

## Military activity. 1969

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SPECIAL

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

NUMBER 58-1-68

Communist Capabilities and Intentions  
in Laos Over the Next Year

Submitted by

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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Concurrent  
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

As indicated elsewhere

31 October 1968


APPROVED FOR RELEASE

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EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, USIB

No. 1



*The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate:*

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Lt. Gen. Joseph F. Carroll, the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency




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**WARNING**

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## COMMUNIST-CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS IN LAOS OVER THE NEXT YEAR

### CONCLUSIONS

A. Over the past year the Communists have greatly strengthened their combat forces in Laos. The combined Pathet Lao (PL)/North Vietnamese Army (NVA) forces now number about 58,000 combat troops; they could overwhelm the regular and guerrilla forces of the Royal Laotian Government (RLG) in the coming dry season. And we do not think that the RLG could expand the size or capability of its forces sufficiently in 6 or 12 months from domestic sources alone to contain the Communists.

B. We do not believe that the Communists intend to conduct a major drive to the Mekong, lest such a move provoke US entry into the Laotian corridor and perhaps upset any negotiations underway on South Vietnam. However, in the next few months, we expect the Communists to exert further military pressure on government forces, especially on guerrilla outposts, in order to strengthen their ultimate bargaining position. They now demand that US bombing of Laos be halted as a prerequisite to discussions of an internal settlement that must be based on "the realities of the current situation."

C. Even if NVA resources were released from South Vietnam, we doubt that this would in itself alter Hanoi's intentions in Laos, since the forces already there can launch an offensive without further reinforcement. Though developments in Vietnam could change Hanoi's calculations concerning Laos, in general we believe that the Communists hope to achieve their objectives without running great risks of military counteraction.







## DISCUSSION


1. Hanoi has ambitions to control all of Laos, but has been unwilling to take actions there which would jeopardize higher priority goals in South Vietnam. In particular, Hanoi has limited the scope of its military actions in Laos, in part, at least, out of concern for provoking a large-scale US ground action against the vital supply routes to South Vietnam which run through Laotian territory.


2. Since the 1962 Geneva settlement, the war in Laos has been characterized by Royal Lao Government (RLG) offensives during the rainy season (May to October) when the mobility of Pathet Lao (PL) and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) forces is restricted, and by Communist counteroffensives during the dry season (November to April) to retake lost areas, often just in time to seize the rice harvest. Thus an uneasy equilibrium has been established, with military factors operating on the RLG and political factors on the Communists to restrain actions that might provoke a major reaction by the other side.


3. In the political field, both sides have continued to pay lip service to the 1962 Geneva Accords, which neutralized Laos, and until recently to the Zurich and Plaine des Jarres Agreements, which established a tripartite government—rightists, neutralists, and the PL. This arrangement has persisted despite the fact that the PL vacated their cabinet seats in April 1963. These are still kept open for them by Souvanna, the neutralist Prime Minister. Until this July it seemed as though the PL objective, despite their denunciations of Souvanna, was the restoration of the tripartite arrangements.

### 1. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

4. Several recent events, however, suggest that the Communists are developing a new position. For the first time, they have made a bombing halt a specific prerequisite to discussions of an internal political settlement. Moreover, while still reaffirming the 1962 international agreements, they have demanded that the internal settlement must take into account "the realities of the current situation."

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5.  PL and Soviet spokesmen have explained that such "realities" mean a recognition of PL control over large areas of Laos (they claim two-thirds of the territory and one-half the population). In addition, they contend that the US and its "puppets" have destroyed the tripartite structure, that Souvanna no longer represents a neutralist faction, and that the present government is, in effect, illegal. Apparently, the PL are laying the ground work to claim a larger role in a new government, and may demand that the neutralists aligned with them in the so-called "National United Bloc" occupy the positions now held by Souvanna's neutralist faction.






