

**A DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD:
INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCES ON ELECTION VIOLENCE**

by

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A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

(Political Science)

at the

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN–MADISON

2014

Date of final oral examination: 14 May 2014

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Abstract

This dissertation examines how and when international organizations (IOs) influence election violence. In view of the lack of attention to this question, this study fills an important gap in the fields of international relations and comparative politics, and also has implications for policymakers. In particular, I focus on two common forms of external election support: IO election technical assistance and election monitoring.

I argue that international organizations can influence election violence by altering the incentives of domestic actors. This external influence is a double-edged sword: IO assistance can reduce violence in some circumstances and increase it in others. The effect depends on the type of IO assistance (technical assistance or monitoring) and the election phase (before or after election-day).

Before elections, governments can send a credible signal of good intentions by inviting IO assistance to support their elections. The government's decision to invite external assistance generates costs for domestic actors, and especially for unfair incumbents: monitoring makes violent and non-violent manipulation more costly and technical assistance makes it more difficult. The government's costly signal of inviting international scrutiny can change opposition beliefs about incumbent fairness, which can in turn dissuade the opposition from using violence against incumbent supporters. In these ways, IO assistance has the potential to reduce domestic actor's incentives for violence in the run-up to elections.

After election-day, violence often erupts when the election process or result is seen as not credible. IOs can influence electoral losers' incentives to challenge results. The effect of external assistance depends on assistance type. Technical assistance, which builds trust in election management bodies and the outcome they announce, can reduce violence in the aftermath of elections. However, when observers condemn elections, they can increase the incentives of losers to challenge the result, and thus potentially contribute to violence.

To test this argument, I use statistical analyses, formal models, illustrative cases, and the compilation of an original dataset on election violence globally. The data employed in this study cover election technical assistance from the United Nations as well as a variety of international election monitoring organizations in Latin America and Africa since 1980. First, I present my own data collection on election violence and document spatial and temporal trends in such violence. Then, I examine the government's strategic selection of IO monitors. In the next three chapters, I explore the role of IO assistance before and after elections.

The statistical models show that, controlling for a host of domestic variables, IO election assistance is strongly related to election violence before and after polling. As a complement to the statistical analyses, illustrative cases of Peru, Zimbabwe, Kenya, Sierra Leone, and Guyana show the hypothesized causal mechanisms. These findings contribute to research on how and under which conditions international organizations can affect domestic politics. The findings suggest new areas of research in international relations about the conditions under which IOs influence domestic politics, and they challenge the common assumption in comparative politics that international factors only play a marginal role in domestic politics. In addition, the empirical findings presented here establish important insights for policymakers engaged in democracy promotion broadly and in particular for those who wish to use international organizations to reduce election violence.

Acknowledgments

This research has benefitted from excellent feedback by a number of people. First of all, I wish to thank Lisa Martin. She has been a wonderful advisor throughout graduate school, and provided insightful and constructive comments on all chapters of this dissertation. My committee was a constant source of support, especially during the later stages of dissertation writing. I am grateful to Susan Hyde for trailblazing the study of election monitoring. Her book initially inspired me to explore observer effects on other aspects of domestic politics, and her deep knowledge of the matter has improved this dissertation. Andy Kydd has taught me much about strategic games, and helped guide the formal models in this study. Jon Pevehouse has been invaluable in thinking through many theoretical and statistical issues that arose along the way. He went far beyond the call of duty in his support for this project. Finally, Scott Straus introduced me to the field of political violence in comparative politics, and his rich knowledge of Africa has been an important resource. They have sharpened my thinking on international organizations and violence. All errors are my own.

I thank Ed Friedman for reviving an interest in democratic backsliding, regime transitions, and his strong encouragement during my initial semesters of graduate school. The department at North Hall has provided a supportive environment throughout all stages. I am particularly thankful for substantive comments by David Canon, Melanie Manion, Jonathan Renshon, Jessica Weeks, and Dave Weimer. Further, one of the empirical contributions, a new global dataset on election violence, would not have been possible without the support of UW and the department and a handful of outstanding research assistants. I gratefully acknowledge Carly Michiels, Marissa Jaramillo, Kati Lorge, and Ruben Garcia.

Navigating graduate school would have been a lot harder without the support of my peers, Sanja Badanjak, Jess Clayton, Barry Driscoll, Melanie Getreuer, Mert Kartal, Dalton Lin, Dave Ohls, and Rebecca LeMoine. I thank Autumn Sabo for getting me away from the desk and putting

research in perspective during the final years of dissertating.

Beyond the confines of North Hall, I am grateful for feedback from Jeff Colgan, Patrick Kuhn, Felicity Vabulas, Michael Wahman, and conference participants at APSA, MPSA, ISA, EPSA, Peace Science, and the Program on International Politics, Economics, and Security (PIPES) at Chicago.

On the policy side, this work has greatly benefitted from interviews with staff at implementing agencies in Washington, D.C. and in the field. My summer research fellowship at the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) and subsequent consulting there have been critical in helping me understand policy challenges. A number of people at IFES were and have remained a great source of support and engagement: Almami Cyllah, Staffan Darnolf, Manar Hassan, Lisa Kammerud, Kyle Lemargie, Rakesh Sharma, and Michael Svetlik. Many other policy experts at donor and implementing agencies have given generously from their time. These include Eric Bjornlund and Glenn Cowan at Democracy International, David Pottie at the Carter Center, Tess McEnergy at the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Dorina Bekoe and Linda Bishai at the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP), and Barry Weinberg at the U.S. Department of Justice. All of these discussions informed my understanding of policy interventions and election violence. Several lively conversations gave me hope that more than my committee members would read this dissertation.

On the home front, I thank my father for his encouragement and my grandparents for trying to understand what exactly I am doing in Wisconsin for all these years. I thank my Berlin friends for welcoming me back every half a year as if it has only been a week. Someone once said that one can never return home. But you certainly make the illusion seem real. I am excited about a great Postdoc year back in Berlin before embarking on a tenure track at Florida State. Finally, I thank my husband, Carlton Henson, for his unwavering support during the last eight years. You truly are a keeper.

Contents

Abstract	i
Acknowledgments	iii
List of Figures	vii
List of Tables	ix
Abbreviations	xi
1 International Organizations and Election Violence	1
1.1 The Policy-Research Gap	3
1.2 Argument	7
1.3 Election Violence	10
1.4 Why Election Violence is Important	13
1.5 Chapter Outline	16
2 Global Data on Election Violence	22
2.1 The Rationale: Why Collect Data on Election Violence?	22
2.2 Methodology	30
2.3 Codebook	31
2.4 Trends in Election Violence	36
2.5 Conclusion	45
2.6 Appendix	47
3 Governments' Strategic Selection of Election Monitors	55
3.1 Domestic Context	59
3.2 Variation in the Stringency of IO Monitors	60
3.3 Argument	78
3.4 Research Design	80
3.5 Results	84
3.6 Illustrative Case: Peru	91
3.7 Conclusion	96
3.8 Appendix	98

4	Costly Signals: International Election Assistance and Campaign Violence	100
4.1	Argument	102
4.2	Formal Model	111
4.3	Research Design	118
4.4	Results	124
4.5	Illustrative Case: Zimbabwe	138
4.6	Conclusion	143
4.7	Appendix A – Statistics	147
4.8	Appendix B – Proof of Equilibria	148
5	Sore Losers? International Condemnation and Post-Election Violence	158
5.1	Post-Election Violence and its Causes	161
5.2	Formal Model	166
5.3	Research Design	173
5.4	Results	177
5.5	Case Comparison: Kenya and Sierra Leone	189
5.6	Conclusion	194
5.7	Appendix	198
6	Trust, Technical Assistance, and Post-Election Violence	203
6.1	Background on Election Technical Assistance	204
6.2	Argument	212
6.3	Research Design	218
6.4	Results	221
6.5	Illustrative Case: Guyana	232
6.6	Conclusion	243
6.7	Appendix – Descriptive Statistics	245
6.8	Appendix 2 – Election Administrative Challenges	246
7	Conclusion	249
7.1	Argument	249
7.2	Findings	253
7.3	Implications	256
7.4	Future Research Avenues	264
7.5	Conclusion	266
	References	269

List of Figures

1.1	Percent of Violent Elections Globally, 1945-2008	10
1.2	Percent of Violent Elections by Continent and Stage, 1990-2012	12
1.3	Chapter Outline and Election Timeline	17
2.1	Spatial Trends – World	37
2.2	Spatial Trends – Africa before, on, after Election-Day	38
2.3	Varying Dynamics and Human Impact	39
2.4	Temporal Trends – Comparison to NELDA	40
2.5	Temporal Trends – by Election Stage	41
2.6	Temporal Trends – Victims of Violence	42
2.7	Correlates of Violence – Level of Democracy	44
2.8	Correlates of Violence – Economic Development	45
3.1	Distribution of IO Monitors in Latin American Elections	56
3.2	Distribution of Dependent Variable: IO Choice	81
3.3	Distribution of IO Monitor Type across Regime Type	84
3.4	Effect of Threshold Status on Inviting Any Observers (ZINB)	86
3.5	Effect of Threshold Status on IO Choice (ZINB)	88
3.6	Effect of Political Regime on IO Choice (ZIP) – across IO Types	89
3.7	Effect of Political Regime on IO Choice (ZIP) – by IO Type	89
3.8	ZIP Model Fit - Predictions for each IO Type	98
4.1	Finite Extensive Game	112
4.2	Ranges of Equilibria	117
4.3	Effect of Hosting IOs on Campaign Violence, Hypothesis 1	125
4.4	Effect of Hosting IOs on Campaign Violence, Hypothesis 2	129
4.5	Effect of Hosting IOs on Campaign Violence, Hypothesis 3	130
4.6	Effect of Hosting IOs on Campaign Violence, Hypothesis 4	131
4.7	Effect of Hosting IOs on Campaign Violence, 3-way Interaction	132
4.8	Distribution of Conditioning Variables	147
5.1	The Post-Election Game	167
5.2	Equilibria and the Loser’s Strength	170
5.3	Equilibria	171
5.4	Effect of Condemnation on Post-Election Violence	178
5.5	Effect of Loser’s Vote Share on Violence	182

	viii
5.6 Violence at Last 3 Elections by Observation Status	188
5.7 Comparing Kenya and Sierra Leone 2007	191
5.8 Distribution of Loser’s Vote Share	198
5.9 Matching – Balance Diagnostics	200
6.1 IFES Training Poster Against Post-Election Violence (DRC 2006)	206
6.2 Types of UNDP Election Technical Assistance, 2002-2012	212
6.3 Effect of Population Size on the Probability of UN Assistance	223
6.4 Distribution of Predicted Probabilities of UN Election Assistance	225
6.5 Effect of UN Election Assistance on Post-Election Violence	228
6.6 Trust in National Election Commissions and Elections	233
7.1 Mechanisms and Effects of IO Assistance on Election Violence	250

List of Tables

2.1	Comparing Election-Related Violence Datasets	25
2.2	Menu of Manipulation	29
2.3	Election Violence Actors	43
2.4	Disqualifications and Changes in Term Limits	43
2.5	GEVD Descriptive Statistics (N=1,227)	47
2.6	155 Countries included in GEVD, 1990-2012	48
2.7	Comparison of Existing Data	49
3.1	Comparing IO Observers in Latin America 1980-2010	68
3.2	Constructing the <i>Regime</i> variable	82
3.3	Determinants of IO Choice	85
3.4	Effect of Threshold Status on IO Choice (ZIP model)	88
3.5	Descriptive Statistics	98
4.1	Tools of Campaign Manipulation for Incumbent and Opposition	105
4.2	Notation in the Game	112
4.3	Elections where Opposition Engaged in Campaign Violence	120
4.4	Predicted Effects of Observable Measures	123
4.5	Determinants of Opposition Pre-Election Violence (Testing Hypothesis 1)	127
4.6	Determinants of Opposition Pre-Election Violence (Testing Hypotheses 2, 3, 4)	128
4.7	Summary of Conditional Hypotheses	131
4.8	Testing Alternative Explanation 1 - Determinants of Election Quality	135
4.9	Testing Alternative Explanation 2 - Determinants of Election Aid	137
4.10	Zimbabwe's Elections: Hosting and Violence	139
4.11	Descriptive Statistics	147
5.1	Post-Election Violence and Protests	162
5.2	Notation in the Game	168
5.3	Distribution of Post-Election Violence Level	175
5.4	Effect of Condemnation on the Probability of Post-Election Violence	178
5.5	Determinants of Post-Election Violence	179
5.6	Loser's Average Vote Share by Violence Level	182
5.7	Matched Elections - Example	190
5.8	Descriptive Statistics	198
5.9	The Effect of Condemnation – Counterfactuals	199
5.10	Matching – 17 Matched Elections	200

5.11	Determinants of Observed Elections	201
6.1	UN Technical Assistance and Post-Election Violence	221
6.2	Determinants of UN Technical Election Assistance	226
6.3	Determinants of Post-Election Violence and Protest	229
6.4	Determinants of Post-Election Violence - <i>Bootstrap Estimates</i>	231
6.5	Changes in EMB Trust conditional on UN Technical Assistance	233
6.6	Guyana's TA Support and Post-Election Violence	235
6.7	Descriptive Statistics	245

Abbreviations

AU	African Union
CARICOM	. . .	Caribbean Community
CC	Carter Center
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CW	Commonwealth of Nations
EAB	Electoral Assistance Bureau (Guyana)
EC	European Commission
ECOWAS	. . .	Economic Community of West African States
EMB	Election Management Body
EU	European Union
EVER	Election Violence Education and Resolution
IFES	International Foundation for Electoral Systems
GECOM	. . .	Guyana Elections Commission
IGO	Intergovernmental Organization
IO	International Organization
NEC	National Election Commission
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
OAS	Organization of American States
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
SADC	Southern African Development Community
TA	Technical Assistance
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNDPA	United Nations Department of Political Affairs
UNEAD	United Nations Electoral Assistance Division

1 | International Organizations and Election Violence

“We could see a dirty election, or one that lacks credibility, or it’ll be both dirty and lack credibility. I don’t know how it can be otherwise.”

– United Nations official¹

“While many international observers left Afghanistan in the wake of attacks on foreigners, years of expensive preparations ... [including \$100 million from the United Nations and foreign donors] were expected to compensate... ‘We have so many controls now, it’s going to be much safer this time.’”

– Afghan Independent Election Commission official²

The Afghan election in April 2014 was one of the most anticipated elections in years. Against the backdrop of its war-torn history, Taliban resurgence, weak state capacity, ethnic cleavages, poverty, and low education, Afghanistan was (again) the perfect candidate for election violence. And indeed, violence erupted. In the run-up to the election, the Taliban aimed at disrupting the election with a series of systematic attacks on the election commission, a voter registration center,³ journalists, and foreigners, including staff from technical assistance missions and election monitors.⁴ In one of these attacks, a member from the National Democratic Institute (NDI) observer delegation was killed. The NDI withdrew its mission. Another monitoring organization, Democracy International, sharply reduced its presence. The International Republican Institute (IRI), usually attending Afghan elections, did not send a mission. On the technical assistance side, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) urged its staff to take vacation days and leave the country. The few remaining United Nations (UN) advisors limited their meetings with Afghan officials.

¹Rod Nordland and Matthew Rosenberg, “Credibility of Afghan Vote in Doubt as Observers Flee Violence,” *New York Times*, 30 March 2014. Available at <http://nyti.ms/1dFidNc> Accessed 6 April 2014.

²Rod Nordland, Azam Ahmed, and Matthew Rosenberg, “Afghan Turnout is High as Voters Defy the Taliban,” *New York Times*, 6 April 2014. Available at <http://nyti.ms/1oA6bd1> Accessed 6 April 2014.

³Matthew Rosenberg and Azam Ahmed, “War and Unrest Provide for a Scarred Campaign Trail in Afghanistan,” *New York Times*, 3 April 2014. Available at <http://nyti.ms/1fwEVGe> Accessed 6 April 2014.

⁴Nordland and Rosenberg 2014, see above.

Yet, as deplorable as these developments were, the 2014 campaigning period compared quite favorably to earlier elections in 2004/05 and 2009/10 in terms of fatalities.⁵ During the 2010 campaign, “candidates, particularly women, could not campaign freely. In some cases, security concerns prohibited candidates from campaigning at all.”⁶ In contrast, during the 2014 election campaign, the Taliban were less active and did not attack any of the eleven presidential candidates.⁷ Candidates, including women, campaigned throughout most of the country. One woman, Habiba Sarobi, even competed for vice president on a leading candidate’s ticket.

Why were the 2014 elections less violent than earlier ones? Most factors suggested that 2014 would be at least as violent as 2009/10. International election observers had withdrawn throughout the campaign and were gone by election-day, thus unable to exert their influence. Similarly, UN technical assistants had largely left the field. Karzai’s retirement after 12 years meant that it would be a transition of power. Domestic conditions had otherwise changed little: since at least 2008, Taliban attacks had been steadily increasing,⁸ and poverty remained a widespread problem.

One critical difference between 2010 and 2014 was that the cumulative effect of extensive technical assistance was finally being felt. For the past decade, the international community has taken an active role in Afghan domestic capacity building, spear-headed by the United Nations. The UN supervised the 2004/05 elections and has engaged in *extensive* domestic capacity building since 2006.⁹ Largely due to these “years of expensive preparations,”¹⁰ Afghan domestic capacity to administer elections has greatly increased. Aimed at sustainability, UN election technical assistance focused on security reforms as well as capacity building for the election commission and tens of thousands of domestic monitors.¹¹ Clearly, this UN assistance contributed to the decline in election-

⁵Taliban attacks killed seven UN workers who helped registering voters before the 2004 Presidential elections; seven candidates before the 2005 Legislative elections; 39 people in the run-up to the 2009 Presidential elections; and 8 people during 2010 Legislative election campaign, while abducting five campaign workers and candidates. Estimates from author’s data compilation (GEVD), which is detailed in Chapter 2.

⁶Democracy International 2011, 2.

⁷The Taliban instead attacked election facilities (killing five Afghans) and foreigners (killing one NDI observer). Nordland and Rosenberg 2014, see above.

⁸U.S. GAO 2013, 17.

⁹UNDP-ELECT ran from 2006 to 2011, and UNDP-ELECT II runs from 2012 to 2015; the total budget for the second phase is \$338 million. See http://www.us.undp.org/content/afghanistan/en/home/operations/projects/democratic_governance/elect/ Accessed 6 April 2014.

¹⁰Nordland, Ahmed, and Rosenberg 2014, see above.

¹¹That said, external assistance for 2014 also included U.S. military air support to transport ballots and about

related fatalities. The UN-supported efforts included

“early and frequent security assessments of the polling centres by Afghan security agencies, numerous election security exercises, a much more significant deployment compared to previous elections of Afghan security forces in terms of troop numbers and better equipment, as well as ongoing operations to improve the elections security environment. The current size of Afghan security forces has doubled since the last Presidential elections and their capability has been much enhanced.”¹²

How can international organizations influence election violence? While anecdotes abound, there are surprisingly few systematic studies on this question. Virtually all developing country elections take place in an international context. In some situations, international actors are actively trying to reduce election violence. But in many cases, even when international actors are *not* explicitly trying to affect this issue, they still have the potential to alter domestic outcomes in important ways. Throughout this dissertation, I focus on two factors: international technical assistance¹³ and election monitoring. These two types of international support have been implemented for decades. Yet their impact on election violence is an open question. To what extent, in what ways, and under what conditions does such an effect exist?

1.1 The Policy-Research Gap

Policy interest in this question has surged in recent years. Several key organizations providing technical assistance, including the UN Development Programme and USAID, have issued guides on best practices within the past five years.¹⁴ These handbooks outline the opportunities for and experiences of external actors in addressing electoral security. Since 2005, a joint initiative by the European Commission and UNDP has sponsored yearly workshops to train policymakers in

50,000 NATO coalition troops. Nordland, Ahmed, and Rosenberg 2014, see above.

¹²“UNAMA notes national preparations for securing Afghan elections,” UNAMA press statement, 27 March 2014. Available at <http://unama.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=12254&ctl=Details&mid=15756&ItemID=37818&language=en-US>. Accessed 6 April 2014. Also see UNDP-ELECT 2011, 11, 54, 88, 94.

¹³International technical assistance supports country-tailored reforms and may include logistics, poll worker training, and civic education, advice on laws and registration methods, computer applications, as well as security reforms. See Ludwig 2004, 176.

¹⁴See UNDP 2009; USAID 2010 and 2013; EISA 2009; and Kammerud 2011.

electoral security.¹⁵ NGOs, too, have developed substantial expertise; IFES has pioneered this effort by developing election violence mitigation tools and integrating them in regular election assistance.¹⁶ This is not just a push from the outside. Acknowledging often ineffective local remedies, regional organizations in Africa are interested in developing better international preventative and mediation techniques.¹⁷ However, what strategies reduce election violence remains unclear. Policy evaluations are based on case studies.¹⁸ While these shed light on individual elections, it is unclear how representative and generalizable these examples are. Similarly for election monitoring, some organizations have noted a link between their actions and election violence,¹⁹ but it often remains unclear whether single incidents were part of a broader pattern.

For outside policymakers seeking to reduce election violence, current research unfortunately offers little guidance. While implementing organizations have drawn attention to the importance of election violence and potential external leverage, it is still a blind spot in policy research on democracy promotion.²⁰ Similarly, most scholarship on election violence focuses on domestic factors and gives almost no weight to international influences. Academia has not caught up with increased interest in the link between external assistance and electoral violence. The comparative politics literature locates causes of election violence at the domestic level. This research has identified political factors, such as electoral system design and institutions,²¹ fraud,²² powerful incumbents,²³ and weak state capacity.²⁴ Other domestic drivers include economics,²⁵ demographics,²⁶ and identity issues.²⁷ Some of these lines of inquiry are limited in their causal power because largely time-invariant fac-

¹⁵See EC-UNDP 2011; for similar USIP workshops, see <http://www.usip.org/events/preventing-electoral-violence-in-africa-tools-policy-makers>

¹⁶For IFES' EVER program, see <http://www.ifes.org/Research/Cross-Cutting/Election-Violence-Education-and-Resolution.aspx>

¹⁷EISA 2009, 17, 14-19.

¹⁸UNDP 2009, 51-93.

¹⁹Atwood 2012, 22.

²⁰Three of the most prominent authors in this field – Thomas Carothers, Larry Diamond, and Peter Burnell – do not explore this phenomenon in their work. See Carothers 2004, 2006a, 2006b, 2010; Diamond 2008; and Burnell 2000.

²¹See Bjornlund, Cowan, and Gallery 2007; Fischer 2007; Höglund 2009; Reilly 2002; and Sisk and Reynolds 1998.

²²See Arriola and Johnson 2012; Bratton 2008; Kuhn 2012; and Kuntz and Thompson 2009.

²³See Bhasin and Gandhi 2013; Chaturvedi 2005; Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski 2014; Klopp and Kamungi 2007/08; Krieger 2000; and Wilkinson 2004.

²⁴Patino and Velasco 2004.

²⁵See Collier 2009; and Collier and Rohner 2008.

²⁶See Arriola 2013; Laakso 2007; Varshney 2001; and Wilkinson and Haid 2009.

²⁷See Robinson and Torvik 2009; and Straus 2011.

tors cannot explain changes in election violence within a few years. For example, electoral systems change rarely, and institutional capacity and economic development change only slowly. While I shift the focus to international influences, I include many of these domestic factors as control variables throughout the statistical analyses.

Further, the scant comparative politics research addressing international influences on election violence is primarily based on case studies (like policy evaluations) and is inconclusive. Some point to successes like Ghana's internationally supported, peaceful power transition in 2008²⁸ and show how technical assistance can help alleviate (if not overcome) deep-seated internal conflicts in several elections.²⁹ However, the only statistical study – to my knowledge – on external effects on election violence in comparative politics concludes that democracy promotion can lead to violence by insisting on elections in weak-capacity, low-income countries.³⁰ For the subset of post-conflict elections, research on the impact of external factors (peacekeeping, technical assistance, monitoring)³¹ on violence is mixed as well. Some praise external assistance as a “critical component of overall conflict-mitigation efforts,”³² while others are inconclusive³³ or find both positive and negative effects across cases.³⁴

International relations scholarship does not offer much insight either. While there is a sizable body of literature on democratization³⁵ and the role of third-party actors in intra-state conflict, there is virtually no work on election-related violence. The vast majority of the international institutions and conflict literature has focused on their effect on *other* types of political violence, such as civil wars,³⁶ low-level intra-state conflict,³⁷ human rights violations,³⁸ and torture in particular.³⁹

²⁸Gyimah-Boadi 2010, 145-146.

²⁹Fischer 2002.

³⁰Collier (2009, 20-21) argues that elections cause violence in countries with per capita GDP below \$2,700.

³¹Kumar 1998, 9.

³²Sisk 2008, 16.

³³Kumar and Ottaway 1998, 231; Kumar and de Zeeuw 2008, 275.

³⁴Bjornlund, Cowan, Gallery 2007.

³⁵See, for example, Pevehouse 2005; Mansfield and Pevehouse 2006; and Kelley 2004.

³⁶Fortna 2004 and 2008.

³⁷Daxecker 2012. The dependent variable is based on Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED), which does not distinguish election-related from other conflict but instead captures any kind of conflict events that happen to occur around election periods. For a more detailed data discussion, see Chapter 2.

³⁸See Hafner-Burton 2005 and 2013; Hathaway 2002; Simmons 2009; and Thomas 2001.

³⁹See Hathaway 2002; Neumayer 2005; and Vreeland 2008.

The burgeoning research on international election observers has provided policymakers with insight on *related* phenomena and has blazed a trail for this dissertation. Yet that research has side-lined violence in favor of examining the observer effect on election fraud and quality,⁴⁰ pre-election boycotts,⁴¹ and post-election protests,⁴² which may or may not involve violence. Finally, in 2014, one article examined pre-election violence in Africa, finding that internationally observed elections are associated with an increase from 0.3 to 0.9 total conflict events over the three-month campaigning period.⁴³ In that study, violent *incidents* were counted and weighted equally, though, no matter how many people were affected, so violence intensity remains unclear.⁴⁴ While it may seem counter-intuitive that domestic actors ramp up violence at observed elections, the argument there is that domestic agents use force in the campaigning period because using it on election-day, when observer missions are largest, will be even more likely to be documented.

In the absence of substantial theoretical and empirical work on the IO-violence link, we can only guess at which IO strategies would reduce election violence. Consensus exists that “there remains a yawning gap of knowledge”⁴⁵ and that “more research is necessary to identify [international] strategies to prevent and control the divisive effects of political contestation.”⁴⁶

To fill the policy-research gap, we need better theories and better data. Throughout this study, I theorize interactions between international and domestic politics. I offer a theory about how international engagement in elections can alter the incentives of domestic actors to resort to violence in the run-up to elections. Similarly, after voting, external actors can change the incentives of electoral losers to challenge results by building trust in the outcome or, alternatively, strengthening the loser’s position vis-à-vis the winner. Any peaceful implementation of election results requires the consent of the loser, and IO actions can be critical at that juncture.

⁴⁰See Hyde and O’Mahony 2010; Hyde 2011; and Kelley 2012.

⁴¹See Beaulieu 2014, 64; Beaulieu and Hyde 2009; and Kelley 2011.

⁴²See Beaulieu 2014, 73; Hyde and Marinov 2014; and Kuhn 2012.

⁴³Daxecker 2014.

⁴⁴For example, five violent “events” may indicate five fatalities in one election and 50 fatalities in another election. Event counts alone do not provide information on violence intensity.

⁴⁵Sisk 2008, 18.

⁴⁶See Kumar and de Zeeuw 2008, 275; and Kumar and Ottaway 1998, 231; see also Höglund and Jarstad 2010, 1.

In addition to the theoretical argument, I contribute to scholarship by providing one of the first global datasets on election violence. This dataset significantly improves on existing data on several fronts. In terms of spatial coverage, it goes beyond current efforts – which focus on Africa – by providing data on countries globally. In terms of timing, it provides systematic information on each of the three distinct electoral phases (before, during, after polling). It also provides details on the types and extent of violent and non-violent manipulation rather than imposing (arbitrary) thresholds. Hopefully, this empirical documentation paves the way for further theorizing and analyses of this important political phenomenon.

1.2 Argument

This dissertation seeks to fill this gap in scholarship and ultimately assist policymakers by evaluating the association between international organizations and election violence, providing some of the first quantitative data and empirical results pertaining to this issue. The argument developed and tested here is that organizations can influence election violence by altering the incentives of domestic actors. The effect on violence depends on the type of IO support (technical support or monitoring)⁴⁷ and the electoral stage (before or after election-day).⁴⁸

Before elections, governments can send a credible signal of good intentions by inviting IO assistance to support their elections. The government’s decision to invite external support generates costs for domestic actors, especially for unfair incumbents. The government’s costly signal of inviting international scrutiny can change opposition beliefs about incumbent fairness, which can in turn dissuade the opposition from using violence against incumbent’s supporters. If the opposition believes that the incumbent is likely fair, it is less likely to engage in violence against government supporters

⁴⁷To clarify some terms: I use election “monitoring” and “observation” interchangeably; and similarly election technical “assistance” and “support.” I focus on these two types of external support largely because they are the most common. Other types of external election support are supervision (where the UN alone administers the process) and peacekeeping (which often accompanies other support types in post-conflict countries).

⁴⁸I often refer to “pre, at, post” elections, which respectively denotes (1) the campaign period or run-up to elections, usually six months preceding election-day, (2) the day(s) of active polling, and (3) the post-election period, usually three months after voting.

because fighting fair incumbents is not beneficial. In this way, IO assistance has the potential to reduce domestic actor's incentives for violence in the run-up to elections.

The signal of inviting IO support is credible because it generates costs for unfair incumbents: technical assistance makes manipulation more difficult, and monitoring makes manipulation more costly. Technical assistance makes (violent and non-violent) manipulation⁴⁹ more difficult by actively reforming domestic processes: increasing citizens' access to complaint mechanisms, and increasing institutional capacity for processing such complaints and for bolstering security at election facilities. Technical assistance (TA) also directly removes some triggers of violence (e.g. by changing registration procedures) and mediates violence where it occurs (e.g. through local cross-stakeholder bodies). Such reforms make it more difficult to tilt the playing field by irregular means and to use violence as a means of political competition.

In the campaigning period, international election monitoring makes (violent and non-violent) manipulation more costly by increasing the risk that such manipulation will be caught and exposed. In the run-up to elections, credible observer groups send pre-assessment missions and issue statements about the possibility of a meaningful election. These statements detail institutional shortcomings and malpractice by domestic stakeholders, including violent and non-violent manipulation (e.g. misuse of state resources, failure to update the voter register). The anticipated public exposure of manipulation generates incentives for domestic actors to limit manipulation or at least adopt less overt strategies. Thus, in the run-up to elections, both types of external support help calm tensions and lower the risk of election violence.

In the wake of elections, however, violence often erupts after electoral losers challenge election results which they deem not credible. At this point, IO support can have divergent effects on challengers' incentives to reject the results: technical assistance again reduces violence, whereas observers' verdict about the elections' credibility can contribute to violence. Long before elections are held, technical support often centers on boosting institutional capacity and credibility. Besides

⁴⁹In my conceptualization, the term "manipulation" can encompass both violent and non-violent means, whereas "violence" always entails physical force and "fraud" does not.

institutional reforms, TA also encourages contestants to stay calm, and aims to socialize citizens and parties to acknowledge that losing is just part of the democratic game, which they may win in future competitions. Taken together, these efforts increase citizens' trust in the national election commission and in the result that it announces, which reduces domestic agents' incentives to challenge the results, thereby also reducing violence risks.

Unlike technical assistants, IO observers provide an independent validation of the election result. When observers cast doubt on the credibility of the result by issuing a negative report, they may encourage losers to challenge the outcome. International condemnations can strengthen the loser's incentives to challenge by increasing the number of people who are willing to fight for him. Negative reports strengthen the loser's relative power by indicating that the loser has more popular support than the official (biased) vote shares suggest, and serving as focal points for mobilization. When losers are more likely to win a potential post-election fight, they are also more likely to challenge the result, which can lead to violence. Because a negative IO report increases losers' incentives to challenge the result, it can have the unintended consequence of contributing to violence.


This dissertation seeks to help close the policy-research gap and fill a lacuna in scholarship by examining how international election assistance affects domestic conflict during elections. In doing so, this project makes both theoretical and empirical contributions. The study provides insight into the effect of two prominent assistance types, their mechanisms, and effects across Latin America and Africa since 1980. It provides systematic analyses to reveal broad patterns across different domestic contexts and international organizations. It tracks causal links with illustrative case, and also provides an original dataset. Before developing and testing the argument, however, it is important to understand the empirical background of election violence. In the rest of this chapter, I document this phenomenon, its importance, and preview the chapter outline of the dissertation.

1.3 Election Violence

Election violence is a type of political violence that is aimed at influencing the elections' process or outcome and occurs temporally close to elections. It is directed against people (candidates, voters, election officials, external supporters) or objects (election facilities, party offices, ballots).⁵⁰ While most analyses focus on the physical use of force, it can also include intimidation, threats, or verbal abuse.

This is not a new phenomenon. Throughout modern history, election violence has occurred in many countries which today are advanced democracies. Britain experienced it at least until the middle of the 19th century: “By 1715, violence and intimidation were regarded as the most effective means of winning votes [in England], a violence which political parties initiated and carried on for more than 150 years.”⁵¹ Election violence occurred in France under Robbespierre.⁵² It has been documented in the American colonies and again later in the U.S. from the period of reconstruction to the modern civil rights movement.⁵³

Figure 1.1: Percent of Violent Elections Globally, 1945-2008



⁵⁰EC-UNDP 2011, 15. For alternative and more detailed definitions, see Straus and Taylor 2012, 19; Höglund 2009, 415-417; Sisk 2008, 5-7; and UNDP 2009, 4.

⁵¹See Rapoport and Weinberg 2001, 28; and Seymour and Frary 1918, 91, 126.

⁵²Seymour and Frary 1918, 318.

⁵³Seymour and Frary 1918, 259, 274, 302; and Weinberg and Utrecht 2002.

While we have insufficient data for pre-World War II, Figure 1.1 illustrates that the percentage of violent elections worldwide has stayed fairly constant since 1945.⁵⁴ Until 1980, it hovered around 15 percent. After 1980, the rate of violent elections has increased and since exceeded 20 percent in most years. This is one of the lower estimates; other violence estimates are closer to 25 percent of elections.⁵⁵ The swift “bump” in violence around 1980 goes along with an increase in the number of elections held per year, as new democracies from the third wave entered the field. Given that such violence has affected elections for decades, it is surprising that research has only recently begun to examine the phenomenon in a systematic, cross-national way.

Perhaps one reason for the relative scholarly neglect is that election violence is not spread evenly but is most prevalent in a single continent: Africa. As Figure 1.2 documents, since 1990 about 44 percent of national competitions there have experienced some kind of election violence before, during, or after election-day.⁵⁶ Africa’s experience stands in sharp contrast to all other continents. Only 20 percent of elections in the Americas, Asia, and Oceania, and only 10 percent of national elections in Europe were accompanied by violence during this time. Even if we exclude advanced democracies from the Americas and Europe, these regions’ violence rates do not approach those in Africa.

Election violence is a global phenomenon and occurs in a variety of political settings. In electoral autocracies, it often takes the form of state repression, such as the targeted killing of candidates and their supporters in Zimbabwe, widespread voter intimidation in Cambodia, and individual arrests and harassment of civil society organizations in Iran and Russia. In emerging democracies, campaign violence often occurs due to party rivalries, such as in India, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone.⁵⁷ While the goal of violence in these settings is improving chances of winning the election,


⁵⁴This shows a 5-year moving average, with data on whether any significant violence occurred during any stage of the electoral process, based on Nelda33 (Hyde and Marinov 2012).

⁵⁵Based on my own data (GEVD), 23.6 percent of elections were violent since 1990; Fischer (2002, 11) estimates that 24.5 percent of elections were violent in 2001. Also see Bekoe 2009; Straus and Taylor 2012; Salehyan and Linebarger 2013; and Simpson 2013.

⁵⁶This includes *any* people killed, injured, arbitrarily arrested, as well as property damage, and is based on my own data collection (GEVD), described in chapter 2.

⁵⁷See Wilkinson 2004; Human Rights Watch 2003; and “Ahead of Elections, Sierra Leone Focuses on Mitigating Political Violence,” *IFES*, 17 January 2012. Available at <http://www.ifes.org/Content/Publications/News-in-Brief/2012/Jan/Ahead-of-Elections-Sierra-Leone-Focuses-on-Mitigating-Political-Violence.aspx> Accessed 18 January 2012.

Figure 1.2: Percent of Violent Elections by Continent and Stage, 1990-2012



at times violence is also used to disrupt the election process altogether. For example, in 2014 the Taliban targeted election facilities and stakeholders to disrupt Afghanistan's Presidential elections in April⁵⁸ and demonstrators blocked polling stations and attacked voters to disrupt Thailand's Legislative elections in February, hoping to replace democracy with an unelected council.⁵⁹

Perhaps surprisingly, election violence even occurs in advanced democracies. For example, in the Netherlands, the LPF party leader and potential future prime minister Pim Fortuyn was assassinated during the 2002 campaign.⁶⁰ In Sweden, foreign minister Anna Lindh was assassinated days before a national referendum on the country's decision to join the Euro, which she had strongly supported.⁶¹ In Macedonia, competition between ethnic groups and against election officials escalated on voting day in 2008.⁶²

⁵⁸Rod Nordland and Matthew Rosenberg, "Credibility of Afghan Vote in Doubt as Observers", *New York Times*, 29 March 2014. Available at <http://nyti.ms/1dFidNc> Accessed 29 March 2014.

⁵⁹Thomas Fuller, "Thai Protesters Disrupt Early Voting in South," *New York Times*, 26 January 2014. Available at <http://nyti.ms/1gfiJlZ> Accessed 26 January 2014.

⁶⁰Marlise Simons, "Elections to Proceed in the Netherlands, Despite Killing," *New York Times*, 8 May 2002. Available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2002/05/08/world/elections-to-proceed-in-the-netherlands-despite-killing.html> Accessed 6 April 2014.

⁶¹Goran Rosenberg, "The Spell of Sweden's Golden Past," *New York Times*, 23 September 2003. Available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2003/09/23/opinion/the-spell-of-sweden-s-golden-past.html> Accessed 6 April 2014.

⁶²Sandevski 2008, 16.

While not fatal, violence in the form of voter intimidation has also occurred in the U.S. For example, during the 2008 Presidential election, voters were harassed in Pennsylvania and North Carolina from both parties' supporters. In Fayetteville, NC, white protesters heckled a few dozen black Obama voters as they entered an early voting center.⁶³ In Philadelphia, two New Black Panther supporters intimidated white voters during voting at a polling place.⁶⁴ In short, while violent electoral tactics are frequent in non-democracies, they are not unheard of in advanced democracies.

1.4 Why Election Violence is Important

Peaceful elections are a cornerstone of democracy. In Robert Dahl's classic definition of polyarchy, it is a key requirement that "elected officials are chosen in frequent and fairly conducted elections in which *coercion is comparatively uncommon*."⁶⁵ While the importance of elections relative to other institutions and freedoms has been debated,⁶⁶ few people would disagree that peaceful transitions of power are a minimal requirement of democracy, and a key advantage over other systems of government. This is not just political theory but a practical reality for citizens' perception of governance. As one government official remarked about Afghanistan's 2014 *relatively* peaceful election: "Whenever there has been a new king or president [in our past], it has been accompanied by death and violence. For the first time, we are experiencing democracy."⁶⁷

Apart from depriving countries of a cornerstone of democracy, violent elections have a number of other negative and lasting consequences for democracy, development, and conflict. They curtail political participation by disenfranchising voters, limiting their choice, limiting candidate's freedom of running for office, and generate frustration with politicians. Election violence in the run-up to

⁶³Christina Bellantoni, "McCain supporters heckle early voters," *The Washington Times*, 20 October 2008. Available at <http://wtim.es/1hjI6my> And "Voter Intimidation," Project Vote. Available at <http://projectvote.org/voter-intimidation.html> Both accessed 6 April 2014.

⁶⁴Krissah Thompson, "2008 voter-intimidation case against New Black Panthers riles the right," *Washington Post*, 15 July 2010. Available at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/14/AR2010071405880.html> Accessed 6 April 2014.

⁶⁵Dahl 1989, 221; emphasis added.

⁶⁶See Kaplan 1997; Zakaria 2007; Pastor 1996; and Schmitter and Karl 1991.

⁶⁷Rod Nordland, Azam Ahmed, and Matthew Rosenberg, "Afghan Turnout is High as Voters Defy the Taliban," *New York Times*, 6 April 2014. Available at <http://nyti.ms/1oA6bd1> Accessed 6 April 2014.

elections reduces voter turnout. It does so by interfering with voter registration, as well as the ability and will of voters to cast their ballot. Campaign violence can lead to displacement, which interferes with citizens' ability to cast their votes. For instance, in Kenya 1997, about 100,000 people left the capital Mombasa during the election because of ethnic cleansing in the campaigning period.⁶⁸ This happened again in the 2007 election.⁶⁹ Citizens' ability to cast their vote is also inhibited when they are physically blocked from polling station under threat of violence, as in Sri Lanka.⁷⁰ Many, however, abstain "voluntarily" on election-day due to earlier intimidation, often abandoning their right to vote not just in the current but also in future elections.⁷¹ For example, Nigerians' odds of voting decreased by 52% if they or someone they knew was threatened with violence for a certain vote choice.⁷² There are more extreme cases. In Sri Lanka, only 1 percent of voters voted in the Tamil-dominated district of Jaffna, "partly due to intimidation and pressures" from the Tamil Tigers/LTTE.⁷³

Violence in the run-up to elections can also cause candidates to withdraw or not register in the first place. This limits candidates' political rights as well as voters' choice. For example, in the Ethiopian elections of 1992, 2000, and 2001, the opposition withdrew its participation due to intimidation and harassment by the ruling party.⁷⁴ Similarly, in Zimbabwe 2008 Presidential election, the opposition candidate withdrew when the ruling party and associated security forces systematically targeted and killed opposition supporters after the first-round. Overall, about 100 opposition activists were killed and thousands more were tortured and raped. That violence was effective. With the main challenger withdrawing, President Mugabe was handed an unopposed victory.⁷⁵

Election violence has both short and long-term consequences for politics and can potentially give democracy a "bad name." In the short term, it distorts election outcomes due to changes in turnout and vote choice. It also lowers the legitimacy of the resulting government because it came to power

⁶⁸Höglund 2009, 417.

⁶⁹Klopp and Kamungi 2007, 15.

⁷⁰Höglund and Piyarathne 2009, 299.

⁷¹Bratton 2008, 626. Also see Höglund and Piyarathne 2009, 299; and Birch 2010.

⁷²Bratton 2008, 626.

⁷³Höglund 2009, 417.

⁷⁴Pausewang, Trondvall, and Aalen 2002.

⁷⁵Chris McGreal and Julian Borger, "Mugabe has declared war and we will not be part of that war," *The Guardian*, 22 June 2008. Available at <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/jun/23/zimbabwe3> Accessed 25 June 2010.

in a flawed process that may or may not have reflected the will of voters. In the long term, election violence can generate frustration with politicians and the police because they failed to protect citizens from violence,⁷⁶ or worse, deliberately allowed violence to unroll.⁷⁷ Citizens' frustration with politics can linger for years after the violence occurred and shape expectations about what elections mean. As one Zimbabwean citizen put it: "It will never be different with the same spirit of killing. I know that when these coming elections are coming, I know many people are going to die."⁷⁸ When citizens come to associate elections along with harassment, intimidation, unrest and destruction, they may justifiably shift to prefer stability over political rights. Overall then, election violence may give electoral systems a bad name, making alternative forms of governance relatively more attractive.

In addition to undermining democratic governance, violent elections also impair economic development. The human cost is often staggering. Post-vote violence after four recent African elections led to more than 3,700 deaths and 250,000 people displaced (Ethiopia 2005, Kenya 2007, Cote d'Ivoire 2010, and Nigeria 2011). The direct human cost has implications for human capital and labor force. Property damage on houses and shops deprives citizens of their livelihoods, often with no or little government compensation. Even agriculture and tourism, in some countries the main sources of national income, can take a significant hit.⁷⁹ Similar to civil wars, high levels of election violence can also result in "development in reverse as incidents of violence undermine government legitimacy, scare away domestic foreign investors, and result in low levels of social trust."⁸⁰

Moreover, election violence may trigger larger conflict. For example, after the 1992 elections in Angola, the country plunged back into civil war. And the 1999 independence referendum in East Timor resulted in 1,400 civilian casualties due to violent attacks by anti-independence militias. Even when large-scale conflict does not erupt, sub-national regions or entire countries can fall into a conflict trap, a vicious cycle in which conflicts aggravate existing poverty and other societal

⁷⁶Höglund and Piyarathne 2009, 299-300.

⁷⁷Wilkinson 2004.

⁷⁸Anders Kelto, "Violence Haunts Zimbabwe Ahead Of Elections," *NPR News*, 19 May 2012. Available at <http://www.npr.org/2012/05/19/153076969/violence-haunts-zimbabwe-ahead-of-elections> Accessed 6 April 2014.

⁷⁹Klopp and Kamungi 2007, 15.

⁸⁰See Sisk 2008, 5; and Hoeffler and Reynal-Querol 2003.

cleavages, which increases the risk of future conflict.⁸¹ The relapse into conflict is particularly unfortunate when elections were part of peace-building strategies; many internationally sponsored peace agreements today stipulate elections as a conflict resolution mechanism, often in insecure contexts.⁸² Post-conflict elections are often associated with renewed fighting, although the risks can be mitigated by domestic and international factors.⁸³

Overall, election violence is central to democratic stability and can hinder a country's political and economic development. Examining its full range of causes, including international influences and domestic-international interactions, can provide scholars with a better understanding and policymakers with a better application of tools to mitigate such violence.

1.5 Chapter Outline

This study has three main objectives: first, to document broad patterns of election violence worldwide; second, to outline the extent, conditions, and causal mechanisms by which international actors can shape the incentives of domestic agents to engage in election violence; and third, to help policymakers decide between certain tools by evaluating their effects. To accomplish these goals, this dissertation uses mixed methods, combining large-N statistical analyses with formal models, qualitative case studies, and an original data collection.

One of the key challenges to conducting research on election violence across countries and years is in identifying and measuring election violence. While there are many indicators of civil conflict, few identify *electoral* violence per se. Chapter 2 compares existing datasets and then introduces original, newly-constructed data on violent and non-violent election manipulation worldwide. Hand-coding condensed news coverage from *Keesing's Record of World Events*, these data cover 1,227 national elections in 155 countries since 1990. The chapter reviews the justification for the source, the 33 variables, the choice of population, and coding procedures for my data collection. I present basic

⁸¹See UNDP 2009, 5; Collier et al. 2003; Collier 2009; and Patino and Velasco 2006.


⁸²See Höglund 2009, 414; and Lopez-Pintor 2000.

⁸³Brancati and Snyder 2013 and 2011.

trends in such violence across space, over time, for electoral stages, as well as correlational statistics with political and economic characteristics. Given the scarcity of disaggregate data on electoral violence, this is a major empirical contribution.

In Chapters 3 through 6, the dissertation closely tracks the chronology of elections, as illustrated in Figure 1.3. At some point, the government sets the election date and then decides whether and which international organizations to invite to attend the election. I then distinguish the pre- and post-election periods because the logic and dynamics of violence differ with timing. In the run-up to elections, violence is often used to influence vote choice or turnout, whereas after election-day it is often used in reaction to announced result, because stakeholders (frequently losers) are dissatisfied with the status quo.

Figure 1.3: Chapter Outline and Election Timeline



In Chapter 3, I examine the government's strategic selection of IO election observers. While research has explored the rise of election monitoring, we know little about why governments invite certain IO observers but not others. Every country faces a menu of available monitoring organizations – regional and extra-regional, IGOs and NGOs – yet it remains unclear how governments decide between these various organizations. I develop a typology of low, moderate, and high-quality monitors based on their missions' preconditions, scope, and reporting policies. The research presented here shows that governments can and do select IOs strategically. Governments at the threshold

to democracy, whose type is uncertain and who thus have incentives to signal their democratic commitment, send stronger signals of their support for democracy. Examining Latin America from 1980 to 2010, I find that support for the argument that countries at the “threshold” to democracy send stronger signals of their democratic commitment than countries at either political extreme. Controlling for a number of other drivers of IO invitations, being at the threshold to democracy increases a country’s probability of inviting *any* monitor by 19 percent and also increases the probability of inviting *higher-quality* monitors by 14 percent. I illustrate the causal mechanism with Peruvian elections since the 1990s.

Moving into the campaigning period, Chapter 4 examines how IO support affects violence up to six months before voting and delves deeper into dynamics between domestic actors. Using a costly signaling model, I argue that governments can send a credible signal of proper electoral behavior by inviting technical assistance and international monitoring to attend their elections, which then calm tensions with the opposition in the run-up to elections. I hypothesize that technical assistance reduces the capacity to engage in manipulation by removing some of the triggers of violence and reforming the electoral process. Monitoring increases the costs to engage in manipulation by creating accountability. Since such IO election assistance is more costly for unfair than fair incumbents, inviting election assistance can be a costly signal. The opposition uses that signal to update its belief about incumbent fairness. These beliefs, in turn, influence the opposition’s incentives to engage in campaign violence. I test the observable implications of the formal model with data on UN technical assistance, credible IO monitoring, and election violence in Sub-Saharan Africa from 1990 to 2008. I show that hosting election IOs significantly reduces opposition campaign violence. When the government does not invite any IOs, the predicted probability of opposition violence is 69 percent. This probability diminishes to 34 percent when the government invites either type of IO, and further diminishes to 8 percent when both types of IO assistance – technical and monitoring – are present. I also find modest support for the conditional effect of hosting IOs. I substantiate the causal mechanism about changed opposition beliefs with a test of alternative explanations and the illustrative case of Zimbabwe in 2000 and 2005.

In Chapters 5 and 6, I explain violence dynamics in the aftermath of elections as a function of how

IOs influence the losers' incentives to challenge the result. I focus on IO election monitoring reports (Chapter 5) and technical assistance (Chapter 6). I argue that electoral losers are important for the dynamics of violence unfolding after elections since the peaceful implementation of any election outcome requires their consent to an adverse result. In Chapter 5, I use a formal model to explore violence dynamics after elections, finding that the loser's probability of winning a potential fight is important: if the loser is likely to win such a post-election fight, he is more likely to challenge the election result. I highlight three conditions under which the loser is more likely to challenge. As one of the conditions, I document how election observers' negative verdict can contribute to violence by indicating that the official result is not credible and by serving as a focal point for mobilization, thus strengthening electoral losers. Controlling for fraud and a host of other domestic variables, international condemnations increase the probability of post-election violence in Africa by about 30 percent. The results are robust to a variety of modeling choices and to controlling for selection, spuriousness, and endogeneity. This chapter contributes to research on election monitoring by highlighting their effects on violence, whereas prior research has underlined effects on related phenomena, such as fraud, boycotts, and protests. It also contributes to research on the negative unintended effects of international organizations.

In Chapter 6, I analyze how technical assistance can increase the credibility of the result, thereby reducing the loser's incentives to reject the announced outcome and reducing violence in the wake of elections. Technical election assistance includes boosting the capacity of election management and dispute resolution bodies, reforming the voter registry, and conducting voter education. I argue that the provision of such assistance in the run-up to elections can contribute to more peaceful post-election periods because it increases citizens' trust in the national election commission. When voters trust the election commission, they are also more likely to trust the announced result, which should in turn lead to fewer election challenges, fewer protests, and less violence. Using data on UN election assistance, regional barometer surveys, and three datasets on post-election unrest, I present statistical evidence that technical assistance has significantly reduced violence in Latin America and Africa since 1990. The mechanism of trust-building is illustrated with descriptive data and elections in Guyana since 1992. Since technical assistance has received virtually no scholarly attention, this chapter provides the first quantitative empirical results pertaining to its effects.

Building on the statistical, formal, and illustrative cases in previous chapters, chapter 7 concludes. That chapter summarizes the argument and findings, and outlines implications of my argument for international relations, comparative politics, and policymaking. For international relations, I illustrate the role of domestic politics, and document how institutions are consequential as well as objects of state choice. I highlight that more scholarly attention should be focused on technical assistance, which is a relatively new research field. For comparative politics scholars, I underline the importance of international influences on national election violence. Although their influence varies, they should be considered as explanatory factors to paint a more complete picture. For policymakers, this research assesses what works in democracy promotion and expands the horizon beyond election observation. Given surged policy interest in technical assistance and the dearth of systematic research on it, this study offers some of the first comprehensive assessments and concludes that more investment should be directed towards election technical support.

2 Global Data on Election Violence

This chapter introduces an original dataset I compiled, the Global Election Violence Dataset (GEVD). The GEVD provides detailed information about election violence globally from 1990 to 2012. The GEVD data focus on election violence as distinct from other types of violence that happen to occur during an election period (e.g. violence primarily related to drug trafficking, secession, terrorism). I define election violence as behavior involving physical force intended to hurt, damage, or kill someone (or damage property) in order to influence an election process, and by implication its outcome. Election violence includes a variety of actions, from tearing a campaign poster to assassinating a candidate or challenging the election result through street protests. To be included, political violence must be related to a national election of some type (executive, legislative, referenda, constituent assembly). For each of the three electoral phases (pre, on, post election-day), GEVD provides information about how many people were killed, injured, arrested, kidnapped, as well as any property damage. It records the main perpetrator/sender and victim/target of the violence. Lastly, it also indicates whether any election phase was accompanied by protest/demonstrations, fraud, disqualifications or changes in term limits.

I proceed as follows. Section 2.1 outlines the rationale for collecting these data, including a comparison to existing datasets and the importance of collected variables. Section 2.2 discusses the methodology, such as sources, data collection process, and measurement. Section 2.3 explains the variables. Section 2.4 then uses these new data to document trends in election violence across time, space, and political characteristics.

2.1 The Rationale: Why Collect Data on Election Violence?

This dissertation relies on mixed methods: a combination of statistical analyses, formal models, and qualitative case studies. Systematic data are needed to identify broad patterns of electoral violence across time and space. When I began this research, however, data on such violence were

scarce. To the best of my knowledge, cross-national quantitative data on election violence only existed for one continent: Africa.¹ Several other datasets capture related phenomena – government repression, civil war, protests – but not electoral violence. Two promising global data collections existed but were not accessible.² Existing datasets on electoral and other conflict are detailed in section 2.1.1. Given the scarcity of data on election violence, I began collecting original data in September 2012.³ As of April 2014, data collection nears completion. The remaining steps include reconciling differences between coders and data cleaning.

The GEVD data contribute to existing collections by extending the geographic scope beyond Africa, providing measures across all three stages in the electoral cycle, disaggregating the violence dummy, and capturing the discrete impact of violence without arbitrary thresholds. These data also enable researchers to better understand the dynamics of election violence, intimidation, and irregular electioneering.

2.1.1 Taking Stock: Existing Datasets on Electoral and Other Conflict

This section gives an overview of prominent datasets in peace and conflict research, focused on whether and how they capture election-related conflict or violence. Since most data are created with a specific purpose in mind that differs from my dissertation goals, they are not a perfect fit. Table 2.7 in the Appendix compares 13 datasets in terms of their coverage, content, variables, methodology, and sources. These datasets fall into three groups:

1. election violence in Africa (datasets # 1-3);
2. election characteristics globally (datasets # 4-6);
3. civil war (datasets # 7-13).

For the last category of data covering civil wars in Table 2.7, note that several of the datasets build on the same underlying data: the Armed Conflict Dataset (ACD).⁴ The ACD contains data

¹Data sources are detailed below. They include AEVD, SCAD, and ACLED.

²Author's email correspondence with Judith Kelley, 11 November 2009; and Leonardo Arriola, 4 July 2013. Megan Reif also collects similar data.

³This project was supported with two grants from UW-Madison: the Undergraduate Research Scholarship Program and the Department of Political Science.

⁴The ACD is a joint project by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) at the department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, and the Centre for the Study of Civil War at the International Peace Research Institute, Sweden.

on armed conflict (internal and external) that involves a government and at least 25 battle deaths within one calendar year. Follow-on projects include geographic mapping of this conflict (# 8, 9), details on conflict onset (# 10), and integration with other conflict types (# 12).

This overview of existing conflict data in Table 2.7 shows that only a few datasets concentrate or even identify *election* violence in some way. Among the 13 datasets reviewed, only six datasets contained reasonably clear codings of violence around elections. These most closely related datasets are the African Electoral Violence Database (AEVD), the Social Conflict in Africa Database (SCAD), data by Arriola and Johnson 2012,⁵ National Elections Across Democracy and Autocracy Data (NELDA), and the Dataset on International Election Monitoring (DIEM). With regard to this dissertation project, each dataset is associated with advantages and disadvantages. These election-related datasets are compared in more detail in Table 2.1. The last row compares my own data collection to existing data.

The first three datasets in Table 2.1 – AEVD, SCAD, and ACLED – are limited to Africa. The African Electoral Violence Database (AEVD) is best suited for the analysis here because it measures violence *intensity* six months before and three months after elections, identifies two actors (incumbent and opposition), and has clearly defined intensity thresholds from zero to three: no violence reported (0), violent harassment (1), violent repression (2), and large-scale violence with more than 25 fatalities (3).⁶

In contrast, the Social Conflict in Africa Database (SCAD) and the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) provide information on violent and non-violent *incidents*.⁷ The advantage of these two datasets is that they are more disaggregated in time and offer short descriptions, which increases transparency. The disadvantage is that a simple incident count does not offer the same intensity information provided in AEVD because events are heterogeneous. Some are violent, others are not. Some are solely related to the election while for others election is of tertiary relevance. If only violent events are counted, or their fatalities, than this can approximate a collapsed version of

⁵I denoted Arriola and Johnson 2012 as A & J in Table 2.1.

⁶Straus and Taylor 2012, 21-22.

⁷See Salehyan and Hendrix 2012; and Raleigh, Linke, Dowd 2012.

the AEVD data into 0/1 versus 2 versus 3 – where the threshold between 2 and 3 is 25 fatalities. Another issue with using this data is that it is unclear how to aggregate events that span multiple days.

Table 2.1: Comparing Election-Related Violence Datasets

Dataset	Electoral Violence?	Timing			Actors Identified?	Scope		Measure
		pre	at	post		Region	Years	
AEVD	✓	✓	✗	✓	✓	Africa	1990-2008	0-3
SCAD	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	Africa	1990-2012	events
ACLED	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	Africa	1997-2012	events
A & J	✓	⏟ combined		✓	✗	global	1985-2005	0-3
NELDA	✓	⏟ combined			✓	global	1946-2010	0-1
DIEM	✓	✓	✓	✗	✗	global	1974-2004	0-3
GEVD	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	global	1990-2012	0-1, #

A key difference between the two event datasets (SCAD and ACLED) is that SCAD data can be easily filtered for electoral events because it has a conflict “issue” variable. In contrast, ACLED makes it difficult, if not impossible, to objectively filter out election-related events because its “event type” variable does not contain an election-related indicator. ACLED event types are battle, territorial transfer, non-violent activity, riots/protests, and violence against civilians. Each of the latter three event types may or may not be election-related, so that selecting any of these types does *not* generate an appropriate measure of *election* violence. It is included in this overview for the sole

reason that another researcher has used it to measure election violence.⁸

While the first three datasets focus on Africa, the latter three have global scope. Of these, the data by Arriola and Johnson (2012) would be the most appropriate to use. These data indicate pre-election intensity as well as post-election onset between 1985 and 2005. It is unclear whether they also include a variable for post-election violence intensity; like AEVD, it does not offer data on election day. However, the data have not been released to the public.

The remaining two global datasets – NELDA and DIEM – provide election characteristics, of which violence is one dimension. The National Elections Across Democracy and Autocracy Dataset (NELDA) provides three relevant, dichotomous variables. However, two of them aggregate violence across all three electoral stages (pre, at, post-election day); these are government harassment of opposition (Nelda15) and civilian deaths (Nelda33). The third indicator (Nelda 31) is focused on the aftermath of elections but (a) only records government use of force; (b) leaves unclear if the use of violence resulted in any injuries or fatalities; and (c) is conditional on protests, i.e. the variable does not record violence in the absence of protests.⁹

The Dataset on International Election Monitoring (DIEM) also offers a relevant variable: unrest/violence, defined as physical abuses, overall violent clashes, or manhandling of persons. This variable is available for election-day and the campaigning period, although the exact timeframe is unclear. It is a categorical variable (0-3) indicating no, minor, moderate, and major problems. However, the cut points are unclear, and no examples are given for the different categories, except that ongoing war qualifies as a major problem.

In short, beyond Africa there is no disaggregate data on the impact of election violence for the three electoral stages. The empirical contribution of GEVD is in providing such data and a number of other variables on non-violent manipulation. The next few sections outline the variables and

⁸Daxecker 2012.

⁹Similarly, Beaulieu (2014, 138) provides data on post-vote violence conditional only when protests occurred. Similar to Arriola and Johnson (2012) and the Nelda data, Beaulieu captures violence in two periods (before and during election) in a single variable.

methodology, and then utilize these new data to document trends in election violence globally.

2.1.2 Choosing Variables and Population

I chose variables to be collected by considering which data were useful but currently unavailable (1) for the dissertation project, and (2) for exploring electoral manipulation more broadly.

First, the arguments advanced in the dissertation guided the temporal and geographic scope of data collection, as well as the collection of timing and actor variables. The year 1990 was chosen as a start year because most international aid and assistance programs supporting elections took off then, so that the central claims of my dissertation can be tested.¹⁰

As documented above, one key dimension missing in current data collections is timing within election periods. Outside the African continent, there are no data that track electoral violence distinctly before, at, and after election-day. However, different stages of the election are associated with different dynamics and mechanisms of violence. With only partial data on timing, we are unable to explore these dynamics. The GEVD remedies this situation by collecting all chosen variables (detailed below) for each stage of the election: six months preceding election-day, election-day itself, and three months after election-day.¹¹

The dissertation project also guided the choice of “population” for data collection. I collect data globally because election violence is a global phenomenon.¹² Yet few variables are available to capture election violence outside of Africa, as shown in Table 2.1. To alleviate this situation, explore patterns of violence across continents, and test arguments on as wide a sample as possible, I decided to collect data on all states exceeding a population of 500,000 people. The selection of states follows the NELDA data collection but adds national referenda. A list of included states is

¹⁰However, pending funding, I hope to extend the data back in time.

¹¹The time frames follow existing practice (Straus and Taylor 2012). I considered collecting data using longer “windows” but decided against this after consulting with Leonardo Arriola. While Arriola used a longer, 12-month window before and after election-day, he found that a six or even three-month window would pick up substantially the same information. For pre-election violence, much of the violence he finds occurs in the 30-day period leading up to the election day. Author’s email correspondence, 2 April 2012.

¹²Fischer 2002, 11-20.

in Table 2.6 of the Appendix.

