

Populism as Interaction:
How “the People” Happened in Serbia in 1988

By

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Abstract

This dissertation develops a new theoretical approach to populism as fractal interaction. Both the aspect of populist mobilization and that of populist discourse are viewed through the lens of interactions between elite actors and popular forces. Fractal interaction refers to the fact that, no matter the scale at which one observes the phenomenon, elite-mass interactions continuously present themselves as the key mechanism propelling populism forward. In other words, as one zooms in and out, the same pattern of elite-mass linkage re-appears. This view of populism as fractal interaction can be considered as both a new definition of the phenomenon as well as a theory of the forces that give it momentum. Populism is defined by and driven by the reoccurring involvement of elites in the activities of popular actors and a corresponding lack of autonomy of mass actors, both in terms of their organizing as well as their ability to construct discourses and ideologies. The empirical case analyzed is Serbia in the late 1980s. In the summer and fall of 1988, Serbia witnessed a large protest wave in the streets and an explosion of populist discourse in the public sphere. This case has all the traits typically associated with populism, such as mass mobilization, celebration of "the people", vilification of the distant and corrupt elite, and the emergence of a charismatic leader in Slobodan Milosevic. The case is approached through a variety of data and multiple methods, both qualitative as well as statistical. The analysis includes an examination of events in general and the relationship between elite events and street protests in particular, the analysis of the citizens' letters to the press and the relationship of such media content to street protests, and the analysis of political cartoons that depicted the productive people in opposition to lazy bureaucratic elites.

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Chapter 1

Introduction:

Populism as interaction: How “the people” happened in Serbia in 1988

Introduction

This dissertation investigates the problem of populism. The empirical case analyzed is Serbia in the late 1980s. The main contribution of the dissertation is to present an account of populism – both the aspect of populist mobilization and that of populist discourse – as a set of interactions. The link of interest is between elite actors and popular forces. Succinctly put, this dissertation suggests that populism can be seen as “fractal interaction.” The metaphor of fractals suggests that populism is “self-similar.” No matter the scale at which one observes the phenomenon, elite-mass interactions continuously present themselves as the key mechanism propelling populism forward. In other words, as one zooms in and out, the same pattern of elite-mass linkage appears. This view of populism as fractal interaction can be considered as both a new definition of the phenomenon as well as a theory of the forces that give it momentum. Populism is defined by and driven by the reoccurring involvement of elites in the activities of popular actors and a corresponding lack of autonomy of mass actors, both in terms of their organizing as well as their ability to construct discourses and ideologies.

By approaching populism through the lens of elite-mass interaction, this dissertation embraces the shadowy element of populism. Populism implies the presence of well-placed political elites

who aiming to politically capitalize on mass grievances. However, instead of simply saying that elite manipulation taints the involvement of popular and mass forces – which may well be the case – this dissertation provides a set of analytical and methodological procedures that can be used to dispassionately analyze the phenomenon. Such an account may be better equipped to understand why populism often carries such pejorative connotations. It should be re-iterated that the emphasis is on matters of both mobilization and organization, on the one hand, and discourse and ideas, on the other. Indeed, the investigation also looks at the interaction between the two. The analysis continuously points to the presence of elite-mass interaction. Hence, fractals as a motivating metaphor.

The dissertation aims to contribute to three bodies of scholarly work: (1) political sociology broadly conceived, (2) the literature on populism and (3) the literature on the former Yugoslavia. First, political sociology has tended to avoid populism. It has favored an analytical approach to matters of popular contention in which the dividing lines between the challengers and their elite targets are clear. Populism makes such an approach inapplicable. Yet, not being able to notice populism when it appears means that researchers may miss important trends in modern political life, both in historical as well as contemporary cases. Second, the literature on populism provides a variety of approaches, all of which have something of relevance to say about the topic. Yet, the current state of the field does not encourage an analysis of interaction nor does it encourage the joint study of mobilization and discourse. This dissertation tries to take a step forward regarding these issues. And third, the literature on the former Yugoslavia has treated the episode of Serbian populism in the late 1980s mainly as a case of elite manipulation. This is

consistent with an elite-centric approach to the broader topic of Yugoslav disintegration. Slobodan Milošević – the Serbian politician later indicted by the international war crimes tribunal in the Hague – is seen as the mastermind behind a series of mass rallies and a ruthless propaganda campaign. It would certainly not be empirically wrong to say that Milošević was manipulative and Machiavellian. What such an account misses is the way mass actors participated in Serbia's populist episode and the way their actions were interwoven with elite actions. In other words, the goal is to “bring the people back in.” However, “the people” are a fictional character, a political spirit that populists try to conjure up. “The people” will therefore remain in parentheses more often than not throughout this dissertation.

This dissertation contains three empirical chapters. All of them deal with a certain aspect of the Serbian case. Serbia was one of the republics of socialist Yugoslavia. In the summer and fall of 1988, it experienced what has since been called an “anti-bureaucratic revolution.” The rise of Slobodan Milošević as charismatic leader is perhaps the most conspicuous consequence of the episode. Yet, the year 1988 also witnessed large scale mobilization of ordinary citizens in the streets, an emergence of a populist discourse which celebrated “the people”, and the vilification of elites as “bureaucrats” and “arm-chair politicians.” It has been common in the former Yugoslavia to say that in the late 1980s “the people happened.” This dissertation is interested in the “hows” of this process. How did the people happen?

How can populism be defined?

How can populism be defined? Arguably, this is something that is quite difficult to do. As mentioned above, one of the ultimate goals of this dissertation is to provide a new definition of populism as fractal interaction. Yet, before the utility of this definition can be demonstrated, it is important to delineate the various possible definitions that the literature has offered.

Definitional problems started early, already in the seminal volume edited by Gellner and Ionescu, the most common starting point for most discussions of populism. Writing about populism, the editors said that “no one is quite clear just what it *is*. As a doctrine or as a movement, it is elusive and protean. It bobs up everywhere, but in many and contradictory shapes. Does it have any underlying unity? Or does one name cover a multitude of unconnected tendencies?” (Ionescu and Gellner 1969: 1). The slippery character of populism has long frustrated scholars. In fact, the favorite sport of scholars of populism is to comment on how vague the concept is (Stein 1980: 9; de la Torre 2000: ch. 1; Taggart 2000: 1-5; Canovan 2005: 10; Laclau 2005a: 3; Panizza 2005a: 1). Indeed, the literature has taken this practice to a new level of meta-reflection, with authors now acknowledging the acknowledgment of the problem (Moffitt and Tormey 2014: 382). Difficulties of definition have lead some scholars to suggest that the concept should be abandoned entirely (Roxborough 1984: 14).

As Collier (2001: 11814) has pointed out, the central difficulty lies with the fact that existing definitions encompass very different, even opposed, characteristics as constitutive elements. A dizzying variety of politicians have been called populist, from Eva Peron to Adolf Hitler, from

Thomas Jefferson to Lech Walesa (Berezin 2009: 26-27). Populism's ambiguities stem from its adaptability to local contexts and its receptiveness to heterogeneous political orientations. It can take on either a left-wing or a right-wing orientation and, in fact, may combine elements of both at the same time. Further difficulties arise from the fact that political actors typically do not like to self-identify as populists. There are exceptions, such as the French politician Jean-Marie Le Pen who, when asked if he was a populist, said that “yes, I am a populist” (quoted in Stanley 2008: 101). But such cases are rare and most often the term is seen as pejorative. In addition, unlike others “isms” such as liberalism, socialism or conservatism, populism does not have its great thinkers or a canon of seminal texts (Taggart 2000: 36).

Definitions which rest on detailed enumerations of characteristics create more problems than they solve. In particular, they make it difficult to fit real-world cases into definitional boxes. For example, one can define populism by referring to all of the following: late development, an anti-elite sentiment of a *Volk*, notions of the people's virtuousness, romantic assessments of a mythical past, sentiments of conspiracy and threat, the charisma of a leader, and a loose form of political organization (MacRae 1968). No doubt many cases that we would usually consider populist would feature most of these elements. But, just as many cases would probably not.

In particular, the link between particular economic policies and populism needs to be severed. Previously, many scholars associated populism with import-substitution industrialization and similar protectionist policies of industrial “catch-up” (Cardoso and Faletto 1979; O’Donnell 1979). Some scholars still see the relevance of particular economic policies – those that are seen

as hurtful in the long run – as the defining characteristic of populism (Acemoglu et al. 2013). Yet, more recently, populism has also been combined with neo-liberal policies, which are more or less the opposite of protectionism. This has occurred even in Latin America where the link between protectionism and populism was historically the strongest (Roberts 1996; Weyland 1996; Ellner 2003). Therefore, it seems to be a mistake to tie populism too closely with any specific policy, social group or structural condition. This has lead researchers to argue that a minimal definition of populism may be the most appropriate (Mouzelis 1985; Weyland 2001; Pappas 2014). The key advantage of a minimal definition is that it would be able to encompass most or all of the cases typically considered populist.

In fact, the literature on populism, especially the literature on populist discourse, has begun to converge on a single definition (Worsley 1969: 244; Canovan 1981: 264; 1999: 4; Taguieff 1995: 9; de la Torre 2000: 4; Meny and Surel 2002: 12; Laclau 2005a: ch. 4; 2005b: 33-34; Mudde 2007: 23; Hawkins 2009: 1042; Moffitt and Tormey 2014: 387). Populism is seen as a mode of politics that juxtaposes the elite and the people, a political approach based on a Manichean division of society which celebrates “the people” and demonizes the elite, with whom “the people” are in political conflict. The upshot of this definition is that it provides enough flexibility to encompass all cases we usually consider populist, from the Russian *Narodniki* to the US People's Party, from Hugo Chavez to the Tea Party.

The downside of this definition is that it stays exclusively in the realm of ideas. It is of little help to researchers who wish to study matters of mobilization and organization (Roberts 1996; 2006;

Weyland 1996; 2001; Jansen 2011). Without paying attention to both matters of political organization and matters of political discourse, the study of populism risks the danger of becoming a field of largely philological, linguistic and psycho-analytic investigation. Jansen's (2011) re-conceptualization of populism as populist mobilization is in this respect a useful step forward. Jansen has proposed that we study populist mobilization as a mode of political practice, a mid-range concept that pays attention to matters of both discourse and organization. Populism would be defined as a “large scale political project that mobilizes ordinarily marginalized social sectors into publicly visible and contentious political action, while articulating an anti-elite, nationalist rhetoric that valorizes ordinary people” (Jansen 2011: 82). This a sound foundation. Since it sees populism as practice, it can accommodate this dissertation's focus on interaction.

Of course, one can find fault even with this definition, as one could with most other definitions in the literature. For example, nationalism appears to sneak its way into the definition of populism. Yet, the concept is nevertheless appealing since it points the analysis towards both discourse and organization, as well as to political processes and practices. It can provide the basis for a more elaborate analysis of elite-mass interaction which is a key goal of this dissertation. In other words, the relevant question is not *when* and *why* does populism emerge, since there appear to be many different scenarios in which it does, but rather *how* does it work? What are the processes internal to it, the mechanisms that propel it forward and give it momentum? The focus on processes is important since it serves to highlight the *interactions* that take place in a populist episode, especially the interactions between mass and elite actors.

Why is populism important?

Why should populism be considered a phenomenon of sufficient social and political importance? The reason lies in its connection with democracy. Many contemporary contributions to the literature on populism have stressed the inextricable link between populism and democracy. Populism has been characterized as a shadow that continues to follow democracy (Canovan 1999: 16), a specter that keeps coming back to haunt it (Arditi 2004: 141), or a mirror in which liberal democracy can view itself, warts and all (Panizza 2005b). At least since the French Revolution, the idea of popular sovereignty has become firmly established as a key legitimating principle of most regimes around the world. Liberal democracies in particular are built on the idea of popular sovereignty, though it is combined – rather uneasily – with constitutionalism and representative institutions. Even when regimes are not liberal-democratic they tend to invoke the will of “the people” and the principle of popular sovereignty. “People’s democracies” of communist Eastern Europe, of which Yugoslavia was an example, illustrate the widespread resonance of the notion that power ultimately rests with the people.

It is common, especially in non-academic debate, to see populism as a pathology of democracy, a phenomenon that is pseudo-democratic or even represents an anti-thesis to democracy. This has given populism its reputation of abnormality and deviation. Yet, the picture is considerably more complex, as scholars of populism often point out. Populism is not a pathology, but a companion of democracy (Meny and Surel 2002; Mudde 2004; Panizza 2005b; Laclau 2005a; Stanley 2008). It is not a deviation, but a built-in feature of democracy. Furthermore, populism

is not just a trait of certain politicians or certain regimes. Instead, it is more appropriate to see populism as a facet of politics that is present to some extent in various political settings. As scholars of populism argue, most politics contains a populist streak (Arditi 2010: 492; Laclau 2005a: 225; Meny and Surel 2002). Populism is an everyday phenomenon.

Nor is the impact of populism on democracy always negative. As scholars of populism point out, populism can be both good and bad for democracy (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2012). It may serve as a corrective for complacent and out-of-touch elites, but it may also signal the first phase of a slide towards authoritarianism. Often the same instance of populism can create divergent interpretations, as is shown by the case of the US People's Party from the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. It has been portrayed both as authoritarian and reactionary (Hofstadter 1955), as well as deeply democratic and modernizing (Postel 2007). This ambiguity of populism is one of its defining characteristics. It can empower ordinary citizens but it can also impose authoritarian uniformity on society or even lead to dictatorship.

All of the above suggests that the counterpart to populism is liberalism.¹ The complexity of governing large societies, especially in the modern era, increases populism's appeal. The web of liberal institutions built for the purposes of governing today's democracies is bound to disappoint. Compared to populism's fiery invocation of "the people", the "muddling through" of liberal institutions cannot be very exciting. Representative institutions do not allow us to see "the people" in action, despite the fact that most regimes rest on some notion of popular sovereignty. Furthermore, "the people" are not a collective that can act in any kind of

conventional way. Most rules that aim to articulate the popular will have some drawback, as Arrow's impossibility theorem and the broader public choice literature show (Riker 1982: 238). Common mechanisms such as protesting and voting can at best transform a subset of "the people" into active participants. Therefore, "the people" are a myth which many may invoke, but a myth nonetheless. The place of power in liberal democracies remains empty, as the French theorist Claude Lefort has argued (Lefort 1986: 279). Modern democracy therefore has a large hole at its core, a hole that cannot be filled.

Nor is the importance of populism's relationship with democracy simply a matter of political philosophy. Recent trends have suggested a renewed importance of populism, world-wide. The slow de-legitimation of conventional political parties and of representative democracy within which they function has given rise to new populist movements even in northern America and Western Europe. This suggests that populism is not a political phase that can be outgrown but a permanent possibility even in rich democracies. The new populist movements of the past several years have criss-crossed the political spectrum: from the left wing Occupy to the right wing Tea Party in the US, from the left wing Syriza in Greece and Podemos in Spain to the right wing Front Nationale and the UK Independence Party in Great Britain. Everywhere, populism appears to be on the rise.

The protracted economic crisis that began with the global financial crash of 2008 and 2009 poses the problem of the relationship between populism and democracy in particularly sharp form. Rather interestingly, the academic left has been on the forefront of trying to rehabilitate

the concept of populism and to use it to build political movements aimed against the economic and political *status quo*. In particular, this concerns the work of Ernesto Laclau (Laclau 1996; 2005a; 2005b; Laclau and Mouffe 1985). Laclau presents a largely discursive account of populism, inspired predominantly by Gramsci's Marxism. Populism is seen as an antagonistic mode of politics that emerges once a plethora of heterogeneous social demands coalesce around a division of “the people” against the elite or “the power” (Laclau 2005a: 74; 2005b: 38). He contrasts populism to “administration”, a technocratic style which takes up each demand in isolation and without conflict, either through the market or through interest group bargaining. By comparison, populism unifies different parts of the social terrain into one combative struggle. As Laclau would say, populism is lead by a logic of equivalence, rather than difference (Laclau 2005a: ch. 4; 2005b: 36-37).

His work has managed to make the transition into the world of politics, in a way that is rare for academic work, especially for what is rather dense and difficult reading. Laclau's work has been a key inspiration for the leaders of Podemos in Spain and Syriza in Greece (for the academic debate see Arditì 2010; Critchley and Marchart 2004; Smith 1998; Townshend 2003). One of the main messages of his body of work is that populism may present a way forward for a radical democratic agenda. If the left is going to pin its hopes on populism, then the importance of a fuller analysis of populist politics increases manifold. For now, it would appear that the research agenda built by Laclau has focused mostly on populist discourse. There is very little in terms of an analysis of contemporary populist organization and mobilization. In general, the approach has not been able to make the transition from social theory to empirical testing. Partly, this is to

do with Laclau's own brand of theorizing, which seems to encourage analysts to pursue linguistics and psycho-analysis rather than empirical testing. There are still rather large holes that need to be filled.

Populism as fractal interaction

As mentioned, the main contribution of this dissertation is to see populism as a set of interactions. The interactions between elite and mass actors can be seen as fractals: no matter where one looks, one always sees the same pattern. In that sense, populism is “self-similar.” In a way, this dissertation continues a tradition in the literature on populism: one of the main goals is to offer a definition of the phenomenon. Of course, a definition is not the only thing offered here. Instead, the fractal metaphor also offers a theoretical account and a set of research tools that one can use in other cases of populism.

Fractals have been employed as a motivating metaphor in a variety of contributions in the social sciences. Examples include: empire-building (Gunduz 2000), poverty traps (Barrett and Swallow 2006), industrial innovation (Farjoun and Levin 2011), genocide (Mann 2013), demographic change (Zhukov, Kanishchev, and Lyamin 2013) and orientalism (Moussawi 2013). Perhaps the best known example of the fractal metaphor in sociology is Andrew Abbott's discussion of turning points and trajectories (Abbott 1997; 2001: ch. 8). As Abbott says, one can always zoom in on a turning point and locate internal trajectories and smaller connected turning points. Or, one can zoom out and see that very same turning point as a node in a larger chain.

That is what fractals look like: they are “self-similar” or recursive. The same pattern exists at various levels of the phenomenon. The best known fractals are intriguing geometric shapes, but examples can also be found in nature, for instance sea shells or snow flakes.

A question that naturally comes to mind when one considers instances of popular mobilization, such as the one Serbia witnessed in 1988, is whether the process was determined more by a top-down or a bottom-up logic. Indeed, this may be the first question that one thinks of: “In the final analysis, is it more about elites or about the masses?” How can one answer this question? Given convincing evidence, one can conclude that the balance tilts more towards one or the other. One can thus say that it was really “spontaneous” and “authentic” or that it was “manipulated” and “orchestrated.” For cases like the Serbian one, an intervening factor is the fact that Slobodan Milošević is universally reviled (and rightly so). By arguing that the people were manipulated one can exculpate them and place blame on a hated political figure. As will be discussed shortly, this procedure is quite common in the literature on the former Yugoslavia.

It is also possible to say – if the episode of popular mobilization is seen as good – that it was really a spontaneous and unadulterated expression of the popular will. It would appear that movements which are seen as more spontaneous command more moral power than planned ones (Polletta 1998; 2006a: ch. 2). This seems to force even the most informative accounts of populism into a quite problematic framing of the phenomenon: is the case more “spontaneous” or more “organized”, more “top-down” or “bottom-up”? For example, when discussing the US People's Party, Taggart notes that it was “a bottom-up phenomenon built through a genuinely

mass movement” (Taggart 2000: 43), which is something that gives it more credibility. When discussing the case of the Russian *Narodniki*, he similarly feels obliged to argue that “there was a degree of spontaneity” (Taggart 2000: 51), suggesting that it had legitimating bottom-up aspects.

Canovan's discussion of “the people” reveals a similar style of thinking. She argues that “the people” can appear in two forms: either as a myth or as an actual protest movement. The argument suggests that “the people” are not only constructed, but may at times materialize and act as “something more spontaneous and less controllable”, as “grass-roots power” or “people power” (Canovan 2005: 134). Once again, the manipulative and spontaneous are cast as opposites. Canovan's example of genuine people power is the anti-communist trade union Solidarity in Poland. She notes that roughly ten million out of a population of forty participated in one way or another. For her, this gives Solidarity the right to represent “the people.” Furthermore, she argues that “no sorcerer conjured or controlled these events which seem to have been a source of astonishment even to those involved” (Canovan 2005: 136).

Once again, spontaneity and surprise strengthen legitimacy, while foresight and planning weaken it. However, ten million people out of Poland's forty is still only a minority. The example of Solidarity actually demonstrates the impossibility of “the people” ever materializing and acting on their own. “The people” must remain a construction. Any invocation of “the people” is bound to contain an element of manipulation. On the flip-side, all supposedly manipulated and highly organized events are bound to contain elements of spontaneity. Why

should we belittle the experiences of those who take part in populist events? They need not be considered political dupes just because they took part in a populist episode (see Auyero 1999; 2001).

However, saying that an episode of popular mobilization, such as the one discussed in this dissertation, is complex is not very satisfying. This problem can be solved if we view populism as fractal interaction. With fractals, we are invited to think about what produced the complexity we observe. This is where notions of “self-similarity” become useful. What does it mean to say that populism is “self-similar?” This means that the linkage between elite and mass actors is something that one can notice at various levels of the phenomenon. More practically speaking, this includes three levels. At the macro-level, the analyst considers the entire episode as a whole and looks for evidence of elite-mass interaction. At the meso-level, the analyst considers the day-to-day linkages between elites and masses. And finally zooming in at the micro-level, the analyst considers the smallest meaningful unit of analysis. If elite-mass interaction is present on all three levels, then it is warranted to speak of fractal interaction. This approach gives a theoretical account of the main mechanisms that power populism, but can also serve as a classifying tool. It can be used to assess if a case is indeed a case of populism.

In other words, the fractal metaphor embraces the endogenous character of populism: that mass action can be traced to elite action which can be traced to mass action and so on. Cause and effect are obviously intertwined. Instead of trying to explain the problem away or myopically insist on the importance of one over the other, this approach tries to turn what one may consider

a weakness into a strength. The logic can be summarized as: if you have a cross to bear, you may as well use it as a crutch.

Therefore, the main engine of populism is elite-mass interaction. Elites simultaneously use the masses while empowering them. This can be called manipulation, if one wishes. But the relevant thing to note is the continued presence of elite actors in processes which harness and amplify the power of ordinary people. The flip-side of this mobilization of popular power is the absence of autonomous spaces, i.e. spaces in which elites do not “meddle” and ordinary citizens have the opportunity to act and discuss on their own. This final point is important: are there opportunities to form autonomous spaces for the creation of discourse? These are not the norm in populism. Yet, “the people” are not asked to be silent. Rather, they are asked to speak up, provided that this is done in forums that elites can shape. This may be the main “sin” of populism. Citizens are not treated as political adults, even as they are – rather paradoxically – encouraged to be active in the political arena.

Literature 1: Political sociology

As mentioned, this dissertation aims to contribute to three bodies of scholarly work. The first of these is political sociology, broadly conceived. The second is the literature on populism. And the third is the literature on the former Yugoslavia and its break-up. What does the field of political sociology say with regard to populism? Curiously, most of mainstream sociology has avoided the topic. As Jansen writes, despite the prevalence and importance of populism, the topic has

received “almost no attention from sociology” (Jansen 2011: 75). Some important recent contributions to the literature have been written by sociologists (Berezin 2009; Jansen 2011), but overall, the field has taken a back seat. A partial exception is the literature on US populism, both the populism of the People's Party (e.g. Redding 1992; Soule 1992; Gerteis 2003), as well as the more recent literature on the Tea Party (e.g. Van Dyke and Meyer 2014; Rohlinger et al. 2015; McVeigh et al. forthcoming). These studies are also rarely framed in terms of populism.

Overviews of the field of political sociology typically exclude populism. For example, *The Blackwell Companion to Political Sociology* does not contain a chapter on populism and the index to the book contains no mention of it (Nash and Scott 2001). The journal *Annual Reviews of Sociology* has not published an article summarizing the state of the literature on populism and only one of its articles – devoted primarily to the rise of the radical right in Europe – provides a discussion of populism (Rydgren 2007). All in all, political sociology has avoided the topic.

A similar picture emerges when one looks at the sub-field of social movements and collective behavior, arguably an area in which debates about populism should be lively. Yet, this is not the case. For example, the widely-read *Blackwell Companion to Social Movements* (Snow et al. 2007) contains no chapter on populism and no mention of the topic in its index. The handbook by Della Porta and Diani mentions populism twice, but only tangentially, while quoting other sources (Della Porta and Diani 2006: 239, 246). The agenda-setting book *Dynamics of Contention* (McAdam et al. 2001) paints a similar picture. It mentions populism twice, in a brief discussion of “authoritarian populist regimes” and in its discussion of Mexico (McAdam et al.:

266, 296). None of its fifteen cases are cases of populism. Nor are the cases discussed in light of their – stronger or weaker – populist characteristics. In other words, the literature on social movements has avoided the topic in much the same way that the larger field of political sociology has.

Political sociology in general and the field of social movements in particular have been built on cases marked by clean divisions between “the good guys” and “the bad guys.” For instance, Tilly's “polity model”, which has informed much of the literature on social movements, is based on a distinction between challengers on the outside and their elite targets on the inside (Tilly 1978). Gamson's discussion of members and incumbents on one side and challengers on the other is similar in this respect (Gamson 1975). But populism muddies the waters, since elites are often involved with the mobilization of “challengers.” One does not know if there is a side to cheer for. The “good guys” and the “bad guys” are not clearly delineated. Indeed, populism presents a good case of an “awkward” research topic (Polletta 2006b), a phenomenon that is morally and politically ambiguous.

This ambiguity may constitute one reason why sociologists have steered clear of populism. In addition, sociologists may have been under the impression that populism is a vaguely defined concept. And this is an impression that is not without merit, as was mentioned earlier. The lack of an agreed-upon definition of populism may have lead political sociologists towards other concepts, such as revolution, social movements, democratization or nationalism. Or, they may have been influenced by the everyday usage of the term, which is predominantly pejorative. As

Jansen argues (2011: 77), populism comes bundled with a variety of unpleasant connotations such as political opportunism, corruption, clientelism and authoritarianism. Therefore, the words “populism” and “populist” are used quite often as political labels with which one can attack his or her political opponents (D’Eramo 2013). The usual assumption with populism is that there must be an element of manipulation, often having to do with ruthless elites who capitalize on popular discontent. The approach of this dissertation is that this is precisely what makes populism interesting. And additionally, it also provides a methodological entry point, a usable research strategy. The presence of elite manipulation suggests that we should pay attention to the way elite-mass interaction works and the way it drives the phenomenon of populism.

Arguably, a fuller understanding of populism may bring important benefits for several areas of sociological research. As Jansen writes (2011: 76), populism is pertinent to the study of relationships between state and society, the role of political parties, the construction and reproduction of political cleavages, the role of leadership and political charisma in movements. These are only some areas of research that may benefit from an engagement with populism. Other areas include comparative-historical work where attention to populism may lead to fresh insights on state formation, political development and democratization. The sociology of organization also stands to gain from an engagement with populist modes of organization, while the sociology of culture may find a lot that is of interest in populist discourses and ideologies. In other words, populism seems to be relevant for a broad spectrum of topics that matter for modern politics.

Therefore, political sociology stands to gain much if it takes populism seriously. But the flip-side also holds: the literature on populism can benefit if it employs some of the analytical tools recently developed within political sociology. This especially holds for process-oriented approaches. Many contributions to basic social theory, i.e. contributions that aim to set the agenda for other researchers, have emphasized the importance of an interactional or relational approach. For example, scholars have pleaded for the analysis of processes and mechanisms, as in the influential “Dynamics of contention” approach (McAdam et al. 2001), for the study of social fields, as in Bourdieu's sociology (Bourdieu 1977; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992), relational fields (Goldstone 2004) and, more recently, strategic action fields (Fligstein and McAdam 2012). The field metaphor suggests interaction and much of sociology has been motivated by these broad insights. Of course, much work still remains. In particular, while fields and mechanisms can serve as a motivating image, one is not really certain about how to operationalize this for empirical research. The chapters in this dissertation try to take a step forward in this respect, by offering research strategies that can be employed more broadly.

And finally, the recent re-emergence of populism even in the politics of many developed countries suggests that an engagement with populism may increase the visibility, influence and importance of sociology. Populism, both in its left-wing and its right-wing version, appears to be on the increase everywhere. Political sociologists can either embrace the phenomenon or stand by their older categories, thereby risking exclusion from wider political and social debates. The case of Ernesto Laclau, a scholar of populism who has been quite influential among the protagonists of recent left-wing populist movements in southern Europe, shows that academic

pursuits need not be disconnected from political practice.

Literature 2: Studies of populism

The second field of study to which this dissertation aims to contribute is the literature on populism. The field is heterogeneous in terms of disciplinary background and frequently segmented according to geographical region. In particular, the literature on Latin American populism figures prominently, as does a distinct literature on right-wing populism in the European Union. Despite the internal heterogeneity of the field, several main bodies of work can be located. The literature on populism can be broadly classified into four camps: modernization approaches, Marxist approaches, discursive approaches and institutional approaches (see also Weyland 2001; Jansen 2011).

Modernization theories placed their emphasis on rapid urbanization, industrialization and the advancement of education (Deutsch 1954; Kornhauser 1959; Lipset 1960). Such socio-economic changes destabilize traditional forms of rule and lead to unstable forms such as populism (Germani 1978; Di Tella 1965; Ionescu and Gellner 1969b). For this group of scholars, socio-economic modernization breaks down traditional political arrangements as well as behavioral patterns. As broad segments of the population become politically activated and mobilized, political instability ensues and populism fills the gap. Modernization theories see populism as a particular developmental phase which can be outgrown as countries develop politically. Empirically, much of this literature has focused on Latin America.

Populism was also frequently approached from the perspective of Marxism in general and dependency and world-system theory in particular (Frank 1966; Wallerstein 1974; Amin 1977). Marxist approaches share some concerns with modernization theories, notably a focus on the economy. Of course, Marxists also have a clear dedication to particular political goals, which are often the opposite of modernization theorists. For Marxists, the incorporation of Third World countries into peripheral and semi-peripheral positions in the world economy leads – once again – to political instability and populism (Waisman 1982; Spalding 1977; Klaren 1973). In that respect, both approaches see economic relations as crucial. Additionally, both approaches are empirically grounded in Latin American experiences. Moreover, populism was seen as coupled with protectionist economic policies, such as import substitution industrialization (O'Donnell 1979; Cardoso and Faletto 1979). In some cases, scholars inspired by structural arguments looked for classes and class-coalitions which formed the basis for particular styles of rule (Paige 1978; Stokes 1989; Luebbert 1991).

These structural approaches have lost influence over the last two decades. They were criticized for leaving little room for politics and culture, for their teleological views of history, and for their definitions of populism as a package of particular policies (Weyland 2001: 5-6; Jansen 2011: 79). Discursive perspectives provide a third approach. This body of work has been on the upswing in recent years, in large part due to the influential work of Laclau (Laclau 1977; Laclau and Mouffe 1985; Laclau 1996, 2005a, 2005b). Discursive approaches see populism as an antagonistic mode of politics that forms in the public sphere when “the people” are successfully

constructed in opposition to the elite. Such contributions focus on the speeches of populist politicians and the populist discourse of particular parties and movements (Kazin 1995; de la Torre 2000; Mudde 2004; Mudde 2007; Hawkins 2009; Mudde and Kaltwasser 2012; Stavrakakis and Katsambekis 2014; Moffitt and Tormey 2014). The discursive approach is important because it highlights the discursive construction of “the people”, the ways in which populist politicians and others try to create a seemingly homogenous force out of a previously segmented society. Yet, measuring populist discourse has proven to be difficult, as researchers themselves frankly admit (Hawkins 2009: 1046; Moffitt and Tormey 2014: 384). In addition, analysis of discourse is undertaken with little to no concern for matters of mobilization and organization. In this respect, a focus on words and ideas becomes detached from the world of political practice. This is something that the fourth approach to populism places center stage.

The fourth approach emphasizes matters of organization, agency and institutions. Populism is explained by the weakened capacity of existing institutions to channel citizens demands and address their expectations (Huntington 1991; Roberts 1996; 2006; Weyland 1996; 1998; 2000; de la Torre 2000; Ellner 2003). Disaffected voters who are not incorporated via strong political parties turn to populist leaders instead. Most of the research has once again been on Latin America. For example, the work on “neopopulism” was motivated by the rise of politicians such as Hugo Chavez and Evo Morales. Some of the same factors – notably the weakness of existing institutions – have been emphasized by scholars of West European populism. These authors have focused most of their energies on the rise of the radical right in Europe. The explanation is similar since it stresses the weakness of political parties and the

inability of liberal democracy to accommodate new grievances (Kitschelt and McGann 1995; Betz and Immerfall 1998; Mair 2002; Ignazi 2003; Norris 2005; Mudde 2007). The expansion of the liberal and technocratic project of European integration further destabilizes centrist political parties and gives more momentum to radical right populists (Berezin 2009).

All of these approaches are valuable and all contribute something to the study of populism. However, they all share the same fault, namely, that they are exclusively oriented towards the problem of populism's emergence. Yet, this is not the only question of relevance when it comes to populism. Moreover, it may be a question that cannot be answered. Faced with the existing plethora of populist cases across the globe, one would have to conclude that populism can emerge in almost any setting. Social modernization and peripheral incorporation into the world economy are not necessary, since populism exists even in the rich democracies of North America and Western Europe. Populist discourses are important, but should be studied with rigor and in connection with popular mobilization. And a focus on weak institutions and parties is helpful, but essentially restates the problem, namely that populists tend to emerge when the existing establishment is in crisis. Therefore, the question of when and where populism emerges may not be one that can be answered. It certainly cannot be answered with a single answer. If that is the case, we may be better off asking other questions.

As already mentioned, Jansen's (2011) re-conceptualization of populism as a mode of political practice offers a good way forward. This approach emphasizes both popular mobilization and populist discourse and aims to study the processual aspects of populism. The next step for this

approach to populism is to focus explicitly on elite-mass interactions and view them from various vantage points, i.e. zooming in and zooming out.

Literature 3: Studies of the break-up of Yugoslavia

The third literature to which this dissertation aims to contribute is the literature on the former Yugoslavia and its terminal crisis in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The main goal here is to “bring the people back in”, i.e. to challenge the overly elite-centered approach that most of the contributions to this literature have relied on. The Serbian populist episode of 1988, or the “anti-bureaucratic revolution” as it is called, has not been studied often. It is usually dismissed as a simple case of top-down mobilization and elite manipulation. Elites are indeed important – most notably the Serbian politician Slobodan Milošević – such a singular focus on elites misses the chance to examine the linkages and interactions between elite and mass actors. Though the goal here is to “bring the people back in”, it should be mentioned that “the people” are a populist construct, not an actor that can act autonomously. This dissertation does not aim to reverse the story from elites to popular actors, but to show the form of interaction between the two.

The literature on the political crisis and subsequent violent dissolution of Yugoslavia has been heavily focused on elites. This is partly an understandable reaction to the so-called “ancient hatreds” thesis (Kaplan 1994). According to this argument, the various ethnic groups in the Balkans were “unusually wild and predisposed to violence” (Ramet 2005: 3). Most scholars of the Yugoslav break-up saw little basis in fact for such sweeping generalizations and decided to

emphasize elite strategies instead, particularly the political use of nationalist grievances. This perspective was further strengthened by a strong desire to assign blame. For many scholars, the most important question about the break-up is “whose fault is it” (Ramet 2005: 4-5)? This type of inquiry leads quickly to particular personalities.

The goal of this section is not to provide a review of the literature on the dissolution of Yugoslavia. A number of contributions exist which perform this task (Ramet 2004a; 2004b; 2005; Dragović-Soso 2008; Jović 2009). Instead, the goal is to show that a singular focus on elite strategies has produced a warped picture of Yugoslavia's final years in general and of the populist episode of the late 1980s in particular. Of course, the presence of Milošević adds credence to the elite-centric argument. He is widely seen as (one of the politicians) most responsible for the violent dissolution of Yugoslavia and the wars of the 1990s. For example, in Ramet's two-part overview of the literature on the Yugoslav break-up, Milošević's name appears 86 times (Ramet 2004a; 2004b). In a recent exchange on Yugoslavia in 1989, Milošević's name appears a combined 61 times (Gagnon 2010a; Kanin 2010; Gagnon 2010b).

When it comes to the rise of nationalism in the late 1980s, most scholars start their accounts with Milošević. For example, Pavković argues that Milošević was “the first communist politician to make use of the re-emerging nationalist ideologies” (Pavković 2000: 103), while Cohen similarly sees Milošević as “the most successful communist functionary to exploit ethnic nationalism as a political resource during the second part of the 1980s” (Cohen 1993: 51). As Dragović-Soso writes, there is a near consensus regarding the role of Milošević in the

centrifugal processes of the late 1980s and early 1990s (Dragović-Soso 2008: 14). The focus on Milošević is further accentuated by the many biographies of him (Đukić 1992; Doder and Branson 1999; Cohen 2001; Sell 2002; LeBor 2004). A focus on Milošević is understandable given his political responsibility for the tragic outcomes of the 1990s. Nobody in their right mind would want to defend Milošević. The analytical problem, however, is that a focus on political responsibility deflects attention from a closer examination of the way the populism of the late 1980s worked and the elite-mass interactions that gave it momentum.

Scholarly accounts of the anti-bureaucratic revolution all point to elite manipulation. Indeed, they predominantly use the dichotomy of “spontaneous” versus “organized” to paint the protest wave as simply a reflection of elite strategies. For example, referring to the Serbian protests of 1988, Glaurdić says that “there was nothing spontaneous in their organization and timing” (Glaurdić 2011: 29). Ramet echoes this statement when she writes that the protests were “ostensibly spontaneous” but really “carefully organized” (Ramet 2005: 56). Bennet again suggests that “there was nothing spontaneous about the meetings, which were all carefully stage-managed” (Bennett 1995: 98). Jović writes that “even when they [politicians] mobilized ‘the people’, they manipulated them successfully in every moment” (Jović 2014). Other contributions similarly speak of the protests as “stage-managed” (Little and Silber 1995: 58; Pavlowitch 2002: 194).

Such a stylization of Serbia's populist protests is not so much empirically wrong as analytically unproductive. It frames the debate in a way that leads to a dismissal of the protests as a top-

down phenomenon not worthy of closer examination. For some scholars, a cursory dismissal of the protests serves to re-establish the lines between the “good guys” and the “bad guys.” For example, Gagnon has tried to show that “the people” had the “right” democratic attitudes, resisted the nationalist onslaught as long as they could, but were ultimately forced down the nationalist path by politicians such as Milošević (Gagnon 2004, 2010a; see also Lowinger 2009; 2013 for a similar argument). Yet, as already mentioned, populism makes it impossible to establish such clean dividing lines. Moreover, if manipulation was present, one would want to know more about the ways in which it was performed.

The elite-centric approach is appealing since it can be used to place blame on a set of universally reviled actors. Instead of the “ancient hatreds” thesis, scholars have constructed another simplified narrative, what can be called the “paradise lost/loathsome leaders” perspective (Cohen 2001: 465; Dragović-Soso 2008: 15). Of course, there can be little question that Milošević was a key actor and no one would want to rehabilitate him. But a quick experiment in counter-factual logic can serve to demonstrate the weakness of the elite-centric argument. What would a budding populist politician keen on exploiting nationalism for political gain have to do? What would have to be his concrete moves? How should he proceed in amassing more power? This is where the elite-centric perspective has very little to say.

