necessity of accumulating supplies in the Soviet Union, that they will not permit Japanese ships or planes to enter the Soviet Union to pick up these supplies and that they are reluctant to arrange for shipments from the Soviet Union to Japan on Soviet carriers.

STANDLEY

711.94114 Mail/6a: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley)

WASHINGTON, July 28, 1943—10 p. m.

617. Department advised by Post Office Department that latter has been informed by Postmaster in Portland, Oregon, that Soviet vessels have refused to carry prisoners of war mail without specific instructions from authorities in Moscow. In view of the fact that Post Office Department was advised by Soviet Postal Authorities early in June that they could assure 300 kilograms prisoners of war letter mail per month from the United States to the Far East, I wish you would take this matter up immediately with the appropriate authorities with the request that necessary instructions be transmitted to masters of Soviet ships in Portland. Post Office contacted Soviet Purchasing Commission here which telegraphed Moscow for necessary instructions. As of July 16 no reply had been received.

(Sent at the request of Mr. Grayson,⁸² Post Office Department).

HULL

711.94114 Supplies/4 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Standley)*

WASHINGTON, July 29, 1943—7 p. m.

620. Your 905, January [July] 21, 9 a. m.; 912, July 21, noon; and 933, July 24, 1 p. m.,⁸³ noted. First paragraph your 905, for American nationals estimated to number 30,000 including war prisoners this Government proposes to ship 185,778 pounds (8,900 cubic feet) of medical supplies and 180,000 food parcels, each weighing 11 pounds (72,000 cubic feet) for a 3-month period. Provision should be made for proportionate shipments by other Allied Governments for their nationals in the Far East. As stated in Department's 1187, May 18,⁸⁴ it is hoped that arrangements can be made to ship from 1200 to 1500 weight tons of supplies per month for American and other Allied nationals.

The Department hopes that in view of the extreme urgency of this situation you will be successful in obtaining early action by the Soviet Government in arranging with the Japanese Government for means of shipping needed supplies.

HULL

711.94114 Supplies/9 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary
of State*

Moscow, August 3, 1943—noon.

[Received August 4—4:44 p. m.]

1004. My 933, July 24, 1 p. m.⁸⁵ I took occasion again last night to press Molotov for a decision on this question. Molotov commented on the unsatisfactory status of Japanese-Soviet relations remarking that the Japanese had seized another Soviet ship and intimated that perhaps it might be better for us to make all necessary arrangements with the Japanese through the Swiss. He said that the Soviet Government would, of course, help all it could. He did not give a definite

⁸² George H. Grayson, Acting Director of the Division of International Postal Service, Office of the Second Assistant Postmaster General.

⁸³ Telegram No. 933 not printed.

⁸⁴ Quoted in telegram No. 365, May 26, 9 p. m., to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, p. 803.

⁸⁵ Not printed, but see telegram No. 905, July 21, 9 a. m., from the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, p. 806.

answer to my representations but I received the impression that the Soviet authorities were reluctant to discuss this question with the Japanese.

STANDLEY

711.94114 Supplies/5 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Standley)*

WASHINGTON, August 3, 1943—9 p. m.

639. Your 945, July 27.⁸⁸ It has always been the Department's intention that such means of shipping supplies to the Far East as may be worked out would be shared in by the Allied Governments, including, of course, the Australian Government. As stated in Department's 365, May 26, the Japanese Government was informed that it was proposed to ship 1200 to 1500 weight tons of supplies per month for "distribution to American and other Allied prisoners."

Department is of the opinion that representations by Australian Chargé would be inadvisable for the reasons given in Department's 280, May 4, which had reference to proposed representations by Canadian and British Government representatives at Moscow.

HULL

711.94114 Supplies/11 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Hamilton) to the Secretary
of State*

Moscow, August 5, 1943—2 p. m.
[Received August 6—1:37 p. m.]

1024. Embassy's 1004, August 3, noon.

(1) The Embassy has now received a note dated August 4 from the Commissar for Foreign Affairs referring to Embassy's note July 19 with regard to question of Soviet Government entering in conversations with the Japanese Government regarding matter of delivery of provisions for American prisoners and nationals in Japanese custody. Molotov's reply states in opinion of Soviet Government the question under consideration should be regarded at the present stage as closed by Molotov's conversation with the Ambassador on August 2 as reported in my telegram under reference. The reply refers again to fact that American Government is entrusting Swiss Government,

⁸⁸ Not printed; it reported that the Australian Chargé in the Soviet Union desired "to make representations to the [Soviet] Government supporting our efforts to arrange for the shipment of supplies to prisoners of war in Japan" but that Ambassador Standley had requested the Chargé to withhold making representations until he could consult the Department. (711.94114 Supplies/5)

as representing interests of United States in Japan to carry on conversations with Japanese Government. The reply concludes with the assurance that as soon as American Government has received reply in the premises from Japanese Government the Soviet Government will give immediate consideration to the possible ways and means of delivering supplies in question through Soviet territory.

(2) The reasons for Soviet Government's reluctance to take action along lines desired by Department are not entirely clear to Embassy. On one occasion an official of Foreign Office referred to fact that the Embassy's communication based on Department's telegram No. 531, July 7, 6 p. m., stated that Japanese Government had agreed to receive and distribute relief supplies whereas the Embassy's communication based on Department's telegram No. 578, July 17, stated that Japanese Government had stated its willingness to give consideration to this Government proposal. A Foreign Office official, also in reference the American Government's statement that it was prepared to use air transport, commented on size of shipments contemplated as indicated in Department's telegram No. 620, July 29, 7 p. m. In any event it seems clear that Soviet Government is averse to entering in discussions with Japanese Government at present stage and that the Soviet Government prefers American Government first obtain definite assent of Japanese Government to some plan with at least the principal provisions thereof expressly stated.

HAMILTON

740.00114A Pacific War/434 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, August 6, 1943.

1880. American interests—Far East. Please inquire when communication based upon Department's 1187, May 18⁸⁷ and follow-up as requested in Department's 1582, July 5⁸⁸ were delivered to Japanese Government and request that Swiss Minister at Tokyo⁸⁹ inform Japanese Government that the United States Government is disturbed over the non-receipt of a reply indicating how the Japanese authorities propose that supplies sent from the United States to Vladivostok shall be moved from Vladivostok to Japan and Japanese-controlled territories. As this matter is of the most vital and immediate concern to the United States Government, the Swiss Minister should endeavor to obtain the Japanese Government's proposal at the earliest possible date.

⁸⁷ Quoted in telegram No. 365, May 26, 9 p. m., to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, p. 803.

⁸⁸ See footnote 78, p. 803.

⁸⁹ Camille Gorgé.

Please request that this matter be treated most urgently and inform Department when a communication based on this message shall have been delivered to Japanese Government⁹⁰ and, if possible, when a reply may be expected.

HULL

711.94114 Mail/7 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, August 12, 1943—3 p. m.
[Received 6:08 p. m.]

1065. Department's 617, July 28, 10 p. m. A note was sent to the Foreign Office on July 29 requesting its urgent attention to the question of arranging for the transmission of prisoners of war mail and the matter has subsequently twice been discussed orally. On August 10 a Foreign Office official stated that this matter should never have been arranged between the two Post Office departments and that the Foreign Office was sending the Embassy a note to the effect that the Soviet Government would be glad to arrange for the transmission of the mail in question as soon as the United States and Japan reached an agreement on the subject. He stated that Great Britain has such an agreement with Japan.

The note to which he referred has not yet been received.

STANDLEY

711.94114 Supplies/11 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley)

WASHINGTON, August 17, 1943—6 p. m.

702. Your 1004, August 3, noon, and 1024, August 5.

1. The Department recognizes the special situation described to you by Molotov and cannot of course press the Soviet Government to do anything which it considers inimical to its own interests. The United States Government is however obliged to leave no stone unturned in an effort to avoid any unnecessary delay in getting urgently needed relief supplies to American prisoners of war who are dying at an alarming rate in the Far East owing to lack of necessary medicines. While the United States Government is doing everything

⁹⁰ The Swiss Legation in Japan conveyed this message to the Japanese Government in a note of August 11. As no reply had been received by September 6, the Swiss Legation again brought this matter to the attention of the Japanese Foreign Office.

possible through the Swiss Government representing its interests in Japan to work out a means acceptable to the Japanese Government by which such supplies may be sent to the Far East on a continuing basis, the increasing public pressure which is being brought upon the United States Government by the relatives and friends of these men is becoming politically embarrassing. It is being increasingly pointed out that since substantial shipments of lend-lease materials are being sent in American ships across the Pacific to the Soviet Union,⁹¹ it should be possible for the Government of the United States to arrange with the Soviet Government that comparatively modest amounts of relief supplies for our prisoners of war in the Far East be sent the same way to a point in Soviet Union from which they could be speedily transshipped to Japan as soon as satisfactory arrangements are completed between the United States and Japanese Governments.

2. It is vitally necessary that the United States Government attempt all feasible arrangements, however preliminary, to get supplies to our prisoners of war in Japan as soon as possible. The establishment of a stock pile of such supplies at a point in the Soviet Union whence they could be speedily transshipped to Japan once arrangements are completed would answer criticisms both of the United States Government for its alleged failure to make such arrangements and of the Soviet Government for its refusal to cooperate to this extent. While the United States Government recognizes that there is no direct connection between the furnishing of lend-lease materials to Soviet Russia and the shipment of relief supplies to American prisoners of war in the Far East, the interested American public fails to make this distinction and the Government is finding it increasingly difficult to make this distinction clear in a way which will not reflect upon the Soviet Government's cooperative spirit.

3. The United States Government would therefore be grateful if the Soviet Government would again examine this matter in the foregoing light. To the end that it will be clearly of record that everything has been done which conceivably can be done to get relief supplies into Japanese territory at the earliest opportunity, United States Government would be grateful if the Soviet Government would agree to an exchange of notes at the time of the signing of the Third Soviet Protocol⁹² and in connection therewith substantially as follows:⁹³

⁹¹ For correspondence concerning the assistance from the United States for the Soviet Union, see pp. 737 ff.

⁹² Signed at London on October 19, 1943; see telegram No. 1660, October 20, from the Chargé in the Soviet Union, p. 780.

⁹³ The bases for much of the following proposals were contained in a letter of August 3, 1943, from Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson, to the Secretary of State. (711.94114 Supplies/6).

4. "(a) The Soviet Government will ship in Soviet vessels (along with lend-lease material delivered to it pursuant to the Protocols) approximately 1500 short tons per month of relief supplies from the West Coast of the United States across the Pacific to the Soviet Union, such supplies to be made available through the American Red Cross.

(b) When arrangements shall have been made such supplies will be transshipped to Japan or Japanese-controlled territories for delivery to the International Red Cross or to other authorities mutually agreeable to the United States and Japanese Governments.

(c) The shipment of relief supplies for American and other Allied prisoners of war by the Soviet Union as provided above shall not reduce the quantity of goods to be supplied to the Soviet Union by the United States under the Third Protocol, nor shall it reduce the amount of shipping to be made available under such Protocol.

(d) The Soviet Government will accept no responsibility for deterioration or spoilage of the supplies during their shipment across the Pacific or during their temporary stay in the Soviet Union, pending transshipment to Japan or Japanese-controlled areas."

5. Without awaiting the formal exchange of notes, which, in the discretion of the Soviet Government, may be done independently of or simultaneously with the Third Soviet Protocol, the United States Government proposes that the shipment of the supplies under consideration begin at the earliest possible moment.

6. If preferred by the Soviet Government, such supplies could be consigned to the American Consul General at Vladivostok⁹⁴ to be held by him until satisfactory shipping arrangements can be made onward to Japan.

7. United States Government again expresses its deep appreciation of the Soviet Government's reiterated expression of a readiness to assist in the transportation of relief supplies to Japan once the United States and Japanese Governments have worked out a satisfactory arrangement.

8. An urgent reply would be greatly appreciated.

9. For the Ambassador. The Department leaves to your discretion the presentation of this matter to the Soviet Government in such manner as in your opinion is best designed to obtain its agreement, using such of the statements in paragraphs 1 and 2 as you may deem advisable in the circumstances.⁹⁵

HULL

⁹⁴ Angus I. Ward.

⁹⁵ Ambassador Standley reported in telegram No. 1142, August 23, 3 p. m. that he had left a note on August 21 with Molotov which set forth the views and proposals of the United States Government; that Molotov had promised immediate consideration and had given assurance that the "Soviet Government desired to be of all possible assistance". (711.94114 Supplies/16)

711.94114 Mail/7 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Standley)*

WASHINGTON, August 20, 1943—6 p. m.

726. Embassy's 1065, August 12. Inform Soviet Foreign Office that ordinary postal correspondence of prisoners of war and civilian internees held by the United States and Japanese Governments has been exchanged since the outbreak of war by various routes including one established by the Universal Postal Union with the cooperation of the Soviet authorities between Basel and Tokyo via Istanbul, Tiflis, and Siberia. Exchange of mail has been in accordance with Articles 36-41 of Geneva Convention of 1929⁹⁶ which United States and Japanese Governments have mutually agreed to apply to prisoners of war and civilian internees. United States Post Office approach to Soviet postal authorities is effort in accordance with Convention to establish more reliable and expeditious route for such mail and is not to be confused with efforts to establish route for bulk relief shipments to Far East.

Repeat request for urgent consideration.⁹⁷

WELLES

711.94114 Supplies/16 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Standley)*

WASHINGTON, August 30, 1943—9 p. m.

771. Your 1142, August 23.⁹⁸ Following for the Ambassador's strictly confidential and personal information.

Concurrently with the negotiations conducted through diplomatic channels in an effort to arrange for the shipment of prisoner of war relief supplies to Vladivostok on the Soviet vessels, the War Department took up this question with the Soviet Purchasing Commission in the United States. In reply to the War Department's representations, Major General Belyaev, Chairman of the Commission, sent a letter on August 26⁹⁹ to General Somervell¹ which reads in paraphrase as follows:

"In regard to your request that relief supplies for American prisoners held by the Japanese be shipped to Vladivostok, I am pleased

⁹⁶ *Foreign Relations*, 1929, vol. I, pp. 336, 345-346.

⁹⁷ The substance of this telegram was communicated to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs by the Embassy in the Soviet Union in a note of August 23 (711.94114 Mail/25).

⁹⁸ Not printed, but see footnote 95, p. 813.

⁹⁹ Not printed.

¹ Lt. Gen. Brehon B. Somervell, Commanding General, U.S. Army Service Forces.

to tell you that the Soviet Government, without awaiting the conclusion of a formal agreement between the United States and Japan concerning the onward movement of these supplies, is ready to begin carrying such supplies to Vladivostok.

In order that these shipments may be effected, we would like to have the following information: (1) Kind of goods; (2) Volume of supplies; (3) Nature of marking and packing; and (4) Date when goods may be expected at Portland."

The War Department is satisfied with this reply and intends to start sending supplies to Vladivostok without delay. As the War Department has requested that nothing be done to disturb the present arrangements, it does not seem advisable for the present that you press the Foreign Office for an answer to your note. If future developments require further negotiation through diplomatic channels in this matter, the Department will advise you accordingly.

HULL

711.94114 Supplies/18 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, September 4, 1943—1 p. m.

[Received September 6—5:07 a. m.]

1264. My 1142, August 23, 3 p. m.² I received late the night of September 3 a note from Molotov dated September 2, the most important sections of which read in paraphrased translation as follows:³

"The Soviet Government has already expressed its readiness to render all possible assistance to American Government in forwarding supplies and medicines to American prisoners of war in Japan. It again confirms its readiness to render all necessary assistance not only in providing storage facilities for supplies which might arrive the Soviet Union for onward shipment to Japan but also in the transportation of these supplies. It sees no reason to fear delay on part of Soviet authorities in making arrangements connected with delivery of supplies to transfer point for onward shipment to Japan as soon as this question is settled between American and Japanese Governments. It is prepared at same time to meet the wishes of American Government and to accepting [in] Soviet warehouses, prior to the regulation of question between American and Japanese Governments, a monthly stock of supplies in the amount of 1500 tons. It is also prepared to instruct the appropriate Soviet authorities with respect to the acceptance by them for storage in Soviet warehouses of the more necessary medical supplies concerning which reference is made in Embassy's note of July 9. Department's 531, July 7, 6 p. m. The

² Not printed, but see footnote 95, p. 813.

³ Full translation of the note was transmitted to the Department by the Ambassador in the Soviet Union in his despatch No. 256, September 17, 1943 (not printed).

Soviet Government considers it necessary to point out that the reference to the effect that interested persons and public opinion in the United States 'are inclined to criticize Soviet Government at what they regard as lack of readiness to cooperate in this matter' is evidently explained by insufficient or incorrect information of sections of American public regarding actual position of Soviet Government in matter. It is clear that Soviet Government cannot assume responsibility for situation.

Furthermore Soviet Government sees no direct connection between furnishing of Lend-Lease supplies and delivery of supplies to American prisoners of war. It consequently sees no basis for statement that American Government finds it embarrassing to explain distinction in these questions in such a way as not to reflect upon cooperative spirit of Soviet Government.

With respect to American proposal to exchange notes on delivery of supplies at time of signing of Third Protocol or independently thereof, the Soviet Government does not object to the latter proposal."

Your 77 [771], August 30, 9 p. m., was received on afternoon of September 3.

STANDLEY

711.94114 Supplies/21 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, September 9, 1943—6 p. m.

[Received September 10—1:35 p. m.]

1321. Your 771, August 30, 9 p. m., and my 1264, September 4, 1 p. m. I have for a number of months pursuant to instructions taken up actively with the Soviet Government the question of my Government's desire to send medical and other much needed supplies to American prisoners of war in Jap custody. At each stage I have reported the attitude of the Soviet Government. For months no real progress resulted. This is evidenced in the written replies made by the Soviet Government. Recently our Government decided to present this matter again to the Soviet Government and in so doing to mention the Third Protocol and Lend-Lease shipments from the United States to the Soviet Union. Concurrently the War Department made representations to General Belyaev. On August 26 General Belyaev replied to the War Department stating that the Soviet Government was ready to begin carrying the supplies in question. On September 2 the Soviet Government, while making statements not accurately descriptive of its previous attitude, replied to the representations made on August 21 through diplomatic channels and agreed to our Government's proposal.

The record on this important subject confirms me in the belief that the sound procedure for our Government to follow in its relations with the Soviet Government is to present matters in such a way that there will be constantly visible in the picture what each is doing for the other and what each is expecting of the other. These factors should always be readily apparent in the channels of contact flowing both to and from our respective countries. If we can by choice of instrumentalities, by the circumstances of our approach, and by unity of purpose cause the Soviet Government to have these various factors in mind and to see that our Government has them in mind, we shall contribute measureably toward attaining the results we desire.

STANDLEY

711.94114 Supplies/18 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Standley)*

WASHINGTON, September 11, 1943—10 p. m.

835. Your 1264, September 4, 1 p. m. Please express to the appropriate Soviet authorities this Government's grateful appreciation of the Soviet Government's kind acquiescence to the United States Government's request for authorization to begin immediately shipments of relief supplies destined for the use of American and other Allied nationals in Japanese custody in the Far East in Soviet vessels proceeding from the American West Coast to Vladivostok, such supplies to be held there until final arrangements with the Japanese Government concerning their onward transmission shall have been made.

It appears from the text of the Soviet note, as paraphrased in your reference telegram, that the Soviet Government has gained the impression that this Government was motivated, in part at least, in re-opening this matter by a fear that there might be some delay on the part of the Soviet authorities in connection with delivery of supplies to the transfer point for onward shipment to Japan when arrangements with the Japanese Government in this regard shall have been completed. Please inform the appropriate Soviet authorities, in connection with the expression of gratitude mentioned above, that this Government had not the slightest thought in this respect and was motivated solely by a desire to save the time that would be required, when the arrangements with the Japanese Government shall have been completed, in shipping relief supplies from the United States to the Soviet Union by having the supplies in storage on Soviet territory at a point near Japanese-controlled territory so that they

may be forwarded into the prison camps with a minimum of delay as soon as the necessary arrangements with Japan are completed.

In answer to the Soviet Government's suggestion that the American public has not been sufficiently or correctly informed of the actual position of the Soviet Government, you might point out that the Department made public announcement, by a press release on July 17,⁴ of the Soviet Government's readiness to assist with the shipment of medicines and other relief supplies to American prisoners of war and internees in the Far East by facilitating the shipment of such supplies through Soviet territory to Japan in case satisfactory arrangements should be made by the United States with Japan. Nevertheless the public, knowing that Soviet ships are plying from our West Coast to Vladivostok with Lend-Lease supplies, has insisted that those ships could carry relief supplies for storage on Soviet territory against the time when they could be expeditiously forwarded to Japan for our people in Japanese custody. The assent of the Soviet Government to such shipments will terminate that insistence and relieve this Government of criticism for failure to expedite the shipment of the supplies as far as we are able. It should be noted in this connection that the supplies are to include supplies for the other United Nations prisoners in Japanese custody.

HULL

711.94114 Supplies/31 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, September 14, 1943—10 p. m.

[Received September 15—2:45 p. m.]

1357. Department's 835, September 11, 10 p. m. From a careful reading of the Soviet note of September 2 paraphrased in my 1264 September 4, 1 p. m., it is clear that several statements were made by

⁴ In this press release (Department of State *Bulletin*, July 17, 1943, p. 31) it was noted that the *Gripsholm* was expected to start soon upon its second voyage to the Far East and to carry "several months' supply of medicines and concentrated foodstuffs" along with "Japanese nationals to be exchanged for American civilians". Supplies and mail were shipped from the United States on the *Gripsholm* for prisoners of war and civilian internees. These articles were carried to the port of Mormugão on the Goa peninsula in Portuguese India where they were transferred in October to the Japanese exchange ship *Teia Maru*. This ship called only at Singapore, Manila, and Yokohama, but not at Hong Kong and Shanghai as earlier expected. Cargo consigned to these two ports was carried through to Yokohama in December, where it was unloaded for later transshipment. Because of unanticipated delay in the onward movement, the Department on January 10, 1944, requested the Swiss Government to urge Japan to forward the supplies and mail by such other means as might be available.

the Foreign Office which do not conform entirely with my note of August 21 or which draw inferences unwarranted. Among these are the Soviet statements on possible delay on the part of Soviet authorities in arranging for delivery of supplies to a transfer shipping point and the information on the Soviet position possessed by the American public. I do not feel however that these divergencies are of sufficient importance to warrant a reply. The central objective of obtaining Soviet agreement to the accumulation of stockpiles on Soviet territory for immediate transshipment upon the completion of arrangements between the United States and Japan has been accomplished and in my opinion to continue discussion of nonessential points would serve no useful purpose. I would therefore suggest that the Department approve confining my reply to the Soviet authorities to a simple expression of appreciation of the agreement to the American request.⁵ In such a reply I can include the substance of the last sentence of your telegram under reference.

STANDLEY

711.94114 Mail/25 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Hamilton) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, September 25, 1943—4 p. m.

[Received September 25—2: 20 p. m.]

1468. Department's 726, August 20, 6 p. m. The considerations set forth in the Department's telegram under reference were communicated to the Foreign Office in the Embassy's note of August 23 and the Foreign Office was requested to give the matter urgent attention. The Embassy subsequent[ly] referred to the matter in conversations at the Foreign Office and requested that action be expedited. A note dated September 22 has now been received from the Foreign Office which replies not to the Embassy's note of August 23 but to its previous note of July 29 and contains essentially the same information as reported in the Embassy's telegram 1065, August 12, 3 p. m. This fact was brought to the attention of the chief of the American Section of the Foreign Office⁶ yesterday who replied that the matter was not being handled in his section but stated that he would investigate the matter and see that a reply was made to the Embassy's note of August 23.⁷

HAMILTON

⁵ In telegram No. 901, September 24, 6 p. m., the Department approved the procedure here proposed by Ambassador Standley.

⁶ Georgy Nikolayevich Zarubin.

⁷ In telegram No. 1178, November 8, 10 p. m., the Department requested that the Soviet Government be again asked to hasten a reply on this subject.

740.00114A Pacific War/556 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland
(Harrison)*

WASHINGTON, September 30, 1943.

2393. Department's 1187, May 18,⁸ and 1880, August 6; your 2179, April 7,⁹ and 5034, August 17.¹⁰ Please request Swiss Government in reference to communication submitted to Japanese Government on May 26 to present to Japanese Government a communication in the following sense:

"The Government of the United States desires to inform the Japanese Government that the Soviet Government, in implementation of its agreement to permit the passage through Soviet territory of relief supplies destined for Allied prisoners of war and civilian internees in Japanese custody in the Far East, including the Philippine Islands, is in fact now receiving on Soviet territory 1500 weight tons per month of relief supplies from the United States, to be held for onward shipment to Japan for distribution to Allied prisoners of war and civilian internees. The fact that supplies are moving forward should serve to disabuse the Japanese Government of any doubts it may have had whether the shipment via Soviet territory of supplies for the relief of Allied nationals in the Far East, as suggested by the Japanese Government itself, was feasible. The Government of the United States, therefore, looks forward to the early receipt from the Japanese Government of a reply to the communication submitted to the Japanese Government by the Swiss Legation at Tokyo on May 26 last, to which thus far no reply has been received."

Please request most urgent treatment of this matter and inform Department of date above communication delivered to Japanese Government¹¹ and, if possible, when a reply may be expected.

BERLE

711.94114 Supplies/18 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union (Hamilton)

WASHINGTON, October 2, 1943—midnight.

959. Reference your 1264, September 4. Pursuant to the authorization set forth in Soviet Foreign Office note of September 2, Amcross¹² has begun making shipments to Vladivostok. Part of first shipment of 1500 tons is leaving Spokane immediately in a Soviet

⁸ Quoted in the Department's telegram No. 365, May 26, 9 p. m., to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, p. 803.

⁹ *Post*, p. 1019.

¹⁰ Not printed.

¹¹ The Legation in Switzerland advised the Department in telegram No. 6456, October 14, that the Swiss had informed the Japanese Government of this communication on October 9 (740.00114A Pacific War/572).

¹² American Red Cross.

vessel and it is expected that balance will follow promptly in several vessels. Expected to arrive Vladivostok last part October. 1500 tons will be shipped monthly thereafter. It is assumed that Soviet port authorities have been informed by Soviet Government in regard to these shipments and have been instructed to warehouse them. Please verify.

Efforts are continuing to arrive at agreement with Japanese as to onward movement of these supplies.

Please inform Consulate General at Vladivostok that these shipments are enroute and give him complete background of agreement with Soviet Government. Also inform him that present shipment includes 100 tons medical supplies which should be stored in semi-heated warehouse as otherwise fluids might breed [*freeze*].

Consulate General should inform Department of storage arrangements made and of arrival and disposition of relief supplies at Vladivostok.¹³

HULL

711.94114 Supplies/58 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, November 1, 1943—5 p. m.

1146. Amcross has informed Department that representative of Soviet Purchasing Commission at Portland has for the time being refused to allocate any further space for shipments of relief supplies to Vladivostok for forwarding, when possible, to Allied nationals in Japanese custody.

Pursuant to the Soviet Government's note of September 2 to the Embassy, Amcross now has at Portland 12 cars of relief supplies awaiting shipment and another 33 cars en route to Portland from inland points. The Japanese Government has been informed that the Soviet Government is now receiving on Soviet territory 1500 weight tons per month of relief supplies from the United States to be held there for onward shipment to Japan for distribution to Allied prisoners of war and civilian internees and has again been urged to inform this Government of the means by which the Japanese

¹³ The Consulate General at Vladivostok reported through the Embassy in Moscow that arrangements had been made locally for the storage of supplies in warehouses, including heated storage for items that could freeze. The first supplies had arrived on October 19. The Consulate General further pointed out that "its steps to prevent pilferage will be greatly facilitated if it can be advised by telegraph by the Department of each shipment together with the name of the vessel and the numbers of the bills of lading on the supplies." (711.94114 Supplies/53) The arrival and storage of later shipments were also reported through the Embassy in Moscow on December 23 (711.94114 Supplies/78).

Government is prepared to receive these supplies. Thus far no answer to this message has been received.¹⁴

With the foregoing information in mind, please endeavor to ascertain whether the central authorities have issued any instructions concerning suspension of relief shipments to Vladivostok and if so the reasons therefor.

STETTINIUS

711.94114 Supplies/60 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, November 7, 1943—2 p. m.

[Received 8:23 p. m.]

1869. Your 1146, November 1, 5 p. m. On November 4 we took this matter up at the Foreign Office. We were asked whether cars of relief supplies now at Portland and cars en route to Portland represented more than the 1500 tons which the Soviet Government had agreed to forward to Vladivostok to be held for onward shipment to Japan. The Foreign Office pointed out that the Soviet Government had agreed to accept one month's stock of supplies, namely, 1500 tons prior to the working out of arrangements between the American Government and the Japanese Government for onward shipment of these supplies from Vladivostok to Japan. The Foreign Office stated that the Soviet Government's agreement did not cover shipments in addition to the amount for one month unless and until an agreement for onward shipment had been arrived at between the American and the Japanese Governments. The Foreign Office stated that according to its information 500 tons had already arrived at Vladivostok; that 1,000 tons were at Portland awaiting shipment; that the Soviet representative at Portland had been instructed to arrange for the shipment of a total of 1500 tons of supplies including those already shipped; and that if any difficulty had arisen in regard to the 1500 tons which the Soviet Government had agreed to accept, further instructions would be issued to the Soviet representatives at Portland to carry out the Soviet Government's original instruction. We pointed

¹⁴During this period the International Red Cross at Geneva, the Japanese Red Cross, and local representatives were seriously concerned to obtain a prompt arrangement with the Japanese which would provide a method for forwarding to Japan the relief supplies from the United States being received on Soviet territory for distribution among the Allied prisoners of war. Despite persistent efforts Japanese cooperation had not been obtained, and no reply had been received to inquiries addressed to the Japanese Government in regard to making arrangements to receive and distribute relief supplies. The Minister in Switzerland stated in his telegram No. 7129, November 13, that "it seems evident that obstructionist militaristic Japanese policy prevails and that really constructive proposals for breaking this down other than by the slow and painful process of persistence are lacking." (711.94114 Supplies/65)

out to the Foreign Office that possibly a misunderstanding had arisen as to whether the Soviet Government's agreement to the United States Government's proposal was restricted to acceptance of only one month's supplies (1500 tons) prior to the conclusion of an agreement by the United States Government with the Japanese Government for onward shipment to Japan. The Soviet Foreign Office officials were insistent that the Soviet Government's agreement to our proposal covered only one month's shipment prior to the working out of an agreement with Japan. Officers of the Embassy are of the opinion that the Soviet Foreign Office's attitude is in conformity with the text of the Foreign Office note of September 2 (see the Embassy's telegram 1264, September 4, 1 p. m., and the Embassy's despatch number 256, September 17¹⁵). We recommend that we not endeavor to increase the stockpile at Vladivostok beyond 1500 tons until agreement with Japan has been reached.

HARRIMAN

711.94114 Mail/34 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, November 11, 1943—5 p. m.

[Received November 12—10:52 a. m.]

1915. Department's 1178, November 8, 10 p. m.¹⁶ The Embassy has still received no reply to its note of August 23 to which reference was made in the Embassy's telegram 1468, September 25, 4 p. m. The matter was discussed again with the Foreign Office on November 10. The Chief of the American Section stated that it was his impression that mail sent overland through the Soviet Union, to which reference was made in the Department's 726, August 20, 6 p. m., was piling up in Soviet Pacific ports pending completion of arrangements for its onward shipment to Japan. He promised to investigate this matter and communicate further with the Embassy. He made it clear that the Soviet Government, while ready to cooperate in the transmission of mail to prisoners of war and civilian internees in Japan, is anxious that such mail not accumulate in Soviet ports. He inquired concerning the present status of negotiations with the Japanese Government for the receipt of both mail and parcels for Americans detained in Japan and whether similar privileges were extended to Japanese subjects in American custody. Zarubin was informed that the Embassy has no recent information on these points but that it was assumed that the negotiations with the Japanese had not yet been satisfactorily completed and that Japanese subjects in

¹⁵ Latter not printed, but see footnote 3, p. 815.

¹⁶ Not printed, but see footnote 7, p. 819.

the United States if not already receiving parcels and mail would be permitted to do so upon the granting of reciprocal privileges to Americans detained in Japan.

HARRIMAN

711.94114 Supplies/69 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, November 24, 1943—2 p. m.

[Received November 25—1:10 p. m.]

2035. Embassy's 1869, November 7, 2 p. m. A memorandum on this subject was handed to Hamilton on November 23 by the Chief of American Section of the Foreign Office. The memorandum confirms the oral statements of Foreign Office reported in telegram under reference and states that there must have been some misunderstanding "inasmuch as it was contemplated that the transport of the above-mentioned 1500 tons of cargo would be fully adequate to assure the first rapid shipment to Japan of foodstuffs and medical supplies as soon as an agreement was reached between the Japanese and American Governments".

The memorandum concludes: "The Soviet Government considers that on basis of the considerations set forth above, there is no further necessity for further shipment to Vladivostok of cargoes above the agreed monthly stock for storage, having particularly in mind that this would entail the unproductive overfilling of the warehouses."

Zarubin stated that 500 tons supplies have already arrived at Vladivostok and that the remaining 1000 tons are on the point of leaving Portland, if they have not already been shipped. He said that he had been instructed to assure United States Embassy that the Soviet Government is prepared to cooperate in arranging further shipments as soon as an agreement between American and Japanese Governments is reached.

HARRIMAN

711.94114 Supplies/70a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, November 24, 1943.

2908. American interests Japan. Your 2179, April 7;¹⁷ Department's to Bern 1187, May 18;¹⁸ your 5034, August 17;¹⁹ Department's

¹⁷ *Post*, p. 1019.

¹⁸ Quoted in Department's telegram No. 365, May 26, 9 p.m., to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, p. 803.

¹⁹ Not printed.

2393, September 30; your 6456, October 14.²⁰ Please request Swiss Government to deliver communication to Japanese Government in following sense:

"In April 1943 the Japanese Government, with reference to several proposals set forth by the United States Government under which relief supplies for American and other Allied prisoners of war and civilian internees in Japanese custody might be forwarded from this country to Japan, stated 'If American Government disposed send Vladivostok correspondence and packages for American internees either by Soviet ship or by land across Siberia, Japanese Government ready examine possibility relieving present situation.'

In a communication presented to the Japanese Government by the Swiss Legation, Tokyo, on May 26 United States Government stated that the Soviet Government 'has expressed to the United States Government a readiness to extend assistance in arranging for the movement of relief supplies and mail to American prisoners of war and civilian internees in Japanese controlled areas subject to the condition that the United States and Japanese Governments reach a suitable understanding on this question' and inquired 'by what means the Japanese Government proposes that supplies sent from the United States to Vladivostok shall be moved from Vladivostok to Japan or Japanese-controlled territories.'

No reply has been received to the communication presented to the Japanese Government on May 26, although repeated efforts have been made by the Swiss Government, at the instance of the United States Government, to obtain a statement from the Japanese Government in regard to this matter.

On October 9, the Swiss Legation, Tokyo, at the request of the United States Government, presented a further communication to the Japanese Government in which it was stated that the Soviet Government had agreed to accept relief supplies intended for distribution to Allied Prisoners of war and civilian internees in Japanese custody in advance of the completion of final arrangements in respect of their onward movement to Japan, and that shipments of supplies to the Soviet Union were in fact then being made. It was pointed out in that communication that 'the fact that supplies are moving forward should serve to disabuse the Japanese Government of any doubts it may have had whether the shipment via Soviet territory of supplies for the relief of Allied nationals in the East as suggested by the Japanese Government itself was feasible.' Although an early reply to this communication was requested, no reply thus far has been received.

Supplies have actually reached Vladivostok and are now awaiting transshipment to Japan. The United States Government cannot proceed unilaterally in this matter and points out to the Japanese Government that until the latter shall have made known to the United States Government the means by which the Japanese Government proposes that relief supplies be forwarded, on a continuing basis, from Soviet territory to a point where the supplies may be received by the Japanese authorities for distribution to Allied prisoners of war and civilian internees in their custody, the proposal advanced to the United States Government by the Japanese Government cannot

²⁰ Telegram No. 6456 not printed, but see footnote 11, p. 820.

be fully implemented. The United States Government points out further that all the conditions set forth in the Japanese Government's proposal of last April have been met and urges that a reply to this communication be forwarded to the United States Government at an early date.

The relief supplies which were shipped on the *Gripsholm* and taken to Japanese territory on the *Teia Maru* for distribution will not last indefinitely. The United States Government therefore desires promptly to be informed where and how the Japanese authorities are willing to receive for distribution to prisoners of war and civilian internees in Japanese hands the supplemental relief supplies already at Vladivostok and those which the United States Government with the Soviet Government's permission proposes to forward through Soviet territory on a continuing basis. The United States Government will endeavor promptly to meet the Japanese Government's wishes with respect to moving these supplies to the point where the Japanese Government is willing to receive them for distribution, so that additional supplies may be made available on a continuing basis when the supplies sent in the exchange ships shall have been consumed."

Please inform Department date this communication delivered to Japanese Government.²¹

HULL

711.94114 Mail/34 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, December 7, 1943—7 p. m.

1357. It appears from the Embassy's 1915 of November 11 that the Soviet Foreign Office may not be fully informed of the status of the exchange of prisoner of war and civilian internee mail between the United States and Japan. The following information is supplied for use by the Embassy in further discussions in effort to obtain the consent of the Soviet authorities to shipments of prisoner of war and civilian internee mail from United States West Coast ports to Vladivostok for onward transmission to Japan.

1. As noted in the Department's 726 of August 20 ordinary postal correspondence (not parcels or bulk relief supplies) of prisoners of war and civilian internees held respectively by the United States and Japan has been exchanged since the outbreak of war by various routes. Agreement covering this exchange is embodied in the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention of 1929 which United States and Japan have mutually agreed to apply to civilian internees as well as to prisoners of war.

²¹ The Minister in Switzerland informed the Department by telegram No. 7627, December 6, 1943, that the Swiss Government had delivered this communication to the Japanese Government on November 30 (711.94114 Supplies/72).

2. Prisoner of war mail has been exchanged between New York and Tokyo via Intercross²² in Geneva which uses Basel, Istanbul, Tiflis, and Siberia route which is now open according to Intercross. Prisoner of war and civilian internee mails of the United States and Japan have also been exchanged at Lourenço Marques and Mormugão in connection with civilian exchange operations.

3. According to Intercross mail to Japan via Tiflis apparently has not been accumulating in the Soviet Union but has been reaching Japan (your 1915 of November 11). The precise route used by Soviet postal authorities as forwarding intermediary for this mail is not known.

4. The willingness of the Soviet postal administration in early June to provide an intermediary service for prisoner of war and civilian internee mail to Japan (Department's 617 of July 28) suggests that at that time the Soviet postal authorities had in mind a method for its onward transmission to Japan and that this mail would not accumulate in Soviet ports.

5. The American authorities desire to obtain the consent of the Soviet authorities to the shipment of prisoner of war and civilian internee mail to Japan from United States West Coast ports via Vladivostok in order to expedite the transmission of this mail. Geneva, Tiflis, Siberia route consumes 4 to 8 months.

6. The transmission of prisoner of war and civilian internee mail should not be confused with the transmission of parcels and relief supplies, intended for Allied prisoners of war in Japanese custody, from United States West Coast ports to Vladivostok for retention there until final arrangements for their onward transmission to Japan shall have been worked out between the United States and Japanese Governments. Efforts to arrive at an agreement with the Japanese concerning the onward transmission of these supplies, as noted in the Department's 959 of October 2, are continuing.

7. Foreign Office may be informed that United States Government accords full reciprocity in regard to receipt of parcels and mail by Japanese nationals in United States custody. Mail and parcels which have been sent from Japan to the United States have been and will continue to be distributed to addressees as expeditiously as possible subject to usual security regulations. The opening of a channel of transmission through Vladivostok would serve to speed the exchange of mail and parcels addressed both to Japanese and American nationals in custody of the adverse party.

8. The representative of the Soviet Purchasing Commission in the United States at Portland, Oregon, has informed the United States postal authorities that prisoner of war and civilian internee mail cannot be accepted on Soviet vessels from Portland to Vladivostok with-

²² International Red Cross.

out special authority from the Soviet Embassy in Washington. In view of your efforts Department has not approached Soviet Embassy.

HULL

711.94114 Mail/40 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, December 15, 1943—1 p. m.
[Received December 16—6:30 a. m.]

2236. The considerations set forth in the Department's 1357, December 7, 7 p. m., were communicated to the Foreign Office in a memorandum dated December 11. The matter was discussed with Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs Lozovsky on December 15 at which time the great interest of the American Government in this question was emphasized and a favorable decision at an early date requested. Lozovsky promised to give the matter his attention.

For the Department's information the Embassy has discussed with the British Embassy here the procedure followed in transmitting mail to British prisoners of war and civilian internees in Japan and has been informed that it is based upon permission obtained by the British from the Japanese Government in June 1942 through the Swiss Government, the protecting power. The British have endeavored to obtain the consent of the Soviet Government to forward mail to persons in Japan other than prisoners of war or civilian internees and to send parcels to prisoners of war and civilian internees. The Soviet Government has declined to assist in the transmission of such mail in the absence of special arrangements made by the British with the Japanese Government, which to date has not been reached.

HARRIMAN

711.94114 Supplies/58 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)

WASHINGTON, December 15, 1943—8 p. m.

1408. For your information the Department has again addressed a note to the Japanese Government (reference Department's 1146, November 1, and previous cables) requesting to be advised of the means by which the stock of supplies already on hand at Vladivostok may be forwarded to American prisoners. The Department concurs with your recommendation that no endeavor be made to increase the stock pile at Vladivostok beyond 1500 tons until agreement with Japan has been reached.

HULL

DIFFICULTIES WITH THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT OVER THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE REGISTRATION OF AGENTS IN THE UNITED STATES OF FOREIGN PRINCIPALS, AND THE EXCLUSION FROM THE MAILS OF SOVIET PUBLICATIONS AS PROPAGANDA ²³

800.01B11 Registration/1584

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle)

[WASHINGTON,] March 1, 1943.

I took up on the telephone with Mr. L. M. C. Smith ²⁴ the complaint of Tass ²⁵ that paragraph (b) of Rule 303, the Regulations under the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, ²⁶ was offensive to the Soviet Government. The gist of the complaint was that foreign press services and associations were exempt from registration except where they were not "bona fide"; and that such associations, when they were owned by foreign governments, ceased to be "bona fide".

Mr. Smith had already been apprised of the complaint of Tass. He readily agreed to the idea of redrafting section 303 (b) so as to eliminate use of the word "bona fide". He pointed out that this would not relieve Tass from registering; and, indeed, they did not object to that. It would, however, remove any implication that they were not "bona fide". ²⁷

The Department of Justice does not believe that the British AP, ²⁸ British UP ²⁹ and Reuters are in the same category. These are privately owned. If they are controlled by the Government, it is merely in the nature of a normal control of censorship, plus their voluntary acceptance, when they do, of the point of view of government spokesmen. The Department of Justice does not want to abrogate the dis-

²³ For previous correspondence on these subjects, see *Foreign Relations, The Soviet Union, 1933-1939*, pp. 926 ff.; *Foreign Relations, 1941*, vol. I, pp. 699-759, *passim*; and *ibid.*, 1942, vol. III, pp. 442-443 and 453.

²⁴ Chief of the Special War Policies Unit, Department of Justice.

²⁵ Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union, official communication organization of the Soviet Government. The Tass complaint in the form of a letter from Mr. Kenneth Durant, manager of Tass in New York, was presented by Mr. Lawrence Todd, representative of Tass in Washington, to Mr. Loy W. Henderson, Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs, on February 26, 1943.

²⁶ Approved June 8, 1938; 52 Stat. 631. Approved, as amended, April 29, 1942 (effective June 28, 1942), 56 Stat. 248. For paragraph (b) of Rule 303 of the Regulations issued on June 23, 1942, see 7 *Federal Register* 4720, or Department of Justice, *The Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938 as Amended and the Rules and Regulations Prescribed by the Attorney General* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1942), p. 26.

²⁷ In a memorandum of February 26, 1943, to Assistant Secretary of State Berle, the Acting Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Atherton) had agreed that the wording was unfortunate and suggested that Mr. Berle might be able to prevail upon an officer of the Department of Justice to have it changed "so that the inference cannot be drawn that persons employed by press associations owned in whole by foreign governments are not acting in good faith." (800.01B11 Registration/1583)

²⁸ Associated Press.

²⁹ United Press.

inction which was made under the Act between press agencies owned by a government and therefore dedicated to foreign government policy, and private press agencies presumably dedicated to gathering the news and disseminating it. They also point out they have not the slightest proof that British AP, British UP and Reuters are actually "controlled" by the British Government within the meaning of the Act.

A[DOLF] A. B[ERLE], JR.

800.01B11 Registration/1598

*The Embassy of the Soviet Union to the Department of State*³⁰

MEMORANDUM

In the course of 1941 and 1942 the Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics more than once made representations to the State Department in connection with non-delivery, destruction and return to the senders by the American postal authorities of Soviet newspapers and books, sent from the Soviet Union and addressed to American scientific, cultural and other organizations and persons. It must be stated regretfully that these representations were of no avail, as printed matter from the Soviet Union is even now not delivered to the addressees. At the same time, neither private persons nor organizations are in a position to get printed matter from the Soviet Union through American bookshops. The "Four Continent Book Corporation"³¹ which specializes in sale of Soviet books and newspapers is prevented from using American mails for carrying out the orders it receives, and it has been demanded by the Department of Justice that not only the corporation should register as an agent of foreign government but Soviet publishing houses on the territory of the Soviet Union as well.

In addition, the bookshop is demanded in case of registration to label all Soviet printed matter as "propaganda not approved by the American Government."

An analogous demand was made by the Department of Justice also to the Inter-Continent News, a telegraph agency supplying a number of American periodicals with telegraphic information from the Soviet Union and transmitting information from the United States to Soviet papers.

³⁰ Left at the Department on March 4 by the Soviet Ambassador, Maxim Maximovich Litvinov.

³¹ A New York outlet for Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga, International Book Company, the central distributor for Soviet publications in Moscow.

According to the information received by the Embassy, a demand to register as agents of a foreign government was made also to some periodicals printed in the United States in languages other than English (Polish, Lettish, Jewish (Yiddish), Finnish, etc.) if they desire to be allowed to receive telegraphic information from the Soviet Information Bureau in Moscow.

The above-mentioned rulings and demands are usually upheld by the State Department and the Department of Justice by references to the existing laws on subversive propaganda and to The Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938. However, these acts do not and cannot give concrete definitions as to what printed organs exactly may be included in the category of subversive propaganda and what persons exactly should in given cases be regarded as agents of foreign governments. In this respect the competent American authorities have ample scope for their own interpretation, judgment and classification. Unfortunately, almost in all cases concerning the circulation in this country of Soviet printed matter or information even of the most innocent kind, the most unfavorable judgments are passed.

As criteria by which the most competent authorities are evidently guided may be taken the following remarks contained in a letter of the Department of Justice to the above-mentioned "Four Continent Book Corporation", under the date of November 23, 1942, signed by Mr. Lawrence M. C. Smith, Chief of Special War Policies Unit, War Division and Mr. James R. Sharp of Foreign Agents Registration Section, a copy of which letter is in the possession of the Embassy.

Putting into the category of political propaganda an album of postcards with reproductions of pictures and photographs, the authors of the above-mentioned letter write:

"Many of the photographs in the 'Moscow Album' are of Soviet political leaders and the identifying material praises them in strong terms. The general effect of the book is obviously to produce a sympathetic attitude toward the Soviet Union and its Government."

Further, putting into the same category of propaganda a book entitled *Land of the Soviets* the above letter reads: "With respect to the *Land of the Soviets*, it appears to be a geographic survey of the Soviet Union, its industrial resources and accomplishments. The official point of view seems to be largely reflected, and the Government's achievements are stressed. The book contains no criticism of any possible weaknesses in the Government program. Here again it would appear that the obvious intent is to produce a sympathetic attitude for the Government of the U.S.S.R."

From these remarks it clearly follows that printed matter on the Soviet Union may be allowed for circulation in the United States only

if it does not contain any data or if it does not even allow any inferences favorable to the Soviet Union or its Government; or when it contains criticism and adverse information about the Soviet Union, its leaders and organizations. Bearing in mind such criteria, it is not surprising that the post office does not allow into the United States perfectly innocent scientific books and even books of fiction, and that such publications as *History of the Ukraine*, *History of Byzantium* and *Encyclopaedia of Literature* had been destroyed as testified by Assistant Postmaster General Mr. Smith W. Purdum, in his letter of August 6, 1942, to the People's Commissariat of Communications.

A similar tendency is patent in the attitude taken in regard to persons and corporations engaged in the distribution of Soviet publications, telegraphic agencies and even newspaper editors who are demanded to register as foreign agents. The "Four Continent Book Corporation" may serve as an example. It is neither an agent or an employee of the Soviet Government, it receives no remuneration from it, it is not subject to its regulations and laws, being a purely commercial organization getting commission on each book or paper it sells. Nevertheless it is demanded to register as a foreign agent, in spite of the fact that other American bookshops trade in books printed abroad, including official publications, without being forced to register as foreign agents.

In addition to the above it seems appropriate to cite the following fact. During the last twenty years the Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union (Tass) has had correspondents in New York and Washington. In the course of all these years there was never a doubt raised of their bona-fide activities as correspondents of a newspaper agency, and they enjoyed the position and privileges granted to all similar agencies. Tass agency has agreements with the Associated Press and the United Press providing that the correspondents of the contracting agencies should be bona-fide correspondents. Nevertheless, the Department of Justice is now inclined to cast doubt on their bona-fide status submitting the only Soviet Telegraph agency in this country to very serious consequences in connection with the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938.

The above-described judgments and actions of the American authorities cannot but be regarded as discriminatory with regard to the Soviet Union and creating obstacles to the maintenance of cultural relations and mutual information between the two countries and as incompatible with the present relations between the two countries, and are brought by the Embassy to the notice of the State Department under instructions of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs.

WASHINGTON, March 3, 1943.

800.01B11 Registration/1597

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] March 4, 1943.

The Soviet Ambassador called to see me today at his request. The Ambassador handed me the memorandum attached herewith³² which is self-explanatory. The Ambassador spoke at some length about the apparent intention of many minor officials of the United States Government to prejudice relations between the Soviet Union and the United States notwithstanding the public and repeated statements by high officials of this Government of their desire to see closer and more understanding relations created.

I said that with regard to the point taken up in this memorandum, I was frankly uninformed; that if the facts were as stated in this memorandum, I felt that corrective measures should be instituted and that I would have an immediate survey undertaken.

The Ambassador also mentioned meetings recently held in Chicago,³³ listed on the sheet attached herewith,³⁴ attended by Mayor Kelly and by Lieutenant Governor Cross, in the course of which violent attacks had been made upon the Soviet Union. I said that of course I did not have to remind the Ambassador that these state and city officials were completely independent and in no sense under the control of the Federal Government and that when they spoke they spoke as state or city officials and not as officials of the Federal Government. I said that of course I regretted any attacks that may have been made upon the Soviet Union and that I wondered if the Ambassador remembered that not so many years ago, in the same city of Chicago, Mayor Thompson of that city had, in a public speech, stated that he intended to "kick the King of England in the snoot". I said that I was sure that the Ambassador would deplore such a statement as much as I and that he could understand that the Federal Government had not been responsible for it.

I told the Ambassador that I hoped to see him again in the next few days inasmuch as the President intended to make a communication of great importance to the Soviet Government in order to get its assistance and suggestions with regard to the first United Nations meeting which the President desired to have held in the United States. The Ambassador expressed the liveliest interest and said he would be

³² *Supra.*

³³ Mayor Edward J. Kelly of Chicago spoke at a meeting on February 14, and that evening attended a banquet where he signed a resolution which had been passed. Lieutenant Governor Hugh W. Cross of Illinois was a speaker soon afterwards at a banquet in the Blackstone Hotel, Chicago, attended by Antanas Smetona, former President of Lithuania, whose escape before the occupation of that country by the Soviet Union was reported by the Minister in Lithuania in telegram No. 111, June 16, 1940, *Foreign Relations*, 1940, vol. 1, p. 369.

³⁴ Not printed.

glad to come to see me in order to get full information about this matter whenever I let him know.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

800.01B11 Registration/1637

The Ambassador of the Soviet Union (Litvinov) to the Secretary of State

The Ambassador of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics presents his compliments to the Secretary of State and has the honor to transmit herewith Form FA-3F-6M filled out by the Amtorg Trading Corporation, 210 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y.,³⁵ and would appreciate it if the Secretary would transmit it to the Department of Justice.³⁶

WASHINGTON, April 29, 1943.

800.01B11 Registration/1644

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Welles)

[WASHINGTON,] May 7, 1943.

The Soviet Ambassador called to see me this afternoon in order to say good-by before he left.³⁷ The Ambassador arranged in my office with regard to his airplane transportation and seemed to be entirely satisfied with the arrangements to be made.

The Ambassador brought up again the matter which he had discussed with me some weeks before, namely, the prohibition placed by the Customs and Justice officials of this Government on the importation into the United States of Soviet books and periodicals. The Ambassador insisted again that these publications were in no sense propaganda and that present regulations made it impossible for the average American citizen to obtain any information with regard to the Soviet Union emanating from Russian sources. I told the Ambassador that after our prior conversation on this subject, I had immediately referred the matter to the appropriate officials of the Government who had had the matter under consideration ever since. I said I was sure that some satisfactory and equitable solution of this problem could be found.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

³⁵ Official purchasing and sales agency of the Soviet Union in the United States.

³⁶ This registration form was sent to the Department of Justice on May 8.

³⁷ See memorandum of the same date by the Under Secretary of State, p. 522.

800.01B11 Registration/1598

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador of the Soviet Union
(Litvinov)*

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the Ambassador of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and has the honor to refer to the memorandum left at the Department by the Ambassador on March 4, 1943 drawing attention to certain alleged instances of discrimination against organizations in the United States engaged in the dissemination of printed material emanating from the Soviet Union. In this memorandum the Ambassador cites a number of instances which in his opinion "cannot but be regarded as discriminatory with regard to the Soviet Union and creating obstacles to the maintenance of cultural relations and mutual information between the two countries and as incompatible with the present relations between the two countries and are brought by the Embassy to the notice of the State Department under instructions of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs".

Since the matters to which the Ambassador has reference in this memorandum fall within the competence of other Departments of the Government, the Secretary of State requested the Attorney General³⁸ to have a careful investigation made in the premises with a view to ascertaining whether there had been in fact any discrimination against the Soviet Union in the application of existing American laws regarding the registration of Foreign agents. A similar request was made of the Postmaster General³⁹ in regard to the alleged discriminatory action of the Postal authorities of the United States in connection with publications emanating from the Soviet Union.

The Secretary of State is now in a position to inform the Ambassador that the Attorney General after a thorough investigation in the premises has stated

"I am satisfied that the Ambassador is misinformed both as to the scope and effect of the Foreign Agents Registration Act, and as to the interpretations and administrative sanctions which have been applied under it. In particular, I can assure you that in the administration of the Foreign Agents Registration Act there has been no such discrimination against the Soviet Union as he suggests, and that on the contrary the Act has been interpreted and administered with a full appreciation of the importance of maintaining satisfactory cultural and other relations between the Soviet Union and the United States."

For the Ambassador's further information there is quoted below from the reply of the Attorney General the following passages deal-

³⁸ Francis Biddle.

³⁹ Frank C. Walker.

ing with the history and purpose of the Foreign Agents Registration Act:

"The Act was originally adopted in 1938, and committed to the State Department for administration. Its purpose was not in any way to prohibit or restrict the activities of foreign agents in this country, or to prevent their dissemination of information or propaganda on behalf of their foreign principals. In line with long legislative experience in comparable fields, the Congress elected to control the effects of propaganda from abroad not by prohibition but by publicity. The Act, therefore, did not prohibit the propaganda activities of agents of foreign principals, but merely required that such agents, as a condition of the right to engage in their activities, should register as foreign agents with the Department of State, furnishing in the registration statement and supplemental reports basic information regarding the nature and terms of the agency. These statements were required to be maintained as public records, so that, through the process of disclosure, the American public could be adequately equipped to appraise the meaning and purpose of propaganda disseminated from abroad.

"After the entrance of the United States into the war the Foreign Agents Registration Act was revised to meet the heightened exigencies of wartime, and its administration was transferred to the Department of Justice. Among the principal revisions of the Act was a requirement that all political propaganda, in whatever form, disseminated by a foreign agent, should be filed with the Librarian of Congress and with the Attorney General, and should be labeled so as to show that the disseminator was an agent of a foreign principal, that his registration statement was available for inspection at the Department of Justice, and that the fact of his registration did not indicate approval by the United States Government of the contents of his propaganda. It will be noted that these requirements of disclosure, while an extension of the provisions of the original Act, were consistent with the basic legislative assumption that the American people can be trusted to appraise the merits of foreign propaganda so long as they are given full information as to its source.

"At the same time, it was recognized in the revisions that the interests of wartime security required special handling of the informational activities of those nations with which the United States was allied. At the suggestion of the President, made to Congress when the revisions of the Act were under consideration, provisions were inserted under which the agents of foreign governments friendly to the United States could be exempted, conditionally, from the strict public disclosure requirements otherwise applicable. The conditions of the exemption are set out in Section 3 (*f*) of the amended Act, and since the text of that section is known to you, and available to the Ambassador, I need say no more of it than that it clearly covers duly acknowledged agents of the USSR.

"The foregoing brief review of the history and purposes of the Act (which, for precision, should be read in the light of the exact language of the Act) should be sufficient to show that the Ambassador is mis-

informed in his assumption that 'printed matter on the Soviet Union may be allowed for circulation in the United States only if it does not contain any data or if it does not even allow any inferences favorable to the Soviet Union or its Government; or when it contains criticism and adverse information about the Soviet Union, its leaders and organizations.['] The Act, both in its original and in its amended state, imposes no restriction whatsoever upon propaganda and other informational matter disseminated by a foreign agent, provided only that the disseminator makes the required disclosure as to his agency: and if a friendly foreign government (such as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) is willing to comply with the provisions of Section 3(f) of the amended Act by furnishing to the Secretary of State the required information regarding the identity and activities of its agents in the United States, those agents are exempted even from the strict requirements of public disclosure otherwise applicable."

In this connection the Ambassador's attention is invited to the fact that the agents of Governments of other countries which are members of the United Nations and which are participating in the war against Nazi Germany have found it possible to conduct legitimate information activities without any difficulty or embarrassment by reason of the Foreign Agents Registration Act. At least eleven major news agencies controlled by governments of the United Nations and fifteen similar information agencies, have, with the sponsorship of their respective governmental principals, been operating under the exemption provisions of the Act, and disseminating information in the interests of the common cause. The administration of the Act has been in the hands of the Special War Policies Unit of the Department of Justice, and representatives of these governments, or of their agents, have had no difficulty in working out their problems through conferences with representatives of the Special War Policies Unit.

In contrast, there has been no substantial use of the exemption provisions for the activities of persons disseminating information as to the Soviet Union. In only two cases, those of the Amtorg Trading Corporation and Kenneth Durant, agent for the Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union (Tass), has exemption under Section 3(f) been sought and received. At least seven other persons or organizations have registered publicly as agencies of Soviet non-governmental principals, but the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, while receiving the benefit of their activities in the United States, has thus far been unwilling to assume the responsibility for them which would bring them under the exemption provisions of Section 3(f).

With reference to the organizations in this country handling material from the Soviet Union, namely the Four Continent Book Corporation and the Inter-Continent News Services, to which the

Ambassador makes specific reference, the following facts communicated by the Attorney General are pertinent:

"Four Continent Book Corporation specializes in the sale of Soviet books and newspapers to the public in the United States⁴⁰ The agency contract under which Four Continent Book Corporation represents Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga is in all substantial respects identical with the earlier agency contract between Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga and Bookniga, Inc.⁴¹

"Four Continent Book Corporation is thus, and in the judgment of the Department quite properly, registered as an agent of a foreign principal. In July 1942 Four Continent Book Corporation inquired of the Special War Policies Unit whether its principal, Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga, was itself subject to registration. The Special War Policies Unit replied to the effect that it was likely that under Rule 50(a) Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga would be subject to registration unless it were certified by the Soviet Government as an official agency, in which case it might avail itself of exemption under Section 3(f) of the Act. No such certification has been furnished, nor has Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga registered.

"It is therefore clear that Four Continent Book Corporation has not been required to register as an agent of a foreign *government*, but only as an agent of Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga, concededly a foreign *principal*. Nor has Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga, or any other 'Soviet publishing houses on the territory of the Soviet Union', been required to register. Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga has merely been advised, in answer to an inquiry from its agent Four Continent Book Corporation, that if it acts itself as an agent of a foreign principal to disseminate political propaganda within the United States by use of means or instrumentalities of interstate or foreign commerce, or of the United States mails, it is subject to registration to the same extent as any other agent similarly acting. In this connection, you may wish to call the Ambassador's attention to Rule 50(a), which makes it clear that agents of foreign principals who use the mails or means or instrumentalities of foreign commerce within the United States to disseminate political propaganda are subject to the applicable requirements of the Act regardless of whether they are physically located within or without the United States."

With reference to the statement contained in the Ambassador's memorandum that the Four Continent Book Corporation has been "prevented from using the American mails for carrying out the orders it receives" and that this corporation has been required to label all Soviet printed matter as "propaganda not approved by the American Government" it would appear that the Ambassador has misunderstood the cause and purpose of the letter from Mr. L. M. C. Smith, Chief of the Special War Policies Unit of the Department of Justice,

⁴⁰ Omissions throughout this document indicated in the original note.

⁴¹ Successor to Bookniga Corporation in 1939 and predecessor of the Four Continent Book Corporation. See telegram No. 311, December 22, 1939, 7 p. m., to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, *Foreign Relations*, The Soviet Union, 1933-1939, p. 933.

dated November 23, 1942 to which he makes reference. On this point the Attorney General has informed the Secretary of State that:

"Agents registered under the Act are not 'prevented from using American mails' in disseminating political propaganda nor required to label it as 'propaganda not approved by the American Government'. A registered agent, if he disseminates political propaganda, is required by the Act only to label it so as to disclose that he is a registered agent, that his registration statement is available for inspection at the Department of Justice, and that the fact of registration does not indicate that the United States Government has approved the contents of the material which he disseminates; and in administering this provision of the Act the Department of Justice has not even required that the information disseminated should be identified as propaganda. All public registrants not accepted and certified by friendly foreign governments are subject to the same labeling requirements and the . . . charge that these requirements discriminate against the Soviet Union is without basis."

The letter from Mr. L. M. C. Smith to Mr. Lambkin ⁴² to which the Ambassador refers cannot be construed as containing a suggestion of discrimination against the Soviet Union since this letter was written at Mr. Lambkin's request for his guidance in order to permit him to determine whether certain specific publications which he wished to disseminate in the United States would fall within the labeling requirements of the Act. He was informed that the material in question would fall within this category under the definition of the term "political propaganda" which in the Act is defined to include any communication

"which is reasonably adapted to, or which the person disseminating the same believes will, or which he intends to, prevail upon, indoctrinate, convert, induce, or in any other way influence a recipient or any section of the public within the United States with reference to the political or public interests, policies or relations of a government of a foreign country or a foreign political party or with reference to the foreign policies of the United States . . ."

It may be added that Mr. Lambkin was not prevented "from using American mail" for carrying out his orders but was merely advised in reply to his specific inquiry that if he used the mails for disseminating publications of this character, the wording of the Act would require their labeling as to source. The same considerations set forth above apply to the Inter-Continent News Service which is registered with the Department of Justice as an agent of a foreign non-Governmental principal and as such is subject to the requirement of the Act.

With reference to the statement contained in the Ambassador's memorandum that certain foreign language publications in the United

⁴² Cyril Lambkin, president of the Four Continent Book Corporation.

States have been requested to register as agents of a foreign government if they desire to be allowed to receive telegraphic information from the Soviet Information Bureau in Moscow, the Secretary of State has been informed by the Attorney General that a search of the files in the Department of Justice fails to show that any such requests have been made. If, however, the Ambassador is in possession of more precise details as to such demands the Secretary of State would be glad to ask the Attorney General to make a more thorough investigation in the matter.

In regard to the Ambassador's suggestion that the Department of Justice appears inclined to cast doubt on the bona fide status of the correspondents of the Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union, Tass, the Secretary of State has been informed by the Attorney General that this erroneous impression apparently arose as a result of the wording of the rule officially adopted under the Foreign Agents Registration Act and that steps are being taken to change the phrasing of this note in order to remove any possible inference that it reflects upon the good faith or character of any correspondent of a newspaper.

With reference to the Ambassador's statement that the use of the United States mails have been denied perfectly innocent scientific books and even books of fiction, the Secretary of State has been informed by the Postmaster General that in so far as he is aware no publications or material of this type has been denied the use of the United States mails. The Postmaster General, however, has informed the Secretary of State that in accordance with the provisions of the Foreign Agents Registration Act and on the basis of the Attorney General's opinion of December 10, 1940⁴³ material of a political nature disseminated by persons or organizations in this country who have not complied in full with the provisions of the Act in regard to the labeling of such material is excludable from the United States mails. The specific publications to which you refer were regarded by the postal authorities of the United States as falling within the definition of political propaganda as defined in the Act and as such could only be sent through the mails if properly labelled.

The Ambassador will perceive from the foregoing that there has been no discrimination whatsoever against organizations in this country engaged in the dissemination of material emanating from the Soviet Union or against the material itself. These organizations have merely been required to conform to the requirements of the United States law on this subject and have been asked to do nothing that is not required of other organizations of a similar nature engaged

⁴³ 39 Op. Atty. Gen. 535.

in disseminating in the United States information and material from a friendly foreign country.⁴⁴

The Secretary of State would like again to draw the attention of the Ambassador to the fact that the information services controlled or operated by other members of the United Nations have found it possible to conduct legitimate information activities in conformity with the Foreign Agents Registration Act without difficulty or embarrassment. Should the Ambassador so desire the Secretary of State would be glad to arrange a meeting between him or such representatives of the Soviet Embassy as he may designate and officials of the Department of Justice who are charged with the administration of the Foreign Agents Registration Act and of the Department of State with a view to exploring the best means of avoiding in the future the misunderstandings and differences which form the subject of the Ambassador's memorandum.

WASHINGTON, May 10, 1943.

800.01B11 Registration/1708

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] August 11, 1943.

The Soviet Chargé⁴⁵ called to see me this morning at his request. Mr. Gromyko referred to the Department's communication to the Soviet Embassy of May 10 last granting exemption from the need for registration of certain Soviet agencies including the Tass News Service. Mr. Gromyko said that notwithstanding the fact that registration had not been required, the Department of Justice was demanding a continued large volume of information from the agency which was similar to the information which would have been given if the agency had been obliged to register. Mr. Gromyko pointed out that the British news service, Reuters, was not obliged to give information of this character and that in a conversation which Attorney General Biddle had had with Mr. Kenneth Durant, the New York head of the agency, Mr. Biddle was alleged to have stated that he had legal powers to relieve the Tass Service from giving this information but that he did not feel disposed to do so.

⁴⁴ In a memorandum of May 11, 1943, the Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Henderson) pointed out: "It is apparent that the chief difficulty on this subject arises in the desire of the Soviet Government to have agents of a Soviet non-Governmental principal enjoy the immunities and privileges only accredited to agents in this country which have been recognized as agents of a foreign government and had so registered." (800.01B11 Registration/1645)

⁴⁵ Andrey Andreyevich Gromyko.

Mr. Gromyko insisted that the information required took up the entire time of two or three employees and that his Government could not understand the discrimination shown by this Government between the Tass and the Reuters agencies in a sense so highly unfavorable to the first named.

I told Mr. Gromyko that I was not familiar with these later developments and that I had thought when this communication of May 10 had been sent to him the matter had been adjusted in a manner satisfactory to the Soviet interests involved. I said I would be glad to look into the matter and see what the situation might be.

800.01B11 Registration/1708

*Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of European Affairs
(Matthews) to the Under Secretary of State (Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] August 21, 1943.

MR. WELLES: We have now received from the Department of Justice the information concerning the registration of the Tass News Agency regarding which the Soviet Chargé spoke to you on August 11. According to this information, on June 25 the Attorney General personally received Mr. Durant, the Manager of the Tass Agency in the United States, and explained to him the requirements under the law for the registration of government-owned news agencies. This was subsequently confirmed by a letter to Mr. Durant from the Attorney General dated July 17, 1943, a copy of which is attached.⁴⁶

The situation is briefly as follows:

Neither the Soviet Embassy nor officials of Tass have ever denied that the Tass News Agency is owned by the Soviet Government. The complaint is that such government-owned agencies are subject to different registration requirements than are privately-owned news agencies such as Reuters. Since all government-owned news agencies in this country, i.e. those of Poland, Yugoslavia and others, are required to comply with the provisions of the Act, the request of the Tass Agency in effect is in reality a request for discrimination in favor of the government-owned news agency of the Soviet Union.⁴⁷ As set forth in his attached letter to Mr. Durant, the Attorney General does not consider it possible to make an exception on behalf of Tass.

⁴⁶ Not printed.

⁴⁷ In a memorandum of August 18 to the Under Secretary of State, the Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Hickerson) remarked that "it is interesting to note that in regard to other matters such as exemption from taxes, travel facilities, et cetera, the employees of Tass in this country are given the status of foreign officials." (800.01B11 Registration/1708)

With reference to the specific point raised by Mr. Gromyko in which he referred to the Department's memorandum of May 10, there was no question of the exception of the Tass Agency from the requirements of registration. The Department of Justice agreed to remove certain wording from the registration which appeared to imply that Tass was not a bona fide news agency. This amendment has been made, as stated in the Attorney General's letter attached.⁴⁸

H. FREEMAN MATTHEWS

800.01B11 Registration/1708

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Bohlen)⁴⁹

[WASHINGTON,] September 9, 1943.

During Mr. Bazykin's call this afternoon I referred to Mr. Gromyko's visit to Mr. Welles on August 11 when he had taken up the question of the registration requirements which the Tass news agency was forced to undergo with specific reference to the fact that the Tass agency was required to give certain data which Reuters was not obliged to furnish. I told Mr. Bazykin that we had taken the matter up with the Department of Justice and that the Department of Justice had informed us that Tass as an official Governmental agency was required to effect a different form of registration than were private agencies such as Reuters; and that the Attorney General had explained this in full to Mr. Durant, Manager of the Tass Agency. I added that according to information received from the Attorney General Mr. Durant made no claim that Tass was being treated differently from other foreign government-owned news agencies but that he felt that to impose heavier burdens upon government-owned foreign news agencies than upon private news agencies must be regarded particularly as discriminating against Tass since it was the only important foreign government-owned news agency in this country.

I pointed out to Mr. Bazykin that the Attorney General did not feel free, in view of the intent of Congress and the legislative history

⁴⁸ The Attorney General, in his letter of July 17, 1943, to Mr. Kenneth Durant, had explained that it was not intended to cast doubt upon the status of Tass representatives as bona fide news correspondents because they represented a government-owned news agency as compared with correspondents of foreign private news agencies. Therefore the wording of Rule 303(b) of the regulations had been revised, and a copy of the amended rule was enclosed with the letter. (800.01B11 Registration/1708)

⁴⁹ A memorandum based on this conversation was sent by Mr. Bohlen to Vladimir Ivanovich Bazykin, First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy, on October 8, 1943 (800.01B11 Registration/1703).

of the Act, to waive all filing requirements for all foreign government-owned news agencies and that it was impossible to make such an exemption in favor of Tass since this would constitute discrimination against other foreign government-owned news agencies. I gave Mr. Bazykin a copy of a letter from the Attorney General to Mr. Durant in which the position of the Department of Justice on this matter was outlined in full. I told Mr. Bazykin that under the circumstances there was nothing the Department of State could do to obtain special treatment for the Tass news agency but that he could be sure that if there was any indication that Tass was being required to do anything which was not required of other foreign government-owned news agencies we would immediately draw the attention of the Department of Justice to any such evidence.

CHARLES E. BOHLEN

800.01B11 Registration/1708

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] October 21, 1943.

The Soviet Ambassador ⁵⁰ called to see me. He referred to a call he had made on Mr. Sumner Welles about August 31 [11] when he had inquired whether it was necessary for Tass, the Russian news agency, to furnish the Department of Justice with the information requested of all foreign news agencies. The Ambassador said he understood an exception had been made for the British. He informed me that Mr. Bohlen had replied to him that an exception could not be made for Tass and that the request was immediately complied with.⁵¹ He raised the question as to whether this was not discrimination against the Russians. He said that it takes a tremendous amount of clerical help to compile the information required and that in the middle of a war they just did not have the time to do it.

I promised to communicate with him on this point.⁵²

⁵⁰ Andrey Andreyevich Gromyko had presented his letter of credence as Ambassador of the Soviet Union to President Roosevelt on October 4.

⁵¹ With a note of October 12, 1943, Ambassador Gromyko had actually sent 16 forms as exhibits which should have accompanied the registration form, which latter had already been received by the Department of Justice on August 16 from the Soviet Embassy (800.01B11 Registration/1703). These 16 forms were sent to the Department of Justice on October 16.

⁵² In a letter of October 30, 1943, to Ambassador Gromyko, Acting Secretary of State Stettinius reviewed the status of the registration requirements for the Tass agency and pointed out that it was required by law for Tass as an official government agency to effect a different form of registration than were private news agencies such as the privately owned British agency Reuters. "In view of these considerations," the Acting Secretary concluded, "I feel sure that you will agree with me that there has been no discrimination against the Tass News Agency." (800.01B11 Registration/1708)

THE TRIAL AND SENTENCING OF GERMAN WAR CRIMINALS AND RUSSIAN ACCOMPLICES IN THE SOVIET UNION

740.00116 European War 1939/1086 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, September 9, 1943—9 a. m.
[Received September 10—11 : 10 a. m.]

1308. A Soviet newsreel which played for some time in local cinemas, pictures the trial and execution of the Soviet citizens⁵³ convicted in July of treasonable complicity with the German invaders in Krasnodar krai.⁵⁴

The film shows in great detail the actual hanging by withdrawing of motor vehicles on which stood the prisoners sentenced to death and gives the impression of great popular rejoicing at the public spectacle.

It is believed that the film is of interest in view of the Soviet campaign regarding punishment of Axis war criminals⁵⁵ who, it was pointed out in the account of the Krasnodar trials, were the instigators of the traitors' deeds.

Such public executions are a novelty in the Soviet Union.⁵⁶

STANDLEY

740.00116 European War 1939/1190 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, December 10, 1943—2 p. m.
[Received 11 : 10 p. m.]

2172. The hanging of the two German soldiers referred to in Department's 1351, December 6, 9 p. m.,⁵⁷ took place in front of the

⁵³ Eleven Soviet accomplices were tried in Krasnodar, July 14-17, 1943, of whom 8 were sentenced to death by hanging, and 3 to exile and penal servitude for 20 years each.

⁵⁴ Territory.

⁵⁵ The Soviet press had already published a note of July 29, 1943, to Sweden and Turkey warning against the granting of asylum to war criminals who might seek refuge in neutral countries to escape answering for their crimes. A full account of President Roosevelt's statement made at his press conference on July 30, concerning refuge in neutral countries for Axis leaders and on the turning over of Axis war criminals for trial after the war, was likewise published; for text of this statement, see telegram No. 644, July 30, 2 p. m., to the Ambassador in Turkey, vol. I, p. 461.

⁵⁶ Very soon after the carrying out of the sentences, the Foreign Languages Publishing House in Moscow printed 17,100 copies in English translation of a brochure (40 pp., 2 rubles, illustrated) entitled: *The Trial in the Case of the Atrocities Committed by the German Fascist Invaders and Their Accomplices in Krasnodar and Krasnodar Territory, July 14 to 17, 1943.*

⁵⁷ Not printed; it requested additional information on the hanging of two German soldiers reported by the Embassy, and inquired whether Soviet authorities had commenced to judge and punish members of the German armed forces charged with the commission of atrocities in the Soviet Union (740.0011 European War 1939/32118).

hotel in which the foreign correspondents were staying in Kiev. A Russian civilian was hanged at same time. The hanging took place while the correspondents were at the theater but the bodies were still there when they returned, and remained for several days.⁵⁸ Signs reading "Arsonists" had been placed on bodies of the two German soldiers and a sign reading "Arsonist and Traitor" had been hung on body of the Russian civilian. The sentence of the Military Court that had condemned them was posted on the gallows.

