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A CONSERVATIVE STUDENT JOURNAL

insight and outlook

in this issue . . .

VOLUME VIII, NUMBER 6 FALL REGISTRATION ISSUE JULY-AUGUST, 1966

A CONSERVATIVE STUDENT JOURNAL

insight and outlook

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Four issues ago, in January, the magazine acquired a new Editor and, to some extent, a new editorial policy. Among the originally unannounced objectives of that policy was the discovery of new Conservative writers, and it is good to be able to report that in these four issues eight writers have made their first appearance in INSIGHT AND OUTLOOK, three of them in this Fall Registration issue. A word on them is in order.

Bill Dennis is a graduate of Earlham College and a graduate student in history at Yale, where he is, *inter alia,* one of the elder statesmen of the Party of the Right. His article on "The Testimony of George F. Kennan" serves as a supplement, and a useful one, to the on-the-scenes reporting of the Managing Editor, of which more later. Donald Lambro, who is a free-lance writer in Washington, and who is getting together a new collection of essays by young Conservative writers, has contributed to this issue of I&O a paper on "The Reformation of Congress," a subject on which he is writing a book himself. And Cornelia Hempe, who happens to be married to the Assistant D. A. of Rock County and former Executive Editor of the magazine, asks about LBJ's role in the truth-in-packaging farrago, "Who's Fooling Whom?"

Another objective, this one announced at the beginning, was (and is) the branching out beyond purely political interests, and in this issue one of our regular contributors, Dale Sievert, examines a recent textbook on the Theory of the Firm, and finds some points which he believes Conservatives would do well to consider while praising the free market. Dick Wright, who takes over as Editor in October (praise be!), reports in two pieces from Vietnam, where he and Associate Editor Dave Keene are two of the ten members of the World Youth Crusade for Freedom finding out what it's like over there. One piece is political, "Vietnam Knows the Reds," and the other (and it may be, the more valuable) is a selection not intended for publication, which has been put together by an unscrupulous editor, and printed under the title "Vietnam Diary." Highly recommended, and we hope there may be a second instalment next issue.

Finally, our three regular columnists are back, for the most part still doing business at the same old stand. Aetius presents his final consideration of a kind of academic freedom — thereby ending a discussion which began in January. He concludes, predictably and accurately, that this kind isn't there either. John Caravan turns from the Supreme Court to the supreme mess going on over in Wauwatosa, and while he is willing to work for racial peace and racial equality (sometime member of SNCC, if I recall correctly), he draws the line at working for racial war — "Wauwatosa: The Name of the Game is Nonsense."

To my own swan-song in "The Old Custom," I have little to add. If I do, sometime, I shall doubtless be persuaded to take the column up again (maybe, who knows, in the next issue, if Dick Wright is sufficiently persuasive), but for the moment, this concludes what I have been saying since 1961 — men say that we of this land have not yet lost that custom, and let us make sure we do not.

— J.C.L.

ABSENT FREEDOM

The other night it occurred to me that there is one kind of academic freedom I take rather for granted, but which may not really be there after all. I have talked in the past about the freedom of the academy to go its own way, the freedom of the instructor to teach what he wants inside the academy or say what he wants outside it, and the freedom of the student to learn or not as he pleases. All these, except possibly the freedom of the instructor to say what he wants outside the academy, are for the most part figments of the academic imagination. But what about the freedom of the student to learn in the way he pleases?

Let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that the student must learn a certain amount of set material, and that this is the purpose of what is inaccurately called a college education. But surely the learning process itself is of some value, even at a state university such as Wisconsin, and so I have found it. Yet I have noted some problems in the finding, and they bear directly on this fifth sort of academic freedom, this freedom of choice in the way to learn.

Is a student to be permitted to learn by arguing with the professor, without the wrong statements he makes in the course of the argument being counted against him in his mark? Is a student who learns the answer to a question by getting it wrong the first time to be penalized, while the student who learns the answer in lecture (and therefore gets it right the first time) is rewarded? Granted an affirmative answer to that question, should the penalty be a significant one? The student who was wrong at first has now learned the answer, and that was the purpose of the course, was it not?

In a way this shades into the old question of whether marks are given on the basis of intelligence or on the basis of improvement. But for the moment I would rather avoid the shading, and ask whether the existence of marks at all is not an infringement of this sort of academic freedom. Necessarily, in this imperfect world, the method of instruction in any course will be geared to the learner by reading or the learner by listening (or, in seminars perhaps, to the learner by arguing). If the course is geared to the listener, then, apart from the danger of producing a class of parrots, there is a pronounced disadvantage given to the student who prefers learning at his own pace rather than the lecturer's. If it is geared to the reader, then the student who has not (in any useful sense) learned to read is at a disadvantage, though he will doubtless eventually learn the material by talking with, or being instructed by, those who can. The number of university students who cannot read (I suppose I should say the number who find it heard to learn by reading) runs, I should estimate, somewhere above fifty per cent., so the problem is real enough to merit some attention. And the result of the problem is that the marks given in any course depend at least as much on the way the material is learned as they do on whether it is learned.

This may seem a minor point, but the difference between a 77 and a 76 (or a 70 and a 69) is frequently the difference between a C and a D, and the difference between a C and a D may be all the difference in the world when it comes to choosing a major field, or getting a job, or getting financial aid. If one point can be that important, and if a student's own learning pattern can easily make much more than a one point difference even if all the material set out is well and truly learned, it is an inescapable conclusion that the student is not really free to learn in the way he pleases.

I suppose the problem arises from the common assumptions that the place to learn is in class, and the books from which to learn are textbooks. All wrong, of course, but it explains why this fifth sort of academic freedom is just as absent from the general scheme of things as the other four.

— Aetius

Some Conservatives we know have been telling us that we ought to support Lyndon Johnson because he has committed 300,000 men in Vietnam. Apart from our doubts as to whether the commitment of 300,000 men is desirable as an end in itself (we might prefer to ask what the result of the commitment will be), it has always been our understanding that Conservatives believed in integrity in government, and we wonder about the connection between integrity and LBJ.

The commentators we have noticed around lately have been having a field day with the rise of the Red Guard in Peking. Interpretations have ranged from the view that Mao has raised the Red Guard the same way Hitler raised the Hitler Youth, to the view that the Red Guard are in the saddle just as the Freedom Fighters were in the saddle in Budapest in 1956, and Mao (or whoever is running China in his name) is playing the part of a right - wing - Communist Imre Nagy. Frankly, we say it's juvenile delinquency, and the hell with it.

President de Gaulle's recent tour of French Africa has, so the papers say, been something less than a rousing success. While we don't exactly disbelieve them, we do recall that in 1958 the same papers were telling us that De Gaulle would spend the rest of his life in Colombey - les - deux - Eglises, and we suspect there might conceivably be a little wishful thinking mixed in with their usual unbiased and coldly factual reporting. We can't blame them, of course — just about everyone except 55% of the French nation, and most of the former French colonies, would like to see De Gaulle get his come-uppance. And what, after all, do the opinions of the French matter to those who make or report American policy?

The manager of a bar we know (one where this magazine is sometimes distributed, in fact) has raised the price of his beer, and he blames it on LBJ — claims, in fact, that if Goldwater had been elected the price would be down 25%. We doubt the accuracy of his figures, but there's no doubt that the rise in the price of beer will bring inflation home to a lot of students at the University of Wisconsin. And if that makes them turn Republican, well, any commodity that has that result can't be all bad.

In fact, the assumption that beer is all bad (an assumption made by the Methodist Church, we are told, not to mention the older residents of the State Street area) seems to us to have very little to commend it. So does the constant proposal to raise the state beer-drinking age to 21 — statewide 18-year-old drinking would seem to make more sense, if what's worried about is the "slaughter on our highways" and not the Demon Beer itself. Prevents driving from town to town, and all that. And in case no one had noticed, the noble expirement of prohibition did not end drinking but made the whole thing worse; isn't it just possible there's a lesson somewhere in there?

About this "slaughter on the highways," we notice that Lieutenant - Governor Patrick Lucey, who did nothing whatever to get Governor Knowles's program to reduce said slaughter through the Legislature this session, and just about everything he could to prevent its getting through, has just discovered with a great air of innocence that we need a program and has generously come up with one (now that there's no Legislature in session), one which bears a strong resemblance to Knowles's, and one which Lucey is now attacking Knowles for not coming up with. INSIGHT AND OUTLOOK is by no means opposed to all Democrats: in fact we'd like to quote David Carley's remark on Lucey's tergiversations. The word was "nonsense."

Finally, a Democratic judge in Democratic Dane County has refused to quash proceedings against a Republican lawmaker for accepting $100 in travel expenses from a constituent, and has fined him $1000 for accepting a bribe. A judge in a Republican county has dismissed similar proceedings against another Republican lawmaker, noting that the law is so vague as to be unconstitutional. Its vagueness, in short, makes it usable for political purposes rather than for justice. But whatever could he mean?

Jared Lobdell

AVE ATQUE VALE

Lo thus was the old custom and usages of this land, and men say that we of this land have not yet lost that custom.

— Malory

But we are losing it. The passage, from which this column has taken its name for the past five years, goes on to lament, "Alas! this is a great default of us Englishmen, for there may no thing us please no term" — and so it is here. We may rejoice over things, it is true; we may be, and are, excited by things; but pleased? I think not; it is too quiet a word, and the state it suggests is too longlasting for this land.

