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WEEKLY
INFORMATION BULLETIN



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- ESSLINGEN
- GÖPPINGEN
- HEIDENHEIM
- NÜRTINGEN
- ULM



Photo by Bowlds PRO

BERLIN MEETING—On his return trip from Moscow to Washington, Secretary of State George Marshall stopped in Berlin, giving General Lucius D. Clay the latest information on results of the Council of Foreign Ministers meeting. General Marshall's complete public report on the Moscow Conference appears in this issue.

OUR CONTRIBUTORS

Teacher Training, written by John Frederic Kraus of the Education and Religious Affairs Branch, IA&C, traces the change from emergency measures after the close of the war to the more permanent educational methods in force today which are designed to raise the standards of the German teaching profession.

Material for **Public Utilities**, submitted by the Public Utilities Section, Economics Division, gives an up-to-date picture of German electric power and manufactured gas production.

Youth Hostels was prepared by Dr. L. E. Norrie of the Education and Religious Affairs Branch, IA&C, to describe the revival of the hosteling movement in Germany.


George Mayer is the Executive Secretary of the **OMGUS Employee Suggestion-Awards Program** and creator of QMGUS' "Gus," the cartoon character who has advertised the Program throughout the American Sector. Animated signatures have been Mr. Mayer's hobby for over 20 years.

MILITARY GOVERNMENT

WEEKLY INFORMATION BULLETIN

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TEACHER TRAINING

By John Frederic Kraus

Signal Corps Photo

Supplying US Zone schools with qualified and properly-trained teachers has been one of the thorniest problems confronting officials in the Education and Religious Affairs Branch, OMGUS.

It is openly acknowledged that the quality of teaching in German schools today is far below former standards—a condition resulting from the cataclysmic changes brought about by the end of the war. A large percentage of the younger and abler teachers have been eliminated by denazification procedures; practically all heads and supervisors of schools have been ousted; books, paper, maps, and other

materials of instruction are in extremely short supply; classes frequently are maintained only on part-time schedules; each teacher has an excessive pupil load; the accelerated professional training of emergency teachers is inadequate; and the superannuation among teachers in general reduces efficiency (the average age of male teachers ranges from 55 to 60 years).

Back in the days of the imperial Hohenzollerns, the educational system put great stress on German nationalism and imperialism, but it is true that in the days of the Republic a sincere attempt was made to give the edu-

cational system a more democratic character. This aim, however, was never fully realized, since the teachers continued to pay tribute to the deeply-rooted chauvinistic thinking that influenced their whole behavior in the classroom.

Under the Nazi regime the entire educational program was devoted to ensuring the instruction of German youth in the spirit of National Socialism, thereby moulding them solidly to the selfish wishes of an authoritarian state from the beginning years of their lives. Heavy pressure was applied in drawing teachers and school administrators into the ranks of the Nazi

party. In the country areas, where there were fewer teachers per community than in the cities, it was practically mandatory to join the party; otherwise an instructor might be replaced by a party member. The Nazis recognized the importance of a teacher's position in a small town, and they took few chances with those who were not political followers.

In the early days of the reopening of schools in the US Zone, it was impossible to make any particular selection of teaching personnel, since the denazification process stripped the schools of approximately 60 percent of their teachers. The percentage fluctuated from as low as 30 percent in the urban areas to as high as 80 percent in the rural districts. Consequently, in order to meet the sudden overwhelming teacher shortage, anyone who was interested—teacher or layman—and who could meet the anti-Nazi requirements was appointed as an assistant or emergency teacher. Many of these persons, although quite well educated, were without professional preparation for or acquaintance with school work. Short training courses, ranging from a few weeks to three months in duration, were established to run simultaneously with actual teaching or were prerequisite to appointment. Such procedures were followed throughout the zone.

They were emergency measures. To carry out a positive, long-range policy for continual educational improvement, 39 training colleges for new teachers have been established in US-occupied territory. Bavaria has 21, Hesse eight, Wuerttemberg-Baden nine, and Bremen one. Regular courses ranging from one to three years have been established at these institutes—all for the training of elementary school teachers—and close to 3,000 students will have graduated by the end of 1947.

Approximately one-third of these colleges are actually on a university level at the present time and all candidates for admission must have had secondary school education before they can be accepted. The others, primarily in traditional-minded Bavaria, accept pupils only from the elementary schools and serve the purpose of combined secondary edu-

cation-teacher training schools. Steps, however, are being taken to dispense eventually with the latter training, which is considered inadequate both for the general and professional education of teachers.

Practices in training vary. Sometimes the scheme requires that a teacher receive first a period of practice as teacher assistant before assuming his role of student of professional theory at one of the institutes. Or the reverse may be true: first the theory, then the practice. During the preliminary period of practice teaching the candidate works with one of the more competent teachers of his specific district. Each week he visits the training center for lectures and discussions. After a year of such experience he attends a teachers college for full-time study, and his place in the field is taken by a new candidate or by a new teachers-college graduate.

The democratizing of Germany through education will have to be accomplished largely by the younger generation, since most teachers over the age of 55 have neither the strength nor the point of view to bring about the desired reform.


The curricula of teacher training institutes are being carefully supervised by Military Government, since they play a basic role in giving the teacher-to-be democratic methods of instruction and in promoting democratic ways of thinking that can be passed on to the young pupil who is of the generation that will determine Germany's behavior in future years. MG Regulations provide that "the content of the teacher-education curricula should be so designed as to insure the development of a professionally-capable generation of teachers with reference to their own personal development, their activity as citizens in a democratic society, and their professional skill. The forms and methods of teaching and learning are to be so designed as to promote democratic modes of behavior, initiative and resourcefulness, and attitudes of tolerance. The academic administration and student organization, as phases of the curriculum, should be so set up as to promote democratic attitudes among

administrative officials, faculty members, and students."

Unfortunately the schools are now dominated by very old teachers, averaging in age between 50 and 60, who already have had to make adjustment to four different educational points of view during their careers: the Hohenzollern doctrine; the quasi-democratic theories of the Republic; the destructive Nazi ideology; and now a democracy which they are incapable of embracing in their advanced years.

It is not American policy to operate or dictate to the German schools or to make detailed demands on their organization. The Germans themselves, however, have urged that MG assume a more active and constructive role in the work of reorganization. Without indicating how assistance can or should be given and remain within the pertinent MG directives, competent German educators who are closely acquainted with the situation have suggested that the following measures, if taken by Americans, would be of great importance in improving the conditions now prevailing: provision for revetting all teachers in order to recover as many able teachers as possible; admission of young candidates to the training colleges, the training period to determine whether the candidate is politically acceptable; availability of American and English professional books, magazines, and materials that will provide the basis for an understanding of English and American democracy at work—perhaps a central American professional library; lectures and discussions under visiting American professors; curriculum conferences upon the reorganization of school programs and school life; education of a large number of young Germans in democratic countries, at a very early date; permission for the organization of teachers' professional societies and publication of educational periodicals; and professional libraries at training centers. To date, all of these suggestions either have already been realized or—in regard to the education of Germans in democratic countries, for example—are to be implemented as soon as possible.





cent of the combined Anglo-American bomb load was dropped on electric utilities, this decrease in power results largely from lack of coal and disruption of the prewar power network. In 1941 there were public utilities and industrial plants generating a total of 69,999 million kilowatt hours, while in 1946 this figure dropped to 28,994 million KWH. Even though industry was operating at less than 50 percent of the authorized level, this generation proved wholly inadequate, particularly during the winter months. Severe restrictions on the use of electric power were necessary both for domestic and industrial uses.

The Allied Control Authority has set a level of 9 million KW generating capacity for 1949, but this figure is not expected to permit industry to resume production at authorized levels. A recent study of requirements indicate 48 million KWH, or 13.5 million KW will be necessary in 1949. If the present level of industry is revised upward, there will have to be a corresponding revision in the electric power requirements.

Gas, an allied product, generally consists in Germany of manufactured gas, the greater part of it being coal gas with water gas added to bring the calorific value down to the standards maintained. Normal heating value of the gas is 4,250 heat units per cubic meter. Coal gas is produced in the conventional-type ovens, chambers, or retorts. Water gas is produced in conjunction with coal gas, and this production is sometimes independent of the coal gas plant, but in many instances is produced while the coke is still in the batteries, ovens, or retorts. As is true in every country the largest plants are located where the concentration of population exists; so that in general there will be a small number of large plants and a large number of small plants. As an example, two-thirds of the US Zone gas production is in less than 10 percent of the number of plants.

In addition to the gas works production, coke-oven gas also is available which is collected from coke plants at various mines and steel mills, and transported through high

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Germany's electric power system before the war was designed according to a nation-wide efficiency plan which is useful even in its disrupted condition today. Two 200,000 volt lines serve as the backbone of the German power network. One 220,000 volt line runs north and south through the western part of Germany, connecting Western Austria (Vorarlberg) and the Upper Rhine hydro plants with steam plants located in the Ruhr and other points in north and western Germany. The other 220,000 volt line extends north and south through eastern Germany. The two lines are tied together by an East-West connection constructed in the north, which is entirely within the British and Russian Zones.