6. While thus signaling their intention to reorder the old tripartite arrangement, the Communists have reaffirmed their regard for the monarchy as a "permanent feature" of Lao national life. Indeed, the whole point of the rather odd visit of the North Vietnamese Ambassador in July after a four year absence seemed to be to make a dramatic distinction between the King and the present Lao government, and this line has been supported by the new Soviet Ambassador and the Neo Lao Hak Xat (NLHX) spokesman in Vientiane. The Communists have always paid deference to the King's position and may hope that the King's desire to preserve the kingdom and establish a united national community can be played upon to their advantage.

7. The Communists are taking other steps to improve their political position. During the past rainy season, they have made more of an effort than ever before to consolidate control over their territory. After unsuccessful attempts to terrorize mountain people who have been assisting RLG guerrillas in the north, the Communists are seeking to win them over by cajolery. This is apparently part of a wider effort to improve their hold over the mountainous and sparsely populated reaches of Phong Saly, Luang Prabang, and Houa Phan (Sam Neua) Provinces, where they have been stepping up their propaganda and political indoctrination programs. Newly constructed roads give the Communists access to hitherto isolated areas. In the south, PL troops have been busy trying to consolidate their hold over the rice-rich Sedone Valley, where the government carried on a development program from 1965 until July 1967. There are recent reports that the PL civil administration is being reinforced by Lao political cadre who have just completed political training in North Vietnam. One report indicates that in Savannakhet Province North Vietnamese political cadre have been attached to the Communist administration for the first time.

8. By the fall of 1967, the RLG had made considerable inroads on territory that the Communists held in 1962.<sup>1</sup> The Communists finally responded by turning an RLG offensive in the Nam Bac area into a debacle for the government in mid-January 1968. During the remainder of the dry season, the Communists administered a series of defeats to the RLG which added up to the worst government setback since the precarious days of 1961 and 1962. The psychological impact was considerable. There was a good deal of apprehension in Vientiane that the Communists would break out from the previous pattern of military action and push on to the Mekong.

9. But this did not happen, and perhaps the most notable feature of the rainy season now drawing to a close was the lack of significant new moves by either side. The Communists did not press their advantage, but devoted themselves to a more intensive political consolidation of their territory than heretofore. RLG forces, who for their part, usually regain considerable terrain in the rainy season, had only some limited successes in the northeast and in the

<sup>1</sup> See centerspread maps.



[REDACTED]

area around Muong Phalane. RLG progress has been nil in the Sedone Valley in the south, in Borkhane Province, and in other potentially significant regions.

10. These developments in the military and political fields seem to form part of a pattern related in large part to Communist strategy in South Vietnam. In anticipating that 1968 would be a "decisive" phase in Vietnam, Hanoi moved to increase its logistic capabilities in Laos, strengthen its forces there, recover lost ground, and set back and demoralize RLG forces. And in their recent statements they have set the stage for demanding a new settlement on more favorable terms should the situation in South Vietnam move into serious negotiations. In short, the Communists have developed a stronger military position while at the same time they are preparing, if the situation in Vietnam warrants, to move into a more active political phase in Laos.

## II. CAPABILITIES

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12. PL and FAR troops are probably about evenly matched in terms of the general effectiveness of individual troops or battalions, and man for man the Meo guerrillas are probably better fighters than either. The NVA forces, however, are definitely better than the FAR, and the psychological impact on the latter when attacked by the NVA is often sufficient to precipitate their defeat. This qualitative inferiority is somewhat compensated for, however, by air support

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Such success as the RLG has enjoyed since 1962 is due largely to the combination of this air support with effective use of friendly guerrilla forces.


13. For several years, Souvanna and other RLG leaders, including the military, have felt that if it were not for the presence of NVA troops, RLG forces could probably quickly dispose of the PL threat. In our view, this is probably too optimistic. Although in terms of present strengths on both sides, Royal

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Lao combat forces would then outnumber those of the Pathet Lao by more than two to one, we do not believe that this numerical advantage would be decisive, in view of the many weaknesses and divisions that will continue to limit FAR effectiveness whatever enemy it confronts. We do believe that the PL need a considerable amount of NVA support to mount a major attack, and that without it, the RLG could almost certainly contain them. We also believe that in northern Laos the Meo guerrillas could put considerable pressure on the PL. But RLG forces could probably not reduce PL forces and territory very rapidly—if at all—without substantial outside logistical and air support.