Many individual Germans held responsible for crimes committed on Soviet territory have been named in reports of Extraordinary State Commission to establish and investigate the crimes committed by German Fascist invaders.⁵⁹ Reports of Commission have been published for Krasnodar, Stavropol, Kursk, the Donbas and other areas. In the case of the Krasnodar report, which names 11 Soviet citizens charged with being accomplices of the Germans in the commission of their crimes, a trial was held which was given wide publicity. Eight of the accused were sentenced to death and other three to 20 years at hard labor in exile. *Pravda* for July 19 announced these sentences had been carried out.

There has been no indication in Soviet press that any of Germans named in reports of Extraordinary State Commission have been tried or punished and it is unlikely [*likely*] that few if any of them have thus far fallen into Russian hands. The Commission's report on destruction wrought in Donbas as published in *Moscow News*, November 17, after listing the Germans held principally responsible concluded: "All these criminals must suffer stern punishment for their monstrous crimes against the Soviet people".

HARRIMAN

740.00116 European War 1939/1197 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, December 16, 1943.

[Received December 18—2:40 p. m.]

2244. Moscow papers for December 16 devote one-half of their issues to an account of the trial of three Germans and a Russian

⁵⁸ For report on the visit of foreign correspondents to Kiev, see telegram No. 2086, November 30, from the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, p. 605.

⁵⁹ The Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Soviet Union by ukaz of November 4, 1942, had formed an extraordinary state commission for ascertaining and investigating the offenses of the German aggressors and accomplices, and for determining suitable compensation for all losses inflicted. For a report concerning the creation of this commission, see telegram No. 982, November 5, 1942, from the First Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union, *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. III, p. 473.

accomplice before the Military Tribunal of the Fourth Ukrainian Front which began December 15 at Kharkov. The accused are Reinhard Retzlav, an official of the 560th Group of the German Secret Field Police, Hans Ritz, Deputy Commander of the Sonder Kommando SD of an SS company,⁶⁰ Wilhelm Langheld, Captain in the German Military Counter-Espionage Service and Mikhail Petrovich Bulanov, a Russian who served as chauffeur for the Kharkov Sonder Kommando SD.

These persons are accused of the execution of thousands of Soviet citizens in specially constructed "gas cars", acts of bestial persecution against peaceful Soviet citizens and the destruction of cities and towns in temporarily occupied territory, the mass slaughter of old people, women and children, and the shooting, burning, and maiming of Soviet wounded and prisoners of war. All the accused are stated to have made complete confessions. The trial is continuing.⁶¹

The leading article in *Izvestia* which is devoted to the trial, points out that this is the first instance in which members of the German armed forces have been brought to trial for their crimes. The proceedings have disclosed that the accused were carrying out the policy of Hitler and the orders of the German Government and the German High Command for the systematic extermination of the Slav peoples. The accusation charges not only the four accused who have been brought before the court but also the heads of the German Government and of the German High Command in general and the following German commanders in particular: Obergruppenfuehrer⁶² Dietrich, Commander of the Adolf Hitler SS Division, Gruppenfuehrer⁶³ Simon, Commander of the SS Death's Head Division, Sturmbannfuehrer⁶⁴ Hanebitter, Chief of the Kharkov Sonderkommando SD, Police Commissioner Karchan, Chief of the German Secret Field Police at Kharkov, Police Commissioner Meritz, Chief of the 560th group of the Gefepo⁶⁵ attached to the staff of the Sixth German Army, and Police Secretary Wolfu, Assistant Chief of the German Secret Field Police at Kharkov.

⁶⁰ Special detail of the Security Service (Sicherheitsdienst) of the Elite Corps (Schutzstaffel, Black Shirts) of the Nazi Party.

⁶¹ Ambassador Harriman informed the Department in telegram No. 2269, December 18, that a group of American and British correspondents had left for Kharkov that day to attend the trial (740.00116 E.W. 1939/1196).

⁶² A Storm Troop (Sturmabteilung, Brown Shirts) or Elite Corps rank equivalent to Lieutenant General.

⁶³ A Storm Troop or Elite Corps rank equivalent to Major General.

⁶⁴ A Storm Troop or Elite Corps rank equivalent to Major.

⁶⁵ German Secret Field Police.

The editorial states that more than 30,000 Soviet citizens were killed by the Germans at Kharkov and in the Kharkov oblast.⁶⁶ The declaration of Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill issued at the Moscow Conference⁶⁷ warned the German criminals that they would be brought back to the countries where their crimes were committed for trial and punishment. Now three of the German criminals have fallen into Soviet hands and are being brought to justice. The German Fascists, fearing retribution, are now trying to cover their tracks but their crimes will be completely uncovered and not a single German who participated in them will escape responsibility and trial. The more hopeless the position of the Hitlerites becomes, the deeper they sink into bestiality and plunder. The Russian people will not forget these crimes of the German monsters and will hold them responsible for all their evil deeds.

In a special article from Kharkov describing the trial Zaslavski⁶⁸ writes that the accused Langheld was calm, self-possessed and unrepentant as he described his ghastly crimes to the court. Langheld defended the Nazi thesis that the Germans are a superior race with a mission to enslave and exterminate inferior peoples. "Of course," concludes Zaslavski, "the Hitlerite Germans are not a special race but a special breed of two-legged animals brought up in special conditions of artificial savagery. This is a dangerous breed. It should be annihilated and rendered harmless in the interests of humanity and compassion." All papers publish gruesome photographs of the corpses of victims of the German crimes.

HARRIMAN

740.00116 European War 1939/1198 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, December 20, 1943—1 p. m.

Received December 21—8:45 a. m.

2275. Embassy's 2243, December 16, 1 p. m.⁶⁹ The press for December 19 reported that the four accused in the Kharkov trial had

⁶⁶ Region.

⁶⁷ For explanation of the issuance of this Declaration of German Atrocities at the Moscow Conference, see the Summary of the Twelfth Regular Session of the Tripartite Conference, October 30, 1943, 4 p. m., vol. I, p. 679. The text of the declaration is printed *ibid.*, p. 768.

⁶⁸ David Iosifovich Zaslavsky, Soviet newspaper correspondent and writer.

⁶⁹ Not printed, but see telegram No. 2244, *supra*.

been sentenced to death by hanging.⁷⁰ *Pravda* for December 20 reports that the sentences were carried out on December 19.

Since the opening of the trials practically half of each issue of the newspapers has been devoted to an account of the proceedings.⁷¹

HARRIMAN

740.00116 European War 1939/1201a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)*⁷²

WASHINGTON, December 23, 1943—3 p. m.

8101. For Bucknell.⁷³ The Office of War Information has been giving almost as much play to the Kharkov trials of German war criminals as the Russians and we understand that the BBC⁷⁴ has also been featuring the trials.

At today's meeting of the Overseas Planning Board the OWI submitted a directive on the subject of war criminals which is being cabled in full text to Carroll⁷⁵ by the OWI. Briefly, this proposed directive put the stamp of approval on the use of news about the apprehension, trial and execution of war criminals and specifically stated that the American radio should "keep alive" that military or para-military personnel of enemy forces "must face trial for crimes under the doctrine of personal responsibility" and cannot "plead that they acted under the orders of military superiors". The directive contained a caution about treating the direct handling of war crim-

⁷⁰ The Kharkov trial was held under authority of a ukaz of April 19, 1943, which had not been published, and the Department had been unsuccessful in its efforts to obtain the text of it. On March 27, 1944, Ambassador Harriman reported in his telegram No. 1059, that it was still impossible to obtain a copy of this decree from the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. An article about the Kharkov trial which had appeared in *Freies Deutschland* of December 19, 1943, included this statement: "Death by hanging was first introduced in the Soviet Union through a decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet dated April 19, 1943." The first executions imposed under this decree were those sentenced to hang at the Krasnodar trial. (740.00116 European War 1939/1371) The famous Soviet jurist Aron Naumovich Trainin, in an article on "The Criminal Responsibility of the Hitlerite Criminals" in *War and the Working Class*, No. 1 (January 1, 1944), asserted that one of the purposes of this decree was to give "to Soviet courts an appropriate weapon for the immediate struggle with the Hitlerite criminals". (740.00116 European War 1939/1245)

⁷¹ The Russian text of the proceedings of the Kharkov trial, printed in issues 308-312 of *Pravda*, December 16-20, 1943, and an English text in three issues of the *Moscow News*, were sent to the Department by the Ambassador in the Soviet Union as indicated in his despatches No. 104, December 22, and No. 110, December 23; neither printed.

⁷² This telegram was repeated to the Embassy in the Soviet Union as No. 1447.

⁷³ Howard Bucknell, Jr., Counselor of Embassy in the United Kingdom.

⁷⁴ British Broadcasting Corporation.

⁷⁵ Wallace Carroll, Director of the United States Office of War Information in London.

inals as within the terms of the Moscow declaration and warned against speculation about the London Commission for Trial of War Criminals until it has officially met.⁷⁶

The Department's representative on the Board took the ground that our propaganda should only use the news of these trials and any further trials as news reports at this time. The portion of the directive to the effect that "the American radio should keep alive that military or para-military personnel of the enemy forces must face trial for crimes under the doctrine of personal responsibility" was not approved by this Government. The view of the War Department is that it does not believe that a campaign of publicity based on the Kharkov trials and similar incidents is desirable at this time, but that it must be withheld until a later time to be determined by circumstances.

Since no agreement could be reached by the Board, and since the British Government was also involved, it was agreed that the problem should be presented to the London Committee⁷⁷ for an emergency decision. You should support on the London Committee the position taken by the Department's representative on the Overseas Planning Board here, and the War Department view as indicated in this telegram.

HULL

740.00116 European War 1939/1206 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, December 23, 1943.

[Received December 24—12:30 p. m.]

2315. The extensive publicity given the Kharkov trial both in the Soviet Union and abroad and the presentation of the case by the prosecuting attorney indicates that the Soviet Government had the following objectives in mind:

1. Internal propaganda. The trial shows the Soviet people that the Government is sincere in its promise to bring Germans guilty of crimes to justice and to lose no time in doing so. It is an instrument for whipping up and keeping alive a spirit of vengeance.

⁷⁶ Invitations had been issued by the British Government on August 31, 1943, to 11 other governments to attend a meeting in London to arrange for the institution of a United Nations Commission for the Investigation of War Crimes. The meeting took place on October 20, without the participation of the Soviet Union. For correspondence on the establishment of this Commission, see vol. I, pp. 402 ff.

⁷⁷ London Political Warfare Coordinating Committee.

2. External propaganda. The trial serves to bring once more to the attention of the world the extent and cruelty of the crimes committed by the Germans on Soviet territory and the resolve of the Soviet Government to track down the criminals.

3. Instilling fear of retribution in the ranks of the German Army and the SS. The case as presented by the prosecutor clearly showed that the Soviet Government intends to hold individual Germans responsible for crimes committed by them even though they were acting on direct orders from their superiors. Press comment has connected the trial with the declaration of the Moscow Conference on German atrocities.

4. Placing of ultimate responsibility for the crimes on the leaders of the German Government and the German High Command. Throughout the trial both in the presentation of the case by the prosecutor and in the testimony of the accused and of witnesses there was an obvious effort to show that the crimes were the result of the Nazi philosophy of the German racial superiority and of the policy which has been adopted by the Nazis for the enslavement and extermination of the Slav peoples. The trial left no doubt of the intention of the Soviet authorities to hold the German Government and High Command responsible for the crimes and atrocities committed in its name and on its orders.

HARRIMAN

740.00116 European War 1939/1207 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, December 24, 1943—9 a. m.
[Received December 25—12:45 p. m.]

2320. The American correspondents who attended the close of the Kharkov trials and the hanging of the convicted men were convinced of the guilt of the accused and of the genuineness of the Soviet charges of organized atrocities. They state that the Russians were punctilious in their observance of the legal proprieties of the trial and that there was no evidence of duress. They observed that the self-abasing testimony of the accused was reminiscent of the famous purge trials⁷⁸ but attributed this largely to the care exercised in selecting those who were placed on trial. If the accused had believed that by giving testimony which would best serve the ends of Soviet propaganda they

⁷⁸ For correspondence on the Moscow trials of 1936-1938, see *Foreign Relations, The Soviet Union, 1933-1939*, Index, p. 1030, entry under "Purges".

would receive milder treatment, they gave no sign that they had been misled when sentence of death was pronounced nor when the actual hanging took place.

HARRIMAN

740.00116 European War 1939/1213 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

LONDON, December 24, 1943—11 p. m.

[Received December 25—2:38 p. m.]

8992. The London Political Warfare Coordinating Committee met today (reference Department's 8101, December 23, 3 p. m.) and agreed upon the following directive.

1. For the time being the Kharkov trials have ceased to have any news value. We should only use the news of these trials or of any future trials as news reports without comment.

2. In dealing with threats of German reprisals we should, pending developments, report as news and without comment both to Germany and elsewhere, German threats of reprisals.

3. We should continue in our output to reaffirm the policy of Allied air attacks which are directed against economic, military and administrative objectives essential to the German war machine. This should be done without in any way linking this theme to paragraph 2 above.

4. In addition we should avoid any comment or speculation whatsoever as to the possible action of the governments concerned in the face of this threat until such time as these governments state their policy.

In addition it was agreed that the Committee should recommend to the United States and British Governments that with regard to the Kharkov trials a decision should be reached at once as to the relation of these trials to the Moscow Declaration. The Committee considers it is essential for propaganda purposes that they should receive a ruling as soon as possible in this matter so as to be in a position to handle the situation when any further trials take place and in order to answer any German efforts to exploit apparent divergencies of opinion between the Allied Governments which such trials might create in the absence of such a ruling. The Committee also decided to recommend to the service authorities concerned that in view of the possible propaganda use which the Germans may make of statements by captured air crews it is important to consider the further briefing of air crews on the nature of military objectives within the target area.

The Committee invited General McClure⁷⁹ to bring this last recommendation to the attention of Etousa.⁸⁰ It also invited Bucknell and Sir Orme Sargent⁸¹ to bring the first recommendation to the urgent attention of their respective governments.

Please repeat to Chiefs of Staff and OWI.

WINANT

740.00116 European War 1939/1214 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, December 27, 1943—11 p. m.
[Received December 28—12:55 p. m.]

2337. Reference your 1447, December 23.⁸² I think you should bear in mind that the Soviet officials are using the Kharkov trials in external propaganda as a means of separating the front line troops from the troops in the rear. You will note that the three Germans selected had seen no service at the front and much is made of this in the Soviet leaflets dropped on German troops at the Russian front.

It would be helpful to know why the War Department does not believe that a campaign of publicity based on the Kharkov trials is desirable at this time.

What additional information do you wish from Moscow on this subject?

Repeated to London.

HARRIMAN

740.00116 European War 1939/1213 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

WASHINGTON, December 31, 1943—7 p. m.

8267. For Bucknell. The Department has considered the relation of the Kharkov trials to the Moscow declaration as requested in your 8992, December 24, 11 p. m., and agrees on the importance for political warfare purposes of making a decision on this relationship through the London Political Warfare Coordinating Committee.

⁷⁹ Brig. Gen. Robert A. McClure, with the Allied Forces Headquarters since 1942.

⁸⁰ European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army.

⁸¹ British Deputy Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

⁸² See footnote 72, p. 849.

Clearly such a decision is required to furnish guidance when and if further trials take place, to rebut any efforts the Germans may make to exploit apparent divergencies of opinion between the Allied Governments as a result of further trials, and to clarify the area of apparent "no man's land" between the Kharkov trials and the Moscow declaration.

It is the considered view of this Government that Kharkov trials are outside the sphere of the Moscow declaration: The latter relates only to persons who are within enemy lines at the time of the signing of the armistice. Nothing in the Moscow declaration limits the freedom of action of the respective United Nations regarding persons captured during hostilities prior to an armistice. Under these circumstances it seems both unnecessary and undesirable for it to be stated publicly in American propaganda that the Kharkov trials either come within or without the Moscow declaration.

Although the above statement fairly represents the view of this Government, you may wish to bear in mind that on the basis of reports from our Embassy in Moscow it appears that the Soviet propagandists have publicly linked the Trial and the Declaration.

The directive adopted by the Coordinating Committee regarding the other aspects of this problem is approved, although, in view of the Soviet propaganda line it is felt that comment on further trials should be held to a minimum since any extensive use of this material would merely furnish the Germans with an opportunity to exploit divergencies of interpretation between the Soviets and ourselves.

HULL

740.00116 European War 1939/1249a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, December 31, 1943—7 p. m.

1493. For your information in the event a Soviet official should bring up the subject a Washington columnist today made the statement that "the United States and Britain have appealed to Russia to postpone further trials of German war criminals until the armistice clears the way for evenly paced action."

The Tass⁸³ representative inquired whether this was correct and he was informed that no such move had been made or even thought of.

HULL

⁸³ Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union, official communications agency of the Soviet Government.

THE REESTABLISHMENT OF THE PATRIARCHATE OF THE RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH, AND RELIGIOUS CONDITIONS IN THE SOVIET UNION ⁸⁴

861.404/508 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary
of State*

Moscow, September 7, 1943.

[Received September 8—9: 56 a. m.]

1289. The Soviet press for September 5 published the following account of the "reception by Comrade J. V. Stalin of Metropolitans Sergius,⁸⁵ Alexis,⁸⁶ and Nikolai."⁸⁷

"On September 4 the President of the Council of People's Commissars, Comrade J. V. Stalin, held a reception during which there took place a conversation with the patriarchal Locum Tenens, Metropolitan Sergius, the Leningrad Metropolitan, Alexis, and the Exarch of the Ukraine, the Metropolitan of Kiev and Galicia, Nicholas.

During the conversation Metropolitan Sergius informed the President of the Council of People's Commissars that the leading circles of the Orthodox Church are planning very soon to call a meeting of bishops to elect a patriarch of Moscow and of all Russia⁸⁸ and to establish in the patriarchate a Holy Synod.

The Head of the Government, Comrade J. V. Stalin, regarded these proposals sympathetically and stated that on the part of the Government there would be no objection.

The Vice President of the Council of People's Commissars, Comrade V. M. Molotov,⁸⁹ was present at the conversation."

STANDLEY

⁸⁴ For previous correspondence concerning the interest of the United States in the protection of church property and in freedom of religious worship in the Soviet Union, see *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. 1, pp. 995 ff.

⁸⁵ Sergey, Metropolitan of Moscow and Kolomna, patriarchal Locum-Tenens (Acting Head) of the Russian Orthodox Church since 1926.

⁸⁶ Alexy, Metropolitan of Leningrad (since 1933) and Novgorod (since 1932).

⁸⁷ Nikolay (Yarushevich), Metropolitan of Kiev and Galich, Exarch of the Ukraine, Exarch of the Western Ukraine and White Russia, director of the affairs of the Moscow Patriarchate in the absence of the patriarchal Locum-Tenens, the Metropolitan Sergey.

⁸⁸ The office of Patriarch had been abolished by Peter the Great in 1721. In 1917, the Metropolitan Tikhon had been elected by a council (Sobor) of the Russian Orthodox Church as the first Patriarch since that time. After many difficulties with the Soviet Government, the Patriarch Tikhon died in the Donskoy Monastery in Moscow on April 7, 1925, after which the office of Patriarch was again left unfilled.

⁸⁹ Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.

861.404/509 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, September 9, 1943.

[Received September 11—10:15 a. m.]

1320. My 1298 [1289], 7th. *Pravda* of September 9th carries the following report on the assembly of bishops of the Orthodox Church.

On September 8th an assembly of the bishops of the Orthodox Church was held at Moscow to elect the Patriarch of Moscow and of all the Russians and to form in the patriarchate a Holy Synod.

The assembly of bishops unanimously elected Metropolitan Sergius as Patriarch of Moscow and of All the Russians.⁹⁰

The assembly further unanimously accepted a message to the Soviet Government proposed by Metropolitan Sergius expressing appreciation for the attention shown to the needs of the Russian Orthodox Church. Grigori, Archbishop of Saratov, read a message to the Christians of the entire world.⁹¹ This document which contained an appeal for the union of all forces in the struggles against Hitlerism, was also unanimously adopted by the assembly.⁹² The assembly then proceeded to the election of the Holy Synod in the Patriarchate of Moscow and of all the Russians. The following were elected members of the Holy Synod: The Metropolitan of Leningrad, Alexis; the Exarch of the Ukraine and Metropolitan of Kiev and Galicia, Nicholas; and the Archbishops of Yaroslavl, Krasnoyarsk, Kuibyshev and Gorki. The article also gives the following biographical note concerning the new patriarch.

The Patriarch of Moscow and of All the Russians Sergius was born at Arazamas in 1867. He studied at the Nizhgorod Theological Seminary and received his higher spiritual education at the St. Petersburg Theological Academy. After completing the Academy he became a member of the religious mission in Japan and then occupied various posts as dean of the Embassy church at Athens; Director of the St. Petersburg Academy; Archbishop of Finland; Metropolitan of Vladimir; and Metropolitan of Nizhgorod. Since 1926 Metropolitan Sergius has been the Patriarch Locum Tenens.

STANDLEY

⁹⁰ The investiture of Sergey as the 12th Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia was carried out on September 12, 1943, with the traditional ceremonies in the Patriarchal Cathedral of the Epiphany in the former village of Yelokhovo, now part of Moscow.

⁹¹ The assembly of bishops (Sobor) expressed the hope that the "long awaited second front will at last be opened by the intensive efforts of the Christians in all Allied countries" thereby hastening the final victory and peace (861.404/515).

⁹² The Sobor exhorted: "May the Divine Head of the Church bless the labors of the Government with His Almighty benediction and crown our struggle in a righteous cause with the desired victory and liberation of suffering humanity from the dismal bonds of Fascism." (861.404/515)

861.404/510 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, September 11, 1943.

[Received September 11—6:52 p. m.]

1334. My 1289, September 7, and 1320, September 9. The *Moscow News* for September 8th reports interview with Alexius, Metropolitan of Leningrad, concerning convocation of the Assembly of Bishops and the election of Holy Synod. Alexius stated that the Assembly would be attended by the three Metropolitans and the Archbishops and Bishops of the principal cities of Russia and that accordingly it would be fully competent to pass on the important questions pertaining to the Church which would be submitted for its consideration. With reference to the composition and functions of the Holy Synod, he said that it would consist of three permanent members including the remaining two Metropolitans and one of the ranking Archbishops, and three additional members elected by the Assembly of Bishops, and the Patriarch. The Holy Synod will function under the Patriarch and will be a purely ecclesiastical body. Alexius emphasized that whereas in Tsarist Russia the Synod included a representative of the State⁹³ and the State actually directed the activities of the Church, the Church has now been completely separated from the State⁹⁴ and the functions of the Synod have changed accordingly. As a purely ecclesiastical body the Holy Synod is not subject to State control. Asked if the convocation of the Assembly meant any changes in policy of the Russian Orthodox Church Alexius replied: If you have in mind changes in relation of Church and State, the answer, in one word is no. These relations were long since defined by Stalin Constitution of the USSR.⁹⁵ These two documents define the position and rights of the Church with utmost clarity guaranteeing the full right of religious worship and in no way whatsoever restricting the religious life of the worshippers or the Church as a whole.

Alexius stated that it had been necessary to convoke the Assembly to consider questions arising from its efforts to render assistance to

⁹³ The Ober-Procuror, or High Procurator of the Holy Synod, a lay official first appointed by Peter the Great to ensure that nothing would be done by the Synod displeasing to the Tsar.

⁹⁴ The decree of January 23/February 5, 1918, ordered the complete separation of Church and State. Further religious laws of April 8, 1929, were still in force in 1943.

⁹⁵ The Constitution of the Soviet Union was formally adopted at the VIII (Extraordinary) Session of the All-Union Congress of Soviets on December 5, 1936; article 124, concerning religion, reads in translation as follows: "In order to insure to citizens freedom of conscience, the Church in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is separated from the State and the School from the Church. Freedom of religious worship and freedom from anti-religious propaganda is recognized for all citizens."

the armed forces in their patriotic struggle and also there were a number of internal Church matters for consideration. One of these is the question of the establishment of theological schools. In this connection Alexius said: I believe these schools and seminaries have not justified themselves. It is common knowledge that a large number of people who studied at seminaries since childhood rejected the clerical calling upon completing studies and did not take Holy Orders. We plan to set up theological institutes and courses open to those who have already received a general secondary education thus selection of the clerical profession will be done by grown up people with character and views already formed.

Commenting on the reception of the Church leaders by Stalin, Alexius said that they consider themselves greatly indebted to J. V. Stalin, the Head of the State, for the sympathetic hearing he gave our plans.

STANDLEY

861.404/516 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Hamilton) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, September 23, 1943.

[Received September 24—1:42 p. m.]

1444. At a service on September 21, in the Moscow Cathedral in which the Archbishop of York participated, messages of greetings and good will were exchanged between the Patriarch and visiting Archbishop.⁹⁷ The Patriarch welcomed the English guest who, he stated, had come to Moscow to express the sympathy of the English people for the Orthodox Church and the Russian people and their admiration for the determination and sacrifices of the Russian people in their struggle against fascism. He paid a tribute to the Archbishop of York for undertaking the perilous journey in order to strengthen the bonds of friendship between the two peoples. In reply, the Archbishop of York expressed the sympathy of the Church of England for the suffering of the Russian nation during the present war and the admiration of the British people for the resistance and sacrifices borne by the Russian people and the Red army. He expressed the determination of Christians to resist the attempt of German and

⁹⁷ The Anglican Archbishop of York, Cyril Forster Garbett, and his party visited Moscow September 19-28, 1943, to exchange expressions of greeting and good will with the Patriarch, and to revive ties of friendship that had long existed between the Anglican Church and Orthodox Church. The time of this visit had been decided upon before Stalin had given his approval to the convocation of an episcopal Sobor for the election of the Patriarch.

Italian Fascists to trample other nations underfoot and denied the claim of Germany to be the master race as contrary to the will of God. In conclusion he offered a prayer for victory and a just and lasting peace.

HAMILTON

861.404/517 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Hamilton) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, September 24, 1943.

[Received September 24—7:58 p. m.]

1453. *Izvestiya* for September 18 reprinted an item from the first issue of the *Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate* regarding the excommunication of "traitors to the Church and the Fatherland".⁹⁸

The few among the clergy who have lent aid or comfort to the Germans or have betrayed their countrymen are warned they will suffer temporal as well as eternal punishment. The Holy Orthodox Church, the Russian as well as the Eastern, states the warning, has already condemned traitors to Christianity and the Church. The assembled bishops who sign the statement, declare that they confirm this condemnation. Everyone going over to the side of fascism will be excommunicated, and traitorous bishops or clergy will be unfrocked.

HAMILTON

861.002/223 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Hamilton) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, October 9, 1943.

[Received October 10—11:33 p. m.]

1578. The Moscow press on October 8th announced the publication of a decree⁹⁹ of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR establishing a Council for Affairs of the Orthodox Church in the Council of People's Commissars for liaison between the Soviet Government and the patriarch of Moscow and all the Russias on questions concerning the Orthodox Church which require decisions of the Soviet Government. G. G. Karpov has been appointed President of the new Council.

HAMILTON

⁹⁸ For correspondence concerning the trial and sentencing of German war criminals and their Russian accomplices in the Soviet Union, see pp. 845 ff.

⁹⁹ The decree was dated October 7.

861.404/522 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Hamilton) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, October 16, 1943.

[Received October 17—11:10 a. m.]

1628. Moscow papers for October 16 announced the award of the medal for the defense of Leningrad by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to the Metropolitan Alexius and other orthodox ecclesiastics in Leningrad. The announcement states that during the great patriotic war the Leningrad clergy assisted in strengthening the defense of the city, participated in collection for equipment and gifts for the Red army and collected more than 6 million rubles for a tank column. On the occasion of the awards Metropolitan Alexius thanked the Soviet Government for the great honor bestowed upon him and stated that the faithful in Leningrad were aiding the Red army with all their strength and praying for victory and speedy destruction of the Fascist occupants. He assured the Government that in the future the orthodox clergy and the faithful of Leningrad would support the defense of the country and would pray for the speedy eviction of the Hitlerites from Russian soil and for the health of Stalin.¹

HAMILTON

861.404/528 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, October 27, 1943—11 a. m.

[Received October 28—11:38 a. m.]

1753. A member of the Embassy staff was received on October 22 by the Metropolitan Nikolai, who presented him with a copy of a recent book entitled *The Russian Orthodox Church in The Great Patriotic War*. This publication is being forwarded to the Department under cover of a despatch.

During the conversation the Metropolitan stated that the recently established Committee on the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church was purely an intermediary body between the Church and the Soviet Government. He emphasized that the Church remained entirely separate from the State and received no financial support from the

¹ In telegram No. 1654, October 20, 1943, the Chargé in the Soviet Union reported a message addressed to Stalin, printed in *Izvestiya*, from Moslem clergy and believers meeting in Tashkent pledging support in the war effort. The Chargé stated that this was the only account the Embassy had noticed in the Russian language press regarding activities of the Moslem clergy. (861.404/524)

State.² In reply to a question, the Metropolitan said that it was impossible to state the present membership of the Orthodox Church but that before the war there were about 120,000,000 Orthodox believers in Russia. At that time, he stated, the society of nonbelievers had a membership of about 3,000,000 but such societies are not active at present, since separate societies are not permitted to operate during the war. The Metropolitan said that it was planned to open a higher theological academy in Moscow and that it was hoped a second academy might be founded in Leningrad. Secondary theological schools are being opened in each Bishopric. In the absence of a public demand, the Metropolitan states, it was not planned to open any new churches in Moscow in the near future.

HARRIMAN

103.918/1865 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, October 29, 1943—2 p. m.

[Received October 30—3 : 10 p. m.]

1775. Department's 991, October 14, 6 p. m.³ The Embassy has obtained the following information regarding the status of the anti-religious movement in the Soviet Union during the Soviet-German war, as a result of interviews with the Director of the Moscow Anti-Religious Museum and with the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Society of Military [*Militant*] Atheists of the USSR.

The Anti-Religious Museum, which was opened in 1925, was closed to the public in August 1941. Its name has been changed to "Museum of the History of Religion". The museum's staff of scientific workers has been reduced from 30 to 2 members. The director stated that 5 members of the staff had been killed at the front during the war. At present the museum operates two traveling exhibits, which visit small towns in the Moscow area and also Moscow factories. These are entitled "Fascism, the Destroyer of Freedom of Conscience" and "Fascism, the Destroyer of Culture." The director stated that the museum staff had a very limited program at present, and that it engaged entirely in scientific and not in propaganda work. During the

² Mr. Elbridge Durbrow of the Division of European Affairs in a memorandum of October 29, 1943, drew attention to "the probable connection between the [Pan-Slav] movement and the recognition and reestablishment of the Patriarch of the Orthodox Church in Russia. It is understood that among the southern Slavs who are also Orthodox in religion one of the deterrents to full sympathy with the Soviet Government has been the latter's suppression of religion." (860F.01/512½) See also footnote 6, p. 584.

³ Not printed.

war there has been no anti-religious propaganda during religious holidays.

Asked why the anti-religious work of the museum had been so curtailed, the director at first referred to technical reasons, such as lack of personnel. Questioned further, he stated that clergymen and religious believers had shown a patriotic attitude toward the Soviet Government during the war, and that therefore militant anti-religious propaganda would be out of order at this time. Asked if the work of the museum would be restored to its former scale and direction after the war, the director said that he thought that their work would have to be scientific and educational in the future, rather than openly propagandistic. He said that communism and religion remained irreconcilably hostile, but that future anti-religious activity would be of a scholarly, restrained character. He also stated that the excesses of the past must be avoided.

The director was courteous and friendly altho a suspicious attitude had been displayed by his assistant with whom the appointment was arranged by telephone. The director personally displayed to the member of the Embassy staff who visited the museum some of the collections which were housed in a storage building near the museum.

The Secretary of the League of Militant Atheists also was friendly and answered questions freely after he had checked his visitor's documents of identity. He said that his organization remained intact throughout the country but that its activities during the war were "more nominal than real".

He stated that the society had suspended all publication activities during the war, with the exception of a brochure published in September 1941 entitled *Fascism—the Destroyer of Freedom of Conscience*. They were not accepting new members during the war although there were many applicants. Asked about the membership of his organization, he said that it had been over a million before the war, but that it was impossible to give any figures now. He said that the organization still carries on activities but on a small scale.

The Secretary stated that the reason for curtailment of anti-religious activity during the war was that the Church had shown a very loyal attitude toward the country, and that it was regarded as an ally in the struggle against fascism. He emphasized that most of the membership of the anti-religious groups had gone to the front or were engaged in vital war work and that therefore anti-religious work could not be promoted.

Like his subordinate, the museum director, he appeared to hope that anti-religious activity would be resumed after the war. He felt that it would have to be more restrained than in the prewar period. He said that ideologically the Soviet Government remained irrecon-

cilable in its opposition to a religious world outlook (*mirovozzrenie*). Asked what forms future anti-religious activity might take, he said that it could be carried on by means of lectures in clubs, by reading programs in libraries, etc. Asked about anti-religious teaching in the schools, the Secretary replied that there was no special anti-religious program in the schools, but that the standard text books used presented a materialist point of view.

The information furnished by these Soviet officials tallies on the whole with that given by an experienced American observer in Moscow who was also consulted. This source stated that he also had visited the Office of the Atheists League, and had been told that they were not carrying on any publication activities. He, however, stated that anti-religious tracts published before the war were still on sale in some of the Moscow bookstores. Metropolitan Nikolai's statement to a member of the Embassy staff that the anti-religious societies are not active during the war (see Embassy's 1753, October 27, 11 a. m.) also seems, on the whole, to be in accord with the statements made by the Soviet officials consulted.

It appears from the foregoing that anti-religious propaganda has virtually ceased in the Soviet Union during the present war, and that such plans for its resumption as are now envisaged indicate that after the war the anti-religious organizations will not be allowed to take such an openly hostile attitude toward the Church and religion as they did in the period before the present war. The opinions expressed by the two Soviet officials who were consulted as to what attitude is likely to be taken after the war should not, in the Embassy's opinion, be accepted as conclusive as the official policy has probably not been formulated.

Moreover the views expressed by the officials who were consulted probably reflect to some extent their personal desires and the natural zeal of a person to continue activities to which he has devoted years of effort.

In evaluating this whole situation, there should be kept in mind the present unprecedentedly favorable attitude of the Soviet Government toward the Church. The restoration of the Patriarchate and the Holy Synod, the resumption of Church publications, and the supplying of candles and other necessary articles for church services, are significant. Other information which has reached the Embassy, such as the report that prominent Soviet architects are now engaged in making plans for restoring churches in the liberated areas is also symptomatic.

Thus under the stress of war the Soviet Government has found it desirable to restore the Church to at least a part of its former prestige.

HARRIMAN

861.404/552 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, January 13, 1944—7 p. m.

[Received January 14—1:38 a. m.]

116. On January 7 my daughter⁴ and a member of the Embassy staff attended one of the large orthodox church services celebrating the Russian Christmas.⁵ The service was presided over by the Patriarch Sergei.

The church was filled with the standing congregation so closely packed that no one could move about. Any individual movement was transformed into a swaying motion which traveled like a wave throughout the congregation. There was no large queue outside. The congregation was made up largely of women—a fair cross section of age groups, a smattering of men and a handful of children. The women were of the labor and peasant groups. Aside from the female members of the choir none were well dressed.

The service was conducted by 12 magnificently robed priests half of whom were old men. The youngest men appeared ill at ease and unskilled in the ritual. They wore army uniforms beneath their robes. The service lasted about 4 hours.

The service was most impressive—perfection in music. Some prayers were chanted, others sung, the choir at each end of the church echoing back and forth with beautiful timing and well trained voices and the congregation joined in occasionally. As the service progressed the church became humid and stuffy. The women stood trance-like and teary half listening and half watching the impressive service. There were prayers for the church dignitaries, for "Russia and the Russian people" but no mention of Stalin and other civil leaders or the Soviet Union was made during the first half of the service at which the Embassy representatives were present.

The church pastor delivered more formal sermon on the meaning of Christmas. He called it a "family day" and commiserated with his congregation over their loss or absence of husbands, sons or brothers. With this almost all began weeping. Then came the announcement "The next collection will be for the Red army". Most contributions were under 5 rubles.

⁴ Miss Kathleen Harriman.

⁵ The Russian Orthodox Church still functions according to the Julian calendar which, for the 20th century, follows the Gregorian calendar by 13 days.

No other foreigners were present and the church officials outdid religious custom by taking the Americans behind the altar rail and showing them constant attention. The desire to impress and flatter was obvious.

Officers of the "NKVD" ⁶ were noticeably scattered throughout the congregation.

HARRIMAN

⁶ The Secret Police of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs.

THE FAR EAST

CHINA

[For correspondence regarding relations of the United States with China in 1943, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, China.]

JAPAN

SECOND EXCHANGE OF AMERICAN AND JAPANESE NATIONALS; INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES IN A THIRD EXCHANGE¹

701.0090/1471a

*Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Long)*²

[WASHINGTON,] December 16, 1942.

JAPANESE EXCHANGE

The first exchange was completed August 25.

In June previous preparation of the list for the second exchange was started.

In August, the Japanese Government named certain individuals.

September 1 the tentative sailing list was submitted to the Japanese Government in compliance with its desires.

September 21 the Japanese Government refused to accept the tentative list as submitted and insisted that the persons to be exchanged be those specifically named by it. At the same time they stated that delay was immaterial.

About this time from secret sources the Department learned that the Japanese Government on September 4 had determined not to make a second exchange for the time being and to postpone it for two or three months, but that the American Government was not to be advised.

This information indicated definitely that the Japanese Government would not be ready to enter into an exchange until November or December.

The weeks and months intervening were consumed by the Department and the investigative agencies of other Departments in arriving

¹ For previous correspondence, see *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. 1, pp. 377 ff.

² Taken by the Secretary of State to a Cabinet meeting on December 16, 1942. In an attached table (not printed) the number of American citizens to be exchanged is set at 5,100, as follows: In Japan, 50; Shanghai and elsewhere in China, 1,300; Manila ("treated as if considered prisoners of war and not subject to exchange"), 3,000; and Guam and Wake ("treated as prisoners of war"), 750.

at a list of names chosen from the lists submitted by the Japanese Government.

From the Japanese lists were stricken the names of 538 persons (in addition to 1630 dependents of those persons, or a total of 2168). This included 46 persons (in addition to 90 dependents of those persons, or a total of 136) from the first and second categories, those being the principal persons desired by the Japanese Government.

November 3 note ³ was dispatched to the Japanese Government listing 1800 persons from the lists submitted by them, but omitting all of the 538 names.

December 16 the Department received the reply of the Japanese Government ⁴ (in response to November 3 United States note to Japan) stating the Japanese Government had taken into consideration that the American authorities had not included in the list the priorities requested by the Japanese Government, and stating further that the Japanese Government does not think it possible to come to an agreement for the second exchange unless the United States "clarifies its attitude".

This reply means that the Japanese Government insists upon the persons it has named as a *sine qua non* of the exchange of the American nationals.

The receipt of this latest communication of the Japanese Government indicates that the American Government will either have to surrender to Japan persons whom the investigative agencies have stricken off the list or make up its mind to leave its citizens in the Far East for the duration.

Latest advices indicate that the Americans are being interned in Shanghai and other places in China under conditions not in keeping with standards of the Geneva Convention.⁵

701.0090/1008: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, February 4, 1943.

291. American interests Japan, second voyage exchange vessel. Your 6128, December 25, noon.⁶ Following is text of Department's memorandum to Spanish Embassy, Washington, dated February 4:

³ *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. I, p. 444.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 446.

⁵ Convention on treatment of prisoners of war, signed July 27, 1929, *Foreign Relations*, 1929, vol. I, p. 336.

⁶ Not printed; it reported Japanese views that delay in the exchange vessels was not attributable to the Japanese Government but to differences between the American and Japanese Governments on the lists of Japanese to be evacuated, and that safe conduct would not be granted (701.0090/1459).

"The Department of State refers to memorandum no. 511 dated December 16, 1942 from the Spanish Embassy ⁷ in charge of Japanese interests in continental United States communicating a message from the Japanese Government relating to the Department's memorandum of November 3, 1942, to the Embassy.⁸ The latter memorandum forwarded a tentative list of Japanese nationals to be exchanged for American nationals on a second voyage of the exchange vessels, the Department proposing that the exchange vessels sail about December 1, 1942.

The Spanish Embassy's memorandum of December 16 informs the Government of the United States that the Japanese Government feels that the American authorities have not taken sufficient interest in finding those Japanese nationals designated by the Japanese Government and that the suggestions of that Government do not seem to have been taken into consideration. It would accordingly appear that the Japanese Government is not prepared to accept the list of Japanese nationals presented with the Department's memorandum above-mentioned for embarkation on the second voyage of the exchange vessel. A previous list for the second voyage was proposed to the Spanish Embassy by the Department's memorandum of September 1, 1942 ⁹ and was likewise rejected by the Japanese Government.

Prior to the first sailing of the exchange vessel, the Government of the United States received from the Japanese Government through the representing Power ¹⁰ a number of lists of Japanese nationals whose repatriation was desired by the Japanese Government. Subsequent to that sailing, the Government of the United States has received numerous additional lists. The total number of persons named therein, including dependents, is at present about five thousand.

As the Japanese Government has already been informed, the Government of the United States, when it attempted to prepare a list of those to be included in the second voyage of the exchange vessel, discovered that in the lists presented by the Spanish Embassy on behalf of the Japanese Government there were many duplications, that in a number of cases the individuals had departed from the United States either before the war or on the first voyage of the *Gripsholm*, that in other cases there was insufficient information for proper identification (such as omission of given names), that many of those named were American citizens and therefore not includible, and that a considerable number of the designated Japanese nationals expressed a desire to remain in the United States. On the other hand there were several thousand Japanese, not yet named by the Japanese Government for exchange, who expressed a desire to be exchanged. The first tentative list, suggested by the Department's memorandum of September 1, 1942, of passengers for the second voyage of the exchange vessel was composed partly of these last-mentioned Japanese and partly of those already named by the Japanese Government. The second list, presented to the Spanish Embassy on November 3, 1942 was composed entirely of Japanese named by the Japanese Government.

⁷ *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. I, p. 446.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 444.

⁹ Not printed.

¹⁰ Spain.

As the Japanese Government is aware, the second sailing of the exchange vessels has already been delayed for many months.

The Government of the United States has been and is still desirous of proceeding with the exchange of American and Japanese nationals at the earliest feasible date. To that end the Government of the United States has, during the months that have transpired since the first sailing of the exchange vessels, put forth great efforts to locate and identify all of the persons in the various lists received from the Spanish Embassy representing the interests of Japan. Those efforts have revealed the above-mentioned defects in the Japanese lists and difficulties in locating Japanese named for exchange, which defects and difficulties expanded with each list received. The mere fact that a particular Japanese did not appear upon the list presented for the second voyage of the exchange vessel does not necessarily mean that the Government of the United States is unwilling to exchange that person. The Government of the United States will give the utmost consideration to each individual case with a view to meeting as far as possible the desires of the Japanese Government.

To the end of exchanging as rapidly as possible all those nationals who are susceptible of being exchanged and thus meeting their desires and the desires of their Governments, the Government of the United States proposes that:

- (1) The Governments of Japan and the United States agree each to exchange a minimum of 4,500 persons of whom 1,500 are to be exchanged on each of three further sailings of the exchange vessels;

- (2) The exchange vessels of each Government arrive at Lourenço Marques on the three sailings on or about April 1, June 15, and August 30, 1943;

- (3) In selecting the individuals to be embarked for exchange the detaining Government will endeavor as far as possible to follow the desires of the other Government and the wishes of the individuals; and

- (4) This arrangement covers, on the one hand, Japanese official and non-official civilians in the United States and in other interested American countries, and, on the other hand, official and non-official civilians of the United States and of the other American countries aforementioned who are in the Japanese Empire and Japanese-occupied territory, including the Philippines, Wake and Guam, and in other areas in the Far East associated with Japan in the war.

Upon the conclusion of this exchange further exchanges could be undertaken if mutually agreeable. In that connection, it is to be pointed out again that there are several thousand Japanese in the United States not yet named for exchange by the Japanese Government who have expressed a desire to return to Japan and whom the United States Government is willing to exchange.

With a view to proceeding immediately under this proposal, if it is acceptable to the Japanese Government, the Government of the United States suggests that, in order that the exchange vessels may be enabled to depart from their respective countries and arrive at Lourenço Marques on the first date above mentioned, April 1, the

Japanese Government either (1) communicate its assent to the list already furnished on November 3, with the assurance from the Government of the United States that vacancies which may occur for the reasons hereinbefore mentioned, will be filled by additional Japanese named in the lists received from the Spanish Embassy, or (2) indicate those Japanese nationals whom it desires eliminated from the November 3 list and suggest from the names already presented by the Japanese Government substitutes therefor. With that assent as indication given, the Government of the United States invites the Japanese Government to indicate its desires with respect to the passenger list for the succeeding two voyages of the exchange vessel from the United States.

The primary purpose of the Government of the United States in wishing to proceed with the exchange at the earliest possible moment is based on humanitarian considerations, including the desire that its nationals now in enemy-controlled areas may be returned as soon as possible to their own country. The Government of the United States assumes that the Japanese Government is similarly motivated.

An early expression of the views of the Japanese Government would be welcomed."

Department does not understand your statement that safe conduct will not be granted but interprets it to mean that safe conduct would not be granted for exchange based upon the list of Japanese nationals proposed for repatriation, transmitted with Department's memorandum of November 3 to Spanish Embassy, Washington, the substance of which was communicated to you for information of Swiss Government in Department's 2469, November 3.¹¹ Since safe conduct is indispensable condition to any such exchange, Department assumes that when satisfied with respect to passenger lists Japanese Government will not only grant safe conduct but will also obtain necessary safe conducts from its allies as already agreed. Swiss Legation Tokyo should be so informed and requested urgently to confirm Department's understanding with respect to safe conduct.

HULL

701.0090/1508 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, February 22, 1943.

[Received February 22—4:08 p. m.]

1211. American interests Japan, exchange. Department's 291, 4th. Swiss representative Tokyo ¹² reported telegraphically February 18 that he insisted personally Japanese authorities examine proposals contained telegram under reference and reply concerning safe con-

¹¹ Not printed.

¹² Camille Gorgé, Swiss Minister in Japan.

duct *Gripsholm* but Japanese Foreign Minister ¹³ replied with generalities stating that Japan favorable evacuation civilians as stated by Tani before Parliament but Foreign Office remained silent concerning concrete measures taken or to be taken toward new exchange.

HARRISON

711.94114 Sick/3 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, April 27, 1943.

[Received April 27—9:33 a. m.]

2576. American interests Japan. Repatriation POW's.¹⁴ Department's 2750, December 5, 1942.¹⁵ Legation Tokyo telegraphs "Have pressed Japanese Foreign Office for reply American proposal. Reply just received that Japanese Government cannot presently give favorable response."¹⁶

HARRISON

701.0090/15933

The Spanish Embassy to the Department of State

MEMORANDUM

No. 97

Ex. 108.03

The Spanish Embassy in charge of Japanese Interests in the United States presents its compliments to the Department of State and with reference to memorandum No. 46 Ex. 108.03 of February 26th ¹⁷ referring to the Japanese enemy aliens to be repatriated on the next exchange vessel, has the honor to transcribe hereto the telegram received from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Madrid, which reads as follows:

"1. Japanese Government received on 13th February United States Government's memorandum dated 2nd [4th] February ¹⁸ concerning

¹³ Masayuki Tani.

¹⁴ Prisoners of war.

¹⁵ Not printed; it requested a report on developments in connection with telegram No. 1812, July 21, to the Minister in Switzerland, which had proposed to the Japanese Government a mutual repatriation of seriously sick and wounded prisoners of war (514.2A12/381).

¹⁶ In telegram No. 2857, May 9, the Minister in Switzerland reported the views of the Swiss Minister in Japan that the principal difficulty prompting the Japanese Government to turn down the proposal of the United States was the question of transport "as Japanese consider cannot allocate ship for this exchange." (711.94114 Sick/4) At a meeting of representatives of the War Department and the Special Division on October 11, 1943, to develop "facts regarding exchange of military personnel", it was stated that the matter was not pressed in order not to jeopardize the second exchange and that further efforts were to be commenced after its completion (701.0090/10-1143).

¹⁷ Not found in Department files.

¹⁸ See telegram No. 291, February 4, to the Minister in Switzerland, p. 868.

exchange of residents and replied on 22nd February¹⁹ that it would be impossible to effect exchange on 1st April owing to shortage of time. Upon further study of said memorandum Japanese Government wish to make following observations.

2. Prompted by humanitarian motive and desirous of exchange as many residents as possible, Japanese Government proposed further exchange but negotiation was delayed chiefly owing, as was pointed out before, to fact that list of Japanese residents to be repatriated compiled by United States Government and forwarded under date of 3rd November was unsatisfactory to Japanese Government. Japanese Government, however, are glad to note from above-said memorandum that United States Government are ready to comply with Japanese requirements in this respect.

3. In these circumstances Japanese Government are desirous of effecting the second exchange at earliest possible date and it is considered expedient to try come to speedy agreement through adjustment of above-mentioned lists leaving to future negotiations question of enlarging scope of exchange and other new proposals embodied in United States memorandum.

4. It is therefore proposed that number of persons to be exchanged shall be as been expected in former negotiations, one thousand five hundred from each side. That place of exchange shall, in consideration of various circumstances, be exchanged from Lourenço Marques to port in territory of Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in East Asia, such as Petropavlovsk in Kamchatka or Vladivostok, and that exchange ships be Soviet ships between American and Soviet ports and Japanese ships between Japanese and Soviet ports. Should these alterations be not agreeable to United States Government, Japanese Government suggest as an alternative that place of exchange shall be Marmagão in Portuguese Goa which is port proposed by Japan to Great Britain, and that exchange ships shall be left to choice of each side. Japanese Government and United States Government shall approach Soviet or Portuguese Government for the necessary cooperation and facilities according as which of these two plans United States Government agree to adopt as regard time of exchange. Japanese Government are prepared to effect exchange directly Japanese requirements regarding list of Japanese subjects to be repatriated are complied with, and an arrangement is made with Government of the country of port of exchange. In the meanwhile it may be pointed out that Japanese Government have suggested latter part of June as time for exchange between Japan and Great Britain.

5. In connection with above-said list, owing to recent severance of Diplomatic Relations between Japan and Chile, it has been made necessary to exchange diplomatic and Consular Officials and other residents between two countries and taking this aspect into consideration Japanese Government's requirements concerning the lists are indicated in an annex²⁰ to this memorandum. Japanese Govern-

¹⁹ This may be reference to note of February 23 from the Japanese Foreign Office to the Swiss Legation in Japan, summarized by the American Minister in Switzerland in telegram No. 1711, March 15, which advised of an early reply to the American Government and stated that it was "impossible for practical reasons maintain date April 1st proposed exchange Lourenço Marques". (701.0090/1533)

²⁰ Not printed.

ment hope that United States Government will, as has been intimated by their memorandum, comply with Japanese requirements.

6. Japanese Government wish that United States Government will reply to above at their earliest convenience."

WASHINGTON, May 4, 1943.

701.0090/1593½

Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hamilton) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Long) ²¹

[WASHINGTON,] May 7, 1943.

MR. LONG: FE ²² offers for consideration observations on the Japanese reply to our proposal of February 4 ²³ for continuing the exchange of nationals. As all related data are not yet available to us, these observations of course are of a general and preliminary character.

1. It is evident that the Japanese Government is ready to effect one more exchange and perhaps further exchanges thereafter.

2. The Japanese still insist that they select the Japanese for the second exchange. We believe that the Japanese attitude in this respect is not due essentially to the Japanese Government's desire to get particular individuals for its war effort but is due (a) to commitments to repatriate designated Japanese made to families and employers in Japan and (b) to a feeling that national honor is now involved in the issue. Having established priorities for repatriation in accordance with what the Japanese believe to be a right under the exchange agreement and being bound to families and business concerns to repatriate designated individuals, the Japanese Government apparently considers that both its national prestige and duty require it to insist on its established priorities.

3. It is believed that, if we accept the Japanese list, the Japanese will be disposed to make important concessions to us with respect to the composition of our list for the second exchange, for instance, the inclusion of a block of say 500 women, children, and sick from the Philippines. (The Japanese have indicated to the British Government a willingness to have 1,000 British women, children, and sick from Hong Kong included in the forthcoming second British-Japanese exchange.)

4. It is our opinion that the consummation of the second exchange will facilitate the negotiation of further exchanges looking to the

²¹ Marginal notation of May 8 by Mr. George L. Brandt, Executive Assistant to Assistant Secretary of State Long: "I think this is a very acceptable statement and should be of use in taking up with ONI [Office of Naval Intelligence] cases of listed Japanese whose repatriation is objected to."

²² Division of Far Eastern Affairs.

²³ See telegram No. 291, February 4, to the Minister in Switzerland, p. 868.

repatriation of the greater part of our people in the Far East. A popular sentiment has developed in Japan, due to stories in Japan of suffering and maltreatment of Japanese in enemy countries, to repatriate as many Japanese as possible. Because of this development and because it is thought that the Japanese now feel that reciprocal repatriation of civilians is the "correct thing" for civilized nations nowadays to carry out, it is believed that the Japanese will be disposed to continue the exchange movement.

5. It appears likely that the British Government will be successful in working out a second exchange. If it does and this Government does not, there will be difficulty explaining why this Government was not able to do something which the British Government was able to do. It is learned informally from an officer of the British Embassy that freedom of repatriation was the unquestioned principle of the first Anglo-Japanese exchange and that the British had no interest in preventing the return to Japan of anyone on the Japanese list, which was drawn up by the Japanese Government.

6. There is no question in our minds that the alternative to general acceptance of the Japanese list for the second exchange is the breakdown of the whole repatriation project, or at least suspension for a very long time.

7. A breakdown of the repatriation project will remove an important means of sending relief supplies to American prisoners of war and internees in Japanese hands.²⁴

M[AXWELL] M. H[AMILTON]

311.9415/435a

The Department of State to the Spanish Embassy

MEMORANDUM

The Department of State acknowledges the receipt of the memorandum no. 97 EX 108.03 of May 4, 1943 from the Spanish Embassy in charge of Japanese interests in continental United States, transmitting a communication from the Japanese Government with regard to a further exchange of United States and Japanese nationals.

The United States Government continues to desire that the second exchange take place at the earliest possible date and is in principle agreeable to the Japanese Government's suggestion that it be made at Marmagão in Portuguese India. The United States Government proposes to use for the exchange the Swedish motorship *Gripsholm*,

²⁴ For correspondence on Japanese treatment of American prisoners of war and civilian internees, see pp. 953 ff.; for correspondence on American efforts to ship relief supplies to these persons, see pp. 1012 ff.

which was used in the first exchange. It is suggested that both governments approach the Portuguese Government to obtain its consent in principle to an exchange at Marmagão. The United States Government for its part is taking this action.

The United States Government is agreeable to the inclusion in the exchange of nationals between the United States and Japan of officials and unofficial nationals being exchanged between Chile and Japan and has so informed the Chilean Government.

The United States Government is agreeable to the inclusion in the exchange of the six Japanese and two Argentine nationals referred to in paragraph 4 of the annex to the Japanese communication.

The Department has not yet received the list of 70 additional persons to be repatriated from the United States, 10 international merchants to be repatriated from Peru and 70 diplomats and international merchants from Chile referred to in paragraph 4 of the annex to the Japanese communication. It is requested that these lists be provided as soon as possible in order that their consideration may not delay the execution of the exchange.

Among the Japanese nationals named by the Japanese Government for repatriation in one or more of the lists previously presented to the Department of State by the Spanish Embassy, there are numerous individuals named whose existence and whereabouts the United States Government has been unable to determine despite diligent efforts through all of its agencies. A list of those names is attached.²⁶ It is requested that the Spanish Embassy and the Japanese Government check the accuracy of these names and provide all possible additional information regarding these individuals which would be of assistance in determining their identity and their whereabouts. It is suggested that the individuals in question may have returned to Japan prior to the outbreak of hostilities, as every effort to locate them within the jurisdiction of the United States has failed to reveal their whereabouts.

There is also enclosed a list ²⁶ of four individuals named in the annex to the Japanese Government's communication under acknowledgement who were not named in the lists referred to in that annex when those lists were received from the Embassy by the Department. One of these has been identified. All possible additional information that would assist in the prompt identification of the other three individuals is requested.

The Department is proceeding with the preparation of a passenger list of Japanese subjects for the *Gripsholm* which takes into consideration the observations of the Japanese Government on the November 3

²⁶ Not printed.

list ²⁷ and will communicate with the Spanish Embassy further in this connection at the earliest possible opportunity.

WASHINGTON, May 26, 1943.

701.0090/1616½

The Spanish Embassy to the Department of State

MEMORANDUM

No. 117

The Spanish Embassy presents its compliments to the Department of State and has the honor to acknowledge receipt of its Memorandum of May 26th, relative to the preparation of lists of the Japanese Nationals who are to be repatriated on the next exchange vessel.

The Spanish Embassy has advised the Japanese Government through the Foreign Office in Madrid, that the American Government is agreeable that the exchange take place at Marmagão in Portuguese India, and that the vessel to be used for the exchange is to be the Swedish Motorship *Gripsholm*.

With regard to the "70 additional persons to be repatriated from the United States" the Japanese Government has answered that such a list is being prepared and will be cabled as soon as possible.

The list of the "ten international merchants from Peru and Bolivia" was sent by this Embassy to the Department of State, as annex to Memorandum No. 114 of May 26th.²⁸

The list of the "70 (76) diplomats and international merchants from Chile" was sent with this Embassy's Memorandum No. 113 of the same date ²⁹ to the Department of State.

Regarding the list of "60 Japanese from Canada" the Japanese Government is at present conferring with the Spanish Consul in Montreal and the names of these will be communicated by cable to this Embassy for transmittal to the Department of State.

The Spanish Embassy would further inform the State Department that the Japanese Government wishes that the "25 Japanese resident in Mexico" be embarked on the second exchange vessel, and whose names will be communicated telegraphically to this Embassy as soon as the Japanese Government receives a reply to the questions it has directed to the Portuguese Representative in Mexico in charge of Japanese Interests in that country.

The Japanese Government also wishes that on the second exchange vessel be embarked certain Thaiandese (Siamese) residing in the

²⁷ See memorandum of November 3, 1942, to the Spanish Embassy, *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. I, p. 444.

²⁸ Not printed.

²⁹ Not printed; correction of number appears in the original.

United States (number not mentioned) whose names will be transmitted telegraphically once the Japanese Government arrives at an agreement with the Government of Thai.³⁰

With the above mentioned Memorandum of the Department of State dated May 26th, was included a list of the Japanese nationals whose addresses are incomplete. The Spanish Embassy would appreciate that the Department of State advise whether it wishes this list communicated to the Japanese Government, informing them that there is no trace of their being in the United States, or asking whether, prior to the commencement of hostilities, these Japanese nationals might have already departed for Japan.

WASHINGTON, May 27, 1943.

701.0090/1627a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, June 2, 1943.

1311. American interests—Far East—repatriation. Department is ready to deliver to Spanish Embassy in charge of Japanese interests list of Japanese nationals for embarkation in second exchange compiled in accordance with recently expressed wishes of Japanese Government as understood here. Final compilation of list is being delayed only by non-receipt so far of names of 70 additional Japanese from United States whom Japanese Government states it particularly desires included in second exchange.

Department desires to receive as soon as possible definitive list of Americans to be embarked from Far East. List should be compiled according to principles already set forth in Department's 665 of March 13, 1942,³¹ paragraph 4, and in telegrams subsequently exchanged in reference thereto, particularly Department's 2117 of September 7 and your 4735 of October 20.³²

In selecting passengers in category "A" (Department's 665) that is, persons arrested or interned, Department desires for humanitarian reasons that those in close arrest and women and children including males up to 21 years be given preference. However, as previously indicated, any women and children declining to return without husband and/or father should take status of such husband or father and

³⁰ In memorandum No. 150, Ex. 108.03 IV, July 5, the Spanish Embassy informed the Department that no Thailandese wished to be repatriated aboard the second exchange vessel (740.00115 Pacific War/1785).

³¹ *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. I, p. 404.

³² Neither printed.

await his turn. In addition to those actually held in camps Department considers as constructively interned and thus eligible for inclusion in category "A" persons whose citizenship has been verified of the categories covered by lists A, D, E, F and G of your 3116 of May 21.³³

After giving preference to those in close arrest and to women and children who are interned or constructively interned as explained above, any remaining space should be allotted to seriously ill men and thereafter to interned or constructively interned men with preference being given, other things being equal, to married men of the category mentioned in your 4735.³⁴

Existing instructions concerning alien relatives and other mixed status cases are confirmed.

Department hopes that names of 70 additional Japanese nationals desired from United States will be received in time to locate them for sailing of *Gripsholm* about July 15 in which case it should be possible for the exchange to take place at Goa not later than August 30.

It is Department's hope that negotiations for further exchanges will be successful and that all Americans desiring to return who cannot be brought out on the present exchange will be repatriated in the near future.

HULL

701.0090/1622a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, June 4, 1943.

1333. American interests—Far East—repatriation. Department understands that space for the second exchange will in harmony with Department's 1311 June 2 be allotted as follows:

- (1) United States officials from Manila numbering with their dependents 25.
- (2) Chilean officials, numbering approximately 40.

³³ Telegram not printed; it listed 202 Americans free at Shanghai on May 15. Lists A, D, E, F and G covered, respectively, sick men and family members; employees obliged to work for Japanese-controlled businesses and their families; those free for special reasons, probably because they were working in the interests of Japan; a minor residing with a neutral family; and members of the American Association (390.1115/7458).

³⁴ Dated October 20, 1942, not printed; it listed 149 American citizens in occupied China separated from their families for a long time (390.1115/5501).

(3) Non-official nationals of other American Republics and Canada in numbers proportionate to the number of US nationals being repatriated (Department's 879 of April 7,³⁵ paragraph 5).

(4) Non-official United States nationals from Manila (Department's 185 of January 22³⁶).

(5) Persons under close arrest, such as those covered by Department's 2114, September 5, 1942; Bern's 2855, June 21, 1942; Bern's 1660, March 12; Department's 1630, June 24, 1942; Department's 2210, September 19, 1942; Bern's 5696, December 7, 1942; Department's 2186, September 16, 1942; Bern's 2519, April 22; and Bern's 2916, May 12.³⁷

(6) All women and children interned or constructively interned desiring to return without head of family.

(7) Seriously ill men and thereafter interned or constructively interned men with their American dependents, if any, with preference being given, other things being equal, to married men of the category mentioned in your 4735.³⁸

HULL

701.0090/15931

The Department of State to the Spanish Embassy

MEMORANDUM

The Department of State refers to the memorandum no. 97 Ex 108.03 of the Spanish Embassy in charge of Japanese interests in the United States dated May 4, 1943 and in particular to the first two sentences of the fourth paragraph of the annex³⁶ thereto promising that there would be communicated without delay the names of additional Japanese to be repatriated in the contemplated second exchange of nationals.

Although five weeks have passed, the Department has not yet received from the Embassy the names of the seventy additional Japanese to be repatriated from the United States. The Department has likewise not yet received lists of Japanese to be repatriated from Canada, Mexico and Brazil. The non-receipt of these lists is delaying the preparation and delivery to the Spanish Embassy of the list of the Japanese to be embarked in the next sailing of the *Gripsholm* in accordance with the wishes of the Japanese Government.

WASHINGTON, June 12, 1943.

³⁵ *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. I, p. 412.

³⁶ Not printed.

³⁷ None printed.

³⁸ See footnote 34, p. 879.

701.0090/1628 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, June 13, 1943.

[Received June 13—noon.]

3560. American interests Far East. Repatriation. Department 1311, 2d. Summary telegram June 10 Swiss Consulate Shanghai follows.

Compilation new passenger list as requested will necessitate complete reregistration all American nationals because present list prepared basis conditions prevailing prior to general assembly.³⁹ Many Americans who at that time either failed apply for evacuation or expressed desire depart only with a later ship or who did not wish separate from other family members eligible in a lower category might have changed their minds since general assembly occurred. Compilation this data from all Americans concerned will entail considerable time and before proceeding with reregistration request confirmation that my interpretation new evacuation plan is correct.

This is my understanding of new priority: (1) persons in close arrest; (2) women and children including males up to 21 years; (3) seriously ill men; (4) men who repatriated their families in accordance with prewar advices [from] Department; (5) outport residents who do not qualify for inclusion 1 to 4; (6) aged who do not qualify for inclusion in 1 to 5; (7) *quasi* officials who do not qualify for inclusion in 1 to 6; (8) officers and employees American organizations sent out by such organizations who do not qualify for inclusion in 1 to 7; (9) other Americans who do not qualify in any of foregoing categories; (10) mixed families comprising aliens.

Swiss note June 12 states contents Department's 1333, June 4, not received Shanghai when foregoing despatched.

HARRISON

701.0090/1628 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, June 18, 1943.

1441. American interests—Far East—repatriation. Your 3560, June 13.

1. By its 1333 of June 4 Department indicated its wishes with respect to allocation of space to those to be repatriated in forthcoming exchange according to directives given in its 1311 of June 2.

³⁹ For message informing the Department of general internment of Americans in China, see telegram No. 743, February 1, from the Minister in Switzerland, p. 959.

2. Please request Swiss Government in so informing its representatives in Far East to endeavor to arrange for Swiss Minister at Tokyo to correlate action of all Swiss representatives in Far East so that these directives may be uniformly carried out.

3. Department is fully conscious of the difficulties presented and hopes that the Swiss representatives in the Far East will, with the information regarding individual cases which they already have in hand, be able to make appropriate adjustments to give effect to Department's directives and wishes referred to in paragraph 1 above without there being caused delay in effecting the exchange.

HULL

701.0090/1643a

The Secretary of State to the Spanish Ambassador (Cárdenas)

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the Ambassador of Spain in charge of Japanese interests in continental United States and has the honor to refer to the Embassy's communication of May 4, 1943 and to subsequent correspondence regarding the proposed second exchange of nationals of the United States, the other American republics, Canada and Japan, particularly the Embassy's memorandum of June 15, 1943 ⁴¹ transmitting a list of 145 additional Japanese nationals to be repatriated from the United States in the forthcoming exchange.

As requested by the Japanese Government in the final sentence of the annex ⁴² to the Embassy's memorandum of May 4, the United States Government has reexamined the lists of the Japanese nationals named by the Japanese Government for repatriation and has prepared and encloses in duplicate a list ⁴² of Japanese nationals willing to be repatriated. These persons, selected according to the United States Government's understanding of the wishes of the Japanese Government regarding the priority of individuals, number 1248. With the reservation of spaces for Japanese to be embarked from other American countries the list totals 1502 individuals.

It is expected that additional Japanese from the following categories of persons will be added to the attached list:

1. Persons named in the enclosure to the Department's memorandum of May 26, 1943, as they are found and if they agree to be repatriated.

2. Any individuals not already included in the enclosed list who were named in the Japanese Government's list of 145 additional Japanese nationals to be repatriated on this exchange and who upon being identified and located agree to be repatriated.

⁴¹ No. 136, Ex. 108.03 III, not printed.

⁴² Not printed.

3. Persons yet to be identified and brought to the port of embarkation, who are listed in the new group of 10 international merchants to be repatriated from Peru and Bolivia.

As the persons in the foregoing categories become available for inclusion in the passenger list they will be added thereto and will be given embarkation preference over other Japanese having lower priority.

In view of this evidence of the United States Government's efforts to meet the wishes of the Japanese Government with respect to the composition of the sailing list for the forthcoming exchange of nationals, the United States Government desires to know whether the Japanese Government is willing to undertake to effect the exchange of nationals at Marmagão on or about September 15. In that event the United States Government would arrange to have the *Gripsholm* leave New York on or about August 1 and proceed to Rio de Janeiro and to Buenos Aires to take on board the additional Japanese to be repatriated from the other American republics.

WASHINGTON, June 24, 1943.

701.0090/1640 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, June 25, 1943.

[Received June 25—6:26 p. m.]

3804. American interests Far East, repatriation. Department's 1311, 2d, and 1333, 4th. Department's telegrams under reference transmitted Swiss Legation, Tokyo, which replied that in its opinion geographic allotment space described Legation's 5751, December 8⁴³ should remain unaltered.

If situation China resulting recent measures internment taken into consideration, space allotted Americans from occupied China would require large increase to detriment space allotted persons from Japan. Furthermore repatriation American internees from Guam impossible.

Legation Tokyo fears modification allotment space would not receive favorable reception Japanese Government.

⁴³ Not printed; it transmitted allocations proposed by the Swiss Legation in Japan as follows: 10 non-American officials, 67 American civilians, 30 Canadians and 3 Latin Americans from Japan and Manchuria; 130 American civilians from Guam; 18 American civilians and 5 Canadians from Indochina; 1 American civilian from Thailand; 10 American civilians, 100 Canadians and 10 Latin Americans from Hong Kong; 160 American civilians, 20 Canadians and 20 Latin Americans from Manila; and 850 American civilians, 54 Canadians and 11 Latin Americans from occupied China. The message also contained relevant lists prepared by the Swiss Legation (701.0090/1440).

Swiss Legation adds if space allotted Japan and Guam not modified lists previously submitted would not be greatly changed. Nevertheless compliance Department's instructions would render impossible repatriation second exchange approximately 20 persons not interned included lists previously submitted. One section this group requested repatriation prior first exchange and would be obliged cede place persons who after long hesitations only recently requested repatriation.

Swiss Legation makes following observations regarding Department's 1333.

Section 1: Only 24 persons this group resulting decision regarding Erdelyi. See Department's 185, January 22.⁴⁴

Section 2: Chilean officials [and] members [of] family number seven; unofficial Chileans should be included section 3.

Sections 3 and 4 lists prepared will not be changed.

Sections 5, 6 and 7: Swiss Legation will cable definite list when informed whether geographic allocation of space still effective.

For following reason Legation Bern recommends Swiss Legation Tokyo be authorized retain geographic allotment of space as outlined Legation's 5751 and allot space within geographic divisions according Department's 1311 and 1333.

Setting aside geographic allocation space might seriously jeopardize proposed sailing *Gripsholm* about July 15 as Swiss representatives throughout Far East would be obliged prepare new lists on basis different that effective since December 1942.

HARRISON

701.0090/1640 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, June 26, 1943.

1506. American interests—Far East—repatriation. Your 3804, June 25. In view of circumstances reported by Swiss Legation Tokyo, Department is agreeable to maintenance in principle of geographical allocation space as described in Legation's 5751 December 8.⁴⁵ As indicated in third paragraph of Department's 1441 June 18 it is hoped that any necessary adjustments can be made without delaying exchange and without unduly disturbing basic arrangements which Department appreciates Swiss have already so painstakingly made.

Because of 5 weeks' delay in receipt of list of additional Japanese

⁴⁴ Not printed; in this telegram the Department indicated that Alice Erdelyi was considered ineligible for exchange because of her alien status (390.1115/-5217d).

⁴⁵ Not printed, but see footnote 43, p. 883.

nationals from United States whose repatriation on forthcoming exchange Japanese Government has particularly requested, sailing of *Gripsholm* has been proportionately delayed. If sailing list as proposed to Spanish Embassy Washington on June 24 is acceptable to Japanese Government and Department so notified by early July *Gripsholm* could leave New York about end of July.

HULL

701.0090/1660a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, July 6, 1943.

1593. Department desires urgently categorical assurances that all persons referred to in numbered paragraph 5 of Department's 1333 of June 4 will be embarked in forthcoming exchange and with particular reference to the three persons covered by Department's 2114 of September 5, 1942⁴⁶ desires urgent confirmation that appropriate Swiss representatives have free access to them in order to provide for their needs and to assist them in arranging their affairs so that they may be ready to embark in the forthcoming exchange.

United States Government is making every effort to arrange for inclusion in forthcoming exchange of those Japanese nationals whose repatriation the Japanese Government has specifically requested from the United States and is according Spanish representatives every facility to ascertain their wishes. In this connection Department would be grateful if Swiss Minister Tokyo would reiterate substance of Department's 1571 of July 3⁴⁷ and insist upon full reciprocity for Swiss representatives in Far East in ascertaining wishes of Americans for inclusion in forthcoming exchange and in extending them appropriate assistance.⁴⁸

HULL

⁴⁶ Not printed; it expressed the Department's desire to receive assurances that Dr. John Leighton Stuart, President of Yenching University, and Dr. Henry S. Houghton and Mr. Trevor Bowen, Acting Director and Controller, respectively, of Peiping Union Medical College, would be embarked on the second exchange vessel (390.1115/4628).

⁴⁷ Not printed.

⁴⁸ On July 6, the Secretary of State sent a note to the Spanish Ambassador advising that "Swiss representatives in charge of American interests in the Far East are not being permitted free access to all Americans there to ascertain their wishes with respect to embarkation in the forthcoming exchange and to assist them in making necessary arrangements in that connection" and requesting the Spanish Government urgently to confirm to the Japanese Government that Spanish representatives in the United States were granted free access to all Japanese nationals here (703.5494/92a).

390.1115/7409 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, July 22, 1943.

1711. American interests—China. Your 4113, July 12.⁴⁹ It would be appreciated if Swiss Legation Tokyo would inform the Japanese Government that in the opinion of the United States Government attempted escape is not a valid reason for excluding anyone from the exchange; and that Teeters⁵⁰ being imprisoned should under the exchange agreement enjoy first priority for exchange. This Government is not excluding from the exchange any Japanese civilians who have attempted to escape from internment camps here.⁵¹

HULL

701.0090/1704a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, July 24, 1943.

1736. American interests—Far East, repatriation. In order to avoid difficulties and delays at the port of exchange Department requests that Swiss representatives in Far East endeavor to effect arrangements along following lines:

1. Swiss delegate traveling on each Japanese exchange vessel should be provided before departure a list in triplicate alphabetically arranged showing by ports name and age, sex, family relationship and nationality of all individuals who, according to reports made to Department in advance by Swiss representatives, are to be embarked on the vessel.

2. Swiss representatives shall at each port of embarkation have privilege of notifying Swiss Minister, Tokyo, by telegraph of any discrepancy between passengers listed for embarkation and those actually embarked. This information should be transmitted to Department without delay. It should cover all data regarding passengers specified in paragraph 1 above and the Legation should repeat it to Bombay for repetition to American Export Lines repre-

⁴⁹ Not printed, but see footnote 39, p. 977.

⁵⁰ Nathaniel D. Teeters, American civilian engineer engaged in the construction of naval facilities at Wake at the time of its capture by Japanese forces on December 22, 1941. For correspondence on the question of treatment of prisoners attempting to escape, see pp. 954-955 and 976-978.

⁵¹ In telegram No. 5115, August 21, 1943, the Minister in Switzerland reported that the Japanese Foreign Office refused to authorize Teeters' repatriation as he was considered a prisoner of war (390.1115/8445).

sentative at Mormugão. Hospital cases among the passengers should be handled similarly with particular attention called to them.

3. Swiss representative on each exchange vessel shall appoint an advisory committee from the passengers to consider questions of berthing on *Gripsholm* at exchange port. A copy of the list of passengers referred to in 1 should be made available to this committee. The duties of the committee shall be to prepare a complete detailed passenger list and to determine which of the individuals on each of the Japanese vessels are entitled by virtue of official position, age, physical condition, or because they are accompanied by small children, to receive preferential berthing on *Gripsholm*. It should be made clear to the committee that it is the desire of the Department that the classes of persons referred to shall receive preferential berthing and that young and healthy individuals shall receive the less comfortable accommodations regardless of considerations of rank, family relationship or position. The Department suggests that each advisory committee comprise at least five individuals, one of whom should be a Canadian and one a national of one of the other American republics. Chairmanship should be elective.

