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1955-1957

VOLUME II

CHINA

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OF  
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Washington

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
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# Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957

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Volume II

## China

*Editor in Chief* John P. Glennon

*Editor* Harriet D. Schwar

DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 9450

OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN

BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

# Preface

The publication *Foreign Relations of the United States* constitutes the official record of the foreign policy of the United States. The volumes in the series include, subject to necessary security considerations, all documents needed to give a comprehensive record of the major foreign policy decisions of the United States together with appropriate materials concerning the facts which contributed to the formulation of policies. Documents in the files of the Department of State are supplemented by papers from other Government agencies involved in the formulation of foreign policy.

The basic documentary diplomatic record printed in the volumes of the series *Foreign Relations of the United States* is edited by the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State. The editing is guided by the principles of historical objectivity and in accordance with the following official guidance first promulgated by Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg on March 26, 1925.

There may be no alteration of the text, no deletions without indicating where in the text the deletion is made, and no omission of facts which were of major importance in reaching a decision. Nothing may be omitted for the purpose of concealing or glossing over what might be regarded by some as a defect of policy. However, certain omissions of documents are permissible for the following reasons:

- a. To avoid publication of matters which would tend to impede current diplomatic negotiations or other business.
- b. To condense the record and avoid repetition of needless details.
- c. To preserve the confidence reposed in the Department by individuals and by foreign governments.
- d. To avoid giving needless offense to other nationalities or individuals.
- e. To eliminate personal opinions presented in despatches and not acted upon by the Department. To this consideration there is one qualification—in connection with major decisions it is desirable, where possible, to show the alternative presented to the Department before the decision was made.

Documents selected for publication in the *Foreign Relations* volumes are referred to the Department of State Classification/Declassification Center for declassification clearance. The Center reviews the documents, makes declassification decisions, and obtains the clearance of geographic and functional bureaus of the Department of State, as well as of other appropriate agencies of the government.



#### IV Preface

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The Center, in coordination with the geographic bureaus of the Department of State, conducts communications with foreign governments regarding documents or information of those governments proposed for inclusion in *Foreign Relations* volumes.

Harriet D. Schwar of the Office of The Historian compiled this volume under the supervision of John P. Glennon. David W. Mabon provided planning and direction for the volume and conducted the initial editorial review. Lynn Chase and Rosa D. Pace prepared the lists of sources, names, and abbreviations.

The Documentary Editing Section of the Publishing Services Division (Paul M. Washington, Chief), performed technical editing under the supervision of Rita M. Baker. The Twin Oaks Indexing Collective prepared the index.

**William Z. Slany**  
*The Historian*  
*Bureau of Public Affairs*

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


# Note

Volumes II and III contain documentation on United States policy with regard to China from 1955 through 1957. Volume II, covering the period from January through July 1955, documents U.S. policy in the Taiwan Strait crisis and diplomatic efforts to end the crisis. Volume III includes material on the ambassadorial talks at Geneva between representatives of the United States and the People's Republic of China between August 1955 and December 1957, as well as on U.S. relations with the Republic of China during that period.

Additional documentation concerning the ambassadorial talks at Geneva is being published in a microfiche supplement to Volume III. The supplement reproduces all of the reports on the talks sent to the Department by the U.S. representative, Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson, along with his comments, the Department's instructions to him, and other related materials, including documents directly related to the talks which are printed in Volume III.

Other volumes scheduled for subsequent publication will contain material related to China. Compilations with a significant amount of such material will include those on U.S. national security policy, East Asian security, issues relating to United Nations membership, and U.S. economic defense policy.



# List of Unpublished Sources

## Department of State

1. **Indexed Central Files.** Papers in the indexed central files of the Department for the years 1955–1957 are indicated by a decimal file number in the first footnote. Among the most useful of these files are 110.11–DU, 121.93, 293.1111, 293.9322, 396.1–GE, 611.93, 611.95A241, 670.901, 711.11–EI, 7711.5800, 793.00, 793.5, 793.5–MSP, and 911.6293.

2. **Lot Files.** Documents from the central files have been supplemented by lot files of the Department, which are decentralized files created by operating areas. A list of the lot files used in or consulted for this volume follows:

### CA Files, Lot 59 D 110

Consolidated political files on China for the years 1954–1955, as maintained by the Office of Chinese Affairs. (Combines 59 D 110 and 64 D 230.)

### CA Files, Lot 60 D 171

Economic files on China for the years 1954–1956 and political files for the year 1956, as maintained by the Office of Chinese Affairs.

### CA Files, Lot 60 D 648

Political files maintained by the Office of Chinese Affairs for the year 1957.

### CA Files, Lot 67 D 579

Top Secret files relating to China for the years 1956–1965, as maintained by the Office of Chinese Affairs and later by the Office of East Asian Affairs.

### Conference Files, Lot 59 D 95

Collection of documentation on official visits by ranking foreign officials, and on major international conferences attended by the Secretary of State, for the period 1949–1955, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

### Conference Files, Lot 60 D 627

Collection of documentation on visits to the United States by ranking foreign officials, and on major international conferences attended by the Secretary of State for the years 1953–1955, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

## X List of Unpublished Sources

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### Conference Files, Lot 62 D 181

Collection of documentation on visits to the United States by ranking foreign officials, and on major conferences attended by the Secretary of State for the years 1956-1958, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

### Conference Files, Lot 63 D 123

Collection of documentation on visits to the United States by ranking foreign officials, and on major international conferences attended by the Secretary of State for the years 1955-1958, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

### EUR Files, Lot 59 D 233

Files of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs for the years 1945-1957.

### FE Files, Lot 56 D 679

Files maintained by the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs for the year 1955, including country files, memoranda of conversation, and conference files.

### FE Files, Lot 58 D 209

Files of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Economic Affairs for the years 1954-1957.

### FE Files, Lot 59 D 19

Files maintained by the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs for the year 1957.

### FE Conference Files, Lot 60 D 514

Files of conferences and meetings maintained by the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs for the years 1956-1958.

### FE/EA Files, Lot 66 D 225

Files relating to China, Japan, and Korea for the year 1964, with some files for the years 1954-1963, as maintained by the Office of East Asian Affairs and its predecessors, the Office of Chinese Affairs and the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs.

### Geneva Talks Files, Lot 72 D 415

Files relating to the Sino-American ambassadorial talks at Geneva and Warsaw for the years 1955-1968, as maintained by the Office of Chinese Affairs and later by the Office of East Asian Affairs and the Office of Asian Communist Affairs.

### INR Files, Lot 58 D 776

Country, subject, and administrative files relating to U.S. intelligence organizations and activities for the years 1945-1960, as maintained by the Office of the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

### INR-NIE Files

Files of National Intelligence Estimates, Special Estimates, and Special National Intelligence Estimates, retained by the Directorate for Regional Research, Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

IO Files, Lot 60 D 113

Consolidated files of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs for the years 1955–1957. (Combines 60 D 113 and 58 D 17.)

OCB Files, Lot 61 D 385

Master set of administrative and country files of the Operations Coordinating Board for the years 1953–1960, as maintained by the Operations Staff.

OCB Files, Lot 62 D 430

Master files of the Operations Coordinating Board for the years 1953–1960, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

PPS Files, Lot 66 D 70

Policy Planning Staff subject, country, and chronological files for the year 1955.

PPS Files, Lot 66 D 487

Subject files, country files, chronological files, documents, drafts, and related correspondence of the Policy Planning Staff for the year 1956.

PPS Files, Lot 67 D 548

Policy Planning Staff subject, country, and chronological files for the years 1957–1961.

Presidential Correspondence, Lot 66 D 204

Exchanges of correspondence between the President and heads of foreign governments for the years 1953–1964, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

Presidential Memoranda of Conversation, Lot 66 D 149

A chronological record of cleared memoranda of conversations with foreign visitors for the years 1956–1964, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

Rankin Files, Lot 66 D 84

Files maintained by Karl L. Rankin during his tours of duty at Athens, Vienna, Canton, Hong Kong, Taipei, and Belgrade, 1932–1961.

ROC Files, Lot 71 D 517

Top Secret files relating to China for the years 1954–1963, as maintained by the Office of Chinese Affairs and subsequently by the Office of East Asian Affairs.

Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation, Lot 64 D 199

Chronological collection of the Secretary of State's memoranda of conversation for the years 1953–1960, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

Secretary's Staff Meetings, Lot 63 D 75

Chronological collection of the minutes of the Secretary's Staff meetings during the years 1952–1960, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

S/P–NSC Files, Lot 61 D 167

Serial file of memoranda relating to National Security Council questions for the years 1950–1961, as maintained by the Policy Planning Staff.



## **XII List of Unpublished Sources**

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### **S/P-NSC Files, Lot 62 D 1**

Serial and subject master file of National Security Council documents and correspondence for the years 1948-1961, as maintained by the Policy Planning Staff.

### **S/PRS Files, Lot 77 D 11**

Collection of record sets of volumes of Daily Press Briefings for the years 1922-1970, as maintained by the Office of Press Relations.

### **S/S-NSC Files, Lot 63 D 351**

Serial master file of National Security Council documents and correspondence, and related Department of State memoranda for the years 1947-1961, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

### **S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files, Lot 66 D 95**

Administrative and miscellaneous National Security Council documentation, including NSC Records of Action, for the years 1947-1963, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

### **State-JCS Meetings, Lot 61 D 417**

Top Secret records of meetings between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and representatives of the Department of State for the period 1951-1959 and selected problem files on the Middle East for the period 1954-1956, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

### **UNP Files, Lot 58 D 742**

Miscellaneous subject files of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs for the years 1945-1957.

### **UNP Files, Lot 62 D 170**

United Nations subject files, 1947-1960, as maintained by the Office of United Nations Political Affairs.

## **Department of Defense**

### *Department of Defense Files*

Documents received by the Office of The Historian from the Department of Defense by request.

### *The Joint Chiefs of Staff*

#### **JCS Files**

Documents received upon request by the Office of The Historian from the Secretariat of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

### *Naval Historical Division, Washington, D.C.*

#### **Radford Papers**

The personal papers of Admiral Arthur W. Radford, Commander in Chief, Pacific (1949-1953), and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (1953-1957).

*United States Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania*

**Ridgway Papers**

Papers of General Matthew B. Ridgway, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, August 15, 1953–June 30, 1955.

**Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas**

**Dulles Papers**

Records of John Foster Dulles, 1952–1959.

**Hagerty Papers**

Papers of James C. Hagerty, Press Secretary to the President, 1953–1961.

**Herter Papers**

Papers of Christian A. Herter, 1957–1961. Herter was Under Secretary of State, 1957–1959, and Secretary of State, 1959–1961.

**President's Daily Appointments**

From White House Office Files, Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Executive Appointments, 1952–1961.

**Staff Secretary Records**

Records of the Office of the White House Staff Secretary, 1952–1961, including records of Paul T. Carroll, Andrew J. Goodpaster, L. Arthur Minnich, Jr., and Christopher H. Russell.

**White House Central Files**

Records of Dwight D. Eisenhower as President, 1953–1961. Documents cited in this volume are from the Confidential File within this collection.

**Whitman File**

Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower as President of the United States, 1953–1961, maintained by his personal secretary, Ann C. Whitman. The Whitman File includes the following elements: the Name Series, the Dulles-Herter Series, Eisenhower Diaries, Ann Whitman (ACW) Diaries, National Security Council Records, Miscellaneous Records, Cabinet Papers, Legislative Meetings, International Meetings, the Administration Series, and the International File.

**National Archives, Washington, D.C.**

**JCS Records**

National Archives Record Group 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

## **XIV List of Unpublished Sources**

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### **Princeton University Library, Princeton, New Jersey**

#### **Dulles Papers, Daily Appointments**

Daily log of the meetings and appointments of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles for the years 1953-1959.

#### **Dulles Oral History Collection**

### **Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Maryland**

#### **Taipei Embassy Files, Lot 62 F 83**

Top Secret files for the years 1953-1958, as maintained by the Embassy in Taipei.

# List of Abbreviations and Symbols

- AA**, anti-aircraft  
**AAA**, anti-aircraft artillery  
**AC&W**, aircraft control and warning  
**ADA**, Americans for Democratic Action  
**AEC**, Atomic Energy Commission  
**AFFE**, Army Forces Far East  
**AG**, Adjutant General  
**ANZUS**, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States (the ANZUS Pact nations)  
**AP**, Associated Press  
**ARC**, Annual Review Committee  
**ATF**, fleet ocean tug  
**BOB**, Bureau of the Budget  
**C**, Counselor, Department of State  
**CA**, Office of Chinese Affairs, Department of State  
**CAF**, Chinese Air Force (Republic of China)  
**CAMG**, Office of Civil Affairs and Military Government, Department of the Army  
**CAT**, Civil Air Transport  
**CCP**, Chinese Communist Party  
**CG AFFE/ARMYEIGHT**, Commanding General, Army Forces Far East, Eighth Army  
**CGUSARPAC**, Commanding General, United States Army, Pacific  
**ChiCom**, Chinese Communist  
**ChiNat**, Chinese Nationalist  
**CHINCOM**, China Committee, a permanent working group of the Paris Consultative Group of nations working to control export of strategic goods to Communist countries  
**CIA**, Central Intelligence Agency  
**CINCFE**, Commander in Chief, Far East  
**CINCPAC**, Commander in Chief, Pacific  
**CINCPACFLT**, Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet  
**CIO**, Congress of Industrial Organizations  
**CNO**, Chief of Naval Operations  
**COCOM**, Coordinating Committee of the Paris Consultative Group of nations working to control export of strategic goods to Communist countries  
**COMFORM DEFCOM**, Commander, Formosa Defense Command  
**COMSEVENTHFLT**, Commander, Seventh Fleet  
**COMTAIWAN DEFCOM (US)**, Commander, Taiwan Defense Command  
**COMUS**, Commander, United States Forces  
**CP**, command post  
**CPPCC**, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference  
**CPR**, Chinese People's Republic  
**DA**, Defense Agency; Department of the Army  
**Deptel**, Department of State telegram  
**DFS**, Direct Forces Support  
**DOD**, Department of Defense  
**DRF**, Division of Research for Far East, Office of Intelligence Research, Department of State  
**Dulte**, series indicator for telegrams from Secretary of State Dulles while away from Washington; also used as series indicator for telegrams to Dulles from the head of the United States Delegation at an international conference  
**E**, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State

## XVI List of Abbreviations and Symbols

- EAS**, Department of State Executive Agreement Series
- ECAFE**, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East
- EE**, Office of Eastern European Affairs, Department of State
- Embdesp**, Embassy despatch
- Embtel**, Embassy telegram
- EUR**, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
- FBI**, Federal Bureau of Investigation
- FBIS**, Foreign Broadcast Information Service
- FCN**, Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (Treaty)
- FE**, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State
- FE/P**, Public Affairs Adviser, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State
- FEAF**, Far East Air Forces
- FEC**, Far East Command
- FMC**, Foreign Ministers Conference
- FOA**, Foreign Operations Administration
- Fr**, France
- FY**, Fiscal Year
- FYI**, for your information
- G**, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
- GA**, General Assembly
- GATT**, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
- GMT**, Greenwich mean time
- GNP**, gross national product
- GOI**, Government of India
- GOP**, Government of Pakistan
- GRC**, Government of the Republic of China
- GVN**, Government of Vietnam
- HICOM**, High Commissioner
- HMG**, Her Majesty's Government (United Kingdom)
- IAC**, Intelligence Advisory Committee
- IBRD**, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
- ICA**, International Cooperation Administration
- ICBM**, Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile
- ICC**, International Control Commission
- ICJ**, International Court of Justice
- IMF**, International Monetary Fund
- INR**, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
- INS**, Immigration and Naturalization Service
- IO**, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
- ISA**, Office of International Security Affairs, Department of Defense
- JCS**, Joint Chiefs of Staff
- KMT**, Kuomintang (Nationalist Party), Republic of China
- L**, Legal Adviser, Department of State
- LST**, landing ship, tank
- MAAG**, Military Assistance Advisory Group
- MAC**, Military Armistice Commission
- MAP**, Military Assistance Program
- MDA**, Mutual Defense Assistance
- MDAP**, Mutual Defense Assistance Program
- ME**, Middle East
- MND**, Ministry of National Defense (Republic of China)
- MSA**, Mutual Security Assistance
- MSP**, Mutual Security Program
- MWDP**, Mutual Weapons Development Program
- NATO**, North Atlantic Treaty Organization
- Niact**, night action; communications indicator requiring attention by the recipient at any hour of the day or night
- NIC**, National Indications Center
- NIE**, National Intelligence Estimate
- NPC**, National People's Congress (People's Republic of China)
- NSC**, National Security Council
- NZ**, New Zealand
- O**, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
- OCB**, Operations Coordinating Board
- OFD**, Office of Financial and Development Policy, Department of State
- OIR**, Office of Intelligence Research, Department of State
- OSD**, Office of the Secretary of Defense
- OSP**, offshore procurement
- P**, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State
- PASEP**, being passed separately
- PAO**, Public Affairs Officer
- PCH&T**, packing, crating, handling, and transportation
- PL**, Public Law
- POL**, petroleum, oil, and lubricants
- POW**, prisoner of war

## List of Abbreviations and Symbols XVII

- PRC**, People's Republic of China  
**PSA**, Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs, Department of State  
**RCT**, regimental combat team  
**ROK**, Republic of Korea  
**S/MSA**, Office of the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Mutual Security Affairs  
**S/P**, Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning  
**S/S**, Executive Secretariat, Department of State  
**SC**, United Nations Security Council  
**SCA**, Administrator, Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, Department of State  
**SCAP**, Supreme Commander, Allied Powers  
**SEA**, Office of Southeast Asian Affairs, Department of State  
**SEATO**, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization  
**Secto**, series indicator for telegrams from the Secretary of State (or his delegation) at international conferences  
**SUNFED**, Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development  
**SYG**, Secretary-General  
**TDC**, Taiwan Defense Command  
**Tedul**, series indicator for telegrams to Secretary of State Dulles while absent from Washington; also used as series indicator for telegrams from Dulles to the head of the United States Delegation at an international conference  
**TH**, Theater  
**TO&E**, Table of Organization and Equipment  
**Tosec**, series indicator for telegrams to the Secretary of State (or his delegation) at international conferences  
**U**, Office of the Under Secretary of State  
**U/OP**, Operations Coordinator, Department of State  
**UK**, United Kingdom  
**UKG**, Government of the United Kingdom  
**UKHC**, United Kingdom High Commissioner  
**UN**, United Nations  
**UNC**, United Nations Command  
**UNCURK**, United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea  
**UNP**, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Department of State  
**UNTS**, United Nations Treaty Series  
**USAF**, United States Air Force  
**USARMA**, United States Army Attaché  
**USARMLO**, United States Army Liaison Officer  
**USARPAC**, United States Army, Pacific  
**USG**, United States Government  
**USIS**, United States Information Service  
**USOM**, United States Operations Mission  
**USSR**, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics  
**UST**, *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements*  
**USTDC**, United States Taiwan Defense Command  
**USUN**, United States Mission at the United Nations  
**VAdm**, Vice Admiral  
**VOA**, Voice of America



# List of Persons

*Editor's Note.* This list is designed to provide ready reference for identification of those persons mentioned most frequently. The identification of the persons on this list is generally limited to positions and circumstances under reference in the volume and is confined to the years 1955-1957. All titles and positions are American unless otherwise indicated. Where no dates are given, the individual usually held the position throughout the period covered by the volume. Chinese names are spelled according to contemporary usage.

- Aldrich, Winthrop W.**, Ambassador to the United Kingdom to February 1957
- Ali, Mohammed**, Prime Minister of Pakistan to August 1955
- Ali Sastroamidjojo**, Prime Minister of Indonesia to July 1955, and again March 1956-March 1957
- Allen, George V.**, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs to August 1957; thereafter Ambassador to Greece
- Allison, John M.**, Ambassador to Japan to February 1957; thereafter Ambassador to Indonesia
- Anderson, Dillon**, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, April 1955-September 1956; White House Consultant from June 1957
- Anderson, Robert B.**, Deputy Secretary of Defense to August 1955; Secretary of the Treasury from July 1957
- Bohlen, Charles E.**, Ambassador to the Soviet Union to April 1957; Ambassador to the Philippines from June 1957
- Bowen, General Frank Sayles, Jr.**, USA, Commanding General, Military Assistance Advisory Group, Taiwan, from August 1956
- Bowie, Robert R.**, Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, to August 1955; Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning, August 1955-August 1957
- Brownell, Herbert, Jr.**, Attorney General of the United States
- Brucker, Wilber M.**, General Counsel, Department of Defense, to July 1955; thereafter Secretary of the Army
- Bulganan, Marshal Nikolai Alexandrovich**, Soviet Minister of Defense to February 1955; thereafter Chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers and Member of the Presidium of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
- Burke, Admiral Arleigh A.**, USN, Chief of Naval Operations from August 1955
- Cabell, Lieutenant General Charles P.**, USAF, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
- Carney, Admiral Robert B.**, USN, Chief of Naval Operations to August 1955
- Chang Han-fu**, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China



## XX List of Persons

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- Chase, Major General William C., USA, Chief, Military Assistance Advisory Group, Formosa, to July 1955**
- Ch'en Ch'eng, Vice President of the Republic of China**
- Chiang Ching-kuo, Lieutenant General, Deputy Secretary General of the National Defense Council, Republic of China**
- Chiang Kai-shek, Generalissimo, President of the Republic of China.**
- Chou En-lai, Premier and Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China**
- Chou Shu-kai, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China from 1956**
- Churchill, Sir Winston S., Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and First Lord of the Treasury to April 1955**
- Clough, Ralph N., Deputy Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs, Department of State, July 1955–June 1957; thereafter Director**
- Cochran, William P., Jr., Counselor of Embassy in the Republic of China to August 1956; thereafter Counselor of Embassy in Sweden**
- Cooper, John Sherman, Ambassador to India, April 1955–April 1956; Republican Senator from Kentucky from January 1957**
- Cumming, Hugh S., Jr., Ambassador to Indonesia to March 1957; Special Assistant for Intelligence, Department of State, May–October 1957; thereafter Director of Intelligence and Research**
- Cutler, Robert, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs to April 1955, and again from January 1957**
- Doyle, Vice Admiral Austin K., USN, Commander of the United States Taiwan Defense Command from July 1957**
- Drumright, Everett F., Consul General in Hong Kong and Macau**
- Dulles, Allen W., Director of Central Intelligence**
- Dulles, John Foster, Secretary of State**
- Eden, Sir Anthony, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Deputy Prime Minister to April 1955; Prime Minister and First Lord of the Treasury, April 1955–January 1957**
- Eisenhower, Dwight D., President of the United States**
- Flemming, Arthur S., Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization to February 1957**
- George, Senator Walter F., Democratic Senator from Georgia and Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to January 1957**
- Gleason, S. Everett, Deputy Executive Secretary of the National Security Council**
- Goodpaster, Colonel Andrew J., USA, Staff Secretary to President Eisenhower; promoted to Brigadier General January 1957**
- Gowen, Franklin C., Consul General in Geneva and United States Representative, International Organizations**
- Gray, Gordon, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, July 1955–February 1957; Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization from March 1957**
- Hagerty, James C., Press Secretary to the President**
- Hammarskjöld, Dag, Secretary-General of the United Nations**
- Hayter, Sir William G., British Ambassador to the Soviet Union to January 1957; thereafter Deputy Under Secretary of the Foreign Office**
- Heeney, Arnold D.P., Canadian Ambassador to the United States to April 1957**
- Hensel, H. Struve, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs to July 1955**


- Herter, Christian A.**, Consultant to the Secretary of State, January–February 1957; thereafter Under Secretary of State and Chairman of the Operations Coordinating Board
- Holland, Sidney G.**, Prime Minister of New Zealand to September 1957
- Hollister, John B.**, Consultant to the Secretary of State, May–July 1955; thereafter Director of the International Cooperation Administration
- Hoover, Herbert, Jr.**, Under Secretary of State to February 1957
- Howe, Fisher**, Director of the Executive Secretariat, Department of State, from March 1956
- Hsu Shao-chang**, Director of the Department of American Affairs in the Foreign Ministry of the Republic of China
- Hull, General John E.**, USA, Commander in Chief, United Nations Command; Commander in Chief, Far East; and Governor of the Ryukyu Islands to February 1955
- Humphrey, George M.**, Secretary of the Treasury, January 1955–July 1957
- Ingersoll, Vice Admiral Stuart H.**, USN, Commander of the Seventh Fleet, December 1955–January 1957; Commander of the United States Taiwan Defense Command, December 1955–July 1957
- Johnson, U. Alexis**, Ambassador to Czechoslovakia to December 1957; United States representative in ambassadorial talks with the People's Republic of China, August 1955–December 1957
- Key, David McK.**, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs to September 1955
- Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeevich**, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
- Knowland, Senator William F.**, Republican Senator from California; Minority Leader and Member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
- Koo, V.K. Wellington**, Ambassador of the Republic of China to the United States to May 1956; Judge, International Court of Justice, from 1957
- Kotelawala, Sir John L.**, Prime Minister and Minister of Defense of Ceylon to April 1956
- Lay, James S., Jr.**, Executive Secretary of the National Security Council
- Lloyd, Selwyn**, British Minister of Defense, April–December 1955; thereafter Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
- Lodge, Henry Cabot**, United States Representative at the United Nations
- MacArthur, Douglas, II**, Counselor of the Department of State to December 1956; Ambassador to Japan from February 1957
- Macmillan, Harold**, British Minister of Defense to April 1955; Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, April–December 1955; Chancellor of the Exchequer, December 1955–January 1957; thereafter Prime Minister and First Lord of the Treasury
- Makins, Sir Roger M.**, British Ambassador to the United States to October 1956; thereafter Joint Permanent Secretary of the Treasury
- Mao Tse-tung**, Chairman of the People's Republic of China
- McCardle, Carl W.**, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs to March 1957
- McConaughy, Walter P.**, Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs, Department of State, to May 1957; thereafter Ambassador to Burma
- Mehta, Gaganvihari Lallubhai**, Indian Ambassador to the United States
- Menon, V.K. Krishna**, Chairman of the Indian Delegation to the 10th, 11th, and 12th Sessions of the United Nations General Assembly, 1955–1957; Indian Minister of Defense from April 1957

## XXII List of Persons

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- Menzies, Robert Gordon**, Prime Minister of Australia
- Merchant, Livingston T.**, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs to May 1956; thereafter Ambassador to Canada
- Minnich, L. Arthur, Jr.**, Assistant Staff Secretary to the President
- Molotov, Vyacheslav Mikhailovich**, First Vice-Chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers and Member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party to July 1957; Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs to June 1956; Minister of State Control, November 1956–July 1957; Ambassador to Mongolia from August 1957
- Munro, Sir Leslie**, Ambassador of New Zealand to the United States
- Murphy, Robert D.**, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
- Nehru, Pandit Jawaharlal**, Prime Minister of India and Minister for External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations
- Nixon, Richard M.**, Vice President of the United States
- Nu, U**, Prime Minister of Burma to June 1956; Prime Minister and Minister of National Planning from March 1957
- O'Neill, Con**, British Chargé in the People's Republic of China, June 1955–October 1957; thereafter Assistant Under Secretary of State in the British Foreign Office
- Palmer, Gardner E.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Economic Affairs from July 1957
- Pearson, Lester B.**, Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs to June 1957; Canadian Representative to the 11th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, November 1956–March 1957
- Peng Meng-chi, General**, Acting Chief of the General Staff of the Republic of China to June 1955; Chief of the General Staff, June 1955–July 1957; thereafter Commander in Chief of the Army and Taiwan Defense Commander
- Phleger, Herman**, Legal Adviser of the Department of State to April 1957
- Pilcher, James Byrd**, Counselor of Embassy in the Republic of China from July 1956
- Pride, Vice Admiral Alfred M.**, USN, Commander of the Seventh Fleet to December 1955; Commander of the Formosa Defense Command, April–October 1955; Commander of the United States Taiwan Defense Command, November–December 1955
- Radford, Admiral Arthur W.**, USN, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to August 1957
- Randall, Clarence B.**, Special Assistant to the President in the area of foreign economic policy and Chairman of the Council on Foreign Economic Policy
- Rankin, Karl Lott**, Ambassador in the Republic of China to December 1957
- Rhee, Syngman**, President of the Republic of Korea
- Richards, James P.**, Democratic Representative from South Carolina and Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs to January 1957; thereafter Special Assistant to the President with the personal rank of Ambassador
- Ridgway, General Matthew B.**, USA, Chief of Staff of the Army to June 1955
- Robertson, Reuben B., Jr.**, Deputy Secretary of Defense, August 1955–April 1957
- Robertson, Walter S.**, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs
- Scott, Sir Robert Heatlie**, Minister at the British Embassy in the United States to October 1955; thereafter Commissioner General for the United Kingdom in Southeast Asia (at Singapore)
- Sebald, William J.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs to March 1957; thereafter Ambassador to Australia
- Shen Chang-huan**, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China

- Shen Ping**, Consul General of the People's Republic of China in Geneva
- Shepherd, General Lemuel C., Jr.**, USMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps to December 1955; Chairman of the Inter-American Defense Board from March 1956
- Smythe, Major General George W.**, USA, Chief of the Army Section of the Military Assistance Advisory Group, Formosa, to July 1955; Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group, Formosa, July 1955–August 1956
- Spender, Sir Percy C.**, Australian Ambassador to the United States
- Stassen, Harold E.**, Director of the Foreign Operations Administration and Deputy Representative on the United Nations Disarmament Commission to March 1955; thereafter Special Assistant to the President
- Stump, Admiral Felix B.**, USN, Commander in Chief, Pacific Command and Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet
- Tan Shao-hua**, Minister of the Embassy of the Republic of China in the United States
- Taylor, General Maxwell D.**, USA, Commanding General, United States Army Forces, Far East, and Eighth United States Army, to March 1955; Commander in Chief, Far East Command; Commander in Chief, United Nations Command; and Governor of the Ryukyu Islands, April–June 1955; thereafter Chief of Staff, United States Army
- Tong, Hollington K.**, Ambassador of the Republic of China to Japan to May 1956; thereafter Ambassador to the United States
- Trevelyan, Humphrey**, British Chargé in the People's Republic of China to May 1955
- Tsiang, Tingfu F.**, Representative of the Republic of China at the United Nations
- Twining, General Nathan F.**, USAF, Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, to June 1957; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from August 1957
- Wainhouse, David W.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs to September 1955; First Secretary at the Embassy in France, September 1955–July 1956; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, July–October 1956; thereafter Counselor of Embassy in Austria
- Wan Waithayakon, Prince Krommun Naradhip Bongsprabandh**, Foreign Minister of Thailand; Permanent Representative of Thailand to the United Nations; President of the United Nations General Assembly from November 1956
- Wang Ping-nan**, Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China to March 1955; thereafter, Ambassador of Poland; representative of the People's Republic of China in ambassadorial talks with the United States from August 1955
- Wilson, Charles E.**, Secretary of Defense to October 1957
- Yeh, George K.C. (Yeh Kung-ch'ao)**, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China and Chairman of the Chinese Delegation to the 10th, 11th, and 12th Sessions of the United Nations General Assembly
- Yu Ta-wai**, Defense Minister of the Republic of China
- Yui, O.K. (Yu Hung-chun)**, President of the Executive Yuan (Premier) of the Republic of China



# UNITED STATES POLICY WITH REGARD TO THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA, JANUARY-JULY 1955

THE TAIWAN STRAIT CRISIS; U.S. CONCERN WITH THE DEFENSE OF TAIWAN AND THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE IN THE TAIWAN AREA; THE FORMOSA RESOLUTION; EFFORTS TO BRING THE PROBLEM BEFORE THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL; NEGOTIATIONS LEADING TO THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA'S EVACUATION OF THE TACHEN ISLANDS WITH U.S. ASSISTANCE; DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS TO BRING ABOUT PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE CRISIS; THE QUESTION OF U.S. POLICY WITH REGARD TO QUEMOY AND MATSU; THE QUESTION OF NATIONALIST RESPONSE TO THE GROWTH OF COMMUNIST AIR POWER; THE ROBERTSON-RADFORD MISSION TO TAIPEI; THE U.S. RESPONSE TO PREMIER CHOU EN-LAI'S PROPOSAL OF NEGOTIATIONS; DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS TO OBTAIN THE RELEASE OF AMERICAN PRISONERS IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA; NEGOTIATIONS LEADING TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE AMBASSADORIAL TALKS AT GENEVA BETWEEN REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA <sup>1</sup>

## 1. Memorandum From the Secretary of State to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay) <sup>2</sup>

*Washington, January 4, 1955.*

### SUBJECT

Current U.S. Policy Toward the Far East <sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> For previous documentation on this subject, see *Foreign Relations, 1952-1954*, vol. xiv, Part 1, pp. 1 ff.