Though it may matter greatly in other ways, it is not immediately important that our old custom was both good and bad. Many affairs doubtless went ill that should not have, as many that should not go ill today. Nor was the fabric of that custom seamless and immutable: to pretend it was is to falsify history. But we have now changed clothes. The old usages may remain — pledges of allegiance, the flag, the Fourth of July, the doctrine that "we are a religious people" — but the custom, as a whole and unitary thing, does not.

For the moment, I am not saying this is good or bad. I am saying only that the land, the world if you like, has changed. A friend of mine observed the other day (he being active in the struggle for civil rights) that the more one presses for action in company with one particular set of radicals, the more radical one becomes in all one's thinking. His own case is instructive. He once founded a Chapter of the Young Americans for Freedom, but because he wanted to better the condition of the Negro in America, he finds himself now an advocate of withdrawal from Vietnam, abolition of HUAC, and all the rest. I do not, nor does he, think the one necessitates the others, but in his case at least, that was the way left. Logically, I suppose, there is no necessary connection: psychologically there may be. I fear there is.

There may, for that matter, be no necessary connection, logically, between a fear of Communism and a fear of the Negro, but there is evidently a clear and present psychological one. This is, in fact, our new custom, whatever the usages may be. In times before, men prayed (in curiously old-fashioned words) to pass their time in rest and quietness, to live a peaceable life in all godliness and honesty, and now the Church, far from being a refuge, is becoming ever more involved in the world. That too is a part of the new fabric, for good or ill.

It would look, from this, as though the dividing issue is civil rights, and it may be so. If it is, then it is worse than useless — is is absolutely misleading — to hope for racial peace under the aegis of the Republic as we have known it. But there is some chance, surely, that it is not so. There is some chance that what has happened — is happening — is the result rather of the (forgive the word) Californization of America, dare I say the Americanization of America, a thing unpolitical and not unlike the Americanization of Europe. And if this is true, what then?

Then, first of all, it is necessary to see what elements in this new thing, this new custom, can be worked with to produce a good land. That first, and after that perhaps a good world, but certainly that first. Can the search for involvement, the affluence, the discontent, the faster rhythms, the gaudiness, the rebellion, the search for experiences, the alienation from what has long been thinght of as maturity, the youth which (to turn the old words about) is increasingly not wasted on the young, the introspection — in short, can the final loss of the old custom — be turned to good account?

Since I speak from the point of view of one who would preserve, if he could, the greater part of the old custom, as I understand it, this question really means, "Is it possible that the old custom is not finally lost?" That is, I think, what I mean by "turning to good account." It has been argued that the coming of the machine age has been attended by a change in the fabric of society comparable not with the relatively minor change from Antiquity to the Dark Ages, or from the Middle Ages to the Renaissance, but with the great prehistoric change from stone to bronze, or from a pastoral to an agricultural economy. Can it then be argued that our pre-Industrial institutions should survive this change much longer?

About that, I confess, I do not know. Some, if not all, of the usages will change — many have already. But I do know that if ever those parts of the old custom which involve individual liberty, the possession of the work of one's own hands, freedom of choice, the freedom (as well as the necessity) of worship, the duty of obedience to fit authority and the need for questioning whether it is fit, the character of man as a rational animal — if ever these are lost, then we shall have not only a new custom, but a new being in place of man, at least in place of western man.

The stakes, you see, are rather higher than mere politics. Out of involvement and discontent and alienation and gaudiness m u s t come, if the old custom is to be preserved, obedience, intelligence, worship and reason.

WAUWATOSA: THE NAME OF THE GAME IS NONSENSE

John Caravan

In which our captive columnist observes an increasingly closer problem and comes up with an increasingly obvious answer

In the suburb of Wauwatosa, for the past two weeks, the local N.A.A.C.P., advised by Fr. James Groppi, has been picketing, marching, making themselves generally obnoxious to the residents, and inciting said residents to violence, in order to persuade Judge Robert Cannon to resign from the Fraternal Order of Eagles. Governor Knowles has called out the National Guard to protect the marchers. Meetings have been arranged between the N.A.A.C.P. and the State Industrial Commissioner, and even on occasion between the N.A.A.C.P. and Judge Cannon. The meeting with the Judge was called off after it became apparent that he wanted to talk the matter over while the N.A.A.C.P. wanted to stage a televised sideshow.

One "civil rights" leader explained to a newsman that the group picked on Judge Cannon because his liberal outlook made it likely that he could be persuaded to resign (or perhaps the word was intimidated) from the all-white Eagles, if pressure were applied. So, in order to intimidate one man, and he of importance only as a rather secondary symbol, into resigning from a fraternal order (the exclusion of dissimilar persons being one of the purposes of a fraternal order), the entire paraphernalia of "civil rights" disorder, including rioting and eventually the National Guard, has been called into play, and soldiers line the streets of Wauwatosa.

Regardless of whether Judge Cannon ought to be an Eagle — and I, for one, can think of more important problems facing the world or the N.A.A.C.P. or even the people of Wauwatosa — it is evident that we have reached the limit. The name of this protest is nonsense. The result will be either (a) the stirring up of racial strife coupled with Judge Cannon's resignation, or, more likely, (b) the stirring up of racial strife without Judge Cannon resigning. And I am perfectly certain that the N.A.A.C.P. and Fr. Groppi are aware of these alternatives. It is therefore necessary to conclude that the desired end is the stirring up of racial strife, however frivolous the pretext on which the stirring up takes place. It would be hard to find a more frivolous pretext than this.

The racial strife is desired because the "civil rights" leaders assume that if the white man fears the Negro he will give away to him, and we can then have a just society. The name of this logic is nonsense. The Ku Klux Klan, the violence in Chicago, the (I regret to say) growing white backlash, show just how much fear of the Negro ends in giving way to the Negro's desires, just as they may be. And even if it did (which is a supposition contrary to fact), the assumption that racist victory, even if it is minority racism, will produce justice, will not bear either logical or historical examination. Precisely as much justice as Nazi racism produced for Germany will Negro racism produce for the whites.

Heaven knows this does not mean that there is no need for greater justice in our present society, nor does it mean that the Negro has not been and is not being exploited, nor does it mean that we can relax in the attempt to secure civil rights. It does mean, however, that the cause of "civil rights" is not an automatic sanction for otherwise foolish and unjustifiable behavior. It does mean that the Milwaukee N.A.A.C.P. is treading the slow path of nonsense into the morass. And it does precisely mean that we have reached the limit of racial warfare for the sake of justice, and are passing over into racial warfare for the sake of racial warfare.

Well, doubtless there are those who like to fight, and this sort of thing keeps them out of the army and on the streetcorners where they want to be. But I note a disturbing progression from the assumption that a legitimate end (justice) justifies a dubious set of means (racial war) to the assumption that these dubiously justified means themselves justify a totally new end (Black Power, or else a perpetuation of racial war). If, in Eric Berne's phrase, these are the games people play, then it is time someone pointed out that the name of the game is nonsense, and there is no winner.

VIETNAM KNOWS THE REDS

Richard O. Wright

The Managing Editor reports from the Front and finds that their anti-Communism is not ours

Vietnam is not blessed with a Gallup poll which a visitor could easily cite as evidence of public opinion. He must do his own sampling, and he must cultivate other material to supplement his impressions. Although handicapped by working in strange surroundings, this writer's research was comprehensive. Government officials, both upper and lower echelon, were interviewed, as were both former (an increasing class) and present students and professors, and of course, the peasants and the poor city dwellers. Buddhists were interviewed, Catholics and Cao Dai, Confucianist and revolutionary, and socialists and supporters of the free economy. The question was, are the Vietnamese anti-communist? The answer was invariably yes, usually emphatically stated, depending on the temperament of the individual. Their unanimity alone was compelling, but in any case, other evidence left no question.

For instance, none of the regimes flowing through the government buildings in Saigon since Ngo Dinh Diem fell have been tinged with neutralist or pro-communist sentiment. All sought a final victory over the Vietcong and a following peaceful solution to Vietnam's many problems. Even the latest attempt at overthrow, the Buddhist led "struggle movement" in central Vietnam, was cut short by the Vien Hoa Dao (Buddhist High council) when they became alarmed at Thich-Tri-Quang's injection of Anti-Americanism and his "inability" to retain control of the demonstrations in the face of V.C. infiltration. P.M. Nguyen Cao Ky, in fact, publicized supposedly pro-communist sympathies of some of the dissident Buddhists in order to distract public affection from the movement. Only if a strongly anti-communist state of mind existed in Vietnam would such a tactic be wise — and it was quite successful. This writer talked to several groups in central Vietnam, which had either never joined or withdrawn from the movement when the communist tendencies were bared.

Further, the groups and parties which would have seemed to be the most likely pro-communists (some were banned partly for that reason) were consciously searched for and explored. Even with these people, no amount of pumping could produce more than indignant disavowals of any such sentiments.

The conclusion is inescapable. The groups which hate the Saigon government the most are themselves staunch anti-communists, for everyone expressed their distaste for communists. Few would grant even the simplest democratic privileges to them (as indeed Vietnam does not). Such is the Vietnamese understanding of and distaste for the threat to their homeland.