4. Advisory committee on each exchange vessel shall prepare complete passenger lists of those vessels in 20 copies showing passengers' names in alphabetical order of family names and numbered consecutively and indicating age, sex, relationship to other passengers, nationality, special or official status if any, physical condition and race. The committee should furthermore prepare a list of the passengers requiring special berthing because of infirmity, illness or age, together with such recommendations as may be necessary in each case. This list must likewise be prepared in 20 copies. The committee should fully familiarize itself with the problems and condition of each passenger and be prepared to assist in the assignment of cabins and berths, in the distribution of tags and labels and in such other tasks as may be required when the port of exchange is reached.

5. All the Japanese passengers being accommodated on one vessel are thus free to discuss among themselves any problems they may have to confront which are similar in nature to the problems dealt with by the American advisory committees. As the Americans being repatriated will be separated on two vessels, it is requested that the Swiss representatives in the Far East arrange if possible that messages regarding berthing problems and other problems incident to the work of the advisory committees on each Japanese exchange vessel may be exchanged between those committees through the Swiss delegates.

701.0090/1681 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, July 24, 1943.

1739. Your 4010, 7th, and 4269, 19th.⁵² As stated in its 2367 of October 14, 1942⁵³ Department maintains its position that all American civilians from Guam who, surprised in their normal civilian activities, are innocent civilian victims of the war and who are now enforced non-permanent residents of Japan, are eligible for exchange. It is hoped that some at least of these persons, particularly the infirm, may be included in second exchange, but all of those whose repatriation at this time may not be feasible should be accommodated in following exchange.

Pending their repatriation Department will appreciate Swiss Minister Tokyo's efforts to obtain improvement in internment conditions of Americans from Guam.

HULL

701.0090/1740

The Spanish Embassy to the Department of State

MEMORANDUM

No. 175

Ex. 120.00

The Spanish Embassy presents its compliments to the Department of State and begs to transcribe the following Memorandum that the Japanese Government has forwarded this Embassy through the "Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores"⁵⁴ in Madrid, regarding the examination of luggage and funds repatriates can take with them on the second exchange vessel.

"Memorandum—It is intention of the Japanese Government as also it is understood that of United States Government to carry out second exchange in accordance with terms of agreement reached at time of first exchange. However, while persons to be exchanged by second exchange are chiefly persons who are not officials, said agreement leaves to future arrangement question of examination of effects of non-official persons to be included in second or later exchange and there were at first exchange cases of violation on part of American authorities of terms of agreement as to search of persons of non-official evacuees. It is also considered desirable to make some alterations in provisions of agreement relating to money which evacuees will be allowed to take with them. On these points therefore Japanese Government make following proposals and wish to be informed without delay whether they are agreeable to United States Government.

⁵² Neither printed.⁵³ Not printed.⁵⁴ Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

1. Japanese Government will not search persons of evacuees, and [will] examine their luggage in a lenient manner. At first exchange American authorities searched persons of non-official Japanese evacuees stripping them without single exception of their clothes and examined their luggage in most unsparing manner. This called forth Japanese Government in most emphatic protest twice last year. At coming exchange both sides shall strictly comply with terms of agreement.

2. Every adult evacuee of each side shall in same way as at first exchange be permitted to take with him or her up to yen 1000 or \$300.00 for use on board ship until arrival at place of exchange. Any amount of money remaining unused shall as before be bought by respective governments. Any Japanese currency received by Swiss Representative shall be deposited with Japanese Bank and shall be permitted to be used for the representation of American Interests. Similar measures shall be taken [by] United States Government in respect any money received by Spanish Representative. 16th July, 1943."

WASHINGTON, July 26, 1943.

701.0090/1709a

The Department of State to the Spanish Embassy

MEMORANDUM

The Department of State refers to previous correspondence with the Spanish Embassy in charge of Japanese interests in continental United States concerning the repatriation of Japanese nationals.

Among the Japanese who have been named by the Japanese Government for inclusion in the exchange and who are willing to be repatriated there are many persons who are seriously ill, physically or mentally. In some cases the attending physicians have indicated that travel might be seriously injurious to their health. In a few cases of physical illness the individuals concerned are willing to sign a waiver of responsibility in order to return to Japan.

Since the individuals referred to have been specifically requested by the Japanese Government the Department is prepared to provide appropriate facilities for their travel to the port of embarkation and appropriate care for them on the exchange vessel. It is desired, however, that the Japanese Government promptly notify the United States Government that it will assume all responsibility for the effects which the journey may have upon the well-being of these individuals. There would be no objection on the part of the United States Government if the Japanese Government were to arrange that the Japanese on board the vessel will among themselves undertake to care for these persons during the voyage.

WASHINGTON, July 27, 1943.

701.0090/1683 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, July 28, 1943.

1781. American interests—Far East, repatriation. Reference your 4313, July 20.⁵⁵ Swiss Legation Tokyo should be informed that Department on July 27 replied ⁵⁶ to communication of Japanese Government dated July 15 [13], 1943 which was delivered at Department after business hours on July 21.⁵⁷

Department is complying with Japanese request to remove from passenger list of June 24 226 Japanese from Peru. It will likewise eliminate from list as requested by Japanese any of 27 Japanese from Hawaii who do not wish to be separated from their wives and families still remaining in Hawaii. Department gives detailed information regarding 155 individuals referred to in Japanese communication, specifying names of 28 of them, who are willing to be repatriated at this time.

Attached to communication Department provided Spanish Embassy for information of Japanese Government a list of 3,101 Japanese nationals designated by Japanese Government for repatriation who have expressed in writing their refusal to be repatriated. Department attached a further list of 151 individuals who have revoked a previously-expressed intention to be repatriated. Department points out that if any of these individuals subsequently accept repatriation their wishes in the matter will be respected, and that they may be interviewed by Spanish representative at any time.

In concluding paragraphs of note Department indicates its feeling that further delay in exchange might be avoided if Spanish Embassy were given authority, such as has apparently been accorded to protecting Power for Japanese interests elsewhere in this hemisphere, to suggest individuals known to it to desire repatriation on humanitarian or other special grounds or individuals specified by the Japanese Government to fill remaining spaces on the vessel. Department indicates that it will continue its efforts to find among Japanese designated for repatriation persons willing to fill the remaining spaces on passenger list but that the number of refusals encountered handicaps this effort. It points out also that whenever any Japanese designated for repatriation by the Japanese Government accept repatriation their names will be immediately incorporated in the list as has already been done in a note dated July 14 [17] ⁵⁸ naming 14 such individuals and

⁵⁵ Not printed.

⁵⁶ Memorandum to the Spanish Embassy not printed.

⁵⁷ Memorandum No. 169, Ex. 108.03, July 21, from the Spanish Embassy, not printed.

⁵⁸ Note of July 17 not printed.

in the present communication naming 28. Department hopes that Japanese Government will observe that the United States Government is prepared to go ahead on the lines of the desires expressed by the Japanese Government and that steps will in view of this immediately be taken looking to the execution of the second exchange in order that the *Gripsholm* may leave the United States on September 1.

HULL

701.0090/1728 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, August 3, 1943.

[Received August 3—5:25 p. m.]

4695. American interests Japan. Department's 1739, July 24 transmitted Legation Tokyo [by] Swiss Foreign Office. Received simultaneously from Legation Tokyo telegram expressing fear decision Japanese authorities refuse repatriation Guam internees final. To avoid delay Japanese-American exchange, Gorgé desires know whether may submit Japanese Foreign Office new list Americans as substitutes Guam internees in case latter unauthorized leave Japan.

HARRISON

701.0090/1729 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, August 4, 1943.

[Received August 4—10:41 a. m.]

4714. American interests Far East exchange. Foreign Office notice dated yesterday states Japanese Foreign Ministry informed Gorgé verbally that, while without reply his memorandum of July 13 to American Government,⁵⁹ the Japanese Government had requested Spanish Government urgently to inform the Department⁶⁰ its readiness to carry out second exchange at Mormugão about September 28 provided American Government's response was satisfactory. Vessel *Teia Maru* would be used and departure from Yokohama fixed August 26.

Japanese Government desires earliest possible response American Government its memorandum July 13 and views of Department regarding dates proposed.

Japanese Government will communicate near future characteristics vessel, itinerary and dates any ports of call. Japanese desire prompt

⁵⁹ Memorandum No. 169, Ex. 108.03, July 21, from the Spanish Embassy, not printed; but see telegram No. 1781, July 28, to the Minister in Switzerland, p. 890.

⁶⁰ Memorandum No. 202, Ex. 108.03, August 6, from the Spanish Embassy, not printed.

information concerning itinerary and dates, ports of call *Gripsholm* in order obtain necessary safe conduct. Japanese request confirmation whether characteristics *Gripsholm* identical those exchange 1942.

Swiss Foreign Office note today advises according oral statement Japanese Foreign Office to Gorgé Japanese Government has submitted all its Allies request necessary safe conduct. German Government replied no objection in principle to grant safe conduct and that necessary instructions this effect will be given. German Government added however that it wished to be informed earliest possible regarding exact itinerary of *Gripsholm* as well as daily statement ship's position, adding it would grant safe conduct on condition that assurance given by American Government in Department's 1192, May 9, 1942,⁶¹ remained in effect.

Japanese Foreign Ministry promised Gorgé early written confirmation foregoing.⁶²

HARRISON

740.00115A Pacific War/554a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, August 5, 1943.

1873. American interests—Far East. Please approach Swiss Foreign Office in following matter in regard to shipment of relief supplies to American nationals held by the Japanese.

Japanese Government has requested that all matters concerning relief cargo on exchange vessels be handled by Intercross⁶³ exclusively and not simultaneously by Protecting Powers concerned (Geneva's 236, July 21⁶⁴). This Government and Amcross⁶⁵ have agreed to this request.

Amcross has today telegraphed to Intercross requesting latter to inform Japanese authorities that in view of the fact that Japanese Government has agreed to receive and distribute relief supplies sent on exchange vessels and since this is the only means by which at present such supplies may be shipped, it is expected that Japanese exchange vessels will remain at Goa until all relief supplies destined for distribution to Allied nationals in Far East are loaded or until capacity of such vessels is reached. Intercross has been requested to inform Japanese authorities that American authorities will accord full cooperation in facilitating onward transmission and distribution of relief supplies sent on exchange vessels by Japanese Red Cross for

⁶¹ Not printed; it contained assurances of safe conduct and that the *Gripsholm* would not be requisitioned by the American Government (701.0090/138q).

⁶² Written confirmation was reported by the Minister in Switzerland in telegram No. 4837, August 9.

⁶³ International Committee of the Red Cross.

⁶⁴ Not printed.

⁶⁵ American Red Cross.

their nationals in the United States and in that connection will hold the American exchange vessel at Goa until all Japanese supplies are taken aboard or capacity of that vessel is reached.

In view of the extensive official correspondence concerning the carriage of relief supplies on the exchange vessels, this Government feels that it is not inconsistent with the agreement mentioned in paragraph 1 above for the question of holding the exchange vessels at the exchange point until they are fully loaded with relief supplies to be taken up also through official channels. It would be appreciated, therefore, if the Foreign Office would instruct Minister Gorgé to support the request made by Amcross in regard to the holding of the Japanese exchange vessels at Goa until they are fully loaded, stressing at the same time the reciprocity in this regard which has been assured by the American authorities.⁶⁶

HULL

701.0090/1729 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, August 7, 1943.

1888. American interests, Far East—repatriation. Minister Gorgé should be informed as follows:

Spanish Embassy Washington has just communicated to Department urgent message⁶⁷ mentioned in your 4714, August 4.

Department is replying to Spanish Embassy⁶⁸ that as stated in its reply of July 27 (Department's 1781 July 28) through the Spanish Embassy to communication of July 13 from the Japanese Government⁶⁹ regarding the exchange, it is prevented from commencing movement of passengers to the *Gripsholm* for embarkation only by problem of finding sufficient number of persons acceptable to Japanese Government and willing to be repatriated to fill remaining spaces on exchange vessel. If Japanese Government agrees with the proposal of this Government that Spanish Embassy be given authority to select individuals to fill these spaces in accordance with whatever directives Japanese Government wishes to give Embassy, Department will be in a position to proceed immediately with movement of passengers to port of embarkation and with other plans for departure of vessel.

⁶⁶ In telegram No. 5777, September 16, the Minister in Switzerland reported a statement by the Japanese Government that the *Teia Maru* would remain at Goa between October 15 and 21 to load relief supplies, and Japanese Government's desire that the American Government be informed in order to ensure that loading operations be concluded before the latter date (740.00115A Pacific War/614).

⁶⁷ Memorandum No. 202, Ex. 108.03, August 6, not printed.

⁶⁸ Memorandum dated August 7, not printed (701.0090/1739).

⁶⁹ Memorandum No. 169, Ex. 108.03, July 21, from the Spanish Embassy, not printed.

Reply points out that it is necessary in the interest of the repatriates that approximately 3 weeks elapse between notice to them of their selection for embarkation and date of actual sailing. The Department can give this notice and otherwise commence preparations for departure of *Gripsholm* immediately on receipt of Japanese agreement to Department's proposal of July 27 and the *Gripsholm* can sail 3 weeks subsequently. As the voyage to Mormugão is expected to require 45 days, the exchange can take place there approximately 66 days after a reply is received from the Japanese Government in the sense suggested.

Reply concludes by stating that characteristics of *Gripsholm* will be identical with those in 1942. Outbound ports of call will be Rio de Janeiro, a Rio de la Plata port, and Port Elizabeth, South Africa. Inbound ports will be Port Elizabeth and Rio de Janeiro. Dates and exact itinerary will be provided as soon as date for departure of vessel is fixed in accordance with the formula given above.

Reference last sentence of penultimate paragraph of your 4714 August 4, Gorgé should be informed that in connection with safe conduct the assurances given by United States Government regarding *Gripsholm* in Department's 1192, May 9,⁷⁰ will remain in effect. This point was not mentioned in Japanese communication through Spanish channels.

HULL

701.0090/1740

The Department of State to the Spanish Embassy

MEMORANDUM

The Department of State acknowledges the receipt of memorandum no. 175 Ex. 120.00 of July 26, 1943 from the Spanish Embassy in charge of Japanese interests in the continental United States setting forth the views of the Japanese Government in regard to the search of baggage and of the persons of repatriates and the amount of funds which each repatriate may be permitted to take out of the country. It is noted that the Japanese Government proposes that the two governments agree not to make a search of the persons of the evacuees and exercise leniency in regard to the search of baggage. It is also noted that the Japanese Government proposes to permit repatriates from the Far East to take with them 1,000 yen and suggests that likewise the United States Government permit repatriates from the Western Hemisphere to take \$300 in United States currency.

At the time of the first exchange the United States Government found it necessary to search the persons of a few Japanese non-officials

⁷⁰ See footnote 61, p. 892.

because it had good reason to believe that certain of those persons were attempting to take with them important amounts of currency in excess of the amounts permitted under the exchange agreement and other things which were prohibited in the interest of national defense. The results of the search justified the suspicion in these cases. The United States Government is furthermore informed that many non-official United States nationals had their persons searched prior to leaving Japanese-occupied territory and that even officials of the United States Government departing from Manchuria and Chosen had their persons searched.

The United States Government proposes that the two governments, while agreeing in principle to waive search of persons whenever possible, reserve to themselves the right in a limited number of cases where considerations of national security are felt to exist to exercise a normal search of the type customarily made in such cases. The Government of the United States is agreeable to the Japanese Government's suggestion that the search of baggage be lenient. It is further proposed in the interest of the repatriates that the search of women if at all necessary be conducted exclusively by female matrons and that a representative of the protecting Power of the same sex be afforded the opportunity to be present if desired by the person to be searched when any search is made, whether of male or female.

With respect to the funds to be carried by repatriates, it is the understanding of the United States Government that under the agreement reached for the first exchange persons leaving the Far East will be permitted to take with them 300 United States dollars, or 1,000 yen or proportionate amounts of both currencies as, for example, \$150 and 500 yen, and that reciprocally a choice of such currencies would be available to Japanese leaving this hemisphere. The United States Government upon confirmation that its understanding is correct will make such facilities freely available to all departing Japanese.

The United States Government expects to permit for humanitarian reasons an unaccompanied child under 21 years old or the oldest child of an unaccompanied family group to carry the full amount of funds permitted to an adult. The United States Government hopes that the Japanese Government will take reciprocal action.

The United States Government agrees that United States currency purchased by the Spanish representative on the *Gripsholm* shall be deposited in an appropriate account in a United States bank for use in the representation of Japanese interests and that Japanese currency similarly purchased by the Swiss representative on the Japanese exchange vessel shall be deposited in a bank and be used for the representation of the interests of the United States.

WASHINGTON, August 7, 1943.

701.0090/1730

The Department of State to the Spanish Embassy

MEMORANDUM

The Department of State refers to its recent memorandum to the Spanish Embassy⁷¹ in charge of Japanese interests in continental United States in which mention was made that the exchange vessel *Gripsholm* on its outbound voyage to Mormugão would call at a Rio de la Plata port.

The Department has been informed that the *Gripsholm*, when fully loaded with passengers and supplies, might encounter difficulties in entering the port of Buenos Aires because of possible shallow places in the Rio de la Plata channel. It is furthermore understood that the voyage of the vessel upstream to Buenos Aires and return would consume two days, delaying the actual exchange of nationals at Mormugão by that length of time. The Department has obtained from the Argentine Government its consent in principle that passengers and baggage for the *Gripsholm*, which should be placed on that vessel at Buenos Aires, be embarked instead on the regular night boat from Buenos Aires to Montevideo and be transferred to the *Gripsholm* in the stream at Montevideo. The Department is seeking the agreement of the Chilean and Uruguayan Governments to this procedure and hopes that the Japanese Government will likewise be agreeable.

According to the understanding of the Department of State the following passengers should leave Buenos Aires:

- (a) Six Japanese nationals from Argentina.
- (b) 77 Japanese nationals from Chile.
- (c) The Spanish Military Attaché and the three members of his family being transferred from Buenos Aires to Tokyo.

The Department would appreciate being informed urgently of the views of the Japanese Government on this proposal.⁷²

WASHINGTON, August 9, 1943.

⁷¹ August 7, not printed; for summary, see telegram No. 1888, August 7, to the Minister in Switzerland, p. 893.

⁷² In memorandum No. 240, August 24, the Spanish Embassy informed the Department that the Japanese Government agreed to permit Japanese evacuees from Chile and Argentina to embark at Montevideo provided that the passengers and their baggage would not be subject to search by Uruguayan authorities. The Uruguayan Foreign Office informed the American Embassy on August 25 that these Japanese would be treated as persons in transit and therefore not subject to examination. (701.0090/1901)

701.0090/1756a : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland
(Harrison)*

WASHINGTON, August 11, 1943.

1924. American interests—Japan. Your 4695, August 3. Department, as stated in its 1739 July 24, hopes that some at least of the civilians from Guam may be repatriated on the next exchange. To the extent that this may not be feasible, Department is willing that Swiss representative list other eligible Americans for inclusion in the exchange.

WELLES

701.0090/1758 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, August 13, 1943.

[Received August 13—11:03 a. m.]

4933. American interests Far East: Repatriation. Foreign Office note August 10 received August 12 states telegram July 31 from Swiss Legation, Tokyo, transmits following statements regarding persons to be repatriated Far East second exchange:

Desiring to be agreeable to American Government, Japanese Government is disposed approve in as large measure as possible lists presented. Japanese Foreign Office notes however lists contain names persons deceased, too ill to travel, or who do not desire repatriation and is opinion that no British subjects should be included this exchange. Therefore following decisions taken.

[Here follow decisions taken by Japanese authorities approving or deleting names of specific nationals of the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and the American Republics, including refusal to sanction repatriation of Messrs. Stuart, Houghton, and Bowen and any repatriation of internees on Guam; and a request by the Swiss Legation at Tokyo for authority to replace deleted names with names next on priority lists.]⁷³

HARRISON

⁷³ In telegram No. 5698, September 13, the Minister in Switzerland stated that the Japanese Foreign Office reported it was unable to repatriate Americans from Singapore and vicinity because of technical difficulties (701.0090/2235).

701.0090/2010a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, August 13, 1943—7 p. m.

1945. American interests—Far East. Department has not yet received answer to its 2173 of September 14, 1942,⁷⁴ and although the persons to whom it refers are listed for repatriation by Swiss Legation Tokyo, Department is so far without specific assurance that they will be embarked.

United States Government is exerting every effort to meet wishes of Japanese Government regarding Japanese nationals to be repatriated in second exchange. It accordingly expects that persons designated for inclusion in exchange by United States Government and the Swiss representatives acting for it as contemplated in Department's 1311 and 1333⁷⁵ to you will actually be embarked by Japanese authorities.

Please take up with Swiss Foreign Office on urgent basis and request that Minister Gorgé be instructed to request Japanese Foreign Office to give categoric assurances in this respect unless he perceives strong reasons to contrary, which should be reported in full detail and as promptly as possible.

Your 4933 of August 13 will be answered in detail in due course.

HULL

701.0090/1779b : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, August 14, 1943.

1956. American interests Far East—repatriation. Department on August 13 delivered to Spanish Embassy in charge of Japanese interests list of 267 Japanese nationals⁷⁶ named by Japanese Government for repatriation who since June 24 have signified willingness to go to Japan. Ninety of these persons possess high-priority standing. Department pointed out in its note that number of passengers made available in this supplementary list exceeds the number of deletions from the list of June 24⁷⁷ caused (a) by the decision of the Japanese

⁷⁴ Not printed; it requested urgent assurances from the Swiss Legation in Japan that all American consular officials at Manila and their families would be repatriated on the second exchange vessel (390.1115A/1134). The Minister in Switzerland reported such assurances in his telegram No. 5637, September 10 (701.0090/2207).

⁷⁵ June 2 and June 4, pp. 878 and 879, respectively.

⁷⁶ In memorandum of August 13, not printed.

⁷⁷ See note of June 24 to the Spanish Ambassador, p. 882.

Government not to accept in this exchange 226 Japanese from Peru and the men from Hawaii who do not wish to leave their families behind and (b) by the withdrawal of certain Japanese nationals of their previous request to be repatriated. Final paragraph of note was as follows:

"The names now made available to the Embassy of those Japanese nationals named by the Japanese Government who are willing to embark, together with the few additional persons whose wishes are now being ascertained, constitute a sufficient number of Japanese nationals named by the Japanese Government to permit the passenger list for the second voyage of the *Gripsholm* from this country to be finally determined. If the Japanese Government finds the proposed sailing list acceptable and will indicate that no further major changes will be made the Department of State can then proceed to assemble the passengers for the second sailing. As previously stated, the passengers can be embarked 21 days after the receipt of the Japanese Government's agreement."

Please inform Minister Gorgé.

HULL

701.0090/1768 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, August 14, 1943—10 a. m.

[Received 6:35 p. m.]

4961. American interests Far East exchange. Following memorandum dated August 10 from Japanese Government was sent to Spanish Government Madrid for transmission to Department through Spanish Embassy Washington.

Japanese Legation Bern communicated text to Swiss Government with request transmit informally to the Department as in view of previous delays through Spanish [it] desires avoid loss of time in this case. Text handed Legation officer morning August 14 by official Swiss Foreign Office reads as follows:

"Memorandum August 10, 1943. The communication dated July 27 of the United States Government and attached lists in reply to the memorandum of the Japanese Government dated July 13⁷⁸ were received during the period extending from afternoon of 6th to morning of 10 August.

1. Japanese evacuees from the United States and Hawaii mentioned in the communication above together with those mentioned in list attached to American communication dated 24th June (excluding

⁷⁸ None printed; but see telegram No. 1781, July 28, to the Minister in Switzerland, p. 890.

persons transferred from Central and South America) number about 380 in all. Reference to lists of evacuees nominated by the Japanese Government shows that this number comprises 69 out of 150 persons of North American list A5, 49 out of 200 of ditto A2, 19 out of 60 of addition of 15th September 1942 and 47 out of 145 of addition of June 1943. Those who are to be understood to have refused to be repatriated are over 60 percentum of those on designated list and when those on other lists who have refused repatriation are added to this total number of those who have refused repatriation comes to be as large as 3101 but among those persons there are those as previously intimated to the United States Government who have informed their relatives of their intention of returning home [with] wives and families of those who owing to illness or for other reasons were unable to accompany their husbands or fathers who evacuated by first exchange ship or immediately before outbreak of war and many others of whom there is no reason to believe that they have any objection to being repatriated according to information in hands of the Japanese Government. In view of these facts and having in mind possibility of any future exchange the Japanese Government wish to point out that they find it difficult to see correctness of this large number of Japanese subjects being represented as having refused repatriation and make reservation on this point.

2. According to calculation made by the Japanese Government, in addition to evacuees so far decided there still remains room for about 160 more persons. [Here follow names and addresses of Japanese persons the Japanese Government wished to repatriate.] Any remaining room on board the ship is desired to be utilized for repatriating such persons as may be picked up from priority list (2933 persons from North America) by the Spanish Ambassador (separate communication will be made to him).

3. The Japanese Government are endeavoring urgently to comply as far as possible with the wishes of the United States Government and other American countries regarding persons to be evacuated from Japan and specified regions under Japanese control. If the United States Government immediately carry out the above mentioned items the Japanese Government agree to the United States proposal to effect the exchange at Marmagão on or about 15th October and will make *Teia Maru* sail from Yokohama on 15th September so as to reach Marmagão by that date via Shanghai, Hongkong, Manila, Saigon and Syonan (Singapore). Particulars of marking characteristics, schedule and course of ship which are necessary for obtaining safe conduct for her are communicated by separate telegram.⁷⁹

4. The Japanese Government wish to be informed by telegraph without delay of the measures taken by the United States Government concerning paragraphs 1 and 2. It is desired that particulars necessary for issuing safe conduct for *Gripsholm* be communicated through Swiss Minister in Tokyo without delay."

HARRISON

⁷⁹ No. 4962, August 14, 11 a. m., not printed; but see note from the Spanish Embassy, August 16, *infra*.

701.0090/1840

The Spanish Embassy to the Department of State

MEMORANDUM

No. 220

Ex. 108.03

The Spanish Embassy presents its compliments to the Department of State and begs to transmit hereafter a telegram received from the Japanese Government through the "Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores" in Madrid, regarding the characteristics, markings and itineraries of the exchange vessel *Teia Maru* which will effect the second exchange voyage from Japan to Marmagão.

"The Imperial Japanese Government requests that the American and British Governments and the other Allied Governments be informed of the characteristics, markings, itineraries and other data of the vessel *Teia Maru* which will be used in the second exchange of Japanese and American nationals, and that the corresponding safe conduct be obtained from said Governments.

(FIRST)

1. *Markings of 'Teia Maru'*—

(1) Daytime

- (a) Hull outside of deckhouses and funnels are grey.
- (b) On each side of hull two white crosses with a Japanese ensign in between are painted amidships.
- (c) On each side of bow and stern a white cross is painted about same height as above mentioned ensign.
- (d) Japanese ensign is on fore deck and white cross on quarter deck and on both sides of bridge.
- (e) Large Japanese flag hoisted on foremast.
- (f) White cross on both sides of funnels.

(2) After Dark

- (a) Ship be lit normally.
- (b) Series of light signals visible all round horizon to be hoisted on top of main mast in vertical order of green red.
- (c) White cross illumination amidships on both sides of hull and on stern.
- (d) White crosses on both sides of back funnel and quarter deck illuminated.
- (e) Illuminating lamp fixed on each side of stern so as to project light slantingly upwards.

2. *Characteristics of 'Teia Maru'*

Tonnage Gross—Seven [*Seventeen*]⁸⁰ thousand five hundred thirty seven (7,537) [(17,537)]

Net—Nine thousand nine hundred ninety (9,990)

⁸⁰ Bracketed corrections throughout this memorandum are based on telegram No. 4962, August 14, 1943, 11 a. m., from the Minister in Switzerland.

Length—One hundred seventy two metres (172)
 Width—Twenty-one point twenty metres (21.20)
 Depth—Fourteen point three metres (14.3)
 Two funnels (low and equal)
 Two masts
 Built in 1932
 Speed—Fifteen knots
 Stern ordinary type

(SECOND) ITINERARY OF THE VESSEL 'TEIA MARU'

[Here follows itinerary of the *Teia Maru*. For corrected schedule, see memorandum by the Department of State to the Spanish Embassy, September 15, printed on page 927.]

(THIRD) COURSE TO BE TAKEN BY EXCHANGE SHIP 'TEIA MARU'

- (1) Leave Yokohama for Kobe via west of Osima (Sagaminada) and off Siono Misaki.
- (2) Leave Kobe for Shanghai via inland sea and Simonoseki Straits.
- (3) Leave Shanghai for Hongkong sailing close to Chinese Coast.
- (4) Leave Hongkong for Northern San Fernando by direct course.
- (5) Leave Northern San Fernando for Cap Saint-Jacques by direct course.
- (6) Leave Cap Saint-Jacques for Syonan (Singapore) by direct course.
- (7) Leave Syonan and pass through Sunda Straits via Karimata Channel then proceed to Marmagão via four point forty ⁸¹ N, ninety four point forty E and five point fifty N, seventy six point fifty N [E].
- (8) Leave Marmagão for Syonan via Sunda Straits by course reverse to outward voyage.
- (9) Leave Syonan for Manila via West of Anabas Islands and twelve point twenty N, one hundred fourteen point zero zero E.
- (10) Leave Manila for Yokohama via West Coast of Luzon Balingtang Straits thirty point zero zero N one hundred thirty three point twenty five [E] and west of Osima (Sagami Nada).

(FOURTH)

The vessel will be provisioned with water and fuel for its round trip in the neighborhood of the Port of Syonan (Singapore)." (August 15th, 1943)

The Spanish Embassy would appreciate an early reply from the Department of State in order to communicate same to the Japanese Government to the ends in view.

WASHINGTON, August 16, 1943.

⁸¹ "Four point forty" and similar expressions in this section show degrees and minutes of North latitude ("N") and East longitude ("E").

701.0090/1775 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, August 17, 1943.

[Received August 17—3:15 p. m.]

5013. American interests Far East. Repatriation. Department's 1888, August 7. Legation Tokyo telegraphs Minister Gorgé communicated contents Department's 1888 [to] Japanese Foreign Office which requested Minister Gorgé transmit following urgent communication English text [to] American Government:

"With reference to a memorandum of the Imperial Japanese Government dated 28 July,⁸² the Imperial Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs begs to acknowledge the receipt of the substance of the reply of the Department of State of the United States Government⁸³ which was to be communicated to the Spanish Embassy in Washington.

The Imperial Japanese Government, as stated in its memorandum dated 10 August,⁸⁴ is prepared to effect the second exchange of Japanese and American subjects on about the 15th October at Marmagão and all preparations are being made with the least possible delay. Therefore it is expected that the American Government on their part will proceed with necessary preparations so that all arrangements will be completed in due time.

Further as regards Río de la Plata, port mentioned in the communication of the American Government, at which the *Gripsholm* is to call in the course of her outbound voyage, the Imperial Japanese Government understands the said port to be Buenos Aires as set forth in the United States Government's earlier note dated the 27 [24] June. On this understanding the Japanese Government has communicated with its allied Governments concerned in order to provide safe conduct to the *Gripsholm* and the Japanese Government on its part is also prepared to afford the same facilities."

Swiss Foreign Office adds Gorgé had interview Japanese Foreign Office at time presentation Department's 1888, told personally by Japanese Foreign Office, if exchange cannot take place on October 15, exchange would probably be adjourned sine die.

HARRISON

⁸² Presumably memorandum No. 202, Ex. 108.03, August 6, from the Spanish Embassy, not printed; for summary, see telegram No. 4714, August 4, from the Minister in Switzerland, p. 891.

⁸³ Memorandum of August 7 to the Spanish Embassy, not printed; for summary, see telegram No. 1888, August 7, to the Minister in Switzerland, p. 893.

⁸⁴ Text quoted in telegram No. 4961, August 14, 10 a. m., from the Minister in Switzerland, p. 899.

701.0090/1758 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, August 18, 1943.

1982. Your 4933, August 13. American interests Far East—repatriation. With reference to the statement “desiring to be agreeable to the American Government the Japanese Government is disposed to approve in as large measure as possible lists presented” the United States Government points out that for its part it has endeavored and continues to endeavor fully to meet the expressed wishes of the Japanese Government concerning the Japanese nationals to be repatriated in the forthcoming exchange and expects the Japanese Government fully to reciprocate in this respect.

It is noted that the Japanese Government states that certain of the persons named for repatriation are deceased, that others are too ill to travel and others do not desire repatriation, and that some are British subjects who should not be included in the American-Japanese exchange. However, it is noted that in most cases information is not provided which of these reasons apply to the specific individuals named and that the Swiss representatives to the extent that they are permitted contact with these individuals report that they all desire repatriation and are capable of traveling. In the circumstances, the United States Government is handicapped in commenting on the specific cases questioned by the Japanese Government.

The United States Government desires to be informed which of the persons other than Mrs. Florence Gonzales and George Bruce are deceased and which of them are too ill to travel. If there are individuals who allegedly are too ill to travel the United States Government wishes the decision to be made in each case by the individual concerned in consultation with the Swiss representative in charge of United States interests in the Far East. It is expected that the Japanese Government will provide on the Japanese exchange vessel the proper medical attention corresponding to the adequate medical attention which will be provided on the United States exchange vessel.

The United States Government has occasion to believe that two—possibly three—of the United States nationals specified by the Japanese Government may not desire repatriation. It does not require that United States nationals be forcibly repatriated but in reciprocity for its willingness to allow the Spanish Embassy representing Japanese interests in United States to communicate freely by letter or in person with any Japanese national in this country whom the Japanese Government may wish to have repatriated in order to verify the wishes of that individual, United States Government expects that similar facilities will be promptly granted to Swiss representatives of United States interests in the Far East. It is particularly noted that Swiss

representatives have on record the wish to be repatriated of the majority of individuals named in the Japanese communication.

Mrs. Sarah Ann Davies in Thailand is an American citizen and the fact that she also possesses British nationality does not deprive her of her United States nationality. Under the laws of the United States Government and of the British Government Mrs. Davies has a right to exercise whichever nationality she desires and hence is eligible for inclusion in the American-Japanese exchange if she wishes repatriation.

The United States Government has so far interposed no objection to the repatriation of any Japanese alien who wishes to be repatriated and has been specifically named for repatriation by the Japanese Government. It is expected that the Japanese Government will be similarly guided, since any such objection would be incompatible with the basic agreement regarding repatriation. Accordingly the United States Government desires urgently to receive the Japanese Government's assurances that Swiss representatives in Far East will be permitted free access to every American to determine his or her repatriation wishes and that the wishes so expressed will be respected.

HULL

701.0090/1768 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, August 18, 1943.

1985. American interests Far East—exchange. Your 4961, August 14, 10 a. m. Upon receipt from Spanish Embassy of Japanese Government's communication quoted in your 4961 Department is in a position to reply in following sense to Spanish Embassy⁸⁵ in charge of Japanese interests:

The United States Government notes the surprise of the Japanese Government at the large proportion of Japanese nationals in the United States who have refused repatriation. However, in each case the written refusal of repatriation by the individual is on record with the United States Government and is available for inspection by the Spanish Embassy. The Japanese nationals concerned have been afforded repeated opportunities voluntarily to express their wishes. In a large number of cases the expression has been consistently negative. On the other hand some of the individuals have changed their minds two or three times and it may be expected that some of them will change them again. Whenever any of these individuals decide to accept repatriation the United States Government is ready to repatriate them in the present exchange. In accordance with this position which it has already repeatedly expressed, the Department on August 13 forwarded to the Spanish Embassy at Washington a memo-

⁸⁵ The reply was dated August 18.

randum ⁸⁶ transmitting a list of 267 additional Japanese nationals, 90 of them possessing high priority on the lists of the Japanese Government, who subsequent to the submission of the June 24 list, ⁸⁷ expressed their willingness to be repatriated.

The United States Government would welcome such steps as the Spanish Embassy might see fit to take to verify the actual intention of the Japanese nationals who have stated that they do not wish to be repatriated. Should interviews with representatives of the Spanish Embassy result in a change of the wishes of any of these Japanese nationals their newly-expressed intention with respect to repatriation will be respected. It is the impression of the United States Government that numerous of these individuals have refused repatriation for reasons of their own convenience or for reasons of small significance. In each instance they have been informed that they have been named for repatriation by the Japanese Government.

With respect to paragraph 2 (a) of the Japanese communication it is pointed out that 11 of the 12 family groups mentioned have registered with the Department of State their written refusal to be repatriated. So far as concerns Mr. Tsutomu Obana and his wife their names were included in the list of August 13 of Japanese nationals who are willing to be repatriated.

With regard to paragraph 2 (b) of the Japanese communication 7 of the 9 groups of individuals mentioned were already included in the list of August 13, one has refused to be repatriated and one is a national of the United States. Of the persons named in paragraph 2 (c) two are named on the list of August 13, one has refused repatriation and the wife of another has refused repatriation although efforts are being made to ascertain whether he himself will accept it. Under paragraph 2 (d) there appear the names of 33 individuals, 14 of whom were previously not recorded in the Department but urgent effort is being made to find them. Three of the remainder are known to have refused repatriation. The wife of Mr. Matao Daigo is still in Peru. It is believed that the balance of the persons named are willing to be repatriated. This point is being verified.

It is noted that the Japanese Government suggests that the exchange take place at Mormugão on October 15. In order to carry out the exchange on that date it would have been necessary for the United States Government to commence assembling the passengers for the *Gripsholm* on August 11, 1943. There is no use to begin assembling passengers until the Japanese Government gives its approval of the list to be embarked. The United States Government will commence to assemble passengers for the *Gripsholm* as soon as it is informed that the Japanese Government finds acceptable a passenger list composed of those named on the June 24 list (less those found unacceptable by the Japanese Government's communication of July 13 ⁸⁸) and those named in the August 13 list, with any substitutions that the Spanish Embassy may designate under instructions of the Japanese Government among those willing to be repatriated.

⁸⁶ Not printed.

⁸⁷ See memorandum of June 24 to the Spanish Embassy, p. 882.

⁸⁸ Memorandum No. 169, Ex. 108.03, July 21, from the Spanish Embassy, not printed.

If the authorization which it is said will be given the Spanish Ambassador permits him to approve the sailing list with such minor changes as unforeseen circumstances may require, such as last-minute individual acceptances and refusals, the assembling of passengers for the *Gripsholm* can begin immediately upon receipt of the Spanish Embassy's communication to that effect and the *Gripsholm* can sail 21 days later if in the meantime satisfactory assurances are received that all Americans designated for repatriation who desire to return from the Far East will be embarked.

HULL

701.0090/1775 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, August 19, 1943.

1999. Your 5013, August 17. American interests Far East—repatriation. United States Government is sincerely desirous of effecting exchange as soon as possible and is preparing to deliver the Japanese citizens whose names have been furnished the Japanese Government at Mormugão on October 15.

The United States Government would appreciate receiving final approval from the Japanese Government of the list as submitted with the understanding that the persons in the United States are available to the Spanish Ambassador representing Japanese interests ^{88a} and that he has access to each one at any time he desires and has had access during the whole period of his responsibility as a representative of the Japanese Government.

The United States Government expresses the hope that the Japanese Government understands that it will take the Japanese vessel about 2 weeks to proceed to Mormugão but it will take the *Gripsholm* about 6 weeks actual sailing time from New York. Further, it will be necessary to make a stop to pick up Japanese members of the exchange at Rio and at Buenos Aires or off Montevideo on the river Plate. The draft of the *Gripsholm* when loaded may not permit the ship to make the voyage up the channel to Buenos Aires. Consequently, arrangements are being undertaken with both local governments to transport the Japanese who would board at Buenos Aires by steamer across the river to deeper water near Montevideo if necessary. An additional stop must be made for fuel in Port Elizabeth, South Africa, on the way around the Cape. However, with the exercise of great diligence the United States expects to be ready to load the vessel with the exchange parties and with the agreed Red Cross cargo and to sail not later than September 2.

Under the circumstances and acting in entirely good faith the United States Government requests the Japanese Government to in-

^{88a} Juan Francisco de Cárdenas, Spanish Ambassador in the United States.

form it within the next 7 days or by Thursday August 26, Washington time, the composition of the American party.

A request for safe conduct in usual form for part of the voyage from the United States to Rio de Janeiro and Montevideo follows this telegram immediately. A safe conduct for the rest of the voyage to Mormugão will be worked out and request therefor will be made in the immediate future.⁸⁹ Early grant of the safe conduct on the part of Japan and her associates in the war will be requested and a response at the earliest possible date is desired for sailing of the vessel on September 2.

Request for safe conduct for the return voyage will be made in due course.

American Government is gratified that the exchange appears imminent.

HULL

701.0090/1758: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland
(Harrison)*

WASHINGTON, August 20, 1943—8 p. m.

2013. American interests Far East—repatriation. For confidential information and guidance of Minister Gorgé:

Department notes that Japanese Government as reported in your 4933 August 13 is opposing repatriation of certain United States nationals who have been named for repatriation by the Swiss representatives in charge of our interests. Department notes furthermore that Swiss Minister Tokyo is vigorously placing before Japanese Government fact that these nationals of United States are willing and capable of being repatriated.

Please have expressed to Swiss Minister Tokyo Department's appreciation of his efforts. It should be made clear to him for use in connection therewith that the United States Government has made available for repatriation all the Japanese aliens whose repatriation has been requested by the Japanese Government and who themselves would agree to be repatriated. It has made freely available to the Spanish representatives of Japanese interests the opportunity to interview the Japanese named for repatriation individually and privately in order to verify their wishes. Department expects that Minister Gorgé and his colleagues will be permitted by the Japanese Government to exercise full reciprocity in this respect.

⁸⁹ A request that the Swiss Government obtain assurance of safe conduct for the voyage of the *Gripsholm* between New York and Mormugão was sent to the Minister in Switzerland in telegram No. 1998, August 19 (701.0090/1882a).

The persons named for repatriation by the Swiss representatives acting in behalf of this Government were selected in accordance with broad humanitarian directives which the Swiss were given discretion in applying. The persons named by the Swiss whose repatriation the Japanese apparently wish to oppose include individuals who have been imprisoned since December 7, 1941, continuously and without being permitted to see a representative of the Protecting Power and without other facilities to which they are entitled under a reciprocal application of the terms of the Geneva Prisoner of War Convention which the Japanese Government voluntarily agreed to apply to civilians detained by them.⁹⁰ Among the American nationals excluded by the Japanese Government are other meritorious cases of persons who should by all rules of humanitarianism and of justice be repatriated. United States Government confidently expects the repatriation of all such persons in reciprocity for its action in repatriating Japanese nationals without exception upon the basis of the expressed wishes of the Japanese Government and without reference to the wishes of this Government.

The Department relies upon Minister Gorgé to exercise the discretionary authority which it has conferred upon him with the understanding that he may concur in such unavoidable substitutions in the Americans to be repatriated as he may find absolutely essential in order to prevent further delay or a failure of the exchange. The Department would appreciate receiving for its information urgent reports of all necessary changes in the lists as compiled by the Swiss representatives giving specifically in each case the reasons which are felt to justify exclusion from the forthcoming exchange.

WELLES

701.0090/1867

The Spanish Embassy to the Department of State

MEMORANDUM

No. 228

Ex. 108.03

The Spanish Embassy presents its compliments to the Department of State and in answer to the Department's memorandum of July 27th ultimo regarding the exchange of sick Japanese and American nationals who are to make the trip on the second exchange vessel, begs

⁹⁰ See telegram No. 733, February 24, 1942, from the Minister in Switzerland, *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. I, p. 799.

to transcribe the reply given by the Japanese Government to the inquiry of July 28th on the matter, which says as follows:

"Memorandum—August 20, 1943—The Japanese Government requests that the American Government be informed as follows:

1. That the internees who are ill, but who are able to make the trip be embarked on the *Gripsholm* and those unable to do so, be repatriated on one of the next exchange vessels.

2. That for the proper accommodation on the Japanese exchange vessel, it is necessary to telegraph the names, sex, ages, and the nature of the illness of those to be embarked.

3. The Japanese Government will embark on the second exchange vessel three doctors and eight nurses for the care of the sick Americans to be repatriated, expecting that the American Government will take the same measures on behalf of the sick Japanese to sail on the *Gripsholm*.

"The Japanese Government would like to be urgently informed on the point of view of the American Government on the matter."

WASHINGTON, August 20, 1943.

701.0090/1867

The Department of State to the Spanish Embassy

MEMORANDUM

The Department of State acknowledges receipt of the memorandum no. 228, Ex. 108.03, of August 20, 1943 from the Spanish Embassy in charge of Japanese interests in continental United States transmitting the reply dated August 20, 1943 of the Japanese Government to the Department's memorandum of July 27 concerning the embarkation on the *Gripsholm* of Japanese nationals who are not in good health.

In conformity with the request of the Japanese Government, Japanese nationals who are ill but nevertheless able to travel will be embarked on the *Gripsholm*. Those who are not able to travel will be allowed to remain in the United States pending a subsequent exchange. If any of them nevertheless insist on traveling on their own responsibility, they will be required to sign a document to that effect, a copy of which will be furnished the Spanish Embassy in order that it may, if it desires, verify the circumstances.

The Department will see to it that for each ill Japanese embarked on the M. S. *Gripsholm* there is delivered to the Spanish representative on the pier at New York a detailed statement indicating name, sex, age and nature of illness. As the Japanese exchange vessel will not

leave the Far East until two weeks or more after the *Gripsholm* leaves New York, there will be ample time to transmit this information by telegraph to Tokyo and to permit the Japanese Government to take necessary steps to care for the proper accommodation on the Japanese exchange vessel of these ill persons.

The United States Government will have on the *Gripsholm* three doctors and nine nurses to care for the Japanese repatriates who may not be well.

It is requested that this information be promptly communicated to the Japanese Government.

WASHINGTON, August 23, 1943.

701.0090/1867a

The Secretary of State to the Spanish Ambassador (Cárdenas)

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the Spanish Ambassador in charge of Japanese interests in the continental United States and in reference to the Department's memorandum of August 6, 1943 ⁹¹ has the honor to enclose herewith a copy in duplicate of a sailing list in three parts ⁹² naming Japanese passengers for the forthcoming voyage of the exchange ship M. V. *Gripsholm*, scheduled to depart from New York on September 2, 1943 for Mormugão, via Rio de Janeiro, Montevideo and Port Elizabeth.

The enclosed lists represent those Japanese repatriates departing from the United States, and do not include repatriates from other countries of this Hemisphere.

It is requested that a collective passport be issued for these people and such visas as may be necessary obtained. In view of the fact that it is inevitable that certain additions to and deletions from the passenger list will occur between the present time and the hour of sailing, it is further requested that an officer of the Spanish Embassy, or Spanish Consulate General at New York, be empowered to incorporate into the collective passport such changes as may be necessary immediately prior to the sailing of the vessel, and that the visas be of such character as to permit these changes to be valid thereunder.

WASHINGTON, August 23, 1943.

⁹¹ Not printed; it stated that it would be necessary to deliver to Portuguese authorities at Mormugão a properly visaed collective passport for repatriates, their individual passports, a list of other persons aboard the exchange vessel and their individual passports, and certificates of vaccination for all passengers and crew (740.00115A Pacific War/526).

⁹² Not found attached to file copy of this document.

701.0090/1794 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland
(Harrison)*

WASHINGTON, August 24, 1943.

2056. American interests Philippines repatriation. Your 5135, August 21.⁹³ The Philippine citizens in question are nationals of the United States and accordingly entitled under the exchange agreement to be exchanged. It is requested that the Swiss Legation Tokyo so inform the Japanese Government.

BERLE

701.0090/1984a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, August 25, 1943.

2068. American interests Far East, repatriation. Department desires Swiss delegate on exchange vessel to make following points clear to all persons being repatriated from Far East in American-Japanese exchange:

1. Upon arrival at Mormugão they will be embarked upon the *Gripsholm* upon execution of their promissory note for the amount of fare and for an additional deposit of \$50 to cover possible incidental expenses. The rate of fare has been fixed at \$525 for adults, half fare for children who at the time of embarkation have not yet attained their tenth birthday and quarter fare for infants who have not yet attained their fifth birthday.

2. From the deposit of \$50 for incidental expenses there will be deducted an amount of fifty-three cents per day per person as stewards' fees. Accordingly the passengers should understand that any amounts which they contribute to the stewards in cash must be considered as additional disbursements on their own responsibility. Such cash payments will not be taken into account in settling the expenses chargeable against the individual passengers.

3. The Department expects to make available to the passengers against their promissory note United States funds not to exceed \$50 per person for minimum necessary expenses aboard the *Gripsholm*, a maximum of \$25 in local currency for necessary expenses ashore at Port Elizabeth and, for passengers continuing to New York, a maximum of \$15 in local currency for necessary personal expenses ashore at Rio de Janeiro. Local currency will not be made available at Mormugão for reasons which will be made clear later.

⁹³ Not printed; it reported Japanese deletion of names of 13 Philippine citizens from the list of persons to be repatriated from occupied China.

4. It is not expected that passengers will be granted shore leave at Goa. There are no facilities ashore which passengers could usefully visit.

5. Department is informed that any letters, including air mail letters, which passengers might attempt to mail at Goa would most probably reach the United States after the arrival of the exchange vessel. It is therefore recommended that passengers await arrival of the vessel at Port Elizabeth before mailing any letters destined for the western hemisphere.

6. Arrangements will be made if possible in order that passengers having occasion to send urgent messages by telegraph to persons in United States may do so at Mormugão through facilities of American Consulate at Bombay and the Department of State. The cost of such telegrams would be collected from the recipient in the United States or charged against the ship's account of the passenger as indicated by the sender.

7. To the extent that mail originating in the United States for the repatriates reaches New York prior to the sailing of the *Gripsholm*, it will be taken on board that vessel and delivered to the repatriates after their departure from Mormugão.

8. Arrangements will be made whereby telegrams arriving at Mormugão for passengers returning to the United States on the *Gripsholm* will be delivered to them on that vessel before it leaves the port.

HULL.

701.0090/2193

*The Spanish Embassy to the Department of State*⁹⁴

MEMORANDUM

No. 247

Ex. 108.03

The Spanish Embassy presents its compliments to the Department of State and with reference to its Memorandum of August 7th, relative to the funds which the Japanese repatriates will be permitted to take with them on the second exchange vessel, begs to transcribe hereafter the answer received from the Japanese Government regarding this matter and which reads as follows:

"Memorandum August 25th, 1943

1. Japanese Government note views of United States Government expressed in response to Japanese proposal regarding search of person of evacuees, examination of their luggage. Japanese Government will properly deal with matter in consideration of these views of United States Government.

⁹⁴ The Department of State acknowledged receipt of this memorandum on September 8.

2. Japanese Government note views of United States Government regarding money to be carried by evacuees and purchase of surplus money. Japanese Government agree to proposal of United States Government to permit an unaccompanied child under 21 years old or oldest child of an unaccompanied family group to carry full amount of money permitted to be carried by evacuees from this side is as a rule limited to Japanese currency amounting to 1000 yens per head and that although evacuees from Japanese occupied areas who possess no Japanese currency will be permitted to carry currencies of such area and any surplus money will be permitted to be appropriated to representation of American interests, it is not intention of Japanese Government to permit American evacuees to carry any currency of United States or any other foreign country."

WASHINGTON, August 26, 1943.

701.0090/1978

The Spanish Embassy to the Department of State

MEMORANDUM

No. 249

Ex. 108.03

The Spanish Embassy presents its compliments to the Department of State and begs to transmit hereafter a Memorandum just received from the Japanese Government, through the "Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores" in Madrid, relative to the articles and material for charitable purposes and luggage to be shipped aboard the second exchange vessel, and which reads as follows:

Memorandum—August 26th, 1943

"The second Nipo-American exchange will be conducted under the same bases specified in the agreement for the first exchange. The alien nationals repatriated of both sides will be allowed to take with them their essential personal effects, provided the exchange-vessel has sufficient capacity, and with the understanding that they are to be transported to the port of embarkation in sufficient time to be put on board the exchange vessel. While the Imperial Japanese Government has granted the request of the American Government for the shipment on board the Japanese exchange-vessel of 3,000 tons of articles destined to the aid and comfort of American internees and prisoners in different locations of the Far East, it cannot consent that the shipment of these articles and material will, in any way, limit or interfere with the quantity of baggage that each repatriated Japanese will take with him on the exchange vessel. Therefore, the Imperial Japanese Government wishes the American Government to be informed of its point of view, and would urgently appreciate being apprised of their own views on the subject, so as to serve as a guide in the decision of the Japanese Government."

WASHINGTON, August 26, 1943.

701.0090/1877 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, August 26, 1943.

[Received August 26—11:59 a. m.]

5242. American interests. Far East exchange. Department's 1999, August 18 [19]; 2014, 20th.⁹⁵ Following telegram dated August 25 from Gorgé received Legation this morning based upon Japanese Foreign Office note August 24:

"1. Japanese Government received from Swiss Legation at 5 p. m. on 23rd August a note which appears to constitute an outline of memorandum addressed by United States Government to Spanish Embassy in Washington on 13th August.⁹⁶ In this note it is stated that United States Government have made a supplementary list of 267 evacuees out of lists of evacuees nominated by Japanese Government and that number of passengers made available in this list exceeds number of deletions, namely 226 transferred from Peru, those transferred from Hawaii, who do not wish to leave their families behind and those who withdrew their request to be repatriated. But list of names of said 267 persons has not yet been received nor is clear the number of persons in excess. However, with a view to avoiding any possible delay being caused to date of exchange which has now been fixed upon, Japanese Government propose that in order to eliminate this number of persons in excess, utilization of last remaining capacity shall be decided by (1) placing at top the '90 persons of high priority standing' referred to in American memorandum and (2) entrusting Spanish Ambassador to select remainder according to second paragraph (excepting D) of Japanese memorandum of 10th August.⁹⁷ Japanese Government request United States Government to make a final decision in this way and let those who will have been thus selected embark, provided that their names are telegraphed as soon as decided so that they may reach Japanese Government by September 5th Tokyo time at latest.

2. Simultaneously with above said American note Japanese Government received replies of United States Government to Japanese memoranda of 29th July and 10th August. Japanese Government believe that United States Government have been kept informed by Swiss Legation, Tokyo, of ardent efforts which have been made by Japanese Government in close contact with that Legation in order to meet as far as possible desires of Governments of United States and other countries in America. Agreement of Swiss Legation has already been obtained to repatriation of 1351 persons out of whom 1110 being United States citizens. Decision is expected to be made today

⁹⁵ Telegram No. 2014 not printed.

⁹⁶ See telegram No. 1956, August 14, to the Minister in Switzerland, p. 898.

⁹⁷ See telegram No. 4961, August 14, 10 a. m., from the Minister in Switzerland, p. 899. Paragraph D gave names and addresses of 33 persons and their dependents whose repatriation had not previously been requested by the Japanese Government. In telegram No. 5270, August 26, the Minister reported Japanese Foreign Office request that "(excepting D)" be deleted (701.0090/1881).

with regard to about 120 persons (of whom about 90 being United States citizens) out of revised list submitted by Swiss Legation, about whom inquiries have been made at various places in China. As regards remaining 29 or so, negotiations are being made with that Legation with a view to speedy settlement. As regards those United States citizens referred to in American reply who cannot embark for various reasons, Japanese Government are prepared to furnish supplementary explanations through Swiss Legation, and as far as circumstances permit will give facilities to same Legation to ascertain wishes of each individual and will pay due regard to such wishes. In compliance with desire of United States Government in respect of Mrs. Davies in Thailand, Japanese Government will see that she is transferred from Bangkok to a suitable port of embarkation if she desires to be repatriated by forthcoming Japanese-American exchange.

In reply to Japanese memorandum of 10th August, United States Government request Japanese Government to inform them of composition of American party by 26th August Washington time. Although making all possible efforts to meet American desire on this point Japanese Government have to point out that delays are unavoidable in actual communications between Japanese and American Governments. In view of fact that Japanese Government, as has been stated in first paragraph of this memorandum, have entrusted Spanish Ambassador in Washington with selection and decision of certain number of Japanese evacuees Japanese Government trust that United States Government similarly entrust Swiss Minister, Tokyo, with final decision as to evacuees referred to in second paragraph, total number of which is about 29. It would thus be expected to effect exchange on 15th October as arranged."

In view absence definite assurance by Japanese for inclusion official Foreign Service group from Manila, categorical assurance this effect requested urgently by Swiss Foreign Office August 22 telegram to Gorgé.

HARRISON

701.0090/1884 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, August 26, 1943.

[Received August 26—4:38 p. m.]

5263. American interests—Far East repatriation. Legation's 4933, August 13 and 5242, August 26. Foreign Office note August 26 states Swiss Minister Tokyo has reported that verification with Japanese authorities of lists of persons to be repatriated not yet finished. During examination of lists Japanese Foreign Office verbally informed Swiss Minister that 16 Philippine citizens will be deleted from list persons to be repatriated from Shanghai (Department's 2056 August 24) as Japanese Foreign Office refuses authorize their repatriation.

Foreign Office further deleted names 15 seamen for Japanese Government observes same principle as Australian Government which according to practice adopted by majority of belligerents treats civilian seamen as prisoners of war according article 81 Geneva Convention and does not allow their participation exchanges.

Finally Swiss Minister reported :

1. Notwithstanding new representation Japanese Government refuses authorize repatriation Ernest Leroy Healey due 4 years sentence pronounced against him for espionage.

2. Refusal authorize repatriation Stuart, Bowen and Houghton maintained, no reason given.

3. Japanese Foreign Office states Karl von Wiegand ⁹⁹ too ill travel.

4. Japanese Foreign Office intends increase number of persons to be repatriated from Hong Kong.¹

HARRISON

701.0090/1934 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, [August 27, 1943.]

[Received August 27, 1943—3:40 p. m.]

5293. American interests Far East. Exchange. Foreign Office note August 27 states telegram received from Swiss Minister Tokyo who refers Japanese communication contained Legation's 5242, August 26 and states Japanese Foreign Office has requested transmission following message which will be communicated by Spanish Government.

"Memorandum August 26. Japanese Government received on August 25 full text of memorandum of United States Government dated August 18.²

With reference to American lists of June 24,³ Japanese Government by their memorandum of July 13⁴ proposed that 226 persons transferred from Peru be excluded and that evacuees from Hawaii be included on certain conditions. By same memorandum Japanese Government agrees to repatriation of all other persons named in above said American lists and made proposals regarding utilization of remaining capacity of exchange ship. By their memorandum of August 10⁵ Japanese Government again requested United States Government to make efforts in respect of individuals to be selected and intimated

⁹⁹ International News Service correspondent.

¹ In telegram No. 5274, August 27, the Minister in Switzerland reported that the Japanese Foreign Office had deleted the names of 14 additional Americans for "special reasons" (701.0090/1910).

² Not printed; for substance, except for lists of names, see telegram No. 1985, August 18, to the Minister in Switzerland, p. 905.

³ Not printed, but see note to the Spanish Ambassador, June 24, p. 882.

⁴ Memorandum No. 169, Ex. 108.03, July 21, from the Spanish Embassy, not printed.

⁵ See telegram No. 4961, August 14, 10 a. m., from the Minister in Switzerland, p. 899.

that they had entrusted Spanish Ambassador in Washington with selection of evacuees of a certain class.

Japanese Government by their memorandum of August 24⁶ submitted principles upon which to deal with some number in excess of capacity of ship and intimated that they authorized Spanish Ambassador to make a final decision according to given instructions. In taking above steps Japanese Government were promoted [*prompted?*] by their desire to facilitate and expedite forthcoming exchange and they expect that it will thus be effected on October 15 as agreed."

HARRISON

701.0090/1927 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, August 28, 1943.

2105. American interests Far East—exchange. Your 5301, August 27.⁷ Please inform Gorgé and Fontanel⁸ that each child is counted as a person for purposes of American-Japanese exchange. This is necessary in view of the need of keeping the ship's company within the limits of the certified lifeboat capacity of the *Gripsholm*. The proposal that children under 2 years be not counted and those between 2 and 4 years be counted as half persons was made by the British Government in connection with the British-Japanese exchange and is not applicable to the American-Japanese exchange.

HULL

701.0090/1978

The Department of State to the Spanish Embassy

MEMORANDUM

The Department of State acknowledges the receipt of memorandum no. 249 Ex. 108.03 from the Spanish Embassy⁹ in charge of Japanese interests in continental United States, regarding the baggage belonging to Japanese repatriates and cargo to be carried on the second exchange vessel.

At the time of the first exchange it was agreed between the United States and Japanese Governments that repatriates would be permitted to take personal effects subject to the capacity of the exchange vessel and provided that the baggage reached the port of embarkation in time to be placed aboard the exchange vessel. In preparation for the second exchange, arrangements have been made so that all the bag-

⁶ See telegram No. 5242, August 26, from the Minister in Switzerland, p. 915.

⁷ Not printed.

⁸ Emile Fontanel, Swiss Consul General at Shanghai.

⁹ August 26, p. 914.

gage of the repatriates will reach the port of embarkation in time to be loaded on the *Gripsholm*. Each repatriate is being allowed, free of charge, thirty cubic feet of hold baggage and three suitcases for use in the cabins, with children having a proportionate allowance of hold baggage to the extent desired by the repatriates. Excess baggage may be shipped at the commercial rate of \$1.00 per cubic foot.

Definite space has been allocated on the *Gripsholm* for the baggage of the repatriates and this space is in no way limited by the cargo space allotted for the relief supplies being shipped to the Far East for American internees and prisoners of war.

With reference to the foregoing, the Embassy is invited, if it desires, to inspect the space which has been allocated for the baggage of the repatriates and for the relief supplies and to report its findings to the Japanese Government.

WASHINGTON, August 28, 1943.

124.546/180c : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, August 30, 1943—3 p. m.

2112. The Spanish Ambassador telephoned Mr. Long and said that he had received a telegram from the Japanese Government requesting an immediate response. He said the Japanese Government asked whether the United States Government would be willing to establish direct contact between the American and Japanese Legations in Bern.

Mr. Long asked the Ambassador whether it was for general application or if it was in regard to the *Gripsholm*. The Ambassador replied that it was not clear from the telegram.

Mr. Long told the Ambassador that he might answer the telegram to this effect: for purposes of completing the exchange of the *Gripsholm* the American Legation would be glad to be in direct touch with an officer of the Bern Foreign Office who could in turn be in direct contact with the Japanese Legation.

The Ambassador said he would reply to that effect and would subsequently send the Department a memorandum.¹⁰ Mr. Long stated that our answer¹¹ to the memorandum would be to the effect above indicated.

Please report immediately any reason for this request which you may ascertain of the Swiss Government and be prepared to carry out the plan as it may be agreed upon.

HULL,

¹⁰ No. 267, Ex. 108.03, August 30, not printed.

¹¹ August 31, not printed.

701.0090/1877 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, August 30, 1943.

2117. American interests Far East—exchange. Your 5242, August 26, first numbered paragraph of quotation. Please inform Gorgé that in addition to Japanese whose inclusion in the passenger list has been definitely agreed upon, Department is bringing to New York a reserve pool of passengers named by the Japanese Government from which Spanish Embassy is to select individuals to fill spaces on vessel in manner suggested by Japanese Government. Spanish Embassy has not yet informed Department of its selections but Department by note today¹² is transmitting to Spanish Embassy complete revised list of Japanese brought to New York and has requested the Embassy to inform Japanese Government exactly which Japanese are embarking in time for the list to reach Tokyo by September 5 Tokyo time (September 4 Washington time).¹³

HULL

701.0090/2109a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, August 31, 1943.

2129. American interests—Japan. Your 5303 August 7 [27].¹⁴ Request Swiss Minister Tokyo inform Japanese authorities that this Government has taken note of these requirements but that it has received the information too late to inform persons addressing mail to internees and prisoners of war for despatch on the *Gripsholm*. American Government intends to deliver after censorship mail received on the return voyage of the *Gripsholm* addressed to Japanese civilian internees and prisoners of war in this country without placing any limitation on number or length of letters. Since the mail being despatched on the *Gripsholm* has been prepared and is being despatched in good faith the Government of the United States requests the Japanese Government reciprocally to deliver this mail as the American Government will deliver the Japanese mail received.

HULL

¹² Not printed.

¹³ A list of 1340 Japanese who embarked on the *Gripsholm* at New York was sent to the Minister in Switzerland in telegram No. 2162, September 3, for immediate delivery to the Japanese Embassy at Bern (701.0090/2158b). In telegram No. 5547, September 8, the Minister reported delivery of the list by the Swiss Foreign Office on September 5, 11 : 45 a. m. (701.0090/2182).

¹⁴ *Post*, p. 1001.

701.0090/2011 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, August 31, 1943—noon.

[Received 3:10 p. m.]

5373. Foreign Office note August 30 states information contained Department's 1945, August 30 [13], transmitted Swiss Legation Tokyo.

In reply to steps taken in accordance with Department's instruction under reference, Japanese Foreign Office confirmed that all persons residing in Philippines whose inclusion American-Japanese exchange approved will be repatriated. Only modifications made to lists were those reported Legation's 5033, August 17.¹⁵

HARRISON

711.94114 Mail/12 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, August 31, 1943.

[Received August 31—2:41 p. m.]

5379. American interests Japan. Department's 1067 [1967], August 16.¹⁵ Swiss representative, Tokyo, informs Legation Japanese Minister Foreign Affairs¹⁶ states he would take necessary measures transmit next exchange vessel correspondence of POW's, civilian internees as well as 25-word messages from American citizens Far East. Japanese Government expects reciprocal treatment and requests confirmation that American Government will transmit next exchange vessel communications of types mentioned from Japanese in United States.¹⁷

Gaimusho¹⁸ communicated identical proposal British Government concerning British subjects Far East.

HARRISON

124.546/181 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, August 31, 1943—5 p. m.

[Received 6:14 p. m.]

5381. Department's 2112, August 30. Legation has continually been in direct contact through officer Swiss Foreign Office with Jap-

¹⁵ Not printed.

¹⁶ Mamoru Shigemitsu.

¹⁷ In telegram No. 2152, September 2, to the Minister in Switzerland, the Department stated it was "giving correspondence from Japanese in United States reciprocal treatment as requested."

¹⁸ Japanese Foreign Office.

anese Legation, Bern. This official expresses belief request Spanish Ambassador due to unreasonable delays transmission messages between Washington [and] Tokyo through Spain as Japanese protecting power and consequent desire expedite such communications.

HARRISON

701.0090/2158a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, September 2, 1943.

2154. Exchange vessel *Gripsholm* sailed from New York²⁰ for Mormugão via Rio de Janeiro, Montevideo and Port Elizabeth as scheduled on September 2 at 7 a. m. Safe conduct²¹ assured by all belligerents.

Please request Swiss Government to inform Japanese Government for its information and information of all other enemy governments.

HULL

701.0090/2008 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, September 4, 1943.

2177. American interests Far East—repatriation. Department has noted from your 5368, August 31,²² paragraph G-(1) last sentence that Japanese are refusing to authorize repatriation of 14 United States nationals from China. From your 5263, August 26, it appears that the refusal in the case of Ernest Leroy Healey is stated to be his conviction for espionage while in the case of Stuart, Bowen and Houghton, no reason for refusal is cited.

In view of foregoing Department feels it necessary to comment that, as explained in its 1275, May 16, 1942,²³ first paragraph, United States Government has in order to make them available for exchange not prosecuted Japanese believed guilty of espionage and other crimes. On the motorship *Gripsholm* which has just sailed from United States are various individuals who might have been successfully prosecuted for espionage had the United States Government wished to withhold them from the exchange contrary to the exchange agreement. There are likewise other individuals on the vessel who could have been made the defendants in criminal prosecutions, with penalties running as

²⁰ With 1430 tons of food parcels and other relief cargo and 5528 pieces of luggage.

²¹ For text of announcement of safe conduct, see Department of State *Bulletin*, October 16, 1943, p. 256.

²² Not printed.

²³ *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. I, p. 420.

high as \$200,000. To facilitate the exchange, United States Government withheld action against these individuals. In return United States Government expects that the Japanese Government will withhold similar criminal action against American citizens in order to facilitate the present and future exchanges and that it will arrange commutation of sentence of Ernest Leroy Healey in order that he may be included in the present exchange.

With respect to Stuart, Bowen and Houghton, United States Government points out that as the Japanese Government can ascertain from the Spanish Government no Japanese alien willing to be repatriated has been withheld from the exchange whom the Japanese Government has expressed a desire to have included therein. The United States Government accordingly requests not only a statement of the Japanese Government's reasons for removing from repatriation list names of Stuart, Bowen and Houghton, but expects their actual inclusion in the present exchange unless the Swiss representative at Shanghai upon interviewing them determines that for valid reasons they themselves do not wish to be repatriated.

HULL

701.0090/2215b

The Secretary of State to the Spanish Ambassador (Cárdenas)

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the Spanish Ambassador in charge of Japanese interests in continental United States and has the honor to inform him that there has been received through Swiss channels a summary of a note dated September 6 from the Japanese Foreign Office to the Swiss Legation²⁴ in charge of United States interests in Japan stating that the Japanese Government refuses to permit the repatriation in the present exchange of nationals of eleven United States citizens accused of espionage, one United States citizen convicted of attempted escape and three other United States citizens who are "under suspicion of having carried on political activities". The Japanese Government has likewise refused to permit the repatriation of one Canadian national charged with espionage.

²⁴ Telegram No. 5546, September 8, from the Minister in Switzerland, not printed. September 6 is the date of a note from the Swiss Foreign Office to the American Minister in Switzerland which summarized a note from the Japanese Foreign Office to the Swiss Legation in Japan. No date is given for the latter in No. 5546. In telegram No. 2213, September 8, to the Minister in Switzerland, the Department inquired whether the contents of No. 2177, *supra*, had been available to the Japanese Foreign Office at the time its note was delivered to the Swiss Legation at Tokyo (701.0090/2180). In telegram No. 5694, September 13, the Minister reported a negative reply from the Swiss Foreign Office (701.0090/2234).

The United States Government views with concern the position taken by the Japanese Government in the communication above-mentioned which is contrary to the exchange agreement between the United States and Japanese Governments as understood by the Department of State. For its part the United States Government, as the Spanish Embassy is aware, permitted the embarkation on the motorship *Gripsholm* when it left New York on its second voyage of all Japanese aliens who were named for repatriation by the Japanese Government and were willing to go, regardless of the criminal charges which might have been brought against them. There were thus placed on the vessel various individuals who might have been successfully prosecuted for espionage had the United States Government wished to withhold them from the exchange contrary to the exchange agreement. Likewise, other individuals were embarked who could have been made the defendants in ordinary criminal prosecutions with penalties running as high as \$200,000. To fulfill the exchange the United States Government withheld legal action against these individuals.

The Secretary of State would be grateful if His Excellency the Spanish Ambassador would urgently confirm to the Japanese Government the fact that the United States Government, as indicated above, has faithfully observed its commitments under the exchange agreement and in full conformity with those commitments has not withheld from the exchange any Japanese alien who wished to be repatriated.

WASHINGTON, September 9, 1943.

701.0090/2245a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Brazil (Caffery)

WASHINGTON, September 10, 1943.

3442. [Here follows account of departure of the Swedish motor vessel *Gripsholm*, under Captain Sigfried Ericsson, on second United States-Japanese exchange voyage.]

6. Because of possible adverse effect on future exchange operations of any untoward incidents various security measures were taken by United States Government at New York. Publicity was limited to a factual press release issued by the Department.²⁵ No press representatives nor press photographers were permitted in the operations area in New York before, during or after embarkation. The ship left her berth at midnight. During embarkation and after passengers were on board no officers or men of armed military forces were permitted

²⁵ Department of State *Bulletin*, September 4, 1943, p. 149.

on board. No display of arms was permitted on pier, at gangplank or on board vessel except sheathed and holstered sidearms. Sole exception to the foregoing was that the patrol guard of United States Coast Guard on stringpiece between vessel and pier carried customary military equipment. Officers and men of Coast Guard in their capacity as security officers for Port of New York were stationed on pier, at gangplank and on board vessel to insure orderly embarkation proceedings. Ship-to-shore telephone was under guard and only such officers or persons designated in writing by the Master or officers in charge were permitted to use telephone on board ship. Coast Guard pilot boats constantly patrolled the waters around the ship until she left New York.

Department is anxious to avoid any situations which could possibly give rise to any justifiable complaint from Japanese Government alleging mismanagement of embarkation proceedings or improper treatment of Japanese nationals.

Foregoing explanation is accordingly given as evidence of extremely serious view United States Government takes of any untoward incident which might adversely affect future exchange operations, a view which it is hoped the Brazilian Government shares. Copies of this telegram should be made available to the Swiss and Spanish delegates aboard, to Mr. Langdon,²⁶ to the Master, and to the Spanish Embassy at Rio de Janeiro.

Please render all appropriate assistance to the interests and authorities concerned with the prompt and efficient dispatch of vessel at Rio de Janeiro. Telegraph pertinent details of vessel's arrival and departure, followed upon vessel's departure by complete airgram report of embarkation proceedings.

HULL

701.0090/2254

The Department of State to the Spanish Embassy

MEMORANDUM

The Department of State acknowledges the receipt of the memorandum no. 272, Ex. 108.03, of September 10, 1943 from the Spanish Embassy²⁷ in charge of Japanese interests in continental United States, transmitting the proposal of the Japanese Government to transfer from Hong Kong to Manila on the *Teia Maru* about 200 Philippine nationals who wish to join their families in the Philippine Islands.

²⁶ William R. Langdon, Departmental Representative on the *Gripsholm*.

²⁷ Not printed.

The Embassy is informed that, provided the Philippine nationals whom the Japanese Government contemplates transferring from Hong Kong to Manila are themselves agreeable to the transfer, the United States Government is agreeable to their accommodation on board the *Teia Maru*.

WASHINGTON, September 13, 1943.

701.0090/2223 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, September 14, 1943.

2259. American interests Far East—repatriation. Your 5650, September 11.²⁸ Spanish Embassy Washington on August 3 informed Department²⁹ that Japanese Government intended to vaccinate against smallpox, typhoid, cholera and dysentery all persons returning from Far East on second exchange and expected the United States Government to do the same for Japanese being repatriated on second exchange.

Department on August 10 replied³⁰ that it would give effect to the Japanese Government's request as quickly as possible so far as concerns cholera, typhoid and smallpox but that it could not proceed with dysentery immunizations until informed which type immunization Japanese Government recommends. United States Government added that it agreed to immunization of the Americans returning from Far East against cholera, typhoid and smallpox but did not consider immunization against dysentery necessary. It was specified that *Teia Maru* should carry adequate stock of emetine and other drugs used against dysentery. Spanish Government under date of August 24 informed Department³¹ that Americans would not be immunized for dysentery but that *Teia Maru* would be provided with the necessary drugs to combat dysentery if it should appear among the evacuees.

In view of the foregoing Gorgé should be informed that the Department expects that evacuees will have been immunized as agreed with the Japanese Government.

Repeated to Bombay in reference its 615, September 10.²⁸

HULL

²⁸ Not printed.

²⁹ Memorandum No. 191, Ex. 108.03, not printed.

³⁰ Memorandum not printed.

³¹ Memorandum No. 238, Ex. 108.03, not printed.

701.0090/19981

The Department of State to the Spanish Embassy

MEMORANDUM

The Department of State acknowledges the receipt of memorandum no. 268 Ex. 108.03 of August 31, 1943 from the Spanish Embassy ³² in charge of Japanese interests in the continental United States, transmitting corrections in the Embassy's memorandum no. 220 of August 16, in which the schedule and course of the Japanese exchange vessel *Teia Maru* was presented. Acknowledgment is also made of a further correction transmitted to the Department on September 6, 1943 by means of a telephone conversation between Señor Don Ernesto Barnach-Calbo ³³ and an officer of the Department.

