Supplement: An important contribution by a famous Austrian publicist.

[s.l.]: [s.n.], [s.d.]

Copy 2.

SUPPLEMENT TO "THE CONTINENTAL TIMES"

AN IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION BY A FAMOUS AUSTRIAN PUBLICIST.

THE ANTITHESIS BETWEEN AUSTRIA-HUNGARY AND RUSSIA

BY

Dr. ALEXANDER REDLICH

THE BALKAN POLICIES OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY AND RUSSIA.

THE ENEMY OF EUROPE.

Dr. Alexander Redlich on the Danger to European Civilization.

An interesting and valuable book by Dr. Alexander Redlich has just been published by the Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt in Stuttgart. Dr. Redlich points out that it must be kept clearly and constantly in mind that the most deadly and dangerous enemy of the Central Powers and of Europe in general is, and must remain, Russia. Her victory over Germany and Austria-Hungary would mean the passing away of that common civilization which, in spite of certain differences and dissensions, unites the nations of the Continent, as well as England.

The longer the war lasts, says Dr. Redlich, the less importance is attached to the purely academic question of who was responsible for its outbreak, and the more the history of the situation and the causes leading up to the war gain in significance. The role of Austria-Hungary in this war is to serve as the first bulwark against the Russian flood, and Germany has the same noble function to fulfil. It is this which determines the true historical perspective of the situation. And for this reason the unholy plot and compact of a political abortion such as the Triple Entente constitutes the great crime against the human race for which England and France must plead guilty at the bar of Time. These two Western powers, once delivered of the obsessions that have misled them, will see that their real interests lie in a solidarity with the Central Powers and in an union with them in the battle of the West against the East.

This thoughtful work should be read by all who are interested in the greater issues of the world war. It consists of three chapters, namely, "The Balkan Policies of Austria-Hungary and Russia"; — "Austria-Hungary and Russia before the Outbreak of the War"; — "The Other Great Powers Before the War".

We take pleasure in giving the following extracts from the first chapter of this authoritative work by the famous Austrian publicist. We heartily recommend this book to all who wish to obtain a true and reliable insight into the workings of the monstrous and gigantic plot that lead up to the war.

* * *

The conflict between Austria-Hungary and Russia owes its origin primarily to the Russian striving for expansion in the Balkan Peninsula, which in turn is only a part of the plan cherished by Russian politicians for over 200 years. History has given us the story of an alleged will of Peter the Great, in which the possession of Constantinople on the one hand and the mastery of the Baltic on the other are designated as the goal of Russian endeavor. This testament has never really had any existence and it is said to be an invention of Napoleon's, but its contents are in perfect accordance with the traditional plans which have been followed by all Russian rulers since the days of Peter the Great.

The expansion of Russia along the Baltic had come to a standstill long ago. But the urging towards the south has remained one of the governing principles of Russian policy to this day, and is to-day the most important of all, since its eastward expansion has been hindered for the present by Japan and England. This urging towards the south has therefore for over a hundred years, determined the nature of Russian policy towards Turkey.

It formed the first point of contact between Russia and the Habsburg monarchy, and at first by no means in a hostile sense. For the beginning of the Russian offensive against Turkey dates from the end of the defensive wars which Austria was forced to wage for hundreds of years against the Ottoman Empire. So we behold Austria and Russia as allies against Turkey in the second half of the 18th century. But even at that time there was jealousy between the two empires. The Russian attempts to divide Turkey in conjunction with Austria-Hungary persisted to the middle of the nineteenth century.

Austria-Hungary resisted these intentions, and became a greater obstacle to Russian dreams of conquest than any other power, although it would never have agreed to wage war with Russia on behalf of Turkey—in contrast to the western powers who supported Turkey by force of arms in the Crimean War. For a long time the conviction has therefore prevailed in Russia that the way to Constantinople lay through Vienna.

At first Russia contented itself by demanding the division of Turkey, and it is apparent that an understanding with Austria-Hungary was by no means precluded. The ancient formula of partition is altered to suit the new circumstances and Russia is willing to reserve the eastern half of the Balkan peninsula as its sphere of influence and to leave the western half to the influence of Austria-Hungary. This thought already contains the germ of the Russian agreement to the occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary. Russia indeed, repeatedly declares itself prepared to approve the annexation of the occupied provinces by Austria-Hungary and even urges the letter to proceed to take this step.