Second, and equally important, disaggregate information on violence levels is desirable but missing in current datasets, especially outside of Africa. Existing variables are dichotomous or at best categorical (0-3), with unclear thresholds. NELDA records whether *any* violence occurs. This is a great first cut, especially since the focus of these data is election characteristics more broadly. However, the violence=1 disguises a lot of meaningful variation in the intensity of violence. It matters whether one region experienced minor clashes or whether the government executed a widespread crackdown on the opposition, leading to hundreds of arrested, injured, and killed citizens. These violence levels are substantially different, yet both are marked “1” in some existing data.

Third, data collection was guided by a concern for data that includes violence alongside non-violent manipulation, such as fraud and legal changes. To identify such variables, I drew on Schedler’s (2002) conceptualization of the “menu of manipulation.” This menu describes the incumbents’ strategies in electoral autocracies. Government in this category allow a minimum of multi-party competition but engineer elections as much as possible to get the desired outcome. Schedler (2002, 41-46) lists seven features of democratic choice and the strategies autocrats employ to limit these choices, of which repression and intimidation are just some options. Two other types of manipulation strategies are temporally between elections, and thus not included in this original data collection.¹³ Table 2.2 reprints Schedler’s original “menu of manipulation.”¹⁴ Borrowing from this “menu of manipulation,” I expanded data collection efforts to include violent and nonviolent electoral manipulation strategies, marked in yellow in Figure 2.2:

- #2 *disqualification of parties*
- #3 *number of people killed* (repression); and *pre_fraud* (restricting access to media and money)
- #4 *disqualification of voters*
- #5 *number of people injured, arrested, kidnapped*; and *pre_fraud* and *day_fraud* (vote buying)
- #6 *day_fraud* and *post_fraud* (vote fraud)

¹³Collecting data on these two strategies – reserved positions/domains and tutelage/reversal – would entail a substantial expansion into different time periods and different sources.

¹⁴Schedler 2002, 39.

Table 2.2: Menu of Manipulation (Schedler 2002, 39)

	DIMENSIONS OF CHOICE	NORMATIVE PREMISES OF DEMOCRATIC CHOICE	STRATEGIES OF NORM VIOLATION
1	The object of choice	<i>Empowerment</i> : Democratic elections involve the delegation of decision-making authority.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Reserved positions</i>: limiting the scope of elective offices • <i>Reserved domains</i>: limiting the jurisdiction of elective offices
2	The range of choice	<i>Freedom of supply</i> : Citizens must be free to form, join, and support conflicting parties, candidates, and policies.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Exclusion of opposition forces</i>: restricting access to the electoral arena • <i>Fragmentation of opposition forces</i>: disorganizing electoral dissidence
3	The formation of preferences	<i>Freedom of demand</i> : Citizens must be able to learn about available alternatives through access to alternative sources of information.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Repression</i>: restricting political and civil liberties • <i>Unfairness</i>: restricting access to media and money
4	The agents of choice	<i>Inclusion</i> : Democracy assigns equal rights of participation to all full members of the political community.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Formal disenfranchisement</i>: legal suffrage restrictions • <i>Informal disenfranchisement</i>: practical suffrage restrictions
5	The expression of preferences	<i>Insulation</i> : Citizens must be free to express their electoral preferences.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Coercion</i>: voter intimidation • <i>Corruption</i>: vote buying
6	The aggregation of preferences	<i>Integrity</i> : One person, one vote. The democratic ideal of equality demands weighting votes equally.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Electoral fraud</i>: “redistributive” election management • <i>Institutional bias</i>: “redistributive” electoral rules
7	The consequences of choice	<i>Irreversibility</i> : Elections without consequences do not qualify as democratic.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Tutelage</i>: preventing elected officers from exercising their constitutional powers • <i>Reversal</i>: preventing victors from taking office, or elected officers from concluding their constitutional terms

Fourth, note that Schedler focuses on the incumbent as the perpetrator of manipulation. While incumbents certainly have advantages in terms of access and resources to engage in manipulation, some of the tools are also available to the opposition. For example, some forms of fraud and violence can also be pursued by opposition groups or other non-state actors. Violence incentives vary by actors. However, information on actors – perpetrators and victims of violence – was missing outside of Africa.¹⁵ Given this shortcoming on the actor dimension, I collected data on perpetrator and target, each indicating one or several actor types: government, opposition, and other.

Finally, I also collect data on changes in term limits. Somewhat surprisingly, Schedler (2002) does not discuss this as a strategy. Yet legal changes to extend terms of office – extending years or consecutive rules – have become quite popular, especially in recent years.

¹⁵Nelda identifies the government as a perpetrator but the timing of violence is unclear.

2.2 Methodology

This section outlines the data source and collection procedures. Data were collected through human coding. Importantly, this allows to better identify whether violence was in fact election-related or not. Determining whether conflict had an electoral dimension is important; otherwise the data would pick up other types of ongoing conflict as well. For example, persistent terrorist violence perpetrated by the Tuareg in Mali and the Taliban in Afghanistan was excluded from the coding unless it was clearly election related.¹⁶ I decided against machine coding to ensure the electoral “quality” of the conflict and because the main interest was not in *event* counts but in violence *intensity*.

2.2.1 Source

As a data source, I used the printed version of *Keesing’s Record of World Events*. *Keesing’s* provides a monthly, objective digest of political, economic, and diplomatic affairs around the world, written mostly by academics and journalists. It relies on a large variety of sources from around the world, including international “classics,”¹⁷ regional news outlets,¹⁸ country-specific news providers,¹⁹ radio broadcasts,²⁰ and election-related sources.²¹ It originated in 1758 as the *Annual Register* and has been published continuously since 1931.

Keesing’s was chosen over alternatives because it provides consistent coverage over time and is reasonably detailed so that the core variables can be coded. In particular, *Keesing’s* is preferable over WND (Facts on File) and World News Connection (WNC) because *Keesing’s* draws on WND as one of its sources and has many others. To get at national elections worldwide, *Keesing’s* also has better coverage: WNC only uses local media (as opposed to national) and WND uses almost

¹⁶For example, bombing a polling center is usually coded as election violence while bombing market places is not.

¹⁷New York Times, The Economist, The BBC, Financial Times, The Guardian, Le Monde Diplomatique.

¹⁸Africa NewsAl-Ahram Weekly, Middle East International, ArabNews.Com, Caribbean and Central America Report, Latin America Relations, EU News.

¹⁹The Hindu, The Times of India Online, China Daily, Bangkok Post, Daily Mail and Guardian (South Africa), El Pais.

²⁰BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Radio Free Europe.

²¹Elections Around The World, United Nations Information Service. For a listing of sources, see http://resources.library.yale.edu/online/dbsbysubjecthxml_info.asp?searchfor=scidb&lookfor=YUL03524

exclusively English-language sources.²²

2.2.2 Collection Process

To date, GEVD consists of 1,227 national elections and referenda.²³ Each entry was coded by two research assistants. One research assistant, a fourth-year political science major, coded the entire dataset. The second coding was done by three other research assistants, including another fourth-year political science major and two freshmen. In this second round of coding, each research assistant coded a world region of personal expertise (living experience, study interest). Data was collected between September 2012 and May 2014.

All research assistants were given background information on elections, election violence, and manipulation. They were trained extensively in coding procedures by the principal investigator. They received a codebook (below) and a memo (in the Appendix) for reference. Throughout the entire coding process, bi-weekly consultations assured timely review of data quality and early detection of uncertainties and divergences. To minimize data collector effect, all divergences between the first and second codings are reconciled by the principal investigator.

2.3 Codebook

2.3.1 Overview

The Global Election Violence Dataset (GEVD) provides detailed information about election violence globally from 1990 to 2012. This dataset focuses on election violence as distinct from other types of violence that happen to occur during an election period (drug violence, family feuds etc). The GEVD defines election violence as behavior involving physical force intended to hurt or kill people or damage property in order to influence any stage of the election cycle. To be included, political violence must be related to a national election of some type (executive, legislative, referenda, constituent assembly). Election violence includes a variety of actions, from tearing a campaign

²²WNC is perhaps better known as a service provided by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS); WNC shut down in late 2013.

²³Follow-up rounds are not coded because it often to which round violence is related, which has a danger of double-counting.

poster to assassinating a candidate or challenging the election result through street protests. For each of the three election-phases outlined below (pre, on, post election-day), GEVD provides information about how many people were killed, injured, or arrested as well as any property damage. It records the main perpetrator/sender and victim/target of the violence. Lastly, it also indicates whether any election-phase was accompanied by protests/demonstrations, fraud, disqualifications or changes in term limits.²⁴

Data is collected on all variables listed below for each of three stages in the election cycle:

- 6 months before election-day: influence the campaign process (“pre”)
- on election-day itself: influence voting / polling around election-day (“day”)
- 3 months after election-day: challenge the result or winner (“post”)

The unit of observation is each national election or referendum. If several rounds were held (such as a Presidential run-off), only the first round is recorded. Election dates and country coverage are mostly identical with Hyde and Marinov (2012) first round-elections. Apart from election-identifiers (listed below), all information about violence is based on the printed version of *Keesing’s Record of World Events*.

2.3.2 Variables

Election-Identifiers

continent: This identifies the continent where the election was held: Africa, Americas, Asia, Europe, Oceania.

country: This gives the name of the country (e.g., Brazil, India).

cowcode: This provides the country code assigned by Correlates of War.

²⁴I do not intend to collect data on intimidation because this variable is difficult to define objectively, and because a variable capturing this is provided by DIEM.

ccode: This refers to the country code assigned by Gleditsch and Ward's List of Independent States.

electionid: This is a unique identification code for every observation in the dataset. For example, electionID 002-2008-1104-P1 identifies the country as USA (002), and the first day of the election as 4 November 2008. P indicates that it was a Presidential election and 1 that it was the first round. In general, the letter "P" stands for presidential elections, "L" stands for legislative or parliamentary elections, and "A" stands for constituent assembly elections. "G" stands for general election, when presidential and legislative are held on the same day.

year: Indicates the year the election took place.

mmdd: This provides the month and day on which each election round took place.

types: This codes the type of election that took place. All elections in this dataset are for national offices, including Executive / Presidential (P), Legislative and Parliamentary (L), Referendum (R) and Constituent Assembly (CA).

Impact – Number of people affected (count)

Killed: Total number of people killed, which can include candidates, voters, poll workers etc.

Injured: Total number of people injured, which can include candidates, voters, poll workers etc.

Arrested: Total number of people arrested, which can include candidates, voters, poll workers etc. This variable accounts for detentions and gets at the one-sided nature of state repression, where authoritarian governments shape elections by constraining candidates or their supporters (e.g. Russia, Zimbabwe).

Kidnapped: Total number of people kidnapped or disappeared, which can include any person

(voters, candidates, state officials).

Disqualification of Candidates or Parties: Total number of candidates (individuals in presidential elections) or parties (groups in parliamentary elections) being disqualified from standing for office. If disqualification is mentioned without a number, coded 1. If no disqualifications reported, coded 0.

Disqualification of Voters: Total number of voters being disqualified from casting their vote.²⁵ If disqualification is mentioned without a number, coded 1. If no disqualifications reported, coded 0.

Indicators – binary

Property: This indicates whether or not any property was damaged, destroyed or stolen. It can include private and public property (e.g. campaign material, ballot boxes, government building). Coded 0 for no property affected, 1 for property affected.

Protest: This indicates whether or not there was one or more protests (street demonstrations). Coded 0 for no protests, 1 for one or more protests.

Fraud: This indicates whether any fraud was committed and reported (e.g. stuffing ballot boxes, inflating vote counts). Coded 0 for no fraud, 1 for fraud.

Change Term Limit: This indicates whether any legal changes were made for election rules, years in office (7 instead of 5 years) or term limits (consecutive instead of single terms). If any or several of these legal changes happened, coded 1. If none of these happened, coded 0.

²⁵This does not include felons etc. who are permanently disqualified in some countries, like the U.S. and the UK.

Violence Actors – categories

Perpetrator: This identifies the primary actor (sender) who committed the violence.

Victim: This identifies the primary target of violence.

Categories:

- 0 – unclear: It is unclear who was the sender or target of the violence.
- 1 – voters: any unaffiliated individuals or groups of people; they are not identified as supporters or representatives of any party or government office (e.g. a mob).
- 2 – opposition: any opposition party or their supporters
- 3 – incumbent: any government or state official, ruling political party or candidate or their supporter, police / security forces /militia.

Violence Location

Location: This reports where the violence took place. For example, Rio de Janeiro, Mumbai. This is an open text field allowing several answers; it lists the locations (e.g. town: “New Glarus, USA;” or state: “Wisconsin, USA;” or region: “Midwest, USA”).

2.4 Trends in Election Violence

This section uses GEVD data to document trends in election violence around the world since 1990. This overview shows that such violence (1) is a global phenomenon, (2) has different dynamics in different stages (pre, at, post), (3) is persistent over time, affecting about a quarter of elections worldwide, and (4) occurs in a variety of political situations.

2.4.1 Spatial Trends


First, election violence is a global phenomenon. While it certainly is more prevalent in developing countries, it is not unheard of in the global North. Figure 2.1 visualizes violence intensity. It plots the proportion of elections that were violent at any of the three electoral stages (before, at, after election-day). Darker shades indicate that a higher percentage of elections have been associated with violence.²⁶ Election violence is more frequent in Africa and Asia, including Nigeria, Zimbabwe, India, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, as well as Kazakhstan and Russia. Violence also occurred in many Latin American states, especially Colombia and Uruguay. Note, though, that such violence is not limited to the global South. In fact, since 1990 it has occurred “even” in Western Europe (Spain, Italy) and Eastern Europe (Poland, Ukraine, Albania, Macedonia).

Violence varies widely even within the most conflict-prone continent, Africa. Three countries have not experienced election violence since 1990 (Namibia, Botswana, Mozambique); many other countries have experienced violence at more than half of their elections. In some countries, violence accompanied more than 75 percent of elections; this group includes Zimbabwe, DR Congo, Nigeria, Cote d’Ivoire, Sudan, and Egypt.²⁷

²⁶Countries shaded in white did not hold direct national elections since 1990: China, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Eritrea.

²⁷Libya’s 2012 election was violent as well, but it was the only direct election since 1965.

Figure 2.1: Spatial Trends – World



2.4.2 Different Dynamics across Election Stages

Figure 2.2 takes a closer look at the violence distribution in Africa across the three electoral stages. It documents that pre- and post-election violence are not strongly correlated, which indicates that different dynamics underly each period. In many countries, the rate of violence differs across election stages. For example, South Africa, Sierra Leone, Tunisia, and Morocco did not experience post-election violence between 1990 and 2012, but did experience campaign violence at many elections (33, 67, 40, 17 percent of elections, respectively). Similarly, 40-50 percent of elections in Lesotho and Liberia have been followed by violence while campaigning and voting itself has always proceeded peacefully.

Figure 2.2: Spatial Trends – Africa before, on, after Election-Day





Figure 2.3 further documents that election stages are associated with distinct dynamics. This Figure illustrates the human impact of violence in terms of how many people were killed, injured, and arrested in any period. Overall, about 70,000 people have been direct victims of election violence since 1990.²⁸ About 20 percent of these, or 14,200 people were killed during election violence since 1990. Another 27,000 were injured in attacks and riots, while 29,000 were arrested. Figure 2.3 reveals that in the campaigning period, most affected people were injured in clashes, whereas after elections most affected people were arbitrarily arrested. In terms of timing, election-day is mostly quiet. According to GEVD, most violence occurs before and after election-day.²⁹

Figure 2.3: Varying Dynamics and Human Impact



2.4.3 Temporal Trends

Turning to temporal trends, Figures 2.4 and 2.5 show the percentage of election violence over time averaged across countries yearly, from 1990 to 2012. The black solid line in both Figures plots the average of violence per year.³⁰ Overall, violence affected between 12 and 38 percent of elections

²⁸Note that GEVD does not measure intimidation, which is likely a much greater number than those “directly” affected.


²⁹However, the election-day time frame only captures 1-2 days whereas “pre-election” covers six months and “post-election” covers three months. Therefore violence per day is actually highest, on average, on election-day itself.

³⁰This is an aggregate, measuring whether any type of violence occurred during any stage and all countries with elections in that year. For GEVD, “any” type of violence here is coded 1 if any of the following occurred: any killed,

each year. The average is 23.6 percent of elections. The cyclical pattern may be due to “natural” variation or the correlation between election-year-cycles in violence-prone countries. To the best of my knowledge, this variation has not been addressed.

The GEVD violence estimate is fairly consistent with other existing estimates, increasing confidence in the methodology. Fischer (2002, 11) estimated that 24.5 percent of elections were violent in 2001; Hyde and Marinov (2012) estimated that 20.8 percent of elections were violent in 1990-2010.³¹ Figure 2.4 uses the NELDA data (dashed red line) to compare over time variation to GEVD (solid black). The lines track fairly closely, with the exception of a few years (1992, 1993, 2001). Differences may exist due to different data sources or different observations.³²

Figure 2.4: Temporal Trends – Comparison to NELDA




A key contribution of this new dataset is added temporal information. While the consistency of estimates increases confidence that GEVD picks up similar dynamics, the new GEVD data provide more information on the timing and form of that violence than comparable datasets. Figure 2.5 documents trends in violence for all three stages: before, at, and after election-day for the past 23 years worldwide.³³ It shows significant variation between election phases. On average, 23.6 percent injured, arrested, kidnapped, or property damage.

³¹Author’s calculation. Arriola and Johnson do not have a comparable estimate; they mention that campaign violence occurs in 13 percent of post-election periods and 18 percent of pre-election periods (2012, 13-14). However, some of this violence probably occurs at the same election, so that these numbers should not be added up.

³²NELDA differs from GEVD in that it includes multiple rounds and excludes referenda.

³³This is also an aggregate measure – any killed, injured, arrested, kidnapped, or property damage – but calculated for each election phase. Note that “any” = 1 for a given election can be the result of violence at 1, 2, or all 3 stages

Figure 2.5: Temporal Trends – by Election Stage



of elections experienced some violence, but this number varies for each stage: 13.3 percent during campaigning, 9.3 percent on election-day, and 10 percent after elections. For example, in 2012, 16 percent of elections had violent campaigning periods but only 5 percent were violent on or after election-day. This estimate is in line with Arriola and Johnson (2012), who also find that if violence erupts, it tends to occur in the pre-election period.


Another important contribution of the GEVD dataset is that lower-level conflict is captured in detail, and no threshold is imposed on what counts as “sufficient” violence to be documented. Outside of Africa, existing datasets capture whether *any* fatalities occurred or whether fatalities exceeded some pre-defined *threshold* (e.g. more than 25 per year).³⁴ GEVD improves on that by adding information on lower-level violence short of deaths – people who were injured, arrested, kidnapped – and counting the number of victims. This way, researchers can use the raw / logged numbers or impose different thresholds instead of having to accept an arbitrary definition of “significant violence.” This provides more detailed information and more leverage for robustness checks in empirical analyses.

The forms of victimization vary substantially. Figure 2.6 shows the raw sum of people being killed, injured, or arrested by year, summing all electoral periods. The total number of violence victims

of the election cycle.

³⁴See NELDA, Arriola and Johnson 2012.

Figure 2.6: Temporal Trends – Victims of Violence



varies between approximately 250 and 13,000 each year. Similar to Figure 2.3, Figure 2.6 illustrates that fatalities are “low” compared to other forms of victimization. According to GEVD estimates, election violence resulted in 26 to 2,589 fatalities per year between 1990 and 2012. In comparison, the number of people injured and arrested ranges from 0 to approximately 12,000. Victimization forms vary widely: in some years, the most common form victimization is arbitrary detention (in 1991 and 2005), while in years most victims are physically injured (2011).

The rate of victimization also varies by actors. In GEVD, actors are categorized in three groups: voters, opposition party or supporters, and incumbent government representative or supporters. Table 2.3 shows the percentage of elections where certain actor groups were involved as victims or perpetrators of violence. These numbers should be interpreted as a trend rather than representative because *Keesing’s* did not clearly identify the actor for most violent elections.³⁵ For the most part, election violence is perpetrated by the government and opposition. While citizens are often victims of violence, they rarely execute it unaffiliated with a political camp.

Finally, another contribution of GEVD is that it allows for testing of the “menu of manipulation” by providing information on interference short of violence. GEVD contains information about disqualifications of voters, candidates, parties, as well as changes in term limits.³⁶ Table 2.4 doc-

³⁵When actors could not be identified, 0 denotes “unknown.” Table 2.3 is based on a small subset of the violence cases for victims (N=97) and perpetrators (N=89).

³⁶Changes in term limits include extended and abolished as well as limited/shortened presidential or legislative

Table 2.3: Election Violence Actors

	Single Victim Group			Multiple Victim Groups			
	Voters	Opposition	Government	Voters & Opposition	Voters & Government	Opposition & Government	Voters, Opposition & Government
Victims	23.7	22.6	29.9	6.2	4.1	7.2	6.1
Perpetrators	6.7	31.4	32.6	2.2	3.3	15.7	7.9

uments the percentage of elections where such disqualifications occurred. It illustrates that these forms of manipulation are relatively rare – they occur in less than 5 percent of elections. While these numbers seem small as world averages, they are concentrated in certain regions. For example, changes in term limits occur predominantly in Africa, where they occur in 9 percent of elections.³⁷ While term limit changes are concentrated in Africa, disqualifications are spread more widely. Of all elections where candidates or parties were disqualified, only about half took place in Africa. The other disqualifications are occurring in Asia, Europe, the Americas, and Oceania. A similar trend holds for disqualifying voters, although the fraction of these elections is smaller.

Table 2.4: Disqualifications and Changes in Term Limits

	Disqualifications of Voters Candidates or Parties		Changes in Term Limits
Percentage of Elections	1.0	4.6	2.6

2.4.4 Context: Correlates of Election Violence


This section touches on two basic political and economic correlates of violence. Election violence is much more common in autocracies than in democracies. Figure 3.6 shows violence averages across regime types. The x-axis plots three measures of political regimes: the number of executive constraints, and the extent of political rights and civil liberties.³⁸ These values range from 1 to terms.

³⁷Note that this estimate is a lower bound because data collection may not have picked up all changes to term limits non-election-years.

³⁸Data from Polity IV and Freedom House; values for civil liberties and political rights were inverted for ease of interpretation.

7, with higher (lower) numbers indicating democracies (autocracies). The estimates tell a fairly consistent story: violence affects about 30-40 percent of elections in autocracies but only 7 percent in advanced democracies.³⁹

Figure 2.7: Correlates of Violence – Level of Democracy



Perhaps surprisingly, election violence occurs in highly democratic countries. In “almost” full democracies (democracy score = 6), about 19 to 25 percent of elections are violent. This decreases to 7 to 9 percent in advanced democracies. However, election violence never averages zero. Put differently, In Freedom House’s “free” political regime category (scores exceeding 5.5 here), violence occurs in 10.2 percent of elections. This underscores that while violence is certainly more prevalent in autocracies, democracies are not completely free from such conflict. Election violence is a concern across all regime types.

A second correlate of violence is economic development. Collier (2009, 20-21) argues that elections cause violence in countries with per capita GDP below \$2,700. Figure 2.8 plots violence rates across levels of economic development,⁴⁰ marking the cutoff with a red vertical line. While this bivariate relationship suggests that the risk of violence is indeed higher in poorer societies, there is much variation, with many cases “off” the trend line (the green lowess curve). Similar to democracies, it seems that wealthier societies are also not free from electoral violence (upper right corner). This


³⁹This is not due to endogeneity: Freedom House and Polity scores are lagged by a year to avoid that the occurrence of violence influences a country’s democracy score.

⁴⁰Data from Penn World Tables, again lagged to avoid endogeneity.

group includes the Netherlands in 2002 and Sweden in 2003 (mentioned above) as well as several elections in Spain and Italy (all above \$17,000) as well as Colombia (\$6,000).

Perhaps more interesting, though, is the group of elections that remains peaceful despite being held in poor societies (lower left corner). This group includes elections in Niger (under \$550), Burkina Faso (under \$800), El Salvador (under \$1,100), Laos (under \$1,500), and Tajikistan (under \$2,000). This suggests that election violence is not purely structural but employed as a strategic tool when convenient. And if it is strategic, it is subject to cost-benefit calculations, which can be influenced.

Figure 2.8: Correlates of Violence – Economic Development



2.5 Conclusion

This chapter introduces a new dataset on election violence and manipulation, the Global Election Violence Dataset (GEVD). Given the scarcity of data on electoral manipulation, especially outside of Africa, this dataset makes several contributions: providing information on violence in all three electoral stages, for types of violence short of fatalities, and with detailed victim estimates rather than thresholds in all regions of the world.

First, it is one of few available datasets on election violence that have global coverage. GEVD provides data on 155 countries since 1990, for a total of 1,227 national elections and referenda.

This makes it possible to test arguments in a larger set of countries, which can help strengthen the generalizability of arguments. Second, it provides systematic information on violence in three different phases (before, at, after elections), while other data have either been limited to certain phases or aggregated across all time periods. This allows for more precise tests of theoretical arguments and for testing of how dynamics of violence vary over time. Third, GEVD improves on existing datasets by documenting the raw number of people affected by violence rather than *ex ante* imposing thresholds. This allows researchers to test for lower levels of violence, which otherwise remain uncaptured, and to establish the robustness of findings by varying the threshold. Fourth, by documenting violence short of fatalities (people injured, arrested, kidnapped), the data provide a depth of information that is not available in other sources. A number of cross-checks reveal that GEVD tracks closely with existing estimates, which increases confidence in the methodology.

Going forward, the new data can be employed in various ways. Most directly, the data are used in chapter six to examine the drivers of post-election violence in Latin America and Africa, showing that international technical assistance can substantially reduce violence in the wake of elections. Since data collection is conceptually inspired by the “menu of manipulation,” it can help answer the question to what degree incumbents use some means of manipulation over others, and when they revert to more subtle measures (such as disqualifications) over the overt use of physical force. More broadly, the data enables researchers to examine whether different types or levels of violence are associated with distinct mechanisms. This question is relatively unexplored, largely because of the scarcity of detailed data on lower levels of violence. It has potentially important contributions to knowledge as well as policy; while international wars have declined,⁴¹ low-level, intra-state conflict has been on the rise. Overall, the GEVD data can be used to examine causes, dynamics, and consequences of election violence worldwide, thereby making an important empirical contribution.

⁴¹Goldstein 2011.

2.6 Appendix

Table 2.5: GEVD Descriptive Statistics (N=1,227)

Variable	Mean	SD	Min	Max
pre_killed	3.24	22.71	0	400
pre_injured	15.4	223.2	0	6,500
pre_arrested	5.47	96.75	0	2,976
pre_kidnapped	0.04	0.78	0	22
pre_property	0.03	0.17	0	1
pre_protest	0.11	0.32	0	1
pre_fraud	0.05	0.22	0	1
day_killed	3.1	58.06	0	2,000
day_injured	1.74	29.85	0	1,000
day_arrested	5.23	86.00	0	2,000
day_kidnapped	0.00	0.08	0	2
day_property	0.01	0.09	0	1
day_protest	0.08	0.28	0	1
day_fraud	0.16	0.37	0	1
post_killed	5.24	62.62	0	1,500
post_injured	4.91	69.63	0	2,000
post_arrested	12.93	263.88	0	9,003
post_kidnapped	0.19	5.74	0	200
post_property	0.03	0.17	0	1
post_protest	0.11	0.31	0	2
post_fraud	0.11	0.31	0	1
disqual_candidate_parties	1.73	45.12	0	1,521
disqual_voters	11,780	294,099	0	10,000,000
change_term_limit	0.03	0.16	0	1
election type	0.78	0.99	0	3
cowcode	433	226	2	950
year	2002	7	1990	2012

Notes: Descriptive statistics exclude information on perpetrators, victims, and locations because these are string variables.

Table 2.6: 155 Countries included in GEVD, 1990-2012

Afghanistan	Gabon	Niger
Albania	Gambia	Nigeria
Algeria	Georgia	North Korea
Angola	Germany	Norway
Argentina	Ghana	Oman
Armenia	Greece	Pakistan
Australia	Guatemala	Panama
Austria	Guinea	Papua New Guinea
Azerbaijan	Guinea-Bissau	Paraguay
Bahrain	Guyana	Peru
Bangladesh	Haiti	Philippines
Belarus	Honduras	Poland
Belgium	Hungary	Portugal
Benin	India	Romania
Bolivia	Indonesia	Russia
Bosnia-Herzegovina	Iran	Rwanda
Botswana	Iraq	Senegal
Brazil	Ireland	Serbia
Bulgaria	Israel	Sierra Leone
Burkina Faso	Italy	Singapore
Burundi	Jamaica	Slovakia
Cambodia	Japan	Slovenia
Cameroon	Jordan	South Africa
Canada	Kazakhstan	South Korea
Central African Republic	Kenya	Spain
Chad	Kuwait	Sri Lanka
Chile	Kyrgyz Republic	Sudan
Colombia	Laos	Swaziland
Comoros	Latvia	Sweden
Congo (Brazzaville)	Lebanon	Switzerland
Costa Rica	Lesotho	Syria
Cote d'Ivoire	Liberia	Taiwan
Croatia	Libya	Tajikistan
Cuba	Lithuania	Tanzania
Cyprus	Macedonia	Thailand
Czech Republic	Madagascar	Togo
Czechoslovakia	Malawi	Trinidad and Tobago
DR of the Congo	Malaysia	Tunisia
DR of Vietnam	Mali	Turkey
Denmark	Mauritania	Turkmenistan
Djibouti	Mauritius	Uganda
Dominican Republic	Mexico	Ukraine
East Germany	Moldova	United Kingdom
Ecuador	Mongolia	USA
Egypt	Morocco	Uruguay
El Salvador	Mozambique	Uzbekistan
Equatorial Guinea	Myanmar	Venezuela
Estonia	Namibia	Vietnam
Ethiopia	Nepal	Yemen
Fiji	Netherlands	Zambia
Finland	New Zealand	Zimbabwe
France	Nicaragua	

Table 2.7: Comparison of Existing Data

Dataset	Coverage: Years Countries/Regions Unit of observation	Content	Variables	Methodology	Sources
<p>1. African Electoral Violence Dataset (AEVD)</p> <p>Straus and Taylor 2012.</p>	<p>1990-2007</p> <p>Sub-Saharan Africa: 46 countries</p> <p>Unit = national election, N=220</p>	<p>Intra-state conflict only</p> <p>Election violence = “physical violence and coercive intimidation directly tied to an impending electoral contest or to an announced electoral result”</p>	<p>Timing: - pre EV: 6 months prior - post EV: 3 months after - NO election-day data</p> <p>Actors: Incumbent, Challenger</p> <p>Intensity: 0 to 3, where 3 is 20 or more deaths (no minimum threshold)</p>	Human coding	<p>Human Rights reports by (1) the U.S. State Department, 1993-2007; (2) Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch; (3) journalism coverage in Africa Report (1990-1992)</p>
<p>2. Social Conflict in Africa Database (SCAD)</p> <p>http://strausscenter.org/s cad.html</p> <p>GeoSCAD offers geographic mapping of conflict events.</p>	<p>1990-2012</p> <p>Africa: 48 countries</p> <p>Unit = social conflict event, N=10,400</p>	<p>NO election violence definition.</p> <p>Event types: riot, strike, demonstration, inter-communal conflict, violence, insurgency/civil war</p>	<p>Elections are one of 12 conflict “issues.”</p> <p>Timing: event start and end date, duration</p> <p>Actors</p> <p>Intensity: # of deaths (no minimum threshold)</p> <p>Location</p>	Human coding	<p>News reports compiled in Lexis Nexis from (1) Associated Press and (2) Agence France Presse newswires</p>
<p>3. Armed Conflict Location and Events Dataset (ACLED)</p> <p>http://www.acleddata.com /data/version-4-data-1997-2013/</p>	<p>1997-2012</p> <p>Africa; 6 Asian states Afghanistan, Pakistan, Lebanon (latter three only 2005/6-2009) + real-time data for select high-risk states in Africa</p> <p>Unit = conflict event, N=60,000</p>	<p>NO election violence definition.</p> <p>Political violence defined as the use of force by a group with a political purpose or motivation.</p> <p>Event types: riots, protests, non-violent conflict, violence against civilians, militia interactions, recruitment activities of rebels</p>	<p>Contains election-related events but makes it difficult to identify them because there is no indicator for this type of conflict.</p> <p>Timing: event date</p> <p>Actors: governments, rebels, militias, ethnic groups, active political organizations, and civilians. Interaction codes are interesting (p. 15)</p> <p>Intensity: # deaths (no minimum threshold)</p> <p>Location</p>	Human coding	<p>Mainly media (local, national reports from war zones), reports by humanitarian agencies/NGOs.</p>

<p>4. Arriola and Johnson 2012</p>	<p>1985-2005 worldwide Unit = national, multi-party elections, N=596</p>	<p>Election violence = acts that violate the physical integrity of individuals; between government forces / incumbent supporters and opposition political party followers.</p>	<p>Pre-election violence onset, covering 12 months before and including election-day Pre-election violence intensity, covering 12 months before and including election-day Post-election violence onset, covering 12 months after election-day Intensity: 0-3 ; onset dichotomous. Minimum threshold is 25 injuries or deaths</p>	<p>Human coding</p>	<p>Media sources, election monitoring reports, and US State Department human rights reports.</p>
<p>5. National Elections across Democracy and Autocracy (NELDA) Hyde and Marinov 2012. http://hyde.research.yale.edu/nelda/</p>	<p>1945-2010 worldwide Unit = national election rounds, N=3,000</p>	<p>NO election violence definition but all variables election-related. Violence needs to be “significant” but no clear threshold given.</p>	<p>Timing: around election; specifics unclear. Intensity: all dichotomous. N15: Government harassment of opposition N31: If riots/protests took place, did government use of violence against demonstrators N33: “Significant” violence involving civilian deaths immediately before, during, or after the election</p>	<p>Human coding</p>	<p>Nohlen’s Election Handbooks; Keesing’s Record of World Events; Lexis-Nexis; IFES; IDEA; Economist Intelligence Unit</p>
<p>6. Quality of Election Data (QED, DIEM) Kelley 2012. http://sites.duke.edu/kelley/</p>	<p>1977-2004 worldwide Unit = national election rounds, N=1,200</p>	<p>NO election violence definition but all variables election-related.</p>	<p>Timing: pre-election (timeframe unclear); and election-day. NO post-election data. Intensity: 0 to 3; thresholds unclear. sr13/23viol: violence and unrest = physical abuses, overall violent clashes, or manhandling of persons (pp. 54-56) sr11/21cheat: aggregate variable for political conditions (intimidation, misuse of public funds, freedom to campaign, media restrictions, and vote fraud)</p>	<p>Human coding</p>	<p>Human Rights reports by the U.S. State Department, 1977-2004</p>

<p>7. UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (ACD)</p> <p>Gleditsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson, Sollenberg, and Strand 2002</p> <p>Harbom 2009</p> <p>http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/ucdp_prio_armed_conflict_dataset/</p>	<p>1946-2012</p> <p>worldwide</p> <p>Unit = conflict-year, N=2,000 conflict-years with 271 conflicts; this excludes non-conflict-years</p>	<p>NO election violence definition.</p> <p>Armed conflict = a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory</p> <p>Conflict Type: extrasystemic, interstate, internal and internationalized internal</p>	<p>Probably contains election-related events but makes it difficult to identify them because there is no indicator for this type of conflict.</p> <p>Conflict Issue: government, territory</p> <p>Timing: Conflict Start and End Date;</p> <p>Actors: Sides A and B; external Supporters for sides A and B;</p> <p>Intensity: dichotomous (cut point is 1,000 battle deaths)</p> <p>Threshold: at least 25 battle-related deaths per dyad-year</p>	<p>Human coding</p>	<p>News reports from Factiva; case studies</p>
<p>8. PRIO Conflict Site: Geo-Referenced Dataset on Armed Conflicts</p> <p>Hallberg 2012</p> <p>http://www.prio.no/Data/Armed-Conflict/Conflict-Site/</p>	<p>1989-2008</p> <p>worldwide</p> <p>Unit = conflict-year, N=791; note that this excludes non-conflict-years included</p>	<p>NO election violence definition.</p> <p>It includes all armed encounters, occupied territories and rebel bases.</p>	<p>Probably contains election-related events but makes it difficult to identify them because there is no indicator for this type of conflict.</p> <p>Conflict site (Country)</p> <p>Location: lat/long, radius</p>	<p>This is a complement to ACD, detailing geographic location of conflict center</p>	<p>Based on ACD</p>
<p>9. UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset (GED)</p> <p>http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/ucdp_ged/</p>	<p>1989-2010</p> <p>Africa</p> <p>Unit = violent event, N=25,000; this includes years in which battle deaths did not exceed 25.</p>	<p>NO election violence definition.</p> <p>Includes organized violence</p> <p>Conflict type: state-based, non-state, and one-sided violence.</p>	<p>Probably contains election-related events but makes it difficult to identify them because there is no indicator for this type of conflict.</p> <p>Timing: day(s) of event</p> <p>Intensity: 6 categories of battle deaths from 1 to 1,000+; 3 casualty estimates</p> <p>Minimum threshold for inclusion is 1 death.</p> <p>Actors: government, group</p>	<p>This is a geographic complement to other UCDP datasets (which are conflict- and dyad-level calendar-year)</p>	<p>Based on UCDP data</p>

<p>10. PRIO Onset and Duration of Intrastate Conflict</p> <p>Gleditsch et al. 2002, Strand 2006, Gates and Strand 2006.</p> <p>http://www.prio.no/Data/Armed-Conflict/Onset-and-Duration-of-Intrastate-Conflict/</p>	<p>1946-2004</p> <p>worldwide</p> <p>Unit = country year (annual and daily data); annual N = 8,000</p>	<p>NO election violence definition.</p> <p>Onset and Duration of Intrastate Conflict</p>	<p>Probably contains election-related events but makes it difficult to identify them because there is no indicator for this type of conflict.</p> <p>Civil conflict onset, duration, intensity</p> <p>Timing: start and end date</p> <p>Issue / incompatibility</p>	<p>This is a complement to ACD, detailing onset</p>	<p>Based on ACD</p>
<p>11. Major Episodes of Political Violence (MEPV)</p> <p>Monty G. Marshall</p> <p>http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm</p>	<p>1946-2010</p> <p>worldwide</p> <p>Unit is country-year, N = 8,000; with N=326 episodes of armed conflict; this includes peace spells</p>	<p>NO election violence definition.</p> <p>Violence = systematic and sustained use of lethal violence by organized groups</p> <p>7 Conflict types: int'l violence, int'l war, int'l independence war, civil violence, civil war, ethnic violence, and ethnic war.</p>	<p>Minimum threshold: 500 battle deaths per episode, with at least 100 fatalities per year.</p> <p>Fatality estimates</p> <p>magnitude of societal and systemic impact</p> <p>indicates neighboring and regional armed conflict</p>	<p>Author coding of books and integrating other datasets (see sources)</p>	<p>Keesing's and other datasets</p>
<p>12. World Bank Violent Conflict Dataset</p> <p>http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/EXTCPR/0,,contentMDK:22488819~menuPK:6835249~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:407740,00.html</p>	<p>1991-2008</p> <p>worldwide</p> <p>Unit = conflict episode, spanning one or several years</p>	<p>NO election violence definition.</p> <p>Conflict type = armed conflict and politically, economically, and socially-motivated collective violence</p> <p>Type: internal, internationalized, interstate, non-state</p>	<p>Probably contains election-related events but makes it difficult to identify them because there is no indicator for this type of conflict.</p> <p>Intensity: dichotomous (cut point is 1,000 battle deaths) as in ACD</p> <p>minimum threshold: at least 25 battle-related deaths per dyad-year, as in UCDP</p> <p>Number of deaths</p> <p>Brief description</p>	<p>Combines ACD, UCDP non-state conflict, and MEPV</p>	<p>Based mainly on ACD, complemented with UCDP non-state conflict and MEPV</p>

<p>13. Correlates of War (COW) Intra-State Wars</p> <p>Sarkees and Wayman 2010.</p> <p>http://www.correlatesofwar.org/COW2%20Data/WarData_NEW/WarList_NEW.html</p>	<p>1816-2007</p> <p>worldwide</p> <p>Unit = intra-state war, N=334</p>	<p>NO election violence definition.</p> <p>Internal war = sustained combat, involving organized armed forces</p> <p>Conflict types: civil wars; regional internal wars; intercommunal wars</p>	<p>The “effective resistance” criteria excludes one-sided state killings, and general riots by unorganized individuals</p> <p>minimum threshold: at least 1,000 battle-related fatalities between/among all participants within a twelve month period within a single country.</p> <p>Actors: sides A and B, initiator</p> <p>Fatalities for each side</p> <p>Timing: start and end date</p>	<p>Human coding</p>	<p>Various sources</p>

3 Governments' Strategic Selection of Election Monitors


“For nations experiencing the difficult rite of passage from nondemocratic regimes, the presence of outside election monitors who can assure the world – and a country’s citizens – that the electoral process was indeed free and fair is crucial... [But] the OAS needs to strengthen its election observation missions... and needs to address many of the concerns of responsiveness, relevance and partiality.”¹

This chapter addresses a simple empirical puzzle: Why do governments invite certain election monitors but not others? While it has become a norm for governments to invite international election monitors to assess their elections, governments choose among several organizations. Every country faces a menu of available monitoring organizations – regional and extra-regional, IGOs and NGOs – yet it remains unclear how governments decide between these various organizations. Most governments choose some but not all available organizations to attend their elections. Choices differ both across countries and over time. For example, Cuba and Dominica have never invited international monitors. Suriname and Grenada usually invite the OAS as the only monitor. Jamaica seems to prefer the Carter Center, and Antigua the Commonwealth. Venezuela, Mexico, and Peru have each chosen different observer organizations over time. Figure 3.1 shows this variation; it plots the percentage of elections in Latin America that IOs have observed from 1980-2010. While countries have mostly invited the OAS (Organization of American States), they have also chosen a range of other organizations.² Given the variety of election monitoring IOs, how do governments choose between them to attend and assess their national elections?

¹Perina 2012, 2, 1, 7.

²Details on each organization are in section 3.2. Notes on abbreviations: CW=Commonwealth of Nations; COPA=Parliamentary Confederation of the Americas; IRI=International Republican Institute; NDI=National Democratic Institute; CC=Carter Center; EU=European Union. Percentage values do not sum to 100 because some elections were not observed by any organization. Similarly, note that some elections were observed by more than one organization.

Figure 3.1: Distribution of IO Monitors in Latin American Elections



The government's choice of IO monitor is consequential in several ways. On the domestic level, governments can gain greater legitimacy if their victory is internationally certified. However, negative IO reports can increase the risk of unrest, protests, and violence.³ Similarly at the international level, governments can use IO monitors to gain democracy-contingent benefits,⁴ but governments may also be targeted with sanctions and cuts in aid and trade in response to flawed elections.⁵

Government retain some influence over these consequences by choosing particular organizations to monitor their elections. IOs are not equal. Monitoring IOs vary in at least three dimensions: the preconditions for missions, their capacity to detect manipulation, and the comprehensiveness of their reports. Using these criteria, this chapter develops a typology of organizations by conceptually grouping them according to the quality of their monitoring, ranging from lenient (low), to moderate (medium quality) and stringent (high quality) organizations.

I argue that the government's selection of IO monitors is contingent on the domestic political regime. Different IOs imply different levels of international and domestic political costs for the government, and therefore different signals of democratic commitment. Governments send not just

³See Chapter 5; and Hyde and Marinov 2014.

⁴Hyde 2011.

⁵Donno 2013.

any but weak, moderate, or strong signals of their democratic commitment. Democratizing governments choose more stringent organizations because these entail higher sovereignty and political costs which enables state leaders to make a stronger commitment to democratic reform. Drawing on research about regime complexity and costly signaling, I argue that governments at the threshold to democracy are more likely to invite more stringent monitors than electoral autocracies or consolidated democracies.

The idea that governments can utilize IOs to credibly signal their commitment to democracy is not new. State leaders can credibly signal their intent to consolidate democratic institutions and practices by joining democratic international organizations (IOs)⁶ or joining human rights regimes.⁷ Short of joining an international organization or institution, one way to send such a democratic signal is by *inviting* IO election monitors to observe and assess national elections.⁸

Hyde (2011) argues that the costliness of the democratic signal (i.e. hosting IOs) varies by incumbent type. Inviting IOs generates a risk of being caught cheating. Pseudo-democrats have a higher risk of being caught than true democrats. However, pseudo-democrats still try to mimic the costly signal to reap democracy-contingent benefits. In line with this argument, she finds that a country's elections are more likely to be observed if it has opposition competition, and if the country received greater amounts of democracy aid.⁹

I argue that the costliness of the democratic signal is not just differentiated by incumbent type but also by IO type. The costliness of the signal depends on the identity of the IO. Along with the rise in election monitoring, we have also seen the evolution of a shadow market of election monitors,¹⁰ or what could be called pseudo-democracy IOs. These are organizations with a democratic facade: they offer election monitoring services and their charters contain some language about the value of

⁶Mansfield and Pevehouse 2006.

⁷Hafner-Burton, Mansfield and Pevehouse 2008. The concept of costly signaling has also been applied to a variety of other phenomena in international relations, including threats in crisis bargaining (Fearon 1993 and 1994), trustworthiness in international conflicts (Kydd 2000), peacekeeping (Fortna and Martin 2009), military alliances (Morrow 2000) and monetary policies during EU accession (Hall and Franzese 1998; Besancenot and Vranceanu 2003).

⁸Hyde 2004 and 2011.

⁹Hyde 2011, 73-83.

¹⁰Kelley 2012a, chapter 3.

democracy and human rights. However, they invest comparatively little effort in observation and invariably endorse elections, regardless of their quality. The prime example is the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), which operates in the former Soviet Union states. The CIS regularly endorses flawed elections, provided the pro-Russian candidate wins.¹¹ In contrast, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) often criticizes these same elections.¹²

This chapter contributes to existing research in two ways. First, I develop a typology of monitoring organizations based on preconditions, organizational capacity, and reporting quality. This differs from existing typologies of IO credibility which rely on region¹³ and past criticism.¹⁴ While these are reasonable classifications, they do have drawbacks. “Past criticism” can result from selection effects, when some IOs are invited to worse elections. To my knowledge, this is an open empirical question and has not been examined statistically. Regarding the geographic proxy, “Western” monitors vary in their professionalism and credibility. The Commonwealth of Nations rarely criticizes elections in the former British Commonwealth, casting some doubt on its credibility. The geographic indicator also cannot capture changes over time within Western/non-Western categories. The typology proposed here does not capture changes over time either. But it is more than one-dimensional and it is specific to each world region, making it more accurate.

Second, this chapter contributes by examining not only *whether* governments invite IO monitors but *which* monitors, and theorizes this as strategic selection. The conventional dichotomous model of signal sending (cost) or not sending (no cost) only describes the first step of whether or not a government invites *any* IO at all. This chapter highlights the important second step: the choice of specific IO monitor(s). Using bivariate correlations, Kelley (2012a, 55) finds that more autocratic states are more likely to host *only* less critical monitors, i.e. a single IO that rarely condemns elections. However, this leaves several interesting questions unsolved: Is criticism the only important dimension influencing government’s IO choice? Further, do more democratic states tend to invite (i) multiple IO monitors, (ii) more critical monitors, or (iii) both? Based on a new typology and a

¹¹Kupchinsky 2005.

¹²For example, Ukraine 2004, Russia 2004, Belarus 2004.

¹³Hyde 2011; Nelda45 and 46 in Hyde and Marinov 2012.

¹⁴Kelley 2012a.

multivariate statistical analysis, I show that more democratic states – and especially states at the threshold to democracy – tend to host more stringent organizations.

This paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.1 briefly describes the domestic institutional context of electoral authoritarianism. Section 3.2 introduces a typology of IO quality based on a qualitative analysis of international election monitoring organizations in Latin America. Drawing on research about international regime complexity, section 3.3 lays out the argument and hypotheses. Based on this ranking of monitoring IOs, section 3.4 presents the research design, including an original panel dataset of 205 national elections in 23 Latin American and Caribbean countries from 1980 to 2010. Section 3.5 discusses the results, and section 3.6 illustrates the causal mechanism in the case of Peru. The final section concludes with implications for future research.

3.1 Domestic Context

Since the argument about strategic selection revolves around political regime type, it is worthwhile to briefly outline domestic political regime characteristics. There are a variety of competing approaches for classifying non-democratic and democratic regimes and their subtypes. Following Diamond, this paper divides nondemocratic regimes into those with some multiparty electoral competition and those that are politically closed.¹⁵ Authoritarian regimes with multiparty electoral competition can further be divided into competitive authoritarian and uncompetitive / hegemonic states. Of key interest for this chapter are competitive authoritarian states; these states have regular, competitive, multiparty elections but they fail to meet minimum requirements of democracy because the rules of the game are frequently violated or changed to serve the ruling party. In particular, incumbents routinely

deny the opposition adequate media coverage, harass opposition candidates and their supporters, and in some cases manipulate electoral results. Journalists, opposition politicians, and other government critics may be spied on, threatened, harassed, or arrested. Members of the opposition may be jailed, exiled, or – less frequently – even

¹⁵Diamond 2002, 25.

assaulted or murdered.¹⁶

In short, competitive authoritarian states have formal elections but the rules of the game are subject to change by the winners.¹⁷ Therefore election outcomes are overwhelmingly determined by manipulation rather than popular preferences.

The literature on electoral authoritarianism is useful for understanding the underlying phenomenon of this study and the dilemma that governments in this regime category face when deciding which international monitor to choose. For electoral autocrats, stringent IO monitors are more costly than lenient monitors. Some elections in Latin America since the 1980s took place under political conditions that did not qualify as fully democratic because they lacked free competition, freedom of intimidation on election-day, and peaceful transfers of power after the election. Even for transitional regimes, inviting external monitors can be a risky strategy if the government cannot guarantee clean elections. Here again stringent monitors can be more costly (than lenient monitors) and they also enable the government to send a stronger signal of their democratic commitment.

Furthermore, this literature guides case selection in this paper because the case in the last section is chosen from a certain subsection of political regimes. Conceptually, the Peruvian case shows the switch from competitive authoritarianism sending a weak signal of democratic commitment (OAS) in 2000 to a democracy in 2001 sending a strong signal of democratic commitment (EU). Selecting a case from the highly democratic group would not be insightful because these states have proven to be democratic for decades and thus have few incentives to send costly signals.

3.2 Variation in the Stringency of IO Monitors

This section establishes a typology of IO election monitoring quality. The typology is based on three dimensions: preconditions, mission scope, and reporting policies. It departs from existing typologies in two ways: by going beyond a dichotomous high/low quality measure and by not

¹⁶Levitsky and Way 2002, 53.

¹⁷Schedler 2006.

relying on past criticism as the sole factor determining quality.¹⁸ First, IOs engaging in election observation differ with regard to the preconditions that have to be fulfilled by the government. Second, IOs differ with regard to their capacity of detecting manipulation. This capacity is a direct function of the scope of their missions, i.e. the duration and size as well as the proportion of polling places covered. Third, IOs differ in the post-election reports issued in terms of how comprehensive, timely, accessible, and critical these are. There is a potential bias when election reports are either not issued or are published several months after the election. With the passage of time, the international community and domestic audiences lose interest in this information. Publishing statements/reports late also opens the possibility of amending the report contingent on the time of publication (i.e. perhaps being more critical), but such a statement will not be as influential as it would have been shortly after the election.

Throughout this assessment, the 2005 UN Declaration, detailed below, is used as a benchmark of existing minimum standards. Based on this comparative assessment, I group monitors into three categories. High-quality/stringent monitors comply with all elements of the UN standards and exceed them on one or more of three dimensions (preconditions, scope, reporting). Average/moderate monitors comply with the standards but do not exceed them, and low-quality/lenient monitors at times fail to meet the basic standards. This typology is based on existing as well as original data collections, as detailed below.¹⁹

I analyze the variation in IO monitoring quality within Latin America. Conceptually, a regionally focused comparison makes sense because not all IOs are available to all countries. For example, the OSCE only observes elections in Europe, and has never sent missions to Latin America. The OAS only observes elections in Latin America and the Caribbean. In addition to the availability issue, potential IO biases (and thus quality) may vary by region.²⁰ Since research on IO quality best

¹⁸For typologies which rely on past criticism as the single determinant of quality, see Kelley 2012a; and Daxecker and Schneider 2014, 9.

¹⁹The caveat to this analysis is that it is based mostly on primary literature published by the international organizations that are the subjects of this study. A potential bias in these documents reporting about own activities cannot be obviated. In addition, comprehensive handbooks and detailed reports about the electoral monitoring standards were not published before the late 1990s and often only within the last five or ten years.

²⁰For example, the EU or OSCE may adjust their usual monitoring policies in countries where they are heavily invested. On the one hand, they may be *less* stringent and critical of elections in Serbia (where they have invested heavily over the last decades) than in regions outside their immediate interest. European organizations may assess

operates by region, Latin America is chosen because it has the longest history of external election observation.²¹ It was the first region where international monitoring was used and then became widespread in the 1990s. Thus the analysis focuses on election monitoring in Latin America and the Caribbean from 1980 to 2010.

Which organizations are available for election monitoring in Latin America? International governmental organizations (IGOs) offering election-monitoring services in this region include the Organization of American States (OAS) and the European Union (EU). Two less active IGOs are the Commonwealth of Independent Nations (CW, for former British colonies) and the Parliamentary Confederation of the Americas (COPA).²² In addition to these IGOs, international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) offering monitoring include the Carter Center (CC), the National Democratic Institute (NDI), and the International Republican Institute (IRI). The three NGOs are non-profit organizations based in the U.S. but independent from the U.S. government.²³

3.2.1 A Common Reference Point: The UN Declaration

The rise in election monitoring generated a variety of practices and principles. In an effort to standardize existing practices and further coherence in election assessments, more than twenty organizations gathered at the United Nations in 2005. These organizations agreed to a set of standards, which became known as the “Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation and Code of Conduct for International Election Observers.”²⁴ This document reinforces earlier UN

elections of similar quality differently (less critical) in CEE countries than in Latin America or Africa, where these organizations are less invested. On the other hand, the EU may also be *more* stringent in Serbia (and other candidate countries) since the stakes for potential EU members are higher; the EU has incentives to be more stringent and reduce the probability of unfair elections in hopes that these developments persist after membership is granted. In either case, IOs monitoring their own regions may face incentives to deviate from their standard monitoring policies.

²¹See Santa-Cruz 2005b, 664; Hyde 2011, 56, chapter 2.

²²COPA brings together the national, regional parliaments and interparliamentary organizations of the Americas. Several prominent IGOs are not observing elections in Latin America: the OSCE has not been active in Latin America; Mercosur does not offer monitoring services; the UNDP coordinates missions but is never itself a monitor to elections in this region. Other election-related activities by the UNDP include designing new electoral systems, institution and capacity building, election planning, dispute resolution and the promotion of underrepresented groups (UN 2004, 5).

²³These three NGOs together form the Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening (CEPPS), which is a cooperative agreement supervised by the USAID since 1995. However, they are independent of the U.S. government and also receive funding from outside sources, including other countries.

²⁴UN 2005. Twenty-two organizations signed the UN Declaration in 2005 and 24 more organizations have endorsed the standards since then. With regard to Latin America, COPA is the only organization that has not signed the

declarations, arguing that the right to vote and the right to stand for public office in periodic, genuine elections are human rights. It defines election observation as the gathering of information and its unbiased analysis.²⁵ However, the UN standards also leave a substantial amount of discretion to IO monitors, as detailed for each dimension below.

With regard to preconditions for observation missions, the UN standards hold that missions should not be organized unless the host government fulfills the following basic conditions:²⁶

- it issues an invitation sufficiently in advance of the election;
- it guarantee observers unimpeded access and free movement to all locations throughout the country, all stages of the election-process, all election technologies, and all election-related persons (e.g. officials, state workers, political parties, civil society, media);
- it guarantees observers freedom to issue, without interference, public statements and reports on their findings about the election;
- it agrees to memoranda of understanding, if required by the organization

Apart from what these internationally recognized guidelines specify, it is also useful to note what they do *not* specify. The Declaration does not specify if the invitation should be issued in a written form; it leaves IOs substantial discretion about the timing of requests, exploratory missions, and deployment. Moreover, the UN Declaration recommends that IOs should not send an election observation mission if it is “likely that its presence will be interpreted as giving legitimacy to a clearly undemocratic electoral process.”²⁷

In terms of the scope of missions, the UN Declaration also leaves much room for variation. The document does not address the size, duration, or dispersion (geographical coverage) of missions.

Further, it does not state if these parameters should be IO standards or whether they are subject to agreement. For a list of all endorsing organizations, see http://www.cartercenter.org/peace/democracy/des_endorsing_organizations.html

²⁵International election observation is the “systematic, comprehensive and accurate gathering of information” concerning the laws, processes and institutions related to the conduct of elections and other factors concerning the overall electoral environment; ... is the impartial and professional analysis of such information; and the drawing of conclusions about the character of electoral processes based on the highest standards for accuracy of information and impartiality of analysis. UN 2005, 2.

²⁶UN 2005, 4-5.

²⁷UN 2005, 4.

to bargaining between the IO and the host country (thus potentially varying across and within countries). In short, it does not specify *how* IO missions should look like; it only specifies what observers should look at. IO missions should examine conditions relating to the right to vote and stand for office, specifically potential discrimination or other obstacles that hinder participation in electoral processes based on gender, race, color, ethnicity, language, religion, opinion, nation or social origin, property, or status.²⁸

Concerning reports, the UN Declaration obliges all signatories to “issue timely, accurate and impartial statements to the public, make periodic reports and a final report upon completion of the election process.”²⁹ This leaves “timely” open to interpretation because it is unclear whether “timely” means hours, days, or even weeks after the election. Reports lose much of their value if they are only issued weeks after the election is concluded. As shown below, monitors vary widely in the availability and timing of their post-election statements/reports. This variation is clearly not in compliance with the UN document. If one of the key motivators behind international election observation is transparency, then the failure to issue statements/reports suggests that there may be little added value of some organizations. Even acknowledging a trade-off between promptness and accuracy, publication within a couple of weeks should be reasonable. Further delays often indicates that other (often political) concerns are preventing the publication of information.

The UN document outlines *minimum standards* for IO election observation. Although issued in 2005, in many respects this Declaration codified and standardized existing best practices by several IOs in election monitoring. Organizations vary in their degree of compliance with these standards; some fall short of it, some comply, and some even go beyond these basic standards by adding further requirements. Based on this variation in compliance, I derive a typology of lenient, moderate, and stringent monitoring IOs.

The following sections lay out to which extent these conditions – preconditions, mission capacity, and reporting – are met in practice by each observer organization. To compare preconditions for

²⁸UN 2005, 3.

²⁹UN 2005, 3.

monitoring across organizations, I examine whether IOs have signed the 2005 UN Declaration containing the above list, and whether they send pre-assessment missions.³⁰ Such preliminary missions are often deployed to decide whether basic conditions for meaningful elections exist. To compare mission scope/capacity across organizations, I examine the size and duration of missions. Deploying only a handful of people over three days is unlikely to yield considerable information. Similarly, consistency within organizations is relevant, and captured with the median number (for skewness) and standard deviation of missions' size.

Finally, to compare reporting quality across IOs, I use several indicators: the length of the report (number of pages), whether reports are issued for every election, how timely these reports are, and whether they are easily accessible (online).³¹ Again, since the main push of the UN Declaration was for standardization and consistency, I measure the median and standard deviation.³² Final reports are often available in print (especially before the 1990s), and can be formally requested. However, with growing individual access to the internet, a special request should not be necessary to obtain this information. Since election monitoring is about transparency and credibility, not making election reports publicly available seems counterproductive. Table 3.1 summarizes IO quality across these measures.

3.2.2 Moderate Monitors: NDI and IRI

The International Republican Institute (IRI) has attended 13 national elections in seven Latin American countries since 1990. The National Democratic Institute (NDI) has attended 17 elec-

³⁰Data on sending pre-assessment missions (CIVISITN), mission size (OBSNUM), mission duration (DEL1DAYS), and report length (DFINPN) is sourced from Kelley 2012a.

³¹The three latter variables are collected from research on the respective IOs' election observation websites. For the OAS, see http://www.oas.org/en/spa/deco/moe_informes.asp For COPA, see http://www.copa.qc.ca/eng/committees/Democracy-Peace/ParliamentaryConfederationoftheAmericas_003.htm For the Commonwealth of Nations, see <http://secretariat.thecommonwealth.org/CountryList/190591/191180/176283/electionreports/> For IRI, see <http://www.iri.org/explore-our-resources/election-observation-and-assessment-reports> For NDI, see <https://www.ndi.org/international-election-mission-chronological> For the Carter Center, see <http://www.cartercenter.org/peace/democracy/observed.html> For the EU 1993-2013 see http://eeas.europa.eu/eueom/missions/index_en.htm, for 2006-2008 see http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/human-rights/election_observation_missions/missions_en.htm, and for 2002-2013 see <http://www.eods.eu/eu-eom-reports-and-statements> For EP missions, see http://www.europarl.europa.eu/intcoop/election_observation/missions19992004_en.htm All accessed 8 March 2014.

³²When the standard deviation exceeds the median, this indicates inconsistency.

tions in ten Latin American countries since 1988. Both organizations have signed and comply with the 2005 UN document, and both employ similar standards. They do not exceed the UN standards but also do not fall significantly below the standards set out in that document.

In terms of preconditions, there is no indication that these two NGOs have developed any further, organization-specific guidelines election monitoring. They have signed and seem to follow the UN Declaration. However, they have not published handbooks, further observation practices, or detailed procedures to be followed. Concerning the scope/capacity of missions, both organizations consistently deploy missions of moderate size (21 to 27 people). One shortcoming is that they are in the host country only for a short time, about 6 days.

The organizations differ somewhat in their reporting. The NDI has issued post-election statements and reports consistently and shortly after election day for all elections it has observed, and made them accessible online. In most cases, these statements were issued shortly after the election (1-2 days).³³ IRI reports are also available for most elections and online. Usually, the IRI issues reports within a day after the election, but sometimes weeks later.³⁴ Moreover, no reports are available for two elections.³⁵

Based on their compliance with the UN standards along these three dimensions, I code the NDI and IRI as medium-quality or moderate monitors. Since the missions are rather small and some IRI reports are issued substantially late, I do not consider these organizations to be of high quality. However, their reporting is considerably better than the OAS (as discussed below) and they have standardized their missions, which is why they are not lenient monitors either.

³³For the NDI, the median number of days between election-day and post-election statements is 1, sd = 1.4. The longest delays in reporting were Guatemala 1990 (6 days) and Dominican Republic 1990 (4 days).

³⁴For example, IRI issued its observation report/statement for Haiti 1990, Mexico 2000, Nicaragua 2001, and Honduras 2009 within a day after the election. It issued reports for Haiti 1995 and Nicaragua 1996 a months after election, and for Venezuela two months after the election. In two cases, the statement dates remain unclear.

³⁵These elections without IRI reports available are Haiti 1997 and El Salvador 1994.