The Department understands that the corrected schedule of the voyage of the *Teia Maru* is as follows:

- “(a) Outgoing—Leaves Yokohama 14th September
 Arrives at Kobe on 15th September
 Leaves Kobe on September 16th
 Arrives at Shanghai on September 18th
 Leaves Shanghai on September 20th
 Arrives at Hongkong on September 22nd
 Leaves Hongkong on September 23rd
 Arrives at San Fernando del Norte on September 25th
 Leaves San Fernando del Norte on September 26th
 Arrives Cap Saint Jacques on September 29th
 Leaves Cap Saint Jacques on September 30th
 Arrives Syonan (Singapore) on October 2nd
 Leaves Syonan (Singapore) on October 4th
 Passes through the Straits of Sunda on October 7th
 Arrives at Mormugão on October 15
- (b) Return trip—Leaves Mormugão on October 21st
 Passes through the Straits of Sunda on October 30th
 Arrives at Syonan (Singapore) November 1st
 Leaves Syonan (Singapore) on November 3rd
 Arrives at Manila on November 7th
 Leaves Manila on November 8th
 Arrives at Yokohama on November 14th”

The Department further understands that the corrected course to be followed by the *Teia Maru* between the Straits of Sunda and Mormugão, in both directions, as set forth in the Embassy's memorandum under acknowledgment and amended by the telephone conversation to which reference has been made, is as follows:

4.40 south—94.40 east
 3.01 north—80.02 east
 6.00 north—74.03 east
 9.02 north—73.45 east

³² Not printed.

³³ Second Secretary of the Spanish Embassy.

9.58 north—70.01 east
15.25 north—69.58 east

The safe conduct which the United States Government granted in its own behalf and in behalf of all its allies for the voyage of the *Teia Maru*, of which the Embassy was notified by note on September 3, 1943,³⁵ is hereby revised to include the foregoing corrections and amendments.

WASHINGTON, September 15, 1943.

701.0090/2341a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, September 17, 1943.

2292. American interests—Far East. Your 5774, September 16.³⁶ Please request Swiss Minister Tokyo urgently to inform Japanese Government that the limitation of baggage of repatriates in manner reported by Fontanel to have been adopted by Japanese authorities in China is contrary to exchange agreement. This Government permitted all Japanese repatriates to take on *Gripsholm* 30 cubic feet of hold baggage plus three pieces of cabin baggage totaling more than 32 cubic feet regardless of weight. Repatriates also permitted to ship hold baggage in excess of 30 cubic feet at established rate of \$1.00 per cubic foot.

All Japanese repatriates were allowed to take their personal effects, clothing and used household effects including linen, silverware and other articles that could be packed in trunks or boxes for transoceanic shipment. If the repatriates wished, they were given opportunity to ship personal effects to friends and relatives or to store possessions in warehouses. Repatriates were allowed to send for personal possessions stored outside camps and assembly centers in order to take them on *Gripsholm*.

There were additionally shipped on *Gripsholm* 130 pieces of baggage left by Japanese repatriates who sailed on first exchange.

The United States Government expects that the Japanese Government will make certain that American repatriates enjoy full reci-

³⁵ Not printed.

³⁶ Not printed; it reported that American repatriates from Shanghai had been restricted to three pieces of luggage per person, each with a maximum weight of 30 kilograms, and two pieces of hand luggage and that passengers from assembly centers in China were not permitted to take personal effects in their possession or stored elsewhere (701.0090/2269). A correction to No. 5774 was forwarded by the Minister in Switzerland in his No. 5827, September 18, namely, that passengers from assembly centers were permitted to take personal effects in their possession (701.0090/2289).

procuity in order that Japanese repatriates aboard *Gripsholm* may not suffer any diminution in liberal amounts of baggage taken with them.³⁷

HULL

701.0090/2279 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, September 17, 1943.

[Received September 17—8:17 a. m.]

5785. American interests Far East, exchange. Legation's 5724, 14th.³⁸ Foreign Office note September 16 states Japanese Legation Bern note of September 15 quoted following telegram from Japanese Government:

"*Teia Maru* sailed from Yokohama for Mormugão via Kobe, Shanghai, Hong Kong, Northern San Fernando, Cap St. Jacques and Syonan as scheduled on September 14 at 1 a. m. Safe conduct assured by all belligerents."

HARRISON

701.0090/2273 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, September 17, 1943.

[Received September 17—9:05 a. m.]

5788. American interests Far East. Repatriation. Department's 2213, September 8, Legation's 5694, September 13.³⁹ Foreign Office note September 15 states Swiss Legation reports contents Department's 2177, September 4, delivered September 8 Japanese Foreign Office.

For his part Swiss Minister has undertaken many representations with a view obtaining Japanese authorization repatriation at least certain Americans in occupied China who are charged with espionage or under suspicion having shown political activity. At last moment he was able to have repatriation of two of these persons authorized

³⁷ The Japanese reply to this message was transmitted to the Department by the Minister in Switzerland in despatch No. 8198, May 17, 1944; it stated that examination of luggage and, in some cases, of persons by American authorities was made with greater rigidity than that by Japanese authorities, and that American refusal to allow Japanese evacuees to take with them personal effects and necessities for the use of babies was an infringement of the exchange agreement (740.00115 Pacific War/2454).

³⁸ Not printed.

³⁹ Neither printed; for summaries of these messages, see footnote 24, p. 923.

and Swiss Foreign Office states it will forward names as soon as received.

In other cases Swiss Minister has met definite refusal Japanese authorities. He has the impression that he might have had greater success if Japanese authorities had to choose between the repatriation and the liberation of these Americans.

Legation presumes Swiss Minister intended to indicate Japanese authorities might have liberated persons mentioned but were not disposed authorize repatriation. Foreign Office official consulted concurs this view. Urgent confirmation being now requested of Gorgé.

HARRISON

701.0090/2301 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, September 20, 1943.

[Received September 20—4:17 p. m.]

5850. American interests Far East repatriation. Legation's 5789, 17th.⁴⁰ Swiss Foreign Office states September 17 that Swiss Minister Tokyo reports when visited *Teia Maru* afternoon September 13 perfect organization and that embarkation caused no incident. He received no complaint. Japanese correct. He learned during interviews with evacuees that Finance Ministry representatives had done all possible facilitate formalities concerning funds which evacuees could take with them. Gorgé describes atmosphere *Teia Maru* excellent, nearly gay. He reports that, according Japanese Foreign Office, Japanese Government took pains so that accommodation so many people one boat offers maximum comfort. He visited provisional dormitories in public rooms, believes evacuees will be fairly crowded notwithstanding care taken in making provisional installations. Evacuees who are not traveling cabin will have only single mattress for bed. Gorgé finally reports among evacuees are two sick persons: Comber, number 18, Legation's 4776, October 22, [1942], and Ross, Canadian, number 325, Legation's 5751, December 8.⁴¹

HARRISON

⁴⁰ Not printed; it reported advice from the Swiss Minister in Japan that the *Teia Maru* would take 1516 persons to Mormugão and that "certain persons on list from occupied China are unable bear travel or do not desire repatriation. They will therefore have to be replaced." (701.0090/2276)

⁴¹ Neither printed.

701.0090/2388

*Mr. William R. Langdon, Departmental Representative on Board
the M.S. "Gripsholm", to the Secretary of State*

AT SEA, September 21, 1943.

[Received September 29.]

Subject: General Report of Second American-Japanese Repatriation
Operation, Section One.^{41a}

SIR: I have the honor to report hereunder the progress up to September 21 of the present American-Japanese repatriation operation.

(a) *Embarkation of Japanese.*

As has no doubt already been reported to the Department, the embarkation of Japanese repatriates from the United States was accomplished on schedule, smoothly and with the greatest degree of efficiency. By the time the ship was under way at midnight of September 1, every passenger was more or less settled in his allotted space while minor matters which troubled individual passengers were being disposed of quickly and satisfactorily. The only mishap in the proceedings was the failure to unload before sailing some 150 pieces of baggage belonging to Japanese held ashore to fill possible vacancies caused by eleventh hour refusals to return to Japan (known as the "Ellis Island pool") but whom there was no need to embark. This baggage is being located and segregated and will be brought back to New York on this ship.

(b) *Conditions on ship and of voyage.*

The arrangements for the health and comfort and entertainment of the passengers leave little to be desired. The medical and nursing facilities are superb, the stewards are courteous and attentive, the food is good, the passengers have complete freedom of the fine appointments of the ship, first-class motion pictures are shown at frequent intervals, the well-stocked bars are available to all, and all reasonable wants for daily articles may be obtained from the ship's novelty store. The spokesman of the Japanese group leaders has expressed to me his appreciation of the pains taken by our Government to provide for the well-being on the ship of the repatriates and assured me that the repatriates were very happy and contented with all arrangements made for them.

[Here follows a detailed account of conditions on the trip.]

Very respectfully yours,

WM. R. LANGDON

^{41a} For section two of report, see p. 942.

701.0090/2289 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, September 22, 1943.

2321. American interests Far East. Exchange. Department's 2292, September 17 sent on basis of text in Legation's 5774, September 16.⁴² The change indicated in Legation's 5827 of September 18⁴² improves situation regarding personal effects of American repatriates but still does not give full reciprocity in type or amount of baggage permitted in comparison with Japanese repatriates. Therefore, contents of Department's 2292 still applicable.

HULL

701.0090/2346 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, September 24, 1943.

[Received September 24—2:45 p. m.]

5962. American interests Far East repatriation. Department's 2177, 4th; Legation's 5788, 17th. Swiss Foreign Office note September 22 states according telegram from Swiss Legation Tokyo Minister Shigemitsu replied to contents Department's 2177 in letter dated September 17 to Swiss Legation. Substance follows.

(Translation from French). Imperial Government has endeavored to accede in as large measure as possible desire American Government concerning repatriation certain designated American citizens. During negotiations this subject with Your Excellency you have insisted on several occasions on repatriation of certain number American citizens four of whom are mentioned in above-mentioned letter from Your Excellency. In fact, Japanese Government was able to give satisfaction in certain cases that were reported to it but with regard to cases of other Americans in question it regrets as stated since beginning of negotiations unable to accede to desire American Government for reasons already explained. I, therefore, request Your Excellency to transmit following communication to American Government: (End translation).

[([Begin original English text). "In view of impending departure of Japanese exchange ship the views of Japanese Government regarding communication of United States Government were at once notified verbally on September 9th to Swiss Legation in Tokyo.

Japanese Government made all possible efforts in order to expedite second exchange and especially to comply with wishes of United States Government in respect to American citizens whom the same Government desire to be repatriated. In consideration of repeated requests of Swiss Legation in Tokyo about a certain number of persons including above-mentioned four Japanese Government, upon

⁴² Not printed; for summary, see footnote 36, p. 928.

negotiations with same Legation, have agreed to repatriation of some of those American citizens. But as regards the four persons in question as it has been intimated to same Legation since beginning of negotiations it is regretted that Japanese Government have been unable to accede to American desire for such reasons as have been explained to Swiss Legation.

It has by American communication for the first time come to knowledge of Japanese Government that among Japanese subjects repatriated by present exchange there are some persons who might have been prosecuted for espionage. Japanese Government wish to state that, as have been pointed out in their memoranda of July 13⁴³ and August 10,⁴⁴ they consider that among those Japanese subjects nominated by them for repatriation and who it is declared by United States Government have refused evacuation there are a certain number of individuals who in fact desire to be repatriated."

HARRISON

701.0090/2351 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, September 25, 1943.

[Received September 25—12:28 p. m.]

5982. Your 2321, September 22. My 5933, September 23.⁴⁵ Foreign Office note September 24 states no reply yet from Gorgé but quotes following response telegram dated September 23 from Fontanel.

"Luggage restrictions have been generally enforced by local Japanese authorities for all passengers embarked in Shanghai on *Teia Maru*, that is, luggage was limited to three pieces per person each of maximum 30 kilos plus two pieces hand baggage. Furthermore, passengers were not accorded facilities to arrange shipment of personal effects stored with friends or private warehouses and were neither permitted to take with them silverware stored in my care. Moreover, all luggage was subjected to extremely severe examination and many articles such as for instance medicines, infant food, tinned foodstuffs in excess of five tins, cigarettes in excess of two hundred pieces, coffee, sugar, soap (except one or two cakes per person), playing cards, alcoholic drinks, candles (even church candles), personal photographs, writing paper, paper wrappings and all written material including personal documents except Bible and passport were confiscated. Unaccompanied women with small children and persons in poor health were obliged to carry hand baggage from pier to steamer as no wharf coolies were provided."

⁴³ Memorandum No. 169, Ex. 108.03, July 21, from the Spanish Embassy, not printed.

⁴⁴ See telegram No. 4961, August 14, 10 a. m., from the Minister in Switzerland, p. 899.

⁴⁵ Not printed; it reported delivery of the contents of Department's telegram No. 2292, September 17, to the Japanese Foreign Office on September 18 (701.0090/2342).

Fontanel further reports did everything possible to obtain less severe measures by local Japanese authorities but experienced great difficulty. July 13 he requested instructions from Gorgé on subject baggage and personal effects but was only advised August 13 that baggage arrangements would probably be similar those in effect first exchange. This was confirmed by Swiss Legation September 7 but Gorgé added that local authorities had decided to limit baggage to five pieces per person as apparent result instructions imposed all ports by reduced capacity vessel.

When Fontanel learned through Japanese Consulate that evacuees would probably be transferred directly from detention centers to vessel he suggested they be authorized leave centers on parole for one or two days to permit them to settle personal affairs. This request received no response.

September 15 Japanese Consulate informed Fontanel that following instructions would be given evacuees.

"Articles permitted to be taken on board: (1) personal ornaments (watches, rings, cuff-buttons, et cetera); (2) clothing (clothes, shoes, hats, umbrellas, et cetera); (3) toilet sets (handbags, compacts, et cetera); (4) smoking articles (pipes, cigarettes, lighters, et cetera); (5) writing material (fountain pens, pencils, et cetera); (6) traveling requisites (wrappers, blankets, et cetera); (7) others such as toys and other requisites for infants and Bibles without any entries and inscriptions thereon; (8) any articles other than the above and particularly books, printed matters, photographs, et cetera, are strictly prohibited; (9) it is also prohibited to take (a) new made articles covered by (1) to (7) in large quantities, (b) things beyond one's means, (c) things of one and the same kind in large quantities.

Number of luggage, that is, trunks, suitcases, kit bags, et cetera, must not exceed three per person and the weight of each must not be more than thirty kilos in addition two small parcels or hand baggages which may comfortably be carried by a repatriate on the day of embarkation would be permitted subject to examination of the contents by the authorities."

Fontanel then approached Japanese Consulate to endeavor obtain modification foregoing instructions which were not according exchange terms but his intervention was without result. He adds in conclusion "although no prior instructions to this effect were issued to passengers it was ascertained on embarkation that the three pieces of luggage were stored in cargo hold and would remain inaccessible during voyage."

HARRISON

701.0090/2346 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland
(Harrison)*

WASHINGTON, September 27, 1943.

2359. Your 5962, September 24. Department has addressed to Spanish Embassy in charge of Japanese interests a note ⁴⁶ quoting the letter of Minister Shigemitsu addressed to Minister Gorgé and continuing as follows:

"It appears from the foregoing quotation that the Japanese Government is unwilling to believe the repeated statements of the United States Government that the Spanish representatives in charge of Japanese interests are, and since assuming the protection of Japanese interests in continental United States have been, at complete liberty to search out any Japanese national in continental United States, to speak to that Japanese freely without witnesses and to ascertain the real desire of such Japanese regarding repatriation to Japan. It would further appear that the Japanese Government has not been informed by the Spanish Embassy of the numerous refusals of repatriation which Japanese nationals in the United States have spontaneously communicated direct to the Embassy. It furthermore appears that the Japanese Government is not aware, or is unwilling to believe, that every Japanese desiring repatriation and named for repatriation by the Japanese Government has been afforded the opportunity to be repatriated even if he first declined repatriation and later signified a change of intention and no matter whether this change was notified direct to the United States authorities or through the Spanish Embassy. Reference is made in this connection to the Department's memorandum of August 31, 1943,⁴⁷ regarding Shinji Fujishiro and to numerous other cases of which the Embassy is aware.

The United States Government attaches great importance to this point because it appears that American nationals eligible for exchange have been withheld from the current exchange because of the Japanese Government's alleged belief that all Japanese nationals named by it for repatriation were not given an opportunity freely to express their real desires and that some among those desiring repatriation were withheld from the current exchange against their real wishes. As the Embassy is in a position to certify to the Japanese Government, no Japanese national in the high-priority categories who signified a desire for repatriation in time to be put aboard the *Gripsholm* was withheld from the exchange and those in the low-priority categories who opted for repatriation were not embarked only because of lack of space. So as not to separate families, there were actually embarked eleven more Japanese nationals than the 1500 which the United States Government was pledged to deliver.

As the Spanish Embassy is aware, the attitude of the Japanese Government expressed in the final sentence of the above quotation is entirely irreconcilable with the true state of affairs. Not only is there of record the written refusal of repatriation of each Japanese

⁴⁶ Dated September 27.

⁴⁷ Not printed.

national whose refusal of the opportunity to be repatriated has been reported to the Japanese Government but as the Embassy knows, it has repeatedly been invited to have its representatives verify the wishes of the Japanese nationals in question.

The Embassy is again invited to take steps on its own initiative to verify the true wishes of every Japanese national in the United States named for repatriation by the Japanese Government who has refused to be repatriated and to certify its findings direct to the Japanese Government. If any Japanese are found who have since the departure of the *Gripsholm* changed their intention not to be repatriated, as some have from time to time, and now are willing to leave this country, it would be appreciated if the Department of State might be informed in order that arrangements may be made for their repatriation in any future exchange of nationals which may be arranged. It would furthermore be appreciated if the Spanish Ambassador would forthwith communicate to the Japanese Government a statement of his knowledge of these matters and of his proposed course of action in respect to the Department's invitation in order that the Japanese Government may no longer have any valid reason to doubt the *bona fides* of the statements made to it in this respect.

The text of this note is being communicated by telegraph through Bern to the Swiss Minister at Tokyo for communication to the Japanese Government."

BERLE

711.94114 Mail/24 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, September 27, 1943.

[Received September 27—6:32 p. m.]

6013. American interests Japan. POW correspondence. Department's 2152, 2nd.⁴⁸ Foreign Office September 25 states Japanese Foreign Office replies as follows to contents Department's 2129, August 31.

"Japanese Government prepared distribute after censorship letters received via *Teia Maru* and addressed POWs or civilian internees; no restriction will be imposed regarding number letters or words."

HARRISON

701.0090/2407a : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland
(Harrison)*

WASHINGTON, September 28, 1943.

2378. American interests Far East repatriation. *Gripsholm* left Montevideo September 23⁴⁹ having completed loading of Japanese repatriates.

⁴⁸ Not printed; but see footnote 17, p. 921.

⁴⁹ The *Gripsholm* had arrived at Montevideo September 21 at 1 p. m.

There are on board the *Gripsholm* 1340 Japanese embarked at New York, 89 embarked at Rio de Janeiro and 84 embarked at Montevideo to which must be added 2 Japanese born on board the vessel. The total number of Japanese on board is thus 1515 or 13 more than United States Government agreed to deliver in the present exchange.

Japanese Government should be informed.

BERLE

701.0090/2326 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul at Bombay (Donovan)

WASHINGTON, September 28, 1943.

435. Your 647, September 22. If the eventuality to which you refer ⁵⁰ should arise you are authorized to disburse against promissory note minimum cost of transportation to British India and of initial cost of hospitalization. You should follow the form of promissory note being used by Smith on the *Gripsholm* and should charge the expenditures to Authorization 15, 1943-44. You should furthermore telegraph Department name of passenger affected, approximate cost of transportation, hospitalization and other anticipated expenses, indicating name and address of person or organization in United States, which should be asked to deposit with the Department funds for the purpose.

BERLE

701.0090/2413½

The Spanish Embassy to the Department of State

MEMORANDUM

No. 292

Ex. 117.00 II

The Spanish Embassy presents its compliments to the Department of State and begs to acknowledge receipt of its Memorandum of September 27th ⁵¹ wherein is transcribed the translation of a communication in French, and its enclosure, addressed on September 17th, by Minister Shigemitsu of the Japanese Foreign Office, to the Swiss Minister in Tokyo.

The Spanish Embassy fails to understand how the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Japan could have addressed a Note in such terms to the Swiss Minister in Tokyo, as this Embassy has periodically informed the Japanese Government of the incidents which have occurred, of the pace of negotiations conducted, and of the ultimate arrangements.

⁵⁰ Telegram No. 647 not printed; the eventuality referred to was "possible disbursements for serious hospital cases or for transportation to British India."

⁵¹ See telegram No. 2359, September 27, to the Minister in Switzerland, p. 935.

for the effecting of the second exchange, as well as of the evident good will shown by the American Government to meet the demands of the Japanese Government, in regard to Japanese repatriations; therefore it is assumed that there has been some misunderstanding which this Representation will endeavor to elucidate.

The Spanish Embassy begs to inform the State Department that it is impossible for it to communicate directly with all those Japanese who have declined repatriation, because it lacks their addresses, therefore, it would appreciate that the State Department kindly apprise it of same or furnish photostatic copies of the answers in its files, from those Japanese nationals who "declined to go", in order that a detailed list may be sent to the "Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores" in Madrid, for the perusal of the Japanese Government.⁵²

WASHINGTON, September 30, 1943.

-701.0090/10-143

The Spanish Embassy to the Department of State

MEMORANDUM

No. 293

Ex. 108.03 VI

The Spanish Embassy presents its compliments to the Department of State and with reference to the Department's Memorandum of September 9th, 1943, regarding the repatriation of fifteen United States Citizens from Japan on the second exchange, begs to transmit below a wire that has been received from the Japanese Government on the matter, through the "Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores" in Madrid, which reads as follows:

"*Memorandum*—October 1st, 1943—Japanese Government formerly received from Swiss Legation in Tokyo in Charge of United States Interests in Japan, Note dated 8th September⁵³ conveying communication of United States Government of similar purport. Views of Japanese Government on matter were at once verbally communicated to Swiss Legation on 8th September and Note was sent to Legation on 17th September.⁵⁴ Japanese Government have made all possible efforts with view to expediting and amicably carrying [out exchange agreement and have?] exerted their efforts in order to comply with wishes of interested Governments regarding repatriation of nationals of United States and other American countries residing in Japan. Concerning certain number of such nationals (including

⁵² In a memorandum of December 3 the Department submitted lists of Japanese nationals and their addresses in the United States and copies of their refusals to be repatriated.

⁵³ This refers to the contents of telegram No. 2177, September 4, to the Minister in Switzerland, p. 922.

⁵⁴ See telegram No. 5962, September 24, from the Minister in Switzerland, p. 932.

fifteen persons in question) repeated request[s] were made by Swiss Legation and in compliance therewith Japanese Government made some of them embark, but as regards fifteen persons in question, it is regretted that Japanese Government, as was made clear since outset of negotiations, were unable to comply with American desire for such reasons as have already been explained. It came by American communication for first time to knowledge of Japanese Government that among Japanese evacuees who have embarked there are some persons who might have been prosecuted for espionage. Japanese Government have pointed out in several occasions that they believe that among those Japanese residents in United States who until [*United*] States Government declare to have refused to be repatriated, there are number of persons who as matter of fact desire to come home. Japanese Government have now received information, according to which message addressed by United States President to President of Senate on 14th September,⁵⁵ reveals that United States Government intend to accord unduly discriminate treatment to Japanese nationals who have expressed desire to evacuate. It is presumed from this that undue pressure was brought to bear upon them when they were questioned as to their intention of evacuation or not. (Owari⁵⁶).”

WASHINGTON, October 1, 1943.

701.0090/2414 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, October 3, 1943.

[Received October 3—1:54 p. m.]

6171. American interests, Far East repatriation. Foreign Office reports contents Department's 2292, September 17, reached Swiss Legation, Tokyo, too late permit effective representations Japanese authorities *Teia Maru* whose departure Shanghai scheduled September 21 left that port September 20.

Swiss also report Department's 2259 September 14, encountered great delay transmission reaching Swiss Legation, Tokyo, 5 days after departure *Teia Maru*.

HARRISON

701.0090/2536b

The Department of State to the Spanish Embassy

MEMORANDUM

The Department of State acknowledges the receipt of the memorandum no. 293, Ex. 108.03 VI, of October 1, 1943 addressed to it by

⁵⁵ *Congressional Record*, vol. 89, pt. 6, pp. 7521, 7522.

⁵⁶ "The end" (Japanese).

the Spanish Embassy in charge of Japanese interests in continental United States, transmitting the text of a communication from the Japanese Government in which that Government seeks to justify its action in withholding from the exchange of American and Japanese nationals 15 individuals who should, in accordance with the terms of the exchange agreement, have been repatriated in the current exchange.

The Japanese Government refers to a message addressed by the President of the United States to the President of the United States Senate on September 14, 1943. The Japanese Government states its belief that that message indicates an intention of the United States authorities to exercise unduly discriminatory measures against Japanese nationals in the United States who opt for repatriation to Japan.

The Japanese Government is informed that the policy of segregating in a separate War Relocation Center those persons of Japanese race, whether Japanese or United States citizens, who are loyal to Japan rather than to the United States had not yet been determined upon at the time in 1942 and early 1943 when Japanese nationals in the Relocation Centers were requested to indicate whether or not they wished repatriation. That policy, therefore, had no effect upon the decision to be taken by these individuals. Furthermore, the conditions of the life of evacuees in the segregation Center will in no material sense differ from those in the other Relocation Centers so that there will not be, as the Japanese Government apparently believes, any discrimination as between Japanese nationals.

The Japanese Government should furthermore take note of the fact that numerous Japanese who are interned for the duration of the war and who could have no possible hope of improving their condition by refusing repatriation have nevertheless refused repatriation. Similarly there are some thousands of Japanese in the United States who are neither interned nor in Relocation Centers. The proportion of refusals of repatriation among those of the Japanese at liberty whose repatriation has been requested by the Japanese Government is even higher than among the Japanese who are interned or who are in the Relocation Centers. Communications with these latter Japanese regarding the request for repatriation was exclusively by letter, removing any possibility that pressure could have been exercised upon them. In view of these facts, the United States Government rejects as baseless and without any foundation in fact or logic the assumption of the Japanese Government that any pressure or discrimination existed to influence the decision of any Japanese regarding repatriation.

The Japanese Government may wish to take note that many hundreds of persons being transferred to the segregation center to await repatriation to Japan are persons who have expressed an urgent desire to be repatriated but who have not been designated by the

Japanese Government for repatriation. Numerous other Japanese desiring repatriation but not yet designated are in the internment camps in this country and also at liberty.

The Department of State further notes the statement of the Japanese Government that prior to the receipt of the Swiss Legation's note of September 8 pointing out that certain Japanese who could have been prosecuted for espionage were included in the present exchange of nationals, it had no knowledge that such Japanese were included among the Japanese repatriates. The United States Government is unable to understand this statement of the Japanese Government as it made a declaration of policy in this matter to the Japanese Government in 1942 and referred to that declaration of policy in giving the Swiss Minister at Tokyo the information upon which his note of September 8, 1943 to the Foreign Office ⁵⁷ was based. This declaration of policy was contained in the Department of State's telegram no. 879, April 7 and no. 1275, May 16, 1942,⁵⁸ to the American Legation at Bern, the texts of which were made available to the Swiss Minister at Tokyo for communication to the Japanese Government. The statement of April 7 was made available to the Spanish Embassy at Washington in a memorandum dated April 10, 1942.

The United States Government in the interest of the successful prosecution of further exchanges of nationals suggests that such exchanges can best be carried on if both parties thereto will guide their conduct in accordance with the original statement which provided that there should be no exceptions on the grounds of the importance of the individuals to the prosecution of the war effort.

WASHINGTON, October 11, 1943.

701.0090/2744

The Department of State to the Swiss Legation

MEMORANDUM

The Department of State would greatly appreciate it if the Swiss Legation would transmit to Mr. Robert Scherer, the Swiss Delegate on the *M. S. Gripsholm*, a message for Mr. Donald W. Smith, the Disbursing Officer of the Department of State on the vessel, that the Department of State approves his recommendation that pecuniary advances up to \$100 be made to the passengers on board the *Gripsholm* but wishes the advances held, so far as he and Mr. Langdon deem feasible, to the original proposed amount of \$50 until the vessel calls at Port Elizabeth where numerous of the passengers will receive

⁵⁷ This note conveyed to the Japanese Foreign Office the contents of telegram No. 2177, September 4, to the Minister in Switzerland, p. 922.

⁵⁸ *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. I, pp. 412 and 420, respectively.

additional funds from sources on shore. Mr. Smith should take particular note that the Department desires separate notes executed for any amounts paid in excess of \$50 to any individual and that opportunity should be given individuals who have received funds from him to repay their notes and have them canceled if they receive adequate funds from sources ashore at Port Elizabeth or at Rio de Janeiro.⁵⁹

WASHINGTON, October 23, 1943.

701.0090/3414

Mr. William R. Langdon, Departmental Representative on Board the M. S. "Gripsholm," to the Secretary of State

[Extracts]

AT SEA, October 23, 1943.

[Received December 15, 1943.]

Subject: General Report of Second American-Japanese Repatriation Operation—Section Two.

SIR: Continuing my report of September 21, 1943 under the same caption I have the honor to report hereunder the progress up to October 23 of the present American-Japanese repatriation operation.

(c) *Attitude of Japanese repatriates.*

The absence of indications of hostility toward the Americans on board among the Japanese repatriates continued to the end of the journey. On October 15 the Spanish delegate, Mr. Danis, invited the members of the "United Local Leader Council", Mr. Burch, myself, Mr. Smith and Mr. Yamagata, the former Japanese Minister to Chile, to a gathering to thank the "Council" for its cooperation in making the voyage so free from any difficulties or unpleasantness, and in the course of this meeting the several officers of the "Council" formally acknowledged the perfection of the arrangements made for this operation and asked me to convey to the Department the passengers' appreciation of the Department's correctness in all matters affecting them. Mr. Yamagata, emphasizing that he was speaking in a personal capacity, added his tribute to the operation. The distinct impression was received that confidence in our Government's fairness in all matters affecting Japanese repatriates has increased as a result of the operation, and it may have been a manifestation of this confidence that \$165,000 were turned in to Mr. Danis by the repatriates against his

⁵⁹ In a memorandum of October 26, the Swiss Legation notified the Department that the contents of its message had been transmitted to Mr. Scherer (701.0090/2955).

receipts (to be redeemed in yen by the Japanese Government) as compared with some \$23,000 on the first exchange.

(d) *Arrival at Mormugão*; ⁶⁰ the "*Teia Maru*"; *Transfer of repatriates and cargo.*

Mormugão. The *Gripsholm* docked at Mormugão in the early afternoon of October 16, a day behind schedule. The *Teia Maru* had docked the day before. All things considered, Mormugão appears to be an ideal place for exchanging prisoners and internees. There is adjoining berthing space for the exchange ships, there are traveling cranes and rail facilities for moving relief cargo and baggage from one ship to another, there are cool and clean sheds right on the pier for use as temporary offices and waiting rooms, and Mormugão is isolated from any population center where passengers or crew may get into trouble or be lost or catch disease. In fact Mormugão is nothing more than a pier with railroad docks and traveling cranes, a single large building (erected in the sixteenth century) used as a hotel and as a temporary home for shipping agencies, and a cluster of small police and administrative buildings.

Contact was established with the *Teia Maru* following docking. The appearance of the American repatriates was shocking, although their physical condition according to the medical officers of the *Gripsholm* was not bad. Most of the repatriates looked exhausted, if not ailing, emaciated and haggard, their appearance no doubt reflecting the grimness of the camps and areas from which they came. The first sight of the Americans on the *Teia Maru* drove home to us on the *Gripsholm* the urgency of bringing home as rapidly as possible remaining Americans in the Far East.

Teia Maru. The conditions on the *Teia Maru*, which is somewhat smaller than the *Gripsholm* and has a normal passenger capacity of 425 (*Gripsholm* normal capacity is 500) no doubt also contributed to the exhausted and woe-begone appearance of the repatriates. Only about a fourth of the passengers had cabin accommodations, the rest being quartered in improvised "double decker" dormitories in the ship's public rooms and in unventilated holds between decks. In daytime there was not even sitting capacity for all so that many persons had to sprawl on deck or lean against bulkheads in order to rest their bodies. The stewards who were boys for the most part [*part*] and undersized even for Japanese were not in sufficient number to keep the ship clean, and the passageways, decks and latrines were filthy and cluttered with litter. On the foredeck there was a pile of decaying

⁶⁰ The *Gripsholm* arrived at Port Elizabeth on October 4, 1:45 a. m., and departed for Mormugão the same day at 5 p. m., both South African standard time.

squash, beets and other vegetables, presumably for the passengers' tables. There had been no change of linen on the voyage and what linen had been originally supplied had been nowhere near enough to go around. The food was said to be bad and far from sufficient, and the rice and cereals were full of weevils. The ship's plumbing had broken down and there was difficulty in getting drinking water, let alone water to wash with. A number of repatriates who by some device before sailing had with them more money than others immediately upon boarding the ship began buying favors from the stewards, so that in a short while the stewards had a mounting price for every service. Rackets quickly developed and at length the already short rations of food were partially withheld by the table boys and peddled all over the ship to those with money. The experiences of the repatriates on the *Teia Maru* are no doubt being reported by repatriates and need not be dwelt upon here.

Very respectfully yours,

WILLIAM R. LANGDON

701.0090/3123a : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland
(Harrison)*

WASHINGTON, November 5, 1943.

2726. American interests Far East—repatriation. The United States Government would like to make another exchange with the Japanese Government to cover 1500 Americans for 1500 Japanese. Will you please present the matter to the attention of the Japanese Government and advise Department of their attitude. If their reply is favorable it might be possible for the *Gripsholm* to leave New York about February 1.

STETTINIUS

701.0090/2976 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Brazil (Caffery)

WASHINGTON, November 9, 1943—midnight.

4168. Following is summary of Department's airmail instruction 5260, November 8, replying to your despatch 13200 of October 23:⁶¹

Department's attitude toward publicity surrounding visit of *Gripsholm* was outlined in its 22, October 2,⁶² to Port Elizabeth for Langdon, requesting him to caution repatriates against loose talk which might lead to circulation of information possibly helpful to

⁶¹ Neither printed.

⁶² Not printed.

the enemy or detrimental to interests of 10,000 American civilians and thousands of American prisoners of war remaining in the Far East. Department nevertheless does not wish to act in a manner which might be interpreted as limiting the freedom of the press. Accordingly, the Department recommends the following on questions specifically raised in your despatch:

1. *Gripsholm* passengers should be allowed to send telegrams on presentation of landing card.

2. For reasons given in detail, Department would not wish to limit nature of messages sent by passengers in any manner other than already prescribed by local censorship and existing security regulations. Such messages should, however, be sent by cable rather than by radio to avoid content becoming known immediately to the enemy.

3. It is not feasible to limit remittances to passengers to channel constituted by Department and Embassy.

4. While realizing impracticability of international telephone calls by passengers, Department does not wish to be in a position of denying them that privilege.

5. Department does not wish to take any steps to discourage repatriates from mailing letters at Rio de Janeiro.

6. Department concurs in recommendation that newspaper representatives and other non-official individuals be not allowed on board *Gripsholm*. Interviews on shore should be satisfactory for all newsmen at Rio de Janeiro.

7. Department is not informed of Brazilian censorship policy regarding press despatches concerning call of *Gripsholm*. Department assumes Brazilian authorities will not wish to pass material of nature to jeopardize chances of repatriation of Brazilian, United States and other American nationals remaining in Far East or information possibly prejudicial to interests of individuals held by Japan. Department considers it desirable that press despatches be sent by cable and not by wireless, thus delaying receipt of information by the enemy. Department assumes press representatives will realize seriousness of matters at stake and will be patient with Censorship authorities. If they make representations to Embassy they should be informed that Department does not wish to impair freedom of press but likewise does not wish its representatives to exercise any pressure upon Brazilian Censorship which might be construed as an attempt to limit conscientious discharge of Censor's duty.

STETTINIUS.

701.0090/3248 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, [undated].

[Received November 23, 1943—7: 28 p. m.]

7389. American interests Far East repatriation. Department's 2726, November 5. Swiss note November 22 states Gorgé submitted question third exchange [to] Japanese Foreign Office spokesman.

Gorgé telegraphs that his informant, while declaring inability make commitment, directed his attention to fact that possibility third exchange could not be given consideration before clarification certain points concerning treatment Japanese citizens interned United States. Spokesman added that Spanish representative requested undertake investigation nature of which American Government is informed.

HARRISON

701.0090/3362a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, December 2, 1943.

2987. American interests—Far East. Inform Japanese Foreign Office that *Gripsholm* arrived New York, December 1.⁶³

HULL

701.0090/3412 : Airgram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, December 6, 1943.

[Received December 15—12 a. m.]

A-529. American interests Far East, *Teia Maru*. Legation's 7217, November 17.⁶⁴ Swiss note December 3 transmits excerpts report from Abegg, Swiss delegate, *Teia Maru*, following return Yokohama of which summary follows.

1. No case grave illness during voyage Yokohama to Mormugão. However more than 100 sick persons among repatriates. These occasioned numerous difficulties particularly berthing passengers. Two ship doctors, 1 pharmacist, 1 trained nurse and 8 orderlies attended 422 patients.

2. Twenty-five passengers required sleep mattresses floor several cabins.

3. Water distribution 2 to 3 hours daily. This insufficient due defective installation.

4. Meals served in three groups notwithstanding several complaints. Swiss delegates found quantity food sufficient but quality sometimes unsatisfactory.

5. Wines and liqueurs offered at high prices.

6. Some complaints regarding service.

7. Discipline majority passengers irreproachable; however, thefts

⁶³ The *Gripsholm* arrived at Port Elizabeth at 7:30 a. m., South African summer time, November 3, and departed the next day at 6:30 p. m. The vessel arrived at Rio de Janeiro at 1:05 p. m., November 15, and departed for New York on the 16th. For arrangements made at the New York pier and general observations, see Department of State *Bulletin*, November 13, 1943, pp. 320, 321. For the Department's press release of January 13, 1944, on the exchange, see *ibid.*, January 15, 1944, p. 77.

⁶⁴ Not printed; it reported that the *Teia Maru* arrived at Yokohama on November 14 (701.0090/3182).

reported by passengers and vessels officers. Especially 48 containers condensed milk, biscuits and provisions one lifeboat missing 5 days following departure Goa [and?] quartermaster *Teia Maru* announced following missing[:] 500 sheets and pillowcases, 50 blankets, 25 mattresses and 169 sets tableware. Swiss delegate believes no proof exists passengers committed these thefts.⁶⁵

8. Committee and subcommittees designated by repatriates performed very useful work.

9. Singapore military authorities sent soap, condensed milk, games as gifts *Teia Maru* evacuees.

HARRISON

740.00115 Pacific War/2023

The Department of State to the Spanish Embassy

MEMORANDUM

The Department of State acknowledges the receipt of memorandum No. 344, Ex. 112.00 II, dated December 1, 1943, from the Spanish Embassy ⁶⁶ in charge of Japanese interests in the continental United States requesting assistance in making inspection visits to the various places in the United States where Japanese nationals are being held in detention, pointing out that the last visits by its representatives were made last August. The Embassy further states that from all camps requests are being received for another visit by the Embassy's delegate to examine their present situation and that these requests indicate that the Japanese nationals concerned believe that the Spanish representation is neglecting them.

The Department has been at all times ready to arrange such visits whenever desired by the Embassy, and in this connection reminds the Embassy that twice within the past month the Tule Lake Relocation Center has been visited by a representative of the Embassy accompanied by a representative of the Department of State and that at the end of October the Spanish Consul at Chicago visited the Japanese prisoners of war at Camp McCoy accompanied by a representative of the Department of State.

While the Department of State has been glad to arrange for such visits whenever requested and while representatives of both the Spanish Embassy and of the other neutral Government which has undertaken the protection of Japanese interests in territory under the

⁶⁵ In a memorandum of December 18, the Chief of the Special Division (Keeley) said: "I doubt if any good purpose would be served by calling these deficiencies to Jap's attention now. It is water over the dam, but if & when a 3rd Exchange is agreed upon we might express expectation that deficiencies of 2nd voyage be remedied in 3rd referring to excellent conditions on *Gripsholm*. Mr. Long feels we cannot make too much of these deficiencies but that we should insist upon seaworthiness & safety measures including sanitation."

⁶⁶ Not printed.

jurisdiction of the United States enjoy at all times unrestricted access to all places where Japanese nationals are held by the United States, representatives of the Swiss Government, which has undertaken the protection of American interests in Japan and Japanese-occupied territories, are still unable to visit places in Formosa, Manchuria, Malaya, Thailand, the Netherlands Indies, and the Philippine Islands where American prisoners of war and civilian internees are held by the Japanese authorities.

In compliance with the Embassy's most recent request there are enclosed three tentative schedules⁶⁷ of trips to be made by its representatives to visit detention stations, internment camps, and relocation centers where Japanese nationals are being held. If it finds these schedules to be satisfactory, the Embassy is requested to notify the Department of State on what dates its representatives will be in a position to meet representatives of the Department at San Francisco, California; McGehee, Arkansas; and Lamar, Colorado.

WASHINGTON, December 8, 1943.

711.94115 Exchange/15 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, December 15, 1943.

3121. American interests—Far East repatriation. Department desires Gorgé to be informed in reference to your 7389 undated (received November 23) that Department although unaware of the clarification desired by the Japanese Government concerning treatment of Japanese nationals interned in the United States promptly informed the Spanish Embassy⁶⁸ of the purport of Gorgé's conversation with spokesman of Japanese Foreign Office and stated Department's willingness to facilitate any investigation which the Spanish Embassy might wish to undertake in order to prepare for the Japanese Government the report which that Government is apparently awaiting.

Spanish Embassy replied December 1⁶⁹ that the Embassy had already transmitted over a hundred reports to the Japanese Government on conditions of places of detention of Japanese in the United States and that the Embassy assumed that upon the receipt of such reports the Japanese Government would be well informed concerning living conditions of its nationals in the United States. In order fully to reassure the Japanese Government on this point however the Embassy requested and the Department promptly authorized Embassy's representatives again to inspect all places where Japanese nationals are held

⁶⁷ None printed.

⁶⁸ Memorandum of November 24, not printed.

⁶⁹ Memorandum No. 344, Ex. 112.00 II, not printed.

in the United States. Those inspections are now under way and it is expected that the Spanish Embassy will report to the Japanese Government the observations of Spanish representatives as a result of such inspections.

For its part the United States Government desires the Japanese Government to be informed that the United States continues its best endeavors fully to implement the humanitarian standard of treatment prescribed by the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention which both the United States and Japan have pledged to each other their intention to apply to civilian internees to the extent adaptable. In that connection all places in the United States where Japanese nationals are detained whether prisoner of war camps, internment camps or relocation centers, have at all times been freely open to visits by representatives of the neutral Power protecting Japanese interests in the United States and such representatives have repeatedly visited all such places to satisfy themselves with respect to the treatment being accorded Japanese nationals there detained. The United States Government feels it is in a position therefore to assure the Japanese Government that its nationals in the United States are well protected and cared for and feels confident that the investigation undertaken by the Spanish Embassy at the request of the Japanese Government will confirm the assurances of the United States in this respect. Accordingly the United States Government feels that both the United States and Japanese Governments can confidently proceed with preliminary arrangements for a further exchange.

The Department has been informed by the Spanish Embassy that it has received several thousand applications from Japanese nationals in the United States requesting repatriation. In order that the United States Government may give consideration to the wishes of the Japanese Government with respect to those Japanese nationals to be repatriated in the third exchange it would be appreciated if the wishes of the Japanese Government might be made known as soon as possible.

For its part the Department would be grateful if Gorgé would arrange to have compiled for the Department's consideration a suggested passenger list of American nationals for the third exchange. In compiling such list the Department believes that those who are ill or otherwise showing their inability to withstand the rigors of continued internment should have preference, including seriously wounded and seriously ill prisoners of war for whose repatriation Articles 68 to 74 of the Convention provide. Department suggests that the camp committees at each place of detention, including those in the Philippine Islands, might cooperate with the Swiss representatives in compiling such suggested passenger list. It is hoped that the Japanese Government will be willing on a compassionate basis

to facilitate communication between the Swiss representatives and such committees for this purpose.

It is evident that the successful termination of the second exchange has been due to the cooperation of all concerned, for which the Government of the United States is deeply appreciative. It is hoped that the experience gained in preparing for and carrying on the second exchange will materially contribute toward the expeditious accomplishment of the third exchange.

HULL

701.0090/3435

Report by Mr. Nathaniel P. Davis⁷⁰ to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, December 17, 1943.

SIR: I have the honor to submit a copy of the report⁷¹ of the Chairman⁷² of the committee of repatriates on board the Japanese repatriation ship *Teia Maru* which was appointed by the Swiss Delegate on board at the suggestion of the Department.

The report gives a full account of the activities of the committee and may be of value to the Department in planning for subsequent exchanges of nationals. I was a member of the committee and am in agreement with the findings of the chairman.

While the report draws attention to a number of aspects of the voyage of the *Teia Maru* which might have been better, it is my recommendation that no action be taken with regard to most of them. I am informed that the Japanese government has stated that no other vessel is available for repatriation purposes and that there is some reason to fear that if fault is found with it no vessel at all will be made available. I think I can state categorically that the overwhelming majority of the repatriates, and certainly this was my own attitude, were happy to be repatriated on any vessel and under any conditions, no matter how unnecessarily unsatisfactory they may have been. And I am certain that the majority of our unfortunate fellow citizens still in Japanese hands would prefer a voyage on the *Teia Maru* to remaining in captivity.

However, I do believe that this government could properly insist on the following:

1. That the vessel be put in proper seaworthy and mechanical condition. The life boats and rafts should be overhauled and made water tight; it should be made certain that each life boat is provided with food and water; life jackets should be provided for each person

⁷⁰ Foreign Service Officer detailed as Inspector.

⁷¹ Not printed.

⁷² Claude A. Buss, formerly Executive Assistant to the United States High Commissioner to the Philippines.

on board and passengers should know where the jackets are to be found; the water distribution system should be overhauled and the engineering staff should be familiarized with it so that breakdowns can be repaired promptly. Restrictions on the use of water are not objectionable, but greater efforts should be made to insure that water is available during the hours, and at the places, specified, which times and places should be notified to all passengers.

2. There should be regular fire and life boat drills.

3. There should be sufficient men in the steward's department to insure proper cleaning of the vessel, particularly the public toilets. On the *Teia Maru* these were in deplorably filthy condition due both to breakdowns in the water system and to inadequate attention from crew members whose duty it was, or should have been, to clean them. The condition of the toilets was a menace to the health of all on board.

4. Steps should be taken to protect passengers against extortion by the crew. It is admitted that the passengers were partially at fault in this matter in that some of them corrupted some members of the steward's department with over-generous gratuities as soon as they came on board. Nevertheless, by no means all passengers were at fault, and in any event a greater degree of discipline exercised by the officers of the vessel would have prevented the flagrant extortion which flourished among the stewards.

Particular attention is invited to those paragraphs of the report describing the work of the accommodations committee on pages 12 and following. It is believed that duplication of effort and dissatisfaction on the part of numerous repatriates could be obviated by clarifying the Department's instructions as to the duties of the committee of repatriates with reference to berthing arrangements for the American ship.

It is requested that copies of the report be sent through diplomatic channels to the Honorable Armando Labra Carvajal and to Dr. Juan Marin, both of whom were members of the committee and who were formerly Chilean Minister to Japan and Chilean Chargé d'Affaires in China respectively. These two gentlemen disembarked in Rio de Janeiro before the report had been completed and both asked that copies be sent to them through the Chilean Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Respectfully yours,

NATHANIEL P. DAVIS.

711.94115 Exchange/16 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State.

BERN, December 30, 1943—11 a. m.

[Received 5:06 p. m.]

8210. Swiss Foreign Office states informally (American interests, Far East, repatriation) Gorgé on December 17, prior receipt Depart-

ment's 3121, December 15, had long conversation Japanese Foreign Office concerning further repatriation Americans.

Japanese spokesman stated that following their last conversation, he had observed certain results which probably signify Spanish Embassy, Washington, able furnish reassuring information. Despite this, Japanese Foreign Office believes atmosphere currently unfavorable third exchange for following reasons: (1) because Japanese authorities had not yet received sufficient information regarding Japanese internees faithful [to] Japanese Government; (2) owing certain incidents as, for example, torpedo sinking hospital ship *Buenos Aires Maru*; Japanese protest to American Government concerning this sinking now fully published Japanese press.⁷³

Gorgé replied foregoing as follows: 1. Available information indicates American Government prepared furnish complete information Japanese [*Spanish?*] Embassy concerning Japanese internees all categories. 2. No details subject hospital ship supplied Swiss Legation.

Gorgé availed himself opportunity direct attention Japanese spokesman to fact that although Japanese detains greater number POWs, United States holding greater number Japanese civilian internees.

He added incontestably United States furnishes more information conditions Japanese internees than Japan furnishes conditions American POWs; that actually Spanish representative accorded every facility visit all Japanese internees while Swiss representatives far from able visit American POW camps. Gorgé pointed out Japan had no reason complain.

Japanese Foreign Office official replied to foregoing that for his part is prepared take all necessary steps facilitate visits Swiss representatives American POW camps.

Gorgé gained impression from interview United States probably has greater interest third exchange than Japan. Gorgé suggests, therefore, that Department create if possible situation more favorable for negotiations, for example, by replying protest Japanese Government mentioned above. Gorgé would appreciate being informed nature American reply in case matter should again arise.

HARRISON

⁷³ For correspondence on protests by Japan against attacks by the United States on hospital ships, see pp. 1036 ff.

JAPANESE TREATMENT OF AMERICAN PRISONERS OF WAR AND CIVILIAN INTERNEES ⁷⁴

740.00114A Pacific War/396a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, January 4, 1943.

32. American interests—Japan—prisoners of war. Department's 1914 August 5th [1942].⁷⁵ Department informed following conditions exist in prisoners of war camp Shisagawa (probably Shinagawa) near Tokyo:

1. Many cases vitamin deficiency exist.
2. One postal card and one letter permitted every 4 months.
3. Prisoners required to work on docks at 10 to 35 sen per day.

Request Swiss Minister, Tokyo,⁷⁶ to endeavor to improve these conditions. He should invite attention of Japanese authorities to following:

1. Vitamin deficiency in diet should be remedied by giving prisoners vitamin concentrates when necessary.

2. Japanese prisoners of war in United States may write each week two ordinary letters of 24 lines each, one post card and one business letter, the length of which may be twice length of ordinary letter. In addition to these communications, spokesmen may write Protecting Power ⁷⁷ as often as necessary. United States Government requests that Japanese practice be liberalized so that American prisoners may have mail privileges similar to those given Japanese prisoners in this country.

3. In its 1914 August 5th Department proposed detaining Power pay prisoners equivalent three Swiss francs per day over and above the cost of their maintenance for their labor. No reply has been received from Japanese Government to this proposal. United States Government desires to reach an agreement with Japanese Government on this point in accordance with Article 34 Geneva Prisoners of War Convention.⁷⁸

⁷⁴ For previous correspondence on this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. 1, pp. 792 ff.

⁷⁵ Not printed; it requested communication to the German, Italian, and Japanese Governments of a proposal by the United States "that prisoners of war whose labor is utilized for other purposes than (1) that necessary for the maintenance or repair of the internment camp, including its appurtenances, (2) that incident to improving or providing for the comfort or health of prisoners, and (3) that concerning the interior economy of their respective internment camps, be paid for their labor the equivalent of three Swiss francs per day over and above the cost of their maintenance." These Governments were also to be informed that the United States would pay civilian internees who volunteer for labor other than that specified in these categories at a rate of not less than three Swiss francs per day over and above the cost of their maintenance (740.00115A European War 1939/396).

⁷⁶ Camille Gorgé.

⁷⁷ Spain was protector of Japanese interests in continental United States.

⁷⁸ Signed July 27, 1929, *Foreign Relations*, 1929, vol. 1, pp. 336, 344.

Swiss authorities should satisfy themselves that prisoners working on docks are not required in contravention of Article 31 Geneva Convention to handle arms, munitions, or other material intended for combat units. Request Swiss to report with regard to this point as soon as practicable.

HULL

740.00114A Pacific War/289 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, January 5, 1943.

[Received January 5—10:03 p. m.]

74. American interests Japan. Swiss Minister Tokyo telegraphs December 26 information contained Department's 2814, December 12⁷⁹ delivered Japanese Foreign Office December 23.

In delivering communication Swiss Minister requested [on] behalf Swiss Government cooperation Japanese Government in inquiries which would seem be necessary to verify allegations made against Japanese civil or military authorities. He noted that in other respects Japanese Government's cooperation had been useful and that he had reason to believe that it would result in institution inquiries desired by American Government.

HARRISON

390.1115/6284 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, January 9, 1943.

[Received January 9—9:55 a. m.]

167. American interests—prisoners of war China. Department's 2845, December 17,⁸⁰ Foreign Office note January 6 reports Gorgé intervened beginning December Japanese Government to obtain revocation sentence Teeters, Cunningham and Smith,⁸¹ still without reply. He believes communication Ministry War, Tokyo, to Swiss Consulate General, Shanghai (Legation's 5807, December 10 [11]⁸²) cannot be considered final reply since official views Japanese Government not yet communicated Swiss Legation.

⁷⁹ *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. I, p. 832.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 839.

⁸¹ Nathaniel D. Teeters, American civilian engineer engaged in the construction of naval facilities at Wake at the time of its capture by the Japanese on December 22, 1941; Cmdr. Winfield S. Cunningham, U.S. Navy, in charge of all naval activities at Wake at that time; and Lt. Cmdr. Columbus D. Smith, Commanding Officer of U.S.S. *Wake*, captured near Shanghai by the Japanese on December 8, 1941.

⁸² *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. I, p. 832.

Nevertheless knowing severity Japanese legislation regarding attempts escaped prisoners war, Gorgé has small hope success his representations.

HARRISON

740.00114 Pacific War/104 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, January 11, 1943.

79. American interests—Japan. Request Swiss Government to notify Japanese Government of receipt through Intercross⁸³ of proposal made by Japanese Government that ashes of deceased American prisoners of war be returned by future exchange ships unless this Government prefers to have deceased prisoners of war given local burial.

Reply has been made to Intercross Delegate in United States⁸⁴ that while this Government is willing to cremate bodies of Japanese prisoners of war dying in United States provided Japanese Government so requests, this Government does not desire that American dead in Japan or Japanese-occupied territory be cremated but desires that they be properly identified and interred until end of hostilities.

Statement is made that this Government is making suitable records of the deaths and disposition of bodies of dead Japanese prisoners of war in order that appropriate exchange may be effected when peaceful relations are reestablished and this Government expects Japanese Government to pursue similar course with respect to deceased American prisoners of war.

Official confirmation of Japanese Government's acceptance of this position is desired and an expression of its wishes respecting disposition of bodies of its nationals dying in United States.

HULL

740.00114A Pacific War/297 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, January 13, 1943.

[Received January 13—11:59 p. m.]

285. American interests—prisoners of war—China. Department's 2761, December 7;⁸⁵ Legation's 6036, December 21.⁸⁶ Intercroixrouge, Geneva, writes January 11.

⁸³ International Committee of the Red Cross, also known as Intercroixrouge.

⁸⁴ Marc Peter.

⁸⁵ *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. 1, p. 830.

⁸⁶ Not printed; it reported that the contents of No. 2761 had been transmitted to Intercroixrouge on December 8, 1942 (740.00114A Pacific War/262).

"Instructed Zindel, our delegate Hong Kong, visit four American aviators reported prisoners Canton. Unfortunately visit impossible as activity delegate now confined Hong Kong exclusively. Paravicini,⁸⁷ Tokyo, requested intervene Japanese authorities obtain authorization visit."⁸⁸

HARRISON

390.1115/6284: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, January 14, 1943.

107. American interests—prisoners of war—China. Your 167 January 9th. Department appreciates Gorgé's efforts in this matter. It is anxious to obtain as soon as possible information requested in the last paragraph of its 2845 of December 17.⁸⁹

HULL

740.00114 Pacific War/125

*Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Special Division
(Keeley)⁹⁰*

[WASHINGTON,] January 22, 1943.

Reference is made to the underlying telegrams nos. 410, 411, 413, and 417 dated January 18, 1943 from the American Legation at Bern⁹¹ transmitting from the Swiss representative in Japan special reports on prisoner of war camps in Japan.

While the language used in describing conditions prevailing in these camps is intended to be reassuring, it is evident that the plight of these prisoners of war is far from satisfactory owing to the lack of nourishing food supplied to them and to the acute shortage of medicinals available for the treatment of the diseases contracted in the tropics (with the exception of the prisoners of war captured at Shanghai and in North China, all of the American prisoners of war taken by Japan were captured in tropical and sub-tropical zones). While the Swiss

⁸⁷ F. Paravicini, International Red Cross Committee delegate to Japan.

⁸⁸ In telegram No. 1201, February 20 (740.00114A Pacific War/333), the Minister in Switzerland reported that the aviators were interned at Shanghai. In telegram No. 2102, April 3 (740.00114A Pacific War/390), he stated that a representative of the Intercroixrouge on March 24 had visited the aviators in a prisoners-of-war camp near Shanghai where they were reported as being in good health and treated the same as other prisoners of war.

⁸⁹ *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. I, p. 839.

⁹⁰ Addressed to the Assistant Secretary of State (Long) and the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hamilton).

⁹¹ None printed.

authorities report that the prisoners in the four camps in Japan visited admit that the Japanese authorities have made certain efforts to improve their condition, all of the leaders appointed by the prisoners as their spokesmen stressed the need for medicinals. In the four camps in Japan referred to in the underlying telegrams the percentage of sickness averages 23.5 percent.

If this rate of sickness prevails in the temperate climate of Japan where food and medical supplies are not only relatively abundant but where Japan appears to be making an effort to fulfill the obligations she has assumed to observe the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention, it seems reasonable to assume that the rate of sickness is much higher in prisoner of war camps in the Philippines and in other tropical and sub-tropical zones where food and medicines are scarce and where the Japanese authorities are believed to be less mindful of the obligations that their Government has assumed respecting the treatment to be accorded American prisoners of war.

Even if disposed fully to abide by these obligations, the Japanese themselves are lacking in vital medicinals which are required to maintain health in the tropics or for the treatment of tropical diseases. It appears, therefore, that unless some means can be found in the immediate future to send supplemental food supplies and urgently required medicines to our prisoners of war in the Far East,⁹² particularly in the Philippines, thousands of them may die from malnutrition and disease.

While the Japanese have refused to consider issuing safe conducts for neutral vessels operating in the Pacific to carry prisoner of war supplies, they have said that such supplies may be shipped on the exchange vessels.⁹³ Heretofore, in our efforts to carry on the exchange we have stressed the desirability of getting back our civilian nationals still in Japanese hands, and have mentioned the shipment of prisoner of war supplies only as an incidental consideration. It now seems that the prisoner of war angle should be emphasized. Our negotiations with Japan for further exchanges are rapidly reaching an impasse because of the objection of the security agencies of the Government to the departure of certain Japanese designated by the Japanese Government for repatriation whose release it is contended would be inimical to the best interests of the United States. The Department may not wish to be in the position of appearing to insist that the arrangement made with Japan for an exchange be carried out con-

⁹² For correspondence on efforts by the United States to send financial and other assistance to American nationals held by Japan, see pp. 1012 ff.; for correspondence on efforts to send assistance by way of the Soviet Union, see pp. 799 ff.

⁹³ For correspondence on the second exchange of American and Japanese nationals, see pp. 867 ff.

trary to the national welfare. However, it might be well for the record at least to bring formally to the attention of the War and Navy Departments the reports we have received concerning the seriousness of the plight of American prisoners of war in Japanese hands, particularly their urgent need for medicinals and supplementary food supplies, so that those Departments may be on record as at least sharing the responsibility for any further delay in the exchange which stands in the way of sending vitally needed prisoner of war supplies to the Far East.

While the Justice Department has no direct interest in the plight of our prisoners of war in Japanese hands, it is understood to have made a greater number of objections than other agencies to the repatriation of those Japanese nationals requested by the Japanese Government as a condition to the continuation of the exchange. It might accordingly be advisable to send to the Attorney General⁹⁴ a copy of any communication on the subject that may be made to the Secretaries of War and Navy.⁹⁵

JAMES H. KEELEY, JR.

[For statement of January 28, 1943, by Mr. Joseph C. Grew, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, entitled "Treatment of Americans Held by Japanese Authorities as Civilian Internees and Prisoners of War", see *War Relocation Centers: Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Military Affairs, United States Senate, 78th Congress, 1st session* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1943), pages 113, 114.]

740.00114 Pacific War/131 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, January 30, 1943.

[Received January 31—12:57 a. m.]

708. American interests Far East. Prisoner of war camps. Legation's 301, 14th.⁹⁶ Swiss Foreign Office note January 27 states Gorgé made personal representations Japanese Foreign Office endeavor obtain improvement four camps named. Stressed following:

⁹⁴ Francis Biddle.

⁹⁵ Henry L. Stimson and Frank Knox, respectively.

⁹⁶ Not printed; it reported observations on visits to four prisoner-of-war camps in Japan by a delegate of the Swiss Legation at Tokyo (740.00114 Pacific War/118).

medical care, medicinals, dental care, clothing, nourishment, installation canteens, communication with Swiss Legation, correspondence, religious services, sports, recreation, transmission funds prisoners' families. Gorgé believes if funds placed his disposal can arrange dispatch books, sport equipment, radio sets, games.

Please instruct whether use American interests funds purpose indicated authorized.⁹⁷

HARRISON

390.1115A/1369 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, February 1, 1943.

[Received February 1—6:48 p. m.]

743. American interests Far East internees. Legation's 6037, December 21.⁹⁸ Swiss Consul Shanghai⁹⁹ telegraphs:

"One hundred and thirty-four Americans without families informed January 23 by Japanese Consul General¹ will be interned January 31 factory district Pootung. Japanese authorities stated measure, officially called "segregation", result military reasons.

Informed non-official but reliable source all Americans including women children numbering about 6,000 to be interned camps vicinity Shanghai and near Nanking by March 15. Japanese authorities will proceed by sections without exception except ill persons and employees municipality [and] other public services whose presence regarded indispensable. For latter special measures taken.

As protest considered useless, request Swiss Legation Tokyo ask Japanese Government provide (1) camps be satisfactory installed organized before internees' arrival, (2) authorization representatives Consulate General visit camps prior arrival internees, later regular intervals, to agree [with] internees and authorities desirable measures to avoid serious difficulties, (3) Japanese authorities assure adequate protection property left by internees.

Measures taken that persons designated internment can make necessary urgent preparations take sufficient personal effects. Believe similar internments expected Tientsin, Peking."

HARRISON

⁹⁷ In telegram No. 446, February 22, to the Minister in Switzerland (740.00114 Pacific War/135), the Department authorized Mr. Gorgé to expend \$5,000 within the current month for purchases of such items. In telegram No. 2437, April 19 (740.00114 Pacific War/197), the Minister in Switzerland advised that funds for this purpose were no longer indispensable as the YMCA was in a position to handle the problem.

⁹⁸ Not printed.

⁹⁹ Emile Fontanel.

¹ Seiki Yano.

740.00114 Pacific War/118 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, February 5, 1943.

300. American interests—Far East—prisoners of war. Legation's 301, January 14.² Request Swiss authorities to bring to the attention of Japanese Government following points:

1. Canteen should be provided in accordance with Article 12 Geneva Prisoners of War Convention.

2. Non-commissioned officers can be required only to do supervisory work (see Article 27).

3. Article 44 of Convention provides that all facilities shall be accorded agents of prisoners for their intercourse with the protecting Power. Department therefore requests that agents of prisoners be permitted to correspond with Swiss Legation whenever they desire.

4. Ministers of religion prisoners of war should be allowed to minister fully to members of same religion in accordance with Article 16.

5. Refer to Department's 32, January 4 concerning mail.

6. United States Government expects Japanese Government to bring its practice into line with treaty provisions with least possible delay.

Request Swiss to inform Department of Japanese reply to above points.

HULL

390.1115A/1376 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, February 9, 1943.

[Received February 9—10:23 p. m.]

900. American interests, Far East, internees. Legation's 743,³ first paragraph. Swiss Consulate General telegraphs:

"Japanese authorities proceeded January 31 internment 100 Americans without families or having Asiatic wife. Latter case husband only interned. Installation camp far from complete but Japanese authorities promised early completion arrangements. About 500 employees Shanghai Municipal Council mostly British informed February 1st would be gathered February 9th various school buildings."

HARRISON

² Not printed ; but see footnote 96, p. 958.

³ Dated February 1, p. 959.

740.00114A Pacific War/364: Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, February 9, 1943.

[Received February 9—10:29 p. m.]

905. American interests—Japan. Department's 2685, November 30.⁴ Swiss Legation Tokyo telegraphs following communicated by Japanese Foreign Ministry subject prisoners of war Japan.

"1. Work arranged according decision Japanese Government apply *mutatis mutandis* Geneva Convention July 27, 1929.

2. Work restricted manufacturing, mining, construction, repair bridges, roads, loading et cetera.

3. Hours same [as those of] civilians, pay calculated basis noncoms soldiers Japanese Army. Also receive articles currently required.

Have requested Japanese Government confirm work no direct relations war activities."⁵

HARRISON

740.00115A Pacific War/366: Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, [February 13, 1943.]

[Received February 13, 1943—6:49 p. m.]

1028. American interests Shanghai. Legation's 1011, February 13.⁶ Swiss Consulate Shanghai telegraphs February 11.

"All my efforts have Japanese order concerning general internment rescinded without result. Recommend protected governments consider urgently intervention Tokyo following points causing great concern British [and] American communities.

1st: Date internment should be postponed especially regards families until camps properly equipped [and] food supply regularly organized. Camps designated generally [in] condition complete unpreparedness; understaffed local Japanese consular authorities not position take necessary steps complete organization within time limit fixed internment.

⁴Not printed; it requested that the Swiss Legation in Japan furnish information about Japanese use of the labor of prisoners of war (740.00114A Pacific War/232).

⁵The Japanese Foreign Office's confirmation was conveyed in telegram No. 1383, February 27, from the Minister in Switzerland. The Department, in telegram No. 550, March 8, to the Minister in Switzerland, requested Swiss representatives to visit labor detachments and report on work being done. (740.00114A European War/270)

⁶Not printed; it reported the opinion of the Swiss Consulate at Shanghai that local representations against internment measures would be of no avail and requested that the American and British Governments "examine whether considering international status Shanghai and fact enemy nationals were not interned during last war, exceptions could be demanded." (740.00115A Pacific War/365)

2nd: Request more liberal policy concerning optional exemption aged, infirm, sick (exemption latter category already partly accepted) pregnant women, infants with indispensable nursing staff or relatives.

3rd: Make representations prevent [use as?] separated camp Yangchow which small inland place near Nanking utterly unsuitable every respect; contact with this place very difficult. Insist all residents Shanghai be interned Shanghai or immediate neighborhood only.

4th: Insist obtain permission [for] camps' inspection prior internment and authorization visit camps regularly immediately thereafter.

Press also obtain permission organize more comfort and pay to insure small additional food allowance. Although Haiphong road camp established over 3 months, not yet obtained permission visit."

Consul adds making every effort emphasize points which greatly disturb prospective internees but since orders originate Tokyo local authorities unable take action.

Swiss Foreign Office already communicated information Legation's 1011 and above [to] Swiss Legation Tokyo [and] requested Legation intervene Japanese authorities obtain postponement general internment.

HARRISON

740.00114 Pacific War/125: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, February 16, 1943.

397. American interests Far East—prisoners of war camps. Your 410, 411, 413 and 417, all January 18th.⁷ While the Japanese Government has assumed the obligation under Article 14 of the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention to provide every kind of medical attention prisoners of war need, it is possible that there is a limited supply in Japan of the medicines used in the treatment of beriberi, dysentery, diphtheria, bronchitis, rheumatism, and many of the other diseases from which American prisoners of war in Japanese hands are suffering. Although the Japanese Government is obligated to provide such medicines the United States Government is prepared to ship them by air to a convenient point where they may be picked up by the Japanese provided that the Japanese Government will undertake that obligation and arrange for the reception and distribution of the medicines in accordance with the terms and spirit of the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention. Several shipments might be made to

⁷ None printed.

some point adjacent to Japanese-occupied territory, there to be picked up by the Japanese for distribution under the supervision of the International Red Cross representatives in Japan and Japanese-controlled territory.

The foregoing observations do not apply to furnishing quinine for the treatment of malaria, chills, etc., as it is known that the Japanese have large supplies of that drug. Request Swiss Minister Tokyo to urge Japanese Government to make adequate quantities of quinine available immediately for the treatment of American prisoners of war in Japanese hands.

In addition to the responsibilities it has assumed under the Geneva Convention, the following considerations might be pointed out to the Japanese Government by the Swiss Minister:

1. Principles of humanity should prompt the detaining Power to make a special effort to provide the best care possible for sick prisoners of war.

2. Medical facilities provided by the United States Government for Japanese prisoners of war are excellent, being equivalent to those provided for personnel of the American armed forces.

HULL

390.1115A/1401 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, February 16, 1943.

[Received February 16—3:44 p. m.]

1075. American interests—Far East. Your 274, 3d.^s Foreign Office reports, according telegram Fontanel February 12, figure 6,000 includes British and Americans. Swiss Consul estimates about 1,200 Americans will be interned Shanghai of total American resident population about 1,400. Figure does not include persons from Guam, Wake, other areas but only residents occupied China.

Estimated 200 probably remaining liberty include (1) sick, (2) Americans of Oriental race, (3) indispensable employees public service and enterprises controlled by Japanese.

Swiss Foreign Office adds informally foregoing measures against Americans being carried out by local Japanese authorities under orders Tokyo.

HARRISON

^s Not printed; it requested the Minister in Switzerland to confirm the figure of 6,000 given in second paragraph of his telegram No. 743, February 1, p. 959, "as this greatly exceeds number of United States citizens estimated by Department to remain in China." (390.1115A/1369)

740.00115A Pacific War/366 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, February 18, 1943.

422. Your 1011⁹ and 1028, February 13. The Department greatly appreciates the efforts of the Swiss authorities in seeking amelioration of the conditions of the internment and its postponement until the camps are completed, and urgently requests that these efforts be continued, with especial emphasis on the points mentioned in your 1028.

Pending clarification of the negotiations now under way for the exchange of American and Japanese nationals it is hoped the Swiss authorities may obtain postponement of the mass internment.

Department would appreciate an urgent report on results above approach.

HULL

390.1115/6665 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, February 19, 1943.

[Received February 20—12:53 a. m.]

1164. American interests, Far East, Prisoners of War Convention. Swiss Legation, Tokyo, reports Department's 2526, November 12¹⁰ notified Japanese Government. Following reply February 12 received.

"1. Prisoners of war: Before receiving American proposal Japanese Government applied *mutatis mutandis* article 14 Geneva Convention regarding treatment prisoners of war. Organized infirmary each camp. If necessary wounded, sick transferred military hospital.

2. Civilian internees

(a) In occupied regions [and] zone [of] operations, civilian internees receive same treatment, care as wounded, sick prisoners of war.

(b) In Japan, Japanese territory overseas, Japanese Government ordered periodic medical inspections internees, sick or wounded receive consultation, medicaments. Authorities also designate among prisoners sanitary personnel to care [for] interned compatriots, take necessary measures their health, bedding, food et cetera. Care at own expense [in] hospitals or [if?] doctor not provided by camp authorized within limits possibility."

HARRISON

⁹ Not printed, but see footnote 6, p. 961.

¹⁰ *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. I, p. 826.

390.1115A/1368 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, February 20, 1943.

434. American interests—Japan. Your 687, January 29th.¹¹ Department notes internees at Sumire are not permitted to receive food-stuffs sent from the outside or to have visitors. American authorities permit Japanese held as internees or prisoners of war in the United States to receive both parcels of food and visitors. There is no limitation upon the number of parcels that may be received. Each Japanese held by the American authorities may have up to two visitors per month and additional visits are permitted in exceptional circumstances. Swiss should bring the American practice to the attention of the Japanese and request reciprocal treatment.

HULL

740.00114A Pacific War/337 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, February 23, 1943.

[Received February 23—10:45 p. m.]

1240. American interests Japan. Your 2416, October 23, Legation's 5010, November 5, your 2529, November 12.¹² Swiss Legation Tokyo telegraphs February 19, that as result representations Gorgé, Minister Tani¹³ addressed note February 17 of which following [is] substance:

"I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of Your Excellency's notes October 29 and November 28 in which you informed me that American Government is in possession reports Japanese radio stations according which imperial authorities have intention bring before Council [of] War American prisoners of war because military operations in which they participated and to inflict upon them severe punishment including death and that the same Government requested Swiss Government ascertain precise cases in which penal processes have been instituted against American soldiers and if Japanese Government has authorized Swiss representatives to visit prisoners in question as well as requesting other relative information.

In response, *primo*: Imperial Government has intention bring before Court Martial and severely punish as enemies of humanity those members [of] crews [of] enemy planes who after having raided Japanese territory, Manchukuo or zones Japanese military operations fall in hands Japanese and who after inquiry reveal themselves guilty [of] cruel or inhuman acts. But it has no intention inflict upon them severe punishment because military operations in which they partic-

¹¹ Not printed.¹² *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. 1, pp. 823, 824, and 827, respectively.¹³ Masayuki Tani, Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs.

ipate as American Government has been informed. This measure taken by Imperial Government is based upon supreme moral [law?] which tries to limit to minimum calamities of war by respect of humanity.

Secundo: Members of crews of American planes who fell into Japanese hands after raid April 18 last on Japan¹⁴ have intentionally bombed and set fire to non-military installations such as hospitals, schools and crowds situated far from military installations. What may be more stigmatized is the fact that they wounded and killed little innocent school children who played in the grounds of their school by machine gunning, deliberately mowing them down although recognizing them as such. The crew members in admitting this declared their act was natural and did not reflect adversely on their conduct. The American Government will understand that such persons are unpardonable as enemies of humanity. The Imperial Government cannot treat such guilty as prisoners of war.

Tertio: The guilt of such persons having been established by court inquiry, the death penalty was pronounced according to martial law. However, following commutation [of] punishment granted as special measure to larger part condemned, sentence of death was applied only to certain of accused.

Quarto: The Imperial Government has the intention to treat as prisoners of war those members of crew of enemy planes who fall into Japanese hands after a raid on territory Japan, Manchukuo and zones Japanese military operations who do not indulge in cruel or inhuman acts."

Complete text and translation follow airmail.¹⁵

HARRISON

740.00114 Pacific War/151 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland
(Harrison)*

WASHINGTON, March 1, 1943.

505. American interests—Thailand. Your 1130, February 18th.¹⁶ Swiss Consulate, Bangkok, should be informed that United States Government does not agree with statement that Geneva Prisoners of War Convention is inapplicable in Thailand, as Thai Government is a party to the Convention and as Japanese Government has agreed to apply its provisions.¹⁷

¹⁴ First air attack on Japan by squadron of U.S. Army bombers led by Col. James H. Doolittle.

¹⁵ Despatch No. 4357, February 23, not printed.

¹⁶ Not printed; it reported the views of the Thai Foreign Office concerning an American aviator shot down in Thailand and made prisoner by Japanese forces.

¹⁷ In telegram No. 503, March 1, to the Minister in Switzerland, the Department requested that the Swiss Consul in Thailand remind the Bangkok authorities of their obligations under the Geneva Convention in connection with an American aviator arrested by Thai authorities (390.1115/6467).

Request Swiss Minister, Tokyo, to bring this matter to the attention of the Japanese authorities and to insist that the Japanese military forces in Thailand apply the provisions of the Geneva Convention to American prisoners of war held by them.

WELLES

740.00115A Pacific War/380 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, March 5, 1943.

[Received March 5—5:52 p. m.]

1521. American interests—China. Department's 422, February 18. Gorgé, Tokyo, telegraphs March 2:

"Before receipt instructions, renewed efforts obtain adjournment measures taken Shanghai for internment Americans. Foreign Office *porteparole*¹⁸ promised February 26 examine matter but stated small hope obtain adjournment. I emphasized, as internees would probably be placed in buildings entirely unsuitable, desirable Swiss Consul General Shanghai given opportunity visit installations before internment."

HARRISON

740.00114A Pacific War/337

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Long)

[WASHINGTON,] March 9, 1943.

General Strong¹⁹ of the War Department telephoned me this morning to say that he had had under consideration the subject matter of the telegram²⁰ which we had sent him and which digested the text of the Japanese note of February 15 [17], the full text of which has not yet arrived.²¹

It concerned the mistreatment of prisoners of war in Japanese hands.