The fundamental purpose of the two North-South lines with the inter-connecting East-West line in the north was to utilize to the fullest extent the power generated in the hydro plants in the southern section of Germany and Western Austria along the Alpine rivers during the summer, or high-water season, and the power generated by steam plants burning brown coal in the Saxonian, Middle German, and Ruhr brown coal districts during the winter, or low-water season. This allows for the burning of the least possible amount of hard coal.

The East-West tie line in the north to balance the surplus cheap power available in either the east or the west, it was possible before Germany was divided into four zones with the consequent disruption of the system, to save thousands of tons of hard coal yearly which otherwise would have been burned in the hard-coal steam plants to meet the power requirements of Germany as a whole.


The Saxonia and Middle-German brown coal steam plants were partially destroyed during the war, and after the war a large part of the generating equipment was removed from these plants by the Soviets. Also removed was one of the circuits from the 220,000 volt line through the Soviet Zone north of Remptendorf, which eliminated the flow of power south to Bavaria and Austria during the winter when it is urgently required. This limits the amount of power which may be sent north from the surplus hydro generation available during the summer months. Due to these altered circumstances brought about by the war and to the high value placed on hard coal in connection with the import-export plan, the small amount of hydro power available in the south during the winter has increased in value to German economy and the summer surplus power has decreased in value.

Since the amount of energy from the southern hydro plants is large in the summer and small in the winter, the flow of energy in the summer was from the south to the north and in the winter from the north to the south. By this arrangement, and with

The decrease in power generation of plants in Germany shows in statistics the reduced efficiency resulting from the war. Since it is estimated that less than one-tenth of one per-

Berlin Gasworks. Most of Germany's gas is manufactured from coal with water gas added. About 60 percent of it goes for cooking, hot-water heating, and other domestic purposes.

Photo by Byers



Youth Hostels

importance of reviving hosteling in Germany. More than 3,000 beds have been furnished by the US Army. Extra food rations have been granted by German officials in Bavaria to members of leadership training courses.

Today, there are 55 lodges open in the American Zone of Germany for youth hosteling purposes. Most of them are old mills, ancient castles, and farm houses. A typical hostel—the Forest Lantern—is located at Salenburg in the Bavarian Forest. It is particularly popular among German young people, partly for its history as a knights' castle and partly for its superb location in the forest. Well-known even before 1933, it was returned again this year to youth groups and has been used chiefly for singing meets and gatherings of group leaders. Its many rooms and simple, comfortable furnishings are well suited for such meetings. Part of the time it still must be used to house refugees, but next year it is to be kept entirely for hikers and conferences. Leadership training institutes also are conducted at the Forest Lantern from time to time by the Land Youth Committee and youth agencies.

Another beautiful youth hostel is situated in Urfeld on an open hill with a view of the Walchensee and the Karwendel mountains. This is on the much-frequented route which leads to the heart of the Bavarian Alps, to Mittenwald, to Garmisch-Partenkirchen, and the final goal of the Zugspitze, known all over the world. The hostel is built in the style of the Bavarian mountain chalets. Ori-

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Even at present inflationary values, 70 million RM is quite a large sum of money. That was the reported size of the war-time bank deposits of the German youth hostels, revealing the importance the Nazi regime attached to traveling youth groups of Germany and the chain of overnight lodges operated for their use. Now, stripped of its strongly nationalist traits, the hostel movement returns to its purpose of earlier days—to provide youth with a wholesome outlet for its spirit of adventure.

Hosteling is not an old movement, although the wanderlust of youth may be old. Born in Altena castle in the Sauerland in 1910, the movement spread rapidly until by 1919 it boasted 300 hostels in Germany. In 1933 there were 2,125 stopover rest spots. Soon after Naziism spread over Germany the hosteling movement was welded into the pattern of the Hitler Jugend.

Like other institutionalized movements in Germany, hosteling was strongly affected by the war. Of the 1,130 hostels in the three western zones only 150 today are useable as hostels and about half of these are serving as hospitals, housing projects, and rest camps. The huge war-time bank account is gone, too—confiscat-

ed under the Allied Control Council Law Number 2.

There has been, however, a genuine effort to revive hosteling in Germany along democratic lines, and lodges are being reopened as fast as they can be repaired or released from other uses. Hosteling finds particularly faithful followers. A group of homeless youths have reconstructed a hostel near Wiesbaden and have reactivated the youth castle Breuberg near Weustadt. With the help of tents, cots, and transportation received from the US Army the Limburg youth hostel also was opened. Groups of young people cut wood for various communities to secure a share of the wood to heat their hostels. Song-books, games, utensils for cooking, and other essential materials have been collected by interested young folk who feel the

Boys and girls learn about nature at a fresh-air camp in Wilmersdorf, Berlin. Young people cut wood, do errands for various communities to get provisions for their hostels.

Signal Corps Photo



Moscow Conference

Secretary of State Marshall in a nationwide radio address outlined the problems faced by and the results of the recently concluded Council of Foreign Ministers Conference in Moscow. Full text follows:

Tonight I hope to make clearly understandable the fundamental nature of the issues discussed at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers.

This conference dealt with the very heart of the peace for which we are struggling. It dealt with the vital center of Europe—Germany and Austria—an area of large and skilled population, of great resources and industrial plants, an area which has twice in recent times brought the world to the brink of disaster. In the Moscow negotiations all the disagreements which were so evident during the conferences regarding the Italian and Balkan treaties came into sharp focus and remained in effect unsolved.

Problems which bear directly on the future of our civilization cannot be disposed of by general talk or vague formulae—by what Lincoln called “pernicious abstractions.” They require concrete solutions for definite and extremely complicated questions—questions which have to do with boundaries, with power to prevent

military aggression, with people who have bitter memories, with the production and control of things which are essential to the lives of millions of people. You have been kept well informed by the press and radio of the daily activities of the Council, and much of what I have to say may seem repetitious. But the extremely complicated nature of the three major issues we considered makes it appear desirable for me to report in some detail the problems as I saw them in my meetings at the conference table.

There was a reasonable possibility, we had hoped a probability, of completing in Moscow a peace treaty for Austria and a four-power pact to bind together our four governments to guarantee the demilitarization of Germany. As for the German peace treaty and related but more current German problems, we had hoped to reach agreement on a directive for the guidance of our Deputies in their work preparatory to the next conference.

In a statement such as this, it is not practicable to discuss the numerous issues which continued in disagreement at the Conference. It will suffice, I think, to call attention to the fundamental problems whose solution would probably lead to the quick adjustment of many other differences.

It is important to an understanding of the conference that the complex character of the problems should be understood, together with their immediate effect on the people of Europe in the coming months.

Coal

To cite a single example, more coal is most urgently needed throughout Europe for factories, for utilities, for railroads, and for the people in their homes. More coal for Allied countries cannot be mined and delivered until the damaged mines, mine machinery, railroad communications and like facilities are rehabilitated. This rehabilitation, however, depends on more steel, and more steel depends in turn on more coal for steel making. Therefore, and this is the point to be kept in mind, while the necessary rehabilitation is in progress, less coal would be available in the immediate future for the neighboring Allied states.

But less coal means less employment for labor, and a consequent delay in the production of goods for export to bring money for the purchase of food and necessities. Therefore, the delay necessary to permit rehabilitation of the mines so vitally affects France that the settlement of this matter has become for her a critical issue. All neighboring states and Great Britain and the Soviet Union are directly affected in various

ways since coal is required for German production of goods for export sufficient to enable her to buy the necessary imports of foods, et cetera, for much of which the United States is now providing the funds.

Moreover, in the background of this coal issue, which is directly related to steel production, is the important consideration of the build-up of heavy industry in Germany, which could later again become a threat to the peace of the world. I cite this single example to illustrate the complications which are involved in these negotiations.

Germany

The Allied Control Council in Berlin presented a detailed report of the many problems concerned with the political, military, economic, and financial situation under the present Military Government of Germany. In connection with these matters, the Ministers considered the form and scope of the provisional political organization for Germany, and the procedure to be followed in the preparation of the German peace treaty.

The German negotiations involved not only the security of Europe and the world, but the prosperity of all of Europe. While our mission was to consider the terms of a treaty to operate over a long term of years, we were faced with immediate issues which vitally concerned the impoverished and suffering people of Europe who are crying for help, for coal, for food and for most of the necessities of life, and the majority of whom are bitterly disposed towards the Germany that brought about this disastrous situation. The issues also vitally concern the people of Britain and the United States who cannot continue to pour out hundreds of millions of dollars for Germany because current measures were not being taken to terminate expeditiously the necessity for such appropriations.

The critical and fundamental German problems to which I shall confine myself are: (a) The limits to the powers of the central government; (b) the character of the economic system and its relations to all of Europe; (c) the character and extent of reparations; (d) the boundaries for

the German State; and (e) the manner in which all Allied States at war with Germany are represented in the drafting and confirmation of the treaty.