This concession is comprehensible when one considers that the occupation of Bosnia by Austria-Hungary was not only coincident in point of time with the "liberation" of Bulgaria by Russia, but also connected therewith in a far more complicated way. An insurrection in Bosnia which had been instigated by Russia makes its occupation necessary, and at the same time furnishes an excuse for a Russo-Turkish war. After this war in 1878, Austria-Hungary was able to take complete possession of Bosnia and Herzogovina, and would doubtless have received Russian support for further expansion along the western Balkans. Russia in return for its expected the entire support of Austria-Hungary for this ambitions with regard to the eastern side of the Balkan peninsula.

These plans were based upon the peace of St. Stefano which had created a greatly-enlarged Bulgaria at the expense of Turkey and also Servia. But this Bulgaria was not conceived as an independent country, but as a Russian province, which was at first to be under formal Turkish sovereignity. Bulgaria was to be a sort of Russian Egypt and was to serve to keep the way to Constantinople open for Turkey. In this way Russia would become the geographical neighbor of Turkey and might annihilate it with one subsequent blow. Further, Roumania was an *enclave* entirely surrounded by Russian territory and might be annexed at the first opportunity.

Such plans were however equally objectionable to both Austria-Hungary and England, and they both expressed themselves to this effect at the Congress of Berlin, at which the boundaries of Bulgaria were made much smaller than Russia had expected. But it was from Austria-Hungary rather than from England that the chief and most effective opposition to Russia's Balkan ambitions arose. Indeed, this opposition was one of the greatest sacrifices ever made by any state.

The Balkan policy of Austria-Hungary since the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina has been marked by the greatest moderation. Austria-Hungary has consistently avoided any attempt to make further acquisitions on the Balkan peninsala, and this strict adherence to law has given it the right to forbid the expansion of Russia. Without pronouncing any judgment as to whether this was the wisest policy to pursue, we must at least say that it compteteley refutes the later charges against the Monarchy.

The independence of the Balkan peoples so far as they were already emancipated, and the upholding of the *status quo* for the rest, are the correct lines of policy, which were followed by Vienna, a long time before they were proclaimed from every side as necessary. On these grounds Austria-Hungary even hesitated to turn the occupation of Bosnia and Herzogovina into an anexation. She did not wish to give Russia any excuse for further aggression. From this policy arose the position of Austria-Hungary with regard to the Balkan States.

Nothing shows the position of affairs more clearly than a comparison between the relation of Austria-Hungary to Servia on the one side and that of Russia to Bulgaria on the other. While Servia during the eighty years of friendly relations with the Dual Monarchy, found herself free to develop unhindered, Russia treated Bulgaria as a vassal state. Prince Alexander of Bulgaria was overthrown by Russian influence, because he attempted, without the consent of St. Petersburg, to form an alliance with Eastern Roumelia, which would have been quite in accordance with Russian ideas.

His successor also incurred the wrath of Russia when he took up an independent standpoint. It could not be expected that Austria-Hungary would be too scrupulous in making use of such dissensions between Russia and Bulgaria. Nothing, however, has prevented Bulgaria from repeatedly falling back into the arms of Russia. Nevertheless, whenever Bulgaria showed itself rebellious, it was held responsible by Petersburg.

The difference in the conception of Balkan policy in Vienna and Petersburg is also made plain through the attitude which the Roumanians under their clever King Carol maintained between the two rival Great Powers. After they had gathered sufficient experience of Russian brutalities in and during the Russo-Turkish war, they confidently inclined more and more toward Austria-Hungary. They knew well enough that no danger threatened from this side.

This Austro-Hungarian policy of moderation has certainly injured no one except perhaps the Monarchy itself. It must not be concluded from this that she will, without more ado, adopt contrary tactics. But it is certain that with Russia she has a different game to play. For her own moderation through which she thought to bring the policy of Russia to a deadlock, has robbed her of many chances, without entirely hindering the progress of Russia. She has not by any means remained inactive, and one may believe that without the Austro-Hungarian opposition, Russia would perhaps have already sat upon the shore of the Straits.

But if Austro-Hungarian opposition prevented Russia from following her chosen way, she yet possessed a means of forwarding her plans. Austria-Hungary had no such means, and therefore the game has always been played by the two nations along different lines.

Russia profited by the kindred nationality which bound her to the Balkan states, and created for her exceptionally favorable conditions. She posed as the champion of Pan-Slavism, and was able to forward her plans under a cloak of sympathy for the young national strivings of the Balkan peoples.

Yes, it was easy for her to use these aspirations as a weapon, not only against Turkey, but also against Austria-Hungary, on account of the mixed nationalities, many of them Slavic, within the Austrian boundaries. From these considerations arose a well-designed Russian revolutionary activity among the South Slavs. This policy was the more crafty, as Russia looked upon the Balkan states as her future prey.