<sup>2</sup> Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5429 Series. Top Secret.

<sup>3</sup> U.S. policy toward the Far East had been the subject of NSC deliberations on several occasions between August and December 1954. On December 21, 1954, in NSC Action No. 1292, the Council (a) discussed NSC 5429/4, "Current U.S. Policy Toward the Far East," December 10, 1954; (b) agreed on several amendments to NSC 5429/4; (c) deferred action on paragraph 5-g pending further consideration by the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, until the next NSC meeting on January 5, 1955; (d) deferred action on paragraph 7-c pending further consideration by the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce, until the January 5 meeting; and (e) requested the Council on Foreign Economic Policy to undertake a study of U.S. economic defense policy applicable to trade with the Communist bloc,

*Continued*

With reference to your memorandum of December 22<sup>4</sup> and in accordance with NSC Action 1292-c, this is to inform you that I approve the language for paragraph 5-g attached to the memorandum with the addition of an amendment proposed by Defense. I am transmitting herewith the recommended language for paragraph 5-g incorporating this amendment (Tab A).

In accordance with NSC Action 1292-d and 1292-e, I am also transmitting the recommended language for paragraph 7-c (Tab B) of NSC 5429/5. Consultations have been held with the representative of the Secretary of Commerce, who agreed with this language.

John Foster Dulles

[Tab A]

#### PARAGRAPH 5-G

(1) Issue a directive to its armed forces that, in the event of unprovoked Communist armed attack against U.S. military or non-military personnel, aircraft, or vessels outside Communist territory, U.S. forces in the area will take against the Communist attacking force during the course of the attack immediate and aggressive protective measures, including if necessary and feasible hot pursuit of the Communist attacking force into hostile airspace or waters.

(2) In addition to the action directed in (1) above, and as constitutionally authorized and specifically approved by the President, take such additional punitive action as may be necessary and appropriate.

[Tab B]

#### PARAGRAPH 7-C

(1) Maintain the current level of United States export, import, and financial controls on trade with Communist China. Without derogating from the basic principles of these controls, administer

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including Communist China. NSC 5429/4, as amended by the Council but without paragraphs 5-g and 7-c, was approved by the President on December 22 and circulated to NSC members as NSC 5429/5, "Current U.S. Policy Toward the Far East," December 22, 1954. For documentation concerning the NSC 5429 series see *Foreign Relations, 1952-1954*, vol. xii, Part 1, pp. 696 ff.

<sup>4</sup> A memorandum of December 22, 1954 from Lay informed Dulles of NSC Action No. 1292-c and enclosed a draft paragraph 5-g, reflecting the discussion at the December 21 NSC meeting. The draft paragraph was identical with that in Tab A below, except that the words "and feasible" were not included. A memorandum of January 3, 1955, from Robertson to Dulles, to which Lay's memorandum is attached, states that the Department of Defense recommended inserting the words "and feasible." (Department of State, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, Far East, U.S. Policy Towards (NSC 5429 Series))

them in such a manner so as to endeavor not to lessen the active cooperation in the multilateral control program of other Free World countries.

(2) Urge other Free World countries to maintain the current level of export controls on trade with Communist China. In aid of this effort, the United States should, without frustrating the multilateral embargo program, endeavor to handle questions of routine exceptions in such manner as to preserve and foster the willingness of other countries to retain the present level of controls.

(3) Whenever it may be determined by the Secretary of State that further effort to maintain the current multilaterally agreed level of export controls would be seriously divisive among our allies or lead nations needing trade with Communist China toward an accommodation with the Soviet bloc, the Secretary should report such determination promptly to the Council for consideration of appropriate action.

(4) In the meanwhile, the Council on Foreign Economic Policy should study, on an urgent basis, all aspects of U.S. economic defense policy applicable to trade with the Communist bloc (including Communist China), taking into account in such study, among other things, the matters set forth in Annex B,<sup>5</sup> and should submit to the National Security Council at the earliest practicable date comprehensive and detailed recommendations for such revisions in such policy as may be required by national security interests, both long and short range.

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<sup>5</sup> For text of Annex B to NSC 5429/5, "Matters To Be Taken Into Account in a Study of Economic Defense Policy Applicable to Trade With the Communist Bloc," see *Foreign Relations, 1952-1954*, vol. xii, Part 1, p. 1068.

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## 2. Memorandum of Discussion at the 230th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, January 5, 1955<sup>1</sup>

Present at the 230th meeting of the Council were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Director, Foreign Operations Administration; the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General (for Item 1); Mr. Williams for the Secretary of

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by NSC Deputy Executive Secretary Gleason on January 6.



Commerce (for Item 3); the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission (for Item 1); the Federal Civil Defense Administrator (for Item 1); the Director, U.S. Information Agency; the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of the Air Force (all for Item 1); General Twining for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps (all for Item 1); the Director of Central Intelligence; Mr. Cutler, Mr. Dodge, and Mr. Rockefeller, Special Assistants to the President; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

[Here follows discussion of agenda items 1, "Basic National Security Policy," and 2, "U.S. Aid to France."]

3. *Current U.S. Policy Toward the Far East* (NSC 5429/5; NSC 5429/4; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated December 20, 1954;<sup>2</sup> NSC Actions Nos. 1275<sup>3</sup> and 1292;<sup>4</sup> Memo for Executive Secretary, NSC, from Secretary of State, same subject, dated January 4, 1955<sup>5</sup>)

Mr. Cutler briefed the Council on the remaining problems to be settled with respect to NSC 5429/4, and pointed out that the Secretary of State had just circulated versions of paragraphs 5-g and 7-c which were satisfactory to him and which, in the case of paragraph 7-c, had been concurred in by the Secretary of Commerce.

With respect to paragraph 7-c, which dealt with controls on free world trade with Communist China, Governor Stassen inquired whether he was correct in perceiving an indication that some relaxation of these controls might be permissible during the interim period. Secretary Dulles replied that a decision on this matter must result from a case-by-case appraisal. He said that he did not wish to destroy the good will of our allies, which was necessary if we were to maintain controls on essential strategic items, by too great insistence on the maintenance of controls on less important commodities.

Mr. Cutler added that according to his interpretation of paragraph 7-c, a certain degree of flexibility was permitted in the interim

<sup>2</sup> The memorandum enclosed a memorandum of December 17, 1954, from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson, giving the JCS views on NSC 5429/3 of November 19, 1954; for text of the JCS memorandum, see *Foreign Relations, 1952-1954*, vol. XII, Part 1, p. 1050. NSC 5429/3 is printed *ibid.*, p. 972.

<sup>3</sup> In NSC Action No. 1275 of December 1, 1954, the Council agreed upon a number of revisions in NSC 5429/3 and agreed that further revisions should be prepared for future consideration; see *ibid.*, footnote 7, p. 1013.

<sup>4</sup> See *ibid.*, footnote 10, p. 1061.

<sup>5</sup> *Supra.*

period before the Council on Foreign Economic Policy completed its over-all study of East-West trade.

Secretary Dulles then said that he wished to suggest a change in the present language of paragraph 9 of NSC 5429/5, which originally read as follows: "The United States must keep open the possibility of negotiating with the USSR and Communist China acceptable and enforceable agreements, whether limited to individual issues now outstanding or involving a general settlement of major issues." Secretary Dulles said that as written above, the paragraph contained an implication that such agreements might be readily achieved. He doubted very much whether there was any such possibility of achievement, and he therefore concluded that if the above paragraph were to be included at all, it should be changed to reflect the unlikelihood that such agreements could be achieved. We should therefore substitute "should keep an open mind on" for "must keep open".

*The National Security Council:*

a. Adopted the amendments to paragraphs 5-g and 7-c of NSC 5429/4 as proposed in the report by the Secretary of State contained in the reference memorandum of January 4 circulated at the meeting.

b. Adopted the amendment to paragraph 9 of NSC 5429/5 to substitute "should keep an open mind on" for "must keep open".<sup>6</sup>

*Note:* Paragraphs 5-g and 7-c of NSC 5429/4 and paragraph 9 of NSC 5429/5, as amended, approved by the President and subsequently circulated for insertion in NSC 5429/5.

[Here follows discussion of agenda items 4, 5, and 6: "Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security," "Areas Considered Accessible in Calculating Long-term Stockpile Objectives," and "NSC Status of Projects."]

**S. Everett Gleason**

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<sup>6</sup> The lettered subparagraphs constitute NSC Action No. 1295. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95)

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### 3. Editorial Note

On January 6 President Eisenhower transmitted to the Senate the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of China, signed at Washington on December 2, 1954, together with a covering message to the Senate dated January 6, a report from Secretary of State John Foster Dulles to the President, dated December 22, 1954, notes exchanged by Secretary Dulles and Foreign Minister

George K.C. Yeh on December 10, 1954, and various public statements made in connection with the signing of the treaty. The President's message and the enclosures are printed in S. Exec. A, 84th Cong., 1st sess., which is reprinted in *Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Historical Series)*, volume VII, 1955 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1978), pages 774-781. The treaty and the notes are printed in 6 UST 433; the President's message, the Secretary's report, and the notes are printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, January 24, 1955, pages 150-152. For documentation concerning the treaty and the exchange of notes, see *Foreign Relations, 1952-1954*, volume XIV, Part 1, pages 555 ff.

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#### 4. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, January 7, 1955<sup>1</sup>

##### PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary  
Mr. Hoover  
Mr. Murphy  
Mr. Allen Dulles  
Mr. Key  
Mr. Robertson  
Mr. McCardle  
Mr. Phleger  
Mr. MacArthur  
Mr. Bowie  
Mr. Popper (UN/P)<sup>2</sup>  
Mr. Meeker (L/UNA)<sup>3</sup>

##### SUBJECT

Problem of the Release of U.S. Airmen in Communist China<sup>4</sup>—Meeting in Secretary's Office, January 7, 1955, 4:00 p.m.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.95A241/1-755. Top Secret. Drafted by Robert K. Sherwood of the Executive Secretariat who is not listed among the participants of the meeting. Approved with minor revisions by Secretary Dulles.

<sup>2</sup> David H. Popper, Director of the Office of U.N. Political and Security Affairs.

<sup>3</sup> Leonard C. Meeker, Assistant Legal Adviser for U.N. Affairs.

<sup>4</sup> Fifteen U.S. Air Force personnel were known to be imprisoned in the People's Republic of China. On November 23, 1954, Peking radio had announced that 11 U.S. airmen and 2 U.S. civilians had been convicted of espionage and sentenced to prison terms ranging from 4 years to life. The 11 airmen were Colonel John K. Arnold, Commander of the 581st Air Resupply and Communications Wing, and his crew whose B-29 had been shot down in January 1953 while they were on a leaflet-dropping mission under the U.N. Command in Korea. The two civilians, John T. Downey and Richard George Fecteau, had been captured in November 1952 while on a mission for the Central Intelligence Agency. In a letter of December 4, 1954, from U.S. Representative at

The Secretary opened the meeting with Ambassador Lodge's suggestion that an officer be appointed in the Government to deal with the problem of prisoners in Communist China. This officer would be responsible for coordinating action and public statements on all individual cases. The Secretary noted that Mr. Lodge's suggestion had been concurred in by Secretary of Defense Wilson who had offered to have the position established in his Department. The Secretary said that the solution might be two "prisoner officers", one in the State Department to handle the problem of civilian prisoners, and one in the Defense Department for military prisoners. The latter would clear all policy statements with State, through a State Department adviser. Mr. Key agreed to work out with FE, CIA, and Defense a program along these lines.

The Secretary then opened the discussion of what practically can be done in the UN or by the US to bring about the release of the airmen should the Hammarskjöld Mission fail. The Secretary suggested that we might get a strong resolution in the UN condemning the Chinese Communists. The Secretary added that formalized sanctions, either by the UN or by the US, would raise the question of "face" for the Chinese Communists and would not be a successful means to gain release of the airmen. He thought that we might instead resort to taking actions that annoy the Chinese without identifying the motive: they would quickly get the point.

There followed a general discussion on the pros and cons of various kinds of aggravating actions which might be taken against the Chinese Communists, including overflights, mining of harbors, and bombing of railroads. The Secretary suggested that junk traffic along the China coast might be intercepted by naval action. Mr. Phleger pointed out that reprisals of this sort might violate international law, as well as the UN Charter. Mr. MacArthur raised the question that

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the United Nations Henry Cabot Lodge to U.N. Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld, the United States had requested U.N. action concerning the 11 airmen. A letter of December 7, 1954, from Lodge to Hammarskjöld had called attention to four additional U.S. airmen who had been shot down between September 1952 and April 1953 while flying missions for the U.N. Command in Korea and were known to be imprisoned in the People's Republic of China. (U.N. docs. A/2830 and 2843) On December 10, 1954, the General Assembly had adopted U.N. Resolution 906(IX), which requested the Secretary-General to seek the release of the 11 U.N. Command personnel and any other such personnel who were still detained. Hammarskjöld had subsequently arranged to visit Peking for discussions with Chou En-lai, Premier and Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China; he arrived in Peking on January 5. Hammarskjöld's public statements and further information relating to his mission to Peking are printed in *Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations*, vol. II, *Dag Hammarskjöld, 1953-1956*, Andrew W. Cordier and Wilder Foote, eds. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), pp. 415-459. Copies of Secretary-General Hammarskjöld's records of his conversations with Chinese Premier Chou En-lai in Peking, January 6-10, are in the Andrew Cordier Papers, Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Columbia University, Box 132.

the reaction of the Chinese Communists might lead them to use planes and submarines against the intercepting vessels. The Secretary then remarked that he did not think that the Chinese Communists want war. Mr. Phleger said he thought there would be serious doubts of the President's Constitutional authority to undertake offensive hostile action against the Chinese Communists which might lead into general hostilities with them. Mr. Murphy said that punitive action such as the Secretary suggested had not been resorted to even during the Korean hostilities.

The Secretary reiterated his feeling that the best course might be for the UN to pass a strongly condemnatory resolution against the Chinese Communists and then leave the matter to the governments concerned, since he felt that we could not get a 2/3-vote to favor strong measures by the UN, and that efforts along these lines might break the organization. Mr. Allen Dulles suggested that the crew of the *Tuapse*<sup>5</sup> now held in Formosa might provide a bargaining instrument. Mr. Dulles added that he would check into available intelligence on junk traffic.

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<sup>5</sup> The Soviet tanker *Tuapse* and its crew, which had been seized by Republic of China naval forces on June 23, 1954, were still being held in Taiwan; for documentation, see *Foreign Relations, 1952-1954*, vol. xiv, Part 1, pp. 338 ff.

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## 5. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the President and the Secretary of State, Washington, January 10, 1955, 12:05 p.m.<sup>1</sup>

1. I reported what Cabot Lodge had told me as to the messages from Hammarskjöld.<sup>2</sup> I indicated that it would probably be wise to

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President. Extract. Secret; Personal and Private. Drafted by the Secretary of State. The time of the meeting is indicated in the President's appointment diary. (*Ibid.*, President's Daily Appointments)

<sup>2</sup> Lodge's reports on January 7 and 10 of messages from Hammarskjöld which the latter's executive assistant, Andrew W. Cordier, had transmitted orally to him, are recorded in notes by Dulles' personal assistant, Phyllis Bernau, of telephone conversations between Dulles and Lodge. On January 7, according to Bernau's notes, Lodge reported a message from Hammarskjöld that Chou was "relating the question of the flyers to the whole complex of questions". On the morning of January 10, Lodge reported a message that Hammarskjöld and Chou were issuing a joint communiqué that day in Peking and that "the meetings have been useful and they intend to continue the contact. Privately, Hammarskjöld says the outside reaction at his departure may prove decisive." In a later conversation, Lodge explained that Cordier thought that by "reaction," Hammarskjöld meant "to be calm as we have been the last few weeks."

try to keep the lid on, at least until Hammarskjold got back and we would have a fuller story. The President agreed, indicating that he doubted the country or the Congress was prepared to go to war about this matter.

JFD

(Memoranda by Phyllis Bernau of telephone conversations with Lodge, at 2:13 and 3:25 p.m., January 7, 1955, and 9:44 and 10:24 a.m., January 10, 1955; both *ibid.*, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations) For text of the communiqué issued in Peking on January 10, 1955, see *Public Papers of the Secretaries-General*, vol. II, p. 436.

## 6. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Cutler) to the Secretary of State <sup>1</sup>

*Washington, January 11, 1955.*

In connection with the attack on January 10 by the Chinese Communists on the Chinese Nationalist held Tachen Islands, Admiral Carney, following a telephone conversation last night, sent to me a memorandum, copy of which is attached.

I had an opportunity after lunch today to discuss the substance of this memorandum with the President and Admiral Radford.

With the President's approval, this question will be discussed as a part of Item 3 at the NSC Meeting on Thursday, January 13, "U.S. Policy Toward Formosa and the Government of the Republic of China". Because of the sensitive nature of Admiral Carney's memorandum, I am sending a copy before the Meeting only to you, so as to afford time for consideration before the Meeting. Secretary Wilson and Admiral Radford have received a copy of the memorandum direct from Admiral Carney.

In our informal discussion, the President was inclined to feel that it might in practice be difficult to apply the last clause of paragraph 5c of NSC 5429/5, <sup>2</sup> and that perhaps CINCPAC should be

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/1-1155. Top Secret. Notes attached to the source text indicate that the memorandum was circulated on January 12 to Under Secretary Hoover, Deputy Under Secretary Murphy, Policy Planning Staff Director Bowie, and Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs Robertson in preparation for a meeting in the Secretary's office that afternoon.

<sup>2</sup> The last sentence of paragraph 5-c of NSC 5429/5, December 22, 1954, reads as follows: "However, refrain from assisting or encouraging offensive actions against Communist China, and restrain the Chinese Nationalists from such actions, except in

*Continued*

authorized to permit Chinat retaliation in the case of any Chicom attack on a Chinat held off-shore island deemed by CINCPAC to be significant, and to meet criteria established by CINCPAC for feasibility and likelihood of success.

Robert Cutler

[Attachment]

**Memorandum From the Chief of Naval Operations  
(Carney) to the President's Special Assistant for National  
Security Affairs (Cutler) <sup>3</sup>**

*Washington, 11 January 1955.*

SUBJ

NSC 5429/5—Current Policy Toward the Far East as Relating to ChiNat Held Off-shore Islands

1. On 10 January 1955 (East Longitude date) the Chinese Communists attacked Ha Hsia Tachen with approximately fifty airplanes in four raids over a period of nine hours. The principal targets were ChiNat ships in the harbor which sustained slight to heavy damage. There is no evidence to indicate that the ChiComs are preparing an amphibious operation against the Tachen Islands in the immediate future.

2. On 3 November 1954 instructions were issued to Commander in Chief, Pacific <sup>4</sup> which provided guidance for military action, both by the U.S. and ChiNat forces, in event of ChiCom attack. These instructions authorized CINCPAC to acquiesce in ChiNat air retaliation in event of ChiCom air attack against the Tachens provided that such retaliation could be initiated with sufficient promptness as would leave no doubt that the ChiNat reaction was in fact a retaliation for the specific ChiCom attack, and further that the targets attacked in retaliation met CINCPAC's criteria as to feasibility and chance of success. The full text of these instructions is appended.

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response to Chinese Communist provocation judged adequate in each case by the President." (See *Foreign Relations, 1952-1954*, vol. xii, Part 1, p. 1062)

<sup>3</sup> This memorandum is Top Secret.

<sup>4</sup> In telegram 031925Z from CNO to CINCPAC, November 3, 1954. The substance was quoted in telegram 278 to Taipei, November 3, 1954: for text, see *Foreign Relations, 1952-1954*, vol. xiv, Part 1, p. 854. Admiral Felix B. Stump was Commander in Chief, Pacific.

3. On 11 January 1955 CINCPAC was advised <sup>5</sup> of the contents of paragraphs 5.c. and g. of NSC 5429/5 and further advised that the policy expressed therein was to be considered as modifying instructions issued to him in November. The most significant part of this new policy as it relates to the current situation in the Tachen Islands is contained in the following extracts from paragraph 5.c.:

"However, refrain from assisting or encouraging offensive actions against Communist China and *restrain* the Chinese Nationalists from such actions except in response to Chinese Communist provocation *judged adequate in each case by the President.*" (Underlining supplied) <sup>6</sup>

4. The ChiCom bombing of the Tachen Islands on 10 January was the heaviest attack against any of the off-shore islands since the large scale artillery shelling of Quemoy in September 1954. The ChiNats have a limited capability for retaliatory action. Their capability to retaliate by means of air attack against ChiCom air fields is extremely limited and such attacks would be militarily ineffective. They also have the capability of attacking ChiCom radar installations on the coast and in addition have the capability to deliver air and surface attacks against ChiCom shipping in port and at sea.

5. As a practical matter the current National policy is difficult to apply. For example, our ability to "restrain" the Chinese Nationalists is limited to a large extent by their willingness to comply with our wishes. If the Chinese Nationalists are to retaliate in response to ChiCom attacks such as the attack on the Tachens on 10 January, retaliatory action should be prompt so as to be related closely in time to the incident which provoked it. The time required to obtain in each instance a Presidential judgment on the adequacy of Chinese Communist provocation might well prove to be a bar to timely ChiNat reaction. In addition a burdensome load would be placed on the highest officials of the U.S. Government each time an incident of ChiCom aggression, however minor, occurred. This would create at the least a difficult administrative problem.

6. In view of the above, guidance is requested as to how the current policy affecting ChiNat retaliatory action is to be applied.

**Robt. B. Carney**

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<sup>5</sup> In telegram 110145Z from CNO to CINCPAC, January 10, not printed. (JCS Files, CCS 381 Formosa (11-8-48) Sec. 16)

<sup>6</sup> Printed here as italics.



7. Telegram From the Ambassador in Japan (Allison) to the Department of State <sup>1</sup>

Tokyo, January 12, 1955—7 p.m.

1668. For the Secretary. At short private talk with General Hull and me just prior his departure Tokyo, Hammarskjöld asked if I would tell you that he thinks it would be most useful to have discussion with you and President early next week concerning events of his trip. If you and President concur he would be willing to come to Washington any time after next Monday. <sup>2</sup>

Following information Hammarskjöld said had been forwarded his staff New York and possibly has been made available to Department <sup>3</sup> but in case it has not he suggested I repeat it. As result of trip Hammarskjöld expresses himself as "moderately optimistic". He said at no time did Chou En-lai attempt to tie up release of prisoners with any other issue. Also it became clearly evident that Chou did not wish finally close door to settlement this issue. It was made clear by Chou that if question of release of prisoners could be completely divorced from any political overtones there was possibility of favorable outcome. Hammarskjöld said Chou did not give any indication as to when or how this could be achieved by [but] Hammarskjöld believes that after two or three months prisoners might be released for some reason such as good behavior or other matter not tied up with political issues.

Hammarskjöld expressed considerable admiration for Chou's intellectual and general ability and said that obviously one could not have such long close association without obtaining a certain conviction about a person. He said that Chou succeeded in a most difficult role in making clear to him, Hammarskjöld, what he wanted him to understand from the Foreign Policy aspect of this whole matter and yet at the same time gave perhaps a completely different impression for domestic consumption of what had been said and agreed to. One of the most significant statements Hammarskjöld made was that Chou appeared in private conversations to be a very worried man. Toward end of talks Chou appeared to become more human and in his private discussions with Hammarskjöld did not resort to any ob-

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.95A241/1-1255. Secret; Priority. According to notes by Phyllis Bernau of a telephone call from Dulles to Lodge on January 12, the Secretary indicated that he was "not keen" about Hammarskjöld's proposal to come to Washington and that an official visit "would make trouble and would give the impression he was the intermediary between the Sec. and the Pres. and Chou"; they agreed that Lodge should see Hammarskjöld first and then confer with the Secretary. (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations)

<sup>2</sup> A similar message from Hammarskjöld had been given orally to Lodge by Cordier on January 11 and transmitted to the Department in telegram 348 from New York, January 11. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.95A241/1-1155)

vious propaganda of the usual Communist clichés. Although Chou had made much in his public message agreeing to Hammarskjöld's trip<sup>3</sup> about "pertinent" questions which should be discussed and implied that these concerned recognition, admission to UN etc., Hammarskjöld said these were not discussed in any way and that Chou obviously did not expect them to be.

Hammarskjöld made no substantive statements to press while in Tokyo although he was importuned to do so. He was met at airport by Foreign Minister Shigemitsu and others but had no private talks with anyone other than General Hull and me.

Allison

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<sup>3</sup> For text of Chou's cable of December 17, 1954, to Hammarskjöld, see *Public Papers of the Secretaries-General*, vol. II, p. 423.

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## 8. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, January 12, 1955<sup>1</sup>

### SUBJECT

Defense of Tachen Islands

### PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Wellington Koo—Chinese Ambassador  
Mr. Robertson, Assistant Secretary, FE  
Mr. McConaughy, Director, CA

Ambassador Koo said he was calling on instructions of the Generalissimo to express the concern of the Chinese Government at the recent large scale Chinese Communist air attacks on the Tachen Islands; to ascertain the U.S. view of the importance of the Tachens; and to find out what moral and matériel support the Chinese Government could expect from the U.S. Government in the defense of the Tachens and the other off-shore islands. The Ambassador said that his Government understood the reasons which compelled the U.S. to exclude the off-shore islands from the Mutual Defense Treaty. Notwithstanding the absence of any treaty obligation on the

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/1-1255. Secret. Drafted by McConaughy, Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs. Initialed by Robertson, indicating his approval. A note attached to the source text indicates that it was sent to the Secretary at Robertson's suggestion and that it was seen by the Secretary. Ambassador Koo's record of this conversation, along with his records of other conversations with U.S. officials during 1955, are in the Wellington Koo Papers, Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Columbia University, Box 195.

part of the U.S., the Chinese Government was hopeful of receiving strong moral and logistic support from the U.S. in the defense of the off-shore islands. The Chinese Government of course did not intend to involve the U.S. in combat action. But matériel and moral support, short of military participation, would be of great psychological value to the Chinese Armed Forces defending the islands. The extent of U.S. support would influence the decision of the Generalissimo as to whether the Chinese forces should go all out to hold the islands.

The Chinese Government is convinced that the Chinese Communist capabilities for bombing the off-shore islands, using Soviet planes, are constantly increasing, with large scale Soviet tactical and logistic assistance. The scale of the January 10 attack was larger than any Communist air action in the Korean War. The Chinese Government considers the threat to its retention of the off-shore islands is increasing dangerously. This makes it essential that the position of the U.S. Government be made known to the Chinese Government.

Mr. Robertson said this was a matter which would require the consideration of the Secretary. The Secretary had been away all of yesterday and Mr. Robertson had been with the Hoover Commission<sup>2</sup> all morning. Hence there had not been an opportunity for full consideration of the heavy Communist bombing attack of January 10. Mr. Robertson said that he did not want to say anything definite until he had consulted the Secretary. However, without putting it in the form of a suggestion, he would like to know what the Ambassador thought of placing the matter before the UN Security Council. The inquiry need not be relayed to the Generalissimo. But for his own background information Mr. Robertson would like to know what the Ambassador personally thought of such a course of action. Here was an unprovoked attack on territory legitimately held by a UN member. It was an act of aggression which threatened peace and security. Could not a case be made for placing it before the Security Council?

Amb. Koo said this possibility had not been mentioned in the two telegrams on the subject which he had received from his Government. He did not believe his Government was thinking in terms of UN action. He asked if Mr. Robertson was thinking of an appeal to the UN by the Chinese Government, or by some other Government, such as New Zealand?

Mr. Robertson said that the question might be raised by any UN member. The Chinese Government could take the action if it wished to.

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<sup>2</sup> The Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government (Second Hoover Commission), established in July 1953.

Amb. Koo said that his Government would probably consider the UN incapable of deterring Chinese Communist aggression against the off-shore islands. Since a UN appeal would probably be ineffectual, he doubted if his Government would want to give serious consideration to it. He inquired what benefits Mr. Robertson thought might result from putting the matter before the UN.

Mr. Robertson said that in all probability the Soviet Union would feel compelled to veto any resolution which might be considered on the subject. A Soviet veto would greatly improve the international position of the Chinese Government, morally and psychologically, and would put the Communist side in an unfavorable light.

Amb. Koo said he felt there was general agreement on the significance of the Tachens from a psychological and political standpoint. There was some disagreement as to the strategic importance of the Tachens from a strictly military standpoint. They were about 200 miles from Formosa and the essentiality of the islands to the military defense of Formosa could be argued. But there was no argument as to their importance from other standpoints. Their loss would undoubtedly be a grave blow to the Chinese Government. A Chinese Communist victory would enhance the prestige of the Communists and embolden them to seize Quemoy and the remaining off-shore islands. All the off-shore islands would be important stepping stones to Formosa and the Pescadores. The inability of the Chinese Government to defend its territory would discredit it among Chinese everywhere and influence many Chinese to go over to the side of the Communists. The momentum gained by the Communists from seizure of the off-shore islands would put them in a favorable position for further aggression.

Mr. Robertson said that the matter of the strategic importance of the Tachens was one primarily for military determination as he saw it. We could not commit ourselves to go to war for islands so far from Formosa. However, the type of consultation called for under the Treaty could and should go forward, even though the Treaty was not yet ratified. He assumed that our top military people in the area were already exchanging views with the Chinese military authorities on this subject. We were already assisting the Chinese in the defense of the off-shore islands by providing military hardware and defense support which were used on the islands. Furthermore the garrison on Tachen and other islands had received the benefit of MAAG training on Formosa, before being rotated to duty on the islands.

Amb. Koo acknowledged that American assistance was being made available indirectly for the defense of the off-shore islands. However he did not understand that our MAAG officers were primarily responsible for consulting with and advising the Chinese military on strategic and combat questions. He thought they were in For-

mosa primarily for training purposes and their advisory role was chiefly in the training field.

Mr. Robertson mentioned that Admiral Stump as the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet had top U.S. military responsibility in the area and was certainly authorized to advise and recommend in the strategic field.

Amb. Koo recognized this fact but mentioned that Admiral Stump had a vast area to cover and was able to visit Formosa and adjacent areas only infrequently.

Amb. Koo then said that his Government had five requests to make of the U.S. Government as follows:

1. That the U.S. Government make an official statement on the Communist assault on the Tachen Islands, expressing its concern at this aggressive action and indicating its sympathy with the Chinese Government in its defense of the islands. He said that the silence of the U.S. Government so far on this act of aggression was noticeable. It was felt that a statement along the lines suggested would tend to keep the Communists guessing as to whether we would assist in the defense of the islands, and would therefore have something of a deterrent effect on the Communists, and a favorable psychological effect on the Chinese Government troops defending the islands.

2. That the U.S. Government assign a fully empowered high ranking military official to Taipei as a consultant. A role more or less corresponding to that of General Collins<sup>3</sup> in Vietnam was envisaged. Such an officer should be authorized to make decisions on the spot. The assignment of such an official would impress the outside world and in itself would tend to improve the situation.

3. That elements of the 7th Fleet be deployed closer to the Tachen Islands. At present the 7th Fleet vessels were standing some distance off. If they stood closer in they would seem to show more of an interest in the defense of the Tachens, and without becoming involved in hostilities themselves, could exert a useful influence.

4. That the U.S. Government give assurances of generous logistic support for the defense of the off-shore islands. He mentioned that the consumption rate for matériel and supplies already was greatly stepped up, and probably would be further accelerated as the tempo of hostilities rose. He mentioned that in the single day of January 10, three vessels had been lost or put out of commission. One aircraft had been lost and large quantities of ammunition expended. If the Chinese Forces had the certainty of strong U.S. logistic support, this knowledge would give a lift to their morale.

5. That the U.S. Government accelerate the delivery of matériel and supplies already scheduled under the Military Assistance Program:—especially jet aircraft, the 4 destroyers recently requested, and a number of LST's. All these items would be very important to the supply and defense of the off-shore islands. The rate of loss of both aircraft and naval vessels was expected to rise as a result of increased

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<sup>3</sup> General J. Lawton Collins, Special Representative of President Eisenhower in Vietnam.