Luckily, the literature contains a contribution that points the way. A detailed account of Serbia's anti-bureaucratic revolution has been written by Vladislavljević (2008). His book takes the first step in “bringing the people back in.” He shows empirically that the protests were

simultaneously a top-down and a bottom-up phenomenon and provides a detailed qualitative historical account of the entire episode. Also arguing against the overly elite-centric perspective offered by most scholars, Vladisavljević restores the anti-bureaucratic revolution to its full historical complexity.

This is simultaneously the main advantage and the main draw-back of the book. It is an invaluable contribution that will be an important reference source when it comes to setting the empirical record straight. However, even though Vladisavljević's book leaves the reader with a sense that the anti-bureaucratic revolution was complex, there is no firm handle on *how* it was complex, on the pattern of interaction between elite and mass actors. This dissertation argues that a handle on this can be achieved by engaging the concept of populism, which is something that Vladisavljević does not explicitly do. Vujačić's theoretical essay on the affinities between "class" and "nation" in communist and post-communist Eastern Europe comes closer. However, he also concludes that populism is too imprecise a concept (Vujačić 2003: 391). As mentioned, this view is shared by many, even many who research the topic. Nevertheless, this dissertation aims to add precision to the study of populism.

It should be explicitly stated that this dissertation does not focus so much on the issue of nationalism in the former Yugoslavia, mostly because this is something that has been researched in detail. The anti-bureaucratic revolution certainly featured a lot of nationalism: Serbian protesters on the streets often voiced typically nationalist claims about the victim-hood of their ethnic group, the media recycled the Kosovo issue as the key myth of Serbian nationhood, and

politicians began to cater to and amplify such newly rediscovered national sentiments. However, most of the topics that have to do with Serbian nationalism – and are worth researching – have already been researched. Yet arguably, the nationalism of the late 1980s was folded into a larger populist package that has not been sufficiently examined.

Which is not to say that studies of populism and the former Yugoslavia have not crossed paths. However, such contributions tend to *say* they are interested in the issue of populism, but actually turn to nationalism in their empirical analysis (Bowman 2005; Laclau 2005a: 197-198). This brings up the issue of how to delineate between nationalism and populism. The two can be meaningfully distinguished for the purposes of analysis, even though they may intermingle in many empirical settings. A good way to differentiate them is to define populism in terms of a vertical cleavage, i.e. a cleavage that separates “the people” and the elite and to define nationalism in terms of a horizontal cleavage, i.e. a cleavage between “the nation” and a racial or ethnic minority (Jansen 2011: 84). Of course, most of the time there will be a lot of overlap between “the people” and “the nation.” This dissertation's main motivation is to study populism, but nationalism will also appear on more than one occasion given the close affinities between the two.

Introducing the case of Serbia

The case of Serbia in the 1980s is not frequently discussed as an instance of populism. As mentioned, most scholars have focused instead on the more explicit nationalism of the 1990s,

both in Serbia as well as in other former republics of Yugoslavia. Yet, Serbia in the late 1980s checks practically all the boxes of an ideal-type case of populism: a peripheral country, economic crisis, a charismatic leader, a division of society into the elite and the people, the emergence of a discourse that celebrates “the people”, and popular mobilization of the people in the streets. Arguably, this is a case that researchers of populism should be interested in, not least because its ramifications include state dissolution and war.

Yugoslavia in the 1980s can be described as a partially modernized and industrialized middle income country. Socialist modernization transformed the country's economic and social landscape but did not managed to lead to full industrial and technological “catch-up” with the West. Throughout much of the 1980s, the Yugoslav economy was struggling. Problems included rising unemployment, stagnating living standards, high inflation and debt (Woodward 1995a; Lowinger 2009). The 1980s became something of a “lost decade” compared to the more impressive growth of living standards in the 1960s and 1970s. The economic malaise was a big problem for the communist party (the League of Communists), though the economic problems of the 1980s seem like nothing compared to the economic disasters seen in the 1990s.

From a political stand-point, Yugoslavia can be described as an authoritarian socialist country with a decentralized political structure, which mostly mirrored the ethnic composition of its population. In comparison with other East European regimes, Yugoslavia was always more liberal and open. This was a political consequence of the domestic legitimacy that Yugoslav communists achieved through World War II, as well as subsequent political developments. The

most notable of these was the break that Josip Broz Tito, the country's life-long ruler, made with Stalin in the late 1940s. This led to a loosening of the regime and to more openness towards the West, including travel and emigration, as well as rapidly Westernizing consumption habits (for example see Doder 1978; Vučetić 2012).

The regime's attempt to pursue a socialist course independent from the Soviet Union but still based in Marxist ideals led to attempts to formulate “workers' self-management.” Workers were given the power – at least on paper – to run the companies they worked in. The system was subsequently transformed into a more comprehensive system of “socialist self-management”, in which all of society was to function along the same participatory principles. Of course, analysts have noted that not all of the lofty goals of egalitarian participation were achieved. Self-management could be used by elites as a tool to ensure wage restraint and labor discipline (Woodward 1995a). All in all, the regime retained a Leninist core: it remained an authoritarian one party system built around a vanguard communist party (Jowitt 1992). The regime can be summarily described as a contradictory combination of an authoritarian core with some important democratizing impulses and a fair dose of domestic legitimacy.

Day-to-day political life was hampered by a convoluted political system established by Tito's final constitution of 1974. It gave a lot of power to republics, leaving the federal center with little to no influence (Jović 2009). By the late 1980s, dissatisfaction with the constitution rose, particularly in Serbia. As one of six republics, Serbia was divided into three territorial parts: central Serbia, the autonomous province of Vojvodina in the north and the autonomous province

of Kosovo in the south. Just as the federation was weak relative to republics, central Serbia was weak relative to its autonomous provinces. That provinces already were *de facto* republics is something that former provincial leaders readily admitted (Lekić et al. 2009: 118). In addition, Serbia was the only republic that was divided in this manner.

The status of autonomous province was particularly controversial in the case of Kosovo given its Albanian majority and Serbian minority. It was a compromise solution meant to appease Albanian politicians who would have preferred for Kosovo to be a republic equal with Serbia. Yet, going so far was something that the Serbian and Yugoslav elite was unwilling to do. Kosovo was of symbolic importance for Serbian history, as a key location of the medieval Serbian state, the Serbian Orthodox church and the site of important battles against the Ottoman Empire (Anzulović 1999). The political position of Albanians in Yugoslavia was complicated by the fact that they were the only non-Slavic group in a multi-ethnic federation dominated by Slavs (notably Serbs, Croats and Slovenians). Indeed, it would not be a stretch to say that Albanians were in a position of second-order citizenship in Yugoslavia. Ethnic distance between groups was generally not a problem, especially among Slav groups, but Albanians were the universal exception: other ethnic groups generally did not want closer ties – through work, friendship or marriage – with Albanians (Baćević et al. 1991; Popović et al. 1990: 134-141).

The second-order status of Albanians was also revealed in the ways the regime would handle their protests. In March of 1981, a protest of Albanian university students over the quality of food in the lunch cafeteria developed into a protest of Albanians throughout the province. The

demands expanded to include a formal recognition of Kosovo as a republic (Lekić et al. 2009: 20-21). The regime turned to repression to halt the protests. Although the country's authoritarianism had progressively softened from the 1960s onwards – so that repression became less and less appealing to political elites – the regime nevertheless had few qualms about repressing Albanian unrest (Vladislavljević 2008: 95). Such a response was much harder to imagine when it came to Serbian protests. Indeed, most of the Serbian protests of 1988 featured little to no police repression. On the other hand, the Albanian protests of 1981 were officially proclaimed a “counter-revolution.” The expression was soon extended to all potentially destabilizing Albanian activity.

The Kosovo issue came to the forefront of Yugoslav politics. The main trend that worried Serbian politicians was the changing demographic composition of Kosovo. Throughout the period after World War II, the share of the Serbian minority had been decreasing and the share of the Albanian majority increasing. The percentage of Serbs in the province dropped from 24 percent in the 1948 census to 13 percent in the 1981 census, while the percentage of Albanians rose from 69 percent to 77 percent in the same period (Petrović and Blagojević 1989: 84). This led to fears of an “ethnically clean” Kosovo, one completely dominated by Albanians. The falling share of the Serbian population was also driven in part by a higher birth rate of Albanians, more than double the birth rate of Serbs (Popović et al. 1990: 12). The position of Serbs was also shared by a small Montenegrin group living in Kosovo, members of which were seen as ethnically and politically close to Serbs.

As the crisis heated up, the focus of political debate turned to the political reasons for Serbian emigration. Many Serbs complained of Albanian pressure as a factor driving them towards emigration to central Serbia. This included low-level violence of various sorts: harassment of Serbian women, stoning of houses, burning of crops. It is impossible to say how widespread these practices really were. The most defensible position seems to be that a kernel of truth existed but that much was exaggerated. Official data show that crime in Kosovo was generally not on the increase (Popović et al. 1990: 45-75). Additionally, ethnically motivated rape (of Serbian women by Albanian men) was relatively rare (Hudelist 1989: 62), while many instances of “rape” were actually lighter forms of sexual harassment (Tijanić 1988: 128) . A survey of Kosovo Serbs who left the province showed that a small minority of Serbs had first-hand experience of Albanian violence but that a much larger percentage of those that left did so because of a general climate of fear (Petrović and Blagojević 1989: 219). Throughout most of the 1980s, the Kosovo issue was one that politicians, including Serbian politicians, tried to address through inter-party diplomacy and calming rhetoric. This is something that began to change only with the political ascendancy of Slobodan Milošević.

Setting the stage for the “anti-bureaucratic revolution”

The 1980s began with the death of Tito, the country's uncontested ruler since World War II. The transition to post-Tito rule was handled smoothly by Yugoslavia's communists. It was only by the mid to late 1980s that social turbulence began to gather momentum. All across Yugoslavia, industrial workers were mobilizing with socio-economic and distributive demands (Stanojević

2003; Lowinger 2009). Many went to the streets and increasingly, to the federal assembly building in Belgrade, to make their grievances heard. In parallel, the Kosovo issue was being put onto the public agenda by sporadic protests of Kosovo Serbs. A group of Serbian nationalist activists began organizing protests and petitions. The core of the group was located in Kosovo Polje, a small town near Priština, the provincial capital.

This group organized the majority of the early protests, although the movement's decentralized character meant that no single organizational center of Serbs in Kosovo existed (Vladislavjević 2008: 104, 142). They also bore the brunt of the initial half-hearted repressive measures, such as the temporary imprisonment of one of their founding members or police surveillance (Doderović 1990: 21, 30; Lekić et al 2009: 21). Fighting for their cause was made more difficult by the distrust and opposition of the Albanian-led political elite in Kosovo, the cautious attitude of the Serbian elite and the disinterest of the federal center and elites from other republics. Outside support came primarily from Belgrade's nationalist intellectuals (Dragović-Soso 2002).

By 1987, this began to change. In particular, changes at the top of the Serbian party meant that the Kosovo Polje group, and the Serbian nationalist movement in Kosovo more generally, may have found a more receptive elite partner. Ivan Stambolić, who had dominated Serbian politics during the mid 1980s, ensured that his long term protege Slobodan Milošević was elected as head of the Serbian central committee, the top position in the Serbian party. In April of 1987, the Serbian nationalist activists from Kosovo Polje asked Milošević to visit them and hold a meeting with officials and ordinary people. This day has since become mythologized: when he

was told that the police was beating the crowd which gathered outside the building, Milošević responded by telling the crowd “Nobody should dare beat you!” (Jović 2009: 258-261; Vladislavljević 2008: 100-101). Overnight, Milošević's popularity with Serbs soared, especially in Kosovo.

Stambolić had the chance to do the same a year earlier when he visited Kosovo Polje. Yet, he chose the opposite path of trying to calm the crowd down (Tijanić 1988: 174). The Kosovo Polje activists decided to give the new man in charge a chance, having failed to get anywhere with Stambolić. In fact, they were ready to give anybody a chance so long as their problems could be publicized and their cause promoted (Doderović 1990: 36-38). Following the Kosovo Polje speech, Milošević increasingly turned to a more populist style of politics and began to use the Kosovo issue to attack his enemies. Various minor conflicts with Stambolić finally lead to a head-on collision at the eighth session of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia in September of 1987 (Pavlović et al. 2008; Vladislavljević 2004). Here, Milošević managed to defeat Stambolić and consolidated power within Serbia.

This party meeting was also important for the way it made elite divisions publicly visible. The conflict between Stambolić and Milošević was televised and millions of interested viewers could witness a high-stakes party session (Lekić and Pavić 2007). Afterwards, it became increasingly difficult for politicians to go back to closed party meetings. The media was now present, domestic and foreign, television and press, at many party sessions. For the younger generation of Yugoslav communists, Milošević included, the increased transparency of political

life was a good thing: it was a natural development of Yugoslavia's socialism, its more open and democratic character. Chapter 2 investigates the role of party sessions for the dynamics of Serbia's anti-bureaucratic revolution.

The eighth session of the Serbian party also revealed the main political cleavages in the elite. Given the complex nature of the Yugoslav state and party apparatus, the fault-lines were many and cross-cutting: young versus old, Serbian unitarists versus those who defended the power of provinces, orthodox communists versus liberal communists, Yugoslav federalists versus confederalists (Vladisavljević 2008: 126). Yet now, the various cleavages began to coalesce around a single division between bureaucrats and populists: between those that continued to work in the old style of politics and those that embraced notions of rapid change via mass support. The old style involved lots of patient, diplomatic work through the institutions of a decentralized party and a complex state structure. The populist style of politics embraced speed, rejected compromise and sought the support of popular forces. The division has alternatively been referred to as “institutionalists” versus “revolutionists” (Jović 2009: 258) or as “cool heads” versus “hot heads” (Stambolić 1995: 194). I refer to it as bureaucrats versus populists.

Populists were primarily located in the Serbian party, especially after Milošević purged Stambolić's adherents. The bureaucrats and technocrats were located in other organizations and institutions: the provincial party organizations of Vojvodina and Kosovo and federal institutions. This is something of a simplification, but the relevant point is that in 1988 it is indeed very hard to find populists outside the Serbian party. Most of the others are old-fashioned politicians who

were caught off guard by the aggressiveness and ruthlessness of Milošević and the circle around him.

For Milošević, the political priority was curtailing the powers of the provinces, both Vojvodina and Kosovo, and reintegrating them under his control. This meant that constitutional revisions had to be agreed to in which the consent of both the provincial elites of Vojvodina and Kosovo was required. Stambolić had made some progress with this process through his slow and methodical intra-party diplomacy. Milošević hoped to reach the same goal with different means. Often, this meant extra-institutional means via the pressure of street protest. A close colleague of Milošević in 1988 summarized this attitude by saying that “everything is allowed if it leads to the fulfillment of goals” (Lekić et al. 2009: 128). Milošević himself summarized this populist style with strong authoritarian undertones with the following motto: “constitutional or unconstitutional, institutional or extra-institutional, statutory or non-statutory, we will do what the people ask of us” (Lekić et al. 2009: 183). Nudged by the Serbian activists from Kosovo, Milošević began his transformation from an unexceptional apparatchik to a man of the people.

In pursuing his new course, Milošević could rely on two main levers of power: the media and wing organizations such as the Socialist Alliance of Working People (SAWP). The main mechanism that Milošević could use was the dependence of some media outlets on the state and party apparatus. In particular, this concerns the newspaper *Politika*. Chapter 3 investigates the role of *Politika* more closely. The second resource that Milošević could employ was the SAWP, a wing organization of the communist party. It was the formal successor of the WWII popular

front. This umbrella organization originally gathered all anti-fascist forces, communist as well as non-communist. By the 1980s, it was a parallel bureaucracy meant to function as an institutionalized forum where a broader set of actors could discuss policies and initiatives put forward by the party. The SAWP was important because it could use its resources to support protest efforts locally. When the decision was finally made to support the protests, the Serbian party gave instructions to local branches of the SAWP to provide protesters with assistance (Lekić et al. 2009: 89). Most of the time, this meant a stage and public announcement equipment, which in previous protests the activists usually improvised by themselves (Vladislavljević 2008: 169).

The political finale of the anti-bureaucratic revolution came in the shape of political resignations. The leadership of both the Vojvodina and the Kosovo committee was forced to step down. This meant that Milošević had emerged as a clear victor. In early 1989 he could pass the constitutional revisions that weakened the powers of the provinces and re-centralized Serbia. In this respect, the power of a communist leader was actually strengthened by a wave of popular mobilization. Of course, the rise of Milošević was not welcomed by other republics. On the contrary, it fed the centrifugal tendencies already present in Yugoslavia. In particular, Slovenia and Croatia were now on collision course with Serbia. However, Milošević was buoyed by the popularity which he amassed in Serbia during the anti-bureaucratic revolution. The final years of Yugoslavia – 1989 and 1990 – were thus a constant tug-of-war between the various republics. The fall of the Berlin Wall in late 1989 put into doubt the viability of socialism, while inter-republican conflicts put into doubt the viability of a federal state framework. The resolution of

the impasse came when armed conflict broke out, beginning with the short skirmish in Slovenia and a brutal war in Croatia. Therefore, the anti-bureaucratic revolution can be seen as a key link in the chain of events that lead to the violent break-up of Yugoslavia.

Road map for the dissertation

This final section of the introduction presents a road-map for the dissertation. It consists of an introduction, three empirical chapters and a conclusion. Each of the three empirical chapters engages a certain aspect of populism, a different interactive process of relevance for the workings of populism. The chapters are connected via the shared concern for populism as a set of interactions. However, the intention behind them is that each chapter can also stand alone as a separate investigation of a certain aspect of populism. Here, I will briefly summarize each of the three chapters and provide a road-map for the reader.

Chapter 2 investigates populism on the terrain of events. The interaction between elite and mass players is traced in the dynamics of protest relative to elite events. As a site of interaction, waves of popular mobilization pose specific challenges. This chapter presents a type of analysis rooted in “eventful history” (Tarrow 1989; Beissinger 2002; Sewell 2005). The interaction between mass actors and elite actors is approached in terms of the relationship between protest events and elite events, in this case sessions of the communist party. This chapter presents an event catalog of contentious events and examines the link with sessions of the communist party, while simultaneously keeping an eye on a variety of other factors and variables.

Chapter 2 is the first to sketch how the fractal metaphor can be operationalized. First, taking the protest wave as a whole, the investigation examines whether certain elite events had a key impact on mass events, i.e. on levels of protest activity. This means looking at certain elite events as turning points in the protest wave taken as a whole. Especially important are elite events that function as statements from the elite, as the work of Ermakoff (2008: ch. 11) has argued. However, one can also zoom in from the macro to the meso level, i.e. to the level of day-to-day linkages between events. Does the relationship between elite events and protests also take this shape? In this scenario, elite events provide opportunities for contemporaneous protest. In other words, protesters may try to disrupt elite events and in this way provide publicity for their grievances. As discussed by Tarrow (1996, 2012: ch. 7), the first possibility is to see some events in general (and elite events in this case) as turning points, the second is to see them as a grid for other processes. There is also a third scenario. Here, one zooms in fully, to consider the single event as a site of interaction. Is it also marked by elite-mass interplay? If one can find evidence of elite-mass interaction on all three levels, then the fractal metaphor is justified.

Chapter 3 investigates a different site of elite-mass interaction. It shifts from matters of political mobilization to discussions in the public sphere. It takes as its jumping-off point the recent critiques of the Habermasian model of the liberal public sphere (Stamatov 2000; Mah 2000; Adut 2012). In particular, Chapter 3 examines a special section of one of Serbia's most important newspapers, *Politika*. This newspaper section was called "Echoes and reactions" and published letters written by readers. The exact authorship of the letters is something that remains

shrouded in mystery. It is highly unlikely that anyone will be able to find out how many were actually written by ordinary readers and how many by Milošević's shadowy allies. Yet, the letter section reveals a key facet of how populism works. It is based on a combination of elite manipulation and popular input. This chapter presents a data-set based on the letters, concentrating on the various usages of the word “people.” The data-set provides a way to assess the strength of populist discourse in comparative fashion, a method which differs from the approaches put forward by the literature (Mudde 2004; Mudde and Kaltwasser 2012; Laclau 2005a; Hawkins 2009; Moffitt and Tormey 2014; Stavrakakis and Katsambekis 2014).

This chapter fleshes out the fractal metaphor by examining the linkages between discourse and protest. Is what happens in the realm of populist discourse connected to trends in popular mobilization? Is what happens in the media linked with what happens in the streets? First, if one takes the letters themselves – or even a single letter – as the unit of analysis, then one is already looking at a product of elite-mass interaction. Some letters were quite probably written by the secret editorial team, some were selected by the team out of a large pile of letters sent by ordinary citizens, and all were equipped with a title chosen by the editors. In that sense, the rules of the interaction are established by the elite, but the participation of ordinary actors comes free-willingly and with gusto. Zooming out to consider the day-to-day dynamics of the relationship, one can ask if the trends in the letters are connected to trends in the streets? Does a rise in populist discourse, i.e. the populist construction of “the people” through the letters, lead to a rise in protest activity? Does the reverse relationship also hold? And finally, one can zoom out further still to consider the protest wave in its entirety. Is there a relationship between exposure

to the mass media and its populist messages and protest activity? Can one say that reading the populist press more leads to protesting more? This is the final stage of the fractal analysis. If there is evidence of elite-mass interaction on all three levels, then the fractal metaphor is justified.

Chapter 4 also focuses on the public sphere but from a different angle. Out of the three empirical chapters, it is the only one that does not aim to contribute to fleshing out the fractal metaphor. Instead, it aims to accomplish a different task. It focuses on the cartoons published in five Serbian newspapers. This investigation makes it possible to examine why “the people” should be celebrated. Chapter 3 shows that the populist discourse in the media aimed to construct “the people” as a unitary political actor. Yet, it does not specify what it was that made the people “good.” An investigation of the cartoons serves to highlight the fact that what conventional text-based material (readers' letters) may not be able to do, images and their visual vocabularies may.

Chapter 4 investigates the imagined interactions “taking place” in cartoons and reveals the presence of a strong discourse of producerism, i.e. a discourse which relies on notions of productive and unproductive work (Hattam 1993; Kazin 1995; Huston 1998; Currarino 2011). The central theme in the cartoons is the division between the blue collar worker and the political bureaucrat or functionary. The worker is usually active while the bureaucrat is passive and lazy. A key theme associated with the bureaucrat is the arm-chair: he is often sitting, resting and sleeping in it. It becomes a symbol of his parasitic character. In other words, the populist discourse of the time is linked to a producerist view which celebrates the manual labor of

ordinary people, especially the blue collar worker, and demonizes the “paper” activity of bureaucratic elites. The importance of producerism extends beyond the socialist setting of Serbia, since producerism continues to offer a “folk theory” about what makes the people “good.”

The fourth and final chapter concludes by looking at several possible extensions of the dissertation. The conclusion extrapolates the findings of the three empirical chapters to consider a wider set of cases. The dissertation also contains two appendices. Appendix 1 consists of tables, Appendix 2 of figures. And finally, Appendix 3 consists of photographs of the protests drawn from the archive of *Politika*.

Chapter 2

Interaction through events: street protests and party sessions

Introduction

This chapter investigates the first instance of populist interaction. It uses events as an entry point into the interactive character of populism. The focus is on the interaction between elite events, on the one hand, and contentious street protests, on the other. Towards the end, this chapter also zooms in more closely on the contentious event itself, i.e. on the populist rally as a form of mass mobilization. By examining the populist rally more closely we can examine elite-mass interactions within the contentious event itself. In other words, the event as a category can prove to be very useful when it comes to the problematic of elite-mass interaction and populism in general (Berezin 2009). The introductory chapter put forward the concept of fractal interaction. This chapter applies this metaphor to the case of the Serbian protest wave by looking at events in several ways and in several levels of zoom: from the protest wave as a whole, to the day-to-day dynamic and finally to zooming in on the populist rally as in itself a site of interaction.

Why the event as a conceptual tool? As some scholars suggests, the event is a practical entry-point into the interactive character of contentious action (Jasper 2012). It can provide a serviceable way in which researchers can operationalize the often-voiced demand for a more dynamic and process-oriented style of research. The plea for processes and mechanisms has become something of a mantra in the literature on revolutions, contentious action and social

movements. The political process approach, popularized by McAdam (1982), first made this case. Since then, a variety of suggestions have been put forward, frequently in the form of agenda-setting theoretical contributions. Scholars have variously emphasized processes and mechanisms (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001), evolution (Koopmans 2005), co-evolution (Oliver and Myers 2003), dialectic relationships in the public sphere (Ellingson 1995; Steinberg 1999), social fields (Bourdieu 1977; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992), relational fields (Goldstone 2004) and strategic action fields (Fligstein and McAdam 2012). Though the goal of an interactive approach to mass contention is universally agreed upon, progress in the operationalization of this agenda has been slow. In particular, translating abstract theory into testable hypotheses has proven to be difficult. The main suggestion of this chapter is that an emphasis on “eventful history” may provide a way forward, not merely for cases of populism.

The main theoretical concepts for an “eventful” approach have been put forward by scholars such as Sewell (1996a, 1996b, 2005), Tarrow (1996, 2012) and Beissinger (2002). The central point of this body of work is to highlight the importance of events, i.e. relatively short occurrences or happenings which may at first glance seem to be only superficial perturbations. Seeing events as relevant means going against the advice of famous French historian Fernand Braudel who suggested that events are merely “surface disturbances, crests of foam that the tides of history carry on their strong backs” (Braudel 1972: 21). While Braudel preferred to emphasize forces of long duration, scholars such as Sewell, Tarrow and Beissinger turned the tables and focused precisely on the short term. The key point of this scholarship is that processes such as revolutions or large protest waves have a logic of their own, one that is partially

autonomous from the long run forces that exert their effects over longer stretches of time.

This theoretical insight is the starting point of this essay. The innovation lies with a focus not only on contentious events, i.e. street events that challenge authority and give voice to mass actors and ordinary citizens, but also elite events, i.e. events at which political elites are the primary actors. For example, cabinet meetings, party conventions, parliament sessions are all elite events. While contentious events happen in the street or in a similar atmosphere of public contestation, elite events take place within the contours of institutional politics, i.e. in settings where the entry of non-elite actors is usually prohibited. Though access is restricted, visibility or publicness of elite events is required in order to make analysis feasible.

How can an emphasis on elite events be operationalized? The work of Sewell (1996a; 1996b; 2005), Tarrow (1996; 2012) and Beissinger (2002) suggests two ways that contentious events may matter. This chapter extends this to elite events. The two ways in which elite events can matter for contentious action are: (1) as turning points and (2) as a form of structure. In the first possibility, elite events divide a period into a distinct “before” and “after.” Particularly important are elite events that function as statements or signals of encouragement. In the second possibility, elite events provide opportunities for contemporaneous protest and can thus form a kind of grid against which protest activity can unfold. Both options are empirically traceable in the timing of contentious action relative to elite events.

These two perspectives function at different levels of zoom. Investigation of potential turning

points implies that the protest wave is considered as a whole. Therefore, the researcher takes a step back to consider the episode in its entirety. Investigating elite events as a form of structure is similar but it means looking at the day-to-day linkages between events. It therefore means that the researcher has zoomed in slightly. The final step is to zoom in fully, viewing the contentious event itself. Each time, the researcher is interested in the presence of elite-mass interaction.

The Serbian protest wave is a useful case because the mechanisms suggested in this chapter present themselves in particularly clear fashion. Frequent and publicly transparent elite events, especially numerous sessions of the communist party, punctuated the daily lives of many citizens of Yugoslavia. The goal of this chapter is to investigate how such elite events mattered for the dynamics of the protest wave. In order to achieve this, a mixed-methods approach is used. Statistical testing of an original event catalog is used in conjunction with a qualitative discussion of some of the key events.

How to approach interaction in protest waves?

What theoretical tools do we have for the analysis of elite-mass interactions in settings such as revolutions and protest waves? The literature on social movements and contentious action often suggests a shift from static to dynamic analysis, from the study of structures to the study of interactions between actors. This agenda has most famously been laid out in the “dynamics of contention” approach (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001). Yet, this is a proposal that social movement scholars are yet to translate into a research strategy with testable claims. Perhaps the

natural place where one could look for analytical tools of this type would be the political process or political opportunity approach. Yet, this approach has been criticized along the same lines, namely, that it does not pay enough attention to interaction and agency (Goodwin and Jasper 2012), or more generally, that it is vague (Gamson and Meyer 1996; Goodwin and Jasper 1999; Koopmans 2004; Amenta and Halfmann 2012).

It is nevertheless clear that the political opportunity approach pays attention to elites. The best known lists of the most relevant political opportunities frequently refer to elites and to the relationship between elites and challengers. Tarrow (1994: 85-89) and McAdam (McAdam 1996: 27), present the following list of political opportunities: (1) openness of the political system, (2) presence of elite divisions, (3) availability of elite allies and (4) a decline in repression. Elites are clearly relevant in all four, and most obviously in the second and third element. However, the presence of elite splits and elite allies remains a background factor. There is little guidance when it comes to the question of *how* such background conditions are leveraged by challengers. This is where an event-based approach can be helpful. It can tell us more about the processes through which these background conditions are activated.

More recent scholarly work has been moving away from the concept of political opportunity structures towards such topics as strategy and strategic interaction (Goodwin and Jasper 2012; Maney et al. 2012; Bakker et al. 2013; Den Hond, Stolwijk, and Merk 2014; Meyer and Staggenborg 2012). As Jasper (2012: 17) argues, in order to move the interactionist agenda forward, we require fine-grained and observable interactions. Events can offer an entry way into

such an analysis. Such an approach to elite-mass interaction would be operationalized in terms of elite events and their relationship with contentious events, in a kind of interactive dance (see also Markoff 1997; Boudreau 2004). It would overcome the dualism of structure and agency and offer a workable operationalization of the interactive character of elite-mass relations.

What would this mean in practical terms? This chapter proposes two ways that elite events can matter for contention, two ways in which the interaction between elite and mass events can be observed. The first possibility is to see elite events as turning points which initiate a new phase of contention. The second is to see them as a form of structure, a kind of grid for contentious action. These mechanisms are drawn primarily from the work on eventful history (Sewell 1996a: 1996b; 2005; Tarrow 1996; 2012; Beissinger 2002).

First, certain elite events can be seen as watershed moments which initiate a new and qualitatively different phase of protest activity. Sewell's (1996b) discussion of the fall of the Bastille is the paradigmatic example of such a moment of historical rupture. This view is in line with philosophical definitions of events as interventions which interrupt routines and create genuine novelty (Arendt 1970: 7; Badiou 2007). On a scale smaller than the French Revolution, critical and focal events have been singled out by a variety of researchers in the social movement literature (Snow et al. 1998; Staggenborg 2000; Ramos 2008). Especially important are events that function as statements. As analyzed by Ermakoff (2008: ch. 11), such events are relevant because they provide occasions in which important actors make a public stand. They are especially important if they are used to communicate elite positions regarding protest

activity, i.e. if they provide signals to challengers about what they can expect from elites (Meyer and Minkoff 2004).

The second possibility is to see elite events as a form of structure, a grid against which other processes, including protest activity can unfold. Tarrow (2012: ch. 7) associates this type of approach with the work of Olzak (1992). Olzak's analysis of ethnic conflict in the US provides an example of how the day-to-day and event-to-event dynamic unfolds. Here, events are data-points which provide a form of structure for an episode of contention. Meyer and Minkoff (2004) similarly talk about structural openings.

The main idea here is that events can form a kind of structure for revolutions and similar “moments of madness” (Zolberg 1972). A good example that makes this case is Beissinger's (2002) work on the “thickened history” of revolutionary times, when events themselves create a type of order out of disorder. Furet (1981) makes a similar point with regard to the French Revolution. A discussion of the particular events of the French Revolution is not just an atheoretical discussion of random circumstances but a discussion of the operating logic of the revolution itself. Of most relevance here is the possibility that protesters time their protests to coincide with elite events. In that case, challengers are using their disruptive power, as the work of Piven and Cloward (1977) would suggest, in order to put pressure on elites and draw attention to their grievances. Of course, to the extent that the elite is not homogenous, such popular protests may actually be in the interest of a segment of the elite. This is particularly important in the case of populism, since a populist elite will benefit if protesters attack their

opponents at street protests.

Inspecting the entire protest wave and searching for a potentially impactful turning point means looking at the protest wave as a whole. Here, the researcher isolates certain (elite) events, knowing what came after them. After the period as a whole is over, can one pinpoint a crucial watershed moment? In particular, one can investigate if levels of mobilization increased after specific (elite) events. This provides a macro view of elite-mass interaction. On the other hand, one can change the perspective and look at events as they are unfolding, in their day-to-day dynamic. Here, the researcher is looking at events as they are happening. This is the view of protesters who are contemplating action. Do (elite) events provide a guide for the protesters? Will the occurrence of protest follow the grid established by elite events? More concretely, do protests occur contemporaneously with elite events? If such a relationship exists between different classes of events then one can say that events provide a form of structure to the protest wave as it is unfolding. The researcher has zoomed in, but is still interested at observing elite-mass interaction. And finally, the third step is to zoom in on the contentious event itself. Is the event also a site of elite-mass interaction? If one finds elite-mass interaction on all three levels, then it is warranted to speak of populism as “fractal interaction.”

The Serbian press as source of data

Data on protest events were collected from the Serbian press. Before looking more closely at the data itself, this section provides an overview of the basic contours of the media landscape. What

did the Yugoslav media scene look like?

Since it operated in an authoritarian one-party regime, the media in Yugoslavia remained under state control. Yet, this control was always weak compared to other countries in communist Eastern Europe. By the late 1980s, the regime had softened considerably and remaining constraints on media freedoms were rapidly falling away (Ramet, 1992a; Thompson, 1999: 7). The absence of official censorship authorities and the decentralization of the media according to republican lines gave journalists room to maneuver and introduced a degree of competition between news sources (Ramet 1992a). Yet, this separation also meant that people in different parts of Yugoslavia did not read newspapers or watch television broadcasts from other republics of the federation.

Furthermore, newspapers were not responsible to the League of Communists (the party) but to the Socialist Alliance of Working People, technically a separate organization. The SAWP was a wing organization of the party with a separate bureaucracy and resources. The idea behind the SAWP was that it should function as a type of public sphere in which public discussion of party policy could take place. The SAWP introduced a degree of institutional separation from everyday political meddling. Though controlled in principle, the media was actually deeply decentralized and efforts to reign it in by and large failed (Ramet 1992a: 414). Of course, ownership stayed in the hands of the state or, as was said at the time, in the hands of society. Private newspapers were a bridge that the communist regime was not willing not cross.

The mid and late 1980s were a period of media liberalization in all republics of the federal state, including Serbia. At the same time, this liberalization was incomplete and frequently paradoxical. Milošević, who quickly realized that the media can be a powerful ally, managed to replace several prominent journalists not to his liking in a variety of newspapers and magazines (Ramet 1992a: 422; Marović 2002: 230-233; Lekić and Pavić 2007: 40-41). His new populist course and the tolerance that he showed for Serbian nationalism lead to some important shifts in the Serbian media landscape. It should be noted that nationalism was taboo given the delicate ethnic balance in Yugoslavia. This, however, began to change as some newspapers increasingly embraced populism and, in package with it, nationalism as well.

The most important shift of this kind occurred in *Politika*, Serbia's central daily newspaper. It became an ally of Milošević and supported his increasingly populist style of politics. *Politika*, one of the symbols of the political establishment, a well-respected if slightly dull newspaper, now became a key component of the newly rising populist regime (Nenadović 1996; Thompson 1999; Marović 2002; Mimica and Vučetić 2008). In retrospect, the turn towards populism has been interpreted as a mistake, even by the paper's erstwhile editor (Minović 2008). The next chapter will look more closely at what kind of content *Politika* published and how it mattered for populist dynamics.

The event catalog in question was constructed using five newspapers. These sources maximize variation on political orientation and geographical scope, two factors the literature suggests must be paid attention to in order to construct relatively comprehensive catalogs (Davenport 2010).

Circulation figures for these newspapers are presented in Table 1. A protest was defined as a contentious street event, i.e. a publicly open and accessible event with messages that challenged authority.² The event catalog analyzed here relies on five newspapers: *Politika*, *Borba*, *Večernje novosti*, *Dnevnik* and *Jedinstvo*.³

Out of the five newspapers, *Politika* was arguably the most important Serbian daily. It was founded in 1904 and enjoyed the reputation of the oldest newspaper in the Balkans. *Politika* ranked highest in a readership poll in which people were asked to name the newspaper they trusted most (Ramet 1992a: 438). *Politika* was not just a newspaper: when people went to buy it at kiosks, they could simply say that they wanted to buy “the paper” (Nenadović 1996: 607). Such a special position makes its conversion to populism all the more important. A new orientation was admitted by their editor at the time, who said that *Politika* “has no right to think differently from the people [...] This creates resistance because we do not want bureaucratic journalism or salon journalism. Some have ironically said that we are succumbing to populism. We are witnesses, but we do not hide that we are also fighters for the truth [...] *Politika* has no editorial policy but to be with the people” (quoted in Nenadović 1996: 597). This is a rather frank admission that *Politika* became a populist newspaper, though the populist label is rejected for its negative connotations. By being with “the people”, *Politika* also became an ally of Milošević who was increasingly moving towards a populist position himself.

The alternative to *Politika* was *Borba*. It was the polar opposite of *Politika*. It was a federal newspaper and, as such, it was outside the reach of Serbian political elites. Its federal character

also made it averse to nationalist agendas. It was well respected for its avoidance of sensationalism and high professional standards. Its editor at the time was a professional who insisted on journalistic integrity (Marović 2002: 234; Ramet 1992b: 40-41). It was not interested in promoting populism since it had comparatively strong liberal and intellectual inclinations (Đurić and Zorić 2008: 128). Indeed, among the daily newspapers available to Serbian readers, it was the sole “dissenting voice” (Bennett 1995: 97).

The third major newspaper in Serbia was *Večernje novosti*. It belonged to the same publishing house as *Borba*, which meant that it too was outside the reach of Milošević and the Serbian party. Unlike *Borba*, it was a catch-all newspaper. It regularly featured more photography, sports and entertainment, all in an effort to attract a larger audience. Some observers describe it as a “tabloid” (Ramet 1992a: 440), while others simply note its high circulation figures (Đurić and Zorić 2008: 127). *Večernje novosti* did not explicitly embrace populism the way *Politika* did, though its catch-all character pushed it in a similar direction.

The final two newspapers included here were local newspapers. *Dnevnik* was the central newspaper in Serbia's northern province of Vojvodina, and *Jedinstvo* in the southern province of Kosovo, specifically aimed at Kosovo's Serbian population. *Dnevnik* was not widely read outside of Vojvodina and *Jedinstvo* was not widely read outside of Kosovo. *Dnevnik* was skeptical of Serbian nationalism since it would probably encroach on the political autonomy of the province. It was thus not very enthusiastic about the protests. On the flip-side, the protesters were also not enthusiastic about *Dnevnik* either and would jeer outside their building during

protest events (Doderović 1990: 56). *Jedinstvo*, on the other hand, was the main newspaper of Kosovo Serbs and was very interested in publicizing their problems. Some of the paper's journalists were close to the Serbian nationalist activists in Kosovo (Hudelist 1989: 76). Taken together, these five newspapers should provide a relatively comprehensive event catalog. The next section investigates if this is the case.