Of course the Vietcong must be considered communist by their very name. It is true that most of them are South Vietnamese. But this fact is no proof of communist sympathy in the countryside, since even the Vietcong are not "thinking communists." Dinh Trinh Chinh, former Minister of Information (the agency responsible for handling V.C. defecters), told this interviewer that 90% of the Vietcong are not communists. That is, they do not willingly fight to institute a communist state in South Vietnam. According to the V.C. defectors interviewed, many fight because they have been kidnapped, which is the more correct term for the Vietcong draft; most have been at least pressured into the ranks. Once they are in, they cannot merely leave to again take up their farming, they fear the Vietcong wrath, or the government's suspicions. So they are committed. Certainly some recruits are affected by the indoctrination they receive, but that isn't why they fight. They are there, and they must fight.

And too, with the extensive propaganda activities of the V.C. one would expect a certain portion of the countryside to believe and to a degree follow them. This of course is becoming less noticeable, simply because too often the communist lies have been exposed. But again, these followers cannot be considered believing communists. The V.C. propaganda is at this stage almost devoted to dire warnings against the "home burning, baby eating" American troops. Communism, or even promises of a better life, are not preached; communism never was, and the Vietcong taxes and manpower drafts have forced abandonment of the welfare of the people approach. No, it cannot be said that this negative propaganda has produced pro-communism in the countrysides of Vietnam.

Just as the Vietcong and their followers cannot be likened to the American idea of communists, neither can it be assumed that because the Vietnamese are anti-communist they are like us. In fact marked differences appear. For one, Americans' dislike of communism is heightened because our own system is one of which we are proud. However, the Vietnamese, if they at one time had a system which they defended, have been disjointed by the colonialism of the past century and its abrupt removal. This is not to say that the Vietnamese do not highly regard certain of their institutions. But still a vacuum exists. The anti-communists here are not anti-com-

munist because the Reds would destroy Vietnam's own "beloved" system. This is a major difference with Americans, and its consequences are many.

The Vietnamese fear of the communist advance is one born of experience. Many consider themselves to have lived under a Red regime; some were in the communist North before the mass exodus of 1954; others have lived in areas of the South dominated by the Vietcong, or actually governed by them between the years 1945-1954. These people explain their feelings simply. "I cannot live under the communists. They take what they want from us and they won't allow us to make our living as we wish," exclaimed one refugee. Others echoed his theme. Some were younger and more idealistic. They disliked communism more generally: Liberty is lost under the communists; communists tell lies, or they are not interested in and are not capable of helping the Vietnamese people. These too are expressions of things they know, b e c a u s e they have lived them.

Similar opinions have found responsive ears in the cities and universities of Vietnam. Why? For one thing, the terror of the war had simplified the delivery of the ideas; and the close proximity to the communist North as well as the Vietcong areas made it impossible for the Red propagandists to suppress the news of hardship existing under their system. So here, although the information is somewhat second hand, the people have also learned to dislike communism, not because they have read of its horror, but because they know of it.

The knowledge of communism in Vietnam is detailed as well as widespread. As one reason for this, many Vietnamese, still young, fought with the communists against the French, gaining at once familiarity with and distaste for their ally. Then the war being so long and nearby, most Vietnamese have a deep interest in the subject. These and other factors have produced a highly intelligent anti-communism here.

But the Vietnam offensive is less effective than it might be, owing to its negative nature. The Vietnamese have rejected communism merely because it is worse than the existing conditions, which are bad enough. However, nowhere is there to be found a really positive program for the future. In the faction riddled politics, for instance, there exists a common dissatisfaction with the "illegitimate" and undemocratic government in Saigon. It is assumed among the intellectuals that democracy is what Vietnam needs. But democracy is as vague a concept to them as it has become in America. Little thought seems to have been given the problems of implementing a concrete democratic system; and when P.M. Ky succumbs to the pressure, taking steps toward designing such a s y s t e m , the intellectuals (mostly in Saigon) adopt a wait and see attitude — they refuse to participate. Certainly they have much reason to be skeptical of the election. If Ky controls it — as he can if he wishes — it could be nothing more than a step towards solidifying his regime. But still the intellectuals in Saigon cannot participate, for they are ill prepared to offer practical advice on the problems of designing a government. Their idea of democracy is in the clouds.

Further, t h e Vietnamese have given little thought to what government should look like in the provinces and villages. The dissatisfaction with the present government is, in the Confucian fashion, directed solely at the national branch. But the deeper problem lies in the inept and corrupted village officials, since without some initiative on the part of locals no amount of hard or skillful work in Saigon can promulgate the successes needed in the countryside to win the war and salvage this nation. This is a truth which, if ever thought of by the Vietnamese "politicking" elite, has never been expressed by them. And if they have not, who in Vietnam has?

It is not at all surprising that such should be the situation in this war torn nation. The immediate problem here for 20 years has been war, and not unnaturally it has occupied the minds of the intellectuals. But other, more disparaging reasons for their poor governmental preparation appear. First, the French tradition, although formally uprooted, left some seeds p l a n t e d here. Since the French have tried to govern themselves for 250 years with little success, one can guess that their influence has been tragic in Vietnam.

Worse still, there is really little political discussion in V i e t n a m . Political activity has been exclusively underground. Seldom does a politician openly espouse his political philosophy, and his failure to do so makes his following more personal than political. With the discussion missing, no chance has existed to refine the notions of government.

Finally, good ideas of western government are not being exported to Vietnam. Western political books are not easily obtained (ignoring the French ones), making impossible any widespread understanding of our political ideas. To compound the problem, the Southeast Asian is traditionally uninterested in political theory, since he attaches much importance to proven s y s t e m s . When vague notions of democracy are all that is generally available, and when it is not considered important to have any more than a vague notion, it is not surprising that we do indeed find prevalent a vague notion of democracy.

Perhaps this problem would fall under the onslaught of political activity which the Vietnamese young crave. Their desire for Liberty, although not well expressed, is deep in their hearts. Now, as military victory over the Vietcong edges toward reality, a political offensive must begin. Possibly the election and constitutional assembly will at least set the stage — possibly it will unscrew the lie from the underground politics. And in the open air, perhaps Vietnam can build a positive reason to reject communism.

THE TESTIMONY OF GEORGE F. KENNAN

William C. Dennis

A student of history wonders about the history and accuracy of Mr. Kennan's views

Amidst the raucous and vituperative denunciations of our intervention in Vietnam, the voice of George F. Kennan stands out, in contrast, as a most reasoned and intelligent plea for the United States to decrease her activity in this area of the globe. Six months after his testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on February 10, 1966, Kennan's position remains an important alternative to the present policy of the Johnson administration. His highly publicized and widely acclaimed presentation deserves careful attention, for its strengths and weaknesses bear directly on the long range future of our foreign policy for Southeast Asia.

Kennan believes extensive involvement in Vietnam is unfortunate inasmuch as the country is of no military or industrial importance. Intervention here, he says, weakens our capacity to maintain our military strength in other areas of the world where we have interests of paramount importance; threatens to upset our good relations with Japan (the only Asian country with great industrial power); blocks efforts to reach an accord with the Soviet Union on the control of nuclear weapons; and forces the USSR to compete with Communist China in hostility towards the United States. Kennan does not think the Vietcong are particularly praiseworthy. He recognizes them as "a band of ruthless fanatics . . . cruel in their methods, dictatorial, and oppressive in their aims" (page 193). He hopes some political settlement can be reached that will not turn South Vietnam over to the Vietcong terrorists. But negotiation with the Vietcong will be necessary, and a complete communist triumph in the South would be preferable to a full scale war involving all of Vietnam. If the Vietcong should eventually win control in the South, Kennan thinks it likely that they would follow a "Titoist" course, relatively independent of control from either Moscow or Peking.

Our present policy in Vietnam, continues Kennan, should be to reduce our military forces and to liquidate our political commitments while avoiding undue damage to our world position. To accomplish these aims we should begin by retiring to coastal enclaves which can be held in strength, allowing the South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) to hold what other areas it can without our support. Then begins a long wait until the Vietcong and Hanoi come to realize that they cannot eliminate us completely from the country without agreeing to negotiations. An armed stalemate might continue for several years, but as times and interests change, as the leadership of the Peoples' Republic of Vietnam passes to a new generation, some sort of accommodation may be possible.

Such is the main thrust of Kennan's attack on administration policy. The government would not disagree with some of the underlying foundations of Kennan's argument. If Vietnam is of no importance to the political and security interests of the United States, if commitments in Vietnam detract from more important efforts elsewhere, then we should not have become involved in the Vietnamese war. Supporters of the war may argue, however, that Kennan and like-minded critics have misestimated the importance of Vietnam on several counts.

1.) Any rapprochement with the Soviet Union is predicated on the proposition that the doctrine of peaceful coexistence continues as the basis of Soviet foreign policy. "Proof" of the efficacy of wars of national liberation would lend great weight to the Chinese position in the current debate over the means of securing Communist world domination. General Vo Nguyen Giap, Commander of the North Vietnamese troops (the Peoples' Army of Vietnam, or PAVN) has said, "South Vietnam is the model of the national liberation movement of our time. If the special warfare that the U. S. imperialists are testing in South Vietnam is overcome, then it can be defeated anywhere in the world" (page 256). With this statement in mind the war appears to be of serious importance indeed.

2.) As a corollary to the first proposition, communist success in South Vietnam might play into the hands of the pro-Peking faction in the North Vietnamese government which advocates greater escalation of the war from the communist side, thereby lessening the chance for a genuine "Titoist" regime in Vietnam. A military setback might strengthen the pro-Russian faction which argues that victory can only be achieved through more subtle means than direct military agression.