Russia thought it would be possible, under the appearance of working to help these countries in their development, at the same time, and without herself lifting a finger, to compass the destruction of Turkey and to nullify the influence of Austria-Hungary. As a result of her moderation policy, Austria-Hungary was bound to pursue an opposite course, for the Pan-slavic policy of the Balkan states was for the most part pursued with out official sanction.

If Austria-Hungary wished to protect herself she would have been obliged to attack these states herself and thereby, at least to all appearance, to throw her former policy over board. We see, therefore, that the problems which are finding a violent solution in this war, are of long standing, and are the direct outcome of Russian policy in the Balkans.

The most powerful confederate of Russia in this policy was, in every way, Serbia. We already know that in the eighties this country lived on the friendliest terms with Austria-Hungary, and enjoyed its every help and protection. To upset these thoroughly natural relations between the two neighbours, which held only advantage for Serbia, and had not the smallest indication of interference with her freedom, was past of the system of Russian's policy. No forcible means were avoided, plots were inspired, party hatred was inflamed, and with bribery, threats and promises, a political radicalism was created that was ready to drown its own country in rivers of blood.

The violent revolutions which Serbia has experienced during the last ten years were directly or indirectly the work of Russia and its organs. Russia contrived that the first well-intentioned attempts of Serbia to create international relations with all Europe, had no result. In the decisive moment of Serbian history the Russian minister in Belgrade was one who was skilled to poison the newly-roused moral feeling among leading circles and to make use of the mecurial Serbian temperament, to rouse and cultivate revolutionary feeling.

Whether it was Persiany before the fall of King Milan, at the time of the King's murder, or Tscharykow, during the last crisis, whether the name be Hartwig or no, The activity of the ministers remained the same.

There was in Serbia an anarchist party, both before and after the actual royal murder. The blame for this lies at Russia's door. She not only favoured these disreputable conspiracies, and often secured them immunity from punishment, but also placed a veto upon all measures from without.

Bulgaria and Serbia were gradually and in the same degree regarded by Russian policy as points of support for the further extension of the power of Russia towards South and West. In both States, one after another, Russia sought with varying success to break in upon their internal relations, to regulate them according to her needs, and to exploit them according to her own idea.

The fall of Prince Alexander of Bulgaria, the persecution of Stambulow, who had attempted to be independent of Russia, the machinations resulting in the abdication of King Milan ot Servia, and the support given to every revolutionary element, not only the one which lost Milan his throne, but also that which had the murder of his son Alexander upon its conscience—these are all examples of these Russian doings.

The significant point about all the foregoing is that they had no official character.

Russian policy in the Balkans took care to make use on every side of such elements as had in the first place no connection with officialdon, and which consequently could easily be disclaimed. It was not necessary to create these instruments. It lay in the nature of the Balkan peoples and their young national development, that they should breed discontented and restless spirits whose deeds and dreams took rise, half from adventures, half from idealistic motives.

In all cases, however, they used violent means and their purpose was the overthrow of the established order of things. It sufficed when these elements were secretly supported ly a strong hand, when they had themselves achieved a certain power in the State in question, and when third powers were prevented from bettering the conditions in these states.

The threads which held this system together were so finely spun that it appeared almost impossible to completely unravel them.

The difficulties of laying bare this complicity between Russia and the revolutionaries, and shearing the threads, became still greater on account of the fact that it wat not always offical Russia who held the ends of the threads.

Far more frequently the continuation of this Russian policy was prosecuted through unofficial circles, circles that for the moment were in opposition to the Government, but proved in the long run to be again the mightiest party in the State. The fluctuations of Russian official policy left no trace on their activities.

The most important representatives of this Circle were found among the highest officers, and their relatives even in the Imperial House. Their first principle was and is the Pan-Slavic Idea. They stood thereby in opposition not only to Austria-Hungary, who barred Russia's way to Constantinople, but also to Germany, and that to be sure in a time in which German statesmen still considered it possible, in spite of the alliance with Austria-Hungary, also to effect a close relationship with Russia.

It was Pan-Slavic circles which at the beginning of the nineties succeeded in concluding an alliance with France, the whole purpose of which was directed against Germany.