All the members of the Council of Foreign Ministers are in apparent agreement as to the establishment of a German State on a self-supporting, democratic basis, with limitations imposed to prevent the re-establishment of military power.

Central Government

This issue of the degree of centralization of the future German state is of greatest importance. Excessive concentration of power is peculiarly dangerous in a country like Germany which has no strong traditions regarding the rights of the individual and the rights of the community to control the exercise of governmental power. The Soviet Union appears to favor a strong central government. The United States and United Kingdom are opposed to such a government, because they think it could be too readily converted to the domination of a regime similar to the Nazis. They favor a central government of carefully limited powers, all other powers being reserved to the states, or *Laender* as they are called in Germany. The French are willing to agree only to very limited responsibilities for the central government. They fear a repetition of the seizure of power over the whole of Germany carried out by the Hitler regime in 1933.

Under ordinary circumstances there are always strong and differing points of view regarding the character of a governmental reorganization. In this case there are great and justifiable fears regarding the resurrection of German military power, and concern over expressed or concealed desires for quite other reasons.

Germany Economy

Regarding the character of the German economic system and its relation to all of Europe, the disagreements are even more serious and difficult of adjustment. German economy at the present time is crippled by the fact that there is no unity of action, and the rehabilitation of Germany to the point where she is self-supporting demands immediate decision.

There is a declared agreement in the desire for economic unity in Germany but when it comes to the actual terms to regulate such unity there are wide and critical differences. One of the most serious difficulties encountered in the effort to secure economic unity has been the fact that the Soviet-occupied Zone has operated practically without regard to the other zones and has made few if any reports of what has been occurring in that zone. There has been little or no disposition to proceed on a basis of reciprocity and there has been a refusal to disclose the availability of foodstuffs, and the degree or character of reparations taken out of this zone.

This unwillingness of the Soviet authorities to cooperate in establishing a balanced economy for Germany as agreed upon at Potsdam has been the most serious check on the development of a self-supporting Germany, and a Germany capable of providing coal and other necessities for the neighboring states who have always been dependent on Germany for these items. After long and futile efforts to secure a working accord in this matter, the British and American Zones were combined for the improvement of the economic situation, meaning the free movement of excess supplies or produce available in one zone to another where there is a shortage. Our continuing invitation to the French and Soviets to join in the arrangement still exists. This merger is bitterly attacked by the Soviet authorities as a breach of the Potsdam Agreement and as a first step towards the dismemberment of Germany, ignoring the plain fact that their refusal to carry out that agreement was the sole cause of the merger. It is difficult to regard their attacks as anything but propaganda designed to divert attention from the Soviet failure to implement the economic unity agreed at Potsdam. Certainly some progress toward economic unity in Germany is better than none.

The character of the control over the Ruhr industrial center, the greatest concentration of coal and heavy industries in Europe, continues a matter of debate. It cannot be decided mere-

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Germans not Changing

Erika Mann, author, lecturer, war correspondent, and daughter of Thomas Mann, Nobel Prize winning novelist, says that the reeducation of Germans has been a failure thus far. This unencouraging report, made to the *New York Herald Tribune*, is based on a first-hand study of Europe by Miss Mann and last-minute advices from her personal acquaintances in the occupied areas.

"It is now nearly two years after V-E Day," says Miss Mann, "but not the slightest hint of a new spirit is to be observed either in the adults or the children. So far as the older students are concerned, the re-orientation of their ideas appears a hopeless task.

"Teacher and parent seem to be encouraging the youngsters to think that under Hitler they had homes, clothes, prosperity and cakes, and that these can only be recovered with the restoration of a similar leader or regime. Despite every effort we make at friendliness, even the children hate our people, although they present a civil front . . .

"I am of the opinion that never should we have based all our educational propaganda on the assertion that 'We bring you democracy.' Instead, we should have followed up General Eisenhower's truthful and sensible announcement that 'We come as conquerors' with the equally and inescapable conclusion that 'We bring you defeat.'

"Supposing that no mistakes had been made. Supposing our occupation and education policies had been as wise, consistent, benevolent, firm, patient and farseeing as could be, should we have succeeded in turning Hitler's Germans into peace-loving democrats? I firmly maintain that we should have failed even then. The German state of mind is a state of mind which defies education.

"Unless and until the German people are made to understand that the road they have come ever since

Bismarck—is not since Frederick the Great—is blocked, and that the unyielding determination of a united world will keep it blocked for decades to come, they will stay on that road, bent on removing whatever obstacles may temporarily prevent them from forging ahead."

Farewell to Prussia

The dissolution of the State of Prussia is a blow to traditional militarism, according to the *Boston Globe* which discusses the Allied Control Council decree in a recent editorial:

"It was in Prussia that the Hohenzollerns emerged, toward the close of the Middle Ages, to a position of dominating power. There appeared the earliest lineaments of the doctrine of war with which Prussia became associated. Frederick the Great stamped the design unmistakably upon the map of Central Europe, not only by inaugurating the beginnings of the famous general staff tradition, but also by instituting the Prussian bureaucracy—that elaborate, meticulous, patient, and indefatigable civil service system which, as decades sped, provided the organizational instrument that welded politics and economics into unified support of the military arm.

"Prussia's history, since the days of the French Revolution, has been a chronicle covering the consistent development of the power thus foreshadowed. There were a few aberrations, but these were soon corrected. As the prowess of Prussia grew, and with it her economic strength, so did her confines. By the close of the Franco-Prussian war, Bismarck was ready to consolidate what had been an almost fantastic congeries of petty kingdoms and duchies into the German Empire, with the Hohenzollerns at its helm. The transformation left many elements of division. It was still too early, even for the organizing genius of the Prussians, to erase them all. But it was too late to halt the progress of

Germany toward the monolithic state which was the logical goal of Prussianism, with its tight combination of Junker militarists and chimney Junkers, under the all-powerful general staff. An Austrian fanatic carried the sinister drama to its climax—and disaster.

It is, of course, too early to guess what Germany will look like, as a nation, after the peace settlements . . . Dissolution of the State of Prussia, however, should help. By breaking up the most powerful and dangerous of the centers of Germany's war mania, and creating separate provinces from its parts, the Allies may strengthen the roles of German provinces less addicted to aggression.

Prussia, as a whole, symbolizes militarism at its savage worst. In the Ruhr and Rhineland problem, the other half of the danger is centered. The Prussian State throve not merely because of the obsession of its war-makers. It flourished because these worked in close combination with a diplomacy staffed from among the Junker families, and with an industry integrated to both through the chimney Junkers or industrialists. Thus the Ruhr typifies the other end of this combination. That is why it is so important to settle this issue wisely too".

The *Kansas City Times* is particularly concerned with what will now be done to reeducate the Prussian mind:

It would seem imperative . . . to destroy Prussian control over German policy in the future. But whether the mere dictated disappearance of a political unit which under the Weimar republic included more than half the total area of Germany would accomplish that objective is another matter. For Prussia, in the familiar phrase, is also a state of mind. Whatever the region is called, it will be inhabited by the same people, the product of the same conditioning in absolute obedience to authority, in the worship of war as an instrument of national

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ly for the purpose of reaching an agreement. Vitaly important considerations and future consequences are involved.

Reparations

The question of reparations is of critical importance as it affects almost every other question under discussion. This issue naturally makes a tremendous appeal to the people of the Allied States who suffered the terrors of German military occupation and the destruction of their cities and villages.

The results of the Versailles Treaty of 1919 regarding payment of reparations on a basis of dollars, and the difficulties encountered by the Reparations commission appointed after Yalta in agreeing upon the dollar evaluation of reparations in kind convinced President Truman and his advisers considering the question at Potsdam that some other basis for determining reparations should be adopted if endless friction and bitterness were to be avoided in future years. They succeeded in getting agreement to the principle of reparations to be rendered out of capital assets—that is, the transfer of German plants, machinery, et cetera, to the Allied Powers concerned.

It developed at the Moscow Conference that the Soviet officials flatly disagreed with President Truman's and Mr. Byrnes' understanding of the written terms of this agreement. The British have much the same view of this matter as the United States.

We believe that no reparations from current production were contemplated by the Potsdam Agreement. The Soviet strongly oppose this view. They hold that the previous discussions and agreements at Yalta authorize the taking of billions of dollars in reparations out of current production. This would mean that a substantial portion of the daily production of German factories would be levied on for reparation payments, which in turn would mean that the recovery of Germany sufficiently to be self-supporting would be long delayed. It would also mean that the plan and the hope of our government, that Germany's economic recovery by the end of three years would per-

mit the termination of American appropriations for the support of the German inhabitants of our zone, could not be realized.

Boundaries

The issue is one of great complications, for which agreement must be found in order to administer Germany as an economic whole as the Four Powers claim that they wish to do.