3.) Since 1954, or earlier, Vietminh guerrillas have occupied portions of Cambodia and Laos. In Laos especially, close cooperation between the Pathet Lao and the Communist Vietnamese has been

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EDITOR'S NOTE: Page references given in the text of the article unless otherwise noted, refer to a convenient paperback compilation of the Senate Hearings, *The Truth About Vietnam*, edited by Frank M. Robinson, and Earl Kep, San Diego, 1966.

evident. This deployment of Vietminh forces probably means that Ho Chi Minh has imperial ambitions of his own for Southeast Asia. Ho is an ardent nationalist, but he also advocates exporting communist revolution. His credentials as a dedicated communist idealogue go back at least as far as 1919 when he attended the Paris Peace Conference seeking independence from France for Vietnam. He is the senior Communist leader in the world today. Even if North Vietnam should remain free from close Chinese guidance, there is little reason to think that a third communist empire in a poor and frightened Southeast Asia would augur well for world peace.

Reports from Thailand, Laos, and Burma tell of extreme internal disorganization in parts of all these countries. Without the presence of United States forces in the area, Communist movements would have an excellent opportunity to exploit the unsettled conditions to their advantage. The serious disputes among Singapore, Malay, Sarawak, Brunei, and Sabah over the future of the Malaysian Peninsula would be aggravated by the growth of communist power to the North. If Malaysia should go communist, then even Indonesian communism might have a chance at resurrection.

4.) As India's Prime Minister, Mrs. Gandhi, made so eloquently clear on her recent visit to the United States, India hopes to demonstrate that through democracy, a poor country can bring about a better life for its people while avoiding the terrors and loss of personal freedom which communism brings with it. An India, proud of its progress and dedicated to democracy, can provide an alternative example to much of the world which is tempted by communism. Problems with communists in Kerala Province and leftists in Parliament already beset the Indian government. The success of the Indian experiment, so dear to the hearts of American Liberals, could be seriously threatened by the emergence of a communist power along her eastern borders.

5.) Kennan feels "that no one is going to be able to draw blood from a stone, and no one is going to make much more out of these territories [that is, Vietnam] than what is in them" (page 221). But the Southeast Asian subcontinent is a potentially prosperous area. Bolstered by United States economic aid and developing along non-communist lines the area can export raw materials, food, and some finished goods to other poor areas of the world, and can provide a growing market for the industrial products of Japan. This trade will strengthen Japan's international position, reduce her need to expand trade with Red China, and contribute to the growth and stability of this industrial country which Kennan thinks is one of prime importance to the interests of the United States.

6.) One of Kennan's hopes is that over a period of years the communist leadership in China will mellow in their aims and ambitions. Until this occurs we should leave the Chinese alone as much as possible (page 231). Secretary of State Rusk argues (pages 338-340) in opposition to Kennan's remarks that it is impossible to leave a power bent on expansion alone unless that expansion is first contained. It may be our obligation to help teach the Chinese the lesson that the Soviets have perhaps already learned — that "the promotion of premature, 'adventuristic' revolutionary projects abroad . . . would be an inexcusable, even a counter-revolutionary act" (from Kennan's *American Diplomacy 1900 - 1950*, page 96). If Chinese communism mellows at all, the process is likely to come through internal reform and not through success in outward expansion. A free Southeast Asia, in close contact with the non-communist world, surrounded by the island chains of the Pacific stretching from the Republic of China to Indonesia, with improved relations with Australia and New Zealand, has a real chance to undergo rapid economic development and controlled social change. If communist expansion fails in Southeast Asia, the Chinese Communists will have nowhere to turn but inward. Then perhaps Kennan's mellowing process will have a chance to begin.

7.) Finally, Kennan's emphasis on the supreme importance of the five great areas of industrial strength does not take into account the future growth of Chinese military and industrial power, or unpredictable changes in the geo-political power balance which may occur as the younger nations of the world begin to reach a point of rapid development. These changes are ignored partly because Kennan thinks ". . . it is impossible to look usefully too far ahead in international affairs. It is too full of uncertainties" (pages 215-216). Yet the alternative to some degree of long range policy planning is crisis diplomacy of the worst sort. The United States cannot reorganize the world as it pleases to fit its immediate needs and should not attempt to. But we do have a certain ability to affect the course of the future. Someday there will be more than five industrial power centers. When that time arrives we should have done what we can to assure that the new centers of power are not aligned against us in cooperation with the communist world and that Communist China does not have valuable military allies to the South. Kennan's view looks backward and to Europe, but much of the future will depend on the course that Asia takes. A free South Vietnam will help to assure that the area of Southeast Asia is not a hostile one.

Having failed to show that South Vietnam is of no strategic importance to the United States, Kennan is even less convincing in his proposals on how to deal with the present situation in Vietnam. The enclave approach was first made famous in a letter by General James M. Gavin which was printed in the February, 1966, *Harper's Magazine*. Later General Gavin testified before

the Senate Committe on Foreign Relations and qualified the idea of strict enclaves to such an extent that he seemed to disagree with the President only on the extent and ferocity of search and destroy missions and bombing in the North. Kennan accepts the enclave theory in its entirety with fortified perimeters around the major cities and ports and reliance on the ARVN forces to defend the countryside if it is to be defended at all. If the ARVN forces are not able to defend the country, Kennan believes we will not be able to do much for them. He seems to ignore the fact that the ARVN troops bore the brunt of terrific fighting for five years before major United States involvement. During this period the ARVN sustained a loss of 35,000 men killed in action with civilian death attributable to the Vietcong running at least as high (page 277). Even with this sacrifice they were unable alone to counter effectively guerrilla and regular forces supported from the North. Withdrawal of American forces in the middle of the war would certainly have a debilitating effect on the morale of the South. Continued terrorism and military action could so weaken the government of South Vietnam that it would never have a second chance to build a free Vietnam. We would be left with several populous cities filled with refugees to defend, to feed and to supply for an indefinite period of time.

Kennan's reliance on enclaves is based partly on a misappraisal of the strength and resources of the Vietcong. He thinks government forces should be able to handle the guerrillas through their superior numbers. He discounts the idea that the Vietcong and the National Liberation Front, dominated by the Peoples' Revolutionary Party, are tools of Hanoi used to mask its activities in the South. In fact, Kennan continues, to speak about "aggression" from the North is misleading because the conflict is so largely a civil war (page 220). United States intervention may even weaken indigenous anti-communist efforts, for as we are the foreigners in the area we will appear to many as the only aggressors (pages 192 & 244). "... In smaller and developing countries, where there seems to be a threat of communism or of forces close to communism taking over, there are usually counter-vailing forces which, if we keep out, will make themselves felt" (page 245).

Although the exact nature of the Vietcong is far from clear, several facts are evident which Kennan has not taken into account. First, the original hard core cadres of Vietcong were composed of Vietminh troops left behind in the South in 1954 on orders from Hanoi. Second, with the foundation of the NLF in 1960 the war became greatly intensified. Hanoi claims complete control over the NLF through its dominant element, the Peoples' Revolutionary Party. As stated by the Hanoi communists in December 1961, in a secret memorandum, since reprinted in many publications in the United States, "The Peoples' Revolutionary Party has only the appearance of an independent existence. Actually our party is nothing but the Lao Dong Party of Vietnam [the name for the Communist Party of the North] unified from north to south under the central executive committee of the party, the chief of which is President Ho . . . during these explanations, take care to keep this strictly secret, especially in South Vietnam, so that the enemy does not perceive our purposes" (pages 340-342). Third, before United States troops had assumed a major share of the war effort, Vietcong guerrillas supported by massive aid from the North were taxing the ARVN forces to their utmost capabilities of defense. This contention is supported by the Legal Committee of the International Commission for Supervision and Control which reported in 1962, Poland dissenting, "There is evidence that the PAVN has allowed the zone in the North to be used for inciting, encouraging, and supporting hostile activities in the zone of the south, aimed at the overthrow of the administration of the south" (page 338). Fourth, at the present time the PAVN is active in the South in battalion strength. Against this type of opposition, the government of South Vietnam cannot succeed in pacifying the country without substantial and prolonged support from the United States.

To meet the demands of the war today the enclave idea should actually be reversed. The better trained and equipped United States troops should bear the burden of the strategic operations against the communist forces, with the ARVN responsible for holding the pacified areas against guerrilla attacks. The ARVN would then be in closer contact with the Vietnamese peasant which would help the government of the South develop trust and confidence in its actions among the people in the rural districts.

If, on the other hand, the enclave theory were instituted, the hands of the communist theorists would be strengthened. Chiang Kai-shek controlled the coastal cities in China and the French controlled Hanoi and Saigon, but both lost. Asian communism, as developed by Mao Tse-tung and refined for Vietnam by General Giap, is peasant communism. Capture the countryside through terrorism, coercion, persuasion, and promises, so the theory runs, add military action at the proper moments, and the cities will fall of their own accord as fruit from a withered vine.