He addressed a memorandum to the Chief of Staff²² in which he recommended one of three courses, (not further specified) but had further recommended that none of them be taken at this time.

The Chief of Staff had sent it to the Secretary of War who had returned it directly to General Strong with a statement to the effect

¹⁸ Spokesman.

¹⁹ Maj. Gen. George V. Strong, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 (Military Intelligence).

²⁰ Telegram No. 1240, February 23, from the Minister in Switzerland, p. 965.

²¹ Received March 12 as enclosure to despatch No. 4357, February 23, from the Minister in Switzerland, not printed.

²² Gen. George C. Marshall.

that he felt that the time is rapidly approaching, if not here, to take reprisals—otherwise we would lose more than by continuing to extend decent treatment to Japanese in our control.

General Strong was inclined to regard the message from the Secretary of War as a directive and was very much concerned and said he wanted to consult with me.

I told General Strong that the question of retaliation seldom attained its objective and that it was very frequently the signal for a progressive deterioration of the whole situation. Consequently, I hesitated to agree with a proposal which would have as its immediate result a serious deterioration in the character of the treatment of our own people in the Far East and which would make their condition even harder to bear than it is at the present time.

Our object is to do what we can to improve the welfare of our people. To threaten retaliation or to actually practice retaliation would have the effect of causing to be brought upon our own citizens in Japanese hands the most terrible experiences of Japanese cruelty and barbarity. In addition to that, the Japanese Government and the persons responsible for Japanese policy in this respect would not be the sufferers but insignificant little particles of the Japanese population in our midst and under our control whom the Japanese had practically deserted would bear the brunt of our retaliation. This would not affect the policy of the Japanese Government except that it would intensify their attitude toward our people by giving them a pretext upon which to proceed further in the practice of cruelty.

I further called his attention to certain changes which were becoming apparent in Japanese general attitude alluding to that which he corroborated as being a more wholesome respect for the power of the United States. General Strong expressed it as an "increasing concern" on the part of the Japanese and a "considerable worry" of the Japanese military authorities on account of the aggressive action under way on the part of United States forces.

He and I discussed the fact that there was a proposal before the Japanese Government to effect an exchange of our civilians and that there were favorable indications that a more favorable attitude was to be taken by the Japanese with regard to the exchange. The exchange would be frustrated as far as the civilians were concerned and the fate of the prisoners of war as well as the civilians would be rendered all the more unbearable if there was a threat of retaliation or an actual act in retaliation.

I further called attention to the fact we had not received the full text of the note and felt strongly we should have the complete text before deciding on any course. After that we should consider the

situation of our civilians subject to exchange and the status of those negotiations and prospects for repatriation.

General Strong said that he would seek an opportunity to present the subject again to the Secretary of War and seek to have him modify his attitude. He thought that the matter might be presented at Cabinet and he asked that the Acting Secretary and the Secretary be advised²³ of the development in order that should it progress to be a major issue and be presented to the Cabinet they would not be unprepared.

B[RECKINRIDGE] L[ONG]

390.1115/6284 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland
(Harrison)*

WASHINGTON, March 12, 1943.

599. American interests—China. Department's 107, January 14. Request Swiss Government to continue to press Japanese Government to restore military rank to Cunningham and Smith in compliance with Article 49 of Geneva Prisoners of War Convention and to accord to these men the treatment provided for officer prisoners of war by this Convention.

Ask Swiss to take the necessary steps to see that these men receive such financial assistance as may be necessary in the circumstances.²⁴

WELLES

740.00114A Pacific War/365 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, March 13, 1943.

[Received March 13—10:45 p. m.]

1679. American interests Japan. Prisoners of war. Department's 32 January 4. Swiss Legation Tokyo communicated Department's 32 [to] Japanese authorities. Following [is] reply.

"1. Prisoners of war suffering illnesses undetermined causes sent [for] observation military medical school Tokyo where ascertained all cases illness not necessarily due lack vitamins. Observation patients continue receive immediately appropriate treatment. Japanese authorities attach great importance question vitamins. Ill

²³ Marginal notation by Mr. Long: "done B. L."

²⁴ In telegram No. 2997, May 15, the Minister in Switzerland stated that Cunningham and Smith retained their rank and that the regulations of the prison where they were detained determined whether they were permitted to receive money or supplies (390.1115/7409).

prisoners of war receive special treatment particularly vitamine injections or barley flour with large vitamine content.

2. When camp opened, permission prisoners correspond outside greatly limited by necessity censorship. Regulations will be liberalized soon.

3. Japanese Government already made known regulations regarding prisoners-of-war work pay (Legation's 905, February 9).

Japanese authorities added canteen soon be established camp near Tokyo.[""]

HARRISON

390.1115A/1489 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, March 16, 1943.

638. Your 1552, March 7th.²⁵ American interests, Japan. Swiss should request Japanese authorities to install a canteen at Negishi Yokohama Camp in accordance with the provisions of Article 12 of the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention.

The attention of the Swiss authorities should be again drawn to paragraph 2 of Department's 393 of February 15²⁶ with regard to interviews between internees and Swiss delegate in the presence of witnesses.

HULL

740.00115A Pacific War/386 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, March 16, 1943.

[Received March 16—7:56 p. m.]

1726. American interests China. Department's 422, February 18. Legation's 1521, March 5. Gorgé cables March 8 following reply Japanese Foreign Office his representations:

"1. Decision intern enemy subjects must be considered measure [by] military authorities prevent repetition increasingly alarming cases espionage conducted occupied zones where military operations in progress. Measure not reprisal [for] treatment Japanese subjects British Indies [*India?*] as Japanese Government already protested British Government, reserving possibility change attitude if not convinced sincerity British Government and results obtained improvement situation [do] not appear satisfactory.

2. Japanese Government will pay cost subsistence internees.

3. Shanghai internees recently requested daily meal from outside and employ cook. Camp commandant agreed [on] condition American, British associations pay costs.

²⁵ Not printed.

²⁶ *Post*, p. 1015.

4. Japanese Government states no internees Chefoo, Tsingtao. Only assembly centers (*centres de rassemblement*). Japanese Government never required these persons pay cost food.

5. In principle Japanese Government sees no objection authorize visit camps China but as military zones operation involved reserves right fix authorized date visit camps."

Swiss Legation Tokyo communicated foregoing Swiss Consulate Shanghai.

HARRISON

740.00115A Pacific War/393 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, March 18, 1943.

[Received March 19—1:53 a. m.]

1759. American interests, Japan—civilian internees, Guam. Department's 2641, November 5.²⁷ Department's 2641 communicated Japanese Foreign Office by Swiss Legation. Following reply:

"Japanese Government has [in] principle furnish[ed?] internees needed clothing, therefore when internees clothing [in] good condition or receive clothing third parties or protecting power, Japanese Government considers not obliged supply. Japanese authorities ordered needed shoes Guam internees."

Gorgé called attention Japanese Government if clothing given internees third parties or Swiss Legation, this due neglect competent authorities. Gorgé expressed hope in future authorities better meet needs internees.²⁸

HARRISON

390.1115A/1519 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, March 18, 1943.

[Received March 19—1:40 a. m.]

1764. American interests Japan, Urawa camp. Department's 370 February 12, Legation's 1586 March 9.²⁹ Foreign Office March 11 reports although Japanese authorities gave assurance install central

²⁷ Not printed: it expressed the Department's expectation that the Japanese Government would reciprocally furnish clothing, linen, and footwear without cost to prisoners of war and civilian internees (740.00115A Pacific War/299).

²⁸ In telegram No. 830, April 3, to the Minister in Switzerland, the Department approved Gorgé's position and expressed the hope "that he will continue to urge Japanese to fulfil their obligations under Article 12 of Geneva Convention." (740.00115A Pacific War/393)

²⁹ Neither printed.

heating³⁰ before end year, not one [*done?*], end February, only heating charcoal brazier reading room. Legation requested Foreign Office inform Swiss Legation Tokyo present heating arrangements obviously insufficient, necessary Japanese authorities either (1) install central heating system or (2) adequate steps be taken heat camp. Also call attention Japanese authorities adequate heating arrangements installed Japanese internment camps United States. Reciprocal treatment expected.

HARRISON

740.00114A Pacific War/401a

*Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Long)*³¹

[WASHINGTON,] March 20, 1943.

The full texts of the Japanese note³² concerning the execution of some of the Doolittle fliers now having been received and studied leaves no room for the doubt I hoped would exist that it was not a definite and positive statement that they had been executed.

There are several alternative methods of procedure. As I see them, they are:

1. To proceed immediately to retaliate by executing a comparable number of Japanese officer prisoners of war in our custody.
2. To publish the note for the information of the American people.
3. To make a strong protest.
4. To send instructions to the Swiss Minister in Tokyo to make to the Japanese Government some communication of our horror and revulsion at their action and to instruct the Minister to visit the members of the Doolittle expedition who are captives there and remaining alive and ascertain which of them are alive and which of them by name were executed.

We have submitted the texts of the Japanese communication to the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy. It is my belief that we should await their replies and that the whole matter should then proceed through the Secretary of State to the President for ultimate decision as a matter of very high and very important policy.

In order to present the matter in definite form for the consideration of the President, I suggest that of the alternatives proposed above we adopt the fourth.

To adopt the first course outlined above would, in my mind, have no effect upon the Japanese Government except that it would provide it with a pretext to retaliate on that account and that it might lead to a

³⁰ In the Urawa camp in Japan.

³¹ Addressed to the Special Division.

³² Received as enclosure to despatch No. 4357, February 23, not printed; for substance of the note, see telegram No. 1240, February 23, from the Minister in Switzerland, p. 965.

progressive deterioration in the whole prisoner-of-war situation. I am not unmindful of the fact that the Japanese hold 18,000 of our prisoners and we a few handfuls of theirs. It is true we hold many of their civilians but I am differentiating between civilians and prisoners of war. There are various other arguments which I do not now go into which incline to a negative decision as far as immediate retaliation is concerned.

The second alternative indicated above would seem to be inopportune because we would unnecessarily inflame the anxiety of the families of those officers who are still alive but whose identity is not disclosed because we do not know which of the prisoners have been executed. Furthermore, under those circumstances publicity might be more widespread and the sentiments involved would run deeper and it might result in sporadic activities against Japanese in this country which in itself would lead to a further deterioration and give Japan a pretext for proceeding against our people. Before giving formal publicity to it, I think we should get information as to the identity of the persons involved. Another reason concerns the exchange agreement of civilian internees between the United States and Japan. Some six or seven weeks ago we made a proposal to the Japanese to exchange 4,500.³³ Any deterioration in that situation would be deplorable if there is a chance for the exchange to be effectuated. Japan, from all we can understand, has not indicated in any way that she has decided not to proceed with the exchange. It is true that she is procrastinating and delaying it and in the meantime has detained all civilians within her military jurisdiction and has indicated that April 1 would not be acceptable but has indicated that May or June might be acceptable. Until there is an agreement or disagreement on the exchange, which would provide an opportunity for 4,500 Americans to be got out of Japanese hands, it would, in my opinion, be ill advised to act precipitately in a manner which would result in our failure to retrieve these persons. Consequently, I suggest that the arguments point to a very strong protest being sent to the Japanese Government and instruction to the Swiss Minister to ascertain the names and present location of those alive and to report upon them and to obtain from the Japanese Government a statement of the names, dates and places of the executions and that we include in the note a statement to the effect that this is such a barbaric departure from the rules of civilized warfare and such a violation of the definite agreements which Japan undertook in connection with prisoners of war that we reserve the right, though delaying its use until further information is received, to retaliate by the execution of an equal number of officer prisoners of war in our hands.

³³ See telegram No. 291, February 4, to the Minister in Switzerland, p. 868.

There might be included a statement to the effect that the United States Government as a humane institution is very loath to resort to retaliation and to inflict upon persons unfortunate enough to be prisoners of war penalties for the barbaric actions of their Government and that we have no present intention of resorting to a course which is pointed out to us by the cruel and uncivilized actions of the Japanese Government, but that even the patience of the United States Government might be strained to the point where it could not in complacency await the opportunity which is definitely approaching to deal with the officers of the Japanese Government on their own home ground in such manner as will punish them for their barbarity and serve as a lasting example to the Japanese people and to succeeding Japanese Governments that the laws and decency of humanity and punishment for breach of them are inexorable and in the gradual course of events will be definitely and deliberately carried out by the United States Government.

I consider the matter of such importance that I request that you disregard temporarily other matters of lesser degree and concentrate upon the preparation of a draft to the effect above indicated, choosing the fourth alternative, so that I may have it at the earliest possible moment. I should prefer to receive it in draft form and if possible by noon March 22.

May I add that until we know the exact number of prisoners involved in the execution, we are not in a position to announce the names or give publicity to the execution or to retaliate in kind—if retaliation should be decided upon.

B[RECKINRIDGE] L[ONG]

740.00114 Pacific War/176 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, March 23, 1943.

[Received March 23—11:51 p. m.]

1853. American interests Japan. Department's 79 January 11th, Legation's 487 January 21st.⁸⁴ Swiss Legation Tokyo telegraphs March 13 following reply Japanese Foreign Office:

"Prisoners of war bodies possession Japanese given honorable treatment inspired by Japanese traditional sentiments. In future will be buried according desire expressed American Government except special cases when competent authorities obliged proceed incineration.

⁸⁴Latter not printed; it reported that the Japanese Government had been notified of the contents of Department's telegram No. 79 on January 18 (740.00114 Pacific War/128).

As no treaty or agreement contains stipulations regarding exchange bodies when peace established, Japanese Government considers premature make decision this subject now.

Documents concerning deceased prisoners of war after official burial prisoners of war camp and wills treated according dispositions adopted for Japanese soldiers. Inquiries proceeding regarding circumstances death prisoners of war shortly after combats."

Legation adds requested Japanese Foreign Office explain dispositions referred to last paragraph.

HARRISON

740.00114A Pacific War/381 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, March 24, 1943.

[Received March 24—7:26 p. m.]

1904. American interests Japan. My 1240, February 23. Foreign Office note March 22 gives substance telegram just received from Gorgé stating Japanese reply [to] his request [for] names and sentence each aviator and whether Japanese Government authorized visit representative Swiss Legation follows:

"Aviators mentioned communication Minister Tani February 17 (Legation's 1240, paragraph *secundo*) not treated as prisoners of war. Consequently Japanese Government does not intend divulge names or state sentences imposed or permit visits to them."

HARRISON

390.1115A/1363 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, March 26, 1943:

756. Your 486, January 21, and 1610, March 10.³⁵ American interests, Japan prisoners of war camps. Request Swiss authorities to continue to press for improvement in mail situation. Japanese interned in this country may write in their own language and may dispatch to addressees here or abroad two letters of 24 lines each, one business letter of 48 lines, and one post card per week. Request reciprocal treatment.

HULL

³⁵ Neither printed.

740.00115A Pacific War/411 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, March 26, 1943.

[Received March 26—6:12 p. m.]

1924. American interests Far East. Legation's 1346, February 26,³⁶ and 1726, March 16. Foreign Office note March 23. Swiss Legation Tokyo reports Japanese Government replied following his request postponement mass internments occupied China.

"1. Competent authorities felt obliged assemble [in] special regions nationals enemy countries to prevent espionage occupied territory China. They desired thereby allow these nationals continue reside with families. Accordingly civilian assembly centers were established which differ internment camps where relatives separated.

2. Similar measures previously taken [in] Malaya, former Netherlands East Indies, Canada, United States, countries where authorities compelled Japanese nationals resident many years one locality move elsewhere without or very short warning. Under such circumstances Japanese Government feels impossible cancel or postpone internment measures because nationals enemy countries have imaginary fears regarding future conditions.

3. Means subsistence civilians assembled these centers and sanitary measures assured by Japanese Government.

4. Japanese Government in principle authorizes visits civilian assembly centers, sending gifts civilians therein especially those ill. [In] view [of] special circumstances prevailing Shanghai, Swiss Legation requested advise local authorities when desires visit or send gifts.

5. Japanese Government also requests Swiss Legation verify with local authorities information from nationals enemy countries regarding civilian assembly centers and internment camps China."

In transmitting foregoing Swiss Minister added would shortly submit report.

HARRISON

390.1115/7114 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, April 3, 1943.

[Received April 4—1:35 a. m.]

2079. American interests, prisoners of war, China. Legation's 167, January 9, and 1660, March 20 [12].³⁷ Swiss Legation, Tokyo, telegraphs:

"[In] answer [to] Gorgé representations [that escapees?] be treated according Geneva Prisoners of War Convention, Japanese Govern-

³⁶ Not printed; it reported that the Swiss Minister had made representations to the Japanese Foreign Office about the mass internment of Americans in China (740.00115A Pacific War/373).

³⁷ Latter not printed.

ment stated articles 50, 54, and 56 this Convention only apply simple attempts escape. According Japanese authorities case Teeters, Cunningham, Smith not simple attempt escape but conspiracy followed by attempt group escape. This comes under article 3, law 38, March 1, 1905 as follows:

'Prisoners who plot group evasion subject following punishment: (a) plot chief's deportation for term or under aggravating circumstances death penalty, (b) others imprisonment forced labor or under attenuating circumstances prison minimum 6 months, maximum 5 years.'

Law referred to modified March 9, 1943. Legation endeavoring obtain text. Will forward when available."³⁸

Swiss Foreign Office adds:

"Form Japanese reply indicates other attempts escape besides Teeters, Cunningham, Smith, therefore requested Swiss Legation endeavor obtain details particularly information regarding following: (1) Were there other attempts prisoners of war escape besides Teeters, Cunningham, Smith; (2) did above three and other American prisoners of war who attempted escape organize attempt together or isolated groups."³⁹

Swiss Legation, Tokyo, telegraphs following separately.

"Japanese Government informs Legation engineer Teeters considered prisoner of war since worked Wake for American Navy. Persons employed by enemy armed forces place designated later will be considered treated prisoners war."

HARRISON

[The question as to what action should be taken by the Department regarding Japanese treatment of prisoners of war attempting concerted escapes received intensive study by Assistant Secretary Long, the Legal Adviser, the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, and the Special Division. Telegrams to the Minister in Switzerland were drafted on April 9 and May 22, but were not sent. In commenting on the May 22 draft, the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Ballantine) stated that a protest might not be advisable because "our legal position may be none too strong" and because of "the possibility that our further insistence concerning the Geneva Convention, to which Japan is actually not a party, will only serve to irritate the Japanese Government possibly to a point where that Government may withdraw its assurance that it will adhere to the provisions thereof".

In a note of September 30 to the British Chargé (Campbell), the Department amplified the reasons why it felt that no purpose would

³⁸ Telegram No. 2662, April 30, not printed.

³⁹ In telegram No. 2436, April 19 (390.1115/7234), the Minister in Switzerland stated that Cunningham, Smith, and Teeters had organized the attempted escape, a British officer had participated and four American Marines had been implicated. In telegram No. 4113, July 12 (390.1115/8120), the Minister reported that Cunningham, Smith, and the British officer had been sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment; Teeters to 2 years; and the Marines to 4 to 9 years.

be served at that time by further controversy with the Japanese authorities, as follows:

(1) "It was believed that no change in the Japanese position or amelioration of the conditions of the prisoners of war would result from such further representations"; (2) "It was thought that the earlier instructions to the American Legation in Bern adequately covered the position of the United States, and that little more could be said than to repeat and amplify the position therein set forth"; (3) "It was feared that further protests in the matter might result in worse treatment by the Japanese of those prisoners who were in their hands, and might lead the Japanese authorities to denounce their undertaking to abide by the provisions of the Convention"; and (4) "It was believed that this was not a point upon which it would be desirable to enter into a lengthy legal argument with the Japanese authorities, as our position from a strictly legal point of view might be less strong in comparison with Japanese arguments than would be our legal position on many other questions involving the treatment of prisoners of war." (711.93114A/2)]

740.00114A European War 1939/310 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, April 6, 1943.

[Received April 6—10:03 p. m.]

2154. American interests—Japan. Department's 632, March 15.⁴⁰ Swiss Legation Tokyo telegraphs March 27 representations Japanese Government until present without reply. Gorgé adds nevertheless has again intervened Foreign Office. States received continually copies telegrams Japanese Prisoner of War Information Bureau to Intercroixrouge containing prisoners of war. There lists carefully checked, copied and names approximate 32,000 prisoners of war and 5,700 civilian internees of countries represented by Switzerland.⁴¹

HARRISON

⁴⁰ Not printed; it requested that the Swiss Government ask expedition of a reply from Japan as to whether it would furnish complete lists of internment and prisoner-of-war camps where American nationals were held, indicating the numbers in, and giving the exact location of, each camp (740.00114A European War 1939/64a Supp.).

⁴¹ In telegram No. 3174, May 24 (740.00114A Pacific War/474), the Minister in Switzerland reported that prior to May 16 about 200 to 300 names of prisoners of war had been communicated to Mr. Gorgé daily and that the number had since increased.

In a memorandum of July 2 (740.00114A Pacific War/493), the Assistant Chief of the Special Division (Guffler) stated that the War Department had informed him several times recently that the lists were now coming through regularly from Japan and that they desired to make no further protests in this connection.

740.00114 Pacific War/185 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, April 7, 1943.

[Received April 7—8:21 p. m.]

2185. American interests China. Department's 666, March 18⁴² transmitted Swiss Consulate Shanghai. Replies following:

"Representative Consulate visited camp 3 hours and half constantly accompanied by Colonel Otera, camp commandant, two other officers, two interpreters. Had impression senior American officer and all prisoners interviewed avoided speaking [about] disciplinary measures, replying general terms vaguely to questions asked.

Certain however camp commandant does everything possible assure welfare prisoners, view shared Intercroixrouge delegate. Believe above information should not be subject protest to Japanese Government as such protest might have unfavorable consequences. Believe preferable insist obtain authorization visit camp monthly, permission talk freely prisoners according Geneva Convention."⁴³

HARRISON

740.00115A Pacific War/411 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, April 8, 1943.

864. Your 1924, March 26. American interests—Far East. Request Swiss to inform their Legation Tokyo that it is the policy of the United States Government to permit persons to live together as family units whenever both spouses have been ordered interned. When only one spouse is ordered interned, other spouse and children may live with him when they desire to do so. Facilities are now being prepared for the accommodation of all family groups who desire to be united. Swiss should request reciprocal treatment.⁴⁴

HULL

⁴³Not printed; it inquired whether the Swiss representative in the Shanghai area had been permitted to interview the prisoner of war spokesman in the Kiangwan camp without witnesses and whether the spokesman could give him information concerning discipline and sickness (740.00114 Pacific War/166).

⁴⁴In airgram No. 503, November 24, the Minister in Switzerland reported a visit by the Swiss Consul General at Shanghai to the Kiangwan camp on November 4. The latter was unable to converse with the prisoners but felt their treatment seemed better in certain respects than that accorded Japanese soldiers. He concluded that "Japanese authorities intend apply principles Geneva Convention but in their own way." (711.93114A/24)

⁴⁵In telegram No. 2990, May 15, the Minister in Switzerland reported a Japanese reply that "in centers where civilians assembled members same family permitted live together." (740.00115A Pacific War/449)

740.00114A Pacific War/398 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, April 10, 1943.

[Received April 10—10:30 p. m.]

2266. American interests Far East prisoners of war. Department's 2761, December 7.⁴⁵ Legation Tokyo telegraphs:

"According communication from Japanese Foreign Office, two officers [and] two non-coms participating raid on Delolo in American plane captured [by] Japanese [and] interned Glenro Camp. Treated as prisoners of war basis participation military operations."

HARRISON

740.00114A Pacific War/401a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, April 12, 1943.

889. Please request the Swiss Government to have its Minister at Tokyo deliver verbatim the following statement to the Japanese Government from the Government of the United States.

The Government of the United States has received the reply of the Japanese Government conveyed under date of February 17, 1943, to the Swiss Minister at Tokyo ⁴⁶ to the inquiry made by the Minister on behalf of the Government of the United States concerning the correctness of reports broadcast by Japanese radio stations that the Japanese authorities intended to try before military tribunals American prisoners of war, for military operations, and to impose upon them severe penalties including even the death penalty.

The Japanese Government states that it has tried the members of the crews of American planes who fell into Japanese hands after the raid on Japan on April 18 last, that they were sentenced to death and that, following commutation of the sentence for the larger number of them, the sentence of death was applied to certain of the accused.

The Government of the United States has subsequently been informed of the refusal of the Japanese Government to treat the remaining American aviators as prisoners of war, to divulge their names, to state the sentences imposed upon them or to permit visits to them by the Swiss Minister as representative of the protecting Power for American interests.

The Japanese Government alleges that it has subjected the American aviators to this treatment because they intentionally bombed non-military installations and deliberately fired on civilians, and that the aviators admitted these acts.

The Government of the United States informs the Japanese Government that instructions to American armed forces have always ordered those forces to direct their attacks upon military objectives.

⁴⁵ *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. I, p. 830.

⁴⁶ See telegram No. 1240, February 23, from the Minister in Switzerland, p. 965.

The American forces participating in the attack on Japan had such instructions and it is known that they did not deviate therefrom. The Government of the United States brands as false the charge that American aviators intentionally have attacked non-combatants anywhere.

With regard to the allegation of the Japanese Government that the American aviators admitted the acts of which the Japanese Government accuses them, there are numerous known instances in which Japanese official agencies have employed brutal and bestial methods in extorting alleged confessions from persons in their power. It is customary for those agencies to use statements obtained under torture, or alleged statements, in proceedings against the victims.

If the admissions alleged by the Japanese Government to have been made by the American aviators were in fact made, they could only have been extorted fabrications.

Moreover, the Japanese Government entered into a solemn obligation by agreement with the Government of the United States to observe the terms of the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention. Article 1 of that Convention provides for treatment as prisoners of war of members of armies and of persons captured in the course of military operations at sea or in the air. Article 60 provides that upon the opening of a judicial proceeding directed against a prisoner of war, the representative of the protecting Power shall be given notice thereof at least three weeks prior to the trial and of the names and charges against the prisoners who are to be tried. Article 61 provides that no prisoner may be obliged to admit himself guilty of the act of which he is accused. Article 62 provides that the accused shall have the assistance of qualified counsel of his choice and that a representative of the protecting Power shall be permitted to attend the trial. Article 65 provides that sentence pronounced against the prisoners shall be communicated to the protecting Power immediately. Article 66 provides, in the event that the death penalty is pronounced, that the details as to the nature and circumstances of the offense shall be communicated to the protecting Power, for transmission to the Power in whose forces the prisoner served, and that the sentence shall not be executed before the expiration of a period of at least three months after such communication. The Japanese Government has not complied with any of these provisions of the Convention in its treatment of the captured American aviators.

The Government of the United States calls again upon the Japanese Government to carry out its agreement to observe the provisions of the Convention by communicating to the Swiss Minister at Tokyo the charges and sentences imposed upon the American aviators, by permitting the Swiss representatives to visit those now held in prison, by restoring to those aviators the full rights to which they are entitled under the Prisoners of War Convention, and by informing the Minister of the names and disposition or place of burial of the bodies of any of the aviators against whom sentence of death has been carried out.

If, as would appear from its communication under reference, the Japanese Government has descended to such acts of barbarity and manifestations of depravity as to murder in cold blood uniformed members of the American armed forces made prisoners as an incident of warfare, the American Government will hold personally and offi-

cially responsible for those deliberate crimes all of those officers of the Japanese Government who have participated in their commitment and will in due course bring those officers to justice.

The American Government also solemnly warns the Japanese Government that for any other violations of its undertakings as regards American prisoners of war or for any other acts of criminal barbarity inflicted upon American prisoners in violation of the rules of warfare accepted and practiced by civilized nations, as military operations now in progress draw to their inexorable and inevitable conclusion, the American Government will visit upon the officers of the Japanese Government responsible for such uncivilized and inhumane acts the punishment they deserve.⁴⁷

HULL

740.00115 Pacific War/1547: Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, April 20, 1943.

[Received April 20—11:47 p. m.]

2453. American interests—Far East, medical treatment internees. Consulate, Shanghai, telegraphs.

"Inquired Japanese Consulate method handling medical treatment American internees. Replied internees receive free medical, dental care [in] camp infirmary (with exception gold crowns, bridges and plates). If medical treatment necessitates transfer hospital, internees must pay expenses.

As internment camp infirmaries not adequately equipped, Japanese authorities ordinarily send seriously ill internees Shanghai hospital. As majority such persons without personal resources unable pay hospitalization and medical treatment. Believe under circumstances best solution advance necessary funds against promissory notes.

If American Government desires [Consulate is] prepared intervene Japanese authorities remind them they obligated pay cost internees including medical treatment. Fear, however, if cost medical treatment left Japanese, internees will not receive required medical care. View urgency request early reply."⁴⁸

HARRISON

390.1115A/1549: Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, April 22, 1943.

[Received April 22—9:32 p. m.]

2513. American interests Japan. Department's 434, February 20. Legation Tokyo communicated Department's 434 Japanese Foreign Office. Received following reply:

⁴⁷ Marginal notation: "OK FDR". For statement by President Roosevelt, released April 21, see Department of State *Bulletin*, April 24, 1943, p. 337.

⁴⁸ In telegram No. 1186, May 18, to the Minister in Switzerland, the Department authorized the Swiss to pay for hospitalization and medical treatment of civilian internees.

"Families American internees [in] camps Japan permitted send packages, visit them twice monthly. Additional visits authorized exceptional circumstances.

Visits and gifts also permitted from representatives Swiss Legation, Intercroixrouge and Apostolic Delegate.

This regime in force before Swiss Legation intervened Japanese authorities at request American Government."

Swiss Legation added as text response from Japanese Government not according observations to present of representatives Legation who visited internment camps, Gorgé requested Japanese Foreign Office apply soonest possible measures described in reply.

HARRISON

740.00115 Pacific War/1558 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, April 24, 1943.

[Received April 25—2:14 a. m.]

2559. American interests China. Treatment British internees. Foreign Office April 20 reports British Government requested Swiss transmit certain observations Japanese authorities regarding treatment British internee camps occupied China. Following reply received which Swiss Foreign Office states applies equally Americans detained these camps.

"1. Rations. Civilian internees China object closest attention competent authorities. Rations described considerably better those received Japanese troops stationed vicinity camps and Japanese residents China. Also above rest population these regions. Despite difficult circumstances authorities consider tastes, habits internees, provide food differing completely oriental food, for example bread, meat, milk products, fruit, coffee, et cetera. Difficulties this respect much greater than British Empire where internees usually subject local food regime. According statement British Government, internees [in] Japanese hands would appear prefer food served Japanese troops and local inhabitants to present regime. If so Japanese Government ready meet request but in view taste internees and other reasons fears such measures would only have deplorable consequences for internees.

2. Health internees received full attention Japanese authorities. Regular and special medical inspections in camps. Doctors dispose [*dispense?*] necessary medicaments. In general health internees described good.

3. Transmission. Correspondence constantly improved. Naturally mail arrives destination certain delay view present difficulties postal communications.

4. In principle visits authorized except when unusual circumstances render impossible."

HARRISON

740.00114 Pacific War/203 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, April 25, 1943.

[Received April 25—3:15 p. m.]

2567. American interests Far East prisoners of war camps. Department's 397, February 16, communicated Japanese Government February 26. Legation Tokyo telegraphs:

"Japanese Foreign Office replies Japanese authorities already done everything possible give necessary care sick prisoners of war.

As Foreign Office omitted express views regarding shipment medicaments, Legation remarks that in reply question recently asked by British Government Japanese declared no objection shipment via Siberia medicaments and concentrated foodstuffs for British prisoners of war. Therefore presume Japanese Government would take same attitude if American Government desires send medicaments same route American prisoners of war Japan and Japanese occupied territories."

HARRISON

740.00114A European War 1939/353b

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, May 1, 1943.

1037. American interests—camp reports. Request Swiss Legations in Berlin, Rome, and Tokyo to report whatever information they may have concerning labor performed by American prisoners of war and civilian internees. Following points are made for the guidance of Swiss in preparing these reports and future reports of visits to camps:

1. Are civilian internees required to perform labor without their consent?
2. Are non-commissioned officers used in other than supervisory capacity without their consent? Are officers required to perform labor?
3. Are officers and civilian internees given gainful employment if they volunteer? If so, what is the nature of the employment?
4. How many men are absent from the camp to perform labor? Into how many groups have they been divided?
5. In a camp where men return to camp each evening, specify number of men who generally go out in work parties.
6. Who determines which prisoners of war must work and which need not work? Has this official any rules which he must follow in making his decision? What are those rules?
7. What official is charged with the responsibility of seeing that the standards of the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention as well as those set up by the detaining Power are met?

8. Where is labor performed?
9. What kind of labor is performed?
10. Under what industrial, sanitary and climatic conditions is labor performed?
11. Does the detaining Power provide food, clothing and medical care to the prisoners as contemplated by the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention? Does the detaining Power make employers responsible for the observation of these sections of the Convention?
12. What provision is made for the religious and recreational needs of the men in labor groups who do not return to the base camp each night?
13. What are the hours of labor? On how many days per week is labor not required?
14. What wages are paid? Are these wages larger or smaller than payment prescribed by Article 34 of Geneva Convention?
15. How much of the wages are paid in cash? In script?
16. How much of the wages are deducted for maintenance?
17. What can the men buy with funds given them?

HULL

740.00114A Pacific War/421 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, May 3, 1943.

[Received May 3—9:31 p. m.]

2717. American interests Japan, POW.⁴⁹ Legation's 1679, March 13. Legation Tokyo intervened Japanese authorities obtain improvements POW Tokyo camp [and] Japanese Foreign Office added following information that already given.

"1. POW seriously ill transferred military hospital. Needed medicaments furnished within limits possibilities. Dental treatment given when possible.

2. Food, clothing furnished POW insofar supplies country permit. Canteen installed each camp.

3. When no obstacle camp commandants authorize POW correspond Swiss representatives and families. Numerous letters already sent except three camps where arrangements not yet made.⁵⁰

4. Permitted hold religious services condition cause no difficulty.

5. Permitted receive sports equipment, games, food et cetera insofar not disturb good order camp."

⁴⁹ Prisoners of war.

⁵⁰ In telegram No. 3469, June 9 (740.00114A Pacific War/499), the Minister in Switzerland reported that the Swiss Legation at Tokyo had received no letters from prisoners of war "until present". In telegram No. 4316, July 20 (711.94114A/17), he reported statement by the Japanese Foreign Office that "all letters containing nothing contrary regulations of April 21, 1943, concerning treatment POW sendable freely Legation Tokyo". The text of these regulations was sent to the Department with despatch No. 6029, September 2 (not printed).

Swiss Legation adds intervened Japanese authorities obtain transfer to civilian internment camp five workmen from Wake, several officers American Merchant Marine. Japanese Foreign Office replied after inquiry transfer made 30th September 1942.

Japanese authorities desire know if Japanese United States have right send money families Japan. If so Japanese Government disposed examine possibility reciprocal treatment American POW.

HARRISON

390.1115A/1553 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, May 7, 1943.

1100. American interests—China. Legation's 2577, April 27th.⁵¹ Inform Swiss authorities Far East that measures reported paragraph 3 are much more severe than those taken by United States authorities with respect to Japanese. Japanese in relocation centers may correspond without restriction with persons in United States. Japanese in internment camps may write three letters and one post card per week. No evacuee in this country was forced to dispose of his property. There was no confiscation of property and as a result of efforts of Government agencies to protect and assist Japanese there was little loss through sale. Request reciprocal treatment.

HULL

740.00115A Pacific War/440 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, May 7, 1943.

[Received May 7—8:42 p. m.]

2808. American interests Far East. Legation's 1924, March 26. Consulate Shanghai telegraphs:

"Made representations Japanese authorities obtain authorization pay relief internees, send gifts in kind or assist in any other manner. Also repeatedly requested during recent months authorization visit camps where interned.

To present all effort unavailing."

HARRISON

⁵¹ Not printed; it reported that Japanese general internment measures in China were almost completed. According to paragraph 3, "internees permitted take with them only limited number personal possessions. Not allowed communicate outside. Japanese authorities will sell at auction furniture [and] other possessions left their homes."

390.1115/7355 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, May 7, 1943.

[Received May 7—8:44 p. m.]

2805. American interests, Japanese occupied territories. Legation's 3672, August 8.⁵² Legation Tokyo telegraphs:

"Renewed efforts with Japanese Government obtain authorization visit POW civilian internment camps.

In reply Japanese authorities confirmed decision July 30, 1942 (Legation's 3672, August 8). Stated Japanese Government not disposed permit visits POW civilian internees camps Philippines, Hong Kong, Malaya, Netherlands Indies, namely all territories occupied Japanese forces except Shanghai."⁵³

HARRISON

740.00114 Pacific War/207 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, May 10, 1943.

[Received May 10—8:50 p. m.]

2873. American interests—Japan, POW. Department's 393 February 15⁵⁴ and 502 March 1.⁵⁵ Swiss Legation Tokyo telegraphs following statement from Japanese Foreign Office:

"American officer POW permitted buy clothing with their pay. Already purchased two pairs trousers and two shirts from Japanese military supplies. Articles daily use provided to noncoms and soldiers satisfactory manner.

Correspondence POW authorized maximum volume circumstances each camp permit. Regulations implied [*applied?*] by American authorities to Japanese POW regarding correspondence (numbered paragraph 2 Department's 32 January 4) considered by Japanese Government as applying only to correspondence civilian internees.

Japanese Government unable authorize representatives protecting power converse POW without witness. Articles in canteens sold at usual market prices."

HARRISON

⁵² *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. I, p. 815.

⁵³ In airgram No. 197, July 12, the Minister in Switzerland reported that Japanese authorities had reaffirmed their decision not to authorize Swiss representatives to visit prisoner-of-war camps in territories occupied by Japanese forces (711.94114A O.T./2).

⁵⁴ *Post*, p. 1015. For reply to No. 393, see telegram No. 1724, March 16, from the Minister in Switzerland, p. 1019.

⁵⁵ Not printed.

740.00114 European War 1939/3365 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, May 18, 1943.

[Received May 18—11:14 p. m.]

3046. American interests—Japan, POW salaries. Department's 2669, November 28th.⁵⁶ Swiss note May 15 contains Japanese reply given below in summary translation.

In accordance provisions article XVII regulations annexed Hague Convention governing laws, customs, land war,⁵⁷ Japanese Government grants enemy officer prisoners same salaries Japanese Army officers corresponding grade. Under circumstances Japanese Government does not consider itself obligated modify these salaries. Nevertheless if United States Government should insist, Japanese Government prepared apply modifications it proposed September 1942 (transmitted Legation's 4414, September 26⁵⁸). This connection it desires again stress following.

1. Monthly pay enemy officer prisoners proposed by Japanese was fixed bearing in mind cost subsistence so that this pay sufficient cover cost food, clothing. Not necessary therefore augment salary or additionally furnish prisoners food, garments.

2. Amount salary paid officer prisoners and method payment will be determined unilaterally by Japanese Government and not on basis reciprocity. American Government will therefore continue pay Japanese officer prisoners in United States their entire salary which will be reimbursed after war by Japanese Government. These measures being taken unilaterally in the two countries, it will not be necessary for American and Japanese Governments to communicate amount sums paid enemy officers their control nor fix exchange rate.

3. As Japanese Government, granting all British officers (including Dominions), Netherlands salary same as Japanese officers corresponding grade, would have difficulty applying behalf American officers alone proposals it made on this subject September 1942 (Legation's 4414). Japanese Government therefore leaves to American Government consultation with Governments Great Britain, Dominions, Netherlands to examine whether they desire have sums paid their officer prisoners modified as Japanese authorities have proposed.

HARRISON

740.00114 PW/207 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, May 25, 1943.

1252. American interests—Japan. Legation's 2873, May 10th, and Department's 32, January 4th. Statements concerning mail made in

⁵⁶ *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. I, p. 828.⁵⁷ Signed on October 18, 1907, *ibid.*, 1907, pt. 2, p. 1204; 36 Stat. (pt. 2) 2277.⁵⁸ *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. I, p. 823.

point 2, Department's 32, apply to both prisoners of war and civilian internees.

Request Swiss authorities to continue their efforts to obtain permission to converse with prisoners of war without witnesses. Request for this privilege should be made of camp authorities each time a camp is visited and Department informed of results.

HULL

740.00115A Pacific War/440 : Airgram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, May 25, 1943—3 p. m.

A-170. American interests—Far East. Legation's 2808 and 2805 of May 7. Department notes that Japanese authorities are reported in your 2805 to be prepared to permit visits to camps near Shanghai, while it is reported in your 2808 that Swiss are unable to visit new camps. Swiss Consul Shanghai should be informed of report from Tokyo and request Gorgé's assistance if necessary.

HULL

390.1115A/1589 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, May 27, 1943.

1277. American interests—Far East. Legation's 2980, and 2990, May 15th.⁵⁹ American policy with regard to internment is outlined in previous telegrams, particularly Department's 712 of March 19, 1942,⁶⁰ and Department's 864, April 8, 1943. Treatment in no case is less favorable than that provided by Geneva Prisoners of War Convention. Because of high standards of housing, diet, clothing, medical care, et cetera, existing in American armed forces, application of Convention insures exceedingly good treatment for internees.

Representatives of Spanish Government have been encouraged to visit all internment camps and relocation centers and to make appropriate reports to Japanese Government. The last visit made was that of a Spanish Consular officer to Santa Fe Internment Camp on April 20, 21, 22. It is assumed that reports of these visits have been forwarded to Tokyo through the Japanese Minister in Madrid or other appropriate channels.

Only Japanese residing on West Coast have been removed to relocation centers. Family members in relocation centers have never been separated and have been permitted to live together as family

⁵⁹ Neither printed.

⁶⁰ *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. I, p. 804.

units. Families where one or both spouses have been interned are now being reunited. This is done by allowing an internee to join his family in a relocation center or bringing all members of the family together in a family internment camp of which there are now two, one at Crystal City, Texas, and the other at Seagoville, Texas.

HULL

390.1115A/1600 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, May 29, 1943.

[Received May 30—1:27 a. m.]

3277. American interests—Shanghai. Consulate Shanghai inquires whether paragraph 2 Department's airmail 1202, February 14,⁶¹ concerning cost burial also applies interned Americans. Fears if Japanese authorities requested assume cost will only incinerate bodies which cheapest form burial without regard desires deceased or religious beliefs. Requests information whether can use American interests funds for cost burial deceased internees only in case internees without resources, otherwise costs charged assets deceased.

HARRISON

740.00114A Pacific War/493 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, June 4, 1943.

[Received June 4—7 p. m.]

3389. American interests Japan. Department's 2814, December 12,⁶² Legation's 74, January 5th. Swiss Legation Tokyo telegraphs May 28 following English text reply received Japanese Foreign Office:

"The Japanese Government immediately commenced investigation of the alleged instances of maltreatment of American prisoners of war and civilian internees in Japan and Japanese controlled territories and as regards some of them such as relate to cases of attempted escape of American prisoners of war in Shanghai the Japanese Government have already sent a reply.⁶³ However throughout the American note there are not a few allegations which are deemed to be based upon fundamental misunderstanding on the part of the United States Government. One of the most glaring instances of such misunderstanding is that the United States Government in their protest, shutting their eyes to the special circumstances prevailing in areas which have till recently been fields of battle, view the occurrences in these circumstances in the same light as those happening in places

⁶¹ *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. I, p. 262.

⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 832.

⁶³ See telegram No. 2079, April 3, from the Minister in Switzerland, p. 976.

remote from the war zone. The United States Government also confuse persons accused of crime with wartime internees.

The Japanese internees in the United States have been interned at places which have been under American administration since before the outbreak of war and which are far distant from the war zone. But the wide areas occupied by the Japanese forces where there are large numbers of prisoners of war and civilian internees are situated far away from Japan. In these areas where sudden changes had taken place and the working of all organizations had come to a standstill the Japanese forces, in spite of an inevitable chaos immediately following occupation, made the utmost efforts for the protection of Americans and in doing so they had to surmount untold difficulties. This forms a great contrast to the wanton slaughter of Japanese residents and various other cruel inhuman acts which the American troops committed in the Philippines and especially at Davao soon after the outbreak of the war.⁶⁴ Moreover among the areas occupied by the Japanese forces there are places which have till recently been scenes of fighting or still are spheres of military operations. In these places the necessity of securing the Japanese forces' own safety and other strategic considerations make it unavoidable for the time being not to allow free activities on the part of nationals of a third country including representatives in charge of the interests of belligerent countries. The American Government, whether deliberately or inadvertently, have disregarded these circumstances and make statements tending to exaggeration. The Japanese Government view such unfair attitude of the United States Government with great regret.

It has been notified to the United States Government that in the treatment of civilian internees the Japanese Government will apply on condition of reciprocity the provisions of the Geneva Convention of 1929 relating to the treatment of prisoners of war as far as they are applicable to civilian internees.⁶⁵ But as for persons accused or suspected of crime and detained according to the Japanese law which is equally applicable to both Japanese subjects and aliens they should be treated in accordance with the relevant domestic laws and it is needless to say that it is not proper to demand the application of the provisions of the Geneva Convention to these persons since such would be tantamount to demanding a treatment for them more lenient than is accorded in time of peace and to Japanese subjects. In actual practice, however, the Japanese authorities concerned are affording within the limits of the relevant laws as lenient and considerate treatment as possible to these persons.

In conclusion the Japanese Government have already declared that they will in the treatment of prisoners of war apply *mutatis mutandis* the provisions of the Geneva Convention of 1929 and that in the treatment of civilian internees they will apply them on condition of reciprocity and as far as they are applicable. And from the humanitarian point of view the Japanese Government are actually affording to the prisoners of war and civilian internees such lenient and considerate treatment as the circumstances now prevailing permit. The Japanese Government believe that their fair and just treatment of

⁶⁴ For correspondence on Japanese allegations of massacre of Japanese residents of Mindanao, see *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. I, pp. 855 ff.

⁶⁵ See telegram No. 733, February 24, 1942, from the Minister in Switzerland, *ibid.*, p. 799.

prisoners of war and civilian internees will be readily appreciated by everyone who takes a general and unbiased view of the matter. The Japanese Government deem it a matter for regret that the United States Government, in complete disregard of the manifold difficulties which exist in areas which are occupied by the Japanese forces or where military operations are still being carried on, should have seen fit to frame their protest on the basis of misconceptions and of trivial occurrences.

As regards the result of investigations concerning each instance referred to in the note of United States Government, the Japanese Government will communicate to Your Excellency in due course of time. In the meanwhile I shall be grateful if you would be good enough to convey the above to the United States Government."

HARRISON

740.00114A Pacific War/493

*Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Long)*⁶⁶

[WASHINGTON,] June 5, 1943.

I recognize the logic and agree with the thought that nothing should be done to interfere with the attitude of the Japanese Government if it manifests itself to be disposed to abide by its obligations.

Concurrently with the arrival of this file on my desk there has also arrived no. 3389, June 4, from Bern, which is the general reply of the Japanese Government to our earlier protest about the treatment of American prisoners of war and civilian internees.

In the light of this new telegram I suggest that the matter be not closed for the moment but that the situation be reviewed.

The Japanese note seems to be conciliatory and to indicate a desire to accord what they consider to be proper treatment under the Geneva Convention. In it they recognize that they declared to apply the provisions of that Convention to civilian internees and they separately reaffirm that commitment to apply the Convention to prisoners of war. However, they do not satisfactorily—to my mind—cover the point which I have attempted to raise, which is that they do not accord their international obligations the authority to which they are entitled. Instead of so doing they give a prior authority to local laws, and in one instance, to a local law enacted quite recently. This subordination of international obligations to the provisions of local laws, particularly when enacted for the purpose, is objectionable and in violation of international law and specifically of the provisions of the Convention.

The Japanese contend that the treatment of our prisoners about which we complained was done in the hurly-burly of a military campaign or in mopping up operations thereafter. They tacitly admit

⁶⁶ Addressed to several officers of the Department.

practices which in themselves constitute a departure from their obligations. And it is on this point that I feel that we should, in due course, make plain our position to the Government, not only for our own account but for the sake of international law and for the observance of international obligations.

However, I do not insist that it be done if the wisdom of the Political Advisors of the Department runs to the contrary. However, this new telegram does open up the subject and necessarily requires a fresh consideration of the subject matter of the "deceased" telegram.⁶⁷ The question now arises as to whether we should say anything at this time or postpone consideration until some future time.

My only insistence is that in due course whenever the circumstances would seem to render it advisable, we keep the record straight that the United States Government exerts its influence to maintain the principle that international obligations once assumed supersede local laws; and conversely, that local laws, no matter when enacted, cannot supersede international obligations.⁶⁸

B[RECKINRIDGE] L[ONG]

390.1115A/1600 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, June 5, 1943.

1337. American interests—Shanghai. Your 3277, May 29.

1. As indicated in Department's telegrams no. 1695, July 3; no. 2641, November 25; and no. 601, March 12,⁶⁹ paragraph 15 of instruction 1202, February 14⁷⁰ is not intended to decrease the basic monthly maximum applicable under paragraphs 7 and 9, nor are internees or prisoners of war excluded from benefits of paragraph 2, if detaining Power fails to provide such benefits.

2. However, as the United States and Japanese Governments have obligated themselves to apply provisions of Geneva Prisoners of War Convention to the treatment of civilian internees in so far as its provisions are adaptable and since Article 76 of that Convention provides that belligerents shall see that prisoners of war dying in captivity are honorably buried, this Government has assumed costs of burial of civilian internees in the United States. In this connection Swiss Consul at Shanghai should be informed of contents of Department's 79 of January 11 and your 1853 of March 23.

HULL

⁶⁷ Draft telegram of May 22, not printed; but see bracketed note, p. 977.

⁶⁸ Marginal notation by the Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck): "Has this been, historically, our practice?"

⁶⁹ None printed.

⁷⁰ *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. 1, p. 262.

740.00114A Pacific War/502 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, June 12, 1943.

[Received June 13—3:46 a. m.]

3551. American interests Far East. Department's 1023, April 30.⁷¹ Swiss Legation, Tokyo, reports no requests received financial assistance American POW interned Japan and Japanese occupied territories. Believes this attributable poor provisioning camp canteens and sale only cheap articles. However, Swiss Legation endeavoring ascertain whether and how financial assistance may be accorded American POW Far East.

HARRISON

740.00114A Pacific War/503 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, June 16, 1943.

1479. American interests—Japan. Domei⁷² has reported that punishment has been meted out by Japanese to 25 members American armed forces who have recently revealed their identity after being held as civilians in the Philippines. Request Swiss authorities to endeavor to verify this report, to obtain names of men, and to report the nature of the punishment.⁷³

HULL

740.00114A Pacific War/543 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, June 16, 1943.

[Received June 17—6:55 a. m.]

3593. American interests, Japan, camp visits. Legation's 2805, May 7. Gorgé Tokyo telegraphs again intervened Japanese Foreign Office to request (1) whether Japanese Government still refused visits

⁷¹ Not printed; it inquired if salaries were being paid to American officer prisoners of war in Formosa, Malaya, the Philippines, and Java and if the Swiss were making payments of pocket money to American prisoners of war in any of these districts (740.00114A Pacific War/421a).

⁷² Japanese official news agency.

⁷³ In telegram No. 7544, December 1, the Minister in Switzerland reported that the Swiss Legation in Tokyo verified the report that 25 soldiers interned at Santo Tomas were condemned to 2 months' imprisonment for offense as stated and interned in POW camp in the Philippines after serving sentences (711.11B114A/121).

POW's camps occupied territory.⁷⁴ Remarked if all camps installed occupied territory Geneva Convention 1929 would remain dead letter under present conditions as visits to internees impossible. (2) Authorization visit camps Japan for which authorization not yet obtained. Requested indication approximate date visits, insisted military authorities establish complete schedule visits. (3) When further visits camps already visited can take place on assumption Japanese Government had no intention authorize only one visit. New dates should be sent [*set?*] this purpose, added Legation prepared make visits frequently as possible, anticipates at intervals 2 or 3 months. Emphasized visits great moral assistance internees long deprived all contact families and whose captivity becomes harder with prolongation.

HARRISON

390.1115A/1637 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, June 29, 1943.

[Received June 30—6:57 a. m.]

3587. American interest—China. Legation's 2577, 27.⁷⁵ Consulate Shanghai telegraphs:

Eight Americans interned June 17 former American Columbia Country Club five others June 19 Lunghwa camp. All 13 [are] members Committee American Association which therefore forced cease all activities.

All Americans residing Shanghai now interned except those oriental origin and very small number exempted reasons health or other. Americans from other parts occupied China especially Amoy and Ningpo arrived internment camps Shanghai. Endeavoring obtain lists internees but meeting considerable difficulties due especially frequent transfers one camp to another and because receive no official information from Japanese authorities.

HARRISON

740.00114A Pacific War/543 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, July 6, 1943.

1602. American interests—Japan. Legation's 3389 June 4th and 3593, June 16th. Request Swiss Government to have Swiss Minister

⁷⁴ On June 18, the Special Division estimated the number of American nationals held by the Japanese at 32,500. Of these, 22,000 had been officially reported as prisoners of war or civilian internees. In a report of October 15, the Military Intelligence Service—X Section of the General Headquarters of the Southwest Pacific Area estimated the number of American prisoners of war held by the Japanese at 14,521.

⁷⁵ Dated April 27, not printed; for summary, see footnote 51, p. 986.

Tokyo communicate textually the following to the Japanese Government:

"The United States Government has received the Japanese Government's communication of May 28, 1943 to the Swiss Minister at Tokyo and has noted both the assurance that the Japanese Government will communicate the results of the investigation of each instance of mistreatment of an American national in Japanese hands which has been reported by the United States Government, and the reassurance that the Japanese Government will apply the provisions of the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention of 1929 to the treatment of prisoners of war in its hands and that it will apply reciprocally the provisions of the same convention to the treatment of civilian internees in so far as those provisions are adaptable.

The United States Government continues to attach the greatest importance to the granting of Japanese permission for Swiss representatives to visit all prisoner of war and civilian internment camps in Japan and Japanese-occupied territory, particularly those in Taiwan, the Philippines, Java and Malaya, and the camps in Indo-China operated by the Japanese authorities, and for the appointment of delegates of the International Red Cross Committee for these areas to carry on the recognized functions of such delegates including the visiting and reporting on conditions in camps. In this connection the United States Government wishes to remind the Japanese Government that Article 86 of the Geneva Prisoner of War Convention provides that representatives of the protecting Power shall be permitted to go to any place without exception, where prisoners of war are interned.

Note has been taken of the Japanese Government's statements that in some areas the necessity of protecting the security of Japanese armed forces and other strategic considerations make it unavoidable for the time being not to allow free activities by nationals of a third State in those areas. It is observed, however, that Taiwan has been under Japanese control for many years and that the Philippines, Java and Malaya have been occupied by Japanese military forces for many months.

The Japanese Government is also reminded that Article 7 of the Geneva Convention provides that prisoners of war shall be evacuated from the zone of combat in the shortest period possible after their capture. The United States Government considers that the Japanese Government has obligated itself under this provision of the Convention to remove American nationals held as prisoners of war or civilian internees from areas where active military operations are being carried on to camps outside those areas where representatives of the Swiss Government and the delegates of the International Red Cross Committee may visit them.

Recognizing that rumors with regard to conditions of internment naturally tend to arise in time of war, whether or not they have any basis in fact, the United States Government has granted every facility to the Spanish representatives charged with the protection of Japanese interests in the continental United States and to the delegates of the International Red Cross Committee to the end that the Japanese Government might have unbiased neutral reports on conditions in prisoner of war camps, internment camps, and relocation centers where Japa-

nese nationals in the United States are gathered. Moreover, visits by Swedish and International Red Cross representatives have been permitted to those camps in the Hawaiian Islands where any Japanese are interned.

The best assurance that Japan is fulfilling its undertaking to apply the provisions of the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention to the treatment of prisoners of war in its hands and to the treatment of civilian internees, in so far as those provisions are adaptable to civilians, would be afforded by allowing representatives of the Swiss Government to discharge their obligation to visit all camps where prisoners of war and civilian internees are held, and by allowing delegates of the International Red Cross Committee to carry on the recognized functions of their office. The failure of the Japanese Government to grant reciprocal facilities for the neutral inspection of civilian internment and prisoner of war camps in all areas under Japanese control can lead only to the conclusion that the reports of American nationals held by the Japanese authorities being treated in a manner far below the standards of the Geneva Convention are not mere rumors but are grounded upon fact."

Transmit copy of this telegram to International Red Cross Committee for its information and request it to continue pressing Japanese Government to allow International Red Cross delegates to perform their recognized functions in the areas mentioned.

HULL

711.94114 Pay-0/2 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, July 12, 1943.

[Received July 12—8:54 p. m.]

4114. American interests Far East. Department's 1023, April 30.⁷⁶
Legation Tokyo telegraphs:

Japanese Foreign Office states officers receive pay, consequently do not require supplementary pocket money. Noncoms, soldiers receive clothing, food, articles current need. Also paid for work. Communication adds if American Government desires give supplementary assistance Japanese authorities have no objection in principle but reserve right decide each case.

HARRISON

711.94114A/3 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, July 14, 1943.

[Received July 14—9:21 p. m.]

4157. American interests Japan. Department's 1252, May 25. Legation Tokyo telegraphs:

⁷⁶ Not printed; for summary, see footnote 71, p. 994.

Japanese Foreign Office states Japanese Government not prepared give such authorization as article 13 Japanese regulations regarding prisoner of war prescribes witness be present all visits to prisoners.

HARRISON

740.00114A Pacific War/531 : Airgram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, July 17, 1943—7:20 p. m.

A-256. American interests—Japan. Legation's despatch 5363, June 15.⁷⁷ Request Swiss authorities to bring the following to the attention of the Japanese Government:

1. In declaring that it would apply the provisions of the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention, the Japanese Government has obligated itself to lodge prisoners of war in barracks affording all possible guarantees of hygiene and healthfulness. As it appears that prisoner of war camps at Chikko and Kobe are not situated in a healthy location, better facilities should be provided.

2. Regulations, orders, notices, and proclamations of every kind should be communicated to the prisoners in the language which they understand in accordance with Article 20 Geneva Convention.

3. Have prisoners given permission that their funds be converted to yen?

4. Swiss should endeavor to obtain reciprocal treatment as regards mail. See Department's 756, May [March] 26.

5. Men of Confidence should be permitted to correspond with the protecting Power in accordance with Article 44.

6. Clothing should be provided in accordance with Article 12.

7. The length of the day's work of the prisoners including the time consumed in going to and returning from work should not be excessive and should not in any case exceed that of local civilian workers engaged in the same type of work as is provided in Article 30 of the Convention. Moreover, each prisoner should have a rest of 24 consecutive hours every week in accordance with the same Article.

HULL

740.00115A Pacific War/482 : Airgram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, July 20, 1943.

A-259. American interests—Japan. Legation's despatches 5159 and 5167 of May 28, 5170 of May 29, and 5187 of May 31.⁷⁸

⁷⁷ Not printed.

⁷⁸ None printed; these despatches transmitted reports on visits by a delegate of the Swiss Legation in Japan to four civilian internee camps at Kobe.

1. Department has noted that Swiss Legation, Tokyo will make representations to the Japanese Foreign Office with a view to obtaining improvement in the lodging, food, and clothing at these camps. It is also noted that conditions at Camps 3 and 4 are not nearly as good as in the other two camps. Request Swiss authorities particularly to press the Japanese to raise the standard of treatment at Camps 3 and 4.

2. Were dollars converted to yen with the consent of the internees?

3. See Department's 756 of May [March] 26 concerning mail.

4. Swiss should continue to request that they be allowed to interview internees without witnesses being present as is provided in Article 86 of the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention. Spanish are permitted to interview Japanese internees and prisoners of war in this country without witnesses.

5. Canteens should be established in accordance with the obligation assumed by the Japanese Government under Article 12, Geneva Convention.

HULL

711.94114A I. R./6: Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, July 21, 1943.

[Received July 23—4 a. m.]

4338. American interests—Far East camp reports. Department's 1037, May 1st. Legation Tokyo telegraphs:

Difficult for inspectors obtain desired information each camp visited. Such data supplied by Japanese authorities with great reluctance. On basis previous visits, following answer Department's questions.

- (1) Civilian internees not required perform labor.
- (2) Noncoms labor similarly soldiers receive 15 sen daily.
- (3) Officers employed exclusively as supervisors.
- (4) All physically fit POW's required labor divided various groups according nature place labor.
- (5) About 70 percent labor outside camp return camp evenings.
- (6) Camp doctor generally determines those physically fit. In his absence labor supervisor decides.
- (7) Camps administered basis regulations issued by Japanese authorities.
- (8) Labor generally performed near camps.
- (10) Labor performed according regulations Japanese industry.
- (11) Military authorities furnish food, clothing, medical care within limitation present inadequate supplies.
- (12) Laborers generally return camp every evening.
- (15) Wages paid cash.
- (16) No deductions for maintenance.
- (17) Laborers can purchase very few articles with wages as canteens contain only limited supplies.

Regarding questions (9), (13) and (14), refer information already supplied (Department's 2685, November 30, Legation's 905, February 9; 1383, February 27 and 2756, May 5th ⁷⁹).

HARRISON

390.1115A/1675: Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, August 3, 1943.

[Received August 3—11:59 p. m.]

4693. American interests China. Basis Department's 1100, May 7, Legation Tokyo made representations Japanese Government to obtain similar treatment for American citizens accorded Japanese by American authorities.

Japanese Foreign Office replied following.

1. View present transportation difficulties, impossible authorize internees civilian assembly centres take heavy baggage. Competent authorities therefore decided permit internees only take effects they themselves considered indispensable or desirable. Internees permitted take such effects without limitation. Regulations perfectly fair, did not adversely affect welfare internees, not type justify protest especially if one compares methods adopted Japanese authorities to very severe measures adopted American Government towards Japanese interned United States.

2. All persons notified internment at least one week advance permitted freely dispose property as deemed best. All cases where impossible internees make necessary dispositions quickly, Japanese authorities gave assistance auctioning property. If one compares benevolent attitude Japanese Government to fact Japanese subjects United States not informed their internment until last moment, consequently unable make necessary dispositions arrange affairs, one reaches conclusion on this point also protest American Government unfounded.

3. Internees civilian assembly centres already permitted send, receive correspondence.

HARRISON

⁷⁹ Nos. 2685, 1383, and 2756 not printed; for summaries of Nos. 2685 and 1383, see footnotes 4 and 5, p. 961.

In a memorandum of July 31 to the Assistant Chief of the Special Division (Gufer), the Chief of the Division (Keeley) commented on a draft telegram in reply to No. 4338 as follows: "Don't you think it advisable to corral all these pin pricks until we get on with the *impending* exchange involving as it does the shipment of much needed medical supplies to our ps/w [prisoners of war] in the Far East". (711.94114A I.R./6) Similarly, in a memorandum of August 21, commenting on a draft telegram protesting inadequate Japanese measures to control malaria and other diseases, George L. Brandt, Executive Assistant to Mr. Long, expressed his agreement and that of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs with Mr. Keeley that "the complaints should not be put forward at this time in view of the exchange situation." (740.00115A Pacific War/555) Neither draft telegram was sent.

390.1115/8353 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, August 7, 1943.

[Received August 8—1:16 a. m.]

4791. American interests, Japan, camp visits. Legation's 3596 [3593], June 16. Legation Tokyo telegraphs Japanese Foreign Office replied following:

1. Japanese Government will authorize visits POW camps occupied territory when it considers opportune.

2. Will authorize progressively visits POW camps Japan not yet visited by inspector Swiss Legation.

3. Cannot agree at present authorize periodic visits POW camps. Each time visit POW camp desired, Swiss Legation should make new request which Japanese authorities will examine.

HARRISON

711.94114 Mail/10 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, August 27, 1943.

[Received August 27—8:43 p. m.]

5303. Am[erican] interests Japan, POW correspondence. Legation's 2849, June 20, 1942.⁸⁰ Legation Tokyo telegraphs August 21 Japanese Government, while maintaining principles previously communicated, has decided following measures facilitate transmission correspondence.

A. Letters sent POWs Japanese hands or civilian internees outside Japan proper and in Japanese territories overseas must contain less than 25 words either typewritten or written clearly capital letters.

B. Letters sent POWs or civilian internees whose names transmitted interested governments by lists from Japanese Foreign Office or POW Information Bureau should be addressed without fail by senders to addressees' camp.

C. Letters not fulfilling conditions under A and sent after receipt present communication will not be forwarded; letters not fulfilling conditions under B will only be transmitted during such time considered necessary that names addressees communicated by Japanese authorities reach interested persons; Japanese authorities will not undertake forward letters sent after this time which do not fulfill conditions under B.

In communicating these rules to Swiss Legation, Japanese Foreign Office added correspondence addressed POWs must only contain personal or family news excluding all information or opinions military, political nature. Often occurs correspondence relates military, po-

⁸⁰ Not printed.

litical matters. In March 1942 Intercroixrouge called attention interested governments this fact in order senders be informed regulations in force; Japanese Government requested March 1943 interested governments contents correspondence be simplified so forwardable more rapidly, however, no improvement obtained and recently correspondence very lengthy, contains increasingly frequent military, political information, abuse, causes great difficulties Japanese authorities especially censorship; Japanese Government therefore obliged take above measures in order transmit correspondence which conforms regulations to addressees rapidly as possible and thus expedite mail for POWs, civilian internees.

HARRISON

740.00115 Pacific War/1837 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, August 31, 1943.

[Received September 3—3:17 a. m.]

5380. American interests, Far East, medical treatment internees. Department's 1186, May 18, 1943.⁸¹ Swiss Consul General, Shanghai, reports Japanese authorities refuse permit his representatives visit hospitalized internees except for sole purpose obtaining signatures promissory notes when internees discharged hospital or in urgent cases to note internee's last wishes. Hospitalized internees not permitted communicate relatives, friends.

He considers this inhumane treatment irreconcilable with Japanese insistence internees pay costs hospitalization and suggests representations Japanese Government to permit his staff visit internees regularly and permit latter communicate relatives, friends. Also suggests indicating Japanese Government that authorization pay hospitalization will be reexamined if more liberal treatment not given.

HARRISON

711.93114A/5 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, September 28, 1943.

[Received September 28—10:44 p. m.]

6041. American interests, Hong Kong. Department's 1230, May 22;⁸² Legation's 4353, July 22.⁸³ Swiss note September 23 states fol-

⁸¹ Not printed; for summary, see footnote 48, p. 982.

⁸² *Post*, p. 1023.

⁸³ Not printed; it reported that the contents of telegram No. 1602, July 6, to the Minister in Switzerland had been communicated to the Japanese Foreign Office on July 16 (740.00114A Pacific War/553).

lowing substance reply Japanese Foreign Office to Swiss Legation Tokyo pursuant latter's representations protection American interests Hong Kong.

Japanese Government does not yet envisage possibility modification its decision not authorize representation by third power of interests enemy country in territories occupied Japanese forces. It permits however to such extent possible dispatch monetary relief and in kind to POWs and civilian internees detained such territories.

HARRISON

711.94114 Mail/16 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland
(Harrison)*

WASHINGTON, September 30, 1943.

2396. American interests—Japan. Legation's 5303, August 27. With regard to paragraph A, does limitation apply to mail addressed to prisoners of war outside Japan proper and in Japanese territories overseas as well as to mail for civilian internees in those territories? Please request Japanese to state clearly what regions are included in terms "Japan proper" and "Japanese territories overseas".

With regard to paragraph B, American Government wishes to point out that names of many prisoners of war and civilian internees have been received without information concerning the names of the camps where they are being held. For this reason much correspondence cannot be addressed by senders to camps.

BERLE

740.00115 European War 1939/7259 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, October 9, 1943.

2479. American interests, Japan and Germany, civilian internees. Request Swiss Government to ask German and Japanese Governments whether American civilian internees held by these Governments who are victims of accidents while performing voluntary labor are compensated while disabled, as provided for in last paragraph of Article 27 of Geneva Prisoners of War Convention, and at what rate. This Government is taking the necessary steps to arrange for compensation to be paid civilian internees who are thus disabled and expects that on a reciprocal basis German and Japanese Governments will do likewise.

HULL

740.00115 European War 1939/7259 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, October 9, 1943.

2480. American interests, Japan, prisoners of war. Request Swiss Government to inform Japanese Government that Japanese prisoners of war who are disabled while performing labor for pay are compensated by this Government at the rate of 40 cents a day until they are again able to engage in labor for pay and to ask whether Japanese Government is compensating American prisoners of war who are thus injured and at what rate.

HULL

740.00115A Pacific War/588 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, October 11, 1943.

2492. American interests—occupied China. Swiss Legation Tokyo should approach Japanese Government as suggested by Swiss Consulate China (penultimate paragraph your 5391 September 1⁸⁴). Swiss Legation Tokyo should also inform Japanese Government that American Government permits representing power free access to Japanese nationals wherever they may be detained and has not restricted extension of assistance to them; that consequently it expects similar treatment of American nationals detained by Japan.⁸⁵

Your 5380 August 31 and 5692 September 13.⁸⁶ American authorities permit Japanese internees to have up to two visitors per month and additional visits are permitted in exceptional circumstances such as illness. There are no regulations limiting visits to Japanese residing in relocation centers. Persons in relocation centers may correspond without restriction and without censorship with persons in the United States, may send 25 word messages through Red Cross channels to friends and relatives abroad, and may receive such messages. The number of these 25 word messages which may be despatched or received is not limited except that one man may not send more than one message to the same city on one day. Japanese in internment camps may write three letters and one postcard per week to addressees in

⁸⁴ *Post*, p. 1031.

⁸⁵ In a memorandum of October 27, 1943, Mr. E. Tomlin Bailey of the Special Division stated that less than 50% of American civilian internees and approximately 10% of American prisoners of war held by Japan had been visited by representatives of the protecting power or the International Red Cross Committee (740.00115A P.W./10-2743).

⁸⁶ For telegram No. 5692, see p. 1032.

the United States and abroad. No limitation is placed on the length or number of letters delivered to internees. Swiss Legation Tokyo should again remind Japanese Government of the favorable treatment extended by American authorities in this regard as well as the fact that Japanese nationals held in this country are provided an excellent diet and have at their disposal unusually well stocked canteens.

It should be stressed that United States Government is deeply concerned over situation of its nationals under Japanese control and wishes immediate assurance that they will be permitted to communicate freely with representatives of Swiss Government and receive all financial assistance to which latter may consider them entitled.

Please report.

HULL

740.00115 Pacific War/1948a : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, October 15, 1943.

2539. American interests—Far East. Legation's 5076, August 19.⁸⁷ Alien enemies are interned only when considered dangerous or potentially dangerous. Interned aliens may request rehearings. Rehearings have already resulted in the granting of permission for approximately 1,200 interned Japanese to join their families in relocation centers. Rehearings in additional cases take place regularly.

Those internees who are not released or paroled to live in unrestricted areas or relocation centers may ask to have their families join them in internment camps. Persons who join husbands or fathers in internment camps are not the subject of an internment order but must agree to be subject to the same restrictions as interned persons. Admittance is being granted as fast as satisfactory facilities can be provided. Expansion of facilities now underway is expected in the near future to provide accommodations for all families which desire to be reunited.

Of the uninterned Japanese only those formerly living in restricted areas on the Pacific coast were removed to relocation centers. Family units in these cases were never broken. Residence in a relocation center is in most cases temporary as residents who are believed loyal to the United States are encouraged and expected to settle in unrestricted areas where their safety and well-being are assured. Persons living in unrestricted areas were not moved to a relocation center.

HULL

⁸⁷ Not printed (390.1115A/1681) ; it transmitted two questions raised by the Japanese Foreign Office on the final paragraph of telegram No. 1277, May 27, to the Minister in Switzerland, p. 989.

740.00115A Pacific War/780 : Airgram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, October 18, 1943.

[Received October 29—5 p. m.]

A-402. Aminterests, Japan, civilian internment camps. Department's airgram 259, July 20. Foreign Office note October 13 states Swiss Minister Tokyo forwards following information regarding paragraph number 1 Department's airgram under reference:

Following intervention Swiss Minister Japanese Foreign Office replied lodging Kobe [camp] number 4 sufficiently spacious. Foreign Office states Swiss delegate must have been unfavorably impressed as space available other camps much too ample, nevertheless Swiss Minister received from Swiss Consulate Kobe plans of camp and will intervene again with Japanese authorities.

Japanese Foreign Office states bathing facilities must suffice. Swiss Consul Kobe⁸⁸ reports additional sheets issued by Japanese resulting three each internee from Guam. Clothing, however, not distributed.

Regarding food, Japanese Foreign Office stated gives great attention both quality and calories value and Swiss Legation should have no concern this regard.

Apart from Foreign Office communication, police authorities Kobe informed Swiss Consulate there it has no authority concern itself with internees' food as this is not jurisdiction protecting power. Swiss Foreign Office note states Gorgé will not fail intervene this connection Japanese authorities.

With regard paragraphs 2 through 5, Swiss Minister will intervene with Japanese Foreign Office when receives report prepared Swiss Consul Kobe regarding present situation camp concerned.

HARRISON

740.00115 European War 1939/7563 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, October 29, 1943.

[Received October 30—2:44 a. m.]

6759. American interests Japan. Department's 2479, October 9. Foreign Office note October 27 states Swiss Legation, Tokyo, reports internees in all camps visited by its delegates in Japan and Korea do not work. Notwithstanding it has submitted Japanese Government question raised Department's 2479.

HARRISON

⁸⁸ Maurice Champoud.

711.94114 Mail/31 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, November 5, 1943.

[Received November 6—4:40 a. m.]

6936. American interests Japan. Department's 2396, September 30. Japanese Foreign Office informed Swiss Legation, Tokyo, provisions paragraph A Legation's 5303, August 27, applicable all POWs Japanese hands. Term "Japanese territories overseas" covers Korea, islands of Formosa, Sakhalin and those [in the] South Sea; also province Kwantung.

Names POWs and civilian internees communicated by Japanese Information Bureau always accompanied indication camp. If for technical or other reason camp address incomplete, correspondence should bear "prisoner of war (or civilian internee) care of Japanese Red Cross Society". Persons having exact address writing "care of Prisoners of War Information Bureau" may so continue without inconvenience.

HARRISON

390.1115A/1711 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, November 5, 1943.

[Received November 6—6:20 a. m.]

6945. American interests, Japan. Swiss Legation Tokyo telegraphs Yokohama authorities ordered evacuation all foreigners resident certain city districts. Citizens enemy countries resident Kanagawa district requested proceed Nanasawa. Latter Thermal station interior this district. Two hotels placed their disposal and enjoying greatest liberty possible. Philippine citizens and persons Japanese origin allowed choose freely new residence. Japanese authorities formally stated this not internment but step taken insure maximum protection citizens enemy countries.

Cost maintenance Nanasawa approximately 150 yen monthly per person. Gorgé inquires whether Americans evacuated Nanasawa, if otherwise qualified under Department's airmail 1202, February 14, 1942,⁸⁹ may receive same financial assistance accorded uninterned Americans; also whether Department authorizes storage furniture evacuated Americans former Consulate Yokohama.⁹⁰

HARRISON

⁸⁹ *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. I, p. 262.

⁹⁰ In telegram No. 2931, November 27, to the Minister in Switzerland, the Department answered both queries in the affirmative, the latter subject to certain qualifications (390.1115A/1711).

711.94114A/165 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, November 11, 1943.

[Received November 12—3:58 a. m.]

7086. American interests—Japan. Foreign Office note November 5 received November 10 states Japanese Foreign Office replied as follows to numbered paragraphs Department's airgram 256, July 17 regarding POWs interned Chikko, Hirohata and Kobe Camps.

1. Chikko—Osaka Kobe camps situated between two cities in region not unhealthy where Japanese reside. Barracks simple but considered sufficient. Guards occupy same.

4. Regulations Japanese Government regarding POWs' mail are followed by competent authorities, regulations in force United States seem concern essentially civilian internees with families, friends there because one business letter weekly authorized not applicable POWs, furthermore dispositions taken regarding number letters POWs American hands authorized remained ineffectual because until now no letters from them arrived Japan but even if advantage taken possibility offered number letters would be small relative letters received and sent American POWs Japanese hands for latter more numerous. Reciprocity requested United States Government does not seem justify itself.