Inspecting the protest data

The press has often been used as a source of event data by social movement researchers because it presents the most readily accessible source. However, questions arise as to the possible selection bias of newspapers. Within this debate, some hold that the press is a source of sufficient quality while others maintain that press coverage needs to be taken with a grain of salt (McCarthy et al. 1998; 2008; Oliver and Myers 1999; Oliver and Maney 2000; Earl et al. 2004; Myers and Schaefer Caniglia 2004; Ortiz et al. 2005; Davenport 2010). Newspapers continue to be used in recent contributions on social movements (Almeida 2008; Bruhn 2008; Santoro 2008; Wang and Soule 2012) simply because, in many settings, there is no alternative source. In the case of Yugoslavia, the rise of Milošević and his growing support for protest activity means that protests would be more, not less likely, to be reported by the press. In that respect, one can expect that event coverage, while not necessarily exhaustive, will nevertheless approximate reasonable levels of completeness.

Whether this is the case is investigated in several ways. Unfortunately, no police data were

located. This makes it impossible to check newspaper data against an alternative source. However, some checks can still be conducted. First, it is possible to assess the existence of “relative” selection bias, by comparing newspapers against each other (Strawn 2008). Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics on several dimensions that can be assessed. These include the main sources of selection bias as identified by the social movement literature. Using the same categories, Table 3 presents an overview of protests unique to each newspaper, i.e. protests mentioned only by a given newspaper.

The main sources of selection bias located by the social movement literature can be summarized as: (1) event size (McCarthy et al. 1996; Mueller 1997; Barranco and Wisler 1999; Hocke 1999; Oliver and Myers 1999; Oliver and Maney 2000); (2) the presence of powerful sponsors and politically significant protesters (Snyder and Kelly 1977; Oliver and Maney 2000; Myers and Schaefer Caniglia 2004); (3) the proximity of the event's location to the media source (Snyder and Kelly 1977; McCarthy et al. 1996; Mueller 1997; Barranco and Wisler 1999; Hocke 1999; Davenport 2010); (4) the relative importance of particular cities, political centers in particular (Myers 2000; Ortiz et al. 2005); (5) shifting temporal priorities, what is sometimes referred to as “media attention cycles” which lead to fluctuations in media interest over time (McCarthy et al. 1996).

The factors listed above are operationalized in the following manner: (1) average and median reported event size;⁴ (2) several organizational variables: whether protest organization included the help of local branches of the Socialist Alliance of Working People, whether a delegation of

Kosovo Serbs came to a protest outside of Kosovo, and whether the protest was organized by Albanians;⁵ (3) two geographical variables which track if the protest took place in Vojvodina or Kosovo; (4) a variable which tracks if a protest took place in the administrative centers of Vojvodina (Novi Sad), Kosovo (Priština) or Serbia (Belgrade); (5) several temporal variables: a simple day counter which tracks if coverage is more likely as the protest wave progresses, a categorical variable which switches to one after the September 5th session of the Serbian party, at which Slobodan Milošević officially endorsed protests and, lastly, a variable which tracks days when important sessions of the party were held. These events could be used by protesters to put pressure on the elite and may therefore be more “newsworthy” to reporters. Also, all models presented in Table 4 include variables which track if protests had socio-economic or nationalist demands. And finally, to better tease out the specific biases of each newspaper, there is also a control variable for the number of newspapers that recorded any given event.

Inspecting the descriptive statistics in Table 2 and Table 3, what seem to be the patterns of event coverage for the five Serbian newspapers? The first thing to note concerns event size, i.e. the number of people estimated at each event. Comparing each newspaper's mean and median participation to the mean and median participation of all five newspapers taken together, it would appear that events not covered by multiple newspapers were small. In other words, each newspaper missed some small newspapers. But the mean and median figures for event size drop substantially in Table 3 which focuses on events unique to each newspaper. In other words, each newspaper's uniquely covered events were also small. In that respect, while all newspapers tended to miss smaller events, each also reported on a unique class of small events missed by the

others. This can give us confidence that – when it comes to smaller events – what one newspaper missed another recorded. I will return to this issue a bit later in this section.

What about other factors? As can be seen from Table 3, the strongest findings appear to be that *Politika* tended to cover more events that raised nationalist demands (the issue of Kosovo) and that *Jedinstvo* tended to cover events that took place in Kosovo. It is hard to offer other conclusions without multi-variate analysis. This is what the models presented in Table 4 do. They assess the likelihood of coverage by any given newspaper measured against the pool of events which combines all newspapers. As can be seen, *Politika* is particularly biased in favor of protests with nationalist demands. The coefficient is statistically significant and the odds ratio is high: *Politika* is about three times more likely to report on a protest if it was a nationalist protest. The only other variable that is statistically significant in the equation for *Politika* is the variable for Kosovo. This variable has a negative sign which signals that *Politika* had trouble covering protests in Kosovo.

Borba is biased against protests that took place in Vojvodina and Kosovo, which means that it has a corresponding bias in favor of protests which took place in central Serbia. It has no other statistically significant biases. *Večernje novosti* was about three times more likely to report on a protest if it had socio-economic and socialist demands. This suggests that *Večernje novosti* was primarily a mainstream socialist newspaper that did not go out of its way to pursue a nationalist agenda. Additionally, the coefficient for protests in Vojvodina is negative and statistically significant. Therefore, it would appear that *Večernje novosti* had trouble covering protests in

Vojvodina.

Jedinstvo has a bias in favor of protests which took place in Kosovo and protests which took place outside of Kosovo but featured a delegation of Kosovo Serbs. This is understandable given that it was a newspaper of Serbs in Kosovo. *Jedinstvo* is almost ten times more likely to report on a protest if it took place in Kosovo. Additionally, *Jedinstvo* was almost three times more likely to cover a protest if it featured a delegation of Kosovo Serbs. And finally, *Dnevnik* has a bias in favor of protests which took place in Vojvodina, which is to be expected given its regional focus. The odds ratio is very high: *Dnevnik* was 33 times more likely to report on a protest if it took place in Vojvodina.

All in all, each newspaper has its own biases, but they do not overlap. This suggests that what one may have missed another caught. Another way to inspect the reliability of data is to return again to event size. As the literature on selection bias shows, event catalogs drawn from newspapers tend to miss some events that sources such as police agencies capture. In particular, the police tends to record many of the smaller protests that the press usually misses. Indeed, event size is singled out as the most common source of selection bias for newspapers (McCarthy et al. 1996; Mueller 1997; Oliver and Myers 1999; Oliver and Maney 2000). Inspecting distributions of events according to event size can give us a reasonable basis of adjudicating the completeness of an event catalog.

What does the distribution of events according to event size look like for data drawn from

Serbian newspapers? Figure 1 presents a histogram for all protests smaller than 10,000 people. As can be seen, the distribution looks more like those that social movement scholars present for police data than those they present for press data (for example, McCarthy et al. 2008: 137). Figure 2 zooms in on protests smaller than 1,000. Even here, there are more smaller protests than larger ones. This can increase our confidence that the main source of selection bias was avoided. Additionally, Figures 1 and 2 exclude protests for which no newspaper provided a size estimate (about one fifth of all protests). Since these can be assumed to be small, Figures 1 and 2 in all likelihood underestimate the number of smaller protests. While any one source, taken individually, would not be able to provide a reasonably complete event catalog, when taken together these five newspapers appear to fare rather well.

Methods

This chapter uses event history methods in its statistical analysis. Following the statistical examination it presents qualitative evidence as well. Event history methods have become the standard approach in the analysis of protest (Hedström 1994; Soule 1997; Myers 1997; 2000; Andrews and Biggs 2006; Beissinger 2007). The question these models ask is: how long is the duration of time until the unit of observation experiences some event. For protest analysis, this usually means asking about the duration of time until a city or a county experiences a protest. From the family of event history methods, this chapter primarily relies on Cox regression (Cox 1972). It has the key advantage that it fits a baseline hazard rate automatically.

All the models shown in this chapter were also double-checked with other models such as Poisson models, negative binomial models, logistic regression models with various time functions and zero inflated count models. The results were robust to model choice. In order to allow for repeated events in a Cox regression setting, a running sum of past protest was included for each municipality (following Myers 1997; 2000). Additionally, standard errors were clustered so as not to assume that counties on a given day are independent from one another. Cox regression models were also double-checked with variance correction models (Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn 2002).

Allowing for repeated events makes the hazard rate calculated by Cox regression models difficult to interpret. In order to offer an assessment of effect size, the event history analysis will be repeated using logistic regression models within a discrete time framework. This type of approach makes it possible to estimate odds ratios which provide a way of estimating effect size. Unlike Cox regression models, logistic regression models do not fit a hazard automatically. Therefore, various time functions will be added as controls.

Dependent variable

The dependent variable in Cox regression models is the duration of time until an event takes place. Figure 3 presents the protest data over time, i.e. from June 1st to November 30th 1988. This was the period under observation and is usually taken as the most turbulent part of Serbia's "anti-bureaucratic revolution." In late November of 1988, the regime implemented a ban on

public gatherings in Kosovo, effectively ending the protest wave. Figure 4 presents the same protest data over space, i.e. over central Serbia and the autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo. The data-set tracks all of Serbia's counties through the entire period of observation. For each day that passes without a protest the duration variable increases by one. After a protest occurs, the duration variable resets.

Independent variables

Elite events as turning points

How do we come up with a list of potentially critical events? What criteria can we use? Perhaps the most logical way is to look for events that have already been singled out by observers who, working independently from one another, picked the same events. A list was made of all League of Communists meetings mentioned by both of the two histories of the protest wave: the most comprehensive documentary book (Lekić et al. 2009) and the most comprehensive social science book (Vladisavljević 2008). The authors of these two books worked independently from one another: Vladisavljević's book was published before the book of Lekić et al., while the latter contains no reference to the former.

This procedure yielded a list of four party events: (1) the session of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, held on July 28th, which was devoted to the problem of Kosovo (Vladisavljević 2008: 134; Lekić et al. 2009: 12), (2) the joint session of the

Presidency of the Central Committee of Serbia and the Presidency of Serbia, held on September 5th 1988, at which Milošević endorsed protests as legitimate even if they had nationalist aspects (Vladisavljević 2008: 147-148; Lekić et al. 2009: 48), (3) the extraordinary session of the Provincial Committee of the League of Communists of Vojvodina, held on October 6th, when the political elite of Vojvodina resigned, an event that became known as the “Yoghurt revolution” since protesters threw carton packages of yoghurt at the building where the meeting was being held (Vladisavljević 2009: 157-160; Lekić et al. 2009: 50-52; Vladisavljević 2008), and (4) the session of the Provincial Committee of the League of Communists of Kosovo held on November 16th, at which Albanian leaders agreed to be removed from the top of the Kosovo party (Vladisavljević 2008: 182-183; Lekić et al. 2009: 29). Each of these four variables takes on the value of zero until the session in question takes place, after which it switches to one for the remainder of the period.

Making a list of “important” elite events by looking for an overlap of party sessions mentioned in the most comprehensive sources on the Serbian protest wave is practical. Yet, the choices of these authors may have been influenced by their knowledge of what came afterward. In other words, the authors know how the protest wave unfolded and may therefore have focused more on some elite events, while ignoring others. To offset this problem, I conducted the same tests for all 55 party sessions that took place during the period of interest. None approached conventional thresholds of statistical significance. Only those events temporally close to the September and November session did, but this effect disappeared when variables for the September and November sessions were included in the model. Therefore, no other event

produced results as robust as the September and the November session. In that respect, the list of four party sessions is sufficient.

Elite events as structure

This variable was constructed by tracking all of the sessions held by the most important political bodies in Serbia. This included meetings of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia, the provincial committees (Vojvodina and Kosovo) and the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. Other bodies such as the Federal Presidency or the Federal Executive Council are excluded since they were politically much weaker than party organs. Also excluded are committees from republics other than Serbia. Given the decentralized character of the Yugoslav federation, they were not immediately relevant for Serbian politics. The variable is constructed as a simple categorical variable that takes on the value of one if a meeting of one of the party bodies took place on that day and zero if it did not. This variable makes it possible to test the possibility that protesters timed their events to coincide with elite meetings.

Control variables

The variables described above operationalize the eventful history approach. Yet, as discussed, this layer of history is not the only that may matter. As discussed by Braudel (1972), there are three temporalities of interest: the eventful, the institutional and the structural. Each provides a

different explanatory story of a revolutionary period. Therefore, the eventful history approach should be assessed while simultaneously testing the importance of slow-changing factors. They are treated here as control variables.

Institutional factors

There are several aspects of the institutional framework that may matter for protest activity. First, territorial divisions may matter. Those places with special political or administrative status in a polity may attract more protest. In particular, this applies to regions with special status within a federally organized political structure (Beissinger 2002: 103-146; Gorenburg 2003). Such places may witness more protest. In the Serbian context, this means controlling for the autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo.

A similar point has to do with particular cities that stand out as targets of protest, especially if they are symbolically or politically important (Myers 2000). Capital cities are particularly relevant since they house the political institutions which are the most common targets of protest activity. It may therefore be expected that protests will be more likely if the location is a political and administrative capital. In the Serbian context, this means taking into account if a protest took place in the administrative capitals of Belgrade (capital of Serbia and Yugoslavia), Novi Sad (capital of Vojvodina) or Priština (capital of Kosovo).

And finally, local political conditions may matter too (for example, Almeida and Brewster

Stearns 1998; Vermeulen 2005). The likelihood of protest may increase if protesters can count on local political bodies that are responsive to their demands. The composition of local-level political bodies should therefore be considered. The Yugoslav system allowed for indirect elections through a delegate system at various levels, including that of county. Some local delegates may have been more responsive to protesters than others. Two dimensions are included as controls. First, the share of young delegates and second, the share of worker delegates. Data for this and most other county-level variables are drawn from the census. Younger delegates may be expected to be less conservative and more receptive to new forms of political expression, while industrial workers are important since some of the larger protests were organized with the help of workers and unions from large manufacturing firms (Vladisavljević 2008: 145-146, 151-160).

Structural factors

What about structural factors, the ones that change the slowest? The relevance of demographic forces should especially be assessed (Goldstone 1991; 1997). Given that the protest wave under consideration is one of predominantly nationalist mobilization, the analysis should assess the relevance of local-level ethnic composition. The size of the antagonist group, in this case Albanians, needs to be considered. Additionally, the rate of increase of the antagonist group should also be considered. Research has shown that places experiencing rapid changes in ethnic composition may be more susceptible to tensions than demographically stable places (Hopkins 2010). As prospect theory suggests, absolute levels may not be as important as rates of change

(Kahneman and Tversky 1979). In other words, we should check if protests were more likely in locations that have a large and/or growing share of Albanians.

These two possibilities look at demographic factors as a form of threat, ethnic threat in this case. The other possibility is to assess demographic factors as a type of resource. For example, many communist regimes experimented with large scale resettling of populations. This means that people from connected familial and kin networks were spatially separated. For protesters trying to organize protests in a variety of places, having extended family contacts in a variety of places may be a resource. This may have been of particular relevance for countries such as Yugoslavia, where segments of traditional society such as the extended family survived industrialization and modernization. This factor brings together demographic shifts with the relevance of networks (Gould 1995; Diani 2004; Hedström, Sandell, and Stern 2000). Observers of the Serbian protest wave have noted that this factor mattered in several protests in Vojvodina (Kerčov, Radoš and Raič 1990: 58-59; Doderović 1990: 57; Vladislavljević 2008: 140). Following World War II, the communist regime relocated many families from Kosovo, Montenegro and eastern Bosnia to Vojvodina. Serbian activists from Kosovo could thus draw on extended family and kin networks to help with organization and turnout at protests in Vojvodina. “Colonist” counties may, therefore, be more likely to experience a protest. The criteria chosen is that at least 500 families were settled in the post-war period (data from Gaćeša 1984: 353).

The final control variable connects the possibility of ethnic threat with economic conditions. Theories of ethnic competition (Olzak 1992) suggest that mobilization may be more likely when

different ethnic groups enter into competition over economic resources such as employment. It may be the case that ethnically structured competition for economic resources increased the likelihood of protest. In the case of Serbia, the presence of a sizable Albanian population should be investigated in conjunction with high rates of unemployment. Did the places that experienced an overlap of these two factors also witness more protests? This control variable will take the shape of an interaction term between the unemployment rate and the share of Albanians. This rounds out the list of the main controls used in this chapter.

Results of event history analysis

I now turn to the results. First, can the impact of elite events be captured visually? Figure 5 graphs the Serbian protest wave together with party sessions. The four important party sessions are marked with an X, the total 55 party sessions with circles. This makes it possible to visually inspect the protest wave. The interrupted line shows the average daily number of protests before and after the September session, the one at which Milošević gave a public signal of encouragement. As can be seen, the level of protest activity does seem to increase after the September session. The same holds for the November session. It is harder to see if protests were more numerous on all of the 55 party sessions. There are more than a few points in time where the connection seems strong. However, given that the human eye seeks patterns where they may not exist, statistical testing will be required.

Table 5 presents descriptive statistics while Table 6 presents the results of the event history

analysis. Variables are introduced step by step in order to examine the stability of the coefficients. The first model contains only the institutional, structural and control variables. The second model introduces the four potentially relevant party sessions, i.e. variables which examine potential points of rupture. The third model removes these but introduces the variable which tracks each party session, i.e. the variable which investigates the possibility of contemporaneous protest. The fourth model is the full model which includes all of the variables of interest. As can be seen, the results for the main eventful variables are stable across the various specifications presented in Table 6.

Coefficients and hazard ratios are difficult to interpret in models with repeated events. Therefore, only direction and statistical significance can be discussed. The fifth model repeats the analysis with logistic regression (discrete time) models. This makes it possible to use odds ratios and makes the interpretation of effect size easier. However, since logistic regression models do not fit a hazard rate automatically, one has to be added manually. A variety of time functions were used: a linear day counter, a squared function, linear and squared functions together, a cubed function, linear, squared and cubed together, a quadratic spline function and a dual-hump spline function. The results described below were always highly similar.

Independent variables are sorted into eventful history factors, institutional factors and structural factors, with the last two groups used as controls. The first included party session was the one in late July. Even though this party session was devoted to the Kosovo issue, the variable is not statistically significant in the models in Table 6. Therefore, this particular party session cannot

be treated as a turning point. As the section with qualitative evidence will show, this event is more of a case that supports the second expectation of this chapter, namely, that protests were time to coincide with party sessions.

The second party session is the one in early September. At this session Milošević endorsed the protests, even if they had nationalist messages. As can be seen in Table 6, this variable is positive and statistically significant. The odds ratio reported in Model 2 is high: protests were about three times more likely to occur after this particular party meeting. Therefore, it makes sense to treat this particular session as a turning point.

The variable for the October session is statistically significant, but has a negative sign and a small odds ratio. Therefore, it did not lead to an increased likelihood of protest. On the contrary, it led to a decreased likelihood of protest. At this particular party session, elites from Vojvodina were forced to resign by the crowd of protesters outside their windows. Once again, this event is more of a case that supports the second theoretical expectation of this chapter. It will also be discussed later, in the section which presents qualitative evidence. That it led to a decreased likelihood of protest is not surprising since the resignations of Vojvodina politicians were a key protest demand. In addition, following the October session the group of Serbian activists from Kosovo which had a hand in many of the earlier protests “officially” disbanded, stating that they had largely achieved their goals (*Politika*, October 7th 1988, 1).⁶

The variable for the November session of the Kosovo committee is also positive, statistically

significant, and has a high odds ratio. However, since this event took place so late in the protest wave it makes little sense to treat it as a turning point, though it certainly was a dramatic event. The results presented in Table 6 were replicated with time series techniques such as intervention models (Box and Tiao 1975). In summary, the expectation that elite events which provided a positive signal to protesters (the September session) would lead to increased protest received support.

The second main eventful history factor has to do with elite events as a form of structure for contemporaneous protest. As can be seen, the variable which tracks if protests took place on the same day as an elite session is positive and statistically significant.⁷ The odds ratio in Model 5 in Table 6 is around 1.35, which suggests that protests were 35 percent more likely to occur on the same day as party sessions. This substantive result was also replicated with incidence rate ratios derived from negative binomial models.

From the list of included controls, the strongest predictors appear to be location in an administrative center and a rising share of Albanians. In other words, administrative centers attracted protest since they housed the relevant institutions that could be targeted by protesters.⁸ The relevance of the variable which tracks the rate of change in the share of Albanians points to a particular form of ethnic threat: absolute levels are not as important as relative increases.

Other control variables did not seem to have a strong impact on the dependent variable. Colonist counties did not, on the whole, attract more protests. The result was unchanged when different

measures of the variable were used (a different number of colonist families). The interaction term which combined unemployment and the share of Albanians was also of little impact, as were the component terms. Out of the remaining variables, the categorical variable for autonomous province hovered around the threshold of statistical significance, as can be seen in Table 6, but was not robust. The variables for the receptiveness of local political assemblies also mattered little. This was unchanged when data on different aspects of local representation were used.

A variety of robustness checks were included as well. They included variables for days of the week, for spatial diffusion, for exposure to mass media such as television and press, for changes in the daily value of the Yugoslav currency relative to the Deutschmark (as a proxy for the deterioration of the economy), population density, economic output, share of industrial workers, crime levels etc.⁹ The most robust of these were exposure to mass media (press) and the spatial diffusion variables. However, they never impacted the results presented in Table 6. The variable for exposure to the mass media will be dealt with in the next chapter, since it deserves more attention than can be provided here.

The September session as a turning point

This section analyzes the September session more closely by providing more historical and qualitative evidence. The next section does the same for some of the better known examples of protests which were timed to coincide with party sessions.

The September session of the Serbian communists presented the first official endorsement of protest activity. The meeting was a joint session of the presidency of the Central Committee of the Serbian party and the Presidency of the Serbian state. After the discussion, which featured 40 speakers and lasted 16 hours, Milošević delivered the closing speech. He rejected attempts to define the protests as undemocratic: “it is unacceptable that meetings of solidarity in the Socialist Republic of Serbia are labeled as dangerous demonstrations and undemocratic forms of pressure that threaten the security of Yugoslavia” (*Politika*, September 7, 1988, 6). Milošević also approved of the protesters' messages: “The content and messages of the protest meetings express demands for socialism and unity and Yugoslavia, brotherhood and unity and equality, which strengthen Yugoslavia and destabilize the forces of bureaucratic resistance to change in the country and the forces of resistance to the liquidation of the [Albanian] counter-revolution in Kosovo” (*Politika*, September 7, 1988, 6). This was a clear show of support to Serbian protesters.

Milošević was also ready to endorse nationalism: “People gather on the basis on which they are attacked and threatened. They are being persecuted as Serbs and Montenegrins and so they emigrate or defend themselves as Serbs and Montenegrins. They cannot defend themselves, emigrate or gather as Dutchmen, protestants or cotton pickers, because nobody is threatening them on this basis” (*Politika*, September 7, 1988, 7). He also downplayed the presence of anti-Albanian rhetoric, by arguing that the presence of exclusionary messages “cannot compromise the gatherings in general” (*Politika*, September 7, 1988, 3). All in all, the signal was

unequivocal. Previous party announcements supported the right of the people to protest, but rejected nationalism. Milošević's statement contained no such caveats. The protests were a “democratic, honest and expected reaction” to the problems in Kosovo (*Politika*, September 7, 1988, 1).

As scholars argue, this announcement “altered the political stage and had a major influence on subsequent political developments” (Vladisavljević 2008: 150). The rejection of the federal line was an unprecedented move and an outright challenge to other segments of the communist elite. The Serbian party had *de facto* become something of an opposition within the ruling communist apparatus (Jović 2009: 310). It now threw its weight behind activists and protesters. After Milošević's announcement, the involvement of official institutions increased, especially at the local level (Lekić et al. 2009: 89). Local institutions began to provide resources such as a stage and professional public announcement equipment to protesters (Vladisavljević 2008: 169). This suggests that the form of protest began to change. Street protests increasingly took the form of the populist mass rally, called the “meeting of solidarity.” This aspect is dealt with towards the end of the chapter. In other words, the September session not only provided a signal to potential protesters but also marked the starting point of a new phase of mobilization in which regime institutions became more involved. Yet, the two aspects are not mutually incompatible as will be shown in the last section of this chapter.

How was the September session received by ordinary citizens? In this respect, the September session stands in stark contrast to other party sessions. To most of these party events ordinary

people reacted with disappointment. As one person said in a letter to the editor with regard to an earlier session: “Following the last session of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, one cannot escape the impression that a lot of people spoke without saying anything” (*Politika*, August 19, 1988, 15). Despite the constant disappointment, the attention of much of the Yugoslav public was turned to these events. As the same person said, “our hope is extended from session to session” (*Politika*, August 19, 1988, 15). Other sessions were criticized because ordinary people “expected that a turning point would occur” (*Politika*, August 11, 1988, 12). In other words, much of the Serbian public paid attention to elite events and scanned them for signals. Most of the time they were disappointed.

The September session is an exception. Many in Serbia reacted with enthusiasm. One letter to the editor rather pathetically called Milošević's speech “the most honest thing that I have heard in my life” (*Politika*, September 7, 1988, 17). The session led to demands for new protests. For example, one group from the town of Niš sent a telegram expressing their “strong support for the positions and conclusions of the Presidency of the Socialist Republic of Serbia and the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia.” They further wrote that they “support the initiative to hold a meeting of solidarity with Serbs and Montenegrins from Kosovo” (*Borba*, September 9, 1988, 4). A similar group letter from Čačak, who provided signatures in two columns of names, said that they too “support the policies of the League of Communists of Serbia” and called for a protest to be organized in cooperation with the Kosovo Serb activists (*Politika*, September 11, 1988, 8).

Opponents of Milošević also recognized that something of fundamental importance had occurred. At the session, Kosovo politicians tried to oppose him but were outvoted by delegates from central Serbia. For example, the Albanian politician Kaqusha Jashari said that: “I am not a supporter of encouraging these gatherings [...] since such encouragement instrumentalizes the discontent” (*Borba*, September 7, 1988, 2). One journalist wrote in an editorial that the Serbian party now “acknowledged the full constitutional legitimacy of such gatherings” (*Borba*, September 10, 1988, 5). Another editorial in a Slovenian newspaper wrote that “the Serbian leadership has obviously decided to support the meetings more or less without qualifications” and that this “opposes the decisions of the federal party leadership in a way that is without precedent in our recent history” (*Delo*, September 7, 1988, 3). In other words, the September session was recognized at the time as a key event, one which altered the political landscape in very important ways.

Party sessions as targets for contemporaneous protest

This section provides qualitative evidence regarding the relevance of elite events as targets for contemporaneous protest. As Vladisavljević writes, activists and protesters “often launched highly visible protests during important party events, such as the LCY [League of Communists of Yugoslavia] Congress, Conference [mini party congress] or a session of the Province's or Central Committee [of Serbia]” (Vladisavljević 2008: 141). Of course, this form of pressure hurt Milošević's opponents the most. At certain points in time – depending on the balance of forces in the top echelons of the party – such protests may have also been inconvenient for Milošević.

The examples shown below show that this was indeed the case on several occasions. Yet, Milošević was the clear favorite amongst the protesters. They carried signs of support and sang songs about him. Other politicians in the communist establishment fared much worse. Unlike Milošević who was embraced by the crowds as an undisputed leader, other politicians were mocked and ridiculed (see the list of protest signs in Kerčov et al. 1990: 276-280).

This section discusses three episodes. The first well known instance of a protest organized to coincide with a party session occurred in June of 1987, well before the protest wave of 1988 took off. In other words, the Serbian activists from Kosovo had by 1988 realized that this could be a powerful tactic. As the literature on perceived opportunities suggests, opportunities may be present, but they have to also be perceived by challengers (Kurzman 1996; Kadivar 2013). By the summer of 1988, Serbian activists could use the tactic to full effect. Of course, one cannot be sure if they were not assisted in this tactic by certain segments of the elite. But this type of elite-mass interaction is tackled more directly in the next section.

Therefore, the first party session that drew a crowd of protesters was the one held in June of 1987. The event in question was a federal party meeting and was covered by more than a hundred foreign journalists (Lekić et al. 2009: 23). Although they were asked not to come, Serbian activists from Kosovo nevertheless decided to put pressure on the party. The logic was simply and effectively summarized by the activists themselves: “The goat grazes differently when the wolf is watching it” (Lekić et al. 2009: 171). The crowd outside the building quickly became more interesting to reporters than the boring speeches given by politicians inside. The

Kosovo activists lead the protest but were joined by locals from Belgrade. About three thousand people gathered in total (Little and Silber 1995: 39). Those Kosovo Serbs who did not go to Belgrade followed the party session via radio and television, as did much of the country. As one report said, people followed the session both at work and at home, and newspapers on the following day sold out very quickly (*Borba*, special edition, June 28, 1987, 25).

The Kosovo Serbs framed their arrival as a show of support for the party. Yet, some were willing to admit that their protest was highly contentious: “I understand that comrades asked us not to come and so make their discussion more difficult, not to pressure them in this way, but they have to understand that our troubles are hard, large and difficult” (*Borba*, June 27-28, 1987, 5). They shouted “Thieves, thieves” and “Red criminals”, a hundred meters away from where politicians held their speeches. In order to convince the crowd to disperse, the Croatian politician Ivica Račan was sent to negotiate with the Kosovo activists. As Račan put it to them: “World media are buzzing about anti-communist demonstrations in Belgrade. And, in front of the Federal Assembly where the session of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia is being held! That is unacceptable!” (Lekić et al. 2009: 172). The crowd agreed to disperse after several hours of heated negotiation, having by then already made their point (Little and Silber 1995: 40).

The second well-known instance of contemporaneous protest is the federal party session which took place in late July of 1988. This party session was already mentioned earlier: the statistical examination showed that it cannot be treated as a turning point. Yet, the event shows how

protesters used party sessions to put pressure on the political elite. On the day of the session, the press published an official plea from Serbian party organs. In it, they again asked the Serbian activists from Kosovo not to come to Belgrade (*Politika*, July 28, 1988, 1).

This demand from Milošević, their new found ally, was controversial among the Serbian activists. Some decided to leave for Belgrade, others stayed in the hope of not alienating him (Vladisavljević 2008: 134-135). About 300 Kosovo Serbs came on the day of the party session (*Borba*, July 30-31, 1988, 6). The Kosovo Serbs made their way to the same park where they had been a year earlier, followed once again by reporters and camera crews. They settled in the near-by trade union building, and followed the session on television. A telegram was sent to the Central Committee in order to let them know that they arrived. The telegram says that the activists saw “this session of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia as the last chance to completely halt the emigration of Serbs [from Kosovo]” (*Borba*, July 30-31, 1988, 8). Once again, the strategy protest made quite a splash.

The third well known instance of protests coinciding with elite sessions is the so-called “Yoghurt Revolution”, a two-day protest which took place in Novi Sad on October 5th and forced the resignations of the leadership of the province of Vojvodina. The exact role of Milošević in these events is difficult to gauge. It seems most likely that Milošević did not instigate the event, since he was at the time involved in behind the scenes negotiations with the Vojvodina leadership (Vladisavljević 2008: 159). However, once the protest began, it seems that Milošević let it drag on as long as he could in order to force the Vojvodina leadership into

resignations. The crowd asked that he address them by chanting “Slobo help us” and “We want Slobo” (Lekić et al. 2009: 51). Milošević, however, chose not to come to Novi Sad. Instead, he sent one of his close aides to deliver a speech against the Vojvodina leadership. This speech accused the Vojvodina politicians of becoming “alienated from the people” (*Politika*, October 7th 1988, 1; Lekić et al. 2009: 51). It only prolonged the agony of the Vojvodina politicians who were trapped inside the building. Throughout the entire event, they were trying to discuss what course of action to take and whether to resign or not.

Outside the building, the pushing and shoving between the crowd and rows of policemen grew more dramatic (Lekić et al. 2009: 52). People threw packages of yoghurt as well as bottles at the building, breaking several windows in the process. In a last ditch effort, the Vojvodina politicians contacted Milošević, but he refused to intervene on their behalf. They asked that a conference be organized to debate the constitutional revisions. To this Milošević responded by saying to the press that “history is on the agenda, debate isn't” (Lekić et al. 2009: 28). Federal institutions were also of little help, leaving the Vojvodina leadership to fend for themselves. Fearing violence, the Vojvodina politicians voted to resign their posts. After the announcement was made, the crowd outside the building slowly began to disperse. After the ouster of the provincial politicians, Milošević's position would become even stronger, as he could begin a purge at all levels of the provincial establishment (Lekić et al 2009: 28).

These examples show that elite events were important because they provided opportunities for protests. If they could disrupt the work of top party organs, protesters could expect to gain a lot

of publicity for themselves and their demands. This provided a form of structure to the protest wave, especially with regard to the day-to-day dynamics which characterized the unfolding of the protest wave. Divisions within the elite also mean that contemporaneous protest hurt some segments of the elite, while benefiting others. Milošević was the clearest victor since he was at the time the darling of the masses.

The populist rally as elite-mass interaction

So far, the chapter has investigated the interactions between events, i.e. between elite events and contentious events. Yet a curious aspect of populist mobilization is that a typical populist rally is in itself a site of elite-mass interaction. In other words, while most social movement scholarship sees contentious action in opposition to elite action – as in Tilly's widely accepted “polity” model – the case of populist mobilization makes such dichotomies more difficult to maintain (Jansen 2011). A populist rally, while remaining contentious and unruly, is simultaneously a product of elite involvement. In other words, seeing populism as interaction requires one to not only investigate the interactions between elite events and mass events, but also the interactions of elite actors and mass actors within contentious events. Here, we have zoomed in fully and are examining the event itself.

The analysis so far has treated all street protests as essentially the same, since this makes quantitative testing possible. Yet, beginning in early September protests began to take on a

specific form: that of the populist “meeting of solidarity” (Vladislavljević 2008: 166-168). In other words, one needs to be sensitive to the various effects that Milošević’s decision to support the protests – made public at the September 5th session of the Serbian party – had on the dynamics of the protest wave. As shown earlier in this chapter, the party session provided a signal of encouragement to those contemplating protest. And as the various reactions to the party session showed, there is evidence that the signal was understood and acted on as such. But the party session can also be seen as something different: as the veneer of public legitimation, something which officially sanctioned a new organizing technique of elites.

In other words, Milošević and his circle did not only talk while encouraging others to do the protesting; they decided to become more involved in contentious activity themselves. The populist rally was the result of this choice. As one of Milošević’s aides frankly admitted: “The leadership of Serbia began to understand that they [Kosovo Serbs] will begin to go all over Serbia. In order that they do not organize gatherings all over Serbia, the leadership decided to support [the protests in] Kragujevac, Kruševac and so on where these protests were held, and gave this as a task to the leadership, the party leadership, and the local leadership and the state leadership in that town, for them to organize meetings of support for the changes to the constitution. And yes, these were large gatherings, yes, they created an atmosphere that the constitution really should be changed, but Kosovo Serbs came to them as guests, they did not lead. In this way, the municipal leadership governs the gatherings that cannot turn into something that you cannot control, but at the same time you did not hurt the Serbs from Kosovo and you obtained the support of the masses” (Lekić et al. 2009: 89).

Therefore, the meeting of solidarity was a compromise between the Kosovo Serbs and the party leadership. The former would prefer to take part in more contentious protests, events that featured more open nationalist rhetoric and the singing of Serbian nationalist songs (Lekić et al. 2009: 173). Yet, such an approach risked repression and the loss of precious elite allies. From early to mid September, the protests came to resemble older mass rallies from Tito's period, i.e. they became more scripted, while never completely losing their contentious character (Vladisavljević 2008: 154). The positive side of the trade-off for the Kosovo Serbs was higher turnout, better public announcement equipment and more sympathetic local media coverage. And perhaps most importantly, the involvement of regime institutions meant that the chances of repression were practically null. The meeting of solidarity usually followed a familiar script: it began with the Yugoslav anthem, featured a mix of speakers, both Kosovo Serbs and local officials from various wing organizations of the party (such as the local World War II veterans association, the local youth organization, the local branch of the SAWP and so on), with the end of the rally coming in the shape of a letter addressed to high-ranking targets, publicly read in order to name, shame and criticize the opponents of “the people” (Vladisavljević 2008: 166). In other words, the populist rally was itself a compromise, a paradoxical result of elite and mass interaction, which tried to control the uncontrollable and channel popular energy while multiplying it manifold.

For many scholars of the former Yugoslavia, the most interesting indicator of elite involvement is the presence of the secret police (Bennett 1995: 98; Silber and Little: 61; LeBor 2004: 98).

Allegedly, secret agents used their influence to increase turn-out when their political sponsors demanded this. However, given the behind-the-scenes nature of such activity, one cannot observe and measure this factor in a systematic way for a larger set of protests. However, some aspects of elite involvement can be traced for the entire catalog of contentious events analyzed in this chapter. As mentioned earlier, newspapers usually noted whether a protest featured the presence of Kosovo Serbs and whether local regime institutions helped with organizations (predominantly the local SAWP, but other wing organizations of the party as well). This information makes it possible to compare patterns of organization before and after the September session of the Serbian party, that is, before and after Milošević's endorsement of the protests.

Table 7 presents the results of two two-way cross-tabulations. Only protests outside of Kosovo are examined, since the loose networks of Serbian activists in Kosovo made it relatively easy for them to organize a protest in the southern province, while, on the other hand, their lack of resources made it more difficult to travel outside Kosovo. The first cross-tabulation looks at protests before the September session and examines how many featured the organizational input of local institutions and how many featured the presence of Kosovo Serbs. As can be seen, Kosovo Serbs did not come to many protests prior to the September session, only a total of 10 protests. And equally interesting, local organizations helped in only 6 out of 47 protests (12.8 percent). Though the numbers are small, it appears that local institutions were more likely to get involved if Kosovo Serbs did come. If they did arrive, local institutions helped in 5 out of 10 protests. Therefore, even in this period, there was some synergy between the regime and the

Kosovo activists. If they did not arrive, local institutions helped in only 1 out of 37 cases (2.7 percent).

The number of protests increased in the period after the September session. Kosovo Serbs arrived for a total of 55 protests. Local institutions helped in 63 out of 120 cases (52.5 percent, as opposed to 12.8 percent in the first period). Clearly, elite involvement increased: regime institutions were involved in more than half of the protests. But it is not as if Kosovo Serbs were squeezed out. On the contrary, their involvement increased. However, they now worked more frequently with regime institutions. In the first period, out of the 10 protests where Kosovo Serbs arrived, 5 were assisted by local institutions and 5 were not. But in the second period, the share of such joint organizing increases. Out of the 55 protests where Kosovo Serbs arrived, 48 protests (87.2 percent) featured the organizational input of local institutions. This is a clear indication of the prevalence of the populist rally, characterized by the interaction of the Kosovo group and regime institutions.

However, even though the populist rally – organizationally “shared” by local institutions and the Kosovo Serbs – now became the dominant form of street event, it never completely replaced other forms. As can be seen, the number of protests organized by the Kosovo Serbs and without the involvement of local institutions increased from 5 to 7. This is not a large increase. But it should also be noted that groups unaffiliated with the Kosovo Serbs and unsupported by local institutions also protested more in the second period: the number of such protests rose from 36 to 50. The most relevant in this respect are industrial workers whose protests were running in

parallel to the protests of the Kosovo Serbs (Vladislavjević 2008: 155-157). This is another indicator that the signal given at the September session was received even by the unaffiliated.