Chinese Communist Air Force capabilities along the China coast opposite the off-shore islands.

The Ambassador requested Mr. Robertson to convey these five requests to the Secretary urgently. He said he hoped to see the Secretary early next week and to receive some indication of the U.S. position then.

Mr. Robertson assured the Ambassador that his representations would receive the early attention of the Secretary.

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9. **Memorandum of Discussion at the 231st Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, January 13, 1955**<sup>1</sup>

Present at this meeting were the President of the United States, presiding (except for Item 8, when the Vice President presided); the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State (for Items 1 through 5); the Acting Secretary of Defense; Gen. Porter for the Director, Foreign Operations Administration; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Director, U.S. Information Agency (for Items 2 through 8); the Under Secretary of State (for Items 5 through 8); the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; Mr. Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; Mr. Rockefeller, Special Assistant to the President; Mr. Bowie, Department of State; the White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

[Here follows discussion of agenda item 1, "CIA Quarterly Report."]

*2. Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security*

[Here follows a summary of the first portion of the intelligence briefing, given by Director of Central Intelligence Allen W. Dulles, and related discussion concerning Costa Rica.]

At the close of this discussion, Mr. Allen Dulles resumed his briefing with comments on the attack by the Chinese Communists on the Tachen Islands, which he described as the heaviest action by the Communists against the Nationalists since the attacks on

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Gleason on January 14.

Quemoy in September. Between 60 and 100 Chinese Communist aircraft had participated in the attack on the Tachens, and the engagement had lasted nine or ten hours. Mr. Dulles believed that the Chinese Nationalists had been caught somewhat unprepared for the attack, which indicated to him good Communist intelligence with respect to the rotation of Chinese Nationalist troops in the Tachens.

Admiral Radford was inclined to disagree with the view that the Nationalists had been caught off guard. He indicated, however, that they had lost one LST and that another LST, as well as a Nationalist gunboat, had been severely damaged.

Mr. Allen Dulles resumed by pointing out the serious morale effect on the Nationalist garrisons in the Tachen Islands if the Chinese Communist attacks were to continue. Continuation of the attacks would also present the Generalissimo with the problem of determining whether or not to engage a considerable sector of the Nationalist armed forces to defend the Tachen Islands.

Admiral Radford interposed to state that the situation in the Tachens was currently such that they could not be held by the Nationalists if the Chinese Communists succeeded in interdicting the supply lines between Formosa and the Tachens. The answer to this problem appeared to be an increase in the number of F-86 aircraft delivered to the Nationalists by the United States. The United States has already provided a certain number of F-86's. General Twining, said Admiral Radford, was of the opinion that it was possible to speed up the delivery of other F-86's so that they could be on hand before April 15, after which date the Nationalists believe that the real Chinese Communist effort to take the Tachens can be expected. Admiral Radford also thought that it would be advantageous from the point of view of the United States if the Chinese Nationalists were successful in producing attrition of the Chinese Communist Air Force. Beyond that, the delivery of an additional wing of F-86's would enable the Chinese Nationalists to run an effective air patrol over the Tachen Islands on those days in which there were concentrations of vessels in the port.

Admiral Radford also indicated the desire of the Chinese Nationalists for eight additional LST's. He advised that these vessels could and should be sent if the United States desires that the Chinese Nationalists hold on to the Tachen Islands. Admiral Radford concluded by stating that General Chase had informed him that the defenses of the Tachen Islands were very strong, and that the problem of resupply was the real key to the situation.

*The National Security Council:*

Noted and discussed an oral briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence on the subject, with specific reference to the situations in Costa Rica and in the Tachen Islands.<sup>2</sup>

3. *U.S. Policy Toward Formosa and the Government of the Republic of China* (NSC 5441;<sup>3</sup> NSC 5434/1;<sup>4</sup> NSC 5429/5; NSC 146/2;<sup>5</sup> NSC Action No. 1146;<sup>6</sup> Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated January 10, 1955;<sup>7</sup> Memo for Secretary of Defense from JCS, subject: "NSC 5429/5, 'U.S. Policy Toward the Far East' ", dated January 12, 1955)<sup>8</sup>

Mr. Cutler briefed the Council at considerable length on the subject report (NSC 5441), concluding that this policy report was something of a miracle inasmuch as it had been approved without change by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and contained no split views by the members of the NSC Planning Board. (A copy of Mr. Cutler's brief is filed with the minutes of the meeting.)<sup>9</sup>

<sup>2</sup> This constitutes NSC Action No. 1300. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95)

<sup>3</sup> For text of NSC 5441, see *Foreign Relations, 1952-1954*, vol. xiv, Part 1, p. 1051.

<sup>4</sup> For text of NSC 5434/1, see *ibid.*, vol. i, Part 1, p. 786.

<sup>5</sup> For text of NSC 146/2, see *ibid.*, vol. xiv, Part 1, p. 307.

<sup>6</sup> In NSC Action No. 1146 of June 3, 1954, the National Security Council agreed to amend NSC Action No. 1136-b of May 27, 1954, to read as follows:

"b. Noted that the President has authorized elements of the U.S. Seventh Fleet, as a routine incident to their patrol of the Formosan area, to pay friendly visits to the Tachen Islands lying off the east coast of China, which are held by the Chinese Nationalist Government and are closely related to the defense of Formosa, in order to make a show of strength that might deter the Chinese Communists from attacking these islands."

<sup>7</sup> The memorandum under reference enclosed a memorandum of January 6 from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense stating the JCS view that those portions of NSC 5441 having military implications were consistent with basic national policy and were acceptable from the military point of view. (Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5441 Series)

<sup>8</sup> The memorandum under reference stated the JCS view that subparagraph 5-c of NSC 5429/5 "will prove to be a bar to timely Chinese Nationalist reaction, and in addition will place a burdensome load on the highest officials of the U.S. Government each time an incident of Chinese Communist aggression, however minor, occurred". It recommended that paragraph 5-c should be revised so that the last sentence would read, "However, refrain from assisting and encouraging offensive actions against Communist China, except in retaliation for Chinese Communist provocation, provided that such retaliation can be promptly applied and is both feasible and enjoys reasonable chance of success" and recommended that a similar modification should be made to paragraph 11 of NSC 5441. (*Ibid.*, NSC 5429 Series) Paragraph 11 of NSC 5441 reads as follows:

"Refrain from assisting or encouraging GRC offensive actions against Communist China, and restrain the GRC from such actions, except in response to Chinese Communist provocation judged adequate in each case by the President."

<sup>9</sup> Not attached to the source text and not found in Department of State files.



Before the Council began its consideration of this policy paper, Mr. Cutler said he wished to call their attention to a story in *The New York Times* of January 12 which described a private memorandum which had been circulated to members of the Congress by the Democratic National Committee and which questioned the wisdom of Senate ratification of the mutual defense treaty with the Formosa government. Mr. Cutler then read the chief points made by this memorandum. In the first place, the memorandum argued that ratification of the treaty would for the first time constitute a formal recognition of Formosa and the Pescadores as territories of the Republic of China. Secondly, such formal recognition would support the claim of the Chinese Communists that an armed attack on Formosa and the Pescadores would not constitute international aggression on their part, but only civil war, in which the right and purpose of other nations forcibly to intervene would be open to serious doubt. In conclusion, Mr. Cutler said he thought the matter serious, and would like to have the Secretary of State comment. The President said that by all means Secretary Dulles should comment.

The Secretary of State said that the memorandum which Mr. Cutler had read did indeed indicate an "interesting development". He would prefer, however, to defer discussion of it until the Vice President (who had momentarily left the meeting) could be present.

Accordingly, Mr. Cutler suggested that the Council look at paragraph 11 of the present paper, because this paragraph posed a certain problem. Paragraph 11 read as follows:

"Refrain from assisting or encouraging GRC offensive actions against Communist China, and restrain the GRC from such actions, except in response to Chinese Communist provocation judged adequate in each case by the President."

Mr. Cutler explained that the recent attack by the Chinese Communists against the Tachen Islands had provided the first test of the adequacy of the policy set forth in this paragraph. A memorandum to him from the Chief of Naval Operations<sup>10</sup> had raised the question as to the validity of current instructions to the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Fleet in the Pacific. There was some question as to whether Chinese Nationalist retaliatory action was to be considered offensive action in the sense of paragraph 11. Furthermore, if paragraph 11 were to be construed in a manner to permit the Chinese Nationalists to engage in retaliatory action against the Chinese Communist mainland, so much time would be consumed in obtaining the judgment of the President that the retaliatory character of Chinese Nationalist action would not be apparent. Mr. Cutler ended by indi-

<sup>10</sup> See the attachment to Document 6.

cating to the Council the President's view, when he was briefed for this meeting, that a distinction should be made between offensive actions which were in retaliation for Chinese Communist attacks, and other kinds of offensive action, and that CINCPAC should exercise his own best judgment with respect to the mounting of retaliatory actions by the Chinese Nationalists. Accordingly, said Mr. Cutler, he had prepared for Council consideration a revision of paragraph 11 of NSC 5441, as well as a revision of paragraph 5-c of NSC 5429/5,<sup>11</sup> which reflected the President's view. He noted that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had likewise presented a revision of these paragraphs. Mr. Cutler then called on the Secretary of State for his opinion of the proposed revision of these two paragraphs.

Secretary Dulles said that he had no objection in principle to the revised language presented by Mr. Cutler. However, he too had prepared a revision<sup>12</sup> which he believed to be more in line with the exchange of notes between the Government of the Republic of China and the United States Government, which had occurred when the mutual defense treaty was being negotiated. His own revision, said Secretary Dulles, made a clear distinction between retaliatory action by the Chinese Nationalists and other varieties of offensive action. After considerable discussion of the various drafts, the Council agreed on a new version of the two paragraphs.

<sup>11</sup> Not attached to the source text.

<sup>12</sup> A draft revision of paragraph 5-c of NSC 5429/5, found attached to Cutler's memorandum of January 11 to Dulles, reads as follows:

"In the event of Chinese Communist attack against the offshore islands, the Senior U.S. Commander of the Pacific area should be authorized to acquiesce in Chinese Nationalist retaliation therefor, provided that:

"a. Such retaliation can be initiated with sufficient promptness and carried out in such a manner as to leave no doubt that it is in fact a retaliation for the specific Chinese Communist attack; and

"b. That any target selected for retaliation be limited to military targets, meet criteria fixed by him as to feasibility and prospect of success, and take due account of the undesirability or provoking Chinese Communist reaction against Formosa itself."

On the source text, the words "offshore islands" were substituted, in what is apparently Dulles' handwriting, for the words "Tachen Islands or Quemoy". Another copy of the draft revision indicates that it was drafted by Bowie and that it was discussed at the NSC briefing in the Secretary's office on January 12. (Department of State, PPS Files: Lot 66 D 70, China) A draft revision of paragraph 11 of NSC 5441, also found attached to Cutler's January 11 memorandum, reads as follows:

"11. Not to agree to GRC offensive actions against Communist China except under circumstances approved by the President.

"a. To authorize actions against Communist China which are promptly and clearly retaliatory, which are against military targets and which are not judged to involve a wasteful expenditure of assets, all in the judgment of the United States Commander in the Pacific area."

The words "and clearly" appear, in what is apparently Dulles' handwriting, on the source text.

Since the Vice President had by this time returned to the meeting, Mr. Cutler suggested that Secretary Dulles now return to the subject of the memorandum circulated to members of Congress by the Democratic National Committee, discussion of which had been deferred.

Secretary Dulles said that this memorandum represented a most interesting development, discussion of which he wished the Vice President to hear. There seemed, said Secretary Dulles, to be a somewhat nebulous group of former members of the State Department—including Messrs. Acheson,<sup>13</sup> Adrian Fisher,<sup>14</sup> Myron Cowen,<sup>15</sup> Paul Nitze,<sup>16</sup> Benjamin Cohen,<sup>17</sup> and possibly Finletter<sup>18</sup>—whose purpose it was to purvey various ideas to the Democratic National Committee. The first of these attempts to purvey ideas critical of the Administration's foreign policy was represented by this memorandum on the mutual defense treaty. This memorandum was plainly designed to obfuscate the issues and to throw monkey wrenches into the Administration's plans. Secretary Dulles then discussed the substantive points made in the memorandum, and went on to say that both these points had been most carefully considered when the treaty was being discussed with the Government of the Republic of China. Indeed, we had used the precise language we had chosen because such language involved no final commitment as to the actual transfer of title to Formosa and the Pescadores to the GRC.

Secretary Dulles then went on to express with some indignation his fear that the memorandum in question would spearhead organized opposition to the ratification of the mutual defense treaty in the United States Senate. The President inquired whether it would not be well to prepare a statement to meet the issues raised by the Democratic memorandum, and perhaps get someone like Senator Mansfield<sup>19</sup> to make it public. Secretary Dulles agreed that it would be wise not to let too much time pass before countering the points raised in the memorandum.

The Vice President inquired, what forum? Perhaps the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Secretary Dulles expressed the opinion that a public meeting of that Committee would be a logical place, adding that he would first, however, have a private conversation with Senator George, who had known about the treaty from its in-

<sup>13</sup> Dean Acheson, former Secretary of State, 1949-1953.

<sup>14</sup> Adrian S. Fisher, former Legal Adviser, 1949-1953.

<sup>15</sup> Myron M. Cowen had served between 1948 and 1953 as Ambassador to Australia, the Philippines, and Belgium.

<sup>16</sup> Paul H. Nitze, former Director of the Policy Planning Staff, 1950-1953.

<sup>17</sup> Benjamin V. Cohen, Counselor of the Department of State, 1945-1947.

<sup>18</sup> Thomas K. Finletter, Secretary of the Air Force, 1950-1953.

<sup>19</sup> Senator Mike Mansfield of Montana.

ception. Secretary Dulles then said that in his opinion the activities of the group which had written this memorandum bordered on the traitorous—at a time when our national security policies were faced with such severe difficulties.

The President said to Secretary Dulles that he saw no reason why it was necessary to forego the possibility of a public statement because the Secretary desired to deal directly with Senator George or Senator Mansfield. The best plan was to show these two what Secretary Dulles intended to say at a public hearing. Indeed, one of these two Senators might well be induced to denounce the activities of this cabal at the time when we most desperately needed bi-partisan support of our foreign policy.

The Vice President observed that it was obvious to him that this whole thing was a calculated political maneuver. Much the same technique had been used to criticize the President's State of the Union message, only in this case the group elected to leak the criticism to the press instead of coming out with a direct public statement. The Vice President went on to state that whoever was selected to make public reference to this breach of bi-partisanship, it should certainly not be either the President or the Secretary of State. Perhaps the best thing would be for some Senator who was not involved, or some well-known press figure, to make the statement.

Secretary Dulles said that in any event the first thing for him to do was to talk to Senator George.

*The National Security Council:*

a. Discussed the subject on the basis of the reference report (NSC 5441) by the NSC Planning Board, in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff transmitted by the reference memorandum dated January 10, and the reference memorandum dated January 12 distributed at the meeting.

b. Adopted the statement of policy contained in NSC 5441, subject to the following amendment:

*Paragraph 11:* Revise to read as follows:

"11. Do not agree to GRC offensive actions against mainland Communist China, except under circumstances approved by the President. Agree to GRC actions against Communist China which are prompt and clear retaliation against a Chinese Communist attack; provided such retaliation is against targets of military significance which meet U.S. criteria as to feasibility and chance of success and which are selected with due consideration for the undesirability of provoking further Chinese Communist reaction against Formosa and the Pescadores."

c. Agreed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should in the light of the statement of policy adopted in b above, review currently-approved force goals for Formosa, and that any resulting policy recommenda-

tions with respect to military assistance and supporting programs for Formosa should be reflected in the overall review of military assistance programs provided for in NSC 5434/1.<sup>20</sup>

*Note:* NSC 5441, as amended, approved by the President, subsequently circulated as NSC 5503,<sup>21</sup> and transmitted to the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency. The action in c above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense for implementation.

4. *Current U.S. Policy Toward the Far East* (NSC 5429/5)

*The National Security Council:*

a. Adopted the following amendment of the last sentence in paragraph 5-c of NSC 5429/5:

"However, do not agree to Chinese Nationalist offensive actions against mainland Communist China, except under circumstances approved by the President. Agree to Chinese Nationalist actions against Communist China which are prompt and clear retaliation against a Chinese Communist attack; provided such retaliation is against targets of military significance which meet U.S. criteria as to feasibility and chance of success and which are selected with due consideration for the undesirability of provoking further Chinese Communist reaction against Formosa and the Pescadores."

b. Adopted the following amendment of paragraph 7-d of NSC 5429/5:<sup>22</sup>

End the sentence after the word "estrangement" in line 6; delete the remainder of the paragraph, substituting therefor the following:

"However, do not agree to Chinese Nationalist offensive actions against mainland Communist China, except under circumstances approved by the President. Agree to Chinese Nationalist actions against Communist China which are prompt and clear retaliation against a Chinese Communist attack; provided such retaliation is against targets of military significance which meet U.S. criteria as to feasibility and chance of success and which are selected

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<sup>20</sup> The lettered subparagraphs constitute NSC Action No. 1301. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95)

<sup>21</sup> Document 12.

<sup>22</sup> Paragraph 7-d of NSC 5429/5 of December 22, 1954, reads as follows:

"d. Utilize all feasible overt and covert means, consistent with a policy of not being provocative of war, to create discontent and internal divisions within each of the Communist-dominated areas of the Far East, and to impair their relations with the Soviet Union and with each other, particularly by stimulating Sino-Soviet estrangement, but refrain from assisting or encouraging offensive actions against Communist China, and restrain the Chinese Nationalists from such actions, except in response to Chinese Communist provocation judged adequate in each case by the President." (See *Foreign Relations, 1952-1954*, vol. xii, Part 1, p. 1062)

with due consideration for the undesirability of provoking further Chinese Communist reaction against Formosa and the Pescadores."<sup>23</sup>

*Note:* The above amendments to NSC 5429/5, as approved by the President, subsequently circulated for insertion in NSC 5429/5.<sup>24</sup>

[Here follows discussion of agenda items 5 through 8: "United States Policy on Berlin," "U.S. Policy Toward Iran," "Security Requirements for Government Employment," and "Report by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff." In Admiral Radford's oral report on a recent trip to various Asian countries, he stated that "he had nothing in particular to add to what he had earlier said about the situation on Formosa and in the Tachen Islands."]

S. Everett Gleason

<sup>23</sup> The lettered subparagraphs constitute NSC Action No. 1302. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95)

A memorandum of January 17, 1955, from Lay to the Director of Central Intelligence stated that at the NSC meeting of January 13, 1955, the President, on the recommendation of the Council, agreed that paragraphs 5-c and 7-d of NSC 5429/5 and paragraph 11 of NSC 5503 "did not preclude the continuation of small scale raids undertaken by the Chinese Nationalists for intelligence purposes." (*Ibid.*, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5503 Series)

<sup>24</sup> With a memorandum of January 15 from Lay, which stated that the President had that day approved the amendments. (*Ibid.*, NSC 5429 Series)

On March 24, 1955, in NSC Action No. 1361-b(1), the Council agreed that the statement of policy in NSC 166/1, "U.S. Policy Toward Communist China", November 6, 1953, should be regarded as superseded by the approval of NSC 5429/5. (*Ibid.*, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95) For text of NSC 166/1, see *Foreign Relations, 1952-1954*, vol. xiv, Part 1, p. 278.

## 10. Telegram From the Ambassador in the Republic of China (Rankin) to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

*Taipei, January 13, 1955—9 p.m.*

459. As result air raids reported Embassy telegram 448, January 10<sup>2</sup> CAF has requested US concurrence in bombing shipping and anti-aircraft positions (only) in mainland ports.

General Chase concurs and has referred request to CINCPAC.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/1-1355. Top Secret; Priority.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 448 reported repeated Communist air attacks that day on the Tachen Islands and Nationalist naval vessels there. (*Ibid.*, 793.00/1-1055)

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 110400Z (MG 5120) from Chief MAAG, Formosa, to CINCPAC, January 11, 1955, reported a proposal by Republic of China Defense Minister Yu Ta-wei

*Continued*

Believe January 10 raids apparently directed primarily against shipping have demonstrated to GRC vulnerability Tachen to interdiction by air. If island were isolated this fashion and by seizure more and more surrounding Islets, it would eventually fall to Communists like ripe apple. This would be contrary our interests which would seem require that if island falls it be only as result military assault and after strong defense, otherwise why have we consistently encouraged GRC to defend off-shore islands.

Yet obviously Chinese airforce from Taiwan cannot provide adequate air defense for Tachen, nor has it capability damaging Communist airfields northwest of Tachen to degree warranting heavy losses which would be incurred.

These matters will be discussed with General Bolte Deputy Chief Staff Army tomorrow although not strictly within his province. Meanwhile Embassy considers that GRC must react promptly and vigorously to these attacks, and that most acceptable method bombing probably that proposed by CAF and concurred in by General Chase.

**Rankin**

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for Nationalist air attacks on Chinese Communist ships of all types at sea and in port along the coast between Tachen and Swatow in retaliation for the Communist attacks of the previous day. General Chase recommended U.S. concurrence. (JCS Records, CCS 381 Formosa (11-8-48) Sec. 16)

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## 11. Telegram From the Representative at the United Nations (Lodge) to the Department of State <sup>1</sup>

*New York, January 13, 1955—midnight.*

358. For the Secretary. Re: UNSYG's talks with Chou En-lai. I met with Hammarskjöld at his apartment at 8 p.m. Waldock <sup>2</sup> his British legal adviser was also present.

Hammarskjöld said that the meeting was on the whole satisfactory. The main problem was to crash the gate and put the matter in proper context. The spy issue was cleared up and Hammarskjöld believes that Chou spoke in good faith.

Chou was suspicious concerning the spy issue for three reasons:

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.95A241/1-1355. Top Secret; Niact; Limited Distribution.

<sup>2</sup> Humphrey Waldock, Professor of International Law at Oxford University, had accompanied Hammarskjöld on his trip to Peking.

First, Downey and Fecteau had been caught in a flagrant situation in 1952.

Secondly this gave Chou the idea that the 581st Wing, while on a UN mission, also had other tasks. This impression was created because of extra personnel in plane. They were also misled by type of radio set—the UCR-4—which they had found with agents in other places.

Third, the lists in Geneva<sup>3</sup> did not include Downey and Fecteau, which made the Chinese suspicious. And the fact that at Geneva we did not object to their statement that they were going to try all these people confirmed their idea.

It was the general political situation, Hammarskjold believes, which led the Chinese to treat the American cases different from the Canadian and other cases, but there is no doubt in Hammarskjold's mind that Chou never expected the reaction which occurred in the United Nations.

Hammarskjold feels that he has clarified all of the points concerning the prisoners. He said several times "the medicine is in the body; their suspicions are dispelled; our arguments are understood and respected".

Chou made a statement that "our views cannot be reconciled", but he only made it once and that was on a pro forma basis. Our views were presented orally and in writing to him.

Chou says the United States used this "spy issue" to stir up an uproar in order to take attention away from the United States-Chiang Treaty. It was clear to Hammarskjold that Chou said this for propaganda purposes.

What really impressed Hammarskjold was that Chou appeared to use every means to avoid tying his hands negatively for the future. Hammarskjold said this was particularly marked in connection with the fact that Chou did not want to overstate his case in the communiqué. He "avoided everything to make it more difficult for him to release the prisoners in the future."

At their last meeting Hammarskjold flatly told Chou—and it seemed to annoy him—that he should release the prisoners.

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<sup>3</sup> Discussions between representatives of the United States and the People's Republic of China concerning U.S. nationals detained in China and Chinese nationals detained in the United States had been initiated during the Geneva Conference of 1954. Four meetings had been held in June 1954 by U. Alexis Johnson, American Ambassador to Czechoslovakia and U.S. Coordinator for the Geneva Conference, and Wang Ping-nan, Secretary General of the PRC Delegation to the Geneva Conference. Two meetings had been held subsequently at the staff level, and, after the conclusion of the Geneva Conference, five meetings at the consular level had taken place in Geneva, the most recent on November 29, 1954. Lists of U.S. nationals detained in the People's Republic of China had been given to the Chinese representatives.



To that Chou said, in Hammarskjold's words, that "he definitely wanted the possibility of releasing the prisoners but it must be in such a way as not to make him lose face in Asia".

Hammarskjold then suggested to Chou that he could do it on the basis of good behavior. Chou said he liked that idea.

Hammarskjold said "my personal conviction is that he will do it".

When I asked what the next move should be, Hammarskjold said "lie low. This thing must above all be worked out in his own mind".

There was, said Hammarskjold, never at any time any hint of bargaining or of direct negotiations with the United States. Chou is not at all interested in the Chinese students from a trading viewpoint. He has a long list of grudges and the students are on that list but he does not want to use them to trade with.

Hammarskjold thinks that we should strive together to create a situation in which Chou will work out a solution in his own mind.

I said, "in other words, we must arrange it so that newspapermen will not act as newspapermen and that Senators will not act like Senators". Hammarskjold and Waldock smiled rather ruefully at that, and Waldock said that that was about it.

I said, "Can't we give some hope, can't we hold out some definite promise of some kind?"

Hammarskjold said this thing must look spontaneous. He pointed out that Chou had said that the four had not been convicted and that he differentiated the four jet pilots very definitely from the eleven. Hammarskjold said that he looked for prompt action on the four and that he was absolutely positive that Downey and Fecteau were safe. Chou told Hammarskjold that the death sentence was completely justified for both Downey and Fecteau but he said "they will come back home one day". Hammarskjold is sure that the four will not be convicted.

He said that the fifteen aviators were in prison in Peking and that Downey and Fecteau were in prison in the northeast. Hammarskjold has photographs and documentary material concerning all the prisoners which he is going to furnish us. He also has a confidential report which he is going to send to us in addition to the official report which he will make to all UN members.

Chou offered visas to the members of the families of all of the seventeen—that is, the 11 B-29 men, the 4 jet pilots and Downey and Fecteau—to come to visit them and to see for themselves how well they were treated. Chou said that he would give visas to the families of the 66 whose names were on the list at Geneva and said that this would have to be worked out with the US Consul General in Geneva.

Hammar skjold said that in his press conference tomorrow <sup>4</sup> he was going to play the whole thing down, that he would not mention the matter of the visas to the families, but would bring out the fact that no deals of any kind had been made and that his trip was a beginning. He feels that his visit has put our prisoners in a very protected position and that they are as safe as men could be at the present time.

Describing the drafting of the communiqué, <sup>5</sup> he said that Chou did not want one but that Hammar skjold wanted a joint communiqué to show that the matter was under control. He said that Bokhari <sup>6</sup> did the first drafting. Hammar skjold wanted the words "in the meantime" inserted. Chou objected and wanted the words "in the spirit of the UN Charter" inserted. Hammar skjold objected to this because he felt that it might be regarded as constituting de facto recognition. The result was that the first sentence in the communiqué which mentioned the prisoner issue by reference was Hammar skjold's and that the second sentence contained phrases which Chou wanted. These were: "at the same time", and "pertinent questions".

Hammar skjold said these were purely face-saving words because 90 per cent of the 16 hours that he spent with Chou was on prisoners of war. He said that for face-saving reasons Chou could not admit of any questioning of the Chinese courts.

Chou's main grudge, according to Hammar skjold, was certain clauses in the treaty with Chiang, that guarantees could be extended to other areas. This Chou interprets as referring not only to the islands but to the mainland.

Chou's only reference to the confessions was at the end and was incidental. Hammar skjold is sure that Chou does not want to make it too difficult to release the prisoners.

Hammar skjold is much impressed with Chou's intelligence. He says he has certain marks of greatness and also of ruthlessness. He said that he referred to him at the Tokyo airport as having the manners of a "grand seigneur", and that the Swedish Minister at Tokyo said, "yes, but a grand seigneur from the early renaissance".

Hammar skjold feels that there was no alternative to having him go, that Chou ignored the UN resolution all the time, but justified his conversations with Hammar skjold on the basis of the UN Charter which in Article 99 gives the Secretary-General the right to interest

<sup>4</sup> The transcript of Hammar skjöld's press conference of January 14, 1955, is printed in *Public Papers of the Secretaries-General*, vol. II, pp. 441-455.

<sup>5</sup> For text of the communiqué issued by Secretary-General Hammar skjöld and Premier Chou on January 10, 1955, see *ibid.*, p. 436.

<sup>6</sup> U.N. Under Secretary for Public Information Ahmed S. Bokhari, who accompanied Hammar skjöld on his trip to Peking.

himself in matters which could reduce international tensions and contribute to world peace.

Hammar skjold wanted Chou to get the real facts. He feels this was accomplished without any commitment on his part whatever. He would like some time "later" to see the President. <sup>7</sup>

Lodge

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<sup>7</sup> Lodge reported his meeting with Hammar skjold by telephone to Secretary Dulles, who reported it to the President by telephone the same evening. The President's press secretary, James C. Hagerty, recorded in his diary that the conversation, as the President had described it to him, "added up to this:

"That Hammar skjold believed that the Chinese were going to release our airmen eventually but they would probably keep them in jail for several months and then commute their sentences. Of course, they are doing this deliberately to see how much trouble they can cause in this country, and the President said, 'How we're ever going to keep those fellows on the Hill from shooting off their mouths for two months on this I don't know, but we've got to do it.'" (Hagerty Diary, January 13, 1955; Eisenhower Library, Hagerty Papers)

A statement issued by the President on January 14 expressed disappointment that the airmen had not been released but urged restraint and support for the U.N. efforts; for the text, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1955* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1959), pp. 15-16.

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## 12. National Security Council Report <sup>1</sup>

NSC 5503

*Washington, January 15, 1955.*

### U.S. POLICY TOWARD FORMOSA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA

Note by the Executive Secretary to the National Security Council

[Here follows a note from Lay dated January 15, 1955, stating that the President had that day approved the statement of policy contained in NSC 5441, as amended and adopted by the National Security Council on January 13, and that the President directed its implementation by all appropriate executive departments and agencies and designated the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency. It also stated that NSC 146/2 and NSC Action No. 1146 were thereby superseded and took note of NSC Action No. 1301-c.]

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5503 Series. Top Secret.

STATEMENT OF POLICY BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ON U.S. POLICY TOWARD FORMOSA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA (GRC)

*Objectives*

1. Maintenance of the security of Formosa and the Pescadores as a part of the Pacific off-shore island chain, which is an element essential to U.S. security.

2. An increasingly efficient Government of the Republic of China (GRC), evolving toward responsible representative government, capable of attracting growing support and allegiance from the people of mainland China and Formosa, and serving as the focal point of the free Chinese alternative to Communism.

3. Continued development of the military potential of GRC armed forces (a) to assist in the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores and (b) to take action in defense of the GRC-held off-shore islands, equipped and trained to contribute to collective non-Communist strength in the Far East and for such other action as may be mutually agreed upon under the terms of the Mutual Defense Treaty.

4. Use of GRC military potential, including the availability of Formosa and the Pescadores for the use of U.S. forces under the terms of the Mutual Defense Treaty, in accordance with U.S. national security policies.

5. Development of a stronger Formosan economy.

6. Improved relations between the GRC and other non-Communist nations.

7. Continued recognition and political support of the GRC as the only government of China and as the representative of China in the United Nations and other international bodies.

8. Increased support for the GRC by non-Communist Chinese outside mainland China and Formosa, especially the overseas Chinese of Southeast Asia, insofar as such support does not conflict with obligations to their local governments.

*Courses of Action*

9. Effectively implement the terms of the Mutual Defense Treaty, taking all necessary measures to defend Formosa and the Pescadores against armed attack.

10. Seek to preserve, through United Nations action, the status quo of the GRC-held off-shore islands, and, without committing U.S. forces except as militarily desirable in the event of Chinese Communist attack on Formosa and the Pescadores, provide to the GRC forces military equipment and training to assist them to defend such off-shore islands, using Formosa as a base.

11. Do not agree to GRC offensive actions against mainland Communist China, except under circumstances approved by the President. Agree to GRC actions against Communist China which are prompt and clear retaliation against a Chinese Communist attack; provided such retaliation is against targets of military significance which meet U.S. criteria as to feasibility and chance of success and which are selected with due consideration for the undesirability of provoking further Chinese Communist reaction against Formosa and the Pescadores.