Once entrenched in the enclaves Kennan thinks we should "dig in, and wait and see whether possibilities for a solution do not open up" (page 205). The possibility which he expects is that the North Vietnamese will eventually decide that they cannot dislodge us by force and will then ask for a conference to discuss the formation of a coalition government. Kennan thinks that the United States would not need to be a party to such negotiations, for it would be better for the Vietnamese to work out their problems by themselves. The negotiations would probably not be immediately forthcoming, "But," Kennan

continues, "I think time might change that . . . it would seem to me that eventually there must be some sort of a political compromise between the various factions in South Vietnam" (page 222). These generalities are somewhat surprising from a man of Kennan's stature. He seems to have nothing more than mere hope to support these sanguine views. In writing on Russia in 1918 he was much more astute when he told about "hunger and cold and confusion and a civil war which had now advanced to the utmost degree of bitterness and commitment on both sides" (from *Russia and the West Under Lenin and Stalin*, New York, 1962, page 135). Here he did not believe there was much chance for compromise. But then Kennan does not think the South Vietnamese are very committed to the war. Thousands of casualties and years of fighting do not seem to constitute much of a commitment.

Presumably these negotiations would permit us to make a graceful exit from the scene, leaving the Vietnamese to settle the politics of coalition government among themselves. Kennan realizes that such a situation would likely mean a communist government for South Vietnam, but he is not certain that such a government would be dominated by Hanoi. Nowhere in his testimony does Kennan explain how such a delayed withdrawal, through "face" saving, would bring about a different settlement for Vietnam from immediate United States evacuation of the country. Nor does he discuss whether such a planned "defeat" would be politically possible at home. Just as the French found it necessary to cut-and-run in a precipitate fashion in 1954, so the people of the United States could be expected to insist upon immediate evacuation of the country, once the decision for eventual withdrawal after a negotiated coalition became known.

If the enclave theory should prove unworkable, Kennan is frank to admit that then he would favor sudden and unilateral withdrawal from the area (page 237). All military estimates regard defensive enclaves as an untenable position, so Kennan's proposal minus the enclaves means defeat.

A hurried reading of Kennan's testimony might seem to reveal that his position is more radical than it actually is. Too often he was silent, or replied in language which seemed to denote agreement, when such extreme critics of the war effort as Senators Fulbright, Morse, and Church used the televised hearings to express their views to the nation. Kennan does not agree with Fulbright that the blame for the war rests solely on President Johnson; he does not applaud the efforts of the noisy "peace" marchers who demonstrate against the war as does Senator Morse; he probably does not support Senator Church who seems to think that because the governments of Southeast Asia are mostly "totalitarian" that there is little to choose between Saigon and Hanoi. But Kennan does not make his opposition to these senators clear. At one point in his testimony, where he seems to retract an earlier statement that we should formally declare war if we are to continue fighting in Vietnam, his real opinion seems confused. At another point, where he agrees with Senator Church that the NATO alliance was directed against Soviet aggression and did not have much to do with bringing economic and political stability to war-torn Europe, he would seem to be seriously in error on the facts of history.

These defects detract from the coherence of Kennan's testimony and make much of it disappointing reading. Although Mr. Kennan is one of America's foremost diplomats and a brilliant historian, his brilliance was not shown at its best in the Senate hearings, and he has failed to make an important original proposal on the war in Vietnam. Kennan's views are most always of interest and often of profound significance, but in this one instance his misestimate of the importance of Asia to American security and his fear that the war in Vietnam will make cooperation with the USSR impossible has led him astray. This essay has aimed to show that Vietnam is an area of vital interest to the United States. Since Kennan's enclave strategy will lead to defeat, both his appraisal of American interests in Southeast Asia and his proposals for action in the war are in error.

VIETNAM DIARY

R.O.W.

Excerpts from a Journal kept on a trip to Vietnam with the World Youth Crusade for Freedom

Tokyo, 25 June — There is a fair sprinkling of English language signs here, and quite a few Japanese speak some English. The hotel is well prepared for us. English language guides, and even English language newspapers are delivered to us free. Several English language/Japanese radio stations are on the air also. So, with all this and our English language map of Tokyo, we do quite well.

Wisconsin Dells could learn some neon light techniques here. There are many rather new and

large buildings, but thousands of small (10′ x 20′) shops are wedged in between them. These shops are usually open in the front and crammed to the roof with wares and equipment. Prices are reasonable but not cheap. People walk around in blue or gray suits; a few have wooden shoes; some have shoddier dress and wear only leather "stockings". The school kids seem to be in uniforms, as are the construction workers. They are generally accommodating, but I get the feeling that some of the workers hate us. I wonder if this is because their unions are Communist controlled, or maybe I get that feeling because I know this and expect them to dislike us.

One gets the impression that Tokyo is a bit dirty, but I think this comes from the makeshift shops and hodge-podge pattern. If you look closely, even the old buildings are clean. The Japanese are continually dusting and washing. Everyone washes his sidewalk morning and night, and taxicab drivers feather-dust their cabs.

Hamburgers and hot dogs are not included on the menu here, but the hotel serves bacon and eggs. Fish is the main staple, sometimes raw (which I found out after I had ordered this noon). I'm going to wait until Hong Kong to buy silk: everything here is cotton and nylon. Only the tourist traps sell silk.

Tokyo, 30 June — Spent most of this week with Japanese students. We contacted a leader and he occupied our time from that point on. We attended several meetings, met about 35 or 40 Japanese anti-Communist students, and spent several hours with the anti-Communist president of a university (he gave us some books he had written). The Japanese anti-Communist leaders of four different schools in Tokyo used our presence as an excuse to organize an inter-university anti-Communist group. This is an historic event, according to them, and should make much news in Japan. These students are much like us, and very interested in helping.

Saigon, 8 July — The city is crowded with refugees. Streets are packed with pedestrians, bicycles, motor bikes, Army trucks, and old French cars. Traffic moves at about 15 mph. And no wonder. Saigon is no larger than Madison in area, but it contains over two million people. The living conditions for most of these people wouldn't qualify for an American slum. Six people live in a tin-covered shack half as big as a one-car garage, and there are row upon row of these makeshift homes. Additional thousands of Vietnamese live in houseboats tied to the shores of the several rivers running through Saigon.

The war has caused the city to fall to pieces. Only in the best areas does anyone bother to pick up the garbage. Only the British Embassy mows the lawn. Any substantial home is built up like a fortress, with barbed wire rolled outside of its high wall. Some homes have armed guards outside.

The Vietnamese people are generally pleasant. The women do not often wear western dress, and do so only when they feel like *not* dressing up. The children especially are friendly to Americans. But whenever we walk along the streets, or enter a café, we are surrounded by beggars holding out hats and children pleading with us to buy cigarettes or shoe shines. I saw several of these poor kids gambling with their money in the street.

The city is quiet, though we can hear shells in the distance at night. Weather not really hot, but it rains every day. The countryside is much more pleasant than Saigon.

Hué, 16 July — This place doesn't belong in the world. The V. C. have cut road traffic between here and Da Nang, and have cut communications to the Phu Bai air base. So we vacation in Hué for another twenty-four hours, and here I sit in a sampan in the middle of a large river.

Things aren't quite so bad here as this makes them sound. The V. C. are causing the trouble in order to divert some of the troops (Marines and Vietnamese) from a few miles north, where the V. C. are in a trap. We were up there (at Command Headquarters in the field), had a military briefing, got wet, and flew back to Hué. The Vietnamese Generals and other "Brass" talk freely with us, but otherwise all I have to show for the trip are some pictures of burning V. C. Headquarters (from the air). The V. C. here aren't bothering with the Ho Chi Minh Trail, but have infiltrated straight across the 17th Parallel (in a supposed demilitarized zone). They have brought in some heavy AA guns, which I think are responsible for the large number of choppers they brought down in that action.

When we got back to Hué, we talked Headquarters into giving us a bunk — found out later what the price was. Included in the attractions were well-cooked American meals and a Frankenstein movie. About one o'clock that night I was jolted from my sleep by a blast I was sure was centered no more than 100 feet from me. About eight more followed, along with much small arms fire. When a soldier rushed in and ordered everybody up, I thought the V. C. were through the fence. They handed us carbines and set us out behind some sandbags near our bunks. When we got out of the dark of the room, it was apparent that the compound was more secure than the amount of firing and hustling had led me to believe. So out there we stood, watching the tracer bullets flashing, the tanks and reaction force roll by, and many yawning, waving, and smiling Vietnamese troop-

ers stroll by as if someone had kicked them out of bed and they weren't quite convinced the V. C. were attacking. This until three o'clock, and then back to bed. Morning revealed that the V. C. hit nothing — they were aiming for a police station a quarter-mile from our compound — neither did we, and most of the shooting on our side was at shadows. A typical V. C. "attack", more harassment than actual fighting. We head for less active areas around Saigon this week, if we can find a plane.

Saigon, 23 July — In Quang Ngai, where we spent July 19 through 22, we toured areas which were in the process of being, or recently were, "pacified." The V. C. managed to mortar the airfield the night before we landed, and the Navy thwarted the V. C. plans to recapture an outpost we had just visited. This was done with the heaviest shelling I have heard over here — the blasts woke me up several times in the night. In the daytime there is little to worry about from V. C. attacks. At night they are active, but they have more important targets than us. We generally sleep in an enclosed and guarded home, and our tours in the countryside are with armed escorts. Glad I'm not in Chicago or Cleveland.

Saigon, 27 July — My suit and suitcase are holding up well, mainly because they are unused most of the time. The last few days, though, the suit would have been comfortable. The monsoon brings cooler weather, and reports of continual rain are a fraud.