This circle, the so-called "war-party", with its ambitions, is founded upon an outspoken contrast to the Czar's own policy. This too, examined at the roots, allows the traces of a certain continuity to be seen. The Russian Czardom of the Nineteenth Century was through its German ancestry and relationships, as well as through the same Conservative conception of State, closely united to the neighbouring kingdoms of Germany (Prussia) and Austria-Hungary, while on the other hand it was on unfriendly terms with the Western Powers. The former Alliance of the Three Emperors was the actual expression of this policy.

Between these two directions a steady and unbroken warfare continued for decades, and when one or the other prevailed there were corresponding fluctuations in Russia's position. While, however, the unofficial war-party held firmly to their purpose, one could not say as much for the policy of the Tsardom.

We have here to reckon with what Richard Graf von Pfeil remarked as early as 1889 regarding Alexander III:

"The whole impression which Emperor Alexander III made upon me was one which I had long suspected to be true, namely that the people about him purposely upheld him in a deep suspicion of Germany. This suspicion had so worked upon him as to produce a scarcely believable change. He believed firmly in his love of peace. But he also believed in all his counsellors, and the influential personalities of Russia, many of whom were not nearly so fond of peace as he."

These words are not only applicable to Alexander III., but also to the relations with Germany. They are a sign of the growing power of those unofficial circles to the disadvantage of that of the Czar, and of a development which dates from the time of the strong-willed Nicholas I., the opponent of France and England in the Crimean war, down to the impotent Nicholas II., that faint-hearted tool in the hand of the surrounding cliques, and his Anglo-French allies. Against this ever increasing power, which either disavowed the official Russian policy and denied all its claims to authenticity, or else succumbed to official circles and infected them with a policy which was bound to ruin the existence of other states—against a power such as this, diplomatic means could never hope to attain a lasting success.

On this account the attempts of Petersburg and Berlin and again of Petersburg and

Vienna, to draw nearer to one another are, from a historical standpoint, not to be taken too seriously, since they lacked all effectual result. In this way it was possible for it to happen, that the Balkan Agreement of Mürzsteg was made between Russia and Austria-Hungary, that Aehrenthal and Iswolski came to an understanding in Buchlau over the annexation of Bosnia, and that immediately after this the attitude of Russia produced the Annexation Crisis.

And later, the understanding between the rulers of Russia and Germany at Potsdam was equally unable to exert any influence over the Russian policies during the Balkan Crisis, much less to prevent the present war.

The policy of this Russian secondary-government, which considered neither official agreements nor the duties of an alleged civilized state especially towards the Balkan revolutionaries, has made an understanding between Russia and Austria-Hungary impossible.

Not even the final goal of the original Balkan policy of Russia would have served as a consequential obstacle for an agreement. The former standpoint of Anstria-Hungary according to which Russia was at all costs to be prevented from advancing along the road towards Constantinople, was by no means always firmly adhered to. On the contrary there was a time when Vienna was prepared to make various partial yet important concessions and to bespeak the opening of the Dardanelles, at least for ships of war. But this concession, which was to be the return made for the permission to annex Bosnia and Herzogovina, came too late.

For not only had the power of the Pan-Slavic party in Russia become all too great, but it had also strengthened itself by means of foreign alliances. The seed it had sown in the Balkans had borne such abundant fruit that the All-Russia element felt that its time for action had arrived. Therefore, it began, and this for the first time, to play up the Slavic ideas among the Balkan people in opposition to the Austrian power. This attempt resulted in the so-called Annexation Crisis.

The annexation of Bosnia by Austria-Hungary disturbed the plans of the Pan-slavists, which were devoted to creating a great Servian empire. But this as well as a Greater Bulgaria belonged—as mere halting-places—to the expansion for which the Russian Pan-Slavists were striving. The Turkish provinces of Macedonia, Albania, and the two nominally Turkish territories of Bosnia and Herzegovina were regarded as the districts most immediate for the purposes of expansion. Only after the Slavic states of the Balkans had been converted into respectable powers would it be possible to think of a conquest of the south-Slavic lands of Austria and Hungary. This of course might result from the shattering of Turkey.

Coincident with the "encircling policy" of Edward the Seventh against Germany, plans had been made for a similar policy for the encircling of Austria-Hungary. The keystone of this policy was to consist in the separation of Italy from the Triple Alliance and its union with the enemies of the Central Powers. In view of the attitude of the non-official Italian circles of that time towards Austria-Hungary, this hope appeared to be within the limits of realization. Thus the circle around the two Central Powers, a circle consisting of France, England, Russia, the united Balkans and Italy, would have been closed.