There is, however, general agreement among the Allies that the matter of the factories and equipment to be removed from Germany as reparations should be re-examined. They recognize the fact that a too drastic reduction in Germany's industrial set-up will not only make it difficult for Germany to become self-supporting but will retard the economic recovery of Europe. The United States has indicated that it would be willing to study the possibility of a limited amount of reparations from current production to compensate for plants, previously scheduled to be removed as reparations to various Allied Countries, which it now appears should be left in Germany; it being understood that deliveries from current production are not to increase the financial burden of the occupying powers or to retard the repayment to them of the advances they have made to keep the Germany economy from collapsing. The Soviet Government has made no response to this suggestion.

The issue regarding boundaries to be established for Germany presents a serious disagreement and another example of complete disagreement as to the meaning of the pronouncement on this subject by the heads of the Three Powers. In the rapid advance of the Soviet Armies in the final phase of the war, millions of Germans in eastern Germany fled to the west of the Oder River. The Soviet Armies, prior to Potsdam, had placed Poles in charge of this area largely evacuated by the German population. That was the situation that confronted President Truman at Potsdam. Under the existing circumstances, the President accepted the situation for the time being with the agreed Three-Power statement, "The Heads of government

reaffirm their opinion that the final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should await the peace settlement."

The Soviet Foreign Minister now states that a final agreement on the frontier between Germany and Poland was reached at Potsdam and the expression I have just quoted merely referred to the formal confirmation of the already agreed-upon frontier at the peace settlement, thus leaving only technical delimitation to be considered.

The United States Government recognized the commitment made at Yalta to give fair compensation to Poland in the west for the territory east of the Curzon Line incorporated into the Soviet Union. But the perpetuation of the present temporary line between Germany and Poland would deprive Germany of territory which before the war provided more than a fifth of the foodstuffs on which the German population depended. It is clear that in any event Germany will be obliged to support, within much restricted boundaries, not only her prewar population but a considerable number of Germans from eastern Europe. To a certain extent this situation is unavoidable, but we must not agree to its aggravation. We do not want Poland to be left with less resources than she had before the war. She is entitled to MORE, but it will not help Poland to give her frontiers which will probably create difficulties for her in the future. Wherever the frontiers are drawn, they should not constitute barriers to trade and commerce upon which the well-being of Europe is dependent. We must look toward a future where a democratic Poland and a democratic Germany will be good neighbors.

Peace Treaty Procedure

There is disagreement regarding the manner in which the Allied Powers at war with Germany are to participate in the drafting and confirmation of the German Peace Treaty. There are 51 States involved. Of these, in addition to the four principal Allied Powers, 18 were directly engaged in the fighting, some of course to a much greater extent than others. It is the position

(Continued on page 12)

OMGUS EMPLOYEE SUGGESTION-AWARDS PROGRAM

The OMGUS Employee Suggestion-Awards Program, a zone-wide project through which US and Allied military and civilian personnel in Germany are given the opportunity to voice their suggestions for improving some phase of the occupation, is playing an important part in facilitating MG's mission in Germany. Since the inauguration of the program on 31 May 1946, more than 1,000 suggestions have been submitted, of which 63 already have been adopted and at least 200 more are currently under consideration. As an incentive to the harnessing of American ingenuity, cash prizes ranging from five to 250 dollars are awarded for meritorious suggestions.


Recent EUCOM decisions and an OMGUS directive of 25 April 1947 make the OMGUS Central Board of Judges the final authority on all suggestions originating with eligible MG personnel in the US Zone of Germany, with procedures streamlined to speed the interval between the date on which a suggestion is proposed and the date on which the originator of a winning plan actually has the cash prize in his pocket.

The Board meets weekly, often evaluating as many as 30 or 40 suggestions which have undergone thorough investigation previously by suggestion staff analysts and operating officials. In the past three meetings 16 prizes of from five to 250 dollars were awarded.

Suggestions have varied from training programs to re-orient German thinking along democratic lines, to a standard shoulder patch for American officer and enlisted personnel in the occupation army. These hundreds of suggestions have been directed toward saving time, lives, and money, and improving morale, while at the same time expediting the task of Military Government in restoring Germany to an economic and democratic level in line with the expressed aims of the Allies.

One American believed that neither the spoken nor the written word was enough to convince the more skeptical Germans of the job the US Government is doing to augment the meager rations produced within the zone. He suggested that motion pictures be made of the ships being loaded in America and unloaded in Germany, and the movement of the food to the German consumers. The idea brought him a 250 dollars award.

When dependents of American military and civilian personnel began arriving in Germany last year, some OMGUS employees felt that insufficient emphasis was being placed on telling the newcomers in advance what they could expect in their military communities. One employee proposed certain improvements to the orientation program for dependents to help them make necessary readjustment for their stay in Germany. Military Government paid him 20 dollars for the idea.




OMGUS EMPLOYEE SUGGESTIONS and AWARDS PROGRAM

The hard water in Germany was proving a hardship to hands as well as to laundered clothes until the idea was presented that OMGUS stock up on water-softening materials. A lieutenant colonel cashed in on that one.

The streets of the US Sector of Berlin and of the US Zone in general have been made safer for both pedestrians and motorists through the suggestion of painting road barrier signs with white paint so that they would be more readily visible at night. Another idea to minimize traffic hazards was the posting of signs regulating traffic in school zones.

The shortage of calendars overseas has always been acute. A suggestion was made that a yearly calendar be printed on the hitherto blank back cover of the OMGUS telephone directory. *(Continued on page 16)*

WELL?
Suggest
SOMETHING



of the United States that all Allied States at war with Germany should be given an opportunity to participate to some degree in the drafting and in the making of the Peace Treaty, but we recognize that there would be very practical difficulties if not impossibilities in attempting to draft a treaty with 51 nations participating equally at all stages. Therefore, the United States Government has endeavored to secure agreement on a method which involves two different procedures, depending on whether or not the state concerned actually participated in the fighting. But all would have an opportunity to present their views and refute other views, and all would sit in the Peace Conference to adopt a treaty.

It is difficult to get the agreement of the countries that have suffered the horrors of German occupation and were involved in heavy losses in hard fighting to accept participation in the determination of the treaty terms by countries who suffered no losses in men or material and were remote from the fighting. The United States, however, regards it as imperative that all the states who were at war with Germany should have some voice in the settlement imposed on Germany.

Four-Power Pact

The proposal for the Four-Power Pact was advanced by the United States Government a year ago. It was our hope that the prompt acceptance of this simple pact ensuring in advance of the detailed German peace settlement that the United States would actively cooperate to prevent the rearmament of Germany would eliminate fears as to the future and would facilitate the making of a peace suitable to Europe's present and future needs. It was our hope that such a commitment by the United States would relieve the fear of the other European powers that the United States would repeat its actions following the first World War, insisting on various terms for the peace settlement and then withdrawing from a position of any responsibility for their enforcement. It was thought that the

compact of the Four Powers to guarantee the continued demilitarization of Germany would reassure the world that we were in complete accord in our intention to secure the peace of Europe.

However, the Soviet Government met our proposition with a series of amendments which would have completely changed the character of the pact, making it in effect a complicated peace treaty, and including in the amendments most of the points regarding the German problem concerning which there was, as I have pointed out, serious disagreement. I was forced to the conclusion by this procedure that the Soviet Government either did not desire such a pact or was following a course calculated to delay any immediate prospect of its adoption. Whether or not an agreement can finally be reached remains to be seen, but the United States, I think, should adhere to its present position and insist that the pact be kept simple and confined to its one basic purpose—to keep Germany incapable of waging war.

Austrian treaty

The negotiations regarding the Austrian treaty resulted in agreement on all but a few points, but these were basic and of fundamental importance. The Soviet Union favors and the other governments oppose the payment of reparations and the cession of Carinthia to Yugoslavia.

But the Soviet Government attached much more importance to its demand that the German assets in Austria which are to be hers by the terms of the Potsdam Agreement should include those assets which the other three powers consider to have been taken from Austria and the citizens of the United Nations by FORCE or DURESS by Hitler and his Nazi government following the taking over of Austria by military force in March 1938. The Soviet Government refused to consider the world DURESS, which in the opinion of the other three powers would be the critical basis for determining what property, that is, business, factories, land, forests, et cetera, was truly German property and not the result of seizures by terrorist procedure, intimidation, fake

business acquisition, and so forth. The Soviet Union also refused to consider any process of mediation to settle the disputes that are bound to arise in such circumstances, nor would they clearly agree to have such property as they receive as German assets subject to Austrian law in the same manner as other foreign investments are subject to Austrian law.

The acceptance of the Soviet position would mean that such a large portion of Austrian economy would be removed from her legal control that Austrian chances of surviving as an independent self-supporting state would be dubious. She would in effect be but a puppet state.

All efforts to find a compromise solution were unavailing. The United States, in my opinion, could not commit itself to a treaty which involved such manifest injustices and, what is equally important, would create an Austria so weak and helpless as to be the source of great danger in the future. In the final session of the conference, it was agreed to appoint a commission to meet in Vienna May 12th to reconsider our disagreement, and to have a committee of experts examine into the question of the German assets in Austria. Certainly prompt action in the Austrian treaty is necessary to fulfill our commitment to recognize Austria as a free and independent state and to relieve her from the burdens of occupation.