When we tour the villages we generally have hundreds of kids lining the road as they hear the approaching jeep. As soon as one of them spies an American in the jeep, a chorus of "Halloo" is sung out, and they all wave. This is the anti-Americanism over here. "Halloo" is the only English word they know.

I just experienced my first Vietnamese haircut. I couldn't talk them out of the works, since they didn't understand English. He trimmed for a while, then massaged, trimmed some more, shampooed, trimmed, played chiropractor, shaved, trimmed, and finally pulled grey hairs. Looks good too.

Just got word we go to the highlands north of here Monday.

THE REFORMATION OF CONGRESS

Donald Lambro

Meanwhile, back at home in D.C., here's what's happening.

A powerful political reform movement is at work in Washington to change substantially the organizational complexion of the Congress of the United States. After decades of insurgent reformation attempts and bitter debate on the need for reorganization, there seems to be a consensus among most Members that change is needed, and needed badly, in a number of significant areas of House and Senate activity.

But all are not agreed as to what course this reformation should take and what type of "New Model" Congress they really want. A broad division lies between those who merely wish to broaden the power and responsibilities of Congress and those who desire sharply to reform its organization and procedures in order to make it more a tool of "Presidential government."

For forty years or more, political scientists, pundits and politicians have been rallying for a stronger Presidency. Consequently, the historic tug-of-war between both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue has been decidedly in favor of the Whit House team. The Presidency, through the interaction of Executive desire and congressional default, has been allowed to expand and prosper, while Congress has lost both power and prestige.

Political theorists have been trying to sell Members of Congress for years on the idea that they must equip themselves with the modern devices necessary to maintaining their position in a space age democracy. Even *New York Times* Washington Bureau Chief, Tom Wicker, in a surprising article, declared that "it is time for scholars, historians and politicians to put their minds to the question of how to make Congress a better balance against the Presidency."

And many of America's scholars, historians and politicians are doing just that. Meanwhile, the Establishment has something far grander in mind. Radical reformers like Senator Joseph Clark (D-Penn.) cloak their cause within the guise of "modernization," wanting to abolish certain committees, end the seniority system altogether, limit committee assignments,

weaken the power of committee chairmen and kill the senate's filibuster. Such reformers want to strengthen the Presidency by plowing away so-called "needless legislative obstacles" which serve to act as a restraining force on Congress.

In March, 1965, Congress established the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress (JCOC), the product of years of debate, pressure and lobbying by "reformist" Members. Many Members complained that the Committee was politically unbalanced, others were relieved to see that several of Congress' more "rabid" reformers were not on it.

Both co-chairmen are Democrats: Senator A. S. Mike Monroney (Okla.) and Rep. Ray J. Madden (Ind.). Some of the more noted liberals serving on the JCOC are Senators John Sparkman (D-Ala.), Lee Metcalf (D-Mont.), Clifford P. Case (R-N.J.), J. Caleb Boggs (R-Del.), and Reps. Jack Brooks (D-Tex.) and Ken Hechler (D-W.Va.). Completing the list are Senator Karl E. Mundt (R-S.D.) and Reps. Tom Curits (R-Mo.), Durwood Hall (R-Mo.), and Robert P. Griffin (R-Mich.), now a U.S. Senator and no longer with the JCOC.

Such political make-up led most Members to believe that the committee, though obviously stacked with liberals, would not go off on a "reform binge." But just in case they went too far in tampering with the traditional procedures of Congress, it was specifically provided in the concurrent resolution that the committee "would not be allowed any recommendations with respect to the rules, parliamentary procedure, practices, and/or precedents of either House . . ."

Nonetheless, House and Senate reformers are still pursuing their goal to abolish the seniority system and replace it with their own plan whereby Members would elect their chairman from the committee's three or four highest ranking members. A preliminary attack on the system is evident in the recommendations of the Joint report to the Congress. After months of exhaustive hearings and more than two hundred witnesses, the Committee finally released their proposals.

The report calls for a "bill of rights," which would give a simple majority the right to call committee hearings and to force a chairman to report a bill to the floor. Such prerogatives, long granted to committee chairmen, would be virtually wiped out and extensively weaken their control. As to committee procedures, the report calls for televised hearings, open meetings to the public, prior announcement of meetings and allowing committees to conduct their hearings during floor sessions. It further proposes that senators be limited to two major committees and one minor, joint, or special committee and hold not more than one chairmanship of a committee and subcommittee.

The JCOC recommends that committee staffs be increased from four to six, the minority be assigned two staff positions and one clerical and that Congress authorize committees to employ outside staff consultants. The report goes on to propose a full-time review specialists be provided for every standing committee, the use of automatic data processing, reorganization of the General Accounting Office, improvement of budget documents and more in-depth examination of multi-agency programs and supplemental and deficiency bills.

They call for the creation of a legislative assistant for each Member; more transportation allowances for Congressmen; a Capitol-wide leased-line telephone service; expansion of the Legislative Research Service; improvement of the Congressional Record with limitations for insertions; the creation of a House ethics committee; and, finally, though not surprisingly, they propose that their committee be made a standing joint committee to continue studying the operations of Congress.

Some of these recommendations will be considered seriously by Congress, especially those proposals dealing with staff assistance and data processing. Such innovations hold considerable merit and would immeasurably aid Congress in dealing with Executive departments. But it is doubtful that Congress will seriously consider the so-called committee "bill of rights" or do anything to further weaken the power of committee chairmen.

The JCOC report is the end result of years of active pressure and lobbying by one organization within Congress which has done more in the last decade to initiate reform than any other single political group in Washington.

The Democratic Study Group, an ultra-secret organization of some 180 liberal House Democrats, who formally organized in 1957, now leads today's reform movement in Congress. Many of DSG's early members, such as Lee Metcalf and Eugene McCarthy, have graduated to the Senate to pursue their work there. But the bulwark of DSG's "reform army" is in the House and it will be here that any future reform will take place.

Besides DSG, the Committee heard testimony from the Teamsters, the A.D.A., the National Committee To Abolish HUAC, the National Lawyers Guild, the American Civil Liberties Union, and a never-ending line of college professors who have been waiting years for the opportunity to tell Congress how to run Congress.

Republicans have been working through their "Task Force on Congressional Reform." With the aid of one staff member, in comparison to the large staff of DSG, they enlisted the talents of some twenty-two Representatives to contribute essays on various aspects of congressional reform to be later published in book form. It will contain, for instance, former Congressman John Lindsay discussing the seniority system, freshman Rep. Donald Rumsfeld (Ill.) discussing how to run a congressional office, with veteran Rep. Tom Curtis (Mo.) writing the forward. These essays will be published

later this year by McGraw-Hill.

Two private organizations have done significant research and study in the field. The American Enterprise Institute, which published an extensive series of booklets representing what they call "a New Model of a strong legislature," has taken a pro-check and balance approach. The American Political Science Association, however, working under a $230,000 Carnegie Corporation grant, takes a more liberal view and, like A.E.I., has made its findings available to the JCOC.

Congress has traditionally and instinctively distrusted committees created to reform them. When one was last created in 1946, almost every proposal was rejected and Members vowed never to create a reform committee again. Nevertheless, reform attempts have erupted sporadically through the years, most of them taking place within the House, and the infamous Rules Committee has been a favorite target of would-be reformers.

An insurgent movement in 1910, led by Republican George Norris of Nebraska, stripped "Czar" Joe Cannon of his power to appoint committee chairmen and purposely strengthened the Rules Committee. This, some forty years later, led to the attack on Rules in 1949 after Truman's "miracle of '48." Administration Democrats passed a new rule that made it impossible for Rules to hold a bill longer than three weeks. But the reform lasted only two years and in 1951 a conservative coalition quickly forced its repeal.

More recently, January, 1965, House liberals (DSG) brought back the 21-day rule, dealing Judge Howard Smith (D-Va.), who had once ruled the Committee with an iron hand, a mighty blow from which he has never fully recovered. Buoyed by such victory, Rep. Richard Bolling, a DSG leader, claimed that the time had come "to chase the conservative foxes out of the liberal chicken coop. For too long," he said, "conservative members of the Democratic party have been able to use their seniority to frustrate the plans and programs of the majority party."

Their heads dizzy with refrom, reform leaders have aimed their sights on the senate's filibuster and the entire seniority system. The proposed committee "bill of rights" is just one step toward DSG's final goal. Despite all this, congressional reform is not an issue which can at once be described as all good or all bad.

Americans tend to see "their government" solely within the office of the Presidency, not the ongress. Gradually, Congress' role and image has slithered from the public mind. Yet its fundamental powers have not really dwindled, but its effective use of those powers have.

The truth is that Congress is in serious need of modern, fresh, imaginative change. Whether this change will be geared to strengthening the legislative branch, or to turning it into a "clearing house" for Presidential government, — as very vocal and powerful "elements" in and out of Congress plan — will have to be decided by the present "Old Model" Congress.

Senator Karl Mundt, commenting on the report, says ". . . [it] does not delve very deeply in the vital question of preserving the traditional check and balance system of our government. Everyone knows that the Executive branch increasingly has encroached upon the powers of the Congress."

If Congress is to resist further encroachments in its tug-of-war with the Presidency, it must undergo an organizational reformation necessary to restoring its image and reinvigorating its spirit. Obviously, such a reformation depends upon dynamic congressional leadership that in its "attitude . . . regards itself," as Tom Wicker says, "as a rival to the President and a power equal to him in the ultimate stuff of government — decision."