12. Continue covert operations . . . .

13. Continue military assistance and direct forces support for the GRC armed forces to enable them to assist in the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores, to take action in defense of the GRC-held offshore islands, and so equip and train them as to enable them to contribute to non-Communist strength in the Far East and for such other action as may be mutually agreed upon under the terms of the Mutual Defense Treaty.

14. Continue coordinated military planning with the GRC designed to achieve maximum cooperation from it in furtherance of over-all U.S. military strategy in the Far East.

15. Encourage and assist the GRC, through such means as offshore procurement and technical advice, to construct and maintain on Formosa selected arsenals and other military support industries.

16. Exercise the right, as appropriate, under the terms of the Mutual Defense Treaty, to dispose such U.S. land, air and naval forces in and about Formosa and the Pescadores as may be required in U.S. interests.

17. Show continuing U.S. friendship for the GRC and the Chinese people, while avoiding any implication of an obligation to guarantee the former's return to power on the mainland.

18. Encourage and assist the GRC to take steps leading toward more responsible representative government suited to the Chinese environment and having a constructive social and economic program, so as to deserve the support and allegiance of the people of Formosa and to serve as the focal point of the free Chinese alternative to Communism. So far as feasible, employ U.S. assistance as a lever to this end.

19. Continue to recognize the Government of the Republic of China as the only government of China and to support its right to represent China in the United Nations. Seek to persuade other non-Communist countries to do likewise.

20. To the extent feasible, encourage the GRC to establish closer contact with the Chinese communities outside mainland China and Formosa and to take steps to win their sympathy and support, insofar as such support does not conflict with obligations to their local

governments. Encourage the leaders of these communities to reciprocate by extending sympathy and support to the GRC as the focal point of the free Chinese alternative to Communism and as a Free World partner in the defense against Communist expansion in Asia.

21. Maintain contact through U.S. officials with anti-Communist Chinese groups outside Formosa which continue to reject cooperation with the GRC, and, without making commitments of U.S. support, encourage such groups actively to oppose Communism.

22. Encourage conditions which will make possible the inclusion of the GRC in a Western Pacific collective defense arrangement comprising the United States, the Philippines, Japan, and the Republic of Korea, eventually to be linked with the Manila Pact<sup>2</sup> and ANZUS.<sup>3</sup>

23. Continue to provide such technical and economic assistance to Formosa as will promote U.S. objectives and will be consistent with other U.S. programs of economic and military aid for the Far East.

24. Encourage conditions which will make possible the eventual inclusion of the GRC in such economic grouping as may be organized among the free nations of Asia.

25. Take all feasible measures to increase the opportunities for the GRC to develop a well-balanced trade with the non-Communist nations of Asia and with other free world countries.

26. Continue to assist the GRC to plan the most productive use of Formosan resources in their own best interests, so as to complement the economies of other free countries, particularly Japan and the Philippines.

27. Continue to work with the GRC toward better fiscal procedures and the revision of programs which run counter to prudent U.S. advice.

28. Encourage the GRC to adopt policies which will stimulate the investment of Chinese and other private capital and skills for the development of the Formosan economy, under arrangements avoiding "exploitation" yet acceptable to private interests.

29. Consistent with the foregoing objectives and courses of action, continue programs in which Formosa serves as a base for psychological operations against the mainland.

30. Continue U.S.-sponsored information, cultural, education, and exchange programs; expand the program for training Chinese and Formosan leaders.

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<sup>2</sup> The Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, signed at Manila on September 8, 1954; 6 UST 81.

<sup>3</sup> Australia, New Zealand, and the United States; for the text of the security treaty between the three countries, signed at San Francisco on September 1, 1951, see 3 UST 3420.

31. Seek to improve relations between the GRC and other non-Communist countries, and develop an appreciation on the part of these countries of the GRC and of the favorable conditions existing on Formosa, by such means as encouraging official and non-official visits to Formosa.

32. Attempt to convince other free world countries of the soundness of U.S. policy toward the Republic of China and of the advisability of their adopting similar policies.

[Here follows an annex entitled "Summary Statement of Current Military and Economic Assistance Programs for Formosa". It is identical to the annex to NSC 5441; see *Foreign Relations, 1952-1954*, volume XIV, Part 1, page 1051.]

13. **Memorandum of a Conversation Between the President and the Secretary of State, The White House Residence, January 17, 1955, 5-6 p.m.**<sup>1</sup>

1. The President had the ticker report on Knowland's speech in Chicago.<sup>2</sup> He said he was unhappy about it, that he did not know what Knowland really wanted, and that it was just muddying the water. I said that at least this time Knowland had talked to me before he had made his speech<sup>3</sup> and indicated that he felt that it might not do any harm if he indicated a certain restlessness. He felt this might improve our bargaining position.

2. I raised the question of Hammarskjöld's coming to Washington to see the President or me.<sup>4</sup> After considerable discussion, it was

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President. Secret; Personal and Private. Drafted by Dulles.

<sup>2</sup> Senate Minority Leader William F. Knowland, in a speech that day before the Newspaper Advertising Executives Association in Chicago, had called Hammarskjöld's mission a failure and warned against a "Far Eastern Munich"; the speech was reported in the *New York Times*, January 18, 1955.

<sup>3</sup> A conversation between the Secretary and Senator Knowland on January 15 is recorded in a memorandum of conversation by Dulles dated January 17. Knowland expressed "considerable dissatisfaction" at developments concerning the U.S. flyers in China and suggested that it might be helpful if someone in the Senate spoke out "vigorously" on the subject. Dulles replied that he saw "no serious objection" to this but that he hoped the Senator would not "urge specific drastic action, which, in fact, the Administration would not be disposed to take." (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Memoranda of Conversation)

<sup>4</sup> A memorandum by Murphy of a telephone conversation with Hammarskjöld on January 14 states that the Secretary-General proposed coming to Washington for a "relaxed talk" with Eisenhower and Dulles about his talks with Chou in order to give them his perspective on the problem. (Attached to a memorandum from Murphy to Dulles, January 15, 1955; *ibid.*, Wang-Johnson Talks)

concluded that I should ask him down to see me but that he would not see the President. In this connection the President recalled that Hammarskjöld had not seen Mao Tse-tung so far as we knew.

3. I discussed the packages and the offer of visas.<sup>5</sup> The President felt we should perhaps plan to deliver the packages with the film personally, asking perhaps one or more Defense officers to call to see the next of kin and perhaps to dissuade them from trying to go to China. He felt that even if they do go to China, we should not issue passports to the newspapermen.

[Here follows discussion concerning the regulation of armaments.]

JFD

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<sup>5</sup> Lodge had reported in telegram 363 from New York, January 16, 1955, that Hammarskjöld had told him of his intention to send and make public a letter to Lodge transmitting packages with pictures and information concerning each prisoner and stating Chou's proposal to issue visas to the prisoners' families. Lodge objected to U.N. publication of the proposal. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.95A241/1-1655)

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#### 14. Telegram From the Representative at the United Nations (Lodge) to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

*New York, January 17, 1955—6 p.m.*

366. For the Secretary. Re: Hammarskjöld-Chou En-lai talks. I told Hammarskjöld this afternoon that I was very much worried about the reaction in Washington to the newspaper stories which have occurred since his return from China. In particular the story which mentioned United Nations membership for ChiComs<sup>2</sup> and the Hamilton story in the *New York Times* this morning<sup>3</sup> which mentioned the Formosa treaty as quid pro quo for prisoners' return. I said that while I thought that Hammarskjöld's actual record of performance was good, the publicity was very bad and could have reactions

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.95A241/1-1755. Top Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution.

<sup>2</sup> Hammarskjöld had stated in response to questioning at his January 14 news conference that it would be "useful" if the People's Republic of China were directly represented in the United Nations. The transcript of his news conference is printed in *Public Papers of the Secretaries-General*, vol. II, pp. 441-455.

<sup>3</sup> The reference is to a report by Thomas J. Hamilton with a U.N. headquarters dateline, which stated that according to "reliable sources", Hammarskjöld believed the chances of the airmen's release would be improved if the United States clarified the defensive nature of its treaty with the Republic of China.



in Congress which would endanger the very existence of the United Nations itself.

I urged him to impress upon his staff the vital importance of not leaking. I also said that I thought he had been off-base in telling representatives of other countries about those portions of his meeting with Chou which related to American policy, to wit the visit of the fliers' parents and the Formosa treaty.

Believe the matter of press release of Chou's proposal is in better shape. Hammarskjöld now agrees to split it up into two letters.

One will transmit material covering the fliers.<sup>4</sup> Hammarskjöld has had that opened so as to be sure he was not transmitting propaganda. It contains films taken of the prisoners recently to show what good condition they are in. It seems better for this to be in a separate letter that the Secretary could release at any time he wishes so as to blanket the news story regarding the second letter.

The second letter concerns the issuance of visas to the prisoners' families to visit them in China.<sup>5</sup> Hammarskjöld agreed to ask Chou to release it at 10:30 p.m. Peking time on Friday, January 21, which is 9:30 a.m. New York time. Hammarskjöld will not release it at the same time but will follow along with texts for the press of what happened.<sup>6</sup> So it will not be a UN story fundamentally it will have a Peking dateline. It was hard to get him to agree to this.

Hammarskjöld does not think that Chou really expects any of the families to come, but is doing it to try to get away from the Ghengis Khan reputation which the ChiComs have achieved.

Hammarskjöld says that after a reasonable period of quiet he will put on the pressure through the Indians, the British and even the Russians, if there has been no progress towards release. He believes the Russians think the whole thing was a great mistake and that even Chou thinks so.

<sup>4</sup> A letter from Hammarskjöld to Lodge, dated January 17, 1955, which transmitted information and photographs concerning the imprisoned Americans, is filed with a covering letter of the same date from Lodge to Dulles. (Department of State, UNP Files: Lot 58 D 742, American Fliers in China—General Correspondence)

<sup>5</sup> A second letter of January 17 from Hammarskjöld to Lodge, transmitted to the Department and filed with the letters cited in footnote 4 above, stated that Chou had offered to facilitate the visit to China of relatives who wished to visit the men under detention. The offer applied primarily to the 15 military personnel and to Downey and Fecteau, but if the relatives of any other Americans under detention wished to visit them, the question should be taken up with the Chinese Consul General in Geneva.

<sup>6</sup> A statement issued at U.N. headquarters on January 21 confirmed an announcement made that day in Peking that the Government of the People's Republic of China would provide facilities for the relatives of imprisoned U.S. military personnel to visit them. For text of the U.N. statement, see *Public Papers of the Secretaries-General*, vol. II, pp. 456-457.

I suggested possibility that any families that do travel to China do so under UN auspices. I believe it could be done under the resolution under which Hammarskjold is operating.

I suggested that the one transmitting the films be made into stills and released for the afternoon papers on Friday, and that it might kill—or at least take edge off—the other story.

Lodge

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15. **Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the President and the Secretary of State, Washington, January 18, 1955, 10:06 a.m.**<sup>1</sup>

Called Secy. Dulles to remind him he wanted to talk to Pres. about "that message to Jim Hagerty"<sup>2</sup> on amphibious attack on little island off coast of Formosa. Only caution Pres. observes is that we must not commit ourselves to point of encouraging attack. He thinks it would be perfectly well to say that this island lies at such a distance, & is of such little importance, that we could not view this with any great concern. In other words, it is not a matter of significance & would not affect vital interests of Formosa or ourselves.

Dulles gave its location: About 10 statute miles north of the northern [most] Tachen Island; about 4 miles from a Communist-held island; about 12 miles off the coast. It is over 200 miles north of Formosa, & really quite an indefensible position. It is not held by regular forces of the nationalist "guerrillas"—is part of a group where there has been a pretty steady attrition for some time. Pres. feels we could say it's a skirmish of no significance whatsoever—but asked Dulles to check with Radford,<sup>3</sup> which he's doing immediately.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Apparently prepared by the President's personal secretary, Ann Whitman. The conversation is also recorded in notes of the same date prepared by Phyllis Bernau. (*Ibid.*, Dulles Papers, White House Telephone Conversations)

<sup>2</sup> Hagerty had called Dulles earlier at the President's request to ask for his comments concerning a Communist attack that day on the Nationalist-held island of Ichiang (Yikiangshan). Dulles told Hagerty that he wanted to talk to the President before his press conference that morning. (Hagerty Diary, January 18, 1955; *ibid.*, Hagerty Papers and memorandum by Phyllis Bernau of telephone conversation between Dulles and Hagerty, January 18, 1955; *ibid.*, Dulles Papers, White House Telephone Conversations)

<sup>3</sup> According to notes by Phyllis Bernau of Dulles' conversation with Radford, the Secretary said the President's disposition was to "play down the importance of this island" and Radford replied that that was "technically correct". (Memorandum by Bernau, January 18, 1955; *ibid.*, General Telephone Conversations)

[Here follow notes of another, unrelated telephone conversation.]

<sup>4</sup> For text of remarks by Dulles at his press conference on January 18 concerning Formosa, Ichiang, and the Tachen Islands and Hammarskjöld's mission to Peking, see Department of State *Bulletin*, January 31, 1955, pp. 190-192. For the transcript of President Eisenhower's press conference of January 19, in which he commented on these subjects, see *Public Papers of the Presidents: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1955*, pp. 185-199.

## 16. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, January 19, 1955, 12:45 p.m. <sup>1</sup>

### SUBJECT

Situation of Off-shore Islands

### PARTICIPANTS

Dr. George Yeh, Chinese Foreign Minister  
 Dr. Wellington Koo, Chinese Ambassador  
 The Secretary  
 Mr. Robertson, Assistant Secretary, Far Eastern Affairs  
 Mr. McConaughy, Director, CA

Dr. Yeh said that he had an important message in regard to the Tachen Islands which he was instructed to deliver to the Secretary. From a strictly military standpoint none of the off-shore islands could be held by the Chinese forces unaided. The off-shore island positions were untenable if the Chinese Government had to depend exclusively on its own resources. However it was not purely a military problem. There were other important considerations in regard to which he wished to consult the Secretary.

The Chinese Government did not want the impression to get out that its forces were unwilling to defend their territory. His Govern-

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, ROC Files: Lot 71 D 517, 1954-1955, Offshore Islands. Top Secret; Limited Distribution. Drafted by McConaughy and initialed by Robertson, indicating his approval. A memorandum of January 24 from Dulles to Robertson reads:

"You will recall that I had two meetings with George Yeh on Wednesday, January 19, the day I lunched with the President. I first saw him in the morning, and he spoke to me about possible help in evacuating forces in the Tachen Islands. Later in the day after lunching with the President, I outlined in the rough what we might be prepared to do.

"I am very anxious that the memorandum of the first conversation should show that it was he who first brought up the question of the evacuation of the Tachens and not I. This may be important later on if the Chinats should claim it was we who forced evacuation upon them. JFD" (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Memoranda)

ment was fully aware of the bad effect which any such impression would have. It would encourage the enemies of Free China in the U.S. and elsewhere to make the old allegation all over again:—the Chinese Nationalists were afraid to fight and when challenged would throw away their arms and surrender. The Chinese Government had been trying to refute this charge by proving that they do have the will to fight. It has been pretty well refuted on Quemoy where 8,000 Communists have been killed and 7,000 taken prisoner in the course of the repulse of various Communist assaults since 1949. The Chinese troops on the Tachens, as elsewhere, are determined to fight. If any of them must be withdrawn, it would be necessary to plan carefully in advance, to minimize the adverse psychological effect.

The Chinese Government has always wanted to include the off-shore islands in security arrangements with the U.S. When the U.S. found it impossible to include the off-shore islands in the Treaty area, the Chinese Government had urged a demonstration of force by the 7th Fleet, or at least the inclusion of the off-shore islands area in the routine patrols of the 7th Fleet. Unfortunately for the last few days all units of the 7th Fleet have given the Tachen Islands a wide berth. They have stayed farther away than usual. This creates an impression of abandonment. He also expressed a hope that officials of the U.S. Government would refrain from making statements which implied the possibility of abandonment and minimized the lack of strategic importance of the islands. Such statements were encouraging to the Communists.

The Chinese Government believed that if the U.S. would indicate a positive interest in the retention of the off-shore islands by the Chinese Government, following up a public statement with "suggestive action", a strong deterrent influence would be exercised on the Chinese Communists. The present situation is dangerous for the U.S. as well as for his Government. The Chinese forces cannot stand idly by and become sitting ducks. They have to hit back against the sources of the Communist attacks, which are on the Mainland. Already the Chinese Government forces have started air bombing of the Communist bases on the Mainland from which the attacks on the Tachens have been launched. If the reciprocal attacks and counter attacks of the two sides continue, the area of involvement almost certainly will become enlarged with growing danger for all concerned. The Communists will probably feel compelled to respond to the attacks on their Mainland bases with counter attacks on the Chinese Government air bases, which are on Formosa and the Pescadores. Communist bombing of Formosa and the Pescadores would probably involve the U.S. Hence the safest course from the U.S. standpoint would be for the off-shore islands to be included in the 7th Fleet patrol area. This might stabilize the situation. The Chinese

Government knows that the U.S. Government has the capability of deterring the Communists and stabilizing the situation. The question is whether the U.S. is prepared to take such action.

The Secretary said the U.S. Government could not afford to bluff in this situation. We cannot indicate that we may intervene unless we are in fact prepared to do so. It would be disastrous if we made statements and then failed to follow through. We must not give any warning which might prove to be empty. Even if the U.S. were at war with Communist China, it probably would not be militarily sound to hold the Tachen Islands. They are too close to the Communist held Mainland and too far from our air bases. It would be necessary to provide air cover from a carrier. It would not make any military sense to tie up a major unit of our fleet and its protecting vessels in order to defend a rocky islet of no strategic importance. It would not be productive. The continuous provision of air cover would actually tie up two of our major carriers since they would have to be rotated. This would be half of the carriers available in the Far East. It is most unlikely that they could be spared. It may be necessary to consider the evacuation of the Tachens, to avoid the heavy drain on Chinese Government resources now taking place. It is understood that 2 LSTs were lost in the recent raid. It was a question how long that rate of attrition could be afforded.

The Secretary was inclined to think that a UN approach might be advisable. If it did not result in a cease-fire, it might at least place the Chinese Government in a stronger moral position. It was probably too late for UN action to save the Tachens. The Secretary asked if the Foreign Minister considered Quemoy the only other island of importance?

The Foreign Minister said he would also include Matsu.

The Secretary said he had the impression it was not very important.

The Foreign Minister said that Matsu was more or less a northern anchor for the Chinese Government position in the Formosa Strait. It was about as far from Keelung as was Quemoy from Kaohsiung. He felt that the strategic importance of all the islands was more or less relative, depending on the situation and on other positions which were held. If the Tachens were lost, Matsu would become more important. He felt that some island position north of Quemoy was needed. The Tachens were extremely useful for radar tracking and for intelligence operations. The Chinese Government could communicate with its agents on the Mainland from the Tachens. It was possible to keep track of Communist shipping as far north as Shanghai from the Tachens. They were a very useful northern outpost. Otherwise the Chinese Government would not have expended so much effort and money in fortifying and maintaining

them. In time of war it would be very valuable. In Communists hands it would assume a new importance and would represent an added threat to Chinese and U.S. positions.

The Secretary remarked that the disparity in distances made the Tachen position untenable. It was only 60 miles from airfields on the Mainland, against 220 miles from airfields on Formosa.

The Foreign Minister asked if the 7th Fleet could not be instructed to operate as usual in the vicinity of the Tachens. He said that for the past 11 days they had "avoided the area like poison". He saw no point in this. It represented a conspicuous departure from previous practice. Naturally the Chinese Commanders on Tachen felt let down by the apparent American pullout. He felt there was no real danger in the 7th Fleet vessels adhering to their normal patrol routes. He was sure the Communists were too smart to attack American Naval vessels.

The Foreign Minister referred to one of the requests delivered by Ambassador Koo to Assistant Secretary Robertson on Jan. 12:<sup>2</sup> namely, that a U.S. civilian or military official of high rank and wide authority be assigned to Formosa as a consultant and expediter. Someone who would have the power to make decisions on the spot, and who would have direct access to the key people in Washington was envisaged.

The Secretary remarked that we had General Chase in Taipei.

Both the Foreign Minister and the Ambassador said that General Chase lacked the rank and the authority which they considered necessary. They had in mind someone at a higher level who would fill a role of greater responsibility.

At this point the conversation was interrupted. It was agreed that the Foreign Minister and the Ambassador would return in the afternoon for a resumption of the conversation.

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<sup>2</sup> See Document 8.

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17. **Memorandum of a Conversation, The White House,  
January 19, 1955, 1:15 p.m.**<sup>1</sup>

Admiral Radford and I lunched with the President at my suggestion. I told the President that I was becoming increasingly concerned

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President. Top Secret; Personal and Private. Drafted by Dulles on January 20. The time of the meeting is from Dulles' appointment diary. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers)

at the situation developing in the Far East out of the strongly mounted and effective Chicom attacks on Nationalist held islands. It is now apparent that these islands could not be held without US interposition. Also it seemed to me apparent that doubt as to our intentions was having a bad effect on our prestige in the area, since it was in many quarters assumed that we would defend the islands, and our failure to do so indicated that we were running away when actual danger appeared. I felt it important to make our intentions clear and then stick to them. I furthermore said that I doubted it was practical at this time to announce our abandonment of them all because this would be such a shock to the Republic of China that they might turn against us. There [*They?*] were now asking insistently for assurances of military support. The Chinese Foreign Minister had just called upon me this morning. I said I had been giving the matter considerable thought for several days and was of the opinion that we should probably now modify our NSC decision <sup>2</sup> to the extent of encouraging the Chinats to evacuate the islands in the Tachen area and to help them to do so, as otherwise evacuation would be impossible. I felt that we should probably, however, indicate our intention to hold Quemoy, which from the standpoint of air was more defensible than the Tachens and also served a more valuable military purpose than the Tachens. I did not know whether the same considerations applied to the Matsu group. I said I thought we should also stimulate UN activity along the lines which had been long considered <sup>3</sup> in the hope that its influence might lead to some pacification in the area.

<sup>2</sup> Paragraph 5-c of NSC 5429/5, as amended in NSC Action No. 1302-a (see footnote 23, Document 9), reads as follows:

"[The United States should:]

"c. Ratify the Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of China covering Formosa and the Pescadores, and jointly agree upon appropriate safeguards against Chinese Nationalist offensive action. Pending the ratification of such a Treaty, continue the existing unilateral arrangement to defend Formosa and the Pescadores (excluding the Nationalist-held off-shore islands). For the present, seek to preserve, through United Nations action, the status quo of the Nationalist held off-shore islands; and, without committing U.S. forces except as militarily desirable in the event of Chinese Communist attack on Formosa and the Pescadores, provide to the Chinese Nationalist forces military equipment and training to assist them to defend such off-shore islands, using Formosa as a base. However, do not agree to Chinese Nationalist offensive actions against mainland Communist China, except under circumstances approved by the President. Agree to Chinese Nationalist actions against Communist China which are prompt and clear retaliation against a Chinese Communist attack; provided such retaliation is against targets of military significance which meet U.S. criteria as to feasibility and chance of success and which are selected with due consideration for the undesirability of provoking further Chinese Communist reaction against Formosa and the Pescadores."

See also NSC 5503, Document 12.

<sup>3</sup> The reference is to a proposed initiative by New Zealand in the U.N. Security Council. The plan, for New Zealand to request Security Council consideration of the hostilities in the area of the Chinese offshore islands and to submit a resolution calling

Admiral Radford said that he was in strong agreement, that the time had come when we should make our position absolutely clear and also make sure that it "stuck". He would have favored holding all the offshore islands, but was prepared to compromise on the basis I suggested.

The President indicated his general agreement with our line of thought. He asked how I would propose to proceed. I said there were three points which needed to be touched. One was the Republic of China, and I could see the Chinese Foreign Minister this afternoon. The other was the British Ambassador, whom I expected to see, and the third was the Congressional leadership. I suggested the President should have a meeting with the Congressional leaders. The President, after some reflection, indicated he thought it might be better for me to meet with them in the first instance with Admiral Radford to get a feeling of the situation. He suggested I should do so the next morning.

Following the luncheon, I dictated the enclosed as a hasty memorandum of what I conceived to be the decisions provisionally arrived at.

JFD

[Enclosure]

#### DRAFT

It is proposed as a matter of substance:

1. To encourage the ChiNats to evacuate Tachen and the other offshore islands exclusive of Quemoy.
2. The United States would provide sea and air protection so as to permit of an orderly evacuation.
3. Contemporaneously, the United States would state that in view of the aggressive actions of the Chinese Communists and their proclaimed intention to seize Formosa, the United States will assist the ChiNats to hold Quemoy Island which, under existing circumstances, is deemed important for the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores. This decision will hold pending the taking of action by the United Nations which will bring about an effective cessation of Chinese Communist aggressive activities in the Formosa Straits.

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for a cease-fire, had been originally conceived by Dulles and developed in discussions with the United Kingdom and New Zealand in September and October 1954. Its implementation had been postponed because of various developments, including the U.S. decision to negotiate the Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of China.



*Procedure*

JFD will outline the foregoing this afternoon to the Chinese Foreign Minister and to the British Ambassador and will arrange for a meeting of Congressional leaders with him and Admiral Radford Thursday morning <sup>4</sup> to ascertain whether Congress will extend the necessary authority to carry out the above course of action, which should be broad enough to permit of attacking the mainland about Quemoy, if that was deemed essential to prevent a buildup which would dangerously threaten Quemoy.

<sup>4</sup> January 20.

### 18. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, January 19, 1955, 3:15 p.m. <sup>1</sup>

#### PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary  
 Sir Roger Makins, British Ambassador  
 Mr. Robertson, FE  
 Mr. Merchant, EUR

At the outset the Ambassador handed the Secretary a copy of the Prime Minister's letter to Mendes-France. <sup>2</sup>

The Ambassador said that he had some questions to ask with respect to the Hammarskjöld report. He asked what impression the Secretary had had from his talk with Hammarskjöld. <sup>3</sup> The Secretary replied that he didn't feel very happy about it. He said that Hammarskjöld had told him that his intellect indicated to him that the situation of the fliers looked bad but that his instinct made him hopeful. The Secretary said that his own impression was that Hammarskjöld had made no progress at all. He referred to the Communist offer of visas for the prisoners' families and then showed Sir Roger a *New York Times* photograph which showed Hammarskjöld under a

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/1-1955. Top Secret. Drafted by Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Merchant.

<sup>2</sup> The letter from British Prime Minister Churchill to French Premier Pierre Mendès-France, dated January 1955, was not related to China. (*Ibid.*, EUR Files: Lot 59 D 233, United Kingdom, 1955)

<sup>3</sup> Dulles, Lodge, and Robertson met with Hammarskjöld and Bokhari that morning for about an hour and a half; no record of the conversation has been found in Department of State files or the Eisenhower Library. For text of a January 19 press release concerning the meeting, see Department of State *Bulletin*, January 31, 1955, pp. 189-190.

sign in Peking in Chinese which was a bitter denunciation of United States aggression in Formosa.

Sir Roger then inquired what happens next in the matter and the Secretary said that it would be our effort to try to keep matters stable as long as we could.

The Secretary then said that a tentative decision had been reached to take certain actions designed to stabilize the situation. He had seen Foreign Minister Yeh at noon and would see him again later in the day for the purpose of encouraging the Nationalists to evacuate the Tachen Islands. For the U.S. to effectively defend the Tachens would involve the use of air and sea power out of proportion to their strategic value. At the same time in order to avoid a loss of morale on Formosa it was contemplated to state that under present conditions the United States would assist the Nationals in the defense of Quemoy. They are important to the defense of Formosa and it remains the avowed Communist purpose to take Formosa. Such action would be subject to UN action or any cease fire or similar measure which might develop as a result of UN action. The Secretary said that he felt it was time now to initiate ORACLE.<sup>4</sup> He felt also the need for Congressional action along the lines of a resolution with respect to our purposes regarding Quemoy. He was meeting early the next morning with the President on this matter and he hoped the British would give us their support.

Sir Roger inquired if the effect of such action on our part would be to bring Quemoy within the scope of the Treaty. The Secretary replied negatively, saying that our action would be provisional pending UN action or, alternatively, the Communists using Amoy as a clear staging base for the invasion of Formosa. It was not contemplated that this would be a permanent extension of the Treaty area. All of this, of course, was dependent upon the action by the Chinese Nationals.

Sir Roger inquired if our assistance in the withdrawal from the Tachens would not involve the risk of hostilities breaking out there.

The Secretary agreed that the risk existed and said if we were shot at we would obviously shoot back. The Nationals, however, of course might refuse to evacuate the Tachens. In any event, he felt Oracle should be activated.

Sir Roger asked if we had talked to the New Zealand Ambassador and Mr. Robertson said he had just talked to him on this subject.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>4</sup> ORACLE was a code name for the proposed New Zealand initiative in the U.N. Security Council.

<sup>5</sup> Robertson's conversation with New Zealand Ambassador Sir Leslie Munro is recorded in a memorandum of conversation by McConaughy, January 19, 1955. Munro

The Secretary noted that all of this would have a bad effect on the release of our airmen.

Sir Roger asked what our thought was on timing. The Secretary gave no clear indication other than that we should move rapidly. The Nationalists presumably would announce that they were regrouping and we would say that we were assisting them in this until a cease fire was achieved by the UN.

Sir Roger said that he would report this conversation immediately to his Government.

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stated that the situation in the area of the offshore islands seemed to be "explosive" and that he thought the proposed New Zealand initiative "would now be most timely." (Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/1-1955)

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19. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,  
Washington, January 19, 1955, 3:45 p.m.<sup>1</sup>

SUBJECT

Defense of Off-Shore Islands

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. George Yeh, Chinese Foreign Minister  
Dr. Wellington Koo, Chinese Ambassador  
The Secretary  
Mr. Robertson, Assistant Secretary, FE  
Mr. McConaughy, Director, CA

The Secretary said that he would state a position which the President was prepared to consider if it was acceptable to the Chinese Government:

1. Provide U.S. sea and air cover for the evacuation of the Tachen Islands.
2. Announce that under present conditions and pending appropriate action by the UN, the U.S. is prepared to join with the Republic of China in maintaining the security of Quemoy.
3. Initiate the UN action in the Security Council which has been considered for some months:—namely, call on Communist China, and presumably other countries, to cease military activities in the area of the Off-shore Islands.

The Secretary said he believed that the announcement as to the protection of Quemoy would largely offset the adverse morale factor

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/1-1955. Top Secret. Drafted by McConaughy.

involved in a withdrawal from the Tachens. The action could be represented as a regrouping designed to concentrate the Chinese Government forces in more tenable positions. It could be held out as a trimming down operation. It could be emphasized that China and the U.S. will stand shoulder to shoulder in a consolidated position.

The Secretary said that we could not count on concrete Security Council action as a result of the UN initiative. A Soviet veto would have to be anticipated. A Communist veto should enable the Chinese Government to command a greater degree of international support.

The Secretary said that the President considered that a Joint Resolution of Congress would be required, since we would have to be prepared if necessary to engage in hostilities with Communist China. We might find it necessary to strike at Communist positions on the Mainland. Such action could not be taken without Congressional authority. He had arranged a meeting with leaders of both Houses of Congress tomorrow morning January 20. He would point out that the Administration considers it necessary that Quemoy be held by the Chinese Government. The port of Amoy, which was commanded by the island of Quemoy, would be an ideal staging ground for an invasion of Formosa if its effective use was not denied to the Communists. This would justify provisional action by the U.S. of the nature contemplated. It was a grave step which might lead to war with Communist China.

As to Matsu, the Chinese Government would have to decide whether to try to hold it. The Secretary said his strong advice would be to pull out. It could be done under cover of the Tachen operation. If the Chinese Government endeavored to hold on to Matsu, it would be eventually snapped off. The U.S. could not extend its coverage to Matsu and the position was not believed to be defensible. A good concentration and balance of Chinese forces could be achieved between Formosa, the Pescadores and Quemoy. Any additional off-shore island positions would represent an over-extension of Chinese Government forces. Other positions could not be held without an expenditure of resources out of relation to the value of such positions. It did not make sense to tie up major forces to hold a bunch of rocks. The U.S. was not prepared to make any commitment apart from Quemoy. On the other hand, it was realized that if all the off-shore island positions were abandoned there would be a very bad effect on morale throughout the Far East. The question was, what do you do to offset the effect of withdrawal from some of the positions? We would join forces to hold a reduced position, giving up the untenable positions which over-extend available Chinese forces.