3.2.3 Lenient Monitors: the OAS, COPA, and the Commonwealth

The Organization of American States

OAS election monitoring activities started in the 1960s, expanded greatly in the 1990s, and have since become institutionalized.³⁶ The OAS has repeatedly affirmed the right to free and fair elections. In 2001, all member states signed the Inter-American Democratic Charter which states in its first article that “The peoples of the Americas have a right to democracy and their governments have an obligation to promote and defend it.”³⁷ The 2001 Charter maintains that states are responsible for ensuring free and fair electoral processes.

In terms of preconditions, the OAS has consistently fallen below the standards set in the UN Declaration. While the OAS mission manual refers to the UN document by specifically integrating most of its language, it explicitly *skips* the UN Declaration’s article 11, which specifies conditions under which organizations should decline to send observers.³⁸

³⁶In the 1960s missions were deployed in an ad hoc manner. These early OAS missions were very limited in time and scope until the Nicaraguan election in 1990 (OAS 2007, 5). In the 1990s, election observation missions were more widely requested by member states and the OAS made an effort to institutionalize the process by establishing the Unit for the Promotion of Democracy, which later became the Department of Electoral Cooperation and Observation (DECO). Within DECO, the Electoral Observation Unit (UNOE) is responsible for the organizations, implementation and follow-up of all the electoral observation missions of the Organization of American States. UNOE determines the parameter for the missions with regard to the number and composition of observers, approaches, timetables, implementation and final reports (OAS 2008, 7)

³⁷The 2001 Democratic Charter defines essential elements of democracy to include human rights, access to power, rule of law, and the holding of periodic, free, and fair elections based on secret balloting and universal suffrage as an expression of the sovereignty of the people.

³⁸OAS 2008, 4.

Table 3.1: Comparing IO Observers in Latin America 1980-2010

IO Monitor	Preconditions		Mission Scope/Capacity			Election Reports			
	signed UN? Declaration?	pre-assessment mission?	consistent size? # of people median, SD	consistent duration? # of days median, SD	duration? # of days	consistent length? # of pages median, SD	always reporting?	timely? # of days median, SD	accessible online?
Organization of American States (OAS), N = 50, 86	✓	✗ not withholding missions	✗ 55, 86	✗ 20, 52	✓ moderate	✗ 49, 46	✗	✗ 1, 81	✗
Parliamentary Confederation of the Americas (COPA) N = 12, 14	✗	✗	✓ 9, 6	✓ 6, 1	✗ short	✓ 43, 9	✓✓	✗ 1, 18	✓
Commonwealth of Nations (CW) N = 4, 11	✓	✓	✓ 20, 6	✓ 21, 6	✓ moderate	✓ 45, 16	✓	✗ 9, 15	✓✓
Int'l Republican Inst. (IRI) N = 13, 13	✓	✓	✓ 21, 18	✓ 6, 2	✗ short	✓ 48, 30	✓	✗ 1, 24	✓
Nat'l Democratic Inst. (NDI) N = 9, 17	✓	✓	✓ 27, 9	✓ 6, 1	✗ short	✓ 68, 46	✓✓	✓✓ 1, 1	✓✓
Carter Center (CC) N = 18, 27	✓	✓ requires meaningful election	✓ 35, 21	✗ 5, 46	✗ short	✓ 78, 34	✓✓	✓ 1, 5	✓✓
European Union (EU) N = 6, 21	✓	✓ requires feasible and useful can deny & withdraw missions	✓ 84, 29	✓ 78, 45	✓ long detailed timetable for preparing & deploying	✓ 33, 11	✓✓	✓✓ 2, 2	✓✓

Notes: Data on pre-assessment missions (C1VISITN), mission size (OBSNUM) and duration (DEL1DAYS), report length (DFINPN) from Kelley 2012a for Latin American elections only, based on 1980-2004. The first column shows two numbers of observations. The first is the number of elections included in the Kelley (2014) variables. Note that that dataset does not include all elections that IOs have observed; it has some missings. The second number of observations refers to the total number of observed elections for each IO in this sample until 2010, based on their websites. Data on the last three variables is sourced from IO mission websites. In the last three columns, double ✓✓ represents “always”, single ✓ represents “mostly”, ✗ indicates “often not” for this sample of Latin American elections. Lastly, COPA is not included in the DIEM data; all data on COPA is from 2000-2010 and from its mission website.

Two of the key democracy-related OAS documents also highlight the half-hearted commitment. The 2001 OAS Charter includes a section on “Democracy and Electoral Observation Missions,” noting that missions should advise the OAS Secretariat “if the necessary conditions for free and fair elections do not exist.”³⁹ However, there is no guidance for the Secretariat as to whether to approve governments’ mission requests when such basic conditions are not met. Similarly, the 2008 OAS “Best Practices Report” also falls short of the UN standard. It indicates that preliminary missions sent to a country months before the election obtain information about electoral authorities and the environment. However, this information is not used to decide whether or not the OAS will send an observation mission, but is only taken into account to prepare a funding proposal and budget.⁴⁰

Anecdotally, the OAS seems to send observer missions to elections where basic conditions are not met more than other organizations. For example, the OAS observed the November 2000 Presidential election in Haiti even though it was unlikely to be conducted properly. In fact, the OAS had attended and itself criticized the previous, disputed Legislative elections in May 2000. After that election, the Haitian government arrested many opposition politicians and supporters to dampen potential protest.⁴¹ The OAS’ criticism and other pressure had no noticeable effect on the government. While other IO monitors refused to attend the November election,⁴² the OAS nevertheless sent an observation mission.

One reason the standard for preconditions has not been followed is that the OAS is a member-state organization offering monitoring *in its home region* and thus subject to internal pressures and diplomacy. Any member state can request an observation mission from the OAS. The 2001 Charter suggests that member states can request electoral observation missions as a “service” from the OAS and their request *cannot* be refused. Pointing to this shortcoming, critics charge that

³⁹OAS 2001, Art. 24 and 25.

⁴⁰OAS 2008, 4.

⁴¹“Haiti Opposition Reports Post-Election Arrests,” *New York Times*, 26 May 2000. Available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2000/05/26/world/haiti-opposition-reports-post-election-arrests.html>. Accessed 8 March 2014.

⁴²“U.S. to Withhold Money for Haiti’s Presidential Election,” *New York Times*, 6 September 2000. Available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2000/09/06/world/us-to-withhold-money-for-haiti-s-presidential-election.html>. Accessed 9 March 2014.

The OAS ... needs to resist the temptation to observe any or every election... Automatic acceptance of invitations vitiates the relevance of electoral observation missions, and the secretary general should be prepared to refuse a request by the government that arrives too late or is made in the context of an electoral process that is already manifestly biased, or marred by constitutional violations and objections from the opposition.⁴³

However, given the absence of rules about when to accept invitations and given the peer-review nature of OAS missions, it is more difficult for the OAS to deny such a mission than for external actors such as the EU or external NGOs in Latin American countries. In sum, the OAS imposes no requirements on its member states (apart from holding elections) and basically guarantees all members requesting a mission that this service will be granted, independent of the political situation. Thus, the OAS standards are lower than the standards established by the 2005 Declaration.

With regard to the scope of observation missions, the missions observe all stages of the electoral process (before, during, after the voting) but there is no standard procedure for mission size and duration, and therefore wide variation.⁴⁴ OAS missions have varied between 3 and 216 days present in country. A three-day presence means observing little more than the election-day. The median OAS mission duration is 20 days, with a standard deviation of 52.

Similarly, OAS reporting is not consistent. For virtually all elections before 1998, OAS statements are unavailable and it does not appear that reports during this time were made available to the public or the press.⁴⁵ Even for elections after 1999, reports for some elections are unavailable⁴⁶ and not always timely and accessible. Since 2005 – coinciding with the UN Declaration – there have been two changes in the OAS reporting. Firstly, reports are made publicly available and many are issued in a more timely fashion than before, usually a day after the election. Secondly, many more

⁴³Perina 2012, 8, 6.

⁴⁴The preliminary mission following the request of the host government “in theory, should occur some months prior to the election.” Following that and “depending on the time available,” the lead team arrives “a reasonable time before the election” (OAS 2008, 3-4).

⁴⁵They are not on the mission website above and not available otherwise online. This is not for lack of research effort; Kelley (2012a) encountered the same problems. See http://www.duke.edu/web/diem/reports/OAS/election_missions_list.doc Accessed 14 March 2014.

⁴⁶Examples include Honduras 1993 and 1997.

reports are not translated into multiple languages; many reports are only issued in Spanish.⁴⁷ For example, in 2007, 6 of 7 reports were in Spanish only, and one in English. Admittedly, Spanish is the primary regional language – but given that the international community converses in English, reports could have also been issued in English in the interest of transparency. Moreover, press statements are mostly not available and not reprinted in the reports, so that early assessments of the elections cannot be verified (final reports are only issued weeks, months, sometimes a year after the election). The length of reports varies between 5 and 245 pages, with the standard deviation as great as the median (46, 49). This suggests that there is no standard rule or procedure for reporting. Finally, the OAS reports themselves are rarely critical even in the face of clear shortcomings.

Overall then, the OAS sets minimal preconditions on its member states and basically guarantees all members requesting a mission that this service will be granted, independent of political conditions in the host country. In addition, there seem to be no fixed monitoring standards because the time spans for preparation and planning of the missions are not standardized. Moreover, the resulting election reports are at times late and not easily accessible to the general public. This is why I categorize the OAS as a lenient monitor, falling below minimum standards set out in the UN Declaration.

The Parliamentary Confederation of the Americas (COPA)

COPA is an inter-parliamentary organization created in 1997 with headquarters in Quebec, Canada. It has been observing elections since 2000. In Latin America, COPA has observed 14 elections in nine countries from 2000-2013. Among IO monitors in Latin America, COPA is the only organization that has not signed the UN Declaration. Since the UN document was aimed at standardization and carries no cost (there is no enforcement mechanism), this suggests that COPA falls short of agreed standards.

Apart from the issuance of a government invitation, COPA sets no preconditions for mission deploy-

⁴⁷Before that, OAS reports were usually published in several languages, depending on country, including English, Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, or French.

ment.⁴⁸ Like the OAS, COPA does not send pre-assessment missions. Instead, a COPA Committee “shall verify ... the political situation in the applicant state” as well as preparations and institutional structure,⁴⁹ and then recommend whether or not to send a mission. But there is again no guidance as to the circumstances under which a mission should not be deployed. COPA seems to never have refused a mission.⁵⁰

Concerning mission scope, COPA observers generally spend only a short time in the host country. COPA recommends that observers arrive “a few days” before the election.⁵¹ Indeed, the median time in country is 6 days.⁵² COPA missions are also relatively small, about 9 parliamentarians, ranging from 3 to 24. With such limited personnel, it is often not feasible to visit more than the capital or select places. Indeed, election reports indicate that many COPA missions often remain in the capital. For example, at the 2007 general election in Argentina, the COPA mission consisted of only four people who visited polling stations *only* in Buenos Aires.⁵³ Similarly, the 2009 Mexican elections, the COPA mission consisted of three people who only visited Mexico City and the surrounding State of Mexico;⁵⁴ the COPA mission to Bolivia 2009, comprising 12 people, visited La Paz and a few neighboring cities.⁵⁵ Similar to the OAS missions, it seems unclear how much observers can observe if they only witness a snapshot of the election in a limited geography.

Most of COPA’s election reports are available online,⁵⁶ and are consistently around 40 pages. While many are issued shortly after the election, the standard deviation is large (median=1 day, sd=18 days). In addition, reports for several elections are undated. This is noteworthy because these reports were for recent elections, after observation had already undergone some professionalization. It also remains unclear if COPA held any press conferences for these elections, usually a regular component of missions to distribute findings to the public.⁵⁷

⁴⁸Nothing is mentioned in its “Election Observer Manual.”

⁴⁹COPA n.d., 18.

⁵⁰According to data from Hyde and Marinov 2012, Nelda48 notes.

⁵¹COPA n.d., 24.

⁵²Since COPA is not included in the DIEM data (Kelley 2012a), all data was collected from its observer website. Available at <http://www.copa.qc.ca/eng/missions/MOE/index.html> Accessed 8 March 2014.

⁵³COPA 2007, 4.

⁵⁴COPA 2009a, 5.

⁵⁵COPA 2009b, 4.

⁵⁶The exception is COPA’s first mission to Mexico in 2000.

⁵⁷These undated reports are Brazil 2006, Mexico 2009, and Argentina 2007.

The Commonwealth of Nations (CW)

The Commonwealth of Nations involves 53 countries, including most former British colonies and the UK. Since 1989, it has observed 11 elections in five Latin American countries. It complies with preconditions set out in the UN Declaration and has moderate mission quality but is more lenient in reporting than other organizations.

In terms of preconditions, the CW has signed the UN Declaration and sends pre-assessment missions. It is unclear what purpose these missions serve – i.e. whether full missions ever got cancelled because of information gained on a pre-assessment mission. The CW missions have moderate scope: on average, they involve about 20 people in country over a three-week period. Mission duration and size vary little, indicating that standards are applied consistently.⁵⁸

The CW reports are of moderate length, about 45 pages, varying between 31 and 68 pages. However, CW fails to publish most reports until weeks after the election. The median time between election-day and post-election statements is 9 days, with a standard deviation of 15 days.⁵⁹ In addition, one of the election reports is not available at all.⁶⁰

3.2.4 Stringent Monitors: the European Union and the Carter Center

Of all monitoring IOs reviewed here, only the CC and EU have preconditions that go beyond the minimum requirements specified in the 2005 UN Declaration. Since these organizations also have larger missions and more consistent reporting, I classify these IOs as stringent / high-quality monitoring organizations.

The Carter Center (CC)

⁵⁸Standard deviation is 6 for medians of 20 people and 21 days.

⁵⁹While the CW issued observation reports for elections in Guyana within a couple of days, it took up to five weeks in other countries.

⁶⁰The CW report that is not available is for Antigua and Barbuda 1999.

The Carter Center has observed 27 elections in 13 Latin American countries since 1989. In terms of preconditions, the Carter Center exceeds the UN standards by specifying additional requirements relating to the domestic political context. Specifically, the Carter Center claims that it will not send observers if political circumstances prevent a meaningful election: “If there exists political deadlock or circumstances that prevent any hope of a meaningful election from occurring the center will not observe.”⁶¹ The CC is interested in observing elections that have the potential to be meaningful and where governments demonstrate an effort to improve election quality. Additionally, the Carter Center also sometimes declines invitation due to insufficient resources, insufficient lead time, or because opposition parties do not welcome the observers.⁶² In addition, the Carter Center has helped organize yearly meetings of monitoring IOs to collaborate and help implement the UN standards, perhaps recognizing the difficulty of enforcement. It has also developed a database of international legal obligations to democratic elections to help IO observers better assess elections.⁶³

The Carter Center’s mission size is consistent and moderate, and usually comprised of approximately 35 people. In comparison to the missions sent by most other IOs (except the OAS and EU), the CC sends on average larger missions, which are thus able to observe more polling places. In terms of duration, CC missions often stay in country for less than a week, which is comparable to NDI, IRI, and COPA. However, some of the CC missions stay in country significantly longer.⁶⁴

The Carter Center’s election reports compare favorably to all other IOs in several respects. The CC issues by far the longest election reports, with a median length of 78 pages. The CC reports are virtually always available online and issued shortly after election-day. The CC publishes most statements the day after the election (median 1, standard deviation 5 days). The publication of

⁶¹Web statement from 1 August 2010, which has since been taken offline. It is reprinted in a report of the CC declining to observe the Ethiopian 2010 elections for exactly that reason: <http://www.ethiosun.com/?p=12503> Accessed 8 March 2014.

⁶²Some combination of these reasons led the CC to decline an invitation to the Venezuelan elections in 2012. The CC declined an invitation to observe the 2012 constitutional referendum in Egypt due to insufficient lead time. See Carter Center 2012a, 2012b. The CC has also declined invitations when mission funding came with political strings attached and when “powerful (usually incumbent) authorities would not allow meaningful observation, for example in Zimbabwe, Ethiopia [2010], and Gabon [1998].” See Carter Center 2011.

⁶³Background and activities of these yearly follow-up meetings can be found at http://www.cartercenter.org/peace/democracy/des_declaration.html The Database on Democratic Election Standards project is at <http://www.cartercenter.org/des-search/des/Introduction.aspx> Accessed 8 March 2014.

⁶⁴These 3 longer Carter Center missions are Jamaica 2002 (23 days), Guyana 2001 (61 days), and Nicaragua 1990 (166 days).

two of the 27 reports issued by the CC were delayed significantly.⁶⁵

The European Union (EU)

For the European Union, the promotion of democracy in countries outside the EU member states is part of its Common Foreign and Security Policy; election observation missions have been deployed since 1993.⁶⁶ The EU has observed 20 elections in 11 Latin American countries between 1996 and 2010. As one indicator of exceeding UN standards, the EU has published several handbooks on election observation standards. These handbooks are sizeable collections of best practices and standards to be followed; 2008 handbook exceeds 200 pages with sections on each of the dimensions discussed below.

The EU observation standards are substantially higher than the minimums required by the 2005 UN Declaration. In terms of preconditions for mission deployment, the EU requires that such missions have the potential to be effective, feasible, and useful.⁶⁷ According to the EU, missions are useful when they can potentially deter fraud and violence, build trust to increase turnout and support civil society.⁶⁸ Missions can be effective when they have sufficient support from stakeholders (parties, government officials, citizen groups, media), and potential reform following the report.⁶⁹ EU election observation missions also require a stable security situation. If any of these conditions are absent, observation missions may not be deployed. When these conditions are met, however, meaningful elections are possible, and EU missions can be effective; thus full missions can be deployed.

In order to determine whether these pre-conditions are met, the EU requires that the host country issues a written invitation sufficiently in advance of the election so that the EU is able to organize and send an exploratory mission. According to EU standards, such exploratory missions

⁶⁵These two delayed statements were for the 2005 Presidential Recall referendum in Venezuela (11 days) and the first round of the Peru 2000 elections (25 days).

⁶⁶The first EU mission was sent to Russia in 1993. Between 2000 and 2008, the European Union observed elections in 41 countries in Africa, Latin America, Asia and the Middle East (European Commission 2008, 7).

⁶⁷EU 2008, 93-96.

⁶⁸Ibid, 93.

⁶⁹Ibid, 95-96.

are deployed half a year in advance of the election. “Memoranda of understanding” with relevant government agencies, containing all the above conditions, are signed two months before election day.

For full observer missions, the EU also stipulates that there must be no interference with EU decisions about the size or composition of the missions or the timeframe of deployment.⁷⁰ This indicates that specifics are not subject to bargaining between the host government and the EU. The organization also stipulates broader freedom of movement requirements by prohibiting the host government from asking for unreasonable prior notification. It also requires freedom of pressure and threats against any EU-related persons; the EU prohibits interference in its activities by the host government, security or electoral authorities.⁷¹ Lastly, the EU reserves the right to withdraw its mission at any point should problems arise with any of its conditions.⁷²

Likewise, the EU also has higher standards for the scope of observation missions, with a detailed timetable for preparing and executing a mission. Long-term observers are scheduled to arrive five weeks, and short-term observers arrive one week before election-day. As for the spatial distribution of mission deployment, EU observers are stationed “in the capital city and regional locations across the host country to ensure that there is a balance of coverage of different regions, and urban and rural areas.”⁷³ The EU standards – in particular their detail and more stringency – contrast strongly with those of the OAS.

The EU mission reports are also regulated by a strict timeline, which states that a preliminary statement must be issued within three days. In practice, most EU statements are issued the second day after the election.⁷⁴ All its statements and reports are publicly accessible. Another EU regulation states that final report must be released within two months after election. To the best of my knowledge, no other organization set limits on final reports. This ensures timely reporting and transparency within a reasonable period after the end of the election. Reports are issued in English

⁷⁰European Commission 2008: 95-96.

⁷¹EU 2008, 96

⁷²EU 2008, 96. This right has been invoked in Darfur/Sudan 2010 because of ongoing violence and the incumbent President Bashir’s physical threats against observers. Another example is the second round in Peru 2000 because it would not be meaningful. See Carling 2010; Hsiao 2010; VOA 2010; for Peru, see NDI/CC 2010.

⁷³European Commission 2008, 24.

⁷⁴Median=2, sd=2.

and in the official languages of the host country. In addition, the European Union sets up a mission website for each election in the country's language to ensure easy public access to all its press statements and mission details. The reports follow templates by the European Commission. Apart from a comprehensive assessment of the election, the final report also includes press statements. EU missions are frequently the most active in terms of media campaigns.⁷⁵ This organization also seeks to retain independence in assessing elections by rarely issuing joint statements; when the EU issues a joint statement, it is usually to strengthen condemnation by showing a united international front.⁷⁶

3.2.5 Summary of IO Variation

This analysis demonstrates that monitoring organizations vary widely in the quality of their election observation efforts, including their willingness to attend meaningless elections, their capacity to detect manipulation, and their reporting standards. Table 3.1 summarizes this variation. The contrast is probably starkest between the EU and the OAS: the EU sets much stricter preconditions, and sends exploratory missions to see if these conditions are met. When these preconditions are not met, the EU declines invitations. When basic conditions are met, the EU sends more comprehensive missions than the OAS and reserves the right to withdraw missions at any point. The EU also runs a more active media campaign, and issues statements/reports that are timely and publicly accessible. In contrast, the OAS does not consider *if* a mission should be sent or whether its presence will bestow legitimacy to a nondemocratic process. It approves mission requests automatically.

With the 2005 UN Declaration as a common reference point, some organization seem to fall below these agreed-upon standards (OAS), while others are in line (NDI, IRI), and still others exceed these standards (CC, EU). Consequently, IO observers in Latin America can be ranked as follows: high quality (EU, Carter Center), medium quality (IRI, NDI), and low quality monitors (OAS, Commonwealth, COPA). This is a reasonable first cut at categorizing IO monitoring quality along

⁷⁵This includes press conferences throughout the observation, frequent media interviews and briefings. The EU mission website contains (beyond the regular documentation) links to the individual elections with additional material.

⁷⁶The EU welcomes cooperation with other IO mission but underlines that it will not issue joint statements in order to retain its independence and quality control. European Commission 2008, 109.

several dimensions. However, since this typology takes into account nine variables, the cut points for the middle category could be varied in future analyses.⁷⁷

3.3 Argument

Conceptually, the plurality of overlapping institutions in election monitoring is one example of international regime complexity. Research on regime complexity defines overlapping regimes as those where “multiple [international] institutions have authority over an issue, but agreements are not mutually exclusive or subsidiary to another.”⁷⁸ This stands in contrast to parallel regimes (without substantive overlap) and nested regimes (where institutions are embedded within each other).⁷⁹ The key idea here is that domestic actors choose the most advantageous venue – in this case monitoring IOs – to serve their interests.

What are the consequences of international regime complexity? Research has found that the plurality of overlapping institutions often gives rise to “forum shopping.” For example, in trade disputes, states can file regionally, multilaterally or not at all. They can work through preferential trade agreements (PTAs), regional agreements (e.g. NAFTA) or the WTO. There are several explanations for government’ choice of forum. Busch finds that states select a forum based on which institution is likely to come closest to the complainant’s ideal ruling against the defendant and where the resulting precedent will be more useful in the future.⁸⁰ Davis finds that states choose a negotiation forum to signal their commitment to resolve a dispute.⁸¹

This chapter contributes to this literature by extending it to the realm of election observation. In line with the “forum shopping” idea, I argue that states choose strategically, that is non-randomly among IOs, and thereby incur differential costs. One factor driving IO selection is the government’s commitment to democracy. States send varying signals of democratic commitment by allowing more stringent international organizations to monitor their election.

⁷⁷For example, the NDI may be considered in the stringent category, as it clearly outperforms the IRI. It is considered here as moderate monitor because the mission size is significantly smaller and shorter than the EU.

⁷⁸Alter and Meunier 2009, 15.

⁷⁹Ibid.

⁸⁰Busch 2007.

⁸¹Davis 2008 and 2009.

In the run-up to elections, governments can send stronger signals of democratic commitment by inviting high-quality/stringent monitors rather than lenient ones. High-quality/stringent monitors are more costly to governments than lenient monitors because stringent monitors are more likely to detect undue interference and more likely to condemn the election, either by not sending a mission, withdrawing it, or issuing a negative report. In contrast, lenient monitors are unlikely to decline invitations regardless of political conditions, less likely to invest in comprehensive observation efforts, and more likely to endorse elections or not issue reports at all. Inviting lenient monitors is not entirely costless – but the costs are marginal compared to more stringent IO observers.

The choice of monitoring IO should be particularly relevant for governments at the threshold to democracy, and middling regimes more broadly. This is because “threshold” countries have higher incentives to signal their democratic commitment than countries at either end of political regime type. Note that such “threshold” countries are not necessarily on their way to democracy – they are just ambiguous and close to democracy. Threshold countries can be one of three types: (a) democratizing countries that do in fact intend to transition to full democracy; (b) backsliding countries that have politically regressed and may or may not wish to return to full democracy; and (c) countries “stuck” in that political regime without much movement over time. Regardless of their past, all three types of threshold countries may wish to send strong signals of their democratic commitment to assure domestic or international audiences.

In contrast, advanced democracies do not need the same degree of external legitimization of their domestic processes; they do not need to signal their commitment any longer because it is not uncertain. Countries with a history of competitive elections and guaranteed freedoms are unambiguously democratic. Since the benefit of observers declines with increased democracy, I thus expect advanced democracies to be less likely to invite (stringent) election observers.⁸²

Compared to middling regimes, autocratic governments also incur high costs by inviting more strin-

⁸²Democracies also incur less costs by inviting more stringent monitors because they usually fulfill all preconditions, have little to hide even in far-way provinces, and little to lose from accurate reports.

gent monitors but presumably gain only moderate benefits. This is because higher quality monitors are likely to detect and expose manipulation. Thus the benefits of inviting such groups will depend on the government's success in concealing manipulation. Autocrat's incentives for inviting stringent monitors depend on their optimism of "gaming" the observers. In middling regimes – neither advanced democracies nor electoral autocracies, but allowing some competition with weaker freedoms – incumbent types are more uncertain. Incumbents in these regimes may or may not aim to promote democracy. To signal their democratic commitment, such incumbents can invite stringent observers which carries higher costs, and thus generates a stronger signal of democratic commitment than inviting less stringent observers. If this argument is correct, we should observe that regimes at the threshold to democracy are (1) more likely than other regimes to invite any IO monitors at all, and (2) more likely than other regimes to invite moderate or stringent IO observers because these states have greater incentives to send a strong signal of their democratic commitment.

Hypothesis 1: *States on the threshold to democracy are more likely to invite any monitoring IOs than consolidated democracies and electoral autocracies.*

Hypothesis 2: *States on the threshold to democracy are more likely to invite higher quality (moderate or stringent) monitoring IOs than consolidated democracies and electoral autocracies.*


3.4 Research Design

I test these hypotheses with data on national elections in Latin America and Caribbean from 1980 to 2010. This dataset consists of 205 elections in 23 countries. The dataset includes all national-level elections, which are presidential, parliamentary, constitutional assembly elections, and referenda. The dependent variable is *IO Choice*, which indicates the most stringent IO monitor present at the election. This data comes from two sources; the years 1980-2005 are covered by Hyde (2008); the years 2006-2010 are covered by my own data collection, for which I consulted each organization's

observer website. It is coded as follows:

- 0 no IO election monitor;
- 1 Organization of American States (OAS), Parliamentary Organization of the Americas (COPA), or Commonwealth of Nations (CW);
- 2 National Democratic Institute (NDI) or International Republican Institute (IRI);
- 3 European Union (EU) or Carter Center (CC)

Figure 3.2: Distribution of Dependent Variable: IO Choice



The distribution of the dependent variable is shown in Figure 3.2.⁸³ This variable shows zero-inflation. To account for these “excess zeros,” I run two types of zero-inflated count models: (a) zero-inflated negative binomial models, also known as zinb or hurdle models, and (b) zero-inflated poisson models. These models essentially estimate two related processes simultaneously: the probability of any monitoring at all (0 vs 1,2,3) and the type of a particular monitor present (1 vs 2 vs 3). The first stage is an inflation stage, which uses a logit model to predict zeros, i.e. the probability that no IO monitor is invited.⁸⁴ The second stage is a count model predicting the specific choice of IO monitor (1,2,3). The main difference between the zinb and zip models is that the zinb models includes a dispersion parameter, α , to account for over-dispersion. This is relevant

⁸³All states in Latin America have invited election monitors at some point since 1980, with the exception of Cuba. In addition to Cuba, several small states have also not invited monitors, including Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, and Dominica. While I collected election observation data for these countries, they three variables in the inflation stage rely on Nelda data, which does not provide data for these smaller countries, which makes them drop out.

⁸⁴For further details on zero-inflated binomial count models see King 1998; Long 1997, 242-247.

because the dependent variable is somewhat over-dispersed; the standard deviation (1.08) exceeds the mean (0.86). However, I also run zip models because the overdispersion is not extreme and the dispersion parameter in zinb models can impede substantive interpretation (estimating predicted probabilities).

The key independent variables are different measures of regime type, and most importantly, an indicator for the threshold to democracy. The variable *regime* is the average level of civil liberties and political rights.⁸⁵ To get broadly at the idea of middling political regimes, I invert and center the original variable, as shown in Table 3.2, so that 3 indicates consolidated democracy and -3 indicates electoral autocracy.

Table 3.2: Constructing the *Regime* variable

Concept	Original Value (Freedom House)	Inverted Value	Inverted and Centered Value
Autocracy	7	0	-3
	6	1	-2
	5	2	-1
Threshold to Democracy	4	3	0
	3	4	1
	2	5	2
Democracy	1	6	3

To measure *threshold* to democracy, I create a binary indicator for levels 3-4 on the original scale; this is identical with levels 0-1 on the centered Freedom House scale. Note that this is not necessarily only an indicator of democratization. It can equally indicate political backsliding, when countries regress from democracy to autocracy and cross the “threshold” for that reason. Countries can also be stationary and not be moving in either direction, caught between full autocracy and full democracy. I expect that countries in any of these three circumstances are (a) more likely to invite stringent monitors and (b) more likely to invite any monitors than countries that are

⁸⁵Freedom House 2014. No measure is perfect (Munck 2009) and the Freedom House Index has been criticized (Munck and Verkuilen 2002), but “political rights” are appropriate here and alternatives such as Polity IV do not contain data for some of the countries in this sample.

either unambiguously autocratic or unambiguously democratic. This threshold measure is fairly restrictive in that it only captures one type middling regimes: those closer to democracy. This is the main measure to test the argument.

As an alternative and less restrictive measure, I include *middling regimes*, which is the squared value of *regime*. This variable helps evaluate if there is a selection-from-the-middle effect, in that regimes in the middling range, that is competitive authoritarian systems (what Freedom House calls “partly free”) are more likely to invite monitors than states at both poles of the regime scale. This is the main reason for centering the variable. Middling countries have small values (minimum = 0) while both poles have large ones (maximum = 9). If the argument is correct, middling regimes should have a similar but perhaps smaller effect than *threshold* countries: they should also be (a) more likely to invite stringent monitors and (b) more likely to invite any monitors than countries that are either unambiguously autocratic or unambiguously democratic.

I include a number of variables to control for other factors driving IO choice and to model the inflation stage. To model this first stage, i.e. whether the election is observed at all, I build on prior research on the drivers of international election observation.⁸⁶ The variable *previously observed* is 1 if the country ever before had an IO monitor present at a national election, and 0 otherwise.⁸⁷ In each country, *previously observed* takes a value of 1 at the second monitored election and all subsequent elections. The variable *opposition competition* is 1 when opposition parties were legal, allowed, and there was a choice of candidates on the ballot; it is 0 otherwise.⁸⁸ The variable *uncertain election* is 1 for elections that were previously suspended, run by a transitional leadership, or the first multi-party elections. I also control for *GDP per capita*, *ODA per capita*, and *political regime*.⁸⁹ These three variables are lagged by one year to guard against endogeneity. To control

⁸⁶Hyde 2011, 73-81.

⁸⁷This variable is generated as a lagged indicator and then revised to account for ten countries which have had international monitors prior to 1979. These countries are Haiti, Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Panama, Guyana, Bolivia, and Argentina.

⁸⁸Data on this and the following variable are mainly sourced from Nelda (Hyde and Marinov 2012). Missing values from Nelda data are filled with with an alternate indicator of opposition competition from DPI data. For the filled values, opposition competition is 1 when last year’s vote share for the largest opposition party exceeds 25 percent, and 0 otherwise.

⁸⁹GDP and ODA data are logged to account for skewness. Data are from Penn World Tables, the World Bank, and Freedom House, respectively. The Freedom House scores are again inverted and centered as shown in Table 3.2.

for other factors driving IO choice, I also include *GDP per capita*, *ODA per capita* as well as *Year 2005*. This variable is a dichotomous indicator for whether the election was held after the 2005 UN Declaration, which may have changed government preferences on IO choice.

3.5 Results

Before discussing the model estimates, the bivariate relationship between regime type and IO Choice provides preliminary evidence in favor of the hypotheses. Figure 3.3 shows the distribution of IO monitor types across political regime types. Middling regime types are more likely to invite any election monitors than regimes at either political extreme. Further, high quality/stringent IO election observers – marked dark blue – are mostly invited by countries in the middle range, at the threshold to democracy. Countries at either extreme (highly democratic or highly autocratic) are most likely not to invite any observers or only low-quality IO observers. A few states have consistently invited either no monitors or only the OAS. These states include Argentina, Uruguay, and Trinidad.

Figure 3.3: Distribution of IO Monitor Type across Regime Type




Table 3.3 shows estimates from ZINB and ZIP models. Model diagnostics show that the zero-inflated negative binomial (ZINB) model is preferred over both the zero-inflated poisson (ZIP) and the ordinary negative binomial (NB) model.⁹⁰ While the ZINB seems to capture the over-dispersion

⁹⁰The Vuong test on model 1 is highly significant, suggesting that ZINB is preferred over the NB model. The

in the dependent variable best, the model estimates only vary slightly.

Table 3.3: Determinants of IO Choice

		ZINB			ZIP		
		1	2	3	4	5	6
Count Stage	Political regime	-0.221*** (0.075)	-0.194*** (0.074)	-0.154* (0.091)	-0.221*** (0.075)	-0.194*** (0.074)	-0.154* (0.091)
	Threshold to democracy	0.396*** (0.137)	0.392** (0.189)		0.396*** (0.137)	0.392** (0.189)	
	Regime squared			-0.163*** (0.048)			-0.163*** (0.048)
	ODA pc	0.123 (0.122)	0.158 (0.125)	0.169 (0.136)	0.123 (0.122)	0.158 (0.125)	0.169 (0.136)
	GDP pc	0.120 (0.123)	0.186 (0.127)	0.196 (0.134)	0.120 (0.123)	0.186 (0.127)	0.196 (0.134)
	Year 2005	0.361** (0.162)		0.424** (0.171)	0.361** (0.162)		0.424** (0.171)
	Constant	-1.174 (1.341)	-1.723 (1.391)	-1.561 (1.464)	-1.174 (1.341)	-1.723 (1.391)	-1.561 (1.464)
	Inflation Stage	Political regime	-0.183 (0.465)	-0.039 (0.466)	0.034 (0.532)	-0.183 (0.465)	-0.039 (0.466)
Threshold to democracy		-1.243* (0.650)	-1.157** (0.556)		-1.244* (0.650)	-1.157** (0.556)	
Regime squared				-0.203 (0.274)			-0.203 (0.274)
ODA pc		1.052 (0.738)	1.052 (0.812)	1.972 (1.452)	1.052 (0.739)	1.052 (0.812)	1.973 (1.453)
GDP pc		3.647** (1.427)	3.208** (1.376)	4.771** (2.323)	3.648** (1.428)	3.208** (1.376)	4.771** (2.323)
Previously observed		-3.392*** (0.810)	-3.289*** (0.818)	-3.936*** (1.466)	-3.393*** (0.810)	-3.289*** (0.818)	-3.937*** (1.467)
Opposition competition		-3.528 (2.204)	-2.698 (2.387)	-2.802 (1.972)	-3.529 (2.204)	-2.698 (2.387)	-2.803 (1.972)
Uncertain election		-4.608 (4.168)	-3.037 (4.536)	-2.615 (2.895)	-4.611 (4.166)	-3.037 (4.536)	-2.615 (2.895)
Constant		-29.357** (12.082)	-26.442** (12.108)	-42.667* (22.196)	-29.363** (12.084)	-26.443** (12.109)	-42.671* (22.201)
ln α		-16.393*** (0.640)	-17.692*** (0.245)	-17.773*** (0.440)			
Observations		205	205	205	205	205	205
Clusters		23	23	23	23	23	23
AIC		522.16	524.77	522.99	520.16	522.77	520.99
BIC	572.00	571.30	572.83	566.68	565.97	567.51	
LL	-246.08	-248.39	-246.49	-246.08	-248.39	-246.49	

Notes: The table reports estimates two sets of models: zero-inflated negative binomial models (ZINB) and zero-inflated poisson models (ZIP). The dependent variable is IO choice. Estimates for the count stage (predicting IO Choice 1, 2, 3) are above the horizontal line and estimates for the inflation stage (predicting IO Choice=0) are below the line. The unit of observation is a national election. Coefficients are reported with robust standard errors clustered on country. ***, **, and * indicates significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level.


α dispersion parameter from model 1 is significant (excludes zero), meaning that ZINB is preferred over the ZIP model. Figure 3.8 in the appendix shows that the ZIP model over-predicts the probability for moderate IOs and under-predicts the probability for stringent IOs. A similar figure could not be generated for ZINB because of problems with the dispersion parameter.

3.5.1 States' Decision to Invite any Monitor at all

Results for the inflation stage – predicting observer/no observer – are in the lower part of Table 3.3. For interpretation, recall that both ZINB and ZIP models predict the probability of zero, meaning a country inviting *no* election observers. Consequently, negative coefficients mean that countries are less likely to have no monitor and more likely to have some type of election observers present.

Countries at the *threshold* to democracy are more likely to invite IO election observers. Note that this does not hold generally for middling regimes; the coefficient on *regime squared* is insignificant. The effect is specific for those countries approximating levels of democracy and guaranteeing more but not all political rights and civil liberties. This effect is substantively important: “threshold” countries are 19 percentage points more likely to invite IO election monitors than countries at either end of the political spectrum. The predicted probability changes from 48.13 to 66.77 percentage points. Figure 3.4 plots this prediction. This difference is statistically significant.⁹¹ This evidence supports Hypothesis 1.

Figure 3.4: Effect of Threshold Status on Inviting Any Observers (ZINB)



⁹¹The associated p-value of the difference of the linear combination is 0.03. Figure 3.4 uses predictions from model 2. Excluding the Year 2005 variable allows predicting probabilities, which is hindered in model 1 by the dispersion parameter.

In terms of alternative explanations, two of the control variables are also significant predictors of inviting election observers: precedent and economic development. When a country has had observers at a previous election, then it is more likely to invite observers again. This suggests that governing elites might find it difficult to justify not inviting any organization when they did so at a previous election. Further, richer countries are less likely to invite election monitors than poorer countries.

3.5.2 The Choice of IO Monitor


The estimates of the count stage are in the upper part of Table 3.3. Countries at the threshold to democracy are more likely to choose higher-quality monitors. The coefficient is consistently significant and positively signed, indicating that such countries select more stringent IO observers. Figure 3.5 illustrates that “threshold” countries are associated with an increase in the type of IO monitor.⁹² Figure 3.6a shows that “threshold” countries are more likely to choose higher-quality monitors. Such countries are associated with a 33 percent probability of inviting moderate or stringent IO monitors, whereas countries at either political extreme only have a 20 percent probability of inviting the same monitors. This difference is statistically significant. A similar insight of this general trend is evident in Figure 3.6b. When countries are highly democratic or highly autocratic (threshold=0), they are likely to invite no or only a lenient monitor (IO Choice=1). When countries are approaching democracy, they shift towards moderate monitors (IO Choice=1.5).

Table 3.4 shows quite similar results from the ZIP estimates. “Threshold” countries are more likely to invite stringent monitors such as the European Union and the Carter Center.⁹³ When countries are not at the threshold, their probability of inviting stringent monitors is only 7 percent. This probability doubles to 14 percent when countries are at the threshold. Note that the ZIP model under-predicts this category of observers (see Figure 3.8 in the appendix), so that this should be seen as a lower-bound estimate. Similarly, “threshold” countries are also more likely to invite moderate monitors; this probability also increases by 7 percentage points (from 18 to 25 percent).

⁹²Predictions hold all other variables at their mean. Estimations are based on model 2.

⁹³Predictions hold all other variables at their mean. Estimations are based on model 4.

Figure 3.5: Effect of Threshold Status on IO Choice (ZINB)



In contrast, such countries are less likely to invite lenient monitors or no monitors at all. This is strong evidence in favor of Hypothesis 2.


Table 3.4: Effect of Threshold Status on IO Choice (ZIP model)

IO Choice	Threshold		Change in Pred. Probability
	=0	=1	
Pr (IO Choice=Always 0 z)	9.34	2.88	- 6.45
Pr (IO Choice=0 z)	39.26	21.59	- 17.67
Pr (IO Choice=1)	33.17	30.81	- 2.36
Pr (IO Choice=2)	18.39	25.37	6.99
Pr (IO Choice=3)	6.79	13.93	7.14

Finally, Figures 3.6 and 3.7 illustrates how predicted IO Choice varies across different political regimes. While this is not part of the hypotheses, it shows the general intuition that states do indeed select IO monitors strategically. If IO choice were random, the lines in these two Figures should be relatively flat and show no discernible pattern. However, the lines slope. As countries become more democratic, they become less likely to invite IO observers. Countries guaranteeing full political rights and civil liberties only have a 50 percent probability of inviting any monitor


at all. When highly democratic countries do invite observers, they are more likely to choose lenient IOs, followed by moderate and stringent monitors. Since stringent monitors are not costly for highly democratic countries, this suggests that the benefit from stringent monitors decreases. Highly democratic countries do not need credible external validation any longer. There is also a supply-side explanation: stringent monitors may have a reduced presence in advanced democracies because they would rather spend their resources in more ambiguous places.

Figure 3.6: Effect of Political Regime on IO Choice (ZIP) – across IO Types



In contrast to highly democratic countries, highly autocratic countries are more likely to invite

Figure 3.7: Effect of Political Regime on IO Choice (ZIP) – by IO Type



stringent IO monitors. Highly autocratic countries have a 20 percentage point probability of inviting stringent monitors; that probability is near zero for highly democratic countries. Autocratic countries are also much more likely than democratic countries to invite monitors at all (85 versus 65 percent probability). At the same time, autocratic countries are about equally likely to choose stringent, moderate, or lenient monitors; the IO type estimates are of similar magnitude and confidence bands overlap. The choice of IO types only begins to diverge when countries cross the threshold to democracy, as indicated by the range between 0 and +1 on the x axis.

In terms of control variables, only the indicator for Year 2005 is significant. It is positive, suggesting that higher-quality monitors were more likely to be invited after 2005. However, it is unclear whether this is a reaction to the UN Declaration or a general time trend.

Which countries are driving this finding? A review of individual countries underlines that several states invited monitoring missions from the European Union or the Carter Center when they reached the threshold to democracy, either because they began democratizing or backslid from democracy towards autocracy. This pattern holds especially true for six countries, some of which democratized, then moved away from democracy, and later re-democratized: Guyana 2006, Nicaragua 1996-2006, Panama 1994, Paraguay 1993, Peru 2001, Mexico 1994-2000, Guatemala 2003, Ecuador 2002-2009, and Venezuela 2000-2006.

A few cases are “off” the regression line, in the sense that the government invited stringent monitors even though they were not at the threshold to democracy. These outliers include Haiti 1990, 1995, and 2006. The U.S. has had a strong and lasting influence there, possibly increasing pressure to invite more critical monitors. Haiti elections could also be seen as multiple chances of democratization that failed. In a handful of cases governments have invited stringent monitors before democratization. These cases include Panama 1989, Guyana 1992, and Nicaragua 1990 – all early in the development of full-fledged monitoring missions.

3.6 Illustrative Case: Peru

This section explores the role of election monitors in Peru since the 1990s. These elections are chosen to illustrate a representative case. The Peruvian elections illustrate that governments are more likely to invite (1) any monitors and (2) more stringent monitors when they are at the threshold to democracy and wish to signal their democratic commitment.

In the late 20th century, Peru had a cyclical pattern of democratic and autocratic rule. Following 11 years of military rule, democratic elections were held in 1980 and again in 1985 and 1990. None of these elections were observed, but this was not unusual for the region at the time. Indeed, the OAS did not conduct its first large-scale observation mission until 1990 in Nicaragua.⁹⁴ During the 1980s, the Peruvian economy was characterized by declining growth, hyperinflation, and increasing poverty. Meanwhile, the government faced armed rebellion from two insurgent groups. Nevertheless, Peru maintained minimum requirements of democratic procedures during the 1980s, and Alberto Fujimori was popularly elected in 1990.⁹⁵

Soon after Fujimori assumed office, though, Peru degenerated into a competitive authoritarian state.⁹⁶ As existing domestic institutions opposed his economic reforms, Fujimori closed down the legislature by dissolving Congress, subordinated the judiciary to the executive by assuming dictatorial powers in 1992, and exerted substantial control over the media.

The OAS played an important role in reacting to this political backsliding. A few days after Fujimori dissolved Congress in early 1992, the OAS resorted to Resolution 1080 and called for the “urgent reestablishment” of democratic constitutional order in Peru.⁹⁷ Likewise, the US suspended aid and pressured the IMF to withhold financial assistance.⁹⁸ This international pressure likely contributed to Fujimori’s concession to (i) hold elections for the general assembly later that

⁹⁴OAS 2012, 4.

⁹⁵Freedom House scores were 3 in 1989 and 1990, on the original 1-7 scale.

⁹⁶According to Freedom House, Peru scored increasingly worse after Fujimori came to power: 4 in 1991, 5.5 in 1992, 5 in 1993, and 4.5 from 1994 to 1999.

⁹⁷Santa-Cruz 2005a, 175.

⁹⁸Palmer 1996, 71.

year.⁹⁹ and (ii) invite international monitors to verify this process. Fujimori sent this signal of his democratic commitment to assure the OAS and the broader international community, and prevent further cuts in aid and other assistance. In other words, as the recent backsliding brought the Fujimori regime “down” to the threshold between democracy and autocracy, he signaled that he still had democratic intentions. In 1992, for the first time in Peru’s history, the government invited international election monitors (OAS).

While the OAS observed elections in both 1992 and 1995, neither of these were sufficiently clean to qualify as remotely democratic. Even the country’s former military ruler, Francisco Morales Bermudes commented that there were “unprecedented irregularities.”¹⁰⁰ However, the OAS assessed both of these as procedurally satisfactory, leaving the opposition deeply dissatisfied and suspicious of OAS assessments.¹⁰¹ Following the 1992 election, Peru continued to backslide and became a competitive autocracy.¹⁰²

In 2000, Fujimori ran for a third-term Presidency. At this point, Peru was back at the threshold to democracy.¹⁰³ In 2000, Fujimori faced a problem in that the 1993 constitution limited the Presidency to two terms. He had two responses. First, he argued that because he was elected in 1990, the limitation in the 1993 constitution did not apply to him. Second, and to further bolster his legitimacy and democratic credentials, for the first time he invited strict monitors. Fujimori invited a joint NDI/Carter Center mission and the EU to monitor the 2000 election. A strengthened OAS observer team and a domestic organization, *Transparencia*, also participated in election monitoring in 2000.

Inviting the joint NDI/CC mission did not turn out well for Fujimori. The Carter Center sent three exploratory missions between December 1999 and March 2000. These pre-election delegations found several irregularities in the political environment:

⁹⁹Pevehouse 2005, 130.

¹⁰⁰Santa-Cruz 2005a, 191.

¹⁰¹Ibid, 187.

¹⁰²See Santa-Cruz 2005a, 174-175; and Levitsky and Way 2002.

¹⁰³Again according to Freedom House, Peru was at the threshold to democracy in 2000 (rated 3.5). It was rated 2 in 2001 and 2.5 from 2002 onwards.

lack of access to the media for opposition candidates; pro-government media bias, particularly in the broadcast media; smear campaigns in the tabloid press against opposition candidates and others critical of the government; incidents of intimidation of opposition leaders and their supporters by the national tax agency (SUNAT); actions by state security agencies to harass and intimidate opposition leaders; the misuse of state resources for electoral advantage, often by linking state aid programs to the *Peru 2000* campaign; falsification of signatures to qualify one of the parties in the *Peru 2000* alliance; widespread impunity for perpetrators of electoral violations; and a general lack of confidence in the neutrality of the election authorities.¹⁰⁴

This joint observer mission also noted that there were no improvements before the first round of the Presidential election on 9 April 2000. This first round was observed by *Transparencia*, the OAS, the EU, and the joint NDI/CC mission. Neither Fujimori nor the opposition party (led by Alejandro Toledo) received 50 percent of the popular vote, so that a run-off election was scheduled for May. Concerning the quality of the first round election, the international organizations commented that the credibility of the process and outcome of the election was undermined by persisting irregularities. In particular, the OAS monitors stated that “by international standards, the Peruvian election process falls far short of what could be called free and fair.”¹⁰⁵ Somewhat more dramatic, the joint NDI/CC mission summarized that “the fundamentally flawed campaign period culminated in an electoral crisis;”¹⁰⁶ it included a detailed list in its final report criticizing the government for its electoral shortcomings and not acting upon the earlier IO recommendations to improve the electoral process.

However, “even” the OAS identified serious shortcomings in the 2000 Peruvian electoral process related to the following issues:¹⁰⁷

- electoral logistics (problems, delays, unexplained silences during the first round);
- the vote-tallying system (instability and problems in the preferential vote for Congress, a lack of familiarity with the new voting software)

¹⁰⁴NDI/CC 2000, 5.

¹⁰⁵OAS 2000, 65.

¹⁰⁶NDI/CC 2000, 6.

¹⁰⁷OAS 2000, 68-69.

- lack of training for poll-workers;
- lack of equal access for candidates to the mass media;
- use of public funds for campaign purposes;
- and the inadequate handling of complaints submitted to the electoral and judicial authorities, which cast doubt on the credibility of the body responsible for the elections, the National Elections Procedures Office (the ONPE), and on the National Elections Panel as the oversight body.

As a result of these irregularities and concerns by the international monitors, the OAS and other monitors recommended postponing the run-off election in order to have sufficient time for alleviating the problems of the first round by implementing changes. However, the Fujimori government announced on May 23 that it would not postpone the second round. In response, all observer groups withdrew their missions on the grounds that the government did not merit their presence and a genuine election seemed unlikely.¹⁰⁸ The opposition boycotted this second round, held on May 28, the main opposition candidate (Alejandro Toledo) withdrew, and Fujimori received more than 50 percent of the vote, or at least that was the claim of the domestic electoral authorities.

In the aftermath of this flawed 2000 election, the Fujimori government became increasingly isolated because of international pressure and eroding domestic elite support. This international pressure and a domestic political scandal over bribery led to the fall of the authoritarian regime, with Fujimori fleeing the country and announcing his resignation in September 2000. An interim government under Valentin Panigua – mostly comprised of non-partisan technocrats – was tasked with political reform and holding new elections on April 8, with a run-off on June 3, 2001. Among several political reforms, they re-staffed the national election commission and established a truth and reconciliation commission to examine abuses in the 1980s and 1990s.

In 2001, the interim government sent a costly signal of its democratic commitment by inviting stringent monitors and those that had criticized the flawed 2000 elections: the EU, the joint NDI/CC, and the OAS.¹⁰⁹ This time, all three missions offered positive assessments. All three organiza-

¹⁰⁸See OAS bulletin # 12; and NDI/CC 2000, 6. Despite withdrawing observers, the OAS left a skeleton staff in the capital, Lima. The OAS was still negotiating the timing of the second round with the government on May 23. See OAS 2001, 69.

¹⁰⁹The former opposition leader, President-elect Alejandro Toledo, became the new president after the 2001 elections.

tions agreed that the elections were a decisive step towards re-democratization and that they were generally clean. The joint NDI/CC mission stated that

Peru's 2001 elections represented an extraordinary accomplishment in the process of returning Peru to the world community of democracies ... These accomplishments stand out dramatically when contrasted to the fraudulent and illegitimate process of last year, which was among the worst ever observed in this hemisphere by the National Democratic for International Affairs (NDI) and The Carter Center.¹¹⁰

This joint NDI/CC mission commented only on “minor problems such as: 1) the late opening of polling stations, 2) confusion among voters as to the correct voting procedure ... and 3) insufficient training of poll-workers.”¹¹¹ Similarly, the OAS stated that both rounds of the 2001 election “took place in a free, fair, and transparent manner. The Transition Government fulfilled its commitment to neutrality and strict adherence to the law. The electoral authorities, for their part, fully performed their respective functions.”¹¹² As in 2000, this OAS mission was again headed by Eduardo Stein, which likely increased its credibility. Generally, the withdrawal of IO missions in 2000 likely contributed to public confidence in the election in 2001 because of the belief that these missions would withhold their sign of approval if necessary.

The mission of the European Union echoed these evaluations by stating that these elections have “fully conformed to international electoral standards” and that the government “scrupulously maintained a perfect posture of neutrality.”¹¹³ However, the European Union mission was somewhat more explicit in listing persistent shortcomings, such as unregulated party activities, the underrepresentation of women and limited discrimination against peasant and native communities.¹¹⁴

The Peruvian elections illustrate that governments are more likely to invite (1) any monitors and (2) more stringent monitors when they wish to signal their democratic commitment. Peru's government first invited election monitors at all in 1992 when it was significantly backsliding, and was

¹¹⁰NDI/CC 2001, 3.

¹¹¹Ibid, 6.

¹¹²OAS 2001a, 54.

¹¹³EU 2001, 3.

¹¹⁴EU 2001, 3-4.

on the threshold between democracy and autocracy. Given this status and persistent international questions about its democratic quality, the Fujimori government had incentives to signal its democratic intentions and decided to invite international observers.

Peru's government then first invited stringent monitors when the democratic constitutionality of the election was at stake, in 2001. After the autocrat had left, the country was still on the threshold to democracy, undergoing political reforms, and the transitional government had incentives to signal its commitment to democracy. Having re-democratized, Peru's government did not invite stringent monitors for the 2006 election. It only invited a lenient monitor (the OAS).

3.7 Conclusion

This chapter argues that states send *varying* signals of democratic commitment by strategically allowing certain IOs to monitor their election. Monitoring IOs vary significantly in terms of their preconditions, scope, and reporting policies. These differences generate incentives for states to choose deliberately between organizations. By incurring self-imposed costs, a government can send information about its commitment to democracy and increase its legitimacy. States at the threshold to democracy – either advancing towards or backsliding from democracy – have higher incentives to send a credible signal of their democratic commitment than advanced autocracies and electoral autocracies.

Using data on Latin America since 1980, I find that such “threshold” states are substantially more likely to invite any observers at all, and are more likely to select higher-quality observers than states at either political extreme. Peruvian elections illustrates this pattern. The quantitative and qualitative data support the argument that governments send weak, strong, or middling signals of democratic commitment by choosing the stringency of their external scrutiny. While the analyses find strong support for this pattern in Latin American countries over the course of three decades, other regions' experiences may differ, so that generalizability becomes an interesting question. However, monitoring IOs vary in all regions, and some organizations – like SADC in Africa or the CIS in Eastern Europe – are less committed to democracy than the OAS or COPA. Thus selection effects

are likely larger in these regions.

This study generates implications for future research and for policy makers. While I have focused on which IOs were present (the outcome), it would be worthwhile to look more closely at the selection *process* as it develops over time, beginning with the initial form of the government's invitation. Many countries invite specific organizations while others issue open invitations for any observer to attend. Beyond invitations, strategic selection can enter the process during negotiations with the monitor, the memorandum of understanding, accreditation or other steps along the way. Apart from demand, the supply of monitors may vary: some IOs may choose not to attend because of lack of funding or concerns about "duplication of effort." Ultimately, though, any IO observer mission depends on government cooperation. In order to identify whether different signaling processes underlie selection at different stages, it would be worthwhile to examine more closely the text of government's initial IO invitations, organizations' responses, and the subsequent interaction. Undoubtedly, this involves data collection efforts on both the demand and supply side. Future research should also consider how monitoring standards of IOs have evolved over time, before and after the 2005 Declaration.


In terms of policy implications, the argument about strategic selection suggests it would be normatively desirable if international organizations offering election monitoring converged more towards common standards. IOs should strive for more consistency and higher minimal standards in election monitoring than currently exist. This could change the supply side of election monitors and hence minimize incentives of non-democratic governments to invite organizations that confer a false shadow of legitimacy. Ultimately, a co-dependent relationship between weak monitors and non-democratic states provides a disservice both to democracy and international election monitoring. I return to this issue in the conclusion chapter.

3.8 Appendix

Table 3.5: Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Mean	SD	Min	Max	N
IO Choice	1.07	1.16	0	3	205
Threshold to democracy	0.36	0.48	0	1	205
Regime	0.94	1.26	-3	3	205
Regime squared	2.45	2.43	0	9	205
Year 2005	0.22	0.42	0	1	205
ODA pc	3.2	1.18	-2.32	5.60	205
GDP pc	8.38	0.77	6.46	9.96	205
Previously observed	0.76	0.43	0	1	205
Opposition competition	0.97	0.18	0	1	205
Uncertain election	0.15	0.36	0	1	205
cowcode	104	38	40	165	205
year	1996	8	1980	2010	205

Figure 3.8: ZIP Model Fit - Predictions for each IO Type



4 | Costly Signals: International Election Assistance and Campaign Violence

“Although the United Nations avoids assisting with pro-forma, non-democratic elections, arguments are sometimes made that, without a UN presence, the opposition will become violent, unrest will spread, and the country (and potentially the region) will be destabilized.”¹

While the primary purpose of elections is to ensure a peaceful and meaningful transfer of power, in many countries campaign violence has become a “strategic option in the competition for elected office.”² Election campaign violence is physical force intended to hurt or kill someone to influence an election process and, by implication, its outcome. In particular, “leaders employ murder, torture, disappearances, and political imprisonment against potential voters and political opposition to suppress electoral competition and intimidate the public.”³ As a result, campaign violence is one form of what Michael Bratton calls “irregular modes of electioneering.”⁴ It is used as a tool to influence vote choice and turnout, thereby shaping the election outcome. Campaign violence is the most common form of election violence; it has occurred in about 18 percent of national elections worldwide from 1985 to 2005.⁵ Yet, the systematic sources of its cross-national variation – and especially the international sources – have not been identified.

I provide a formal and statistical analysis of the causes of campaign violence. I contend that we have paid insufficient attention to the importance of international factors driving this form of domestic conflict. I argue that two forms of international intervention – election technical assistance and monitoring – increase scrutiny of the electoral process and can help explain important variation

¹Ludwig 2004, 182.

²Arriola and Johnson 2012: 2.

³Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski 2010: 2.

⁴Bratton 2008: 621.

⁵Arriola and Johnson 2012. The comparable number for post-election violence is 13 percent.

in campaign violence. My argument is that technical assistance reduces the *capacity* of domestic stakeholder to engage in manipulation because it reforms electoral processes so that some options of “irregular electioneering” are taken off the table (or at least reduced). This is in contrast to international monitors who increase the *costs* of manipulation and thus make existing options less attractive.

This chapter makes two contributions: (1) examining the causes of opposition campaign violence and (2) identifying the effect of international intervention for this type of violence. First, this paper distinguishes the timing and perpetrator of violence: it identifies the causes of pre-election violence perpetrated by the opposition. Recent studies have taken a step forward by distinguishing *electoral* conflict from other ongoing political violence. But it remains unclear when such violence occurred – i.e. before, during, or after election-day – because the data are usually aggregated across time periods.⁶ One exception to this is a statistical study on campaign violence by Arriola and Johnson (2012). Examining pre-election periods worldwide from 1985-2005, they find that campaign violence is inhibited by corruption, and by higher economic and democratic development. They find that campaign violence increases with population size and recent civil war experience. This chapter contributes to this existing research by focusing on campaign violence and the opposition as the perpetrator of violence. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first attempt to identify the drivers of opposition violence. While Arriola and Johnson (2012, 13) focus on violence between the incumbent and the opposition, they do not distinguish the perpetrator; Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski (2014) focus on incumbent repression. Therefore this chapter contributes to existing research by examining violence stemming from the opposition.

Second, I examine the effect of two international factors that have been largely overlooked: IO monitors⁷ and international election technical assistance. Both external programs support free and fair elections, but they differ in their activities and mechanisms of influence. International technical assistance implements country-specific reforms in collaboration with the host govern-

⁶Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski (2013) measure campaign violence with data on the *entire* electoral cycle, using two Nelda variables. Nelda33 captures violence “before, during, or after the election”; Nelda15 captures government harassment of the opposition, which does not have a time indicator.

⁷While not measuring violence, a few papers examine the effect of election monitoring on post-election protests (Hyde and Marinov 2014), and pre-election conflict events (Daxecker 2014).

ment. Democracy-oriented technical assistance missions have been implemented since the late 1980s but have received far less attention than their monitoring counterpart, perhaps because they are less media-driven. Yet these missions are more locally engaged and enduring than monitoring: while observers usually passively record and report activities of domestic actors, election technical support actively changes electoral processes and institutions before and during the campaigning period. Unlike monitoring, technical assistance evaluates a country's electoral context months before election-day (instead of mainly after it). Moreover, technical assistance missions tend to be in the host country months (or even years) before the election. If long-term observers (weeks) have a greater effect than short-term observers (days), then it is reasonable to expect that technical assistance missions (months) changing rules and behavior should leave at least *some* imprint on the election process. This paper sets out to assess that imprint, and incorporates the possible effect of both international interventions on domestic conflict.

This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 4.1 lays out the theoretical argument and summarizes existing research on campaign violence. Section 4.2 introduces a formal model, presents equilibria, and specifies hypotheses. Section 4.3 explains the research design, and section 4.4 provides statistical evidence for the argument and against alternative explanations. Section 4.5 illustrates the mechanism linking international election assistance and campaign violence with Zimbabwe's 2000 and 2005 elections. Section 4.6 concludes with implications for future research.

4.1 Theory: IO Effects on Campaign Violence

Election violence – and in particular the effect of international interventions – is under-researched. While a literature has developed on international election monitoring and its effect on fraud,⁸ violence is rarely discussed. A handful of papers examines how monitors influence *post*-election protests, conflict and violence,⁹ but we know relatively little about the causes of *pre*-election violence.¹⁰

⁸See Hyde 2011; and Kelley 2012a.

⁹On protests, see Hyde and Marinov 2014; and Kuhn 2012. On conflict, see Daxecker 2012. And on violence, see Chapter 5

¹⁰One exception is Arriola and Johnson 2012, who examine pre-election violence as part of their global analysis of corruption and violence. I was unfortunately unable to obtain data from the author.