In the same article, Wicker adds, ". . . the American people have so elevated the Presidency, have so developed confidence in its ability to lead and decide (unable to find those qualities elsewhere), that their first instinct is to support the temporary occupant, rally to his position, and accept *his* outline of the facts — *his* definition of 'the national interest.'"

It is time to bring back a Congress capable of influencing and initiating Presidential policies.

Before this can happen, however, Congress must begin thinking of itself as more than a debating chamber, more than a "bill factory," more than just the "meeting hall" it has become.

If Congress does streamline itself, if it begins to take advantage of the modern devices, teams of experts and advisory counsels which have made the Presidency second to none in federal power, then it can lay claim to its real role in shaping America's national and international policies. But first it must seize the initiative and remind the American people that a Congress from the people and for the people is at work in Washington, and it must relentlessly tell them how it operates and frequently what it thinks.

Yet Congress will not be in a position to check Presidential power unless it gives its Members the tools with which to deal skillfully and efficiently with Executive departments (while still retaining those rules and procedures necessary to an ordered and stable legislature). Mr. Wicker reminds us, finally, that "such an evolution requires the recognition that if the Presidency has c h a n g e d and grown, so must Congress if it is to remain in any sort of balance.

"We have quite enough Presidential power and will have more; let's at least begin to thing about cooping with it."

Many of the Joint Committee recommendations could aid Congress to more effectively cope with the Executive branch, others would do much to inhibit its effectiveness.

In the final analysis, Congress must decide which road it is to travel.

WHO'S FOOLING WHOM?

Cornelia G. Hempe

The wife of a former editor considers the role of LBJ as Housewife.

President Johnson recently asked Congress to enact legislation which purported to p r o t e c t consumers from deceptively labeled merchandise. He may have renewed his Trinitarian Image in the eyes of nearsighted Americans. If they lack wide perspective, t h e y will be fooled, but eradication of one more fragment of individual choice is hardly the road to salvation.

In trying to learn the justification behind this proposal, we are met with the rhetorical vagueness which we have come to expect from our President. He speaks of deception. But he not only fails to specify what sort of deception he believes is occurring, he doesn't even inform us what he means by deception.

Certainly, the exposure and pre v e n t i o n of deliberate deception practiced on American consumers is necessary in any properly functioning free market economy. That manufacturers owe a responsibility of good faith to the buyers of their products is elementary free market economics. Not even the most vociferous proponents of *caveat emptor* would seriously apply this slogan to the area of business fraud.

But to use these sentiments to justify the proposed Johnson legislation would be to misapply them grossly. It is one thing to oppose deliberate falsification; it is entirely another matter to impose uniform federal regulation when no showing of fraudulent l a b e l i n g has been made. In short, the need for federal regulation has not been shown.

If the President's only purpose is to clarify package superlatives, such as "giant" or "economy" sizes, he is assuming that the buyer is too stupid or ignorant to be his own best purchaser. I am sure that this assumption would be violently repudiated by many consumers.

True, almost everyone has waded through the myriad of "super," "family," or "5¢ off regular price" labels, wondering why he must endure such a polyglot of names and figures before he can determine the most economical purchase. In more desperate moments, I am sure that many of us have wished for an unpackaged genie to lead us out of that mathematical maze. And yet, simple arithmetic can be used to ascertain how many ounces will cost how many pennies. A bother? Yes. Impossible? Hardly.

Many consumers, tired of such mental gymnastics, might welcome such standardized and easy-to-understand measures as P r e s i d e n t Johnson now proposes. But why must this be done by federal regulation? If such regulation is needed, free market competition itself offers the best solution. A company attuned to customer dissatisfaction (and what enlightened company isn't?) could introduce easy-to-understand sizes. Not only would it win the undying gratitude of millions of customers, but it would p r o b a b l y experience burgeoning sales. Is there any doubt that this success would be imitated — and the problem solved — without resort to coercive legislation?

President Johnson further expostulates that deceptive labels must be banned "to protect the needy." But if certain merchandise is confusingly labeled, wouldn't it be more accurate to say that the "unsuspecting" or "ignorant" need protection? These, of course, can be rich or poor. Coercive federal labeling standards would hardly be an impetus towards curing this problem. The only apparent result would appear to be an increased dependence upon federal (Johnsonian?) judgment.

Moreover, there is a distinct possibility that a manufacturer who allied himself with the political "ins" would be granted more leeway in advertising and labeling than one who happened to be on the other side of the political fence. The favored producer, using sanctioned but borderline gimmicks, could reap a greater profit than one not so favored, not on the basis of product superiority, but on the more dubious basis of political friendship. Eventually, consumers would become imbued with the notion that if the government designated Product A as "safer" or "more economical" than Product B, then Product A must really be the safer or more economical of the two. Without reading and comparing the various brands and by exclusively t r u s t i n g federal "standards," buyers could favor a product only because the maker was favored by the dominant political clique.

Behind all of this I think there lies a deeper problem. Americans are abdicating their own responsibilities to the government. They will permit the government to tell them what and how to purchase instead of exercising their free choice that is essential to a system of free enterprise. They should try for better consumer awareness for themselves and for others. The failure to do so means that they will continue ignorant. Rights and responsibilities go hand in hand. Allowing the federal government to take over d u t i e s which we are still capable of assuming will lead to only one outcome: the federal government will remove our rights of responsible individual choice and free enterprise.

Probably few w o u l d recognize governmental regulation for what it really is, that is, the government telling us what and how to purchase. Rather than work their minds, most consumers would prefer a nice pat answer. Such standards do not appear to be much regulation, but then our federal government is often accused of "creeping socialism." It sneaks up on us in just the sort of unnecessary standards as Johnson has proposed. And then we have crept one more step.

THE INCOMPLETE CAPITALISTS

Dale Sievert

A former Editor, and student of Economics, surveys some recent writings and inquires about the Conservative's belief in the free market.

A productive approach to politics and economics comes from nurturing and weeding your own backyard as much as or more than your opponent's. As long as no one digs into your beliefs too deeply, it is easy to be doctrinaire. And the more certain we are of our opinions and open-mindedness, the harder it is to be open if, indeed, we are not.

I have noticed that the conservative will invariably praise the free market for what it can and does do. But I doubt if the free market is fully accepted in practice by many conservatives owing to a faulty understanding of what the free market is.

I begin with the assumption that the free market is the best possible economy to the extent that it can create the most economic satisfaction. Also, given certain inherent restraints, such as intelligence, skills, and so on, every individual will find his position of maximum economic satisfaction through workings of the price system, which is the mechanism of the free market.

There are a lot of "ifs" here, too many, indeed, to ever let the free market operate at perfect efficiency. But, as Professor Milton Friedman points out, even though an object falling through the atmosphere doesn't fall exactly as the Universal Law of Gravitation says it should, owing to air resistance, this doesn't mean the theory is superfluous.

The free market, like any other economic system, exists to allocate scarce resources among alternative ends. It uses the price system to do this, where prices act as signals to describe the state of the elements of the economy. The free market does the following:

> In the first place, the market rations supplies of consumer goods among consumers; this rationing is governed by the willingness of consumers to pay, and provided the distribution of income is acceptable it is a socially efficient process. Secondly, the market directs the allocation of production between commodities, according to the criterion of maximum profit, which, on the same assumption, corresponds to social usefulness. Thirdly, the market allocates the different factors of production among their various uses, according to the criterion of maximizing their incomes. Fourthly, it governs the relative quantities of specific types of labor and capital equipment made available. Fifthly, it distributes income between the factors of production and therefore between individuals. Thus it solves all the economic problems of allocation of scarce means between alternative ends.[1]

But those who favor the free market way need to straighten up the yard. The free market faces two main dangers. One is the imperfections or departures from the perfect theoretical state. The market suffers from the fallicies and prejudices of man, but the typical conservative never tires of criticizing liberals for spoiling the market's perfection. It must be admitted that some legislation actually increases the efficiency of the free market (although conservatives would often oppose such legislation for reasons other than economic ones). Some economic conditions cherished by conservatives may lead to market inefficiency.

The second danger to the market lies in the great strides that socialism, or economic planning, is making. A common error is for conservatives to be sarcastic and cocksure, while the economic turtle modernizes his gait for the takeover from the aging free market.

There is much to say for admitting the relative similarity of the two economic systems. The main difference is the allocative tool — the price system in the free market (an automatic and, thus, a freedom providing tool) and human direction in socialism. For both the job is to arrange all elements of the economy so that the economic harvest for society is the largest possible, given certain innate and not easily alterable, non-human conditions. The free market usually works better than central direction, partially because of experience. It has been around one or two hundred years longer than the newer central planning. Some improvements have greatly helped the latter, though, among them Leontief's input-output analysis, the electronic computer, and a refined system of "pricing." The striking improvements made in the (still relatively inefficient) Soviet price system can be found in Professor Morris Bernstein's article, "The Soviet Price System," in the March 1962, *American Economic Review*.