6. POWs receive regularly clothing, underwear, shoes.

7. POWs work shorter hours Japanese workers and have in addition holidays.

In transmitting foregoing Swiss Legation notes no reply to paragraph 5 Department's airgram but states Japanese Government already replied (see Legation's 4316, July 20⁹¹).

HARRISON

740.00115A Pacific War/823 : Airgram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, November 19, 1943.

[Received November 29—3 p. m.]

A-492. American interest Japan. Civilian internment camps, Legation's airgram 402, October 18. Foreign Office note November 16 states Swiss Legation Tokyo forwarded following information in reply similarly numbered paragraphs Department's airgram 259, July 20.

(2) Men of Confidence stated conversion rate fixed by Japanese authorities. Internees not required make purchases, able retain dollars without requesting conversion.

(3) Internees authorized forward monthly English letter 100 words or two letters weekly 500 words Japanese.

⁹¹ Not printed ; for summary, see footnote 50, p. 985.

(4) In principle witnesses present interviews but majority cases do not follow conversation.

(5) Absence canteen due difficulty obtain merchandise. Furthermore, local authorities have ordered Kobe merchants visits camps periodically.

HARRISON

711.94114A/165 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, December 1, 1943.

2971. American interests—Japan. Legation's 7086, November 11. Japanese prisoners of war in this country do not exercise their privilege of writing letters to Japan. This is not the fault of the American Government which has informed the prisoners of this privilege. Civilian internees do write and their letters are transmitted through the same channels as letters addressed to American prisoners of war in Japanese hands.

Japanese prisoners of war in this country may send each week one letter of 24 lines and one postcard both of which they may address to Japan if they desire. In requesting reciprocal treatment the American Government asks that each individual American prisoner of war be granted by the Japanese Government the same privileges as each individual Japanese prisoner of war is given by the American Government.

HULL

711.94114 Pay-L/5 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, December 1, 1943.

[Received December 1—11:50 p. m.]

7531. American interests—Japan. Department's 2480, October 9. Foreign Office note November 27 states Swiss Legation Tokyo telegraphed November 27 that Japanese Foreign Office gives assurance Japanese Government pays POWs injured during work for pay will receive regular salary until resumption work. Prisoners maimed or dead result injury received during work benefit same relief Japanese workers. Japanese Government desires be informed measures taken American Government regard dead or maimed POWs.⁹² Jap-

⁹² In telegram No. 3293, December 31, to the Minister in Switzerland, the Department stated that prisoners of war who die as a result of injuries are honorably buried, are extended military honors and their estates taken care of in accordance with article 77 of the Geneva Convention; and that those disabled receive no other compensation than their 40 cents a day pay as long as they remain disabled (711.94114 Pay-L/5).

anese Foreign Office stated orally relatives dead prisoners result accidents at work will receive end hostilities indemnity due.

HARRISON

125.5743/93 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, December 2, 1943.

2985. American interests—Philippine Islands. United States Government has received names of many American civilians interned in the Philippine Islands but has received none of the names of the persons held at Los Banos, some or all of whom are understood to have been transferred from other camps.

As Article 77 of the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention, which both Japan and the United States are endeavoring to apply to civilian internees to the extent adaptable, provides that names shall be reported of both internments and transfers as well as releases on parole, repatriations, escapes, stays in hospital, deaths, et cetera, for each individual, United States Government would be grateful if Swiss Legation would find it possible to induce Japanese Government, which has reported names of some internees, to report all names as provided in Article 77, particularly with respect to Los Banos and any other camps where names of internees have not yet been fully reported.

HULL

740.00115 Pacific War/2028 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, December 3, 1943—10 a. m.

[Received 7: 27 p. m.]

7574. American interests, Far East, medical treatment internees. Legation's 5380, August 31. Following summary Swiss note November 30 conveying information telegraphed by Fontanel, Shanghai:

Prior "segregation" Swiss protégés, persons requiring medical attention generally sent by Swiss representative and associations to Allied doctors who content very low or nominal fees; patients signed "special loan notes". Upon internment all Allied doctors and owing to certain abuses by other less scrupulous physicians Swiss representative in consultation interned American, British doctors prepared list recommended physicians largely neutrals who agreed maintain fees reasonable level and prevent prolongation unnecessary. These doctors treated all sick persons receiving financial assistance namely, all

those still exempt for reasons of health from segregation measures; also sick persons in camps liberated for treatment Shanghai hospitals.

Fontanel states Japanese authorities categorically refused assume medical costs outside "assembly centers". Special arrangements accordingly made with Shanghai hospitals. This practice satisfactory despite decision Japanese authorities not permit Swiss representative visit patients thus hospitalized.

Japanese inspectors recently named Shanghai hospitals now insist, contrary hospital regulations, camp patients henceforth be treated by them or doctors they designate. Fontanel reports about 60% available beds "Country Hospital" and "General Hospital" continually occupied by camp patients (approximately 170 persons). Monthly expenses these medical services charged against official funds approximately 1,500,000 Shanghai dollars.

Owing to foregoing developments Fontanel informed Japanese Consulate that, inasmuch as Japanese authorities refuse assume in accordance with provision Geneva Convention these medical expenses which must be paid from official funds represented government, he is unable tolerate intervention Japanese inspectors. Japanese authorities replied that henceforth camp patients, if liberated, undergo treatment outside camps shall themselves pay these expenses. Japanese added that necessary funds shall be deducted from those paid by Swiss representative to assembly centers for relief. Fontanel replied that relief funds paid not usable except for pocket money disbursements which previously enabled internees procure at canteen necessary items and supplementary food urgently needed maintain health.

Fontanel adds that until Japanese authorities give assurance relief funds not utilized cover hospitalization and for other purposes all financial relief will be discontinued. According recent information reaching Fontanel, relief funds partially used purchase stoves, fuel for winter; also for various camp improvements, repairs and this use of relief funds appears improper in view of Japanese responsibility provide these articles.

Suspension relief greatly disturbs internees who are in great need. Fontanel hopes conclude arrangement locally and with a view to avoiding aggravation of situation requests that for the present no intervention be made Tokyo. He desired learn urgently whether Department approves his attitude.⁹³

HARRISON

⁹³ In telegram No. 3089, December 11, to the Minister in Switzerland, the Department indicated approval of Mr. Fontanel's action, and its desire "to be kept informed as his negotiations progress." (740.00115 Pacific War/2028)

711.94114A/209 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, December 15, 1943—5 p. m.

[Received 8:29 p. m.]

7871. American interests Japan and occupied territory, inspection of prisoner of war camps. Foreign Office official handed Tait⁹⁴ December 14 notice to the effect that Gorgé reports full accounts Japanese prisoner camps never visited and certain others for example those Tokyo and Yokohama have not been inspected for more than a year. This situation greatly concerns Gorgé who does not miss single opportunity personally insist with Japanese Foreign Office obtain necessary authorization visit. He fears prisoners of war have impression he is not doing all possible being [*bring?*] moral comfort which they doubtlessly need greatly.

Under these circumstances he suggests British and American Governments again insist authorization visit prisoners of war camps be given Swiss representatives.

British Legation received similar communication December 10 and telegraphed London same day.

HARRISON

EFFORTS BY THE UNITED STATES TO SEND FINANCIAL AND OTHER ASSISTANCE TO AMERICAN NATIONALS HELD BY JAPAN⁹⁵

811B.142/4 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, January 11, 1943.

[Received January 11—10:23 p. m.]

225. American interests—Far East. Contents Department's 2885 December 22⁹⁶ transmitted Swiss Legation Tokyo.

Swiss Foreign Office reports January 9 following:

"Swiss Minister Tokyo states despite several personal endeavors [he has] not succeeded up to present obtain reply from Japanese Government this subject, difficulties apparently caused by unwillingness agree

⁹⁴ George Tait, First Secretary of Legation in Switzerland.

⁹⁵ For previous correspondence on this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. I, pp. 243 ff., *passim*. For correspondence on efforts to send assistance by way of the Soviet Union, see *ante*, pp. 799 ff.

⁹⁶ Not printed (811B.142/2 Suppl.); it stated that immediate financial assistance to Americans in the Philippines was urgently required and asked for the Swiss Government's suggestion as to practical means of making American funds available to these Americans should the Japanese Government not be favorably disposed to the Department's proposal. This proposal, set forth in telegram No. 2075, September 1, 1942, to the Minister in Switzerland (811B.142/1a), entailed sending \$25,000 of American Red Cross funds to its Philippine Chapter.

direct remittance funds to American citizens or distribution relief through Swiss representative.

Minister Gorgé therefore proposed Japanese Government accept designation delegate Intercroixrouge⁹⁷ to distribute \$25,000 to American citizens Manila as already done Hong Kong."

HARRISON

811B.142/4 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, January 15, 1943—6 p. m.

117. American interests—Far East. Legation's 225, January 11. Department is glad to note that Swiss Minister, Tokyo, has again proposed to Japanese Foreign Office that Japanese Government agree to designation of Intercross representative in Manila. Problem of furnishing financial relief to American nationals in Philippine Islands would appear to be solved if Intercross delegate could function there in same manner as Japanese authorities now permit such delegates to function in Hong Kong and Shanghai. The Department hopes that the Swiss Minister in Tokyo will continue to press for favorable decision in this matter.

If favorable reply not received in immediate future, Department desires that Swiss Government ascertain from Japanese Government what method for transfer of funds to Philippine Islands it will agree to.

HULL

740.00114A Pacific War/272 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, January 22, 1943.

178. American interests—Far East. Your 6222, December 30.⁹⁸ If no reply has yet been received from Japanese Government to communication submitted on December 28, please request Swiss Government to present to Japanese Government a communication in the following sense:

"The Government of the United States had hoped to receive an early reply from the Japanese Government to the communication submitted on December 28, 1942, by the Swiss Legation at Tokyo relating to the question of opening a means for forwarding supplemental supplies and mail between the United States and the Far East

⁹⁷ International Red Cross Committee at Geneva, or Intercross.

⁹⁸ Not printed; it reported that the contents of telegram No. 2868, December 19, 1942, to the Minister in Switzerland, had been communicated to the Japanese Government on December 28. For text of telegram No. 2868, see *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. 1, p. 839.

for prisoners of war and civilian internees.⁹⁹ As no answer has yet been received, the Government of the United States would like to know at the earliest possible moment when a reply may be expected."

HULL

340.1115A/3064 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, January 30, 1943.

249. American interests Hong Kong—financial assistance. Last sentence your 5272, November 18¹ and your 5952, December 17.² Department has established an allocation of \$25,000 to enable the payment of relief to American nationals including citizens of Philippine Commonwealth in Hong Kong through the International Red Cross against promissory notes and provided the International Red Cross delegate there permitted to make payment direct to the individuals concerned. Delegate should reasonably satisfy himself as to claimant's American nationality and, within the maximum amount of \$60 monthly now prescribed for Hong Kong, should extend financial relief on a basis graduated downward, giving full consideration to the real need of the individual and his normal living standard. In this connection efforts should be made to have the nearest Swiss official representative provide the delegate with a copy of instruction No. 1202 of February 14, 1942³ for the delegate's guidance in determining which persons⁴ could ordinarily qualify for official assistance.

As soon as possible, Department desires to be furnished by telegraph (1) the names of persons receiving relief (2) the amount given to each and (3) a brief description of the evidences of nationality submitted such as passports, certificates of registration, birth and baptismal certificates and letters testifying registration at consular offices. In addition, Department would appreciate receiving as soon as possible definite data which would enable it to estimate the monthly disbursements required to afford necessary relief to those entitled to

⁹⁹ In telegram No. 504, March 1, to the Minister in Switzerland, the Department authorized provisionally the transmission through official channels of personal messages to and from Japan on behalf of American nationals (012.3/-8489).

¹ Not printed; it cited the refusal of the Japanese Government to permit the Swiss to distribute American funds at Hong Kong as in principle it did "not recognize any representation [of] foreign interests in occupied territory." However, the Japanese were reported as agreeing that the International Red Cross Committee representative in Hong Kong might be designated to distribute relief to American citizens under the direction of local authorities (340.1115A/3032).

² Not printed.

³ *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. I, p. 262.

⁴ According to an estimate by the Special Division on January 15, there were between 350 and 400 American nationals, including Filipinos, at liberty in Hong Kong.

receive aid. Any question as to right of claimants to receive aid should be referred to Department.

Effect payment to International Red Cross for transmission to Hong Kong the equivalent of \$25,000 charging Authorization No. 53, 1942-1943.

Telegraph earliest date when relief may be expected to begin at Hong Kong under this authorization.⁵

HULL

740.00114 Pacific War/133 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, February 15, 1943.

393. American interests—China.⁶ Your 731, February 1st.⁷

Paragraph 1: Advances without notes are hereby provisionally authorized wherever essential to welfare of prisoners. However, Swiss representatives should if possible obtain some form of evidence that funds actually reach prisoners. Department would prefer simple group receipt authorized by paragraph 15 of instruction 1202, February 14 [, 1942,]⁸ and believes that Japanese Government should be requested to authorize that form of receipt. As alternative, senior officer should at least be permitted to acknowledge receipt of each lump sum advanced by Swiss representative.

Paragraph 2: The Swiss representatives should inform Japanese authorities that this Government takes a serious view of their refusal to permit Swiss representatives to interview internees without witnesses.

As a practice this is contrary to the provisions of Article 86 of the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention⁹ and is not in accord with the practice of this Government which without exception permits the representatives of the Spanish Embassy charged with the representa-

⁵ In telegram No. 1204, February 20, the Minister in Switzerland reported that the Swiss Legation in Japan had already sent 10,000 yen to the International Red Cross delegate at Hong Kong for the relief of Americans and Filipinos before receiving Department's instructions (340.1115A/3104).

⁶ Relief assistance was also made available to American nationals in Far Eastern areas not occupied by Japan. In telegram No. 1264, December 24, 1942, to the Ambassador in China, the Department authorized loans "as an exceptional measure" to Americans in unoccupied China (390.1115A/1287). In telegrams No. 1733, December 14, 1942, and No. 326, March 2, 1943, to the Minister in Portugal, the Department advised that a total of \$20,000 was being turned over to the British Foreign Office to cover expenditures by British consular officials in Macau for relief of American nationals, including Philippine citizens, there (390.1115A/1320, 1370). In airgram No. 235, January 9, 1943, to the Minister in Portugal, the Department stated that funds had been made available to reimburse the Portuguese Government for expenditures made by the Governor of Macau in extending relief to destitute Americans there (390.1115A/1348a).

⁷ Not printed.

⁸ *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. I, p. 262.

⁹ Signed July 27, 1929, *ibid.*, 1929, vol. I, pp. 336, 357.

tion of Japanese interests in the continental United States to interview Japanese nationals without witnesses. The Swiss representatives should urge the Japanese Government to grant reciprocal treatment. The Department desires to be informed of the result of these representations.

HULL

390.1115A/1425 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, February 20, 1943.

[Received February 21—1:45 a. m.]

1202. American interests—Far East internees. Department's 2943, December 29,¹⁰ Swiss Consulate Shanghai telegraphs:

"Measures Japanese to assure welfare internees proven entirely insufficient. Internees require money, supplies. Efforts undertaken meet following difficulties: (a) Japanese refuse permit recipients relief sign promissory notes, even object simple receipts [on] ground relief [from] protecting power [and] Intercroixrouge voluntary gifts. (b) Food situation Shanghai and outports worse because exhaustion stocks, sharp increase prices. Request authorization waive promissory notes, merely keep special account with individual, collective receipts obtainable or statements associations or Intercroixrouge when representative Consulate cannot visit camp.

At request associations please grant authorization establish stocks indispensable medicaments, foodstuffs as sugar, powdered milk, canned meat, fish. Begun purchase medicaments but required stocks involve expenditure 400,000 francs. Would American Government assume responsibility in proportion number citizens benefited. Early decision requested."

HARRISON

390.1115A/1425 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, February 24, 1943.

465. American interests—Far East internees. Your 1202, February 20.

1. Please inform Swiss Government (a) that Department authorizes waiver of promissory notes as suggested; and (b) that Department authorizes expenditures for stocks mentioned paragraph 3 your 1202 and assumes responsibility in proportion to number American nationals benefiting from gratuitous distribution thereof.

¹⁰ *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. I, p. 841.

2. Department would appreciate receiving as soon as possible detailed description of procedure used in disbursing funds and of precautions taken to assure actual receipt of medicaments and food supplies by internees. It is assumed Swiss representative will coordinate his activities with those of International Red Cross Committee, and will adjust cash payments of financial assistance to internees in accordance with supplies distributed, keeping them in any case within maximum.

3. Please express United States Government's appreciation of Swiss Government's efforts in behalf American internees.

HULL

811B.142/4 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, February 24, 1943.

469. American interests—Far East. Reference Department's 117, January 15, and previous telegrams in regard to transmission of funds to American internees in Philippine Islands.

In view of desperate need of funds for purchase food and medicines please urge Swiss Government to press for earliest possible solution this problem. In meantime please obtain from Swiss Government statement as to progress thus far made in the matter.

HULL

811B.142/8 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, March 2, 1943.

[Received March 2—3:15 p. m.]

1429. American interests—Far East. Legation's 225, January 11. Department's 117, January 15, and 469, February 24. Swiss Legation Tokyo telegraphs February 25 proposal [by] Japanese Foreign Office [that] \$25,000 be transferred Chief, Saint Thomas internment camp Manila for delivery against receipt Internees Executive Committee which would be charged distribution relief. Gorgé reports this system employed behalf Netherlanders resident Philippines functioning satisfactorily according Swedish Legation Tokyo. Rate approximately two yen equals one peso. Acceptance proposal urged [by] Swiss Legation Tokyo as no other method remittance Manila envisaged.

Please instruct.

HARRISON

740.00114A Pacific War/350 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, March 5, 1943.

[Received March 5—9:23 p. m.]

1517. American interests—Far East. Department's 178, January 22. Legation's 760, February 2.¹¹ Swiss Legation, Tokyo, telegraphs:

"*Porte Parole*¹² Japanese Foreign Office informed Gorgé: (1) According views Japanese Government, strategic reasons against voyage *Kanangoora*¹³ still stand. (2) Possibility other solution will be examined appropriate services although simplest solution appears send medicaments, foodstuffs, correspondence, et cetera next exchange.¹⁴

Gorgé held extended interviews Japanese Foreign Office, examined all practicable means early solution. Believes exchange vessel only means."

HARRISON

811B.142/8 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland
(Harrison)*

WASHINGTON, March 6, 1943.

538. American interests—Far East. Your 1429, 2d. American Red Cross has deposited \$25,000 for extension relief to American nationals held at Saint Thomas Internment Camp, Manila. Swiss Minister at Tokyo should be authorized to remit equivalent this amount to chief of camp for delivery against receipt to internees' executive committee. American Red Cross desires these funds be expended for purchasing supplementary food, clothing, comfort articles and medical supplies to be distributed to American nationals at camp.

Please telegraph amount pesos or yen delivered to executive committee and date of delivery, whether similar arrangements can be made for remitting funds to Baguio and elsewhere in Philippine Islands where Americans might be held in detention and approximate number of American nationals in each camp.

It is desired to make regular remittances to provide for the continuing needs of American internees in the Philippines. Please endeavor ascertain for how long above remittance will suffice and amount per month needed in future. Endeavor also to arrange for periodic reports to Department concerning use to which funds are put.

¹¹ Not printed; it reported that the contents of Department's telegram No. 178, January 22, had been communicated to the Japanese Government on January 29 (740.00114A Pacific War/318).

¹² Spokesman.

¹³ See telegram No. 2061, August 29, 1942, *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. I, p. 817.

¹⁴ For correspondence on the second exchange of American and Japanese nationals, see pp. 867 ff.

American Red Cross requests that supporting bills and receipts covering expenditures be transmitted to it at earliest opportune moment.

WELLES

740.00114 Pacific War/171 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, March 16, 1943.

[Received March 16—7: 53 p. m.]

1724. American interests China. Department's 393, February 15. Swiss Consulate Shanghai telegraphs March 5.

"1. As advances to prisoners of war not great benefit in camp, principal consideration [is to] make available 'comfort allowance' to permit purchases according 'request list' by senior officer of supplementary food supplies as sent camp [by] Intercroixrouge. Senior officer will transmit [to] Swiss Consulate through Intercroixrouge receipt for supplies. Consul will attach original vouchers. This procedure simplest, most suitable meet relief request recently presented by senior officer.

2. Reference second paragraph Department's 393, consider intervention at Shanghai useless regarding right claimed by Swiss representative interview internees without witness as Japanese authorities occupied China cannot take decisions such questions. Recommend intervention Tokyo and again insist obtain authorization regular monthly visits prisoners of war camps."

Foreign Office instructed Gorgé make suggested intervention Japanese authorities.

HARRISON

740.00114A Pacific War/396 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, April 7, 1943.

[Received April 7—8: 43 p. m.]

2179. American interests Far East. Department's 2868, December 19.¹⁵ Legation's 6222, December 30.¹⁶ Swiss Legation Tokyo telegraphs following reply from Japanese Government:

"In principle Japanese Government not opposed sending correspondence and packages to American prisoners of war, civilian internees Japan and territories under Japanese control but cannot authorize neutral ships enter waters where military operation taking place.

However, if American Government disposed send Vladivostok correspondence and packages for American internees either by Soviet

¹⁵ *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. I. p. 839.

¹⁶ Not printed, but see footnote 98, p. 1013.

ship or by land across Siberia Japanese Government ready examine possibility relieving present situation."

HARRISON

390.1115A/1543 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, April 14, 1943.

[Received April 14—11:59 p. m.]

2339. American interests—Far East internees. Department's 465, February 24. Consulate Shanghai telegraphs:

"Internment measures¹⁷ still process execution, therefore impossible furnish information desired until arrested persons all interned. Similarly unable communicate names 200 Americans who will probably be liberated (requested Department's 525, March 4¹⁸). Will send soonest possible.

Reference system relief payments (Department's 465, paragraph 2), relief paid interned Americans occupied China, according Department's 1202, February 14, 1942,¹⁹ in principle considered loans but Japanese authorities fear American Government will eventually demand repayment not from beneficiaries but from detaining power.

For this reason all efforts find practical solution for payment relief to internees meets opposition Japanese authorities. To reassure them this respect and permit effective assistance internees, recommend authorization declare payments made on basis paragraph 15 Department's 1202 be considered gifts not loans of American Government."

HARRISON

390.1115A/1546 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, April 16, 1943.

[Received April 16—10:36 p. m.]

2400. American interests—Hong Kong. Department's 249, January 30, Legation's 1204, February 20.²⁰ Intercroix Geneva April 13 reports:

"Intercroix representative Hong Kong cables negotiations detaining power with view assisting American civilians still inconclusive. Local authorities consider such activities outside sphere as task assist POWs, civilian internees.

¹⁷ For message informing the Department of general internment of Americans in China, see telegram No. 743, February 1, from the Minister in Switzerland, p. 959.

¹⁸ Not printed.

¹⁹ *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. I, p. 262.

²⁰ Telegram No. 1204 not printed; for summary, see footnote 5, p. 1015.

Representative visited Camp Stanley containing 18 American civilians 1st April. Food situation camp causing anxiety, studying possibility improving."

HARRISON

340.1115A/3223 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, April 21, 1943.

949. American interests, Far East, financial assistance to alien wives and children. Your 1769 March 18.²¹

1. United States Government is still awaiting reply to its communication of February 4 to Japanese Government ²² concerning continuation of exchanges. In the absence of a Japanese reply, it is not possible to make any definite statement on dates of repatriation.

2. In view of suffering caused to loyal American nationals' alien wives and alien minor children in Far East left without means of support owing to mass internment now being imposed by Japanese Government upon such American nationals or attributable to unexpected delays in exchange, following procedure is authorized as purely temporary expedient in Far East pending completion of exchanges:

3. Notwithstanding the provisions of numbered paragraph 13 of the Department's instruction no. 1202 of February 14, 1942,²³ alien members of family qualified for inclusion in exchange under numbered paragraph 3 of Department's 1246 of May 14 ²⁴ may, if in need and not otherwise provided for, receive monthly payments in amounts to which they would be entitled under instruction no. 1202 if they were American nationals, provided that in each instance

(a) alien member of family signifies or has signified definite intention to proceed to United States by final exchange vessel, accompanying American members of family;

(b) Swiss representative is satisfied intention is genuine; and

(c) American member of family is eligible to receive financial assistance.

4. Receipts embodying promises to repay should be executed by American member of family, if possible; otherwise by beneficiary.

5. All doubtful cases should be referred to Legation Bern.

6. Reports analogous to those requested in penultimate paragraph of Department's instruction 1537 of October 3 [1942] ²⁴ should be sub-

²¹ Not printed.

²² See telegram No. 291, February 4, to the Minister in Switzerland, p. 868.

²³ *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. I, p. 262.

²⁴ Not printed; it requested data on all persons seeking financial assistance who claimed American citizenship (340.1115A/2772).

mitted in each instance, whether financial assistance is granted or refused.

HULL

740.00114 Pacific War/202 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, April 22, 1943.

[Received April 22—9:55 p. m.]

2515. American interests China, advances to prisoners of war. Legation's 1724, March 16. Consulate Shanghai telegraphs:

"Delegate Intercroix discussed [at] length with Japanese authorities question financial relief prisoners of war. Japanese showed great repugnance permit Consulate pay prisoners of war money from American Government. Have refused thus far authorization such payments. Reason (Legation's 2339, April 14) is fear United States will require Japanese repay money advanced American prisoners of war.

[In] view [of] these conditions suggest all financial relief American prisoners of war be paid directly by delegate Intercroix Shanghai who has greater facilities this respect than Swiss representative."

Foreign Office requests examination this suggestion. If approved, desires know if Department will remit required funds Intercroix Geneva or Consulate Shanghai for payment to local delegate Intercroix.

HARRISON

390.11B15/21 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, April 23, 1943.

960. American interests, Hong Kong. Your 1942, March 26.²⁶

1. Department believes that loyal American nationals will not wish to remain in enemy territory where it might prove difficult to avoid contributing directly or indirectly to the enemy war effort. Having provided for repatriation of American nationals and their families (including alien spouses and alien unmarried minor children), Department is not disposed to authorize financial assistance to those refusing (on grounds other than physical inability to undertake the voyage) opportunity for repatriation. However, pending further developments in exchange negotiations and further instructions on financial assistance to Filipinos, it may be considered that no such opportunity has been offered Filipinos in the Far East and hence that they have not refused repatriation.

²⁶ Not printed; it inquired whether eligibility of Filipinos in Hong Kong to receive relief was conditioned on their willingness to proceed to the United States.

2. Seamen's certificates issued by Insular Collector of Customs and United States High Commissioner at Manila ²⁷ are acceptable as establishing Philippine citizenship.

3. Information furnished pursuant to second paragraph of Department's 249, January 30 will doubtless enable you and Department to verify decisions concerning financial assistance at Hong Kong.

HULL

390.1115A/1574 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, May 7, 1943.

[Received May 7—3:40 p. m.]

2812. American interests, Hong Kong. Legation's 2400, April 16. Intercroix Geneva writes May 5:

"Intercroix representative Hong Kong reports after negotiations Japanese authorities, states [they] desire he abstain pursuit question relief Filipinos. Assured him they will arrange any assistance required.

Further states favorable prospects receiving permission assist small number uninterned Americans. Will report when arranged."²⁸

HARRISON

390.1115A/1546 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, May 22, 1943.

1230. Your 2400, April 16.

1. Please ascertain whether Intercross delegate Hong Kong can purchase urgently needed medical and food supplies for distribution to interned and uninterned American nationals there and precautions which could be taken to assure actual receipt of such supplies.

2. The Japanese Government should be informed that its attitude toward representation in such areas as Hong Kong has seriously hampered the representation by Switzerland of American interests in Japanese-controlled territory. In view of the absence of restrictions upon the facilities of the Spanish, Swedish and Swiss representatives protecting Japanese interests in the continental United States, Hawaii and Samoa, respectively, the United States Government is entitled to

²⁷ Francis B. Sayre, who was evacuated from the Philippines in February 1942.

²⁸ In telegram No. 3258, May 28, the Minister in Switzerland advised that Japanese authorities in Hong Kong would allow payment of relief only to those who had always declared themselves American citizens and that a very small number of Philippine citizens would therefore benefit from relief granted by the American Government (340.1115A/3266).

expect that the Japanese Government will facilitate rather than impede the agencies endeavoring to act in behalf of American interests. In fact, the United States Government is of the opinion that such restrictions upon the representation of belligerent interests by neutral powers are warranted only if temporary in character and if dictated by military necessity in areas where active military operations are in progress. If the Japanese Government still maintains its opposition to the exercise by Switzerland of good offices in behalf of American interests at Hong Kong, it is earnestly hoped that the Swiss Minister at Tokyo may be able to persuade them to permit the informal acts of the International Red Cross Delegate at Hong Kong in behalf of American nationals, whether uninterned, interned, or prisoners of war. An early reply is requested.

If the Japanese Government does not agree, it is hoped that Gorgé may be able to obtain a satisfactory counter-proposal.

HULL

740.00114 Pacific War/202 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, May 25, 1943.

1255. American interests Japan. Your 2339 April 14 and 2515 April 22.

1. Please ask Swiss Government to deliver following communication verbatim to Japanese Government:

"The United States Government has learned informally that the Japanese Government, fearing future claims upon it, is averse to permitting advances of official United States Government funds to American nationals detained by Japan.

The United States Government has voluntarily undertaken to extend financial assistance to American nationals in enemy territory finding themselves in an abnormal position by reason of the war. The use of public funds for such assistance envisages the eventual reimbursement of the United States Government from the personal resources of the beneficiaries, who are asked solely for that purpose to sign receipts embodying promises to repay the sums advanced.

The Japanese Government is requested urgently to instruct its appropriate representatives in Japan and Japanese-occupied or controlled areas to permit the representatives of the Power protecting American interests in such areas, or the delegates of the International Red Cross in areas where the protecting Power is not permitted to function, free access to all American nationals for the purpose of advancing necessary funds to them against appropriate receipts and for their general protection."

2. Payments to prisoners of war at Shanghai may be made through the International Red Cross delegate there in the same manner as was authorized for civilian internees at Shanghai by Department's 2943

December 29.²⁹ As also provided by that telegram, funds for such payments should be advanced to International Red Cross from funds supplied to Swiss Consulate Shanghai for representation American interests.

HULL

390.1115A/1574 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, May 29, 1943.

1292. American interests Hong Kong. Your 2812 May 7. Department desires that Swiss Legation Tokyo inform Intercroix delegate Hong Kong of eligibility of qualified Filipinos to receive financial assistance subject to provisions of Department's 960 April 23 and that as American nationals they should be permitted access to delegate.

HULL

340.1115A/3266 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, June 21, 1943.

1461. American interests Hong Kong. Your 3258 May 28.³⁰ Please endeavor to ascertain and report number of Filipinos actually receiving financial assistance, as well as number considered qualified to receive financial assistance under Department's 249 of January 30, 960 of April 23 and 1292 of May 29 but not receiving financial assistance owing to attitude of Japanese authorities.³¹

HULL

740.00115A Pacific War/486 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, June 22, 1943.

[Received June 23—2:43 a. m.]

3716. American interests Japan. Department's 1255 of May 25th. Consulate, Shanghai, telegraphs:

Japanese authorities now permit monthly payments interned civilians in form pocket money.

²⁹ *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. I, p. 841.

³⁰ Not printed; for summary, see footnote 28, p. 1023.

³¹ In telegram No. 4182, July 15, the Minister in Switzerland cited a report of the Swiss Legation in Japan that 166 Filipinos had applied for relief and that "Payment could be made to 77 but for Japanese prohibition payment funds Filipinos who are not American citizens." (340.1115A/3282)

Have decided for present allocate 700 Nanking dollars to internees, equivalent about 40 Swiss francs per person monthly because insufficiency food at camps and constant depreciation currency. This amount probably soon requires increase.

HARRISON

811B.142/12 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, June 22, 1943.

[Received June 22—8:41 a. m.]

3723. American interests Far East. Department's 538, March 6. Legation, Tokyo, telegraphs:

Transferred 100,000 yen Manila June 1st representing approximately 50,000 pesos. Bessmer, contemplated by Intercroixrouge as its representative Manila, states amount sufficient one month. Querying Swiss regarding unanswered questions Department's 538.

HARRISON

740.00114 Pacific War/231 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, July 6, 1943.

[Received July 6—9:29 p. m.]

3975. American interests Japan. Department's 1255, May 25. Legation Tokyo telegraphs:

Japanese Foreign Office replied Japanese Government assumes cost maintenance American POWs, internees and in general assists indigent citizens enemy countries. Each time Swiss representative desires give supplementary relief should request authorization Japanese Government which will make decision after examining if relief corresponds necessity and if possible transmit funds persons concerned.

HARRISON

740.00115A Pacific War/498 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, July 8, 1943.

[Received July 8—9:01 p. m.]

4019. American interests Japan, Guam internees. Legation's air-mail 5187, May 31.³² Legation Tokyo reports:

³² Not printed.

Clothing Guam internees³³ entirely insufficient. Intervened repeatedly Japanese authorities but despite promises nothing received.

Underclothes, socks, pullovers indispensable, impossible purchase Japan. Request authorization make necessary purchase Shanghai. Propose use part \$3,500 which Congress [of] Industrial Organizations labor groups remitted Swedish Legation for use YMCA, balance by promissory notes. Request urgent information whether above procedure satisfactory.³⁴

Full text report follows airmail.³⁵

HARRISON

811B.142/12 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, July 13, 1943.

1644. Department's 538, March 6 and your 3723, June 22. Amcross has made a second deposit of \$25,000 for extension of relief to American nationals at Santo Tomas internment camp, Manila. Assuming that arrangements can again be made for transmission these funds to internees executive committee, Swiss Minister at Tokyo should be authorized to remit equivalent of this amount in same manner and for same purposes as before.

Amcross desires make available additional funds for extension supplementary relief to American nationals, including prisoners of war, detained elsewhere in Philippine Islands. Please endeavor to obtain all of the information requested in Department's 538 and telegraph when second deposit has been transferred to Santo Tomas Executive Committee.

Amcross has requested that Swiss Legation in Tokyo be asked what method has been set up to account for receipt and use of funds remitted.

HULL

740.00115A Pacific War/512 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, July 17, 1943.

[Received July 17—10:14 p. m.]

4245. American interests Far East. Department's 538, March 6; Legation's 3723, June 22. Legation Tokyo telegraphs:

Distribution relief effected by camp Executive Committee. Arranged send Committee through Gaimusho³⁶ necessary instructions use funds, establishment [of] receipts, et cetera.

³³ These internees were detained at a camp in Kobe, Japan.

³⁴ In telegram No. 1773, July 27, to the Minister in Switzerland, the Department gave its approval to this procedure (740.00115A Pacific War/498).

³⁵ Despatch No. 5546, July 8, not printed.

³⁶ Japanese Foreign Office.

Japanese in principle agreed payment similar relief Americans interned other parts Philippines. Also promised examine question future payment relief internees Manila and other camps by Executive Committee.

Meantime received through Japanese military authorities following list all [in] pesos prepared by Executive Committee immediate needs [and up to?] 6 months 7,000 interned American civilians including families still liberty:

- (1) Shoes, clothing, bedding, linen, toilet articles 175,000.
 - (2) Hospital and medical care: (a) bedding, mosquito nets, linen, et cetera 50,000; (b) medical, pharmaceutical equipment 16,000; (c) medicaments including anesthetics 84,000; subtotal 150,000.
 - (3) Hospitalization outside camp 20,000.
 - (4) Monthly financial relief families liberty 75,000.
 - (5) Monthly financial relief 3,000 indigent internees 180,000;
- [Grand] total 600,000.

Articles listed paragraphs 1, 2, 3 unobtainable or insufficient quantity Japan, therefore necessary examine possibility sending exchange ship. List prepared Executive Committee caused Foreign Office certain surprise but nevertheless stated Japanese Government agrees in principle send articles requested for Manila internees on exchange ship as in first exchange. Japanese, however, emphasize volume articles shippable depends available space, length [and] stay [of] ship [in] exchange port, therefore quantity only ascertainable later.

HARRISON

340.1115A/3287 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, July 21, 1943.

[Received July 21—11:09 p. m.]

4337. American interests Hong Kong. Department's 1491, June 24.³⁸ Although Legation offered Intercroix Committee February 1st, Swiss franc check equivalent \$125,000, it has not thus far been accepted. Considerable correspondence has been exchanged with Committee since, its most recent letter being dated July 16. Attitude of Committee appears to be that it will not accept these funds until Hong Kong delegate is able to settle with Japanese authorities concerned question of actual payments to prospective American recipients. Committee states Hong Kong negotiations very difficult in view triangular nature involving Hong Kong delegate, local authorities and Tokyo officials. Communication difficulties between Geneva and Hong Kong also mentioned.

³⁸ Not printed (340.1115A/3064); it inquired about the status of funds allotted under telegram No. 249, January 30, to the Minister in Switzerland, p. 1014.

It appears therefore that Committee will not accept funds allotted until such time as Hong Kong delegate can effectively make payments to beneficiaries.

HARRISON

390.1115A/1666 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, July 22, 1943.

[Received July 23—3:50 a. m.]

4354. American interests—Hong Kong. Department's 1230, May 22. Legation Tokyo telegraphs:

Japanese Government states disposed authorize sending relief packages Americans Hong Kong under following conditions.

1. Swiss Legation must request special authorization Japanese Finance Ministry for every transfer funds Tokyo to Hong Kong.

2. Kind and quantity foodstuffs, medicaments purchased, distributed Americans Hong Kong to be determined by Japanese military authorities.³⁹

No reply yet received from Japanese regarding paragraph 2 (Department's 1230). Making further efforts ascertain Japanese attitude.

HARRISON

340.1115A/3282 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, July 24, 1943.

1737. American interests—Hong Kong. Your 4182, 15th.⁴⁰ Japanese Government should be informed this Government attaches greatest importance to extension of financial assistance to American nationals which under our laws includes Philippine citizens and desires assurances that they will be permitted to receive such assistance if considered qualified under Department's 1202 of February 14, 1942.⁴¹

As this Government permits any person claiming Japanese nationality to seek protection of Spanish Embassy representing Japanese interests and does not deny to them any assistance to which that Embassy may consider them entitled it expects reciprocal treatment for all persons claiming protection of this Government.

HULL

³⁹ In telegram No. 4793, August 7, the Minister in Switzerland reported that the Japanese Foreign Office had authorized representatives of Americans at Hong Kong to send receipts for the kind and quantity of articles to the Intercroix delegate there (390.1115A/1678).

⁴⁰ Not printed; for summary, see footnote 31, p. 1025.

⁴¹ *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. I, p. 262.

390.1115A/1666 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland
(Harrison)*

WASHINGTON, August 11, 1943.

1926. Your 4354, July 22. American interests—Hong Kong. Department desires to provide aid to qualified American nationals at Hong Kong and if Japanese Government will not permit procedure outlined in telegram 249 of January 30, is agreeable to whatever conditions Swiss Legation in Tokyo finds acceptable in the circumstances.

Department will appreciate receiving as soon as feasible a telegraphic report indicating what is actually being accomplished by the Intercross delegate in the way of extending assistance to American nationals at Hong Kong.

WELLES

740.00115A Pacific War/512 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, August 18, 1943.

1979. Your 4245, July 17.

1. Express gratitude of Department and Red Cross for successful efforts of Minister Gorgé in opening a channel for sending funds to American nationals detained in Philippine Islands. Request for supplies is being met substantially by shipment on *Gripsholm*.⁴²

2. From funds made available for representation of American interests, Department authorizes the Swiss Government to make remittances to the internees' Executive Committees of the American internment camps in the Philippines under the following conditions:

(a) Beginning with current month or as soon as feasible thereafter, the sum of not exceeding \$25,000 per month may be remitted to the Santo Tomas internment camp for the purposes listed in your 4245 and for so long as the number of American internees and number of members of their families at liberty remain materially unchanged.

(b) Additional remittances to other internment camps in Philippines authorized on basis of proportionate number of American nationals benefitting therefrom as compared with those at Santo Tomas for whom assistance is approved herein.

(c) Funds delivered to the Executive Committees should be used (1) for the purchase of available supplies considered necessary for supplementation of the diet provided by the Japanese authorities, (2) for the payment of essential services obtained outside of camp, and (3) to provide each internee with a small amount of money for personal use.

⁴² Vessel chartered by United States Government for effecting exchange of American and Japanese nationals.

(d) From funds delivered, Executive Committees may advance funds, against promissory notes if possible, to indigent internees for delivery to members of their families at liberty.

3. The Executive Committees should acknowledge receipt each month of funds transferred and as soon as possible after receipt of first month's remittance should report what amounts from that month's funds were used for purposes listed in sections (c) and (d) of Paragraph 2. Report should include breakdown of amounts used by Committees in purchasing food, clothing, medical supplies, and comfort articles for general distribution in camp.

4. Swiss Legation at Tokyo should be requested to report by telegraph how funds are used during first month in each camp and thereafter monthly the amounts remitted to each internment camp in Philippines.

5. Swiss Legation should also be requested to report what kind of accounting system is put into effect to assure receipt of funds by internees and their proper utilization.

6. Department assumes that statement "Japanese in principle agreed payment similar relief Americans interned other parts Philippines" means that similar payments may also be made to American prisoners of war in Philippines, presumably through Committees headed by camp leaders. Endeavor confirm this assumption at early date.

7. Please request that Swiss Minister at Tokyo telegraph when these instructions received and his views as to when remittances under this authorization may be expected to begin.

8. The above procedure is provisionally an exception to Department's instruction 1202 of February 14, 1942⁴³ since it appears that neither criteria nor procedure prescribed therein can be applied at present in Philippines.

HULL

740.00115A Pacific War/588 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, September 1, 1943.

[Received September 1—7:47 p. m.]

5391. American interests, occupied China. Legation's 3716, June 22. Swiss Consulate, Shanghai, reports credits at disposal Japanese authorities utterly insufficient insure proper provisioning civilian internment camps because cost living rising regularly about 15% monthly. Men of confidence persistently request Swiss increase

⁴³ *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. 1, p. 262.

monthly payments for [from] 700 to \$1100 ⁴⁴ (one [hundred] dollar[s] ⁴⁵ equals 4.25 Swiss francs).

Report added Swiss payments must be approved Japanese who accord Swiss no facilities control their use. With view exercise at least indirect control [over] use of funds and camp canteens which poorly stocked with sales prices unknown, Swiss Consul Shanghai ⁴⁶ requested authorization send each beneficiary either relief amount in specie or equivalent in products. This refused. Swiss Consulate advised against requesting Japanese for amelioration behalf internees owing low standard living Chinese and some Japanese resident Shanghai.

Recommends, however, Swiss Legation, Tokyo, be instructed request Japanese Government have local authorities refrain from intervening in any manner in relief payments leaving this discretion Swiss representatives. Swiss also to be authorized correspond freely and personally converse with men of confidence.

Until Japanese Government agree foregoing, Swiss Consulate, Shanghai, hesitates recommend augmentation relief. Swiss Foreign Office requests Department's observations for transmission Tokyo, Shanghai.

HARRISON

740.00115A Pacific War/610 Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

Bern, September 13, 1943.

[Received September 13—10:46 p. m.]

5692. American interests—occupied China. Legation's 3716, June 22, and 5391, September 1. Foreign Office notes received September 7 and 9 contain following information regarding internment camps of Pootung and Chapei near Shanghai.

(a) When Swiss Consul General visited Camp Pootung internees stated only permitted spend freely three-sevenths of monthly relief of 700 dollars accorded them and that its use was determined by Japanese authorities very probably with tacit approval men confidence. Similar statements made to Intercoixrouge delegate who visited camp recently.

(b) Swiss Consulate General obtained indirectly detailed statement indicating use of relief which has been paid between March through July 1943 to persons interned Chapei. Of 2,734,000 dollars internees were able spend freely for purchases canteen only 1,480,000 dollars relief [sic] permitted following expenditures: milk 83,000; eggs 38,000; other food 378,000; infirmery equipment 38,000; kitchen equip-

⁴⁴ Nanking dollars.

⁴⁵ Corrected on basis of last paragraph of the Minister's telegram No. 5692, *infra*.

⁴⁶ Emile Fontanel.

ment 24,000; building repairs 60,000; other equipment 90,000; shoe purchases and repair 174,000; laundry 43,000; taxis for sick 43,000; hospital and doctors bills 34,000.

Swiss Consulate noted since May it pays directly hospital and doctors bills and that during first 3 months of camp it sent to internees large supply tinned food and medicaments [in] its own name and in name associations.

In first paragraph Legation's 5391 word hundred inadvertently omitted between words one and dollar.

HARRISON

740.00115A Pacific War/724 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, September 30, 1943.

[Received September 30—9:02 p. m.]

6091. American interests Philippines. Department's 1644, July 13; 1979, August 18. Foreign Office note September 28 reports Swiss Legation Tokyo obtained authorization Japanese Government send 100,000 dollars Manila. Foreign Office immediately transferred Swiss Legation Tokyo 105,134.40 yen representing countervalue 25,000 dollars on basis paragraph 2 (a), Department's 1979. Simultaneously reminded Swiss Legation Tokyo funds thus placed its disposal to be utilized only in accordance Department's 1979.

HARRISON

740.00115A Pacific War/730 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, October 3, 1943.

[Received October 3—9:26 p. m.]

6170. American interests, occupied China. Legation's 5692, September 13. American internees boarding *Teia Maru*⁴⁷ Shanghai informed Swiss representative restrictions on use internees relief money withdrawn, now able freely spend entire amount allotted. All emphasize necessity increasing allotment 700 to 1,000 dollars as large part required indispensable items not furnished by Japanese such as shoe repairs, clothing, medicines, doctors [and] dentists fees, dietetic food [for] children, invalids. Report canteens somewhat better provisioned. Swiss representative taking steps obtain authorization increase relief allotments and will report results.⁴⁸

HARRISON

⁴⁷ Vessel chartered by Japanese Government for effecting exchange of American and Japanese nationals.

⁴⁸ In telegram No. 7088, November 11, the Minister in Switzerland reported that monthly relief allowances had been increased on September 1 to \$1200, the equivalent of 54 Swiss francs (740.00115A Pacific War/789).

390.1115A/1704 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, October 18, 1943.

[Received October 18—11:59 p. m.]

6541. American interests, Hong Kong. Department's 1926, August 11. Swiss Legation, Tokyo, telegraphs Japanese Government authorizes payment relief envisaged Department's 149 [249], January 30. However, this authorization applicable neither Philippine citizens (Legation's 4182, July 15⁴⁹) nor persons who previously failed declare their American nationality (Legation's 3258, May 28⁵⁰).

Owing foregoing, relief paid thus far only to seven Americans including three currently aboard *Teia Maru*. In addition seven relief applications submitted Legation.

Swiss Legation, Tokyo, adds that during May, June 800 yen paid four American civilians and 720 yen [to] 118 [18] POWs. Expresses belief available funds sufficient for one year if number beneficiaries not increased.

HARRISON

740.00115A Pacific War/784 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, November 4, 1943.

[Received November 4—11:06 p. m.]

6908. American interests, Philippines. Department's 2460, October 7.⁵¹ Swiss Legation, Tokyo, reports able transmit funds American civilian internees camps other than Santo Tomas. On basis lists Japanese POW Bureau and section 2 (b) Department's 1979, August 18, Swiss Legation position disburse dollars 7410 monthly as follows: Camp Bacolod, 1000 dollars; Baguio, 2000; Cebu, 1000; Davao, 2500; Iloilo, 700; Tacloban, 200; Tagbilaran, 10.

Swiss Legation unaware whether lists currently correct. Japanese Government requested indicate number American internees various camps. Nevertheless effecting initial transfers without awaiting. Japanese reply reverts to Legation's 4114, July 12,⁵² regarding payments American POWs. Representations made obtain authorization send relief POWs. Result representations awaited.

Legation again querying Swiss whether 25,000 transfer represents Amcross donation.

HARRISON

⁴⁹ Not printed; for summary, see footnote 31, p. 1025.⁵⁰ Not printed; for summary, see footnote 28, p. 1023.⁵¹ Not printed.⁵² *Ante*, p. 997.

740.00115A Pacific War/812: Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, November 9, 1943.

[Received November 9—11:59 p. m.]

7019. American interests—Philippines. Legation's 6908, November 4. Swiss note November 6 confirms \$25,000 transfer mentioned Legation's 6091, September 30 represents second Amcross deposit (Department's 1644, July 13).

Swiss Legation, Tokyo, now able transmit similar amount monthly behalf Americans detained Santo Tomas. These transfers to which \$7,410 added effective November 1 made according paragraph 2, Department's 1979, August 18, that is from funds placed disposal Swiss Government for representation American interests Far East.

HARRISON

740.00115A Pacific War/800: Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, November 15, 1943—10:35 p. m.

[Received November 15—10:35 p. m.]

7162. Department's 2000, August 19; Legation's 6867, November 2.⁵³ Telegraphic accounts from Swiss representatives Far East covering 12 months ended June 30, 1943, show following relief payments which Legation has converted into United States dollars at average transfer rate for Swiss francs during that period: Tokyo, dollars 46,169.98; Shanghai, 635,404.04; Bangkok, 831.88; Saigon, 11,240.81; grand total dollars 693,646.71.

Figure given above for Saigon covers 18 months ended June 30, 1943, as no breakdown available to Legation for calendar year 1942. Of 64,431.33 piastres equivalent dollar amount given above 54,203.39 appeared in 1942 accounts.

Following is breakdown Shanghai total by quarters: Third quarter 1942, dollars 144,606.51; fourth quarter 1942, 156,794.17; first quarter 1943, 272,049.93; second quarter 1943, 61,953.43.

It may prove useful in connection with Shanghai figures to point out changes which occurred in Central Reserve Bank dollar rate. This was \$7.955 CRB for one Swiss franc during third quarter 1942, 8.5733 during fourth quarter, 8.894 first quarter 1943, and 21.73 second quarter.⁵⁴

HARRISON

⁵³ Neither printed.⁵⁴ For additional information on currency conversion matters, see airgram No. A-492, November 19, p. 1008.

PROTESTS BY JAPAN AGAINST ATTACKS BY THE UNITED STATES ON HOSPITAL SHIPS

740.00116 Pacific War/59

The Spanish Embassy to the Department of State

MEMORANDUM

No. 148

The Spanish Embassy presents its compliments to the Department of State and begs to transmit herewith the complaint that has been received from the Japanese Government through the "Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores"⁵⁵ of Madrid on:

"Aerial attacks suffered by the following Japanese hospital ships that had all the markings and characteristics of such, as stipulated in the Treaties, and which represents an act contrary to Article I of the 1907 Geneva Treaty⁵⁶ as applied to Naval Warfare:

Arabia Maru—Sailing on January 4th, 1943, at reduced speed, when mooring at pier at Rangun, was bombed repeated times. Three grazing consolidated bombardments dropping more than ten bombs in the sea at 5 or 6 meters starboard of ship, resulting in some damage. The weather was clear, clouds at 5,000 meters and visibility extremely good.

America Maru—Sailing on January 30th, 1943, at 4:20 a. m. at 4.12.38 latitude south and 152.17.45 longitude east, outside the port of Rabaul, being attacked by enemy plane, four bombs fell behind the starboard, and then machine-gunned; no damage. At moment of attack all night markings were perfectly illuminated.

Manila Maru—March 4th, 1943 at 11:20 a. m. torpedoed two times by enemy submarine at 136.17 longitude east and 5.36 latitude south; no damage, due to the quick working of the ship.

Urabu Maru—April 3rd, 1943 at 2:59 p. m. sailing toward Rabaul was bombed by dive bombers at 150.7 longitude east, and 2.47 latitude south; damaging and resulting in six health officers and a crew member dead, six quarantine officers wounded and four crew members wounded, with the direct impact and bombs that fell near the ship. It was a little cloudy.

Huso Maru—April 15th, 1943, sailing toward Shortland was attacked at 31.33 latitude south and 152.20 longitude east by planes. Three times without damage, in the following manner:

1. Plane dropped a luminous bomb and another explosive bomb at about 2,500 meters, falling at about 500 [meters?] off the bow.
2. Plane dropped from about 1,500 meters off bow and star-

⁵⁵ Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

⁵⁶ Reference is evidently to the convention for the adaptation of the principles of the Geneva Convention to naval warfare, signed at The Hague, October 18, 1907; for text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1907, pt. 2, p. 1229. The Geneva Convention for the amelioration of the condition of the wounded in armies in the field was signed at Geneva, July 6, 1906; for translation, see *Foreign Relations*, 1906, pt. 2, p. 1559.

board, a luminous and two explosive bombs which fell at about 400 meters at 35 degree angle off port side.

3. Plane dropped from about 2,000 meters exactly parallel to port side a luminous and another explosive bomb which fell about 200 meters off port side.

The same ship (*Huso Maru*) April 16th, between 6:13 and 8:22 p. m. returning from Shortland with sick, was machine-gunned two times and bombed four times by planes; some damage, no victims; all attacks were in full moon and with all the night lights illuminated.

Buenos Aires Maru—April 25th, 3:45 p. m. sailing at the latitude of Hong Kong, was torpedoed by submarine; small damage, seven wounded.

The names of all these ships were communicated to the enemy countries, and had all the marks and characteristics required by the Treaties."

WASHINGTON, June 28, 1943.

740.00116 Pacific War/59

The Secretary of State to the Secretary of the Navy (Know)

WASHINGTON, July 6, 1943.

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Honorable the Secretary of the Navy and encloses a copy of memorandum no. 148 dated June 28, 1943 from the Spanish Embassy⁵⁷ in charge of Japanese interests in continental United States, regarding alleged attacks on six Japanese hospital ships.

Since the Japanese Government does not specify that only United States forces were involved in these alleged attacks and since it is believed that a similar protest has been addressed by the Japanese Government to the British Government, it is suggested that this matter might be brought before the Combined Chiefs of Staff in order that a mutually satisfactory answer may be made to the protest of the Japanese Government.

This Department has acknowledged the receipt of the enclosed memorandum from the Spanish Embassy.⁵⁸ It would be appreciated if the Navy Department, after the necessary investigation and consultation, would inform this Department of the nature of the detailed reply which may be made to this memorandum.

A copy of this letter and of the enclosed memorandum have been sent to the Secretary of War.

⁵⁷ *Supra.*

⁵⁸ The Department's memorandum of July 6 to the Spanish Embassy stated that the Embassy's memorandum was "receiving appropriate consideration and a reply will be made when the necessary investigation is completed."

740.00117 Pacific War/60

The Acting Secretary of the Navy (Forrestal) to the Secretary of State

(SC) A16-2(1)

WASHINGTON, 18 September, 1943.

SIR: Reference is made to Department of State letter of 6 July 1943 enclosing a copy of a memorandum from the Spanish Embassy regarding alleged attacks on six Japanese hospital ships.

The Department of State's letter with enclosure was referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff who have had the charges fully investigated. It appears that most of the attacks on hospital ships alleged by the Japanese did [not?] occur. None of the attacks were deliberate. For the information of the Department of State detailed data concerning the six alleged attacks is enclosed herewith⁵⁹ as Enclosure "A", and a letter addressed by General Douglas MacArthur⁶⁰ to the Prime Minister of Australia⁶¹ in connection with this protest is also enclosed as Enclosure "B".

It is understood that a similar protest was made by the Japanese to the British Government. In this connection an agreement of the Combined Chiefs of Staff provides that if a protest concerning the same incident is addressed by the enemy to both the United States and British Governments, consultation shall take place before a reply is made. A copy of this letter is being furnished to the British Chiefs of Staff, as well as to the U. S. Chiefs of Staff. It is requested that the appropriate British authorities be consulted before a reply to the Japanese protest is made in this case.

In accordance with a request in your referenced letter, the following detailed reply to the Japanese Government is recommended:

"The alleged attacks on six Japanese hospital ships have been carefully investigated. Only in the cases of the *Urabu Maru* and *Huso Maru* is there evidence that the attacks did occur. These were accidental attacks and occurred only because the ships were inadequately marked as hospital ships.

"In the cases of the other hospital ships mentioned there is no evidence that attacks were made on these ships. Military operations were in progress in the vicinity at the approximate time of the alleged attacks. Possibly the hospital ships were in too close proximity to the military objectives, or being improperly or insufficiently marked, were, through mistake, the objects of attacks themselves, though all the reports available indicate that all attacks were made on ships of a different character.

"The terms of the Hague Convention outlining the markings, use, and immunity of hospital ships, have been made known to all concerned in the armed forces of this Government. The fact that they are known by the personnel of the armed forces and that such per-

⁵⁹ Enclosures not printed.

⁶⁰ Commanding General of U.S. Army Forces in the Far East.

⁶¹ John Curtin.

sonnel make every effort to observe them, is repeatedly indicated by reports of the sighting of hospital ships which have not been molested when recognized as such.

"This Government desires to take every practicable step to avoid attacks on hospital ships. To this end it is considered that hospital ships should carry out the following policies:

a. In order to acquire right to immunity at night, hospital ships must be illuminated continuously from sunset to sunrise.

b. In order to acquire right to immunity at night, the funnels and hulls of hospital ships must be illuminated from sunset to sunrise to show the red crosses, white painting and green band. Distinctive markings which must at all times be displayed on the decks for identification from the air must be similarly illuminated at night.

c. If markings are not illuminated at the time of an attack at night, no complaint can be entertained. It is not, however, illegal for a hospital ship to darken ship at her own risk on necessary occasions such as when lying in a port, passing through defensive minefields or in company with the fleet.

d. Any form of maneuvers or stratagems at sea such as practiced by naval vessels to deceive an enemy is not permitted to hospital ships, except when alteration of course is necessary in special circumstances to avoid compromising an operation.

e. A ship which has been designated as a hospital ship may carry the following:

(1) The regular personnel assigned to the ship.

(2) Combatant and noncombatant personnel only if wounded, sick, or shipwrecked, except that strictly medical corps personnel and personnel of an officially recognized relief society traveling either as units or as casualties may be carried for passage in either direction.

(3) Supplies incident to and for use on board the ship.

(4) Regular medical supplies and equipment, exclusive of ambulances and all other vehicles.

(5) No other passengers, materials, mail, or stores may be carried.

f. A hospital ship in company with legitimate targets is not because of that fact a legitimate target for attack, but is placed in jeopardy and accepts the risk of accidental attack under such circumstances.

g. A hospital ship operating in the vicinity of military objectives accepts the risk of damage incidental to attacks upon the military objectives.

"If the Japanese Government will carry out such policies with regard to the operation of hospital ships, the chances of mistaken attacks occurring against these ships will be greatly reduced."

Respectfully,

JAMES FORRESTAL

740.00117 Pacific War/65

The Acting Secretary of the Navy (Forrestal) to the Secretary of State

(SC) A16-2(1)

WASHINGTON, 29 September, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The State Department letter of 6 July 1943, enclosing a memorandum from the Spanish Embassy regarding alleged attacks on six hospital ships, was answered by Navy Department letter of 18 September 1943, in which the necessary information was provided on which to make a reply to the Japanese Government.

The American Red Cross has forwarded to the Navy Department a cable received from Geneva on 31 July 1943, enclosed herewith as Enclosure "A", containing a Japanese protest against the same six alleged attacks plus three additional attacks.⁶² This cable was referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who have caused the additional charges to be fully investigated. It appears that two of these additional attacks did occur. Neither attack was deliberate. One was the result of insufficient identification marks and the other probably from being in too close proximity to legitimate targets. For the information of the State Department, detailed data concerning the three additional alleged attacks are enclosed herewith as Enclosure "B".⁶³

Since the State Department is preparing an answer to the Japanese Government concerning six of the nine cases mentioned in the Red Cross cable, it is believed that the best interests would be served and all replies best kept in consonance if the State Department would prepare the reply to the Red Cross cable.

The assurance that all United States operating forces are fully informed of the requirements of the Hague Convention and make every effort to abide by them is reaffirmed.

In accordance with the agreement of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to keep each government fully advised of individual action taken in regard to protests, a copy of this letter is being furnished to the British and United States Chiefs of Staff.

Sincerely yours,

JAMES FORRESTAL

⁶² Cable not printed; the American Red Cross had transmitted a copy of this cable to the Department of State on August 3. The official protest of the Japanese Government on the three additional attacks and one subsequent attack was conveyed to the Department by the Spanish Embassy in its memorandum of December 13, p. 1043.

⁶³ Not printed.

740.00117 Pacific War/61

The Secretary of State to the Secretary of the Navy (Know)

WASHINGTON, November 13, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I refer to the Navy Department's letter of September 18, 1943 stating that the charges made by the Japanese Government in the protest forwarded to the United States Government through its protecting Power in this country regarding alleged attacks on six Japanese hospital ships have been fully investigated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and transmitting the text of a proposed reply to that protest. Mention is also made of the fact that a similar protest has been received by the British Government, and attention is called in that connection to an agreement reached by the Combined Chiefs of Staff that consultation shall take place between the British and United States Governments before a reply is made to a protest concerning the same incident that is addressed by the enemy to both Governments.

As requested by the Navy Department, the text of the proposed reply to the Japanese protest was communicated to the British Embassy⁶⁴ for consideration by the appropriate British authorities.

In a recent telephone conversation, Captain Hale of the Central Division of Operations of the Navy Department was apprised by an officer of this Department that according to oral information that had been received from the British Embassy the British Government had expressed its disagreement with the reply to the Japanese protest proposed on the part of this Government and that the Embassy suggested that a meeting be arranged between certain of its representatives and others of this Government as a means of achieving an agreement of views with respect to the replies to be made to the protest by the United States and British Governments. Captain Hale stated on October 29, 1943 during a subsequent telephone conversation that he had conveyed the suggestion of the British Embassy to the Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff but that the latter was of the opinion that a written communication setting forth the views of the British Government in the matter would be required for purposes of study. This information was communicated to the British Embassy, and a written statement dated November 2, 1943, a copy of which is enclosed,⁶⁵ has now been received from that source. There are also enclosed a copy of this

⁶⁴ September 30, not printed.

⁶⁵ Not printed; it expressed the view of the British Government that presentation of "the facts in regard to the individual cases, might prove a more effective reply to the specific Japanese allegations than would the statement of agreed principles set forth in the Department of State's draft." (740.00117 Pacific War/61)

Department's memorandum of September 30, 1943 and a copy of the British Embassy's memorandum of August 5, 1943 ⁶⁶ that are referred to in the statement.

The views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in regard to the sense of a further communication to be addressed to the British Embassy on this subject would be appreciated.

In the event, however, that it should eventually be agreed that a reply to the Japanese protest be made substantially in the terms set forth in the Navy Department's letter of September 18, 1943, I offer for the consideration of the appropriate military authorities the following suggested amendments in the text of that proposed reply in the belief that if so amended it would be more likely to result in a favorable response from the Japanese Government:

(1) The fourth paragraph which immediately precedes sub-paragraph "a" to be deleted and a paragraph in the following sense to be substituted therefor:

"The United States Government desires that the Japanese Government be informed that the United States Government has every intention of continuing to respect the immunity of hospital ships in accordance with its assumed obligations and international practice. It is observed, however, that it is not always possible for aircraft under modern conditions to make out the markings on hospital ships. The United States Government has accordingly placed additional markings on its hospital ships and urges the Japanese Government to do likewise. In this connection, the mutual adoption of the following policies is advocated:"

(2) The following new paragraph to be inserted between sub-paragraphs "c" and "d":

"In addition, the United States Government proposes the mutual adoption of the following policies in clarification of international practice as set forth in the provisions of Article 4 of the Tenth Hague Convention:" ⁶⁷

(3) If these suggested amendments are adopted, the final paragraph of the previously proposed reply (that following sub-paragraph "g") to be deleted.

A further protest of the Japanese Government transmitted to this Government through the channels of the International Red Cross Committee alleging attacks on nine hospital ships, including the six referred to in the earlier protest transmitted through the protecting Power and the additional three that form the subject of the Navy Department's letter of September 29, 1943, was similarly transmitted to the British Government. The British Embassy informed this Department ⁶⁸ in that connection that the British Government does

⁶⁶ Neither printed.

⁶⁷ *Foreign Relations*, 1907, pt. 2, p. 1229.

⁶⁸ In a letter of September 17, not printed.

not propose to reply to this second protest, since it is considered that the International Red Cross Committee has no standing in this matter, and inquired regarding the action which the United States Government proposes to take. In replying to the Embassy,⁶⁹ it was stated that this Department had already informed the Chairman of the American Red Cross, through whom it received the message from the International Red Cross Committee, that the Japanese Government had previously complained of six of the alleged attacks through the Spanish Government in charge of Japanese interests in the continental United States and that the reply of the United States Government, when it is communicated to the Japanese Government through Spanish channels, will be transmitted to him in substance for his information. It was also stated that it had been indicated to the Chairman that the same procedure will be followed when investigations are completed in connection with the other three alleged attacks on Japanese hospital ships. The Embassy stated on October 4, 1943 ⁷⁰ that it was informing the British Government of the proposed action of the United States Government in this regard.

No further word has been received from the British Embassy concerning the Japanese protest transmitted through the channels of the International Red Cross Committee. In view of the policy formulated by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, however, no definitive action will be taken by this Department in replying to either protest alleging attacks on Japanese hospital ships without first obtaining the concurrence of the British Government.

Sincerely yours,

For the Secretary of State:
BRECKINRIDGE LONG
Assistant Secretary

740.00117 Pacific War/94

The Spanish Embassy to the Department of State ⁷¹

MEMORANDUM

No. 352

Ex. 119.01

The Spanish Embassy presents its compliments to the Department of State and begs to transmit herewith, a complaint that has been received from the Japanese Government, through the "Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores" in Madrid.

"The Imperial Government files protest with the United States Government for the aerial or submarine attack against four of its

⁶⁹ Reply of September 30 not printed.

⁷⁰ Letter not printed.

⁷¹ Handed on December 14 to Assistant Secretary Long by the Spanish Ambassador (Cárdenas), and acknowledged by the Department on January 1, 1944.

hospital ships, as specified hereafter. The names of such ships were communicated to the American Government, in accordance with The Hague Treaty of 1907, relative to the Geneva Treaty, the markings of said ships being as stipulated in Article V of said Treaty and the ships being sufficiently lighted during the nights of the attacks, the latter resulting in infringement and direct violation of said Treaty.

The Imperial Government had already, in the month of June last,⁷² energetically protested to the American Government for attacks on its hospital ships; notwithstanding this fact, the Japanese Government finds itself once again placed under identical circumstances.

The Imperial Government when submitting this protest to the American Government demands guarantees that such attacks will not recur.

1—*Takasago Maru*. Was attacked by enemy submarine which discharged two torpedoes against it on April 26, 1943, at 1:38 A. M. at approximately 60 miles northeast of Amboina, South latitude 3 degrees 19 minutes and Longitude East 127 degrees, 27 minutes, its helm having been damaged and the helmsman killed, part of the hull was also damaged.

2—*Mitsuho [Mizuho] Maru*. Was attacked by an enemy plane which directed three bombs against it on July 1st, 1943, at 2:17 A. M. at 152 degrees longitude East and 42 degrees South latitude.

3—*Muro Maru*. Was attacked by an enemy submarine on July . . . ,⁷³ 1943 at 9:3 [sic] A. M. near Palaos, 7 degrees 37 minutes North latitude, 134 degrees 26 minutes longitude East.

4—*America Maru*. Was attacked September 6, 1943 at 11:29 A. M. at 1 degree 37 minutes Latitude South and 149 Longitude East, by a four-motor Consolidated type plane. This enemy bomber directed four bombs against the *America Maru*, machine gunning the decks, wounding three of the crew and damaging the hull of the ship."

WASHINGTON, December 13, 1943.

740.00117 Pacific War/95

*The Spanish Embassy to the Department of State*⁷⁴

MEMORANDUM

No. 354

Ex. 111.00

The Spanish Embassy presents its compliments to the Department of State and begs to transmit herewith the complaint that has been received from the Japanese Government through the "Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores" of Madrid regarding the aerial bombardment of the hospital ship *Buenos Aires Maru* and which reads as follows:

⁷² See memorandum from the Spanish Embassy, June 28, p. 1036.

⁷³ Omission indicated in the original; cable transmitted by the American Red Cross on August 3 indicates date was July 1.

⁷⁴ Acknowledged by the Department on January 1, 1944.

"(1) While navigating at a point 2 degrees 40 minutes south latitude and 129 [149]⁷⁵ degrees 20 minutes East longitude at 8:10 November 27 this year, Japanese hospital ship *Buenos Aires Maru* was attacked by the United States aircraft (Consolidated B 24). Vessel was hit by bomb on portside and sunk in about forty minutes. Said United States aircraft came with sun behind it at altitude of about 1,000 metres from direction of ship's stern and after dropping one bomb disappeared into cloud in direction of ship's bow. As soon as ship was struck, life boats, motor boats, etc. numbering 18 in all, were lowered and nearly all wounded and sick soldiers and others on board were taken into life boats or on raft before ship sank. However, about 30 persons in No. 4 hatch including wounded and sick soldiers who were being borne on stretchers were apparently either crushed to death or injured by beam over hatch entrance which fell with violent explosion of the bomb, and went down with ship. Drifting with no means of communication those taken aboard life boats, motor boats, etc. sighted United States patrol planes on several occasions between November 27 and December 2, and on each occasion they hoisted a red cross formed with pieces of red cloth. Said patrol planes seemed to recognize the markings from extremely low altitude at which they flew. In fact, on December 1, one of them flying at altitude of only about [100] metres machine gunned drifting boats packed with wounded and sick soldiers resulting in two killed and one injured. On afternoon December 2, some of drifting boats were discovered and rescued by Japanese vessels which happened to be navigating in vicinity. On basis of reports given by survivors remaining drifting, survivors were rescued by Japanese airplanes and boats on same day and 3rd, but total casualties numbered 374 in dead or missing including nurses going home on relief.

(II) Name of *Buenos Aires Maru* had been duly communicated to United States Government December 1942, through the Spanish Government representing Japanese interests in accordance with stipulations of article 1 of Hague Convention of 1907 for Adaptation of principles of Geneva Convention on Maritime War. —Moreover, in addition to markings stipulated under Article 5 of foregoing Convention, vessel bore special red cross markings for aerial and night purposes designed by Japanese Military Authorities which are extremely easy to recognize. This fact, also, had been duly communicated to United States Government, furthermore weather being very clear at time of attack it was perfectly possible to recognize these markings from low altitude of about 1,000 metres with sun at back. In these circumstances the bombing in question by United States aircraft not only is violation of above mentioned Hague Convention and fundamental principles of International Law, but also must be considered as against humanity, especially killing of innocent nurses as well as machine gunning of wounded. In view of these facts Japanese Government hereby lodge solemn protest with Government of United States urge their reflection and demand prompt reply based upon investigation, punishment of responsible persons and guarantee against recurrence of such incidents in future. At same time Japanese Government declare that they will reserve all rights with respect to

⁷⁵ Correction based on memorandum No. 91, Ex. 111.00, May 8, 1944, from the Spanish Embassy.

rectification of above mentioned unlawful act. On June 28 last, Japanese Government lodged protest with United States Government through Spanish Government representing Japanese interests concerning attacks upon *Arabia Maru* and five other Japanese hospital ships. More recently Japanese Government protested to United States Government through same channel concerning similar attacks upon *Takasago Maru* and three other hospital ships, but to this date they have not been in receipt of any reply instead there is no end to attacks upon Japanese hospital ships as has been proved by sinking of *Buenos Aires Maru*. This matter on which Japanese Government look with grave concern and to which they desire to draw attention to United States Government."

WASHINGTON, December 20, 1943.

[Replies to the three Japanese protests were made in 1944.]

REPRESENTATIONS BY JAPAN REGARDING THE TREATMENT OF
JAPANESE NATIONALS IN THE UNITED STATES AND HAWAII

740.00115 Pacific War/844

The Spanish Embassy to the Department of State

MEMORANDUM

No. 333

The Spanish Embassy has the honor to inform the Department of State of the following complaints received from the Imperial Japanese Government through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Madrid, regarding the removal of Japanese nationals inland from the Pacific Coast:

According to information received by the Japanese Government, General DeWitt, Western Defense Commander of the United States, issued a proclamation on March 3rd [2nd] of this year,⁷⁶ establishing a military zone from which Japanese aliens and second-generation Japanese were to be evacuated. A Reuter dispatch from San Francisco, of the same date, reported that the mentioned zone covered the entire Pacific seaboard within 150 or 400 kilometers from the coast line.

Subsequent information from different news dispatches from neutral sources and communications from the Spanish Embassy in Washington revealed that compulsory removal of Japanese nationals to inland places was being effected in every locality. According to a news dispatch from New York on March 25th, 600 Japanese families who had been living in Los Angeles were transferred in motor trucks

⁷⁶ War Department Public Proclamation No. 1, 7 *Federal Register* 2320.

and under military guards to upland districts in the Sierra Nevada, about 400 kilometers from said city. They were only permitted to carry their own clothes. A news dispatch from Washington, of March 26th, further disclosed the fact that Japanese nationals thus compulsorily removed en masse, were to be employed in the cultivation of wild lands, receiving as a monthly payment from \$50.00 to \$90.00 from which a deduction of \$15.00 for food and clothing, was to be made.

In view of this information, the Japanese Government has been forced to conclude that the policy of the United States is apparently designed to eradicate all Japanese communities, under pretense of instituting military zones covering vast areas, thus depriving the great majority of Japanese nationals on the Pacific Coast of the very basis of living, and in utter disregard of their invaluable contribution to industrial activities.

All of them are deported to wild inland districts and forced to engage there in hard tasks such as the cultivation of the soil, while all their property and belongings left behind are being confiscated by the enemy property custodian. This policy is obviously contrary to the humanitarian principles applied by civilized Governments in the treatment of civilian nationals of belligerent countries. The employment of these Japanese nationals in the reclamation and cultivation of wild lands, with a meager monthly salary of from \$50.00 to \$90.00 after they have been deprived of their means of subsistence, is tantamount to compulsory labor since they have no choice but to engage in the prescribed work. On March 24th, 1942, the United States Government through the Swiss Minister in Tokyo,⁷⁷ notified the Japanese Government as follows:

"The United States Government did not contemplate and had not made use of the provision of Article 27 of the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention⁷⁸ to compel Japanese Civilians detained or interned by it to labor against their will."⁷⁹

In taking note of the above statement, the Japanese Government understands that it expresses the intention of the United States Government to subscribe to the well-established international usage, which forbids the subjection of enemy civilians to any kind of forced labor. Under any circumstances, therefore, the Japanese Government finds it impossible to reconcile the measures taken by the United States Government with regard to Japanese nationals on the Pacific Coast, with its formal declaration conveyed to the Japanese Government through the Swiss Minister in Tokyo.

⁷⁷ Camille Gorgé.

⁷⁸ Signed July 27, 1929, *Foreign Relations*, 1929, vol. I, p. 336.

⁷⁹ See telegram No. 712, March 19, 1942, to the Minister in Switzerland, *ibid.*, 1942, vol. I, p. 804.

The Japanese Government enters hereby its protest to the United States Government for its unwarranted action and requests said Government to explain these measures, as well as to state whether any steps have been taken for the protection of these Japanese nationals compulsorily removed from their places of residence.

In the opinion of the Japanese Government these steps should include provision of living quarters in places where they may engage in different occupations, adequate protection and assistance to families with women and children, and to the aged and infirm, and any other measures tending to ameliorate the situation, and alleviate the effect of the sudden change in mode of living.

The Japanese Government would also be obliged to the United States Government for information, as soon as possible, regarding the number of Japanese transferred and their respective places of removal.

The Spanish Embassy will deeply appreciate an early reply from the Department of State that can be transmitted to the Japanese Imperial Government.

WASHINGTON, August 3, 1942.

740.00115 Pacific War/844

The Department of State to the Spanish Embassy

MEMORANDUM

The Department of State refers to memorandum no. 333 of August 3, 1942 from the Spanish Embassy in charge of Japanese interests in the continental United States transmitting complaints received from the Imperial Japanese Government through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at Madrid regarding the Japanese nationals removed from certain areas in the Pacific coast region of the United States.