Thus, the September turning point had diverse ramifications: it inaugurated the populist rally as the main form of protest activity, it encouraged the arrival of Kosovo Serbs, and it encouraged the mobilization of other groups. The new populist agenda of the regime – to encourage mobilization publicly but to attempt to control in on the ground – thus faced the challenge of the rising level of mobilization throughout society. A force was unleashed that was difficult to control, even in the short-run.

Conclusion

This chapter has taken the first step towards understanding populism as a set of elite-mass interactions. Events provide an entry point into the interactive character of populism. Following the notion of “fractal interaction”, this chapter looked at the Serbian protest wave from several vantage points. At each level, what one finds is elite-mass interaction. In that respect, populism is like a fractal, i.e. it is self-similar. Zooming in always reveals more interaction between elite and mass players.

Considering the protest wave as a whole, one can begin by inspecting the protest wave for turning points. The September session appears to be the most obvious turning point, the point in time in which elite intervention most impacted the overall level of mobilization. But one can

move in closer as well and examine the presence of day-to-day linkages. Here, it appears that the existence of party sessions provided a useful target for protesters. They could organize protests targeting the elite on days they held high-profile party events. Once again: elite-mass interaction. And finally, when one zooms in fully on a single day, a single event, the same interactive logic re-appears. The populist rally, called the “meeting of solidarity”, was itself a compromise that resulted from the interaction of partially conflicting forces: elite and mass forces combining to create a particular type of event that was both contentious and scripted, unruly and controlled. These are the main findings of the chapter.

What are the main contributions of this chapter to the three main bodies of work outlined in the introductory chapter: (1) political sociology, (2) the literature on populism and (3) the literature on the former Yugoslavia and its break-up? First, what is the contribution of this chapter to political sociology, broadly conceived? Of most relevance is the methodological strategy used in this chapter: to study the interaction between elites and masses through the interactions between elite events and contentious events. This is an analytical approach and research design that can be operationalized in other settings, including those not characterized by populism. While analysis of contentious events and of catalogs of contentious events is well established, there is an absence of work which thematizes elite events and their linkages to contentious events. This chapter suggests ways in which this can be remedied, a research strategy that is replicable.

What is the contribution to the second literature of interest, the study of populism? Here, the contribution lies with the way populism can be studied as a form of political practice, as

suggested by Jansen (2011). The event is a category the importance of which for populism is only slowly being recognized (Berezin 2009). As discussed in the introduction, populism has most often been studied by analyzing discourse. This is an important line of inquiry and the next chapter will engage in something quite similar. Yet, there is no reason to restrict populism to populist discourse. Populism also unfolds through events and can be studied as such. At the same time, the presence of populism requires the researcher to pay attention to various types of events more, since the phenomenon of the populist mass rally is a hybrid form, a kind of cross between a typical contentious street event and a highly scripted and elite-controlled rally. Yet, as this chapter showed, even this form of event is actually a site of interaction. In that sense, populist interaction between elites and masses takes place not only between events but also within events.

And third, what is the contribution to the scholarship on the former Yugoslavia? Here, the main contribution is to give insight into the mechanisms driving Serbia's anti-bureaucratic revolution. Most scholars point to elite manipulation but do not provide much detail about the ways in which this manipulation unfolded. Vladisavljević (2008) puts forward an account of the populist episode as simultaneously bottom-up and top-down. This is an important step forward, but his contribution does not present an event catalog nor flesh out in a quantitative manner the linkages between events. This chapter has tried to do precisely that, thus allowing one to not only say that the Serbian protest wave was complex, but to be more specific about the ways in which it was complex, the type of interactions that made it complex.

Chapter 3

Interaction through readers' letters: The construction of the people

Introduction

The second chapter of this dissertation used events as a way to investigate the interactions of mass and elite actors. Events provide one entry-point into the interactive character of populism. This chapter picks up where the previous left off, but shifts the emphasis to the public sphere: I now turn to the interactions between elite and mass actors in the public sphere. More specifically, this chapter investigates a key part of one of Serbia's most important newspapers, *Politika*. The newspaper section was called “Echoes and reactions” (*Odjeci i reagovanja*) and its goal was to publish letters from readers. The story of Serbian populism would be incomplete without an analysis of this newspaper section and its impact.

The last chapter looked at the “fractal” character of populism by examining events from different vantage points, zooming in and out. A similar tactic will be used this time, though the emphasis shifts to populist discourse. Once again, the linkage of interest is between elites and masses. If key media outlets like *Politika* attempted to create “the people” through readers' letters, then one can ask the following questions. Considering the protest wave as a whole, one can ask if exposure to *Politika* increases the likelihood of protest. Zooming in at the day-to-day level one can ask if the various types of populist media content, specifically the letters from readers, are linked to levels of mobilization. As one increases, does the other follow? Is the

relationship reciprocal? And finally, one should be sensitive to the source material as well. The phenomenon of readers' letters is not free of elite intervention. At the very least, editors could pick and choose which letters to publish. Yet, the editors of *Politika* may have gone even further and written some of the letters themselves. In other words, even the several pages devoted each day to readers' letters were a site of elite-mass interaction. Once again, if there is evidence of interaction at all three levels, then it is warranted to speak of the “fractal” character of populism.

While the interactions between elite events and contentious protests drove much of the dynamics of the protest wave taking place in the streets, the interactions between elites and masses on the pages of “Echoes and reactions” lead to a key process in the emergence of Serbian populism in 1988: it led to the creation and construction of “the people.” The letters published by *Politika* created a peculiar field of interaction in which the input of elites and ordinary citizens combined and blended together. An image emerged of “the people” as a united, vocal and assertive force. “The people” became an actor in itself, an agent that could “do” things. As mentioned in the introduction, “the people” are largely a myth, a construct that populist actors try to conjure. The letters were quite successful in conjuring up this spirit. But this does not mean that it can have no consequences. By invoking “the people” so much, “Echoes and reactions” created a political force in its own right.

How did this construction of “the people” work? In trying to answer this question this chapter tries to assess which elite intervention mattered most. Several operationalizations of elite intervention are used: (1) the “editorial” intervention of the journalistic team that ran “Echoes

and reactions”, picking (and possibly writing) the letters they wanted, (2) the “academic” intervention of university professors and highly educated intellectuals who also wrote many letters for “Echoes and reactions” and (3) the “public” intervention of high-ranking politicians who can signal the endorsement of a new course of political action, as Milošević did at the September session of the communist party when he endorsed the protests and officially embraced a populist style of politics. Which of these elite interventions has the strongest link with the populist construction of “the people”? Providing an answer to this question is one of the goals of this chapter.

Yet, as mentioned above, the other goal of this chapter is to investigate the linkages between public discussion and protest activity. Can one show that the two are connected? The connection between discourse and protest is something that can itself be operationalized in several ways. In line with the theme of fractal interaction, this chapter uses two different approaches. First, zooming slightly out, the first approach is to look at the day-to-day linkages between media content and protest activity. Does an increase of one lead relatively quickly to an increase of the other? In which way does the arrow point? The second approach zooms out even more to consider the protest wave as a whole. It is interested in the long-run effects of media exposure on the propensity to protest. Together, this type of investigation can provide insight into the connection between populist discourse and popular mobilization, two phenomena that tend to be studied in isolation, as the introductory chapter noted.

The public sphere, populism and Milošević's manipulation

As with the previous chapter, this chapter also aims to contribute to three bodies of work: (1) political sociology broadly conceived, (2) the literature on populism and (3) the literature on the former Yugoslavia's final years. First, with regard to political sociology, this chapter contributes to our understanding of the public sphere. Much of the debate on the public sphere has been framed by Habermas's (1991) book *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*. It has proven to be a seminal contribution, one that has provoked fruitful discussion (see the collection of essays in Calhoun 1992). It has provided a model, partly based in historiography and partly in normative theory, of what a liberal public sphere looks like. This model of the public sphere is characterized by civility, open access and critical discussion. When entering the public sphere, rational individuals discard their status and power and engage the other side as equals. Each side tries to see the other's perspective and the better argument carries the day. Political conflict is dissolved and social learning takes place (Habermas 1991: 130-131).

Much of the subsequent literature has found the model useful but has also critiqued it in a variety of ways, notably with regard to issues of gender (Fraser 1990) and class (Negt and Kluge 1993). Such critiques aim to be more realistic with regard to how “actually existing” public spheres function (Adut 2012). For the purposes of this chapter, the most useful contributions to the debate on the public sphere are those that look at the way public spheres tend to create a collective and unitary actor, for example “the public” or “the nation”, out of a collection of individuals supposedly engaged in free thinking and rational discussion (Mah 2000; Stamatov 2000). As Mah argues, the public sphere “comes to be represented as a single, unified being, a

mass subject” (Mah 2000: 155). Stamatov adds that this dynamic is something that was built into the public sphere from the start and may lead to the public sphere turning “bad” (Stamatov 2000: 549), i.e. subverting the very liberal goals it was meant to safe-guard. This concern is of special interest once populism enters the public sphere on a large scale. When populism takes center stage, the public sphere may become the setting where “the people” emerge as a unitary actor. And though such an image is by necessity a political phantasy, it may nevertheless have tangible effects on political events. Mapping the emergence of “the people” in the public sphere and tracing its effects on events are key goals of this chapter.

Second, the literature on populism is another field to which this chapter contributes. As argued in the introduction, the literature on populism tends to be divided into studies of, on the one hand, populist discourse and, on the other, populist organization, mobilization and strategy. For many scholars, populism is primarily a political discourse that juxtaposes the people with the elite (Mudde 2004; Laclau 2005a; Laclau 2005b; Stanley 2008; Hawkins 2009; Moffitt and Tormey 2014; Stavrakakis and Katsambekis 2014). Such an approach means looking at populism as rhetoric, ideology or discourse, whatever the preferred term may be. The alternative approach is to turn to matters of populist mobilization and organization (Mouzelis 1985; Weyland 2001; Mair 2002; Roberts 2006; Jansen 2011). For this body of work, populism is primarily a tactic of politicians, a means of employing the masses in political conflict and a mode of mobilization when conventional political parties and regular institutional channels fail or are unavailable.

Yet, such a division of academic labor makes us blind to the possible links between discourse and mobilization, the “dialectical” relationship between the two (Ellingson 1995; Steinberg 1999). As Canovan suggests, a more balanced approach would keep one eye on “the people” as a myth formed in discourse and “the people” as they materialize, in an incomplete and less mythical way, in street protests and popular movements. In her own words: “The mythic People may have two aspects, figuring on the one hand as a spirit summoned by political sorcerers, but on the other hand as something more spontaneous and less controllable, a movement that occasionally happens [...] we need a dual approach that complements the investigation of more-or-less manipulative 'magic' with an analysis of movements” (Canovan 2005: 134). That is the approach of this chapter: to consider the relationship between populist discourse and popular mobilization, the “myth” or the “magic”, on the one hand, and the action of movements, on the other.

Yet, Canovan's quote would suggest that the myth of “the people” is something of a black box. Though one can agree that manipulation is at the core of the myth, it may still be worthwhile examining which type of intervention matters most. This is where the chapter contributes to the literature on the former Yugoslavia. As mentioned in the introductory chapter, the literature on Yugoslavia's terminal crisis usually paints the entire anti-bureaucratic revolution as a consequence of elite manipulation. Such work primarily sees the protest wave as a top-down phenomenon in which Milošević used nationalist grievances in general and the Kosovo issue in particular in order to strengthen his political position (Ramet 1992c: 225; Cohen 1993: 51; Bennet 1995: 83; Woodward 1995b: 97; Little and Silber: 58; Pavković 2000: 89; Pavlowitch

2002: 194; Glaurdić 2011: 29). Though one can easily agree with the general thrust of this assessment, there is very little nuance in terms of a careful weighing of the types of mechanisms at work: which elite interventions were important?

More specific to this chapter, the literature on the former Yugoslavia has dealt with the role of the media primarily in light of the subsequent period, i.e. during the wars of the 1990s (Snyder and Ballentine 1996; Slapšak et al. 1997; Thompson 1999; Skopljanac-Brunner et al. 2000; Kurspahić 2003; Đerić 2008). When it comes to the late 1980s, scholars tend to give more general assessments about the impact of the media. Thus, scholars speak of the “massive propaganda campaign” of the late 1980s (Doder and Branson 1999: 59), about how “the popular press ran a coordinated campaign” (Pavković 2000: 105), about the way Serbian public opinion was “deliberately manufactured and intensively cultivated by the Serbian media since 1987” (Bennett 1995: 96), or how *Politika* became “a mouth-piece” of Milošević (Ramet 1992c: 228). Such blanket assessments – even if they are largely correct – can provide only very limited insight into the concrete mechanisms by which Milošević's manipulation in the public sphere worked. For this, we need a closer examination of “Echoes and reactions”, arguably the most important two pages in the most important Serbian newspaper of the time.

“Echoes and reactions”

This section provides an introduction to “Echoes and reactions”, the section of *Politika* which published letters from readers. Superficially, “Echoes and reactions” was like any other section

devoted to letters to the editor. It evolved out of “Among us” (*Među nama*), a popular but tame section which published letters having to do with quotidian local problems, i.e. “a pensioner rubric” (Marović 2002: 237; Mimica and Vučetić 2008: 15). “Among us” published letters in which readers complained about inconveniences which they encountered interacting with public services or in their immediate communal surroundings. The practice of writing letters in order to complain about services was common in socialist countries and offered an acceptable way in which grievances could be voiced and problems with administration highlighted (Deutz-Schroeder and Stadt 1994; Fitzpatrick 1996; Dimitrov 2014). Beginning in July and August of 1988, the letter section was transformed by printing letters with explicitly political topics written in a highly confrontational tone. It expanded from the single page devoted to “Among us” to two, sometimes three pages usually placed in the middle of the newspaper. The emergence of “Echoes and reactions” was a key component in the paper’s struggle against “bureaucratic journalism” or “salon journalism”, as mentioned in the last chapter. As the general editor of *Politika* put it, *Politika* wanted to “be with the people” (Nenadović 1996: 597).

However, *Politika* was not the only newspaper to feature a section devoted to readers' letters. As will be shown later in this chapter, even the more liberal and Western-oriented *Borba* featured readers' letters. But the centrality of *Politika* in the Serbian landscape made “Echoes and reactions” crucial. Letters published in *Politika*. continued to reverberate throughout the public sphere: some of them were read at prime-time slots on TV Belgrade, the monopolistic television station in Serbia (Marović 2002: 239; Mimica and Vučetić 2008: 20). The fact that these letters were presented as coming from the people made them difficult to criticize: who would want to

criticize “the people”? And those that did criticize the letters exposed themselves to the risk of becoming a target. Persons targeted by “Echoes and reactions” would quickly become politically dead.

The day-to-day editorial practices of “Echoes and reactions” remain a mystery. The general editor of the newspaper has written lengthy memoirs but has not divulged many details about the way the letter section was run (Minović 2007; 2008). Fortunately, several insider accounts exist which shed light on the problem (Nenadović 1996; Marović 2002; Mimica and Vučetić 2008). It seems that the section was run by a secret team with an office separate from the rest of *Politika*. It can be assumed that many letters were signed by fictional names. The secret team was in close contact with the powerful Committee for Public Information of the League of Communists of Serbia, a party organ that was the main go-between newspaper editors and communist politicians, including Milošević. Connected outsiders volunteered their texts and were subsequently rewarded by advancing professionally. Some politicians wrote under pseudonyms (Marović 2002: 212, 226, 239; Mimica and Vučetić 2008: 25). Even though “Among us” used to insist that contributors send numbers of their identification cards along with a full address, the editors of “Echoes and reactions” decided to abandon such scruples. The long-standing editor of “Among us” was removed (Marović 2002: 238).

In other words, the manipulative aspect of “Echoes and reactions” is clear. Yet, were the analysis to stop there, it would miss the interactive character of the section. The fact that many letters were probably written by members of a secret para-journalist team does not mean that the

section did not spark genuine enthusiasm from readers, many of which decided to become contributors. For example, a photograph in *Politika* showed the quantity of letters that they would receive each day: about half a meter tall (*Politika*, September 24th 1988, 15). If this picture is genuine, it would mean that “Echoes and reactions” was as much real as it was doctored. Or more accurately put, it was both simultaneously. Observers have noted this elusive character of the letters by speaking of it as “both spontaneous and ordered anger”, “organized spontaneity” (Nenadović 1996: 587, 588), or as a “field of interaction” characterized by “why not – the relative spontaneity of reader reactions” (Mimica and Vučetić 2008: 7, 16).

The difficulty with claiming that the letter section was completely manufactured is the presence of counter-evidence. In one case, when journalists from other newspapers suggested that authors of two letters were fictional, one of the two responded publicly thereby “proving his existence” (Mimica and Vučetić 2008: 25). Tellingly, the second of the two never reacted, pointing again to the hybrid character of “Echoes and reactions”, i.e. the fact that it is best seen as simultaneously genuine and manipulated, spontaneous and doctored. Therefore, it points us to the way populism works more broadly. As one insider suggests, “Echoes and reactions”, “definitely contains something authentically popular. But it also contains something which is without doubt putschist, hounding and totalitarian” (Nenadović 1996: 595). This is the twin character of populism, more broadly.

It seems most appropriate to view “Echoes and reactions” as a site of elite-mass interaction. The manipulation could work only if it was based (at least in part) on actual popular opinion. Had it

been completely artificial it would not have resonated and become the cult phenomenon that it became. Perhaps it is best to see the section as something that “was building a new reality which would soon become more real than reality itself” (Mimica and Vučetić 2008: 5). Or similarly, as something that made it possible for *Politika* “to create over time the type of people that it preferred, that is, readers who learn from it [from *Politika*] how to think and speak and be Serbian patriotic role-models for others” (Nenadović 1996: 594). In other words, *Politika* was constructing “the people.”

The phenomenon of readers' letters

The innovation of *Politika* was to take the rather timid practice of writing public letters to complain about life under socialism and turn it into an aggressive type of public forum. The new platform could be used by Milošević and his circle to attack political enemies, express support for the new populist course of the Serbian party, heighten the salience of the Kosovo issue and support the protest activity taking place in the streets. Most interestingly, however, the pages of “Echoes and reactions” were a place where “the people” could be constructed as a collective actor. The people talked to the people about the people, thereby performing a form of auto-communication (Čolović 2011: 174). In retrospect, the naivety of this type of discussion seems striking, but one should not judge the readers of the time by current standards.

Here are some examples of the kind of “construction of the people” which took place in “Echoes and reactions.” One of the favorite things that letters liked to do was discuss the

phenomenon of letter-writing itself. Most frequently, the letters gave compliments to the newspaper and its new section: “I want to express my delight and great pleasure that *Politika* informs us objectively and in great detail about current problems. Of special interest is the section 'Echoes and reactions' where readers can express their unhappiness and bitterness with the slow resolution of Kosovo's drama. This writing of *Politika* can only upset the enemies of this society” (*Politika*, September 14th 1988, 14).¹⁰ This letter illustrates some of the key goals of the section: it was meant to raise the profile of the Kosovo issue as well as confront those who would oppose such an approach.

Another letter also praised *Politika* while attacking other newspapers. This time the target was the Vojvodina newspaper *Dnevnik*, whose reporting on the protest activity was seen as insufficiently enthusiastic: “Here, this is yet more proof about what it means for newspapers to become puppets, sycophants that is, of political structures or better said, of arm-chair politicians, and what it means when newspapers like those published by the publishing house *Politika*, with their reporters who fulfill their mission correctly and accurately, and so it is no wonder that *Politika*, as the people say, sells out like hot cakes” (*Politika*, September 13th 1988, 13).¹¹ Rambling aside, this letter showcases how to praise *Politika* and attack its opponents. In addition, the letter uses the expression “arm-chair politicians” (*foteljaši*) to characterize passive and lazy politicians. The next chapter deals more directly with this juxtaposition of the productive people and the unproductive politicians.

Some assessments went beyond simply praising *Politika* and insisted that “Echoes and

reactions” was a window into the people's soul. For example, one letter said that “[i]t has been shown that the letter section 'Echoes and reactions' expresses the opinions and positions of the broadest public, working people and citizens of this country” (*Politika*, October 9th 1988, 6).¹² Or similarly: “Our common man and his soul have spoken through 'Echoes and reactions.' The worker, peasant, intellectual, scientist, war veteran have expressed themselves and this irresistible love for their country and a peaceful life has been crowned in numerous articles which we should stop and analyze, as a priceless jewel” (*Politika*, November 28th 1988, 17).¹³ As the letter continued, “our common man has long refrained from public statements. But when he felt and saw the abyss ahead of him, he took up the pen and words came together like pearls. Philosophers, historians and sociologists should think hard about these letters...” (*Politika*, November 28th 1988, 17).¹⁴ In short, not only have the people finally “spoken” on the pages of *Politika*, but they have a wisdom which goes beyond the wisdom of trained intellectuals. The theme of anti-intellectualism is a common one in populism (Taggart 2000: 8; Hofstadter 1963) and the Serbian case is no exception.

In this spirit, one reader suggested that “[e]verything that the people have said in 'Echoes and reactions' should be published in a single book as proof (as a trace) of the people who have begun to speak with their heart and soul, honestly and justly in a stream reaching to the heavens” (*Politika*, October 3rd 1988, 17).¹⁵ The book would be “a kind of document of the plebiscitary expression of the people regarding the fateful questions of our time and of the future” (*Politika*, October 3rd 1988, 17).¹⁶ In similar fashion, another letter suggested that letters published in “Echoes and reactions” should be given to politicians as they prepare for important

party sessions: “From your 'Echoes and reactions' one can easily conclude that the people have too much wisdom and too little political power, while things are the opposite with the leadership. That is why I suggest that all the letters from this section be provided as special materials which will be supplied for the 17th session of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, so they could be used by the leadership as a mirror” (*Politika*, September 18th 1988, 17).¹⁷ As this letter argued, “Echoes and reactions” can be treated as a compendium of popular knowledge, a collection of what “the people” feel and know.

Responding to the challenge of readers' letters

The innovation introduced by *Politika* – an expanded space for readers' letters with explicitly politicized messages – became something that other newspapers had to respond to. Why do they not provide similar avenues for “the people” to express themselves? *Borba*, the most liberal of Yugoslav newspapers provides an interesting counter-point to *Politika*. It too used to print readers' letters but did so in a modest way: relatively rarely and without an explicitly political edge. Their letters were similar to the predecessor of “Echoes and reactions”, the more timid “Among us.” Throughout the summer and fall of 1988, the letters published in *Borba* did not stray too far from this more conventional model. Most letters dealt with complaints about administration and public services. Only rarely did *Borba* publish letters with explicitly political messages. Thus, one can infer that *Borba* engaged in its own selection processes. It is highly likely that many political letters were shelved, as *Borba* tried to contain the phenomenon of popular letter-writing.

Borba also tried to address the new phenomenon more head-on. They did so by trying to engage the people, albeit in polite and diplomatic ways. Here is one example of a letter that attacked *Borba* for its unwillingness to expand the space it gives to letters: “It is incomprehensible, indeed absurd, that *Borba*, as the only Yugoslav newspaper [...] does not have an entire page devoted to readers' letters” (*Borba*, September 26th 1988, 2).¹⁸ As the letter continued in its criticism: “For me, having a narrow letter section in some newspapers is proof of a certain distance, alienation of the newspaper from its readers” (*Borba*, September 26th 1988, 2).¹⁹ In other words, explicit pressures were now exerted onto other newspapers that they should adopt the same practices taking root in *Politika*.

This letter however, shows the difference in approach between *Politika* and *Borba*. Not only did *Borba* print a letter which criticized it, but it also introduced the practice of providing answers to readers' letters. This was not common in *Politika*. To this particular letter *Borba* responded by having the editor of the newspaper pen a response personally. Rather politely, he responded by saying that “*Borba* devotes special attention to so-called outside contributions, the printing of pieces, opinions and positions of people who are not employed in the paper” (*Borba*, September 26th 1988, 2).²⁰ Such a direct response indicated a dedication to transparency that was not in evidence in *Politika*. The editor did not respond to hostility with hostility but aimed to defuse the situation.

In another example, a reader's letter again attacked *Borba*. As the letter said: “some newspapers

have opened their pages to readers and introduced new sections in which readers comment on current events in the country and [have therefore become] proper newspapers of the people” (*Borba*, November 21st 1988, 2).²¹ To this, the letter-writer added a question: “why does *Borba* not introduce the appropriate section in which citizens could present their opinions and suggestions with regard to all questions of interest to readers?” (*Borba*, November 21st 1988, 2).²² The letter further suggested that this would increase the circulation figures of *Borba*. This can be taken as a sign that the introduction of “Echoes and reactions” most probably lead to an increase in sales of *Politika*.

In their response, *Borba* noted that the trend of readers' letters was becoming a universal phenomenon: “...as is known, all newspapers receive with pleasure an increased flow of letters from readers, and especially *Borba* as a federal newspaper which has the obligation of taking seriously each letter that we receive” (*Borba*, November 21st 1988, 2).²³ The answer again shows the careful and diplomatic tone of *Borba's* journalists: the reader is not attacked and the numerous letters are said to be received “with pleasure.” The response again reminded the readers that *Borba* does indeed have a section devoted to letters: “for more than a year, in line with the new editorial policy, *Borba* devotes special attention and secures space for letters from our readers” (*Borba*, November 21st 1988, 2).²⁴ The journalist in charge of writing this response added that *Borba* not only provided space for letters but also tried to provide answers – often from the very institutions challenged – and concluded that the result was “some sort of collective interview, with which we are especially pleased” (*Borba*, November 21st 1988, 2).²⁵ Once again, the picture is presented in a non-conflictual way: despite the fact that the letters

challenged *Borba* directly. In this respect, *Borba* approximates certain Habermasian qualities that were absent in *Politika*, a liberal dedication to civility, compromise and discussion.

An even more revealing exchange took place between a factory worker and the “director” of *Borba* (a political post). The letter attacked the paper's director by saying that “I hope you will publish this letter even though your director Milan Rakas will probably not like it, just as I did not like his article” (*Borba*, August 22nd 1988, 3).²⁶ The letter continued: “As far as I know, Rakas is a good man and communist and so I do not understand why in his article he disputes the right of the people (who are seldom wrong) to call out particular functionaries who with their (lack of) work did not justify the confidence of the people who, as he says, 'are publicly labeling and disqualifying individuals’” (*Borba*, August 22nd 1988, 2).²⁷ In a directly confrontational manner, the letter says that “it is clear to everyone today that being silent hurts this country, which belongs to the people and only to the people. Being silent is in the interest only of the enemies of the country and therefore, comrade Rakas, do not tell the people to be quiet. Be confident that the people will not make a mistake since they have not made mistakes before” (*Borba*, August 22nd 1988, 2).²⁸ This letter talks of “the people” in a way that was common in *Politika*: “the people” know what they want, they do not make mistakes and are now actively taking matters into their own hands.

The response was written by Rakas himself. Once again, not only did *Borba* print an attack on itself, but treated an ordinary letter writer (factory worker, in this case) as a contribution that was on par with a top-ranking political functionary. This shows the more tolerant and open-

minded orientation of *Borba*. Rakas' response continues with *Borba*'s choice of politeness over disagreement: “I agree with you comrade [...] that the people have the right to call out certain functionaries, which as you say have 'not justified the confidence of the people'” (*Borba*, August 22nd 1988, 2).²⁹ After this conciliatory gesture, Rakas concluded that: “With regard to the people, I hope that they will call out all of us more often, and especially those of us who occupy high-ranking positions [...] Probably some should not only be called out but also removed, but of course only through our forms of socialist democracy” (*Borba*, August 22nd 1988, 2).³⁰ Rakas here placates the reader by agreeing with him but counters with the hope that, should some politicians resign, that this process should follow institutional rules. In this respect, the liberal hope in procedure and due process comes through, even if the institutions in question are those of a socialist country. This hope that rules will be followed and due process respected was a clear counter-point to *Politika*'s “Echoes and reactions.”

In summary, this section showed how the introduction of “Echoes and reactions” reverberated through the Serbian public sphere and how it forced *Borba*, the main liberal counter-part to the openly populist *Politika*, into a defensive stance. The comparison between *Politika* and *Borba* will be pursued throughout this chapter since the two can be treated as opposites and are thus useful in framing the continuum from fully populist to (imperfectly) liberal. The next sections begin to introduce the data-set built for the purpose of analyzing the populist “construction” of the people in the media.

Inter-coder reliability

The data constructed for the purposes of this chapter are all derived from a corpus of readers' letters published in the Serbian press. The specific categories which were coded will become explicit during the course of this chapter. For the first step, it is important to show that the data was coded with replicability in mind. Therefore, Table 8 presents the results of inter-coder reliability testing. The goal of these tests is to show that the coding was conducted in such a way that it could be replicated by other researchers.

Which measures of reliability should be used? Percent agreement is the simplest and most common measure. Yet, as the literature on inter-coder reliability suggests, it should be supplemented with other measures which take into account the agreement which happens solely by chance (Lombard et al. 2002; Neuendorf 2002; Krippendorff 2004a, 2004b). Other measures, such as Cohen's Kappa (Cohen 1960) and Fleiss' Kappa (Fleiss 1971) address this concern. The most versatile measure is Krippendorff's Alpha (Krippendorff 1970; Krippendorff 1978) which combines several measures in a single measure: Pearson's correlation coefficient, Spearman's rank correlation coefficient, Scott's pi and Fleiss' kappa. Krippendorff's alpha can be used with any number of coders, with missing data, binary, nominal, ordinal and other types of data and is automatically adjusted according to sample size. It thus has the virtue of being comparable across different data-sets.

The ranking of what counts as a sufficiently high reliability score is by necessity a bit arbitrary. For percent agreement and Cohen's Kappa, for example, Landis and Koch suggest that scores

from 0.01 to 0.20 be interpreted as slight agreement, between 0.21 and 0.40 as fair agreement, between 0.41 and 0.60 as moderate agreement, between 0.61 and 0.80 as substantial agreement and between 0.81 and 1 as almost perfect agreement (Landis and Koch 1977). Fleiss offered an alternative scale: below 0.40 as poor, between 0.40 and 0.75 as fair to good, and above 0.75 as excellent (Fleiss 1981: 218). Krippendorff suggests that researchers “can rely” on data where alpha is equal to or larger than 0.80, consider data between 0.66 and 0.80 only “for tentative conclusions” and “discard” data where alpha is less than 0.66 (Krippendorff 2004b: 241-243).

Table 8 presents the results of the inter-coder reliability tests. All the calculations were done using the free web-based utility “ReCal” (Freelon 2010; Freelon 2013; <http://dfreelon.org/utills/recalfront/>). I present the results for percent agreement, Cohen's kappa, Fleiss's kappa and Krippendorff's alpha. As can be seen, and as is consistent with the methodological literature, scores for percent agreement are higher than the stricter statistics such as Krippendorff's alpha. The percent agreement figures range from 0.93 (or 93 percent) to 1.00 (or 100 percent), which means that the coding is characterized by “almost perfect” agreement. Krippendorff's alpha figures range from 0.87 to 1.00 which places the coding into the category in which researchers “can rely” on the data. The figures for Fleiss' kappa and Cohen's kappa are quite similar to Krippendorff's alpha. In addition, there are no large differences between the three coders. Nor are there large differences between categories. All of them have reliability scores of 0.87 or higher, while some are characterized by complete agreement (no differences between coders).

How does this coding compare with other attempts to measure aspects of populist discourse? Much of the literature on populist discourse has been qualitative and has not sought a more positivist approach. In particular, this holds for much of the literature inspired by Laclau (2005a), whose influence seems to steer research away from empirical testing and into other forms of analysis, most obviously Lacanian psychoanalysis (Laclau 2005a: 101-116). Of the various researchers who have attempted to measure populism as a discourse, the work of Hawkins most stands out (2009).

Hawkins adopts what he calls holistic grading: coders were asked to assess if the speeches of Latin American politicians were “non-populist”, “mixed” or “populist” based on a list of elements that populist discourse usually contains (Hawkins 2009: 1062-1064). He reports correlation coefficients of 0.79 and 0.87, 78 percent agreement and a kappa of 0.68. Additional aspects of his analysis revealed that percent agreement dropped at times to 70 percent while Cohen's kappa dropped to 0.44 (Hawkins 2009: 1052-1053). Further analysis of particular politicians revealed that reliability dipped towards the 60-70 range for percent agreement and the 0.27 to 0.33 for kappa (Hawkins 2009: 1060). In other words, attempts to code aspects of populist discourse in which the coder is asked to infer and interpret tend to lead to lower reliability scores. The approach chosen in this chapter was to approach the textual data in a more mechanical manner, which produced higher reliability scores.

Overview of readers' letters

Having dealt with concerns regarding data reliability, it is possible to turn to the basic contours of the data. In order to investigate how the “construction of the people” worked, a specific research design was adopted. First, how can the letters be organized? The categories used here were chosen because they make it possible to construct several operationalizations of elite intervention and, in extension, to assess which elite intervention mattered most for the construction of “the people.”

The first group of letters that should be investigated are those letters which had the word “people” (*narod*) in the title. Although it is not possible to say which letters were written by the secret editorial team and which by ordinary readers, the choice of title is important since it points to an editorial decision: to include the word “people” in the title. While authorship of letters cannot be known, the choice of title was in the hands of the editorial team. By itself, the choice of title is a decision which aims to mold public opinion rather than merely reflect it. In other words, the letters that contain the word “people” in their titles are important since they reveal an ambition on the part of the editors to engage in the construction of “the people.” This chapter refers to this as the “editorial intervention.” It is the first of three ways in which elite intervention into the populist construction of “the people” is operationalized.

The second way to approach elite intervention is to track letters written by those with high educational credentials. Many – though not all – letter-writers would state their educational status. Given the emphasis in the literature on the importance of academics and university professors in the centrifugal dynamics that broke-up Yugoslavia (Dimitrijević 1999; Dragović-

Soso 2002), it is particularly important to keep track of various academic contributors. Did various professors and letter-writers with doctorates engage in more “construction of the people”? Did they try to speak in the name of “the people” thereby creating the people as a single unified agent? This can be called the “academic” intervention. Academics and professors do not speak directly in the name of the regime, but they do ally with it, especially the Serbian party's new populist course.

The third way of operationalizing elite intervention is to track letters according to when they were published. As discussed in the previous chapter, one elite event proved to be a particularly important watershed for the dynamics of the protest wave: the September 5th session of the Serbian League of Communists. This event provided a public signal which legitimated protests and lead to an increase in mobilization. Was there a corresponding trend in the public sphere? Can differences be found in the volume and content of letters published before and after the September session of the Serbian party? If this is the case, then it can be said that the public signal offered by the September session mattered for the construction of “the people.” This elite intervention is called the “public” intervention, to contrast with the “editorial” intervention, which is less transparent. In summary: the three ways in which elite influence can be approached can be called “editorial”, “academic” and “public.”

Table 9 provides an overview of these groups of letters for *Politika* and *Borba*. While “Echoes and reactions” from *Politika* is the main topic of interest in this chapter, the collection of letters published in *Borba* is useful as a comparison group. Since *Borba* was the daily newspaper with

the strongest liberal tendencies in Yugoslavia, it presents the closest that Yugoslavia's public sphere could approximate liberal norms of discussion and debate. At the same time, the fact that many readers wrote to *Borba* strongly suggests that many letters published in *Politika* were also genuine. The former's stronger professional standards would imply that it was much less likely to fabricate letters the way *Politika* probably was. In other words, the practice of letter-writing was something that was firmly in place in the Yugoslav public sphere as a whole, as was also suggested by the previous sections.

As can be seen in Table 9, *Politika* published more letters than *Borba*. For the period under observation, the same one that is used throughout this dissertation, i.e. from the start of June to the end of November 1988, *Politika* published a combined 804 letters, while *Borba* published 131 letters. In other words, the sheer volume of letters in *Politika* was much larger. *Politika* also published more letters with the word “people” in the title: 60 letters out of 804 compared to only 2 out of 131 in *Borba*. These difference suggest that the editorial strategies of the two newspapers diverged.

Of course, it should not be assumed that *Borba* necessarily presents a “true” reflection of ordinary citizens' opinions. It is not possible to say whether their selection of printed letters is a faithful and representative sample of the letters they received. Nor should it be assumed that those people writing letters are a representative sample of the population as a whole. The earlier discussion suggests that *Borba* may have been employing their own selection criteria. Yet, the discrepancy between the two newspapers makes possible a less ambitious claim, namely, that a

divergence between the two newspapers (with regard to letters with “the people” in the title) did exist, regardless of where the “neutral” position may have been. To the extent that letters with the word “people” in the title present cases of populist discourse, it can be concluded that *Politika* was engaged in the populist construction of “the people” more than *Borba* was. A more detailed investigation of the word “people”, and how it was used, will be developed throughout this chapter.

As can be further seen in Table 9, *Politika* and *Borba* published about the same percentage of letters by academics and professors. In other words, neither can be singled out as giving more space to the educated elite. And finally, what is the share of letters published before and after the September session of the LC? It should be mentioned that “Echoes and reactions” took form only in mid July. This was also when *Borba* began to publish its letters more frequently, probably in reaction to what they saw in *Politika*. In other words, it is not surprising that a higher percentage of letters was published in the second half of the protest wave, i.e. the period from September 5th to the end of November. A divergence between the volume of letters exists here too, with *Politika* publishing 63.3 percent of its letters after the September session, while in *Borba* the percentage is slightly lower at 54.1 percent. However, closer examination will be required to see if the September session encouraged an expansion of the readers' letters phenomenon.

Table 10 gives more insight into this problem. It breaks down letters written before and after the September session using the various groups of relevant letters, as was done in Table 9. As can be

seen, the percentages are all relatively similar. There does not seem to be a marked increase in letters with the word “people” in the title published by *Politika* in the aftermath of the September session. Nor did more academics have their letters published in this period. In other words, the impact of the “public” intervention, i.e. the encouraging signal sent from the top of the political establishment at the September session, does not seem to matter too much. Out of the three possible ways that elite intervention can be operationalized – i.e. the “editorial”, “academic” and “public” interventions – it would appear that the patterns so far point to the importance of the “editorial” intervention. The analysis will continue to probe this question.

Usages of “the people”

How can the word “people” be used? An overview is presented in Table 11. It provides a list of words that appear most often in the sentences that feature the word “people”, across all categories of letters. To the categories of letters introduced earlier, Table 11 also adds an additional comparison group of letters from *Politika*. This group of letters provides a benchmark against which one can compare the other letters. A total of 100 letters were chosen that were published in *Politika* but did not have the word “people” in the title and were not written by academics. These letters were chosen randomly from the remaining corpus of letters. They play a role similar to the letters from *Borba*. Together they provide a way to assess the gradations of populism in the public sphere.

As can be seen in Table 11, the list of words that appear most often does not diverge wildly from

one group of letters to another. Most of the time, the word “people” appears together with words such as Kosovo, Yugoslavia, Serbia, Serbian, leadership and so on. These are the main topics of political conversation in Serbia at the time. In other words, more targeted categories will be required than merely observing frequencies. The relevant question is: which usage of “the people” can be said to come closest to the populist construction of “the people”?