14. We continue to estimate, however—as we did in March 1968<sup>4</sup>—that the combined PL/NVA forces now in Laos have the military capability to reduce the RLG area of control to a few enclaves in fairly short order. They could do so without diverting resources from South Vietnam or drawing significant reinforcements from the North. And we do not think that RLG forces could expand their size or capability sufficiently in 6 or 12 months from domestic sources alone to contain the Communists.

### III. COMMUNIST INTENTIONS

15. There are several options open to the Communists over the next six months or so. There are various indications of preparations to resume military activity as the dry season commences, and it is possible that the Communists have decided to exercise their military superiority and quickly overrun most of Laos. They might think this would be an effective means of putting the US under new pressures to reach a general settlement in Indochina. We believe this is unlikely. The Communists would necessarily feel considerable uncertainty over US countermoves in the Laotian corridor, especially at a time of changeover in American administrations. And, as long as the outcome in Vietnam is in doubt and under some sort of negotiation, we believe that Hanoi would not run needless military risks in Laos before the chances of a new political settlement there had been tested.

16. We do expect, however, that Communist forces will keep up substantial military pressure on RLG forces in the coming dry season. In the northeast, where General Vang Pao's Meo guerrillas have long been a thorn in their side, particularly in Houa Phan and Xieng Khouang Provinces, they will probably make a considerable effort to reduce a number of guerrilla sites and consolidate their claims. They will probably also try to clear the guerrilla outposts along the border of northeastern Khammouane Province with North Vietnam, as well as in the northwest Provinces of Houa Khong and Luang Prabang. In the south, they will maintain the threat to the Mekong from Thakhek to Champassak Province. They will attempt to disrupt US-sponsored aid and development programs. And, of course, they will protect their vital infiltration and supply routes to South Vietnam in the Laotian corridor.

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


17. We anticipate more direct political pressures on Vientiane and the King, which these military moves will serve to reinforce. At some point, depending again on developments in South Vietnam, the Communists might offer to open negotiations, providing the bombing in Laos ended. In any case, Hanoi would believe its military pressures would improve the chances for eventual negotiations on better terms.

18. Obviously, a major change in the situation in Vietnam could affect Hanoi's calculations. But we do not believe that the release of NVA assets from South Vietnam would, in and of itself, be a decisive factor in changing Hanoi's policy in Laos. In the event of a Vietnam settlement favorable to them, the North Vietnamese would anticipate that political pressures would cause Laos to fall into their hands fairly soon. They would therefore see no need for ambitious moves in Laos that might risk upsetting any agreements reached on South Vietnam, particularly respecting US military withdrawals. Should the settlement be unfavorable to the Communists, we believe that military caution in Laos would appear even more desirable to them.

19. Eventually, if the Communists cannot achieve what they want in Laos through a combination of pressures, they may resort to a vigorous military campaign. But for now, they appear to be moving slowly, calculating that the outcome in Vietnam will be such that a new settlement in Laos can be reached which would provide them an improved power position, from which they could ultimately take control.









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ANNEX

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ARMY ATTACHE PRESS BACKGROUND

For your information, the following figures and general statements are used at press briefings in Vientiane.

A. Strength figures:

(1) PL combat forces: (Inf, Armor, Arty and AA)	29,235
(2) NVN combat forces: (including advisers and regular units):	18,350
(3) Total Deuanist and Dissident Neutralists:	2,500
(4) Total enemy combat forces:	50,085
(5) Total NVN forces (includes (2) above plus support units):	40,000
(6) Total friendly Lao armed forces (FAR plus ADC is 65,000; FAN is 10,000):	75,000

B. MACV provides all information on infiltration and activities on the HO CHI MINH trail in the Laotian panhandle.

C. More than half of Laos is under firm government control and another 20% is under marginal RLG control. Over 80% of the population lives in government controlled territory. If the question of a map arises, it is clear that there is no real line of contact in Laos and that a line on a map would be a generalization that reflects only the broad outlines of the picture.