Foreign Minister Yeh asked if the President proposed to accomplish this by Executive Order and not under the Treaty?

The Secretary said this was correct.

Mr. Robertson said presumably the Chinese Government would announce a regrouping operation.

The Secretary said that concerted action would be required. Presumably the Chinese Government would announce its intention to regroup, saying that it would no longer endeavor to hold those positions which were of no vital strategic significance, and would concentrate its forces on Formosa, the Pescadores and Quemoy. Probably the U.S. would announce that without awaiting the ratification of the Treaty, the U.S. would take interim action to assure the security of Quemoy, which was considered essential to the protection of Formosa and the Pescadores. "Security" in this context had a broad connotation. It would mean that either U.S. Forces or Chinese forces would be empowered to attack a build-up on the Mainland which seemed to be aimed at Quemoy, Formosa and the Pescadores. We would not have to wait for an actual attack.

Dr. Yeh said he would communicate the U.S. proposals at once to his Government. Meanwhile he hoped that the Secretary would make every effort to keep the subject sub rosa.

The Secretary said he would urge the Congressmen to maintain secrecy. He would do this with all the earnestness at his command.

Dr. Yeh said that even if his Government accepted the kind offer just outlined, it would require considerable planning and preparation. There would have to be an effective pretense of maintaining normal conditions while the preparations went forward.

The Secretary agreed, and said he thought that the U.S. would be prepared to send forces into the Tachen area to protect it pending the withdrawal.

Dr. Yeh asked if UN action after the evacuation was contemplated? Would the Tachens in effect be given to the Communists?

The Secretary said this was correct.

Amb. Koo said if his Government accepted, it would be necessary to make plans in advance, and move very rapidly in the execution of the plans.

The Secretary said he thought the Joint Resolution might require two or three days' debate in Congress, perhaps more. The matter might be referred to Committees of Congress. The Secretary knew that Senator George was extremely reluctant to take any action which might lead to war with Communist China. He wanted our commitments limited strictly to Formosa and the Pescadores. The Secretary did not know whether Senator George and the rest of the Democratic leadership of the two Houses would go along. The Democrats controlled Congress. Strong bipartisan support of the proposal by the Congress and the American people would be a necessity.

Dr. Yeh asked if the Secretary could defer his consultations with Congress until he had time to hear from President Chiang?

The Secretary said he did not think so. He said it was necessary to begin to educate the members of Congress. He would not define the Administration proposal so clearly in his conversation with the Congressional leaders tomorrow. But he wanted to get their reaction to the basic questions. He wanted to begin to crystalize the issues and the thinking. The President would probably present the detailed proposal later. The Secretary thought the situation was so acute that we could not afford to wait.

Dr. Yeh said he thought he could get an answer in six hours or so.

The Secretary said he would make it clear that the proposed course of action requires the concurrence of the Chinese Government. The U.S. would of course want to consider the ideas of the Chinese Government. As to substance, the proposal was very much in the interest of the Chinese Government. If the Chinese Government rejected the proposal, it would lose the whole business.

The Secretary said that in order to maintain our own self respect, we could not play a fuzzy game any longer. That game was played out. The Chinese Communists had already begun to probe and were exposing the indecision. The U.S. must now make clear its position and be prepared to carry out the obligations it was now prepared to assume. Otherwise the U.S. reputation would become tarnished. The U.S. could not afford to back down from any position which it assumed, or to be exposed in a bluff. We must decide how far our interests require us to go and then we must deliver on our commitments. As he saw it there were three choices: to try to hold all the off-shore islands; to disclaim responsibility for any of the off-shore islands which would result in the eventual loss of all of them; or to concentrate on Quemoy as the closest and most important, and hold it. This third choice was so much better than the others that there was no real choice. The problem was with Congress. We must begin to educate Congress as to the requirements of the present situation. Of course the talks would not commit the Chinese Government, nor would they be so definite as this conversation.

The Secretary said it was hard to persuade soldiers to die in a hopeless cause. He thought it was questionable whether the garrison on the Tachens would fight if they had no hope. He supposed they would fight if they could be sure of support which would give them hope. He did not doubt the strong will to fight of the Chinese forces if they had assurances of adequate backing.

Dr. Yeh said he was very happy to know that the U.S. Government had come to a definite decision. He agreed that fuzziness had existed for too long. Although the Chinese military capabilities were

very limited, the decision was a difficult one, which the Generalissimo could not make alone. The President of the Executive Yuan (the Premier) would be consulted, and probably a secret session of the Cabinet would be convened. He did not say the proposition would be rejected, but the matter was one of great moment and considerable delicacy. He agreed that the Tachens had only limited strategic value for the Chinese Government. But if they fell to the Chinese Communists, he felt they would have a far greater strategic significance for the Communists.

The Secretary expressed some doubt about this, pointing out that no airfields could be built in the Tachens.

Dr. Yeh agreed but he pointed out that the Tachens control the northern entrance to the Formosa Strait.

The Secretary said that he felt we could not fool around the fringes of the problem any longer. It was necessary for all concerned to speak very frankly. The assumption of joint responsibility for the protection of Quemoy would be a very serious step by the U.S. It might take a little time to get Congress fully informed on the problem, perhaps a week or so.

The Foreign Minister and the Ambassador said they would despatch an urgent message to Taipei.

**20. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, January 19, 1955, 4:45 p.m.<sup>1</sup>**

CONFERENCE

Sec/State, Under Sec/State, Mr. Bowie, Asst Sec Robertson, Mr. Phleger, Director of Central Intelligence, R. Cutler

1. Secretary Dulles reported on conversations which he had been having during the day with the President and Admiral Radford. They had concluded:

a. that Chincom aggressive conduct against the Tachens indicated a clear intent to knock off all the Nationalist-held offshore islands; the Chincoms having already asserted a determination to "liberate Formosa";

b. that it would be shocking to sit by while the Chinat forces (not able alone to defend themselves) were destroyed or taken cap-

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, PPS Files: Lot 66 D 70, China. Top Secret. Drafted by Cutler. According to Dulles' appointment diary, the participants arrived and departed at varying times, and the conference was apparently interrupted when the Secretary met with Senator Knowland at 4:58 p.m. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers)

tive on these islands, and that their destruction or capture would deeply prejudice the morale of the Chinat forces on Formosa and have a damaging effect upon all US friends in the Far East (Japan, ROK, Phillipines, etc.);

c. that, therefore, the time had come for the US to take more positive action and eliminate the fuzziness as to what the US would or would not do in the area (beyond its already declared intentions as to Formosa and the Pescadores and its various treaties—SEATO, ANZUS, ROK, etc.)

2. Accordingly, the following action was contemplated:

a. the Chinats would announce that they were withdrawing from various Chinat-held offshore islands, in order to regroup and reform on others. (Actually, while it would be for the Chinats to decide which islands to withdraw from, they would withdraw from *all* such offshore islands, except Big and Little Quemoy).

b. the US would announce that it would assist such Chinat withdrawal with ships, etc., and would protect with force the safety of such withdrawal.

c. the US would announce that it would help the Chinats to hold Big and Little Quemoy with all US forces necessary for purely defensive action, until such time as by UN action or otherwise such assistance was not required. (See par 3 below).

d. the US would encourage UN action (which tonight's news-flashes indicate may be soon initiated by the UK, Australia, or NZ) to bring about a cease-fire in the area.

e. the President will commit US forces to assist in the defense of the Quemoy *only* on the basis of a Congressional resolution (see par 4 below)

3. As to defense of the Quemoy:

a. this is a necessary counter to the abandonment of the other Offshore islands by the Chinats.

b. Note by R.C.: the US should *not* emphasize the selection of the Quemoy as important to the defense of Formosa, because at some time the US may wish to withdraw from the Quemoy, while, of course, retaining its Formosa position, and because the Quemoy is *not* necessary to the defense of Formosa. (see par 6 below)

c. as to purely defensive action by US forces: it is contemplated that US sea and air power, rather than ground troops will be used. Defensive action would not rule out shelling Chinese mainland,—destroying there hostile build up of armament, troops, logistics, air strips; "hot pursuit".

4. Attached is Draft No. 2<sup>2</sup> of what the Secretary of State will propose at 9 AM on Jan 20 to the Congressional leaders. He dis-

<sup>2</sup> The attachment, headed "Draft #2, Jan. 19, 1955", reads as follows:

"The President would be authorized by the Congress to use the armed forces of the United States for the purpose of securing Formosa and the Pescadores against armed attack, this authority to include the securing of such related positions now in friendly hands and the taking of such other measures as he judges to be appropriate



cussed this matter with Senator Knowland at 5 PM, Jan 19/55,<sup>3</sup> who was non-committal. The Secretary and Admiral Radford will then come to the NSC Meeting for report and discussion.

5. The Secretary of State realizes:

a. this course increases the risk of war, but the risk is already existing because of our Far Eastern treaties and position as to Formosa.

b. this course may open up the question of two Chinas in the UN, but he hopes our allies and ourselves can contain the issue to restoring status quo in the area.

c. that it will have some, but not greatly prejudicial effect, on the putting through of the European treaties.<sup>4</sup>

6. In order to avoid an open-ended guarantee of the Quemoy from which withdrawal will be difficult without avoidable loss of prestige, Bowie suggests tying our help to the Chinats to hold the Quemoy to the request to the UN to bring peace in the area—until the UN acts.

7. A.W. Dulles raised question of effectiveness of Chinat troops on Quemoy; were they infiltrated? would they fight? Robertson thought they would fight. Radford told J.F. Dulles they would fight if they had some confidence of backing.

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for the security of Formosa and the Pescadores. This authority, unless renewed by the Congress, would expire June 30, 1956, or whenever before then the President shall consider that the peace and security of the area are reasonably assured by international conditions created by the United Nations or otherwise, and shall so report to the Congress."

<sup>3</sup> No record of this conversation has been found in Department of State files or the Eisenhower Library. According to notes by Phyllis Bernau, Knowland called Dulles briefly at 5:38 p.m. and told him that he thought Congressional reaction would largely depend on whether the President was prepared to make a definite recommendation. (Memorandum by Bernau, January 19, 1955, Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations)

<sup>4</sup> The reference is to several agreements signed at Paris on October 23, 1954, but not yet ratified, establishing the Western European Union and providing for the accession of the Federal Republic of Germany to the North Atlantic Treaty.

21. Telegram From the Ambassador in the Republic of China (Rankin) to the Department of State <sup>1</sup>

Taipei, January 19, 1955—8 p.m.

468. Taipei despatch 46 July 24, 1953 and telegrams 50 and 51 July 22, 1953 <sup>2</sup> and 467 January 18, 1955 <sup>3</sup> also Department's telegram 76 July 30, 1953. <sup>4</sup>

Defense Minister Yu Ta-wei called on me this afternoon and stressed "extreme gravity" of situation developing in Tachen area. Repeating substantially what he has told General Chase recently and latter has passed on to Admirals Radford and Stump, <sup>5</sup> Yu predicts offensive actions of Reds in Tachen region unavoidable will produce chain of mutual retaliation and consequent expansion of war. He considers it already perhaps too late to break this chain and stabilize front but believes important to try and that only US is capable of effective action in this sense.

Minister Yu feels he has shown great restraint in withholding retaliatory action while awaiting US concurrence which has been denied after delays of week or two. <sup>6</sup> In case of yesterday's attack on Ichiang (or Yikiang) however, US approval received quickly <sup>7</sup> and Chinese Air Force today bombed shipping at Swatow, Pintang and

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/1-1955. Secret; Priority. Passed by the Department to CINCPAC at Rankin's request; also passed to the Army, Navy, Air Force, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

<sup>2</sup> For text of telegrams 50 and 51 from Taipei, July 22, 1953, and for information concerning despatch 46 from Taipei, July 24, 1953, see *Foreign Relations, 1952-1954*, vol. xiv, Part 1, p. 232 ff.

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 467 from Taipei, January 18, 1955, reported an amphibious attack on Ichiang and bombing attacks on the Tachen Islands that day. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/1-1955)

<sup>4</sup> Telegram 76 to Taipei, July 30, 1953, is summarized in footnote 1, *Foreign Relations, 1952-1954*, vol. xiv, p. 242.

<sup>5</sup> In telegram 181030Z (MG 5240) from Chief MAAG, Formosa, to CINCPAC, January 18, 1955. (JCS Records, CCS 381 Formosa (11-8-48) Sec. 17)

<sup>6</sup> Minister Yu's proposal of January 11 (see footnote 3, Document 10) had not received U.S. concurrence. Telegram 142155Z from CNO to CINCPAC, January 14, 1955, reads in part as follows:

"Because of the time which unfortunately but necessarily has elapsed consider operation should not be conducted now. However it is considered to be within the revised NSC policy and therefore an approved type of operation. It should be prepared for and executed promptly following the next incident which meets your criteria with regard to ChiNat retaliation. In this connection and to avoid insofar as possible damage to neutral shipping consider operation should be conducted under conditions good visibility. The foregoing concurred in by JCS and SecDef." (JCS Records, CCS 381 Formosa (11-8-48) Sec. 17)

<sup>7</sup> Telegram 181251Z from CINCPAC to Chief MAAG, Formosa, January 18, 1955, authorized the execution of a Nationalist proposal to attack Communist shipping in the areas of Swatow, Amoy, and Fuchow in retaliation for the Communist attacks on Ichiang and the Tachens that day. (*Ibid.*)

Amoy. He noted his restraint again evidenced by absence of request for agreement to bomb targets on mainland.

Official US statement to effect 7th fleet would extend appropriate air support in Tachen area against further Communist attacks would, Minister Yu believes, offer only chance of stopping spread of conflict. With prospect of US air cover if needed, Chinese Navy could again command Tachen waters which should obviate necessity of direct US naval support. (Yu also suggested to Chase that US show of naval force in Tachen area would be useful.)

Failing some positive action by US, Minister Yu is convinced Reds will push southward with their command of air and consequent ability to use otherwise inferior naval power, taking Nanchi Matsu, et cetera, in due course. By that time frequent alerts in Taipei would be unavoidable, due to nearness of enemy air activity, and direct involvement of Formosa in conflict must be expected.

*Comment:* Conflicting military views on importance of offshore islands provide no satisfactory basis for me to express opinion except from political or psychological standpoint. In latter connection I believe loss of Tachen or others among more important islands would have most unfortunate effect on Chinese and other Asian opinion by undermining confidence in US strength and determination. Subject to opinion of US military authorities, therefore I recommend most sympathetic consideration of Minister Yu's request for statement re air support.

If on other hand it now definitely decided islands in Tachen area not particularly important, I believe US should so inform Chinese and assume formal responsibility for advising their evacuation before excessive losses of men and material have been incurred. Such advice should be considered in light of earlier US urging that "all feasible steps should be taken to strengthen" island defenses.

Further consideration often overlooked in this complex situation is that present Communist attacks represent clearcut case of new aggression against UN member with which US has just signed defense pact. Simply calling for cease-fire, without at same time branding aggressor, would therefore encourage world opinion to assume sponsors of cease-fire proposal find little to choose between two belligerents in present case.

**Rankin**

22. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,  
Washington, January 20, 1955, 9 a.m. <sup>1</sup>

ATTENDING

*The Department*

Secretary Dulles  
Under Secretary Hoover  
Asst. Secy. Robertson  
Asst. Secy. Morton

*Joint Chiefs of Staff*

Admiral Radford

*Senate:*

Senator George  
Senator Wiley  
Senator Byrd (for Chmn Russell)  
Senator Saltonstall  
Senator Clements  
Senator Knowland

*House:*

Rep. Richards  
Rep. Chiperfield  
Rep. Arends (for Rep. Short)  
Rep. McCormack (for Speaker)  
Rep. Martin  
Rep. Vinson

*Americans imprisoned in communist China*

The Secretary explained that he had had a full report from Secretary General Hammarskjold concerning the Americans being held prisoners by the communist Chinese, and that the Secretary did not feel there was much solid ground for encouragement in what the S. G. had said. The Secretary said that Hammarskjold's own words were: "my reason does not give me much warrant for hope, but my instinct does." The Secretary said he was not able to have the same instinct at second hand that the Secretary General had at first hand. The Secretary felt, however, that the Hammarskjold mission had done much to dispel genuine suspicions on the part of the communists that these men were on a spying mission in China and were not in a legitimate sense members of the UN command. Although Hammarskjold got no assurances, he thinks he put medicine in the body and hopes the medicine works. The Secretary said Hammarskjold did

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Memoranda. Secret; Personal and Private. Prepared in the Department of State.

Thruston B. Morton was Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations.

Members of the Senate are identified as follows: Alexander Wiley of Wisconsin, ranking minority member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; Harry Flood Byrd of Virginia, member of the Senate Armed Services Committee; Richard B. Russell of Georgia, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee; Leverett Saltonstall of Massachusetts, Senate Minority Whip and member of the Senate Armed Services Committee; Earle C. Clements of Kentucky, Senate Majority Whip.

Members of the House of Representatives are identified as follows: James P. Richards of South Carolina, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee; Robert B. Chiperfield of Illinois, ranking minority member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee; Leslie C. Arends of Illinois, Minority Whip and member of the House Armed Services Committee; Dewey Short of Missouri, ranking minority member of the House Armed Services Committee; John W. McCormack of Massachusetts, House Majority Leader; Sam Rayburn of Texas, Speaker of the House; Joseph W. Martin, Jr., of Massachusetts, House Minority Leader; Carl Vinson of Georgia, Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee.

bring back information about the prisoners, posed photographs, etc., which is being furnished the families.

Senator Knowland asked if the information concerned the 11 Americans in prison only, or the four pilots as well. The Secretary answered that there were no photographs of the four pilots, who were in Northern Manchuria, but that information and photographs had been received by some of the families of the four pilots through other channels. When Senator Knowland asked if Hammarskjold had seen the American prisoners, the Secretary said he had not.

*Formosa and the Off-shore Islands.*

The Secretary said that the situation in the Formosa area is developing in an acute way which seems to call for a sounder defensive concept than now prevails, particularly on the part of the Chinese Nationalists, probably involving the regrouping of their forces and strengthening their positions with our help. The Secretary explained that the present situation with reference to the off-shore islands is a matter of historic accident, rather than one of military planning. When the Nationalists were driven off the mainland, they stopped at every opportunity on these islands, relinquishing them only as they were compelled to. There has been a steady attrition in the Nationalist position within the last five to six years, largely due to voluntary withdrawals from positions which became untenable, some of them as the result of minor military action.

The Secretary and Admiral Radford pointed out the islands still held by the Nationalists on the map. The Tachen Islands, some 300 miles north of Formosa, have some 10,000 Nationalist troops, in addition to guerillas, on them. One of the islands, Yikiang was captured by the communists on January 18. On all the off-shore islands, the Nationalists have almost 1/3 of their trained troops.

The Secretary pointed out that the present disposition of the Nationalist troops is not a logical one to meet an attack. The island positions are to a considerable extent untenable, or could be held only with great effort not only on the part of the Nationalists but of ourselves as well. A serious problem confronts us as to whether the United States is justified in tying up a considerable part of its existing mobile forces in that part of the world—aircraft carriers, etc.—to try to prevent the capture of these islands. The Tachen islands are so far from Formosa and so relatively near communist air bases that raids can be carried out and the planes return to their base before planes from Formosa could intercept them. With this situation, carrier based planes would be the only defense.

The Secretary said that there is no doubt in his mind that the ultimate purpose of the communist Chinese is to try to take Formosa and the Pescadores. The Peiping announcement of the capture of Yi-

kiang Island referred to this ultimate objective, and there are other indications that their actions are preparatory to taking Formosa.

The Secretary stated that the problem had reached such magnitude that it had to be dealt with in a comprehensive way. The subject was discussed with the President by Admiral Radford and the Secretary at lunch yesterday (January 19) and is to be taken up with the National Security Council today. The Secretary said it was their conception, broadly speaking, that there should be a regrouping of Nationalist forces which would enable them to effect an orderly withdrawal from some of the off-shore islands, and that with some help from us they would then try to hold the remaining positions, particularly the islands in the Amoy area (Quemoy and adjacent islands).

Senator Wiley asked how far from the mainland are the islands of the Quemoy group. Admiral Radford pointed it out on the map as about 5 miles. He added that there are some 50,000 nationalist troops on Kinmen<sup>2</sup> island in this group, and that one-third of the entire nationalist army of 350,000 men are scattered throughout all of the off-shore islands.

The Secretary pointed out that the problem involved elements of morale, not only of the Nationalist Chinese, but of all other countries in the Far East.

Senator Wiley asked about airfields in the area. Admiral Radford pointed on the map to important communist fields on the mainland, especially the principal concentration near Canton. When Senator Wiley asked if the communists had big guns mounted off the Quemoy group, Admiral Radford said not very big, that the Nationalists had their guns on Kinmen and the other islands, and that this area could be covered from Formosa. As to Amoy's strategic value to the communist, Admiral Radford said it was the best harbor on the Chinese mainland south of Tsingtao, and that this would undoubtedly be the assembling point for an invasion of Formosa, 100 miles away.

The Secretary pointed out that the big difference between Quemoy and the Tachens is that the former can be covered by Nationalist air forces from Formosa, while the Tachens could only be protected from carrier based planes.

The Secretary continued that this concept involved withdrawal from the Tachen and some of the other islands and a regrouping of forces in more important islands. This could only be carried out with the help of the United States, and our assistance would be necessary to enable them to get Nationalist forces, people and supplies out. The Secretary said the islands under attack would be in a hopeless posi-

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<sup>2</sup> Chinmen, or Quemoy.

tion and could not be reinforced; recently the Nationalists were attacked while trying to resupply the island and got pretty well banged up.

Rep. Arends asked if there were 10,000 troops on the island, and Admiral Radford replied that it was a whole division of their trained troops, and that they have a lot of supplies on the island.

Rep. Martin asked if the Chinese Nationalists agree that we should abandon the islands. Admiral Radford said that we have not talked with them yet, but added that they could not continue to resupply the islands. The Secretary said that he did talk with George Yeh, the Nationalist Foreign Minister, yesterday, and that they recognize that they could not possibly hold the islands unless we can give them very considerable support—aircraft carriers in the area, etc.—and they are talking in terms of possible evacuation.

Senator Knowland asked what value the Tachens have, if any, from the point of view of an early warning network for air raids from Formosa and Okinawa. Admiral Radford said there is now an old Japanese radar, no good facilities. He added that if we had to, we could watch the whole China area to get warnings.

Senator Saltonstall asked, if we are going to help, in what way we would be called upon to help in the evacuation of the Tachen islands. The Secretary answered that this would involve some risk of tangling with opposing planes, and furnishing facilities for evacuation.

The Secretary informed the group that as another phase of the problem, we are considering a parallel move involving going to the UN to see if it is prepared to call for a cease-fire in the area and whether or not the Chinese communists will comply. The Secretary said it is his opinion that the communist Chinese will not comply with a cease-fire; in fact, such a proposal would probably be vetoed by the Soviets in the Security Council. Nevertheless, the Secretary felt that discussion in the UN might be a stabilizing factor, especially if the United States could quickly ratify the Formosan treaty. The Secretary said that he felt that one of the factors in this flare-up of activity is the feeling of the communist Chinese that they can frighten the United States from going through with this treaty. Once we nail this treaty down, there is some chance that the Chinese communists may tend to abate their efforts if the UN calls popular pressure on them. The Secretary added "That is speculative, and we don't give any guarantees, but it is the best estimate we can make."

#### *Congressional authorization*

If this program were adopted, the Secretary continued, we would want to have (and the President thinks we ought to have) some authority from Congress to use the armed forces of the United States in

the area for the protection and security of Formosa and the Pescadores. Some would say that the President has inherent authority in that field, but I think that is highly doubtful. The President's orders to the Seventh Fleet stemmed, presumably, from the authority of the President at the time of the outbreak of the Korean War. After the Korean War broke out and we became engaged pursuant to the UN Resolution, President Truman issued his orders to the Seventh Fleet to, among other things, prevent an attack on Formosa,<sup>3</sup> and presumably the powers he exercised derived from his war powers. Since the armistice in Korea, the question as to whether the President has war powers deriving from the Korean War becomes more and more doubtful. This would especially be true when it comes to authority to send armed forces of the United States into this area to assist Nationalists in regrouping their forces and to act as against any concentration which seems clearly designed to presage an attack on Formosa and the Pescadores themselves. Those are matters on which I think the President would want to have the sanction of the Congress.

Rep. McCormack asked if the President didn't have certain powers as Commander-in-chief. He added that he was not disagreeing with the Secretary, but in a matter of an emergency in which the national security might be involved—

The Secretary said that even if the treaty were in force, he did not think the President would want to use forces of the United States under the treaty without Congressional approval, either formal or informal. These treaties read that an attack on the area would be a danger to the United States, and the United States would act according to its constitutional processes. There has always been some debate between the Senate and the Executive as to just what that meant. The debate came up on implementation of the North Atlantic Treaty. The Secretary explained that he had always interpreted that language to mean that if Congress were in session and could be consulted the President should consult the Congress to support any action which might have a belligerent character. If Congress were not in session and could not be brought back in time, presumably the President would be justified in acting on his own responsibility. The Secretary said the President expressed that view to him and Admiral Radford yesterday and that the President was to meet with them further as the program unfolds.

Senator Wiley asked if we have any troops on any of the off-shore islands, and Admiral Radford replied that we have some observers, the number varying from two to eight.

<sup>3</sup> For text of President Harry S. Truman's statement of June 27, 1950, in which he announced his directive to the Seventh Fleet, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. vii, p. 202.



Senator Wiley pointed out that usually Presidential intervention depends on protection of our own citizens, but that here we would be intervening on the part of one of the sides to a civil war. He said he firmly believed this would require congressional action, but that we must not fall into the plot the Kremlin might want us to for this would mean out and out war.

Secretary Dulles said that if we do not withdraw from some of the islands and regroup the Nationalist forces, there will be a falling of the islands one by one, including Quemoy, involving wiping out more than a 100,000 of the best Nationalist troops, a drop in morale on Formosa so that the defense of Formosa would be extremely difficult and might require considerable replacements of Nationalist and United States troops. We would be charged with turning and running and making excuses, and the whole effect on the non-communist countries in Asia would be extremely bad.

Senator Saltonstall said he thought the same thing.

The Secretary said he felt that if this action were taken, the Formosan treaty were ratified, and the President were given these powers, there will be a realization that we have reached the point that we are not going to retreat more and it possibly will have a stabilizing effect. "In my mind, the risk of war is greater if we don't take this action." One of the dangers leading to war comes from miscalculation. A country that has gained one objective after another becomes too ambitious, goes too far and war is the result. That could result here if we don't quickly map out what we are prepared to do. Up to the present time we have been covering this situation by hoping the communists would be deterred by uncertainty. They are probing and will continue to probe to find where we will stop them. Our position has deteriorated and this step must be taken.

Senator Saltonstall asked if there can be a resolution presented to Congress to give the President power to use troops to help Nationalist China without making it a declaration of war. The Secretary said he does not suggest a declaration of war. Senator Saltonstall said the resolution would be simply general approval to use troops to help defend our security. The Secretary said "yes", and to use the armed forces to secure Formosa and the Pescadores and whatever might be necessary to their defense. Such a resolution might be effective for a year, to be renewed, if necessary, and possibly with a provision for termination if as the result of UN action there were a cease-fire in the area.

Senator Clements asked if we were ready to take a position that we are drawing a line and that from that line we retreat no further.

The Secretary said "No", but the position should be made clear, for he felt that a continued attitude of uncertainty and of bluff from now on would carry great danger.

Senator Saltonstall asked if the Secretary thought there was any connection between the prisoner of war problem and the communist attacks on the islands. The Secretary said he had asked Hammar-skjold if he thought the communists reasoned that we would not engage in any defense operation for fear of endangering the negotiations, and he said he did not think there is a connection between the two. The Secretary added that he thought it was anybody's guess.

Senator Wiley: If we intervene, and that is going to be the policy of the Executive, do you think they would interfere with our airforce? Admiral Radford said it was not so much a question of intervention. The first action we would have to take, and there is urgency in this decision because the communists are getting ready to attack the main position of the Nationalists on Tachen Islands—We don't want to lose the whole division and its equipment on those islands. We would have to cover their withdrawal, for they couldn't get out without our help. Senator Knowland suggested "Dunkirk", and the Secretary said if we didn't help, it wouldn't be a Dunkirk for they wouldn't get out. Admiral Radford continued, if we went in, first we would have to put carriers in the area and keep our fighter pilots in the air while the evacuation is going on, and the communists might engage them.

Senator Wiley asked, in case of dog-fights, how far would we go? Would we pursue them inland? What if they sink a carrier? We understand they have the best undersea craft in the world and have more in the Far Eastern area than we have in our total fleet. Admiral Radford said that in case of a defensive action, we probably would not have to pursue communist planes back to their bases; we would cover the islands and shoot them down if they come over, and there would not be much danger of a defensive action expanding. As far as carriers are concerned, I doubt that communist planes would attack the carriers. Their submarines are a long way from there, and we keep close watch of where they are. The Chinese communists have only one or two in Tsingtao. The carriers are protected by a submarine screen, and it is my opinion there would be no Russian intervention. If they did intervene we could take care of it.

Senator Wiley: What would be the effect upon morale if we got these troops off the islands—in Formosa and the Far East. Some think the whole Far East would be against us if we meddle in this thing. Admiral Radford said he thought there was no such opinion in the Far East. I think our greatest problem in the Far East is making clear to our friends what we are for and what we are against. I think the most important aspect of this particular problem is, whatever we decide to do, it must be published to the whole world in unmistakable language.

Senator Clements asked what the Admiral meant by "we". Admiral Radford said he meant the United States, that we might expect some moral support, but as far as military help from our allies is concerned, no one else has the strength at this time.

Rep. McCormack asked what the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is. Admiral Radford said that in September three of the Joint Chiefs recommended that we hold all the off-shore islands (Ridgway dissented at that time). The Admiral added that there would probably be the same division now, but that he had not talked over the immediate problem with them. The September decision involved a total of 10 islands.

Rep. Vinson: What number would you propose to hold now? Admiral Radford said definitely all of the Amoy area islands (four), and that he believed the Joint Chiefs would advise holding Matsu and the Dog group.

Senator Knowland observed that with radar on those islands there could be good coverage. Admiral Radford added that they would also serve as observation posts for any seaborne convoys of the communists, but that we do have plane and sea patrols in the straits now.

Senator Saltonstall said this decision would primarily mean giving up the Tachen Islands. Admiral Radford replied that the Nationalists are still on two small islands in the Tachen group. We would expect them to get off the northern islands and we would cover their withdrawal. There are some 10,000 civilians on those islands which we would have to offer to evacuate.

Rep. Richards commented that he agreed that if we plan to get out of some of the islands we must tell the world how far we are going and that we are going no further. On his trip this year, he had found that most of the people don't know what we are doing and would like to know. Admiral Radford said it was his view as the result of his recent trip that Far Eastern countries don't know what we plan to do. The only way we can stabilize the situation and probably prevent a live war is by a firm stand now.

Rep. McCormack: "We are committed to the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores." Admiral Radford said that is a protective motive. Communist control of this area would outflank the Philippines and cut across all our defenses. The Secretary said that it would so jeopardize our offshore defenses that it would really be a matter of time before we would be forced back to Hawaii or the West Coast. He added that the sentiment in the Philippines is extremely sensitive to the Formosan situation. Admiral Radford pointed out that the psychological effect of the loss of Formosa, in Japan and other countries in the Far East would be terrific.

Secretary Dulles said that this position would implement the pending treaty which covers only Formosa and the Pescadores. He said he was not suggesting a permanent position any different from the treaty, but the treaty also says we will react to an attack against Formosa and the Pescadores. Considering the present mood of the Chinese communists, the proposed position seemed the only one to take. If the situation changes so that there is acceptance by the Chinese communists of the treaty position that we have taken concerning Formosa, or if the UN cease-fire pacifies the area, then the commitment insofar as the off-shore islands is concerned would disappear. I would not recommend our assuming any permanent obligation to defending anything other than Formosa and the Pescadores. The other islands come in only because the Chinese communists profess that they are attacking Formosa and the Pescadores. The Nationalists have large numbers of their best troops on Kinman (Chinmen). As long as the Chinese communists profess their goal to drive them out, then I think it would be criminal folly on our part to sit and watch the taking of the approaches to these islands which could be held with minor help on our part. We would be weakening our ultimate position that we are obligated to defend Formosa and the Pescadores themselves.