It should be re-iterated that a key component of populist discourse is that it sees society as divided into two antagonistic groups: the elite and the people. For the conflict to capture the wider society, “the people” have to be seen as a unified and homogenous actor. In other words, out of heterogeneous society a single and cohesive actor has to emerge. In practical terms, of course, this is not possible. Street protests can come close, but even in large protest waves only a minority of all citizens takes part. Instead, what is possible is the emergence of “the people” as an actor in discourse. Once “formed” in the public sphere, this actor can lead to real-life consequences. For the many individuals whose careers and lives were impacted by the attacks in “Echoes and reactions”, the consequences were quite real. In other words, the creation of a collective actor called “the people” may seem like a political fiction, but actions with real consequences can be done in the name of “the people.” Furthermore, as will be shown later in the chapter, the link between the fiction of “the people” and protest activity in the streets is also worth examining.

Serbian language allows for a distinct use of the word “people” that is not very intuitive in English: it can be used in the singular. In English it would be unusual or even plain incorrect to

say, for example, that “the people has risen.” But in Serbian this comes naturally with the word *narod*. By using it in the singular, a first step is taken towards the image of “the people” as a single and coherent actor. The word can also be used in the plural. The word *narodi* can be translated as both “peoples” and “nations.” Indeed, the people in the singular, i.e. *narod*, can mean both “the people” and “the nation.” Serbian language also uses a distinct word for nation (*nacija*), which in the late 1980s was not in common usage. The word people (*narod*) thus did more “work.” Using the word *narod* in the sense of “the people” means referring primarily to the *demos* or the citizenry, while using it in the sense of “the nation” begins to add ethnic traits. In other words, the word “people” can be the basis of both populism and nationalism. It was sufficiently broad to provide a basis for both.

In the English language, “peoples” is legitimate but is somewhat outside everyday usage. On the other hand, it was common in the former Yugoslavia. In particular, political parlance often referred to those groups that “had” a republic (for example, Croats, Slovenes, Serbs) as “peoples/nations” (*narodi*). On the other hand, ethnic groups that did not have a republic would be called a “nationality” (*narodnost*), i.e. an ethnic minority. The largest “nationality” were Albanians. Such groups had certain rights to autonomy, but no republic to call their own. “Their” territorial unit could not be given the status of republic. Albanians did not “have” a republic, but “had” a province. A province was not, however, a “state” in quite the same way as Serbia, Croatia or Slovenia were. In order to refer to all ethnic groups living in a certain republic one had to say “peoples and nationalities” (*narodi i narodnosti*). Using only “peoples” might mean that one is excluding Albanians or other groups. The word *narod* would thus appear

frequently with “nationality” (*narodnost*) simply as a matter of a certain phrase become part of a time's politically correct vocabulary. The same holds for the expression “working class” (*radnička klasa*) which was often used together with the word “people” (*narod*) to denote the ultimate sovereign power in this socialist country. The exact point at which the working class ended and “the people” began was left vague, but using the two together guaranteed that the speaker had encompassed the entirety of the collective actor with whom ultimate political power was said to have rested in socialist Yugoslavia.

This discussion of the word people (*narod*) delineates the main uses that need to be tracked: in the singular and in the plural, together with the word “nationality” (*narodnost*) and the word “working class” (*radnička klasa*). Using the word in the plural, or with the words “nationality” and “working class” indicates use that stays within the bounds of existing vocabulary. These are conventional usages, expressions which had established themselves throughout the period after World War II. Speaking of “our people” (*naši narodi*), “our peoples and nationalities” (*naši narodi i narodnosti*), or “the people and the working class” (*narod i radnička klasa*) was as natural as praising Tito. In short, this type of usage is not innovative.

Populist and conventional usages of “the people”

However, using the word in the singular was slightly different. It begins the transition towards the populist construction of “the people” as a unified actor. The second usage which reveals the populist construction of “the people” even more is when the word “people” (*narod*) was used as

the subject in a sentence, i.e. the active agent that performs a certain action. For example, when a letter published in *Politika* says that “[t]he people know best what is good for them and what is not” (*Politika*, August 5th 1988, 13)³¹, the word “people” is used as the subject of both sentences. In these instances the populist creation of “the people” comes to life and begins to “do” things by itself. When “the people” are used in the singular and as the subject of a sentence, the populist construction of “the people” is pushed furthest. The next several tables provide an overview with regard to these various uses of the word.

Table 12 shows how often the word “people” appeared in the various groups of letters. This includes the same categories of letters as before. As can be seen, the word “people” appeared most often per letter in the first group of letters, i.e. those letters that were published in *Politika* and had “the people” in the title. The figures give the mean and median number of instances that “the people” appeared per letter. On average, a letter that had “the people” in the title used the word 8.9 times. Letters written by academics and professors see this value drop to 5.4. For the comparison group of letters from *Politika*, the figure drops further to 2.2 and in *Borba* to 0.7. The median figures are lower throughout, but the relative differences between the four groups of letters are similar. The other rows in Table 12 reveal essentially the same patterns. For example, instances of “the people” appearing in the singular, as the subject in a sentence, and both, all show the same differences across groups of letters. In other words, the populist construction of “the people” is most pronounced in those letters that featured “the people” in the title. Letters written by academics come in second, the comparison group of *Politika* letters third and *Borba* comes in last. In that respect, it would appear that the “editorial intervention” is the heaviest

when it comes to the populist construction of the people. The “academic” intervention is second. Letters published in *Borba*, on the other hand, seem to largely abstain from the populist construction of “the people.”

Table 13 presents the same data but breaks it down into two periods: before and after the September session of the Serbian party. The results do not reveal large differences but they are consistent across the various usages of the word “people.” As can be seen in Table 13, the word “people” in all its variants appeared more often in the period prior to the September session. This is an interesting contrast to the figures presented in Table 9 which showed that more letters were published after the September session. In other words, the volume of letters rose, but they engaged in less populist construction of “the people” (per letter). The differences are not large but they are consistent across categories. How can this be interpreted?

The first conclusion that seems warranted is that the “public” intervention of the September session did not lead to more construction of “the people.” A larger share of total letters may indicate that ordinary citizens wrote in more, but this is something one cannot be sure of. On the other hand, the fact that more letters engaged in the construction of “the people” prior to the September session may point again to the relevance of the “editorial” intervention. In other words, the secret team behind “Echoes and reactions” may have been “preparing” the terrain by choosing and/or writing more “people-heavy” letters in the first period of the protest wave. At a later stage, Milošević officially endorsed a new populist course for Serbia as a whole which may have lessened the need for such writing. Of course, there is no direct evidence for this, but there

are signs in the data that distinctly point towards this possibility.

Table 14 presents the same data but shows counts and percentages instead. It includes the same populist usages of the people but includes several conventional usages as well. The new categories are the following: (1) how often “the people” were used in the plural (*narodi*), i.e. to denote the officially acknowledged and constitutive peoples/nations of Yugoslavia; (2) how often “the people” were used together with the word “nationality” (*narodnost*), i.e. a joint phrase to refer to both those Yugoslav nations that “had” republics (*narodi*) and the nationalities or national minorities who did not “have” a republic (*narodnosti*); and (3) how often “the people” appear together with the working class (*radnička klasa*) to denote the keeper, in the last instance, of popular sovereignty in socialist Yugoslavia.

As would be expected, much of the same patterns portrayed earlier are present in Table 14. For example, letters with the word “people” in the title have the largest share of usages in which “the people” are in the singular, the sentence subject or both, measured as a percentage of the total number of times “the people” appear in this category of letters. As would also be expected, *Borba* presents the smallest figures in all categories. For example, about 32.8 percent of the instances of the word “people” used in *Politika*'s letters (which had the word “people” in the title) were cases in which “the people” appeared in the singular *and* as the sentence subject. The figure is 20.2 percent in the case of *Borba*'s letters.

With regard to the conventional usages of the word “people” – in the plural, together with

“nationality” (*narodnost*), together with “working class” (*radnička klasa*) – the figures are somewhat higher in *Borba*. In that sense, this shows that the letters in *Borba* tended to stay within the contours of the existing political vocabulary. For example, 24.4 percent of the time, “the people” were used in plural form in *Borba*'s letters. The figure drops to 11.7 in *Politika*'s letters that had the word “people” in the title. The same difference appears with the word “people” appearing together “nationality.” This shows that the usages of the word “people” were more formulaic and old-fashioned in *Borba*. The letters in *Borba* stuck to the conventional political vocabulary of post-WWII Yugoslavia more than those in *Politika*.

What do “the people” do?

The last sections showed that the word “people” could be used in new and innovative ways: by putting it in the singular and – even more interestingly – by turning it into the subject of sentences. But what did “the people” in such sentences “do”? This section focuses attention on the action itself. This can be done by looking at the verbs that form the basis of the predicate in a sentence. While the subject is the carrier or agent of the action, the predicate (verb) tells us what kind of action is taking place. What do “the people” “do” when they are transformed into an agent by populist discourse?

Table 15 presents a list of the most common verbs used in predicates, once again organized according to the same categories of letters. Only sentences in which “the people” were used in the singular and as the subject were examined. The analysis restricts itself to only those verbs

that appeared a minimum of three times. The flexibility of language by necessity makes this type of catalog incomplete. There are many other predicates that were used less than three times. For a verb to be represented in Table 15, repetition has to combine with ease of use. Even so, Table 15 can provide a useful glimpse into the basic patterns of the populist construction of “the people.”

As can be seen in Table 15, the most common verb is the verb “say.” Several examples can be provided. These sentences are taken out of their context and so it may not be possible to fully understand the meaning behind the sentence. But the goal here is to provide examples of what the practice of “people” “saying” something looked like. As one letter suggests: “That is why the people have risen and have loudly said what is bothering them and what they want” (*Politika*, November 8th 1988, 13).³² Another letter attacked a particular politician by arguing that: “The people of Novi Sad have said what you wanted to keep quiet, they have said the truth together with Serbs from Kosovo and they have demanded one Serbia, one constitution, one court” (*Politika*, July 13th 1988, 13).³³ This particular quote references the protests in Vojvodina and attacks the Vojvodina leadership. The following letter similarly attacks the same political elite and references an instance in which authorities cut the power used by organizers to power their public announcement equipment: “Despite the fact that the power was cut, the people have said loudly and clearly that they want a unified republic, equality of all citizens, that Kosovo Serbs should not be left to fend for themselves, and if the Vojvodina leaders have not understood this then it is time for them to disappear from the political scene” (*Politika*, July 22nd 1988, 12).³⁴

These examples can give the reader a sense of what it means when “the people” “say” something. Most of the letters refer to the protests as instances in which the people “said” something and are taking the opportunity to present this as the opinion of “the people” as a whole. The usage of the verb “demand” is similar. The following letter is interesting for the way it explicitly references populism: “While sociologists and political scientists argue and diagnose what kind of phenomenon this is (is it populism, a result of socialist spontaneity or something else), while politicians react with confused and rigid bans on the gatherings of the people, they [the people] are entering political life and demand that the system be opened (which has for some time been bureaucratically formalized, neglected and blocked) for their troubles, problems and interests” (*Politika*, September 25th 1988, 17).³⁵ The letter does not resolve whether the phenomenon is indeed populism. It merely says that popular discontent needs to be addressed. “The people” “demand” that “the system” be opened to their grievances.

The other high-ranking verbs in Table 15 are very similar: express, know, accept, speak. They all refer to “the people” making up their minds and taking some sort of stand. As one letter said: “Given that the people have expressed their historic interest in the constitution of their republic with regard to the changes of the constitution of the Socialist Republic of Serbia, the question must be asked if the changes that are put forward reflect these interests” (*Politika*, July 19th 1988, 12).³⁶ Like many letters, this one also links expressions of the popular will to the proposed changes to the constitution of Serbia. The people are said to have made their opinions crystal clear: they want constitutional revisions.

Some letters explicitly claim insight into what the people “know.” For example, one letter comments on the fact that some of the songs sung at protests had strong national overtones. It defends “the people” by saying that: “Throughout our history, and thus including the present moment, our people knew which songs to sing and to whom” (*Politika*, November 24th 1988, 16).³⁷ In other words, “the people” have a wisdom that makes it impossible for them to make a mistake. The following letter makes a similar claim – of the people displaying a certain form of “trans-historic” wisdom – but makes it with regard to the people of Montenegro who “through the ages always knew who they were and what they want, always firmly in opposition to tyranny and with high patriotic ideals for which they are known in the world” (*Politika*, October 18th 1988, 17).³⁸ Although “the people” know what is right, this knowledge is not something that comes from any kind of education. Instead, it is a kind of primordial political instinct. As one letter said: “Our people were not taught 'nice manners' in high diplomatic circles, but they knew, though uneducated, usually with only four years of grade school, to sing pretty verses to their party and comrade Tito while he was still alive” (*Politika*, August 18th 1988, 15).³⁹ In other words, “the people” “know” certain things – indeed very important things – but this knowledge derives primarily from emotion, not from any kind of sophisticated learning.

Of the other verbs present in Table 15 the final two that deserve closer attention are “call out” and “enter into politics.” They indicate the politicization of “the people” in an even more explicit way. For example, one letter said that “[r]ecovery from our very difficult situation will happen when all of those whom the people have called out for their laziness resign and answer

to the people” (*Politika*, September 1st 1988, 15).⁴⁰ In other words, calling out or criticizing certain politicians is also something that “the people” do as one. The theme of laziness hints at the “unproductive” character of the political elite, a topic dealt with in the next chapter. “The people” can also “enter politics.” As one letter said, “[t]here are historic situations where the people, who are stripped of their rights and angry, do not ask for the rules of the game, but enter into politics and spoil the calculations of compromising and alienated political rulers” (*Politika*, September 25th 1988, 17).⁴¹ The year 1988 was seen as one such historic situation in which “the people” have entered politics and complicated the lives of political elites. “The people” cast aside the “rules of the game” and re-assert their sovereignty.

In summary, this section has given an overview of the main actions that “the people” engage in. The focus was on sentences in which “the people” appear in the singular *and* as the subject in the sentence. Given the diversity of possible verbs that can be used and the predicates that may form in sentences, the numbers presented in Table 15 are relatively small. Yet, they nevertheless provide an overview of some of the most common predicates that were used when “the people” are the subject. Most of the time, “the people” would say, express, know, accept, speak, gather, demand and call out. As can be seen in Table 15, the most formulaic expressions were made in those letters published in *Politika* which had the word “people” in their titles. They most often resorted to stylized representations of “the people” “doing” things. In that respect, the “editorial” intervention seems to matter the most, once again.

Relationship between discourse and protest

What about the link between the populist construction of “the people” and protest activity? The first step is to zoom out from the letter as a unit of analysis. What emerges when one considers the day-to-day linkages between the letters and the protests? Table 16 presents the results of several Granger causality tests. As a technique, Granger causality tests can be used when one wishes to disentangle the temporal ordering of two time series: do changes in one series systematically and repeatedly precede – or follow on the heels of – changes in another series (Granger 1969)? The main logic of Granger causality tests is to use lagged values of one time series to forecast the value of another. It is said that series A “Granger causes” series B if the expectation of B, given the history of A, is sufficiently different from the expectation of B, unconditional on A. This method makes most sense when researchers wish to let the data speak (Thurman and Fisher 1988). In the case of the relationship between discourse and protest, it makes sense not to assert exogeneity, even of a weak kind, but use tools that are adapted to potentially mutually constitutive relationships.

As can be seen in Table 16, it would appear that protest activity and the populist construction of “the people” “Granger cause” one another. However, the relationship holds only for *Politika* and not for *Borba*. This finding complements the previous analysis nicely. Two measures of protest activity are used: the number of protests and the number of protesters. With regard to the populist construction of the people, two measures are used. For *Politika*: the number of letters and the number of letters that have the word “people” in the title. For *Borba*: the number of letters and the number of mentions of the word “people” in the letters it published. The smaller

number of letters in *Borba* made collecting this data possible and, in addition, the number of letters with the word “people” in the title is very low (only 2 such letters) which would have made the tests meaningless. For *Politika*, the number of letters with the word “people” in the title has been shown to be highly correlated with the number of times “the people” appear and can thus be used as a satisfactory proxy for the latter.

For *Politika*, in most cases, the null hypothesis (that there is no Granger causality) can be rejected, at either the $p < 0.05$ level or the $p < 0.10$ level. Therefore, populist discourse “Granger causes” popular protest as well as *vice versa*. For *Borba*, no relationship of Granger causality was discovered. This is consistent with the generally observable intent of *Borba* to stay out of the populist construction of “the people” and to attempt to contain the phenomenon of readers' letters. For *Politika*, however, one can say that not only did they embrace the phenomenon of readers' letters and construct “the people” on the pages of their newspaper, but they also aided the real-life emergence of (a subset of) “the people” in the streets. They truly were a key motor of populism in Serbia.

These tests investigated the short term linkages between media content and protest. Is there also a long-term connection between exposure to a certain type of media content and levels of mobilization? If one zooms out fully, can a link be found between reading *Politika* and protesting more? Naturally, one cannot say that the link – should it exist – is only due to the letters published in “Echoes and reactions”, since *Politika* had other content on its pages. Yet, to the extent that the new sensationalistic letter section became one of the primary reasons to buy

Politika, the claim is not without a basis in fact. It should be kept in mind that the circulation of *Politika* began to grow just as “Echoes and reactions” was introduced, i.e. in 1988. To remind the reader, the circulation of *Politika* hovered around 200,000 copies throughout most of the 1980s. But in 1988 and 1989 – when “Echoes and reactions” were at their peak – it doubled to about 400,000 copies per day (Minović 2007: 282).

How can the potential link between exposure to media and levels of mobilization be measured? One way to gain leverage with regard to this question is to add data on the circulation of *Politika* (Minović 2008: 125-126) to the protest data-set employed in the previous chapter. It then becomes possible to assess if the counties which had higher circulation figures also protested more, net of a variety of other potentially important factors. For the sake of consistency, the co-variates used in this analysis are the same cross-sectional variables used in the previous chapter.

Levels of protest were operationalized in two ways: as the number of protests and the number of protesters. Table 17 presents the results of the basic models which use the same cross-sectional variables used in Chapter 2. To this list, the circulation variable was added. The models are ordinary least squares models and spatial regression models which incorporate the possibility of spatial auto-correlation in the dependent variable. As can be seen, the coefficient for the variable for *Politika's* circulation is positive and statistically significant in all the models presented in Table 17, predicting both the number of protests and the number of protesters in a given county. The variable used in Table 17 for *Politika's* circulation is a *per capita* measure, which corrects

for the population size of a given county.

In order to provide insights into the robustness of the effect and to estimate the size of the effect, a wider selection of models was estimated with the independent and dependent variables in their natural units. Histograms were constructed which show the distribution of regression coefficients, i.e. the effect size estimates for this variable in a variety of multi-variate models. Figure 6 shows the histogram for models estimating the number of protests, while Figure 7 shows the histogram for models estimating the number of protesters. In all models, the coefficient for the circulation variable was positive and statistically significant. Indeed, it was the most robust one, statistically significant at a high level ($p < 0.001$). The histograms make it possible to estimate the size of the effect for the entire anti-bureaucratic revolution, i.e. from the beginning of June to the end of November 1988. The models vary estimation techniques (OLS, OLS with robust standard errors, spatial regression models) and control variables (cross-sectional variables used in Chapter 2 with additional control variables, most notably population density and percentage of Serbian population, as well as other demographic and economic variables).

As can be seen in Figure 6, an additional protest took place for every 2,000 copies sent to a county on a daily basis, for the entire duration of the protest wave (from the beginning of June to the end of November 1988). Figure 7 shows a similar calculation for the number of protesters. These results use the minimum crowd estimate provided by all five newspapers, as this puts the lower bound on the potential impact of *Politika*. As can be seen, an increase of 1 copy per day

per county lead to an increase of 40 protesters for the average county for the entire duration of the protest wave. Overall, these are not small effect size estimates, especially if one keeps in mind that the five newspapers recorded a total of 338 protests with a median event size of approximately 1,125 people (depending on calculation). The increase in circulation which took place in 1988 (noted above) would suggest that the editors of *Politika* recognized the power of the newspaper and sought to expand it. In that sense, it is possible to say that the strategy of *Politika* – which rested on the new popularity of “Echoes and reactions” – had a traceable impact on popular mobilization. This shows that populist discourse does not stay in the sphere of ideas and words, but has implications for other, more tangible, forms of social activity.

Conclusion

This chapter has built on the previous chapter but has shifted the emphasis from events to discourses in the public sphere. As Jansen points out, a full examination of the mechanisms that drive populism should encompass both matters of mobilization and organization, on the one hand, and discourse and ideas, on the other (Jansen 2011: 82). Yet, the literature on populism tends to study these two aspects of populism in isolation. As this chapter has shown, this is something that can and should be remedied. Indeed, once the investigation proceeds on both fronts, the researchers can gain precious insight into the relationship between discourse and protest.

The main conclusion of this chapter echoes the conclusion of Chapter 2: populism is best seen

as fractal interaction. The metaphor of fractals proves to be just as useful here as it did in analyzing events. Elite-mass interactions can be empirically traced no matter the scale of the phenomenon that the researchers is looking at. From a macro perspective, linkages between elite and mass actions can be traced in the link between exposure to media and local levels of mobilization. The media, which was heavily influenced by elite tactics and interests, reveals itself to be a key factor driving up the level of popular mobilization in the long-term.

Zooming in slightly, one can consider the linkages between populist discourse and popular protest in the day-to-day dynamic. As the empirical investigation revealed, increases in one lead to increases in the other. And furthermore, the arrow does not run only from discourse to protest but also from protest to discourse. In that respect, one can conclude that the two were mutually constitutive. The relationship can rightly be called dialectical.

And finally, one can also zoom in fully. In Chapter 2, the minimal unit that could be observed was a single contentious event. With regard to populist discourse, the smallest unit of analysis is the letter, (supposedly) sent by an ordinary reader and published in the main Serbian newspaper of the time, *Politika*. Here is where the populist construction of “the people” took place. The secret editorial practices of “Echoes and reactions”, the section of *Politika* devoted to readers' letters, suggest once again the presence of elite action. It is safe to say that the ruthless team which aided Milošević's political agenda had no qualms about picking and perhaps even writing the letters they wanted. Insider accounts of Serbian media at the time all suggest that a degree of manipulation was present. Yet, these very insiders also suggest that “Echoes and reactions” was

not entirely fake. Indeed, it seemed to have provoked a great deal of enthusiasm from ordinary citizens. They willingly joined the collective process of constructing the people. In that respect, “Echoes and reactions” is also a site of elite-mass interaction.

An analysis of the letters suggests that an “editorial intervention” had the most impact on the populist construction of the people. “The people” appeared as an active agent that “did” various things most often in letters that had the word “people” in the title. Though one cannot know how many letters were written by the secret team that ran “Echoes and reactions”, tracking letters with the word “people” suggests an ambition on the part of the editors to fully engage in the construction of “the people.” Since the editors picked the title (no matter the author) of a letter, this information can tell us which letters were “programmatically.” Various comparison groups revealed a much smaller share of such populist content.

In addition to the “editorial intervention”, two additional operationalizations of elite intervention were assessed: “academic” and “public.” The former refers to letters written by various university professors and academics, who willfully joined the populist project of constructing “the people.” The latter refers to the signal sent by Milošević, whose speech at the September session of the Serbian party encouraged protests and embraced populism. Neither of these two operationalizations of elite intervention appears to have the weight that the “editorial intervention” had on the populist construction of “the people.” This does not mean that these actors should be absolved of responsibility, but only that their contribution to the creation of the populist atmosphere needs to be assessed comparatively. This type of analysis can give us a

better handle on the question of which elite intervention mattered most.

Moreover, the emergence of such a strong populist discourse in *Politika* was a phenomenon that did not go unobserved in the wider Serbian public. *Borba*, as the most liberal Yugoslav newspaper, tried to navigate the new populist waters carefully and manage the fallout as best they could. Its own section of readers' letters reveals itself predominantly as an attempt to contain the populist barrage. The new phenomenon of letter-writing did not leave *Borba* unaffected, but they tried to channel it towards conventional practice. The letters they published were not explicitly political, they tended to use conventional political wording, they abstained from constructing “the people” as a single and unified actor, and they tried to engage the letters in genuine discussion, presenting responses and answers along with the original letters. The final result was a section that was largely disconnected from the protest wave occurring on the streets of Serbia. Unlike *Politika*, which embraced the role of populist instigator, *Borba* tried to remain an observer.

Though the analysis provided in this chapter presented an examination of the populist construction of “the people”, missing is a fuller examination of what made the people “good.” The letters published in “Echoes and reactions” celebrate “the people.” But what is it that made “the people” good? And furthermore, “the people” which emerge in “Echoes and reactions” seem to have no opponent, no counter-part. Who is on the other side? The next chapter takes up this challenge by examining a selection of political cartoons. This particular vocabulary seems to have been better equipped to explain why the people are good and who is on the other side.

As the next chapter will show, the answer lies with a “producerist” view of “the people” as productive. On the other side of the political divide are lazy and parasitic bureaucrats. The imagined interactions between “the people” and the bureaucrats revolve around a logic of producerism.

Chapter 4

Imagined interactions: Cartoons and the ideology of producerism

Introduction

This chapter moves on to another form of populist interaction. This time, the focus is on the imagined interactions between ordinary people and elites “taking place” in the public sphere. This final empirical chapter analyzes a collection of political cartoons from the period of the anti-bureaucratic revolution in order to assess the typical ways that elites and masses “interacted.” Though these interactions did not actually take place, they are nevertheless based on common notions of what “the people” and the elite are like. The artists who drew the cartoons operated with certain ideas regarding what ordinary people would say or do if they had a chance to interact with political elites. In this way, this chapter probes the political imagination of the time and the ways it stylized the divide between ordinary citizens and political elites.

The main finding of this chapter is that such imagined interactions between “the people” and the elite are deeply marked by an ideology of producerism. Producerism refers to the division of society into productive and parasitic groups. The key theme that emerges is the opposition of the blue collar worker to the functionary or political bureaucrat. Their interactions usually revolved around the following: the worker is active and productive, the functionary is lazy, passive and parasitic. In particular, the political functionary is often presented as sitting in an arm-chair, which becomes a symbol of his parasitic nature. Therefore, producerism provides an answer to

the question why should the people be seen as “good” and the elite as “bad”, something that the previous chapter did not provide an answer to.

In addition to assessing the general thrust of populist discourse in the public sphere, this chapter is also interested in differences in how the populist divide between “the people” and the elite is framed across different media. Was the divide between the blue collar worker and the lazy functionary the only way to represent the populist dichotomy of “the people” versus the elite? Chapter 3 showed that *Politika* occupied a special place in the Serbian public sphere: it tried to construct “the people.” How did the political cartoons published in *Politika* differ from those published in other newspapers? The main finding which emerges in the empirical analysis concerns the use of a parallel theme to represent “the people.” Though *Politika* did not abandon the theme of the blue collar worker, it began to embrace the theme of the crowd at a protest, a theme which celebrated and encouraged popular protest against political elites. This innovation indicated a trend of moving away from typical socialist ways of representing “the people” as embodied in the industrial worker.

And lastly, what is the role of nationalism and its linkage with populism? This question naturally appears given the frequency of nationalist protest and the salience of the Kosovo issue for the anti-bureaucratic revolution as a whole. The previous chapter could not provide an answer to this question since the word “people” (*narod*) denotes (primarily) the plebs/demos as well as the nation/ethnos. Can the visual vocabulary used in cartoons provide more leverage? If so, the vertical divide between “the people” and the elite can begin to be supplanted by horizontal

divisions which pit one ethnic group against another. In the case of Serbia in the late 1980s, the ethnic division of most interest is the divide between Serbs and Albanians. Was the populist cleavage (people versus elite) in any way linked to the nationalist cleavage (one ethnic group against another)? And furthermore, did nationalism draw on producerist ideas, such that some ethnic groups were presented as lazy and parasitic? Producerism need not only be oriented towards elites: unproductive members of society can also be located horizontally, in various ethnic or racial minority groups.

Overall, the empirical analysis shows that the amount of nationalism present in cartoons is limited, probably because of the taboo character of explicitly nationalist discourse. The small number of nationalist cartoons makes it difficult to formulate strong conclusions. Yet, it would appear that the theme of the functionary could form part of nationalist discourse, i.e. the functionary could function as a target for class-based demands coming from workers, but also as a target for nationalist demands which emphasized the victimization of Serbs. On the other hand, producerist language does not seem to couple with nationalist ideas: there are no traces of a combination in which ethnic “others” would be attacked because of their parasitic character. In that respect, producerism remains attached primarily to populism.

The data-set used in this chapter consists of around 800 political cartoons drawn from three different Serbian newspapers (*Politika*, *Borba*, *Večernje novosti*). Cartoons are a source that is particularly apt for the study of populism. They are designed to target the broadest segments of society and can therefore bring out the populist repertoire of a given time and place. The three

newspapers make it possible to span the political spectrum. The data is analyzed primarily with statistical tools. Qualitative discussion of the cartoons provides the reader with examples to help visualize the imagined interactions between ordinary people and the elite.

To summarize the main contributions of this chapter to the three bodies of work to which the dissertation aims to contribute. First, what is the contribution to political sociology? Arguably, it lies with this chapter's use of cartoons as a source of data. Text-based evidence has been much more common. Visual material in general and cartoons in particular are rarely used as data, as will be discussed shortly in more detail. Yet, the visual vocabulary analyzed in this chapter may be able to capture certain aspects of populist discourse that the textual vocabulary analyzed in the previous chapter could not. This suggests that, where relevant, both types of vocabularies need to be assessed in order to gain insight into the relative strength and content of populist discourse in a given time and place.

Second, what is the contribution to the literature on populism? Producerist ideology has been documented in most depth in the literature on nineteenth century US history, especially the ideologies of organized labor and small-scale farmers relative to the business and political elites of New York and Washington (Hattam 1993; Kazin 1995; Huston 1998; Currarino 2011). Workers and farmers were considered productive, while politicians, railroad tycoons and bankers were considered parasitic. These notions were linked to the People's Party, which peaked in influence in the late nineteenth century. Producerism continued to live on even as the People's Party disappeared. It has continued to influence American politics to this day, most

notably with the Tea Party (Peck 2014). But the US case notwithstanding, the literature on populism does not engage the topic of producerism, despite the possibility that producerism can provide additional reasons for populists to celebrate “the people” as good and deserving. This chapter aims to show the wider relevance of producerism for populism.

And third, what is the contribution to the literature on the former Yugoslavia? An emphasis on producerism is crucial in reconstructing the political imaginary of the socialist period as a whole. Yet, there are no works on this topic. Some scholars at the time did present the “bureaucracy” in terms of its parasitic nature (Jovanov 1989: 55-59), echoing the wider populist discourse of the time. Yet, the literature on the former Yugoslavia seems to have had little interest in what is arguably a key feature of the *Weltanschauung* of the socialist period. Other scholars working on socialism and post-socialism have discussed the persistence of producerism in some groups, such as blue collar workers in Russia and Ukraine (Crowley 1997a; Crowley 1997b). Yet the literature on the former Yugoslavia seems to have a blind spot for this phenomenon.

Populism, producerism and nationalism

Populist discourse is based on the juxtaposition between “the people” and the elite. “The people” are celebrated as good and the elite are reviled as evil. Yet, a key question that is left unanswered is why are the people good? Why are the people worthy of the praise that populists lavish upon them? Abstract appeals will in most empirical cases probably be accompanied by

additional arguments about what makes the people good. This is where producerism can step in: “the people” are good because they are productive. The emergence of populism is aided when notions of who the productive classes are become widespread. These cultural notions of who the producers are need not correspond perfectly to the actual structure of the economy. The contribution of some may be overblown, that of others slighted. But the reason that the people on the whole can emerge as good is that they are seen as productive. The elite, in contrast, is painted as parasitic.

The idea that some work is productive and some unproductive has deep roots in Western culture. The medieval debate about lending as usury is one early example. With the rise of capitalism, the issue became particularly salient. Liberal authors such as John Locke, Adam Smith and David Ricardo all tried to find some way to distinguish productive work from unproductive work and make a case for labor as the main source of wealth. These concerns culminated in the labor theory of value which in turn found a particularly important place in Marxism (for several key contributions see Dobb 1973; Meek 1976; Roemer 1982; Hayashi 2005). The idea that only labor can create wealth leads to radical political ramifications, which liberal authors usually did not endorse, namely, that the fruits of labor should be appropriated by workers.

The intuitive notion that only those that toil in the sweat of their brow are active members of society thus becomes the basis for redistributive demands. For communist regimes, it was the labor theory of value, along with related ideas such as the base and superstructure model, that legitimated the dictatorship of the proletariat *via* the vanguard party. Blue collar workers had a

special place in such ideological projects, as the group most closely connected to the creation of wealth in an industrial setting. Therefore, when it comes to producerism, communist and post-communist settings provide a potentially rewarding research site. In the case of Yugoslavia, producerism was additionally strengthened by the country's break with the Soviet Union which led to a critique of "bureaucracy." As mentioned in the introductory chapter, the Marxist roots of the regime were not put in question by Tito's break with Stalin. Instead, the party sought new forms of legitimation *vis-à-vis* the working class, the main group in whose name it claimed to rule. It therefore embraced "worker self-management" as the regime's official program. This additionally strengthened the position of workers, at least symbolically, if not in day-to-day practice. Workers were celebrated by the regime as "self-managers" and producers: they were the ones whose hard work paid for everything in Yugoslavia, including the comfortable lives of political functionaries.

Of course, populism frequently goes hand in hand with nationalism. Indeed, some analysts of Yugoslavia's dissolution couch their work on the Yugoslav case as a discussion of populism, but bring up examples which are closer to nationalism instead. Both in Bowman's and in Laclau's discussion of Yugoslavia, the empirical discussion focuses on the construction of post-Yugoslav nations (for example Croatian or Serbian) in an antagonistic relationship with one another (Bowman 2005; Laclau 2005a: 197-198). As discussed earlier, nationalism and populism frequently appear together, but analysts can separate them conceptually if they approach nationalism primarily as a discourse that locates the enemy of the people in some ethnic or racial minority, not in the elite. Nevertheless, the slide of populism towards nationalism deserves

closer scrutiny. Populism has a checkered history of such transitions, frequently transitioning from an emphasis on class to an emphasis on nation.

And finally, producerism need not target only elites as unproductive. It may intersect with nationalism and target ethnic and racial minorities as parasitic and unproductive. For example, in the context of American right-wing populism, African Americans or Hispanic immigrants can be targeted as living from undeserved government “hand-outs”, a discursive trend begun already by the Southern politician George Wallace in the 1960s (Lowndes 2005). Therefore, the final intersection of interest is the one between nationalism and producerism: are some groups painted as parasites on the body politic?

To summarize, the analysis will therefore pay attention to the following questions: (1) Do the cartoons in the Serbian media juxtapose “the people” and “the elite”, thereby forming a populist discourse? (2) Do the cartoons present “the people” as productive and the elite as parasitic, thereby formulating a producerist discourse? (3) Are cartoons with nationalist themes placed within the contours of populist discourse, thereby showing that populism tends to drift towards nationalism? And (4) are nationalist themes also presented in producerist fashion, painting ethnic or national minorities as unproductive members of society? The next section discusses cartoons as a source of data.

Cartoons as data

This chapter relies on political cartoons as a source of data. This empirical source is not used often, especially compared to conventional textual sources. Even so, there is a number of contributions that have used cartoons as data (Emmison and McHoul 1987; Morris 1992, 1993; Gamson and Stuart 1992; Greenberg 2002; Conners 2005; Olesen 2007; Morrison and Isaac 2012). Though the exact impact of cartoons is hard to measure, the Muhammad cartoon controversy in Denmark has shown that cartoons can be a source of great contention and conflict (Müller and Özcan 2007; Olesen 2007), as have the more recent Charlie Hebdo killings in Paris. In the US, the heyday of cartoons has probably passed (Lamb 2004), even though they remain highly read (Caswell 1994; Abel and Filak 2005: 161). Changes in the contemporary business environment have destabilized the profession, but cartoons as such remain in high demand (Danjoux 2007).

Cartoons are more immediate than conventional texts. They can help readers quickly interpret and organize events and processes from their social and political environment. Since they present crystallizations of political and social problems, they can offer small narratives regarding social issues (Greenberg 2002). Furthermore, cartoons cater to all segments of the population and do not have high pre-requisites in terms of education and specialized knowledge (Giglio 2002: 910). For example, cartoons are a medium that can even reach illiterate audiences (Long et al.: 654). Therefore, cartoons have an effect of leveling access to political debate. In that respect, they are a particularly apt source of data when it comes to the problem of populism, the goal of which is to engage the broadest segments of the population. In order to connect to as many readers as possible, political cartoonists must use popular knowledge and widespread

representations of the social and political world (Connors 2005). Therefore, political cartoons can be expected to reproduce and re-enforce conventional wisdom and taken for granted cultural meanings, especially when they appear in mainstream media (Greenberg 2002: 182; Morrison and Isaac 2012: 64).

Cartoons are also an apt source of data for the study of populism since they are a medium that relies heavily on the personalization of social issues and social conflict. For example, instead of speaking abstractly about capital, cartoonists working for the Wobblies in early twentieth century America depicted capitalism personified in the overweight and overdressed capitalist (Morrison and Isaac 2012: 65). This makes it possible for cartoons to better capture binary oppositions, such as good and evil, and provide a cognitive and moral guide for everyday life (Greenberg 2002: 186; Morrison and Isaac 2012: 65). Cartoons are particularly good at allocating blame and responsibility (Greenberg 2000), which makes them a source capable of capturing populist rhetoric and imagery. They can quickly tell us who, if anybody, can be blamed for ordinary people's troubles. They are a good window into a country's populist repertoire, whatever its particular contents and relative strength may be.

Populism and producerism (I): General patterns

This chapter uses three daily newspapers in order to map the Serbian public sphere. The three newspapers used are *Politika*, *Borba* and *Večernje novosti*. Using these three papers make it possible to cover the political spectrum: from supportive to wary to undecided. *Dnevnik* and

Jedinstvo, the two newspapers included in Chapter 2, are omitted here since *Jedinstvo* printed only 59 cartoons during the six month period under observation. For reasons of symmetry, this chapter excludes the other local newspaper, i.e. *Dnevnik* (though its 214 cartoons would allow for statistical analysis). The local character of these two newspapers also limits their utility when it comes to the goals of this chapter, i.e. mapping the main alternatives in Serbia's national public sphere. The period under observation is the same as in previous chapters, from the beginning of June 1988 to the end of November 1988. During this time, the three newspapers printed a combined 844 political cartoons: 546 in *Borba*, 151 in *Večernje novosti* and 147 in *Politika*.⁴² The number of cartoon artists varied from 19 in *Politika*, 63 in *Borba* and 8 in *Večernje novosti*. Due to some overlap of artists across newspapers, the total number of artists who published cartoons during this period is 81.