Why are some election campaigns accompanied by violence while others are not? More competitive elections, where the opposition poses a credible threat to the incumbent, are associated with more repression and violence.¹¹ For example, during the 2002 campaign period in Gujarat (India), ethnic riots were more frequent in highly competitive districts. As a “particularly brutal and effective form of campaign expenditure,” these Hindu-Muslim riots were organized to increase the salience of ethnicity over other issues and thereby successfully influenced voter preferences.¹² Another driver of violence seems to be election fraud, though the direction of that influence is debated. While some argue that election fraud can trigger violence, others argue that fraud may actually inhibit the onset of campaign violence in hybrid regimes.¹³

Most research on the causes of election violence concentrates on domestic factors with little or no attention paid to the international environment. To the limited extent that international factors are considered relevant for election dynamics, the focus has been on election monitoring. International election monitoring involves IOs sending missions to observe and judge the host country’s electoral process. The most important judgement is usually made shortly after vote tabulation, when the monitoring mission endorses an election as “free and fair” or not. Such monitoring missions – which vary in size, length and dispersion around the country – can influence political dynamics by detecting and deterring manipulation. IO monitors can detect election fraud by being physically present throughout the voting process, which includes not just election-day but usually one or more weeks (rarely months) of the campaigning period. Beyond polling and vote aggregation, many observers also evaluate the legal framework, media bias and campaign spending, all of which can significantly tilt the playing field.¹⁴ Anticipating that the observer’s findings will be published, domestic political stakeholders can be deterred from engaging in manipulation,¹⁵ and perhaps even violence. This chapter extends existing arguments about monitoring effects on fraud to the issue of violence because the logic of the causal mechanism should be equally applicable to this form of manipulation.

¹¹Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski 2010.

¹²Wilkinson and Haid 2009.

¹³See Norris 2012; and Arriola and Johnson 2012, respectively.

¹⁴Hyde 2011.

¹⁵For deterring fraud on election-day, see Alvarez et al. 2008: 211; and Hyde 2007. Note that some irregularities may just be displaced into neighboring, unobserved electoral districts (Ichino and Schündeln 2012).

I argue that governments can send a credible signal of good intentions by inviting technical assistance and stringent international monitoring to attend their elections. Such IO presence tends to calm tensions in the run-up to elections. Before delving into the causal mechanism of such IO influence, I consider the incentives of contesting candidates. During the election campaign, candidates can *anticipate the consequences* of their actions for the post-election period. I assume that candidates seek to win *and* avoid any challenge to their victory. Whoever wins wants the loser(s) to accept the election result so that gaining and holding power can progress smoothly.

Two insights from chapter 5 are relevant here: In order to minimize the chance of a challenge after polling, contestants need to (i) win decisively and (ii) avoid a negative IO monitoring report. In the wake of elections, the chance of violence significantly increases with a larger vote share for the electoral loser and international condemnation. That is because both of these strengthen the loser and may encourage him to fight: the vote share shows that the loser has significant popular support, perhaps enough to win a fight. A negative IO monitoring report provides a focal point for mobilization and indicates that significant vote fraud occurred, so that the loser's popular support is likely larger than the announced election result suggests. Anticipating such dynamics, candidates ideally secure *both* a decisive win and a positive report to reduce the prospects of a challenge in the wake of elections. They can only gain a positive evaluation if they invite IOs in the first place, and they need to otherwise try to maximize their chances of winning.

How can candidates maximize their chances of winning? Which tools of campaign manipulation can incumbent and opposition use? The available tools of manipulation for competitors in elections are limited only by human imagination; every democracy must have experienced some form of election manipulation at some point. The list in Table 4.1 summarizes the most common practices and areas of manipulation. Generally speaking, the incumbency advantage includes more resources and better access to government power in order to manipulate an election or its outcome, such as staffing the national election commission in its favor.¹⁶ Limiting voter eligibility and permissible candidates are two frequent and effective means used by incumbents that are not available to chal-

¹⁶See Lehoucq 2003; and Hafner-Burton, Hyde and Jablonski 2010.

lengers. But challengers are not helpless. Vote buying, ballot stuffing, and voter intimidation are particularly effective in areas where the opposition has strong support.

Table 4.1: Tools of Campaign Manipulation for Incumbent and Opposition

Tool	Incumbent	Opposition
Limiting eligibility of voters	yes	no
Limiting eligibility of candidates, parties	yes	no
Intimidation of voters	yes	yes
Intimidation of candidates or parties	yes	yes
Targeted government largess or jobs	yes	no
Media bias	yes	no
Vote buying	yes	yes
Policy moves	yes	yes
Manipulation of election commission	yes	yes

In terms of reducing the risk of a challenge to their win, incumbents can avoid a negative IO report by not inviting international monitors. While this will preclude the possibility of a negative monitoring report, it does not prevent other forms of international condemnation and it raises doubts about the intentions of the government.¹⁷ An international norm has emerged about monitoring since 1990; even pseudo-democrats are expected to invite IOs in order to seem legitimate.¹⁸ Thus the lack of an invitation may in itself signal bad intentions to the domestic and international audience. In other words, while not hosting international monitors was an option in the early 1990s, it is less so today. With the exception of advanced, “consolidated” democracies which can graduate from the norm, most countries are expected to invite international monitors.¹⁹ Incumbents face a dichotomous choice about whether to invite or not. Either way the decision generates a signal about intentions and influences the perceived legitimacy of the election process. In other words,

¹⁷Zimbabwe 2008 is a case in point. While long-time incumbent Mugabe did not allow monitors to attend, domestic reports about intimidation and fraud caused international outcry: “The decision to go ahead with the poll brought unprecedented condemnation of Mugabe from inside and outside Africa and the vote was widely dismissed as illegitimate. The U.N. Security Council unanimously expressed deep regret and said a free and fair vote had been impossible.” Reuters 2008.

¹⁸Hyde 2011.

¹⁹Hyde 2011, 51. Note that any invitation involves two decisions: whether and whom to invite. The first step may be automatic especially for many post-conflict countries which tend to be so low in capacity or otherwise donor dependent that the government’s choice is not so much about *whether* to invite but *whom* to invite, given a wide menu of organizations. On the second step, my substantive interest is on stringent IOs (as in chapter 5). Stringent monitoring IOs differ from lenient IOs in the size and dispersion of its project teams, the length of time spent in the host country and the willingness to criticize irregularities. Governments can choose lenient monitors who are unlikely to see or say much.

there is no neutral decision.

A government's decision about inviting an IO is a calculated risk. On the one hand, governments face a differentiated cost of being caught cheating, but not every malfeasance will get caught because IO monitors cannot perfectly observe the process (limited time and resources). Similarly, IO technical assistance will not be able to fix all problems completely. On the other hand, *both* government types (fair and unfair) benefit from sending a positive signal, i.e. inviting either type of IO election support. However, the unfair government potentially reaps a greater benefit because it may get a positive report even though it used some manipulation.

I argue that the mechanism through which IOs can affect the chances of campaign violence is through increasing international scrutiny of the political process. Such scrutiny should reduce the capacity (technical assistance) and increase the costs (monitoring) of domestic stakeholders to resort to force as a means of political competition, and thus calm political tensions. Overall, the presence of election-related IOs should reduce campaign violence.

The Effect of Monitoring on Campaign Violence

Monitoring increases the costs of contestants to engage in irregular electioneering by creating accountability. This makes contestants less likely to manipulate elections. International monitors make manipulation or violence more costly because their presence increases the risk that these actions are revealed and publicly condemned. For example, The European Union mission condemned campaign violence in Guyana in 2001:

“There is no place for violence in a democratic election campaign. It is totally unacceptable that any party or its supporters should be confronted with violence or language that could inflame violence. Such actions are completely contrary to both the letter and spirit of international standards for democratic elections. The international observers call on all Parties to restrain their supporters and we urge the public at large to engage

in the elections in a calm and peaceful manner.”²⁰

This public criticism also referred to the location of the specific incident, which drew attention to the main party actors in the relevant region. Criticism by international observers can result in domestic and international consequences, such as court proceedings, reductions in foreign aid, trade and diplomacy.²¹ While these long-term consequences are not always arising, at the least monitoring makes it more likely in the short-term for manipulation to be revealed and condemned.

The risk of receiving a negative report varies by government type. A fair government’s risk is near zero because they do not cheat but some (perhaps unintentional) irregularities may still surface. In contrast, an unfair government’s risk of a negative report is much greater because they cheat more often, which is more likely to get caught and publicized. Unfair governments may gamble, invite an IO and hope for a positive report. For example, the Putin-Medvedev duo successfully gambled by inviting the stringent OSCE monitor for its 2012 presidential election and was rewarded with an overall positive report on election-day.²² Although the OSCE observers documented many incidents of manipulation (e.g. media bias, carousel voting, ballot stuffing), they concluded that the March 2012 election was “better” than the December 2011 Parliamentary election. The IO gamble paid off for Putin as he was able to manipulate *and* avoid a strongly negative report, thereby stabilizing or even increasing his domestic strength. In all, the cost-benefit ratio is higher for unfair than for fair government types.

The Effect of Technical Assistance on Campaign Violence

Technical assistance makes (violent and non-violent) manipulation²³ more difficult by actively re-

²⁰“Long Term and EU Observation Mission Statement Condemning Violent Protest,” EU Press Statement for Guyana, 1 March 2001.

²¹The existence and extent of punishment is not further explored in this dissertation. However, Donno (2010, 2013) and Hyde (2011, 100-125) provide some evidence of international punishment for manipulated elections. At some occasions of election violence (for example, Kenya 2007 and Ivory Coast 2010), international costs even include ICC prosecution of individual leaders. Ivory Coast’s former president Laurent Gbagbo is currently on trial at the ICC facing four charges of crimes against humanity committed by his camp between December 2010 and April 2011 (Daily Monitor 2012).

²²OSCE 2012, 1.

²³Non-violent manipulation means tilting the playing field by irregular means, and violent manipulation means using physical force as a tool of political competition.

forming domestic processes. While the specific programs are tailored to each country, most of them fall into two broad categories: work with institutions and work with civil society.²⁴ In terms of reforming institutions to influence conflict in the campaigning period, technical assistance activities include (i) increasing institutional capacity for processing complaints; and (ii) removing direct triggers of violence by changing rules about party and candidate registration procedures. In terms of civil society initiatives, technical assistance activities mainly focus on (iii) informing voters about appropriate campaigning behavior, their rights, and avenues of complaint; and (iv) mitigating violence where it occurs during the campaign by sponsoring local mediation bodies and training election officers and security forces about their proper role at campaign rallies, such as protecting citizens independent of ideology rather than siding with one party. Taken together, these reforms make it more difficult for the incumbent and the opposition to manipulate the election.

To understand how technical assistance reduces the capacity to engage in violence and other forms of manipulation (which trigger violence), consider Sierra Leone 2007. The incumbent president Ahmed Tejan Kabbah of the SLPP party requested technical assistance, which was provided by the United Nations and the IFES. In terms of removing direct triggers of violence, IFES and the UN cooperated with the National Election Commission (NEC) to make the registration period more peaceful. In the 2002 national and 2004 local elections, the process of candidate nominations had been particularly conflict-prone. They designed new procedures, disseminated information about them and trained domestic stakeholders. For example, to avoid personal confrontations in the nomination process, each political party was allocated time slots for registration. This greatly reduced occasions in which candidates from competing parties were sharing the same space at a high-stakes event (registration) and thereby reduced the potential for confrontations and personal conflicts. As a result, the nomination proceeded peacefully and “political parties expressed satisfaction in the nomination process,” which stands in contrast to the two previous elections.²⁵

Besides conflict prevention, technical assistance also supported mitigation once conflict arose. In

²⁴Kammerud 2011. A third category of programming supports watchdog activities, monitoring incidents of violence in near real-time through text messaging and online mapping, thereby supporting local law enforcement personnel. It is not explicitly included here because this type of programming has only evolved in the past five years.

²⁵EU 2007, 18.

the realm of non-violence campaigning, the major innovation was the creation and training for the District Code of Conduct Monitoring Committees (DMC). While a code of conduct for political parties was made in late 2006 and a national monitoring committee in the capital was established in January 2007, these initiatives were largely paper rules with little impact on behavior. As a solution, regional units were established in all of the 14 districts and were active from May to October 2007. All of these units were comprised of stakeholders from political parties, civil society and the police, which was crucial for the enforcement function. This design allowed the DMCs to identify areas of conflict and to mitigate tensions. In addition, rapid response actions were financially supported. In the campaigning period, these included interventions such as a mediation meeting settling a dispute between the two main parties on 3 August. The EU observer report praised the DMC for having become “an efficient forum for addressing contentious issues. Their regular meetings acted as an efficient conflict mediation tool during the campaign period and successfully promoted reconciliation among political parties after clashes between their supporters.”²⁶

In addition to conflict prevention and mitigation, IO technical assistance also helped reform domestic processes to lower the capacity for fraud, which is an important trigger of violence. In particular, IFES helped improve the capacity for the Political Parties Registration Commission (PPRC), which is responsible for registering new political parties and monitoring compliance of registered political parties to the laws of transparency in political finance. Sierra Leone has had a history of corruption and mismanagement, so party finance laws were passed in 2002 and the PPRC in place since 2005. However, the PPRC lacked the capacity and knowledge about how to implement and enforce its powers. As a result, until 2006 political parties had never submitted such reports. Assistance was provided to set up regional and national office and develop internal procedures for reporting requirements, manuals, and forms. For the first time ever, a political finance officer was put in place to monitor party finances. By the end of 2007, 69 percent of parties complied with the reporting requirements. Given the absence of compliance before, this was “impressive.”²⁷

²⁶EU 2007, 17.

²⁷IFES 2007, 1. EU Election Observation Mission noted that “in a positive development all seven political parties contesting the elections submitted their statement of assets and liabilities to the PPRC. It is the first time in Sierra Leone that this constitutional requirement has been met.” EU 2007, 17.

Finally, IO technical assistance also helped the NEC designing and producing voter education materials which informed citizens about the electoral process and the need for *peaceful* participation.²⁸ As part of the voter education activities, IFES project staff and the Independent Youth Forum developed a “citizens’ peace pledge” which was printed on widely distributed t-shirts. These messages were also aired in the form of jingles and video clips before soccer games and public cinema performances, and primarily aimed at first-time voters and the youth population. In addition to educating the general citizenry, assistance was also provided for training of the NEC staff and political party representatives.

As a result, voters and staff are more informed about their role in the process, the role of others, and what constitutes legitimate behavior. Citizens are also more informed about which behavior is illegal and how to react to transgressions. This helped empower the local citizenry and helped create more accountability on the part of perpetrators. Technical assistance makes it more costly for the incumbent and the opposition to manipulate the election because participants are more informed about the process, their rights, and avenues of complaint. Technical assistance makes violence less likely because some of the triggers of violence are removed and citizens are aware of alternative (legal) pathways to manage disputes. In short, technical assistance makes it more difficult to tilt the playing field by irregular means. That is a cost a government (and opposition) bears by inviting such assistance for their elections.

As a consequence, both technical assistance and monitoring affect the likelihood of manipulation. These costs are differentiated by the type of actor. A fair government – intending to follow the rules of the game – risks much smaller costs than an unfair government.²⁹ Fair governments have little to lose through international scrutiny. In contrast, the unfair type needs to adjust his behavior away from obvious manipulation towards more subtle forms (due to monitoring), and perhaps not

²⁸Given the 80 percent illiteracy rate, many of these messages were implemented through the radio, which reaches about 80 percent of the population. Other channels included pictorial illustrations on posters, stickers, leaflets and t-shirts.

²⁹The term “unfair” is intentionally broad to simplify the model and include actions that manipulate electoral competitiveness in the incumbent’s favor. An unfair government does not abide by the rules of a free and fair election, and instead seeks to manipulate the electoral process. Such unfair actions include vote-buying, intimidation, threat or use of physical violence, restrictions on party and candidate laws, limitations on mobilization, and media bias.

use some manipulation tools at all (due to technical assistance). In other words, the risk is higher for an unfair government than for a fair government, creating differentiated costs. Since the costs of accepting IOs carries a differential cost depending on government type, external actors serve as a signal of the government's type.

4.2 Formal Model

This section presents a signaling game to generate hypotheses about the effect of IOs on campaign violence. A signaling model is a dynamic game of incomplete information with two players. Player 1 can be either of two types and sends a signal, which may help Player 2 to update its belief about Player 1's type. After receiving the signal, Player 2 decides how to react. In this signaling game, there are two candidates in the campaigning period, $i = \{I, O\}$, where I stands for the Incumbent and O for the Opposition.³⁰ The Incumbent knows whether he competes fairly or unfairly.³¹ However, the Opposition is uncertain about whether the Incumbent is fair.³² By inviting international technical assistance and election monitors, the Incumbent sends a signal to a wide audience, including the Opposition. Depending on its type, the Incumbent may also want to use the signal to distort or limit information about his type. The extensive form of the game and its payoffs are presented in Figure 4.1 and Table 4.2.

For this game I make a few assumptions about the players and the IOs. The Incumbent decides whether to invite IOs. While the Opposition may be able exert pressure on the Incumbent or exploit a non-invitation for shaming, she does not have a major say in this decision. I assume that both the Incumbent and the Opposition want to maximize their chances of winning the election. Competing for the election can be done through fair or unfair means, including violence. The

³⁰I use the male pronoun "he" for the player moving first (the Incumbent) and "she" for the player moving second (the Opposition).

³¹Formally, I define a Incumbent fairness through cost and benefit. The cost of manipulation is executing it and being caught cheating, which decreases the actor's and the election's legitimacy; this cost is further increased when *stringent* IOs monitor elections. The benefit of manipulation is increasing chances of winning. For the unfair type, $c < b$, meaning that the costs of manipulating the election are less than the benefits of manipulation. However, if $c > b$, so the costs of manipulation exceed the benefits, then the Incumbent is fair. All candidates seek to win but the fair type does not want to win through manipulation because he wants to have a positive reputation and legitimate hold of power, reducing the chance of a challenge in the short run and increasing the chances of popularity in the long run.

³²The Opposition has some prior belief about the Incumbent's type but remains uncertain.

Opposition’s main decision is whether to use violence because it is a weapon of the weak; fraud is more difficult to implement for non-Incumbents. As for IOs, I assume that the decision to attend is non-strategic. This is a reasonable assumption because monitors rarely decline invitations.³³ Because IOs virtually never refuse to attend and to simplify the model, I thus assume that IOs accept invitations; therefore inviting and hosting are treated as equivalent. The timing of the moves is as follows:

1. Nature chooses I to be type I_F with probability p and type I_{UF} with probability $1-p$.
2. I chooses whether to host IOs (H) or not (NH).
3. O chooses whether to engage in violence (V) or not (NV).

Figure 4.1: Finite Extensive Game




Table 4.2: Notation in the Game

h	Unfair Incumbent’s anticipated cost from hosting an IO
c	Incumbent’s cost of facing violence stemming from the Opposition
v	Opposition’s payoff from using violence, depending on whether Incumbent is type fair (v_F) or unfair (v_{UF})

³³It has only occurred in 1.7 percent of elections worldwide since 1945. That is, in only 51 out of 2,974 elections did “any monitors refuse to go to an election because they believed that it will not be free and fair” (Nelda49 from Hyde and Marinov 2012).

The payoffs for Incumbent and Opposition are as follows. The unfair Incumbent type can anticipate to incur a cost by hosting IOs, h . I assume that $h > 0$. The cost of hosting IOs is differentiated by Incumbent types. This allows the IO to act as a costly signal. It is not costly for a fair Incumbent to host IOs for two reasons.³⁴ First, since he competes fairly “by nature,” he has nothing to hide from international scrutiny. It is highly unlikely that monitors accuse a fair Incumbent of being unfair; the fair type receives a positive report with near certainty.³⁵ Second, hosting technical assistants is not costly for the fair type because he is interested in honest competition and values an improvement in the election process and the trust gained from voters more than the potential loss of votes due to institutional reform (e.g. removal of ghost voters from voter registry, officials’ training, civic education).³⁶ In other words, while any institutional change is somewhat costly, the fair Incumbent is willing to bear that cost because it contributes to long-term legitimacy. Since costs are low and benefits are high, fair incumbents always have incentives to invite election observers.³⁷

In contrast, the unfair Incumbent type incurs two kinds of costs: behavior change and a negative IO report.³⁸ The unfair type needs to restrain his behavior to appear more fair and find more subtle

³⁴The transaction cost in terms of organizing logistics (acknowledgment, travel) are incurred by both types and negligible and therefore set to zero. Normalizing the fair incumbent’s hosting cost to zero is a simplifying move. Alternatively, we could also assume that hosting IOs generates some marginal costs for fair incumbents, where $h_F > 0$ instead of $h_F = 0$. However, the model’s implications will remain as long as hosting is more costly for unfair than fair incumbents, $h_F < h_{UF}$, which is quite plausible. Since the implications are similar without this simplification, I empirically test hypotheses about the hosting cost on the full sample (fair and unfair incumbents).

³⁵There are no cases in this sample where fair incumbents have received negative reports (condemnations). In this sample, 19 percent of elections were condemned by IO monitors. 12 of these 19 percent were condemned because of significant fraud on election-day. The remaining 7 percent were condemned because the playing field was substantially tilted long before the election (so that stuffing ballot boxes was no long necessary). Examples of condemned elections without a level playing field include those that lack basic freedoms (Equatorial Guinea 1999), have strongly biased state media (Uganda 2001, 2006; Cameroon 1992), and a partisan election commission (Kenya 1997, Comoros 1996).

³⁶Examples of fair incumbents hosting technical assistance missions include Madagascar 1993 and 1996, South Africa 1994 and 1999, Senegal 2001, and Mali 1997 and 2002. All these elections were held in democracies (lagged polity score above 6) and with opposition competition allowed, where presumably fair incumbents decided to invite technical assistance.

³⁷This is a reasonable, simplifying assumption because it is empirically rare that fair incumbents do not invite credible / stringent election observers in Africa: in only 3 of 220 elections did plausibly fair incumbents not host credible observers: Lesotho 1998, Zambia 1996, and Burundi 2005. In all three cases, they hosted other, more lenient international observers. Overall, 34 of 220 elections were not attended by stringent observers but only lenient/non-Western observers. 24 of these 34 elections were presided over by clearly unfair incumbents (lagged polity score below 0). Another 7 of the 34 election were held in countries with a decent democratic history (more than 15 years of polity score above 5), where the benefit of external validation may be low: South Africa 2004; Botswana 1994, 1999, 2004; Namibia 2004; and Mauritius 2000, 2005. These are “early graduates” from the norm of observing in the sense of switching from stringent to lenient observers but still adhering to the norm of having *any* observer present.

³⁸Both types of cost are captured in the single parameter h . This is because there is no theoretical reason to treat them separately; both costs are incurred by the unfair type only; and it helps to keep the model simple.

ways of unduly influencing the electoral process. As a result, the cost/benefit ratio for hosting IOs is higher for unfair than fair Incumbents. For the fair Incumbent type, the costs are smaller relative to benefits generated by hosting IOs.

Independent of type or message, the Incumbent also suffers a cost c when facing violence stemming from the Opposition.³⁹ This includes losing Incumbent voters³⁹ because fewer turn out on election-day after being intimidated by the Opposition. It also includes a greater demand on security forces to restore and maintain order, as well as direct costs to the image of the Incumbent as being in control.

For the Opposition, v is her payoff from using violence. The Opposition makes a cost-benefit analysis of how the use of violence can help her engagement in the election process.⁴⁰ Violence is beneficial in that it maximizes the Opposition's chances of winning by reducing turnout for the Incumbent. However, fighting is always costly, so the Opposition incurs some costs by carrying out the violence (equipment, people, logistics). Further, the Opposition's costs of using violence depend on which type Incumbent she is facing. Recall that under incomplete information, the Opposition does not know with certainty which type the incumbent is, but she has some prior beliefs or perception about the incumbent's type. The payoff to violence is less when facing a likely fair type: $v_F < v_{UF}$. This could be for two reasons: (1) the Opposition loses legitimacy and thus potential voters if it fights against an incumbent who is perceived to be likely fair; and (2) if the Opposition faces an unfair Incumbent, the only way to have any chance at winning the election is through irregular means (e.g. violence).⁴¹ That is, the opposition has options short of violence when it competes against a likely fair incumbent. But trying to win against an unfair incumbent is an uphill battle because unfair types by definition tilt the playing field in their favor. The parameter v is positive if the benefits exceed the costs of violence, and negative otherwise. I assume

³⁹Again, this cost c is captured in a single parameter because both Incumbent types incur that cost, and it keeps the model simple.

⁴⁰This analysis focuses on the opposition as political parties engaged in political competition. The incentives may differ for extra-systemic actors, such as terrorist groups uninterested to work from within the system. Once rebel groups participate in the political process as parties, I assume that such electoral competition changes their *de facto* preferences.

⁴¹On balance, it seems more costly for the opposition to fight likely fair incumbents than unfair incumbents. However, it may also be possible that using violence against unfair incumbents carries a higher risk of retribution (i.e. higher costs) than against fair incumbents. In this case the payoff assumption $v_F < v_{UF}$ may not hold.

that $v_F < 0 < v_{UF}$, meaning that using violence is primarily beneficial if the Incumbent is likely unfair but the opposite is true when the Incumbent is fair. Using violence against a fair Incumbent creates more costs than benefits for the Opposition.

The main variation this chapter seeks to explain is why the government's acceptance of election assistance is associated with a reduction in opposition campaign violence. My argument is that by accepting IO support the government sends a signal of its intended behavior during the election. Let's assume the government signals that it intends to compete fairly. Receiving that signal, the opposition is more likely to *believe* that the incumbent is of type fair. The opposition thus has lower incentives to engage in violence during the run-up to elections for two reasons. First, the opposition does *not need* to use violence against an incumbent who is perceived to be fair because the opposition has chances of winning against fair types using regular means of competition. Second, the opposition's use of violence would be *too costly* because the opposition risks losing popular legitimacy when it fights against a likely fair type.

4.2.1 Equilibria

This section lays out the equilibria of the game in Figure 4.1; proofs of equilibria are in Appendix B (section 4.8). The ranges of the three equilibria are summarized in Figure 4.2. The equilibria depend on two parameters, which are the Incumbent's cost of sending the signal (h) and the Opposition's prior belief that the Incumbent is type "fair" (p). There are three types of equilibria. First, there is a separating equilibrium when $h > c$. Even a successful bluff by the unfair Incumbent type gives a payoff less than 0, so there is no incentive to bluff. Thus when $h > c$, the unfair type prefers not bluffing.

Strategy Profile for Separating

$$\left. \begin{array}{l}
 1_F: H \\
 1_{UF}: NH \\
 2: NV \text{ if } H, V \text{ if } NH \\
 p(F | H) = 1 \\
 p(F | NH) = 0
 \end{array} \right\} \begin{array}{l}
 \text{when parameter values satisfy:} \\
 (1) h > c \text{ (unfair 1 chooses NH)} \\
 (2) v_F < 0 \text{ (holds by assumption; 2 chooses NV given H)} \\
 (3) v_{UF} > 0 \text{ (holds by assumption; 2 chooses V given NH)}
 \end{array}$$

Second, there is a pooling equilibrium when $h < c$ and p is high. The unfair type of Incumbent has an incentive to bluff because $h < c$. This bluff works because the Opposition has a high prior belief that the Incumbent is type fair.

Strategy Profile for Pooling

$$\left. \begin{array}{l} 1_F: H \\ 1_{UF}: H \\ 2: NV \text{ if } H, V \text{ if } NH \\ p(F | H) = p \\ p(F | NH) = 0 \end{array} \right\} \begin{array}{l} \text{when parameter values satisfy:} \\ (1) h < c \text{ (both 1's choose H)} \\ (2) p > \frac{v_{UF}}{v_{UF} - v_F} \text{ (2 chooses NV against H)} \\ (3) v_{UF} > 0 \text{ (holds by assumption; 2 chooses V against NH)} \end{array}$$

Third, there is a semi-separating equilibrium when $h < c$ and p is low. The unfair type has an incentive to bluff but the bluff cannot always work because the Opposition thinks there is a high chance that the Incumbent is unfair. So the equilibrium is in mixed strategies for both players.

Strategy Profile for Semi-Separating

$$\left. \begin{array}{l} 1_F: H \\ 1_{UF}: (r) H + (1-r) NH \\ 2: V \text{ if } NH; (s) V + (1-s) NV \text{ if } H \\ p(F | H) = \frac{p}{p+r(1-p)} \\ p(F | NH) = 0 \end{array} \right\} \begin{array}{l} \text{when parameter values satisfy:} \\ (1) r = \frac{v_F * p}{v_{UF} * p - v_{UF}} \text{ (probability that unfair I hosts)} \\ (2) s = 1 - \frac{h}{c} \text{ (probability that O is indifferent between V and NV)} \end{array}$$

4.2.2 Empirical Implications

These equilibria yield several observable implications about the effect of hosting IOs, the hosting cost, and perceived incumbent fairness on the likelihood of violence.

First, hosting IOs should always be associated with less violence than not hosting, regardless of other factors. This is the key result. In every equilibrium, the effect of hosting is to reduce election violence. In the pooling equilibrium, both types host and the opposition does not use violence. Off the equilibrium path, not hosting would lead to violence. In the separating equilibrium, hosting

Figure 4.2: Ranges of Equilibria

	unfair (p is low) $p < \frac{v_{UF}}{v_{UF} - v_F}$	fair (p is high) $p > \frac{v_{UF}}{v_{UF} - v_F}$
$h < c$	<p>Semi-Separating:</p> <p>Fair I's host.</p> <p>Unfair I's host with probability</p> $r = \frac{v_F * p}{v_{UF} * p - v_{UF}}$ <p>O uses violence with probability</p> $s = 1 - \frac{h}{c}$	<p>Pooling:</p> <p>Both types of I host.</p> <p>O uses no violence.</p>
$h > c$	<p>Separating:</p> <p>Only fair I's host;</p> <p>O refrains from violence (because by assumption $v_F < 0$).</p> <p>Unfair I's do not host;</p> <p>O chooses violence (because by assumption $v_{UF} > 0$).</p>	

also leads to non-violence while not hosting results in violence. In the semi-separating equilibrium, hosting potentially leads to some violence (mixed opposition strategy) while not hosting certainly results in violence. Across all equilibria, hosting IOs is associated with a reduction in violence. This leads to hypothesis 1.

Hypothesis 1. *Hosting IOs is associated with a reduced probability of opposition campaign violence.*

Second, when the hosting cost is low and conditional on hosting (i.e. when incumbents invite IOs), an increase in perceived incumbent fairness should be associated with less violence. Here I contrast the pooling and the semi-separating equilibrium in the low-cost region. If the government hosts IOs, there is some chance of violence in the semi-separating equilibrium but no violence in the pooling equilibrium. This effect is conditional on hosting because when the government does not host election assistance, an increase in perceived incumbent fairness does not change the prospects for violence: violence is predicted in both equilibria. This yields hypothesis 2.

Hypothesis 2. *When the hosting cost is low and conditional on hosting, an increase in perceived incumbent fairness should be associated with less violence.*

The third and fourth hypotheses are about the effect of the hosting cost on expected violence. When perceived incumbent fairness is low and conditional on hosting, an increase in the hosting cost should be associated with less violence. This effect may be small. For this third hypothesis, I compare the separating and semi-separating equilibria. Hosting is associated with some potential violence when the hosting cost is low (in the semi-separating equilibrium) and no violence when the hosting cost is high (in the separating equilibrium). This is again conditional on hosting because not hosting leads to violence in both equilibria.

Hypothesis 3. *When perceived incumbent fairness is low and conditional on hosting, an increase in the hosting cost should be associated with less violence.*

When perceived incumbent fairness is high and conditional on hosting, an increase in the hosting cost should have no effect on violence. Here I contrast the pooling and separating equilibria when p is high. Hosting is associated with no violence in the pooling and separating equilibria. Similarly, not hosting is associated with violence in the pooling and separating equilibria.

Hypothesis 4. *When perceived incumbent fairness is high and conditional on hosting, an increase in the hosting cost should have no effect on violence.*

4.3 Research Design

I test these observable implications in a statistical analysis of national-level legislative and presidential elections in Sub-Saharan Africa from 1990 to 2008. This region is chosen for three reasons. First, this region provides substantial variation in pre-electoral violence.⁴² In a study of global scope, Arriola and Johnson (2012) define campaign violence as at least 25 fatalities in the year running up to election-day. They estimate that about 27 percent of elections have been accompanied by such violence in Africa. This region is second behind Asia (35 percent of campaign violence),

⁴²I would be less fruitful to focus on campaign violence in Europe where variation in such violence is low.

followed by the Middle East/North Africa (22 percent), Latin America (19 percent), and Eastern Europe (7 percent).⁴³

Second, Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is a good region to test the argument because it consists of ambiguously democratic states where sending a costly signal carries some value. Hyde (2011) argues that advanced, long-standing democracies “graduate” from the norm of inviting IOs because incumbents in such countries do not need to signal their type any longer after having proven to be fair types for decades.⁴⁴ This is not the case for countries in this sample: virtually all have incentives to invite election IOs. I include consolidated autocracies in this sample – i.e. countries which ban opposition competition – for two reasons. First, while autocracies may not succeed in “faking” the signal and convincing other actors of their democratic type, they can certainly try.⁴⁵ Second, autocracies could be undergoing an attempt at limited democratization and thus should not be excluded *ex ante* from the analysis.⁴⁶

Third, this region is chosen because sufficiently granular data is available to examine the question of opposition engagement in campaign violence. To test the specific implications of the formal model, the dependent variable is pre-election violence perpetrated by the opposition. While some datasets distinguish the timing, few identify the perpetrator of election violence. Aggregate measures are less desirable because incumbent violence dilutes the data and inference about opposition actions becomes difficult if not impossible. The African Electoral Violence Database (AEVD) provides the best measure of opposition campaign violence. Adopting a lower threshold for “violence” but

⁴³Arriola and Johnson 2012, 13, 35. I was unable to obtain data from the authors.

⁴⁴According to Hyde’s definition (2011, 51-52, 74-75) there are no advanced democracies in this sample. According to Hyde, unambiguously democratic countries are three groups of countries. First, long-term developed democracies that have been democratic for at least four decades and OECD members in 1960 (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States). Second, India and Israel. Third, countries upon joining the European Union: since 2004 Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia; since 2007 Bulgaria and Romania. While some advanced democracies at times invite monitors (notably the US in 2004 and 2012), this rate is much lower than for “ambiguously” democratic countries.

⁴⁵For example, this has been Russia’s strategy in recent years by inviting the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) to monitor its elections. The CIS is a much more lenient observer than the OSCE, and rarely criticizes the government for irregularities.

⁴⁶This sample contains 13 elections in consolidated autocracies, defined as no choice of candidates on the ballot or opposition parties not allowed/legal (Hyde 2011, 74; data from Hyde and Marinov 2012). These 13 elections are: Swaziland 1993, 1998, 2003, 2008; Zimbabwe 2008 legislative and executive; Nigeria 1992, 1993, 1998; Burkina Faso 1991; Djibouti 2005; Comoros 2002; and Sudan 1996.

shorter time frame than Arriola and Johnson (2012), Straus and Taylor (2012) record that 55 percent of elections in SSA have experienced campaign violence.⁴⁷

The dependent variable is *opposition campaign violence*, indicating whether the opposition engaged in election violence in the six months prior to polling day. In this SSA sample, the opposition engaged in such violence in 22.3 percent of elections. That is, in 49 out of 220 elections the opposition used violence in the campaigning period. Table 4.3 lists these 49 elections and indicates by * the 25 cases in which the opposition was not just engaged in violence but also the primary perpetrator. In the remaining 24 cases, both incumbent and opposition engaged in campaign violence.

Table 4.3: Elections where Opposition Engaged in Campaign Violence

Country	Year and Election Type
Angola	1992 concurrent
Burundi	1993 concurrent, 2005 executive
Cameroon	1992 executive
Central African Republic	1992*, 1999* legislative, 2005 concurrent
Comoros	1990* legislative, 1992* executive
DRC	2006* concurrent
Gabon	1990* executive
Gambia	2001 legislative
Ghana	2004*, 2008* concurrent
Guinea	1993, 1998 legislative
Ivory Coast	1995 concurrent
Kenya	1992*, 1997, 2002, 2007 concurrent
Liberia	1997, 2005 concurrent
Madagascar	1993* legislative and executive
Malawi	2004 concurrent
Mali	1997* concurrent
Mozambique	1999*, 2004* concurrent
Nigeria	1992* executive; 2003, 2007 concurrent
Republic of Congo	1992* concurrent; 1993* executive
Senegal	2000* legislative, 2007* legislative and executive
South Africa	1994*, 1999*, 2004* executive
Swaziland	1998 executive
Tanzania	1995 concurrent
Togo	1993, 2005 legislative; 1994 executive
Uganda	2001 legislative and executive
Zimbabwe	1996 legislative, 2005 executive

To evaluate the observable implications outlined above, I use a number of variables. Hosting IOs is measured in four ways. The variable *hosting IO-M* is 1 if the government invited any stringent

⁴⁷Straus and Taylor 2012, 28.

(Western) election monitoring organizations, and 0 otherwise.⁴⁸ The variable *hosting IO-TA* is 1 if the government received UN election technical assistance.⁴⁹ The variable *hosting IOs* indicates whether no IO attended (0), either monitors or TA was present (1), or both were present (2). The variable *hosting IOs2* is a coarsened version, indicating whether no IO type attended (0), or any type attended (1).

I capture the cost of hosting (*h*) with three alternative variables: the competitiveness of participation, democracy INGOs, and opposition strength. The cost of hosting for an unfair Incumbent should be negatively correlated with the competitiveness of participation. If a country represses or limits oppositional activity (i.e. low competition), then the cost of hosting election IOs can be quite high. In this case hosting IOs is costly because (i) technical assistance can help level the playing field and (ii) monitoring makes it more likely for such irregularities to get exposed and condemned. More often than not, the incumbent is the main source of irregularities.⁵⁰ Therefore the concept “hosting cost” is proxied by the variable *competitiveness*, which ranges from 0 to 5, with higher numbers indicating more competition.⁵¹ When a country has high competition (regularly competing political groups), then the cost of hosting election IOs should be low. Conversely, high hosting cost is proxied with low competition. I transform this variable in two ways. I invert it so that it positively correlates with hosting cost. And instead of looking at a single year, I take the three-year weighted average to have a more consistent estimate.⁵²

A second proxy for hosting cost is the count of *democracy INGOs* in a country, which should also be negatively correlated and thus inverted.⁵³ While NGOs vary widely by issue area (environment, gender, peace etc), I consider only transnational NGOs that include citizen participation and whose primary objective is “democratic change.” This objective is coded in the Transnational Social Movement Organization dataset which itself draws on the Yearbook of International Orga-

⁴⁸Nelda46 from Hyde and Marinov 2012.

⁴⁹For 1990 to 20012, data is sourced from UNDP (2002b), which lists member states’ requests for election technical assistance to the UN system and UN TA provision. I thank Susan Hyde for generously providing this list; it was originally online but taken down after 2008. For the years 2003-2008, I source UN TA data from Prati (2012), Appendix 1.

⁵⁰Hyde 2007.

⁵¹ I source data from Polity IV, Marshall and Jaggers 2012.

⁵²The three lagged years are weighted as follows, assuming the election year is t0: t1*0.5 + t2*0.3 + t3*0.2.

⁵³This counts the number of INGOs in which citizens of a state have membership in.

nizations.⁵⁴ In addition to the specific issue area, these data are a good proxy for hosting cost because they distinguish the country's permanent / long-term democracy INGO membership from short-term NGO/IGO election assistance. It explicitly *excludes* the latter type, i.e. IGOs as well as NGOs led or directed by a government or international agency.⁵⁵ The cost of hosting election IOs varies for unfair incumbents depending on how many democracy INGOs the country is already affiliated with. If a country's citizens actively participate in many democracy INGOs, then inviting an IO for temporary election assistance carries a low cost because the pressure on the government increases only moderately. High participation suggests a more active civil society in a country open to reform. In contrast, low citizen participation in democracy INGOs tends to indicate government restrictions on such activities. If a country has no or few INGO affiliations, then hosting an election assistance IO is quite costly because it can have a high impact on the cost and capacity of engaging in manipulation. Similar to democratic history, I invert the original INGO count to create *democracy INGOs*, so that it correlates positively with hosting cost.

A third proxy for hosting cost is the incumbent's likelihood of winning, measured by *opposition strength*, which can drive his decision to invite international assistance. In contrast to the two measures above, which impose *ex ante* costs on the incumbent, a potential election loss is an *ex post* cost. This is similar to Fearon's distinction of costly signals in sinking costs (which are incurred immediately, *ex ante*) versus tying hands (which are incurred in expectation, *ex post*).⁵⁶ The ultimate cost of hosting for *any* Incumbent is losing the election. When the Opposition is weak, that risk is small even with a cleaner election process. The Incumbent may be willing to limit his "menu of manipulation" by striking overt measures such as ballot stuffing and deliberate miscount of votes from the list.⁵⁷ However, if the Opposition is strong, the hosting cost is higher because a (somewhat) cleaner election may mean the difference between losing and winning. Thus Opposition strength increases the unfair Incumbent's cost of hosting (*h*). I use data from DPI to

⁵⁴Smith and Wiest 2003. Examples of such groups are the African Centre for Democracy and Human Rights, the Coalition for Democratic World Government, the Inter-African Union of Lawyers and the International Association for the Promotion of Democracy under God. An alternative measure would be the INGO count by Hafner-Burton (2005) but this does not distinguish issue areas, which means it is not as good a measure of the hosting cost for specific election assistance IOs.

⁵⁵Thus these rules explicitly exclude those groups captured in the "hosting" variables above: US-led NGOs (IFES, NDI, IRI, CC) and IGOs (EU, AU).

⁵⁶Fearon 1997.

⁵⁷The menu of manipulation is defined in Table 4.1.

measure opposition strength in percentage points.

The last model parameter is the Opposition's prior belief that I is fair (p). I assign type by past behavior in the realm of human rights in terms of government respect for the *physical integrity* of its citizens. This index captures government repression and political violence and is constructed from torture, extrajudicial killings, political imprisonment and disappearance. It is coded from human rights reports. I use the Cingranelli-Richards human rights data (CIRI).⁵⁸ It ranges from 0 to 8, where higher values indicate greater respect for these rights. Table 4.4 summarizes the proxies for model parameters. Summary statistics and distributions are shown in Table 4.11 and Figure 4.8 in the appendix.

Table 4.4: Predicted Effects of Observable Measures

Model Parameters	Variable	Measurement	Data Source
hosting	hosting IO-M	presence of IO election monitors (0/1)	Nelda
	hosting IO-TA	presence of UN technical assistance (0/1)	UN 2002, Prati 2012
	hosting IOs	no/either/both IO types present (0/1/2)	as above
	hosting IOs2	no/any IO type present (0/1)	as above
hosting cost, h	competitiveness	3-year lagged, weighted average	Polity IV
	democracy INGOs	inverted count dem. INGO memberships	TSMO
	opposition strength	percentage points	DPI
perceived I fairness, p	physical integrity	index of physical integrity rights	CIRI

In addition, I include a number of control variables at the election and country level. On the election level, I include election type which indicates whether it was a legislative (0), executive (1) or concurrent (2) election. I also use *likely incumbent victory* to control for relative winning prospects.⁵⁹ On the country level, *civil war* is coded no war (0), first election after civil war (1) and ongoing civil war (2).⁶⁰ In addition, I control for *ethnic fractionalization*, *oil and gas income*, *GDP per capita*, and *population size*.⁶¹ To mitigate endogeneity, all independent variables are lagged by one year except for election type and civil war.

⁵⁸Cingranelli and Richards 2011.

⁵⁹Nelda12. Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski 2014.

⁶⁰Straus and Taylor 2012.

⁶¹Finkel, Perez-Linan and Seligson 2007; and World Bank 2012. Results do not change substantively when system (parliamentary vs. presidential) is used instead of election type (legislative vs. executive). The last three variables are logged to adjust for high skewness.

To clearly identify the effect of UN assistance on violence, the ideal estimation method includes country-fixed effects to account for the non-random treatment of UN assistance. Recall that while it has become a norm for election monitors to be invited and to attend, this is not the case for UN technical assistance. Many countries in Africa never receive UN assistance between 1990 and 2008.⁶² It stands to reason that this group of countries differs in some respects from the group of countries that have received UN assistance on some or many elections.⁶³ To better identify the UN effect, it is possible to focus on only those countries that have some positive probability of UN presence and where UN presence actually varies over time. The country-fixed effect estimation does that because it drops panels without variation and examines changes within countries over time.

I evaluate hypothesis 1 with country-fixed effects models (conditional logits). I show models with random effects and with clustered standard errors for comparison. While conditional logits allow better identification in the case of non-random treatment by discarding non-varying panels, this becomes a problem in small datasets. The original violence data used here comprises 220 elections in 40 countries. The conditional logit method estimates effects for only 16 of these countries – those where UN presence varies over time.⁶⁴ Discarding entire panels also reduces the amount of variation on the dependent variable, so that fewer “positive” outcomes remain (violence=1). Since hypotheses 2, 3, and 4 involve more computationally intense interaction effects, rare positive outcomes and fewer observations make fixed-effects models not possible for testing hypotheses 2, 3, and 4. As a viable alternative to capture unobserved heterogeneity between states, I return to models with clustered standard errors for these estimations.

4.4 Results

Table 4.5 shows the test results for Hypothesis 1, and Table 4.6 shows results for Hypotheses 2, 3, and 4. Substantive effects and interaction effects are illustrated in Figures 4.3, 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6. I

⁶²Countries without UN assistance include Cape Verde, Sao Tome and Principe, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Equatorial Guinea, Gambia, Mauritania, Niger, Ivory Coast, Togo, Cameroon, Gabon, CAR, Chad, Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Swaziland, Madagascar, Comoros, Mauritius, Seychelles.


⁶³Countries with variation in UN assistance include Burkina Faso, Benin, Senegal, Mali, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Kenya, Uganda, Nigeria, Zambia, Mozambique, Tanzania, South Africa, Malawi, Namibia, Lesotho.

⁶⁴See models 1-4 in Table 4.5 and the previous footnotes for a list of included and excluded countries.

find strong evidence in favor of the four hypotheses outlined above.

The main result is shown in Table 4.5 and Figure 4.3. As expected in hypothesis 1, the coefficients for hosting IOs are generally negative and statistically significant, indicating that IO presence is associated with a reduction in opposition campaign violence. Comparing the country-fixed effects models (1-4), we see that inviting any type of IO assistance – monitoring or technical – is associated with reduced opposition campaign violence. This effect seems larger in magnitude for election monitoring than UN assistance. Inviting both types of IOs also significantly calms tensions with the opposition. Figure 4.3 illustrates the magnitude of this effect. When the government does not invite any IOs, the predicted probability of opposition violence is 69 percent. This probability diminishes to 34 percent when the government invites either type of IO, and further diminishes to 8 percent when both types of IO assistance – technical and monitoring – are present.⁶⁵ This is strong evidence in favor of hypothesis 1.

Figure 4.3: Substantive Effect of Hosting IOs on Violence



In Table 4.5, the coefficients on control variables are in an expected direction. The opposition is

⁶⁵The Hausman test between models 3 and 7 indicates that fixed effects is not absolutely necessary ($p=0.36$) but given non-random treatment issue, these seems to be more appropriate. The effect magnitude is estimated from model 13, which simulates the country-fixed effects regression in model 3 with country-indicators, as plotting predicted probabilities from fixed-effects models is complicated.

significantly less likely to engage in pre-election violence when the incumbent likely wins or when civil war is ongoing. There are interesting findings on two control variables: population size and per capita GDP. In the cross-country comparison, population size is associated with more opposition campaign violence. However, as population grows *within countries over time* (models 1-5), opposition violence is less likely. In addition, the coefficient on the per capita GDP variable is in an unexpected direction (positive) in many models, indicating that opposition violence is somewhat higher in wealthier countries; it is also not statistically significant. The insignificant and at times positive relationship between economic development and election violence is also a side finding in chapter 5. It is somewhat surprising because it contradicts arguments made by others that elections in poor countries cause violence.⁶⁶

Table 4.6 shows the results for testing hypotheses 2, 3, and 4. Since these involve interaction effects which are easier to interpret visually, Figures 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6 illustrate these interaction effects.⁶⁷ Note that these models necessarily focus on certain subsets of elections (specified ranges of hosting cost and incumbent fairness), so that the number of observations drops.⁶⁸ Consequently, I regard the analyses below primarily as a valid test of Hypotheses 2, 3, and 4. However, I am less confident generalizing to comparable elections based on limited data (i.e. models 1-6 in Table 4.6).

⁶⁶Collier 2009.

⁶⁷Since I deduced strong theoretical expectations about the direction of influence from the formal model, I use 90 percent confidence intervals for these estimations.

⁶⁸The drop is most pronounced for testing hypothesis 3. This issue is difficult to mitigate because I am not aware of any alternative dataset on opposition campaign violence. While some data document campaign violence, the actor is generally not clearly identified.

Table 4.5: Determinants of Opposition Pre-Election Violence (Testing Hypothesis 1)

	Country-Fixed Effects					Random Effects				Clustered SEs on Country			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
Hosting IO M	-3.277 (2.087)					-0.339 (0.886)				0.042 (0.486)			
Hosting IO TA		-1.885* (1.020)					-0.773 (0.750)				-0.361 (0.549)		
Hosting IOs			-2.325*** (0.785)		-3.121*** (0.933)			-1.102** (0.533)				-0.691* (0.393)	
Hosting IOs2				-1.850** (0.854)					-1.118* (0.664)				-0.874* (0.530)
Election type	-1.944* (1.120)	-0.175 (0.566)	-0.075 (0.599)	-0.309 (0.550)	-0.112 (0.692)	-0.200 (0.515)	0.172 (0.382)	0.271 (0.391)	0.213 (0.373)	0.128 (0.307)	0.289 (0.259)	0.375 (0.279)	0.309 (0.268)
Civil war ongoing						-2.001 (1.499)	-1.771* (1.022)	-1.715* (1.029)	-1.578* (0.958)	-1.105 (0.699)	-0.916* (0.547)	-0.922* (0.554)	-0.892* (0.524)
Oil & Gas pc	-0.360 (0.270)	-0.036 (0.118)	-0.225 (0.141)	-0.123 (0.124)	-0.307* (0.171)	-0.099 (0.100)	-0.002 (0.071)	-0.015 (0.077)	-0.007 (0.071)	-0.067 (0.062)	0.007 (0.058)	0.009 (0.058)	0.008 (0.056)
GDP pc	2.842 (2.577)	-0.192 (1.291)	0.289 (1.489)	0.970 (1.288)	0.409 (1.705)	0.169 (0.645)	-0.111 (0.529)	-0.163 (0.555)	-0.086 (0.519)	0.276 (0.384)	0.024 (0.402)	-0.062 (0.423)	-0.048 (0.364)
Population size	-9.669* (5.386)	-5.726** (2.744)	-7.718** (3.154)	-5.460** (2.705)	-10.312*** (3.893)	1.170** (0.593)	0.920** (0.427)	0.967** (0.444)	0.928** (0.418)	0.828** (0.360)	0.663** (0.281)	0.687** (0.291)	0.698** (0.297)
Executive constraints	2.214** (1.012)	0.509* (0.304)	0.898*** (0.331)	0.788** (0.312)	1.233*** (0.407)	0.280 (0.260)	0.105 (0.175)	0.183 (0.186)	0.163 (0.177)	0.082 (0.143)	0.053 (0.134)	0.090 (0.135)	0.084 (0.129)
Likely Incumbent Victory	-3.053** (1.401)	-1.104 (0.751)	-2.022** (0.994)	-1.352* (0.775)	-2.620** (1.161)	-1.295 (0.849)	-0.657 (0.610)	-0.902 (0.639)	-0.792 (0.611)	-0.377 (0.658)	-0.322 (0.563)	-0.482 (0.584)	-0.475 (0.593)
Ethnic fractionalization						0.858 (3.137)	-0.792 (2.576)	0.422 (2.521)	0.026 (2.345)	1.026 (2.565)	-0.710 (2.259)	0.015 (2.334)	-0.138 (2.289)
Constant					125.918** (50.057)	-22.552** (11.031)	-14.658* (7.977)	-15.530* (8.569)	-15.142* (8.099)	-17.604** (7.846)	-11.431* (6.853)	-11.395 (7.366)	-11.442* (6.956)
Observations	55	72	76	76	76	143	157	164	164	143	157	164	164
Countries										39	39	40	40
AIC	35.34	61.28	54.07	61.39	110.48	136.82	164.43	164.43	166.46	141.38	169.19	169.33	169.80
BIC	49.39	77.22	70.39	77.70	164.08	169.41	198.04	198.53	200.56	171.01	199.75	200.33	200.80
LL	-10.67	-23.64	-20.04	-23.69	-32.24	-57.41	-71.21	-71.22	-72.23	-60.69	-74.59	-74.67	-74.90

Notes: The table reports logit estimates. The dependent variable is Opposition Violence. The unit of observation is a national election. Coefficients are reported with country-fixed effects in models 1-4, country-indicators in model 5, random effects in models 6-9, and standard errors clustered on country in models 10-13. In models 1-5, the control variable *ethnic fractionalization* is dropped from the estimation because it is time-invariant. Also in models 1-5, the variable *civil war ongoing* is omitted because the estimated coefficient is large (-16). Omitting this variable does not change the substantive interpretation of the main results because coefficients only increase slightly in magnitude. When included, this variable never gained significance in models 1-5. ***, **, and * indicates significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level.


Table 4.6: Determinants of Opposition Pre-Election Violence (Testing Hypotheses 2, 3, 4)

	Hypothesis 2 Hosting cost low			Hypothesis 3 Incumbent fairness low CIRI ≤ 2			Hypothesis 4 Incumbent fairness high CIRI ≥ 3			3-way Interaction	
	Competitiveness 1	INGOs 2	Opposition 3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
Hosting IOs2	1.672 (1.545)	17.637** (8.891)	-1.738 (1.815)	19.565 (16.428)	22.461*** (8.420)	-9.145 (7.387)	0.590 (1.585)	-1.991 (1.667)	-2.870** (1.367)	1.911 (2.745)	4.435 (3.070)
CIRI	-0.611* (0.321)	2.509* (1.489)	-0.449* (0.273)							-0.731 (0.506)	0.639 (0.734)
CIRI X Hosting IOs2	-0.619 (0.408)	-3.745** (1.911)	-0.162 (0.363)							-0.173 (0.632)	-1.196 (0.773)
Competitiveness				7.098 (5.471)			0.698 (0.552)			0.135 (0.795)	
Competitiveness X Hosting IOs2				-7.736 (6.657)			-0.553 (0.512)			-0.721 (0.852)	
Democracy INGOs					2.070*** (0.692)			-0.014 (0.205)			0.550 (0.425)
Democracy INGOs X Hosting IOs2					-3.804** (1.499)			0.135 (0.219)			-0.704* (0.437)
Opposition Strength						-0.271 (0.217)			-0.113* (0.060)		
Opposition Strength X Hosting IOs2						0.651 (0.560)			0.131* (0.070)		
Competitiveness X CIRI										0.155 (0.148)	
Competitiveness X Hosting IOs2 X CIRI										0.012 (0.187)	
Democracy INGOs X CIRI											-0.130 0.099
Democracy INGOs X Hosting IOs2 X CIRI											0.167* (0.102)
Election type	0.879** (0.385)	-1.110 (0.791)	-0.538 (0.501)	-2.776* (1.645)	-5.239*** (1.773)	-5.184 (3.510)	0.650** (0.286)	0.696** (0.285)	0.217 (0.366)	0.611 (0.284)	0.465* (0.261)
Civil war ongoing	-3.851*** (1.159)	-3.548* (2.014)	-0.733 (0.817)								
Oil & Gas pc	0.176** (0.074)	0.087 (0.079)	-0.091 (0.095)	-0.084 (0.105)	-0.246 (0.165)	-0.341 (0.238)	-0.004 (0.051)	-0.016 (0.052)	0.026 (0.047)	-0.004 (0.047)	-0.015 (0.046)
GDP pc	-1.307** (0.633)	-2.240* (1.257)	0.280 (0.692)	-1.559 (1.145)	1.227 (1.481)	-6.906 (5.715)	0.264 (0.428)	0.443 (0.411)	0.074 (0.445)	0.264 (0.403)	0.237 (0.365)
Population size	0.352 (0.421)	4.001 (2.440)	0.814 (0.514)	-2.238 (2.018)	-4.299** (1.707)	0.585 (0.538)	0.767** (0.364)	1.030** (0.404)	0.799** (0.392)	0.595 (0.292)	0.598** (0.287)
Executive constraints	0.752** (0.358)	1.197* (0.669)	0.342** (0.158)	7.585 (5.540)	8.684*** (3.237)	3.185** (1.494)	0.206 (0.205)	0.067 (0.163)	0.251 (0.180)	0.454 (0.189)	0.273* (0.155)
Likely Incumbent Victory	0.045 (0.805)	-1.930** (0.937)	-1.156 (1.241)				-0.393 (0.729)	-0.353 (0.595)	-1.018 (0.779)		
Constant	2.073 (9.871)	-67.093 (41.788)	-12.621 (11.145)	7.985 (12.683)	30.169** (14.002)	34.279 (30.044)	-17.751** (8.174)	-20.427** (9.290)	-12.424 (7.576)	-13.318 7.033	-16.002** (7.234)
Observations	93	46	79	21	22	19	145	144	93	164	166
Clusters	31	18	34	11	12	10	39	39	34	41	41
AIC	85.96	48.27	82.15	30.74	32.74	26.35	134.22	132.86	92.48	158.36	170.77
BIC	113.82	68.38	108.22	40.14	42.56	33.90	163.99	162.55	117.80	198.66	211.22
LL	-31.98	-13.13	-30.08	-6.37	-7.37	-5.17	-57.11	-56.43	-36.24	-66.18	-72.38

Notes: The table reports logit estimates. The dependent variable is Opposition Campaign Violence. The unit of observation is a national election. Coefficients are reported with standard errors clustered on country. Largely because of the smaller samples, these models omit a three control variables. The (time-invariant) control variable ethnic fractionalization because inclusion leads to complete determination of the dependent variable in these smaller samples. This variable never gained significance. Excluding fractionalization seems a reasonable solution. The other two control variables (civil war, incumbent victory) are dropped across some models to allow convergence. ***, **, and * indicates significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level.

Hypothesis 2 is tested in models 1-3. Here, I focus on the subset of elections where the hosting cost is low. I consider hosting costs to be low when any of the following conditions exist: competitiveness of participation is high, there are more than 9 INGOs active in the country, or the opposition is weak, having received less than a 25% of the vote share in the last election.⁶⁹ Figure 4.4 shows the interaction effects from models 1 and 2. As hypothesized, the opposition engages in significantly less violence when incumbent invites IOs and is perceived to be fairer. That is, when the opposition perceives the incumbent to be fair (>5), hosting IOs is associated with less opposition violence. This is in line with the pooling equilibrium. In contrast, when the opposition sees the incumbent as unfair (<2), inviting IO assistance has no significant effect on campaign violence. This is in line with the semi-separating equilibrium according to which the prospects of violence do not change drastically.⁷⁰ The magnitude of this effect is also noteworthy. When the incumbent is seen as fair, elections with IOs are about 20-70 percentage points less likely to have opposition violence than elections without IO missions. The effect estimate varies depending on the proxy for hosting cost. This supports Hypothesis 2.

Figure 4.4: Substantive Effect of Hosting IOs on Campaign Violence Conditional on Incumbent Fairness (Hypothesis 2)




⁶⁹The substantive effects in Figures 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6 are based on the first two measures. Using opposition strength, the effect is often similar but not as pronounced and thus often short of significance. This may be because the variable has a large percentage of missing values and thus fewer observations than the other two conditioning variables (140 instead of 200 observations), see Table 4.11.

⁷⁰According to the semi-separating equilibrium, not hosting is associated with violence, and hosting is associated with some positive probability of violence.

Hypothesis 3 is tested in models 4 through 6 of Table 4.6. Figure 4.5 plots the interaction effects from models 4 and 5. In line with Hypothesis 3, as the hosting cost increases, hosting IOs is associated with reduced opposition violence. Recall that hosting costs decrease with more democracy INGOs in a country and higher competitiveness; the relationship is negative/inverse. For that reason, the graphs below show an inverted x axis: higher values indicate higher hosting cost but (a) lower competitiveness and (b) lower democracy INGOs. Figure 4.5 shows that hosting IOs is associated with significantly less violence when the hosting cost is high (low competition, few INGOs) but not when hosting is cheap. That is, when the hosting cost is high, hosting is associated with less violence – in line with the separating equilibrium.⁷¹ This supports Hypothesis 3.

Figure 4.5: Effect of Hosting IOs on Campaign Violence
Conditional on Hosting Cost and **low** Incumbent Fairness ($CIRI \leq 2$, Hypothesis 3)




Hypothesis 4 is evaluated in models 7 through 9 and Figure 4.6. As expected, the incumbent's decision to invite IOs has *no* effect on violence: when the incumbent is seen as fair and hosts IOs, increased hosting costs have no effect on opposition violence.

Two interesting findings emerge from the control variables. The effects of election type and population size differ depending on perceived incumbent fairness. Executive and consecutive elections are associated with less violence when the incumbent is seen as unfair but more opposition violence when the incumbent is seen as fair. Similarly, larger populations are associated with less opposition

⁷¹According to the semi-separating equilibrium (when hosting is cheap), hosting IOs should be associated with somewhat less violence. This is not evident in Figure 4.5.

Figure 4.6: Effect of Hosting IOs on Campaign Violence
 Conditional on Hosting Cost and **high** Incumbent Fairness ($CIRI \geq 3$, Hypothesis 4)



(a) Hosting Cost Proxy = Competitiveness

(b) Hosting Cost Proxy = Democracy INGOs

violence under unfair incumbents but more violence under fair incumbents. One possible explanation is that the opposition fears heavier retribution under more repressive incumbents and thus abstains from intimidating incumbent supporters in these contexts. However, these side findings should not be over-emphasized since they are based on a much smaller sample size in models 4 through 6.


The models above include interaction terms to evaluate Hypotheses 2, 3, and 4. However, by splitting the sample according to the hosting cost (high/low) or perceived incumbent fairness (high/low), I have introduced an implicit 3-way interaction. For valid inference, all variables should be included in a single model with the full sample and a 3-way interaction. Models 10 and 11 in Table 4.6 show the models and Figure 4.7 plots this effect from model 11.⁷² For reference, the conditional hypotheses are summarized in Table 4.7.

Table 4.7: Summary of Conditional Hypotheses

Hypothesis	3-way Interactions			Expectation
2	Hosting	X low cost	X increase in perceived fairness	reduction
3	Hosting	X increase in cost	X low perceived fairness	reduction
4	Hosting	X increase in cost	X high perceived fairness	no effect

⁷²To plot this 3-way logit interaction, I used code from <http://www.jeremydawson.co.uk/slopes.htm> and changed the intercept from the coefficient in model 11 (-16.00) to the coefficient from the same model without controls (-1.84, not shown), since otherwise the lines would appear below the graph window.