It is proper now to see what can be done to rejuvenate the free market (which ought to be kept for more than merely economic reasons). Professors Cohen and Cyert, in *Theory of the Firm: Resource Allocation in a Market Economy*, list nine policy variables where such measures can be taken:

> . . . we feel that desirable public policy measures should
> 1. Increase the economic pressures on firms
> 2. Increase the freedom of entry into imperfect markets
> 3. Encourage technological change
> 4. Increase market knowledge of economic units
> 5. Reduce barriers to resource mobility
> 6. Eliminate discrimination which is based on race, religion, or sex
> 7. Align the interests of managers more closely with the interests of stockholders
> 8. Increase the skills of managers through improved academic training
> 9. Align social costs and benefits with private costs and benefits.[2]

The following focuses attention on these points.

Probably the most controversial area in the free market is the recognized and also the latent power of the very large firms and the havoc they could conceivably cause. I am puzzled to see how many conservatives today deny any such danger. Most prevalent among these are the young, inexperienced, and his-

tory-shallow and the rationalizing entrepreneur who accepts only those criteria of the market that benefit himself. The powers due to bigness are evident in the areas of finance (where, for example, J. P. Morgan once had the power to disrupt and, thus, control much of the economy), politics (where large firms and industries could and too often do sway legislation and block others to their own ends and against society's e.g., pollution legislation), and in the influence on other social institutions (as in Latin America, where the entire rural social and economic system is constricted by the few large landowners). The pros and cons for big business are voluminous, and it is absurd to state flatly that bigness in itself is bad. But some of the disadvantages of bigness or oligopoly (where a few large firms comprise the industry) are blocked entry, with resulting high prices and semi-monopoly profits, slowness of resource re-allocation, and stagnant pricing (owing to the kinked demand curve).

In very many cases today, however, only oligopoly is economically feasible (e.g., the auto industry) — but one may doubt that the firms must be the size of a General Motors. Steps must still be taken to avert prevention of new firms from entering the industry (as did Alcoa until a 1945 ruling ended that activity) and to promote as much healthy competition as possible.

It might be added that most conservatives support the profit idea, but few (I would venture to guess) would accept the free market's restriction of it. In order to maximize efficiency, the free market only allows a type of profit called "normal profit," i.e., the minimum remuneration necessary for the firm to remain in existence. "It is the profit that accrues to the entrepreneur as payment for managerial services, for providing organization, for risk-bearing, etc."[3] All profit above that (often called "economic rent" or "monopoly profit") is economically and socially wasteful. Of course, for the individual entrepreneur, it is productive. What we must do then is make a value judgment. We must ask ourselves why we choose again an economic system: 1) should it be equitable (not egalitarian) in that each individual is paid according to his real output? 2) should it not be designed to "promote the general welfare" rather than be subject to the arbitrary decision and power of the men or groups in power (witness the current waste in the airline strike due to two very strong opposing groups, which reminds me of two youngsters fighting for a piece of candy).

Getting back to the economic pressures on firms, Cohen and Cyert believe that:

> . . . it is difficult to evaluate the desirability of oligopoly. On the one hand, static analysis indicates that the existence of oligopolies is incompatible with the attainment of some of the necessary conditions for economic efficiency. At the same time, however, we have argued that because of economies of scale and the effects of oligopoly firms on technological progress and product variation, oligopoly may be a desirable form of market structure. There is a clear role for anti-trust policy to play in enforcing competition in oligopolistic industries. It would be undesirable to permit oligopolies to collude or to erect artificial barriers to entry. Because of the potentially desirable aspects of oligopoly, we do not advocate an unrestricted policy of dissolving oligopoly firms and replacing them with a number of smaller firms. The critical factor, we believe, is maintaining freedom of entry in oligopolistic industries.[4]

Point three in Cohen and Cyert's listing is not a very controversial one, but point four is, especially in agriculture. Though few will deny economic efficiency is aided by market information (concerning prices, demand, supply, technology, etc.), many conservatives will strongly insist the government is not justified in providing such information in agriculture, but not elsewhere. But unique in such a large sector is an atomistic market structure in the production side (there are about 3.6 million farms), unusually large, diverse markets and market types, and unusual phenomena such as extremely volatile prices, slowly adjusting supply, etc.). Indeed, "The justification of the use of federal funds for agriculture market news and statistics is much the same as for research. The numerous small units of the agricultural plant are not in a position to undertake these services for themselves."[5]

Point five, barriers to resource mobility, is one of the most controversial and misunderstood areas of the economy. Heilbroner capsules the operation of the market and particularly the role of factor resources:

> The market mechanism provides a method of solving the production and distribution problems of society, with a minimum of recourse to tradition or command. It does so by utilizing the motive of economic self-interest, or maximization of income, in a society based on the monetization of income of tasks and the mobility of the factors of production. The motive of self-interest serves to drive the factors of production into those employments where they will fare best. By raising or lowering rewards (wages or profits or rents), labor, capital, and land can be directed to whatever uses society desires.[6]

Cohen and Cyert offer some policy measures to aid resource mobility and efficiency by fulfilling more of the criteria of the free market.

> Any measures which increase the mobility of resources lead to a more efficient economy. Long-run equilibrium adjustments may come too slowly (or never be attained at all) if resource-mobility barriers are too great. The ability of our economy to adjust efficiently to changes in consumer tastes and to changes in technology depends upon resource mobility. Some public policies aimed at increasing mobility are retraining displaced workers for new occupations and relocation workers from depressed areas to areas where there is a relative shortage of labor. . . .
>
> Discrimination based on race, religion, or sex decreases the mobility of economic resources. The refusal of some firms to hire Negroes forces them to work in occupations where the value of their marginal product is less than it otherwise could be. This violates some of the necessary conditions for an efficient pattern of resource allocation thereby reducing the aggregate amount of goods and services available for consumption in the entire economy. Thus such measures as the fair employment practices clause in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 can be recommended on the basis of micro-economic policy considerations as well as for ethical reasons.[7]

In some areas of labor policy, conservatives are often the leaders in striving for labor mobility, whereas in other areas such as job discrimination, they are very often working against the market. Milton Friedman discounts this last point as not

being as important as that of economic freedom of individuals. His reference to "positive harm" means actual physical harm and to "negative harm" what is caused when "two individuals are unable to find mutually acceptable contracts . . .", and he finds that:

> There is a strong case for using government to prevent one person from imposing positive harm, which is to say, to prevent coercion. There is no case whatsoever for using government to avoid the negative kind of "harm." On the contrary, such government intervention reduces freedom and limits voluntary co-operation.[8]

Little enough is controversial about point seven. A firm operates most efficiently and, therefore, society gains the most when the owner's interest is closely cared for.

No one will disagree with point eight being important. What is not always agreed upon is how the costs of such things as managerial training, dam building, pollution control, etc. should be paid, inasmuch as the recipients of the rewards of such investments are not only the investors. This leads us into point nine, that of aligning social costs and benefits with private costs and benefits. Again, I turn to Cohen and Cyert who make a case for solving the problem of legislation:

> . . . It is not at all clear that the equating of private marginal benefits with private marginal costs which occurs in a perfectly competitive economy results in similar equalities between social marginal benefits and social marginal costs. In fact it is easy to envision situations where this is not the case. For example, a farmer who dams a stream running across his land creates benefits to all landowners downstream. In a perfectly competitive economy a dam which is clearly beneficial to society as a whole may not be built because its private value to any individual is less than its cost of construction. . . .
>
> . . . our first example, in which there was a discrepancy between the social benefits and the private benefits from a dam, illustrates why in fact such projects as dams, highways, airports, schools, stadiums, etc., are frequently financed and owned by governments . . . in which there was a discrepancy between the social costs and the private costs of smoke, illustra tes why such types of social legislation as smoke control laws, unemployment compensation insurance, compulsory vaccination laws, etc., may be passed by governments.[9]

Professor Dorfman adds that national output is lost when there are such external economies (as in the examples above) and remarks

> . . . The defect is inherent in the price system, where the guiding principle is that each enterprise should bear the cost of the resources it employs, and no others, and should receive the benefits of the goods its produces, and no others.[10]

A strong believer in the free market, Professor Kindleberger of MIT, argues that:

> Where the public interest, as well as the private, is being adequately served by private enterprise, there is good reason for government to leave organization in private hands. Where it cannot be, government must fill the void. It is fatuous to be doctrinaire on the question of private versus public enterprise.[11]

It is time that conservatives come to grips with modern day problems and modern day suggested methods of solving them. If, as they say, they believe in the free market rather than a central economy, then it would be well to find out how best to make it work.

Footnotes

1. Harry G. Johnson, *Money, Trade, and Economic Growth*, George Allen and Urwin Ltd., London, 1962, p. 156.
2. Cohen and Cyert, *Theory of the Firm: Resource Allocation in a Market Economy*, Prentice Hall, 1965, p. 395.
3. Henderson and Quant, *Microeconomic Theory*, McGraw-Hill, 1958, p. 97.
4. Cohen, *op. cit.*, p. 392.
5. Kohls, *Marketing of Agricultural Products*, Macmillan, 1961, p. 223.
6. Heilbroner, *The Making of Economic Society*, Prentice Hall, 1962, p. 68.
7. Cohen, *op. cit.*, p. 394.
8. Milton Friedman, *Capitalism and Freedom*, University of Chicago Press, 1962, p. 113.
9. Cohen, *op. cit.*, p. 296-297.
10. Robert Dorfman, *The Price System*, Prentice-Hall, 1964, p. 140.
11. Kindleberger, *Economic Development*, McGraw-Hill, 1965, p. 130.