The main goal of the analysis is to investigate the strength and content of the populist discourse in Serbia. Which themes appear in the cartoons? Following previous research (Ball and Smith 1992; Greenberg 2002; Morrison and Isaac 2012) each cartoon was coded inductively. Objects that physically appeared in the drawing were noted. Instead of trying to code more complex themes, the coding concentrated primarily on cataloging the elements present in each cartoon. This procedure is apt when it comes to the organization of a large number of cartoons quantitatively. Qualitative insights can be provided when bringing up examples of particular cartoons. In total, there were 469 different themes which were coded in the process.⁴³

An example can be given to show how the coding was done. Figure 8 (*Večernje novosti*,

November 17 1988, 2) is a rather typical cartoon featuring a functionary or political bureaucrat. Coding proceeded by noting all the elements physically visible in the picture: functionary, arm-chair, ear plugs, desk, carpet and door. The goal of the coding was to be as mechanical as possible. For example, in this cartoon, the political functionary is shown as wearing ear plugs. He has pushed the desk against the door in order to prevent anyone from entering. His goal, apparently, is to sleep undisturbed in his arm-chair. This showcases one of the main arguments of this paper: the political functionary in an arm-chair is painted as unproductive and parasitic, a stylization which made it possible for populism to emerge. The coding itself consisted of listing visible objects. Inter-coder reliability was at 92.1 percent agreement.⁴⁴

Table 18 presents a list of the most common themes that appear across all three newspapers. Overall, the most common theme is the functionary. He is drawn as a generic character, not as any specific Yugoslav politician. Such a practice was still rare and only on several occasions did cartoons feature a recognizable politician. Ridiculing a powerful politician or institution was still taboo. Milošević, for example, appears only once. The second and third most common themes are the worker and the ordinary man. Table 19 presents the most frequent themes for cartoons that feature the theme of the political functionary. As seen in the first column, the functionary appears most often alongside workers. The second most common theme is the arm-chair. Table 20 presents the most frequent themes that appear together with the worker theme. As expected, the worker theme most commonly combines with the functionary theme.

Figure 9 presents a network representation of co-occurrence for all three newspapers. The size

of each node is proportional to the overall frequency of that theme, while the width of the ties between nodes is proportional to the number of times two themes appear together. As can be seen, the theme of the functionary is most common and appears most commonly with the theme of the worker and the theme of the arm-chair. Figure 10 presents the same relationship for *Politika*, Figure 11 for *Borba* and Figure 12 for *Večernje novosti*. As can be seen, these network graphs suggest broad similarities across newspapers, though the next section reveals some interesting divergences as well. However, before moving on to these, this section will flesh out in more detail the trends in the newspapers taken together.

Table 22 presents five logistic regression models. These models include the most common themes as predictors and several control variables as well. The dependent variable in Model 1 is the presence of the functionary theme. The dependent variable in Model 2 is the presence of the worker theme. As can be seen, the theme which tracks the worker theme is positive and statistically significant in Model 1, and the theme which tracks the functionary theme is positive and statistically significant in Model 2. The odds ratios are moderately high: a cartoon was 1.96 times more likely to feature a functionary if it also featured a worker, and 1.94 times more likely to feature a worker if it also featured a functionary. In that respect, there is evidence for the presence of a discourse that contrasted the functionary with the worker.

A pair of examples can help to flesh out this juxtaposition. Figure 13 (*Borba*, June 1 1988, 12) shows a political functionary and a blue collar worker. The worker is recognizable given his cap and checkered shirt. The functionary says to the worker: “It is time we achieve some progress!”

However, it is the worker who has to push the functionary in his armchair. In other words: politicians talk about moving forward, but it is ordinary workers who have to do all the work. Figure 14 (*Borba*, October 17 1988, 11) is similar. It features an ordinary worker and a political functionary. The worker is dressed in overalls, a cap and is carrying a wrench. The functionary is sitting in an arm-chair, once again dressed in a suit. The worker asks: “What if I resigned?” The question implies that while the functionary can step down and give up his responsibilities, the worker cannot. His work is indispensable. The functionary, on the other hand, is replaceable.

What about the presence of producerism? Are the elite and the people presented in unproductive and productive ways, respectively? The examples shown above provide some hints, but what can the statistical analysis tell us? Model 1 in Table 22 shows that the coefficient for the variable which tracks the presence of the arm-chair theme is a positive and statistically significant predictor of the likelihood that a cartoon will feature the functionary theme. The odds ratio is very high at 6.1, which suggests that a cartoon was about 6 times more likely to feature the theme of the functionary if it also featured the theme of the arm-chair. The network graphs presented in Figures 9 through 12 similarly show the importance of the link between the functionary theme and the arm-chair theme. The cartoons presented so far, in Figures 8, 13 and 14, all suggest the same. Together, this suggests that elites were portrayed as parasitic, i.e. they were coupled with themes that signal the elite's unproductive character.

On the other hand, no theme stands out for the worker theme as the arm-chair does for the functionary theme. In other words, there is no single theme which systematically appears with

the worker theme and signals the worker's productive character. For example, in Figure 13 he is pushing the arm-chair. In Figure 14 he is carrying a wrench. The theme of the wrench appears only twice in total. The hammer, a similar theme, also appears only twice. Unlike the functionary's arm-chair, the worker has no "prop" that would be used to communicate his productive nature. For example, Figure 15 (*Politika*, October 9 1988, 16) provides yet another tool that the worker uses in his work: a fork-lift. He is transporting a bureaucrat sitting in an arm-chair. Beside him other bureaucrats wait in their arm-chairs. Once again, the worker is shown as a producer in a typical industrial setting. It may well be that the worker's status as producer was so self-evident that it did not require elaboration. All the examples shown in this chapter point to that conclusion, but the fact still remains that no theme was common enough to leave behind statistical patterns.

The frequent juxtaposition of workers and functionaries suggests that this is the main axis that organized the populist divide between "the people" and the elite. The male blue-collar worker is at the core of "the people." Model 3 in Table 22 investigates if another figure, the "ordinary man", functioned in a similar way. As can be seen, this theme does not appear often together with the functionary theme. In fact, the coefficient for the variable which tracks the presence of the functionary theme is negative and statistically significant in Model 3. In other words, the ordinary man theme is a theme that was more frequent in less political cartoons. Figure 16 (*Politika*, June 5 1988, 1) provides an example. Here, an ordinary man and his wife are having a conversation. The man says: "I am hungry!" The wife responds: "Alright! We will put that into the conclusions, just rephrase it a bit!" This cartoon places the ordinary man into a domestic

setting together with his wife. Figure 16 is not without political connotations (the man may be hungry because of the difficult economic situation), but it is nevertheless not populist in its approach. There is no direct interaction with members of the elite. This example also presents a rare cartoon with female protagonists. Women appeared in only 26 cartoons in total, mostly in “domestic” contexts such as the one in Figure 16. Political cartoons usually contain only men, indicating a strong patriarchal element in the public discourse of the time.

What other themes, aside from the worker, could represent “the people”? Model 4 in Table 22 investigates the theme of the crowd at a protest. As can be seen, this theme was more likely to appear in *Politika*: the coefficient is statistically significant and positive, while the odds ratio is high at 4. However, the theme did not seem to pair frequently with the functionary theme: this variable's coefficient is negative and statistically significant. In this respect, the theme of the crowd did not have the same hold over the Serbian public sphere as did the blue collar worker, the more traditional representation of “the people.”

Yet, the new trope of the crowd did become rather popular in *Politika*. In September of 1988, the month that protests took off (as Chapter 2 showed), about 46 percent of cartoons published in *Politika* contained the crowd theme, while in the other months, it was a much smaller 15 percent. The other two newspapers did not feature such a change. About 12 percent of *Borba*'s cartoons in the protest-heavy September featured the crowd theme, compared to 6 percent in the other months. In *Večernje novosti*, the percent is 11 for both the month of September as well as the other months. Figure 17 (*Politika*, September 12 1988, 10) provides an example of the

crowd theme. In the cartoon, a group of people at a protest is pushing a ball of yarn. The image is interesting for the way it flatters “the people”: they are pictured as determined to see things through to the end, at which, presumably, important truths about Yugoslav politics will be revealed. This is in tune with *Politika's* new mission as an engine of populist mobilization.

Finally, Model 5 in Table 22 investigates cartoons that featured the arm-chair theme, the main producerist theme. As can be seen, the main result is the positive and statistically significant coefficient for the variable which tracks the presence of the functionary theme. This is a result that complements the results of Model 1 in Table 22.

It should be mentioned that all models in Table 22 include several control variables. These include a day counter to control for the progress of time as well as a categorical variable that switches to 1 after the September session of the Serbian party. Also included is a count of the total number of themes in a cartoon. In addition, a control variable was constructed for cartoons with text and without. Cartoons with text tend to be more straightforward in their interpretation. Given the blunt nature of populist discussion, as shown in Chapter 3, it was expected that instances of populist discourse would be more likely if a cartoon featured text. An example can be given of a cartoon without text and the way it provides a more ambivalent message. Figure 18 (*Borba*, August 25 1988, 2) shows a crowd of protesters emerging from a recently opened tin can. The message is deeply ambivalent. The image could mean that the cartoon artist is either excited or concerned about the rise of protest. Once let out of the can, what will “the people” do? There is no answer to this question: the cartoon is open-ended. This communicates a much

deeper uncertainty than the other cartoons described above. Figure 18 does not mean to mobilize, but invites reflection. The message is not handed to the readers. Instead, they are asked to think for themselves.

Populism and producerism (II): Differences across newspapers

The analysis so far focused on the general patterns in the cartoons. This section aims to look more closely at differences between newspapers. First, as can be seen in Table 18, although all three newspapers are similar in the rankings of the most common themes, the share of specific themes nevertheless varies across newspapers. The functionary theme is the most common in all three newspapers, but it appears in 44.4 percent of cartoons in *Večernje novosti* and a smaller 29.7 percent of cartoons in *Borba*. Some other differences stand out even more. For example, the worker theme is the second most common theme in *Borba* and *Večernje novosti*, at 21.1 and 25.8 percent respectively. However, it is ranked much lower in *Politika*, sixth overall, appearing in 13.6 percent of its cartoons. This suggests that *Politika* showed less interest in the more traditional socialist trope of the blue-collar worker.

In addition, as can be seen in Table 18, the second most common theme in *Politika* is the crowd at a protest, a theme that appeared in 22.4 percent of its cartoons. The same holds for the third most common theme in *Politika*: the theme of the protest sign (20.4 percent). On the other hand, the crowd theme appeared in only 6.6 percent of *Borba*'s cartoons and 11.3 percent of *Večernje novosti*'s cartoons. The percentages are also low for the protest sign theme: 3.8 percent in *Borba*

(not in the top ten) and 13.9 percent in *Večernje novosti*.

Thus, it is possible to say that the three newspapers were politicized in somewhat different ways. *Borba* and *Večernje novosti* continued to operate with the more traditional socialist language, while *Politika* stepped into the brave new world of populist encouragement. Figure 17 is a good example of this type of cartoon. Figure 19 (*Politika*, November 21, 13) is similar. It shows the crowd of protesters as a large rock falling on the head of a functionary. Figure 20 (*Politika*, September 23 1988, 16) makes much the same point. In this cartoon, the functionary is drawn with black sleeve protectors, worn by clerks to protect them from ink stains. This serves to highlight the fact that the bureaucrat has an office job. His calm rest in the arm-chair is upset by the crowd which emerges from the cuckoo clock. The message again flatters “the people” for the way they can upset the *status quo*.

Next, Tables 19 and 20 reveal some interesting differences regarding co-occurrence of themes. When it comes to cartoons that featured the functionary theme, the most common co-occurrence in *Borba* and *Večernje novosti* is the worker theme, 45.7 and 29.9 percent, respectively. But for *Politika*, cartoons which featured the functionary theme featured the worker theme less often, only 17.3 percent of the time. For *Politika*, the highest ranking theme for cartoons that featured functionaries is the arm-chair theme (42.3 percent). As can be seen in Table 19, the percentage for the presence of the arm-chair theme is lower for *Borba* and *Večernje novosti* (17.3 and 17.9 percent). In other words, out of the three newspapers, *Politika* paired the functionary theme less often with the worker than other newspapers, and more often with the arm-chair theme than

other newspapers.

In that sense, the producerist view according to which functionaries are lazily sitting in their arm-chairs is most common in *Politika*, though it is also present in the other two newspapers. While *Borba* and *Večernje novosti* juxtaposed the functionary primarily with the worker, *Politika* juxtaposed it equally to the worker and the crowd. In other words, the populist dichotomy in the case of *Borba* and *Večernje novosti* is based around the division between functionaries and blue collar workers, while for *Politika* it is based around both that divide and the one between functionaries and protesting crowds (both at 17.3 percent). Figures 19 and 20 provided examples of how the functionary could be juxtaposed to the crowd.

Table 21 focuses on some of the more interesting connections and presents the results of several two-way cross-tabulations. These tests are simple bivariate tests which investigate if the null hypothesis of independence between two categorical variables should be rejected or not. As can be seen, the functionary and the worker theme do not seem to be independent when one looks at all the newspapers together: the chi-squared statistic is high at 66.2 and the p-value is low (smaller than 0.001). However, once this test is performed for each newspaper individually, it appears that only *Borba* has a statistically significant connection between the functionary and the worker theme (this was confirmed with newspaper-specific multivariate models).

When it comes to the functionary and the arm-chair theme, the null hypothesis of independence can be rejected, as evidenced by the statistically significant chi-squared values for all

newspapers, not only jointly but individually as well (this was also confirmed with newspaper-specific multivariate models). When it comes to the pairing of the functionary and the crowd themes, it would appear that the only statistically significant result emerges with *Borba* (this result was not confirmed in *Borba*-specific multi-variate models). The percentages from Table 19 would have suggested either no result or a statistically significant result for *Politika*. Therefore, it would appear that the results are inconclusive. The result reported in Table 21 may well be the consequence of the higher number of cartoons published in *Borba*, such that a larger sample leads to statistically significant results. It should be mentioned that the chi-squared statistic decreases for *Borba* going from the top to the bottom of Table 21, i.e. the link is strongest for the functionary-worker pair and weakest for the functionary-crowd pair. In itself, that is informative: it tells us that for *Borba* the strongest link is the first one.

Another way to investigate these issues is to construct mosaic plots for the relationships of interest. Figures 21, 22 and 23 provide a visual way to assess the relationship between the functionary theme on the one hand and the worker, arm-chair and crowd themes on the other. Each mosaic plot produces tiles whose size reflects the frequency of a particular combination. It also contains information on the statistical likelihood of a given combination. In Figure 21, for example, each newspaper has its own block of four tiles with *Borba* on the top and *Večernje novosti* (VN) on the bottom. The vertical divide tracks the presence or absence of the functionary theme while the horizontal divide does so for the worker theme. The color of each tile provides information on the statistical significance: how likely a given combination is given the null hypothesis of independence. Tiles that are deep blue correspond to cells where the

combination is of much greater frequency than would be expected if the two variables were independent. Tiles shaded deep red correspond to combinations that are rare under the hypothesis of independence. Simply put, deep blue indicates a positive connection, deep red indicates a negative connection while white indicates the lack of a connection. The Pearson residuals which provide numeric values for this assessment are equal to the sum of squared residuals in a bivariate test.

As can be seen in Figure 21, the relationship between the functionary and the worker theme is strongest in the case of *Borba*. This is something that the percentages in Table 19 and 20 already suggested as did the large chi-squared value reported in Table 21. The relationship is much weaker for the other two newspapers. In other words, the traditional socialist juxtaposition of worker versus bureaucrat is strongest in *Borba*. Figure 22 shows another relationship, that between the functionary theme and the arm-chair theme. This was the main producerist element in popular discourse uncovered in the previous section, most explicitly in Model 1 in Table 22. As can be seen, the relationship seems to hold for all three newspapers, though even here there are some differences. In the case of *Borba*, the relationship is strongest, in the case of *Večernje novosti* the weakest. This result replicates the cross-tabulations presented in Table 21, where the relationship between the functionary and the arm-chair was found in all three newspapers, but with gradations. In other words, the producerist ideology of the time, which saw bureaucrats as lazy, as passively sitting in their arm-chairs, was something that existed in all three newspapers, i.e. across the political spectrum. It should be mentioned that the slightly higher statistically significant result for *Borba* relative to *Politika* is once again probably due to the larger number

of cartoons published in *Borba*. This does not invalidate the findings of Figure 22, but it should be kept in mind that the descriptive break-down presented in Table 19 showed that, for *Politika*, about 42 percent of cartoons that featured the functionary theme also featured the arm-chair theme, while for *Borba* the figure is 17 percent. Nevertheless, it would appear that the producerist styling of the functionary was not exclusive to any one particular newspaper.

And finally, Figure 23 presents a mosaic plot which pairs the functionary and the crowd themes. These results are again inconclusive. The patterns presented by Figure 23 seem weaker than the patterns in Figures 21 and 22. More examination of this relationship will be conducted with multi-variate testing.

The results of this are presented in Table 23. The first three models test the presence of a particular combination of themes, the same combinations that Table 21 and Figures 21 through 23 investigated. The first is the pairing of the functionary and the worker theme, the second the pairing of the functionary and the arm-chair theme and the third the pairing of the functionary and the crowd theme. The models rely on the same co-variates as the models presented in Table 22. Model 1 in Table 23 investigates which factors help to predict the joint presence of the functionary and the worker themes. The main result which stands out is the positive and statistically significant coefficient for the variable which tracks cartoons published in *Borba*. This is in line with the findings presented in Table 21 and Figure 21. In other words, the populist juxtaposition of worker and functionary was most likely in *Borba*: 2.1 times more likely, to be exact.

Model 2 in Table 23 predicts the joint appearance of the functionary and the arm-chair theme, the most explicit producerist combination present in the cartoons. As can be seen, the coefficient which tracks cartoons published in *Politika* is positive and statistically significant. Cartoons were about 2.5 times more likely to feature together the themes of the functionary and the arm-chair if they were published in *Politika*. The findings presented in Table 21 suggested that all newspapers were prone to pair these two themes, but this multi-variate test shows that the relationship – though it exists in all three newspapers – was strongest in *Politika*.

And finally, Model 3 in Table 23 investigates the determinants of the last pair, the combination of the functionary theme and the crowd theme. This presents an alternative populist stylization, one that ran parallel to the worker-functionary juxtaposition. As can be seen in Model 3, no newspaper was especially likely to feature this combination. Previous analysis of this relationship did not offer definitive conclusions and it would appear that this will remain so. Most probably, the problem is the relatively small number of such cases. In all, this particular combination appears only 36 times: 9 times in *Politika*, 21 times in *Borba* and 6 times in *Večernje novosti*. This makes it hard to offer conclusive insights regarding the relationship. Yet, at 3.3, the odds ratio for *Politika* is high. The coefficient is not statistically significant at conventional thresholds (p-values is 0.09), but this may be driven in part by the smaller number of cartoons in *Politika*.

In summary, it may be best to conclude that the functionary-crowd pair was a relatively novel and rare combination, one that *Politika* tried to use but that, in numerical terms, was not

sufficiently strong to leave behind statistical patterns. It should not be concluded that the crowd theme was opposed to the worker theme. None of the statistical results from Tables 22 and 23 would suggest that. And at times, the crowd was drawn as a crowd of workers. For example, Figure 24 (*Večernje novosti*, July 8 1988, 2) shows a crowd at a protest composed exclusively of blue collar workers. In that sense, the shift from a single worker to the crowd was not a radical departure within the political imagery of the time.

Interestingly, the predictor of strongest statistical significance in Model 3 is the variable which tracks the presence of the arm-chair theme. This suggests that even the nascent populist divide between the functionary and the crowd coupled with producerist notions of lazy bureaucrats. In other words, while the visualization of the populist divide may have begun to morph from one centered on blue collar workers to a new one centered on protesting crowds, the view of functionaries and bureaucrats did not change, indicating the continued relevance of producerism.

Populism and nationalism

What about nationalism? Was there an overlap between populism and nationalism? This section turns to nationalist cartoons. How could they be defined? This section defines nationalist cartoons as those that dealt with the Serbian “national question”, the Kosovo issue and Serb-Albanian relations. In such cartoons, Serbs and the Serbian nation are depicted as the victim which has been wronged in one way or another, most frequently by the alleged Albanian threat.

What would such a cartoon look like? Figure 25 (*Borba*, August 4 1988, 5) provides the first example. It portrays a two-headed eagle attacking a nest in a tree. The two-headed eagle is a national symbol of Albania, most obviously located in Albania's national flag. The little birds in the nest are wearing hats typical of Serbian peasants (one of them has a traditional Montenegrin hat). In other words: Albanians are attacking innocent Serbs (and Montenegrins).

It should be re-iterated that nationalist discourse was usually presented as a demand for equality: Serbia was unfairly treated by the constitution of 1974 and this wrong should be righted. Serbia should be allowed to become a “state” just like all the other republics in federal Yugoslavia. The demand to curtail the power of the provincial leaderships of Vojvodina and Kosovo was presented as a demand for normalcy. Figure 26 (*Politika*, July 18 1988, 8) provides an example of this type of thinking. Two men are talking and one asks: “Are you for a narrow or a wide Serbia?” This references the informal names for Serbia without and with provinces, respectively. The other man, a blue collar worker, replies: “If you ask me, I am for a normal Serbia!” The expression on his face suggests anger. The fact that he is only asking for a “normal Serbia” suggests that his anger is righteous and justified. Serbian grievances are presented as a demand for something that others in Yugoslavia already have.

In total, there were not many nationalist cartoons published by the three main newspapers during the period under observation. All in all, there was a total of 34 such cartoons. Out of the 34, 15 were published in *Politika*, 10 in *Večernje novosti* and 9 in *Borba*. The figures are too low to offer very firm conclusions. Yet, given that the denominator is much higher in the case of

Borba, i.e. given that it published more cartoons than *Politika* or *Večernje novosti*, one can conclude that *Borba* was least prone to adopt this form of discourse. Yet, *Borba* was not entirely immune to nationalist rhetoric either, as Figure 22, published in *Borba*, shows.

Such a small number of nationalist cartoons means that any statistical result has to be interpreted with caution. To offset this problem, this section will complement the statistical analysis with numerous examples, so that the reader can get a sense of what nationalist cartoons looked like and what messages they conveyed. The relatively low number of nationalist cartoons can best be explained by the taboo nature of Serbian nationalism. This type of discourse remained outside the accepted mainstream. It is not surprising that the cartoonists of the main newspapers steered clear of it. Yet, they did not avoid it altogether.

As mentioned, statistical patterns should be interpreted with caution since the overall number of nationalist cartoons is so small. With this caveat in mind, I now turn to the results of the last logistic regression model reported in Table 23. Three variables in Model 4 have coefficients that are statistically significant and negative: the worker theme, *Borba*, cartoons with text. This means that nationalist protests were less likely to pair with the worker theme, that they would occur with a smaller likelihood in *Borba*, and that they were more likely to occur in cartoons that had text. The turn to nationalist discourse thus entailed a turn away from the conventional socialist focus on the blue collar worker. The result for *Borba* is not surprising since it published the least number of nationalist cartoons, but had an overall higher number of cartoons. The positive result for the variable which tracks the presence of text would indicate that nationalist

cartoons were rather blunt, since they more frequently resorted to text.

What do these results mean for the link between populism and nationalism? The main populist concepts that emerged in the analysis so far have been the functionary opposed to the worker and the functionary opposed to the protesting crowd (predominantly in *Politika*). Does the functionary appear in nationalist cartoons as well? As the results of Model 4 in Table 23 show, the variable which tracks the presence of the functionary theme is not statistically significant. In this respect, the connection between the main populist theme and nationalist cartoons is not strong enough to be statistically significant. Yet, the data is too thin to provide grounds for a rejection either. Several examples can show that the functionary theme was not incompatible with nationalism. Just as the bureaucrat was attacked as the enemy of “the people” due to his parasitic character, he could also be an enemy of Serbs. By extension, he could be treated as a *de facto* ally of Albanians. Once again, the reasons are to be found in the functionary's laziness and ineffectiveness.

For example, Figure 27 (*Večernje novosti*, September 14 1988, 2) shows a group of bureaucrats hiding behind a tree. They are trying to trap a two-headed black eagle, the symbol from Albania's flag. The bureaucrats are luring it with papers. This cartoon ridicules the bureaucratic manner of dealing with the alleged Albanian threat and suggests that a stronger antidote will be required. Papers and speeches will not suffice. Therefore, the cartoon connects attacks on the bureaucracy with the struggle against allegedly insurgent Albanian nationalism. Figure 28 (*Politika*, October 7 1988, 2) is another example of how the functionary theme could be linked

with the alleged Albanian threat. In this cartoon, the political bureaucrat is drawn as a snail. The text on his back reads “Yugoslavia's program for Kosovo.” The cartoon again ridicules the bureaucratic way that political elites have attempted to deal with problems in Kosovo. Policy implementation is seen as advancing at a snail's pace.

Yet another nationalist cartoon makes the same linkage. Figure 29 (*Večernje novosti*, October 22 1988, 2) portrays the bureaucratic way of stopping Serbian emigration from Kosovo. The cartoon shows an expensive black car accompanied by policemen on motorcycles. They are trying to block the passage of a group of people in the road. The title reads “Stopping the emigration” which indicates that the people are Serbs from Kosovo, who are leaving the province. The same theme appears in Figure 30 (*Borba*, August 5 1988, 4). It shows a bureaucrat who declares: “Comrades, we have to stand in the way of the emigration.” As the crowd of Serbs passes, he is run over and only the microphone stand is shown in the last image. The people are recognizable as Serbs due to the reference to emigration but also by their traditional caps. Once again, the suggested message revolves around the inefficiency of bureaucratic methods of dealing with the Kosovo problem. All in all, no strong claims about the compatibility of the functionary theme and nationalism are possible. Yet, the examples shown above show that the connection should not be ruled out. As mentioned, the reason why the data are so thin lies most probably with political taboos which surrounded Serbian nationalism.

And finally, is there a link between nationalism and producerism? Overall, the answer appears to be no. There is no attempt to paint other ethnic groups as parasitic or unproductive. With regard

to Albanians, there was only one such case which, in very broad terms, approximated this type of discourse. Figure 31 (*Večernje novosti*, October 30 1988, 1) shows a photographer taking a picture of a stereotypical Albanian family with its numerous children. The title says “Birdie” which could be translated as “Say cheese.” It references the bird on the other side of the picture, i.e. the Albanian two-headed eagle, the symbol of the Albanian nation. The cartoon plays on the widespread stereotype that all Albanians have large families. This cartoon does not explicitly base its portrayal of Albanians on their parasitic status, but the theme of the overly large family can be seen as approaching such an interpretation. After all, if they have such large families, Albanians will surely become an obstacle to the economic development of Yugoslavia. All in all, this cartoon was the only one that somewhat approximated the inter-connection between nationalism and producerism, and did so quite imperfectly.

Conclusion

This chapter investigated the imagined interactions between “the people” and the elite which “took place” in the Serbian public sphere. The many cartoons that newspapers published provided a place where cartoonists could imagine what ordinary people would say and do if they had a chance to interact with the political elite. The key theme that emerges from the analysis is the juxtaposition of the blue collar worker and the political functionary. The former is presented as productive and the latter as unproductive and parasitic. In particular, the functionary was often portrayed together with an arm-chair. In other words, he is an “arm-chair politician” (*foteljaš*) who is living comfortably while ordinary working people toil and struggle.

An investigation of political cartoons makes it possible to complement the findings of the previous chapter. Looking at the many letters published in the Serbian press, Chapter 3 gave insights into how the populist construction of “the people” worked. Yet, it did not provide an answer as to *why* the people should be seen as “good.” Populism celebrates the people, but its strength will be multiplied if it can provide a compelling answer to the question *why* the people should be seen in superlatives. The visual vocabulary of the time proves to be more sensitive to this issue than the letters were. This may be a lesson of wider relevance to sociologists: visual data such as cartoons may uncover things that textual sources cannot.

Some interesting differences between different media emerged as well. In particular, *Politika* stayed true to its populist mission, as discussed in Chapter 3. It supplemented the populist divide between worker and functionary with a new emphasis on protesting crowds. This new way of presenting “the people” was not in opposition to the older and more traditionally socialist representation of “the people.” But it did indicate a step beyond the usual way of framing the populist divide between ordinary people and the elite. *Politika* raised the stakes by taking the conventional worker-functionary dichotomy and adding to this imagery the new emphasis on powerful and purposive crowds. Interestingly, the new theme of the crowd continued to combine with a producerist view of elites as parasitic and lazy. In that sense, producerism proved resilient.

And lastly, nationalist cartoons were rare, which means that no firm conclusions can be offered

about the ability of nationalism to fit within the populist discourse of the time. Overall, the rarity of nationalist themes suggests that explicit nationalism was still taboo at the time. The Yugoslav state was built on a compromise of many nations and openly emphasizing and promoting the grievances of one was still politically unacceptable to many in the country.

While producerism has been investigated primarily in the case of late nineteenth century America, this chapter has emphasized a very different case, the late socialist setting of Serbia in the 1980s. That producerism and populism appear to be coupled in such divergent cases suggests the wider relevance of the relationship. In the Serbian case, producerist attitudes were derived in large part from the Marxist foundations of the communist regime. Ideas such as the labor theory of value and the base and superstructure model, once they found their way to the popular mainstream, lead to wide-spread beliefs about what constitutes productive and unproductive work.

Even though this version of producerism is specific to a given time and place, its relevance persists so long as we live in a material civilization where the production and consumption of scarce goods continues to be of paramount value. In the neoliberal era, the blue collar worker may be replaced by the taxpayer or the small business owner, but the basic divide into productive and unproductive classes persists. Therefore, scholars of populism may need to pay more attention to the ways producerism can assist the rise of populism as a political force.

Chapter 5

Conclusion

Introduction

This dissertation has investigated the problem of populism. It has developed an approach to populism as a set of interactions. In particular, populism reveals itself to be a phenomenon that is characterized by elite-mass links at all levels. Wherever one looks one sees a similar pattern of elite-mass interactions. It is “self-similar”: at all levels elites make use of and amplify popular mobilization while trying to control it and mold it. That is why this dissertation suggests the metaphor of fractals: whether one looks at the macro-level, the meso-level or the micro-level, one always sees the same re-current pattern. Populism can therefore be seen as fractal interaction. The fractal metaphor provides both a theoretical account of the forces driving populism forward, i.e. the mechanisms that give it momentum, as well as a tool that can be used for classification. In other words, other cases can be approached with the same definition in hand and can be checked if they showcase the same pattern of elite-mass linkages. If not, the phenomenon in question may be better approached with other analytical concepts.

The analysis presented in this dissertation has built on previous contributions to the literature but has also attempted to make an additional step forward. While political sociology, broadly conceived, has tended to avoid the topic of populism, some recent contributions open up fruitful avenues for future research. In particular, Jansen's (2011) re-definition of populism as a mode of

political practice opens up the possibility of viewing the processes internal to populist episodes. This was a major goal of this dissertation: to provide a dynamic analysis of how populism works in time. In addition, Jansen urges scholars to study both populist discourse and populist mobilization. This is an important point since much of the recent literature on populism has focused predominantly on the former. Examining the links between what is happening in public discussion and what is happening in the streets was another major goal of this dissertation. And while Jansen's definition is indeed very useful, it does not fully engage the elite-mass linkages that give populism its momentum. A focus on these is the main contribution of this dissertation.

In order to be more systematic, Table 24 summarizes the main contributions of the dissertation. It breaks them down for the dissertation as a whole and for each of the three empirical chapters. The contributions are sorted according to the literature which they engage. As mentioned in Chapter 1, there are three bodies of work to which this dissertation aims to contribute: (1) political sociology as a whole, (2) the literature on populism and (3) the literature on the former Yugoslavia. The reader can consult this table for an overview of the main points of this study. To summarize, the goal of the dissertation was to (1) engage a topic that political sociology has tended to ignore, most probably because it is morally and politically “awkward”; (2) to provide an account of populism as a set of elite-mass interactions that are patterned in a “fractal” manner; and (3) to bring “the people” back in to the study of the Yugoslav break-up, which has been dominated by a single-minded focus on elites. Table 24 also lists the contributions of each chapter to each of the three bodies of work.

The main goal of this concluding section is to consider possible extensions. Does this dissertation provide fruitful new ways to approach other cases? Can the analysis – developed as it was on the Serbian case – travel beyond the Yugoslav setting? Each of the following three sections uses two examples meant to illustrate the wider relevance of chapters 2, 3 and 4. The cases differ greatly, in terms of the world region where they are located, in terms of the time period, and in terms of the type of regime. This suggests the broader applicability of the tools developed in this dissertation. The first section looks at the way the “eventful” approach of Chapter 2 can illustrate two very different cases of popular mobilization: the Soviet Union in the late 1980s and Peru in the early 1930s. The second section looks at discourse-protest links in two cases of interest: the Fox News-Tea Party link in the US and the case of large street posters in Mao's China. Both of these sections try to locate aspects of the same fractal structure that chapters 2 and 3 of this dissertation uncovered. Finally, the third section looks at two possible extensions of Chapter 4 and its emphasis on producerism. Two quite different cases of populism – Boulangism in late 19th century Paris and the peasant populism of early 20th century Croatia – show that populism and producerism can link up in many different settings, irrespective of the political orientation and the main basis of social support.

The final section looks at some of the trade-offs of populism, as suggested by this dissertation. Rather than assess populism as predominantly negative or predominantly positive, it may be more fruitful to frame the relative merits of the phenomenon in terms of trade-offs. What can populism achieve and what does one give up when going down the populist path? The main trade-off seems to be scale versus autonomy. Populism can scale up popular initiative but at the

cost of autonomy. This again brings us back to the fractal character of populism: elites are “meddling” at every level of the phenomenon. Thus, popular actors and their actions may be amplified but they may lose their autonomy in the process. Contemporary attempts to re-appropriate populism and use it as a basis for a new radical democratic project need to be mindful of this trade-off.

Implications and extensions of Chapter 2

Do the lessons of Chapter 2 travel? Can other cases be approached with the same tools? This section looks at two cases which show that some insights can indeed be useful beyond the case of Serbia. First, I discuss the case of the Soviet Union and the large protest wave that led to its demise in the late 1980s and early 1990s. I rely on the widely-read book written by Beissinger (2002). The implosion of the Soviet Union is not usually considered a case of populism, but some populist aspects nevertheless appear. And furthermore, it is a good starting point for a comparative analysis since it shares several key similarities with Yugoslavia: the Soviet Union was also a multi-ethnic socialist country built on a domestic revolutionary foundation. Second, I discuss the case of Peru in the 1930s and use Jansen's account of populism in that Latin American country (Jansen 2009). Peru is quite different from Serbia, but nonetheless shows some of the main points of Chapter 2 regarding elite-mass interactions and the utility of a fractal approach.

The Soviet Union collapsed in the early 1990s amidst a wave of popular protest. Arguably the

most detailed account of the episode has been written by Beissinger (2002). He frames the protests predominantly in terms of nationalism and does not engage the concept of populism. The intention of this section is not to show that re-naming the phenomenon would be preferable. Little is to be gained from such an analytical maneuver. Instead, I will try to show that events in general and elite events in particular played an important role in the structuring of the protest wave, in a way that is similar to the Serbian episode. At times, however, the phenomena that Beissinger talks about do seem to look like populism. There are more than a few hints at this, particularly in his qualitative discussions. The large size of the Soviet Union may imply that this is something that may have varied across the continent-sized multi-ethnic state. For example, Beissinger discusses how local party organizations in Armenia took part in organizing protest campaigns (Beissinger 2002: 66-67). It is highly probable that this was not the sole instance of this practice.

There are some interesting similarities between the Yugoslav and the Soviet setting. At times, protagonists from the Soviet Union talk about the “bureaucracy” much in the same way that those in Serbia did. For example, a protest group in Kishiniev (or Chişinău, capital of Moldova) formed as “an expression of frustration with the obstruction of *perestroika* by the republic's bureaucracy” (Beissinger 2002: 82). In other words, the bureaucracy was the enemy in the Soviet Union, much like it was in Yugoslavia. Gorbachev himself was not a stranger to “anti-bureaucratic” rhetoric. For example, he noted how he had “grown frustrated with political and bureaucratic foot-dragging” (Beissinger 2002: 58) and lamented how “we have a whole crowd, a whole army of paid employees whose job is to resolve those issues for which people are going

out on the street, and they are not doing it” (Beissinger 2002: 60). On a visit to the Baltic countries Gorbachev argued that *perestroika* had failed to resonate with the local population, not because they were against the Soviet Union, but because of “the bureaucratism of the bosses” (Beissinger 2002: 62). It should also be kept in mind that *perestroika* and *glasnost* were originally conceived in typical populist fashion, “with the aim of 'mobilizing the masses' for realizing a new political course” (Beissinger 2002: 58). And initially, protests took place as part of *perestroika*, not against it or against the party (Beissinger 2002: 60). Gorbachev's “mistake” may have been to surrender too much control. In other words, while Milošević managed to both open up space for popular initiative and mold that initiative in ways that suited him, Gorbachev was unwilling or unable to do the same.

However, from the perspective of Chapter 2 of this dissertation, the most intriguing is Beissinger's discussion of elite events. In terms of looking for watershed moments, i.e. elite events that divide the entire protest wave into “before” and “after”, his discussion of the Nineteenth Party Conference of June 1988 seems to fit quite well. This party session, “with its freewheeling debate and its introduction of radical political reforms was, as Gorbachev put it 'the real turning point after which perestroika took on an irreversible character'” (Beissinger 2002: 82). Following the party session, “attempts to challenge the Soviet regime proliferated with great rapidity, diffusing across multiple groups and imparting a true tidal character to the events” (Beissinger 2002: 83). This suggests that the Nineteenth Conference played the role of a key elite intervention into the dynamics of the protest wave. It provided a public signal that protest activity is legitimate.

Beissinger also talks about other elite events that seemed to have structured the protest wave at a more meso-level. For example, he mentions the March 1989 elections for the USSR Congress of People's Deputies and the first session of the new legislature in late May as events that showed “the increasing autonomy of the event as a causal factor in mobilization” (Beissinger 2002: 86). More explicitly, he calls the electoral campaigns of early 1989 a “lightning rod for oppositional mobilization” (Beissinger 2002: 86). These events seemed to have structured the day-to-day dynamic of many ordinary citizens. As he writes, the legislative meetings were broadcast live and “transfixed the public for days on end” (Beissinger 2002: 86), much like they did in Yugoslavia. He also gives examples of protests that were successful precisely because they were timed with elite events, such as the protest of the Moscow Popular Front in May 1989, timed to coincide with the Congress of People's Deputies (Beissinger 2002: 91). All in all, while Beissinger does not include elite events in his quantitative testing, the qualitative discussion seems to suggest that they mattered in ways that were quite similar to the Serbian case.

Jansen's (2009) discussion of Peru in the 1930s case showcases how zooming in further still – to the level of single events – reveals particular patterns of elite-mass interaction. The populist rally is neither a completely bottom-up nor a completely top-down event. Though scripted, it can also have something of a carnivalesque atmosphere. And though the charismatic leader's speech is the climax of the event, the rally is also a chance for many socially marginal groups to take part in a form of street theater. Party discipline and chain of command relationships may be important, but so are various social clubs and grass-roots groups through which ordinary citizens

come to participate. In other words, the populist rally is a site of elite-mass interaction. The cases which he discusses (Jansen 2009: ch. 5) include two large rallies that happened in Lima in August of 1931, ahead of the presidential election. The two candidates, Victor Raul Haya de la Torre and Luis Miguel Sanchez Cerro, both commanded a lot of support from the population as a whole and built large populist movements. These two rallies were slightly different from the Serbian rallies of 1988 since Milošević did not, as a rule, speak at the rallies. The notable exception is the large “meeting of brotherhood and unity” which took place in November in Belgrade and drew a crowd of about a million.