Senator Knowland: Even assuming for the moment that the UN cease-fire should be tentatively or otherwise accepted by the Chinese communists, do you have any reason to believe they would respect a cease-fire any more than they have complied in other instances such as Indochina, where they were building up their fire-power six times what it had been—or is there any reason to believe they would use a cease-fire to gather equipment in this instance and improve their position?

Representative McCormack: If we get the UN into it won't we compromise ourselves further. It seems to me that if we take affirmative action, it should be without qualification, without any if's to it. I pointed out in a speech in Boston the other day that confining ourselves to the Pescadores and Formosa was an invitation to the communists to take the other islands. If we take this action, we better be firm without qualification.

Senator Clements referred to the September decision of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to retain 10 islands,<sup>4</sup> and asked if there is any unanimity among them now. Admiral Radford said this situation arose

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<sup>4</sup> The reference is unclear. In September 1954 the Joint Chiefs of Staff held divided views concerning U.S. policy with respect to the Nationalist-held offshore islands. See the memorandum of September 11, 1954, from Radford to Wilson and its attachments *ibid.*, 1952-1954, vol. xiv, Part 1, p. 598.

at lunch with the President yesterday and he had not had a chance to discuss it with the Chiefs.

Senator Clements asked if such a resolution came to Congress whether the President would state the United States' position. The Secretary said it would be on the basis of the President's message, whether he delivered it in person or not. Senator Clements asked if our position would be clearly drawn, what we are willing to defend, where we will draw the line, and where we will retreat no further. The Secretary said it was his view that this should be made clear, leaving some latitude for details for the military exigencies of the situation, but this should be made clear in the President's message or in subsequent action of the Executive. He agreed that the time has come when we need to make our position clear and that we will stick to it. Senator Clements reiterated that not only must our position be made clear, but there must be assurances given that we will make it stick.

Representative Vinson: You stated the off-shore islands would not be kept permanently. I assume that was on the ground they have no particular value to the defense of Formosa. The Secretary explained that Formosa and the Pescadores form a natural part of the off-shore island chain; he did not think the United States should be permanently committed to holding these small islands as part of the treaty obligation.

Representative Vinson asked, if the Reds took these islands, would this jeopardize the proper defense of Formosa. The Secretary believed that if they fell into the hands of the communists in the present circumstances, he felt it would jeopardize the defense of Formosa from the psychological factor. The value of the islands at the present time is partly military and partly psychological, and those factors do change. Some of the islands are virtually uninhabitable except at terrific cost. To extricate ourselves from some of them, we would have to firm up our position somewhere else.

Senator Knowland commented that amphibious operations against small islands involve considerable vessels and air coverage from communist China, but to take Formosa and the Pescadores a much larger operation would be involved, with 9 million people on Formosa. The communists would have to count on a sizable invasion fleet in some harbor area. He asked whether the harbor of Amoy is a likely spot where an invasion force would be gathered for an invasion of Formosa if Quemoy and the other islands were not held. Admiral Radford said it would be a logical base for assembling large convoys.

Admiral Radford referred to Representative Vinson's question concerning intangible factors which the Secretary had mentioned. He added that if we decided we would not support any of the off-shore

islands and told the Nationalists they must withdraw and we would cover, they might not agree with us. We are not even sure they will agree with this much. We must look at our own interests—holding Formosa means having friendly, non-communist forces on that island. They might say this is hopeless and Formosa would fall from internal collapse. If the troops on Formosa became convinced this is hopeless, we might have to go in ourselves.

Senator George asked what attitude or reaction there had been from the Chinese Nationalists on the proposal of a cease-fire. Secretary Dulles said their attitude was negative. The question of going to the UN on such a proposal has been under consideration for some time—since the September meeting of the Joint Chiefs. The Secretary said the President of [in?] the NSC had asked that alternatives be explored and that he has been working actively on the subject and had worked out a plan that has been pretty well covered with the UK, Australia and New Zealand. When Assistant Secretary [Robertson] was in Formosa in October,<sup>5</sup> he discussed the subject with the Generalissimo who had indicated they would go along, reluctantly, if as a counterpart the United States entered into the treaty with Formosa and made some arrangement for assisting them on some of the off-shore islands. Since the treaty has been signed, however, they have not been as favorable as they were previously.

Rep. Vinson asked if it had been determined that a joint resolution will be requested from Congress to authorize the President to supply forces. The Secretary answered that there has not been a final decision by the President, but that he is thinking along those lines and had asked the Secretary to explore it with the leadership today. Later, the Secretary said, he would join the President and Admiral Radford at the National Security Council meeting today, and it is likely that a firm decision will be taken.

Rep. McCormack asked how quick action must be. Admiral Radford said that communist attacks on the Tachens would depend on the weather. If the decision is made that we will cover the Nationalist withdrawal from the Tachens we would move three carriers to Okinawa to be in readiness. If there is good weather in the Tachens, it is just a question of what day the communists will pick.

Senator Wiley asked what the possibilities would be if the Nationalists didn't agree to the proposal. The Secretary replied that we would be in a hell of a fix. Before any steps are taken by this Government, however, we would try to get their agreement. Admiral Radford said he thought the Nationalists would agree to this proposal.

<sup>5</sup> For text of McConaughy's memorandum of Robertson's conversations with Chiang Kai-shek during his visit to Taipei, October 12-14, 1954, see *ibid.*, p. 728.

Senator Wiley said the newspapers had reported that George Yeh, the Nationalist Foreign Minister, had left the Department the day before in a huff. Assistant Secretary Robertson said he had left the Secretary's office with George Yeh the day before and that he was not in a huff and was in as good a humour as he could be. The Secretary said that when he mentioned such a plan Yeh had said he would report to the Generalissimo, and we are now awaiting his views.

Senator George commented that a quick ratification of the Formosa treaty would be necessary. The Secretary agreed, pointing out that he thought one of the factors back of the communist activity at this time was in the hope that they would scare us out of ratifying the treaty. With ratification an accepted fact, it might take some of the heat out of the situation. If they think they can frighten us out of the treaty, they will continue their activity, and the Secretary considered it very desirable that we act on the treaty as soon as possible.

Senator Saltonstall referred to the possibility of UN action, and as one who wants to believe in the UN, after the unsuccessful efforts on the prisoners of war, he asked if it would not weaken the UN to give it another job doubtful of success. Secretary Dulles said that there are pressures from many quarters to get this matter into the UN. He believed the UN will be a good place to mobilize world opinion as to what we are thinking and that it would be better to do that. He said he did not believe anything would be accomplished other than that. The UN's principal function is as an opinion forming body. Undoubtedly a veto would [be] made if the matter came before the Security Council, but we would be able to get world opinion to support us which is important. We also have a critical situation in Europe, and it is extremely important that we make an effort to get UN support rather than giving the impression that we are acting on our own in a reckless way and trying to get into war with the communists. On the whole, the Secretary thought we would gain more than we would lose in trying to get the UN to act and that to oppose such a procedure would be a mistake.

Rep. Chipfield asked if the Secretary feels that the treaty should be ratified before Congress is asked to take other action. The Secretary said that although time would be important in both cases, he did not think it is vitally important which comes first. As he had pointed out, he felt the treaty is extremely important. Even if it were in force, however, he felt the question of implementation would arise, and he felt the President would not want to rely merely on the treaty powers but would want to bring the matter to the Congress. So the treaty would not replace the need for Congressional action, although, if consummated, it might destroy one of the objectives the

communists have in their present operation. The two things could go ahead concurrently.

Rep. McCormack commented that we have had commitments in this area since June 20 [27], 1950. The Secretary agreed, although he said the question of the President's authority is obscure following the Korean armistice.

Senator Byrd asked if this proposal would get the support of the UK having in mind their efforts to get Chinese communists admitted to the UN. The Secretary said he thought they would be sympathetic to the position. He said he thought the British were beginning to be frightened as to the Chinese communist menace and are beginning to feel that it endangers Malaya. He said he believed they would be sympathetic to this course of action. Admiral Radford agreed that the British are more concerned than they were.

Rep. Arends asked if it were a matter of days or weeks. The Secretary replied that it is a matter of days.

Rep. Martin: If the President can do this without action on the part of Congress—today's session in the House will be our last one until next Monday.<sup>6</sup> The Secretary said the President would probably not be able to send up a message until Monday. Rep. Martin said that if the plan is to go to Congress and time is important, if the support of the leadership on the policy were obtained, would the President go ahead, in the interest of secrecy. He said his thought was that once the President presents the plan to Congress, the communists would attack right away. The Secretary said he thought it would be better to have a clear indication of national unity with Congress behind it. Rep. Martin said his use of the word "secret" was probably unfortunate, but that he had in mind the national interest.

Admiral Radford said if the situation got critical we might just fly some patrols over and make a demonstration.

Rep. Richards said it is vital to decide whether we are going to bring up the treaty or the other thing first. The treaty discussion in the Senate will blow the whole thing wide open and may damage the other, so this question should be decided quickly. Senator Knowland said there could be prolonged debate in the Senate under its rules on the treaty, and since it would be a matter of days within which the communists could destroy the division on Tachen, he would think the resolution should be offered first rather than the treaty.

Senator Clements said that if it is a question of speed, a resolution is not the way to get it; there will be discussion in the Senate on the resolution. If the President can make it positive, that would help.

Senator Knowland commented that if the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the NSC, and the President recommend this in the national interest,

<sup>6</sup> January 24.



that would give it a strong position. Senator Clements said this information would have been valuable to have had before this meeting was called, and they would have been in a much better position to handle the problem.

Senator George said that the SEATO defense pact hearings have been completed, and as soon as the list of witnesses on the Formosa treaty has been made up his Committee would be ready to act on the treaty. He said those were the preliminary steps and his committee would go ahead.

Rep. McCormack commented that if the Congress adopted the resolution that would be as good as approval of the treaty. He said he wanted action and thought we have been dilly dallying too long.

The Secretary, referring to Senator Clements' reference to the time of the meeting, said we might be criticized for not consulting before the executive branch had come to a decision. Senator Clements said his comment was not intended as criticism but only as an observation.

Senator Knowland asked what is going to be said to the press about this meeting, since they were hovering around outside like bees. The Secretary suggested that they simply say that it was a briefing on the status of the American prisoners of war and recent military activity off the China coast—to by all means avoid anything that might involve a war scare.

Rep. McCormick said that assuming that the President decides a request for a resolution should be sent up, he thought the Secretary and Admiral Radford should have an expression of views of the legislative branch (he doesn't like word "leaders"), and that this would be of assistance when the decision is made.

Senator Knowland said he thought the President should come to the Congress in person to present this proposal.

Senator Wiley said he was no specialist in this field but that he thought it would be necessary to have a private understanding with Chiang as to the islands. He said that Senator George feels that we are losing caste and position and are liable to get into war anyway.

23. Memorandum of Discussion at the 232d Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, January 20, 1955<sup>1</sup>

The following were present at this meeting of the Council: The President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State (for Item 5); the Secretary of Defense; the Director, Foreign Operations Administration; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General (for Items 1, 2 and 5); the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission; the Under Secretary of State (for Items 1 through 4); the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; Robert Cutler, Joseph M. Dodge, and Nelson A. Rockefeller, Special Assistants to the President; the NSC Representative on Internal Security (for Item 1); Robert R. Bowie, Department of State; the White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

[Here follows discussion of agenda items 1-4: "Continental Defense (Port Security)," "Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security," "United States Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Korea," and "United States Objectives and Courses of Action With Respect to Indonesia."]

5. *Chinese Nationalist Offshore Islands* (NSC 5429/5; NSC 5503)

Since Secretary Dulles and Admiral Radford were now present, Mr. Cutler suggested that the Director of Central Intelligence brief the Council on recent developments in the Tachen Islands.

Mr. Dulles began with a prediction that the loss of Ichiang Island in the Tachens group to the Chinese Communists would shortly be followed by Chinese Communist attacks on the main group of the Tachen Islands.

In the action against Ichiang, Mr. Dulles said that the Communist forces had consisted of one regiment and two battalions of Chinese Communist troops, numbering between 3000 and 4000. Against this force the Nationalist garrison on Ichiang had consisted of just under 1000 guerrillas. The island had been captured after about two hours of fighting. The Communists had handled the action with considerable skill. They had had very careful cover so that there had been little warning, either of the landing forces or of the Communist

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Gleason, except for the portion concerning agenda item 1, on January 21. According to the President's appointment diary, the meeting took place at 10 a.m. (*Ibid.*, President's Daily Appointments)

air sorties, which had numbered 60. All U.S. personnel on the Tachens, numbering eight, had been evacuated except one individual.

With the capture of the island, Mr. Dulles pointed out, the Chinese Communists were in a good position to shell the main Tachen Islands, which were only seven and a half miles distant from Ichiang. The Nationalists were obviously preparing to risk further losses of naval vessels in order to support the garrison on the main Tachen Islands. This move was necessary, however, if the morale of the garrison, which was not very good in any case, was to be kept up.

According to other reports, the Generalissimo was now considering the desirability of evacuating the Chinese Nationalist forces from the remainder of the Tachen Islands. Unfortunately, there was some question as to whether he would be able to withdraw these garrisons even if he desired to, except in the unlikely event that the Chinese Communists voluntarily permitted these forces to be evacuated. In any event, the loss of the Tachen Islands would have a very unfortunate effect on the morale of the Chinese Nationalists.

Mr. Dulles indicated that the Nationalists had retaliated yesterday for the attack on Ichiang, by a series of air strikes on Communist ports and shipping, especially in Swatow, where they had apparently sunk a British flag vessel of some 1700 tons. From Quemoy the Nationalists had yesterday bombarded two adjacent islands held by the Chinese Communists. There had been no substantial Chinese Communist attacks on Quemoy during the last few days.

At the conclusion of Mr. Dulles' briefing, Mr. Cutler called on the Secretary of State to speak.

Secretary Dulles said that he was sorry indeed to have to inaugurate the second year of the Eisenhower Administration with a recital of serious problems. However, he had come to the conclusion, over the last few days and hours, that the situation in the Tachens and on the other islands held by the Chinese Nationalists had deteriorated so rapidly that it was very unlikely that any of these islands could be defended against Chinese Communist attack in the absence of U.S. armed support on a very considerable scale. Since the United States had not proposed to offer the Chinese Nationalists any assistance in the defense of these islands which would involve the armed forces of the United States, the time had come for a reconsideration of our policy of refusing to participate in the military defense of *any* of the Nationalist-held offshore islands. The loss of the Tachen group of islands would have very serious psychological effects not only on the Chinese Nationalists, but in other areas of the Far East such as Korea, Japan, and the Philippines, unless this loss were accompanied by a clearer indication than was now available of United States intentions and where we stood ourselves. If it were indicated

that the Communists were free to seize all these offshore islands, the result would be very bad indeed.

Accordingly, continued Secretary Dulles, it had seemed to him wise to suggest that the evacuation of the Tachen island group should be offset by a stated willingness on the part of the United States to assist with its armed forces in holding the Quemoy Islands and possibly the Matsu group. These two groups of islands covered the harbor entrance of Amoy and Foochow, respectively, whence a Chinese Communist invasion of Formosa would probably be mounted. Moreover, the Chinese Communists invariably related their attacks on these offshore islands to their determination ultimately to "liberate" Formosa.

So, said Secretary Dulles, the United States is faced with what is in fact a series of Communist military operations which are ultimately directed toward the capture of Formosa. He therefore concluded that it would have a very grave effect throughout all the nations of free Asia if we were to clarify a U.S. position which in effect amounted to abandonment of all the Nationalist-held offshore islands. People would of course pose the question of why it is necessary for the United States to clarify its position on these islands. We had decided not to do so up to the present in the hope of confusing the Chinese Communists as to our real intentions vis-à-vis these islands. This policy of obscuring our intentions had, however, begun to backfire, and the Chinese Communists were apparently confident in the belief that the United States was unwilling to fight in order to save any of these islands. Accordingly, Secretary Dulles could see no further advantage in the policy of obscuring our intentions, and insisted that further pursuit of it would embarrass U.S. prestige in the Far East.

This being so, the next question was what to do. It seemed to him, said Secretary Dulles, fundamentally unsound for the United States to try to assist the Chinese Nationalists to hold the northern groups of islands. The Tachens and the other islands in this area were simply too difficult to defend. On the other hand, Quemoy and the Matsu group could be readily protected by U.S. air power, including such air power based on Formosa. Accordingly, the Administration might well consider a new policy which would involve (1) the use of U.S. armed forces to assist the Chinese Nationalists to evacuate their garrisons from the northernmost islands, and (2) support of the Chinese Nationalists in the defense of Quemoy and perhaps the Matsu Islands, *so long as* the Chinese Communists professed to be preparing to attack Formosa.

If we could make this proposal clear and at the same time push through quickly the mutual defense treaty with Formosa, and if we are truly determined to hold Formosa and related areas needed in

order to hold Formosa, all this would be the best possible way to avoid a steady deterioration of the U.S. position in the general area, and specifically would provide the best means of defending Formosa and the Pescadores.

At the same time, continued Secretary Dulles, the United States should encourage, or at least acquiesce in, UN actions designed to bring about a cease-fire in this general area. Secretary Dulles then alluded to the directive, given to him at the Denver meeting of the National Security Council last summer,<sup>2</sup> to undertake negotiations with respect to possible UN action to stabilize the situation in the area. He had followed out this directive, and as a result we had on hand a program for UN action which had been carefully worked out with the British and New Zealand. This program had now been on the shelf, however, for some months. While he could not, therefore, guarantee that the British were still in favor of such a procedure, he had made inquiries of London, and expected word of the British attitude today. Meanwhile, his guess was that the British would continue to support this program for action in the UN. While he doubted very much whether the Chinese Communists would accept any UN action unfavorable to themselves, such a UN action might nevertheless have at least some deterrent effect on the Chinese Communists.

Secretary Dulles then informed the Council that he and Admiral Radford had just met with various leaders of Congress to discuss the subject of our policy toward the offshore islands. These Congressional leaders had included the Majority and Minority heads of the two Foreign Relations Committees and the two Armed Services Committees, as well as Senator Knowland, the Minority Leader of the Senate, and Mr. Clements, who had taken the place of Senator Lyndon Johnson.<sup>3</sup> Also present were the Majority and Minority Leaders of the House.

In the course of describing the existing situation to these members of Congress, Secretary Dulles said, there had been considerable discussion of the President's authority to commit U.S. armed forces to the task of evacuating the northern group of islands and of assisting in the defense of Quemoy. Secretary Dulles himself described the President's authority to do this as "now rather vague". This power had stemmed from the existence of hostilities in Korea, but since the armistice in Korea the President's war powers had been "subject to considerable attrition". Inasmuch as we might very well have to use our armed forces in order to evacuate the garrison on the Tachens, and since this might well involve actual conflict between the Ameri-

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<sup>2</sup> On September 12, 1954; for extracts of the memorandum of discussion, see *Foreign Relations, 1952-1954*, vol. xiv, Part 1, p. 613.

<sup>3</sup> Senator Lyndon B. Johnson of Texas, Senate Majority Leader.

can forces and the Chinese Communists, Secretary Dulles had indicated his opinion that it would be best to meet this situation by a clear enunciation of, and a grant to the President by the Congress of, the power to commit the armed forces of the United States to the defense of Formosa and related areas.

Secretary Dulles said that he had pointed out to these Congressional leaders that the United States certainly did not plan any permanent commitment of the armed forces of the United States to hold these offshore islands, nor was there any intent whatsoever to enlarge the area of the mutual defense treaty. This area, however, not only covered Formosa and the Pescadores, but also covered "attacks directed against Formosa and the Pescadores". The latter, it could be argued, could cover U.S. action in Quemoy and the Matsus. Furthermore, Secretary Dulles had argued that even if the proposed mutual defense treaty were at present actually in force, the President would desire, if time permitted, a Congressional grant of authority for the use of the armed forces of the United States in the circumstances described. If Congress were not in session, or time did not permit, Secretary Dulles believed that the President could act. A lack of adequate authority at the present time could be very dangerous indeed in view of possible contingencies in the near future.

In sum, said Secretary Dulles, the discussion with the members of Congress had been extended—from 9:00 a.m. until nearly 11:00. In the course of the discussion the problem had been pretty fully explored, and the Congressional leaders had asked many questions, especially of Admiral Radford. He and Admiral Radford had drawn the conclusion that the members of Congress had generally recognized the dangers inherent in the situation and the great importance of an unequivocal statement of the U.S. position—unequivocal both as it applied to the Executive and the Legislative Branches of the Government. Secretary Dulles also believed that there was little doubt that the Congress would promptly give the President the powers which he needed to meet the situation, although it might be necessary for the President to appear personally before a joint session of the two houses. Likewise, continued Secretary Dulles, the members of Congress with whom he had talked seemed in general to approve the course of action which he had outlined above, except in the case of Senator Wiley, and even Senator Wiley, thought Secretary Dulles, was unlikely to persist in his opposition. A minority of the Congressional group, thought Secretary Dulles, apparently favored an effort by the United States to hold all the offshore islands. The majority, however, thought that his balance was sound.

At the conclusion of Secretary Dulles' statement, Mr. Cutler inquired if Admiral Radford wished to add anything. Admiral Radford

said that he believed that Secretary Dulles' statement had been so detailed and so accurate that he himself had nothing to add to it.

The President inquired which of the Congressional leaders had expressed the view that the United States should assist in the defense of *all* the Nationalist-held offshore islands. Admiral Radford and Secretary Dulles replied that, in so far as they had been able to understand him, this had been the view of Senator Wiley. Admiral Radford added that the House Majority Leader, Mr. McCormack, had expressed strongly the view that the President now had, without further Congressional action, all the powers he needed to hold the offshore islands in the face of Communist attacks.

The President said that a decision by the United States to give up the Tachen Islands, which the Joint Chiefs of Staff were already on record as having said were not vital to the defense of Formosa, would at least have the merit of showing the world that the United States was trying to maintain a decent posture. At the same time, the proposed policy would make clear that this U.S. concession with respect to the Tachens would not mean that the United States was prepared to make any concessions with respect to Formosa and the Pescadores. The particular problem, continued the President, with respect to the defense of the Tachens was the lack of a safe port for our ships in this area. As a result, it would be very difficult for us to sustain the garrisons in the Tachen Islands. All in all, concluded the President, an announcement of a decision to evacuate the Tachens garrison, together with a statement of our determination to hold Formosa and the islands "in front of it" (Quemoy and the Matsus), would appear to be the best course of action.

Secretary Dulles then explained that he had had a discussion on this subject yesterday with George Yeh, the Foreign Minister of the Chinese Republic. He expected to receive a reply some time today, and while he anticipated that the Chinese Nationalists would profess to be greatly saddened at not being able to hold all the offshore islands, they would be quite willing to accept something less than all. The President commented that he thought that they would be glad to do so because the new arrangement would tie in Nationalist China very actively with the United States.

Mr. Cutler then observed that he wished to call the Council's attention to the exact language of the present policy of the United States with respect to the offshore islands, and thereafter to ask the Secretary of State a question. Mr. Cutler then proceeded to read paragraph 5-c of NSC 5429/5, as follows:

"c. Ratify the Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of China covering Formosa and the Pescadores, and jointly agree upon appropriate safeguards against Chinese Nationalist offensive action. Pending the ratification of such a Treaty, continue the existing uni-

lateral arrangement to defend Formosa and the Pescadores (excluding the Nationalist-held off-shore islands). For the present, seek to preserve, through United Nations action, the status quo of the Nationalist-held offshore islands; and, without committing U.S. forces except as militarily desirable in the event of Chinese Communist attack on Formosa and the Pescadores, provide to the Chinese Nationalist forces military equipment and training to assist them to defend such offshore islands, using Formosa as a base. However, do not agree to Chinese Nationalist offensive actions against mainland Communist China, except under circumstances approved by the President. Agree to Chinese Nationalist actions against Communist China which are prompt and clear retaliation against a Chinese Communist attack; provided such retaliation is against targets of military significance which meet U.S. criteria as to feasibility and chance of success and which are selected with due consideration for the undesirability of provoking further Chinese Communist reaction against Formosa and the Pescadores."

Mr. Cutler then put his question to the Secretary of State: Would not an American commitment to employ its armed forces in the defense of Quemoy and the Matsu Islands almost certainly involve the United States in military actions on the mainland of Communist China? Would not there be inevitable hot pursuit far inland? Accordingly, it seemed to Mr. Cutler that if the United States were to adopt the policy proposed by Secretary Dulles, we should be very clear indeed that by so doing we are greatly enhancing the risk of war with Communist China. Had the Secretary of State gone into these long-range consequences in his discussions with the members of Congress?

The President said that he disagreed with Mr. Cutler's fundamental premise. The proposed course of action would not merely not enhance, it would actually decrease the risk of war with Communist China which we are now running under our existing policy. Secretary Dulles also argued that there was greater risk of war in leaving our position unclear with respect to the offshore islands than in making it clear, as he proposed to do.

Mr. Cutler repeated his insistence that if the Chinese Communists attacked Quemoy and the Matsus, and the United States assisted the Chinese Nationalists to resist the Communists, our aircraft would certainly go in hot pursuit of enemy aircraft, and the danger of one incident leading ultimately to another and ultimately to war with China seemed very clear to him. The President commented that of course if the Chinese Communists wanted to make general war out of anything the United States did, there was nothing we could do to prevent it.

Secretary Humphrey said it was very hard for him to understand, and even harder for him to justify, the proposal to retain the Quemoy, which were set right down in the middle of a Chinese



Communist harbor. Quemoy was a "hot spot" right in the middle of Chinese Communist territory.

Secretary Dulles indicated that the answer to Secretary Humphrey's misgivings was as follows: As long as the Chinese Communists insist that they are going to take Quemoy as part of their operations for the ultimate seizure of Formosa, all this put Quemoy in a very different light. If we wait to mount our defense of Formosa until we have lost all these islands, and much of our prestige as well, we would be fighting at a terrible disadvantage. That seemed to be the choice which now confronted us.

Mr. Allen Dulles interrupted this exchange by pointing out that the most probable Chinese Communist action, if the United States determines to hold Quemoy, would be to resort to constant artillery pounding of the Quemoy defenses until these defenses had been pulverized. Admiral Radford, however, said that such pulverization of Quemoy's defenses by the Communists would not be possible in the face of Chinese Nationalist air attacks on the surrounding Chinese Communist areas.

The President commented that unless we were prepared "completely to discount Formosa", further delay in making up our minds would result in rapid and serious deterioration of the situation. He still insisted that the chances of general war with Communist China would be less under the course of action now proposed by the Secretary of State than the "dangerous drift" which we are now in.

Secretary Humphrey said that yes, this might be the case until and as long as the United States refuses to draw a clear and sensible defense line and abandons any attempt to defend territories lying outside this defense line. The real question, however, was where to draw this defense line, and why Quemoy should be included within it.

Secretary Wilson said that prior to the time at Denver when Secretary Dulles had proposed his plan for UN action to stabilize the situation on the offshore islands, he himself had had a proposal which had appealed to him but which he had abandoned in deference to Secretary Dulles' UN proposal. His own idea had been that the only reasonable hope of stabilizing the situation in the Far East was a determination by the United States to hold Formosa and the Pescadores. There could be no "cooling off of the hot situation" vis-à-vis Communist China so long as these other close-in islands remained in the hands of the Chinese Nationalists. To let them remain in Nationalist hands was simply to invite Chinese Communist military action against them. Accordingly, if we make a new move now, we should get the Chinese Nationalist garrisons off just as many of these small islands as we can, and should explain that the sole reason

that we are assisting in holding any of the islands at all is that they are vital to the defense of Formosa.

Secretary Wilson added that he thought it was foolish to fight a terrible war with Communist China simply in order to hold all these little islands. It was plain that there was no hope in the world that the Chinese Nationalists could overcome and supplant the Communist regime on mainland China. He therefore repeated that our only reasonable hope of stabilizing the whole U.S. position in the Pacific was to evince our determination to hold the great offshore island chain and let the rest go. In short, we should defend only Formosa and the Pescadores and let the others go. The alternative seemed to him to be general war with Communist China. As Secretary Humphrey was expressing his agreement with Secretary Wilson, the latter added that once we had got off the smaller offshore islands we should make it clear to the Chinese Communists that if they attacked Formosa it would mean war with the United States.

Governor Stassen expressed agreement with the policy advocated by the Secretary of State, not only for the reasons which Secretary Dulles had given, but for other reasons as well. As the Chinese Communists continued to build up their power and prestige and took more and more of these islands, they inevitably set in motion a deterioration of the position. He greatly feared the psychological effect on the free nations of Asia of the gradual loss of all these islands.

The President intervened to say that it seemed clear to him that Quemoy and the Matsus were the outposts for the defense of Formosa.

Secretary Dulles explained that he by no means disagreed with the position taken by Secretaries Humphrey and Wilson "over the long period". However, these things are largely a matter of timing. We must now deal with a practical situation which is on our hands, and this was certainly not the moment or the occasion to inform the Chinese Nationalists that we would not assist them to hold any of the offshore islands. To do so would at present have a catastrophic effect on Chinese Nationalist morale. However, if later on the situation cooled down and the Chinese Communists renounced their intention of seizing Formosa, the United States would then be in a position to give up these other islands, as Secretaries Humphrey and Wilson were recommending.

The President pointed out that Secretary Dulles had indicated that we would only assist in holding these offshore islands until the UN acted to stabilize the situation or the intentions of Communist China toward Formosa had changed. Secretary Dulles agreed with the President that this was an accurate description of his position.

Secretary Wilson said that on the contrary, he could not but feel that the Chinese Communists were very logical in their determina-

tion to seize the offshore islands. The Chinese Communists simply felt that they were putting the finishing touches on a victorious civil war. The President inquired how Secretary Wilson knew that in this event the Chinese Communists would stop short of Formosa. Secretary Wilson replied that he did not know this. Secretary Dulles added that the whole policy of the Chinese Communists with regard to the offshore islands was ultimately directed against Formosa.

The Vice President at this point inquired as to the mechanics of making clear our new intentions regarding the offshore islands. Who would announce the decision of the United States to assist in the evacuation of the northern group of islands and the holding of others?

In answer to the Vice President, Secretary Dulles suggested that the President would make such an announcement in the form of a message to the Congress, which would state in effect that it had become necessary for the Chinese Communists to regroup and consolidate their forces on these offshore islands. The precise details would not be spelled out, but the President's statement would convey the idea that some of these islands would be evacuated and that others would be held because they were related to our determination to defend Formosa. The Presidential statement would likewise make reference to action in the UN and to the desirability of a cease-fire.

The Vice President explained that the reason he had asked his question was that if the announcement were made in person to the Congress by the President, certain political difficulties could surely be anticipated. The President added that he was personally opposed to appearing before the Congress, and thought that this part of the plan should be played down.

Dr. Flemming said that while of course we did not wish to become involved in a war with Communist China over Quemoy, neither did we wish to get involved in such a war over Formosa. We therefore must be sure that in trying to avoid the first we do not bring on the second. With respect to the point made by the Vice President on the form of the President's statement, Dr. Flemming also expressed the hope that the President would not feel it necessary to deliver his message to the Congress in person. The impact of such a personal appearance would be so strong as almost certainly to set in motion trends toward inflation and a hue and cry for the imposition of controls on the economy.

Secretary Humphrey said that so far as he could discern, the members of the National Security Council were all in favor of the same general policy respecting this problem, except that they did not agree on "where the line should be drawn". The President added—"and when the line should be drawn." Secretary Humphrey went on

to say that if the purpose of the Secretary of State's policy was simply to defend Quemoy until the Chinese Nationalist garrison could be evacuated, he was glad to accept such a proposal. He was, however, firmly opposed to any U.S. commitment which contemplated holding Quemoy indefinitely. Secretary Dulles added that of course the United States could not forcibly remove the Chinese Nationalist garrison from Quemoy without starting a war with Nationalist China. Governor Stassen pointed out to Secretary Humphrey that it was not only Formosa and Quemoy which we were talking about, but a lot of other countries in the Far East. The United States must take a strong position which will have a bracing effect on the free countries of the Far East. Secretary Humphrey countered with the statement that nothing in the world would please Soviet Russia so much as to get the United States involved in hostilities with Communist China. The President said that he could not agree more.