Figure 4.7: Substantive Effect of Hosting IOs on Campaign Violence Conditional on Hosting Cost and Incumbent Fairness (Hypotheses 2, 3, 4)



In model 11, the three-way interaction is significant, as is one of the two-way constituent terms. Figure 4.7 helps interpret the conditional Hypotheses; it suggests that Hypotheses 2 and 4 receive strong support, and Hypothesis 3 moderate support. Solid lines indicate higher perceived incumbent fairness, and dashed lines low perceived incumbent fairness. Black lines indicate IOs are present while red lines indicate IO absence. Since Hypotheses 2, 3, and 4 are conditional on hosting IOs, focus on the black lines in Figure 4.7. For Hypothesis 2, examine the black lines in the low cost region (left side of graph), which mark the effect of hosting IOs when hosting is cheap. Here an increase in perceived incumbent fairness (changing from dashed black to solid black lines) is associated with less violence. This is in line with Hypothesis 2. For Hypothesis 3, examine the dashed black line. As the hosting becomes more costly, the violence risk (slightly) decreases. This supports Hypothesis 3 but note that the slope of the line is small, so it is not a strong effect. For hypothesis 4, examine the solid black line, which marks the effect of high fairness and hosting IOs. As the hosting cost increases, there is a slight uptick in the slope, but this effect is probably not significant. The null effect is in line with Hypothesis 4.

Overall, these analyses provide support for the model's implications. All hypotheses receive some empirical support. The main, unconditional hypothesis is especially strong in significance and magnitude: *the incumbent's decision to invite election IOs significantly reduces opposition campaign violence*. In the run-up to elections, such violence is about 30 to 60 percentage points less

likely when IO missions attend national elections. Since these findings hold for a range of models, control variables, and are based on a relatively large number of observations (40 African countries since 1990), these findings should be generalizable to similar countries in other regions, such as Latin America and Asia. Further, these analyses show that the effect of IO assistance on violence is conditional on the costliness of hosting and perceptions of incumbent fairness, although these receive only moderate support.⁷³

4.4.1 Alternative Explanations

The main variation this chapter seeks to explain is why the government's acceptance of election assistance is associated with less opposition campaign violence. My argument is that by accepting external assistance the government sends a signal of its intended behavior; the government signals that it intends to compete fairly. Receiving that signal, the opposition is more likely to *believe* that the incumbent is fair. The opposition thus has lower incentives to engage in violence during the run-up to elections for two reasons. First, the opposition's use of violence would be *too costly* because the opposition risks losing popular legitimacy when it fights against a likely fair type. Second, the opposition does *not need* to use violence against a fair incumbent because in this situation it has chances of winning using regular means of competition, short of violence. There are at least two alternative explanations which can potentially explain the correlation between IO election support and lower opposition campaign violence.

One alternative explanation is that instead of the opposition changing its belief about incumbent type, accepting IO aid simply makes the election more fair, so there is less need to use violence. The idea is that by inviting IO aid, the incumbent decides to adopt a lower level of manipulation, which helps making the election more fair. As explained in section 4.1, there are several ways in which technical assistance and monitoring can level the electoral playing field in the run-up to elections. The key difference is in the mechanism: IO invitation changing opposition *beliefs* about incumbent type (my argument) versus IO presence and activities *making* the campaign more fair. This

⁷³I am less confident in the generalizability of these findings because they are based on smaller samples. As data on opposition campaign violence becomes available in the future, these conditional hypotheses can be re-evaluated to increase confidence.

alternative explanation complements rather than competes with the proposed argument. While a definitive test of the mechanism is difficult (short of interviews with opposition representatives), one way to go about empirically distinguishing this alternative proposition from my argument is by estimating the effect of an IO presence on the quality of the election campaigning period or the extent of problems during that phase.

Does IO monitoring or technical assistance improve the quality of elections? Existing research suggests that monitored elections are less fraudulent on election-day⁷⁴ but does not give much insight into campaigning periods or more general election quality (beyond fraud). There is some indication that monitored elections are better on average over the entire election period⁷⁵ but this may mask variation across the three stages of elections: pre, at, post election-day. Timing is important for this alternative explanation. Technical assistance usually starts months before the election and thus has potential to improve the electoral process. However, this quality-improving effect is less certain for monitoring missions. Most full-size observation missions only enter the country a week before the election. Pre-election missions are rather small and thus probably less effective at changing the electoral environment in the run-up to elections. Therefore it is unclear how monitoring would improve the quality of the campaigning period. In fact, research suggests that election observation may actually reduce pre-election quality. Internationally observed elections are associated with more pre-electoral fiscal manipulation and more conflict events.⁷⁶ In other words, while monitored elections may be better on election-day itself, there may be no or a negative effect in the pre-election period. Nevertheless, I test this alternative explanation by identifying the effect of IO presence on election campaign quality.

Table 4.8 shows that IOs have none or a limited effect on election campaign quality. The dependent variable measures election campaign quality, where 1 indicates high quality (no or minor problems) and 0 indicates low quality (moderate or major problems).⁷⁷ As discussed above, the incumbent

⁷⁴Hyde 2007.

⁷⁵Kelley 2012a, chapter 7.

⁷⁶See Hyde and Mahony 2010; and Daxecker 2014.

⁷⁷This is measured by the inverted SR11cheat from Kelley (2012a). According to this measure, 36 percent of elections in this sample have low-quality campaigning periods, 33 percent of elections have high-quality campaigning periods, and 31 percent of elections in this sample have missing values.

Table 4.8: Testing Alternative Explanation 1 - Determinants of Election Quality

	Fixed-Effects			Clustered SEs			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Hosting IOs	1.006 (1.174)			1.054** (0.426)			
Hosting IOs2		0.136 (1.187)	0.201 (1.391)		0.344 (0.444)		
Hosting IO M						0.797 (0.613)	
Hosting IO TA							3.182*** (1.032)
Election type	0.789 (0.756)	0.694 (0.741)	1.036 (0.887)	-0.219 (0.374)	0.007 (0.366)	0.038 (0.350)	-0.430 (0.386)
Oil & Gas pc	-0.920 (3.017)	-0.728 (2.244)	-1.628 (2.724)	0.190*** (0.067)	0.184*** (0.066)	0.186*** (0.064)	0.311*** (0.101)
GDP pc	-8.051 (4.942)	-8.735* (4.639)	-13.352** (5.836)	-0.854* (0.459)	-0.921* (0.475)	-0.777* (0.470)	-1.668*** (0.601)
Population size	-5.206 (5.347)	-6.931 (5.165)	-10.943* (6.507)	-0.995*** (0.327)	-0.921*** (0.331)	-0.876*** (0.327)	-1.235*** (0.414)
Executive constraints	-0.386 (0.525)	-0.472 (0.528)	-0.770 (0.660)	0.430** (0.183)	0.423** (0.177)	0.407** (0.176)	0.397** (0.196)
Likely Incumbent Victory	-3.418 (2.103)	-3.148* (1.800)	-4.918** (2.339)	-1.383*** (0.526)	-1.479*** (0.494)	-1.441*** (0.509)	-1.393** (0.696)
Civil war ongoing				-0.139 (0.613)	-0.211 (0.548)	-0.111 (0.554)	-0.333 (0.591)
Ethnic fractionalization				-2.602 (1.877)	-2.119 (1.636)	-1.874 (1.659)	-7.588*** (2.676)
Constant			237.580** (120.629)	22.229*** (7.115)	21.734*** (7.605)	19.449** (7.560)	36.109*** (10.641)
Observations	41	41	41	115	115	100	108
Countries	12	12	12	38	38	38	37
AIC	34.70	35.52	74.91	129.55	134.66	119.78	111.73
BIC	46.69	47.52	107.46	157.00	162.11	145.84	138.55
LL	-10.35	-10.76	-18.45	-54.77	-57.33	-49.89	-45.86
Country-fixed effects	yes	yes	no	no	no	no	no
Country indicators	no	no	yes	no	no	no	no
Country-clustered SE	no	no	no	yes	yes	yes	yes

Notes: The table reports logit estimates. The dependent variable is election quality. The unit of observation is a national election. Coefficients are reported with fixed effects (models 1-2), country-indicators (model 3), and standard errors clustered on country (models 4-7). ***, **, and * indicates significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level.

has three options: invite no IOs, invite only one type (technical assistance or monitoring), or invite both IO types. Table 4.8 shows that inviting any or both types has no effect on election quality.

In the fixed-effects models (1-3) of Table 4.8, IO assistance has no effect on election quality.⁷⁸ The coefficient always falls short of significance. It is consistently positively signed, suggesting that IO assistance tends to improve election quality rather than make it worse, but the difference between elections with and without IO missions is too small to be significant. This casts doubt on the first

⁷⁸As discussed above, I consider the fixed-effects logits to be the best identification approach because they capture non-random treatment of UN assistance: they focus on over-time variation in countries where the UN has attended at least once, rather than countries without any UN experience.

alternative explanation. The models with standard errors clustered on country take into account all countries – regardless of experience with UN missions. According to these models, coefficients are again positive but here elections with UN assistance have a significantly higher quality (fewer problems) than elections without UN missions. Hosting both IO types also significantly improves pre-election political conditions, but this seems to be mostly driven by the UN effect. I conclude that there may be some limited support for this alternative explanation when non-random treatment is not accounted for.

One issue to note is that higher election quality and less opposition violence may be endogenous. They are measured at the same time point (pre-election) and it is plausible that one impacts the other. Thus clearly establishing causality for this alternative explanation would be challenging. Even if exogeneity could be established – meaning IO assistance improves quality, which then decreases opposition violence – this explanation does not contradict my argument about changes in opposition’s belief about incumbent fairness; rather they are complementary and both processes may be at work.

A second alternative explanation is that some of the election aid goes to opposition parties – in the form of money, jobs, training – and the opposition does not use violence because it fears losing such IO aid in future elections. Again, while such aid is less frequently provided by monitoring, technical assistance is often aimed at a variety of stakeholders, including opposition parties. As an effort to work with civil society, such assistance can include poll training and political party support – this is often done even-handedly to all major parties, including the opposition. While this explanation is plausible, there are at least two theoretical reasons against it. First, this explanation assumes that opposition parties have a sufficiently long time horizon to forgo violence now in order to (re-)gain financial support at the next election in four to five years. Additionally, in many newly democratic countries, party systems are still in flux so that the particular opposition party may not exist at the next electoral cycle. Second, the level of election aid to any given opposition party may be too small to deter the group from engaging in violence. In a multi-party state, individual parties only receive a small slice of the pie, which may not generate a sufficiently large incentive to deter opposition violence.

Table 4.9: Testing Alternative Explanation 2 - Determinants of Election Aid

	Election Aid per capita			Election Aid		
	1	2	3	4	5	6
Opposition campaign violence	0.006 (0.017)	0.006 (0.017)	0.008 (0.011)	0.499 (1.663)	0.499 (1.663)	0.017 (1.267)
Election type	0.015 (0.011)	0.015 (0.011)	0.008 (0.006)	1.030 (1.069)	1.030 (1.069)	0.661 (0.621)
Civil war ongoing	0.263*** (0.061)	0.263*** (0.061)	0.009 (0.023)	8.580 (5.900)	8.580 (5.900)	-2.216 (1.861)
Ethnic fractionalization		-1.419 (1.275)	0.018 (0.043)		-82.254 (123.466)	-4.430 (3.886)
Oil & Gas pc	-0.006* (0.003)	-0.006* (0.003)	-0.002* (0.001)	-0.841** (0.322)	-0.841** (0.322)	-0.055 (0.112)
GDP pc	0.007 (0.044)	0.007 (0.044)	-0.000 (0.006)	-3.272 (4.303)	-3.272 (4.303)	-0.776 (0.741)
Population size	-0.033 (0.067)	-0.033 (0.067)	-0.005 (0.008)	1.638 (6.474)	1.638 (6.474)	1.778*** (0.590)
Executive constraints	-0.005 (0.007)	-0.005 (0.007)	-0.007* (0.004)	0.599 (0.698)	0.599 (0.698)	-0.263 (0.298)
Likely Incumbent Victory	-0.000 (0.017)	-0.000 (0.017)	0.003 (0.009)	-0.144 (1.607)	-0.144 (1.607)	-0.018 (1.271)
Constant	0.419 (1.125)	1.003 (0.632)	0.100 (0.135)	-20.720 (108.978)	20.889 (61.161)	-25.863** (12.634)
Observations	91	91	91	91	91	91
Clusters	38	38	38	38	38	38
R2	0.39	0.69	0.11	0.20	0.68	0.28
Country-fixed effects	yes	no	no	yes	no	no
Country indicators	no	yes	no	no	yes	no
Country-clustered SE	no	no	yes	no	no	yes

Notes: The table reports OLS estimates. The dependent variable is USAID spending on election aid. The unit of observation is a national election. ***, **, and * indicates significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level.

To test this second alternative explanation, it would be ideal to use data on funding for opposition parties and opposition parties' thinking about the value of such aid. Neither of these are easy to obtain. Data on party-aid often does not distinguish between incumbent and opposition, so I use aggregate party aid from the U.S., the largest bilateral donor. If the second alternative explanation is correct, opposition violence in the last election should reduce party aid in the following election.

Table 4.9 shows that the second alternative explanation is not supported. Opposition violence during the last election has no effect on aid to political parties (and other election-related issues) in the next election. The dependent variable, *election aid*, captures yearly USAID investment in “electoral assistance and political party support programs.”⁷⁹ Whether measured as per capita or overall, aid to political parties and elections is not driven by past opposition violence. These find-

⁷⁹AK110 from Finkel et al. 2008. It is a two-year average and measured in millions of constant 2000 USD.

ings are robust to measuring opposition *campaign* violence rather than opposition violence during the entire electoral cycle. The coefficient does not gain significance.

In sum, hosting IO assistance can significantly reduce opposition campaign violence. This is because the government's acceptance of international scrutiny changes the opposition's belief about the government's fairness and likely behavior during the election period. The opposition does *not* engage in less violence because it fears losing outside financial support in the next electoral cycle.

4.5 Illustrative Case: Zimbabwe

By hosting IO election assistance, governments show that they are willing to bear the costs of international scrutiny. This increased scrutiny should reduce the capacity (technical assistance) and increase the costs (monitoring) of domestic stakeholders to resort to force as a means of political competition. By hosting IOs, the government signals that it intends to compete (more) fairly, which can change the opposition's perception of incumbent fairness. Receiving that signal, the opposition is more likely to believe that the incumbent is fair, which reduces opposition incentives to engage in campaign violence. The opposition has lower incentives to engage in violence during the run-up to elections because (1) it may lose some of its legitimacy and own supporters when fighting a likely fair incumbent and (2) it may be able to win if the incumbent is indeed fair. This section examines the causal link between the government's costly signal (hosting IOs) and reduced violence: changed opposition beliefs about incumbent fairness.

To illustrate the link between hosting IOs and changes in opposition beliefs, I draw on Zimbabwe's elections. Since independence in 1980, President Robert Mugabe has ruled Zimbabwe as leader of his party, the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (Zanu-PF). Since 1999, the main opposition party is the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) under its leader Morgan Tsvangirai. Smaller opposition parties have surfaced over time but never won nationally at the polls. Elections have been held regularly but have fallen short of fair competition. In many elections, incumbent Mugabe has used a combination of the irregular campaigning tools listed in Table

4.1: intimidation, government largess, media bias, and manipulation of the election commission.⁸⁰ Consequently, this is a hard case to find any effect of IO missions on changes in opposition's belief about incumbent fairness. The Zimbabwean opposition should have high priors about the incumbent being unfair. As I show below, however, the opposition does regard IO election missions as an important signal of government intentions and likely government behavior during the election campaign.

As Table 4.10 shows, the presence of IO monitors has been accompanied by an absence of opposition violence during Zimbabwean election campaigns in 1990, 2000, 2002. In contrast, no IO monitors attended the 1996 and 2005 election, which experienced opposition campaign violence.⁸¹ The incumbent's use of violence has been constant throughout this time. Between 1990 and 2008, Mugabe has used election violence during every national election and in particular every campaigning period.⁸² This means that variation in opposition violence is not a direct reaction to the incumbent's use of force. To compare similar types of elections, I focus on legislative elections in 2000 and 2005.

Table 4.10: Zimbabwe's Elections: Hosting and Violence

year	type	INGOs	Opposition Strength	Hosting IO M	Opposition Violence
1990	E	na	17.87	1	0
1995	L	9	na	0	0
1996	E	7	na	0	1
2000	L	8	6.00	1	0
2002	E	12	47.00	1	0
2005	L	8	47.00	0	1
2008	L, E	8	39.52	0	0

4.5.1 Hosting credible IO monitors - infer (potential) fairness: 2000 elections

The parliamentary elections on 24-25 June 2000 were internationally observed and had no opposition campaign violence. By 2000, Mugabe had been in power consecutively for the past 20 years, and has had a track record of using violence as a political tool during elections. Admittedly, the opposition probably did not expect him to suddenly change stripes and turn into a democrat. But Mugabe's decision to host IOs prompted the opposition to expect more fair incumbent behavior

⁸⁰For a review of Zanu-PF strategies since 1980, see Kriger 2005.

⁸¹According to the UN data, Zimbabwe never hosted technical assistance.

⁸²Straus and Taylor 2012.

(and thus a more level electoral playing field) than before Mugabe invited observers.

Facing an economic crisis, shrinking domestic legitimacy, and international donor pressure, incumbent Mugabe invited several international observer missions on 16 May 2000: the European Union (EU), the National Democratic Institute (NDI), the Commonwealth of Nations, and the Southern African Development Community (SADC).⁸³ The incumbent's decision to host credible IOs prompted the opposition to think that there is a chance of free and fair elections, which in Zimbabwe means elections free of government repression. The leader of the largest opposition party (MDC), Morgan Tsvangirai, stated that IO election monitors may be associated with less incumbent manipulation. Four days after Mugabe invited IO monitors, opposition leader Tsvangirai suggested that the government may compete fairly and that unfair government behavior was not a forgone conclusion:

“We will test the waters and if there are any incidents of [government] violence, *this is what is going to make the elections free and fair or not.*” Opposition leader Tsvangirai also “hoped the deployment of international observers for next month's elections would reduce the violence.”⁸⁴

The opposition's interpretation of government fairness was supported to some degree when the government granted a later deadline for candidate nomination. The opposition had brought a case to the High Court in the capital, Harare, in order to delay the nomination deadline. The delay was important because with constituency boundaries still unclear, opposition candidates were unsure where to collect supporting signatures. The court granted a delay to 3 June, “the last day possible under Zimbabwe's election rules.”⁸⁵ Again on June 5, the opposition leader suggested that there is a chance the elections may be fair, threatening consequences “*if they rig the elections.*”⁸⁶

⁸³“Zimbabwe's Mugabe accepts Commonwealth monitors,” *Reuters*, 16 May 2000. Available at <http://www.zimbabwesituation.com/may18.html> and <http://www.zimbabwesituation.com/may19a.html#link8> On international observers in the Zimbabwe's 2000 election, see Laakso 2002.

⁸⁴“Zimbabwe opposition ‘to test violence,’” *BBC News*, 20 May 2000. Available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/756818.stm>

⁸⁵“Opposition wins election change,” *BBC News*, 25 May 2000. Available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/763553.stm>

⁸⁶MDC leader Tsvangirai “warned the government that his party would declare “war” on Mugabe if Zanu-PF rigged the forthcoming parliamentary elections. “The consequences will be too ghastly to contemplate if they rig the elections. They will beg us to remove them because the atmosphere would have become too hot for them.” See “War threat if election rigged,” *News24 (SA)*, 5 June 2000. Available at <http://www.zimbabwesituation.com/jun9a.html#link8>

The opposition's interpretation of potential fairness given IO monitors was echoed by political commentators at the time. A day after Tsvangirai's statement, the spokesman of the Commonwealth observers, McKinnon, argued that the government wished for free and fair elections, and that hosting IO monitors can support this process.⁸⁷ Further, a domestic political analyst argued that "the *fact* that we are going to get a lot of international observers will have a calming influence on the situation [of political violence]."⁸⁸ This suggests that it is primarily the government's *decision* to host IOs – rather than IO actions – which can calm tensions.

The opposition party, MDC, did not engage in campaign violence and repeatedly advocated peaceful campaigning.⁸⁹ On the day Mugabe invited observers, MDC secretary-general Welshman Ncube said that "despite pre-election violence and the intimidation of voters [by incumbent supporters], his party was obliged to contest the election by its strong commitment to oust Mugabe democratically."⁹⁰ Two days later, MDC leader Tsvangirai "urged voters today to resist violence and intimidation by ruling party militants and oust the party from power in upcoming parliamentary elections."⁹¹ Tsvangirai also stated that "We [the opposition] are still committed to fighting the elections on political discourse, not violence."⁹² And indeed the opposition did not engage in campaign violence. There are no reported incidents of any killings, kidnappings, beatings or other uses of physical force by opposition supporters.⁹³

In addition to this mechanism, outside observers have noted that the *presence* of international monitors calmed tensions in the campaigning period. The EU stated in its report that "the presence of a substantial number of international observers throughout the country played an important role

⁸⁷"The deployment of observers will help ensure a free and fair election", McKinnon said, adding: "That is certainly what the government has told me it wants to have." *Agence France Presse*, 16 May 2000. Available at <http://www.zimbabwesituation.com/may18a.html#link5>

⁸⁸Quoted Alfred Nhema of the University of Zimbabwe, *Independent Online*, 16 May 2000. Available at <http://www.zimbabwesituation.com/may22.html#c1>

⁸⁹Kruger 2000, 447.

⁹⁰"Zimbabwe's Mugabe accepts Commonwealth monitors," *Reuters*, 16 May 2000. Available at <http://www.zimbabwesituation.com/may18.html>

⁹¹See <http://www.zimbabwesituation.com/may19b.html#link4>

⁹²"The 'train drivers' giving Mugabe a headache," *The Mail & Guardian*, 14 May 2000. Available at <http://allafrica.com/stories/200005040225.html?viewall=1>

⁹³U.S. State Department 2001.

in reducing political tensions and calming conflict at a local level.”⁹⁴ Zimbabwe experts note that the presence of observers underlined the country’s “accountability over the elections, which, no doubt, was very important for the opposition,” and that IO observers contributed to peace and stability, even if temporary.⁹⁵ Given that the history of Mugabe’s rule presents a difficult case for the opposition to change its beliefs about incumbent fairness, this is strong evidence in favor of the mechanism and the overall effect.

4.5.2 Not hosting credible IO monitors - infer unfairness: 2005 elections

Five years later, legislative elections were held again, on 31 March 2005. By now, Mugabe had experience with the dynamics of monitoring, in particular international criticism of the 2000 elections, and was cherry-picking international observer groups to avoid criticism. Mugabe did not invite Western groups, which had been more critical of the 2000 and other past elections. The non-invited groups included the EU, NDI, CC, the Commonwealth, along with bilateral observers from Britain, Australia, and Japan. Even a SADC delegation was barred, presumably because it had issued a damning report earlier.⁹⁶ The official rationale for cherry-picking observers was that “we in Africa would like to be judged by Africans who share the same values with us” and that some foreigners may be “stirring up unrest in the country.”⁹⁷

Mugabe only invited sympathetic observers, meaning “observers only from countries that have either openly supported the ruling ZANU PF government or have maintained silence about the country’s prolonged political and human rights crisis.”⁹⁸ In effect, this meant inviting only regional and pro-Mugabe observers, including observers from South Africa, Tanzania, Namibia, China, Iran, Venezuela, and Russia. Hosting only “friendly” observers – and no Western IOs – carries little weight. It cannot send a signal of fairness because there are no or only negligible costs involved

⁹⁴EU 2000, 25.

⁹⁵Laakso 2002, 455, 459.

⁹⁶Dzikamayi Chidyausiku, “The Right Sort of Observers: South Africa joins some less than democratic states invited to watch the election, as anyone who might be critical is struck off the list,” *Institute for War and Peace Reporting*, Africa Reports: Zimbabwe Elections No. 20, 25 March 2005. Available at http://www.zimbabwesituation.com/mar26a_2005.html#link9

⁹⁷Lewis Machipisa, Zimbabweans applaud EU sanctions, *BBC*, 20 February 2002. Available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/1829394.stm> Accessed 8 march 2014. And see Chidyausiku, cited above.

⁹⁸Ibid.

by hosting lenient observer groups. This strategy was obvious to the opposition, which concluded that Mugabe tried to avoid international scrutiny:

The cherry-picking process will have a serious impact on the credibility of the ballot result... There is no diversity in the kind of observer teams invited by the government. The election will consequently lose all credibility because the observer missions are not truly representative of the international community as a whole... There are serious legitimacy and credibility issues surrounding the upcoming elections... *If the government really believed free and fair elections were about to be held, then it would have freely welcomed anyone interested to observe them. By barring so many observer teams, the government has shown that it has something to hide.* The world will have no confidence in the observers that have been selected.⁹⁹

Since the government did not host credible IOs, the opposition concluded that the government was unfair. The opposition engaged in violence during the parliamentary election campaign: MDC supporters killed one Zanu-PF supporter and kidnapped a Zanu-PF senior party official.¹⁰⁰ The senior party official was kidnapped by six MDC youths, who later appeared before a Harare magistrate.¹⁰¹ Further, four weeks before the election a Zanu-PF supporter, Gift Chimbandi, was burnt to death in his house in Mazowe East, just north of the capital Harare.¹⁰² This shows that even in a “hard case” for the argument proposed here (long-term repressive incumbents), hosting election IOs can change opposition beliefs about incumbent fairness and consequently their incentives to engage in campaign violence.

4.6 Conclusion

This chapter examines the effect of IO election assistance on opposition campaign violence. Governments can send a costly signal of their fairness by inviting international election assistance in the

⁹⁹Ibid.

¹⁰⁰U.S. State Department 2006.

¹⁰¹“Zimbabwe: 6 More MDC Youths On Kidnapping Charges,” *The Herald*, 3 June 2005. Available at <http://allafrica.com/stories/200506030963.html>

¹⁰²“During elections political violence increases in March 2005,” *Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum*, 26 March 2005. Available at <http://www.hrforumzim.org/publications/monthly-political-violence-reports/mpvr-mar-2005/>

form of technical assistance and monitoring. The two forms of international intervention are costly because they increase scrutiny of the electoral process. Technical assistance reduces the capacity of domestic stakeholder to engage in manipulation because it reforms electoral processes so that some options of “irregular electioneering” are taken from the table (or at least reduced). International monitoring can increase the costs of manipulation, thus making these options less attractive. Both are costly interventions for unfair governments.

I use a signaling model to derive hypotheses about how IO assistance influences opposition violence. By inviting external assistance, incumbents can send a costly signal of their type, i.e. whether they intend to compete fairly or unfairly in the election. Receiving that signal, the opposition updates its belief about the incumbent’s fairness. Since fighting likely fair incumbents is more costly and less beneficial than fighting unfair incumbents, the opposition’s updated belief can also change its incentives to engage in violence in the run-up to elections.

The statistical analysis of national elections in sub-Saharan Africa from 1990 to 2008 provides strong support for the argument. The main result is that hosting IO election assistance can significantly reduce opposition campaign violence. Inviting no election IOs at all is associated with a 68 percent probability that the opposition engages in campaign violence. Inviting either type of IO assistance – technical or monitoring – is associated with a significant reduction in violence. With at least one type of assistance, the probability of opposition campaign violence is only 36 percent. This probability is even further reduced to 9 percent when the government has invited both types of IO assistance. In addition to this main, direct effect of IO assistance on campaign violence, the IO effect is also conditional on perceived incumbent fairness and the costliness of hosting IOs. When the cost of hosting is low, an increase in perceived incumbent fairness is associated with a significant decrease in opposition violence. And when the incumbent is seen as likely unfair, inviting IOs is only associated with less violence when hosting is costly, e.g. through high opposition competition or few other NGOs in the country.

This analysis combined with a test of alternative explanations supports the argument that a government’s *decision* to host election IOs can have pacifying effects on electoral competition because

it changes opposition incentives to engage in violence. This effect, as estimated here, is solely due to the government's decision about whether to invite IOs: it does not depend on the direct effect that IOs may have once they arrive in the country and start reforming or observing the process. The mechanism underlying this relationship – changed opposition beliefs about incumbent fairness – is illustrated with national elections in Zimbabwe.

This chapter contributes to existing research in two ways. First, it identifies the drivers of pre-election violence, and examines a specific type of perpetrator: the opposition. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study of opposition violence. Other studies have focused on incumbent violence during the campaign or aggregated violence independent of perpetrator.¹⁰³ Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski (2014) found that incumbents use less violence in the campaigning period when they are likely to win the election. Similarly, this chapter found some indication that the opposition also uses less violence when confronted with a likely incumbent victory (i.e. opposition loss). This supports the notion that violence is employed as a political tool, and employed when beneficial. This reveals an interesting dynamic: when threatened with defeat, an incumbent is more likely whereas the opposition is less likely to use violence, all else equal. This may be the case because using violence is less costly to the incumbent, since he can draw on state resources. It may also be the case because of loss aversion or the perceived value of holding office. Psychologists have shown that individuals prefer avoiding losses to acquiring gains.¹⁰⁴ While the spoils from office are objectively constant, an incumbent losing office may lose more satisfaction than the opposition gains satisfaction from winning office. Future research could further explore campaign violence to identify perceptions, capabilities, and incentives varying by actors.

Second, this chapter contributes to existing research by highlighting the pacifying effect of IO election assistance: technical assistance and monitoring. Both external programs support free and fair elections, but they differ in their activities and mechanisms of influence. International technical assistance implements country-specific reforms in collaboration with the host government. Democracy-oriented technical assistance missions have received far less attention than their

¹⁰³See, respectively, Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski 2014; and Arriola and Johnson 2012.

¹⁰⁴Kahnemann and Tversky 1984.

monitoring counterpart, perhaps because they are less media-driven. Yet these missions are more engaged and enduring than monitoring: while observers passively record activities of domestic actors, technical support actively changes electoral processes and institutions before and during the campaigning period. In fact, the analysis here finds that technical assistance or both types of IOs can significantly reduce campaign violence, but monitoring alone is not effective (Table 4.5, models 1-4). Given this finding and the scarcity of research on technical assistance, future efforts to explore the dynamics and effects of such technical assistance missions would be a contribution valued in academia and the policy community. I return to the effect of technical assistance on post-election violence in chapter 6.


For election observation, chapters 4 and 5 demonstrate important dynamics between IOs and domestic stakeholders. On the one hand, the government's decision to invite election IOs can calm the campaign process by *reducing* the opposition's incentives to engage in violence. On the other hand, this decision to invite can "backfire" after the election if the IO monitor declares that the official result is not credible, *increasing* the loser's incentives to challenge the result violently. This suggests that election assistance can be a double-edged sword: fueling or calming violence depending on IO assistance type and electoral stage.

4.7 Appendix A – Statistics

Table 4.11: Descriptive Statistics

	Variable	Mean	SD	Min	Max	N
DV	Opposition Campaign Violence	0.22	0.42	0	1	220
IVs	Hosting IO M	0.78	0.41	0	1	181
	Hosting IO TA	0.16	0.36	0	1	211
	Hosting IOs	0.80	0.64	0	2	219
	Hosting IOs2	0.68	0.47	0	1	219
Conditioning variables	Competitiveness	2.64	1.13	0	5	190
	Opposition Strength (percentage)	10.9	14.44	0	49.54	140
	Democracy INGOs (count)	5.58	3.33	0	14	214
	CIRI Physical integrity	4.62	2.08	0	8	195
CVs	Election type	0.88	0.85	0	2	220
	Civil war ongoing	0.16	0.43	0	2	220
	Oil & Gas pc (logged)	-5.41	6.35	-9.21	9.49	206
	GDP pc (logged)	6.38	1.02	4.28	9.88	216
	Population size (logged)	15.24	1.65	11.18	18.78	220
	Executive constraints	3.42	1.88	1	7	186
	Likely incumbent victory	0.65	0.47	0	1	201
	Ethnic fractionalization	0.66	0.23	0.06	0.94	206
	cowcode	489	61	402	625	220
	year	1999	5	1990	2008	220

Figure 4.8: Distribution of Conditioning Variables



4.8 Appendix B – Proof of Equilibria

4.8.1 Proof of Pooling Equilibrium

Player 1 strategy: Both types of the Incumbent choose the same message, so that they cannot be distinguished on the basis of their behavior. Since the fair type only hosts, in a potential pooling equilibrium both types host.

$$\sigma_1(t) = \begin{cases} \text{if fair: host IOs} \\ \text{if unfair: host IOs} \end{cases}$$

Beliefs for Player 2: If the Opposition sees that the Incumbent plays *host* - along the equilibrium path - Bayes' rule applies. We know that $P(\text{fair}) = p$ and $P(\text{unfair}) = 1 - p$. By construction (the assignment of the Incumbent's strategy above), we also know that $P(\text{host} \mid \text{fair}) = 1$ and $P(\text{host} \mid \text{unfair}) = 1$. Plugging in and solving, we get:

$$\begin{aligned} \mu_2(\text{fair} \mid \text{host}) &= \frac{P(\text{host} \mid \text{fair}) P(\text{fair})}{P(\text{host})} \\ &= \frac{P(\text{host} \mid \text{fair}) P(\text{fair})}{P(\text{host} \mid \text{fair}) P(\text{fair}) + P(\text{host} \mid \text{unfair}) P(\text{unfair})} \\ &= \frac{1p}{1p + 1(1 - p)} = p \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \mu_2(\text{unfair} \mid \text{host}) &= \frac{P(\text{host} \mid \text{unfair}) P(\text{unfair})}{P(\text{host})} \\ &= \frac{P(\text{host} \mid \text{unfair}) P(\text{unfair})}{P(\text{host} \mid \text{unfair}) P(\text{unfair}) + P(\text{host} \mid \text{fair}) P(\text{fair})} \\ &= \frac{1(1 - p)}{1(1 - p) + 1p} = 1 - p \end{aligned}$$

Best Response for Player 2: We determine the Opposition's best response by calculating her expected utility in the case of hosting.

Against *host* (at the right-hand information set):

$$\begin{aligned}
 EU_2(\text{no violence, host}) &= \mu_2(\text{fair} \mid \text{host}) * U_2(\text{no violence, host; fair}) \\
 &\quad + \mu_2(\text{unfair} \mid \text{host}) * U_2(\text{no violence, host; unfair}) \\
 &= p * 0 + (1 - p) * 0 = 0
 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
 EU_2(\text{violence, host}) &= \mu_2(\text{fair} \mid \text{host}) * U_2(\text{violence, host; fair}) \\
 &\quad + \mu_2(\text{unfair} \mid \text{host}) * U_2(\text{violence, host; unfair}) \\
 &= p * (v_F) + (1 - p) * (v_{UF})
 \end{aligned}$$

Player 2 chooses *no violence* against *host* when her payoff from violence is smaller than that from no violence. Per above:

$$EU_2(\text{violence, host}) < EU_2(\text{no violence, host})$$

$$p * (v_F) + (1 - p) * (v_{UF}) < 0$$

$$p(v_F) + v_U - p(v_{UF}) < 0$$

$$p(v_F) - p(v_{UF}) < -v_{UF}$$

$$-p(v_{UF} - v_F) < -v_{UF}$$

$$p(v_{UF} - v_F) > v_{UF}$$

$$p > \frac{v_{UF}}{v_{UF} - v_F}$$

$$BR_2(\text{host}) = \begin{cases} \text{if } p < \frac{v_{UF}}{v_{UF} - v_F}: \text{ violence} \\ \text{if } p > \frac{v_{UF}}{v_{UF} - v_F}: \text{ no violence} \end{cases}$$

Against *not host* (at the left-hand information set):

$$\begin{aligned} EU_2(\text{no violence, not host}) &= \mu_2(\text{unfair} \mid \text{not host}) * U_2(\text{no violence, not host; unfair}) \\ &= 1 * 0 = 0 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} EU_2(\text{violence, not host}) &= \mu_2(\text{unfair} \mid \text{not host}) * U_2(\text{violence, not host; unfair}) \\ &= 1 * v_{UF} = v_{UF} \end{aligned}$$

The best response for Player 2 against *not host* is violence because by assumption $v_{UF} > 0$.

$$BR_2(\text{not host}) : \text{violence}$$

There is a pooling equilibrium if Player 2 chooses *no violence* against *host* and *violence* against *not host*. The fair type by assumption cannot deviate. The unfair type does not deviate as long as his equilibrium payoff ($-h$) is greater than ($-c$). This is an equilibrium under two conditions: (1) $h < c$ and (2) p is high. The threshold value of p depends on v .

Player 2 chooses *no violence* against *host* when her payoff from violence is smaller than that from no violence. As shown above, this is the case when $p > \frac{v_{UF}}{v_{UF} - v_F}$.


Strategy Profile for Pooling:

$1_F: H$
 $1_{UF}: H$
 $2: NV \text{ if } H, V \text{ if } NH$
 $p(F | H) = p$
 $p(F | NH) = 0$

when parameter values satisfy:
 (1) $h < c$ (both 1's choose H)
 (2) $p > \frac{v_{UF}}{v_{UF} - v_F}$ (2 chooses NV against H)
 (3) $v_{UF} > 0$ (2 chooses V against NH)

O's Prior Belief about p

	unfair (low)	fair (high)
$h < c$		Pooling
$h > c$		



4.8.2 Proof of Separating Equilibrium

Player 1 strategy:

$$\sigma_1(t) = \begin{cases} \text{if fair: host IOs} \\ \text{if unfair: not host IOs} \end{cases}$$

Beliefs for Player 2: If Player 2 sees that Player 1 plays *not host* (at the left-hand information set), she will assign probability 1 to type unfair. If she sees Player 2 play *host*, she will assign probability 1 to type fair. These are the only beliefs consistent with Bayes' rule, because both the left-hand and the right-hand information sets are reached with positive probability along the equilibrium path. Recall Bayes' rule and plug in known quantities, such as $P(\text{fair}) = p$ and $P(\text{unfair}) = 1 - p$.

By construction, $P(\text{host} \mid \text{fair}) = 1$ and $P(\text{host} \mid \text{unfair}) = 0$.

$$\begin{aligned}\mu_2(\text{fair} \mid \text{host}) &= \frac{P(\text{host} \mid \text{fair}) P(\text{fair})}{P(\text{host})} \\ &= \frac{P(\text{host} \mid \text{fair}) P(\text{fair})}{P(\text{host} \mid \text{fair}) P(\text{fair}) + P(\text{host} \mid \text{unfair}) P(\text{unfair})} \\ &= \frac{1p}{1p + 0(1-p)} = 1\end{aligned}$$

Therefore $\mu_2(\text{fair} \mid \text{host}) = 1$ and $\mu_2(\text{unfair} \mid \text{host}) = 0$. Since the fair type can only host in the model, we know that

$$\begin{aligned}\mu_2(\text{fair} \mid \text{not host}) &= 0 \\ \mu_2(\text{unfair} \mid \text{not host}) &= 1\end{aligned}$$

Best Response for Player 2: We determine the Opposition's best response by calculating her expected utility for each case.

Against *host*:

$$\begin{aligned}EU_2(\text{no violence, host}) &= \mu_2(\text{fair} \mid \text{host}) * U_2(\text{no violence, host; fair}) \\ &\quad + \mu_2(\text{unfair} \mid \text{host}) * U_2(\text{no violence, host; unfair}) \\ &= 1 * 0 + 0 * 0 = 0\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}EU_2(\text{violence, host}) &= \mu_2(\text{fair} \mid \text{host}) * U_2(\text{violence, host; fair}) \\ &\quad + \mu_2(\text{unfair} \mid \text{host}) * U_2(\text{violence, host; unfair}) \\ &= 1 * v_F + 0 * v_{UF} = v_F\end{aligned}$$

The best response for Player 2 against *host* is no violence because by assumption $v_F < 0$.

$BR_2(\text{host})$: no violence.

Against *not host*:

$$\begin{aligned}
 EU_2(\text{no violence, not host}) &= \mu_2(\text{unfair} \mid \text{not host}) * U_2(\text{no violence, not host; unfair}) \\
 &= 1 * 0 = 0
 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
 EU_2(\text{violence, not host}) &= \mu_2(\text{unfair} \mid \text{not host}) * U_2(\text{violence, not host; unfair}) \\
 &= 1 * v_{UF} = v_{UF}
 \end{aligned}$$

Therefore the best response for Player 2 against *not host* is violence because by assumption $v_U > 0$.


$BR_2(\text{not host})$: violence

It is an equilibrium for Player 2 to play *no violence* against *host* and *violence* against *not host* as long as $h > c$. The fair Incumbent cannot deviate. The unfair type does not deviate as long as his equilibrium payoff ($-c$) exceeds his deviation payoff ($-h$).¹⁰⁵

Strategy Profile for Separating:

- 1_F : H
 - 1_{UF} : NH
 - 2: NV if H, V if NH
 - $p(F \mid H) = 1$
 - $p(F \mid NH) = 0$
- when parameter values satisfy:
- (1) $h > c$ (unfair 1 chooses NH)
 - (2) $v_F < 0$ (2 chooses NV given H)
 - (3) $v_{UF} > 0$ (2 chooses V given NH)

		O's Prior Belief about p	
		unfair (low)	fair (high)
$h < c$			
$h > c$	Separating	Separating	



¹⁰⁵In detail: When the Opposition receives signal NH, it chooses V, so the unfair Incumbent's payoff for NH is $-c$. When the Opposition receives signal H, it chooses NV, so the unfair Incumbent's payoff is $-h$. The unfair Incumbent chooses NH as long as $-c > -h$, or in other words $h > c$.

4.8.3 Proof of Semi-Separating Equilibrium

Player 1 and 2 strategies: If a semi-separating equilibrium exists in this game, it must take the form that the fair type of Player 1 chooses *host* exclusively, and the unfair type of Player 1 mixes *host* and *not host*. The only uncertainty exists with respect to the mixing probabilities for the unfair type.

$$\sigma_1(t) = \begin{cases} \text{if fair: host} \\ \text{if unfair: } r * \text{host} + (1 - r) * \text{not host IOs where } r \in (0,1] \end{cases}$$

$$\sigma_2 = \begin{cases} \text{if not host: violence (because by assumption } v_{UF} > 0) \\ \text{if host: } s * \text{violence} + (1 - s) * \text{no violence} \end{cases}$$

Beliefs for Player 2: If Player 2 observes H, player 2 will update beliefs about player 1's type using Bayes' rule. Fair type will H with probability 1; unfair type will host with probability r . We calculate player 2's updated belief about player 1's type, knowing that

$$P(\text{host} \mid \text{fair}) = 1$$

$$P(\text{host} \mid \text{unfair}) = r$$

$$P(\text{fair}) = p$$

$$P(\text{unfair}) = 1 - p$$

$$P(\text{fair} \mid \text{not host}) = 0$$

$$P(\text{unfair} \mid \text{not host}) = 1$$

$$\begin{aligned} \mu_2(\text{fair} \mid \text{host}) &= \frac{P(\text{host} \mid \text{fair}) P(\text{fair})}{P(\text{host})} \\ &= \frac{P(\text{host} \mid \text{fair}) P(\text{fair})}{P(\text{host} \mid \text{fair}) P(\text{fair}) + P(\text{host} \mid \text{unfair}) P(\text{unfair})} \\ &= \frac{1 * p}{1 * p + r * (1 - p)} = \frac{p}{p + r(1 - p)} \end{aligned}$$

Mixing strategy for Player 2: The unfair type of player 1 has to choose r to keep player 2 indifferent

between V and NV. We calculate player 2's payoff to V using updated beliefs and set this equal to 0; then solve for r. Given H, player 2 indifferent between V and NV when $r = \frac{v_F * p}{v_{UF} * (p-1)}$.

$$\begin{aligned}
 EU_2(\text{violence, host}) &= \mu_2(\text{fair} \mid \text{host}) * U_2(\text{violence, host; fair}) \\
 &+ \mu_2(\text{unfair} \mid \text{host}) * U_2(\text{violence, host; unfair}) \\
 &= \frac{p}{p+r(1-p)} * v_F + \left[1 - \frac{p}{p+r(1-p)}\right] * v_{UF} \\
 0 &= \frac{p}{p+r(1-p)} * v_F + \frac{r(1-p)}{p+r(1-p)} * v_{UF}
 \end{aligned}$$

$$-v_{UF} * r * (1-p) = v_F * p$$

$$r = \frac{v_F * p}{v_{UF} * (p-1)}$$

Mixing strategy for Player 1 type unfair: Player 2 has to choose s to keep the unfair type indifferent between H and NH. If the unfair type chooses H, player 2 will choose V with probability s . We calculate the unfair type's payoff from H in terms of s .

$$EU_{1U}(\text{host}) = s * (-h - c) + (1 - s) * (-h) = -hs - cs - h + hs = -h - cs$$

If the unfair type chooses NH, player 2 will know that player 1 is type unfair, and so will choose V, so the unfair type payoff will be $-c$. We set $-c$ equal to $-h - cs$ and solve for s .

$$-c = -h - cs$$

$$s = 1 - \frac{h}{c}$$

We also know that for this semi-separating equilibrium to arise, p must be sufficiently low. From above, we know that

$$r = \frac{p*v_F}{p*v_{UF}-v_{UF}} \text{ which is equivalent to } p = \frac{r*v_{UF}}{r*v_{UF}-v_F}$$

From the prior pooling equilibrium we know that $p = \frac{v_{UF}}{v_{UF}-v_F}$

We also know that $r \in [0,1]$ and that $v_F < v_{UF}$ and that $v_{UF} > 0$. Therefore for any values of r (except $r = 1$): the “pooling p ” is necessarily bigger than the “semi-separating p ”

$$\frac{v_{UF}}{v_{UF}-v_F} > \frac{r*v_{UF}}{r*v_{UF}-v_F}$$

When p is sufficiently high, we have a pooling equilibrium; and when p is sufficiently low, we have a semi-separating equilibrium.

Strategy Profile for Semi-Separating:

$1_F: H$ $1_{UF}: (r) H + (1-r) NH$ $2: V \text{ if } NH; (s) V + (1-s) NV \text{ if } H$ $p (F H) = \frac{p}{p+r(1-p)}$ $p (F NH) = 0$	}	when parameter values satisfy: (1) $r = \frac{v_F*p}{v_{UF}*p-v_{UF}}$ (probability that unfair I hosts) (2) $s = 1 - \frac{h}{c}$ (probability that O is indifferent between V and NV)
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O's Prior Belief about p

	unfair (low)	fair (high)
$h < c$	Semi-Separating	
$h > c$		

5 | Sore Losers? International Condemnation and Domestic Incentives for Post-Election Violence

Following the Presidential election in November 2010, Cote d'Ivoire was left with two men claiming the presidency. The incumbent Laurent Gbagbo had served as President for ten years and won a plurality of votes in the first round of voting against 13 opponents, but fell short of a majority with only 38 percent of the total vote. In the run-off, Gbagbo was second behind Alassane Ouattara who won 54 percent of the total vote. The recently formed electoral commission certified that Ouattara had won, and this certification was further supported by the UN's observer tabulation and the European Union's (EU) congratulations to Ouattara on December 3. However, the constitutional court – staffed with Gbagbo loyalists – published its own election result after invalidating seven Ouattara-heavy Northern districts due to “irregularities.” The court declared Gbagbo the winner with 51 percent. The EU election observation mission reacted swiftly, stating that it “condemns ... [and] refuses to recognize the results announced by the Constitutional Council which it considers contrary to the will expressed by the Ivorian people in the polls.”¹

The international condemnation of the announced result strengthened the alleged electoral loser: “Backed by the UN and the EU, Cote d'Ivoire opposition leader Alassane Ouattara ... declared himself president-elect.”² Both men took an oath of office as President of the Republic on December 4. Ouattara's supporters took “to the streets to rally” and were lethally repressed when “security forces launched grenades at Ouattara supporters” and civilians, leading to 14 fatalities.³

Street fighting quickly escalated into broader, civil conflict over the following four months. Dur-

¹Declaration of the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly on the Proclamation of the Results of the 2nd Round of the Presidential Election Held in Cote d'Ivoire on 28 November 2010, 5 December 2010. Available at <http://www.acp.int/content/declaration-acp-eu-joint-parliamentary-assembly-proclamation-results-2nd-round-presidential->. Also see <http://www.thepatrioticvanguard.com/spip.php?article5697>; and Korva Coleman, EU To Ivory Coast's Gbagbo: Get Out, NPR, 17 December 2010. Available at <http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2010/12/17/132132112/eu-to-ivory-coasts-gbagbo-get-out>.

²Cote d'Ivoire: Ouattara Claims Victory as Gbagbo Backlash Mounts, Radio France Internationale, 3 December 2010. Available at <http://www.english.rfi.fr/africa/20101203-ouattara-claims-victory-Gbagbo-backlash-mounts>.

³See ACLED Cote d'Ivoire events 47983, 47978-47980; and SCAD Cote d'Ivoire event 4370244; also see 4370245.

ing that time, over a thousand civilians were killed and one million civilians fled heavy fighting. The UN Security Council authorized military action against Gbagbo in late March 2011. By late April, Ouattara's supporters controlled about ninety percent of the country and Gbagbo was finally forced to give up when French and UN troops bombarded the Presidential palace in Abidjan.

Cote d'Ivoire is one case of post-election violence but it is not unique. Violence has erupted after several recent elections, most prominently in Africa: Ethiopia in 2005, Kenya in 2007 and Nigeria in 2011. In sub-Saharan Africa since 1990, electoral violence ensued after almost 20 percent of national elections.⁴ Since the peaceful implementation of any election outcome requires the consent of the loser, what makes a loser accept an adverse result? Why does intense violence break out after some elections but not others? Finally, how do domestic and international factors influence the propensity for post-election violence?

I argue that international condemnation – in the form of a negative report by an IO election monitor – can increase post-election violence by increasing the loser's incentives to challenge the result. A negative report (alleging manipulation) benefits the loser because it increases the loser's likelihood of winning a potential post-election fight by increasing the number of people who are willing to fight for him. A negative report (i) suggests that the loser likely has more popular support than the official (biased) result indicates. When election results are biased, they are usually biased in favor of the winner,⁵ so that the winner's vote share is artificially inflated whereas the loser's vote share is artificially low. Therefore, negative reports indicate that the loser likely has greater popular support than the official result suggests, perhaps as much or more popular support than the winner. Further, a negative report (ii) facilitates mobilization among the loser's supporters by serving as a focal point around which they can mobilize; it helps to crystallize support behind the loser in favor of overturning the result. If the loser is more likely to win a potential post-election fight, he is more likely to challenge the result. By increasing the loser's incentives to challenge the result, a condemnation can also increase the risk of violence – either because the loser challenges violently or because the loser's challenge is violently crushed.

⁴Author's calculation from Straus and Taylor 2011, see Table 5.1.

⁵Hyde (2007) finds that most fraud originates from the incumbent, who can bring to bear the resources and power associated with his office; and incumbents often win.

This chapter makes two contributions. First, it contributes to research on the effect of international actors on domestic politics and conflict.⁶ While the link between negative monitoring reports and “domestic political uprisings and electoral revolutions” has been noted in some cases, the connection “has not been treated ... with rigorous cross-national quantitative methods.”⁷ This paper provides systematic evidence of this link with new data from 39 states in sub-Saharan Africa between 1990 and 2008, case studies, and a formal model. The statistical analysis shows that controlling for fraud and a host of other covariates, international condemnation has an additional, violence-inducing effect: It is associated with a 35 percentage point increase in the probability of post-election violence. Thus, credible international election observers can at times increase domestic conflict and have lasting influence on national politics. More broadly, this article highlights unintended effects and thereby complements other work on negative side effects of IOs on domestic politics.⁸

Second, this chapter contributes to civil conflict research by highlighting an important but under-explored type of conflict: electoral violence. About a quarter of elections worldwide are affected by electoral violence.⁹ In sub-Saharan Africa since 1990, 1 in 5 elections is followed by electoral violence.¹⁰ Despite its prevalence, the logic and dynamics of *electoral* conflict have been largely neglected compared to other conflict types such as civil war.¹¹ I argue that electoral losers are important for the dynamics of violence unfolding after an election, and highlight conditions under which the loser’s dissatisfaction with the announced electoral result often leads to violence. I argue that the loser’s probability of winning a fight is important and that his chance of winning such a fight is a function of his popularity, his incumbency advantage (if any), and whether the election result receives international condemnation. The statistical analysis shows that a balance of power increases conflict: greater support for the electoral loser also has a violence-increasing effect. I

⁶For example, see Gourevitch 1978; Levitsky and Way 2005 and 2006; Mansfield and Pevehouse 2006; and Pevehouse 2005.

⁷Hyde 2011: 8. For research on post-election protests – not violence – see Hyde and Marinov 2014; and Kuhn 2012.

⁸See Abouharb and Cingranelli 2006; and Busch and Reinhardt 2003.

⁹See Fischer 2002; Bekoe 2009; Straus and Taylor 2012; and Simper 2013.

¹⁰Straus and Taylor 2012.

¹¹For civil conflict research, see Hegre et al. 2001; Collier 2003; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Davenport and Armstrong 2004; and Kalyvas 2006.

argue that in such contexts the loser has greater incentives to challenge the result because his chances of winning a fight are decent if vote shares reasonably reflect mobilization potential among the population. Several other predictors of other types of civil conflict, such as natural resources, ethnic fractionalization and economic development are less influential for post-election violence.

Some may object that the argument proposed here about international condemnation suffers from a selection effect. If this were true, IO monitors would attend more problematic elections; their condemnation would reflect the problems but such elections would have been violent independent of the negative report. This concern is addressed theoretically and empirically in detail later. For an explanation of why this is not the case – rather IO reports have an independent effect on violence – refer to section 5.4.7. The paper proceeds as follows. Bringing together research on political violence and IOs, I situate my argument in each literature and then discuss the theoretical mechanism in section 5.1. The formal model and its implications are introduced in section 5.2. The research design and the new data on the intensity of post-election violence in sub-Saharan Africa is laid out in section 5.3, followed by the discussion of statistical results and a case comparison in section 5.4.

5.1 Post-Election Violence and its Causes

For the purposes of this paper, post-election violence is physical force intended to hurt or kill and arises in reaction to an announced election result.¹² This logic is different from pre-election violence, which can be used to influence turnout and vote choice on election-day.¹³ The only two statistical studies (to my knowledge) examining conflict/violence after elections suggest that four covariates are key drivers: fraud, pre-election violence, opposition boycotts, and an international presence.¹⁴ To avoid conceptual stretching, electoral violence here does not include corruption or

¹²As explained in section 6.3, the dependent variable has four categories, all of which focus squarely on the use of physical force. However, the lowest violence category (level 1) also includes as one of its five indicators opposition newspapers being confiscated.

¹³Straus and Taylor 2012: 20-21.

¹⁴See Arriola and Johnson 2012 for post-election violence; and Daxecker 2012 for general intra-state conflict events that happen in the period after elections. Another statistical study examines the subset of post-election protests and asks when governments use repression in these cases (Hafner-Burton, Hyde and Jablonski 2014). Other studies examine aggregate violence across the entire election period without attention to timing (Norris 2012) or violence across the entire country-year (Cingranelli and Filippov 2010; Davenport 1997; Davenport and Armstrong 2004; Richards 1999; Richard and Gelleny 2007). A few case studies exist for egregious cases; Straus 2011 analyzes patterns

fraud.¹⁵ While violence necessitates an element of physical force, fraud does not.

Similarly, violence needs to be distinguished from peaceful demonstrations. While protest movements can potentially turn violent, empirically there is wide variation in the conflict intensity of protests. In short, fraud and peaceful protests can trigger violence but these are three distinct phenomena. More importantly, our understanding of post-election violence will be incomplete by only looking at protests. Almost *half* of all post-election violence erupts without protests, as shown in the lower row of Table 5.1.¹⁶ Thus a substantial portion of post-vote violence cannot be explained by the protest literature. Examples of this category – post-vote violence without protests – are Tanzania 1995 and Zimbabwe 1995 and 2000.¹⁷ Post-vote violence (independent of whether protests occurred) is rarely addressed in a cross-national way. Research on related phenomena of protests, rebellions and revolutions suggests that these events are often driven by fraud, incumbent popularity, and the key actors’ unity and capacity.¹⁸

Table 5.1: Post-Election Violence and Protests
in sub-Saharan Africa 1990-2008 (N=202)

		Protests	
		no	yes
Violence	no	70.3 %	10.9 %
	yes	8.4 %	10.4 %

of violence after Cote d’Ivoire’s 2010 election.

¹⁵Lehoucq (2003) and Dunning (2011) include fraud in their election violence definitions.

¹⁶Violence data from Straus and Taylor 2012 (N=220). For ease of interpretation, the three violence levels were collapsed to a dummy; the category “yes” includes levels 1, 2 and 3. Protest data from Nelda29 in Hyde and Marinov 2012 (N=202).

¹⁷See Laakso 2007, 239-240; and Kriger 2005.

¹⁸See Bunce and Wolchik 2010; Magaloni 2006 and 2010; and Kuhn 2012. For a review of the riot literature, see Wilkinson 2009. Cases in the upper row of Table 5.1 are addressed by research about what triggers mass protest (see Tucker 2007; Kuntz and Thompson 2009: 267-257). The right column is covered by research on the drivers of government repression *once protests occurred* (see Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski 2014) and on how other domestic threats relate to repression (see Davenport 1997; Carey 2010; Moore 2000; and Gartner and Regan 1996).

While this is not the first paper to note that IO monitors can impact post-election dynamics,¹⁹ it is the first to empirically show that IO condemnation increases the risk of post-election violence. Consistent with Daxecker (2012), I argue that when a Western IO monitor alleges fraud, the probability of post-election violence increases. To test this argument, we should measure post-election violence and monitor criticism. Instead, that paper measured general intra-state conflict (where the electoral connection is unclear) and monitor presence interacted with fraud presence (which is problematic).²⁰ In short, this paper contributes to previous research by (i) measuring the trigger of violence (condemnations) instead of assuming it and (ii) capturing post-election violence. I also provide a formal model, illustrative cases, and document that this effect is robust to several common inference concerns, including spuriousness, selection, and post-treatment bias.

Election observer missions begin when governments issue a formal (written) invitation to one or more IOs. IOs tend to decline a request only when their institutional capacity is exceeded, when efforts would be duplicated, or when it is clear that meaningful elections cannot be held. IOs here include both intergovernmental (e.g. European or African Union) and non-governmental organizations (e.g. Carter Center and National Democratic Institute). IO monitors usually issue press statements about the validity of the election process and outcome shortly after the election takes place. Longer statements are issued weeks after the election, and interim statements also may be issued depending on context. For simplicity, “report” here denotes any public statement by monitors after the election. Note that election monitoring is not perfect: unsystematic irregularities often remain unmentioned in the report but widespread, substantial manipulation is likely to get caught and condemned. Generally, egregious violations will be condemned.

¹⁹See Hyde and Marinov 2014; Daxecker 2012; and Kuhn 2012. These papers do not allow inference for violence intensity or onset because they do not distinguish between peaceful and violent aftermaths. Hyde and Marinov as well as Kuhn use a protest dummy regardless of violence level. Daxecker counts conflict events and each event – whether violent or not – receives equal weight in that analysis, so that the identical value can reflect very different empirical realities in terms of fatalities. Perhaps more importantly, the data source of the last paper makes it difficult if not impossible to know whether any of these events were actually related to the election.

²⁰That interaction term between the presence of monitors and the presence of fraud is supposed to capture criticism, assuming that the presence of both factors automatically translates into monitors alleging vote fraud. However, this is a strong assumption. Many have criticized international monitors for sometimes legitimizing fraudulent elections (see Abbink and Hesseling 2000; Carothers 1997; Geisler 1993; and Kumar and Ottaway 1998. Kelley (2012a) has empirically shown that the presence of fraud does *not* automatically translate into negative reports. A recent example of this dynamic is the gubernatorial election in South Kordofan, Sudan. See Carter Center 2011; and Verjee 2011.

The argument in this paper rests on the *actual verdict* made by international observers after election-day.²¹ Independent validation is an important factor in post-vote violence. A positive verdict, i.e. an IO report validating the official result, may encourage all stakeholders (losers and voters) to accept the result by increasing public confidence that the outcome is legitimate and an accurate representation of preferences of the population, rather than the result of manipulation or fraud. Thus a positive report may encourage the loser to accept the result, regardless of whether the loser is the incumbent or the opposition.²²

However, a negative IO report may have the opposite effect. International condemnation can increase post-election violence by strengthening the election loser's incentives to fight. In other words, a negative IO report *shifts* the candidate's probability of winning a post-election fight in favor of the loser by increasing the number of people who are willing to fight for the loser. If the loser is more likely to win a potential fight, he is more likely to initiate it. The mechanism here of *shifting probabilities of winning a fight* and thereby triggering post-election violence is different from research that argues that IO reports influence *uncertainty* about manipulation or incumbent popularity.²³ Arguments about uncertainty imply that IO monitors can *shrink* the confidence interval around the point estimate of fraud, but do not necessarily *shift* the estimate of manipulation or incumbent popularity itself.

This mechanism linking the IO condemnation to violence has two parts. First, a negative report strengthens the loser by suggesting that his popular support is likely higher than the official election result suggests. A negative IO report indicates that manipulation took place, usually in favor of the winner, and thus the loser's popular support is likely greater than the official result indicates.²⁴ For example, this may indicate that instead of 35 percent of the popular vote, the loser actually

²¹This stands in contrast to arguments about IO effects on the campaigning period or election-day, which often rely on the *anticipation* of an IO report. See Alvarez et al. 2008: 211; Hyde 2007; Ichino and Schündeln 2012; and Kelley 2012b.

²²Respective examples include the 1991 presidential election in Zambia (see Bjornlund and Cowan 2011: 27, 8, 23; NDI/CC 1991: 59, 4), Bulgaria's first multi-party election in 1990 (see Bjornlund and Cowan 2011: 28; and Garber and Cowan 1993), and Paraguay 1989 (ibid.)

²³See Daxecker 2012; and Kuhn 2012.

²⁴Hyde (2007) finds that most fraud originates from the incumbent, who can bring to bear the resources and power associated with his office; and incumbents often win.

enjoys the support of 40 or 45 percent of voters.²⁵ Since the loser has greater chances of winning a potential post-election fight against the winner, he is also more likely to challenge the result. That challenge can lead to violence either because the loser challenges violently or because the loser's challenge is violently crushed.

Voting and fighting are complements rather than substitutes.²⁶ Casting a ballot and fighting are linked "in the sense that people who vote for a party are also more likely to fight for the same party."²⁷ Election results roughly proxy for the distribution of underlying support²⁸ and the potential to mobilize a sufficiently large portion of the population to fight against another candidate. This effect should increase in strength as the loser's vote share approaches 50 percent because this tipping point indicates that the Loser may be almost as strong or stronger than the Winner in terms of popular support, and thus more likely to prevail in a potential fight, all else being equal.

Second, the international condemnation strengthens the loser by serving as a focal point around which the loser's supporters can mobilize; it helps crystallize support behind the loser in favor of overturning the result. His supporters face a tough choice: staying home or going out in the streets. While they prefer supporting their candidate, claims of fraud are easily made – especially by electoral losers – and the stakes are high: public contestation of the official election result can be individually costly, especially when it involves violence.²⁹ An international verdict can help supporters distinguish between political cheap talk and claims substantiated by evidence. The IO report serves as a coordination mechanism to decide between two equilibria: all stay home or all go out in the streets. The latter is the focal point if an election is condemned, all else equal. Thus a negative report strengthens the loser because it increases the number of people who are willing to fight for him.