D. General nature of the Lao performance is much improved by:

- (1) Better command and control at national level through general staff growth and development and the establishment of the Combined Operations Center;

- (2) A general reorganization of the defense establishment, now underway, which will result in a streamlined military force, tailored to local requirements and responsive to local requirements;
- (3) Increase in experienced officers and their placement in responsible positions;
- (4) Rise in standards of training and job proficiency; and
- (5) Growth of more professional attitudes and outlooks throughout the Lao Armed Forces

E. Decline in Pathet Lao performance has been offset by the introduction of new North Vietnamese Army units, new weapons (such as the 140 mm rockets RPG7 and the AK family of arms), plus increased quantities of munitions into Laos.

- F. (1) OARMA observers are maintained in the field to provide first-hand reporting on the military situation to the U.S.
- (2) At the request of the Royal Lao Government, the U.S. has since 1964 been conducting reconnaissance flights over Laos escorted by armed aircraft. These reconnaissance flights are frequently fired upon by communist forces on the ground. By agreement with the RLG the escort fighter aircraft may return fire. These flights have been announced publicly since they began.



MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE

ROYAL LAO GOVERNMENT

<u>NAME</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>BIRTHDATE</u>
SOUVANNA Phouma	Prime Minister Minister of National Defense	Oct 7, 1901
MG BOUNLEUT Sanichanh	Inspector General	Oct 1, 1924
MG AMKHA Soukhavong	Deputy Inspector General	Feb 2, 1921
COL THONGPHANH Knoksy	Director of the Secretariat	Oct 9, 1933
BG BOUNTHIENG Venevongsos	Chairman of the Cease-Fire Committee	Oct 19, 1925
COL PHEUY Misaiphon	Director of Research, Plans and Operations	Nov 7, 1921
COL KAYSONE Sananikone	Director of the Military Budget	June 15, 1916
COL PHANH Inthavong	Director of Military Pensions	Nov 11, 1931
LTC PHOMMA Sayasane	Director of Personnel, Records and Mobilization	1928
COL SAKOUNE SANANIKONE	Director of Military Security	Apr 10, 1923
COL (Thao) SOY Savady	Director of Military Justice	Jul 12, 1917

HEADQUARTERS

FORCES ARMEES ROYALES

<u>NAME</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>BIRTHDATE</u>
MG OUAN Rathikoun	Commander in Chief	Mar 3, 1922
MG BOUNPONE Makthepharaks	Deputy Commander in Chief	Aug 11, 1926
BG OUDONE Sananikone	Chief of Staff	Apr 5, 1921
BG LA Pathammavong	Deputy for Operations	May 27, 1923
BG HOUMPHANH Norasing	Deputy for Logistics	Aug 11, 1926
COL KHAMTHENE Chinyavong	Director of Psywar	Sep 24, 1928
COL PHAO Southi	Director of Operations	Aug 18, 1928
COL ETAM Signvongsa	Director of Intelligence	May 15, 1926



<u>NAME</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>BIRTHDATE</u>
COL HATSADY	Director of Training and Sports	1931
COL BOUNMA Vongprachanh	Director of Personnel	May 10, 1928
COL SOUVANH Sinhavong	Director of Transport	Oct 17, 1933
COL BOUNLEUT Philavong	Director of Logistics	Nov 28, 1934
COL FONGSAMOUTH Arounpradith	Chief of Engineer Service	Jul 4, 1933
COL KHAMPHANH Sadettan	Chief of Medical Service	Jul 8, 1919
COL BOUNNAO Sabandith	Chief of Ordnance Service	Jan 4, 1934
COL SILAC Pathammavong	Chief of Signal Service	Feb 4, 1928
COL BOUNCHANH Thammavong	Chief of Quartermaster Service	Jul 9, 1930
COL PHADY Khammy	Chief of Finance Service	Jun 29, 1933
COL LOUNE Sisounol	Provost Marshal	June 20, 1930