Summary

Complicated as these issues are, there runs through them a pattern as to the character and control of central Europe to be established. The Foreign Ministers agreed that their task was to lay the foundations of a central government for Germany, to bring about the economic unity of Germany essential for its own existence as well as for European recovery, to establish workable boundaries, and to set up a guaranteed control through a four-power treaty. Austria was to be promptly relieved of occupation burdens and treated as a liberated and independent country.

Agreement was made impossible at Moscow because, in our view, the Soviet Union insisted upon proposals

(Continued on page 14)



Food Plans Criticized

The *Sueddeutsche Zeitung* (Munich) points out that General Clay, Minister Dietrich, the Bavarian Minister for Agriculture, and the Munich Food Office all use different statistics and have made contradictory forecasts about the amount of food available for coming ration periods. The lower the office, the smaller its figures.

"A staggering example: The Americans calculate that Bavaria will be able to export 800,000 tons of potatoes. The Bizonal Office expects delivery of 110,000 tons. The Bavarian Minister of Agriculture declared in Stuttgart that Bavaria could furnish only 67,000 tons."

Bread Bureaucracy

The article speaks of "helplessness of the bread bureaucracy," of "dilettantism and charlatanery," of "paper calories," and "Potemkin rations," "In this moment a strong hand is needed with the necessary powers and independence from councils and committees ... We know that without American help we would have to die from starvation ... But we do not know why a land like Bavaria ... is not able to distribute more than a ridiculous 62 grams of cheese per ration period." The writer points out that all sides have made mistakes "otherwise one would not have distributed 12,500 grams of bread in December 1946, and only 4,000 grams four months later." He warns that if the promise that things will become considerably better after June is again not kept, the effect will be irreparable.

Emergency Program

The *Fraenkische Nachrichten* (Tauberbischofsheim) suggests an emergency program of food production: "Even if distress cannot be eliminated entirely, it can at least be relieved. The production of fertilizers, which must above all be made available to the farmer, must be increased and secured. A rise in the production of

oil-producing plants, cultivation of peas and beans for plant albumen, perhaps even large-scale attempts to cultivate soya beans in Germany are all tasks for this year. We cannot understand that people are content with the official statement that we more or less face the prospect of perishing if no help comes from the outside."

Germans to Blame

Das Zeit-Echo (Schwaebisch-Hall) puts the blame on the Germans themselves in commenting on General Clay's statement on food before the *Laenderrat*:

"If the present German governments are not able to carry out a just food distribution, the common man in the street will have the opportunity of voting for another government in the next election. These were the final words of General Lucius D. Clay's criticism of procurement and distribution of food in Germany ... He repeatedly emphasized that an improvement of the situation depends on the Germans themselves. To the objection that 93 percent of the delivery quota of bread cereals has been reached in Wuerttemberg, the General replied that the quota must be fulfilled 100 percent. Those hard words of the supreme Commander of the American Occupation Power should be an echo to the often heard assertions of various German ministers and officials who say that the present food crisis is the result of the non-arrival of promised imports from abroad."

The article concludes that radical measures must be taken to see that every one delivers his quota, and that black marketeers and other transgressors are prosecuted.

Comments on CFM

The *Rhein-Neckar-Zeitung* (Heidelberg) 26 April, editorializes on the results of the meeting of the Council of Foreign ministers which "even disappointed the most

moderate expectations." The Big Four failed to solve the "main problem of our time"—peace for Europe. The paper doubts whether the committees established by the Foreign Ministers will be successful until the next conference, or that one of the Allied governments will revise its views expressed at Moscow. Speaking of Germany and her present situation in the world, the paper continues:

Uncertain Future

"For a people that is no longer a state and that must first acquire inner freedom gained with the loss of independence, months appear like decades if they must live in uncertainty about the future and in a state between war and peace ... Germany knows that she has obligations of guilt toward the world and can understand the distrust of other countries. But without the possibility of fulfilling these obligations with her own strength and without choosing a new political course of her own, Germany will neither be capable of existing nor will she be in a position to carry out a passive function in Europe."

Consolidation of Spheres

The *Fraenkische Nachrichten* (Tauberbischofsheim) 24 April, sees as temporary result of the failure of the Moscow Conference a crystallization of present conditions, and the possibility of "two worlds":

"The zones remain separated, currency reform postponed, the boundary of the Eastern territories remains de facto as it is, and prospects for a future change will naturally decrease in view of the existing and ever more consolidated facts. The condition of a crippled German economy continues, with all its detrimental consequences for the rest of Europe. Both sides envisage a consolidation of their present political spheres of influence, but both sides are also aware that this way out represents the only solution left, but by no means one which is good or not fraught with danger..."

Moscow (Cont'd from p. 12)

which would have established in Germany a centralized government, adapted to the seizure of absolute control of a country which would be doomed economically through inadequate area and excessive population, and would be mortgaged to turn over a large part of its production as reparations, principally to the Soviet Union. In another form the same mortgage upon Austria was claimed by the Soviet Delegation.

Such a plan, in the opinion of the United States Delegation, not only involved indefinite American subsidy, but could result only in a deteriorating economic life in Germany and Europe and the inevitable emergence of dictatorship and strife.

Freedom of information for which our government stands inevitably involves appeals to public opinion. But at Moscow propaganda appeals to passion and prejudice appeared to take the place of appeals to reason and understanding. Charges were made by the Soviet Delegation and interpretation given the Potsdam and other Agreements, which varied completely from the facts as understood or as factually known by the American Delegation.

There was naturally much uncertainty regarding the real intention or motives of the various proposals submitted or of the objections taken to the proposals. This is inevitable in any international negotiation.

However, despite the disagreement referred to and the difficulties encountered, possibly greater progress towards final settlement was made than is realized.

The critical differences were for the first time brought into the light and now stand clearly defined so that future negotiations can start with a knowledge of exactly what the issues are that must be settled. The Deputies now understand the precise views of each government on the various issues discussed. With that they can possibly resolve some differences and surely can further clarify the problems by a studied presentation of the state of agreement and disagreement. That is the best that can be hoped for in the next few months. It marks some progress, however painfully slow. These issues are matters of vast im-

Restoration of Church




Photo by Marburg

The Frauenkirche, the most important medieval building in Munich, is now being restored. Serious injuries to the church occurred in 1943, 1944, and 1945. At the conclusion of the war the first monuments officers in Munich found that the towers were undamaged although the copper covering of the domes was partially blown away. Foundations and most of the outer walls were preserved. The tremendous undertaking of clearance and restoration was begun in the summer of 1945. Complete restoration of the Frauenkirche will require many years.

portance to the lives of the people of Europe and to the future course of world history. We must not compromise on great principles in order to achieve agreement for agreement's

sake. Also, we must sincerely try to understand the point of view of these with whom we differ.

In this connection, I think it proper to refer to a portion of a statement

made to me by Generalissimo Stalin. He said, with reference to the Conference, that these were only the first skirmishes and brushes of reconnaissance forces on this question. Differences had occurred in the past on other questions, and as a rule, after people had exhausted themselves in dispute, they then recognized the necessity of compromise. It was possible that no great success would be achieved at this session, but he thought that compromises were possible on all the main questions, including demilitarization, political structure of Germany, reparations and economic unity. It was necessary to have patience and not become pessimistic.

I sincerely hope that the Generalissimo is correct in the view he expressed and that it implies a greater spirit of cooperation by the Soviet Delegation in future conferences. But we cannot ignore the factor of time involved here. The recovery of Europe has been far slower than had been expected. Disintegrating forces are becoming evident. The patient is sinking while the doctors deliberate. So I believe that action cannot await compromise through exhaustion. New issues arise daily. Whatever action is possible to meet these pressing problems must be taken without delay.

Finally, I should comment on one aspect of the matter which is of transcendent importance to all our people. While I did not have the benefit, as did Mr. Byrnes, of the presence of the two leading members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, I did have the invaluable assistance of Mr. Dulles, a distinguished representative of the Republican Party as well as a recognized specialist in foreign relations and in the processes of international negotiations and treaty-making. As a matter of fact, the bipartisan character of the American attitude in the present conduct of foreign affairs was clearly indicated by the strong and successful leadership displayed in the Senate during the period of this conference by Senators Vandenberg and Connally in the debate over a development of our foreign policy of momentous importance to the American people. The fact that there was such evident unity of purpose in Washington was of incalculable

assistance to me in Moscow. The state of the world today and the position of the United States make mandatory, in my opinion, a unity of action on the part of the American people. It is for that reason that I have gone into such lengthy detail in reporting my views on the conference.

Prussia (Cont'd from p. 9)

policy, and in the destiny of the master race which made Prussianism a symbol of ruthless aggression.

"The dissolution of their coordinating institutions may temporarily reduce their capacity for effective action. But until the 40 million Prussians are reeducated in the ways of peace and democracy, the hated spirit of Prussia will still abide in the very center of Europe, ready to head up a new German expansion whenever the Allies commence to relax their supervision. If the Control Council and the governments it represents are fully aware of that peril, if they do not tend to assume that the abolition of the Prussian state has achieved a corresponding human revolution among the Prussians, then the political decentralization of this territory should prove a useful contribution to the remodeling of Germany. If not, we shall all be indulging in the kind of dangerous illusion which permitted the Nazi reincarnation of the old German imperialism."