This makes it plain that all the preparations had already been made even at that time, for the war which has now broken loose. It is equally clear that the Balkan Union of 1912 and the war against Turkey were nothing more than the carrying-out of one step of the great program, which originated in the head of Edward the Seventh and the Russian Pan-Slavists and the execution of which had been begun long before.

It cannot be too often repeated that the revolutionizing of the Balkans formed the first point in this programme. While in Macedonia, Bulgarian, Serbian and Grecian societies (the Komitatsches) worked towards the realization of this end, Bosnia and the South Slavic countries of the Monarchy were kept back by the effectiveness of the Servian organizations (Slovensky Jug, Marodna Ockrana). The next task was to create in the Turkish provinces a similar condition to that which prevailed in Bosnia in 1876. The old methods should be made over anew.

The Porte was stormed with proposals for reforms, the realization of which was in no wise expected. A seizure from without was on this account necessary, and this the Balkan states themselves could contrive in favour of their enslaved brothers. The programme of the Balkan war was also ready prepared.

This reckoning was palpably destroyed through the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary. For so long as these countries of the Monarchy were only provisionally occupied, their conquest was much more possible than from the moment when they became, in all due form, integral parts of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

On the other hand the annexation did not make any change in the actual acquisition, but constituted a political advantage for Austria-Hungary, as security for what had previously been won, and therefore a step forward upon that territory from which it was desired to oust Austria-Hungary, and from which one was accustomed to see her draw back. As a result of the justifiable acquisition of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Monarchy safeguarded the provinces on the frontiers of these two lands, that is, Croatia and Slavonia as well as Dalmatia.

The last finally ceased to be a mere strip of coast without a hinterland, and all the three Slav provinces already named lost, wholly or in part, the possibility of becoming neighbours of Servia. The old Austro-Hungarian provinces were thus given a bulwark against the political assault of the Balkan Slavs. On the other hand, Austria-Hungary through its sovereignty over Bosnia and Herzegovina, became a Balkan state, and so acquired a new political title of legality to possess influence over events in the geographically shut-off district of the Balkan Peninsula.

The annexation also endangered the encircling plot against Austria-Hungary. On the other hand, however, there were conditions which rendered resistance as necessary as it was hopeful. It appeared necessary, on account of the fact that the simultaneous Declaration of Independence by the new kingdom of Bulgaria, was regarded, of course, without the rightest justification, as a matter arranged between Austria and Bulgaria, and designed to completely overthrow the Russian Balkan plan.

Only the least defeat of Austria-Hungary was necessary to bring Bulgaria to its senses —that is, once more in subjection to Russian influence. The resistance to the annexation appeared also hopeful, because it was hoped to win one or perhaps two allies to the ring against Austria-Hungary. The first was Turkey, the second, possibly, Italy.

So far as Italy was concerned, the preliminary conditions appeared favourable. On the one side there was a coldness between Italy and Austria-Hungary, on the other hand an approach towards friendliness between Italy and Russia. The strain between the two members of the Triple Alliance did not, however, rest only upon the well-known differences in domestic politics and upon the Irredentist aspirations in Italy, but could constantly draw new support from the annexation question itself.

Shortly before in the apparent side-issue of the Austria-Hungarian project of a railway through the Sandjak, Italy had already shown that she followed every movement of Austro-Hungarian policy in the Balkans with a suspicious eye. If—and how far any definite agreement exists between Austria-Hungary and Italy with regard to Balkan politics, we do not know, apart from the understanding over Albania, which was concluded in Monza in 1897 and renewed in 1900. One may surmise, however, that Italy did not intend to tolerate any further extensions of Austria-Hungary in the direction of Macedonia and finally to Salonica. When Austria-Hungary took such a big political step as the annexation of Bosnia and Herzogovina, the point at issue was what interpretation would be placed upon this in Italy?

Many Italians, to be sure, have never ceased to regard every Austrian-Hungarian move towards the South as a threat levelled against Albania or Salonica. The harsh action of the year 1914, is, represented to the English ambassador in Rome, by an Italian, as something that had an intimate connection with an advance towards Salonica.

The annexation also aroused more or less suspicion in Rome—due, no doubt, partly to Russian influences. The opinion of some politicians that Baron Aehrenthal had refrained from taking steps with regard to the Sandjak, merely for the purpose of quieting the fears of Italy, does not seem unlikely. In any event Russia, at the beginning of the Annexation Crisis, had every reason to hope that Italy might become its ally.

This was still more true with regard to Turkey or rather to the young Turk government which had just come into power, and whose self-esteem had been deeply offended by this step on the part of Austria Hungary. It was therefore only necessary for Russia to allow free play to the Chauvinism which had been whipped up in Servia and Montegro in order to see an imposing coalition arise against Austria-Hungary.