MILITARY REGION I HEADQUARTERS

BG (Tiao) SAYAVONG	Commanding General	Jul 17, 1928
COL BOUNCHANH Savathphayphane	Deputy for Operations	Dec 9, 1927
COL PHOUY Manosane	Chief of Staff	July 18, 1927
COL (Tiao) VANNASENG Sayasane	Deputy for Guerrilla Warfare	Apr 30, 1931

MILITARY REGION II HEADQUARTERS

MG VANG PAO	Commanding General	Oct 15, 1928
COL CHANSOM Pakdymonivong	Deputy for Operations	July 15, 1927
COL SISAVATH Vongkhamheuang	Chief of Staff	Aug 28, 1926

MILITARY REGION III HEADQUARTERS

MG BOUNPONE Makthepharaks	Commanding General	Aug 11, 1926
BG KOT Venevongsos	Deputy Commanding General	Jul 13, 1922
COL (Thao) LY	Chief of Staff	Apr 1, 1932
COL KHAMSOUK Insisiengmay	Deputy for Operations	May 30, 1925

MILITARY REGION IV HEADQUARTERS

MG PHASOUK Somly	Commanding General	Dec 9, 1916
BG KANE Insisiengmay	Deputy for Operations	Jul 20, 1928
LTC KANE Soumpholphakvy	Chief of Staff	Jun 30, 1932

MILITARY REGION V HEADQUARTERS

MG KOUPRASITH ABHAY	Commanding General	Jun 24, 1926
COL THONGLITH Chokbengboun	Deputy Commanding Officer	Agu 4, 1931
COL ONH Sananikone	Deputy for Psyops & Deputy for Logistics	July 10, 1928

MINISTERS AND SECRETARIES OF STATEROYAL LAO GOVERNMENT

<u>NAME</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>BIRTHDATE</u>
SOUVANNA Phouma	Prime Minister Minister of Foreign Affairs Minister of National Defense Minister of Veterans Affairs Minister of Rural Affairs	Oct 7, 1901
SOUPHANOUVONG (NLHS - absent since 1963)	Deputy Prime Minister Minister of National Economy Minister of Planning and Cooperation	Jul 13, 1909
LEUAM Insisiengmay	Deputy Prime Minister Minister of National Education, Fine Arts and Sports and Youth	Aug 7, 1917
PHOUMI Vongvichit (NLHS - absent since 1963)	Minister of Information, Propaganda and Tourism	Apr 6, 1909
PHENG Phongsavan	Minister of Interior Minister of Social Welfare	Jul 19, 1910
NGON Sananikone	Minister of Public Works and Transportation	Dec 29, 1914
BOUN OM na Champassak	Minister of Religious Affairs	Feb 12, 1916
SISOUMANG Sisaleumsak	Minister of Posts Minister of Public Health (Acting Minister of Information in absence of Phoumi Vongvichit)	Oct 31, 1917
INPENG Suryadhay	Minister of Justice (Acting Minister of Planning in absence of Souphanouvong)	Feb 13, 1923
SISOUK na Champassak	Minister of Finance (Acting Minister of National Economy in absence of Souphanouvong)	Mar 20, 1928
SOUK Vongsak (NLHS - absent since 1963)	Secretary of State for Public Works and Transportation	Jan 15, 1915
SOUKAN Vilaysarn	Secretary of State for Veteran Affairs	Jan 17, 1918
KEO Viphakone	Secretary of State for Social Welfare	Apr 15, 1920



<u>NAME</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>BIRTHDATE</u>
KHAMPHEUANE Tounalom NLHS - absent since 1963	Secretary of State for National Economy and Planning	Mar 12, 1926
SOUK Upravan	Secretary of State for Rural Affairs	Jun 12, 1927
HOUMPHANH Saignasith	Secretary of State for Finance	May 11, 1928
KHAMPHAI ABHAY	Secretary of State for Public Health	Nov 6, 1928
LIEN Pravongviengkham	Secretary of State for Sports and Youth	

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