Danes Allow Transfer

Offices of Military Government for Bavaria, Wuerttemberg-Baden, and Hesse have been advised that a tentative agreement has been reached between OMGUS and Denmark to bring about the transfer of 11,500 German nationals from Denmark to the US Zone.

Priority is to be given to those persons who have relatives now permanently housed in the US Zone, and to families who have employable members, exclusive of mothers with children under ten years of age. The rate of acceptance is approximately 1000 persons each week. All families will be moved intact, and Danish authorities will supply four days' rations for each person at the time of departure. Each person will be permitted to have up to 1000 RM or Allied Marks in his possession.

Public Utilities (Cont'd from p. 5)

pressure grids. This is also coal gas, and as a by-product of coke production this method of distribution was used to avoid wasting this valuable fuel.

The latest accurate figures available on gas production in the US Zone are for the year 1940, which represents about the peak, as during the war there was much disturbance of gas operations. In 1940 gas produced in the US Zone amounted to 89,060,000 cubic meters, or 74,171,000 cubic meters per month. In 1946 gas produced in the US Zone amounted to 456,889,000 cubic meters, or 38,074,000 cubic meters per month, which was 51 percent of the 1940 production. In addition to the gas produced within the zone, there is grid gas imported from the Ruhr and distributed in Greater Hesse. In 1944 this imported gas amounted to 220,769,923 cubic meters and in 1946 to 62,639,000 cubic meters, or 28 percent of the maximum ever brought into the US Zone

Capacity as applied to gas works is a variable term—for it is possible to increase or decrease production with the demand. The normal installed capacity in the US Zone in terms of cubic meters is 97,690,000 per month. The installed capacity is, therefore, 130 percent of 1940 production. Some of this normal capacity was destroyed during the war and gradually has been coming back into service as repairs are made. In November 1946 the operable normal capacity was 65 percent of the installed capacity as compared with 10 percent at present. The current capacity is ample if coal is made available.

No level of production has been set for the gas industry, nor has there been one recommended. Since gas is primarily a service (and of that about 60 percent is for domestic use) its level automatically will be established by industries and uses which are themselves controlled. Another limiting factor will be the amount of coal available. As an estimate, it is hoped that gas production in 1947 will be at least up to the levels of 1940 or better, which in itself will indicate an advancement in general economic conditions.

Official Instructions

Wear of Prescribed US Army, Navy or Marine Corps Uniforms by US Civilian Personnel in the US Occupied Zone, AG 332.31 GAP-AGO, Hq EUCOM, 8 April 1947.

International Motoring, AG 092 GAP-AGO, Hq EUCOM, 14 April 1947.

Wearing of "MG Polizei" Armbands or Insignia by German Police, Memo. No. 40, OMGWB, 14 April 1947.

Renewal of German Real Estate Requisitions, AG 602 GDS-AGO, Hq EUCOM, 18 April 1947.

Transfer of Records of Post, Camp and Station Property, AG 140 GDS-AGO, Hq EUCOM 18 April 1947.

Clarification of Definition of Term of "Ordinary Labor" for Purpose of Hiring of Indigenous Personnel for OMGUS, AG 091.714 (CS), OMGUS, 28 April 1947.

Change 1 to Title 1, "General Provisions", AG 010.6 (CO), OMGUS, 28 April 1947, The old text of Title Number 1 is entirely superseded by this revision. Significant and important changes introduced during the past year with reference to basic principles and concepts of US Military Government administration and the manner in which US objectives are to be achieved.

Directive No. 49 — Amendment to Directive No. 43, "Interzonal Travel", PR, OMGUS, 29 April 1947, A one-trip, interzonal pass may be issued — without preliminary authority of the commanding authorities of the zone to be visited. The pass will be issued for a period of thirty days unless a 15-day extension is granted by the authorities of the zone visited.

Law No. 52, Amendment to Law No. 16—Marriage Law, Approved and signed by ACC 21 April 1947.

Issue of Expendable Stationery and Office Supplies, Administrative.

Instructions No. 29, OMG Wuerttemberg-Baden, 14 April 1947.

Personnel Visiting Rome, AG 200.4 GAP-AGO, Hq EUCOM, 18 April 1947.

Establishment of Exempt Air Force Installation, AG 322 GCT-AGO, Hq EUCOM, 18 April 1947.

Standard Operating Procedure for Courier Service, Administrative Instructions No. 30, OMG Wuerttemberg-Baden, 18 April 1947.

Use of US Army Vehicles, AG 451 GDS-AGO, Hq EUCOM, 18 April 1947.

US Army Facilities in the European Command, AG 322 GAP-AGO, Hq EUCOM, 19 April 1947.

40-Hour Work Week, Administrative Instructions No. 31, OMG Wuerttemberg-Baden, 21 April 1947.

Relations with Allied Authorities, Change 1, Memo. 18, OMG Wuerttemberg-Baden, 21 April 1947.

Review of Individuals removed by Military Government and Subsequently Cleared under Law No. 104, Change 1, Memo. 143, 21 April 1947.

USFET-SOP 80, Administration and Employment of Non-US Personnel, Change No. 1, Hq EUCOM, 23 April 1947.

Copies of Official Instructions listed in the **Weekly Information Bulletin** may be obtained by writing directly to the originating headquarters.

Youth Hostels *(Cont'd from p. 6)*

ginally a simple square house, it has been enlarged by an additional building to accommodate larger numbers of guests in attractive bedrooms and lounges. This year it still is used as an old peoples' home for refugees, but by next summer it will again serve its original purposes and be reequipped as an "International Youth Hostel." It is the particular project not only of German youth but of groups from all countries to make this hostel a place where young people from any land can find a friendly welcome.

Hosteling today in Bavaria as in all the Laender of the three western zones, operates through local committees of volunteers to provide light meals and inexpensive overnight lodging to wanderers. The program pattern is spontaneous and informal,

utilizing the talents of the ever-changing group at hand. Singing, folk-dancing, and friendly conversation combine with more thoughtful exchanges of ideas to make hosteling a popular and useful activity for the youth of Germany.

OMGUS Employee Awards

(Cont'd from p. 11)

One MG civilian suggested a need for a printed explanation of the workings of the various units of Military Government. This led to the publication in five issues of the *Weekly Information Bulletin*, of a comprehensive series covering the operation and functions of Military Government. These five special issues are currently being reprinted in a single volume entitled "MG," which will soon be available for distribution to interested US and Allied persons and organizations.

The Suggestion Awards program has opened a new avenue for ideas to reach OMGUS. It has met with a response 35 times as great as the average for the War Department as a whole in its best year, 1945. In that year the WD participation rate was 1.2 suggestions per 100 employees compared with 40 per 100 employees for OMGUS. The Suggestion Program staff accounts for this high participation rate by the fact that a rapidly changing organization like OMGUS is confronted with a steady supply of newly-created problems to challenge the attention of alert employees.

Many of the best and most practical of the suggestions submitted fail to receive awards because the problems for which they have proposed solutions are being resolved successfully by responsible offices even as the suggestions are being formulated by others. Nevertheless, a relatively high number of awards have been made and important MG benefits have been derived through the alert thinking of employees.

Personnel Changes

Col. James L. Harbauch, Jr., JAGD, has been assigned as Judge Advocate, European Command.

STATION LIST

MILITARY GOVERNMENT ELEMENTS

UNIT OR OFFICE OF
MILITARY GOVERNMENT

LOCATION

DIRECTOR OR
COMMANDING OFFICER

THE MILITARY GOVERNOR: General Lucius D. Clay
OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (US)

Office of Mil Gov for
Germany, (US)

Berlin

Maj Gen F A Keating
Deputy Military Governor

LAND WUERTTEMBERG-BADEN

Office of Mil Gov for
Wuerttemberg-Baden

Stuttgart

Mr Sumner Sewall

1st Mil Gov Bn (Sep) (APO 154)

Hq 1st Mil Gov Bn (Sep)
Hq & Sv Co

Stuttgart
Stuttgart

Lt Col M O Edwards
1st Lt F J Czeiner

Stuttgart Area

*S-10 SK Stuttgart
*S-21 LK Boeblingen
*S-23 LK Esslingen
*S-29 LK Ludwigsburg
*S-30 LK Waiblingen
*S-50 LK Backnang
*S-53 LK Leonberg
*S-55 LK Nuertingen
*S-58 LK Vaihingen

Stuttgart
Boeblingen
Esslingen
Ludwigsburg
Waiblingen
Backnang
Leonberg
Nuertingen
Vaihingen

Lt Col I L Harlow
Capt M P Ernst
Capt N Semaschko Jr
Capt E E Oja
Maj F A Hubbard
Capt R Forrest
Capt S P Giunta
Maj J S Capell
Capt S Smith