The Russian Foreign Minister Iswolski had, it is true, shortly before concurred in the matter of the annexation, for which Baron Aehrenthal is said to have given his promise to support the question of the opening of the Dardanelles. The opinion prevails that Iswolski refused to abide by his agreement merely because Aehrenthal had out-witted him with regard to the date of the Annexation. It is possible that Iswolski may have thought of a simultaneous solution of the two questions, that of the Dardanelles and that of annexation. But whether or not some such motive came into play is of purely secondary significance; for as we have seen, the question of annexation was not merely confined to this formal act, but dealt with the carrying-out, step by step, of a great plan of encirclement directed against Germany and Austria-Hungary—a plan behind which stood not only Russia, but also Edward the Seventh of England.

Two facts prove conclusively that the opposition shown against the annexation was all according to program and was not the mere result of side issues. One fact is the visit paid by Edward of England to Emperor Franz Josef at Ischl, two months before the proclamation of the Annexation—the other is the violent resistance offered by England—in a far greater degree than Russia—to the completed annexation. Between the visit of King Edward in Ischl, on the 2nd of August and the Annexation, on the 5th of Oct. the meeting of Iswolski and Aehrenthal, already mentioned, took place—at Buchlau on the 15th and 20th of September.

We fancied that the visit of King Edward might under certain circumstances have produced a friendly attitude on England's part in the question of the annexation,—had Edward been able to attain that which he desired. But inasmuch as he did not succed in his object—the separation of Austria-Hungary from Germany—with Emperor Franz Josef, the objection of England to the annexation of the 2nd of August was easily to be explained, even in the event of its not having had knowledge of the impending facts. For England wished either to obtain the help of Austria-Hungary for its policy of isolating Germany or it would be forced to include Austria-Hungary in the process. For this reason, as already remarked, it could not tolerate any advance of Austria-Hungary upon the Balkan peninsula.

The assent of Iswolski to the annexation was given six weeks after the 2nd August, a date which was so important for the decision of England. This consent was therefore to be interpreted as serious only then, when Russia in the matter of the Annexation, was resolved not to balk at taking up an opposing attitude towards England. But since the question of the Annexation had for England an importance only in so far as it related to the question of the isolation policy, Russia in order to place itself on the side of Austria-Hungary in the matter of the Annexation, would be forced to repudiate the encircling policy. This dissolved the Entente. This would have been possible only if Russia had assured itself an alliance with Austria-Hungary and Germany. The maintenance of Iswolski's consent to the Annexation would therefore have led to a displacement of the entire balance of power throughout Europe.

It was conceivable that the consent given by Aehrenthal in Buchlau as to the opening of the Dardanelles, would have furnished the basis for some such re-grouping of the powers The Austrian-Russian agreement would then in the West have consisted in the recognition by Russia of Austria-Hungary's predominance in the western half of the Balkans—for which the acknowledgment of the Annexation was to some extent the symbol—while on its part, Austria-Hungary was to make certain concessions to Russia in the eastern half of the Balkans—the first of which was to be concurrence in the idea of opening up the Dardanelles.

This agreement would have had one point directed towards England, the other towards the Russian Pan-Slavists. For England at that time opposed the opening of the Dardanelles with all its power.
But the Pan-Slavists, who had, no doubt, been nursiug the hopes of the Servians in the matter of Bosnia and Herzogowina, would have seen in an agreement of this sort, an abandoning of Servia to its fate, and in a wider sense a surrender of the entire Greater Servian Plans, which were primarily directed against Austria-Hungary.

If Iswolski did not keep his promise to Aehrenthal, only two explanations are possible—he either gave way to the double pressure exerted upon him from London and from his own land, or he was not sincere in his acquiescence. In the event of the latter, it is certainly comprehensible that he must have found the sudden carrying-out of the Annexation most painful. For by this be lost his hope of rendering his acquiescence illusory by means of a long-drawn out delay. At the very least he was anxious to secure the cooperation of Austria-Hungary for the opening of the Dardanelles, but without making any return. There is no doubt that had Russia remained faithful to its word, Austria-Hungary would have acted up to its agreement.

One might well doubt the sincerity of Russia, and Austria-Hungary was in danger of furthering the interests of its dangerous rival, without obtaining the least security for its modest demands. The fact remains that Russia, at the decisive moment, proved its absolute unreliability, and even though it could not hinder the annexation, it nevertheless supported the isolation schemes of Edward the Seventh,—and indeed, took its own initiative in the matter.