Mr. Cutler commented that it seemed to him that most of the members of the National Security Council were determined to look only on the rosy alternative as to what was likely to happen if this new proposed course of action were adopted. The Council was refusing to face up to the darker alternative—namely, that war with China was a very real risk if the United States were to commit itself militarily to the defense of Quemoy.

The President again brought the discussion back to the problem of Congress and of Presidential authority to take action on the offshore islands in order to defend Formosa. Secretary Wilson inquired whether the President felt that he had now sufficient authority to order the commitment of U.S. forces to assist in the evacuation of the Tachen Islands. The President replied that in any case it was necessary to draw the line. Admiral Radford pointed out that after all, the United States had warmly encouraged the Chinese Nationalists to continue to hold all the offshore islands.

The President then raised the question as to the whereabouts of the units of the Seventh Fleet, and whether it would not be desirable to move some of the aircraft carriers in the general direction of Formosa. Admiral Radford expressed the opinion that it might be desirable to move some of our carriers toward the area of the Tachens at once.

The President explained his opinion that it was not that any of these offshore islands was going to be easy to defend, but that the psychological consequences of abandoning these islands were so serious. It had long been the general policy of this Administration to help build up indigenous forces to defend on the ground against Chinese Communist attacks. It would be the role of the United States merely to supply air and naval support in the event of overt Communist aggression. We were now confronting a concrete test of this

policy, and we must be concerned with the morale of those soldiers who might well be called upon to defend Formosa if the Chinese Communists attacked it.

Secretary Humphrey said that on the contrary, it looked to him as though in this new policy toward the offshore islands, the United States was actually trying to seize Chinese Communist territories. Expressing agreement with Secretary Humphrey, Secretary Wilson repeated that he was more than willing to defend Formosa, but certainly not these "darn' little islands". The President said that this was all very well, but we probably couldn't hold Formosa if Chiang Kai-shek gives up in despair before Formosa is attacked. Secretary Humphrey said that while that was the bad feature on one side of the argument, the bad feature on the other was the prospect of war with Communist China.

Secretary Dulles insisted that what the President was pointing out is sure to happen if we abandon all these islands. The resultant effect on morale on Formosa would be terrible. Moreover, as for the chances of this policy involving the United States in war with Communist China, he thought there was less than a 50-50 chance, because the Chinese Communists didn't want to "get tough with us in a big way" at this time. What they wanted to do was to erode our position in the area.

Secretary Humphrey added that nevertheless he wished the United States could trade Quemoy for the captured American flyers.

The Council then briefly discussed the reliability and the fighting spirit of the Chinese Nationalist garrison on the Tachen Islands. Mr. Allen Dulles described it as "rather poor" as a result of the January 10 attack. Admiral Radford, on the other hand, thought that morale seemed very good when he had discussed it on his recent trip, and he believed that the defense position on the Tachen Islands was so strong that it would cost the Communists a lot to take it. Governor Stassen pointed out that once the Chinese Communists begin their attacks, they would almost certainly expend whatever resources were necessary to seize these islands.

Secretary Dulles said that in any event the United States must now make its position crystal clear. We must decide now on what territories to hold, and hold them. He did not believe that we could give up all the offshore islands. We could give up the northern Tachen group and perhaps also the central Matsu group. This would leave us with the bare bones of Quemoy. This, however, we must certainly keep, or else we should be faced with a very serious situation all the way from Tokyo to Saigon. Secretary Wilson said that he would go as far as to fight for Formosa, and at the same time would make clear that the only reason that we were holding on was to assist in the defense of Formosa. But just as soon as the Chinese

Communists renounced their intention of attacking Formosa, he would abandon Quemoy.

The President said that he wished to ask Admiral Radford a question: Suppose, in the course of our movements, Chiang Kai-shek should tell us that he was prepared to abandon these offshore islands. What effect would such a move have on the U.S. strategic position in this area? Admiral Radford replied that he would favor holding on to these islands if we really meant to defend Formosa, because of the importance of their location at the harbor entrances of Amoy and Fuchow. To lose these islands would make the defense of Formosa a great deal more difficult, even though the U.S. Chiefs of Staff have agreed that their retention was not vital to the defense of Formosa. The islands, added Admiral Radford, were especially important for our air reconnaissance of China.

The President commented that it seemed possible to him that we could word our intentions respecting these islands in such fashion as not to tie ourselves down on them forever. On the other hand, he simply could not believe that it was possible to go to the Generalissimo, ask him to give up every single one of these islands, and then expect him to turn around and defend Formosa itself.

Secretary Wilson explained that a practical problem had arisen in his mind. If the Chinese Communists go ahead with additional military action against the offshore islands, do we or do we not supply military equipment to the Chinese Nationalists to replace their combat losses? Mr. Cutler explained to Secretary Wilson that it was present policy to replace such losses.

Secretary Humphrey then inquired of the Secretary of State whether there was any way by which we could force action in the United Nations designed to stabilize the situation on the offshore islands. Secretary Dulles explained to Secretary Humphrey that we had held off on the UN action because both the British and the Chinese Nationalists, for quite opposite reasons, desired a delay. Moreover, until recently there had been no heavy Chinese Communist military operations against these islands. Now, however, we can move pretty quickly in the UN if we desire to. He had to admit, however, that the Congressional leaders with whom he had talked earlier had not shown much enthusiasm for the proposed action in the United Nations.

Summing up, the President suggested that the following was the best course of action for the Council: Arrange another short meeting of the Council between nine and ten tomorrow morning before the Cabinet meeting, and have ready for his consideration the precise sequence of actions to be taken to carry out Secretary Dulles' proposal, as well as the list of individuals who were to carry out these actions. By tomorrow morning the President believed that Secretary Dulles

could produce such documents, since he would have heard from both Yeh and Eden. The President said he did very much want the British to go along with us because, after all, in a crisis they were good sturdy old allies. Moreover, upon thinking it over, Chiang Kai-shek himself might come to have a different feeling over the abandonment of some of these islands, inasmuch as by this new course of action he would have the United States firmly tied in with him.

In this connection, said the Vice President, the Council should bear in mind the problem of Congressional opinion. Congressman McCormack's comment with respect to the President's having sufficient authority already to defend these offshore islands, appeared to the Vice President to indicate the likelihood that politics would be played by some members of Congress. Secretary Dulles said that he was in agreement that you might well have a revolt on your hands in the Congress if the Administration proposed to abandon all the offshore islands. The President agreed, and said that there was hardly a word which the people of this country feared more than the term "Munich".

Secretary Dulles indicated that he would have ready by tomorrow morning at nine o'clock a draft of the President's statement to the Congress. The President again expressed grave doubts as to the wisdom of any personal appearance before Congress. What we wanted to stress, he said, was the continuity of our policy, and not to indicate by his appearance some sudden new departure.

*The National Security Council:*

a. Noted an oral briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence on the situation with respect to the Chinese Nationalist offshore islands.

b. Noted and discussed an oral report by the Secretary of State on his current analysis of the situation with respect to the Chinese Nationalist offshore islands and his views as to U.S. policy regarding these islands.

c. Noted the President's request that the Secretary of State present to a special Council meeting to be held on January 21, 1955, an outline of the courses of action which he would propose the U.S. adopt regarding the Chinese Nationalist offshore islands.<sup>4</sup>

*Note:* The action in c above subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of State.<sup>5</sup>

[Here follows a note concerning agenda item 1.]

**S. Everett Gleason**

<sup>4</sup> The lettered subparagraphs constitute NSC Action No. 1311. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95)

<sup>5</sup> In a memorandum of January 20 from Lay to Dulles. (*Ibid.*, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5429 Series)

24. Draft Message From the President to the Congress <sup>1</sup>

*Washington, January 20, 1955.*

The situation in the Far East leads me to ask the Congress for authority to employ the armed services of the United States, if necessary, to insure the security of Formosa and the Pescadores.

Since the end of Japanese hostilities, these islands have been in the friendly hands of the Republic of China. Also, it has been recognized by the United States that it was important for the security of the United States that these islands should remain in friendly hands. In June 1950, when the Communists committed armed aggression in Korea, President Truman ordered our Seventh Fleet to defend Formosa from possible invasion from the Communist mainland. Last December we signed a Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of China covering Formosa and the Pescadores.

The Chinese Communists have recently embarked upon active military operations which they assert are designed for the avowed purpose of conquering Formosa by force.

In September 1954 they opened up intensive artillery fire upon the island of Quemoy, approximately 125 (?) <sup>2</sup> miles due west of Formosa. This island had theretofore been peacefully held by the Republic of China for approximately five years. This aggressive activity was followed by air attacks of mounting intensity against other islands, notably those in the vicinity of the Tachen group approximately 200 miles north of Formosa. One of these islands (Ichiang) was seized as the result of an intensive air and sea operation on January 18. There have been recent heavy air attacks against the main Tachen Islands themselves.

Such attacks are related by the Communists themselves to their purpose to conquer Formosa. Thus, following the seizure of Ichiang, the Peiping Radio said "the victory shows that the Chinese people are unshakeable in their determined will to fight for the liberation of Taiwan (Formosa). Our people will use all their strength to fulfill that task."

In the light of the announced plans of the Chinese Communists to retake Formosa by force, it is essential for the United States to

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/1-2055. Top Secret. Sent to the President with a covering note of January 20 from Secretary Dulles, which reads as follows: "Here is a draft of possible message such as it was agreed I should try to make. I have put this together in the face of considerable interruptions, and no doubt it can be improved by me and others. Perhaps, it is adequate at the moment to illustrate the kind of thing we have in mind." A postscript adds: "I am not sure about the June 30, 1956 date." The source text, labeled copy 3, January 20, 1955, bears the notation "as sent to President".

<sup>2</sup> As in the source text.



make sure that war does not occur by reason of any possible miscalculations of our intentions. In the interest of peace, the United States must remove any doubt regarding our intentions or our willingness to fight, if necessary, to preserve our vital interests in Formosa and the Pescadores. This requires not only Presidential action but also Congressional action.

Under existing conditions, in the interest of its own security, the United States must undertake several actions for the safety of Formosa and the Pescadores:

1. It must assist the Republic of China to regroup its forces. Many of these are scattered throughout the smaller offshore islands as a result of historical rather than military reasons. Since many of these forces are exposed to vastly superior air power they can probably not be redeployed without assistance of the armed forces of the United States.

2. Under present conditions two groups of islands now held by the Republic of China would constitute useful stepping-stones in the hands of the Communists if they are determined to pursue their design to conquer Formosa. These are the Quemoy Islands, which dominate Amoy Harbor, and the Matsu Islands, which are outside of the Foochow Harbor. These two harbors, directly opposite Formosa, would be most useful in mounting a direct attack against Formosa as threatened by the Chinese Communists. In the light of the present threat of attack against Formosa, the United States must be prepared to join in denying control of these islands by the Chinese Communists until the peace and security of the area are reasonably assured by international conditions created by the United Nations or otherwise.

In view of the foregoing facts, I ask the Congress for prompt but limited authority to use the armed forces of the United States, if necessary, for the purpose of securing Formosa and the Pescadores against armed attack. This authority should have the limited scope I have indicated.

Because I believe that the present danger, if it is faced firmly, may prove temporary, I suggest that the authority accorded me should also be limited in time. It might well expire on June 30, 1956, or whenever earlier I am able to report to the Congress that the peace and security of the area are reasonably assured by international conditions created by the United Nations or otherwise.

No doubt I already possess some of the authority which I request, and I shall not hesitate to exercise it if emergency conditions make this seem important from the standpoint of the welfare and security of the United States. However, in this matter it should be made evident that the full authority of the Congress is behind whatever has to be done to preserve the peace and security of Formosa. The very fact that the full power of government is thus made mani-

fest will itself be a factor in deterring those who otherwise might be disposed to challenge the position of the United States.

Let me make my position crystal clear: I do not now suggest that the United States should permanently enlarge its defensive obligations beyond Formosa and the Pescadores. That was the present area of mutual concern which was agreed upon as between the Republic of China and ourselves. That, unhappily, is the danger if armed attack directed against that area now confronts us. The existence of that danger requires us to take into account closely related areas which might to an important degree contribute to the failure or the success of such an attack. The offensive military purpose of the Chinese Communists has been made unmistakably clear not merely by words but by deeds. Thus, the issue has been presented by their choice, not ours. Just as they created that issue, so they can end it.

The situation which has been created by the Chinese Communists is obviously one which has led to international friction and may indeed constitute a threat to the peace within the meaning of the Charter of the United Nations. Therefore, we would welcome action by the United Nations which might, in fact, bring an end to active hostilities in the area.

In conclusion, let me emphasize that which I seek is no declaration of war nor what, in my opinion, will lead to war. That is far from my purpose. I seek authority for a limited use for a limited time of the Armed Forces of the United States in order to create a position of strength and security in a vital area that is openly challenged. I believe that making our position clear offers the best hope of diminishing the challenge. Such a contribution by the United States is needed to prevent grave miscalculations by our enemies, and indeed by our friends. If that miscalculation occurred, it would encourage further aggression and might lead ultimately to the war which we are determined by every honorable means to avoid.

Our purpose is peace. We know that peace is not gained by ambiguous policies. Therefore, I intend, with your help, to clarify our purposes. In doing so we shall at all times remain faithful to our obligations as a member of the United Nations to be ready to settle our international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.

25. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,  
Washington, January 20, 1955, 6:30 p.m.<sup>1</sup>

## PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary  
Sir Roger Makins  
Sir Robert Scott  
Mr. Robertson  
Mr. Merchant

Sir Roger who had called at his request opened the conversation by saying that he had now received a reply from London based on a Cabinet Meeting that morning. The British Government is disturbed by developments. They had thought it was our common objective to work to a situation under which the Chinese Communists accepted a separation of Formosa from the mainland and the Chinese Nationalists abandoned the off-shore islands. The Cabinet did not like the idea of a "provisional guarantee" of Quemoy believing that its lack of clarity would confuse all parties and that furthermore it would encourage the Nationalists to hang on to the coastal islands. The Cabinet had considered the Secretary's provisos that the "provisional guarantee" should last only until the Communists had acquiesced to the terms of our treaty with Formosa or until the United Nations took some effective action. On the first point London felt that as long as the Nationalists held Quemoy the Communists could never be brought to accept the treaty. On the second point they felt that as long as the Nationalists continued to hold Quemoy the minimum Communist cooperation necessary to the success of ORACLE could never be secured. Sir Roger went on to say that the British Government had always been in favor of United Nations intervention in the situation and accordingly they were ready to move at once on ORACLE (subject to New Zealand concurrence) if the United States would withhold its proposed provisional guarantee of Quemoy. If the latter is impossible then the Cabinet felt that the fundamental basis for ORACLE had changed and the entire matter would require reconsideration. British public opinion, it was felt, would find it difficult to accept the operation on the changed basis. Lastly, Sir Roger said, Sir Anthony Eden recalled the Secretary saying that Quemoy could not be defended except with the use of atomic weapons.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/8-2958. Top Secret. Drafted by Assistant Secretary Merchant and revised by Dulles. Filed with a memorandum of August 29, 1958, from Fisher Howe, Director of the Executive Secretariat, to the Acting Secretary.

<sup>2</sup> The reference is apparently to a conversation between Eden and Dulles in London on September 17, 1954. According to Merchant's notes of the conversation, the Secretary commented that an argument against U.S. defense of Quemoy was that

Eden's question was whether Quemoy was sufficiently vital to risk such wide-reaching developments.

The Secretary replied that the term "provisional guarantee" was more formalistic than intended. If he had used the expression himself it connoted a legalism which he had not intended. He went on to say that so long as the Communists continued to profess that their present actions are merely preliminary moves for the conquest of Formosa, then it was important that the U.S. promptly clarify its position in the area. If the Tachens are evacuated and no other move made or explanation given, the impression will be that of a collapse in position. The consequences he foresaw in Japan, Korea, the Philippines and very possibly throughout all of Southeast Asia would be extremely serious. The interpretation which would gain currency was that the U.S. was vague until its interests were attacked and then did nothing. The Communists were making it extremely hard for the U.S. to adopt and maintain a moderate position.

The Secretary said that he did not know if it would be possible to hold back publicly with respect to Quemoy while the evacuation of the Tachens and ORACLE were going ahead. The Communists' air was extremely active and moreover the Communists might well attribute the self-control which we were exercising in the matter of the Air Force prisoners as weakness on the part of the U.S. If we could get a temporary U.N. injunction that would be fine but the chances were probably against our ability to secure it.

The British Ambassador replied by asking that if ORACLE was launched on Monday in the Security Council and one of the first actions were to be to invite the Chinese Communists to attend, would they actually come? He suggested that the fact of UN intervention might well hold the position on morale in the area, to which the Secretary had referred, for a time. If the UN action in fact produced no hope for a solution, then a new judgment would be required.

Mr. Robertson pointed out that it had been our conception from the first consideration of ORACLE that the result would have been a standstill leaving the Nationalists in control of the off-shore islands. It had not been our view that a result of ORACLE would be the giving up of these islands by the Nationalists.

Sir Roger agreed and said that he had referred to the ultimate result rather than the immediate one. He went on to say that the Embassy and the UK UN Delegation had gone over the ORACLE papers and said they still appeared appropriate. He asked what the

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"all out assault might carry Q[uemoy] unless A-bomb used tactically in last resort"; see *Foreign Relations, 1952-1954*, vol. xiv, Part 1, p. 650. Although Dulles and Eden discussed the offshore islands problem on subsequent occasions between September and December 1954, records of those conversations in the Department of State files do not indicate any similar comment by the Secretary.

situation in recent hours had been in the Tachens and the British were told that there had been no significant change.

The Secretary pointed out, however, that the situation could become critical in a very few days, particularly since the Nationalists now assume (and the Communists presumably as well) that the U.S. will do nothing to assist the defense of the Tachens.

Sir Roger inquired as to our thoughts with respect to taking diplomatic action in Moscow and Peiping as an accompaniment to ORACLE.

Mr. Robertson replied that it had been earlier agreed to notify the two Communist governments only a few hours before the institution of the Security Council action.

Sir Roger inquired if it would be possible to inform Moscow and Peiping privately through diplomatic channels of our intended support of Quemoy. Mr. Merchant pointed out that one difficulty of such a private warning was that if it were successful the public impression would be one of Communist restraint rather than resolution on the part of the U.S.

Sir Robert noted that a great deal in the whole operation depended on long-term purposes of the U.S.

The Secretary replied that we had no long-term purpose or interest beyond Formosa and the Pescadores but that if they were threatened with attack, we were heavily dependent upon the state of Nationalist morale. They have 350,000 troops on the island and our thinking has been that in any necessary defense of Formosa, our contribution would be sea and air. If the morale of the Nationalists is so low that their troops would not fight then we presumably would have to furnish them. The Secretary then referred to the necessity of the President securing Congressional authority.

Sir Roger inquired if it might not be possible to make our intended action with respect to Quemoy dependent upon the success or failure of action in the U.N. The Secretary replied that it might be possible to be less specific than now planned in our public statement but that it was necessary to make clear to the Nationalists our intentions regarding Quemoy. It would then also be necessary to tell the Communists so that they made no miscalculations. He would give the matter further thought.

Mr. Robertson pointed out that in this matter we were taking into account not only the question of the morale of the Nationalists but the morale throughout all of free Asia.

The Secretary noted that if in fact the action in the U.N. was successful, the U.S. decision with respect to the defense of Quemoy would never need to be implemented. He added that his reference to the use of atomic weapons in his conversation with Sir Anthony Eden related only to the most extreme hypothesis of the Communists

attacking Quemoy in so heavy a human wave as to make it impossible to stop them with ordinary firing power. He felt that this was a remote possibility. (At this remark Sir Roger and Sir Robert exchanged a glance and Sir Robert made what was obviously a verbatim note.) Sir Roger then inquired whether we considered that an air attack on Formosa would bring our treaty into effect.

The Secretary replied that he had considered that that sort of battle would normally<sup>3</sup> be between the Nationalists and the Communists and that the U.S. would stay out unless the attacks were so heavy as to threaten the defensibility of Formosa.<sup>4</sup>

The Secretary then concluded the conversation by saying that he would like to consider overnight whether or not we could shape our plans so as to take into account the British views on ORACLE. He emphasized that our position was solid in maintaining the position necessary to thwart a Communist effort to seize Formosa. He mentioned that the NSC was meeting at 9:00 the next morning and asked that our views be communicated urgently to London.

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<sup>3</sup> The word "normally" was inserted in Dulles' handwriting in the source text.

<sup>4</sup> The phrase originally read: "to threaten the collapse of the forces of Formosa." The revision appears in Dulles' handwriting on the source text.

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26. **Memorandum of Discussion at the 233d Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, January 21, 1955, 9 a.m.**<sup>1</sup>

Present at the 233rd meeting of the Council were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Director, Foreign Operations Administration; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission; the Director, U.S. Information Agency; the Under Secretary of State; the Deputy Secretary of Defense; Robert R. Bowie, Department of State; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Assistant to the President; Robert Cutler and Nelson A. Rockefeller, Special As-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Gleason on January 24. The time of the meeting is from Eisenhower's appointment diary. (*Ibid.*, President's Daily Appointments)

sistants to the President; the White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

*Chinese Nationalist Offshore Islands* (NSC 5429/5; NSC 5503; NSC Action No. 1311 <sup>2</sup>)

The Director of Central Intelligence read a special intelligence estimate entitled "Reactions to Certain Possible U.S. Courses of Action with Respect to the Islands off the Coast of China". <sup>3</sup> He pointed out that this estimate had been prepared as a matter of urgency the previous evening, and represented an uncoordinated CIA estimate (copy filed in the minutes of the meeting). The general tone was not optimistic on the reaction to be anticipated if the course of action suggested at the previous day's meeting of the National Security Council by Secretary Dulles were adopted.

The President said he was not surprised by the conclusions of the estimate, and asked if there were any questions. There being no questions, Mr. Cutler called on Secretary Dulles to report on the latest developments and future actions regarding the new proposal as to the Nationalist-held offshore islands.

Secretary Dulles explained that he had had a talk with the British Ambassador yesterday evening. There had been a meeting of the British Cabinet yesterday in London to discuss the course of action proposed by the United States. Secretary Dulles said that he was not certain yet as to the precise position taken by the British Cabinet, but two points seemed fairly clear. In the first place, the British Government was reluctant to see the United States take this proposed step relative to the offshore islands. The reluctance stemmed, apparently, from the British feeling that in order to make this commitment stick, we might be obliged to use atomic weapons in order to hold the Quemoy and the Matsu Islands. The British were always very sensitive about this subject. Secondly, the British felt that if there were to be a public declaration at this stage regarding the U.S. course

<sup>2</sup> See Document 23.

<sup>3</sup> Not found in Department of State files or Eisenhower Library, but see Document 40. A memorandum of January 21 to Dulles from W. Park Armstrong, Jr., Special Assistant to the Secretary for Intelligence, referred to this estimate and reads:

"Our people participated yesterday evening in the preparation of this estimate. We concur in general, but have the following reservation in regard to Paragraph 5:

"We believe that it would be almost impossible under the circumstances assumed here to convince the Chinese Communists that the exercise of their capability to take Quemoy or their attack on Matsu would result in full-scale war with the US, and we therefore believe that such attacks would be likely over the longer run." (Department of State, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 61 D 167, Formosa)

of action, the decision would be irrevocable, and efforts to stabilize the situation in the United Nations would prove futile.

On the other hand, said Secretary Dulles, while the British might not like this program, they would probably be willing to go along with it if it involved the President's going to Congress to seek authority generally to use the armed forces of the United States in the defense of Formosa, without publicly identifying those offshore islands which the United States would help to defend. Secretary Dulles felt, however, that this latter point should be made clear privately to both the Chinese Nationalists and the Chinese Communists. In these circumstances the British might be willing to go ahead with the program for action in the UN.

Secretary Dulles went on to say that in the course of working on the Presidential statement to Congress, he had come to the conclusion that it would be best not to nail the flag to the mast by a detailed statement respecting our plans and intentions on evacuating or holding certain of these islands. This matter could be covered by informing the Chinese Nationalists exactly what we have in mind.

The President then informed the Council that he had talked with Joe Martin and the Speaker of the House yesterday morning.<sup>4</sup> Mr. Rayburn had reflected Mr. McCormack's opinions. In general, he had said that the President had all the powers he needed to deal with the situation, and that whatever the President decided to do would be unequivocally backed by the House of Representatives. He believed, however, that a joint resolution at this particular moment would be unwise because the President would be saying in effect that he did not have the power to act instantly, and a filibuster could start in the Congress, causing dissension both in the Congress and throughout the country. Accordingly, it was the Speaker's advice that the President take whatever action he deemed necessary, and thereafter ask for Congressional approval of such action. Speaker Rayburn guaranteed that this approval would go through the House in 45 minutes, without a word of criticism of the President.

The President went on to say that in talking this matter over with the Secretary of State, he and the Secretary had believed that they could do a lot of things as a mere matter of course, but that we must at all costs avoid another Yalu River sanctuary situation in any struggle over Quemoy. The President said he was absolutely determined on this point. Accordingly, he had concluded that we must get a line of action clearly in mind, including all the sequential steps. He

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<sup>4</sup> Described here is a telephone conversation that took place the previous afternoon between the President and Representative Martin and Speaker Rayburn. (Memorandum of telephone conversation at 2:40 p.m., January 20, 1955, not signed but probably prepared by the President's personal secretary, Ann C. Whitman; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries)



believed that we could do what we wanted to do with regard to these islands without being too specific in the statement to Congress. On the specific side, the President said that if we went to Congress for authority to defend the Formosa area generally, the proposal would have a tremendous effect. This would also provide time in which to let the UN action get off the ground. If the UN does not get off the ground in time, we will have to follow up with this new policy decision. In any case, we will have to let the Chinese Nationalists know about this decision. The President then inquired whether anything had been heard as yet from Foreign Minister Yeh. Secretary Dulles replied that nothing but an unofficial radio [telephone?] report had been heard from the Foreign Minister.

Secretary Humphrey said that it was clear in his mind that the President's intention was to withdraw from the Tachen Islands. But do we withdraw from Quemoy and the other offshore islands?

The President explained to Secretary Humphrey that our ultimate objective was to defend Formosa and the Pescadores. The other offshore islands were incidental to this objective. He therefore contemplated no permanent extension of the defense area of Formosa. We will continue to defend these islands until some other arrangements can be made to quiet the Formosa area. We would then get out of the offshore islands.

Governor Stassen suggested that it might be wise to emphasize that our ultimate objective is stability in the Far East, with Formosa in friendly hands. The President replied to Governor Stassen in the affirmative, and then proceeded to read the opening sentences of a draft statement to the Congress which had been prepared by Secretary Dulles.<sup>5</sup> He interrupted his reading to state that he did not feel he needed additional authority in order to evacuate Chinese Nationalist garrisons from certain of the offshore islands. However, if in the course of such action we were obliged to attack the Chinese Communists, the President felt that he might need additional authority. On the other hand, he did not wish to specify the precise details of why he needed such extra authority.

In some anxiety, the Attorney General<sup>6</sup> inquired whether the President intended to change his plan to seek additional authority from the Congress. The Attorney General thought it still highly desirable to seek this authority.

The President assured the Attorney General that he had not changed his ideas on this subject, and asked the Secretary of State to go on reading the draft statement to the Congress. However, the Vice

<sup>5</sup> It is not clear whether the reference is to the draft printed as Document 24, or to a revision thereof.

<sup>6</sup> Herbert Brownell, Jr.

President interrupted to state that he did not agree to the position taken by Speaker Rayburn as the President had earlier outlined it. Secretary Dulles added that he also thought it more desirable for the President to seek from Congress additional authority for the use of the armed forces of the United States. The President said he agreed, although he was opposed to any personal appearance before the Congress and preferred simply to send a written statement.

Continuing on the subject of the Rayburn view, the Vice President said he very much doubted any likelihood of a filibuster in the Senate. If, on the other hand, the President did not go before the Congress with a request for additional authority, and then "moved in" on the situation in the offshore islands, he would be drawing a parallel with the action in 1950 on Korea. "Some of the boys on our side" would be certain to pick this up and use it against the President by arguing in effect that he was doing precisely what President Truman did in June 1950. So, the Vice President concluded, even if the President found himself obliged to act before the joint resolution went through Congress, it would be better at least to have asked for Congressional authority. Moreover, the Vice President was sure that Congress would move promptly to pass the resolution.

Secretary Dulles then proceeded to read the remainder of the proposed statement by the President, concluding his reading amidst murmurs of approval. The President said that of course the document would need a little more editing. He hadn't seen this version until last midnight. Words were extremely important in this cold war situation. The Presidential statement must be temperate and exact, but also it must reveal our firm intention. That's the best kind of a notice before the world, and if it gets genuine support from the Congress, such support would be worth a lot of additional armed forces. Accordingly we must be very careful in our choice of words.

After the President and other members of the Council had discussed certain sentences in the proposed statement, Secretary Humphrey inquired of the President how long it would take the UN to reach a decision if the UN did undertake action to stabilize the situation. Would it be a matter of weeks or months?

Secretary Dulles said that such UN action would take at least a month. The President expressed the belief that a UN action would not have much influence on the course of action that the United States would have to undertake at once. On the other hand, such UN action would have great influence on world opinion.

Secretary Humphrey insisted that the Quemoy problem had got to be settled. That was the dagger point. The President replied that Secretary Humphrey made a mistake in assuming that Quemoy was the Chinese Communist objective. It was not; they were after Formosa. Secretary Humphrey denied this, and said that he was assuming,

rather, that Quemoy was a point which the United States would find it impossible to defend for any great length of time. The President said that it would be OK with him if the UN succeeds in achieving a solution which will enable the United States to get out of Quemoy without risk to Formosa. Secretary Humphrey replied that it was still going to be hard to explain to the American people why we were finding it necessary to hold on to Quemoy. In some exasperation, the President said to Secretary Humphrey that he sat in this room time after time with the maps all around him, and a look at the geography of the area would explain why we have to hold Quemoy.

Dr. Flemming commented that no matter how the Presidential statement were worded, the action that the President proposed to take was of an extraordinary and momentous character. He was accordingly much concerned about the inflationary and similar influences which the President's statement would set in motion in the country as soon as its text became public. Dr. Flemming therefore advised that language should be put into the statement to indicate that the proposed action would not involve any stepping up in the currently-approved level of the armed forces or in currently-approved mobilization measures. The President agreed heartily with Dr. Flemming's suggestion.

After further discussion of various points made in the draft statement, Secretary Dulles turned to a draft,<sup>7</sup> which had been prepared by Mr. Phleger, chief law officer of the State Department, and Assistant Attorney General Rankin,<sup>8</sup> of the Congressional resolution.

The President thought the draft of the proposed joint resolution was a good one, although it contained no hint as to actions that had been taken hitherto in using our armed forces to defend Formosa since President Truman had decreed this in his order to the Seventh Fleet. The President, in the course of a discussion of the text of the joint resolution, said he favored keeping its text general enough to allow him the necessary freedom of action.

Governor Stassen said he was fearful lest there be any unnecessary limitation of the powers of the Commander-in-Chief, in view of the contingencies that the United States faced in the future. The President said he agreed with this, but reminded Governor Stassen that it was also essential, if possible, to avoid a split in Congressional and public opinion. The President said that all might be sure of one thing—namely, that he would do in an emergency whatever had to be done to protect the vital interests of the United States. He would do this even if his actions should be interpreted as acts of war. He would rather be impeached than fail to do his duty.

<sup>7</sup> Not identified.

<sup>8</sup> J. Lee Rankin, Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal Counsel.

The President then inquired when the statement to the Congress would be sent up. Secretary Dulles hoped that the final text might be ready to send up by Monday, and the President suggested that it be sent as soon as it was ready.

Mr. Allen Dulles then said that he was in a position to make a brief comment on the current situation on the main Tachen Islands. There was no action, and only a few junks in the harbor. The morale of the Chinese Nationalist soldiers was said to be good, but the commanding general, Liu Lien-I, was said to be in the depths of despair. There was some possibility that he might sell out to the Chinese Communists after our MAAG was out, and all our people have now been evacuated. Mr. Dulles then predicted that with good leadership the Nationalist garrison would put up a good fight. It might prove necessary, however, to get rid of this Nationalist commander in the Tachens. Since the weather was bad, Mr. Dulles thought no Chinese Communist attack likely over the next few days.