Mannheim Area

*M-16 SK/LK Mannheim
*M-43 SK/LK Heidelberg
*M-89 LK Buchen
*M-90 LK Mosbach
*M-91 LK Tauberbischofsheim
*M-92 LK Sinsheim

Mannheim
Heidelberg
Buchen
Mosbach
Tauberbischofsheim
Sinsheim

Lt Col C Rue
Lt Col C L Jackson
Capt C A Wright
Capt J Zecca
Capt N W Barber
Capt J E Switzer

Karlsruhe Area

*K-47SK/LK Karlsruhe
*K-46 SK/LK Pforzheim
*K-87 LK Bruchsal

Karlsruhe
Pforzheim
Bruchsal

Maj C S Keena
Maj R H Stimson
Capt T C Stenson

Heilbronn Area

*H-28 SK/LK Heilbronn
*H-22 LK Crailsheim
*H-26 LK Schwaebisch Hall
*H-52 LK Kuenzelsau
*H-54 LK Mergentheim
*H-56 LK Oehringen

Heilbronn
Crailsheim
Schwaebisch Hall
Kuenzelsau
Bad Mergentheim
Oehringen

Lt Col C H J West
Capt R C Lawton
Maj S A Warren
Capt T E Griswold
Capt B V Bloom
Capt G H Caple

Ulm Area

*U-11 SK/LK Ulm
*U-25 LK Goepingen
*U-20 LK Aalen
*U-24 LK Schwaebisch Gmuend
*U-27 LK Heidenheim

Ulm
Goepingen
Aalen
Schwaebisch Gmuend
Heidenheim

Maj M L Hoover
Lt Col A G Spitz
Maj C H Palette
Maj R Lascoe
Maj L H Kyle

LAND GREATER HESSE

Office of Mil Gov
for Greater Hesse

Wiesbaden

Dr J R Newman

2nd Mil Gov Bn (Sep) (APO 633)

Hq 2d MG Bn (Sep)
Hq Co 2d MG. Bn (Sep)
Sv Co 2d MG Bn (Sep)

Wiesbaden
Wiesbaden
Oberursel
Frankfurt
Wiesbaden
Wetzlar
Dillenburg
Gelnhausen

Lt Col S S Graham
1st Lt P J Weiss
Capt B A Sturdevan

Maj G C Sola
Col F H Boucher
Maj D Easterday
Maj B L Bassinor
Capt C D Fexy

*SK Frankfurt
*SK Wiesbaden
*LK Wetzlar
*LK Dill
*LK Gelnhausen
* Liaison and Security

**UNIT OR OFFICE OF
MILITARY GOVERNMENT**

*LK Biedenkopf
 *SK/LK Hanau
 *LK Oberlahn
 *LK Limburg
 *LK Maintaunus
 *LK Rheingau
 *LK Obertaunus
 *LK Usingen
 *LK Untertaunus
 *LK Schluechtern
 *SK/LK Kassel
 *LK Melsungen
 *LK Fritzlar-Homburg
 *LK Ziegenhain
 *SK/LK Marburg
 *SK/LK Fulda
 *LK Huenfeld
 *LK Waldeck
 *LK Frankenberg
 *LK Eschwege
 *LK Witzenhausen
 *LK Hersfeld
 *LK Rotenburg
 *LK Hofgeismar
 *LK Wolfhagen
 *SK/LK Darmstadt
 *LK Groß-Gerau
 *SK/LK Offenbach
 *LK Bergstrasse b Worms
 *LK Erbach
 *LK Buedingen
 *LK Dieburg
 *LK Friedberg
 *SK/LK Giessen
 *LK Lauterbach
 *LK Alsfeld

Office of Mil Gov
for Bavaria

Hq 3rd Mil Gov Regt
Hq & Sv Company

Co A
 *A-210 SK/LK Wurzburg
 *A-220 SK/LK Aschaffenburg
 *A-221 SK/LK Schweinfurt
 *A-250 LK Kissingen
 *A-251 LK Kitzingen
 *A-330 LK Alzenau
 *A-331 LK Bruckenua
 *A-332 LK Ebern
 *A-333-LK Gemunden
 *A-334 LK Gerolzhofen
 *A-335 LK Hammelburg
 *A-336 LK Hassfurt
 *A-337 LK Hofheim
 *A-338 LK Karlstadt
 *A-339 LK Konigshofen
 *A-340 LK Lohr
 *A-341 LK Markt Heidenfeld
 *A-342 Mellrichstadt
 *A-343 LK Miltenberg
 *A-344 LK Neustadt (Saale)
 *A-345 LK Obernburg
 *A-346 LK Ochsenfurt

Co B
 *B-211 SK/LK Nurnberg
 * Liaison and Security

LOCATION

Biedenkopf
 Hanau
 Weilburg
 Limburg
 Hofheim
 Ruedesheim
 Bad Homburg
 Usingen
 Bad Schwalbach
 Schluechtern
 Kassel
 Melsungen
 Fritzlar
 Ziegenhain
 Marburg
 Fulda
 Huenfeld
 Korbach
 Frankenberg
 Eschwege
 Witzenhausen
 Hersfeld
 Rotenburg
 Hofgeismar
 Wolfhagen
 Darmstadt
 Groß-Gerau
 Offenbach
 Heppenheim
 Erbach
 Buedingen
 Dieburg
 Friedberg
 Giessen
 Lauterbach
 Alsfeld

LAND BAVARIA

Munich

3rd Mil Gov Regt (APO 407)

Munich
 Munich

Regierungsbezirk Unterfranken

Wurzburg
 Wurzburg
 Aschaffenburg
 Schweinfurt
 Bad Kissingen
 Kitzingen
 Alzenau
 Bruckenua
 Ebern
 Gemunden
 Gerolzhofen
 Hammelburg
 Hassfurt
 Hofheim
 Karlstadt
 Konigshofen
 Lohr
 Markt Heidenfeld
 Mellrichstadt
 Miltenberg
 Neustadt a. d. Saale
 Obernburg
 Ochsenfurt

Regierungsbezirk Oberfranken-Mittelfranken

Ansbach
 Nurnberg

**DIRECTOR OR
COMMANDING OFFICER**

Capt W L Culbertson
 Maj R A Gish
 Lt Col M A Meacham
 Capt J S Chapin
 Maj J C Nelson
 Capt W F Hintz
 Capt J Nottingham
 Capt J N Francis
 Maj M E Chotas
 Capt O Howard
 Lt Col G J Alhrecht
 Maj W C Gipple
 Maj J Connely
 Capt T W Harris
 Lt Col C H Reed
 Lt Col H R Cress
 Capt W G Westbrook Jr
 Maj C F Parshall
 Maj L S Williams
 Maj G P Moore
 Maj E F Covell
 Maj H Baymor
 Capt S Kershaw
 Capt L R Allen
 Capt T E Faircloth
 Lt Col A Skarry
 Capt N C Neider
 Lt Col J C Rose
 Maj A Gill
 Maj L H Brown
 Capt G P Johnson
 Capt M S Clark
 Maj F E Perry
 Maj C R Russe
 Capt C R Argo
 Capt S A Karas

Brig Gen W J Muller

Col C C Morgan
 Maj R M Schwartz

Lt Col M E Henderson
 Lt Col Robert Herbison
 Lt Col M W Crouse
 Maj G M Marsh
 Maj R C Jernigin
 Maj E H Emry
 Capt A T Neumann
 Maj R C Gesell
 Capt G G Brock
 Maj J S Sullivan
 Capt V R Hurst
 Maj R J Holmes
 Capt R E Hellmig
 Capt F L Beelby
 Maj J E Breland
 Capt S E Witty
 Capt L K Owens
 Capt I A Lowell
 Maj A C McIntyre
 Capt J L Hinkel
 Maj H P Clark
 Capt L A Williams
 Maj E C Wimberly