It is noted that the Japanese Government has drawn the conclusion from reports received by it that Japanese nationals may have been removed from their customary places of residence in the United States without adequate guarantees of their physical welfare and property and under conditions which constitute violations of the undertaking of the United States Government not to make use of the provisions of Article 27 of the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention to compel Japanese civilians detained or interned by it to labor against their will.

The Japanese nationals removed from areas in the Pacific coast region of the United States were removed because of military necessities and for their own protection. They were first transferred to temporary assembly centers, some of which have been visited by

representatives of the Spanish Embassy. From the assembly centers the Japanese will be removed to relocation centers which are not internment camps but are on the contrary areas where communities are being established in which the Japanese may organize their social and economic life in safety and security under the protection of the central authorities of the United States.

As will be realized, had these persons simply been ordered to remove from the restricted areas in which they were resident and been left to their own devices in the finding of places in other regions of the United States in which to settle, they might have encountered great difficulties and suffered hardships in the course of their endeavors to establish themselves on their own resources. As it is, they have been provided under the protection and at the expense of the American Federal Authorities with living quarters where family groups may remain together in communities organized especially for them. They are provided with living quarters and other necessities of life, including liberal rations of food, whether they volunteer for work or not. Furthermore, special assistance in the form of public health programs, medical and hospital facilities, and special food and treatment for the aged and infirm, as well as for women and children, have been provided.

Scrupulous care has been exercised to avoid a violation of this Government's undertaking not to apply Article 27 of the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention to compel Japanese nationals to work against their wills. Only those who volunteer to work will be given employment. An endeavor is made to assign these persons to the type of work to which they are best fitted by education and previous training and for which they receive compensation.

Furthermore, measures have been taken to protect the property of the Japanese removed from their previous places of residence. This property has not been confiscated.

The Department of State has forwarded the Spanish Embassy's memorandum under reference to other interested agencies of the United States Government with a request for additional information regarding the removal of Japanese nationals from areas in the Pacific coast region, particularly with reference to the request in the penultimate paragraph of the Spanish Embassy's memorandum regarding the number of Japanese transferred and the respective places to which they were removed. When replies shall have been received from these agencies a further communication will be addressed to the Spanish Embassy.

WASHINGTON, August 24, 1942.

740.00115 Pacific War/1206

The Spanish Embassy to the Department of State

MEMORANDUM

No. 473

The Spanish Embassy has the honor to enclose copy of a cablegram from the Imperial Japanese Government through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at Madrid, relative to the supposed ill-treatment inflicted upon Japanese nationals on their detention and posterior internment in concentration camps of the United States.

The Spanish Embassy would be deeply obliged to the State Department for an investigation of the complaints of reference where it may proceed, and will equally appreciate to be apprised in due time as to its results, so a reply on the matter in question can be transmitted to the Government of Japan.

WASHINGTON, October 27, 1942.

[Enclosure]

*Copy of Telegram Received From the Japanese Imperial Government
Through the Foreign Office at Madrid*

The Japanese Imperial Government begs that the following telegram be transmitted to the United States Government:

"The Japanese Government having received reports from Japanese subjects repatriated from the United States by the exchange-vessels⁸⁰ is astonished at the most inhuman cruelty and insult inflicted upon them by the United States Authorities in the course of their arrest, examination, internment and transport. The United States Government has thereby violated their solemn declaration to apply as far as possible to interned non-combatants, the provisions of the Convention relative to treatment of prisoners of war signed at Geneva in July, 1929. The Japanese Government, therefore, does hereby lodge a most emphatic protest and demands the United States Government's serious consideration of the matter.

I.—ARREST AND INTERNMENT

1.—(a) Many Japanese subjects aged over sixty have been interned and not a few of them being over eighty. The average age of Japanese subjects interned is fifty-four or fifty-five at many internment camps. These aged internees are treated equally with those who are in the prime of life. In respect to housing, food and discipline, no special consideration for their age is accorded to them.

⁸⁰ For correspondence on first exchange of American and Japanese nationals, see *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. 1, pp. 377 ff.

(b) Three Japanese subjects who died at Fort Missoula, Montana, Viz :—

Messrs. Seiichiro Itoh
Kamaki Kinoshita, and
Shigekazu Hazama

had been invalids from before their arrest, but no allowance was given them on account of their ill health.

Mr. Hazama, especially, was operated upon at Los Angeles to remove cancer of the rectum and had been progressing very unfavorably when he was arrested. He was carried away from his sick bed and in his railway journey to Missoula, he was three days and three nights forced to sit in a compartment, windows of which were shut and blinds were lowered, consequently, his illness was rapidly aggravated and he succumbed on the first of March.

(c) Mr. Fusaichi Katoh, resident of Los Angeles, who was wounded in the right eye by a motorcar accident, was not allowed to see a Doctor before he was arrested and carried to the internment camp at Tujunga. He was later allowed to go out to consult an oculist, but the Los Angeles Authorities instead of allowing him to receive medical treatment imprisoned him and took him to Santa Fe, thus it became too late for any treatment to be efficacious and Mr. Katoh lost sight of his injured eye.

2.—From these facts it cannot but be concluded that in the internment of Japanese civilians, the United States Government is paying not the slightest regard to their age or conditions of health. In internment of the United States citizens, the Japanese Government is giving generous consideration to their age and health and only a very few who are aged over sixty have been interned and that only for special reasons the Japanese Government calls serious.

Attention of the United States Government to the fact that they have committed an act of inhumanity by interning large numbers of Japanese civilians of advanced age or suffering from serious illness on no justifiable grounds and by placing them in such conditions as to cause them unbearable pain and expose their life to danger, the Japanese Government demands that the United States Government immediately release those aged and invalid internees.

II.—TREATMENT ACCORDED IN COURSE OF ARREST AND TRANSPORT

1.—The Japanese civilians interned in the United States have in the course of their arrest and transport, been treated by the United States Authorities in the following manner:

(1) Created [*Great?*] number of these who were arrested in the region along the Pacific Coast were sent to places of detention in handcuffs, and some of them despite their old age, over sixty, were even chained to motorcars. They were put in narrow and filthy

detention rooms of the Immigration Office or local Police Stations, they were subjected unnecessarily to insulting maltreatment in the course of their arrest, transport, and examination. They were frequently beaten and kicked. Following are only a few out of many instances of such brutal treatment:

(a) Those who were arrested in San Francisco, detained at the Immigration Office on the 7th of December, 1941, were allowed to have a walk outdoors for only an hour once in ten days.

(b) Thirteen Japanese subjects who were arrested at Los Angeles on the same day were jammed into narrow stifling prison cell of a capacity for two persons and consequently they experienced great difficulty even in easing nature.

The next day they were sent to the Federal Penitentiary at Terminal Island without breakfast or lunch till six o'clock in the afternoon. On their arrival at the prison they were kept standing in the open air for nearly three hours, their persons were rigorously searched in an insulting manner for several hours in a cold room without a fire and they were forced to undergo humiliating disinfecting process, then they were clothed in convicts uniforms and were forbidden to wear their own overcoats even when they were outside in the rain. When some of them carried food to their ailing friends through the prison yard they were not allowed to cover the foodtrays to protect them from the rain.

(c) The Japanese subjects who were interned at the Lincoln Heights Jail, Los Angeles, were put in dark cells together with convicts and for two weeks were not allowed either to see sunlight or to go out into the open air. Food was given only twice a day and it consisted only of boiled beans, consequently, those who were of old age or delicate constitution became ill on account of lack of nourishment and contaminated air of cells.

(d) Special mention must be made of Mr. Rikita Honda, physician, who was arrested at Los Angeles, at the outbreak of war and committed suicide in a solitary cell of the Immigration Office on the 14th of December. It appears that he was under special suspicion owing to the fact that he was president of the Los Angeles Naval Association (Kaigun Kyokai), but this association is a mere social club. He had nothing to conceal from examining officials. He advised his compatriots detained at the Immigration Office to answer honestly and uprightly questions put to them by examining officials. These facts admit of most grave suspicions as to the circumstances leading to his suicide.

(2)—(a) A member of the staff of the Japanese Consulate in Los Angeles, who was in a very feeble condition, convalescing from an illness, was, when sent from Fort Missoula to White Sulphur Springs, handcuffed and chained to the bed as if he were a hard criminal. As he witnessed that the Immigration Officer received the handcuffs from his superior when departing from Fort Missoula, there was no doubt that this maltreatment was ordered by the internment camp authorities.

(b) When interned civilians were transferred from one internment camp to another, they were treated as if they were convicts, soldiers loaded their guns with ball cartridges in their presence and they were forced to walk to the station while soldiers levelled guns at them and crowds of people looked on.

2.—In interning United States civilians the Japanese Government has been careful not to take any other measures than are necessary for restraining their personal liberty. They have never been handcuffed nor have they been ever examined or threatened like criminals. The Japanese Government is unable to see on what grounds the United States Government felt justified in treating Japanese civilians in such a cruel, inhuman manner, as aforesaid Japanese Government lodges most emphatic protests against the insulting and inhuman treatment accorded to Japanese civilians by the United States authorities, and demands the United States Government furnish a detailed report concerning circumstances which led to the death of Mr. Rikita Honda.

III.—TORTURE AT INTERNMENT CAMPS

(1) In examining interned Japanese civilians the United States authorities took such illegal actions as follows:

(a) At Fort Missoula some Japanese civilians who entered the United States prior to 1942 without passports were beaten, kicked, forced to keep standing for hours running, and given no food in order to extort from them false confessions that they entered the country after 1942. Owing to this brutal treatment they fell unconscious and they were forced to sign documents which were described as their depositions, but contents of which they know nothing about. There are also reported numerous cases of insulting treatment in the same camp.

(b) At Fort Lincoln, examining officials knocked down and kicked Japanese civilian and broke his two upper teeth.

(2) The Japanese Government desires to notify the United States Government that it is most gravely concerned about the above mentioned inhuman acts of violence on the part of the United States authorities and demands the United States Government reply in explanation of these outrages. The Japanese Government further demands the United States Government to take adequate and effective measures in order to prevent recurrence of such events.

IV.—COMPULSORY LABOUR AT INTERNMENT CAMPS

1.—(a) Authorities of internment camp at Missoula, Montana, alleged that application of the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention to internees entails obligations on the part of those interned to offer gratuitous labour for "upkeep and maintenance" of the internment camp and that the internment camp does not only mean enclosed compound but includes all constructions and equipment belonging to the camp. Thus they ordered the Japanese internees to clean the

stable in which horses owned by camp officials were kept and to help build the Japanese garden and swimming pool which were under construction outside camp grounds. They threatened Japanese internees that unless they voluntarily went to work there would ensue unpleasant consequences. Nothing was said about compensation for their work.

(b) At the internment camp at Santa Fe, New Mexico, where labour was wanting owing to the strike of a local trade union, authorities tried to compel the Japanese to build barracks for internees in spite of their opposition.

(c) There are also instances of internees having been put to such labour not directly related to their maintenance, as cleaning of offices of camp officials, or cooking and table service of these officials.

2.—Above mentioned stable in which horses of camp officials are kept, are not integral part of the internment camp for civilians. The above mentioned garden and swimming pool being situated in a place to which internees have no access can in no respect form part of the camp.

The Geneva Convention contains provisions stipulating labour for purpose of administration, management, and maintenance of internment camps, but there are no provisions concerning supply of labour for building new camps. Moreover, it is needless to say that labour supplied by internees should be such as is directly related to their subsistence and comfort, therefore, the abovesaid reasons given by the internment camp authorities have no foundation in putting Japanese civilian internees to unjustifiable labour. The United States Government has contradicted their statement made in note addressed to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs⁸¹ by the Swiss Minister in Tokyo, under date of March 23rd, 1942,⁸² to the effect that the United States Government has never imposed compulsory labour on interned civilians and that they have no intention to do so in the future. The Japanese Government therefore, enters a protest against the above mentioned measures taken by the United States Government, and demands that the United States Government immediately cease enforcement of the above mentioned labour imposed on Japanese civilian internees and pay adequate compensations to those who have hitherto been put to such labour. The Japanese Government further demands guaranty of the United States Government that it will not take such measures again.

V.—TREATMENT AT DEPARTURE OF EXCHANGE SHIP

1.—In the agreement concluded between Japan and the United States regarding the exchange of diplomatic and consular officials,

⁸¹ Shigenori Togo.

⁸² See telegram No. 712, March 19, 1942, to the Minister in Switzerland, *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. I, p. 804.

etc, it is stipulated that examination of luggage of non-official evacuees shall be "lenient" and that their persons shall not be searched (*Vide* Paragraph 20 of the United States Government reply received by the Japanese Government on the 11th of February ⁸³). There are instances in which the United States Government has clearly violated their pledge on these two points.

(a) At the Pennsylvania Hotel, New York City, on the 10th of June and at the internment camp at Ellis Island, from the 7th till the 9th of June, Customs Officials and members of the F. B. I.⁸⁴ relentlessly and recklessly examined the possessions of the Japanese evacuees and they made no scruple to break or damage them in the course of examination. They went to such extremes as breaking open watches, cutting open lapels of coats, and ripping up belts. They spent four or five hours in the examination of two or three packages. They seized large quantities of things of various descriptions, including watches, cameras, fountain pens, cigarette lighters, clothing, etc. They seized not only every written or printed scrap of paper including note books, address books and etc, but also blank sheets of paper, not excepting even wrappers of soap. They also seized all chemicals, including aspirin tablets. No receipts were given for these seized articles.

(b) On the thirteenth of June at the abovesaid Hotel and internment camp, luggage was thoroughly examined when persons of all evacuees were also searched in an insulting manner. They were made stark naked and even plaster applied to wound was stripped off. Some of the evacuees had their hair searched. Women were also made naked by women examiners and many of them were subjected to most humiliating search.

2.—The Japanese Government most emphatically protests against such deliberate and flagrant violations of stipulations of exchange agreement, especially against unlawful seizure of evacuees belongings without giving them receipts therefor and most insulting and inhuman search of persons of evacuees.

The Japanese Government demands the United States Government to offer an explanation for these outrages and to return unlawfully seized articles to their owners."

JORDANA

Minister of Foreign Affairs

740.00115 Pacific War/1206

The Department of State to the Spanish Embassy

MEMORANDUM

The Department of State refers to the Spanish Embassy's memorandum of October 27, 1942 with which there was enclosed a copy of

⁸³ See telegram No. 379, February 7, 1942, to the Chargé in Switzerland, *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. I, p. 391.

⁸⁴ Federal Bureau of Investigation.

a telegram received from the Government of Japan through the Ministry for Foreign Affairs at Madrid reciting reports received by the Japanese Government from Japanese subjects repatriated from the United States to the effect that they had suffered treatment inconsistent with the principles of the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention, and protesting with regard to this reported mistreatment.

The Government of the United States has instructed all of its officers concerned with the handling of Japanese subjects to exercise the most scrupulous care that their actions with relation to Japanese under their control shall be governed by the humanitarian principles of the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention and the generally recognized principles of international law. With a view to the maintenance of the highest possible standards of humanitarian treatment, the American Government has not hesitated in the past to investigate all complaints made to it by the Spanish Embassy or by Japanese subjects concerning alleged mistreatment or concerning differences of opinion between Japanese subjects and officers of the American Government with regard to the interpretation of the Geneva Convention. The American Government is now making a thorough investigation of every complaint reported by the Japanese Government in its telegram under reference with a view to removing the causes of legitimate complaints and taking appropriate disciplinary action with regard to them.

It would be appreciated if the Spanish Government would inform the Japanese Government in this connection that the American Government has itself received from American nationals repatriated from Japan and Japanese-controlled territory reports of shocking mistreatment, cruelties and insults, inflicted upon these American nationals by officers and agents of the Japanese Government and that the American Government has prepared a report concerning these experiences of its nationals for submission through the Swiss Government to the Japanese Government⁸⁵ in the thought that the Japanese Government on its part will desire to make a thorough investigation of the complaints of American citizens regarding their mistreatment by its officers and agents with a view to taking the necessary steps to avoid the repetition in the future of abuses and to taking appropriate disciplinary action with regard to past abuses.

Pending the completion of the investigation that the American Government has undertaken it desires to make the following comments regarding the complaints recited in the Japanese Government's protest:

1. The complaint regarding the treatment of the aged and infirm:

Elderly and infirm Japanese subjects have been detained for investigation only when there existed special reasons of a serious nature

⁸⁵ See telegram No. 2814, December 12, 1942, to the Minister in Switzerland, *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. I, p. 832.

necessitating their detention and have been ordered interned only when it has been determined after a thorough hearing, at which the persons in question have been permitted to appear and to produce evidence in their own defense, that there are grave reasons for holding them. A number of older persons who were detained temporarily on the outbreak of hostilities were released following their hearings. Others against whom orders of internment were issued have subsequently been released following reviews of their cases.

At all detention and internment camps and stations at which Japanese subjects have been or are being held, the American Government provides special medical care, and hospitalization when necessary, for the sick, infirm and aged. Furthermore, in all detention and internment camps the distribution of labor necessary for the maintenance of the facilities used by the internees is made by spokesmen elected by the internees themselves. These spokesmen take into consideration in the distribution of the labor to their fellow detainees and internees their age and physical condition.

2. The complaints about methods of transport and confinement:

Immediately upon the outbreak of hostilities the American Government proceeded to the construction at great expense of detention and internment camps prepared in accordance with the provisions of the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention to which Japanese subjects, whom it was necessary to detain locally in the interest of the national safety, were transferred with the utmost rapidity possible. The Japanese so transferred were transported in standard trains and every effort was made to effect such transportation in the greatest possible comfort. It should be added with regard to this category of complaints that the Japanese subjects detained were not held in confinement in jails with criminals but were placed in special detention stations and camps and were not clothed as are convicts, being provided in most cases with clothing from American army stores in fulfillment of this Government's undertaking to supply civilians detained or interned with clothing in accordance with the provisions of the Geneva Convention for the supplying of needed clothing to prisoners of war.

3. The complaints of torture at camps:

These complaints have already been the subject of a thorough investigation, the results of which were reported to the Spanish Embassy by the Department of State in its memorandum of August 6, 1942.⁸⁶

4. The complaints about compulsory labor at internment camps:

The Government of the United States has instructed all Commanders of detention and internment camps not to require labor from detainees and internees except in connection with the administration,

⁸⁶ Not printed. The memorandum gave the substance of a Department of Justice report that a Japanese was struck and injured by an inspector in an altercation, "that some of the aliens were required to stand for long periods of time, some merely to show respect for the examining officer . . . ; some were shouted at and called liars and damned liars; some were seized by the body or clothing and shaken or pushed; and some were confined in the guard house at Fort Missoula for varying periods of time." The officers responsible were removed. (740.00115 Pacific War/714)

management, and maintenance of the camps, as provided in the Geneva Convention, and in connection with camp installations used for the benefit and comfort of the internees. The camp authorities have further been instructed that any other employment of the labor of persons held in their camps must be upon a voluntary basis, must not be in violation of Article 31 of the Convention, and must be compensated.

With reference to the employment of internees in the maintenance of gardens, swimming pools, et cetera, outside of the camp enclosures, it is understood that at some camps internees have labored on a voluntary basis, sometimes with financial compensation and sometimes with compensation in goods, in the maintenance of gardens, swimming pools, bakeries, and other installations outside of the camp enclosures proper. In such cases the internees were permitted to use the swimming pools, and the produce from the gardens and bakeries was consumed by them in the camps.

5. The complaints about treatment at the departure of the exchange ship:

The Japanese subjects brought to New York to be placed on the exchange ship were transported in Pullman sleeping cars and were housed in New York in a first-class hotel. Only a few suspect individuals among them were subjected to search. No Japanese subjects with official status were subjected to searches of any sort.

When the investigation to which reference has been previously made shall have been completed the Department of State will again communicate with the Spanish Embassy with regard to these matters.

The Department of State would be grateful if, in forwarding this preliminary reply to the Japanese protest, the Spanish Embassy would inform the Japanese Government that in the American Government's opinion the best proof of the readiness of a belligerent to accord to enemy aliens in territories controlled by it the full benefit of the humanitarian provisions of applicable treaties, conventions, and agreements, as well as of international law, is afforded by the readiness of that belligerent to permit representatives of the Protecting Power to have access to all places where enemy aliens are held.

In its assurance of its own honorable intention to accord to Japanese nationals subject to American control the full benefits of all applicable humanitarian provisions of international law and treaties, the Government of the United States continues to be willing to permit representatives of the Spanish Embassy, as the Protecting Power for Japanese interests, to visit all places in which Japanese subjects are held or accommodated by the American authorities.

The American Government desires to remind the Japanese Government in this connection that the best assurance that Japan is fulfilling its undertakings in respect to American nationals subject to its control would be afforded by the granting of permission for representatives of the Swiss Government in charge of American interests in Japan

and Japanese controlled territory to visit all places without exception in which American nationals are held.

WASHINGTON, December 12, 1942.

702.9411A/78

*The Swedish Minister (Boström) to the Secretary of State*⁸⁷

The Minister of Sweden in charge of the Japanese interests in the Territory of Hawaii presents his compliments to the Honorable, the Secretary of State, and has the honor to forward, herewith, copy of a cablegram from the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs concerning the complaints of the Japanese Government regarding the treatment of the personnel of the former Japanese Consulate General in Honolulu after the outbreak of the war on December 8, 1941.

The Swedish Minister asks the Secretary of State to be good enough to give this matter due consideration and to enable him to transmit the reply of the American Government.

The said cablegram also contains complaints concerning the treatment of Japanese from Hawaii after their transportation to the mainland. That part of the message has been sent, in copy, to the Spanish Embassy for consideration.

WASHINGTON, December 31, 1942.

No. B-113.

[Enclosure]

EXCERPT FROM A CABLEGRAM DATED DECEMBER 24, 1942, ADDRESSED TO THE SWEDISH LEGATION, WASHINGTON, D.C., BY THE SWEDISH MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS B

(B 113) Japanese Government ask you transmit following to American Government:

"The Imperial Japanese Government have received from the former Japanese Consul General at Honolulu⁸⁸ who recently returned by the exchange ship following report regarding the treatment accorded to him and members of his staff including their families by the United States authorities. According to this report the treatment was extremely cruel and inhuman, [and] a grave insult was inflicted upon the Japanese officials in utter disregard of the well established international usage concerning the treatment of consular officials. The Imperial Japanese Government are astonished at such outrageous measures indulged in by the American authorities to which they hereby

⁸⁷ Handed on January 4, 1943, to Assistant Secretary Long by the Swedish Minister; acknowledged by the Secretary of State on January 26.

⁸⁸ Nagao Kita.

wish to draw the latter's most serious attention with the request for adequate explanation.

Alinea I—A raid on the Japanese Consulate General at Honolulu at [and?] internment of its members.

Alinea (1)—At about 09.30 a. m. on the 7th of December 1941 about ten policemen belonging to the local special police force came to guard the premises of the Consulate General and its vicinity. About noon armed officials numbering about ten (two or three of them in uniform and the rest in plain clothes and armed with rifles and revolvers) suddenly rushed to the back entrance of the Consulate office and, pressing the Consul General and others who happened to be there forward, they broke into the room by the entrance. Then without explaining either their identities or reason for their visit they thrust the Consul General and others with violence into the adjoining office of the Consul General and after examining all pockets of their clothes seizing at the same time contents thereof compelled them to undress. They went to the length of searching rigorously shoes and socks. They knocked hard Mr. Morimura, Chancellor of the Consulate General, on back without provocation and even committed such an act of affront as to force the Consul General to take off his underpants. They searched desks, cabinets and everything in the room that they could lay hand on carrying away some articles. It was learned later that these officials were certain Benjamin van Kuren, Captain of Detectives of the Honolulu police station, his men and members of the FBI.

Alinea (2)—These officials then forced the Consul General and members of his staff to sit upright in another room forbidding them to talk except in English. During many hours that ensued they placed rifles on the table with muzzles towards the Japanese officials and made the latter wait until the arrival of Mr. Robert L. Shibers, Chief of local branch of the FBI. As the last mentioned did not appear even after dusk the police asked the Consul General to accompany them to the police station. This the Consul General naturally refused to do. When the total darkness began to prevail in the room, owing to the blackout, the Japanese officials were moved to the front porch. Later Mrs. Seki, wife of Mr. Seki, Chancellor, was also removed by the police from the official residence on the second floor of the Consulate to join the party and hence had to share the fate of long internment. In the meantime the families living at the official residences in the compound of the Consulate remained isolated not being allowed any contact with each other or with the interned members of the Consulate.

Alinea (3)—The Japanese officials had to stay all night through in the front porch under strict police supervision, permission not being granted to go either to their residences in the Consulate com-

pound for meal or to toilet in the office which was only a few yards away. They were told to do their needs by the front door and even Mrs. Seki was not allowed to use the toilet room despite her earnest pleading. They were forced to sleep that night on the chairs in the porch and on the hard narrow wooden bench fixed to the wall with blankets only to warm themselves with, which became available only after repeated requests. During night policemen would point their rifles at the consular officials sometimes even when they were standing in the garden to do their needs. To the repeated requests to return to the room made by the consular officials early in the morning of the 8th of December the police refused to listen, saying that they were under the order to watch them at the same position where they had found them, and it was late in the morning that they were allowed to reenter the house upon negotiations with the police who came to take their turn.

Alinea (4)—They were again forced to sit upright under the strict supervision of two policemen with steel helmets and revolvers who took away fruit knives from breakfast table and even disallowed them to use articles like pen and pencil. On the nights of the 8th and 9th they were forced to shape [*share?*] meager and uneasy sleep huddling together on blankets laid on the floor. Only after repeated requests they were permitted on the 10th to use two rooms for the Consular officials and one room for Mrs. Seki as their bedrooms. Still they were not free from disturbing intrusions by the police who inspected their faces by light of torch frequently during the night. Thus the Consul General, other officials, Mrs. Seki and Mr. Osaki, chauffeur, who joined the group later, eight in all, were forced to remain sitting upright in the Consulate office during the daytime taking their meals there and in the evening they went into the bedrooms on the second floor. They were not allowed to walk except to go to toilet for which they had to apply each time. This condition lasted until the middle of December when for the first time they were allowed to take a walk for an hour daily in one part of the compound of the Consulate and to take bath but they were not permitted to converse with their respective families who were allowed to have a walk in the compound at the same time nor to return to their homes situated within the compound. During this period the armed police—about 15 in number—who were on guard, some in the Consulate office some in the corridors, frequently examined the number of the consular officials and other internees, followed them each time they went to bedrooms and stood on guard at the entrance of bathroom both when they were preparing [apparent omission] to the 22nd of January 1942. It is specially to be observed that the United States authorities in raiding the Consulate General and forcefully detaining its members and also in taking such harsh measures as mentioned above never uttered a

word about the changed relations between Japan and America or about the outbreak of war between the two countries. They acted with violence as if they were arresting criminals or making raid on gambling men.

Alinea II—Search of the Consulate General and official residences of consular officials.

Alinea (1)—While the Consul General and his staff were under detention, the police searched freely every part of the office without obtaining permission of the Consul General or asking him to be present. There they not only smashed the door of the cable room completely but also broke open several steel cabinets in the Vice Consul's room together with other locked cases.

Alinea (2)—The American authorities raided frequently the official residences of the Consul General and his staff and threatening helpless women and children with brute force, made through [*thorough?*] searches of the houses. The authorities moreover demanded them to hand over the keys and without asking them to be present wantonly opened trunks and chests searching and seizing articles. Consequently there was no way to ascertain what was being taken away nor [had] the police furnished any information. It was discovered later that radios, cameras and money had been taken away, but regarding other missing articles nothing is known yet as the police authorities when approached dodged questions in one way or another. It is true that the best part of money was recovered later but it was deposited with the Bishop National Bank where it still remains to this day. It is beyond doubt that cash amounting to 60 dollars, two baseball gloves, two rolls of bleached cotton (these being property of Mr. Tsukikawa, Chancellor) and cash amounting to 21 dollars and one set of Sheaffer fountain pen and Sharp pencil (these belonging to Mr. Seki, Chancellor) were stolen by searching policemen. The police authorities admitted probability of this theft on the part of policemen. These searches were made in such violent manner that many chests and [*of*] drawers suffered irreparable damages including the chest of drawers with mirror which was in the Consul General's bedroom.

Alinea III—Unreasonable restrictions imposed upon the consular officials.

Alinea (1)—The Consul General, his staff and their families were not allowed to read any newspaper during the period from the 7th of December until they went on board the exchange ship on the 18th of June.

Alinea (2)—As their money was promptly seized and their communications with outside cut off and in addition they are allowed to purchase only limited quantities of a few daily necessities, the consular officials experienced considerable inconveniences. They were

transferred to the continent. They requested permission to purchase overcoats, sweaters, socks, underwear, etc. for their families (these articles had not been necessary in such mild climate as in Honolulu) but Captain Van Kuren allowed them to buy only tooth paste, tooth brushes and one other article. At the time of departure for the continent the American officials, saying that they were examining plants, searched trunks and suitcases in the presence of the consular officials but apparently the plant examination was only an excuse, because the officials concerned were heard to discuss about articles which had nothing to do with plants, seizing at random photographs, memos and all other papers.

Alinea IV—Search of persons and internment during the voyage to the continent.

Alinea (1)—At about 8 p. m. on the 8th of February 1942 the Consul General and his party went on board a steamer at Pearl Harbor to be transported to the continent. They were not informed of their destination. Certain Captain Kirkgiss led them to a room adjoining the engineroom and told them to wait until all necessary arrangements were made. The room was unbearably hot. After half an hour the same captain led the Consul General and his staff into another room and with the help of his men searched their persons in the most strict manner. They also examined cabin trunks and seized several hundred articles. It lasted as long as until 3 o'clock next morning. On this occasion the Consul General and his staff were forced to become almost naked, infant children of the consular officials were mercilessly separated from their mothers, for whom they were crying, and their persons were searched in the same manner. Above all wife of one of the consular officials was subjected to such insulting examination that she was forced to take off clothes and stockings and was left with only a chemise on. Then the inspecting officials pulling off the chemise from bottom and opening pants peeped into from behind and touched her hips. They even ransacked hair of ladies in order to ascertain whether nothing was hidden there. All iron shutters of cabin windows being closely shut and armed soldiers being posted outside the cabin the Consul General and his party remained confined all the time in a narrow stifling cabin from the 8th of February when they went on board the steamer until their disembarkation on the continent on the 17th of February, except their mealtime visits to the dining room (which was next to the engineroom and seemed to be a room assigned for plain sailors). During this period they did not have chance to get single ray of sunshine. Fearing that this would impair tender health of five children in the party they entreated the captain to allow the children to go out into sunshine for a short time daily. The captain promised to consider the matter but nothing was done. In the meantime all their belongings

were being subjected to examinations. The captain asked the Consul General and Mr. Okuda, Vice Consul, to surrender their keys. Apparently trunks and suitcases in the baggage room were also examined with those keys. On the occasion of their disembarkation they asked the captain to return them the seized articles as promised but the captain refused to do so saying that they would be returned after examination by the naval authorities. These articles were sent to Arizona later on. The seized articles, including all sorts of books, note books, toys, cakes, toilet articles, soap, knives, lighters, cards, albums, etc. were of more than fifty kinds and several hundreds in number. The examination was extremely severe not neglecting a hinge of jewel box. Examiners even tore off eyes of teddy bears and cut body open to examine the inside. Moreover considerable number of the seized articles have not been returned. Clothes, shoes and other articles seem to have been stolen altogether.

Alinea V—Treatment at Arizona Plateau.

Alinea (1)—The party, numbering 23 in all, got out of the train somewhere in Arizona Plateau on the 19th of February and were given accommodation at four bungalows suitable only for temporary shelter. It was several days after their arrival that it was ascertained that the place was the Triangle T Ranch near Dagoon. The American authorities only mentioned the name of Arizona while en route not informing them on the ultimate destination and even after their arrival at the destination they tried to conceal the names of the place and of hotels they were staying at.

Alinea (2)—In April a member of the FBI of Honolulu, Tilman by name, visited them at Arizona and on the pretext of making "daily talks" subjected all the consular officials and their families to very severe cross examinations for 6 days from the 17th to the 22nd of the same month. Especially he subjected Mr. Okuda, Vice Consul, to a cross examination lasting many hours using threatening language.

Alinea VI—Delay of embarkation of the exchange ship at New York.

The party left Arizona on the 8th of June to go on board the exchange ship which was due to sail on the 11th of June and arrived at New York at 11 a. m. on the 11th of June and went immediately to the Pennsylvania Hotel. However they were not allowed to embark the ship on the pretext that her departure was postponed and they were kept imprisoned at the same hotel for a week under strict surveillances. On the evening of the 18th they were allowed to embark on the exchange ship just about 3 hours prior to her departure. The American authorities interned the Consul General and members of his staff separately from the members of the Embassy and other Consulates and despite the fact that the embarkation on the exchange ship of other Japanese officials took place on the 11th of June they did not

allow the members of Honolulu Consulate to get on board the steamer until just immediately before her departure. Moreover in spite of the repeated inquiries made by Admiral K. Nomura, Japanese Ambassador in Washington, since several months before, the American authorities did not give any information concerning the whereabouts of the members of Honolulu Consulate and moreover they evaded the question regarding their whereabouts and the time of their embarkation even after they had arrived at New York. They also dodged inquiries made by the Consul General concerning the whereabouts of other Japanese officials. These measures towards the members of the Japanese Consulate General at Honolulu were it must be admitted unnecessarily strict and severe contrary to the international usage and utterly incomprehensible."

Cable text reply from American Government.

740.00115 Pacific War/1328

*The Swedish Minister (Boström) to the Secretary of State*⁸⁹

The Minister of Sweden in charge of the Japanese interests in the Territory of Hawaii presents his compliments to the Honorable, the Secretary of State, and has the honor to enclose, in copy, a cablegram dated December 24, 1942, containing complaints from the Japanese Government concerning the treatment of Japanese civilians interned in the Territory of Hawaii.

The Swedish Minister asks the Secretary of State to be good enough to give this matter due consideration and to enable him to transmit the reply of the American Government.

WASHINGTON, December 31, 1942.

No. B-114.

[Enclosure]

CABLEGRAM DATED DECEMBER 23, 1942, ADDRESSED TO THE SWEDISH LEGATION BY THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS B, STOCKHOLM

B 114 Japanese Government ask you transmit following to American Government:

"Some time ago the Imperial Japanese Government lodged a protest with the United States Government against unjust treatment accorded to [by] the United States authorities to Japanese civilians in the continental United States but since then the Japanese Government have learned anew from their subjects repatriated from Hawaii that Japanese subjects arrested and interned in the territory of Hawaii

⁸⁹ Handed on January 4, 1943, to Assistant Secretary Long by the Swedish Minister and acknowledged by the Secretary of State on January 21. No reply as to substance was made to the Swedish Minister until 1944.

were treated in similar manner. The Japanese Government therefore invite serious attention of the United States Government to the matter and demand full explanation thereof.

Alinea (1)—The majority of the Japanese who were arrested in Oahu Island were sent to local immigration station in handcuffs as was the case with the Japanese arrested on the Pacific Coast of the continent and in some case about 200 of them were confined in a room with capacity for only about 80 persons. They were not permitted to go out of the room except for meals which were served regardless of weather on lawn in the compound under strict watch of soldiers with fixed bayonets posted about two feet apart.

Alinea (2)—The camp authorities at the Sand Island camp declared that they were treating Japanese civilians as prisoners of war and compelled them to perform gratuitous labor in such works as erection of tents intended for interned Germans or Italians, construction of fences around camp, laundering and repair work of various kinds related to nearby military establishments, and growing of vegetables to be supplied to soldiers.

Alinea (3)—Japanese interned at the above-mentioned camp were subjected to rigorous search of their persons and possessions on their arrival, while all of their money and articles were seized by the camp authority. When part of the interned Japanese were transferred to the continental United States they were obliged to get from their families about 50 dollars per head for miscellaneous expenses to cover the journey. They were compelled to deposit money with the military authorities on the explicit understanding that it will be returned on their arrival in the continent, but after their arrival at the destination the authorities ignored the repeated requests from the Japanese of the return of money in question as well as money seized on their arrival at the camp. A few of them who departed for Japan by the first exchange vessel left the Japanese internees in the camps in the continent in great hardship owing to total lack of money. Search and examination by the United States authorities of person and luggage of Japanese nationals arrested and interned in Hawaii was most rigorous and repeated with needless frequency. The Japanese were forced to undergo search on their arrival at and departure from camp and also on their embarkation on and disembarkation from vessel for transfer or for repatriation. Some of them were searched as repeatedly as nine times in all after their arrest until their departure from the United States.

Alinea (4)—The Japanese who were transferred from the Sand Island Camp to the continent were jammed into locked room near the ship's bottom with wire netting and were forbidden to go out of the room except for meals or lavatory for which they were required to get permission from guards. Every time however guards who grudged the trouble treated the Japanese in the most inconsiderate manner which made them suffer good deal of pain and inconvenience."

Cable text reply from American Government.

MINISTRY FOREIGN AFFAIRS B.

740.00115 Pacific War/1148

The Department of State to the Spanish Embassy

MEMORANDUM

The Department of State refers to memorandum no. 333 dated August 3, 1942, from the Spanish Embassy in charge of Japanese interests in the continental United States, and to the Department of State's preliminary reply thereto dated August 24, 1942, concerning the complaints received from the Imperial Japanese Government regarding the treatment of Japanese nationals moved from certain areas in the Pacific coast region of the United States.

It was pointed out in the Department's preliminary reply that the Japanese nationals moved from areas near the Pacific coast of the United States were moved because of military necessities and for their own protection. The evacuation was carefully planned in order to minimize hardships to individuals, to safeguard their health, and to protect the evacuees' personal and property interests.

The policy of the United States Government was made known some weeks before the order of evacuation was put into effect. During this time the Japanese were urged to prepare for evacuation, and to conduct their preparations in a calm and unhurried manner. On March 6, 1942, for example, the Commanding General, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army,⁹⁰ made the following statement to the prospective evacuees:

"Keep your balance, don't make hasty disposition of your farms, shops, residence or other property; continue your work on your crops until such time as the exclusion of enemy aliens and Japanese-Americans from strategic areas is officially ordered. Exclusion has not yet been ordered."

No evacuee was forced to dispose of his property or to take any action with regard to his personal or business affairs. If he did choose to dispose of his property or to take other action with regard to his business or personal affairs, he was encouraged to seek the advice of the appropriate governmental agencies and to accept their aid. The Federal Security Agency, the Farm Security Administration, the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, and other Federal, State, and local agencies cooperated with the Army authorities in seeking a solution of these individual problems. The Farm Security Agency reports that there is much evidence to support the statement that the Japanese who disposed of their assets did so on very satisfactory terms. Representatives of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco conducted 24,257 interviews on general property problems. There was no confiscation of property and as a result of these efforts, little loss

⁹⁰ Lt. Gen. John L. DeWitt.

through sale. The courts remained open to Japanese nationals at all times.

The United States Public Health Service found that the general health of the entire group was very good, although 9,484 persons were given treatment in connection with the evacuation program. The American Red Cross has reported that the medical care, health, and sanitary aspects of the Japanese assembly centers represent an outstanding achievement considering the difficulties under which the evacuation was undertaken.

The evacuees were first removed to assembly centers where their sojourn was temporary. All assembly centers have now been closed and the persons evacuated have moved to relocation centers where facilities of a more permanent nature have been provided for their use. It should be pointed out that at no time have these persons been interned.

In its memorandum of March 3 [5], 1943, to the Spanish Embassy in charge of Japanese interests in the continental United States, the Department of State informed the Embassy the number of Japanese nationals residing in the several relocation centers.⁹¹

The ten relocation centers which have been established are at sites which were selected after consideration of over 300 proposed locations, of which 100 were given careful field investigation by trained soil scientists, engineers, economists, geologists, and agronomists. Each site selected meets the following minimum requirements:

1. It contains not less than 5,500 acres in a single block;
2. It contains a substantial acreage capable of producing agricultural products;
3. It is located in a climate which is suitable for human habitation and the growing of agricultural crops;
4. It is provided with an adequate supply of pure water;
5. It is close to an electric power line and good railroad and highway transportation facilities;
6. It is free from flood hazards;
7. It is so located that conditions are favorable for installing a sanitary sewage disposal system; and
8. It is free from any conditions that might adversely affect human health.

Perhaps the best evidence that environmental factors are favorable at each site is the fact that there are prosperous and populous communities near each project.

The Japanese in the relocation centers are assured of their food and shelter and of their personal safety. Food, shelter, medical care, and educational facilities are available to all, whether they accept the opportunity of employment offered to them or not. This employ-

⁹¹ Memorandum not printed; it stated the number of such Japanese nationals was 37,111 (740.00115 Pacific War/1388).

ment is often in agricultural pursuits, but other employment is available for those evacuees who have special talents. Persons with professional training in medicine, law, dentistry, and teaching, for example, are permitted to continue the practice of their professions. Factories for the manufacture of furniture and clothing have been established and barbers, beauticians, and others who render similar services may follow the lines of endeavor for which they are trained. Evacuees who are skilled painters, carpenters, plumbers, and electricians are offered employment in maintenance work at the centers. Reasonable compensation is paid for all labor performed. Moreover, persons not voluntarily unemployed may upon application receive unemployment compensation, and public assistance grants are available to unemployed adults, to children under sixteen, and to families with inadequate incomes.

It is not intended that the Japanese who were originally moved to relocation centers must remain there for the duration of hostilities. Those who desire may apply for permission to leave the centers for either an indefinite or a temporary period to reside in non-restricted areas. A considerable number of permits for such residence have already been granted and it is anticipated that a large number of evacuees will take advantage of the opportunity to leave the relocation centers.

The United States Government in executing its program for the evacuation of persons of Japanese race from certain areas on the Pacific coast was careful to see that everything which was done exceeded the standards set up by the Geneva Convention of 1929 relative to the treatment of prisoners of war even though the evacuees were not interned. Moreover, the officials of the United States Government charged with the execution of the program have been mindful of the dignity of the individual and have tried at all times to minimize the hardships which the evacuation might cause.

WASHINGTON, May 7, 1943.

702.9411A/78

The Secretary of State to the Swedish Minister (Boström)

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Honorable the Minister of Sweden in charge of Japanese interests in the Territory of Hawaii and has the honor to refer to the Minister's note no. B-113 of December 31, 1942 and to the Department's acknowledgment of January 26, 1943⁹² regarding the alleged mistreatment of the personnel of the former Japanese Consulate General at Honolulu after the attack on the United States by Japan.

⁹² Latter not printed.

Careful consideration has been given to the protest of the Japanese Government regarding the alleged mistreatment of this group of Japanese nationals, and it is felt that the comments of the Japanese Government do not take into consideration the proximity of the former Japanese Consulate General to military and naval installations and the fact that after the Japanese attack on the Island of Oahu, certain precautions were immediately necessary in view of probable further hostilities in that area. Mr. Kita, the Consul General, was for his part fully aware of these circumstances and later expressed his appreciation for the considerate treatment he and his staff had received.

On the morning of December 7, 1941, soon after the Japanese attack on Hawaii, a group of local police were sent to protect the Japanese Consulate General. Mr. Kita was so informed and he acknowledged the fact that the Consulate General was under protective custody in view of the outbreak of hostilities.

Shortly after this, the military governor of the Territory of Hawaii issued an order prohibiting any alien Japanese from possessing any weapons, cameras, radios, codes, ciphers, sketches or information regarding military and naval installations. Mr. Kita was informed of this order and was requested to turn over to the authorities any of these articles which he and his staff might have. Receipts were given for those articles taken into custody. It has been ascertained that no threats or force were used in any case. As there was a large amount of money in the possession of the members of the Consulate General, this money was placed in the safe of the Consulate General, the combination of which was known only to the members of the Consulate General. In accordance with the regulations of the Treasury Department, Mr. Kita later took this money to the Bishop National Bank of Hawaii and placed it in special blocked accounts in his name and in the names of Messrs. Okuda, Tsukikawa and Seki. Special permission was given to Mr. Kita to withdraw up to \$1200 a month from the blocked account in his name for living expenses of the members of the Consulate General and their families.

With regard to the alleged destruction of the property of the Consulate General, it will be recalled that Mr. Kita wished to recover some keys which were locked in the cable room and Mr. Kita gave his assent to the breaking of the panels of the doors in order to obtain the keys. A lock on the steel cabinet was forced as there were no available keys to open it. Mr. Kita himself broke the mirror over the chest of drawers in his bedroom.

With reference to the loss of \$21 and a fountain pen and pencil set belonging to Mr. Seki, a thorough investigation was made, but no trace has been found of these missing items. The loss of various articles belonging to Mr. Tsukikawa has also been investigated. It

appears that one bolt of bleached cotton was given to the Red Cross by one of the employees of the hotel where Mr. Tsukikawa resided. A search for the baseball glove and \$60 has not revealed the whereabouts of these articles. However, it has been determined that none of the above-mentioned articles were taken by the police authorities.

For the first days after the outbreak of war, the movements of the members of the Consulate General were necessarily restricted and with the exception of the night of December 7, 1941 when everyone remained fully dressed in view of probable air attacks, a precaution which was followed by almost everyone on the Island, this group lived an almost normal life. At no time was anyone forbidden the use of sanitary facilities or embarrassed in this connection.

The boundaries of the Consulate General were protected by police officials with riot guns while the buildings were protected by men with revolvers, and at no time were any guns intentionally pointed at members of the Consulate General.

The members even on the first day of hostilities were served by a Japanese maid the best food available on the Island. A blacked-out game room was prepared which permitted the Japanese to read and play games in the evening. During the day the Japanese exercised outdoors and freely mingled with other persons on the grounds of the Consulate General.

When the members of this group were to be removed to continental United States arrangements were made to return any articles which had been taken from the group. As she had done during the stay at the Consulate General, Miss Asakura purchased a variety of articles and clothing for the group to be used on the trip. It is to be noted that it was impossible to buy heavy winter clothing since none of the clothing stores in the Territory of Hawaii carried that type of clothing. There was no restriction on the amount of available clothing and luggage which could be purchased other than the space permitted on the vessel.

When the group boarded the vessel they were met by the commanding officer who informed Mr. Kita that in order to safeguard his party it was felt necessary to restrict the group to a certain area. Guards were placed at the entrance way in order to see that none of the other passengers or crew molested the group. In view of the fact that the ship was traveling in a war area, Mr. Kita was also informed that search would have to be made of everyone boarding the ship as well as their baggage. The search which was deemed by the captain of the vessel to be necessary in the interest of the safety of the vessel and its passengers was conducted with due regard to the modesty of the individuals and a female nurse was requested to search the female passengers.

In accordance with the military requirements all portholes were sealed while traveling on the open seas. Temperature of the area occupied by the group was taken at frequent intervals and there was no evidence that the health of the passengers was impaired. The Japanese nationals received daily medical inspection and several of the group received medical treatment for seasickness, and with the exception of an infection on Robert Hiroyoshi Sumida's leg, there were no serious problems regarding the health of the group.

Mr. Kita gave approval to a plan whereby food for the passengers was prepared by servants of the former Consulate General in their own style, and this method was found to be most satisfactory.

The Department has made a reply direct to the Spanish Embassy⁹³ regarding that portion of the protest of the Japanese Government which pertained to the treatment of this group while in continental United States.

WASHINGTON, September 8, 1943.

702.9411A/79

The Department of State to the Spanish Embassy

The Department of State refers to a memorandum dated January 4, 1943 from the Spanish Embassy⁹⁴ in charge of Japanese interests in continental United States and to the Department's reply of January 26, 1943⁹⁵ regarding the alleged mistreatment of the personnel of the former Japanese Consulate General at Honolulu after their transfer to the continental United States.

Careful consideration has been given to the protest of the Japanese Government, but this Government cannot agree that the treatment was unnecessarily strict and severe. For the protection of these Japanese nationals, it was considered necessary to keep secret any information regarding their movements. For reasons of national security the members of this group were not given an indication of their destination.

The Department is not aware that this group was subjected to any threatening language or treatment. On the contrary they were given courteous treatment, and every attempt was made to make their stay in Arizona and New York as agreeable as possible.

With respect to the alleged delay experienced by them in boarding the M.S. *Gripsholm*, a definite sailing date had not been agreed upon by the interested Governments up to the time when these passengers were embarked and in view of the uncertainty it was felt undesirable

⁹³ *Infra*.

⁹⁴ No. 1, Ex. 106.00, not printed; it quoted sections V and VI of the enclosure to Note B-113 of December 31, 1942, from the Swedish Minister, p. 1059.

⁹⁵ Not printed.

to move them from their quarters until the sailing date was definitely known.

The Department is sending a reply ⁹⁶ on the other portion of the protest from the Japanese Government direct to the Swedish Legation which is in charge of Japanese interests in the Territory of Hawaii.

WASHINGTON, September 9, 1943.

740.00115 Pacific War/1206

The Department of State to the Spanish Embassy

MEMORANDUM

The Department of State refers to memorandum no. 473, dated October 27, 1942, from the Spanish Embassy in charge of Japanese interests in the continental United States, transmitting a copy of a telegram received from the Japanese Government through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Madrid, concerning the reported mistreatment of Japanese nationals in the United States.

It was pointed out in the Department's preliminary reply dated December 12, 1942, to the memorandum under reference, that the American Government was making a thorough investigation of every complaint reported by the Japanese Government with a view to removing the causes of legitimate complaints and taking appropriate disciplinary action with regard to them. This investigation has now been completed and the facts which have been established and the disciplinary action which has been taken is set forth below:

The Japanese Government's telegram states that the average age of Japanese subjects held in many internment camps in the United States is fifty-four or fifty-five, that a few Japanese subjects over eighty years of age have been interned, and that no consideration is given to internees because of their advanced age. A careful study made by the Immigration and Naturalization Service, which is charged with the internment of dangerous or potentially dangerous enemy civilians in the continental United States, shows that only two Japanese aged eighty or over have been in the custody of that Service and that but one Japanese of eighty years of age is held at the present time. The same study shows that the average age of internees of Japanese nationality is now forty-five. The treatment of all the persons held is so uniformly considerate that it has not been necessary to make special provisions for the aged unless they are also sick or infirm. In that case they are hospitalized and given proper medical treatment and special diets. It has been the experience of the detaining authorities that older Japanese have often been anxious to join their friends and

⁹⁶ *Supra.*

relatives in the general quarters rather than remain in hospitals as the detaining authorities would have preferred.

Jurisdiction over the investigation, apprehension, and internment of Japanese nationals in the Hawaiian Islands, Alaska, and the Panama Canal Zone is vested in the War Department. In the internment camps under the jurisdiction of the War Department special consideration is accorded elderly and infirm internees. In addition, special medical care by competent physicians is provided for even the most minor ailments. Hospitalization when necessary is provided in Army hospitals or in hospitals established solely for the internees where the standard of equipment and professional service is equal to that in the hospitals of the United States Army.

The Japanese Government refers specifically to the cases of Messrs. Seiichiro Itoh, Kamaki Kinoshita, and Shigekazu Hazama. It is said that these persons were invalids before being taken into custody and that no consideration was given to them because of their ill health.

The records show that Mr. Seiichiro Itoh arrived at the detention station at Fort Missoula, Montana, on December 19, 1941, after being in the custody of the Immigration and Naturalization Service from December 10 until that time. During those nine days Mr. Itoh did not complain of any physical ailment or request any treatment, nor did he make any request for special consideration because of his age. On January 20, 1942, the medical officer at Fort Missoula reported that Mr. Itoh was in a state of advanced senile decay and the medical officer extended all the help that he could to Mr. Itoh. During the period of his illness Mr. Itoh was visited professionally by three Japanese physicians who indicated their satisfaction with the treatment he was receiving. The only recommendation that these physicians made concerning Mr. Itoh's treatment was that the cardiac stimulation being administered to him should be increased and this was done. Mr. Itoh died on February 3, 1942, of hypostatic pneumonia. His daughter has expressed her thanks to the authorities at Fort Missoula for their kindness throughout the period of her father's illness.

Mr. Kamaki Kinoshita was taken into custody on March 16, 1942, at Seattle, Washington. It is the practice of the attending surgeon of the United States Public Health Service to examine all detainees within thirty-six hours of their admission to the Detention Station at Seattle. There is no record to show that Mr. Kinoshita reported having a cold or that the fact was known to the officers at the Station. Mr. Kinoshita was transferred to Fort Missoula on March 20, 1942, where the medical officer in charge found that he had contracted bronchial pneumonia. The medical officer noted at the time that the patient had had a cold and mild respiratory infection of three days' duration and that he was previously in fair health. Mr. Kinoshita died on April 1, 1942, of heart failure due to pneumonia and senility.

Mr. Shigekazu Hazama was taken into custody on December 8, 1941. The records fail to show that either he or his friends reported his illness to the detaining authorities. However, upon his arrival at Fort Missoula, the officers in charge discovered his illness and Mr. Hazama was removed from the detention station to St. Patrick's Hospital at Missoula where he received competent professional care until his death on March 1, 1942. Mr. Hazama's death was due to carcinoma of the colon. During the entire time that Mr. Hazama was at Missoula officers of the Immigration and Naturalization Service extended courtesies for which they were thanked by the Hazama family and by the Japanese spokesman at Fort Missoula.

It is probably true that the windows of the train in which Mr. Hazama traveled from Los Angeles to Missoula were shut and that the blinds were lowered as this precaution has often been taken to protect Japanese from possible injury and from being exposed to public curiosity.

Mr. Fusaichi Katoh, to whose case the Japanese Government refers, was apprehended on February 21, 1942. Three days previously he had visited his personal physician, under whose treatment he had been for a growth on his right eye following an old traumatic injury. The physician has stated that when Mr. Katoh visited him on February 18, 1942, he found that the acute attack for which he had been treating Mr. Katoh had cleared up and that Mr. Katoh was not suffering any pain. This information from the physician is set forth in a letter dated February 22, 1942, addressed to the inspector in charge of the Tuna Canyon Camp where Mr. Katoh was then held. Dr. Ernest King, who was then Acting Assistant Surgeon at the Tuna Canyon Camp, remembers Mr. Katoh's case. He states that Mr. Katoh's condition did not become acute while he was at the camp. As Dr. King was not an eye specialist, however, he referred Mr. Katoh's case to the Los Angeles General Hospital for an eye operation if such was necessary. The records of the hospital show that Mr. Katoh was received there from Tuna Canyon at 11:30 a. m., March 10, 1942, and that he was discharged at 1:20 p. m. on March 12, 1942. The attending physician's notes contain the recommendation that the "patient may be discharged so far as his eye is concerned . . .⁹⁷ his eye is no longer painful". Later the same day Mr. Katoh started his journey to Santa Fe, New Mexico, where he was interned. Mr. Katoh remained at Santa Fe until July 17, 1942, when he was transferred to the Pomona Assembly Center, Pomona, California. He was subsequently moved to the Heart Mountain Relocation Center. It is clear that Mr. Katoh was given all the treatment that was considered advisable by the doctors who attended him.

⁹⁷ Points appear in the original.

The Japanese Government complains that a great number of the Japanese subjects who were arrested near the Pacific Coast of the United States were sent to places of detention in handcuffs and sometimes despite their old age were even chained to motor cars. The American authorities in investigating this report have found one case where a Japanese subject was actually handcuffed. In that case the use of handcuffs was necessary to prevent the man from destroying himself until a doctor could administer a hypodermic.

It is said that the Japanese subjects who were arrested in San Francisco and detained on December 7, 1941, were allowed to have a walk out of doors only for an hour once in ten days. The records of the Immigration and Naturalization Service show that during the period between December 7, 1941, and March 30, 1942, there were received at the detention station of the Service at 801 Silver Avenue, San Francisco, California, 448 Japanese aliens who were taken into custody under presidential warrants of arrest. During the period of custody the detainees were afforded a choice of two outside recreation facilities daily. The first choice was a large enclosed yard to the rear of the gymnasium. The second choice was a driveway running parallel to the entire rear length of the Station. When the weather was clear and the enclosed recreation yard properly drained, they were allowed to go into the recreation yard for one and one-half hours in the morning and one and one-half hours in the afternoon. When the weather was inclement, the detainees were allowed two outdoor periods of thirty minutes daily on the cement driveway. According to the statistics of the United States Weather Bureau, there was an unusually long period of inclement weather during the months of December 1941 and January 1942.

The Japanese Government complains also concerning the treatment given to Japanese subjects at Terminal Island, California. It was found that more than one hundred Japanese subjects entered the Terminal Island Institution during the afternoon of December 8, 1942, and were quartered in a section of the institution separate from that occupied by the other inmates. They had ample room and their beds were furnished with mattress, pillows, clean linen, and blankets. At all times they were treated with courtesy and they were subjected to no humiliation. The formalities connected with their entrance into the institution took several hours, but while they were waiting for their admission hot coffee and sandwiches were served to them at intervals.

The Japanese Government asked for a detailed report of the circumstances surrounding the suicide of Dr. Rikita Honda. Dr. Honda was apprehended on December 7, 1941, and was quartered with a Japanese and two other detainees in a room in the Immigration Station at Terminal Island, San Pedro, California. The room was large,

measuring sixteen feet by twenty-eight feet, had three large windows and an adjoining private bath. Dr. Honda went into the bathroom during the early hours of the morning of December 14, 1941, and there committed suicide by cutting his veins. After slashing his wrists and one arm, Dr. Honda returned to the bedroom. One of his roommates, having heard Dr. Honda groan, turned on the light and discovered that Dr. Honda was bleeding. The roommate summoned a guard who immediately called a physician. Dr. Honda was still living when the physician arrived but the latter was unsuccessful in his efforts to save him.

The officers of the Immigration and Naturalization Service who were serving at Terminal Island at the time of Dr. Honda's death and the men who were sharing the room with him have been questioned carefully. The testimony of Dr. Honda's roommates indicates that he never expressed his suicidal intentions to them although he was obviously worried about his plight and that of his interned friends. The doctor's roommates also said that to their knowledge he had engaged in no altercations with either officers or fellow detainees. The officers of the Immigration and Naturalization Service have testified that, aside from requiring Dr. Honda to execute the alien enemy questionnaire required of all enemy aliens, they made no attempt to solicit information of any sort from him. From the testimony given both by Dr. Honda's roommates and by the guards, there is no reason to think that anyone entered the bathroom or bedroom during the night of December 13-14 who might have attacked Dr. Honda. On the other hand it has been ascertained from the notes prepared by Dr. Honda prior to his death that he considered suicide his duty as a Japanese officer.

The Japanese Government reports that a member of the staff of the Japanese Consulate in Los Angeles was transferred from Fort Missoula to White Sulphur Springs while he was ill and that he was handcuffed and chained to a bed en route. The person to whom the Japanese Government refers is believed to be Mr. Ken Nakezawa. Mr. Nakezawa received medical attention at Fort Missoula from April 13, 1942, to April 17, 1942, because he was suffering from influenza. The attending physician was Dr. Nakaya, a Japanese internee who discharged Mr. Nakezawa as cured on April 17. On April 20, 1942, Mr. Nakezawa departed by train from Fort Missoula in the custody of an officer of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. During the journey to White Sulphur Springs, Mr. Nakezawa and the Immigration Officer occupied the same section in the sleeping car, one having the upper berth and the other having the lower berth. During the night each man wore a shackle around one wrist. The two shackles were attached to the ends of a lightweight chain five feet in length. Mr. Nakezawa expressed his amusement at

the procedure rather than his displeasure and at no time was he chained to his berth. The connecting chain hung loosely and away from public view behind the curtains of the upper and lower berth. Except for the fact that Mr. Nakezawa became train sick during the first night of the journey the trip was uneventful and conducted under pleasant circumstances.

In its complaint the Japanese Government has again referred to the misconduct of certain employees of the American Government at Fort Lincoln and Fort Missoula toward Japanese nationals. As the Department of State informed the Embassy in the Department's memorandum of August 6, 1942,⁹⁸ the two Korean interpreters involved in the incident at Fort Lincoln were dismissed. Moreover, Inspector Bliss and Special Inspector Herstrom, who were also mentioned in the Department's memorandum of August 6, have been expelled from the Service and the commander of Fort Missoula was removed. In addition to the strong disciplinary action which has been taken in these instances, measures were adopted to review all of the cases which had been heard by the officers involved and to insure that these occurrences would not be repeated.

The Japanese Government has stated that when interned civilians were transferred from one internment camp to another in the United States, they were treated as if they were convicts, soldiers improperly displayed their weapons and the internees were the objects of public curiosity.

It has been the policy of the American authorities when transfers are necessary to effect them with the least possible publicity and embarrassment to the internees. No information concerning a prospective transfer is made public. The only persons who witness the transfer therefore are those who happen to be in the immediate vicinity at the time that it takes place. During transfers made by the Immigration and Naturalization Service the internees are guarded by officers of that Service who carry firearms only in the safe position and safe manner in which they carry such weapons in the regular course of duty. Soldiers entrusted with the guarding of personnel have weapons which are carried inconspicuously, yet available for instant use. In no way is there intended to be a display of armed strength to embarrass or intimidate the internees.

In investigating the facts surrounding the transfer of Japanese internees, the Government of the United States has found but one occasion concerning which it might be said that the display of arms exceeded that necessary for proper protection. This occurred at Santa Fe, New Mexico, on March 14, 1942. The investigation establishes, however, that sentiment at the time ran extremely high in New Mexico against the Japanese since many of the New Mexico National

⁹⁸ See footnote 86, p. 1057.

Guardsmen had been at Bataan, and the display of firearms on this occasion was advisable for the protection of the internees.

The Japanese Government states that the Government of the United States has not honored its obligation with regard to the employment of civilian internees and states that American officials forced Japanese internees to perform labor other than that permitted by the terms of the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention when it is adapted to the treatment of civilian internees. On the contrary, the American Government has been mindful of its obligation in this respect and issued an order providing that all work which did not relate to the upkeep or maintenance of the internment camp should be on a voluntary basis.

The stables at Fort Missoula mentioned in the Japanese complaint are located inside the compound. The Japanese internees were at first required to maintain them in a sanitary and orderly manner as the buildings were used for recreation and storage purposes by the Japanese in addition to quartering Government-owned horses. Eventually work of this kind was assigned to other personnel.

The work on the gardens at Fort Missoula was performed voluntarily and the work performed by the Japanese in connection with the swimming pool project was limited to cutting away bushes along the bank of the near-by river so that they could go swimming, boating, and fishing. The Japanese spokesman at Fort Missoula has testified that the work was performed voluntarily and that everyone was anxious to assist in the project.

It is also said in the Japanese telegram that the authorities at the internment camp at Santa Fe attempted to compel the Japanese to build barracks for internees. The investigation which has been conducted reveals that on the occasion referred to Japanese internees were requested to assist in the construction of barracks for their own use. When they were asked to aid in this work they declined because of possible difficulty with a labor union and the request of the American authorities was not pressed.

It is also said that Japanese internees have been required to clean offices and perform cooking and table service for camp officials. The reference is apparently to Tuna Canyon Camp where five Japanese were permitted at their own request to clean the administrative offices, serve at the officer's table in the messhall in the event of emergency meals and assist in preparing bunks and changing linen and towels. They were compensated by the officers for this work, such compensation being paid to the spokesman of the camp to be distributed among destitute internees. The investigation reveals no other instances of this kind.

The Government of the United States takes this opportunity to repeat that it has instructed all of its officers concerned with the han-

ding of Japanese nationals to exercise the most scrupulous care that their actions with relation to the Japanese under their control shall be governed by the humanitarian principles of the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention and generally accepted rules of international law. The American Government has not hesitated to investigate all complaints made to it by the Spanish Embassy or by individual Japanese subjects concerning alleged mistreatment or concerning differences of opinion between Japanese nationals and officers of the American Government with regard to the interpretation of the Geneva Convention. The American Government expresses the hope that the Japanese Government will thoroughly investigate all of the incidents which were set forth in the communication from the Government of the United States⁹⁹ delivered by the Swiss Legation in Tokyo to the Japanese Foreign Office on December 23, 1942, with a view to the correction of all abuses, the disciplining of the employees of the Japanese Government involved and the submission of a full report in the premises to the American Government.

WASHINGTON, October 16, 1943.

**SEIZURE BY JAPANESE AUTHORITIES OF PROPERTY OWNED BY
AMERICAN NATIONALS IN OCCUPIED CHINA**

394.1153/5 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, May 30, 1942.

[Received May 30—7:10 p. m.]

2361. American interests China. Swiss Consulate General Shanghai telegraphed May 26 following:

"Notwithstanding their assurances to respect private property Japanese authorities in occupied China have ordered from beginning the liquidation of principal banks and certain large American companies. Funds resulting from this liquidation are blocked and American companies in question find it impossible to adjust their affairs before their repatriation.

In addition Japanese authorities have taken over on their own account the exploitation of most important companies without naming an administrator for enemy property who should be the depository of the profits of exploitation. Authorities have nevertheless authorized certain employees who are citizens of countries at war with Japan to continue their work."

Swiss Consulate General at Shanghai requests instructions regarding action which should be taken.

HARRISON

⁹⁹ Telegram No. 2814, December 12, 1942, to the Minister in Switzerland, *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. I, p. 832.

394.1153/6 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, June 5, 1942.

[Received June 5—9:20 a. m.]

2492. American interests—China. Legation's 2361, May 30. Swiss Consulate General, Shanghai telegraphed May 30 following:

"As result confiscation assets of American companies and enterprises and their rapid liquidation it has become extremely difficult if not impossible for interested persons obtain access to books and files of companies. Under these conditions necessary data to present their claims at end of war lacking, either in part or totally. American Association requests State Department advise urgently necessary measures to be taken to allow interested persons opportunity to obtain, while still possible, necessary documents to justify claims which they expect present after war; resumption future activities most American companies will be impossible unless instructions are issued to regulate question of repayment of losses sustained."

HARRISON

394.1153/6 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, July 23, 1942.

1833. American interests China. Your 2361, May 30, and 2492, June 5. In United States Japanese nationals and their agents may liquidate business enterprises subject only to supervision by appropriate Federal authorities. They have custody of their records and are allowed to collect monies due them and to pay their obligations. The only exception relates to Japanese banks, which in New York and California are being liquidated by State banking authorities and in Hawaii and the State of Washington by Federal banking authorities. Even in case of banks, however, Japanese nationals have access to their records.

The United States Government considers the action of the Japanese authorities in occupied China to be extremely high-handed, especially their action in denying to responsible representatives of American organizations access to their books and papers. If such American nationals are not allowed to operate their enterprises with merely supervisory control, they should at least be given access to their books, papers, and properties in order that they may prepare an inventory of their properties and adjust their affairs in a systematic and understandable manner so that they may have a record of their outstanding obligations and of the general state of their business.

Please request that Swiss representatives at Tokyo and Shanghai be so informed and that the latter furnish by telegraph lists of

American properties affected with full name of each company. Names will enable American authorities charged with administration of China Trade Act ¹ to identify China Trade Act companies.

HULL

394.1153/7: Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, October 10, 1942.

[Received October 10—11:55 p. m.]

4603. American interests—China. Legation's 2492, June 5th, Department's 1833, July 23rd. Swiss Consulate General, Shanghai, telegraphs October 6th:

"American Association desires obtain exact instructions regarding type documents and financial statements to be conserved on which American companies can base post-war claims for damages sustained.

To assist Department formulating reply Swiss Consulate General gives following summary action taken by Japanese authorities against enemy property.

1. Small enterprises and stores: Can continue business freely.
2. Banks and insurance companies: Japanese authorities ordered forced liquidation, appointed liquidators Japanese nationality.
3. Other important societies: Japanese administrators placed in charge by Japanese military authorities and report regarding administration to army, navy or police. In general lucrative enterprises continued while others liquidated. Part English and American personnel requested assist liquidation. [In] many cases managers discharged.
4. Steamship transport companies, warehouses, fuel depots, port equipment, breweries, et cetera: Already confiscated by Japanese military authorities. Owners and persons interested refused rights control and participation carrying on business.
5. Real estate: Companies recently received instructions from Japanese authorities cancel leases enemy citizens to lease to Japanese civilians. Result increasingly difficult Americans find quarters.

Japanese administrators and liquidators received full authority act. Most cases proprietors or representatives sequestered companies have access archives, able prepare balance sheets and inventories. Japanese authorities often confiscated property without military value and generally without receipts or receipts without indication quantity value merchandise sequestered.

Situation other parts occupied China similar or less favorable for enemy companies.

In general military authorities taken possession evacuees' property left behind.

¹ Approved September 19, 1922; 42 Stat. 849.

On basis instructions (Department's 1833, July 23) and provisions Fourth Hague Convention 1907² Swiss Consulate General protested to Japanese Consulate General, Shanghai, acts against private enemy property. Japanese Consul General³ replied as Anglo-Saxon powers do not observe provisions Hague Convention Japanese authorities do not consider themselves bound by provisions either. Japanese Consul General stated in particular 'Trading with the Enemy Act'⁴ in conflict with Fourth Hague Convention and Japanese private property Hong Kong, Malaya, Philippines and Netherlands India was not respected.

Swiss Consul General⁵ received assurance measures taken against enemy property carried out with every possible care, but Swiss Consul General has some doubts as organization measures taken against enemy property seems insufficient and various military authorities act independently. According information from Japanese Consulate General, Shanghai, regulations regarding administration enemy property in preparation."

HARRISON

394.1153/8 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, November 26, 1942.

[Received November 26—10:45 a. m.]

5453. American interests China. Legation's 4603, October 10. Swiss Consulate General Shanghai telegraphs November 23 following:

"Japanese authorities occupied China recently undertook general investigation property citizens countries at war with Japan with intention transfer to name Japanese Consulate General Shanghai ownership of properties registered American and British Consulates.

Japanese Consulate General requested Swiss Consulate General communicate information contained financial registers among archives representatives third powers whose interests Switzerland protecting.

Japanese Consulate repeated request shortly afterward stating in case refusal Japanese military authorities might find necessary sequester financial registries in question to obtain information they required. Swiss Consulate General while stating prepared furnish information certain cases which seemed justified replied did not consider authorized accept method procedure which appeared incompatible with obligations protect security archives entrusted to it. Nevertheless 3 or 4 days ago Japanese military authorities insisted on surrender archives confided to Swiss Consulate Canton. Consul⁶ protested against order but forced turn over archives Japanese authorities."

Swiss Foreign Office in forwarding above communication states already requested Swiss Legation Tokyo protest Japanese Foreign Office

² Signed October 18, 1907, *Foreign Relations*, 1907, pt. 2, pp. 1204-1216.

³ Tateki Horiuchi.

⁴ Approved October 6, 1917; 40 Stat. 411.

⁵ Emile Fontanel.

⁶ August Hoffmeister.

regarding these demands made by Japanese military authorities occupied China.

HARRISON

394.1153/10 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, January 15, 1943.

[Received January 15—11:40 p. m.]

338. American interests China. Department's 1833, July 23 [1942]. Swiss Foreign Office reports Swiss Minister Tokyo⁷ intervened Japanese Government basis Department's 1833, requesting similar treatment American enterprises Shanghai. Japanese Foreign Office replied memorandum which Swiss Legation Tokyo summarizes telegram January 9 as follows:

(Translation from French) "As personnel Japanese companies America almost all arrested, interned, their participation liquidation enterprises not generally authorized and generally requests examine books and archives refused. Majority cases liquidation Japanese companies effected former American employees or Americans Japanese origins under direction supervisor Treasury or Federal Reserve without Japanese allowed participate. Japanese Government knows only one case where Japanese authorized examine part company's balance sheet, another case Japanese received month-end accounts but these confiscated upon his repatriation. Even uninterned Japanese not authorized participate liquidation companies which supervisor exclusively does. These Japanese received instructions appear own offices only as legal witnesses, prohibited even examine account books and could only examine necessary documents presence supervisor (case Pacific Trading Company, San Francisco). Japanese Government aware one or two cases (Japanese Cotton Company, Dallas, Texas, for example) where Japanese could participate liquidation enterprises, collect amounts due and meet obligations. But even these cases could not take documents outside office. Most Japanese personnel Japanese banks arrested, requests examine books, archives refused, liquidation these banks exclusively by superintendents or examiners assisted by former American employees or Americans Japanese origin. Among uninterned Japanese some at requests American authorities gave explanations concerning transactions and assistance certain operations, but none had access books except Japanese personnel New York Branch Sumitomo Bank. Even these could only examine books and archives of Bank but not books regarding liquidation. This enterprise done by American authorities."

Swiss Foreign Office adds:

"Above information supplied Japanese Government by Japanese repatriated⁸ formerly composing personnel banks and business houses

⁷ Camille Gorgé.

⁸ For correspondence on this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. I, pp. 377 ff.

United States. Japanese Foreign Office knows only small number cases where Japanese informed regarding circumstances of liquidation, when begun. Japanese Government considers measures taken property repatriated Japanese from American West Coast unjustified many respects.

From information received regarding liquidation Japanese property summarized above memorandum Japanese Government concludes information furnished by American Government does not accord measures actually taken by American authorities under these conditions, finds necessary reject request American Government made with apparent object obtain reciprocally authorization American citizens Shanghai examine books, archives companies in order prepare inventories and settle affairs. Japanese Government decided proceed liquidation enemy property and administration according Japanese laws. Regarding participation liquidation, American citizens will examine each case due regard measures applied United States towards Japanese subjects."

HARRISON

394.1153/11 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, January 25, 1943.

[Received January 25—9:48 p. m.]

561. American interests China. Legation's 5453, November 26. Swiss Consulate General Shanghai telegraphs:

"Japanese authorities Shanghai taking series measures cancel titles properties listed financial registers former American and British Consulates. With assistance Nanking Government, Japanese authorities endeavoring issue instead Japanese consular titles ownership in names certain Japanese organizations.

American and British interests affected by these measures urgently their Governments report these developments to American and British representatives at Chungking."

Foreign Office states same telegram communicated British Legation Bern.

HARRISON

394.1153/11 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, May 23, 1943—noon.

1238. American interests China. Your 561 January 25. With view to protecting titles of American property holders in Shanghai area, Swiss Consul General Shanghai should endeavor to obtain list of American properties disposed of as mentioned and to keep Department informed of additional properties similarly confiscated in the

future. Department also wishes to learn whether Japanese authorities have had access to or have taken possession of the land registers of American Consulate General, which were among archives relinquished April 1, 1942 to Swiss authorities Shanghai, who will of course appreciate importance of preserving intact those records. It is hoped that they have taken appropriate measures for such preservation.

HULL

394.1153/21 : Telegram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, June 22, 1943—3 p. m.

[Received June 22—2:34 p. m.]

3710. American interests China. Department's 1238, May 23. Consulate Shanghai telegraphs:

All property inscribed consular registers name American citizens treated as enemy property. When actual proprietor, however, not citizen country at war with Japan can request cancellation former title and inscription property Japan consular register.

Under these conditions perceive no possibility furnish list all transfers property made Japanese authorities with collaboration Nanking Government.

However, confirm American consular register [and?] all archives intact. Inventory previously made showing numbers of volumes and titles to properties but work copying other details would represent enormous work almost impossible accomplish.

Have document entitled "List of Shanghai registered land at American Consulate General corrected to 12th January 1941".

HARRISON

394.1153/33

Memorandum by the Chief of the Special Division (Keeley) ⁹

[WASHINGTON,] July 9, 1943.

The Department's 1833 of July 23, 1942 to Bern, replying to reports that Japanese authorities at Shanghai were liquidating American enterprises without permitting the interested persons to have access to the books and files thereof, stated upon the basis of Mr. Hackworth's memorandum of June 20, 1942 ¹⁰ of his conversations with Treasury and the Alien Property Custodian that in the liquidation of Japanese enterprises in the United States Japanese nationals were permitted:

⁹ Addressed to the Office of the Legal Adviser, the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, the Foreign Funds Control Division, and the Office of Assistant Secretary Long.

¹⁰ Not printed.

1. Either the custody of their records or access to them;
2. To collect their debts;
3. To settle any outstanding obligations.

The reply of the Japanese Government, transmitted in Bern's 338 of January 15, 1943, took issue with that statement and levied the following charges concerning the treatment accorded by American authorities to Japanese companies in this country:

[Here follows summary of the Japanese Government's charges.]