For Jansen, the widespread image of the populist rally – as a case in which the populist leader seduces the audience with his oratorical skills and establishes a direct connection with an atomized mass – is flawed (Jansen 2009: 190-191). This view of the rally neglects the organization that goes into the event, both from the party elite and various local groups. There is a lot of effort that goes into “producing” a populist rally and an emphasis on oratorical skills misses them. In the end, the populist rally is a political spectacle in which ordinary people demonstrate “*to themselves* their own strengths and virtues” (Jansen 2009: 235, italics in original). Haya de la Torre and Sanchez Cerro were heads of rather different parties and movements, the former being more organized and disciplined, the latter more decentralized and loose. Yet, as Jansen argues, both were similar in the way they brought elite and mass forces together in the populist rally. In other words, when one zooms in on the populist rally as a unit of analysis, like Chapter 2 of this dissertation did, one again sees a patterned form of elite-mass interaction.

Rather interestingly, Jansen also attempts to zoom out even further than this dissertation did. He considers the trajectory of Peru throughout the twentieth century and notices the periodic recurrence of populist episodes (Jansen 2009: 247). Periods of populism are followed by periods of elite consolidation which are then interrupted by more populism. In that sense, populism may create the conditions for its own reproduction. Of course, the empirical challenge then is to demonstrate the linkages that make such reproduction possible across large stretches of time. This dissertation has not attempted this, since the evidential burden appears to be too high. Yet, some have made precisely this claim with regard to Serbia, and have linked the populism of the late 1980s to earlier populist leaders such as Dimitrije Ljotić, a pro-fascist politician active in the 1930s (Popov 1993). Whether the link is strong enough is up for debate. One difficulty in making the assertion is that Ljotić and his party did not enjoy much political support and never won more than 1 percent of the vote in inter-war Yugoslavia. However, if such a link could be demonstrated, it would be yet more evidence about the fractal character of populism.

Implications and extensions of Chapter 3

Can the lessons of Chapter 3 travel as well? Is it fruitful to approach other cases in the same way? Although I would argue that it is, differences in research design and in methodology make exact parallels difficult. Yet, this section will use two cases to argue that similar linkages between populist discourse and popular mobilization may exist in other cases. The two populist examples are the Tea Party in the US and China under Mao. Both display some of the same

patterns that Chapter 3 sketched with regard to discourse-protest links and the elite-mass interactions that underpin them.

A key obstacle to demonstrating the fractal character of discourse-protest linkages in other cases concerns detail of data and difference of research design. Yet, in some cases, the wealth of research and quality of data make comparison possible. The most prominent example that fits the bill is the US case. Enough research has by now accumulated on the relationship between the media and mobilization in the case of the Tea Party. This especially holds with regard to the research on the emergence of *Fox News*, a media outlet that can be called populist. The question of interest is whether *Fox News* has something to do with the Tea Party's protest activity and electoral success.

Approaching the relationship from a macro perspective, can one say that *Fox News* has led to more Tea Party protest and electoral success? Of course, the issue of electoral success could not be considered in the one-party regime of socialist Yugoslavia. Yet, for researchers of the US, this relationship is perhaps the most politically intriguing. And indeed, as researchers have noted, the entry of *Fox News* is associated with electoral shifts favorable to the Republican Party (Stefano and Kaplan 2007). Analysis of the 2000 elections showed that the presence of *Fox News* is associated with higher vote shares for Republicans. According to the estimates of Stefano and Kaplan, *Fox News* convinced up to 28 percent of its viewers to vote Republican. Another study similarly showed that *Fox News* managed to persuade voters if they already identified as Republican or if they were Independents (Hopkins and Ladd 2014). In other words, *Fox News*

probably could not “convert” those who identified as Democrat but could influence the vote intentions of Independents as well as Republicans. The relationship between exposure to *Fox News* and voting patterns – viewed from a macro perspective – seems to hold, at least for some segments of the population.

These studies investigate electoral results. What about protest mobilization? Is there a connection between *Fox News* and Tea Party protests? Banerjee (2013) has provided the most detailed study of this relationship. His research design includes both *Fox News* as well as other media and considers the relationship in a dynamic way. The period of observation is longer, roughly a year and a half, and Banerjee accordingly takes the week as the unit of analysis. The main conclusion of his study is that media coverage tends to precede Tea Party protest. However, this is something that holds predominantly for the mainstream media. The relationship between *Fox News* and protest activity is weaker. Instead, it seems that coverage in the mainstream media responds to the coverage in *Fox News*. Then, the protests respond to the coverage of the mainstream media. This he explains in terms of an “echo chamber” (Banerjee 2013: 63). Although the coverage of *Fox News* did not have a direct effect on protest, it predicted the coverage in the mainstream media which then proceeded to drive protest mobilization in the following week.

This is an interesting account of the triadic relationships between a right-wing populist media outlet, the broader mainstream media and the mobilization of protesters. Meso-level links did exist, but *Fox News* was not a direct influence on the protesters. Banerjee frames the findings in

terms of a “liberal bias” theory: supporters of the Tea Party are under the impression that most of the media is biased against the Tea Party (Banerjee 2013: 43). Therefore, Tea Party protests are more likely to occur following negative coverage of the Tea Party. To the extent that the “liberal bias” frame is connected to a larger narrative of who “the people” are and who “the (liberal) elites” are, there may indeed be an underlying similarity between Banerjee's findings and the findings of Chapter 3.

The additional complexity of the meso-level links in the US case may be explained, in part at least, by the much larger size of the country and the larger number of media outlets. One should keep in mind that, in terms of size and population, Serbia would fall somewhere between Indiana and Illinois. Additionally, its media market was much more uniform, with *Politika* commanding a much more prominent role than any media outlet does in the US. Therefore, it may not be surprising that the link is tighter in the case of Serbia. Yet, the presence of week-to-week linkages even in the US case showcases that the relationship found in Chapter 3 may be of broader relevance.

Zooming in further still, can the media content itself be a site of elite-mass interaction, as was the case with the readers' letters analyzed in Chapter 3? The content of Fox News does not lend itself easily to such an analysis, given different formats of its shows and programs. Bringing in another instance of populism may be helpful in this regard. The remainder of this section will therefore briefly discuss a facet of Chinese politics under Mao: the writing of large character posters or *dazibao*. Such posters were especially common during the Cultural Revolution, but

have been a staple of Chinese politics both before and after. Typically, *dazibao* are large pieces of paper placed in public locations, for passers-by to read. Everything from a short poem or cartoon to a long essay or news report can be a *dazibao* (Sheng 1990: 234). They are especially conducive to the kind of populist politics that Mao favored in which the masses are actively encouraged to mobilize, especially in order to attack various enemies of the people.

The *dazibao* have a long history, but first took center stage in the “Hundred flowers” campaign when Mao demanded that “a hundred flowers blossom” and “a hundred schools of thought contend” (Fuchs 2015: 303). The people were encouraged to write *dazibao* in order to expose “bureaucratism, sectarianism and subjectivism” (Sheng 1990: 236). The intriguing aspect of the *dazibao* is that they provide a degree of unanimity to the writer. However, this also opens up space for manipulation. At the same time, the bottom-up enthusiasm in writing *dazibao* is striking. During the “Hundred flowers” campaign, one work unit with 32,000 employees wrote about 40,000 *dazibao* in August of 1957. Six middle schools produced around 320,00 *dazibao* in the following month (Sheng 1990: 238). Yet, one could never be entirely sure about the authorship of the *dazibao* and the signatures, if provided, need not have been genuine. The chief beneficiary of the *dazibao* was Mao since the posters usually echoed his own positions. For Mao, the posters were proof that “the masses have created a form of making revolution” (Fuchs 2015: 302). Yet, when they made points that he did not approve of, he would shut the *dazibao* down. Therefore, the practice of writing large character posters ebbed and flowed with the rhythms of high politics and the political calculations of the moment.

The practice reached new heights during the Cultural Revolution. Indeed, the Cultural Revolution was “both ignited and prolonged by the practice of making *dazibao*” (Lu 2004: 73). The first *dazibao* of the Cultural Revolution was an attack on university professors who were seen as opposed to it. Then, Mao wrote his own *dazibao* called “Bomb the headquarters – my first *dazibao*” in which he encouraged the practice of *dazibao* writing and attacked the opponents of the Cultural Revolution (Sheng 1990: 239). Following this, *dazibao* writing exploded. One witness remembers that the *dazibao* were everywhere, especially at universities. Every corner of a wall, every inch of free space was used. People strung up clotheslines so that *dazibao* could be hung (Cushing and Tompkins 2007: 30). The popularity of the *dazibao* led to a shortage of paper and glue and people began to use old newspapers instead of paper and mud instead of glue (Sheng 1990: 240). Nor was the phenomenon restricted only to universities or large cities like Beijing and Shanghai. *Dazibao* were ubiquitous throughout mainland China, all the way to the remote villages near the border with Burma (Lu 2004: 77). The practice of writing posters is similar in many ways to the readers' letters published in *Politika*. Both constituted forms of popular participation that depended on mass enthusiasm but were susceptible to elite control and manipulation. The pages of *Politika* and the walls across China were both sites of elite-mass interaction.

Implications and extensions of Chapter 4

What about the lessons of Chapter 4? Do its lessons about producerism travel well? Is producerism a key component strengthening populism in a wider selection of cases? This

section suggests that this is indeed the case. Two cases are discussed that form versions of populism that are different from the one that Serbia witnessed in the late 1980s but are still associated with a form of producerism. The first is Boulangism, a populist movement in late 19th century France which found support among small shopkeepers in Paris. The other is the peasant populism of Stjepan Radić in early 20th century Croatia. Neither form of populism is associated with socialism or Marxism, as the Serbian version was, but each nevertheless presents a producerist narrative about certain segments of “the people” as especially productive. This showcases the flexibility of the link between producerism and populism across different economic foundations and historical periods.

The first case is the phenomenon of Boulangism in late 19th century France. This case of populism takes its name from Georges Boulanger, a French General and politician who in the 1880s amassed a great deal of popularity and was in a position to take power through a coup, though he eventually decided not to do so (Laclau 2005a: 178-182). His version of populism drew on his personal charisma as well as his status as a popular military officer. Yet, he also brought together disparate right-wing and left-wing currents, from the Bonapartists who drew inspiration from the military dictatorship of Napoleon to leftist groups who drew inspiration from the Jacobins (Vaičiulenas 1991: 103-104). Therefore, the case is not easy to pigeonhole as either leftist or rightist.

In the 1880s, France was still reeling from the repression of the Paris Commune as well as suffering from the global economic crisis which manifested itself, most of all, through high rates

of unemployment. The political setting, therefore, was ripe for a populist challenge to the liberal order which had, however shakily, been established after the Commune. Paradoxically, Boulangism could make use of the very avenues opened up by liberalism, such as the media and electoral politics. It can therefore be called the “first political movement to make use of all the possibilities offered by liberal democracy to destroy that same liberal democracy” (Sternhell 1991: 26). Boulangism relied on a mixture of personal charisma, media campaigns, parliamentary politics and street demonstrations, all in its goal to oppose the corrupt parliamentary system.

What type of content filled the populist shell in the case of Boulangism? The melange was varied: “an aggregation of heterogeneous forces and demands which cannot be organically integrated (Laclau 2005a: 180). Yet, it is relatively clear that Boulangism relied on an urban basis for its support. One group stood out in particular: small shopkeepers or the *commerçants* organized through the *Ligue syndicale*, a shopkeepers' association that continued with much of Boulanger's political agenda after the general's suicide in 1891. It was in this sector of the urban economy that Boulangism was most firmly established (Nord 2005: 328, 437).

When one examines the economic ideology of Parisian shopkeepers, what one finds is a particular version of producerism. For the Parisian shopkeepers, the society was divided into productive and unproductive classes, the latter consisting of big business as well as state bureaucrats. They were especially opposed to the large department stores that were threatening their business and livelihood. The *grand magasins* were “vampires, octopoi, machineels,

tentacled monsters ruthlessly draining the life-blood from neighborhood markets” (Nord 2005: 266). Boulangism offered an attractive option to the small shopkeepers of Paris who could see themselves in Boulangism's “reconciliation of all good patriots, of all honest folk” (Nord 2005: 326). Opposed to the honest folk were various parasitic groups.

Indeed, aside from the large departments stores, the enemies of the people could be expanded to include a variety of other unproductive groups: financiers, foreigners, Jews, do-nothing monopolists who had all, “like a colony of parasites, infested the productive body of the nation” (Nord 2005: 328). As could be expected, this kind of politics had more than a tinge of antisemitism and xenophobia (Nord: 488). The enemies of the people were various “parasites who jabbered or speculated but did not engage in productive work” (Nord 2005: 440). To this, the small shopkeepers hoped to promote a utopia of their own, a nation of small owners with independent workshops and stores, all bound together by a renewed patriotism. This vision of politics was not primarily socialist or working class. Indeed, cafes serving workers were never as prominent in the *Ligue Syndicale* as their counterparts in richer neighborhoods of Paris (Haine 1999: 149). Despite this, the populism of Boulanger and of the Parisian shopkeepers can still be called producerist. In other words, the link between populism and producerism need not exclusively rest on socialist or left-wing foundations.

The second case discussed in this section highlights both the versatility of populism and the robustness of the link between populism and producerism. The setting is quite different from 19th century Paris and, though it is spatially close, it is also very different from Serbia in the

1980s. The rest of this section will briefly discuss the peasant populism of Stjepan Radić, a Croatian politician. Radić was politically active both before World War I when Croatia was part of Austria-Hungary as well as later when Croatia joined the other south Slav nations and formed the first Yugoslavia. Given that Croatia was poor and that the peasantry constituted about 84 percent of the population (Cipek 2001: 61), Radić saw the peasants as the only base for a mass movement. He pushed for universal suffrage hoping to bring the peasantry into politics as a dominant force. Radić and his Croatian Peasant Party saw society as essentially divided into two groups: those “above” and those “below” (Cipek 2001: 57). Above were the “gentlemen” (*gospoda*), often referred to pejoratively as coat-wearers (*kaputaši*) (Boban 1998: 42; Biondich 1999: 65; Cipek 2001: 57). Below were “the people” of which the most numerous were the peasants. The main political cleavage emphasized by the Croatian peasant movement was thus similar to other agrarian populist movements, such as the Russian *Narodniki*. Urban elites were chastised by Radić as snobs, an attitude that sometimes veered towards antisemitism (Boban 1998: 235). The political goal of his party was to give to the peasants the same political respect that the urban gentlemen or *kaputaši* enjoyed (Biondich 1999: 67-68).

Along with this agrarian version of populism, Radić's ideas contain a strong producerist streak. The problem with the gentlemen is that they wish to “live without beneficial work, at the expense of the people” (Biondich 1999: 67). On the other hand, it is the peasant who feeds everyone, “the priest and the count” (Boban 1998: 92). No other group – rural artisans, merchants, clergy, teachers, rural officials – could survive without the peasant (Biondich 1999: 66). It is the peasant who “feeds and sustains everybody from the emperor to the agricultural

bureaucrat” and, unlike the industrial worker who depends on the capitalist and the world market, the peasant “has his own existence in his own hands, on his own land and in his calluses” (Cipek 2001: 63). Other groups in society cannot say they are productive in quite the same manner. The special role that the peasant plays economically makes his interests converge with society as a whole. The peasant was “simultaneously the owner of his land, a worker, a capitalist and an entrepreneur. It is in this one class that the entire national economy combines and the peasantry could say in an economic sense: we are the state!” (Cipek 2001: 61). In other words, the peasantry is not just a class with its own interests. Instead, what is in the interest of the peasant is in the interest of everybody.

For Radić, peasants were positive for a variety of reasons. It would be a simplification to say that he relies solely on producerism to make the case that the people, i.e. the peasants, should be seen as “good.” He also made moral arguments which centered on the peasants' Christianity, their “soul”, innate sense of justice, and loyalty to the home (Boban 1998: 243; Cipek 2001: 61-64). Yet, the productive character of the peasants is a key characteristic of what makes them the most important group in society. Without their labor, all the other groups in society would go hungry.

It should be mentioned that this version of producerism emerged before the “modern” version which arose in Yugoslavia after World War II. Indeed, Radić's ideas were formed in large part in an anti-modern way: his political ideas were marked by ambivalent attitudes towards industrialization and the slow transformation of peasants into urban factory workers. In Austria-

Hungary this process was still a very slow one and the picture was not much different in inter-war Yugoslavia. The peasants seemed to be destined to constitute the majority of the people for a long time. Indeed, he wished to officially transform the state into a peasant state. Even so, Radić's populism had a strong producerist component. In that regard, one can argue that the link between populism and producerism does not depend on the presence of modernizing ideologies such as Marxism and socialism.

Populist trade-offs

The final step in this dissertation is to provide an assessment of populism. What are its relative merits? Can it be assessed as predominantly good or bad? Or to rephrase, what does this dissertation tell us about the trade-offs that accompany populism?

The perception of populism outside of academic debates is almost universally negative. Indeed, the term is often a pejorative label which one can use to discredit one's political opponents. Intriguingly, some recent academic debates have tried to re-appropriate the term and to use it as a basis for a new political project of radical democracy. In particular, this refers to Laclau's (2005a) intellectual and political agenda. For Laclau and his followers, populism can provide a political platform for an attack on the current liberal democratic order, the hegemony of neoliberalism in the sphere of political ideas and the constant re-trenching of previous progressive and leftist achievements. Yet, if the contemporary left is to embrace populism as a new foundation for radical democratic politics, it should be made clear what such a choice

entails. What does one gain and what does one lose with populism?

This dissertation has proposed that we study populism as fractal interaction. With populism, wherever one looks one can see the input of elites. They are involved, in one way or another, at every step of the way. They are involved both in terms of the street mobilization that popular forces engage in and the discourses that they produce in the public sphere. Populism entails elite involvement in both aspects, as chapters 2 and 3 have showed. But this involvement does not entail demobilization. On the contrary, populism implies that elites are trying to encourage and amplify the input of popular actors. The masses are given space to participate in politics and in the public sphere in quantities that are usually unthinkable. The flip-side of this is that elites will manipulate popular input to suit their goals and interests. “The people” are asked to come to the streets and to bring their stories and opinions into the public sphere, but their input is molded to suit elite interests. This is the main trade-off which comes with populism.

In other words, what is won in terms of scale is paid by a corresponding loss of autonomy. Elite involvement can lead to larger and more frequent protests. Elites have at their disposal the kinds of resources that ordinary citizens and activists can only dream of. But such protests will constitute events in which some things cannot be said, though they may be on the minds of citizens. The same holds for popular contributions to the public sphere. The emergence of populism means that ordinary people will have more space to contribute their thoughts to the wider social conversation. Yet, this conversation is not really a debate between individuals with different opinions. It is more like the echo of the same voice, repeated *ad nauseam*. Only those

messages that are compatible with elite agendas will be given space, though such opinions may indeed be genuinely shared by many ordinary citizens. Autonomous public spheres – ones in which ordinary citizens would not be under the tutelage of elites, but would be encouraged to find and construct their own discourses – are not encouraged. Just as the possibility of autonomous organizing disappears, so does the possibility of autonomous discourse-making.

Indeed, this may be the main sin of populism: it does not treat ordinary citizens as political adults, as citizens in the full sense of the word. Instead, they are kept in a state of political naivety, even as they are asked to enter politics on a massive scale. Populist episodes typically feature the entry of an assertive and combative “people” onto the center stage. It is indeed impressive to see so many people politically striving to achieve a goal about which they feel so strongly. Yet, the dark side of such populist mobilization is always present. They are somebody's else's pawns, even though they are not only that, i.e. even as the control that is being exercised over them is imperfect and incomplete. Ultimately, this makes populism an unhappy choice when it comes to the long term political education of a citizenry.

Therefore, the new left's recent emphasis on populism is not unwelcome, but needs to proceed with caution. Populism is a double-edged sword. A defense of populism is not impossible, even with everything that has been written about it in this dissertation and in the broader literature on populism. Yet, such a defense of populism needs to be qualified. Scaling-up smaller initiatives among ordinary people may indeed require a dose of populism. In the very least, it may entail the discursive construction of “the people” as a united front against some distant and corrupt

elite. It may also entail organizational involvement of elites at various levels. Yet, should radical democratic movements wish to proceed along this way they will have to be mindful of the manipulations, large and small, that such a choice entails. And should such manipulations accumulate, who is to say that “the people” will not once again withdraw from politics and leave politics in the hands of the elite, however loathsome?

- 1 Canovan, however, rightly points out that liberalism was throughout much of its history an anti-elite ideology, especially since it was aimed against aristocratic elites and the church (Canovan 2005: 84-87).
- 2 This definition excludes strikes that stayed within factory walls but includes those that spilled over into the street. Comparisons of press-derived data against the aggregate figures for strike activity in Serbia and Yugoslavia (Fočo 1989: 62) revealed that the press could not be used as a source of strike data.
- 3 Newspapers were read manually in libraries in Belgrade (National Library of Serbia). For each day under consideration, the newspapers' domestic politics sections were read, i.e. all of the newspaper excluding international news, culture, sports and entertainment.
- 4 In the logistic regression models estimated below, an estimate of 500 people was used for protests that had no reported event size, since it can be plausibly assumed that they were small. The results were unchanged when this estimate was altered.
- 5 The vast majority of events were protests of ethnic Serbs. Yet, towards the end of the protest wave, in November of 1988, a short Albanian counter-mobilization occurred. Albanians went to the streets to defend "their" political elite, i.e. the most prominent Albanian politicians in the Kosovo party. Fifteen percent of recorded protests were protests of Albanians.
- 6 Additional analysis revealed that, while it had a negative long-term impact, the October session had a positive temporary impact on protest activity. In other words, it led to a short upsurge in protest. This is also visible in Figures 3 and 5 and is backed up by historical research. After the "Yoghurt revolution" in Novi Sad, protesters in other towns across Vojvodina also demanded that their local elites resign (Vladisavljević 2008: 160). The effect does not last longer than five days.
- 7 The analysis also checked if protests were more likely on the day after a party session. However, coefficients for this version of the variable failed to reach conventional thresholds of statistical significance.
- 8 The impact of an interaction term which combined administrative center status and the occurrence of a party session was also assessed. This variable was also positive and statistically significant and had a high odds ratio. However, this result disappears when the interaction term's component parts are included in the model.
- 9 The possibility of reverse causation was also investigated, i.e. whether increases in protest activity lead to party sessions. This possibility did not receive support. This is to be expected given that party sessions had fixed dates and took time to organize. In contrast to party organizations, activists and protesters were much more nimble. In a looser sense, elites clearly were reacting to the protests since "street politics" was a frequent topic of discussion at party meetings.
- 10 "Želim da izrazim oduševljenje i veliko zadovoljstvo što nas *Politika* objektivno i iscrpno obaveštava o svim aktuelnim problemima. Posebno je interesantna rubrika 'Odjeci i reagovanja' u kojoj čitaoci mogu da iskažu svoje nezadovoljstvo i ogorčenje sporim ili nikakvim rešavanjem kosovske drame. Ovakvo pisanje *Politike* smeta samo okorelim neprijateljima ovog društva." ("Šta će Ragip Haljilji raditi na univerzitetu", *Politika*, 14. 9. 1988, 14).
- 11 "Eto, i to je još jedan dokaz šta znači kada listovi postanu poltroni, tj. ulizice rukovodećih struktura ili bolje reći opet 'foteljaša' a kad listovi tipa Politikinih izdanja sa svojim izveštačima izvršavaju svoju misiju korektno i tačno, onda nije čudo što Politikina izdanja kako narod kaže PLANU za pola sata." ("Neću da čitam Dnevnik", *Politika*, 13. 9. 1988, 13).
- 12 "Pokazalo se da rubrika 'Odjeci i reagovanja' odražava mišljenje i stavove najšire javnosti, radnih ljudi i građana ove zemlje." ("Za ostavke okrivljuju narod", *Politika*, 9. 10. 1988, 6).
- 13 "Kroz rubriku 'Odjeci i reagovanja' progovorio je naš čovjek, njegova duša. Ispoljio se radnik, seljak, intelektualac, naučnik, borac i te neodoljiva ljubav prema svojoj zemlji i mirnom životu ovaplođena je u bezbroj članaka nad kojima treba stati koje treba analizirati, kao neprocenjivi narodni dragulj." ("Trajne poruke 'Bitke za istinu'", *Politika*, 28. 11. 1988, 17).

- 14 “Dugo se naš čovek ustezao od političkih istupanja. Ali kada je osetio i video pred sobom bezdan, prihvatio se pera i reči su se ređale kao prirodni biser. Nad ovim pismima treba da se zamisle naši filozofi, istoričari, sociolozi...”, (“Trajne poruke 'Bitke za istinu””, *Politika*, 28. 11. 1988, 17).
- 15 “Sve što je narod izneo u rubrici 'Odjeci i reagovanja' [...] trebalo bi da nađe mesta u jednoj knjizi kao dokaz (trag) o tome kada je narod progovorio srcem i dušom, iskreno i pošteno u mlazu do neba.” (“Vreme kada je narod govorio”, *Politika*, 3. 10. 1988, 17).
- 16 “...bio bi to svojevrsan dokument o plebiscitarnom izjašnjavanju naroda o sudbinskim pitanjima našeg i budućeg vremena.” (“Vreme kada je narod govorio”, *Politika*, 3. 10. 1988, 17).
- 17 “Iz vaše rubrike 'Odjeci i reagovanja' lako se može zaključiti da narod ima previše mudrosti, a premalo vlasti, što je kod rukovodstva potpuno obrnuta stvar. Stoga predlažem da se za 17. sjednicu CK SKJ kao poseban materijal dostave svi članci ove rubrike, koji mogu rukovodstvu poslužiti kao ogledalo.” (“Mudrost naroda”, *Politika*, 18. 9. 1988, 17).
- 18 “Za mene je neshvatljivo, da ne kažem apsurdno, da *Borba* kao jedino jugoslavensko glasilo najšireg fronta SSRNJ nema celu stranu posvećenu priložima čitalaca.” (“Sve stranice otvorene”, *Borba*, 26. 9. 1988, 2).
- 19 “Za mene je skućena rubrika za čitaoce u nekom listu dokaz određene distance, otuđenosti redakcije od čitalaca” (“Sve stranice otvorene.”, *Borba*, 26. 9. 1988, 2).
- 20 “*Borba* izuzetnu pažnju posvećuje tzv. spoljnoj saradnji, objavljivanju priloga, mišljenja, stavova i sl ljudi koji nisu stalno zaposleni u listu.” (“Sve stranice otvorene”, *Borba*, 26. 9. 1988, 2).
- 21 “[...] da su neki listovi otvaranjem svojih stranica za čitaoce i uvođenjem novih rubrika u kojima čitaoći komentarišu aktuelna politička zbivanja u zemlji postale prave narodne novine” (“Čekamo nove predloge”, *Borba*, 21. 11. 1988, 2).
- 22 “...zašto *Borba* ne uvede odgovarajuće rubrike u kojima bi građani mogli da iznose svoja mišljenja i predloge o svim pitanjima koja interesuju čitaoce?” (“Čekamo nove predloge”, *Borba*, 21. 11. 1988, 2).
- 23 “...kao što je poznato svi listovi danas sa zadovoljstvom uočavaju sve veći priliv pisama svojih čitalača a posebno *Borba* koja kao savezno glasilo ima obavezu da brine o svakom pismu koje nam stigne.” (“Čekamo nove predloge”, *Borba*, 21. 11. 1988, 2).
- 24 “Već više od godinu dana u skladu sa novom uređivačkom politikom *Borba* s posebnom pažnjom odvajava prostor za pisma naših čitalaca.” (“Čekamo nove predloge”, *Borba*, 21. 11. 1988, 2).
- 25 “...kao neka vrsta “kolektivnog intervjua” – što nam je posebno drago.” (“Čekamo nove predloge”, *Borba*, 21. 11. 1988, 2).
- 26 “Nadam se da ćete objaviti ovo pismo koje se svakako neće dopasti vašem direktoru Milanu Rakasu, kao što se ni meni nije dopao njegov članak.” (“Pravo naroda nije osporeno”, *Borba*, Milan Novaković, 22. 8. 1988, 2).
- 27 “Koliko mi je poznato, Rakas je pošten čovek i komunista i zato mi nije jasno zašto u svom članku 'Igra vatrom' osporava pravo narodu (koji inače vrlo retko greši) da proziva pojedine funkcionere koji svojim (ne)radom nisu opravdali poverenje naroda ili, kako on to kaže, 'javno etiketiraju i diskvalifikuju pojedince.'” (“Pravo naroda nije osporeno”, *Borba*, Milan Novaković, 22. 8. 1988, 2).
- 28 “...danas je svima jasno da ćutanje šteti ovoj zemlji, koja najviše pripada narodu i samo narodu. Ćutanje koristi samo neprijatelju zemlje i zato, družo Rakas, ne zatvarajte usta narodu. Budite uvereni da naš narod neće pogrešiti niti je do sada grešio.” (“Pravo naroda nije osporeno”, *Borba*, Milan Novaković, 22. 8. 1988, 2).
- 29 “Slažem se sa Vama, družo, da narod ima pravo pozivati pojedine funkcionere, koji kako vi to kažete 'svojim ne(radom) nisu opravdali poverenje naroda.’” (“Pravo naroda nije osporeno”, *Borba*, Milan Novaković, 22. 8. 1988, 2).

- 30 “A što se tiče naroda, smatram da nas on treba sve češće prozivati, a naročito sve nas koji se nalazimo na odogovrnim funkcijama [...] Verovatno neke treba ne samo prozivati nego i opozivati, ali jasno kroz poznate naše oblike socijalističke demokratije.” (“Pravo naroda nije osporeno”, *Borba*, Milan Novaković, 22. 8. 1988, 2).
- 31 “Uostalom, narod najbolje zna šta je za njega dobro, a šta ne.” (“Narod najbolje zna što je za njega dobro”, *Politika*, 5. 8. 1988, 13).
- 32 “Zbog toga je narod i ustao da glasno i jasno kaže šta ga muči i šta hoće.” (“Pritisak naroda ne može biti nedemokratski”, *Politika*, 8. 9. 1988, 13).
- 33 “Narod Novog Sada je rekao ono što si mislio da prečutiš, rekao je istinu zajedno sa Kosovcima i tražio jednu Srbiju, jedan ustav, jedan sud.” (“Narod je razumeo narod”, *Politika*, 13. 7. 1988, 13).
- 34 “Uprkos tome što im je ukinuta struja ovaj narod je jasno i glasno rekao da želi svoju jedinstvenu republiku, ravnopravnost svih građana, da Kosovci neće biti prepušteni na milost i nemilost i, ako su sadašnji vojvođanski rukovodioci to shvatili, da je vreme da nestanu sa političke scene.” (“Advokati Beograd su za jedan ustav, jednu Srbiju”, *Politika*, 22. 7. 1988, 12).
- 35 “I dok sociolozi i politikolozi raspravljaju i dijagnosticiraju o kakvom se to novom fenomenu radi (da li se radi o populizmu, izrazu socijalističke stihije ili drugoj vrsti pojava), a političari zbunjeno i rigidno reaguju zabranama zborovanja narod i ne pitaju forume, ulazi u politički život, tražeći otvaranje sistema (koji je već duže vreme birokratski formalizovan, zapušten i blokiran) za njegove muke, probleme, interese.” (“Na strani naroda je bol i istina”, *Politika*, 25. 9. 1988, 17).
- 36 “Pošto je narod iskazao svoje istorijske interese za konstituisanje svoje republike kod promena Ustava SR Srbije, mora se postaviti pitanje da li promene koje se predlažu izražavaju sve takve interese.” (“Narod je rekao: na redu su rukovodioci”, *Politika*, 19. 7. 1988, 12).
- 37 “Narod je, u svakom pa i ovom trenutku naše istorije znao, koju pesmu i kome treba pevati.” (“Progovorila je duša naroda”, *Politika*, 24. 11. 1988, 16).
- 38 “Crnogorski narod, kao dio srpskog naroda, kroz vjekove je znao ko je i šta hoće, uvijek odlučno u borbi protiv tiranije za visoko uzvišene patriotske ideale i kao takav u svijetu je poznat.” (“Pokrenuti željom za promenama”, *Politika*, 18. 10. 1988, 17).
- 39 “Naš narod nije se učio 'lepom ponašanju' u visokim diplomatskim krugovima, a znao je, iako neuk, obično sa četiri razreda osnovne škole, da iz srca izlije lepe stihove svojoj Partiji i drugu Titu dok je još bio živ.” (“O Kosovu ne može u rukavicama”, *Politika*, 18. 8. 1988, 15).
- 40 “Izlazak iz ove naše, veoma teške, situacije je da svi prozvani od naroda podnesu ostavke i za svoj nerad odgovaraju narodu, a da narod ukaže poverenje mladim, sposobnim, stručnim i jugoslovenski orijentisanim ličnostima bez obzira koje su nacionalnosti i iz kojeg su dela naše Jugoslavije.” (“Građani ih kritikuju, a Radio Tirana hvali”, *Politika*, 1. 9. 1988, 15).
- 41 “Ima istorijskih situacija kada obespravljen gnevan narod, ne pitajući za pravila igre, ulazi u politiku, kvareći račune kompromiserskim otuđenim političkim vrhuškama.” (“Na strani naroda je bol i istina”, *Politika*, 25. 9. 1988, 17).
- 42 This excludes cartoons for children, either Serbian or foreign (for example Disney). This also excludes foreign political cartoons (re-printed from foreign newspapers) which some sources, notably *Borba*, would occasionally publish. It also excludes the rare re-prints of cartoons from other Yugoslav republics.
- 43 All of the coding was conducted by the author.
- 44 Unlike the previous chapter, additional types of inter-coder reliability checks were not conducted. The reason lies with the way the coding was structured: measures such as Cohen's Kappa or Krippendorff's Alpha require coding decisions to be a mixture of presence and absence (ones and zeroes). Here, all coding decisions were about the presence of a

certain motif. In such cases, measures other than percent agreement provide figures that are not informative (for more see the discussion at ReCal website: <http://dfreelon.org/?s=low+alpha+presence+absence>).

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APPENDIX 1

TABLES

Tables for Chapter 2

Table 1. Circulation of Serbian newspapers

	<i>Politika</i>	<i>Borba</i>	<i>Večernje novosti</i>	<i>Dnevnik</i>
Circulation in 1983 (sales)	243,826	30,976	339,859	34,158
Circulation in 1990 (sales)	184,551	31,408	222,282	39,677

Source: Figures adapted from Ramet (1992a: 438-441; 1992b: 42). Circulation data for *Jedinstvo* is unavailable. Based on the size of the Serbian population in Kosovo and other circulation figures it can be estimated between 4,000 and 6,000 copies per day.

Table 2. Descriptive statistics for newspaper coverage

	Overall	Reported in only one newspaper	Reported in two or more newspapers	<i>Politika</i>	<i>Borba</i>	<i>Večernje novosti</i>	<i>Dnevnik</i>	<i>Jedinstvo</i>
Number of events recorded	338	159	179	151	143	141	103	190
Mean protest size (number of persons)	17,318	8,313	23,019	34,407	31,065	29,105	40,972	28,852
Median protest size (number of persons)	2,500	2,000	2,500	6,000	9,000	5,000	5,000	3,000
Number of protests where local political organizations helped organize	111 32.8%	30 18.8%	81 45.2%	71 47.0%	67 46.9%	61 43.3%	44 42.7%	78 41.1%
Number of protests which featured arrival of Kosovo Serbs (for protests outside of Kosovo)	65 19.2%	17 10.6%	48 26.8%	44 29.1%	46 32.2%	39 27.7%	34 33.0%	44 23.2%
Number of Albanian protests	51 15.1%	24 15.0%	27 15.0%	12 8.0%	14 9.8%	22 15.6%	15 14.5%	42 22.1%
Number of protests in Vojvodina	66 19.5%	28 17.6%	38 21.2%	32 21.2%	28 19.6%	26 18.4%	47 45.6%	26 13.7%
Number of protests in Kosovo	171 50.6%	83 52.2%	88 49.1%	64 42.4%	53 37.1	67 47.5	31 30.1%	126 66.3%
Number of protests which occurred in administrative centers (Belgrade, Novi Sad, Priština)	87 25.7%	36 22.6%	51 28.4%	50 33.1%	38 26.6%	40 28.4%	29 28.2%	42 22.1%
Number of protests which took place after the September 5th session of the Serbian party	256 75.7%	116 72.9%	140 78.2%	142 94.0%	107 74.8%	110 78.0%	82 79.6%	153 80.5%
Number of protests which coincided with sessions of the communist party	126 37.3%	65 40.8%	61 34.0%	45 29.8%	49 34.3%	44 31.2%	30 29.1%	82 43.2%
Number of protests with socio-economic demands	91 26.9%	41 25.8%	50 27.9%	48 31.8%	49 34.3%	48 34.0%	43 41.8%	33 17.4%
Number of protests with nationalist demands	211 62.4%	89 55.9%	122 68.2%	119 78.8	102 71.3%	99 70.2%	63 61.2%	130 68.4%

Note: Protest size figures do not include events that did not feature an estimate size (31 such events for *Politika*, 41 for *Jedinstvo*, 18 for *Večernje novosti*, 16 for *Dnevnik*, 23 for *Borba*). Columns for individual newspapers (*Politika*, *Borba*, etc.) include events covered by that newspaper, regardless of whether other newspapers also covered that event or not. In other words, these columns include both events reported solely by the given newspaper as well as those overlapping with other sources. Therefore, some events are counted multiple times. The first three columns count events only once.