²⁵At the extremes, if one player receives 70 percent vote share in the election, then his support in the population is fairly large and this player has good chances of winning a potent post-election fight against another player. In contrast, if a player only receives 10 percent vote share in the election, that player's strength in the population is rather low and consequently his chances of winning a fight are small, all else equal.

²⁶See Chacon, Robinson and Torvik 2011; Londregan and Vindigni 2006; Wilkinson 2004; and Steele 2011.

²⁷Londregan and Vindigni 2006: 25.

²⁸Similarly, Simper (2013: 3-4) argues that election results are seen as indicating the strength of contestants. Among other things, manipulated results can discourage opposition supporters from protesting and can increase strong contestant's post-electoral bargaining power.

²⁹Even without violence, rational and self-interested individuals have few incentives to participate in collective action. Olson 1965. For a counterargument, see Lohmann 1993.

Once a sufficient number of supporters gather on the streets, “informational cascades” can set in where the size of the masses keeps swelling.³⁰ This second mechanism builds on previous research about how manipulated elections can serve as a focal point for solving collective action problems by changing an individual’s calculus about participating in protests or rebellions.³¹ The exposure of fraud can facilitate mobilization of the loser’s supporters by lowering individual’s cost of punishment, increasing the likelihood of success and increasing the individual’s cost of inaction.³²

5.2 Formal Model

This section introduces a formal model capturing the incentives of candidates and parties, and thus applies to both presidential and legislative elections. The post-election model is illustrated in Figure ?? and captures the interaction between the two key players, the election Loser and Winner (L and W). While there are cases of a winner using force after vote tabulation, in general the Loser has greater incentives to incite violence because he has the most to gain from a change in the status quo of political leadership. The Loser may be either the incumbent or the opposition. The Loser starts the game by consenting to the election result or challenging it. The Loser’s decision is observed by the Winner and is common knowledge. The Loser’s consent ends the post-election game. Alternatively, if the Loser decides to challenge the result – through a verbal announcement, legal proceeding, or street protests – he incurs some marginal cost of challenging, and the Winner chooses whether to resist that challenge or concede. If the Winner concedes to the Loser, the game ends.³³ If the Winner resists – through a verbal act or low-level repression³⁴ – then the Loser chooses whether to back down or fight. At this point, a decision by the Loser to fight will lead to violent conflict and sometimes even civil war.

³⁰Lohmann 1994: 50.


³¹See Tucker 2007; Przeworski 1991 and 2006; and Weingast 1997.

³²These mechanisms have been explored in the literature on rebellions, revolutions and protests. See Tucker 2007; Kuntz and Thompson 2009, 256-257; and Kuran 1995, 247.

³³The words “consent” and “concede” both mean that the respective player gives up, but different words were chosen to reduce ambiguity in the text as to which player and part of the game is referred to.

³⁴The model does not include a marginal cost of resisting for the Winner because such cost is often low empirically and not consequential for the model. Including the Winner’s resistance cost in the model would not change much and only shrink the range in Figure 5.2.

Figure 5.1: The Post-Election Game



For the game shown in Figure 5.1, I assume that players are rational actors who seek to maximize their payoffs. Winning the post-election contest, thus presiding over the government and its resources, gives a payoff of 1. Losing the post-election contest gives a payoff of 0. The payoff for fighting is the probability of winning a post-election dispute (P_i) times the material benefit of presiding over the country (1) minus the cost of fighting (c_i). Since fighting is costly, c_i is never zero and always positive; this fighting cost can include anything from people, weapons, logistics to intangible reputational costs. I assume that both sides have sufficient resources to start a street fight. If the Loser challenges, he incurs an additional, marginal cost c_c .³⁵ Payoff components are summarized in Table 5.2 and discussed in more detail below.

The four terminal nodes of the game are perhaps best illustrated with several presidential and legislative elections: Senegal 2012, Cote d'Ivoire 2010, Kenya 2013, and several of the color revolutions. The recent election in Senegal (2012) is an example of the Loser's consent to the election

³⁵Let $c_i \in (0, 1]$ and $c_c < c_L < 1$. That is, I assume that the marginal cost of challenging is smaller than the fighting cost and smaller than the value of holding office.

Table 5.2: Notation in the Game

P_i	Probability of winning the post-election contest
c_i	Cost of fighting
c_c	Cost of challenging incurred by the Loser

result in the presence of a positive observer report (EU). The Senegalese incumbent Abdoulaye Wade secured a plurality in the first round against 13 challengers (32 percent of the vote), but then lost in the run-off against Macky Sall by a landslide (66 versus 34 percent). Wade conceded without delay following certification of the results, and the power transition proceeded peacefully.

The second terminal node is the situation where the Loser challenges the result and the Winner concedes completely, leading to an election being overturned with little or no violence. For example, in the case of Georgia's 2003 legislative election, IO election monitors criticized the process by stating that it "fell short of ... international standards for democratic elections."³⁶ The military refused to support the government. The protesting crowds in Tbilisi further swelled and the Loser Saakashvili challenged the official result by storming the parliament building. The following day, election Winner Shevardnadze resigned. Similar dynamics unfolded in Serbia's Bulldozer revolution in 2000, Ukraine's Orange revolution in 2004, and Kyrgyzstan's Tulip revolution in 2005.³⁷

An example of the Loser challenging a result and the Winner resisting is Cote d'Ivoire in 2010, as laid out in the introduction. The fourth and final node, which shows the Loser backing down from his challenge, is exemplified by the 2013 presidential election in Kenya. After delays in tabulation, the election commission declared Kenyatta the winner with 50.07 percent of the vote versus Odinga's 43 percent, thus narrowly avoiding a runoff. Odinga alleged irregularities and challenged the result by taking his complaint to the Supreme Court. On March 6, the EU and other international observers endorsed the election.³⁸ The winner Kenyatta resisted by proclaiming that this was

³⁶International Election Observation Mission, Preliminary Statement, 3 November 2003: 1. Available at <http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/georgia/13138>. This was a joint mission composed of the parliamentary assemblies of the OSCE, the Council of Europe, the European Parliament and the OSCE's Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR).

³⁷Tucker 2007.

³⁸EU preliminary statement, "Kenyans demonstrate strong commitment to democratic elections," 6 March 2013. Available at <http://www.eueom.eu/files/dmfile/eom-kenya-preliminary-statement-6-march-2013-en.pdf>.

“the real victory.”³⁹ After a partial recount of votes, the Supreme Court upheld the election of Kenyatta on March 30. The same day, loser Odinga conceded defeat and backed down from his challenge.

What all these situations have in common is that the prize or good at stake (leadership), is genuinely indivisible.⁴⁰ This feature is particularly salient in presidential contests, where only *one* person can emerge as the election Winner. No bargaining is feasible in presidential elections.⁴¹ Similarly, many legislative contests are essentially conducted as winner-take-all, first-past-the-post elections at the district level, where only the winning candidate from each constituency is admitted to the national legislative body.⁴² With few legislative elections held under PR rules in Africa, legislative governing coalitions remain a rare phenomenon.⁴³ And even when such coalitions are formed, *one* of the parties is the major partner, which is a status worth competing for.

The basic insight supported by this paper is that with indivisible goods a balance of power increases conflict and a preponderance of power diminishes conflict.⁴⁴ As such, this paper argues that power asymmetries reduce the probability of post-election violence, which is in line with related research

³⁹Available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/10/world/africa/kenyatta-wins-kenya-presidential-election.html?pagewanted=all>.

⁴⁰While few political issues are intrinsically indivisible, some are genuinely indivisible, such as a presidency. Another way of thinking about indivisibility is an extreme undervaluing of any intermediate solutions between 0 and 1 (Kydd 2012: 92).


⁴¹As Kenya 2007 and Zimbabwe 2008 show, executive powersharing – while theoretically possible – is difficult because the presidency ends up being indivisible when it is seen as an all-or-nothing institution. Kenya’s Prime Minister Raila Odinga acknowledges that the powersharing agreement did not transfer into much de facto powers: “They don’t want to accept the changes that are taking place. This is what is causing some friction sometimes in government. It is not that there is anything wrong with the structure that has been introduced. It is only the resistance by those that have been there – not to respect the new created constitutional order” (Quoted in Scheffler 2009, 11:05.) Comparing the powersharing agreements in Kenya and Zimbabwe, PM Odinga argues that “the Zimbabweans got a much better arrangement than the one that we have in Kenya” (Quoted in Scheffler 2009, 15:03.) Yet even “the better off” Zimbabwe’s MDC is not sharing much actual power. As Deputy-Prime Minister Arthur Mutambara of MDC puts it: “You can see that we are not in full control. We are not exactly in charge. There are other forces in control” (Quoted in Mehler 2009, 6).

⁴²For example, 52 percent of legislative elections in Sub-Saharan Africa 1990-2008 were held under plurality or majority rule, while 16 percent had a mixed (FPP and PR) system, and only 32 percent were held under PR rules. Overall, legislative elections under PR rule comprise only 13 percent of the full sample of elections in Sub-Saharan Africa 1990-2008.

⁴³Of those legislative elections under PR rule, none currently have coalitions. Only Guinea-Bissau had a legislative governing coalition before the 2009 presidential assassination and the 2012 military coup.

⁴⁴Assuming that both players are interested in winning the electoral competition, the costs of fighting would need to be prohibitively high to prevent either player from fighting. If fighting costs are low, both sides have a credible threat to fight. When conflict costs are high, then war need not happen. However, in the case of election violence, the use of force can be relatively small, such as a fight between the police and protesters, retaliatory violence against communities or assassination attempts on individuals.

on the link between elections and civil war more broadly.⁴⁵ Consider a range delimited by 0 and 1, the value of holding office, as shown in Figure 5.2. If the chance of winning (power balance) is in the middle range, where the boundaries are determined by the costs of conflict, then war is inevitable. If the probability of winning is such that $c_W < P_W < 1 - c_L - c_c$, then there is war, otherwise there is peace.⁴⁶ Therefore anything that boosts the Loser's chance (popular support, international condemnation of results) encourages conflict because it pushes the Loser closer to 50 percent.⁴⁷ Figure 5.2 visualizes this dynamic, showing that post-election violence depends on the strength (i.e. position) of the Loser (P_L). With indivisible issues such as election outcomes, imbalances of power are conducive to peace whereas a balance of power can induce conflict.



Solving the game in Figure 5.1 through backward induction, three equilibria arise. Figures 5.2 and 5.3 display the solutions of backward induction. The sufficient condition in equation 5.1 gives rise to the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium in which the Loser consents to the election outcome. Equation 5.2 shows the conditions for the equilibrium in which both players to fight. Finally, equation 5.3 gives the conditions for the third equilibrium in which the Winner concedes after a challenge.

⁴⁵Chacon and Torvik 2006.


⁴⁶Note that the probabilities of P_W and P_L must always sum to 1, or more formally: $P_W = 1 - P_L$.

⁴⁷Some may read Figure 5.2 as suggesting that the effect of the vote share on violence is non-monotonic because an extremely high vote share may cause a switch from equilibrium 2 to equilibrium 3. This is not the case; the effect of this variable is monotonic because the loser's vote share is by definition always below 50 percentage points. Since the vote share never exceeds 50 percent, it is a monotonic effect.

$$c_L > P_L \quad (5.1)$$

$$c_W < P_W \text{ AND } c_L + c_c < P_L \quad (5.2)$$

$$c_W > P_W \text{ AND } c_L < P_L \quad (5.3)$$



5.2.1 Empirical Implications

A candidate's probability of winning a post-election fight is a function of three variables. Reflecting the candidate's strength, these three variables are (1) his vote share s , (2) his incumbency advantage i and (3) the IO report r .⁴⁸ These parameters are important for the balance of power between

⁴⁸It is conceivable that the three parameters are not independent. For example, the vote margin and IO presence may be endogenous to the degree of incumbency advantage. It stands to reason that autocrats competing in an election may be more likely not to invite observers and to increase the vote margin. However, in this empirical sample (Sub-Saharan Africa 1990-2008), the correlation between incumbency advantage and observed elections or margins is quite low (0.03 and 0.08 respectively).

contestants in terms of what proportion of the population they are able to mobilize and what other (state control) resources they can draw on.⁴⁹

The official support for each candidate (s) becomes public knowledge in the form of vote shares when the election result is announced.⁵⁰ As discussed above, the election result reflects the strength of support in the population (mobilization potential) with potential error. Error is often a result of manipulation but can also occur due to capacity issues. The impact of a candidate's vote share on his probability of winning a fight is positive. For example, as the Loser's vote share s_L increases, so does P_L . With regard to the model in Figures 5.1 and 5.2, an increase in the Loser's vote share makes it less likely for equilibrium 1 to hold because when his vote share exceeds his fighting cost, the Loser is more likely to challenge the result than consent to it. Consequently, an increase in the Loser's vote share makes post-election violence more likely.

Hypothesis 1. *An increase in the Loser's share of support increases the likelihood of post-election violence.*

Let the incumbency advantage i be common knowledge to all players and voters, and $i_i \in (0, 1]$. This term captures the incumbent's powers: the incumbent – who can be the election Winner or Loser – has an advantage over the other player in terms of access to state institutions, resources and the media during and immediately after the election. Such “hyper-incumbency advantage” can create an “uneven playing field.”⁵¹ While incumbency advantage is important in advanced democracies (name recognition, agenda-setting, pork-barrel spending), it is critical in other polities. Incumbent abuse of the state in less democratic settings can generate critical disparities that affect the opposition's capacity to organize, and thus tilt the balance of power significantly in favor of the incumbent. Incumbency advantage as defined here – prompt, post-election access to state (repressive) resources – is primarily an advantage of the executive, not the legislature.⁵² The impact

⁴⁹The model does not include parameters for the size of the military or the number of guns on either side because while these are indicators of fighting power, good data on these variables is not available, which makes these parts untestable.

⁵⁰Note that the “official” election result may or may not be the true election result; manipulation can distort the result.

⁵¹See Greene 2007; and Levitsky and Way 2010.

⁵²Yet less coercive advantages may be used by parties in legislatures for tilting the field in the campaigning period (not post election). For example, in Botswana and Tanzania, elections have been reasonably free of fraud and intimidation at least since the 1990s but the ruling parties have won every national election and controlled majorities

of the incumbency advantage on a candidate's probability of winning a fight is also positive: as i increases, so does P_i . And as P_L increases, the chance of violence grows because an incumbency advantage pushes the Loser closer to a balance of power. This increases the Loser's chances of winning a fight and thus his incentives to challenge the election result, yielding a greater likelihood of post-election violence.⁵³

Hypothesis 2. *An increase in the Loser's incumbency advantage increases the likelihood of post-election violence.*

In the presence of IO election monitors, the probability of winning a post-election contest (P_i) is a function of the IO report *in addition* to the vote share s and the incumbency status i . The IO report provides information on $r \in [-1, 1]$, which is the degree of manipulation in favor of the Winner, detected during electoral observation.⁵⁴ A negative report indicates that the Winner has less population support than the official vote share suggests, and thereby lowers the Winner's probability of winning a post-election fight (reduces P_W). On the flipside, a negative report also means that the losing candidate's support is likely larger than the official result indicates, which can increase incentives for the Loser to challenge the result (increase P_L). All else equal, a negative IO report should make the Winner more likely to concede, encourage the Loser to challenge and thereby result in a greater likelihood of post-election violence.

Hypothesis 3. *A negative IO report increases the likelihood of post-election violence.*

5.3 Research Design

I test these predictions empirically using panel data from 1990 to 2008 for national elections in sub-Saharan Africa. This region is chosen for three reasons. First, this region offers significant in the legislature due to monopoly over access to state institutions, finance, and mass media (Levitsky and Way 2010).

⁵³As Figure 5.2 shows, the effect of P on the probability of violence depends on the player. An increase in P_L leads to an increase in violence. However, as P_W increases, the power asymmetry grows and the chance of violence diminishes. Consider a situation where the former authoritarian President has been re-elected and enjoys near-unrestrained control over state resources, enabling him to remain in power. The former incumbent's access to the military, finances and media means that any challenger faces an uphill battle.

⁵⁴Empirically, most manipulation is executed by incumbents (see Hyde 2007; and Beaulieu and Hyde 2009). In this paper's sample of elections in sub-Saharan Africa, incumbents won 80 percent of the elections in which they competed (author's calculation).

variation in both the dependent (violence) and the key independent variable of interest (condemnation). In particular, sub-Saharan Africa is more prone to this type of violence than other world regions, with violence erupting in the wake of about 28 percent of elections over the past twenty years.⁵⁵ Second, virtually all countries in Sub-Saharan Africa have a per capita GDP of less than \$2,700. According to Collier, when per capita GDP falls below this point, holding elections actually causes violence.⁵⁶ Thus this sample allows for a good test of this proposition. Third, as a practical matter it is chosen because disaggregate data is available for this region.⁵⁷ The unit of observation is the national election, which includes legislative and presidential contests. In the dataset introduced below, elections occurring within three months of each other are collapsed to one observation because it is difficult (if not impossible) to distinguish whether violence relates to one or another temporally close election given the level of detail in the dataset's sources.⁵⁸

The dependent variable for this analysis is the level of election violence in the three months after each national election, and this is operationalized as an ordered variable to capture variation in the intensity of violence.⁵⁹ Post-election VIOLENCE LEVEL has four levels and is coded zero when no post-election violence was reported. It is 1 for violent harassment (police breaking up rallies, party supporters fighting, street brawls, opposition newspapers being confiscated, and limited short-term arrests of political opponents) and 2 for violent repression (long-term high-level arrests of party leaders, consistent use of violent intimidation, limited use of murders and assassinations, torture). The highest post-election violence category is coded 3 for repeated, coordinated physical attacks leading to twenty or more deaths. Table 5.3 shows the distribution of this variable. Since the “moderate” violence category only has 5 observations, I estimate both ordered logit and binary logit models (combining levels 2 and 3). Standard errors are clustered by country to capture

⁵⁵Arriola and Johnson 2012, 35.

⁵⁶Collier 2009, 20-21, Collier and Rohner forthcoming. Virtually all countries in Sub-Saharan Africa fall in this category while preserving substantial variation. Only one country (Gabon) exceeds this threshold and is included in this analysis, since the other two potential “outliers” (Equatorial Guinea and Seychelles) drop out of most models due to missing data. In this analysis, per capita GDP varies between \$60 (Liberia 1996) and \$4,700 USD (Gabon 1998).

⁵⁷In comparison to other regions, we do not have the granularity that will allow for a good test of my formal model. Most other available data is binary variable for election violence, where smaller incidents are conflated with large-scale, systematic campaigns of violence. Other data does not distinguish the timing of violence (pre, at, post election-day), which makes it unuseful for this paper. In contrast, the dataset introduced in this section offers both a differentiation of timing and intensity of violence.

⁵⁸Straus and Taylor 2012, 22.

⁵⁹Straus and Taylor 2012, 21-22.

unobserved heterogeneity between states.

Table 5.3: Distribution of Post-Election Violence Level (N=220)

Violence Level	Label	Frequency	Percent
0	none	182	82.7
1	low	22	10.0
2	moderate	5	2.3
3	intense	11	5.0

The key independent variables are the Loser’s vote share, his incumbency status and the report by an IO election monitor. The variable LOSER’S VOTE SHARE is coded from the official election result as percentage points for the runner-up / strongest Loser. This variable is normally distributed between 0 and 50, with a mean of 25.31 percentage points.⁶⁰ The variable INCUMBENT LOST is coded 1 when the Loser is the executive incumbent and 0 otherwise.⁶¹ As noted above, the advantages of incumbency in terms of state coercive resources lie mainly with the executive, not the legislature. The main international independent variable is NEGATIVE IO REPORT. The variable NEGATIVE IO REPORT is coded one when a reputable IO monitor – the European Union, Carter Center, NDI and IRI – seriously questioned the outcome or process of the election.⁶² IO monitors issued negative reports in 12.44 percent of elections in this sample.

In addition, several control variables are employed to account for other determinants of election violence. First, I control for whether IO election observers attended an election to establish the impact of the report beyond the presence of observers. The variable INTL OBSERVERS PRESENT

⁶⁰Data come from Nohlen 1999; African Elections Database; and Carr 2012. The distribution is visualized in Figure 5.8 in the Appendix. A zero value reflects first-round presidential elections with single candidates (Sao Tome and Principe 1991, Burkina Faso 1991, Cape Verde 1996, Djibouti 2005). The single case of 50 percent is the presidential run-off in Cape Verde 2001, which was won by just 12 votes. To ensure that results are robust to oppositional coalitions instead of single parties or candidates (Wahman 2012), results were re-estimated to accurately account for elections in which the runner-up (Loser) was part of a coalition. The main results are robust.

⁶¹The incumbency advantage in terms of access to state resources is an advantage of the executive, not an advantage that the legislature has. We should therefore expect that a chief executive who has lost at times uses violence because he can. Thus the INCUMBENT LOST variable is restricted to presidential contests because we would only expect a losing chief executive to (be able to) resort to these means. In contrast, the losing party in a legislative election has less ability to take advantage of these means of power. This variable is constructed from Nelda24 and 21 in Hyde and Marinov 2012, which in turn is based on Archigos data by Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza 2009. Missing data for Nelda24 was filled as much as possible by the author according to Nohlen 1999; IPU; African Elections Database; and Carr 2012.

⁶²See Hyde and Marinov 2012 and forthcoming. Since I control for the *presence* of Western monitors with INTL OBSERVERS PRESENT, NEGATIVE IO REPORT is also coded 0 when no Western monitors were present.

is coded 1 when Western IO monitors observed the election and 0 otherwise.⁶³ Second, ODA PC captures the per capita amount of net official development assistance and official aid received.⁶⁴ It is lagged by a year and scaled in thousands of constant US dollars to ease interpretation of the coefficient.

Third, ELECTION-DAY FRAUD is equal to one when there was explicit cheating on election day.⁶⁵ PRE-ELECTION VIOLENCE measures election-related violence in the campaigning period. It is coded 1 if any violence occurred up to six months preceding an election, and 0 otherwise.⁶⁶ Fourth, POLL TYPE distinguishes between legislative contests (0) and presidential contests (coded 1), which can be more conflictual because the “winner takes all.” This variable is coded 2 for two or more elections within 3 months of each other.⁶⁷

Beyond the predictors of post-vote violence, the broader conflict literature suggests several national-level control variables. DEMOCRACY is a categorical variable measuring the extent of executive constraints in terms of decision rules.⁶⁸ GDP PER CAPITA controls for economic development.⁶⁹ It is measured in thousands of constant US dollars to ease interpretation of the coefficient. Beyond economic development generally, the current state of a country’s economy may drive violence levels. When unemployment is high, more people are dissatisfied and therefore have a motif and ability to participate in unrest. Since unemployment data for developing countries is chronically hard to come by, GDP PC GROWTH is used as a proxy, which measures per capita GDP growth in annual percent.⁷⁰ As a form of unearned income, OIL AND GAS INCOME PER CAPITA is included,

⁶³Coded from Nelda47, Hyde and Marniov 2012. As robustness checks, Nelda46 (Western monitor presence) and Nelda45 (any international monitor present) were used; the main results are unaffected.

⁶⁴World Bank Development Indicators 2012. For a link between aid and conflict, see Savun and Tirone 2011; and Collier and Hoeffler 2002.

⁶⁵SR21 from Kelley 2012a is categorical, and the highest level (3) is coded here as significant vote fraud.

⁶⁶Straus and Taylor 2012. For ideas of how violence can beget further violence, see Collier 2007, 34, 27; Gurr 1993, 126-127; and Uvin 1998, 220-221.

⁶⁷Straus and Taylor 2012. As an alternative, robustness tests also include a system type variable (presidential versus parliamentary system) instead of the poll type (election). The main results are unaffected. For research on conflict and voting systems, see Sisk and Reynolds 1998; Sisk 2008, 11-13; and Cingranelli and Filipov 2010.

⁶⁸Marshall and Jaggers 2011. One disadvantage of this variable is the amount of missing data (15 percent in this sample). To ensure that the results are not due to an exclusion of the cases with missing values, the “checks” variable from DPI is used. This leaves the main results unaffected. See Vreeland 2008a and 2008b; Hegre et al. 2001; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Simmons 2009; and Hafner-Burton, Hyde and Jablonski 2010.

⁶⁹See World Bank Development Indicators 2012; and Collier 2009, 49.

⁷⁰World Bank Development Indicators 2012.

which is the value of oil and gas production to a government once subsidies are accounted for, divided by the country's population and logged.⁷¹ POPULATION SIZE is measured in thousands and logged.⁷² Finally, ETHNIC FRACTIONALIZATION is also included.⁷³ All control variables are lagged by one year to avoid endogeneity, except for INTL OBSERVERS PRESENT, PRE-ELECTION VIOLENCE, ELECTION-DAY FRAUD and POLL TYPE. Descriptive statistics are provided in Table 5.8.

5.4 Results

5.4.1 The Effect of Condemnations

The results of the ordered and binary logit regression models predicting the level of post-election violence are in Table 5.5.⁷⁴ Controlling for IO presence, vote fraud, campaign violence and a host of other correlates, negative IO reports have an additional effect on violence after elections. The variable NEGATIVE IO REPORT is statistically and substantively significant. As hypothesized, international condemnation is associated with a substantial increase in post-election violence. Table 5.4 shows the simulated effect (predicted probability) of a NEGATIVE IO REPORT.⁷⁵ When Western monitors attend an election with vote fraud, a negative report is associated with a 35.1 percentage point increase in the probability of intense violence. This effect is somewhat smaller but still of substantial magnitude for elections without significant vote fraud; in such a context a condemnation increases the probability of intense violence by 17.5 percentage points. This is strong evidence that a negative report by IO monitors matters greatly for conflict in the wake of elections. In contrast, Table 5.4 also suggests that fraud alone does not change the prospects for violence that much. Without international condemnation, a fraudulent election is only 1.7 percentage points more likely to be followed by intense violence than a clean election (1 versus 2.7 percent).

Another view of the IO effect is presented in Figure 5.4, which shows the simulated effect (pre-

⁷¹See Ross 2012; Fearon and Laitin 2003; and Hegre and Sambanis 2006.

⁷²World Bank Development Indicators 2012.

⁷³This data is from Finkel, Perez-Linan and Seligson 2007, who average the index of ethnic fractionalization used by Annett 2001; Fearon 2003; and Fearon and Laitin 2003. Also see Chandra 2004; and Wilkinson 2004.

⁷⁴The proportional odds assumption (parallel regression assumption) of ordered logistic regression holds, as indicated by non-significant Brant and LR test (omitted for brevity).

⁷⁵Probabilities are estimated from model 7 using Clarify with all variables at their mean / modes (King, Tomz and Wittenberg 2000). The upper right box – negative reports without major fraud – has 10 observations in the original dataset.

Table 5.4: Effect of Condemnation on the Probability of Post-Election Violence

		Condemnation	
		no	yes
Major vote fraud	no	1.0 %	18.5 %
	yes	2.7 %	37.8 %

dicted probabilities) of a condemnation on moderate / intense violence when fraud has occurred. The effects are statistically significant because each point estimate does not overlap the confidence interval of the counterfactual. Thus the certification of Western election monitors by itself, and especially when major fraud is involved, substantially and significantly decreases the prospects of peace in the wake of elections. Further, the predicted probability of intense post-election violence is much higher with a negative report. This is strong evidence in favor of Hypothesis 3.

Figure 5.4: Effect of Condemnation on Post-Election Violence




Table 5.5: Determinants of Post-Election Violence

	Ordered Logit models 1-4				Binary Logit models 5-8			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
LOSER'S VOTE SHARE	0.032* (0.018)			0.026 (0.018)	0.098*** (0.024)			0.100*** (0.028)
INCUMBENT LOST		0.595 (1.226)		0.499 (1.430)		1.404 (1.079)		0.624 (1.194)
NEGATIVE IO REPORT			1.523** (0.725)	1.506** (0.664)			3.748*** (1.064)	3.365*** (1.060)
INTL OBSERVERS PRESENT	0.362 (0.458)	0.181 (0.479)	-0.162 (0.571)	0.004 (0.525)	-1.638 (1.213)	-0.920 (0.695)	-2.272** (1.070)	-2.929* (1.773)
ODA PC	-4.405 (5.132)	-5.468 (4.850)	-7.747 (5.038)	-4.546 (5.902)	-13.685 (10.002)	-4.784 (9.583)	-13.068 (7.092)*	-9.309 (16.968)
ELECTION-DAY FRAUD	1.398** (0.544)	1.187** (0.483)	0.959* (0.512)	1.244** (0.566)	2.907*** (0.948)	1.905*** (0.664)	1.204* (0.719)	2.492** (1.164)
PRE-ELECTION VIOLENCE	0.864 (0.677)	0.956 (0.635)	0.710 (0.623)	0.641 (0.615)	-1.065 (0.859)	0.086 (0.869)	-0.940 (1.022)	-1.567 (1.126)
POLL TYPE	0.202 (0.402)	0.346 (0.362)	0.400 (0.359)	0.268 (0.345)	1.031* (0.538)	0.524 (0.532)	0.577 (0.442)	1.032* (0.535)
GDP PC	0.175 (0.297)	0.017 (0.302)	0.006 (0.324)	0.121 (0.334)	-0.843 (0.911)	-0.748 (0.581)	-1.230** (0.553)	-1.549* (0.798)
GDP PC GROWTH	-0.076 (0.063)	-0.091 (0.055)*	-0.105 (0.054)*	-0.085 (0.058)	0.094 (0.087)	0.087 (0.075)	0.069 (0.071)	0.073 (0.071)
DEMOCRACY	-0.027 (0.144)	0.046 (0.145)	0.069 (0.162)	-0.018 (0.157)	-0.054 (0.248)	0.212 (0.203)	0.220 (0.288)	0.032 (0.276)
OIL AND GAS	-0.062 (0.056)	-0.034 (0.056)	-0.038 (0.058)	-0.058 (0.056)	-0.181* (0.108)	-0.053 (0.096)	-0.011 (0.091)	-0.133 (0.107)
POPULATION SIZE	0.042 (0.331)	0.017 (0.361)	-0.190 (0.399)	-0.144 (0.335)	0.027 (0.592)	-0.195 (0.566)	-0.842 (0.549)	-0.489 (0.512)
ETHNIC FRACTIONALIZATION	-0.311 (1.458)	-0.004 (1.307)	0.571 (1.375)	0.364 (1.575)	-2.941 (2.529)	-0.012 (2.160)	2.146 (1.816)	-0.709 (2.172)
Observations	143	172	174	138	143	172	174	138
AIC	198.04	225.43	219.54	195.88	75.04	95.07	83.16	69.75
BIC	242.48	272.64	266.92	245.64	113.56	135.99	124.22	113.66

Standard errors clustered on countries in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicates significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level.

5.4.2 The Counterfactual

Next, I identify more clearly the effect of IO reports. While the main analyses in Table 5.5 estimates the effect of condemnations, the counterfactual there is heterogenous: it includes elections with positive reports and elections without monitors. To identify more clearly the appropriate counterfactual – positive reports – I limit the sample to only those elections that have in fact been attended by credible IO monitors, and re-run the same models with all controls (equivalent to models 4 and 8 in Table 5.5). The results are in Table 5.9 in the Appendix. Models 1 and 2 in Table 5.9 show that the effect of condemnations is even larger in the “clean” sample. The coefficient remains significant, positive, and its magnitude increases by 0.3 relative to the full sample in Table 5.5. In substantive terms, the probability of violence onset increases from 19.8 to 80.1 percent probability when an election is condemned.⁷⁶ This alleviates concerns that the effect of condemnations is driven by looking at all elections regardless of whether they were observed – condemnations have even greater effects when we focus strictly on observed elections.

As a second way to get at the counterfactual, I keep the full sample but use dummies to create the counterfactual situation. The baseline or reference category is the absence of monitors, and this variable is excluded from the estimation. To identify the effect of condemnations, I compare the coefficient on *negative* to the coefficient on *positive* reports. Model 5 shows that the coefficient on condemnation is again significant and positive whereas the coefficient on positive report is not significant. Moreover, the coefficients on *negative* and *positive* reports are statistically different from each other ($p = 0.02$), confirming that condemnations indeed exert an independent effect. This effect is substantial for predicting violence intensity.⁷⁷

Finally, some may wonder whether positive reports can have the opposite effect of condemnations: deter violence. It is plausible that endorsements may quell unrest and temper tensions by placating the loser. The answer here is mixed. Looking at the full sample (models 5 and 6 in Table 5.9), the coefficient on *positive report* does not gain statistical significance and switches signs, indicating

⁷⁶This is estimated using Clarify, with all other variables at means and modes.

⁷⁷The coefficient in the model for violence onset (model 6) is not significant.

that there is no effect on violence.⁷⁸ A closer look at the data reveals that positive reports are followed by intense violence in five percent of elections. These include returns to civil war, as in Angola 1992, as well as elections in Togo (1993, 2005) and Nigeria 1993. Low-level harassment ensued in another 13 percent of elections when they were endorsed. Overall, it seems that positive reports are followed by a combination of peace and war. When focusing on only observed elections (models 3 and 4), the coefficient gains significance and is negative, as expected: associated with a reduction in violence. However, the magnitude of the effect is smaller than that for condemnations.

5.4.3 The Effect of Loser's Vote Share

Moreover, supplementary data is sufficiently granular to allow inference about the behavior of the key actor. Losers are more likely to challenge an election result if it was condemned. This statistical finding supports the formal model presented in Figure 5.1. There is a significant relationship between “loser consent” and international condemnation.⁷⁹ A multivariate analysis with “loser consent” as the outcome and all regressors from the main analysis also support that insight: international condemnation is positively correlated with a challenge by the Loser. Similarly, a stronger Loser in terms of vote share is less likely to consent to the announced result.⁸⁰

The analysis also provides strong support for the importance of the Loser's public support for conflict prospects. Before presenting the multivariate statistics below, a simple comparison of means suggests that the Loser's vote share correlates positively with post-election violence levels. Table 5.6 shows the average vote share for the runner-up and the associated violence level in the wake of elections. An increase in the vote share is associated with a simultaneous increase in violence. A one-way ANOVA test indicates that the difference in the means is statistically significant, suggesting that the mean of the Loser's vote share differs among the violence levels.⁸¹

⁷⁸The variable POSITIVE REPORT varies from 0 to 1 with a mean of 0.60 and a standard deviation of 0.49.

⁷⁹The associated p-value is 0.001 (Fisher's exact test). The ordinal variable “loser consent” captures the loser's acceptance of results, where elections are coded 0 when none of the main losing parties accepted the outcome, 1 for partial or delayed acceptance and 2 when all losing parties conceded defeat immediately after announcement of the results (Lindberg 2006, 43-44).

⁸⁰The coefficients are not statistically significant, which is likely a result of the further reduced sample size (N=125). The only significant predictors making consent less likely are significant vote fraud and concurrent elections. Tables available from author upon request.


⁸¹When using the violence dummy, the associated p-value is 0.03. When only the “moderate” violence is collapsed

Table 5.6: Loser's Average Vote Share by Violence Level (N=220)

Loser's Average Vote Share in %	Post-Election Violence Level
24.5	none
25.0	low
28.8	moderate
33.9	intense

The multivariate analysis confirms this insight. The coefficient of LOSER'S VOTE SHARE is always positive and statistically significant. It is also substantively important. Figure 5.5 shows the impact of the Loser's vote share on the predicted probability of violence.⁸² When the Loser's vote share increases by a standard deviation above its mean (from 25 to 39 percent), the probability of moderate / intense violence increases from 12 to 35 percent. This is an 23 percentage point increase in the risk of violence.⁸³ This finding confirms the importance of the Loser's popular support and fraud. Yet the previous discussion also shows that fraud is not the entire story; international condemnation impacts the risk of violence even more.

Figure 5.5: Effect of Loser's Vote Share on Violence



with “intense” (because moderate only has 5 observations), the p-value borders significance at 0.109.

⁸²Plot generated from model 5 through Clarify for a typical case at means and modes and fraud=1. The data is evenly distributed, supporting estimation across the full range of the variable.

⁸³The effect is smaller at clean elections, with an estimated 5 percentage point increase in violence.

5.4.4 The Effect of Incumbency Advantage

There is weak evidence for the incumbency advantage effect on conflict (Hypothesis 2). I hypothesized that another factor strengthening the Loser, apart from his vote share and international endorsement, is his incumbency status. When the Loser is the incumbent, then he can draw on additional resources for a potential fight, and thus strengthen his position. As hypothesized, the coefficient of this variable is consistently positive across all models. However, it falls short of statistical significance. One reason may be that the simple dichotomous variable `INCUMBENT LOST` does not fully capture the substantive concept. Ideally, this measure would also include the military's size and budget. However, data availability limits a more comprehensive measure.⁸⁴ Therefore the violence-increasing but insignificant effect remains suggestive of these dynamics.

5.4.5 Alternative Explanations

Probably the most important competing explanation is that violence is simply triggered by vote fraud on election-day, making this purely a domestic story. Among the control variables, only `ELECTION-DAY FRAUD` is consistently a significant predictor and increases the chances of violence in the wake of elections. Substantively, this effect is smaller than the effect of a negative IO report. As Table 5.4 shows, significant vote fraud is associated with a 2.3 percentage point increase in the probability of intense violence.

Conceptually, the concern about vote fraud is one about spuriousness. The relationship between condemnations (treatment) and violence (outcome) could be spurious if fraud or other election characteristics (pre-treatment covariates) influence both condemnations and violence. To alleviate the spuriousness concern, I employed genetic matching.⁸⁵ The matching analysis confirms that condemnations have an additional effect and do not only reflect “bad” elections which would have resulted in violence regardless of condemnation. In the first stage, I predict the probability of an election being condemned following Kelley (2012a).⁸⁶ In the second stage, this propensity score

⁸⁴For example, military expenditure data for Sub-Saharan Africa 1990-2008 is only complete for about half the countries in this sample. SIPRI 2012.

⁸⁵See Ho et al. 2007; Sekhon 2009; and Diamond and Sekhon 2013.

⁸⁶This includes foreign aid, international observers present, campaign violence, fraud, uncertain election (first

is included along with all controls from the main analysis (Table 5.5) to predict post-election violence.⁸⁷ The matching process greatly improves balance across treated and control observations, as shown in Figure 5.9 in the Appendix.⁸⁸ Matched pairs are in Table 5.10 in the Appendix. The average treatment effect is 0.28 with a standard error of 0.12, which is highly statistically significant and positive, in line with models from the main analysis. Comparing elections of similar quality across a host of factors (including fraud), international condemnation is associated with a significant increase in post-vote violence.

Other control variables in Table 5.5 do not consistently achieve statistical significance. A few gain significance in a couple of models. Some models suggest that executive and consecutive elections are associated with a greater risk of violence. GDP per capita and growth, natural resources, the presence of international observers are at times associates with less violence. However, these effects are inconsistent. Perhaps surprising to some, pre-election violence does not affect post-election violence. The variable does not reach significance and also switches signs. A close look at the data shows why: only three percent of elections (7 out of 220) have experienced both pre- and post-vote violence. These seven elections were held under repressive/non-competitive⁸⁹ and transitional⁹⁰ regimes. This finding strengthens the argument that election violence is not purely structural, as, for example, arguments about economic development imply.⁹¹ Rather, political agents employ violence around election times when this strategy is attractive.

multi-party or transitional or previously suspended) and opposition competition (opposition party legal and allowed and candidate choice on ballot), GDP per capita (as a proxy for capacity) and election type. See Kelley 2012a, 59-76, 197-198; and Hyde and Marinov 2012.

⁸⁷Acknowledging the concern about post-treatment bias and following the main analysis in Table 5.5, the second stage does not include variables for loser's vote and incumbency status. However, including these variables does not change the interpretation. In fact, excluding these variables yields a conservative estimate (0.28) while inclusion yields a larger estimate (0.30). Inclusion yields one more pair of matched elections and changes some of the pairs.

⁸⁸This shows the standardized mean difference in the empirical CDF. Black dots indicate significant differences in means, as estimated by the recommended bootstrap Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test. Gray dots indicate that the difference in means is not significant. Since all mean differences between treated and control groups become insignificant after matching, the resulting sample is balanced and a great improvement over significant differences in the original (pre-matching) data.

⁸⁹Kenya 1992; Togo 1993, 1998; and Ethiopia 2005.

⁹⁰South Africa 1994; Republic of the Congo 1993; and Guinea 1998.

⁹¹Collier 2009.

5.4.6 Robustness Checks

The results are robust to a variety of different choices, including changes in model estimation, measures of the dependent and independent variables, as well as the unit of observation.

First, I check for post-treatment bias because the key explanatory variables (condemnation, loser's vote share, losing incumbents) may be unduly influenced (i) by control variables and (ii) by each other. In the main analysis, I accounted for the latter issue by running consecutive models for each explanatory variable (models 1-3 and 5-7 in Table 5.5). Here, I test for the first issue of whether control variables unduly influence explanatory variables so that the effect estimate on violence is biased. My concern about post-treatment bias is greatest for the fraud variable and pre-election violence. The tests show that post-treatment bias exists but is marginal and does not affect the substantive interpretation of results: significance levels, and the direction of influence are unchanged, and the magnitude of the coefficients changes only slightly. When running the original models (Table 5.5) and excluding FRAUD, the coefficients on NEGATIVE IO REPORT and LOSER VOTE SHARE only change minimally,⁹² and CAMPAIGN VIOLENCE again remains insignificant. Likewise, when running the original models and excluding CAMPAIGN VIOLENCE, the coefficients on NEGATIVE IO REPORT, LOSER VOTE SHARE, and FRAUD also only change minimally.⁹³ In all these cases the significance and substantive interpretation is unchanged.

Second, model choice may unduly drive results, so fixed and random effects models were also run. An alternative ordered logit and multinomial logit model were run by collapsing levels 2 and 3 of the dependent variable. None of these changes affect the substantive interpretation. Furthermore, I used genetic matching to alleviate concerns about model dependence and spuriousness.⁹⁴ The matching process is described in section 5.4.5. The average treatment effect is 0.28 with a standard error of 0.12, which is highly statistically significant and positive, in line with models from the main

⁹²The coefficient on NEGATIVE IO REPORT increases by 0.06 in the ordered logit models and decreases by 0.2 in the binary models. Similarly, the coefficient on LOSER VOTE SHARE decreases by 0.004 in the ordered logit and by 0.03 in the binary models.

⁹³The coefficient on NEGATIVE IO REPORT increases by 0.1 in the ordered logit models and 0.3 in the binary models. The coefficient on LOSER VOTE SHARE only changes at the second decimal point. And the coefficient on the FRAUD variable increase by 0.1 in the ordered logit models and changes slightly in the binary models.

⁹⁴See Ho et al. 2007; Sekhon 2009; and Diamond and Sekhon 2013.

analysis.

Third, a portion of the elections could not be included in the models because vote shares are not available. Data on seat shares is available for more cases. Note that seat shares in legislative elections often exaggerate the majority by accommodating the Winner with more than his proportional vote share. Running the models with the seat share specification does not change the results.

Fourth, the unit of observation is changed from (concurrent) elections to election rounds, so that every legislative and presidential elections is a single observation, even if they occurred within the same week. Note that available data sources do often not allow us to empirically distinguish whether violence broke out because of one election or another election within a short time period. Nevertheless, the models were re-run on election-rounds. This does not change the substantive interpretation. However, the Loser's vote share loses significance in one model.

5.4.7 IO Selection

Given the empirical evidence for a substantial effect of condemnations by IO monitors, one may wonder whether this is just an artifact of selection. In the main analysis, I control for the presence of IO monitors but do not address their selection directly. However, selection is not a problem either theoretically or empirically for this study. From a theory perspective, IO selection into certain elections is not a problem because IO monitors tend to go where they can have a positive impact while avoiding the most conflict-prone elections.⁹⁵

The statistical analysis provides support for the rationale that IO monitors are *not* substantially more likely to attend violent elections. I examine the selection question in two ways: (1) by using predicted violence for the current election, and (2) by using actual violence from the last few elections. The first approach entails a two-stage estimation. In the first stage (model 1 of Appendix Table 5.11), I predict post-election violence onset based on determinants of observed elections and

⁹⁵ Author's interview with European Parliament's election monitoring staff in Brussels on 29 March 2011.

all variables from the main analysis except for condemnation and monitor presence.⁹⁶ The predicted values from this equation measure the probability that any given election turns violent. In the second stage (model 2), I use these predicted probabilities to check if they influence the presence of IO monitors. The coefficient is not significant, meaning that *expected* violence is not a factor driving IO monitors to attend elections.


In the alternative second approach, I test whether *past history* of violent elections makes monitors more likely to attend. For a bivariate analysis, I split elections into two groups: those where credible monitors attended and those where they did not. The difference in past violence means between observed and unobserved elections is *not* statistically significant, whether looking at only the most recent election or the last three elections.⁹⁷ Figure 5.6 underlines the violence similarity between observed and unobserved elections, graphing the violence distribution of these two groups of elections. This suggests that international monitors are no more or less likely to go to countries with a history of violence.

The multivariate results also indicate that previous election violence is not a crucial factor for the presence of IO monitors. Models 3 through 5 in Table 5.11 show logit analyses of the determinants of international observer presence. This again includes determinants of observed elections as identified by Hyde (2011), the two variables for previous election violence discussed above, and all remaining variables from the main analysis. In short, whether IOs attend an election does *not* depend on the predicted violence level: the violence coefficients never gain statistical significance and the direction varies. Overall, selection into more or less violent elections is not a problem for this study, and it is clear that the effect of international condemnations is not due to selection.

⁹⁶For determinants of observed elections, see Hyde 2011, 73-83; data from Hyde and Marinov 2012.

⁹⁷Associated p-values are 0.78 and 0.57, respectively. Data from Hyde and Marinov 2012. The variable VIOLENCE t_1 is dummy. The variable VIOLENCE t_1-t_3 is a weighted average: 0.6 for the previous election, 0.3 for the next, and 0.1 for the most distant election of the three. The presented results are robust to different weights.

Figure 5.6: Violence at Last 3 Elections by Observation Status



5.5 Case Comparison: Kenya and Sierra Leone 2007

This section compares two elections to illustrate the mechanism linking international condemnation to post-election violence: strengthening the loser and increasing his incentives to challenge the result. I document these dynamics by comparing the 2007 elections in Kenya and Sierra Leone. These two elections are very similar across the structural factors that cause post-election violence, as detailed below. The Sierra Leone election was held on 11 August and 8 September 2007. It pitted Vice President Solomon Berewa of the ruling Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP) against the challenger Ernest Koroma of the All Peoples Congress (APC) Party. The first round results were announced on August 25, with both candidates falling short of the required majority; Koroma received 44 and Berewa 38 percent of the vote. Results from the run-off election were announced starting September 10, with Koroma winning the election with 54 percent over Berewa's 45 percent. International election monitors endorsed the results and the loser, Berewa, accepted the outcome. The Kenyan election was held a few months later, on 27 December 2007, and pitted incumbent president Mwai Kibaki of the PNU party against opposition challenger Raila Odinga of the ODM party. Official results, announced on 30 December, declared Kibaki the winner with 47 percent versus Odinga's 44 percent. International election monitors condemned the results and the loser, Odinga, challenged the outcome.

This pair of elections is drawn from the matching process; it is one of the 17 pairs that genetic matching identified as balanced on a number of domestic and international covariates, except for the main independent (condemnation) and dependent variable (violence). As Table 5.7 shows, the matched election-pair is essentially balanced: both elections experienced fraud on election-day, the loser's vote share was nearly identical and large (44/45 percent), the incumbent had not lost, and credible observers were present.⁹⁸ In fact, The European Union was the largest Western monitor at both elections. The two countries also had similar ethnic divisions.⁹⁹ Moreover, the two elections

⁹⁸Some of the other control variables are not exactly equal, e.g. GDP and ODA pc. However, these variables are not significant predictors of violence, and matching indicated that they are – while not exact – at least *effectively* balanced.

⁹⁹Each country has about five major ethnic groups, with at least two of similar magnitude. In Kenya, about 17 percent of the population are Kikuyu, 14 percent Luhya, and 13 percent Kalenjin. The loser Odinga of the ODM party was supported by Kalenjin in the West and South; the winner Kibaki of the PNU party was supported by Kikuyu in the East and geographic center of Kenya. In Sierra Leone, about 35 percent of the population are Temne

are also effectively balanced on their probability of receiving a negative report from international election monitors. Recall that this probability was estimated in the first stage of the matching procedure based on prior research.¹⁰⁰ Overall then, these two elections are quite similar across the structural factors that trigger violence in the wake of elections.

Table 5.7: Matched Elections - Example

	Treatment	Control
	Kenya 2007	Sierra Leone 2007
Prob. (Condemnation)	47	41
Fraud	yes	yes
Vote share loser	44	45
Incumbent lost	no	no
IO monitor present	yes	yes
Campaign violence	low	low
Poll type	general	general
Oil and gas	no	no
Democracy (Polity IV)	6	5
ODA pc (current \$)	28	78
GDP pc (current \$)	612	357
GDP pc growth (percent)	3.63	3.78
Population size (million)	36.5	5.3
Ethnic fractionalization	0.86	0.78

Yet two striking differences exist in terms of international criticism and violence: Kenya's election was internationally condemned and the electoral loser challenged the result violently. In contrast, Sierra Leone's election was internationally endorsed and the election loser accepted the result and conceded defeat peacefully. In terms of the formal model, these two elections are located on different ends of the game tree, as shown in Figure 5.7.


This is surprising because these countries are strikingly similar across a large number of factors and – if anything – the Sierra Leone election should have ended in violence, rather than the Kenyan election. This is because Sierra Leone had recently emerged from a decade-long civil war (1991-2002). As a result of this conflict and the limited success of demobilization, weapons were still

and 31 percent Mende. The winner Koroma from the ACP party drew support from the Temne in the West and North, while the loser Berewa of the SLPP party drew support from the East and South of the Sierra Leone.

¹⁰⁰For the matching process, see section 5.4.6. While the probabilities of condemnation are not exactly balanced (47 versus 41 percent), they are *effectively* balanced because this variable ranges from 0 to 99 percent and the difference between 41 and 47 is not significant.

widespread and the population de-sensitized to violence. Sierra Leone's 2007 election could have proceeded similarly to the post-conflict election in Angola 1992, which plunged the country back into civil war. Against these odds, Sierra Leone's election did not mark a return to violence – instead it marked a peaceful power transition to a different party. In this volatile situation, the international verdict about the credibility of the election may have helped diffuse potential tensions – or, more likely, the lack of condemnation meant that the election was not challenged and conflict was not incited.

Figure 5.7: Comparing Kenya and Sierra Leone 2007



The two elections proceeded quite similarly in many respects. Campaigning and election-day were unremarkable and in compliance with norms, proceeding relatively smoothly and peacefully. Both countries experienced significant vote fraud in the form of *over-balloting* in incumbent strongholds: turnout exceeded 100 percent in several constituencies, clearly indicating that ballot boxes were stuffed.¹⁰¹ These irregularities surfaced in the vote counting process, and tabulation proceeded slowly.

Despite their many similarities, these elections differed sharply in the international reaction they evoked and in their aftermath. While Kenya's election was condemned and experienced high levels of violence, Sierra Leone's election was endorsed and remained peaceful. Why did the verdicts

¹⁰¹In Sierra Leone, over-balloting occurred in Pujehun, Kailahun, and Moyamba. In Kenya, over-balloting occurred in Molo and Kieni constituencies.

differ? A definitive answer is difficult, and a close comparison of the processes reveals no clear answers. Given that the elections were similar and the main observer identical (EU), one possible explanation is that the verdict was partly influenced by how the national election commission (NEC) reacted to the vote fraud from election-day.

In Sierra Leone, the commission dealt with the ballot stuffing in a transparent manner: it annulled polling stations where turnout exceeded 100 percent. It also remained transparent throughout the counting process, with international observers allowed to witness the tabulation locally and at the national headquarters. While a definitive reason is unclear, the NEC conduct may have contributed to the have EU observer to state that while there were a few issues, the overall process was “generally well administered.”¹⁰² By declaring the process credible and forthcoming vote share as accurate, international observers also confirmed the lack of majority popular support for the loser and thus the dim prospects of winning a potential fight against the winner. Moreover, the lack of international and domestic support also left the loser without a focal point for mobilization. Official results were issued a few days later, and Koroma was announced the winner. That same day, the electoral loser Berewa decided not to challenge the result and to concede defeat. As a consequence, the post-election period remained peaceful.

In Kenya, the commission was less transparent in dealing with the irregularities. The NEC decided to include the affected constituencies in the count, and physically barred EU monitors from observing the tallying procedure at some counting centers;¹⁰³ further, local officials in some Kibaki strongholds also kept results secret. The EU described their conduct as “clearly disturbing.”¹⁰⁴ Within a few hours after the critical EU statement, the results were announced, according to which Kibaki had won with 47 percent, ahead of challenger Odinga with 44 percent. Within 15 minutes after the results announcement, Odinga supporters challenged the result by attacking the homes

¹⁰²European Union Election Observation Mission Republic of Sierra Leone, Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions, 10 September 2007, 1.

¹⁰³“Scores dead in Kenya poll clashes,” *BBC News*, 31 December 2007. Available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/africa/7165602.stm> Accessed 20 July 2013.

¹⁰⁴Jeffrey Gettleman, “Riots Batter Kenya as Rivals Declare Victory,” *New York Times*, 30 December 2007. Available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/30/world/africa/30kenya.html?pagewanted=all&r=0> Accessed 20 July 2013.

and business of Kibaki supporters (looting, burning property).¹⁰⁵ Within three hours after the announcement of results, “Mr. Kibaki tried to pre-empt any [further] challenge [i.e. he resisted] by having himself hurriedly sworn in to a second term in office. All domestic and international observer missions swiftly issued statements condemning the tallying process and casting doubt on the result.”¹⁰⁶ The EU chief observer promptly stated that “the election commission has not succeeded in establishing the credibility of the tallying process,” that there are “*concerns about the accuracy of the final result of this election*”; overall the 2007 elections had “fallen short of key international and regional standards for democratic elections.”¹⁰⁷

Odinga chose to fight after “charges of fraud were lent extra weight by the EU election monitoring team.”¹⁰⁸ He “vowed not to back down” and called for a “million-man march [in Nairobi] ... to protest what [he] called a ‘civilian coup.’”¹⁰⁹ After international observers criticized the announced result, one Odinga supporter declared: “How can one man [Kibaki] cheat a whole nation?... If a guerrilla war starts, I am ready to join in.”¹¹⁰ Even Odinga supporters in the U.S. were fueled by the condemnation and held a demonstration in Washington. As one Odinga supporter explained: “[Our elections] were marred by a lot of irregularities, and these have been documented by the European Union observer team ... So we are ... expressing our dissatisfaction with the electoral process.”¹¹¹

Furthermore, the EU acknowledged the role that its report played in the dynamics of unfolding violence: “[An EU media release] noted evidence of manipulation and identified where results collected by its observers in regional tally centres differed from official tallies in Nairobi. *This release may have reinforced the narrative (of a vote stolen by the election commission on behalf of Presi-*

¹⁰⁵The violence also had a strong ethnic component, with the Kalenjin supporting Odinga and Kikuyus supporting Kibaki.

¹⁰⁶Human Rights Watch 2008: 22.

¹⁰⁷See Jeffrey Gettleman, Tribal Rivalry Boils Over After Kenyan Election, *New York Times*, 30 December 2007; and European Union Election Observation Mission, Preliminary Statement: Doubts about the Credibility of the Presidential Results Hamper Kenya’s Democratic Progress, 1 January 2008.

¹⁰⁸EU says Kenya poll flawed, death toll nears 260, *The Daily Star*, 2 January 2008.

¹⁰⁹See EU calls for inquiry into allegedly flawed Kenyan poll results, *Deutsche Welle*, 1 January 2008. And Kenneth Ogosia, Rails Calls for Million Man Protest, *All Africa*, 31 December 2007.

¹¹⁰Kenya under pressure as death toll rises, *ABC News*, 1 January 2008.

¹¹¹Kenyans in U.S. Protest Disputed Election Results, *Voice of America*, 3 January 2008.

*dent Kibaki) which was driving violence.*¹¹² Taken together, this evidence supports both stages of the mechanism. First, the EU’s criticism of the election result suggested that Odinga’s vote share (popular support) was larger than the official result. Second, this condemnation was an important factor contributing to the narrative of a stolen election and thereby facilitating mobilization among Odinga’s supporters.

To summarize, the elections in Sierra Leone and Kenya were quite similar across the factors driving post-election violence. Both experienced significant vote fraud on election day, an important trigger of violence. Yet the elections differ in their post-election outcomes: in Sierra Leone, the EU endorsed the election and peace prevailed whereas in Kenya the EU condemned the election. This contributed to the “narrative of a stolen election” and fueled violence by strengthening the loser: indicating that he has more popular support and giving his supporters a focal point for mobilization. In contrast, in Sierra Leone allegations of fraud could be discounted because the process was deemed credible and the result accurate, which helped in getting the loser to accept the result.

5.6 Conclusion

This chapter argues that post-elections violence often erupts after electoral losers challenge the result. Losers are more likely to challenge results when they have decent chances at winning the challenge or a potential post-election fight. In this context, condemnations by IO election monitors can strengthen the loser and shift his incentives to fight by indicating that he probably has more popular support and by serving as a focal point for mobilization, legitimizing the challenge. Violence then ensues either because the loser challenges violently (as in Kenya 2007) or because peaceful challenges are violently crushed (as in Ethiopia 2005). Using new data on post-election violence in Africa since 1990, a formal model, and illustrative cases, the results indicate that such violence is more likely and more intense when a reputable IO election monitor doubts the accuracy of the election result. These results are robust to a variety of modeling choices, and to controlling for selection and spuriousness.

¹¹²Atwood 2012: 22 (emphasis added).

The effect of IO monitors on violence is an unintended consequence – observers do not aim to fuel violence in their host countries. Yet, when IO monitors condemn elections, they can unwittingly have negative effects on civil conflict and unrest. This chapter stands in contrast to much existing research on international election monitoring, which has reached considerable agreement about the intended positive consequences on governance in host countries. Research has documented how external election monitors can detect and deter fraud,¹¹³ increase participation of opposition parties,¹¹⁴ encourage voter turnout,¹¹⁵ boost confidence in the announced result,¹¹⁶ and help raise the overall quality of current and future elections.¹¹⁷

Some have raised caveats about the *extent* of these positive effects¹¹⁸ and noted strategic adaptation by the incumbent.¹¹⁹ Yet there seems to be general agreement that international election observation has made “significant contributions to the spread of democracy around the world.”¹²⁰

Even when we shift the focus from regular politics to domestic *conflict*, monitors’ *positive* contributions are highlighted. Some have noted observers’ potential for peacemaking,¹²¹ conflict management and mediation.¹²² More specifically concerning negative IO reports, recent research underlines positive effects in terms of making election protests more efficient and thereby helping self-enforcing democracy.¹²³

Without denying these positive effects, this article presents a different viewpoint, drawing attention to the negative unintended consequences of IO monitoring. To date, the only identified, systematic negative repercussions spurred by IO condemnations revolve around the reaction of the *international* community. Foreign donors may cut democracy-contingent benefits or otherwise seek to

¹¹³See Alvarez et al. 2008: 211; and Hyde 2007.

¹¹⁴See Bjornlund, Bratton, Gibson 1992, 408; and McCoy, Garber, Pastor 1991, 109.

¹¹⁵McCoy, Garber, Pastor 1991, 107.

¹¹⁶See Garber and Cowan 1993; and McCoy, Garber, Pastor 1991, 11-113

¹¹⁷See Kelley 2012a, chapters 7 and 8; and Donno 2013, chapter 5.

¹¹⁸See Kelley 2012a, 168-169; and Carothers 1997, 20-27.

¹¹⁹See Simpson and Donno 2012; Ichino and Schündeln 2012; and Hyde and O’Mahony 2010.

¹²⁰Carothers 1997, 30, 19-21.

¹²¹McCoy, Garber, Pastor 1991.

¹²²See Pastor 1998; McCoy and Diez 2011; and Rudolph 2013.

¹²³Hyde and Marinov 2014.

enforce democratic norms.¹²⁴ However, research has been relatively mute about the reaction of domestic stakeholders – the primary audience of IO reports – immediately after the release of negative verdicts. We do not yet know what effect international monitoring has at the critical moment after voting – whether the electoral result is accepted or contested. This article sheds light on an important but under-studied area: the effect of monitoring on domestic politics in the volatile weeks after voting.

These findings also have policy implications. One potential recommendation is to avoid deeply flawed elections and shift international investments to alternative means of democracy promotion, especially when the country is at risk of election violence. I have shown that observer’s condemnation can contribute to post-election violence. Some scholars argue that when election observers condemn elections and contribute to post-election *protests*, this is “good” conflict because it can help shape incumbent incentives and enforce democracy.¹²⁵ *Violence*, however, may be a different matter. Apart from the ethical issues involved, whether election violence is “good violence” and has democratizing effects is an open empirical question. To the extent that election violence does not have democratizing effects, this study suggests that in some situations, international investment in election assistance may be better shifted away from monitoring and towards technical assistance.

Some international observers are certainly aware of the choices they may have to face after election-day. For example, the EU notes that “fiercely-contested elections in divided societies can pose observers thorny choices.”¹²⁶ Determining the optimal policy choice in any given situation can be difficult. While observers may increase the conflict risk with a condemnation, endorsing fraudulent elections reduces their credibility over the long run, and credibility is their primary currency. Observers are generally concerned about their reputation. One potential solution to this dilemma is to not put observers in this situation. When assessment missions indicate that elections will likely not be meaningful, IOs could be more strict in self-policing and refrain from sending full missions. As an alternative to monitoring, organizations could sponsor technical assistance to support domestic reform efforts. Externally supported reforms can be particularly helpful to establish independent,

¹²⁴See Hyde 2011; and Donno 2013.

¹²⁵Hyde and Marinov 2014.

¹²⁶Atwood 2012, 22.

capable, and credible election management bodies, which I explore in Chapter 6. While we have a good understanding of international monitoring, and this dissertation begins to examine the effect of technical assistance on violence, the research field is wide open to systematically explore the role of international technical support on domestic politics and conflict.