The Japanese reply was forwarded to the Treasury Department and the Alien Property Custodian. In its reply of February 24, 1943 ¹¹ the Treasury Department stated:

1. In the vast majority of cases Japanese managerial personnel was available and was authorized to take charge of liquidation proceedings under the general supervision of Treasury's Foreign Funds Control;
2. Where such managerial personnel was under detention, liquidation was for the most part carried out under Treasury supervision by attorney-in-fact selected and appointed by such personnel;
3. Where the owner of a Japanese enterprise could not be located, a member of his family was requested to perform the liquidation under Treasury supervision;
4. However, large Japanese banks were placed under direct Government supervision and therefore constituted an exception to the foregoing procedure.

In a letter dated April 30, 1943,¹¹ it was stated by the Office of the Alien Property Custodian that in the case of businesses in liquidation under the jurisdiction of the Custodian:

1. Former Japanese managers were not permitted access to the books and records;
2. They were not permitted to take part in liquidations;
3. However, the records of such businesses are being carefully preserved for their eventual return, should this be permitted by any subsequent treaty.

It thus appears that we are not in a strong position to rebut the Japanese Government's allegations, although failure to reply would no doubt be taken as tacit acknowledgment of our culpability in the matter. SD ¹² would be grateful for your suggestions concerning the course of action that should be taken.¹³

J[AMES] H. K[EELEY]

¹¹ Not printed.

¹² Special Division.

¹³ In a memorandum of November 13 to the Special Division, the Legal Adviser stated that the letter of April 30 from the Alien Property Custodian "more or less confirms the contention made by the Japanese Government" and "in view of the lapse of time since those contentions were advanced I suggest that the matter be allowed to rest." (394.1153/34) This suggestion was generally agreed to by the interested Departmental offices.

394.1153/23 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, August 5, 1943.

1870. American interests China. Your 4542, July 28.¹⁵ Although no indication given in telegram under reference, Department assumes Swiss Consul Shanghai has reported to Swiss Minister Tokyo incident concerning confiscation of private property Hankow¹⁶ and similar depredations and that appropriate representations have been made by Swiss to Japanese Foreign Office to enable latter to instruct Japanese authorities Hankow and elsewhere appropriately.

HULL

394.1153/29 : Airgram

The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State

BERN, November 26, 1943—1 p. m.

[Received December 13—4 p. m.]

A-506. American interests—occupied China. Legation's 1088, February 16.¹⁷ Legation requested Swiss Foreign Office November 6 ask Swiss Consulate Shanghai verify report *Koelnische [Zeitung?]* Oct. 26 which stated Japanese authorities turned over to Chinese administration Shanghai 52 British or American firms, several schools and missionary institutions.

Fontanel telegraphs that inasmuch as Department made no comment statements contained Legation's telegrams under reference he refrained from forwarding further reports concerning Japanese measures taken against property Swiss-protected nationals. Following is Fontanel's résumé current situation:

Since February 1943 Jap authorities on several occasions transferred to administration and control Nanking Government large number of properties located Shanghai and in outports belonging to enemies of Japan including principal American-British commercial and industrial enterprises, educational institutions (including uni-

¹⁵ Not printed; it reported that the Japanese had confiscated at Hankow 200 cases containing property belonging to repatriated or interned enemy nationals under Swiss protection and had not delivered any receipts for the property.

¹⁶ In telegram No. 5409, September 1, the Minister in Switzerland advised that the Swiss Consul General at Shanghai would personally inform Mr. Gorgé during his visit to Tokyo in the near future (394.1153/25).

¹⁷ Not printed; it reported that the Japanese authorities had ceded to the Nanking Government about 1,000 confiscated enemy industrial and commercial enterprises and educational institutions (394.1153/14).

versities, churches) ¹⁸ and excluding only enterprises actively exploited under direct military control. Fontanel believes these transfers made for propaganda purposes in effort demonstrate that Jap authorities are materially disinterested in occupation China and recognize sovereignty of Nanking Government. Jap authorities plundered equipment and essential reserves several enterprises prior transfer. Majority of others still under immediate control of Japan inspectors.

Notwithstanding repeated representations, Fontanel unable to obtain statement of attitude Jap authorities toward enemy property and unable to obtain official information concerning transfers reported to him. Buildings containing effects [of persons?] repatriated or containing segregated repatriated [*sic*] persons partly rented Japanese citizens and partly left unoccupied under Japanese seals. Many rifled owing to [lack of?] police protection. Fontanel inquires whether Department desires receive telegraphic list transferred properties published local press.¹⁹

HARRISON

¹⁸ Further information on the disposition of seized American and British properties was furnished to the Embassy in China by the Chinese Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The information, based on Japanese broadcasts and newspaper accounts, was transmitted to the Department from time to time. On June 29, 461 pieces of such property in Kwangtung and at Hankow and Amoy were turned over to the Nanking regime by the Japanese. Similarly transferred were 67 pieces in the Wuhan area on July 20; 220 buildings in the Canton area and unidentified properties in Central China on July 29; 180 pieces at Amoy on July 30; 17 pieces in the Hankow area on September 30; 39 pieces in North China on October 25; and 58 pieces in the vicinity of Peiping on December 21.

¹⁹ In airgram No. 22, January 18, 1944, the Department advised the Minister in Switzerland of its desire "to receive such reports on American property as Swiss representatives may be able to prepare" and requested the Minister to inquire "whether lists of transferred properties published in the press . . . could be forwarded by mail."

KOREA

INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE FUTURE STATUS OF KOREA AND THE QUESTION OF RECOGNITION OF A PROVISIONAL KOREAN GOVERNMENT¹

895.01/266

*Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hamilton) to the Secretary of State*²

[WASHINGTON,] April 22, 1943.

MR. SECRETARY: On April 17 an officer of the Chinese Embassy, at the instance of the Chinese Foreign Office, approached an officer of FE³ to obtain in strict confidence the view of this Government in regard to the question of recognition of the "Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea" located at Chungking, China.

You may recall that two reports have appeared recently in the press in regard to the future status of Korea: Dr. T. V. Soong⁴ was quoted in the *New York Times* of March 13 as having stated, in response to a question, that China wanted to see Korea independent; and in a press report from London, dated April 7 and written by Frederick Kuh of the *Chicago Sun*, it was stated that the President and Mr. Eden⁵ had "reportedly agreed that Korea is to be detached from Japan and after being placed under international trusteeship for a limited period will be proclaimed an independent state". Also, on March 29 Dr. Soong called on Mr. Welles⁶ at Dr. Soong's request, at which time Dr. Soong made inquiry in regard to any general impressions relating to Mr. Eden's conversations in Washington. In reply, Mr. Welles, referring to the question of Korea, commented to the general effect that it seemed to him that the thought of the Chinese, the British, and the United States Governments was moving along similar lines in envisaging the setting up after the war of Korea as an independent country under a temporary international trusteeship.

In view of the foregoing, it is suggested that Mr. Berle⁷ ask the Chinese Ambassador⁸ to call on him and that Mr. Berle inform the

¹ Continued from *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. I, pp. 858-881.

² Marginal notation by the Secretary of State: "OK".

³ Division of Far Eastern Affairs.

⁴ Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs.

⁵ Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. For correspondence on his visit to Washington, March 12-30, see pp. 1 ff.

⁶ Sumner Welles, Under Secretary of State; for memorandum of his conversation with Dr. Soong, March 29, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, China, p. 845.

⁷ Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State.

⁸ Wei Tao-ming.

Ambassador of the substance of the preceding paragraph. It is suggested further that Mr. Berle make further comment to the Ambassador to the effect that it would seem best to us to let the matter rest there; that, as the Ambassador knows, the question of recognition of any regime as the Government of Korea involves a good many complicated factors which relate not only to the situation in the Far East but have a bearing also upon somewhat analogous situations in other parts of the world; that this Government and, we are sure, the other governments of the United Nations are giving special attention at this time to questions which are associated with prosecution of the war; that if the Chinese Government has views or information which we do not have and which it believes would be helpful to us, we should, of course, be very glad to be informed thereof; that we appreciate the spirit of cooperation shown by the Chinese Foreign Office in making this inquiry; and that we hope that there will continue to be free and frank exchange between our two Governments in regard to this question.

In this connection, it may be of interest that our Chargé d'Affaires at Chungking⁹ has reported in a despatch dated March 17, 1943¹⁰ that, according to the Director of the East Asiatic Affairs Department of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs,¹¹ the Chinese Government has always encouraged unity between the two principal Korean factions in China, namely, the "Provisional Government", composed chiefly of conservative Koreans, and the Korean Revolutionary Party, which is "radical" and which has the support of the younger and more aggressive Korean elements. The Chinese official informed Mr. Vincent that if the two factions were able to attain unity he felt that the Chinese Government would then wish again to consider the question of recognition and consult with the United States Government with regard to its attitude toward the question. Mr. Vincent indicates in his despatch that the two factions are still a long way from unity. Mr. Vincent adds that the "Foreign Minister of the Provisional Government of Korea"¹² recently released a statement in Chungking opposing proposals appearing in the American press that Korea be put under international or mandated control.

M[AXWELL] M. H[AMILTON]

⁹ John Carter Vincent.

¹⁰ No. 1004, not printed.

¹¹ Yang Yun-chu.

¹² Tjo So-wang.

895.01/268

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State
(Berle)*

[WASHINGTON,] May 12, 1943.

The Chinese Ambassador came in to see me, at my request.

I referred to the fact that on April 17th the Chinese Embassy had consulted the Department with a view to obtaining, in strict confidence, the view of this Government with regard to the question of the recognition of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea, at Chungking, China.

I said that the matter had been discussed in the Department, and by instruction of Secretary Hull I could state the following:

On April [*March*] 29th, Mr. T. V. Soong had called on Mr. Welles and at that time Mr. Welles had said that the Governments of Britain, the United States and China, with respect to Korea seemed to have similar ideas.

I said that while we envisaged an independent Korea after the war, we felt that the matter of recognition had better rest in abeyance for the time being. There were a number of countries not yet liberated, in respect of which groups of citizens were clamoring for recognition as provisional governments. The recognition of any provisional government would probably lead to increasing demands of this kind, and in most of these cases we did not have information sufficient to give assurance that any such group would be acceptable to the people of the country. We were in this same state of mind with regard to Korea. I said that we were aware of the fact that the Chinese Government, being closer to the situation, might have better information; and we would of course be very glad to consider with great sympathy any views which the Chinese Government cared to express.

The Chinese Ambassador thanked me and said that he gathered that the ideas of our Government were substantially the same as their own. Rumors had reached his Government, which were given some color by speeches in Congress and publicity here, suggesting that this Government might be considering the Korean matter; and his Government had at all times wished to keep in close harmony with our own views and actions on these subjects. This was the reason for the Chinese inquiry.

He said that the Chinese view favored letting the matter rest in its present position for the time being.

A[DOLF] A. B[ERLE], JR.

Note: See memorandum of Mr. Maxwell Hamilton to the Secretary, dated April 22, 1943; and OK'd by the Secretary. A. A. B., JR.

895.01/251

*The Chairman of the Korean Commission in the United States (Rhee)
to President Roosevelt*

WASHINGTON, May 15, 1943.

SIR: I have the honor to transmit to you the enclosed telegraphic message¹³ received from the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea, now in exile in Chungking. This message expresses the national sentiment of the 23,000,000 Korean people, and I am sure it merits your special consideration.

May I call your attention to the fact that now is the time for the United States to rectify the wrong and injustice done to the Korean people and their nation during the last thirty-eight years. In 1905, as Your Excellency will recall, the United States allowed Japan to occupy Korea¹⁴ and in 1910 to annex her,¹⁵ all in violation of the American-Korean treaty of 1882.¹⁶ As Your Excellency has graciously mentioned in one of your public addresses, the Korean people have since suffered more and longer than all the conquered races in the world.

The destruction of Korea was only the beginning of Japan's march of conquests. It is needless to recount here the nations that have fallen one by one into the hands of the Tokyo militarists. Since December 7, 1941, how much of American blood and billions has been spent to save civilization and democracy from the island tribes of Nippon?

All of this is due to the failure of the statesmen of the West to realize the importance of an independent Korea as a bulwark of peace in the Orient. These statesmen have overlooked the historical fact that it was the Koreans, and only the Koreans, who defeated the invading hordes of Japan time and again during the centuries past. These statesmen, instead of helping Korea to be a strong, independent state contributed their moral and material support lavishly toward the building of a world menace in the Empire of Japan.

Allow me to repeat, Your Excellency, it is time for the United States to change its mistaken conception of Korea—a conception created only by Japanese propaganda influences. If the American

¹³ Copy not found attached; the message, signed by Mr. Tjo, was forwarded to the Department by the Counselor of Embassy in China (Vincent) in telegram No. 690, May 11, 7 p. m.; it stated that "all Koreans desire absolute independence only and therefore are opposed to any understanding or suggestion concerning post-war international guardianship of Korea."

¹⁴ For correspondence regarding the establishment by Japan of control over Korea, see *Foreign Relations*, 1905, pp. 612–616, 625–634.

¹⁵ For correspondence on the annexation of Korea by Japan, see *ibid.*, 1910, pp. 677–685.

¹⁶ Treaty of peace, amity, commerce and navigation, signed May 22, 1882, William M. Malloy (ed.), *Treaties, Conventions, etc., Between the United States of America and Other Powers, 1776–1909* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1910), vol. 1, p. 334.

statesmen today fail to realize this fact, the postwar settlements will leave the way open for another and even greater disaster than the present world conflagration.

Since Pearl Harbor—nearly a year and a half—we have been urging the State Department to recognize the Korean nationalist government, the oldest government-in-exile. The replies we have received were merely inconsequential excuses. Now we have reports indicating Russia's aim to establish a Soviet Republic of Korea. It is to be earnestly hoped that these reports are groundless. At the same time it should be borne in mind that the danger of Russian expansion in the Far East, so feared and dreaded by the United States forty years ago, has not entirely disappeared.

In order to accelerate the present war effort and to safeguard the future peace of the Pacific, I beseech you, Your Excellency, to recognize now the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea and to give the Koreans every aid and encouragement so that they may do their share in fighting our common enemy, Japan, thereby rendering a material service to the United States.

Respectfully yours,

SYNGMAN RHEE

895.01/251

Major General Edwin M. Watson, Secretary to President Roosevelt, to the Chairman of the Korean Commission in the United States (Rhee)

WASHINGTON, [May 26, 1943.]

MY DEAR DR. RHEE: By direction of the President, I acknowledge the receipt of your letter of May 15, 1943, in which you discuss various matters relating to Korea and with which you enclose a copy of a telegram from Mr. Tjosowang.

I do not need to assure you that the contents of your letter and its enclosures have received careful attention.

Very sincerely yours,

EDWIN M. WATSON

825.01/286

The Chargé in China (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State

No. 1491

CHUNGKING, August 20, 1943.

[Received September 13.]

SIR: I have the honor to enclose a copy of a memorandum dated August 14, 1943,¹⁷ setting forth opinions in regard to the Korean problem expressed to an officer of the Embassy by General Wang

¹⁷ Not printed.

Peng-sheng, adviser to General Chiang Kai-shek¹⁸ on Japanese affairs and liaison officer between General Chiang and various non-Chinese groups in Chungking. General Wang indicated that his views do not necessarily represent those of General Chiang and they are communicated to the Department for what they may be worth as expressions of opinion by a Chinese official of influence.

General Wang's statements may be summarized as follows: The Korean problem must be solved before there can be permanent peace in the Far East. Solution lies in the complete restoration of Korean independence. China hopes that the United States will play an important role in underwriting Korean independence. Present dissension among Korean groups is most regrettable but the Koreans must be united in order that a forceful Korean government can be transplanted to Korea when the proper time arrives. The question of recognizing a Korean provisional government is merely one aspect of a much greater problem affecting the future position not only of Korea but also of the areas in southeastern Asia occupied by the Japanese. A conference of the interested United Nations should be called to formulate a definite policy in this regard. China is in no position to call such a conference but the United States and Great Britain should take the lead in so doing.

Respectfully yours,

GEORGE ATCHESON, JR.

895.01/305

The Ambassador in China (Gauss) to the Secretary of State

No. 1886

CHUNGKING, December 6, 1943.

[Received December 28.]

SIR: I have the honor to enclose copy of a letter dated October 18th,¹⁹ addressed to me by Mr. Syngman Rhee of the Korean Commission in Washington, D. C., in regard to the future status of Korea.

Mr. Rhee anticipates that the Korean divisions trained and maintained by the Soviet Government as a part of the Soviet Far Eastern Army will be used by Soviet Russia eventually to invade Korea and to set up a Soviet Republic there, affiliated with the U. S. S. R. He therefore urges recognition of the so-called Korean Provisional Government now at Chungking.

I have little doubt that should Soviet Russia become involved in the war against Japan the Korean divisions now in Siberia will be used in any invasion of Korea; but recognition of the so-called Korean Provisional Government of professional revolutionaries constantly

¹⁸ President of the Chinese Executive Yuan.

¹⁹ Not printed.

quarreling amongst themselves in China would not prevent the situation he anticipates.

Reference is made to the Embassy's despatch no. 1815 of November 15, 1943,²⁰ reporting on recent developments in the "Korean Provisional Government" in China.

I am making no reply to Mr. Rhee.

Respectfully yours,

C. E. GAUSS

895.01/301 : Telegram

The Ambassador in China (Gauss) to the Secretary of State

CHUNGKING, December 7, 1943—11 a. m.

[Received December 7—10:06 a. m.]

2333. 1. Representative[s] two major Korean parties at Chungking called at Embassy December 4 and requested interpretation of phrase "in due course" relating to Korea in Cairo Declaration.²¹ They stated initial Korean reaction one of unqualified approval but Chinese press translation of phrase as "at appropriate (or proper) time" together with rumor at Chungking that postwar Korea would be under Chinese mandate had already disturbed Koreans; that Korean meeting in celebration Cairo statement was canceled when official text released; that Koreans were now attempting to obtain interpretation of phrase from Foreign Office and Wang Chung-hui.²² Korean representatives revealed strong fears of Chinese intentions regarding postwar position of Korea and expressed belief Japs would use "qualified statement" as propaganda in Korea and occupied areas to show United Nations intended place Korea under Chinese control.

2. *Ta Kung Pao* December 3rd reported statement by Foreign Minister Korean Provisional Government expressing Korean pleasure at Cairo Declaration and suggesting United Nations now recognize Provisional Government and furnishing military Lend-Lease aid to Korean Army, but this statement was issued prior to release here of text Cairo Declaration.

GAUSS

²⁰ Not printed.

²¹ Made by President Roosevelt, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, President of the National Government of the Republic of China, and British Prime Minister Churchill; released by the White House on December 1, 1943. The part of the Communiqué relating to Korea stated: "The aforesaid three great powers [the United States, China and the United Kingdom], mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent." The full text of the Communiqué is printed in *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, p. 448. For further references to documentation on Korea, see *ibid.*, index entries on p. 916.

²² Secretary-General of the Chinese Supreme National Defense Council.

PHILIPPINES

CONSIDERATION OF PROBLEMS RELATING TO THE COMMONWEALTH OF THE PHILIPPINES; CONDITIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES UNDER JAPANESE OCCUPATION¹

811B.01/476

The Acting Secretary of State to President Roosevelt

WASHINGTON, February 9, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: President Quezon of the Philippines called to see me this morning and expressed great concern with regard to the effect which the recent declaration by the Japanese Government of its intention to grant immediate independence to the Philippine people² was having upon the Filipinos. He gave me to read certain recent broadcasts, which apparently had been received from Manila, which in his judgment indicated that the Filipinos were taking seriously this Japanese propaganda. He felt that if some counteracting measures were not undertaken, the effects might be very prejudicial both to his own Government and to the interests of this country.

He said he felt it was necessary for him to make a broadcast to the Philippines which would remind the Philippine people that no faith could be put in Japanese promises and that this Government had already promised them independence as soon as the Japanese invaders had been driven out.

He gave me to read the text of his proposed broadcast, which I attach herewith for your information.³ He asked that you send him a few lines expressing your approval of this text and authorizing him to make the statements concerning United States policy which are contained therein.

The broadcast seems to me entirely in line with your own views and the policy which you have already announced.

¹ For previous correspondence relating to the Philippines, see *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. 1, pp. 882 ff. See also section under Spain entitled "Concern of the United States over congratulatory telegram sent by the Spanish Government to José P. Laurel, Head of the Japanese-controlled Philippine government", *ibid.*, 1943, vol. II.

² Presumably statement made on January 27 by Japanese Prime Minister Hideki Tojo before the 81st Session of the Imperial Diet, Tokyo: "I sincerely expect the Filipinos will further strengthen their cooperation with our country and thus consummate at the earliest possible opportunity the independence of their land."

³ Not printed.

Will you let me know if President Quezon's proposal meets with your approval, and, if so, if you will be willing to send him the direct authorization he has requested.⁴

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

SUMNER WELLES

811B.01/482

*The Secretary of the Interior (Ickes) to President Roosevelt*⁵

WASHINGTON, September 1, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Mr. Byrnes⁶ has learned that Senator Tydings⁷ is willing to introduce a resolution, which presumably would have the effect of promising Philippine independence coincident with ousting the Japanese from the Islands, or with the military government of occupation. While it is difficult to advise on undrafted legislation, I should like to record my view that there are several reasons which argue strongly against the immediate consideration of legislation of the type suggested:

1. The Department in consultation with Commonwealth authorities has drafted a generous and effective program for Philippine rehabilitation. Prospects for favorable action would be diminished if Congress had previously passed an independence resolution.

2. President Quezon desires that the United States rather than (or in addition to) an international body provide for the military security of the Philippines. He rests this policy on your statement of December 28, 1941,⁸ "... that their freedom will be redeemed and their independence established *and protected*." To further this purpose he wishes the United States to establish naval and air bases in the Islands. If this policy is followed, our military authorities may prefer to arrange for the bases prior to independence.

3. Commonwealth officers expect a recontinuance of trade relations with the United States on a basis of greater preferences than appear available through reciprocal trade agreements. It would probably be desirable to recommend legislation on a "domestic" basis prior to further Congressional action on independence.

4. Since Japanese occupation nearly all important Nationalist Party and pro-Spanish leaders remaining in the Philippines have accepted Japanese commissions and have formed a puppet govern-

⁴ No response from President Roosevelt found in Department files. A revised text of President Quezon's speech was broadcast to the Philippines February 20, Manila time, and reprinted in the *Congressional Record*, vol. 89, pt. 9, Appendix, p. A851. In his broadcast, President Quezon stated that President Roosevelt's authorization had been given.

⁵ Copy transmitted by President Roosevelt on September 2 to the Secretary of State for comment.

⁶ James F. Byrnes, Director of the Office of War Mobilization.

⁷ Millard E. Tydings, of Maryland, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs.

⁸ Department of State *Bulletin*, January 3, 1942, p. 5.

ment. On the contrary, it appears that the common people have remained loyal and have supported guerrilla activities. If independence should coincide with the ousting of the Japanese or with the military government, the collaborationists would be in a position to obtain initial control over the new government.

5. In February of this year, President Quezon broadcast to his people, "This (establishment of the Philippine Republic) cannot happen until our country is liberated from the invader—until you, my fellow citizens, *can exercise your full right to elect the officials of the Government of the Republic.*" I considered this a sound pronouncement. I believe that no action should be permitted to endanger the orderly establishment of the independent state on the basis of free suffrage.

For the reasons set forth I am convinced that, while independence should be granted as soon as practicable after the war, the best interests of both the United States and the Philippines would be served by a schedule which would admit carrying out the rehabilitation program under our auspices to a stage where its success would be reasonably assured, and the prior settlement of the principal terms of military security and trade relations. I am equally convinced that there must be adequate time and legal provision for weeding out collaborationist influence and for holding elections under civil control.

A further Philippine matter is of present concern. The Commonwealth constitution limits the term of the president to eight consecutive years and provides for automatic succession of the vice president in the event the president is disqualified for any reason. President Quezon will complete eight consecutive years in office on November 15, 1943. In the plebiscite for the adoption of the 1940 amendments and in the 1941 elections the voters were given clearly to understand that the succession would occur in due order. While Vice President Osmeña expects to succeed, elements attached to President Quezon may work to avoid the legal succession, and worse, to maneuver you into responsibility for setting aside the Commonwealth constitutional provisions. It is anticipated that you may be advised to this step by army authorities on asserted grounds of military advantage.

Since the beginning of United States occupancy of the Philippines the organic laws have been strictly followed on both sides. Osmeña is capable and loyal and he has enjoyed a popularity among the Filipino people equal to that of Quezon. I believe that, regardless of other factors, failure to uphold the constitution would be a serious blow to the cause of future representative government in the Philippines, and that it would offer the enemy an opportunity for adverse propaganda among the Filipinos under their control.

Sincerely yours,

HAROLD L. ICKES

S11B.01/482

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt

WASHINGTON, September 8, 1943.

The Secretary of State offers the following comments seriatim on the numbered paragraphs in the letter dated September 1, 1943, herewith returned, from the Secretary of the Interior, Mr. Ickes, on the subject of possible legislation changing the date for granting independence to the Philippines. There is also offered comment pertinent to the observations made by Mr. Ickes on the question of the succession to the Presidency of the Commonwealth of the Philippines.

1. It is understood that the rehabilitation plan now in preparation by the Interior Department contemplates a broad and substantial program for the rebuilding of the economy of the Philippines. It is conceivable that the Congress, which will be called upon to sanction the program, might be more disposed to deal with the subject while the Government of the United States retains sovereign rights over the Islands rather than at a time when such rights no longer exist. Certainly the implementing of such a program would be facilitated, granted that you and the Congress give approval to the plan, if it could be carried out under the sole authority of this Government. To fix a new date for granting independence to the Philippines without regard to the rehabilitation program might well jeopardize the carefully worked out plans for the rebuilding of Philippine economy. There is, of course, the possibility that the Congress might wish to consider merging into one act the independence question and the rehabilitation program, with machinery for implementing the latter as soon as possible after the enemy has been driven from the Islands.

2. The Tydings-McDuffie Act⁹ already contains authority for the retention of naval reservations and fueling stations in the Philippines after complete independence is granted. It is understood, however, that the Commonwealth authorities now feel that not only an adequate naval force should be maintained in the Islands but that a formidable air force will also be required. It is most likely that the entire question of defense for the Philippines will be reviewed when the Congress next gives consideration to Philippine affairs. There will probably be an insistent demand from Filipino leaders for protective measures of a much broader character than was contemplated when the Tydings-McDuffie Act was passed. This is a subject concerning which the appropriate officials of the War and Navy Departments are in better position to make recommendations, based on experience and expert knowledge, than are officials of the Department of State. Nevertheless, it can be said that the principle of maintaining naval facilities in the Philippines after independence is granted is already recognized in the Tydings-McDuffie Act and that what remains to be done is to decide in what form and to what extent these facilities and other security measures will be maintained after the Philippines become independent.

3. If a plan for economic rehabilitation of the Philippines is submitted to the Congress before the termination of the war, as is now

⁹ Approved March 24, 1934; 48 Stat. 456.

contemplated, its merits could be determined solely on the basis of the general welfare of the people of a dependency and on the basis of the regulation of our domestic trade. To carry out such a program by negotiation with a separate and distinct government would result in delay and add confusion to a situation already confounded. In view of the circumstances existing today in the Philippines, it would seem to be advisable at least to await the submission of the rehabilitation program before fixing a new or an indeterminate date for Philippine independence.

4. While a large number of important and well-known Filipino political and industrial leaders are now working actively with the puppet government at Manila, the expulsion of the Japanese from the Islands will quickly alleviate that condition. The puppets will disappear quickly from the scene and their influence will probably have disappeared with them.

5. The one certain way to make it possible for the Filipinos to exercise their full right to elect their own officials is to expel the enemy from the Islands by military force with a minimum of delay. The machinery for the administration of the affairs of the Commonwealth Government was running as smoothly as could be expected up to the time of the Japanese occupation, and it must be assumed that the Filipinos will be perfectly capable of restoring this machinery to normal functioning once they are rid of Japanese control. The exercise of free suffrage could therefore be restored to pre-war status fairly soon after the exit of the Japanese from the Islands. The presence of an American army of occupation would certainly not be incompatible with the exercise of the right of free suffrage.

Reports have been current recently of plans purporting to make it possible for President Quezon to succeed himself notwithstanding the constitutional bar against the President of the Commonwealth serving more than eight years consecutively. The latest plan reported is one said to contemplate that Mr. Osmeña should become President on November 15, 1943, the date on which President Quezon's eight years of incumbency expires, with the understanding that a Council of State to administer the affairs of the Commonwealth will be appointed by Mr. Osmeña, with Mr. Quezon as President of the Council. Still other reports, all unconfirmed thus far, include one to the effect that, the *de facto* authority of the Commonwealth Government having been extinguished by the Japanese by reason of the military occupation of the Islands, you will be asked by Mr. Quezon, at an appropriate time before the expiration of his tenure of office, to appoint, in your capacity as the head of the government that exercises *de jure* sovereign rights in the Philippines, an Administrator of the affairs of the Philippines. It is surmised that Mr. Quezon might hope that he would be appointed Administrator. When or whether this or any other plan will be submitted to you is not known, but if the will of the Filipino people as expressed in their constitution is ignored by the Commonwealth authorities at Washington so as to alter the right of succession to the Presidency, it is believed that the reaction in the Philippines cannot

but be unfavorable and that such a deviation would be looked upon as a contravention of democratic principles of government.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

811B.01/623

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Long)

[WASHINGTON,] October 2, 1943.

The Tydings Resolution¹⁰ presents the question of the immediate independence of the Philippines. The actual movements toward independence and all matters connected therewith are internal affairs and consequently under the jurisdiction of the Department of the Interior. However, connected therewith there are certain phases which bring into focus the question of the foreign relations of the Philippines and of the United States and therewith the Department of State is concerned.

The interest of the Department of State in its international relations would be twofold. First, the relationship to be established between the Government of the United States and the Government of the independent Philippines. Second, the repercussions in the field of international politics caused by the independence of the Philippines.

Considering them separately—

1. (a) The American Government would upon the attainment of independence by the Philippines immediately proceed to deal with the Government of the independent Philippines on that new basis. There would be an exchange of ambassadors and we would approach the new Government on an entirely new basis than that upon which we now deal with the Philippines.

(b) The military operations planned for the defeat of Japan contemplate the use of the Philippines as air and naval bases for the prosecution of the war against Japan. If the Philippines were granted their immediate independence, the United States Government would have to deal with that Government as an entirely independent concern. It is possible that members of the Government now present in the United States would reappear in the Philippine Islands to assume control of that part of the Islands freed from Japanese domination. The theory of dealing with that Government as an independent Government would raise difficulties because we would no longer have the *right* to exercise the authority we have under the present arrangement with the Philippines Commonwealth. It is even possible that members to be added to the Government there might take the position that they had contributed very heavily to the war and desired to be at peace and might assume a policy of neutrality. In that case it would be necessary for the United States to take steps which in effect would make war against the Philippines in order to reestablish ourselves in a posi-

¹⁰ S.J. Res. 81, introduced in the Senate on September 24, 1943, *Congressional Record*, vol. 89, pt. 6, p. 7813.

tion to use those areas for military and naval bases for use in the operations against Japan.

2. (a) There immediately is presented the repercussion in India and the effect of the independence for the Philippines upon the complicated and delicate situation which England faces in regard to India.¹¹

(b) The propaganda use to which Japan might put the independent Philippines movement in the countries under her control, such as Burma and Indo-China.

(c) Omitted from Departmental consideration because it is a matter of internal affairs of the Philippines, nevertheless reference is made to the effective use Japan could make of propaganda amongst the Filipinos by stating that we had deserted them and that we had failed in our obligations to continue our protection over them during the period intervening before their attainment of complete independence.

(d) Growing out of the status of independence is to be considered the attitude which other governments would assume toward the Philippines and the question of their recognition of that entity. It cannot be assumed that the British Government would not recognize the independence of the Philippines but there is no doubt that that Government would probably consider the effect upon its own situation in India and the manner in which it might be affected by this new movement for independence. The same applies to the Netherlands Government and its relationship with the Netherlands East Indies.

(e) A number of other matters, concerning the changed relationship, that would present themselves in case the Philippines were granted their immediate independence appear on the memorandum hereto attached prepared by Mr. Lockhart.¹² These, however, deal largely with the internal situation.

811B.00/145

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Alger Hiss, Assistant to the Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck)

[WASHINGTON,] October 6, 1943.

Subject: Acceleration of the date of Philippine independence.

Participants: Mr. Abe Fortas, Under Secretary of the Department of the Interior; Mr. E. D. Hester, Department of the Interior; Mr. Lockhart; Mr. Hiss.

On the invitation of Mr. Fortas, who volunteered to supply the Department with information on recent developments on the above topic, Mr. Lockhart and Mr. Hiss called on Mr. Fortas who had Mr. Hester with him.

¹¹ For correspondence on this subject, see vol. iv, pp. 178 ff., *passim*.

¹² Memorandum of October 1 by Frank P. Lockhart, Chief of the Office of Philippine Affairs, not printed.

Mr. Fortas said that he had attended a meeting at President Quezon's apartment on Monday.¹³ He mentioned Secretary Stimson,¹⁴ Judge Rosenman¹⁵ and Senator Tydings as among those present. Secretary Ickes was also present. Mr. Fortas said that after prolonged discussion it was agreed that it would be recommended to the President that his proposed message to the Congress should ask for authorization to declare the Philippines independent "as soon as feasible". This formula would eliminate the proviso, heretofore supported by most of the executive departments, that independence not be authorized until after the reoccupation of the Islands. At the same time it would give the President far more discretion than the pending Tydings' Resolution which would require the declaration of the independence of the Philippines within thirty days after its effective date. It was also agreed at the conference at President Quezon's apartment that the President's message should provide for negotiations to insure the security of the Philippines. Mr. Fortas said that President Quezon considered it unwise to make any special mention of the word "bases". In addition it was agreed that the President's message recommend legislative authorization to consider the nature of U. S.-Philippine economic relations and to authorize an American program of rehabilitation in the Philippines.

Mr. Fortas then told us in strict confidence that upon Judge Rosenman's instructions, the Department of Interior is now engaged in drafting a revision of the Tydings' Resolution, which revision Senator Tydings has agreed to introduce as his own measure. The revision will supersede the existing resolution and will be drafted in such a way as to carry out the recommendations contained in the President's message.

While we were with Mr. Fortas a "ticker" report setting forth the text of the President's message¹⁶ was received by Mr. Fortas. He glanced at it and said that the message had gone forward in the form agreed to.

Mr. Fortas said that there had also been discussion of the need for revising those provisions of the Tydings-McDuffie Act, as amended, which provide for a gradual adjustment in Philippine-American economic relations. Senator Tydings had agreed to the desirability of such revision but took the position that the revision should not be a part of the proposed independence resolution. It was, consequently, agreed that this matter should be taken care of by additional legislation which is also to be introduced by Senator Tydings. Mr. Fortas informed us in confidence that upon Judge Rosenman's instructions

¹³ October 4.

¹⁴ Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War.

¹⁵ Samuel I. Rosenman, Special Counsel to President Roosevelt.

¹⁶ Of October 6; for text, see *Congressional Record*, vol. 89, pt. 6, p. 8121.

the Department of the Interior is also engaged in drafting this legislation.

Mr. Fortas said that Secretary Stimson has told him that he considers it most important that the economic legislation be enacted, and that it not become sidetracked. Secretary Stimson apparently regretted that it had been necessary to separate the two topics and place them in separate legislative proposals and he is apparently fearful that this separation will militate against the chances of the economic legislation being approved.

Mr. Fortas said that at the conference at President Quezon's apartment he had pointed out that the existing Tydings' Resolution greatly broadens the scope of the provision authorizing a conference of representatives of the Government of the United States and of the Commonwealth. Mr. Fortas said that he had pointed out that under the existing legislation this conference is limited to "formulating recommendations as to further trade relations between the United States and the independent Philippine Republic"; whereas Senator Tydings' Resolution provides that the conference is "for the purpose of formulating recommendations as to further trade relations between the United States and the independent Philippine Republic, including all questions affecting the post-war economy, defense, and relationship of the two governments". Mr. Fortas pointed out that it would be confusing to have the conference formulating recommendations as to post-war relationships of a political nature and as to military, naval and air bases, since these subjects are purely the province of the executive and not of the legislative branch of the Government. Mr. Fortas said that very little attention was paid to his remarks at the meeting but that he had subsequently expressed his views in greater detail and with greater emphasis to Judge Rosenman. Mr. Fortas said that there was little that his Department could do in this matter which he considered primarily of interest to the War and Navy Departments and the Department of State.

Mr. Fortas said that Senator Tydings had indicated that he contemplated proceeding with the new Resolution without hearings as soon as it was introduced.

811B.01/486 : Circular telegram

*The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Officers*¹⁷

WASHINGTON, October 18, 1943—9 p. m.

In connection with the action of the Japanese Government in establishing a puppet government in the Philippines on October 14 and in

¹⁷ In Afghanistan, Argentina, Ireland, Liberia, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and Turkey. The Legation in Switzerland was requested to repeat the message to Harold H. Tittmann, Jr., Assistant to Myron C. Taylor, President Roosevelt's Personal Representative to Pope Pius XII.

announcing that it had entered into a political, economic and military alliance with the alleged new régime, the following is for your information and use as indicated:

The action of the Japanese Government in causing to be set up an illegitimate government in the Philippines in no way whatsoever alters the happy and mutually helpful relations subsisting between the Government of the United States and the legitimate Commonwealth Government of the Philippines nor does it in any way impair the sovereign rights of the United States in the Islands. The government of the United States acknowledges its obligation to drive the enemy from the Philippines and to that end it resolutely devotes itself. It is expected that only governments allied with the Axis cause will recognize the alleged new régime or have any relations with it even of an informal character. The Japanese action is in utter disregard of the welfare and happiness of the Filipino people and without either their legal or moral sanction. Their primary, and perhaps sole, objective is to use the Philippines and their resources for military purposes.

You may orally and informally bring to the attention of the appropriate authorities of the government to which you are accredited the substance of this message. Please also promptly report any developments which you believe would be of interest to the Department.

HULL

[On October 22 a public statement was released by President Roosevelt regarding the puppet government in the Philippines; for text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, October 23, 1943, page 274.]

811B.00/153

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs (Tydings)*¹⁸

WASHINGTON, November 8, 1943.

MY DEAR SENATOR TYDINGS: It is my understanding that you will submit a Joint Resolution by which the present President and Vice President of the Commonwealth of the Philippines shall continue in their respective offices until the President of the United States shall proclaim that constitutional processes and normal functions of government shall have been restored in the Philippine Islands. Thereupon the tenure of office of the present President of the Common-

¹⁸ Identical letter sent on November 8 to the Chairman of the House Committee on Insular Affairs (Bell).

wealth shall cease and the Vice President shall become President to serve until such time as his successor shall have been elected and qualified according to the Constitution and the laws of the Philippines.

The Department of State has been asked to comment on this proposal and I desire to state, in connection with the request, that the Department is in sympathy with the purpose of the legislation.¹⁹

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD R. STETTINIUS, JR.

811B.50/40

The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the House Committee on Insular Affairs (Bell)

WASHINGTON, November 20, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. BELL: I have received your letter of November 9, 1943,²⁰ enclosing a copy of H. J. Res. 184, introduced by you on November 4, 1943, relative to the policy of the Congress with respect to the independence of the Philippine Islands.

It is noted that Section 3 of the resolution authorizes the President of the United States, after consultation with the President of the Philippines, to advance the date of the independence of the Philippine Islands by proclaiming their independence as a separate and self-governing nation prior to July 4, 1946.²¹ The Department of State views with sympathy this provision of the resolution.

It is noted that Section 2 of the resolution relates solely to the acquirement and retention of military bases and necessary appurtenances thereto. In as much as the provisions of this section are of primary concern to the military authorities, it is assumed that you will wish to obtain the views of those authorities on the provisions under reference.

The Department has been informed by the Bureau of the Budget²² that there would be no objection to the submission of this report to your Committee.

Sincerely yours,

CORDELL HULL

¹⁹ Enacted as Public Law 186, approved November 12; 57 Stat. 590.

²⁰ Not printed.

²¹ Legislation to this effect was enacted as Public Law 380, approved June 29, 1944; 58 Stat. 625.

²² Letter of November 19, not printed.

*Report by Mr. Karl L. Rankin*²³

[AT SEA,] November 25, 1943.

INTRODUCTION

Under Japanese military occupation the Philippine Islands have been governed very largely under the same laws and by much the same men as under the Commonwealth. There were two fundamental changes. The first was symbolized by the immediate conversion of the United States High Commissioner's²⁴ residence into the official Headquarters of the Japanese Commander-in-Chief.²⁵ The second was the abolition, at least temporarily, of the popularly elected legislature. Behind the scenes, of course, Japanese activities and influence affected all phases of Philippine life. But in a governmental sense the outward changes introduced were less striking than the very general continuance of old forms.

It seems probable that the policies pursued by Japan in governing the Philippines were determined well in advance. Subject to such modification as military security might require, there were compelling practical reasons for preserving the machinery of the Commonwealth Government. It had enjoyed popular support, and had functioned efficiently on the whole. The invaders' immediate purposes were to gain military control and to redirect all economic activity as quickly as possible toward the further prosecution of the war. Practical considerations quite evidently outweighed any ideological objections. Even for the more distant future, it would not much matter what form of government obtained in the Philippines as long as external relations and vital phases of economic life were under Japanese control.

It remained to find a means of taking over the machinery of the Commonwealth Government. This was facilitated at the outset by arrangements made for the surrender of Manila. The High Commissioner and President Quezon were already at Corregidor, and the latter's Secretary, Jorge B. Vargas, had been left at Malacanan with the unenviable assignment of obtaining the best treatment he could for the city. Communication ceased between the High Commissioner

²³ Prepared aboard M. S. *Gripsholm* in response to the Department's unnumbered instructions of August 25 and 27 to the former Consul at Manila (Steintorf); approved by Nathaniel P. Davis, Foreign Service Inspector. Mr. Rankin was a Foreign Service Officer temporarily detailed at Manila. In an introductory note, he states that "No documents or notes of use in preparing the report were brought out of the Philippines by the writer. It is based upon the memories of a few individuals plus odd newspapers brought along by non-official repatriates." The *Gripsholm* was used in exchange of persons between the United States and Japan. For correspondence on exchange agreement with Japan, see *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. 1, pp. 377 ff.

²⁴ Francis B. Sayre.

²⁵ Lt. Gen. Masaharu Homma.

and his Executive Assistant in Manila, Claude A. Buss, while the President and General MacArthur's²⁶ Headquarters continued to maintain contact with Vargas as the ostensible representative of whatever authority remained in the capital.²⁷

The invaders were not slow to see the opportunity offered them. Judged by Oriental standards, the Japanese were on their good behavior when the city was occupied. Whether or not this was due in part to leaving Vargas in charge, the fact remains that the United States had abdicated its authority in Manila before the Japanese arrived. "Collaboration", probable in any case, became inevitable.

The immediate establishment of a Japanese Military Administration in Manila was soon followed by the creation of an Executive Commission, composed of leading Filipino politicians and fulfilling the functions of the former Cabinet. Both of these organizations obviously were transient in character. It is understood that the Commission was told to go ahead and run the country until a permanent form of government could be worked out, but with an admonition not to revive ante-bellum politics. After the emergencies of the first few weeks had been met, the chief end of the Military Administration was to direct the Philippine Executive Commission.

Next came the introduction of the one-party system, in the Japanese form of a National Service Association, followed by preparations for the establishment of a Philippine Republic. The program of creating a puppet state was complete.

[Here follow sections on the Japanese Military Administration, the Philippine Executive Commission, and the Neighborhood and National Service Associations.]

INDEPENDENCE

With the work of the Military Administration and the Executive Commission well in hand, with "mopping-up operations in the Philippine Islands practically completed," according to a Japanese communiqué of December 2, and with the National Service Association one-party idea thoroughly embodied in the new Kalibapi,²⁸ Premier Tojo²⁹ found it opportune in January, 1943, to issue a formal pledge of independence for the Philippines. In the same speech before the Imperial Diet, independence was promised to Burma "within the year" and to the Philippines "at the earliest possible moment." This

²⁶ Gen. Douglas MacArthur, Commanding General of U.S. Army Forces in the Far East.

²⁷ Marginal notation by unidentified person: "H[igh] C[ommissioner] was in communication with Buss up to evening of Dec. 31st. I believe Pres Com[mon]wealth was not in communication w/Vargas after Jan. 1."

²⁸ Authorized abbreviation of "Kapisanan Paglilingkod Sa Bagong Pilipinas," or Association for Service to the New Philippines, created by an executive order issued on December 4, 1942, by the Commander in Chief of the Imperial Japanese Forces in the Philippines.

²⁹ Of Japan.

pledge provided a theme for countless political speeches throughout the Philippines, by both Japanese and Filipinos, during the succeeding months. On one hand it was cited as final proof of Japan's true intentions and the other as implying a threat that independence would not be granted until all guerilla activity had ceased and whole-hearted collaboration had become general.

The Philippines began to receive a series of visits from prominent Japanese. Among these, ex-Ambassador Nomura³⁰ stayed only long enough to predict the eventual defeat of the United States and to evade questions put to him by the press as to American treatment of Japanese internees.³¹

On May 5, 1943, Premier Tojo arrived in Manila. He appears to have been satisfied with the attitude of the Filipinos,* as voiced by Vargas † and others, or at least to have found no reason for further delay in fixing an approximate date for Philippine independence. Greater East Asia Minister Kazuo Aoki, visited Manila a few days after his chief and apparently confirmed his findings. On June 16, not long after his return to Japan, Tojo declared before the Diet that the Philippines would be given independence within the course of the year. In the visitors' gallery at the time was a group of Filipinos, headed by Mayor Guinto,³² who were enjoying a junket to Japan. Four days later a Preparatory Commission for Philippine Independence, consisting of twenty members headed by José P. Laurel,³³ was set up in Manila.

Great attention was given in the press to the activities of the Preparatory Commission, ‡ which included all of the members of the Philippine Executive Commission. Interesting additions included Vicente Madrigal, the shipping magnate, Manuel A. Roxas, who had thus far refused to collaborate in any way and had spent some time in Fort Santiago as a result, and Alaoya Alonto Sultan Sa Rmain, the sole representative of the Mohammedan Moros. As their work progressed, Laurel announced that the Commission had agreed upon a republican form of government as best suited to the Philippines. At a plenary session of the Commission on September 3, 1943, the new constitution § was adopted.

* Adm. Kichisaburo Nomura, Japanese Ambassador in the United States, February to December 1941.

³¹ For correspondence on this subject, see pp. 953 ff., *passim*.

* See enclosure no. 3 for text of Tojo's statement. [Footnote in the original; enclosure not printed.]

† See enclosure no. 4 for text of Vargas' statement. [Footnote in the original; enclosure not printed.]

³² Leon G. Guinto, Mayor of Manila.

³³ First Commissioner of Justice in the Philippine Executive Commission; he became Commissioner of the Interior in December 1942.

‡ See enclosure no. 7 for a typical editorial of this period. [Footnote in the original; enclosure not printed.]

§ See enclosure no. 8 for the text of the constitution and membership of the Commission, all of whom signed it. [Footnote in the original; enclosure not printed.]

Laurel is credited with most of the redrafting of the Commonwealth Constitution to meet the new conditions imposed by Japanese conquest. In the preamble the Filipino people "proclaim their independence." In fact the constitution contains no reference either to Japan or to the Co-Prosperity Sphere. The most striking feature, however, is the virtually dictatorial power given to the President of the Republic. Elected by a majority of all the members of the unicameral National Assembly for a term of six years, he appoints not only the Cabinet Ministers and Vice-Ministers, Ambassadors, bureau heads, the higher officers of the armed forces and the advisory Council of State, but also all judges, provincial governors, city and municipal mayors and all other officers of the government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law.

The full significance of the presidential appointive powers becomes apparent when it is noted that the approval of the legislature is in no case required, and that one-half of the National Assembly itself is made up of presidential appointees, the provincial governors and mayors of chartered cities being members *ex-officio*. The remaining half of the Assembly is to be elected in a manner that "shall be prescribed by law, which shall not be subject to change or modification during the Great East Asia War." It appears that such "elections" are to be in Kalibapi hands, and it will be recalled that the governors and mayors who are members of the legislature also head the local branches of the Kalibapi. Directly or indirectly, therefore, the entire membership of the National Assembly will be made up of presidential appointees.

With the Assembly so completely under presidential control, the concurrence of the required majority of all its members in concluding treaties should not be difficult to obtain. Even this requirement is dispensed with in the case of executive agreements with a foreign nation for the utilization of natural resources and the operation of public utilities for the duration of the Greater East Asia War. The veto power of the President is made all but final by a provision that he may disapprove a bill for the second time, if repassed over his veto by a two-thirds vote, and that in such case the Assembly may not during the same session reconsider the measure. A unanimous vote of the Supreme Court is required to declare unconstitutional a law, executive order, ordinance or regulation.

After incorporating most of the provisions of the Commonwealth Constitution, such as a bill of rights and the requirement that 60 percent of the capital of a corporation exploiting natural resources must belong to citizens of the Philippines, the new document ends with several transitory provisions. The new constitution was to be "ratified by the people" in a manner to be provided by law. The departments of the Executive Commission were to become ministries

of the Republic automatically, while existing courts and laws were to be taken over and continued in force except where inconsistent with the provisions of the constitution. All property rights and privileges acquired since the outbreak of the war were made subject to adjustment and settlement at the termination of hostilities. Finally, within one year after the end of the war, the National Assembly is required to provide for the election by popular suffrage of delegates to a constitutional convention which shall formulate a new constitution to be submitted to the people "at a plebiscite."

In making public the text of the constitution, Laurel stated that it did not agree in all respects with Japanese ideas, but that the Preparatory Commission had been given a free hand in the drafting. Some days later the constitution was ratified by a Kalibapi Convention in Manila, presumably as provided by law in the form of an order issued by Chairman Vargas. On September 15, the various Kalibapi chapters selected their delegates to the new National Assembly. Within two weeks the Assembly had convened and elected José P. Laurel President of the Republic of the Philippines, permitting him to leave at once for Tokyo accompanied by Vargas and Aquino.³⁴ Laurel was expected to sign treaties providing for the continuance of Japanese military occupation and the regularizing of various economic questions. Vargas would open the first Philippine Embassy in Tokyo. Laurel and Aquino would return to Manila, where they would obtain the National Assembly's approval of the new treaties with Japan and take part in the formal inauguration of the Philippine Republic on October 15, 1943.

PUBLIC OPINION

In its general conception the Japanese plan for winning over the people of the conquered Philippines scarcely could have been improved. It was of the same high order as the strategy of their general staff during the first six months of the war. Yet despite their important initial success in gaining the collaboration of so many Filipino leaders, the plan as a whole has been a failure. The people referred scornfully to independence "made in Japan," and to the "peace of the carabao" which Japanese military protection would afford them. Leading Filipino collaborationists were spoken of as "military objectives." The United States was never more popular among the people of the Philippines than at the moment Japan was giving them independence.

What were the causes of Japanese political failure in the Philippines? The first was the impossibility of persuading any important number of Filipinos that the United States could lose the war. Certain victory was the central theme of Japanese propaganda, and

³⁴ Benigno S. Aquino, Director-General of the Kalibapi.

it was well presented on the whole. That it did not succeed in the Philippines was the fruit of 43 years of intimate contact with Americans. The attitude of the average Filipino with some education differs in no important way from that of the average American as regards the issues of the war. He is just as certain that the Axis is in the wrong, just as sure of a United Nations' victory. In agreement with certain American radio commentators, the Filipino is inclined to be over-optimistic as to the time required to defeat Japan, despite the overwhelming Japanese military successes of which he was an eyewitness. If the war does not last too long, it appears improbable that the Japanese will make much headway in changing his opinion.

The second cause of Japan's political failure in the Philippines may be found in the repetition of the worst mistakes made by Americans. At his best the invader was condescending and patronizing to the Filipino; at his worst he was grasping and brutal. In the beginning Japanese propaganda laid emphasis on the disappearance of the color line which Americans and British had drawn. It was a good point and worth following up. But the Filipinos found that in actual practice the Japanese soon monopolized the best clubs, hotels and apartments to a greater extent than the Americans had ever done. They demanded and got the best of everything. Equally objectionable to many was the Japanese assumption of superiority in medicine and other professions where Filipinos take legitimate pride in their own accomplishments.

And the Japanese were unnecessarily brutal. It has been mentioned that they were on their good behavior when Manila was occupied, judged by Oriental standards. This was less true in the provinces, where executions and looting are reported to have been much more general. The Filipino knows the meaning of martial law, and when taking part in a guerrilla raid he realizes the risk involved. But after nearly half a century of American rule he was not accustomed to torture. Certainly he was not used to seeing innocent men tortured simply for the purpose of extracting information.

The Filipino did not care for public floggings or the dislocating and breaking of limbs in punishment for minor offences. Americans were rough at times, particularly in the early days, but such cases were exceptional and did not represent a policy. With the Japanese it was a simple routine; they evidently considered that they were being very easy with the troublesome Filipinos. Certainly they were much harder on the Chinese in the Philippines, from the Consul-General in Manila,³⁵ who appears to have been executed, to the simple junk man who was beaten up by a guard at the Consular Internment Camp, apparently just to show off.

³⁵ Yang Kuang-sheng.

What then was the attitude of the typical Filipino toward the native collaborationist government? It followed the same pattern as that of the average American citizen in the Philippines: almost no one really approved of collaboration, but beyond that opinions varied widely. At one extreme, many felt that shooting was too good for men who played the Japanese game to the extent indicated in their speeches. Others felt that in an exposed position, such as that of Vargas, there was no alternative to collaboration. In between there was support for a policy of reserving judgment until after the war when all the facts would be known. There promised to be strong opposition to any proposal for a general amnesty. The extremists will be out for blood, while many of the so-called collaborationists will prefer an opportunity to clear themselves in a public investigation.

It is a common belief in the Philippines that if President Quezon and Vice President Osmeña had remained behind they too would have been compelled to collaborate. Certainly the Japanese would have put forth extraordinary efforts to bring this about. On December 30, 1941, three days before the occupation of Manila, General Homma addressed a persuasive letter to President Quezon,^{||} calling upon him to collaborate. A year later the Japanese were still dealing gently with him, as illustrated by an editorial in the *Manila Tribune* of December 15, 1942,[¶] on Mr. Quezon's "tragedy". His subsequent radio speeches, however, appear to have gotten under Japanese skin, and in the same newspaper, on August 25, 1943, the semi-official "Commentator" expressed himself in no uncertain terms on President Quezon's hypocrisy, threatening him and other Filipino refugees with charges of high treason.**

After nearly two years of Japanese occupation the spirit of the Filipino people remained high. Despite the one-sided military campaign, which cost the lives of some 30,000 of their sons and for which the help promised by America never arrived, they are loyal to the United States. American civilians interned in the Philippines were all but unanimous in praising the extraordinary solicitude shown them by Filipinos at every opportunity. The red armband, prescribed for Americans and other United Nations nationals when they went outside of an internment camp for any reason, was a badge of honor not of disgrace in Filipino eyes. A strange Filipino greeted an American on the street soon after the armbands were introduced. "That's a good idea," he said, "now we know whom we can talk to safely."

^{||} See enclosure no. 1 for text of letter. [Footnote in the original; enclosure not printed.]

[¶] See enclosure no. 2 for text of editorial. [Footnote in the original; enclosure not printed.]

** See enclosure no. 3 for text of "Commentator's" remarks. [Footnote in the original; enclosure not printed.]

When thousands of American prisoners were marched through the streets of Manila after the fall of Corregidor, the Japanese hoped that it would impress the Filipinos as final evidence of the downfall of American power in the Far East. But the reaction was simply one of sorrow and of sympathy for the men who had endured five months of hell on "The Rock" and were so obviously in a state of exhaustion. Cigarettes and food were handed to them whenever the attention of the guards relaxed. Much later several hundred American prisoners appear to have been taken through the streets barefooted, many of them dressed only in makeshift g-strings. Again all Manila was talking, not of Japan's triumph but of Japan's inhumanity. Then in the summer of 1943 a propaganda picture, "Down with the Stars and Stripes," was being filmed in Manila, with American prisoners and tanks in one of the shots. Some Filipino and Spanish girls among the onlookers are reported to have used the occasion to throw cigarettes to the Americans and were taken to Fort Santiago as a result.

A political evaluation of the Philippines under Japanese rule necessitates at least brief reference to guerrilla activities. A traditional avocation of many Filipinos, it received new emphasis with the hatred engendered by Japanese occupation and ruthlessness. It is easy to exaggerate the military importance of guerrillas, but as an expression of public opinion they are decidedly significant in the Philippines. Outside the chief military centers, mostly in Luzon, the Islands were lightly held by the Japanese. In many regions the so-called guerrillas were all but supreme. Some units were headed by USAFFE³⁶ officers, American and Filipino, while in at least two cases they were being led by former provincial governors.†† There were reports almost every week of the killing of Japanese soldiers within the city limits of Manila, and they were forbidden to go out singly at night. Leading collaborationists realized that the guerrillas regarded them as military objectives and took what precautions they could. The attempt on Laurel's life was only the most spectacular of a series. Great efforts were made to conceal such occurrences in most cases, but a number of rather prominent Filipinos are known to have been assassinated. In parallel action, the Chinese in Manila disposed of one of their well known businessmen for cooperating with the Japanese.

Guerrilla activity in the provinces was a major factor in increasing the population of Manila to a point where housing, food and unemployment problems, difficult enough in any case, added fuel to Filipino

³⁶ United States Army Forces in the Far East.

†† See copy of letter of Governor T[h]omas A. Confessor attached to report of November 29, 1943, entitled "Japanese Military Activities in the Philippines," from Vice Consul Peter K. Constan. [Footnote in the original; letter and report not printed.]

hatred of the Japanese. Local stocks of textiles and clothing were virtually exhausted at the end of the first year. The invaders did not concern themselves with supplying manufactured articles to the Philippines; probably they had neither goods to spare nor ships to carry them. The urban Filipino found that he could buy almost nothing except food, which rose continuously in price, while the farmer gradually lost interest in supplying the city markets in return for paper money which would no longer obtain for him even the few items he was accustomed to buy. Rationing and price control measures in general did not work smoothly and the cost of living rose to unprecedented heights. Business was all but stagnant. The public made no mistake in blaming everything on the invaders, and their opinion was not diverted by the enforced observance of Japanese holidays, with parades, homage to the Imperial Palace and free street-car rides.

Japan has failed to win Filipino support and sympathy. Even the idea of independence, prostituted by the Japanese, has lost its appeal for the time being. "We would rather be slaves under the Americans," a prominent Filipino insisted. But signs of discouragement were beginning to appear, particularly in the provinces where American radio news is less generally heard than in the cities. Also it is just possible that after the granting of nominal independence to the Philippines the invaders may try to mend their ways. Many of them appear to like the Filipino; they secretly admire his Occidental accomplishments, his good English. But the Japanese seem not to realize that an Oriental differs in outlook and reactions from an Occidental only in so far as his cultural inheritance has been different, and that in most respects an educated Filipino is more like an American or a Spaniard than a Japanese. If the invaders should become aware of this fact, resulting in a more intelligent approach to winning Filipino friendship, and if the war should last long enough, the enthusiasm of the Filipino people for America might well become blunted.

The people of the Philippines are still convinced that the Americans will come back and give them real independence. But they may be more modest than in earlier years. They know now that complete independence is possible only for the strongest nations, perhaps no longer even for them. Protection against future aggression they must have. In return they must be ready to accept some degree of American or international supervision over their foreign relations, and perhaps over their handling of minorities. But as the most advanced of the southern Oriental peoples their sensibilities must be respected. The Americans returning to Manila after the war must not expect to find things as they were. The "white man's" privileges, symbolized by the exclusiveness of the Army and Navy Club, must be a thing of the past. Modesty will become Americans as well as Filipinos. In

Bataan they went down to defeat together and under Japanese rule the people of the Philippines remained the faithful friends of Americans in adversity. They will be partners in victory.

[In a letter of December 13 to the Chairman of the House Committee on Insular Affairs (811B.50/39), the Secretary of State indicated the Department's "sympathy with the general purpose of the resolution to create a joint United States-Philippine Commission to investigate and make recommendations concerning the post-war economy, trade, finance, economic stability, and rehabilitation of the Philippine Islands." The resolution was H. J. Res. 183, introduced in the House of Representatives on November 4. Legislation establishing the Filipino Rehabilitation Commission was enacted as Public Law 381, approved June 29, 1944; 58 Stat. 626.]

THAILAND

INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES IN QUESTION OF RECOGNIZING A FREE THAI MOVEMENT

892.01/32

*The Secretary of State to the Deputy Director of the Office of
Strategic Services (Goodfellow)*

WASHINGTON, August 26, 1943.

MY DEAR COLONEL GOODFELLOW: In reply to your oral inquiry of August 4 relating to possible American operations conducted in connection with a Free Thai movement, the position of the Department of State is as follows:

The United States recognizes Thailand as an independent state which is now under the military occupation of Japan. This Government does not recognize the Thai Government as it is now constituted; but this Government has refrained from declaring war on Thailand, has continued to recognize as "Minister of Thailand" the Thai Minister in Washington¹ who has denounced his Government's cooperation with Japan, and has sympathetically regarded a Free Thai movement in which he is prominent.

The Government of the United States looks forward to the re-establishment of Thailand's independence as quickly as possible. Available information indicates that there remain in the present Thai Government a number of officials who opposed the capitulation of that Government to Japanese pressure. It is understood that Luang Pradist Manudharm (known also as Nai Pridi Bhanomyong), a member of the Council of Regents, is one of these officials and that he has participated prominently in a secret movement which aims to restore the Government as it was constituted prior to the Japanese invasion.

In the light of this understanding Luang Pradist Manudharm is presumed by the Government of the United States to represent a continuity in the Government of Thailand as it was constituted prior to the defection of the Thai Prime Minister^{1a} to the Japanese at the time of the Japanese invasion and to be one of the outstanding leaders in the movement for Thai independence. Accordingly, until this Government has indications to the contrary from the Thai people, it feels warranted, without in any way committing itself in respect

¹ Mom Rajawongse Seni Pramoj.

^{1a} Field Marshal Luang Pibul Songgram.

to the future, in regarding Luang Pradist as one of the leading representatives in Thailand of the Thai nation.

The attitude of this Government, as above outlined, is a provisional position pending a free expression of the wishes of the Thai people following the liberation of Thailand by United Nations forces. The efforts of the Government of the United States are and should be limited to assisting the Thai people to restore a native regime capable of discharging its responsibilities and free from foreign control. The final choice of the leaders of such a government is a matter for the Thai people alone to decide.

It is believed that this will give you the information you wished.

Sincerely yours,

CORDELL HULL

892.01/47

*Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs
(Ballantine)²*

[WASHINGTON,] December 11, 1943.

The report of conversation ³ between officers of the Department and the Thai Minister and two of his associates ⁴ who have just arrived from the Far East suggests the possibility that sooner or later an approach may be made to this Government upon the subject of establishment somewhere in territory under control of the United Nations a Free Thai Government-in-exile or a Thai committee of liberation. The Secretary of the Thai Legation, in conversation with an officer of FE, ⁵ said that Tularaksa, while in Chungking, had handed the American Ambassador a document ⁶ which the Secretary understood to be a request for recognition and cooperation in establishing a provisional Free Thai government-in-exile. As yet the Department has not received such a document. In the light of the position heretofore taken by the Thai Minister that he did not favor such a project, it is not known how far he will be influenced by the views of his two associates but at any rate this is a matter which FE proposes to study with a view to considering what the attitude of the Department should be on this matter if and when an approach is made to us.

J[OSEPH] W. B[ALLANTINE]

² Addressed to Assistant Secretaries of State Long and Berle and to the Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck).

³ Memorandum of conversation, December 9, by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, not printed.

⁴ Sanguan Tularaksa (or Tularak) and Deng Tilaka.

⁵ Division of Far Eastern Affairs.

⁶ Undated memorandum to the Counselor of Embassy in China by S. Tularak, President of the Committee for Siamese Liberation; received in the Embassy September 23. Copy furnished the Department by the Thai Minister with his memorandum of December 23, not printed. For summary of the undated memorandum, see memorandum of December 31 by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, p. 1121.

892.01/12-1343

Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck)

[WASHINGTON,] December 13, 1943.

Reference FE's memorandum of December 9⁷ in record of a conversation with the Thai Minister and other representatives of the Free Thai movement:

On December 10 Sir George Sansom⁸ called on me at his request and informed me that the British Foreign Office had asked that he discuss with us the question of attitude to be taken regarding Thailand—especially regarding the question of the Free Thai movement and dealings with representatives thereof. Sir George said that reports received by the Foreign Office indicate that various Thai nationals are in contact with Chinese authorities at Chungking, and with American authorities in China and with British authorities in New Delhi. The Foreign Office is apprehensive, Sir George said, lest, in the absence of a formulation and a coordination of British and American official views, there develop a crossing of wires and, through diversity of contacts, a creation of commitments or implied or inferable commitments to various Thai nationals or groups which might lead to confusion, misunderstandings and possible embarrassments.

I stated to Sir George that we also have had some misgivings with regard to some of the implications and possibilities of the present carrying on of relationships with Thai nationals by various authorities whose practices and objectives are not identical. I said that the Department has endeavored to make clear to other agencies of this Government the need to exercise caution and proceed with circumspection in dealing with Thai nationals or groups. I pointed out that, whereas Thailand and Great Britain have declared war on one another, the United States, although Thailand declared war on us, has not declared war on Thailand; that we have chosen to regard Thailand—or the Free Thai movement—as being represented in this country by the Thai Minister in Washington; and that we thus have recognized a Free Thai movement but are not committed as regards a Thai Government.

Sir George and I were of one mind regarding the desirability of discussion between the British Government and this Government with a view to avoiding crossing of wires by the two Governments or by agencies of either of them.

In the light of what appears in FE's memorandum under reference, and of FE's further memorandum of December 11, I feel that it would be desirable for FE to make forthwith the study of which mention is

⁷ Not printed.

⁸ British Minister.

made in the latter of these two memoranda, and that further discussion of the subject with Sir George Sansom at an early date would be appropriate and might be helpful.

S[TANLEY] K. H[ORNBECK]

892.01/12-3143

*Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs
(Ballantine)*⁹

[WASHINGTON,] December 31, 1943.

Reference the underlying documents pertaining to the Free Thai movement (memorandum from the Thai Minister of December 23, 1943,¹⁰ to which is attached a memorandum to the Thai Minister from S. Tularak, President of the Committee for Siamese National Liberation,¹¹ a copy in Thai of the Thai law of September 11, 1941¹² regarding the duty of all Thai to resist invaders, and a copy of a statement¹⁰ made by Sir Josiah Crosby, former British Minister to Thailand, concerning Thailand's declaration of war on Great Britain and the United States; Mr. Hornbeck's memorandum of December 13 in record of a conversation with Sir George Sansom on the question of the Free Thai Movement).

It appears from the remarks of Sir George Sansom that the question of the attitude to be taken regarding Thailand—especially regarding the question of the Free Thai Movement and dealings with representatives thereof—is of concern to the British Foreign Office. Sir George indicated that the various Free Thai groups in China, India and the United States have diverse contacts with three of the United Nations groups and that out of these diverse contacts there might arise commitments or implied commitments which in the absence of a coordination of official views might lead to misunderstandings and embarrassment.

On its part the Department has likewise received intimations of a disturbing nature. It appears that there are differences and mutual dislike and suspicion between the Thai Minister in Washington and the Thai Military Attaché¹³ who was sent from Washington to Chungking . . . It has also been learned that some Thai in China, or while formerly in China, felt that the Chinese wished to use them to China's political advantage. The same can be said of Thai in India with respect to the British. There also is understood to be

⁹ Addressed to the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle) and the Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck) who concurred.

¹⁰ Not printed.

¹¹ Not printed; it was a copy of the memorandum received by the Embassy in China on September 23.

¹² Not found attached to file copy.

¹³ Lt. Col. Mom Luang Kharb Kunjara.

some doubt in British and Chinese minds as to the purposes of the United States Government with respect to the Thai Minister and post-war Thailand. This is doubtless stimulated by the fact that the Thai Minister is the most prominent individual in the Free Thai movement outside of Thailand as it is at present constituted.

The need to formulate and coordinate official views on the question of the Free Thai movement is made immediate in its urgency by the memorandum of the Thai Minister based on Tularak's memorandum to him.

Tularak's memorandum sets forth the strength of the movement in Thailand which he claims to represent and on the basis of that showing makes certain specific political and military proposals. His political request is that assurance be given that the Movement for Siamese National Liberation would be officially recognized and a free Siamese government would be set up somewhere in Allied territory if certain political personages who are leaders of the movement in Thailand could be rescued. Contingent upon such recognition, he further requests that the Siamese government's financial credits be unfrozen for the use of the free Siamese government if and when it be established. Suggestion is also made that Mr. Peck, former American Minister, should be accredited to the free Siamese government and that the former Advisor for Foreign Affairs, Mr. F. R. Dolbeare, an American now with OSS, should be reappointed.

In his memorandum the Thai Minister takes Tularak's memorandum as a point of departure and then gives what he believes to be the legal basis of the Free Thai movement. He goes on to outline the course of events at the time of the Japanese occupation of Thailand and recalls that he repudiated Thailand's alliance with Japan in a document dated December 12, 1941,¹⁵ deposited with the Department. The Minister further cites various witnesses to show that the Thai nation has been resisting the Japanese by every feasible means. He concludes with a request "to enter into negotiations with the United States Government, with a view to carrying on to its honourable conclusion the Thai resistance as provided by law."

The request of the Thai Minister raises the question of the possible courses which the Department might follow with respect to the Free Thai Movement.

One course would be to permit that Movement to continue as at present, but with clearer definition of its status so as to avoid misunderstanding among the interested members of the United Nations. Thai, prominent or otherwise, who might succeed in escaping from Thailand, would be free to join the Movement and make their con-

¹⁵ Not printed. This document was a copy of a broadcast by the Thai Minister to the citizens of Thailand (740.0011 Pacific War/1401). For statement to similar effect by the Thai Minister, see *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. v, p. 389.

tribution to the war effort. The advantages of not setting up any official Thai organization with political implications are fairly obvious and need not be expounded here.

Two other courses would be the establishment of (1) a government-in-exile or (2) a committee of national liberation. Either course would be contingent on a number of imponderable factors such as (a) the ability of an adequate number of Free Thai to escape from Thailand, (b) the extent to which the escapees would actually represent the sentiments of the people of Thailand, (c) the actual advantage or disadvantage to the war effort of such an official body, and (d) the willingness of this Government to become involved in Thailand's internal politics to the extent of deciding whether the Free Thai group or the Pibul Government, which was legally established and continues to function in Bangkok although under Japanese domination, represents Thailand.

In opposition to these two courses it can be said that recognition by the Department of either such organization would be contrary to the Department's policy of not granting recognition to free movements. The attitude of the Department on free movements has not exceeded the statement made by Mr. John Hickerson for the Secretary of State in a letter to Judge Felix Forte sent on May 28, 1943¹⁶ in reply to a question regarding the policy of this Government toward free movements in the United States. The answer was made that "the Department has not accorded official recognition to any of the free movements" although they have been regarded and treated with sympathy and understanding. Within the last few days this attitude was reaffirmed by officers of Eu¹⁷ with respect to Austria. The question of the status of Austrian groups had arisen as a sequel to the Moscow declaration.¹⁸

The French Committee of National Liberation appears superficially to offer some precedent for a similar Thai Committee but actually the cases are quite different. It is sufficient to say that the French were our active allies, that the French Committee represents the best co-operation in the war of which the French, as allies, are at present capable, and that the French actually administer territory within the sphere of the United Nations. The French do not offer an exception to the Department's policy on free movements because they have not been regarded as a free movement in the usual sense. According to some officers in Eu the French have been treated as in a category by themselves. Russia has gone so far as to recognize the French Committee as the representative of the state interests of the French Republic and has exchanged plenipotentiary representatives. The

¹⁶ Not printed: the actual sending date of this letter was June 6, 1943.

¹⁷ Division of European Affairs.

¹⁸ For text, see vol. I, p. 761.

United States has made a statement recognizing the French Committee as administering those territories which acknowledge its authority and has assigned Mr. Edwin C. Wilson as the representative of the United States Government to the French Committee with the personal rank of Ambassador.

Various governments-in-exile such as the Netherlands Government-in-exile offer no precedent for a Thai group of government officials who might escape from Thailand to set up a government-in-exile. The various governments-in-exile which are recognized were regularly functioning before Axis occupation and simply continued functioning within the limitations of their new situation. Furthermore they expect to return to their various countries to take up the work of administration again.

The situation of the Thai is closer to that of Denmark than to any other Axis controlled nation. Both have accredited Ministers at Washington who have declared themselves independent of the current government while affirming loyalty to the King; both have kings who are now the figureheads of government and who will probably be available for the formation of democratic government after the war; the United States is not in a state of war with either of the nations but Thailand has declared war on the United States; and prominent men have escaped from Denmark who are capable of establishing a government-in-exile while prominent men plan to escape from Thailand. On the other hand the Thai King in Switzerland is not in the hands of the enemy as the Danish King is. As yet the Department has opposed the idea of setting up a Danish government-in-exile.

Another possible course would be to permit the Thai to organize a council which might be known as The Advisory Council Representing the Movement of Thai National Liberation. The Council would be made up of prominent men from Thailand who are representative of the Movement of Siamese National Liberation (described in the memorandum of S. Tularak) and who are so recognized by the Thai Minister at Washington. The Council would have no political status either of a government-in-exile, as the Netherlands, or of a national committee of liberation, as the French. All official relations would be with the Thai Minister as usual. It would be understood, however, that the Thai Minister would speak with the advice of the Council and that his acts would represent their considered opinion. Such a development would avoid cutting across the Department's policy of not giving political status to free movements, it would avoid the difficulties of a national committee of liberation with its implied or inferable political commitments, it would avoid the dangers of a government-in-exile which would expect to return to Thailand to become the government for at least an initial period of time, it would avoid the difficulties involved in getting this and other United Nations

Governments committed to the idea of a government-in-exile or a committee of national liberation while there are so many factors still imponderable. It would have the positive advantage of offering a means for Thai of ability to focus their strength and make themselves felt in as effective a way as possible under the limitations of the situation. Such a Council should satisfy the Thai and should be an enlargement of Free Thai activities on which the interested United Nations Governments could agree.

FE believes that it would be desirable to explore further the suggestion of the establishment of an Advisory Council and as a first step toward that end suggests that the Department confer in regard thereto with OSS, under which most of the Free Thai who cooperate with American agencies function. Following such conference the Department might then ask the Thai Minister to call so as to obtain a clarification of the Thai Minister's views on points pertinent to this problem. Depending on the results of the conversations with OSS and the Thai Minister, it might then be advisable to discuss the matter with the British Minister, Sir George Sansom. It is possible, however, that the outcome of the conversation with OSS might suggest that perhaps the Department should talk with Sir George Sansom before calling in the Thai Minister. Ultimately, in the event that unanimity was apparent following the taking of these suggested steps, we might look forward to the formulating of a joint official view on the part of interested United Nations in order that there might be avoided any misunderstanding as to the intentions of the United Nations with respect to the Free Thai movement and the future independence of Thailand.

There is attached a draft letter ¹⁹ to General Donovan of the OSS, enclosing a copy of the Thai Minister's memorandum and a record of Mr. Hornbeck's conversation with Sir George Sansom. Subsequent to the dispatch of this letter, contact might be made by telephone with Colonel M. Preston Goodfellow of the OSS suggesting that he call at the Department to discuss the matter with Mr. Hornbeck and officers of FE.

J[OSEPH] W.B[ALLANTINE]

**EXCHANGE OF VIEWS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA
REGARDING A CHINESE DECLARATION ON THAILAND**

[For correspondence on this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, China, pages 13-14, 23-24, and 36-37.]

¹⁹ Letter of January 13, 1944, from Assistant Secretary of State Berle, not printed.

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¹ In indexing persons the intention has been to include all references to persons of significance for an understanding of the record, with the following exceptions: (1) The name of the Secretary of State or the Acting Secretary of State appearing as the signer of outgoing instructions unless there is a clear indication of the Secretary's or Acting Secretary's personal interest; (2) the name of an American officer in charge of a mission appearing as the signer of reports to the Department of State, except for personal items; (3) the names of persons to whom documents are addressed.

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