Table 3. Protests unique to specific newspapers

	<i>Politika</i>	<i>Borba</i>	<i>Večernje novosti</i>	<i>Dnevnik</i>	<i>Jedinstvo</i>
Number of events recorded uniquely by given newspaper	29	25	18	13	70
Mean protest size (number of persons)	8,481	15,836	6,782	4,262	6,389
Median protest size (number of persons)	2,500	10,000	1,000	1,750	650
Number of protests where local political organizations helped organize	4 13.8%	3 12.0%	1 5.6%	2 15.4%	17 24.3%
Number of protests which featured arrival of Kosovo Serbs (for protests outside of Kosovo)	2 6.9%	6 24.0%	1 5.6%	1 7.7%	5 7.1%
Number of Albanian protests	0 0%	2 8.0%	4 22.2%	0 0%	18 25.7%
Number of protests in Vojvodina	3 10.3%	4 16.0%	3 15.7%	0 0%	1 1.4%
Number of protests in Kosovo	10 34.5	4 16.0%	9 50.0%	0 0%	60 85.7%
Number of protests which occurred in administrative centers (Belgrade, Novi Sad, Priština)	11 37.9	3 12.0%	2 11.1%	5 38.5%	15 21.4%
Number of protests which took place after the September 5th session of the Serbian party	18 62.1%	18 72.0%	11 61.1%	8 61.5%	57 81.4%
Number of protests which coincided with sessions of the communist party	6 20.7%	16 64.0	7 38.9%	2 15.4%	34 48.6%
Number of protests with socio-economic demands	9 31.0%	5 20.0%	8 44.4%	11% 84.6	7 10.0%
Number of protests with nationalist demands	22 75.9%	12 48.0%	7 38.9%	2 15.4%	40 57.1%

Table 4. Logistic regression models of protest coverage

	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)		(5)	
	Event recorded by <i>Politika</i>		Event recorded by <i>Borba</i>		Event recorded by <i>Večernje novosti</i>		Event recorded by <i>Dnevnik</i>		Event recorded by <i>Jedinstvo</i>	
	Coefficient	Odds ratio	Coefficient	Odds ratio	Coefficient	Odds ratio	Coefficient	Odds ratio	Coefficient	Odds ratio
Average protest size (natural log)	-0.069 (0.092)	0.933	0.070 (0.092)	1.073	0.022 (0.097)	1.023	0.024 (0.110)	1.024	0.013 (0.082)	1.013
Local political organizations helped organize protest	0.148 (0.422)	1.160	-0.210 (0.424)	0.809	-0.571 (0.471)	0.564	-0.606 (0.519)	0.544	0.452 (0.366)	1.572
Arrival of Kosovo Serbs at protest	-0.577 (0.601)	0.561	-0.086 (0.582)	0.916	-0.606 (0.629)	0.545	-0.179 (0.633)	0.835	1.074* (0.477)	2.928
Albanian protest	-0.134 (0.791)	0.874	-0.780 (0.745)	0.458	1.105 (0.773)	3.020	0.337 (0.878)	1.401	0.233 (0.667)	1.262
Protest in Vojvodina	-0.585 (0.471)	0.556	-1.669** (0.501)	0.188	-1.203* (0.508)	0.300	3.486*** (0.590)	32.687	0.200 (0.444)	1.222
Protest in Kosovo	-0.962* (0.447)	0.382	-1.421*** (0.462)	0.241	-0.316 (0.482)	0.728	-0.419 (0.591)	0.657	2.261*** (0.431)	9.601
Protest in administrative center (Belgrade, Novi Sad, Priština)	0.663 (0.353)	1.942	-0.325 (0.378)	0.722	-0.109 (0.383)	0.896	0.381 (0.459)	1.463	-0.431 (0.351)	0.649
Time (days)	-0.001 (0.007)	0.998	-0.007 (0.007)	0.992	-0.006 (0.007)	0.993	0.001 (0.009)	1.001	0.010 (0.007)	1.010
September 5th session of the Serbian Party (dummy)	-0.096 (0.598)	0.908	-0.062 (0.616)	0.939	0.427 (0.634)	1.533	0.863 (0.733)	2.371	-0.709 (0.591)	0.492
Sessions of the Communist Party (dummy)	-0.205 (0.323)	0.814	0.261 (0.331)	1.298	-0.479 (0.343)	0.618	-0.331 (0.395)	0.717	0.696* (0.300)	2.006
Socio-economic demands	0.328 (0.463)	1.389	0.014 (0.446)	1.014	1.069* (0.486)	2.914	-0.263 (0.487)	0.768	-0.629 (0.399)	0.533
Nationalist demands	1.164* (0.521)	3.204	-0.549 (0.465)	0.577	0.403 (0.555)	1.496	-0.933 (0.611)	0.393	0.281 (0.425)	1.325
Number of newspapers that reported on an event	1.378*** (0.167)	3.968	1.524*** (0.177)	4.592	1.606*** (0.181)	4.986	1.501*** (0.195)	4.490	0.687*** (0.132)	1.988
Constant	-2.670** (0.994)		-1.669 (0.965)		-3.335** (1.028)		-5.201*** (1.238)		- 3.743*** (0.961)	
N	338		338		338		338		338	
Log likelihood	-141.773		-137.434		-135.164		-107.973		-161.366	
Chi-squared (df)	181.18*** (13)		185.67*** (13)		188.92*** (13)		199.67*** (13)		140.60*** (13)	

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

Table 5. Descriptive statistics

	<i>Minimum</i>	<i>Maximum</i>	<i>Median</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Standard deviation</i>
Protest held on same day as party meeting (55 events)	0	1	0	0.28	0.45
Autonomous province (Vojvodina or Kosovo; 66 total counties)	0	1	0	0.40	0.49
Administrative center (Beograd, Novi Sad, Priština)	0	1	0	0.18	0.13
Share of young delegates (aged 27 to 39) in local political assembly	0.25	0.68	0.41	0.42	0.07
Share of industrial worker delegates in local political assembly	0.02	0.39	0.15	0.15	0.06
Share of Albanian population (percentage)	0.01	98.80	0.30	34.59	41.88
Increase in Albanian population (1981 to 1991)	-3.30	15.80	2.85	3.18	4.09
Colonist county (more than 500 families settled after WWII; 12 counties in total)	0	1	0	0.07	0.26
Unemployment rate (Unemployed as percentage of entire population)	1.10	11.10	5.63	5.90	2.35

Table 6. Event history models

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5	
	Cox regression model		Cox regression model		Cox regression model		Cox regression model		Logistic regression discrete time model	
	<i>Co-efficients</i>	<i>Hazard ratios</i>	<i>Co-efficients</i>	<i>Hazard ratios</i>	<i>Co-efficients</i>	<i>Hazard ratios</i>	<i>Co-efficients</i>	<i>Hazard ratios</i>	<i>Co-efficients</i>	<i>Odds ratios</i>
<i>Eventful history factors</i>										
Session of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, July 28th 1988 (regarding Kosovo)			0.316 (0.323)	1.372			0.365 (0.329)	1.441	0.668 (0.356)	1.950
Session of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia with the Presidency of Serbia, September 5th 1988 (Milošević's endorsement)			1.118*** (.239)	3.059***			1.061*** (0.242)	2.889***	1.103** (0.327)	3.014**
Session of the Provincial Committee of the League of Communists of Vojvodina, October 6th 1988 (resignations of Vojvodina politicians)			-1.266*** (0.194)	0.281***			-1.300*** (0.195)	0.272***	-1.020** (0.319)	0.360**
Session of the Provincial Committee of the League of Communists of Kosovo, November 16th 1988 (removal of Albanian politicians)			0.832** (0.300)	2.299***			0.995** (0.296)	2.706**	0.938*** (0.266)	2.556***
Protest held on same day as party meeting					0.244* (0.106)	1.276*	0.256* (0.104)	1.292*	0.296** (0.110)	1.345**
<i>Control variables</i>										
Running sum of past protest (county specific)	0.047*** (0.010)	1.048***	0.038* (0.019)	1.039*	0.048*** (0.011)	1.050***	0.040* (0.019)	1.041*	-0.005 (0.016)	0.994
<i>Institutional factors</i>										
Autonomous province (Vojvodina or Kosovo)	0.709 (0.394)	2.032	0.758 (0.409)	2.135	0.703 (0.393)	2.020	0.754 (0.407)	2.126	0.638* (0.279)	1.893*
Administrative center (Beograd, Novi Sad, Priština)	2.523*** (0.520)	12.476***	2.721*** (0.519)	15.202***	2.498*** (0.517)	12.161***	2.695*** (0.520)	14.820***	2.417*** (0.425)	11.221***
Share of young delegates (27 to 39) in local political assembly	-0.152 (0.207)	0.858	-0.164 (0.214)	0.848	-0.151 (0.207)	0.859	-0.163 (0.214)	0.849	-0.088 (0.148)	0.915
Share of industrial worker delegates in local political assembly	-0.298 (0.212)	0.741	-0.319 (0.215)	0.726	-0.296 (0.212)	0.743	-0.317 (0.215)	0.727	-0.177 (0.154)	0.837
<i>Structural factors</i>										
Albanian population	0.004 (0.010)	0.004	0.005 (0.010)	1.005	0.004 (0.010)	1.004	0.004 (0.010)	1.004	0.006 (0.008)	1.006
Increase in Albanian population (1981 to 1991)	0.216*** (0.041)	1.241***	0.227*** (0.043)	1.255***	0.215*** (0.041)	1.240***	0.227*** (0.043)	1.255***	0.159*** (0.033)	1.173***
Colonist county (more than 500 families settled after WWII)	0.569 (0.500)	0.766	0.526 (0.511)	1.692	0.577 (0.498)	1.781	0.531 (0.509)	1.701	0.035 (0.450)	1.036
Unemployment rate	0.009 (0.007)	1.009	0.009 (0.007)	1.009	0.009 (0.007)	1.009	0.009 (0.007)	1.009	0.007 (0.005)	1.007
Albanian population * unemployment rate	0.001 (0.116)	1.001	-0.004 (0.119)	0.995	0.003 (0.115)	1.003	-0.003 (0.119)	0.996	-0.033 (0.093)	0.966
Linear time function									0.003 (0.005)	1.003
Number of observations (failures)	30195 (304)		30195 (304)		30195 (304)		30195 (304)		30195	
Log pseudo likelihood	-2552.915		-2508.934		-2544.722		-2498.009		-1358.604	

Note: Robust standard errors (clustered on county) in parentheses. Statistical significance: * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$.

Table 7. Cross-tabulation of protest and organization before and after September 5th session of the Serbian party (for protests outside of Kosovo)

<i>Before September 5th session</i>		Kosovo Serbs came to the protest		
		No	Yes	Total
Local political organizations helped organize the protest	No	36	5	41
	Yes	1	5	6
	Total	37	10	47
		Chi-squared: 15.813***	p-value: less than 0.001	
<i>After September 5th session</i>		Kosovo Serbs came to the protest		
		No	Yes	Total
Local political organizations helped organize the protest	No	50	7	57
	Yes	15	48	63
	Total	65	55	120
		Chi-squared: 49.232***	p-value: less than 0.001	

Note: Statistical significance: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Tables for Chapter 3

Table 8. Assessment of inter-coder reliability (3 coders, 5 categories, 50 cases per category)

	Percent agreement	Percent agreement pairwise			Fleiss' Kappa	Cohen's Kappa	Cohen's Kappa pairwise			Krippendorff's Alpha
		Coders 1 and 3	Coders 1 and 2	Coders 2 and 3			Coders 1 and 3	Coders 1 and 2	Coders 2 and 3	
Overall (250 cases)	0.968	0.964	0.972	0.968	0.968	0.936	0.928	0.944	0.936	0.936
“The people” (<i>narod</i>) used in sentence (50 cases)	0.986	0.980	0.980	1.000	0.987	0.973	0.960	0.960	1.000	0.973
“The people” used in singular or in the plural (<i>narodi</i>) (50 cases)	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
“The people” used (<i>narod</i>) as subject of sentence (50 cases)	0.963	0.920	0.980	0.900	0.933	0.866	0.840	0.960	0.799	0.867
“The people” (<i>narod</i>) used together with “nationality” (<i>narodnost</i>) (50 cases)	0.986	0.980	0.980	1.000	0.987	0.973	0.960	0.960	1.000	0.973
The people used together with “working class” (<i>radnička klasa</i>) (50 cases)	0.933	0.940	0.920	0.940	0.933	0.866	0.880	0.839	0.879	0.867

Table 9. Overview of readers' letters (June 1st to November 31st 1988)

	<i>Politika</i>	<i>Borba</i>
Total number of readers' letters published	804 letters	131 letters
Number of letters with “the people” (<i>narod</i>) in title	60 letters 7.5 percent	2 letters 1.5 percent
Number of letters written by academics and professors	95 letters 11.8 percent	12 letters 9.2 percent
Number of letters published before the September 5th session of LC of Serbia	295 letters 36.7 percent	60 letters 45.8 percent
Number of letters published after the September 5th session of LC of Serbia	509 letters 63.3 percent	71 letters 54.2 percent

Table 10. Letters before and after September 5th session of the League of Communists

	<i>Politika</i> (total of 804 letters)	<i>Politika</i> Letters with “the people” (<i>narod</i>) in title (60 letters)	<i>Politika</i> Letters written by academics and professors (95 letters)	<i>Borba</i> (total of 131 letters)
Before the September 5th session of LC of Serbia	295 letters 36.7 percent	26 letters 43.3 percent	39 letters 41.0 percent	60 letters 45.8 percent
After the September 5th session of LC of Serbia	509 letters 63.3 percent	34 letters 56.7 percent	56 letters 59.0 percent	71 letters 54.2 percent

Table 11. Frequency counts for words that appear in sentences that feature the word “people”

	<i>Politika</i> – Letters with “the people” (<i>narod</i>) in title (total of 60 letters)	<i>Politika</i> – Letters written by academics and professors (total of 95 letters)	<i>Politika</i> – comparison group – no “people” in the title and not written by academics (100 randomly selected letters)	<i>Borba</i> (total of 131 letters)
1	people (<i>narod</i>) 536	people (<i>narod</i>) 510	people (<i>narod</i>) 220	people (<i>narod</i>) 94
2	Serbian (<i>srpski</i>) 100	Yugoslavia (<i>Jugoslavija</i>) 52	Kosovo (<i>Kosovo</i>) 34	nationality (<i>narodnost</i>) 17
3	Yugoslavia (<i>Jugoslavija</i>) 73	Serbian (<i>srpski</i>) 42	Serbian (<i>srpski</i>) 29	Montenegrin (<i>crnogorski</i>) 15
4	leadership (<i>rukovodstvo</i>) 54	Kosovo (<i>Kosovo</i>) 39	Yugoslavia (<i>Jugoslavija</i>) 29	Yugoslavia (<i>Jugoslavija</i>) 14
5	Kosovo (<i>Kosovo</i>) 53	Serbia (<i>Srbija</i>) 37	leadership (<i>rukovodstvo</i>) 26	Yugoslav (<i>jugoslavenski</i>) 13
6	Serbia (<i>Srbija</i>) 51	nationality (<i>narodnost</i>) 36	Serbia (<i>Srbija</i>) 21	right (<i>pravo</i>) 11
7	nationality (<i>narodnost</i>) 36	people, individuals (<i>ljudi</i>) 25	year (<i>godina</i>) 19	unity (<i>jedinstvo</i>) 10
8	political (<i>politički</i>) 33	leadership (<i>rukovodstvo</i>) 25	nationality (<i>narodnost</i>) 15	country (<i>zemlja</i>) 7
9	Yugoslav (<i>jugoslavenski</i>) 32	Montenegrin (<i>crnogorski</i>) 24	state (<i>država</i>) 15	leadership (<i>rukovodstvo</i>) 5
10	country (<i>zemlja</i>) 27	constitution (<i>ustav</i>) 23	Vojvodina (<i>Vojvodina</i>) 13	YPA / Yugoslav People's Army (<i>JNA</i>) 4

Note: Calculations produced in Nvivo. List excludes non-essential and helping words. Declinations solidified into single categories.

Table 12. Appearances of “the people” in various groups of letters

		<i>Politika</i> – Letters with “the people” (<i>narod</i>) in title (total of 60 letters)	<i>Politika</i> – Letters written by academics and professors (total of 95 letters)	<i>Politika</i> – comparison group – no “people” in the title and not written by academics (100 randomly selected letters)	<i>Borba</i> (total of 131 letters)
How many times “the people” (<i>narod</i>) appear (per letter)	Mean	8.933	5.368	2.200	0.717
	Median	8	2	1	0
How many times “the people” (<i>narod</i>) appear in the singular (per letter)	Mean	5.000	2.400	1.020	0.534
	Median	4	1	0	0
How many times “the people” (<i>narod</i>) appear as the subject (active agent) in a sentence (per letter)	Mean	1.950	0.915	0.320	0.152
	Median	1	1	0	0
How many times “the people” (<i>narod</i>) appear in the singular <i>and</i> as the subject (active agent) in a sentence (per letter)	Mean	1.833	0.894	0.320	0.145
	Median	1	0	0	0

Table 13. Appearances of “the people” in various groups of letters (before and after September 5th session of the League of Communists)

		<i>Politika</i> – Letters with “the people” (<i>narod</i>) in title (total of 60 letters)		<i>Politika</i> – Letters written by academics and professors (total of 95 letters)		<i>Politika</i> – comparison group – no “people” in the title and not written by academics (100 randomly selected letters)		<i>Borba</i> (total of 131 letters)	
		Before	After	Before	After	Before	After	Before	After
How many times “the people” (<i>narod</i>) appear (per letter)	Mean	11.346	7.882	6.076	4.875	2.320	2.013	0.816	0.718
	Median	10	6	3	2	1	1	0	0
How many times “the people” (<i>narod</i>) appear in the singular (per letter)	Mean	5.769	4.411	2.717	2.178	1.440	1.785	0.533	0.535
	Median	5	3	1	1	0	0	0	0
How many times “the people” (<i>narod</i>) appear as the subject (active agent) in a sentence (per letter)	Mean	2.076	1.852	1.051	0.821	0.440	0.280	0.166	0.140
	Median	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
How many times “the people” (<i>narod</i>) appear in the singular <i>and</i> as the subject (active agent) in a sentence (per letter)	Mean	1.884	1.794	1.000	0.821	0.440	0.280	0.166	0.126
	Median	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0

Table 14. Appearances of “the people” in various groups of letters

	<i>Politika</i> – Letters with “the people” in title (total of 60 letters)	<i>Politika</i> – Letters written by academics and professors (total of 95 letters)	<i>Politika</i> – comparison group – no “people” in the title and not written by academics (100 randomly selected letters)	<i>Borba</i> (total of 131 letters)
<u><i>Populist usages</i></u>				
How many times “the people” (<i>narod</i>) appear in total	536	510	220	94
How many times “the people” (<i>narod</i>) appear in the singular (as percentage of mentions of “the people” in this category of letters)	455 (84.8 percent)	394 (77.2 percent)	148 (67.2 percent)	70 (74.4 percent)
How many times “the people” (<i>narod</i>) appear as the subject (active agent) in a sentence (as percentage of mentions of “the people” in this category of letters)	184 (34.3 percent)	153 (30.0 percent)	47 (21.3 percent)	20 (21.2 percent)
How many times “the people” (<i>narod</i>) appear as the subject (active agent) in a sentence <i>and</i> in the singular (as percentage of mentions of “the people” in this category of letters)	176 (32.8 percent)	150 (29.4 percent)	47 (21.3 percent)	19 (20.2 percent)
<u><i>Conventional usages</i></u>				
How many times “the people” (<i>narod</i>) appear in the plural (as percentage of mentions of “the people” in this category of letters)	63 (11.7 percent)	75 (14.7 percent)	22 (10.0 percent)	23 (24.4 percent)
How many times “the people” (<i>narod</i>) appear together with “nationality” (<i>narodnost</i>) (as percentage of mentions of “the people” in this category of letters)	27 (5.0 percent)	47 (9.2 percent)	14 (6.3 percent)	15 (15.9 percent)
How many times “the people” (<i>narod</i>) appear together with “working class” (<i>radnička klasa</i>) (as percentage of mentions of “the people” in this category of letters)	18 (3.3 percent)	17 (3.3 percent)	6 (2.7 percent)	3 (3.2 percent)

Table 15. Most common verbs in sentences where “the people” is the subject (active agent) and is used in the singular

	<i>Politika</i> – Letters with “the people” in title (60 letters)	<i>Politika</i> – Letters written by academics and professors (95 letters)	<i>Politika</i> – comparison group – no “people” in the title and not written by academics (100 randomly selected letters)	<i>Borba</i> (total of 131 letters)
How many times “the people” (<i>narod</i>) appear as the subject (active agent) in a sentence <i>and</i> in the singular	110	85	32	19
Verbs used at least three times:				
(The people) say (<i>reći, kazati</i>)	10	3	1	0
(The people) express (<i>iskazati</i>)	5	0	0	0
(The people) know (<i>znati</i>)	5	3	3	0
(The people) accept / do not accept (<i>prihvatiti</i>)	5	0	0	0
(The people) speak (<i>govoriti</i>)	4	1	0	0
(The people) gather (<i>okupiti se</i>)	4	0	0	0
(The people) understand (<i>razumeti</i>)	4	0	0	0
(The people) demand (<i>tražiti</i>)	3	5	4	4
(The people) want / do not want (<i>želeći</i>)	3	4	0	0
(The people) call out / criticize (<i>prozvati</i>)	3	2	5	0
(The people) enter into politics (<i>ulazi u politiku</i>)	3	1	0	0
(The people) rise (<i>ustati</i>)	3	1	0	0
(The people) state (<i>izjasniti</i>)	3	0	0	0
(The people) decide (<i>rešiti, odlučiti</i>)	3	0	0	0
(The people) attack (<i>napadati</i>)	3	0	0	0
(The people) put pressure (<i>vršiti pritisak</i>)	3	0	0	0
(The people) stay silent (<i>ćutati</i>)	3	0	0	0
(The people) suffer (<i>patiti, trpiti</i>)	3	0	0	0
(The people) want (<i>hteti</i>)	1	1	3	0

Table 16. Granger causality tests

Does series A “Granger cause” series B?			
<i>Politika</i>			
A	B	Chi-squared	p-value
Number of protests	Number of letters published in <i>Politika</i>	5.346*	0.021
Number of protesters (natural log)	Number of letters published in <i>Politika</i>	3.102+	0.078
Number of letters published in <i>Politika</i>	Number of protests	1.169	0.279
Number of letters published in <i>Politika</i>	Number of protesters (natural log)	3.322+	0.068
Number of protests	Number of letters with “the people” in the title	5.661*	0.017
Number of protesters (natural log)	Number of letters with “the people” in the title	4.405*	0.036
Number of letters with “the people” in the title	Number of protests	1.384	0.239
Number of letters with “the people” in the title	Number of protesters (natural log)	4.023*	0.045
Does series A “Granger cause” series B?			
<i>Borba</i>			
A	B		
Number of protests	Number of letters published in <i>Borba</i>	0.005	0.939
Number of protesters (natural log)	Number of letters published in <i>Borba</i>	0.012	0.911
Number of letters published in <i>Borba</i>	Number of protests	1.326	0.249
Number of letters published in <i>Borba</i>	Number of protesters (natural log)	1.485	0.223
Number of protests	Number of times the “the people” appear in <i>Borba's</i> letters	0.359	0.549
Number of protesters (natural log)	Number of times the “the people” appear in <i>Borba's</i> letters	0.408	0.523
Number of times the “the people” appear in <i>Borba's</i> letters	Number of protests	0.032	0.857
Number of times the “the people” appear in <i>Borba's</i> letters	Number of protesters (natural log)	1.128	0.288

Note: The null hypothesis is that there is no Granger causality. Statistical significance: + $p < 0.10$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$.

Table 17. Regression models (OLS and spatial regression models)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Number of protests (natural log)	Number of protests (natural log)	Number of protesters (natural log)	Number of protesters (natural log)
Autonomous province (Vojvodina or Kosovo)	0.340** (0.113)	0.367** (0.113)	-0.259 (0.821)	-0.232 (0.794)
Administrative center (Beograd, Novi Sad, Priština)	1.851*** (0.317)	1.839*** (0.305)	-0.291 (2.287)	-0.298 (2.207)
Share of young delegates (27 to 39) in local political assembly	-1.048 (0.585)	-1.011 (0.565)	-4.671 (4.221)	-4.806 (4.074)
Share of industrial worker delegates in local political assembly	-0.378 (0.658)	-0.411 (0.634)	-5.847 (4.750)	-6.276 (4.602)
Albanian population	0.003 (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)	-0.056* (0.028)	-0.056* (0.027)
Increase in Albanian population (1981 to 1991)	0.137*** (0.024)	0.139*** (0.024)	0.221 (0.179)	0.229 (0.173)
Colonist county (more than 500 families settled after WWII)	0.257 (0.174)	0.258 (0.168)	3.035* (1.259)	3.017* (1.214)
Unemployment rate	0.002 (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)	0.044** (0.015)	0.045** (0.015)
Albanian population * unemployment rate	0.053 (0.041)	0.054 (0.040)	1.209*** (0.298)	1.215*** (0.287)
Circulation of <i>Politika</i> (per capita measure)	0.426*** (0.069)	0.424*** (0.067)	3.306*** (0.502)	3.283*** (0.485)
Spatially lagged dependent variable		-0.087 (0.083)		-0.062 (0.091)
Constant	0.011 (0.289)	0.033 (0.278)	0.434 (2.089)	0.878 (2.060)
Log likelihood	-114.12	-113.588	-440.144	-439.932
Number of observations	165	165	165	165

Note: Coefficients and standard errors in parentheses; *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

Tables for Chapter 4

Table 18. Most frequent themes (out of 469 themes)

	All	<i>Politika</i>	<i>Borba</i>	<i>Večernje novosti</i>
1	Functionary 281 (33.3 percent)	Functionary 52 (35.4 percent)	Functionary 162 (29.7 percent)	Functionary 67 (44.4 percent)
2	Worker 174 (20.6 percent)	Crowd at protest 33 (22.4 percent)	Worker 115 (21.1 percent)	Worker 39 (25.8 percent)
3	Ordinary man 158 (18.7 percent)	Protest sign 30 (20.4 percent)	Ordinary man 110 (20.1 percent)	Ordinary man 26 (17.2 percent)
4	Crowd at protest 86 (10.2 percent)	Arm-chair 25 (17.0 percent)	Newspaper 47 (8.6 percent)	Protest sign 21 (13.9 percent)
5	Arm-chair 80 (9.5 percent)	Ordinary man 22 (15.0 percent)	Arm-chair 37 (6.8 percent)	Arm-chair 18 (11.9 percent)
6	Protest sign 72 (8.5 percent)	Worker 20 (13.6 percent)	Crowd at protest 36 (6.6 percent)	Crowd at protest 17 (11.3 percent)
7	Newspaper 69 (8.2 percent)	Newspaper 17 (11.6 percent)	Pulpit 35 (6.4 percent)	Pulpit 10 (6.6 percent)
8	Pulpit 54 (6.4 percent)	Papers 10 (6.8 percent)	Sheep 28 (5.1 percent)	Woman 10 (6.6 percent)
9	Flag 37 (4.4 percent)	Pulpit 9 (6.1 percent)	Shepherd 27 (4.9 percent)	Dinar (currency) 9 (6.0 percent)
10	Woman 35 (4.1 percent)	Administrative clerk 8 (5.4 percent)	Bread 25 (4.6 percent)	Flag 8 (5.3 percent)
Number of cartoons	844	147	546	151

Table 19. Most frequent themes that appear with the “functionary” theme

	All	<i>Politika</i>	<i>Borba</i>	<i>Večernje novosti</i>
1	Worker 103 (36.7 percent)	Arm-chair 22 (42.3 percent)	Worker 74 (45.7 percent)	Worker 20 (29.9 percent)
2	Arm-chair 62 (22.1 percent)	Worker 9 (17.3 percent)	Pulpit 29 (17.9 percent)	Arm-chair 12 (17.9 percent)
3	Pulpit 45 (16.0 percent)	Crowd at protest 9 (17.3 percent)	Arm-chair 28 (17.3 percent)	Pulpit 9 (13.4 percent)
4	Crowd at protest 36 (12.8 percent)	Protest sign 9 (17.3 percent)	Crowd at protest 21 (13.0 percent)	Ordinary man 7 (10.4 percent)
5	Ordinary man 27 (9.6 percent)	Papers 8 (15.4 percent)	Ordinary man 17 (10.5 percent)	Crowd at protest 6 (9.0 percent)
Number of cartoons	281	52	162	67

Table 20. Most frequent themes that appear with the “worker” theme

	All	<i>Politika</i>	<i>Borba</i>	<i>Večernje novosti</i>
1	Functionary 103 (59.2 percent)	Functionary 9 (45.0 percent)	Functionary 74 (64.3 percent)	Functionary 20 (51.3 percent)
2	Crowd at protest 28 (16.1 percent)	Crowd at protest 5 (25.0 percent)	Crowd at protest 16 (13.9 percent)	Crowd at protest 7 (17.9 percent)
3	Arm-chair 21 (12.1 percent)	Arm-chair 5 (25.0 percent)	Arm-chair 11 (9.6 percent)	Arm-chair 5 (12.8 percent)
4	Protest sign 18 (10.3 percent)	Protest sign 4 (20.0 percent)	Flag 10 (8.7 percent)	Protest sign 4 (10.3 percent)
5	Bread 12 (6.9 percent)	Administrative clerk 4 (20.0 percent)	Pulpit 9 (7.8 percent)	Expensive car 4 (10.3 percent)
Number of cartoons	174	20	115	39

Table 21. Cross-tabulations

		All newspapers	<i>Politika</i>	<i>Borba</i>	<i>Večernje novosti</i>
Functionary and worker theme	Chi-squared	66.212***	0.938	83.955***	1.017
	p-value	Less than 0.001	0.333	Less than 0.001	0.313
Functionary and arm-chair theme	Chi-squared	77.763***	36.492***	40.256***	4.115*
	p-value	Less than 0.001	Less than 0.001	Less than 0.001	0.042
Functionary and crowd at protest theme	Chi-squared	3.164	1.221	15.174***	0.639
	p-value	0.075	0.269	Less than 0.001	0.424

Note: *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.

Table 22. Logistic regression models

	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)		(5)	
	Functionary theme		Worker theme		Ordinary man		Crowd at protest theme		Arm-chair theme	
	Coefficient	Odds ratio	Coefficient	Odds ratio	Coefficient	Odds ratio	Coefficient	Odds ratio	Coefficient	Odds ratio
<i>Themes</i>										
Functionary theme			0.664** (0.216)	1.943	-1.491*** (0.277)	0.224	-1.010** (0.329)	0.364	1.875*** (0.312)	6.523
Worker theme	0.676** (0.212)	1.964			-1.8914** (0.376)	0.150	-0.107 (0.314)	0.898	-0.615 (0.332)	0.540
Ordinary man theme	-1.524*** (0.276)	0.217	-2.024*** (0.382)	0.132			-2.866*** (0.668)	0.056	-0.469 (0.430)	0.625
Crowd at protest theme	-0.970** (0.313)	0.379	-0.201 (0.310)	0.817	-2.781*** (0.683)	0.062			0.390 (0.3701)	1.478
Arm-chair theme	1.806*** (0.311)	6.086	-0.690* (0.332)	0.501	-0.659 (0.448)	0.516	0.178 (0.414)	1.194		
<i>Newspapers</i>										
<i>Politika</i>	-0.164 (0.287)	0.848	-0.501 (0.343)	0.605	0.067 (0.360)	1.069	1.398*** (0.395)	4.049	0.582 (0.386)	1.789
<i>Borba</i>	-0.261 (0.223)	0.769	0.148 (0.250)	1.160	0.298 (0.281)	1.347	-0.161 (0.360)	0.850	-0.178 (0.340)	0.836
<i>Control variables</i>										
Time counter	-0.001 (0.001)	0.999	0.001 (0.001)	1.000	0.001 (0.003)	1.001	0.003 (0.004)	1.003	0.006 (0.004)	1.006
September 5th session of the Serbian party (dummy)	0.003 (0.340)	1.003	0.001 (0.374)	1.001	-0.118 (0.381)	0.888	-0.220 (0.499)	0.802	0.273 (0.505)	1.314
Number of themes in cartoon	0.814*** (0.089)	2.257	0.742*** (0.095)	2.102	0.781*** (0.094)	2.184	1.033*** (0.129)	2.810	0.375* (0.111)	1.456
Cartoon with text (0=without text)	-0.311 (0.247)	1.364	-0.281 0.304	0.754	-0.017 (0.287)	1.017	-0.902* (0.431)	0.405	0.040 (0.363)	0.456
Constant	-2.986*** (0.374)		-3.724*** (0.427)		-3.274*** 0.447		-5.383*** (0.639)		-5.231*** (0.602)	0.959
Observations	844		844		844		844		844	
Chi squared (degrees of freedom)	253.80*** (10)		170.13*** (10)		139.76*** (10)		142.01*** (10)		115.17*** (10)	
Log likelihood	-410.085		-344.384		-337.048		-206.865		-206.986	

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.

Table 23. Logistic regression models

	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
	Functionary * worker		Functionary * arm-chair		Functionary * crowd at protest		Nationalist cartoons	
	Coefficient	Odds ratio	Coefficient	Odds ratio	Coefficient	Odds ratio	Coefficient	Odds ratio
<i>Themes</i>								
Functionary theme							0.147 (0.420)	1.159
Worker theme			-0.305 (0.350)	0.736	0.812 (0.436)	2.253	-1.664* (0.765)	0.189
Ordinary man theme	-2.233*** (0.491)	0.107	-1.274* (0.510)	0.279	-2.360* (1.081)	0.094	-0.574 (0.543)	0.562
Crowd at protest theme	-0.182 (0.362)	0.833	0.010 (0.380)	1.010			-1.084 (0.788)	0.338
Arm-chair theme	0.127 (0.372)	1.135			1.438** (0.472)	4.216	-1.256 (0.803)	0.284
Newspaper theme								
<i>Newspapers</i>								
<i>Politika</i>	-0.560 (0.489)	0.570	0.922* (0.431)	2.514	1.180 (0.698)	3.256	0.399 (0.461)	1.490
<i>Borba</i>	0.747* (0.331)	2.111	0.009 (0.396)	1.009	0.702 (0.595)	2.010	-1.141* (0.497)	0.319
<i>Control variables</i>								
Time counter	-0.003 (0.002)	0.999	0.008 (0.005)	1.008	-0.001 (0.007)	0.998	0.001 (0.006)	1.001
September 5th session of the Serbian party (dummy)	0.752 (0.476)	2.121	0.141 (0.557)	1.152	-0.340 (0.772)	0.711	0.182 (0.718)	1.200
Number of themes in cartoon	1.056*** (0.111)	2.876	0.680*** (0.118)	1.974	0.959*** (0.166)	2.610	0.301 (0.164)	1.351
Cartoon with text (0=without text)	-0.109 (0.384)	1.115	-0.064 (0.399)	0.937	-0.283 (0.636)	0.752	1.302** (0.389)	3.678
Constant	-5.289*** (0.574)		-5.884*** (0.700)		-7.428*** (1.004)		-3.831*** (0.759)	
Observations	844		844		844		844	
Chi squared (degrees of freedom)	162.84*** (9)		74.65*** (9)		98.10*** (9)		47.65*** (11)	
Log likelihood	-231.674		-184.224		-99.738		-118.682	

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.

Tables for Chapter 5

Table 24. Summary of this dissertation's contributions

	Contributions to:		
	Political sociology	Literature on populism	Literature on the former Yugoslavia
Dissertation as a whole	Populism is neglected as a research topic (an “awkward” topic)	Populism as (fractal) elite-mass interaction (building on the concept of populism as a mode of political practice)	Bringing “the people” back in (rectify elite-centric approach)
Chapter 2	Interaction in protest waves approached through events (a research methodology that can be replicated more broadly)	Populism viewed through the lens of popular mobilization (much of the literature focuses solely on populist discourse)	Investigate the dynamics of the protest wave in a quantitative manner (the literature has given only qualitative accounts)
Chapter 3	Contribution to theories of the public sphere (adds to critique of the Habermasian model)	Measure gradations of populist discourse reliably and focus on discourse-protest links (two aspects that tend to be studied in isolation)	Comparison of various operationalizations of “elite intervention” (which elite manipulation mattered?)
Chapter 4	Cartoons as a source of data (not used often, especially apt for investigating popular discourses)	Link between populism and producerism (producerism provides a narrative about what makes “the people” good and the elite bad)	Blind-spot in the literature for producerism (investigate how “the people” and the bureaucratic elite are juxtaposed)

Appendix 2 - Figures

Figure 1: Histogram for event size, protests up to 10,000 people (all newspapers)




Figure 2: Histogram for event size, protests up to 1,000 people (all newspapers)




Figure 3: The Serbian protest wave (from June to November 1988)




Figure 4
The Serbian protest wave (June to November 1988)




Figure 5: Party sessions and the Serbian protest wave (from June to November 1988)




Figure 6:
Histogram of effect size estimates
Number of protests regressed on number of copies of 'Politika' (in 10,000s)
(Variety of multivariate models)





Figure 7:
Histogram of effect size estimates
Number of protesters regressed on number of copies of 'Politika'
(Variety of multivariate models)








Figure 8. *Vecernje novosti*, November 17th 1988, page 2.


Figure 9. All three newspapers



Note: Network of co-occurrence (Size of node indicates overall frequency. Width of tie indicates frequency of co-occurrence)


Figure 10. *Politika*

Note: Network of co-occurrence (Size of node indicates overall frequency. Width of tie indicates frequency of co-occurrence)

Figure 11. *Borba*

Note: Network of co-occurrence (Size of node indicates overall frequency. Width of tie indicates frequency of co-occurrence)

Figure 12. *Vecernje novosti*



Note: Network of co-occurrence (Size of node indicates overall frequency. Width of tie indicates frequency of co-occurrence)



Figure 13. *Borba*, June 1st 1988, page 2. “It’s time to make some progress!”



Figure 14. *Borba*, October 17th 1988, page 11. “What if I resigned?”



Figure 15. *Politika*, October 9th 1988, page 16.



Figure 16. *Politika*, June 5th 1988, page 1. "I am hungry! Alright! We will put that into the conclusions, just rephrase it a bit!"



Figure 17. *Politika*, September 12th 1988, page 10.




Figure 18. *Borba*, August 25th 1988, page 2.




Figure 19. *Politika*, November 21st 1988, page 13.



Figure 20. *Politika*, September 23rd 1988, page 16.




Figure 21. Mosaic plots for functionary and worker themes




Figure 22. Mosaic plots for functionary and arm-chair themes




Figure 23. Mosaic plots for functionary and crowd themes



Figure 24. *Vecernje novosti*, July 8th 1988, page 2. "Protest signs"




Figure 25. *Borba*, August 4th 1988, page 5.



Figure 26. *Politika*, July 18th 1988, page 8. “Are you for a narrow or a wide Serbia?”
“If you ask me, I am for a normal Serbia!”




Figure 27. *Vecernje novosti*, September 14th 1988, page 2.




Figure 28. *Politika*, October 7th 1988, page 2. “Yugoslavia’s program for Kosovo.”



Figure 29. *Vecernje novosti*, October 22nd 1988, page 2. “Stopping the emigration”




Figure 30. *Borba*, August 5th 1988, page 4. “Comrades, we have to stand in the way of the emigration.”



Figure 31. *Vecernje novosti*, October 30th 1988, page 1. “Birdie” (Say cheese).

Appendix 3 - Photographs (from the archive of
Politika)



Protest in Novi Sad, October 6th. Message reads: "Novi Sad - Solidarity. July 9th - September 25th - October 5th - 6th"



Protest in Novi Sad. Messages read: “Brotherhood and unity are the guarantee of Yugoslavia’s strength”, “To attack Tito means to attack the people”, “Freedom, peace, security to all”, “The constitution of Serbia according to the will of the people”, “We want Tito’s Yugoslavia”, “Welcome people from Kosovo”, “Unified Yugoslavia”, “From words to action”, “We should protect brotherhood and unity as the pupil of our eye”, “We are fighting against Vojvodina’s bureaucracy”, “Serbs from Kosovo, you are not alone”, “Brotherhood, unity, democracy”



Protest in Novi Sad



Protest in Novi Sad. Messages read: “Emigrees back to Albania”, “How long will this society tolerate the terror on Kosovo”, “Solve this in peace, we will not be able to solve it that way”, “Down with those that do not want the people”, “Slobo - freedom”, “Serbia from three parts, you will be whole again”, “To distance yourself from your own people means to lose your base”



“Meeting of Brotherhood and Unity”, Belgrade November 19th



Slobodan Milosevic at the “Brotherhood and unity meeting” in Belgrade, November 19th



Unidentified protest, pictures of Josip Broz Tito and Karadjordje, Serbian national hero



Protest in Majdanpek



Protest in Majdanpek. The messages read: “WWII Veterans! Be in the front lines again”, “Ask the people”, “Kosovo is Serbia”, “We want changes”