5.7 Appendix

Table 5.8: Descriptive Statistics

	Variable	Min	Max	Mean	SD	N
DV	POST-ELECTION VIOLENCE level	0	3	0.29	0.75	220
	POST-ELECTION VIOLENCE dummy	0	1	0.07	0.26	220
IV	LOSER'S VOTE SHARE	0.00	50.00	25.31	13.49	184
	INCUMBENT LOST	0	1	0.07	0.25	202
	NEGATIVE IO REPORT	0	1	0.12	0.33	217
CV	INTL OBSERVERS PRESENT	0	1	0.69	0.47	220
	ODA PC	0.00	0.90	0.10	0.12	220
	ELECTION-DAY FRAUD	0	1	0.24	0.43	199
	PRE-ELECTION VIOLENCE	0	1	0.55	0.50	220
	GDP PC	0.06	7.99	0.98	1.55	212
	GDP PC GROWTH	-29.48	56.83	1.55	6.45	214
	DEMOCRACY	1	7	3.42	1.87	186
	OIL AND GAS VALUE	-9.21	9.49	-5.41	6.35	206
	POPULATION SIZE	4.27	11.87	8.32	1.65	220
	POLL TYPE	0	2	0.88	0.85	220
	ETHNIC FRACTIONALIZATION	0.06	0.94	0.66	0.22	205

Figure 5.8: Distribution of Loser's Vote Share




Table 5.9: The Effect of Condemnation – Counterfactuals

Sample DV Model	Only Observed Elections				All Elections	
	ordered (1)	binary (2)	ordered (3)	binary (4)	ordered (5)	binary (6)
LOSER'S VOTE SHARE	0.021 (0.019)	0.139 (0.032)***	0.020 (0.019)	0.127 (0.028)***	0.026 (0.018)	0.094 (0.028)***
INCUMBENT LOST	0.799 (1.445)	0.048 (1.336)	0.589 (1.463)	-0.260 (1.464)	0.413 (1.402)	0.089 (1.227)
NEGATIVE REPORT	1.889 (0.873)**	3.999 (1.354)***			1.541 (0.718)**	0.628 (1.391)
POSITIVE REPORT			-1.756 (0.826)**	-3.557 (1.067)***	0.038 (0.517)	-2.658 (1.701)
ODA PC	-13.288 (8.000)*	-9.684 (28.389)	-12.879 (8.015)	-9.341 (25.904)	-4.470 (5.881)	-8.772 (17.201)
ELECTION-DAY FRAUD	1.123 (0.716)	2.630 (1.427)*	1.145 (0.709)	2.683 (1.404)*	1.238 (0.566)**	2.408 (1.160)**
PRE-ELECTION VIOLENCE	0.257 (0.744)	-2.769 (1.613)*	0.315 (0.756)	-2.646 (1.493)*	0.662 (0.616)	-1.544 (1.099)
POLL TYPE	0.266 (0.413)	0.883 (0.450)*	0.264 (0.419)	0.894 (0.420)**	0.263 (0.347)	0.999 (0.514)*
GDP PC	0.507 (0.335)	-0.334 (1.257)	0.559 (0.334)*	0.089 (0.897)	0.143 (0.321)	-1.354 (0.760)*
GDP PC GROWTH	-0.046 (0.052)	-0.001 (0.085)	-0.048 (0.052)	-0.005 (0.083)	-0.086 (0.059)	0.063 (0.069)
DEMOCRACY	-0.050 (0.166)	-0.498 (0.278)*	-0.062 (0.168)	-0.552 (0.289)*	-0.021 (0.158)	0.001 (0.286)
OIL AND GAS PC	-0.106 (0.063)*	-0.134 (0.109)	-0.118 (0.063)*	-0.205 (0.155)	-0.062 (0.054)	-0.187 (0.150)
POPULATION SIZE	-0.244 (0.342)	-0.385 (0.825)	-0.193 (0.335)	-0.143 (0.847)	-0.134 (0.333)	-0.397 (0.514)
ETHNIC FRACTIONALIZATION	2.726 (1.980)	3.160 (3.804)	2.656 (1.999)	2.720 (3.358)	0.360 (1.594)	-0.769 (2.277)
Observations	101	101	101	101	139	139
AIC	154.23	54.56	155.02	55.42	196.13	70.49
BIC	196.07	91.17	196.86	92.03	246.01	114.50

Ordered and Binary Logit models. Standard errors clustered on countries in parentheses.

***, **, and * indicates significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level.

Figure 5.9: Matching – Balance Diagnostics




Table 5.10: Matching – 17 Matched Elections

Treatment	Control
Cameroon 1992 E	Cameroon 2004 E
Kenya 1997 E	Kenya 2002 G
Madagascar 2001 E	Madagascar 1996 E
Togo 1998 E	Togo 2003 E
Zimbabwe 2002 E	Zimbabwe 2000 L
Zimbabwe 2005 L	Zimbabwe 2000 L
Niger 1996 E	Chad 1996 E
Kenya 1992 E	Togo 2003 E
Kenya 2007 G	Sierra Leone 2007 G
Uganda 2006 E	Kenya 2002 G
Uganda 2001 E	Chad 1996 E
Nigeria 2007 E	Tanzania 2005 E
Nigeria 2003 E	Sudan 1996 G
Cameroon 1997 L	Angola 2008 L
Mauritania 1992 E	Senegal 1993 G
Rwanda 2003 E	Zimbabwe 1995 L
Rwanda 2003 L	Zimbabwe 1995 L

Note: Bold entries experienced post-election violence.

Table 5.11: Determinants of Observed Elections

DV Model	Stage 1 Violence Onset (1)	Stage 2 Observed (2)	Observed (3)	Observed (4)	Observed (5)	Observed (6)
PR (POST-ELECTION VIOLENCE)		7.398 (4.716)				
LOSER'S VOTE SHARE	0.086*** (0.020)					
INCUMBENT RUNNING	1.323 (1.088)					
ELECTION-DAY FRAUD	2.446*** (0.792)					
PRE-ELECTION VIOLENCE	-0.896 (0.869)					
VIOLENCE AT LAST ELECTION			0.284 (0.323)		0.281 (0.332)	
VIOLENCE AT LAST 3 ELECTIONS				-0.264 (0.527)		-0.236 (0.555)
ANY PREVIOUS EL OBSERVED		1.128** (0.567)	1.167** (0.490)	1.195** (0.510)		
LAST EL OBSERVED					0.485 (0.493)	0.530 (0.506)
OPPOSITION COMPETITION		-0.232 (0.928)	0.435 (0.788)	0.448 (0.728)	0.617 (0.746)	0.560 (0.708)
UNCERTAIN ELECTION		1.328** (0.623)	1.553** (0.672)	1.420** (0.723)	1.133** (0.536)	0.964* (0.545)
MILITARY ASSISTANCE		-4.120 (8.814)	-5.410 (9.187)	-5.760 (8.302)	-7.541 (9.069)	-7.719 (8.432)
ODA PC	-4.970 (10.949)	-6.253 (4.371)	-8.921** (3.759)	-9.453*** (3.520)	-8.512** (4.314)	-8.947** (4.015)
GDP PC	-0.683 (0.663)	-0.386* (0.200)	-0.364 (0.224)	-0.350 (0.217)	-0.438* (0.246)	-0.422* (0.244)
GDP PC GROWTH	0.069 (0.081)	0.026 (0.037)	-0.018 (0.040)	-0.041 (0.049)	-0.011 (0.039)	-0.034 (0.048)
DEMOCRACY	0.021 (0.213)	0.112 (0.114)	0.123 (0.112)	0.119 (0.117)	0.120 (0.114)	0.111 (0.119)
OIL AND GAS	-0.142 (0.091)	0.014 (0.044)	-0.024 (0.045)	-0.013 (0.046)	-0.011 (0.041)	-0.001 (0.042)
POPULATION SIZE	0.043 (0.512)	-0.199 (0.245)	-0.178 (0.257)	-0.153 (0.262)	-0.146 (0.286)	-0.124 (0.286)
ETHNIC FRACTIONALIZATION	-2.078 (1.888)	1.874 (1.299)	1.349 (1.278)	0.281 (1.479)	1.304 (1.342)	0.227 (1.515)
POLL TYPE	0.233 (0.442)	0.639** (0.256)	0.657*** (0.253)	0.719 ** (0.281)	0.616** (0.260)	0.685** (0.294)
Observations	139	137	174	162	174	162
AIC	74.59	156.79	200.75	188.66	203.85	191.31
BIC	112.74	197.67	244.97	231.89	248.07	234.54

Logit models, standard errors clustered on countries. ***, **, * indicates significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level.

6 Trust, Technical Assistance, and Post-Election Violence

“A new focus on the administrative side of elections could prove of lasting importance to the enterprise of democratization. It is the one dimension that has been consistently overlooked.”¹

Peaceful elections are a sine qua non of democracy and much research has explored the political, economic, and demographic factors of democratization and (election) violence. Yet relatively little attention has been paid to election *administration* and even less to international efforts to improve it. In this chapter, I argue that election technical assistance (TA) increases the capacity and credibility of election management bodies, which increases the credibility of the election result, leading to fewer violent challenges after polling-day.

Citizens are more likely to accept election results when they regard national election institutions as neutral, independent, and capable. In contrast, if citizens or parties believe that even repeated competition is unlikely to yield a win because electoral institutions are biased, then they are unlikely to accept any election result. Moreover, while increasing institutional capacity is important for its own sake, it also produces better results from parallel voter education efforts. An important part of TA involves socializing citizens into the “rules of the game” called democracy.² However, citizens are unlikely to agree to an adverse result if they are likely to lose all future competitions because the election commission does not announce the *true* results. Therefore the effect of “soft” civil society work likely depends on institutional reform.

In this chapter, I argue that the provision of such assistance in the run-up to elections can contribute

¹Pastor 1999b, 18. More than a decade later, this field is still largely overlooked.

²These rules include repeated interaction, peaceful competition and the normalcy of losing.

to more peaceful post-election periods. Using data on UN election assistance, regional barometer surveys, and three datasets on post-election unrest and violence, I present statistical evidence that UN election assistance significantly reduces violence in Latin America and Africa. I argue that the main mechanism linking UN assistance and reduced violence involves citizens' increased trust in the national election commission. When voters trust the election commission, they are also more likely to trust the announced result, which in turn leads to fewer election challenges, fewer protests, and less violence. The mechanism of trust-building is illustrated with descriptive data and an examination of elections in Guyana since 1992.

This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 6.1 compares technical assistance to monitoring, and provides background about UN technical assistance in particular. Section 6.2 introduces the theory linking TA, trust, and violence and specifies hypotheses. Section 6.3 lays out the research design, and section 6.4 discusses the results, first accounting for non-random treatment. Section 6.5 illustrates the mechanism in the case of Guyana, and section 6.6 concludes.

6.1 Background on Election Technical Assistance

Before proceeding with the argument of this chapter, I identify differences between technical assistance and monitoring relevant to violence, and provide background about UN technical assistance.

Differences between Technical Assistance and Monitoring

In chapter 5, I focus on violence after elections and show how a negative report by international election monitors can increase violence. Such international condemnation strengthens the electoral loser by suggesting that he is more popular and by serving as a focal point for mobilization. Using data national elections in sub-Saharan Africa and a comparative case study of Kenya and Sierra Leone in 2007, I find support for this argument. In this chapter 6, I again focus on post-election violence but explore the effect of international technical assistance (TA) rather than monitoring. While both international interventions can reduce *campaign* violence – as shown in chapter 4 –

their effect on violence *after* elections differs in terms of: (1) the mechanism, (2) the direction and (3) the timing of the effect. I will start by discussing the mechanisms and then move on to the direction and timing.

First, technical assistance (TA) influences election violence through a different mechanism than monitoring. While monitoring can provide information about fraud and popular strength of candidates or parties, TA does not do that. Instead, TA implements country-specific reforms to raise the capacity of institutions and civil society.³ In all, technical assistance should make a challenge to the election result less likely by increasing the capacity and credibility of the election commission, encouraging contestants to stay calm, and “teaching” citizens and parties that losing is just part of the game.


Specific TA activities that help reform electoral institutions and are relevant to post-election dynamics include:

- training (national) election management bodies (increasing capacity for resolving disputes and processing complaints; improving credibility) and improving their election material, such as the voter registry (purging ghost voters to reduce multiple voting and registering new voters to increase participation);
- training on-the-ground staff, i.e. election officers and security forces, about their proper role. For example, greater transparency of institutions about registration requirements and the location of polling places can decrease tensions on election day and beyond because potential voters are not turned away from polling stations and therefore do not feel disenfranchised.

In the realm of civil society initiatives, technical assistance activities mainly focus on educating voters about their rights and responsibilities. Such activities include education about the voting process itself (polling booth procedures and locations, ID requirements, expectations about tabulation) as well as “appropriate” behavior during the entire process. As a result, voters are

³See Ponzio 2004, 226; and Kammerud 2011. A third category of programming supports watchdog activities, monitoring incidents of violence in near real-time through text messaging and online mapping, thereby supporting local law enforcement personnel. It is not explicitly included here because this type of programming has only evolved in the past five years.

Figure 6.1: IFES Training Poster Against Post-Election Violence (DRC 2006)



more informed about their role in the process, the role of others, and what constitutes legitimate behavior. Citizens are also more informed about which behavior is illegal, how to react to transgressions, and how to manage disputes through legal (instead of violent) means. For example, for the 2006 election in the Democratic Republic of Congo, posters were designed and distributed that emphasized the need for peace after elections and the loser's acceptance of the result. These posters, shown in Figure 6.1, contrast two ways of reacting to an election result. The poster on the left shows the wrong reaction where arguments and violence arise between supporters of opposing camps. The poster on the right shows the proper reaction, where losers recognize the result and winners celebrate peacefully.

Youth and first-time voters are especially important to reach through civic education programs because young people are often hired as perpetrators for violence.⁴ One initiative to bring the “peaceful consent” message to young voters entails multiple soccer matches between groups on the town and village level. Given a number of soccer matches, winning, losing and (mostly) peaceful competition are part of the normal game.⁵ While one team may lose today, it may also win again in the future. This expectation underlines many sporting competitions, and TA organizes iterative

⁴For example, youth groups, and in particular unemployed young men, have been responsible as perpetrators for “most of the violence during the 2007 campaign” in Sierra Leone (ARI 2011, 3). There is also a positive association between young males and civil war propensity (Fearon and Laitin 2003, 86).

⁵As Elizabeth Cote, IFES country director Guinea, states: “If you organize tournaments [that are] peace related and between party youths, there is always a winner and a loser, exactly the same as during the election.” Available at <http://www.ifes.org/Content/Videos/2011/Elections-Worth-Dying-For-Maintaining-the-Peace-During-Elections-in-Africa.aspx>. Accessed 2 July 2013.

matches in the hopes that this message transfers from competition in sports to politics.⁶ Playing and losing against different “teams” is not the end of the day but just a temporary state of affairs until the next competition.

The key point is that TA works through a different mechanism than monitoring. TA activities do not provide information about fraud and popular strength but rather increase capacity and understanding in civil society to deal with disappointing outcomes in a peaceful manner. Such activities essentially build trust in the system, institutions, and political camps through iterated interaction.

Second, the effect of technical assistance should be different from election monitoring in terms of its direction. I expect that TA works only in one direction: it tends to reduce violence intensity. In contrast, monitoring reports – depending on the verdict – can increase or decrease violence after voting. Unlike monitoring, TA works through institutional reform and education, thereby changing people’s perception and behavior.

One crucial difference between TA and monitoring is in the purpose and nature of their reports. TA reports are unlikely to influence violence intensity for several reasons. Unlike monitoring, TA *does not judge* the credibility of the election result.⁷ Unlike monitoring, whose widely anticipated judgements on the election result can influence the power dynamics between competitors, TA does not issue reports on the accuracy of the result.⁸ TA reports primarily evaluate the success of the implemented assistance project rather than the election. While such a performance evaluation is integrated with the election, it is distinct. For example, TA project reports evaluate if their goals were met in terms of training stakeholders, reforming processes and agencies – not about whether a candidate or party truly won. Further, TA reports are mostly for *internal* (within agency) use

⁶For example, IFES organized soccer matches in East Timor 2007 to “encourage friendships across clubs” and “promote peace.” BELUN-EVER report No. 4, released 9 August 2007, 6. As for their impact on attitudes and behavior, local civil society organizations (who had implemented these matches) noted “youth showing respect for each other at parties where there were previous tendencies for violence to occur.” BELUN EVER in Timor-Leste Final Report, 21 December 2007, 9.

⁷The following statements are generalizations to highlight the difference between two basic election assistance types. There have been occasion on which UN technical assistance is invited to administer the entire electoral process or conduct parallel vote counts (i.e. verify the result). However, these are only a handful of elections, such as Cambodia 1993, Croatia 1997. UN DPA 2002, 3.

⁸While TA – the focus here – does *not* issue statements on elections, other forms of UN support may. Ludwig 2004, 175.

and do not involve high-level press conferences like monitoring. As a result, TA reports generally are not circulated in the media.⁹ Finally, TA reports are unlikely to influence post-election violence because they are only issued weeks or *months after* the election, i.e. usually long after competition dynamics have calmed down. Therefore I expect that TA reports do not matter for violence and that TA decreases post-vote violence through the mechanisms outlined above. If TA is successful, i.e. international actors are able to reform electoral institutions and strengthen civil society, then it likely reduces violence (regardless of what TA reports say).

Third, the effect of TA is different in its timing in two ways. While timing dynamics are not tested in this chapter, their observable implications could be tested in future research. TA can be seen as an “ex ante” measure because it requires substantial lead time prior to election-day in order to influence violence afterwards, while monitoring reports are issued “ex post” after election-day.¹⁰ If the critical question is whether citizens challenge the result, then we should be able to observe some of the effects of TA on citizens’ attitudes *throughout* the electoral cycle as well as after the election. In contrast, the effect of monitoring on post-election violence (a positive or negative verdict on the election’s credibility) can *only* be measured in attitudes and behavior *after* the election.

More importantly, the effect of TA is probably observable at the “treated” election as well as cumulatively over time. On the one hand, UN assistance is meant to improve the currently held election: “UNDP’s approach to electoral assistance has placed great emphasis on the conduct of elections and less on long-term capacity development.”¹¹ On the other hand, the kind of institutional and social capital reforms that TA pursues take time because institutional and attitudinal change is slow. Targeted initiatives can be successful but it is difficult to “perfect” an entire system within a few months. Adopting Pierson’s (2003) framework, the effect of TA is slow and cumulative whereas monitoring is part of a causal chain with tightly wound sequences and short-term or immediate effects. In addition to affecting the current election, technical assistance should reduce a country’s

⁹One exception to the media rule are reports by externally supported domestic NGOs which monitor and report on election violence. For example, projects supported by IFES’ EVER program are aimed at reporting about election violence. However, these reports also do not judge the election result – they only document local incidents of violence.

¹⁰See the appendix for a list of administrative challenges. Most of these challenges are prior to election day and can be improved through TA.

¹¹UNDP 2001, 1.

experience of post-election violence cumulatively *over time* by indirectly slowly changing citizens' attitudes about institutions and other players, and therefore citizens' reaction to election results.

In sum, I expect technical assistance to reduce post-vote violence through institutional reform and civil society work, which should increase trust in the national election commission and its announced result.

UN Election Technical Assistance

The premier international organization providing technical election assistance is the United Nations. Beyond the UN, smaller organizations supporting TA include government agencies,¹² IGOs,¹³ and NGOs.¹⁴ UN election assistance dates back to the late 1980s; in 1994, the UN General Assembly approved a resolution to strengthen the UN's role in "enhancing the effectiveness of the principle of *periodic and genuine elections and the promotion of democratization*."¹⁵ This paved the way for UN "verification" as part of broader peace-building missions,¹⁶ and then for self-standing missions. Since 2000, UN election assistance has increasingly aimed at sustainability, shifting "from elections as a political quick-fix to recognition that democratic development takes time."¹⁷ The UN provides several types of election support:¹⁸

- Supervision: certifying elections during decolonization due to the absence of sovereign states; last provided in Namibia 1989-90
- Verification of elections as part of peacekeeping, mostly in the early 1990s; first in Nicaragua 1990; later examples include Angola 1992, El Salvador, Mozambique and South Africa 1994

¹²Government agencies include CIDA/Canadian International Development Agency; DFID/United Kingdom Department for International Development; USAID/United States Agency for International Development; AusAID/Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade; GIZ/Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit.

¹³IGOs include the European Union; OCSE ODIHR/Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights; IOM/International Organization for Migration; IPU/Inter-Parliamentary Union.

¹⁴NGOs include IFES/International Foundation for Electoral Systems; NDI/National Democratic Institute for International Affairs; International IDEA/International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance

¹⁵See Resolution A/RES/48/13; and Ludwig 2004, 178, 185.

¹⁶Ludwig 2004, 186.

¹⁷Ludwig 2004, 180.

¹⁸Ludwig 2004, 173-176. Also see Ludwig 1995.

- Follow and Report: these small observation missions (1-2 observers) are rather rare; examples include Russia 1993, Paraguay 1993, and Algeria 1996¹⁹
- Organization and Conduct: organizing elections; provided only twice: Cambodia 1992-93 and East Timor 1999-2002
- Coordination and Support of International Observers: logistical assistance, deployment plans to avoid duplication of effort; no certification by UN; examples are Ethiopia 1992, Armenia 1995
- Support for Domestic Observers: training domestic NGO observers, aimed at domestic capacity building; first in Mexico 1994
- Technical Assistance: the most commonly requested service²⁰ and the focus of this study; includes advice on systems, laws, and registration methods, poll-worker training, civic education, and logistics.

Under the UN umbrella, a variety of bodies contribute to election assistance; some of the assistance is provided through the UN Development Programme (UNDP) since 1991, some through the Electoral Assistance Division (EAD) within the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) since 1992, and some through the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) if the country already hosts a mission. Given the variety of agencies involved, the UN established a “focal point” (currently the DPA Under-Secretary-General) for election assistance. To further increase coordination among various election-related UN entities, the UN established the Inter-Agency Coordination Mechanism for United Nations Electoral Assistance in 2009.²¹

Most of the UN’s electoral assistance is provided by the UNDP.²² While election assistance is only a fraction of the UN’s portfolio, it is unrivaled in scope among non-UN TA organizations. According to its own estimates, 83 UNDP country offices completed 394 electoral support projects during 1999-2011, with a total price tag of \$3 billion.²³ In terms of regional distribution, about 40 percent

¹⁹UNDPA 2002b.

²⁰See Ludwig 1995, 342; and Ludwig 2004, 173.

²¹Membership includes the DPKO, EAD, UNDP, UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, and UN Office of Project Services, UN Women, and UN Volunteers. UNDP 2012, 18.

²²According to a recent UN survey, 53% of all UN electoral support staff worked for the UNDP, 20.5% for the DPA/EAD and 9.6% percent for the PKO. UNDP 2012, 135.

²³UNDP 2012, 18.

of the country offices providing TA were in Africa and about 20 percent in Latin America, followed by Asia/Pacific (20 percent), the Arab states (10 percent), and Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States (10 percent).²⁴ There is large variation across countries in terms of the financial scope, with multi-year budgets varying between small projects worth a few million USD to mid-size projects with multi-year budgets of \$30-60 million (e.g. Niger, Burundi, Indonesia, Bangladesh) to large projects of several hundred million USD.²⁵

Technical assistance is commonly provided by the UNDP,²⁶ with activities focussing on strengthening election administration (25%) and civic and voter education (19%). In Latin America and Africa, the relative emphasis on the administrative side of elections is even higher, at 32 and 28 percent respectively.²⁷ Figure 6.2 illustrates the global distribution of UNDP electoral support activities.²⁸ To help countries establish independent EMBs, institutional capacity development includes “training in the management of electoral systems, ... support for legal reform, institutional restructuring, improving professional development programs, and strengthening public information and outreach capacity, resource management, and sustainability programs.”²⁹

In terms of receiving technical assistance, the process is very similar to monitoring. The host country government must formally request UN assistance.³⁰ Following this request, the UN “focal point” conducts a desk review or a needs assessment mission, consisting of two experts in country for about ten days.³¹ The UN’s decision about whether to provide assistance is based on the type of assistance requested, domestic political conditions, the viability of the electoral process, sufficient lead time, and IO budget constraints.³² Most country requests are granted but the specific

²⁴UNDP 2012, 19.

²⁵Large UNDP projects for electoral assistance include Nigeria (\$112 million during 2006-2011), Sudan (\$196 million during 2004-2011), and Afghanistan (\$809 million during 2004-2011). UNDP 2012, 19.

²⁶Ludwig 1995, 342.

²⁷UNDP 2012, 23.

²⁸This figure is taken from UNDP 2012, 22. The unit of measurement is (undefined) “human and financial” effort.


²⁹Ponzio 2004, 217-218.

³⁰Governments need to request support several months prior to election-day. In rare cases, the process begins with a mandate of the UN Security Council or General Assembly. See Ludwig 2004, 171; Ludwig 1995, 342-343; and UNDP 2012, 17.

³¹Ludwig 2004, 172-173.

³²Ludwig 1995, 342. When assistance missions are not granted, the UN usually cites “insufficient lead time” and, more rarely, “the absence of enabling environment.” UN 2002.

Figure 6.2: Types of UNDP Election Technical Assistance, 2002-2012



components of assistance vary.³³ To my knowledge, this chapter is the first statistical examination of the drivers of UN election assistance missions, and section 6.4.1 provides interesting insights.

6.2 Theory: Institutional Trust and Violence

The concept of institutional trust is central to my argument about the effect of TA on violence. In this section, I first clarify the concept of trust used here, the trust object, explain how trust matters for post-vote violence, and then situate the argument in the literature.

The concept of trust has multiple meanings. *Interpersonal trust* describes face-to-face relations between individuals based on an expectation of reciprocity. *Generalized trust* can exist between

³³According to its own calculation for 1991-2001, the UN “received requests for electoral assistance from 89 countries. The UNDP has assisted 68 of those countries: 40 in Africa, 13 in Latin America and the Caribbean, 8 in Asia, 5 in Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States and 2 in Arab States” (UNDP 2001, 1). Also see Ludwig 2004, 173.

citizens of a society that have not known each other before. The level of such generalized trust depends on a country's institutions, economic development and culture as well as an individual's income and education.³⁴ This also involves an expectation of reciprocity in actions between individuals.³⁵ The focus here is on *institutional trust*: trust in institutions such as the government, political authorities, and administrative bodies.

Unlike inter-personal trust, trust in political institutions is not built on the assumption of reciprocity. Rather, institutional trust means “that the truster knows the normative idea of the institution, and has some confidence in the sanctions that provide additional motivations for officials to behave according to this idea.”³⁶ Put differently, institutional trust builds on three elements: (1) that the institution is fair in its legal setup, (2) competent in its ability to work by its rules, and (3) that citizens have knowledge about the first two.

Technical assistance can help with all three elements: It can change rules and regulations, increase capacity (through funding, logistics, training), and increase information flow to the relevant audience (citizens) through communication campaigns, civic and voter education. Apart from institutional capacity and compliance, citizen knowledge is key. As Offe puts it, if people understand the institution and its function, “it will motivate their support for the institution and their compliance with its rules.”³⁷

6.2.1 Technical Assistance and Institutional Trust

At the heart of trust in elections is trust in election management bodies (EMBs). These institutions can be categorized into three types:³⁸ (1) an office / agency located within a ministry of home or internal affairs (as in many advanced democracies), (2) an office under other supervisory authority; and (3) a self-contained, more or less independent institution (as in many new democracies and also

³⁴Patterson 1999.

³⁵Offe 1999.

³⁶Warren 1999, 349.

³⁷Offe (1999) summarized in Warren 1999, 6. To some extent this also involves trusting individuals working inside an institution: that such people share the institution's rules and regard them as binding.

³⁸This categorization is based on Lopez-Pintor 2000, 13, as quoted in Elklit and Reynolds 2000, 6.

Canada, Australia, India). In the last type, EMBs are often called national election commissions (NECs).

In terms of trust in election management bodies, we can further distinguish confidence in five distinct features (or specific trust objects): organizational structure, degree of independence from political forces (including appointment, tenure, resources), internal motivations, staff motivations, and transparency.³⁹ Reforms supported by technical assistance are perhaps most able to influence two of these five issues: political independence and transparency. In some cases, it is also possible to change the EMB's organizational structure, particularly after watershed or highly violent elections where domestic political will is high (e.g. Kenya 2007/2013). But such occasions are rare.⁴⁰ Strategies to reduce a deficit of trust can be either top-down (if institutions comply better with their rules) or bottom up (if citizens trust more in institutions / become more adapted to extend trust to total strangers).⁴¹ In that sense, TA can be effective from both directions because it aims to affect institutions themselves as well as citizen's perceptions about these institutions.

My argument is that international technical assistance should increase trust in electoral institutions (i.e. EMBs) and perceived electoral fairness. Perceived fairness and institutional trust are strongly related because the goal of EMBs is "to conduct an election that is judged fair by all sides."⁴² Empirical evidence supports the argument that EMB performance is a strong and positive predictor on citizen's perception of electoral fairness.⁴³

Apart from election technical assistance – which to my knowledge has received no attention in statistical research – there are a number of other drivers of trust in elections. Previous research has

³⁹Elklit and Reynolds 2000, 6-7. To gauge the effectiveness of EMBs, one can examine their outcome, i.e. citizens' "trust" in the election as expressed in post-vote surveys (Lopez-Pintor 2000). On a conceptual level, a lack of transparency can also lead to individuals' limited information about the institution; the lack of compliance of the institution with its own rules can also be a problem for trust development (see Hardin 1999; and Offe 1999).

⁴⁰It is also noteworthy that from the EMB's administrative perspective, election can suffer from at least three main problems: uneducated pool of citizens from which to draw election workers, poor infrastructure for communication and transportation, and people not used to contesting and so more likely to acquiesce to undemocratic behavior (Pastor 1999b). Technical assistance can help address these problems to some degree: through logistical support as well as civic and voter education.

⁴¹Warren, 7.

⁴²Pastor 1999b, 2; and Pastor 1999a.

⁴³For a cross-national study of EMB performance in Africa, see Kerr 2013. For within-country study of poll worker performance in the US, see Hall, Monson, and Patterson 2009; and Atkeson and Saunders 2007.

also identified a number of individual, election, and country-level determinants of trust in elections. Individual-level factors include support for a winning/losing party or candidate, interpersonal trust, perception of corruption, political interest, party identification, left/right self-placement, and socio-economic variables (age, education, income).⁴⁴ Characteristics of the election itself influence trust in the election, such as the closeness of the race, campaign dynamics, alternation in power, and the number of days from the election to surveys / polls.⁴⁵ Lastly, a number of country-level differences matter for trust in elections, including the level of democracy, GDP per capita, and the electoral system.⁴⁶ Some research indicates that trust in elections varies across regions, with Latin America ranking lower than other regions.⁴⁷

Beyond *trust* in elections, there is also a small but growing literature on international determinants on the *quality* of elections. Kelley (2012a) examines national elections globally and finds that international election monitors can improve the quality of elections they attend in terms of higher acceptability, fewer problems and more turnovers.⁴⁸ Perhaps more importantly, she finds that monitoring does *not* improve election quality over time in the vast majority of countries.⁴⁹ Recent research by Daniela Donno, however, argues that negative monitoring reports can trigger reactions in the international aid community (aid cuts, sanctions), which can help enforce electoral norms over the long run.⁵⁰

While these are important insights, it leaves at least two questions unanswered that this chapter tries to address: First, what is the effect of technical assistance (as opposed to monitoring) on post-election violence? Second, can trust be affected by such international assistance? As mentioned above, perceived fairness can matter more than objective measures of fairness, so to reduce protest and violence, perceptions/trust are of central concern.

⁴⁴See Anderson et al. 2005; Banducci and Karp 2003; Maldonado and Seligson 2013; and Birch 2008.

⁴⁵See Maldonado and Seligson 2013; and Birch 2008.

⁴⁶See Maldonado and Seligson 2013; Banducci and Karp 2003. Norris (2004) finds a limited effect of cultural variables such as religion, language group, and ethnicity.

⁴⁷Carreras and Irepoglu n.d., 6.

⁴⁸Kelley 2012a, chap. 7. Kolev (2010) and Lehoucq and Kolev (2013) show that domestic structure matters: election quality can be worse under plurality voting systems than proportional representation.

⁴⁹Kelley 2012a, chap. 8.

⁵⁰Donno 2013.

6.2.2 Institutional Trust and Election Violence

EMB performance matters for post-election violence in the short run and democratization in the long run. Peaceful elections (and democratic consolidation more broadly) require the election loser's acceptance of the results,⁵¹ and administrative problems often play a role when an election is perceived as *not* free and fair and results are rejected.⁵²

Election management bodies can foster more accepted (i.e. peaceful) elections in the short run and, in the long run, can also foster a transition to broad civil and political rights. Election administration influences the quality of the electoral process and the credibility of the announced result, which lays the groundwork for the political legitimacy of the resulting government or eventual democratic consolidation.⁵³ More specifically, election administration can determine the political efficacy of an election process, and efficacy is an important driver for “the legitimacy and principled commitment to democracy”, i.e. a driver in the process of democratic transition and consolidation.⁵⁴ In some cases – notably Mexico 1994/1998 and Ghana 1996 – the election commission's independence was key to the transitional election and democratization.⁵⁵ Thus in addition to sustaining prerequisites for democracy, more aid effort should be put in the preparation of elections.⁵⁶

How does institutional trust matter for post-vote violence? Most countries allow some form of electoral competition regulated by national institutions. However, these key political institutions vary widely in quality. More often than not, they are weak, dependent on support from other government branches (funding, appointments) or otherwise subject to undue influence. Even in countries that have experience with democracy, these institutions may not have the trust of their citizens. Administrative competence is critical because technical problems can be seen as politically

⁵¹Schedler (2001, 71) states that “If political parties (a) refuse to participate in democratic elections, (b) actively deny others the right to participate, (c) try to control electoral outcomes through fraud and intimidation, or (d) do not accept the outcomes of democratic elections but rather mobilize extra-institutional protest, boycott elected assemblies, or take up the arms to overthrow elected authorities by force, then democracy has clearly not ‘become the only game in town...’”

⁵²Pastor (1999b) finds that for Africa in the 1989-1999 period.

⁵³Elklit and Reynolds 2000, 5.

⁵⁴Elklit and Reynolds 2000, 5.

⁵⁵See Eisenstadt 1999; and Gyimah-Boadi 1998.

⁵⁶Elklit 1999.

motivated.⁵⁷ For example, Kenya has long struggled with trust in its National Election Commission because of capacity and credibility issues. When the lack of trust is coupled with irregular institutional behavior, greater distrust can lead to violence. Even though institutional reforms took place before the 2013 election, the past actions of the commission made citizens wary of trusting the institution. After polling for the 2013 election, some people felt that, “Technical glitches have opened up the space for doubt. And that’s a problem in an environment where the perception of integrity is as important as the reality.”⁵⁸

In other words, trust – or the “perception of integrity” – is important for the basic functioning of political competition and to keep that competition peaceful. Perceptions about EMB bodies matter for confidence in the electoral process and for political behavior.⁵⁹ When elections and thus the resulting government are perceived as illegitimate, election results are more likely to spur popular protests and violence. This has been the trend in Eastern Europe as well as sub-Saharan Africa and beyond.⁶⁰

In most advanced democracies, institutions are perceived to have high integrity because they have a positive track record from past elections. That positive record generates trust among the citizenry and keeps violent contestation low. This history and perception of integrity is lacking in most developing countries. If post-election violence breaks out because the election result is not perceived to be generated by a trustworthy institution, then one way to reduce violence is to increase electoral institutions’ integrity. This is a major purpose of technical assistance. Greater trust in the EMB and/or an increase in the perceived electoral fairness should lead to less post-election violence.

Taken together, this suggests that the provision of technical assistance should be associated with less post-election violence because such assistance can increase the capacity and credibility of the election commission, which in turn should lead to fewer post-election challenges. This leads to the

⁵⁷Pastor 1999b.

⁵⁸Available at <http://aje.me/ZZ3N0g>

⁵⁹Elklit Reynolds (2000, 7) state that “Perceptions about EMB independence are in any case almost as important as the actual, but indiscernible, level of independence, for perceptions might also be the basis for actions and counteractions of political actors at all levels.”

⁶⁰For the color revolutions, see Tucker 2007; Thompson and Kuntz 2004; Kuntz and Thompson 2009. For Africa, see chapter 5; and Daxecker 2012. For global analyses, see Hyde and Marinov 2014; and Kuhn 2012.

main hypothesis:

Hypothesis. *The provision of UN election technical assistance should be associated with a decrease in post-election violence.*

6.3 Research Design

I evaluate this hypothesis in several steps. Importantly, we must take into account that UN assistance is not deployed randomly to countries. To address this issue, I use a two-stage estimation recommended for the case of discrete endogenous variables and discrete dependent variables.⁶¹ In the first stage predicting (endogenous) UN assistance, a reduced-form probit is estimated using all exogenous variables. The fitted/predicted probabilities are saved. In the second stage predicting violence, these predicted probabilities are included as instruments instead of actual values of UN assistance. After identifying the effect of UN assistance on violence, I then examine the mechanism underlying this relationship with descriptive data and a comparative cases.

The key independent variable is *UN TA*, which is 1 if the UN provided technical assistance in the run-up to an election, and zero otherwise. The UN is somewhat of a black hole for reliable data, especially when it comes to activities that span several UN entities, regions, and years. The UN Department of Political Affairs (DPA) used to publish a list of TA missions up to 2002 on its website but has since taken that information down.⁶² As a result, data for this variable comes from two sources. The UNDP document lists member states' requests for election technical assistance to the UN system from 1989 to 2002. It details which requests were granted, over which time period assistance was implemented, and which type of assistance was provided. Only technical assistance (far the most frequent type) were included in the analysis.⁶³ Since this data only reaches into 2002,

⁶¹Wooldridge 2001, 623. Other solutions cannot be used given the binary nature of the key variables. In particular, I cannot use `ivregress` because the dependent variable (violence) is not continuous; I cannot use `ivprobit` because the endogenous variable (UN) is not continuous. Another potential option (Stata's `treatreg`) has a great chance of misspecification error.

⁶²UNDP 2002b. I thank Susan Hyde for generously providing this list.

⁶³Other types include coordination and support of domestic and international observers, limited observation for internal use, verification, and the organization of entire electoral processes.

I sourced data about UN TA for 2003-2011 from related research.⁶⁴ This second document lists UNDP's democratic governance projects with country-year information and short titles. I included only election-related technical assistance.⁶⁵

For the dependent variable, post-election violence and unrest, I source from three datasets: AEVD, GEVD, and Nelda. For data on Africa, I use a *binary* variable indicating 1 if electoral violence in the 3 months after national elections exceeded 20 fatalities or involved violent repression, such as long-term high-level arrests of party leaders, consistent use of violent intimidation, limited use of murders and assassinations, torture. According to the African Election Violence Dataset (AEVD),⁶⁶ such violence has erupted after 8 percent of national elections. For election violence data across regions, I draw on my own data collection, the Global Election Violence Dataset (GEVD), and create three variables capturing violence up to three months after national elections. The variable *aggregate* is a dummy variable indicating whether any people were killed, injured, arbitrarily arrested, or kidnapped. The variable *killed binary* aggregates this by indicating whether anyone died in election-related violence. The variable *killed #* is a count of election-related fatalities; it is logged because of high skewness. Across the 195 African elections that I have data on, fatalities varied between zero (for 163 elections) and 1,000 (Angola 1992, Kenya 2007); the logged variable ranges from 0 to 6.9. Finally, I also use an indicator for whether any *protests* occurred after the election. According to the Nelda data,⁶⁷ 22 percent of elections in Africa were followed by protests. Note, however, that this variable does not indicate the timing of demonstrations, and that these protests may or may not be violent.

To model where UN technical assistance missions are likely to deploy, I include three variables. Ideally, this analysis would lean on prior cross-national research on this topic. To my knowledge, UN election technical assistance has not been examined through statistical research, so I lean mainly

⁶⁴Prati 2012, Appendix 1. This is a senior honors thesis from a Stanford undergrad under the guidance of Professor Stephen J. Stedman.

⁶⁵For example, I included items like "Proyecto de Asistencia Tecnica al Tribunal Supremo Electoral de Honduras"; "Appui au Processus Electoral en Haiti 2010-2011"; "Appui au cycle electoral de 2010" in Burundi; "Support to Civic Education" in Ghana 2006-2010; and "Support to the Organization of 2005 Elections" in Liberia; and "PACE" (short for *Projet d'Appui au Cycle Electoral*) in the Central African Republic in 2009.

⁶⁶Straus and Taylor 2012: 21-22. I exclude 2 countries (Sao Tome and the Seychelles) because most covariate values are not available for these places.

⁶⁷Hyde and Marinov 2010.

on the UNDP's own account.⁶⁸ UNDP's work pursues two key objectives: improving capacity and governance. Capacity development is identified by the UNDP as a main objective.⁶⁹ Therefore TA should be more likely to be deployed in countries with low capacity in terms of institutions and civil society. I proxy for low capacity with *GDP per capita*.⁷⁰ Improved governance is a means to the dual goals of reduced conflict and democracy building. Historically, governance work was not primarily about democracy as such but more broadly geared towards conflict resolution.⁷¹ Several variables capture the post-conflict setting: *civil war ongoing*, *civil war in past 1/5/10 years* and *first election after civil war*.⁷² These are binary indicators of government-opposition conflicts with a minimum of 25 battle-related deaths per year. The UN has become more focused on democratic openness since the 1990s, so I also include a measure of *executive constraints*.⁷³

In addition, I include several election- and country-level control variables when predicting UN assistance and violence. Since the outcome variable is identical to chapter 5 (post-election violence), control variables are very similar. The election-level controls are IO *condemnation*, whether there were any election *monitors present*, whether the *type* of election was for the national legislature, executive, or both, whether the incumbent was running (*incumbent running*).⁷⁴ Further election-level controls include vote fraud, and the vote share of the losing candidate.⁷⁵ The country-level control variables are *ethnic fractionalization*, *GDP pc growth*, *ODA per capita* in thousands, *natural resources per capita*, and *population size*; the last three variables are logged because of skewness.⁷⁶

All models are probit estimations unless otherwise noted. The unit of analysis is a national election

⁶⁸The main work on UN democracy assistance is a collection of case studies (Newman and Rich 2004). There is more work on democracy assistance by other donors, with statistical application to US assistance (e.g. Finkel et al. 2008).

⁶⁹UNDP 2009, 52.

⁷⁰While a measure of institutional capacity related to elections is available (SR12CAP in Kelley 2012a), it has 30% missing values (66 out of 220 in Africa) and would thus further decrease the number of observations from 167 to 123. The results do not change using the capacity indicator and the smaller sample: the coefficient is negative and insignificant, just like the coefficient for the proxy of pc GDP. This confirms that the UN is somewhat more likely to attend low-capacity elections. But the effect is not statistically significant.

⁷¹Still today, the UN is supposed to be politically neutral with respect to democracy or autocracy, and for a long time, democracy was not the specific goal – only a means to the end of reduced conflict, i.e. peace through governance.

⁷²Data is sourced from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, version 4.

⁷³Polity IV xconst. Original model also included a measure of UN peacekeepers in the country but this drops out of most models because of high collinearity / perfect prediction.

⁷⁴These data come from Nelda/Hyde and Marinov 2010.

⁷⁵DIEM; Nohlen 1999; African Elections Database; and Carr 2012.

⁷⁶These variables are drawn from Finkel et al. 2008, the World Bank 2012, and Ross 2012.

(legislative, executive, general). I exclude most election rounds, such as presidential runoffs and second- and third-round legislative elections because the post-election timeframe usually overlaps with the first round and it is often unclear whether violence erupted because of one or the other. All variables are lagged except for the election-level covariates. Standard errors are clustered by country to capture unobserved heterogeneity between states.

6.4 Results

6.4.1 Accounting for Non-Random Treatment: Where is the UN deployed?

A naive comparison of whether violence occurred in UN-assisted elections is misleading. For the 400 national elections examined here in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa, violence erupted after 6 percent without UN assistance and after 2-3 percent of elections when the UN was present. This difference is statistically indistinguishable (t-test $p=0.14$ and $p=0.39$). The simple bivariate correlation shown in Table 6.1 suggests (wrongly) that UN missions have no effect on violence outbreak because it ignores the non-randomness of UN assistance.

Table 6.1: UN Technical Assistance and Post-Election Violence

		Violence Onset	
		no	yes
UN TA	no	74 %	6 %
	yes	17 %	3 %

(a) Latin America 1990-2011, N=201

		Violence Onset	
		no	yes
UN TA	no	77 %	6 %
	yes	15 %	2 %

(b) Africa 1990-2008, N=197

One potential explanation for this is that the UN deploys in easy elections where peace is likely to last, regardless of a UN presence. If this were true, then even the null effect would be an overestimate of the actual effect. However, it is more plausible that UN missions are sent where they

are most needed. Borrowing an analogy from Page Fortna’s work on UN peacekeeping, “crime rates are probably highest in neighborhoods with the most cops on the street.” However, this is not because police cause crime but because “police are put in place in response to the likelihood of crime.”⁷⁷ In the election violence context, election technical assistance is deployed to strengthen domestic institutions, build civil society, and curb expected violence, which is why violence-prone countries should be more likely to receive such assistance.

Table 6.2 presents the determinants of UN technical assistance for sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America since 1990. The coefficients are mostly signed as hypothesized; this reveals several interesting insights. Perhaps surprisingly, a history of civil war is not a strong predictor of election technical assistance. The coefficients on *civil war* in the past 1/5/10 years are generally insignificant and switch signs between regions.⁷⁸ The best predictor of technical assistance across both regions is population size: larger countries are much more likely to receive technical assistance than small countries.

Since population size is such a powerful predictor of assistance but is not a predictor of election violence (as shown in chapter 5), I treat it as an instrument in the two-stage estimation. This means it will be excluded from the second-stage estimates, as recommended for instrumental variable regressions.⁷⁹ A two-stage estimation is appropriate (among other things) when the “excluded” instrumental variable (here population) is only included in the model predicting the endogenous variable (TA) but excluded from the model predicting the outcome (violence). One concern may be that the above models are misspecified. However, the two-step procedure employed here is “fully robust to the probit model being misspecified.”⁸⁰ This is a convenient feature in this particular case given the scarcity of research on this topic to guide model specification.

The substantive effects of population size in Africa are smaller than in Latin America, as shown in Figure 6.3. In Africa, large countries are much more likely to receive assistance: big countries

⁷⁷Fortna 2003, 101.


⁷⁸The coefficient is only significant in model 8, indicating that Latin American countries with a civil war in the previous year are less likely to receive TA.

⁷⁹Sovey and Green 2011, 189.

⁸⁰Jeffrey Wooldridge, see <http://www.stata.com/statalist/archive/2011-03/msg00188.html>

like Nigeria (120 million in 2006) have a 56% chance of receiving UN assistance, while moderately sized countries have only a 26 percent chance (e.g. about 25 million in 2006 in Ghana and Uganda) and tiny countries have only a 1 percent chance of receiving assistance (Cape Verde Equatorial Guinea). In Latin America, large countries like Brazil and Mexico (100-200 million people) have a 99 percent chance of receiving assistance while moderately sized countries have a 46 percent chance of assistance (Venezuela and Peru with 25 million), and small countries have almost no chance of receiving assistance (Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana with roughly a million people).

Figure 6.3: Effect of Population Size on the Probability of UN Assistance



It is important to note, though, that for some countries in Latin America population size and foreign aid dependence work in exactly opposite directions. Small countries in Latin America are also highly aid dependent, which increases UN assistance. Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago received \$200-600 per capita in foreign aid, which is associated with a predicted probability of 77-99 percent of receiving UN assistance. In contrast, less aid-dependent countries like Mexico and Brazil (about \$5 per capita) have almost no probability of receiving assistance. In addition to size and aid dependence, the presence of election monitors correlates significantly with assistance in Latin America. The presence of IO monitors is associated with a 24 percentage point increase in the probability of UN assistance.

In Africa, election type and executive constraints are important correlates of UN assistance. The predicted probability of UN assistance is only 5 percent for legislative elections but 14 for executive

elections and 30 for consecutive elections. Similarly, the number of executive constraints predicts UN assistance only in Africa. Here the predicted probability of receiving TA increases from 7 to 24 percent as the number of executive constraints increase from 1 to 7.⁸¹

The predicted probability of UN assistance from models 1 and 8 are used in the second step of the estimation. The distribution of these probabilities is shown in Figure 6.4. Note that most elections have a predicted probability of less than 40-50% for receiving UN assistance. In Africa, there are only 3 high outliers: Ghana 2008, Mozambique 1994, and Nigeria 2007, with predicted probabilities equal to 62, 66 and 85 percent respectively. In Latin America, only elections in Haiti have predicted probabilities of UN assistance exceeding 63 percent, and the watershed election Mexico 1994.

⁸¹These are estimates from model 1 and 8, which provide the best model fit.

Figure 6.4: Distribution of Predicted Probabilities of UN Election Assistance





Table 6.2: Determinants of UN Technical Election Assistance

	Sub-Saharan Africa, 1990-2008					Latin America, 1990-2011				
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
First election after civil war	0.538 (0.470)					0.470 (0.544)				
Civil War Ongoing		0.173 (0.297)					-0.623 (0.553)			
Civil war in past 1 year			-0.337 (0.335)					-0.762* (0.414)		
Civil war in past 5 years				-0.268 (0.324)					0.534 (0.390)	
Civil war in past 10 years					-0.173 (0.320)					0.282 (0.322)
GDP pc	-0.120 (0.236)	-0.078 (0.254)	-0.144 (0.246)	-0.158 (0.250)	-0.153 (0.253)	0.089 (0.524)	0.184 (0.531)	0.270 (0.543)	0.189 (0.522)	0.195 (0.525)
ODA pc	0.321 (0.342)	0.306 (0.345)	0.278 (0.324)	0.325 (0.318)	0.301 (0.323)	1.239*** (0.477)	1.445*** (0.492)	1.606*** (0.515)	1.286*** (0.463)	1.314*** (0.482)
Incumbent running	-0.369 (0.247)	-0.361 (0.240)	-0.298 (0.240)	-0.300 (0.240)	-0.315 (0.243)	0.180 (0.414)	0.198 (0.427)	0.269 (0.414)	0.235 (0.458)	0.243 (0.457)
Population size	0.400* (0.213)	0.345* (0.195)	0.315* (0.187)	0.322* (0.183)	0.310 (0.189)	1.258*** (0.445)	1.512*** (0.463)	1.719*** (0.484)	1.256*** (0.449)	1.301*** (0.454)
Violence at last election	-0.028 (0.317)	-0.040 (0.310)	-0.005 (0.318)	0.005 (0.317)	0.009 (0.318)	-0.072 (0.214)	0.104 (0.259)	0.162 (0.256)	-0.178 (0.230)	-0.075 (0.221)
Election type	0.549*** (0.147)	0.556*** (0.144)	0.542*** (0.146)	0.538*** (0.149)	0.557*** (0.140)	-0.391 (0.389)	-0.453 (0.378)	-0.558 (0.412)	-0.389 (0.409)	-0.373 (0.405)
IO Monitors present	-0.167 (0.317)	-0.072 (0.341)	-0.077 (0.336)	-0.108 (0.343)	-0.099 (0.342)	1.020*** (0.366)	1.177*** (0.387)	1.364*** (0.434)	0.948*** (0.354)	0.955** (0.386)
Executive constraints	0.132* (0.072)	0.127* (0.072)	0.125* (0.067)	0.128* (0.068)	0.131** (0.064)	-0.097 (0.127)	-0.143 (0.120)	-0.162 (0.115)	-0.088 (0.142)	-0.109 (0.131)
Ethnic fractionalization	-0.723 (1.346)	-0.589 (1.367)	-0.445 (1.347)	-0.473 (1.344)	-0.506 (1.337)	-1.046 (1.004)	-0.861 (1.023)	-0.665 (1.044)	-1.082 (1.001)	-1.009 (0.975)
Oil & Gas value pc	0.003 (0.027)	0.001 (0.023)	0.007 (0.025)	0.010 (0.026)	0.008 (0.026)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Constant	-3.964*** (1.297)	-3.614*** (1.127)	-3.497*** (1.225)	-3.377*** (1.254)	-3.360*** (1.299)	-17.192*** (6.154)	-20.307*** (6.424)	-22.992*** (6.704)	-17.565*** (6.306)	-18.013*** (6.454)
Observations	167	167	167	167	167	167	167	167	167	167
Clusters	38	38	38	38	38	23	23	23	23	23
AIC	147.64	148.41	147.76	148.09	148.45	149.70	147.91	145.11	147.66	149.68
BIC	185.06	185.83	185.18	185.51	185.87	187.11	185.33	182.52	185.07	187.10
LL	-61.82	-62.21	-61.88	-62.05	-62.23	-62.85	-61.96	-60.55	-61.83	-62.84

Notes: The table reports probit estimates. The unit of observation is a national election. Coefficients are reported with country-clustered standard errors. ***, **, and * indicates significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level.

6.4.2 How does UN Assistance Affect Post-Vote Violence?

Having identified which factors make UN assistance likely, this section examines the effect of treatment / UN deployment. The key variable of interest here is the predicted probability of UN election assistance. The dependent variable is post-election violence occurring in the three months after voting. Since the outcome variable is identical to chapter 5 (post-election violence), this analysis includes all the same election- and country-level control variables. The election-level controls are IO condemnation, election fraud, presence of IO monitors, election type, the vote share of the losing candidate and whether the incumbent lost. The country-level controls include per capita ODA, per capita GDP, GDP growth, executive constraints, and ethnic fractionalization. The probit estimations again include standard errors clustered on country to account for heterogeneity between countries.

Table 6.3 presents the results and shows a negative relationship between UN assistance and violence. The coefficient on election assistance is consistently negative and statistically significant ($p=0.03$). This suggests that an increase in the probability of UN technical assistance is associated with a decrease in the probability of post-election violence. This effect is also substantively important. Recall that most observations have predicted UN values under 30 percent, as shown in Figures 6.4 and 6.5. As the probability of UN assistance increases from zero to 30 percent, the probability of violence onset decreases by 12 percentage points.⁸² Given that the average chance of violence is at roughly 8 percent (see descriptive statistics), this effect is substantively important. Figure 6.5 shows this effect on predicted probabilities with the negative slope (red line) between 0 and 30 percent. The effect for Latin America is much smaller but still significant and negative. Moreover, modest effects should be seen in context; in many countries where the UN operates, the task of reform is formidable.⁸³ Overall, the analyses provides support for the main hypothesis of this chapter: that UN election assistance can reduce post-election violence risks.


Despite the two-step estimation, I take confidence in the results because the coefficient estimates of the control variables are quite similar to chapter 5. As in prior analyses, the key drivers of post-

⁸²This is estimated from model 3 with all variables at their means.

⁸³Newman 2004, 198.

vote violence are IO condemnations, fraud, the loser's vote share and election type. The remaining predictors are mostly correctly signed.⁸⁴

Figure 6.5: Effect of UN Election Assistance on Post-Election Violence



⁸⁴Surprisingly, perhaps, the sign for recent civil war experience is consistently negative. However, since these coefficients are small and far from significant, this is not a concern.

Table 6.3: Determinants of Post-Election Violence and Protest

Scope Dataset Dependent variable Model	Sub-Saharan Africa, 1990-2008							Latin America, 1990-2011					
	binary 1	AEVD Data binary 2		binary 3	aggregate 4	GEVD Data killed binary 5	killed # 6	Nelda Data protest 7	aggregate 8	aggregate 9	GEVD Data aggregate 10	killed binary 11	killed # 12
Probability (UN TA)	-5.054** (2.142)	-4.943** (2.141)	-4.893** (2.038)	-3.530*** (1.282)	-3.692** (1.645)	-1.519** (0.683)	-3.408** (1.396)	-0.601 (1.127)	-2.601 (1.633)	-2.838** (1.438)	-2.838** (1.438)	-0.733 (0.461)	4.370*** (1.644)
Civil war in past 1 year	-0.073 (0.624)												
Civil war in past 5 years		-0.250 (0.615)								-1.503** (0.602)			
Civil war in past 10 years			-0.534 (0.590)	-0.216 (0.293)	-0.225 (0.314)	-0.081 (0.176)	-0.218 (0.314)				-1.671*** (0.520)	-1.671*** (0.520)	-0.072 (0.078)
Condemnation	1.370*** (0.480)	1.397*** (0.463)	1.368*** (0.418)	1.524*** (0.279)	1.546*** (0.269)	1.183** (0.499)	1.780*** (0.521)	0.934 (0.721)	1.363* (0.812)	1.336 (0.829)	1.336 (0.829)	0.146 (0.205)	0.167 (0.593)
Vote fraud dummy	0.962** (0.411)	0.954** (0.410)	0.967** (0.418)	0.143 (0.271)	-0.252 (0.267)	-0.126 (0.182)	0.602* (0.361)					-0.143* (0.082)	-0.326 (0.380)
GDP pc Growth	0.053* (0.031)	0.052 (0.032)	0.057 (0.036)	-0.065** (0.030)	-0.037 (0.031)	-0.004 (0.017)	0.023 (0.027)	-0.110 (0.085)	-0.074 (0.066)	-0.076 (0.060)	-0.076 (0.060)	0.005 (0.009)	-0.101** (0.044)
Ethnic fractionalization	-1.026 (0.985)	-1.025 (0.949)	-1.194 (1.008)	0.035 (0.998)	0.478 (1.091)	0.677 (0.526)	-0.063 (0.947)	3.720** (1.674)	4.618** (2.028)	4.808*** (1.855)	4.808*** (1.855)	0.569** (0.261)	3.082** (1.286)
Vote share loser	0.044*** (0.010)	0.043*** (0.010)	0.042*** (0.011)	0.000 (0.009)	-0.001 (0.009)	0.008 (0.006)	-0.014 (0.013)	0.054** (0.023)	0.063*** (0.024)	0.063*** (0.022)	0.063*** (0.022)	0.009* (0.005)	0.066*** (0.020)
IO Monitors present	-0.758 (0.622)	-0.741 (0.584)	-0.669 (0.529)	-0.222 (0.279)	0.029 (0.328)	0.162 (0.169)	0.613* (0.342)	1.542 (0.963)	2.208* (1.295)	2.245* (1.178)	2.245* (1.178)	0.365 (0.226)	-0.064 (0.905)
Incumbent lost	-0.089 (0.562)	-0.093 (0.566)	-0.166 (0.557)	-1.120* (0.586)	-0.761 (0.530)	-0.267 (0.265)	-0.711 (0.516)					-0.068 (0.078)	0.499** (0.215)
ODA pc	0.208 (0.259)	0.240 (0.253)	0.275 (0.267)	0.182 (0.196)	0.156 (0.152)	-0.017 (0.140)	0.465** (0.227)	-0.574*** (0.220)	-0.856** (0.343)	-0.861*** (0.310)	-0.861*** (0.310)	-0.116 (0.085)	-0.336 (0.242)
GDP pc	-0.560 (0.415)	-0.580 (0.408)	-0.639 (0.428)	-0.492*** (0.185)	-0.436* (0.226)	0.003 (0.114)	-0.139 (0.251)	-1.397** (0.553)	-1.971** (0.787)	-1.720** (0.710)	-1.720** (0.710)	-0.345* (0.192)	0.326 (0.581)
Executive constraints	0.212** (0.099)	0.201** (0.098)	0.203** (0.100)	0.037 (0.072)	0.021 (0.085)	0.018 (0.065)	0.307** (0.120)	0.089 (0.089)	-0.083 (0.110)	-0.065 (0.136)	-0.065 (0.136)	-0.003 (0.025)	-0.632*** (0.194)
Election type	0.896*** (0.252)	0.863*** (0.268)	0.872*** (0.245)	0.455** (0.228)	0.270 (0.238)	0.164 (0.170)	0.641** (0.258)	-0.698* (0.419)	-0.648 (0.588)	-0.637 (0.607)	-0.637 (0.607)	-0.235 (0.155)	0.335 (0.760)
Constant	-2.932*** (1.005)	-2.744*** (1.023)	-2.523** (0.995)	-0.473 (0.992)	-0.951 (1.057)	-0.428 (0.671)	-1.236 (0.990)	-2.079 (1.713)	0.044 (1.547)	-0.312 (1.533)	-0.312 (1.533)	0.670 (0.525)	-1.558 (1.729)
Observations	137	137	137	136	136	136	137	106	106	106	106	105	130
Clusters	38	38	38	38	38	38	38	22	22	22	22	22	22
AIC	70.61	70.41	69.52	151.25	128.58	406.75	131.14	51.69	49.75	48.64	48.64	199.43	68.67
BIC	111.49	111.29	110.40	192.02	169.35	447.53	172.02	83.65	81.72	80.61	80.61	236.59	108.82
LL	-21.31	-21.21	-20.76	-61.62	-50.29	-189.38	-51.57	-13.84	-12.88	-12.32	-12.32	-85.72	-20.34

Notes: The table reports probit estimates in all models except model 6 and 12, which show OLS estimates. In models 8-11, the variables vote fraud and incumbent are omitted from the estimation because they predict failure perfectly. The unit of observation is a national election. Coefficients are reported with country-clustered standard errors. ***, **, and * indicates significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level.

As a robustness check on these estimations, I use bootstrapping. Since the two-step procedure employed here creates modeling uncertainty, some recommend bootstrapping the standard error in small samples.⁸⁵ There is no clear line about when samples are “too” small for valid inference. Plausibly, a sample of 50 is small and 500 is large but there is no standard threshold beyond which samples are considered “large enough.” In this analysis, the first stage is based on 167 observations and the second stage on 106-137 observations. Since these do not allow for asymptotic results, inference may be inaccurate if standard errors, confidence intervals, and p-values are off. To guard against false inference due to modeling uncertainty, I thus add a robustness check by bootstrapping the standard errors. While imperfect, bootstrapping is one way to check for the stability of the results.

Bootstrapping standard errors involves re-sampling the dataset a specified number of times; anything between 50 and 200 is recommended; I choose 50. For each sample from the data, the standard errors are calculated to gain information about their variability. To allow replication of the presented results, I set a “random” number as seed value.⁸⁶ Except for the seed value, nothing changes between models. The last thing to note is that the models estimated below are a reduced version of the models in Table 6.3. With the bootstrap procedure, the full models from Table 6.3 have convergence problems, likely due to rare outcomes. The full sample of 206 observations has 16 positive outcomes; regression on 13 variables creates problems, which are probably aggravated by the bootstrapping sampling procedure. Therefore I dropped non-essential control variables until the model converged.

Table 6.4 presents the results of the bootstrap estimations for Africa. The key insight is that the coefficient on UN assistance stays consistently negative; the size of the coefficient is stable and only slightly smaller than in the main models (-4.5 instead of -5); and the coefficient remains significant in most models. This builds confidence in the main result: that UN assistance can reduce post-election violence.

⁸⁵As for the standard errors of the second-stage equation, Wooldridge finds that there is “no need to adjust the standard errors asymptotically, but you can bootstrap if you have a smaller sample.” See <http://www.stata.com/statalist/archive/2011-03/msg00188.html>

⁸⁶In models 1 through 5, I set “random” seeds at 12, 123, 1234, 12345, and 123456.

Table 6.4: Determinants of Post-Election Violence - *Bootstrap Estimates*

	1	2	3	4	5
Probability (UN TA)	-4.515** (2.027)	-4.515* (2.535)	-4.515 (3.667)	-4.515** (2.187)	-4.515** (1.900)
GDP pc	-0.216 (0.301)	-0.216 (0.312)	-0.216 (0.344)	-0.216 (0.261)	-0.216 (0.281)
Executive Constraints	0.242* (0.139)	0.242** (0.120)	0.242 (0.203)	0.242* (0.127)	0.242** (0.119)
Election Type	0.683** (0.338)	0.683 (0.417)	0.683* (0.364)	0.683 (0.458)	0.683* (0.361)
Condemnation	1.246*** (0.434)	1.246** (0.561)	1.246** (0.607)	1.246** (0.535)	1.246*** (0.466)
Vote Fraud Dummy	0.523 (0.484)	0.523 (0.552)	0.523 (0.515)	0.523 (0.406)	0.523 (0.488)
GDP pc Growth	0.033 (0.039)	0.033 (0.035)	0.033 (0.035)	0.033 (0.042)	0.033 (0.037)
Constant	-2.933*** (0.734)	-2.933*** (0.858)	-2.933*** (0.841)	-2.933*** (0.598)	-2.933*** (0.637)
Observations	169	169	169	169	169
Clusters	39	39	39	39	39
AIC	75.89	75.89	75.89	75.89	75.89
BIC	100.93	100.93	100.93	100.93	100.93
LL	-29.95	-29.95	-29.95	-29.95	-29.95

Notes: The table reports probit estimates with bootstrapped standard errors for Sub-Saharan Africa, 1990-2008. The dependent variable is a binary indicator of post-election violence from AEVD. The unit of observation is a national election. ***, **, and * indicates significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level.