Col E M Haight
 Lt Col A G Callicot

**UNIT OR OFFICE OF
MILITARY GOVERNMENT**

LOCATION

**DIRECTOR OR
COMMANDING OFFICER**

*B-222 SK/LK Bamberg	Bamberg	Lt Col J C Barnet
*B-223 SK/LK Bayreuth	Bayreuth	Lt Col S R D Smith
*B-224 SK/LK Erlangen	Erlangen	Lt Col J A Thompson
*B-225 Neustadt & Coburg	Coburg	Lt Col F Robie
*B-226 Kronach	Kronach	Maj H T Lund
*B-227 SK/LK Hof	Hof	Maj H L Woodall
*B-228 SK/LK Ansbach	Ansbach	Lt Col W R Whitaker
*B-229 SK/LK Furth	Furth	Lt Col J A McEbooy
*B-247 LK Lichtenfels & SK Staffelstein	Lichtenfels	Maj T B Stuart
*B-252 LK Ebermannstadt	Ebermannstadt	Maj L L Haupt
*B-253 LK Hochstadt a. d. Aisch	Hochstadt	1st Lt L W Dilgard
*B-254 SK/LK Kulmbach	Kulmbach	Maj F Meszar
*B-255 LK Pegnitz	Pegnitz	Capt J R Palmer
*B-256 LK Muenchberg	Muenchberg	Maj. I Cleary
*B-258 LK Rehau	Rehau	Maj R C Anderson
*B-259 LK Wunsiedel	Wunsiedel	Capt G Hultzen
*B-260 LK Forchheim	Forchheim	Maj H Zurn
*B-261 LK Dinkelsbuehl	Dinkelsbuehl	Maj A F Adams
*B-262 LK Eichstatt	Eichstatt	Capt R Julien
*B-263 LK Feuchtwangen	Feuchtwangen	Capt N E Petty
*B-264 LK Gunzenhausen	Gunzenhausen	Maj R J Nielson
*B-265 LK Hersbruck	Hersbruck	Capt D S Stroup
*B-266 LK Hilpolstein	Hilpolstein	Capt R E Peters
*B-267 LK Weissenburg	Weissenburg	Maj C W Collier
*B-268 LK Rothenburg	Rothenburg	Maj F K Hinchey
*B-269 LK Schwabach	Schwabach	Maj F K Stringer
*B-270 LK Scheinfeld	Scheinfeld	Capt G B Jones
*B-271 LK Windsheim	Windsheim	1/Lt J W Horton
*B-272 LK Lauf	Lauf	Maj F C Smith
*B-273 LK Neustadt (Aisch)	Neustadt a. d. Aisch	Maj C J Cody
*B-347 LK Naila	Naila	Capt W V Evans
*B-348 LK Stadtsteinach	Stadtsteinach	Maj F T Brewster

Regierungsbezirk Niederbayern und Oberpfalz

Co D	Regensburg	Lt Col G D Hastings
*D-212 SK/LK Regensburg	Regensburg	Maj G J Ganer
*D-230 SK/LK Weiden-Neustadt a. d. Wald	Weiden	Maj C G Doyle
*D-243 SK/LK Passau	Passau	Lt Col R T Nichols
*D-244 SK/LK Amberg	Amberg	Maj H J Mrachek
*D-245 SK/LK Landshut	Landshut	Maj R E Boyd
*D-246 SK/LK Straubing	Straubing	Lt Col J R Hector
*D-274 LK Cham	Cham	Capt I R Mariels
*D-275 LK Burglengenfeld	Burglengenfeld	Capt Phillips
*D-276 LK Parsberg	Parsberg	Maj E O Carlson
*D-277 LK Tirschenreuth	Tirschenreuth	Capt E A McNamara
*D-278 LK Neunberg vorm Wald	Neunberg	Maj S Kommel
*D-279 LK Eschenbach	Eschenbach	Maj R O Woodward
*D-301 LK Deggendorf	Deggendorf	Maj H A Hardt
*D-302 LK Eggenfelden	Eggenfelden	Capt M Glossop
*D-303 LK Grafenau	Grafenau	Capt A J Harwood
*D-304 LK Kelheim	Kelheim	Capt G L Milner
*D-305 LK Landau a. d. Isar	Landau	Maj J A Wickham
*D-306 LK Pfarrkirchen	Pfarrkirchen	Capt N Ugland
*D-307 LK Regen	Zweisel	Lt Col G M Foster
*D-308 LK Vilshofen	Vilshofen	Capt Segar
*D-309 LK Vilsbiburg	Vilsbiburg	1st Lt G I Thomas
*D-310 LK Wolfstein	Freyung	Capt R N McWhorter
*D-349 LK Kemnath	Kemnath	Maj D L O'Roark
*D-350 LK Nabburg	Nabburg	Maj I G Shackelford
*D-351 LK Oberviechtach	Oberviechtach	Maj J Mulholland
*D-352 LK Riedenberg	Riedenberg	Maj V M Corbin
*D-352 LK Vohenstrauß	Vohenstrauß	Maj B B Coullahan
*D-353 LK Roding	Roding	Maj L P Rhodes
*D-354 LK Waldmuenchen	Waldmuenchen	Maj R W Hitchcock
*D-355 LK Beilngries	Beilngries	Maj E Fitcher
*D-356 LK Neumarkt i. d. Opf.	Neumarkt	Capt R W Ziegler
*D-358 LK Sulzbach-Rosenburg	Sulzbach-Rosenburg	Capt V D Dygert
* Liaison and Security		

**UNIT OR OFFICE OF
MILITARY GOVERNMENT**

LOCATION

**DIRECTOR OR
COMMANDING OFFICER**

*D-375 LK Bogen
*D-377 LK Dingelfing
*D-378 LK Griesbach
*D-379-LK Ketzting
*D-380 LK Mainburg
*D-381 LK Mallersdorf
*D-382 LK Rottenburg
*D-383 LK Viechtach
*D-385 LK Wegscheid

Bogen
Dingolfing
Griesbach
Kotzting
Mainburg
Mallersdorf
Rottenburg
Viechtach
Oberzell

Maj J F Staudinger
Maj J C Robertson Jr
Capt C G Dansby
Maj J J Maher Jr
Capt E R Garrison
Capt G C Jones
Maj R E Levy
Maj J F Rey
1st Lt K L Miller Jr

Regierungsbezirk Oberbayern

Co E
*E-213 SK/LK Munich
*E-231 SK/LK Freising
*E-232 LK Miesbach
*E-233 LK Traunstein
*E-234 LK Altoetting
*E-235 SK/LK Rosenheim
*E-236 LK Garmisch-
Partenkirchen
*E-237 SK/LK Ingolstadt
*E-280 LK Erding
*E-281 LK Laufen
*E-282 LK Muhlendorf
*E-283 LK Wasserburg
*E-284 LK Toelz
*E-285 LK Aibling
*E-286 LK Fuerstenfeldbruck
*E-287 LK Landsberg
*E-288 LK Pfaffenhofen
*E-289 LK Starnberg
*E-290 LK Weilheim
*E-291 LK Wolfratshausen
*E-311 LK Berchtesgaden
*E-361 LK Ebersberg
*E-362 LK Aichach
*E-364 Schrobenhausen
*E-367 Dachau
*E-368 Schongau

Munich
Munich
Freising
Miesbach
Traunstein
Altoetting
Rosenheim
Garmisch
Ingolstadt
Erding
Laufen
Muhlendorf
Wasserburg
Bad Toelz
Aibling
Fuerstenfeldbruck
Landsberg
Pfaffenhofen
Starnberg
Weilheim
Wolfratshausen
Berchtesgaden
Ebersberg
Aichach
Schrobenhausen
Dachau
Schongau

Lt Col R J Philipott
Lt Col J H Kelly
Maj L R Day
Capt W A Forys
Capt V L Thom
Capt C A Larimer
Lt Col S R Place
Lt Col R T Shelby
Lt Col J A Crewe
Capt G D Jacobson
Capt T Eshleman
Maj M E Hough
Capt D Root
Maj A O Froede
Capt S J Kushner
1st Lt C C Boatwright
Maj K B Cassidy
Maj H E Reed
Maj C E Carlsen
Capt C A Brown
Capt M J Groves
Maj W W Perham
Capt E J Pennetto
Maj E J Newmayer
Capt H J Bierman
1st Lt J A Walker
Maj A J Le Feare

Regierungsbezirk Schwaben

Co G
*G-214 SK/LK Augsburg
*G-239 LK Dillingen
*G-240 LK Neu-Ulm
*G-241 LK Sonthofen
*G-242 SK/LK Kempten
*G-292 LK Donauwoerth
*G-293 LK Gunzberg
*G-294 LK Markt Oberdorf
*G-295 LK Memmingen
*G-296 LK Mindelheim
*G-297 LK Neuberg
*G-298 LK Nordlingen
*G-299 LK Fussen
*G-300 LK Krumbach
*G-369 LK Illertissen
*G-370 LK Kaufbeuren
*G-372 LK Wertingen
*G-373 LK Friedberg
*G-374 LK Schwabmunchen

Augsburg
Augsburg
Dillingen
Neu-Ulm
Sonthofen
Kempten
Donauwoerth
Gunzberg
Markt Oberdorf
Memmingen
Mindelheim
Neuberg
Nordlingen
Fussen
Krumbach
Illertissen
Kaufbeuren
Wertingen
Friedberg
Schwabmunchen

Lt Col C M Avery
Maj John Ray
Lt J R Barker
Maj H E Howlett
Capt J N Urtes
Lt Col R A Norton
Capt M G Kruglinski
Maj M G Norum
Capt S D Lubin
Maj E R Wagner
Capt L A Proper
Maj H M Sebastian
Capt J A Morris
Capt F W Guzak
Capt H V Worthington
1st Lt Montgomery
1st Lt G A Conner
1st Lt Rogers
Capt D J Moran
1st Lt E C Paie

LAND BREMEN (APO 751)

Office of Mil Gov for
Bremen
Wesermuende Detachment

Bremen
Wesermuende

Mr T F Dunn
Lt Col L S Diggs

BERLIN SECTOR (APO 742-A)

Office of Mil Gov
Berlin Sector
* Liaison and Security

Berlin

Col F L Howley