To this isolation policy Russia, indeed, even went so far as temporarily to sacrifice one of its favorite ideas—that is, the annihilation of Turkey. We have already remarked that Russia at the beginning of the Annexation Crisis, had counted upon an alliance with Turkey. It did not wish to let the bitterness of the Young Turks against Austria-Hungary, remain unutilized. But this was still further determined by the fact that after the tentative approach Russia made to Austria-Hungary, it returned all the more energetically to England and sought a way by which, at least for the time being, it might come to an understanding with England in regard to the Balkan policy.

But England regarded the attitude of Turkey as favorable to its interests, and Russia for a time adapted itself to this condition of things. We see the idea of the Balkan League raise its head for the first time during the Annexation Crisis. But now this plan was to be altered, and Turkey, because of its antagonism to Austria-Hungary, was to be made a member of the Alliance. England as well as Russia began to work upon the execuation of this plan.

England goes to work with her "non-official" agents, the Buxton brothers, Russia uses her Ambassador in Constantinople, Tscharykow, to carry out her plans. And yet the plan failed. Turkey may have well hesitated ere delivering herself into the hands of her worst enemies—, on the other hand the German influence in Constantinople, represented by Ambassador Freiherr von Marschall, may have been sufficiently strong to keep the Porte from taking any such step . . . . .

All subsequent plottings against Austria-Hungary were now also directed against Germany. From this point we may trace that development of the English-Russian agreement which involved the ignoring of vital interests of the one party to the advantage of the other. Through its alliance with Russia, England would sooner or later be forced to modify its policy in the Orient—but England sacrificed for Russia's sake its still fairly friendly and secure relationship to Germany.

The interests that drew England and Russia together were purely of a negative nature, moreover they were interests which had absolutely nothing in common—the antagonism to Germany on one hand and the rate of Austria-Hungary on the other. A fraternity doomed from the very beginning to be of short duration. It was bound to collapse as soon as one or the other side gave up its antagonistic attitude. Both sides were conscious of this and therefore all efforts were made to attain the goal of the alliance—namely war . . . .

Both parties to the compact now began to prepare energetically for war. Russia, especially had been inadequately equipped. England prepared itself by sea—Russia by land. The plots and intrigues proceed. "Who is not for us is against us"—that is the Russian-English motto. Turkey proves abdurate—she must be destroyed. She refuses to enter the Balkan League—so the Balkan League must annihilate her. But ere the League is formed, a new enemy against Turkey is discovered, namely Italy.

This country now saw a chance for fulfilling a long-cherished wish—and seizing Tripoli . . . It was hoped that a certain community of interests might thus be established between Italy and the Balkan States, and therefore between Italy and the Triple Entente. Austria might, in the event of a Balkan war, be forced to intercede—which would still further arouse the antagonism of Italy. This would set that ball of contention Albania, rolling between the two countries. Italy might be induced to take part in the isolation policy and to throw its weight upon the side of the Entente in the event of a world war.

Such considerations it must have been that induced the Triple Entente to uphold its assent to the Italian attack upon Turkey for ten years, while at the same time it altered its attitude towards the annexation of Bosnia. This attitude is the more remarkable when we consider that Bosnia is a land which does not at all affect the interests of the Western powers, whereas Tripoli by reason of its situation on the Mediterranean was of the greatest importance to them. But Tripoli, obviously, was to be some recompense to the Italians for Tunis, whose occupation by the French had driven Italy into the Triple Alliance.

In order to complete the encircling of the Central Powers, it was necessary to win Roumania for the Triple Entente. The methods adopted differed little from those used in the case of Servia. The Roumanian tribes living in Austria-Hungary were pointed out as victims whose "liberation" was to form the noble goal of the Roumanian people. But a great disappointment ensued when these Roumanians in Austria-Hungary proclaimed their absolute fidelity to the Empire at the outbreak of war in 1914. But the money and the intriguants of the Entente continued their work.

Greece was also to be enlisted—by means of a Greek—Bulgarian alliance, as contra-distinguished from the Serbian-Bulgarian. This was to be directed exclusively against Turkey,—Greece to be a mere auxiliary—to be discarded after the booty had been secured by its help. Serbia and Bulgaria had need of Greece, not feeling themselves sufficiently strong in the face of Turkey. The real core of the matter was a purely Slav alliance and its program consisted first of all in destroying Turkey, then attacking Roumania and Greece, and finally seizing the South Slav provinces of Austria-Hungary. That this league was known in St. Petersburg from its very beginnings, is something of which no man is to-day ignorant, and I need therefore not emphasize this fact—which was conveyed to me by word of mouth by Balkan diplomats.