6.5 Mechanism

The previous section showed that UN technical assistance significantly reduces post-election violence. As outlined in section 6.2, I argue that the mechanism through which TA reduces violence is trust in the election management body (EMB). To explore this mechanism, this section first draws on survey data and then on elections in Guyana.

6.5.1 Measuring Institutional Trust

To operationalize the mechanism, I use data about citizens' trust in the EMB come from regional barometer surveys. The Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) is available for 26 countries in two-year increments from 2004 and 2012.⁸⁷ The items of interest ask (a) "to what extent do you trust the supreme election commission" and (b) "to what extent do you trust the elections."⁸⁸ The answer is recorded on a scale of 1 through 7. The second barometer used here is the Afrobarometer, which provides survey data on 20 African countries for the years 1991-2012. Here the items of interest ask (a) "to what extent do you trust the national election commission" and (b) "to what extent do you think elections were free and fair." Answers are recorded on a scale of 0 to 3.⁸⁹

These data help shed light on the first link in the causal chain: Elections that received TA experience greater improvements in institutional trust than elections that did not receive UN assistance. Since the survey data from Latin America are more evenly spaced in time, I use these data to measure changes in EMB trust over 2-year periods. I create three comparison groups: (1) periods without elections, (2) periods with elections but no TA and (3) periods with elections that received TA. As table 6.5 shows, EMB trust increases by 0.06 points when the UN is absent and by 0.27 when the UN has provided assistance. However, this difference is only suggestive because it is a tri-variate comparison and it is not statistically significant.⁹⁰

⁸⁷In the five Latin American barometer rounds, the number of countries increases from 11 countries in 2004 to 26 countries in 2012. Available at <http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/survey-data.php> Accessed 6 January 2014.

⁸⁸In original wording: Hasta que punto tiene confianza usted en el Tribunal Supremo Electoral? Hasta que punto tiene usted confianza en las elecciones?

⁸⁹Available at <http://www.afrobarometer.org/> Accessed 6 January 2014. In the four AfroBarometer rounds, the number of countries increases from 12 countries in 1999 to 20 countries in 2008.


⁹⁰In the t-test for whether trust changes differ between groups 2 and 3, the p-value is 0.38. Group 2 has 28 observations, and group 3 has 4 observations.

Table 6.5: Changes in EMB Trust over 2-year periods, conditional on UN Technical Assistance (Latin America)

Group	Change in Trust points on 1-7 scale
No election	-0.12
Election without UN TA	0.06
Election with UN TA	0.27

Further, the data confirm that it is plausible to infer the perceived credibility of the election based on the credibility of the EMB. As Figure 6.6 illustrates, trust in the EMB and election itself are indeed highly correlated. The two variables are quite similarly distributed, with most citizens' trust in the middling range and a "bump" at "no trust at all." As a side note, we can also infer that EMB trust is generally low: on average, less than a quarter of the population trusts the EMB in Latin America and Africa.

Figure 6.6: Trust in National Election Commissions and Elections



6.5.2 Illustrative Case: Guyana

This section examines national elections in Guyana since 1992 as a representative case of how technical assistance can reduce post-election violence. This is intended as a plausibility test illustrating the causal mechanism – TA increasing capacity and credibility – rather than a definitive test of the argument. After historical and electoral background, I concentrate on the 2006 election because these were the first violence-free elections in over a decade and were preceded by extensive UN assistance and a substantial overhaul of the administrative process.

Nestled between Venezuela and Suriname, Guyana gained independence from the UK in 1966. Before the British handed over governance, the electoral system was changed from first-past-the-post to proportional representation in order to reduce the effect of ethnic tensions. As one of the poorest countries in the Western hemisphere and with a population of less than a million people,⁹¹ Guyana’s main fault lines run between the Afro-Guyanese and Indo-Guyanese. Afro-Guyanese represent about 30 percent of the population and mainly support the People’s National Congress (PNC), which dominated politics from independence to 1992. Indo-Guyanese comprise about 43 percent and mainly support the People’s Progressive Party (PPP), which has ruled since 1992.⁹²

Although four elections were held between 1968 and 1985, the 1992 election was hailed as the first free and fair election since independence. Even though this 1992 and all subsequent elections were internationally endorsed as “free and fair,” though, violence unfolded after the 1992, 1997, and 2001 elections whereas 2006 and 2011 remained peaceful.⁹³ Since credible observers have endorsed all elections since 1992, their consistent verdict cannot explain variation in violence. Similarly, little has changed on the domestic scene since the early 1990s. In contrast, technical assistance and the changes in electoral administration it generated, are a plausible reason for reduced violence in the 2006 and 2011 elections. Table 6.6 shows IO support and post-election violence for Guyana’s

⁹¹Data from World Bank Development Indicators. In 2011, Guyana’s GDP per capita rose to \$1,200. The population size is around 750,000 people.

⁹²The remaining population is of mixed heritage (17 percent) and of Amerindian descent (9 percent).

⁹³Data from GEVD. This data is consistent with Nelda29 except for 2011 (which is not available) and 1992 (which Nelda29 says had riots). According to GEVD, 1992 was peaceful after the election; but election-day was violent, with 2 people killed, 200 arrested and property damage in the capital, Georgetown.

national elections.⁹⁴

Table 6.6: Guyana's TA Support and Post-Election Violence

Election	Extent of TA Support	Endorsement by Int'l Observers	Post-Election Violence
1992	extensive	✓	no
1997	limited	✓	yes
2001	limited	✓	yes
2006	extensive	✓	no
2011	limited	✓	no

A common theme throughout Guyana's post-vote violence is the refusal of some political parties to accept the election results, caused by parties' distrust of the election commission (GECOM) and rumors spread by the local media: "In the decades following independence in 1966, voting ... was a harbinger of instability and violence. With each poll came *accusations* of stuffed ballot boxes and election malpractice, stoked ... by biased reports from the country's polarized media."⁹⁵ The skepticism of the election process and media reports to that effect regularly caused the opposition PNC party to challenge the announced results through violent street demonstrations. Guyanese came to expect violence around their elections. As the head of the election commission (GECOM) put it, "Every single election in this country was associated with bloodshed, burning ... It was as if concomitant with an election there must be mayhem."⁹⁶

Forbes Burnham ruled Guyana as a competitive authoritarian regime from 1966 until his death in 1985. Under his tenure, elections were regularly rigged, the government used violence and intimidation against the opposition, and curtailed independent media.⁹⁷ In 1974, Burnham declared the PNC party paramount and the country a socialist state, tightening relations with Cuba and the Soviet Union, and nationalizing most industries. After Burnham's death in 1985, economic and international pressure for reform mounted. President Hoyte took over, abolished the one-party

⁹⁴For UNDP and IFES support for the 1992 election, see IFES 1992, 15-16. UNDP support in 2001 and 2006, see UNDP 2010, 25. For UNDP support of the 2011 elections, see http://www.undp.org.gy/web/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=88

⁹⁵Commonwealth, "Hopes for peaceful elections in Guyana as media strike deal," 13 April 2010. Available at <http://secretariat.thecommonwealth.org/news/34580/34581/222429/1304codeofconductguyana.htm> Accessed 6 April 2014. Italics added.

⁹⁶GECOM head Surujbally, quoted in Chaubey 2011, 2. Also see EAB 2006, 13.

⁹⁷Levitsky and Way 2010, 147.

state, rolled back socialist policies, and began electoral reforms. As part of these reforms, Hoyte transferred responsibility for the election process to a newly created, more independent election commission (EC). The commission overhauled the voter registry, which made proxy and overseas vote fraud much more difficult. As a result, the PNC lost control over the election administration. Change did not occur over night, though, as the extent of electoral reforms needed was overwhelming. Further, voter confidence in elections had been shattered by decades of manipulation.

Following Burnham's death, the first elections were held in 1992 after a two-year delay due to insufficient preparations.⁹⁸ President Hoyte's electoral reforms also included efforts for a new voters' list, rule changes, and a new chairman of the elections commission. Beginning in 1991, the UNDP supported electoral reforms quite extensively: it "paid the monthly rent for the Elections Commission building; provided computer hardware, software, and technical personnel for voter registration, logistics, and vote tabulation efforts; and vehicles and staff for Election Day support."⁹⁹ IFES provided further technical support, while other international organizations provided logistical support (generators, ballot boxes, and signage).¹⁰⁰ The international observers – CC and CW – endorsed the election, as did the domestic observer (EAB). The 1992 election resulted in a power transition, with the PPP party gaining a majority after PNC had ruled since the 1960s. The election result was implemented smoothly, with the PNC leaving power peacefully.¹⁰¹ No post-election violence broke out.

In contrast to 1992, the 1997 elections received only limited technical support, and violence broke out when the opposition PNC challenged the result. In the run-up to the 1997 elections, technical assistance was limited: the UNDP did not provide election assistance, and IFES' assistance was primarily logistical support: special paper for the voters' list, UV lamps to verify ID cards, and a new computer system for the Commission headquarter (hardware, software, training).¹⁰² The

⁹⁸International advisors from the Carter Center and the Commonwealth advised to postpone the election because they deemed preparations insufficient.

⁹⁹IFES 1992, 15-16.

¹⁰⁰Ibid.

¹⁰¹Levitsky and Way 2010, 149. On the 1992 election, also see Carroll and Pastor 1993.

¹⁰²IFES 1998, 1, 26. UNDP supported the coordinated between international observers. Two UNDP staff members were present but these were resident representatives, who also coordinate other economic, health, and education programs in the host country. Also see the government's account of elections, which does not mention the UNDP for 1997, at http://www.guyana.org/post_election97.htm Accessed 6 April 2014.

PPP party received 55 percent and the PNC 40 percent of the vote. As before, domestic and international observers – IFES, CW, OAS – endorsed the election.¹⁰³

However, administrative breakdowns delayed the announcement of results, triggering violent protests for weeks. After ballots were counted at polling stations, it took more than twelve hours for the results and ballot boxes to reach the commission’s headquarters;¹⁰⁴ this was a significant delay given Guyana’s small geographic dimensions. The transmission breakdown deepened distrust of the commission’s work and led the opposition (and losing) PNC party to protest the results violently with riots and massive demonstrations in the capital, Georgetown. A further two-week delay in results announcement¹⁰⁵ also aggravated tensions until CARICOM mediators brokered an agreement, known as the Herdmanston Accord, for a full recount and further electoral reforms. The international audit of the election confirmed the results, finding only marginal differences.¹⁰⁶

The Herdmanston Accord of January 1998 ended weeks of post-election unrest and called for a re-drafting of the constitution, further electoral reforms, and new elections within three years. The election commission was established a permanent body, the Guyana Elections Commission (GECOM), in 2000. Acknowledging the ethnic basis of election violence, new electoral laws made it a criminal offense for anyone to do or say something that can result in racial or ethnic violence or hatred – with deterrent costs. Any candidate or party found in violation of this law could be barred from running for five years, face half a million USD penalty, and be subject to a special inquiry commission (which formed only after the 2001 election).¹⁰⁷

While these were substantial reforms, they did not address the administrative shortfalls of 1997,¹⁰⁸ so that 2001 represented a *deja-vu* of sorts: “The crises of confidence surrounding the 1997 and 2001 electoral processes is ... a direct result of electoral flaws – not fraud – compounded by a lack of political good will and trust. When added to misinformation, inflammatory statements and actions,

¹⁰³For a summary of all statements, see http://www.guyana.org/post_election97.htm Accessed 6 April 2014.

¹⁰⁴EAB, see http://www.guyana.org/post_election97.htm

¹⁰⁵Elections were held on 15 December 1997 and results announced 30 December 1997. Riots lasted into the new year.

¹⁰⁶See http://www.caricom.org/jsp/pressreleases/pres17_98.jsp

¹⁰⁷Chaubey 2011, 3

¹⁰⁸Chaubey 2011, 4.

the potential for civil commotion increases significantly.”¹⁰⁹ Similar to 1997, the PPP won (with a slight majority), international and domestic monitors endorsed the election,¹¹⁰ and administrative problems again led to the PNC challenge and violent demonstrations. The administrative problems included citizens missing from the voter roll and a four-day delay in the announcement of results by GECOM. Local media played an important role in speculating about reasons for the delay, fueling rumors of malpractice. Again, the opposition PNC was convinced of rigging and rejected the results with weeks-long violent riots, resulting in four deaths and property damage.¹¹¹

Guyana’s 2006 Elections

In the run-up to the 2006 elections, Guyana received extensive technical support from the UNDP and IFES, with international donors covering over half of the \$7 million budget. None of the reforms were magic, but most were overdue, and several contributed to a peaceful post-election period. The reforms fall into two groups: support to institutions (GECOM voter registry and tabulation, media monitoring) and support for civil society (voter education, communication, violence monitoring, and peacebuilding).¹¹² Guyana chose deliberately to not only request TA support but to outsource important implementation positions to foreigners because domestic leaders would face greater distrust in the ethnically polarized climate.

Institutional reforms for GECOM focused on updating the voter registry and speeding vote tabulation. In previous electoral cycles, the voter registry was mainly updated in the few months prior to polling, which coincided with party campaigning. This politicized the registry process and undermined credibility in the registry as well as voter ID cards. In response, GECOM changed the timing of this process by introducing a *continuous* registration system; this meant updating the voters’ roll since October 2005 instead of summer 2006 for the 28 August 2006 election. It also established more permanent and temporary registration offices in each region, concentrated on the more populous coastal areas and Georgetown. In addition, GECOM introduced technologi-

¹⁰⁹EAB 2006, 13.

¹¹⁰International monitors were the European Union, the Carter Center, and the Commonwealth. These IOs supported a domestic monitors under an umbrella organization, EAB.

¹¹¹Violence data from GEVD. Also see Chaubey 2011, 2; Commonwealth 2006, 10, 37; and “A small riot in Guyana,” *The Economist*, 12 April 2001. Available at <http://www.economist.com/node/569348> Accessed 6 April 2014.

¹¹²Much of the following discussion draws on Chaubey 2011.

cal innovations, such as “check digits” and parallel coding to reduce human error, and biometrics (photo and fingerprints) collected by door-to-door verification. To check fingerprints for multiple registrations, GECOM deliberately involved an external actor (a US vendor) to allay parties’ distrust of domestic institutions.¹¹³ GECOM also chose a foreigner (a British citizen) to head the IT department “to quell public perceptions of political bias” after the two prior Guyanese heads since 2001 resigned in frustration about distrust against them.¹¹⁴ The IT department at GECOM is responsible for entering and storing data on voter registration.

To speed the dissemination of results after polling – whose delay had previously led to rise of rumors and violence – it increased phone capacity and made each of the ten regions report to the national headquarter rather than thousands of polling stations. GECOM decentralized the process by having each polling station tabulate and announce results locally, and also added new staff and polling stations in overworked districts (most populous regions).¹¹⁵ These reforms were effective: the commission released results within three days of voting (instead of 6 days after 2001 and 15 days after 1997), reducing opportunity for rumors and frustration to spread.

A third institutional reform, funded by the UNDP, focused on a media monitoring unit (MMU), which was responsible for monitoring and enforcing the media code of conduct. That code, drafted and signed by local media representatives, aimed to eliminate inaccurate, biased, or inflammatory statements, which had played a key player in instigating violence in earlier elections.¹¹⁶ Again, external help was enlisted for this purpose, with a veteran journalist from the BBC leading the effort.¹¹⁷ The MMU kept a tab on inflammatory language and equal reporting (documenting inches in newspapers and minutes in broadcast media). Violating media outlets were notified in writing and referred to an independent panel – also financed by UNDP – and composed of two veteran journalists from external Caribbean countries. As a result, the media was much more responsible in its reporting.¹¹⁸

¹¹³Chaubey 2011, 6.

¹¹⁴Chaubey 2011, 11.

¹¹⁵Chaubey 2011, 8.

¹¹⁶Commonwealth statement, see <http://secretariat.thecommonwealth.org/news/34580/34581/222429/1304codeofconductguyana.htm> Accessed 6 April 2014.

¹¹⁷Chaubey 2011, 7.

¹¹⁸Commonwealth quoted in Chaubey 2011, 12.

Apart from institutional reforms, technical assistance also worked with civil society. This included voter education about the process and implemented reforms, local monitoring of election violence, and a social cohesion program to mitigate ethnic tensions. IFES implemented its Election Violence Education and Resolution (EVER) Program with a local NGO, the Electoral Assistance Bureau (EAB). The IFES-EAB collaboration trained citizens to monitor election violence in their communities by observing rallies and documenting cases of violence, intimidation, threats, tensions. The EVER project operated in seven of the most affected regions. This program was created to “monitor, report and analyze election-related violence,”¹¹⁹ empowering civil society and creating greater accountability for (potential) perpetrators. EAB issued six reports between June and October 2006, detailing any tensions, accusations and incidents and naming perpetrators.¹²⁰ The program seems to have had some deterrent affect, as “politicians frequently cited the reports to warn supporters against using violence.”¹²¹

Where, as in Guyana, post-election violence was triggered by citizens’ distrust and *perceptions* of malpractice, institutional reforms are only of limited effect unless they are communicated broadly to citizens. Civil society work also focused on voter education generally and communicating GECOM reforms specifically. Three weeks before the election, GECOM released a statement about its “safeguards aimed at preventing (i) multiple voting, (ii) other forms of skullduggery, and (iii) any potential for dissatisfaction on election-day.”¹²² This six-page document outlined how difficult peroration/multiple voting had become due to the photo ID, verification, and indelible ink. Ballot stuffing had also become more challenging due to transparent ballot boxes, the continuous presence party representatives and the police in every polling station, the temporary presence of domestic and international monitors, and the local count of ballots in front of these stakeholders. It pointed out that any violating elector or staff person “will be subjected to questioning, and possibly, be

¹¹⁹EAB 2007, 23

¹²⁰For example, the fourth EAB-EVER report stated “People’s Progressive Party/Civic (PPP/C) party supporters stoned the house of and severely beat a People’s National Congress/Reform One Guyana (PNC/R- 1G) party candidate on August 8th at Hope West, Enmore, East Coast Demerara; PPP/C supporters were caught tearing down the posters of PNC/R-1G by the supporters of the PNC/R-1G at Industrial Site, Ruimveldt, Georgetown on August 11.” EAB 2006 report #4, 2.

¹²¹Chaubey 2011, 10.

¹²²GECOM release on 8 August 2006. Available at www.gecom.org.gy/pdf/release_polling_safeguards.pdf Accessed 6 April 2014.

arrested immediately.”¹²³ These were not empty threats. On election-day, a presiding officer from district four (which includes the capital) was suspended within the hour “after allowing a number of people to vote, even though they were not on the list.”¹²⁴

Finally, another civil society initiative focused on non-violence campaigning and ethnic inclusiveness. The EAB recruited local VIPs to convey the importance of peaceful elections on the radio and television. In addition, the UNDP financially supported the inter-religious organization (IRO) to implement a “social cohesion program” to bridge the divide between the Afro- and Indo-Guyanese communities. This program organized marches for peace and thousands of conversations between ethnic groups and gave them an opportunity to interact with each other, and build trust on the local level.¹²⁵ Again, the UNDP took the lead in implementing the program and enlisted the help of a foreigner, this time a European development advisor, because of mistrust against Guyanese government officials.

The extensive technical assistance contributed to the first peaceful transition of power in more than a decade. Not only did the losing PNC accept the results in 2006, it even conceded defeat a day before official results were announced. The PNC conceded defeat, thereby allowing a peaceful implementation of the election result. The EAB directly attributed post-election peace “to the acceptance of the election results by all of contesting parties” and noted that in prior elections “the main opposition party had not been satisfied with the elections or their results, and in marching to air grievances, violence and looting broke out.”¹²⁶ The front page of the Guyanese Chronicle summarized this as a “peaceful poll surprise.”¹²⁷ Combined with the absence of campaign violence, the 2006 elections were declared to be “free, fair and peaceful for the first time since Independence.”¹²⁸ IO technical assistance was key in creating more peaceful elections. The UNDP concluded that

facilitation by the international community converted what was almost universally expected to be an elections process fraught with violence into the most peaceful and

¹²³Ibid.

¹²⁴Commonwealth 2006, 41.

¹²⁵UNDP 2009, 68.

¹²⁶EAB 2006 report #6, 2.

¹²⁷Commonwealth 2006, 52.

¹²⁸EAB 2007, 8.

universally endorsed electoral process in Guyana's 40 years of post-independence history.¹²⁹

Guyana demonstrates the importance of running “administratively credible elections that limit the space for rumor and suspicion to take hold.”¹³⁰ In 2011, the UNDP offered limited assistance,¹³¹ mostly focusing on media monitoring, and these elections again remained peaceful. Guyana also illustrates how IOs can substitute for local processes when domestic capacity is insufficient or trust has eroded. Guyanese officials consistently “out-sourced” programs to UNDP and deliberately chose foreigners for key positions because local officials faced higher skepticism in the charged political environment.

Alternative Explanations

Several competing explanations of the switch to peaceful elections in 2006 can be ruled out. First, international election monitoring has low explanatory leverage because external observers were present at all elections since 1992 and have consistently endorsed each election.¹³² Their positive verdict has not kept Guyanese parties and voters from challenging election results in 1992, 1997, and 2001, which all resulted in street protests and violence.

Second, several domestic factors can be ruled out as causes. The electoral system (PR) and winning party (PPP) did not change since 1992. The PNC has lost every election since 1992 but the same outcome (defeat) was sometimes accepted (when seen as fair) and sometimes rejected (when not seen as fair). Economic development did not notably improve until 2011, when it cleared the \$1,000 per capita GDP hurdle. One potential competing explanation, decreased voter interest, is plausible but has quite different effects in other countries. While turnout decreased by 20 percent in 2006 compared to 2001, it remains unclear whether this reduction in voter interest causes

¹²⁹UNDP 2009, 67.

¹³⁰Chaubey 2011, 2.

¹³¹Limited UNDP assistance consisted of USD \$850,000 and a focus on media monitoring instead of the nearly \$4 million and comprehensive approach for the 2006 elections. For 2011 funding, see http://www.undp.org.gy/web/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=88

¹³²The Carter Center attended in 1992, 2001, and 2006. The EU attended in 2001. The Commonwealth of Nations attended in 1997, 2001, and 2006.

less violence. As a counter-example, Afghanistan's 2014 election was also the first peaceful contest in decades but voter turnout sharply increased from about 37 percent in 2009 to 60 percent in 2014.

A more promising competing explanation is that voters became tired of election violence, and were ready for a new approach. However, that voter tiredness/weariness may itself be a result of the non-violence programs implemented with UNDP and IFES support. TA programming on the need for peaceful elections, the consequences of violence, and mediation initiatives were intended to make citizens more aware of the human cost. Therefore, if this TA program had any effects, it *should* make voters tired of violence and stimulate discussion about alternative means. In that way, a change in voter and party attitude may well have contributed to peaceful elections; but it would represent an indirect effect of technical support on violence rather than a competing explanation.

6.6 Conclusion

This chapter investigates the effect of international technical assistance on post-election violence. I argue that the provision of such assistance in the run-up to elections can contribute to more peaceful post-election periods by increasing trust in electoral institutions and results, reducing incentives for violence. Technical election assistance includes boosting the capacity of election management bodies, reforming the voter registry, and conducting voter education. Using data on UN election assistance, regional barometer surveys, and three datasets on post-election violence, I present statistical evidence that technical assistance has significantly reduced violence in Latin America and Africa since 1990. I argue that the main mechanism linking UN assistance and reduced violence involves citizens' increased trust in the national election commission. When citizens trust the electoral commission to follow the rules, they are more likely to perceive the outcome as fair and acceptable, which should in turn lead to fewer election challenges, fewer protests, and less violence. The mechanism of trust-building is illustrated with descriptive data and with elections in Guyana since 1992.

Beyond exemplifying the causal mechanism linking technical support and reduced violence, the case

study of Guyana illustrates two other interesting features of IO support. First, it shows how IO technical assistance can *substitute* for local processes when domestic capacity is insufficient or trust eroded. Guyanese officials consistently “out-sourced” programs to UNDP and deliberately chose foreigners for key positions because local officials faced higher skepticism in the charged political environment.

Second, Guyana also suggests that technical assistance and monitoring might be linked. If (i) TA can raise trust levels and (ii) “institutional trust” conditions the effectiveness of international monitors’ reports, then TA can indirectly influence the effect of monitoring reports on violence. Monitoring reports should have the greatest effect at middling levels of institutional trust: Too little trust or too much trust in domestic electoral institutions make international monitors’ reports unimportant. That is, if citizens do not trust their country’s institutions *at all* – as in Guyana in the 1990s – they likely protest regardless of what international monitors say. If citizens have *full* trust in electoral institutions beyond any doubt, they likely do not protest regardless of monitors’ reports. In both cases, monitoring efforts seem irrelevant for violence. Thus for international monitors to be effective, citizens need to have some moderate level of trust in the country’s domestic institutions.

One way to raise institutional trust is to provide international technical assistance. TA can not only fix some of the country’s electoral problems but can also teach people that losing is part of the game. Institutions and perceptions change slowly, so it is unrealistic to expect TA to increase the level of institutional trust from minimum to maximum in a relatively short time period. Instead, “some” trust in domestic institutions is needed for international actors to help reduce election violence. Once TA accomplishes this goal of creating middling levels of institutional trust among the public, international monitors may have a significant impact on the level of violence intensity. This implies that TA and monitoring may go hand in hand in influencing election violence. I intend to explore this link between technical assistance and monitoring, and the conditional effect of monitoring, in future research.

6.7 Appendix 1: Descriptive Statistics

Table 6.7: Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Mean	Latin America				N	Mean	Sub-Saharan Africa				N
		SD	Min	Max	SD			Min	Max			
UN Technical Assistance	0.198	0.400	0	1	207	0.178	0.383	0	1	197		
Prob (UN TA)	0.193	0.198	0	0.830	174	0.170	0.162	0.001	0.856	175		
AEVD binary						0.078	0.268	0	1	206		
GEVD aggregate	0.088	0.284	0	1	171	0.231	0.422	0	1	195		
GEVD killed dummy	0.082	0.275	0	1	171	0.164	0.371	0	1	195		
GEVD killed #	0.210	0.851	0	5.468	171	0.422	1.181	0	6.909	195		
Nelda protest	0.119	0.324	0	1	194	0.213	0.410	0	1	202		
First election after civil war	0.061	0.239	0	1	214	0.136	0.344	0	1	206		
Civil war ongoing	0.168	0.454	0	2	214	0.175	0.44	0	2	206		
Civil war in past 1 year	0.196	0.474	0	2	214	0.170	0.414	0	2	206		
Civil war in past 5 years	0.243	0.430	0	1	214	0.272	0.446	0	1	206		
Civil war in past 10 years	0.355	0.480	0	1	214	0.340	0.475	0	1	206		
IO Condemnation	0.066	0.249	0	1	211	0.133	0.340	0	1	203		
IO monitors present	0.593	0.492	0	1	214	0.733	0.443	0	1	206		
Vote fraud dummy	0.089	0.285	0	1	203	0.236	0.426	0	1	199		
Vote share loser	24.218	13.643	0	59.2	156	24.424	13.288	0	50	170		
Incumbent lost	0.072	0.259	0	1	194	0.069	0.255	0	1	202		
Election type	0.618	0.487	0	1	204	0.888	0.851	0	2	206		
ODA pc	3.736	1.354	-5.896	6.43	214	-2.868	0.824	-6.03	-0.716	206		
GDP pc	1.295	0.527	0.315	2.464	210	-0.777	0.93	-2.846	2.079	206		
GDP pc growth	1.774	4.515	-13.678	16.236	210	1.493	6.492	-29.483	56.83	206		
Ethnic fractionalization	0.388	0.188	0.071	0.71	214	0.675	0.206	0.061	0.944	200		
Executive constraints	5.810	1.331	1	7	205	3.419	1.876	1	7	186		
Population size	9.366	1.187	6.584	12.172	214	8.576	1.393	5.853	11.873	206		
cowcode	103.916	39.267	40	165	214	489.932	58.627	402	625	206		
year	2000.682	6.405	1990	2011	214	1999.432	5.216	1990	2008	206		

Note: The following variables are logged: killed #, ODA pc, GDP pc, and population size.

6.8 Appendix 2: Election Administrative Challenges (Pastor 1999b)

Pre-Election Stage

1. Designing a system to appoint registration and election officials and then training them;
2. Delineation of the boundaries of voting areas;
3. Designing a voter registration system, establishing voting sites, and notifying the voters;
4. Registering voters on-site or at home and aggregating a voters' list at the national and local levels;
5. Publishing and distributing a preliminary list to allow voters and parties an opportunity to review and correct the list, adding, deleting, or modifying data or the voting sites;
6. Collecting information on voters and processing the data into voter identification cards;
7. Finalizing the registration list and sending copies to the regions and to the voting sites;
8. Distributing voter identification cards (sometimes at the same place as registration and voting) and assuring that they are received by the right people;
9. Registering and qualifying political parties and candidates;
10. Establishing and enforcing rules on campaigning, access to the media, and financing;
11. Ensuring security of the voters, the candidates, and the polling stations;
12. Developing rules for the proper observation of elections by domestic and international monitors and giving credentials to them;
13. Production of election materials; printing and securing the ballot; delivery of the election materials to designated sites;

Election Day

1. Polling officials should set up their booth and verify receipt of the materials in the presence of monitors before the polling officially begins;
2. Polling officials should open the ballot boxes in the presence of voters, then close, and seal them, and begin the voting;
3. Polling officials should certify that voters are on the registration list and that they vote privately and in accordance with the procedures (often including dipping one's finger in ink to preclude multiple voting);

4. Election officials should monitor the voting of all sites during the day and have quick-reaction teams ready to distribute election materials and resolve problems during the day;
5. Ballots should be counted in the open, preferably at each site and in the presence of monitors from all major political parties or the public: other procedures for identifying, counting, and organizing blank or invalid ballots should be followed;
6. Tally sheet should be jointly signed by all the poll-watchers, and results should be delivered to sub-regional offices and the national election commission as expeditiously as possible;
7. At the national election commission, results should be announced as they arrive, but precautions are needed to avoid double-counting;

Post-Election Verification and Dispute Settlement

1. Electoral Tribunal or appropriate body should investigate and adjudicate complaints;
2. Electoral Commission, or designated body

7 Conclusion

From Afghanistan to Zimbabwe, almost all states hold elections today.¹ Yet elections are not created equal; in many countries, elections lack meaning because competition is hampered or electoral integrity otherwise impaired. A significant portion of elections is accompanied by unrest, where competition is violent rather than peaceful. While ideally a solution to violent succession crises, elections often result in fatalities when domestic agents use violence as a tool of political competition. In fact, about a quarter of national elections worldwide are accompanied by electoral violence.²

Virtually all developing country elections take place in an international context. In some situations, international actors are actively trying to reduce election violence. But in many cases, even when international actors are *not* explicitly trying to affect this issue, they still have the potential to alter domestic outcomes in important ways. How do and can international organizations influence the outbreak of election violence? What are the conditions and the mechanisms? And to what extent can IOs change violence intensity? Throughout this dissertation, I have focused on two factors: international technical assistance and election monitoring. The following sections summarize the argument, findings, and implications for research and policymaking.

7.1 Argument


My main argument is that international organizations can influence election violence by altering the incentives of domestic actors. This external influence is a double-edged sword: IO assistance can reduce violence in some circumstances and increase it in others. The effect depends on the type of IO assistance (technical assistance or monitoring) and the election phase (before or after election-day). Both types of IO support – technical assistance and monitoring – increase international scrutiny of sensitive domestic political processes. But they operate with distinct mechanisms. Election mon-

¹States without direct national elections are China, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Eritrea.

²See Chapter 2; Fischer 2002; Bekoe 2009; Straus and Taylor 2012; Salehyan and Linebarger 2013; and Simpser 2013.

itoring provides information about the behavior of stakeholders while technical assistance builds institutional capacity and strengthens civil society. In the run-up to elections, both types of external support can help calm tensions and lower the risk of election violence. However, in the wake of elections they have divergent effects: technical assistance again reduces violence, whereas observers' verdict about the elections' credibility can contribute to violence. These mechanisms are summarized in Figure 7.1.

Figure 7.1: Mechanisms and Effects of IO Assistance on Election Violence



Before elections, governments can send a credible signal of good intentions by inviting IO assistance to support their elections. The government's decision to invite external support generates costs for domestic actors, and especially for unfair incumbents. As I discuss in chapter 4, monitoring makes violent and non-violent manipulation more costly and technical assistance makes it more difficult.

Inviting election observation is a costly signal because observers can publicly expose fraud and create accountability for manipulation (i.e. fraud or violence). In the run-up to elections, credible observer groups send pre-assessment missions and issue statements about the possibility of a meaningful election. These statements detail institutional shortcomings and malpractice by domestic stakeholders, including violent and non-violent manipulation (e.g. misuse of state resources, failure to update the voter register). The anticipated public exposure of manipulation generates incentives for domestic actors to limit manipulation or at least adopt less overt strategies.

Inviting technical assistance is a costly signal because it makes manipulation more difficult by actively reforming domestic processes: (1) increasing information about appropriate campaigning behavior and avenues of complaint, (2) increasing capacity for processing complaints, (3) removing direct triggers of violence and (4) quelling violence where it occurs during the campaign. These reforms reduce the capacity of domestic actors to engage in manipulation. First, technical assistance makes it more difficult for the incumbent and the opposition to manipulate the election because civil and voter education helps inform participants about the process, their rights, and avenues of complaint. Second, Complaints are more likely to be processed, as technical assistance often helps increase the capacity of election management bodies. Third, TA can help remove direct triggers of violence by changing rules about party and candidate registration procedures. Fourth, TA can help quell violence where it occurs by sponsoring local mediation bodies and training election officers and security forces about their proper role at campaign rallies, such as protecting citizens independent of ideology rather than siding with one party.³ In short, technical assistance makes it more difficult to tilt the playing field by irregular means and use violence as a means of political competition. That is a cost a government (and opposition) bears by inviting such assistance for their elections.

The government's costly signal of inviting international scrutiny can change opposition beliefs about incumbent fairness, which can in turn dissuade the opposition from using violence against the incumbent's supporters. If the incumbent does not invite external monitors and the opposition infers that the incumbent is likely unfair, it has incentives to engage in violence. This is because the incumbent himself created an uneven playing field, which makes the opposition's effort an uphill battle. Facing a repressive incumbent, the opposition is unlikely to win using regular means of competition, so that it has incentives to also resort to violent means. In contrast, if the opposition believes that the incumbent is likely fair, it is less likely to engage in violence against the incumbent and his supporters because fighting fair incumbents is not beneficial. In this way, IO assistance has the potential to reduce domestic actors' incentives for violence in the run-up to elections.

³Wilkinson (2004) has shown that the role of local police is important for whether violent clashes occur and intensify.

After election-day, violence often erupts when the election process or result is seen as not credible. IOs can influence electoral losers' incentives to challenge results. The effect of external assistance depends on assistance type. Technical assistance, which builds trust in election management bodies and the outcome they announce, can reduce violence in the aftermath of elections. However, election observation can increase incentives of challengers by condemning elections, thus potentially contributing to violence.

Election monitoring can contribute to post-election violence by casting doubt on the credibility of the election result, as I discuss in chapter 5. Independent validation is an important factor in post-vote violence. International condemnation can increase post-election violence by strengthening the election loser's incentives to fight. A negative IO report alleges that significant fraud or other manipulation occurred and that the official vote shares are likely biased. Such a condemnation strengthens the loser by (i) indicating that he has more popular support than the official vote share suggests and (ii) serving as a focal point for mobilization. Taken together, negative IO reports can shift the probability of winning a potential post-election fight in favor of the loser by increasing the number of people who are willing to fight for the loser. If the loser is more likely to win a potential fight, he is more likely challenge the result, which can lead to violence. Therefore, a negative report by IO election observers increases incentives to challenge the result, which can contribute to violence.

Technical assistance, however, can reduce violent challenges after the election by increasing the capacity and credibility of the election commission. As I discuss in chapter 6, the mechanism linking TA and reduced post-election violence involves citizens' increased trust in the national election commission. When voters trust the election commission, they are also more likely to trust the announced result, which in turn leads to fewer election challenges and less violence. Besides increased institutional capacity and credibility, TA also encourages contestants to stay calm, and aims to socialize citizens and parties to acknowledge that losing is just part of the game, and they may win in future competitions.

7.2 Findings

To test these arguments, I utilized statistical analyses, formal models, short case studies, and the compilation of an original dataset. Chapter 2 presented new global data on election violence and discussed the variables. I also illustrated trends in election violence since 1990 across the world, and showcased the spatial and temporal distribution, highlighting that election violence mainly occurs in the global South but is not unheard of in the North either. I found some initial support for the idea that violence dynamics differ before and after elections by examining the changing distributions of violence before, during, and after elections. I also empirically explored the relationship between violence and political and economic development, documenting that election violence is much more common in middling and autocratic regimes, and that the risk of violence decreases in more developed countries. I utilized the new GEVD data in the statistical tests of chapter 6. Chapter 2 also contains a description of alternative measures of election violence, including the AEVD data, which are used in chapters 4 through 6.

In chapter 3, I focused on the government's strategic decision of whether to invite election monitors, and if so, *which* organization it invited. I used IO election handbooks, reports, and an external dataset to develop a typology of IO monitors. This typology distinguished three levels of IO monitoring quality (between lenient, moderate, stringent) based on IO's preconditions for monitoring, capacity to detect manipulation, and reporting policies. Building on this typology, I presented a hurdle model of IO choice which controlled for other processes associated with IO choice, including per capita income and aid, the level of democracy, and election characteristics, among others. The model estimates indicated that states at the threshold to democracy are less likely to abstain from inviting observers and more likely to invite high-quality monitors. This result was robust across several model specifications and estimation methods. In line with my argument, states at the threshold to democracy have greater incentives to send strong signals of their democratic commitment, therefore inviting more stringent monitors.

In addition, chapter 3 illustrated the causal mechanism with Peruvian elections since the 1990s. This documented how government incentives of whether and *which* IO monitor to invite varied with

changes in the political regime type. When Peru backslid from democracy towards authoritarianism, it was the first time the government invited any observers in an effort to signal its democratic intentions, and the IO invited was lenient. When Peru was again at the threshold to democracy a decade later – when the democratic constitutionality of the election was at stake, and when the transitional government took over – the Peruvian government invited stringent monitors to signal its commitment to democracy.

Chapter 4 tested for the relationship between inviting IO assistance and pre-election violence perpetrated by the opposition. This chapter introduced a signaling model to derive hypotheses about the effect of hosting IO technical assistance or monitoring on opposition campaign violence. I employed a logit model, data on UN assistance and monitoring, as well as opposition campaign violence in Sub-Saharan Africa since 1990, while controlling for factors such as per capita GDP and oil income, civil war experience, election type, executive constraints, and likely incumbent victory, among others. The results indicated that hosting IO assistance was associated with a significant reduction in opposition campaign violence. While the main models included fixed effects, further tests with random effects and clustered standard errors showed that hosting IO election assistance had a robust effect on pre-election violence. This effect was even greater when both types of IOs attended the election (technical and monitoring) rather than only one type of organization, indicating that they indeed use different mechanisms to calm tensions in the campaigning period.

Further, chapter 4 presented support for conditional effects of hosting IOs on election violence. Models with interaction terms showed how the effect of hosting IO assistance is dependent on the hosting cost and the opposition's perception of incumbent fairness. I also tested for, and rejected, alternative explanations of the effect of IO assistance on reduced opposition violence. There was little statistical evidence that IOs make the campaigning period fairer (thus creating less need for opposition violence) and no evidence that the opposition uses less violence because it fears losing external election aid in the future. To illustrate the causal mechanism – changed opposition beliefs about incumbent fairness – I selected a hard test for the argument: Zimbabwe. Given Mugabe's long, repressive rule, the effects of hosting IOs on the opposition's perception of incumbent fairness should be limited, and opposition violence should change little as a result. Focusing on Zimbabwe's

2000 and 2005 elections, I documented that even when the opposition has high priors about incumbent fairness, the government's decision to allow election IOs can change opposition beliefs about incumbent fairness and consequently their incentives to engage in campaign violence. Mugabe's invitation of international scrutiny can help explain variation in opposition campaign violence in Zimbabwe.

Chapter 5 presented a formal model of loser-winner interaction that begins after IO monitors have announced their verdict on the credibility of the election. I derived equilibria and hypotheses about three factors that strengthen the loser's incentives to challenge election results: a negative IO report, large popular support, and incumbency powers. The (ordered) logit models of post-election violence onset and intensity also controlled for other factors associated with such violence, most prominently vote fraud. The results indicated that international condemnations were associated with significant increases in post-election violence onset and intensity.

To explore the power of the main alternative explanation of post-vote violence (vote fraud), and guard against potential spuriousness and model dependence, I used matching as a robustness. The genetic matching process compared pairs of elections with the same level of fraud and other covariates but different IO verdicts. The estimated effect of negative reports was again significant and positive, showing that condemnations can increase the risk of violence onset as well as increase violence intensity. I also tested for endogeneity (reports being influenced by violence) but found no evidence of reverse causation statistically. In addition, I used newly collected data to show that verdicts are issued within a couple of days after the election while violence is measured up to 90 days after the election, which makes it difficult to explain the effect with endogeneity. To illustrate the causal mechanism, I drew one of the paired cases from the matching process (the 2007 elections in Kenya and Sierra Leone) and showed how similar domestic context led to different outcomes because the condemnation encouraged the electoral loser Odinga to challenge the result in Kenya whereas the endorsement in Sierra Leone did not give the same strength to loser Berewa. While violence often involves multi-causal processes, there is robust evidence that international condemnation is one of these causes and can contribute to post-election violence.

Chapter 6 tested for the relationship between UN technical assistance and post-election violence in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa. To take into account the non-random deployment of UN assistance, I used a two-stage estimation. In the first stage I estimated a reduced-form probit to predict (endogenous) UN assistance. In the second stage, I used the fitted/predicted probabilities as instruments for UN assistance to predict post-election violence. The estimated effect was significant and negative, indicating that technical assistance can substantially reduce violence. This logit and regression effect was robust across three datasets, including GEVD, and across two continents since 1990. Elections in Guyana since 1992 illustrated the mechanism of technical support increasing trust in the credibility of elections, which limits incentives to challenge results, and thereby reduces post-election violence.

In sum, statistical analysis, formal models, and qualitative case studies broadly support the argument that international organizations providing election assistance can influence election violence by changing the incentives of domestic actors. Given that the empirics span Latin America and Africa, the results are generalizable to other developing countries that hold elections but are not yet advanced democracies, thus potentially inviting IO support. The argument is generalizable to many countries in South and East Asia because these two conditions hold there, and election violence is similarly prevalent.

7.3 Implications

The relationship between international organizations and domestic election violence has important implications for policymakers and scholars. The findings here suggest new areas of research in international relations about the conditions under which IOs influence domestic politics, and they challenge a common assumption in comparative politics that domestic politics is mainly driven by domestic factors. In addition, the empirical findings presented here establish important insights for policymakers who wish to use international organizations to reduce election violence.

The central contribution of this study to IR is in proposing and testing arguments about how international organizations can change domestic election violence. Following the call to explore *how* international institutions matter,⁴ this study has revealed mechanisms, illustrated the role of domestic politics, and documented how institutions are consequential as well as objects of state choice.

I have highlighted causal linkages between the domestic and international levels of analysis, and how mechanisms vary with the type of organization. Monitoring organizations can alter domestic incentives to engage in violence by observing and providing credible information about actor behavior, serving as costly signals of democratic intentions, and thus changing domestic actors' perceptions of each other. In contrast, technical assistance organizations can also change agents' incentives for violence by boosting the capacity of domestic institutions so that fewer opportunities for malpractice exist, thereby increasing citizens' confidence in electoral integrity and reducing incentives for violent unrest. Given that even international organizations with enforcement powers, like the ICC, often remain dependent on state cooperation and thus limited in their effect, these mechanisms are important ways to pacify potentially "explosive" domestic political processes.

This study also has implications for understanding the role of *domestic politics*, particularly for the literature on the "second image reversed" and "two-level games."⁵ I have focused on one part of the two-level game: how domestic agents use constraints from international organizations to further their own domestic agenda. Governments can bind their hands by inviting technical assistance to change electoral processes and limit the options of themselves on those of their opponents (chapter 6). Governments can also use IOs to signal their intentions (chapters 3 and 4). Further, this study has contributed to the "second image reversed" literature by adding another domestic political outcome (election violence) that can be influenced by international causes. I have examined domestic processes to show how international organizations alter domestic decisions, and how domestic and international agents interact.

⁴Martin and Simmons 1998.

⁵Both of these bodies of literature are vast. Foundational pieces are Gourevitch 1978; and Putnam 1988.

Further, this study has shown how international organizations can *substitute* for domestic practices to some degree. When domestic capacity is low, technical assistance can support and expand the domestic bureaucracy. Aimed to be a temporary and sustainable investment involving local agents, international assistance boosts domestic capacity through logistical help and advice. In rare cases, governments transfer domestic authority to international organizations for administering elections entirely. More often, governments transfer some of their authority to monitor elections to IOs.

It is important to keep in mind that international organizations are *objects of state choice*. While governments may be pressured by opposition groups or the international community, governments retain authority about whether and how to interact with organizations providing election assistance. I have documented how their choice of international assistance (type and quality) is subject to strategic considerations. In particular, I have shown how variation in political regime types influences the government's choice of organization. States at the threshold to democracy are more likely to select high-quality monitors (those with greater capacity) to attend their elections and send stronger signals of their democratic commitment. Whether these signals are true reflections of their nature or intentions is a different matter, and in some cases worth exploring. In this way, international organizations can become tools for domestic political purposes, be it improved political processes, regime legitimacy, or international credibility.

While an object of state choice, international organizations are *consequential* for domestic politics. By uncovering the effect of organizations on election violence, this study has explored new ground in three ways. First, it has shifted the focus from fraud⁶ to violence as an important dimension of politics that (election) IOs can influence. This contributes to institutionalist research on the “second image reversed”⁷ as well as research on the effect of third-party actors in domestic conflict.⁸ Second, this study has shifted attention away from the *limits* of monitoring and the *extent* of its positive effects⁹ to the negative effects of organizations. In this way, it adds nuance to research

⁶See Hyde and O'Mahoney 2009; Hyde 2011; Kelley 2012a; and Ichino and Schündeln 2012.

⁷See Gourevitch 1978; and Pevehouse 2005.

⁸See Fortna 2004, 2008; Kydd 2003, 2006; Beardsley 2008; and Regan 2002.

⁹See Hyde and Kelley 2011; Stremlau and Carroll 2011; and Kelley 2012a

on election monitoring and, more broadly, contributes to the literature on the negative unintended effects of IOs.¹⁰ Third, this work helped opening up a new research field: international election technical assistance. External support of political infrastructure has received relatively little attention.¹¹ The little research that exists on election technical support and conflict often relies on case studies and offers mixed results, ranging from carefully optimistic to inconclusive and skeptical of any pacifying effects.¹² In contrast, this study provides systematic empirical evidence and shows that such assistance can substantially reduce the risk of violence.

Comparative Politics

For both academic and policy researchers in democratization, election violence is a – perhaps *the* – missing link in understanding the transition to truly democratic regimes. In loose parlance, it is hard to conceive of a society that regularly experiences election violence as democratic. On the other hand, any system that regularly has non-violent and free elections is more likely a consolidated democracy. For Dahl, peaceful, regular, and fair elections are an essential component of the democratic process:¹³

A democratic government provides an orderly and *peaceful* process by means of which a majority of citizens can induce the government to do what they most want it to do and to avoid doing what they most want it not to do.¹⁴

Thus, by definition, election violence undermines the presence of democracy, and eliminating such violence is crucial to democratic consolidation. Despite this, election violence remains relatively understudied. We have enormous bodies of democratization studies but few are linked to this phenomenon. As noted below, the international influences on election violence have been particularly neglected.

¹⁰See Savun and Tirone 2011; Abouharb and Cingranelli 2006; Hartzell, Hoddie, Bauer 2010; Simpser and Donno 2012; Busch and Reinhard 2003; and Shaffer, Sanchez, and Rosenberg 2008.

¹¹The main exceptions are Goldstone et al. 2008; Newman and Rich 2004; and Darnolf 2011.

¹²See Ludwig 1995, 2004; Santiso 2002; and Steinorth 2011, 318-319.

¹³Dahl 1989, 233.

¹⁴Dahl 1989, 95.

Much comparative politics research on election violence focuses on domestic causes, skeptical that there are important influences outside the nation-state. In contrast, this study has shown that even when controlling for the largest domestic driver of post-vote violence (fraud) and a variety of other domestic factors, international organizations still exert a significant and substantially important effect on violence. Moreover, the magnitude of the effect of IOs on violence exceeds that of alternative domestic factors. My argument does not minimize the role of domestic factors but rather points out that international influences should be taken into account as well to paint a more complete picture. While there are certainly cases in which IOs are absent or non-consequential, in most cases it is worthwhile to consider international influences, especially since both levels interact in significant ways.

This study has also attempted to document how different types of violence (by timing and actor) are associated with distinct mechanisms. This implies that studies of such conflict should distinguish the timing to gain conceptual clarity about causal links, and apply appropriate empirical measures to capture this variation. Aggregate indicators across all electoral stages can mask this variation. Similarly, research can be more cumulative if it distinguished the perpetrator of violence. While data on this dimension is scarce outside of Africa, and also has substantial missingness in GEVD, it does exist for the government as perpetrator (Nelda). However, since chapter 4 has shown that opposition violence displays substantial variation and is subject to similar cost-benefit calculations, it would be a great contribution to compile data on *election* violence by actors other than the government. This can help shed more light on the question of how different types and levels of election violence are associated with distinct mechanisms.

Although I have focused on election violence as a tool of political competition, this phenomenon is part of a larger “menu” that incumbents, opposition forces, and others choose from to engineer elections. Chapters 4 through 6 have explored the links between fraud and violence in different electoral stages. This implies that studies of electoral manipulation, which tend to focus on a single phenomenon or an aggregate indicator of manipulation,¹⁵ can benefit from taking a more holistic

¹⁵See Nichter 2008; and Birch 2007.

view, and considering links beyond the more obvious (fraud and violence).¹⁶ To support that endeavor, this dissertation has also made an important empirical contribution by compiling original data. Given the scarcity of data on violent and non-violent election manipulation, especially outside of Africa, this dataset makes several contributions: providing information on violence in all three electoral stages, for types of violence short of fatalities, and with detailed victim estimates rather than thresholds in all regions of the world.

Policymaking

What works in international democracy promotion? Thomas Carothers, arguably the most prominent author on this question, identifies three main areas of external democracy promotion: elections, state institutions, and civil society.¹⁷ Carothers is wary of election assistance and institution building, suggesting that implementing agencies often underestimate pre-existing structures and the complex challenges of reforming them. He argues that such assistance should focus first on civil society and parties in order to succeed.¹⁸ While he acknowledges that all three areas are linked, he overlooks how election technical assistance can influence each of them.

Prominent policy researchers – such as Thomas Carothers, Larry Diamond, and Peter Burnell – have written little about aspects of democratization that I have found essential. Election technical assistance (TA) can and does play an important role in improving elections, institutions, and civil society.¹⁹ As Chapters 4 and 6 have shown, TA can support civil society through civic and voter education as well as media reforms. It can also reform state institutions – helping to transform national election commissions into independent, capable, and credible bodies, and furthering interaction between election management and the security sector. Most centrally, TA can help improve the administration of elections, making them legitimate fora for competition. That is not to say that technical assistance is a panacea – changes crucially depend on domestic political will and take time – but it is a promising tool of democracy promotion that has been underappreciated compared

¹⁶See Bratton 2008.

¹⁷Carothers 1999, 334-340.

¹⁸Carothers 2006a.

¹⁹Ludwig 2004, 186. See also USAID 2010, 2013; UNDP 2009, 2012. These assessments are mainly based on case studies.

to the wealth of work on party aid, monitoring, and rule of law reforms.

How can external actors help countries conduct peaceful transitions of power? I have shown that technical assistance has pacifying effects before and after elections while election observation can potentially contribute to violence in the wake of elections. Some scholars argue that when election observers condemn elections and contribute to post-election *protests*, this is “good” conflict because it can help shape incumbent incentives and enforce democracy.²⁰ *Violence*, however, may be a different matter. Apart from the ethical issues involved, whether election violence is “good violence” and has democratizing effects is an open empirical question. To the extent that election violence does not have democratizing effects, this study suggests that in some situations, international investment in election assistance may be better shifted away from monitoring and towards technical assistance.

Monitors at flawed election face a dilemma: they can follow their mandate of providing accurate information, condemn the election, and risk post-vote violence; or they can endorse a fraudulent election, hoping to delay or deter violence, and risk their own reputation in the long run. My analysis indicates that monitors predominantly choose the first option and are truth tellers, probably because they have strong incentives to maintain their reputation, which is their main currency and source of credibility.²¹ However, one way to avoid this dilemma is for monitors to not place themselves in this situation in the first place. Observers should not attend elections that seem unlikely to have meaningful competition. Usually, credible organizations follow this practice. However, it remains unclear why some organizations attend farce elections, such as those in Zimbabwe, Swaziland, and Ethiopia. Instead of investing in elections with little potential of fair competition, and risking legitimizing a deeply flawed process, policymakers may be better advised to invest these resources in technical assistance programs.

Independent of the findings on election monitoring, the findings on technical assistance for electoral security demonstrate that these programs should be expanded where possible. While policy interest in technical support has increased over the last five years, it is unclear if actual investment has

²⁰Hyde and Marinov 2014.

²¹Hyde 2012. On a parallel finding on human rights NGOs, see Hill, Moore, and Mukherjee 2013.

improved. Several of the leading organizations have issued guidance on best practices for technical support. The UNDP issued its programming guide for elections and conflict prevention in 2009, followed by USAID's electoral security framework in 2010 and best practices guide in 2013.²² IFES has held several internal meetings over the last year to insure that violence resolution is integrated in regular elections programming, and the U.S. Institute of Peace has regularly held workshops for policymakers to transfer practical tools for election violence prevention as part of technical assistance efforts.²³ Organizations evaluate the success of such programming based on case studies of individual elections. Using large N statistical analyses of UN assistance, I have shown that TA can act as a pacifier both before and after elections. This implies that investment in TA is worthwhile and, if anything, should be expanded when possible. To enable evaluation of assistance programs across organizations, it would also be beneficial to collect more in-house data on the timing, scope, and shape of such programs.

Returning to election monitoring, chapter 3 has shown how the government's strategic selection of monitoring organizations is a concern.²⁴ The obvious solution is more standardization of practices among monitoring groups, yet it is unclear how to achieve this goal. While the UN Document was signed in 2005 and spurred yearly follow-up meetings to support the implementation of standards,²⁵ it suffers from two critical shortcomings: compliance cannot be enforced;²⁶ and some organizations have not ratified it (e.g. COPA). At the extreme end, there are a couple of observer organizations in Eastern Europe and Asia that are widely acknowledged to have little interest in competitive elections or democracy but still offer monitoring services: the Commonwealth of Independent States and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Their membership includes countries without direct national elections (China) and countries where elections are not exactly cliff hangers but regularly won with 80 percent vote shares for the ruling party and similar turnout.²⁷ As such, it is perhaps

²²See UNDP 2009; and USAID 2010, 2013.

²³Author attended some of these meetings at each organization. For the USIP workshop, see <http://www.usip.org/events/preventing-electoral-violence-in-africa-tools-policymakers>

²⁴This concern has also been noted by credible organizations. See Carter Center 2006, 2.

²⁵For yearly meeting notes, see http://www.cartercenter.org/peace/democracy/des_declaration.html

²⁶"Endorsers of the Declaration are not formally accountable to other bodies or stakeholders." OSCE/ODIHR 2009, 9.

²⁷Examples are Kyrgyzstan 2005, executive elections in Kazakhstan 1991-2012, and Tajikistan's 1999, 2006, 2013 elections. That said, some governments regard even farce election monitoring as too much danger to their hold on power. Turkmenistan, although arguably a perfect fit, is not a full member of either organization, partly because it fears the potential democratic powers of Georgia and Ukraine in the CIS. See Valentinas Mite, "CIS: Turkmenistan

unsurprising that these organizations apply lower standards and regularly endorse sub-par elections. As long as member-states benefit from engaging in window dressing by gaining external legitimacy without costs, this situation seems unlikely to change. One potential solution is to establish a board at these follow-up meetings to rate the performance of monitoring organizations each year according to an objective scoreboard.²⁸ This peer-review process can generate naming-and-shaming dynamics, which have been influential in related issue areas.²⁹

7.4 Future Research Avenues

This work is not the definitive statement on IOs and election violence. It has just scratched the surface of this relatively new research field. Moreover, several new puzzles have surfaced during the course of this research. This section outlines a few directions that could add to this body of knowledge.

Some empirical questions emerged. First, can combining different types of external assistance generate greater changes in domestic politics? Chapter 4 has shown how the presence of *both* technical and monitoring groups at a single election has a much greater violence-reducing effect than either type alone. I argued that they operate under different mechanisms, and thus generate a greater joint effect. Future research could explore how to best sequence or coordinate these two types of assistance. For example, the effect of monitors on post-election unrest may depend on institutional trust: too little or “too high” trust in domestic electoral institutions may render international monitors ineffective in terms of changing violence levels.³⁰ One way to increase the level of institutional trust is technical assistance. Once TA accomplishes this goal of creating middling levels of institutional trust among the public, international monitors can be expected to have a significant impact on the level of violence intensity. This suggests that technical assistance and monitoring should go

Reduces Ties To ‘Associate Member,’” *Radio Free Europe*, 29 August 2005. Available at <http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1061002.html> Accessed 14 March 2014. On the other extreme, Ukraine withdrew from the CIS’ monitoring mission to Kyrgyzstan 2005 because it did not want to be associated with a seemingly endless charade of impartial election monitoring. See Kupchinsky 2005.

²⁸The factors considered in chapter 3’s typology could serve as a starting point.

²⁹See Hafner-Burton 2005; Murdie and Davis 2012; and Meernik et al. 2012. Note that these articles examine the effect of shaming by international institutions on states, not the effect of peer-shaming.

³⁰That is, if citizens do not trust their country’s institutions *at all*, they will protest regardless of what international monitors say. If citizens have *full* trust, they will not protest regardless of monitors’ reports. Therefore the effect of monitors on violence intensity after elections may be conditional on middling levels of institutional trust.

hand in hand, but it is ultimately an empirical question.

Second, why do actors not commit to costless but potentially beneficial agreements? The Parliamentary Confederation of the Americas (COPA) has not signed the UN Declaration on monitoring standards. Given that signing is costless, commitments cannot be enforced, many members are democracies, and all its member states are also part of the OAS, which is a signatory, it is unclear why COPA has not taken this step. While the predominantly autocratic membership of other organizations (CIS and SCO) may fear potential democratic pressures, this concern is not a plausible explanation for the majority of members in COPA. Further, signing can generate perks for IO bureaucrats (yearly meetings). A deeper case study of this organization could answer this puzzle, and potentially have bearing on the larger IR question of why actors do not commit to costless but beneficial agreements.

Third, as for election violence, we still know little about its consequences. Apart from the direct human cost, lower turnout, and distorted vote shares, what long-term consequences do violent elections have? Do they give democracy a “bad name” when citizens come to experience violent elections so frequently that their enthusiasm for democracy wanes? Cross-national and survey research can help shed light on this question.

Fourth, future research could also contribute to knowledge by exploring how domestic actors choose between different tools of manipulation. While this idea has been conceptually developed, to the best of my knowledge, it has not been empirically evaluated. The new GEVD can help test existing theoretical arguments about the “menu of manipulation,” can help examine to what degree domestic actors use some means of manipulation over others, and when they revert to more subtle measures (such as disqualifications) over the overt use of physical force. This question is relatively unexplored, largely because of the scarcity of data on lower levels of violence.

Finally, technical assistance provides fertile ground for future research. My dissertation only scratches the surface of democratic technical assistance. Democracy has to be learned; no country was “born” with advanced institutions. In established democracies, citizens solve their disputes

through ballots rather than bullets. What does it take to achieve a political system in which competing interests are resolved non-violently, citizens feel they can meaningfully participate, and democratic institutions are seen as legitimate? What are the different types of democratic technical assistance that countries can draw on to achieve a more democratic state? Like monitoring, it is supplied by a multitude of actors: IGOs,³¹ NGOs,³² and bilateral government services,³³ each with its own programming. Perhaps most importantly, once technical support has been provided, how durable is its effect? More research on the actors, causal processes, and effects is warranted.

Future research could evaluate technical support beyond elections. Democratic technical assistance consists of a wide range of activities beyond election reform, including political party support, rule of law, human rights, legal and judicial developments, civil society, media, anti-corruption, de-centralization, and civil-military relations. For more than fifty years, and especially since the 1990s, such external technical assistance has flourished, with billions of dollars spent on democratic technical assistance in emerging democracies. Yet, we have very little empirical evidence of what works or if these efforts have made a systematic and sustained difference.

7.5 Conclusion

How can international actors influence election violence? This dissertation concludes that international organizations can affect violence dynamics by altering the incentives of domestic actors, yielding both positive and negative effects. While not denying the continued importance of domestic drivers, IOs can play an important role in changing the use of physical force as a tool of political competition. This study has revealed empirical links between IOs and election violence and has provided theoretical arguments for these relationships. The formal models and short case studies highlighted some of the causal processes of these arguments. While this research raised new questions, it also provided some theoretical and empirical basis for scholars and policymakers to hope that external assistance can change the prospect of peaceful power transitions, and thereby

³¹IGOs include the UN, the EU, OSCE ODIHR/Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the IOM/International Organization for Migration; and the IPU/Inter-Parliamentary Union.

³²NGOs include IFES/International Foundation for Electoral Systems; NDI/National Democratic Institute for International Affairs; International IDEA/International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance

³³Bilateral technical assistance providers include the U.S. (USAID), Great Britain (DFID), Canada (CIDA), Australia (AusAID), and Germany (GIZ).

influence a key component of democracy.

More than a decade ago, Robert Pastor drew attention to the fact that the administrative side of elections is critical but overlooked.³⁴ With few exceptions, that situation has not changed. Truly independent and credible election commissions are an important foundation of democracy and democratization. If commissions are credible and approve elections, elections will almost certainly be peaceful regardless of the presence of any international organizations. However, to help commissions reach that level of institutional quality, external support can prove critical.

³⁴Pastor 1999b, 18.

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