The threatening danger was recognized in time by the Austrian-Hungarian Foreign Minister Count von Berchtold—who sought to attack it at its very roots. Among the measures he undertook was one proposing certain reforms in Mecedonia in which all the powers were to participate—a project which came to naught. No pressure was put upon the Balkan States and after the vacillation of Russia, it was left to the tiniest monarch in Europe, th king of Montenegro, to declare was against Turkey and to light up the Balkans with the flame of war.

The first move in the Balkan program succeeded—chiefly through the excellence of the Bulgarian army and the disorganization of the Turks. Would the other two steps meet with equal success? But, thanks to the attitude of Austria-Hungary and Germany, the plan was frustrated . . . . .

Despite the peaceful attitude of the Triple Alliance during the Balkan wars, the European conflict might have broken loose, had not a sudden change in England's attitude to Russia ensued. So Austria-Hungary's demands received consideration despite the hostility of Russia. This alteration in English policy is partly to be traced to the change in the government—which had hitherto maintained an aggressive attitude towards Germany under the influence of Edward the Seventh. England supported the Triple Alliance chiefly because the war party in England and other countries harped constantly upon the alleged dangers of an aggressive Germany. This delusion was fostered by the Moroccan crisis. An independent Albania was an assurance both to Austria-Hungary and Italy that they need not fear the advent of Servia upon the Adriatic—this country being a mere advance post of Russia—which would have ended the common ownership of Austria and Italy in the Adriatic.

Russia was aware that the refusing to grant Servia an exit to the Adriatic would result in a split among the Balkan States—which came to pass almost instantly, as recent history shows—in the quarrels over Macedonia and Salonica.

Dr. Redlich now lays bare in the most fascinating, detailed and authoritative manner all the tangled skein of diplomatic intrigue plots, calculations, conspiracies, discussions, visits of Grey and King Gerge to Paris in May, 1914, Marine agreements and the other machinery of the great intrigue and desperate speculation that led to the outbreak of the war. The motives, causes and effects, the judgments and gropings of politicians in the complicated waste of tangled interests English, Russian, Servian, Italian, Austrian-Hungarian now in the light, now in the dark.

If one should enquire why the Balkan States had so far been spared by Russia and why they would become its victims after a successful war—there can be but one answer: The Balkan States will survive so long as Austria-Hungary exists and they will vanish as soon as Austria-Hungary is destroyed.

For though if hoped to call half the world in arms against Austria-Hungary, yet it did not appear to feel itself safe against the military power of the two allied empires, The increase in the German army and similar reforms in the Austrian-Hungarian may have furthered this idea. The army reforms of the Central Powers were the answer to the fact that Russia had already mobilized the Balkan States for war against Austria.

Russia strove with all its power to increase its armaments, and threw all its weight into the scale to bring about the three-year's service in France. It was endeavoring to hasten the war, feeling no longer so sure of its allies as before, especially England. Ger-attitude during the Balkan war convinced even the English that Germany cherished no aggressive intentions. An understanding between England and Germany was not impossible.

But the bungling amateur diplomacy nf a Churchill sought to relieve the strain by suggesting a plan of disarmament which would have been almost entirely to the disadvantage of Germany. Churchill strove to remove the cause by doing away with the effect—instead of proceeding in the opposite manner. The first move would have been to remove the German-English spirit of rivalry and the suspicion that arose from it. . . . . Russia's chief advantage therefore lay in perpetuating and furthering the ill-will, the envy the suspicion on the part of England and the feeling for revenge on the part of France . . . . This whole complex of discussions and bargainings and negotiations was put into action by Russia's Ambassador at Paris, Iswolski.

The frighful tension was growing every day more acute. They came the pistol shot at Sarajevo. The assassins were Austrian subjects, the weapons were Servian, the thought behind the blow was Serbian, too—but behind all these stood Russia. This murder was the final test of a great nation's patience, vitality and endurance. It was the culmination of 10 years of Russian plottings. In that long, long chain of crimes that reached in underground ways from St. Petersburg and Moscow—and sought to fetter the Tschechs, the Poles, the Ruthenians, Roumanians, Servians and Italians, in order to set them all on fire at the appropriate moment, the murder of Sarajewo formed the final link. And now there was nothing left for the Monarchy to do but to prove that it was still strong enough to tear this chain asunder.