*The National Security Council:*

a. Noted an uncoordinated estimate by the Central Intelligence Agency on the consequences of certain U.S. actions regarding the Chinese Nationalist offshore islands, as read at the meeting by the Director of Central Intelligence.

b. Noted and discussed a proposed Presidential message to the Congress and a draft Congressional resolution requesting authority to use U.S. armed forces if necessary for the purpose of securing Formosa and the Pescadores against armed attack, as read at the meeting by the President and the Secretary of State.

c. Agreed that the President should request from Congress authority to use U.S. armed forces if necessary for the purpose of securing Formosa and the Pescadores against armed attack, this authority to include the securing and protection of such related positions now in friendly hands, and the taking of such other measures as the President might judge to be appropriate for the security and defense of Formosa and the Pescadores.

d. Reaffirmed the willingness of the U.S. to support in the United Nations action to bring to an end the active hostilities in the general area of Formosa and the Pescadores.

e. Agreed that, pending either evidence of de facto acquiescence by the Chinese Communists in the U.S. position regarding Formosa and the Pescadores or action by the United Nations restoring peace and security in the general area, the U.S. should, with appropriate use of U.S. armed forces:

(1) Assist the Chinese Nationalists to withdraw from such offshore islands (including the Tachens) as may be mutually agreed with the Chinese Nationalists.

(2) For the purpose of securing Formosa and the Pescadores against armed attack, assist the Chinese Nationalists to defend the Quemoy Islands and the Matsu Islands from Chinese Communist attacks so long as such attacks are presump-

tively made by the Chinese Communists as a prelude to attack upon Formosa and the Pescadores.

f. Noted that, unless circumstances arise as a result of future developments under the action in e above, no increase in the currently-approved level of U.S. armed forces (NSC Action No. 1286-b as amended by NSC Action No. 1293-d)<sup>9</sup> or in currently-approved mobilization measures, is required at this time.<sup>10</sup>

*Note:* Documents to implement the action in c above, as approved by the President, have been filed as part of the official Minutes of this meeting.<sup>11</sup> The action in d above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of State for appropriate action. The action in e above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretaries of State and Defense for appropriate implementation. The action in f above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization.<sup>12</sup>

S. Everett Gleason

<sup>9</sup> NSC Action No. 1293-d of January 6, provided a general target for personnel strength for U.S. armed forces.

<sup>10</sup> Lettered subparagraphs constitute NSC Action No. 1312. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95)

<sup>11</sup> Not attached to the source text.

<sup>12</sup> NSC Action Nos. 1312-c, -d, -e, and -f were transmitted in a memorandum of January 26 from Lay to Dulles. (Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5503 Series)

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## 27. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, January 21, 1955, 10:30 a.m.<sup>1</sup>

### PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary  
 Sir Roger Makins, British Ambassador  
 Sir Robert Scott, British Minister  
 Mr. Robertson—FE  
 Mr. Merchant—EUR

At the outset the Secretary informed the British Ambassador that he had presented the views of the British Government to the President before the NSC meeting this morning. He said that at the

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/1-2155. Top Secret. Drafted by Merchant. Nonsubstantive revisions in Secretary Dulles' handwriting appear on the source text.

NSC meeting it was agreed that there would be no statement publicly made regarding the intentions of the United States with respect to Quemoy and the Matsu Islands. The Secretary said that the President intends to go before Congress on Monday to ask for Congressional authority for the limited use of United States military forces. At this point the Secretary read certain key paragraphs from the President's draft message <sup>2</sup> (warning that this text could not be regarded as final but could be accepted as indicating the general approach).

The points in the message specifically elaborated on by the Secretary were (1) the statement regarding our intention to assist the Chinese Nationalists to regroup their forces the better to defend Formosa; (2) the statement regarding the matter of further authority to strike at forces patently grouped for an attack against Formosa; (3) the statement to the effect that it was not being suggested that the treaty area of our defensive concern was being enlarged; and (4) the reference to the fact that the United States would welcome action by the United Nations which would moderate or eliminate the existing danger.

The Secretary then went on to say that the NSC had adopted as a policy (which would not be made public at this time) the need for preparedness to act against the mainland in the event of concentrations directed at Formosa. The Secretary emphasized that it was our intention to try to avoid any action against the mainland during the period in which the United Nations might be making a serious effort to settle the difficulty. He said that obviously no absolute promise could be given with respect to such restraint.

Finally the Secretary said that he hoped the British Government would consider that we had substantially met the points which they had raised and that it would thereby be enabled promptly to support

ORACLE.

The Secretary then said that he desired to comment on one sentence ("This is on the understanding that the final objective is to work slowly towards a state of affairs in which Formosa and the Pescadores are protected from attack, and at the same time, restrained from launching attacks; while the importance of the offshore islands steadily diminishes and they are finally allowed to pass to the control of the mainland government.") contained in the Ambassador's letter of January [21] just delivered to him (attached). <sup>3</sup> He said that

<sup>2</sup> Apparently a revision of the draft printed as Document 24.

<sup>3</sup> Not attached to the source text. The substantive part of the letter reads as follows:

"I have had further word from London about the situation in the Formosa Straits. The position of Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom is that they are ready (subject to New Zealand agreement) to support immediate action in the Security Council on lines already agreed, if the United States Government is prepared to

he could not accept or give any commitment with respect to the reference that the offshore islands should finally be allowed to pass to the control of the mainland government. He said whereas this might be in the British minds it definitely was not in ours. He said that major problems such as the difficulty over the Saar frequently could diminish in importance if they were considered and settled in a larger context, e.g., a close rapprochement of Germany and France. Accordingly he accepted the possibility that the offshore islands which now constitute so dangerous an area might diminish in importance if the larger issues surrounding them could be eased or settled.

The British Ambassador then thanked the Secretary for the information he had just been given. He said that in his personal opinion he believed we have met in substance the British position and that our approach was moderate. He promised to recommend to his government that we move ahead promptly on ORACLE.<sup>4</sup>

Sir Robert Scott then injected the thought that if ORACLE is to have a chance to succeed the Communists themselves must give it a fair wind.

The Secretary replied that we would do our best to allay Nationalist activities while the UN was seized with the matter but there was the matter of reciprocity and obviously they could not be inactive in the face of stepped-up Communist attacks. Reference was made to the sinking of a small British ship in recent days by Nationalist bomber attacks on Swatow harbor. The Secretary said that it was his impression that the ship was owned by the Communists but under British registry. The British Ambassador said he thought it was under charter to Chinese Communists and indicated that this matter

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withhold any promise of help in the defence of Quemoy until the results of the action in the Security Council are known.

"This is on the understanding that the final objective is to work slowly towards a state of affairs in which Formosa and the Pescadores are protected from attack, and at the same time, restrained from launching attacks; while the importance of the offshore islands steadily diminishes and they are finally allowed to pass to the control of the mainland government.

"In making this statement Her Majesty's Government are not committed to participate in any action, however provisional, to guarantee any of the coastal islands after the results of the Security Council action are known." (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/1-2155)

<sup>4</sup> A letter of January 20 from Scott to Dulles states:

"Sir Anthony Eden is willing despite the risks inherent in the situation to go ahead with the Security Council operation as soon as possible, though he doubts whether all the preparatory work can be completed by Tuesday January 25th. He suggests that a working party should meet at once here in Washington to complete the preparations.

"He stresses that if the exercise is to succeed both sides should be urged to exercise great restraint.

"He is meanwhile informing Mr. Nehru in strictest confidence of the action proposed." (*Ibid.*, ROC Files: Lot 71 D 517, 1954-1955, Offshore Islands)

should not be too important though no doubt he will be instructed to protest.

The Secretary then read a short extract from a cable just received from Ambassador Rankin <sup>5</sup> indicating that the Chinese Nationalists feared that there was a connection between the Hammarskjöld efforts to secure the release of our airmen and the projected evacuation of the Tachens.

The British Ambassador then raised on a personal basis the question of what might be done in the way of talking plainly to Moscow and Peiping at the time ORACLE was initiated. The Secretary confined himself to saying that we were planning to inform Ambassador Bohlen in Moscow fully on the situation and our intended actions so that as occasion warranted he could inform the Soviet Government.

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<sup>5</sup> Telegram 474 from Taipei, January 21, reported that U.S. proposals given to Yeh by Dulles had been considered at Cabinet-level meetings that day and that a telegram to Yeh, in Chiang's hands for approval, would accept the evacuation proposal "with reluctance" but oppose a cease-fire; questions which might be expected included whether or not the evacuation proposal had any connection with Hammarskjöld's visit to Peking. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 793.00/1-2155)

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28. **Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, January 21, 1955, 11:45 a.m.** <sup>1</sup>

SUBJECT

Defense of the Off-shore Islands

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. George Yeh, Chinese Foreign Minister  
 Dr. Wellington Koo, Chinese Ambassador  
 The Secretary  
 Mr. Robertson, Assistant Secretary for FE  
 Mr. Martin, Deputy Director for CA

Dr. Yeh explained that the Chinese Government's response to the position stated by the Secretary in their discussions on January 19 had been somewhat delayed, because of certain questions which Taipei had wished to get clear first. However, a cable was now being decoded at the Chinese Embassy, which he had requested be delivered over here as soon as possible.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, ROC Files: Lot 71 D 517, 1954-1955, Offshore Islands. Top Secret. Drafted by Martin initialed by Robertson, indicating his approval.



Dr. Yeh said that one question raised by Taipei was whether action would be taken in the United Nations before or after withdrawal from the Tachen Islands? Dr. Yeh had told Taipei that he had understood the Secretary to say that UN action would be taken after withdrawal from the Tachens. Dr. Yeh said his Government saw no need for a UN resolution following a withdrawal from the Tachens, and possibly from Matsu. The Chinese Government would not try to re-take these positions after withdrawal.

The Secretary replied that he had not been specific on the question of timing of the two actions. Action in the United Nations was not a matter which we could control, while timing of withdrawal from the Tachens depended on the military situation and on how long it would take to make the necessary preparations. We had already started to move carriers from the Manila area in the direction of Okinawa. We can't be sure what precise time relationship there would be between withdrawal from the Tachens and UN consideration of a cease-fire resolution.

The Secretary said he wanted to inform Dr. Yeh of what our program was. He said that the President was planning to send a message to Congress asking for authority to use U.S. forces in and around Formosa for these purposes:

(1). If requested by the Chinese Government, to be ready to assist in the regrouping and consolidation of Chinese Forces in the Formosa area. The Secretary pointed out that the Chinese held certain off-shore islands for historical reasons rather than for military reasons, and that a regrouping and consolidation of these positions would be desirable from a military standpoint.

(2). To further the defense of Formosa by being prepared to strike rapidly against hostile attack. There might not be time to consult Congress after a hostile attack had been identified as such.

The Secretary read portions of the draft message to Congress but emphasized that the language was tentative and that he was planning to discuss it further with the President this afternoon. The message would make clear that the President was seeking authority to use U.S. armed forces in the Formosa area for non-provocative purposes in order to meet developments which might necessitate their use in the coming hours. It was not proposed to enlarge the area the United States was committed to defend.

The Secretary told Dr. Yeh that it had now been decided that the United States would be prepared to assist in the defense of Matsu as well as Quemoy. However, no public declaration would be made at present in this respect. He was simply informing Dr. Yeh so that the Chinese Government would know what the U.S. present intentions were. The Secretary said that in his opinion the message to Congress asking for authority to use armed forces in the Formosa area would

have an electrifying effect throughout the world and we would want to see what its effect would be before making any further statement.

Ambassador Koo asked whether the message would not mention Quemoy and Matsu?

The Secretary reaffirmed that it would not mention these territories by name.

Dr. Yeh commented that the message seemed to him excellent. He had one point to raise, however. He wondered if the use of the word "regrouping" could be avoided. He did not know how it would sound in translation. Perhaps it could be stated "in the event of regrouping".

Mr. Robertson pointed out that it was simply a question of withdrawal from nonstrategic to strategic positions. This amounted to strengthening of the Chinese position.

Dr. Yeh said that the Generalissimo had asked whether it would be possible for U.S. forces to support the Chinese in defending the Tachens while the islands were being evacuated. The Chinese garrison could not pull out immediately, since there were no adequate docking facilities in the Tachen harbor. The Generalissimo wanted to know whether we would help in fighting a rear-guard action.

The Secretary said that he knew the harbor in the Tachens was exposed and assured Dr. Yeh that it was our intention to provide cover for evacuation. This meant that we would knock down any Communist planes which would try to interfere.

Dr. Yeh asked if he could inform the Generalissimo that the U.S. was prepared to participate in rear-guard action on the Tachens.

The Secretary said that we would protect the evacuation, which meant that we would fight if attacked by the Chinese Communists while evacuation was going on.

Returning to his question as to the use of the word "regrouping", Dr. Yeh suggested inclusion of the phrase "if and when requested", in the sentence referring to regrouping in the draft message to Congress.

The Secretary noted this suggestion on the draft message.

Dr. Yeh said he had a question as to the timing of an announcement from Taipei as to the withdrawal from the Tachens: Should it be made simultaneously with the announcement of the U.S. intentions respecting Quemoy? The Secretary replied that we were not now intending to make a public announcement as to Quemoy. He suggested that the Chinese announcement might be made at the time of the President's message to Congress.

Ambassador Koo asked how Congress might react to the message.

The Secretary indicated that he thought Congressional action would be favorable on the whole. He thought the House action

would be quick as House rules differ from those of the Senate, which permit unlimited debate. The Secretary felt that there might be four or five Senators who might be opposed and this might drag out the debate for a few days. He also pointed out the normal course would be for the draft resolution to go to Committee for hearings. However, he hoped that the resolution would get through the Senate within a week.

Ambassador Koo suggested withholding announcement of the Tachens' evacuation until after Congressional action on the joint resolution. Dr. Yeh pointed out that the Chinese could not make an announcement as to withdrawal from the Tachens on Monday.

The Secretary agreed that it would be better to wait until after Congressional action on the proposed joint resolution.

Dr. Yeh then asked what the situation was with respect to possible UN action.

The Secretary replied that it was boiling and he would not be surprised if the matter would be brought into the UN next week.

Dr. Yeh said that there had been rather stiff reaction in Formosa to the report of possible UN action.

The Secretary said that he understood the feeling on Formosa but he thought the odds were 10-1 that the results of UN consideration would benefit the Chinese Nationalist position. He was sure that the Chinese Communists would not come and they would not want to admit that the United Nations had any authority in the matter. Mr. Hammarskjold had reported that Chou En-lai would not even admit the existence of the UN Resolution on the imprisoned airmen and refused to discuss the matter with Hammarskjold on the basis of the UN Resolution. The Secretary felt that the Chinese Communists would simply flout the United Nations. Mr. Robertson asked how the Chinese Communists could possibly accept UN jurisdiction in this matter when they had refused to accept UN jurisdiction in Korea.

The Secretary said that the newspaper accounts of the conference with the Congressional leaders yesterday were terrible, as they made it look as though things were going against the Chinese Nationalists while in fact the program under consideration would have the opposite effect.

Dr. Yeh indicated that Taipei had asked his opinion as to what its public position should be in response to the newspaper stories. He said that he had suggested the following two points: 1) that the Chinese Government had not indicated to the U.S. any intention of withdrawing from the Tachens, and 2) that it had not requested the United States for any assistance in withdrawing from these islands.

The Secretary referred to four questions contained in a telegram just received from Ambassador Rankin.

1. Has the evacuation proposal any connection with Hammar-skjold's visit to Peiping?

The Secretary said the answer is no. In fact our intelligence estimate is that the proposed U.S. action will make it less likely that the prisoners will be released.

2. Can Senate action on the Defense Treaty be expedited to reassure the Chinese public and armed forces?

The Secretary said that he had spoken to Senator George who said he was prepared to push the Treaty through rapidly. The Secretary pointed out that in the President's message to Congress Monday, it was also proposed to emphasize the need for a speedy ratification of the Treaty, which provided the whole framework for the security of the Formosa area. In reading the language from the draft message, the Secretary emphasized that this was only a draft and he couldn't guarantee this language would be in the final version.

Dr. Yeh said that he hoped the amendment he had proposed in the sentence about regrouping would be left in the message.

Ambassador Koo again referred to the question of whether Matsu and Quemoy would be mentioned in the message.

The Secretary again said that they would not be mentioned in the message. However, the National Security Council had made the decision this morning that it would be U.S. policy to assist in their defense. This was a matter of U.S. policy and not of agreement with the Chinese Government, and, therefore, could be changed by the U.S. just as any other policy.

Ambassador Koo asked if the President had approved the policy. The Secretary replied in the affirmative.

3. Can units of the 7th Fleet proceed to Tachen immediately?

The Secretary said that as he had already indicated the carriers were enroute to the vicinity of Okinawa.

4. Can the U.S. provide transports to help in evacuation?

The Secretary said that he didn't know the answer to that question. He wondered if it would be necessary.

Ambassador Koo said that he thought the Chinese would not have sufficient transports to make a quick evacuation.

The Secretary commented that the evacuation would not have to be rapid since the U.S. would participate in defending the Tachens while the evacuation was under way.

Dr. Yeh then raised the question of the immediate need for a man from the Pacific Command to go to Formosa. He should be a man who could make decisions.

Mr. Robertson said that this was under Admiral Stump's jurisdiction.

The Secretary and Mr. Robertson indicated that they thought it would be a good idea to have a high-level officer proceed immediately to Formosa. The Secretary suggested that Mr. Robertson could take the matter up with Admiral Radford.

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29. Memorandum of a Conversation, The White House,  
Washington, January 21, 1955, 4 p.m. <sup>1</sup>

PRESENT

Admiral Arthur Radford  
Admiral Robert Carney  
General Nathan Twining  
General Lemuel Shepherd  
General Charles L. Bolte  
The Honorable John Foster Dulles  
The Honorable Charles E. Wilson  
The Honorable Robert B. Anderson  
Mr. Robert R. Bowie

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Radford, said that he had asked to bring the Chiefs in because of comments they had made regarding proposed action to be taken in Tachen Islands. Admiral Carney was the spokesman for the group, pointing up the difficulties of evacuation. There are 30,000 individuals on the island, civilian and military forces, and apparently a considerable quantity of military equipment. A ship sunk at the entrance to the harbor necessitates lightering all equipment out beyond that spot. (Incidentally, the President during discussion said someone had made a grave error in allowing that situation to exist.) Admiral Carney, supported by Admiral Radford, said that the evacuation would be much more arduous than their defense or reinforcement.

Apparently the Joint Chiefs were afraid that the proposed message to the Congress advocated a course of action (evacuation) which they consider unwise and wanted to register with the President the difficulties they foresaw. The President discussed the intent of the message being prepared:

- (1) for its logical purpose
- (2) to tell the Chinese Communists of our intentions
- (3) to dispel doubts in foreign capitals as to whether we were acting on Constitutional grounds
- (4) to bolster morale of Chinese Nationals.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administration Series. Top Secret. Drafted by Ann C. Whitman, the President's personal secretary.

He said further the message had been rewritten in more general, not specific, terms.

During conversation, the following points were brought out:

(1) In opinion of Joint Chiefs, Chinese Nationalists cannot defend Tachen.

(2) On direct question of President, Admiral Carney estimated evacuation would take something on the order of a couple of weeks. Admiral Radford concurred.

(3) The CIA believes the Communists will not interfere with evacuation.

(4) Secretary Dulles said that the islands would surrender if left to own devices; the issue is clear, you must try to get them out or let them surrender.

(5) President is disturbed by reports of the Chinese Nationalist commander on island.

(6) Secretary Wilson asked if there was any way to propose now a cease fire. Secretary Dulles replied that was United Nations business; any proposal from us would be disaster.

(7) Again Secretary Wilson suggested the long-range viewpoint, saying in his opinion one of three things must happen to stabilize the situation. Those things were:

(a) Chinese Reds take the islands

(b) Chiang give up effort to get back on mainland

(c) Chinese Communists give up idea they are going to take Formosa.

He questioned how we could bring about condition that these things could even be discussed. President said United Nations was place for that.

(8) Comments by President during course of conversation:

(a) Much easier to prevent landing than to carry on fight after landing takes place.

(b) No position is hopeless if you have a good commander.

(c) Supplying food for 30,000 people would be relatively easy, ammunition something else again.

(9) If President or Dulles or Wilson or anyone is asked what our intentions are, reply is to be that it is a military secret.

(10) Joint Chiefs will set up a task force for concerting plans.

After the Joint Chiefs and Wilson and Anderson left the meeting, the President read draft of proposed message. Dulles thought it was good, proposed getting point about United Nations in more towards beginning, and wanted Radford's statement that no increase in military procurement or supplies would be necessary. Draft was then retyped and submitted to Dulles later in evening.<sup>2</sup>

Ann C. Whitman

<sup>2</sup> Not found in Department of State files or Eisenhower Library.

30. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,  
Washington, January 22, 1955 <sup>1</sup>

SUBJECT

Defense of the Off-Shore Islands

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. George Yeh, Chinese Foreign Minister  
Dr. Wellington Koo, Chinese Ambassador  
Mr. Wang, Secretary to Ambassador  
Mr. Robertson, Assistant Secretary, FE  
Mr. McConaughy, Director, CA

Mr. Robertson asked about the accuracy of a report in this morning's *Washington Post*, from the International News Service at Taipei, that the Chinese Government after a Cabinet meeting had officially rejected the American proposals, and were resolved to defend the Tachen Islands.

Foreign Minister Yeh said there was nothing to this report. He said there was as much nonsense in the news despatches from Taipei as from Washington.

Amb. Koo summarized a telegram from President Chiang. He said that President Chiang confirmed the formal acceptance of the U.S. proposals as to the protected evacuation of the Tachens and the joint defense of Quemoy and Matsu. The Chinese Government accepted the proposals with reluctance, considering a withdrawal from the Tachens to be an undesirable alternative, but the only one left. It was not to the liking of the Chinese Government but the reasons which caused the American Government to recommend it were understood and this solution must be accepted. The Generalissimo wanted certain "understandings", requests and observations conveyed to the Department as follows:

1. The U.S. to furnish air and naval cover for a safe evacuation of the Tachens.

2. A U.S. statement eventually to be made as to its support of the defense of Quemoy and Matsu, at about the same time as the announcement of the withdrawal from the Tachens. Orders to be given to the 7th Fleet including U.S. naval air elements to proceed to the vicinity. He understood that such orders had already been given, so this point was already taken care of.

3. Complete secrecy to be observed in the matter. This is necessary to protect the evacuation. If advance knowledge of the evacuation is circulated, it will alert the Communists and result in needless loss of human lives, both civilian and military. There will be about 36,000 persons to be evacuated.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/1-2255. Top Secret. Drafted by McConaughy and initialed by Robertson, indicating his approval.

4. Expedited ratification of the Treaty to be sought. Press reports are arousing unfortunate suspicions among the Chinese public that the rumored action by the President may be a substitute for the Treaty and may result at least in a delay of its ratification.

5. Confirmation that no "deal" resulted from Hammarskjold's conversations in Peiping with Chou En-lai with regard to the imprisoned fliers. A frank statement would be welcomed as to whether there is any intention to delay action on the Treaty until the fliers are released, or to offer any other quid pro quo to the Communists through Hammarskjold for the release of the fliers.

6. The proposed New Zealand action in the Security Council should be regarded with great reserve. It will give rise to a great deal of suspicion, misgiving and misunderstanding and will encourage and aid the neutralists who are working toward the goal of "two Chinas".

7. It would be desirable for the President's message to recognize that the Chinese Government has been and is resisting strongly the Communist attacks on the off-shore islands.

Mr. Robertson observed as to point (2), that the Secretary had not agreed to make any public declaration that the U.S. would participate in the defense of Quemoy and Matsu. On the contrary, the Secretary had stated specifically on January 21, that "no public declaration would be made at present in this respect". The Secretary had indicated that the President's message to Congress would ask for authority to use armed force "in the Formosa area". There would be no further public statement, at least until we saw the effect of the President's message. It would not be desirable to pin the U.S. action down specifically to certain islands.

Dr. Yeh said that he and the Ambassador had fully understood that the President's message would not refer to Quemoy and Matsu by name. It was the thought of the Chinese representatives that at some future time these two islands might be named. They had assumed that the President's message would ask for authorization to protect a general area.

Mr. Robertson said that an authorization would be sought to use armed force in the general area as necessary. It should be clearly understood that there was no U.S. commitment to make a public statement specifying certain islands.

As to the evacuation of the Tachens, Dr. Yeh felt that it was a military necessity to defer any announcement of intention to withdraw until the withdrawal operation was practically complete. He felt that secrecy could be fairly well maintained. He said it had been done in the case of the evacuation of the small island of Chou Shan, north of the Tachens, some time ago. This had been done by the Chinese Government entirely on its own.

Mr. Robertson felt it was doubtful whether knowledge of the evacuation could be kept from the Chinese Communists.



Dr. Yeh said that his Government wanted to offset the bad effects of the withdrawal from the Tachens. For this reason they were anxious to say something about the defense of Quemoy and Matsu as soon as possible. The Chinese Government would like to indicate that they would be held, and that the U.S. had kindly offered to assist as necessary in holding them. Some positive favorable announcement should be timed with the adverse news of the withdrawal from the Tachens.

Mr. Robertson said the Department assumed that the Chinese Government would soften the impact of the announcement by describing it as a regrouping operation. The announcement that the U.S. would help to cover the withdrawal would also have a beneficial effect. It was not anticipated that the U.S. would say anything about assisting in evacuation before the Chinese Government announced its intentions. It was estimated that the Congressional debate on the President's message might take up to a week.

Dr. Yeh said that a few days after Congress has acted, it was hoped that some sort of official statement confirming the President's readiness to assist the Chinese Government could be made.

Amb. Koo said it was important to counteract the erroneous impression that the Chinese Government was prepared to withdraw from all the off-shore islands. President Chiang felt that the timing of all moves should be worked out jointly. President Chiang wanted to make it clear that in his view the evacuation of the Tachens presented a danger which should be clearly recognized:—there would be less control over a Communist surge southward from the Tachen area toward the Formosa Strait. The defense of the Formosa Strait would be adversely affected. For this reason he thought the abandonment of the Tachens would be a mistake.

Mr. Robertson pointed out that our military people did not think so. The Tachens would not be sufficiently important to pay a price for holding, even in war time. They were so much closer to Mainland air bases than to the island air bases available to us that the Communists would always have a great advantage. Furthermore they had little intrinsic importance.

Dr. Yeh remarked that this was a matter of dispute. "Strategists, like philosophers, don't always agree".

Mr. Robertson expressed the hope that the Generalissimo would be made to realize that the recent U.S. decisions represent "a hardening, not a weakening, of U.S. policy". He felt that possibly the Generalissimo did not yet understand the full significance of the recent decisions.

Dr. Yeh said that he appreciated the purport of the recent U.S. decision. At the same time he felt that the evacuation of the Tachens would have the effect of boosting both the prestige and the appetite of the Chinese Communists. It would tend to lead to further Chinese Communist aggression. Turning to the evacuation problem, he said that the withdrawal of slightly more than 36,000 people from the Tachens would be a big undertaking, full of difficulties. There were no good boat landings. The people would have to go single file down narrow paths to the water's edge and embark on sampans, which would ferry them out to the ship anchorages. It might take an hour and a half to move an individual from the island to the evacuation ship, even with quiet seas. Careful planning would be needed for the evacuation and for the regrouping on other islands.

Mr. Robertson mentioned that Admiral Pride had already been given orders to proceed to Taipei.<sup>2</sup>

Dr. Yeh said that his name had already been suggested by the Chinese Government and the Government was gratified that Admiral Pride had been designated. U.S. transports would be needed to assist in carrying out the evacuation. If the Chinese Government had to rely chiefly on its own resources, the evacuation would be greatly prolonged.

Mr. Robertson felt that these details would have to be worked out in Taipei, with Admiral Pride participating. Admiral Pride would make his recommendations. Mr. Robertson did not anticipate any difficulties over the extent of U.S. assistance.

Dr. Yeh said that only civilians who wanted to leave would be evacuated. There would be no forcible evacuation of unwilling civilians.

Amb. Koo said that President Chiang was greatly perturbed by the leakage of classified information to the U.S. press. He knew that the U.S. was also concerned and hoped that everything possible would be done to block the leaks. The Generalissimo felt that the entire matter should be handled so as not to discourage the Chinese people. At the proper moment the Chinese Government would have to issue an explanatory statement. The leakage of information in advance would not make the Government's task any easier.

As to point (5), Mr. Robertson said that the reports which the Ambassador had mentioned that Secretary General Hammarskjold had worked out a deal with Chou En-lai in Peiping were "100% false". Hammarskjold represented the UN, and not the U.S., in Peip-

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<sup>2</sup> Telegram 212353Z from CNO to CINCPAC ADMIN and COMSEVENTH FLT, January 21, stated that Task Force 77 might be ordered to assist in the evacuation of the Tachens and directed Pride to proceed to Taipei and confer with the Chinese Defense Ministry and with Chase to determine the factors and requirements involved should the evacuation be ordered. (JCS Records, CCS 381 Formosa (11-8-48) Sec. 18)

ing. He had said nothing on behalf of the U.S. Government, and had informed us that he did not discuss any quid pro quo. The U.S. Government was anxious to hasten the ratification of the Mutual Defense Treaty. The question of the fliers could not be allowed to influence our consideration of the Formosa security problem. The action we are now considering may cause the Communists to harden their attitude towards the Americans under detention. This is regrettable, but it cannot be helped. U.S. action was made necessary by the Chinese Communists attacks on the Tachens and their admission that these attacks were a prelude to the "liberation" of Formosa.

Mr. Robertson said as to point (6) that the U.S. could not oppose the proposed New Zealand Resolution in the Security Council, and we did not see how the Chinese Government could oppose it. Mr. Robertson stressed that if the resolution were contemptuously rejected by the Communist side, the position of the Chinese Government would be improved. He thought the New Zealand resolution would probably go forward.

Foreign Minister Yeh said that he had two important observations to make:

1. It is important that the Tachens be denied to the Communists after the withdrawal of the Chinese Government forces. Communist use of the Tachens as a military base would pose a serious additional security threat. He suggested that United Nations influence be invoked to have the Tachens declared a "neutral zone". This action would not have to be identified with the New Zealand Resolution.

2. The precise wording of the New Zealand Resolution was very important. Suitable wording could do much to minimize the unfortunate aspects of the Resolution. He hoped that New Zealand Ambassador Munro and Ambassador Lodge could consult with the Chinese delegate, T.F. Tsiang, about the wording.

As to the Foreign Minister's interest in the wording of the New Zealand Resolution, Mr. Robertson agreed that this was important. It should be phrased so as to make it as acceptable as possible to the Chinese Government. Mr. Robertson said that the interests of the Chinese Government would be borne in mind in our discussions with the New Zealand Embassy.

### 31. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union <sup>1</sup>

Washington, January 22, 1955—5:15 p.m.

576. For Ambassador from Secretary. (See immediately following cable.) <sup>2</sup> In connection President's request for Congressional authority to use US forces in defense of Formosa and Pescadores, we are considering have you approach Soviets in attempt secure exercise by them of moderating influence on Chinese Communists. Desire your views before deciding to do so. Such approach might make following points:

1. Settled policy of US is to preserve Formosa and Pescadores in friendly hands in interests of its own security. The US will take whatever action may prove necessary, including use of US military forces if required to maintain this policy.

2. Close-in offshore islands take on significance for US primarily as they relate to actions directed against Formosa and Pescadores. Increasingly in recent months, Chinese Communist leaders have explicitly asserted that their actions against these offshore islands are directed toward seizure of Formosa and the Pescadores. Under such circumstances, these islands have an importance to US, which they would not have under different conditions.

3. In order to contribute to reducing area of conflict, US, if requested by Republic of China, is prepared to assist it in withdrawal of its forces from certain of these offshore islands. In participating in such activities US will have purely defensive purposes but will be prepared use its own forces to deal severely and promptly with any interference with such withdrawals.

4. US believes that United Nations should take action to bring to an end active hostilities in Formosan Straits. US expects that United Nations may be seized of this problem within next few days.

5. US has hope that United Nations would have good prospects for ending hostilities in Formosan Straits provided Chinese Communists refrain from military action while question is under UN consideration. Chinese Communist military action against Nationalist-held offshore islands during UN deliberations would seriously prejudice chances for a successful outcome. In addition, such Chinese Communist military action would entail gravest consequences for peace. US will not be deterred by such possible consequences from protecting areas important to its interests.

6. US trusts USSR shares its hope that hostilities in Formosa Straits will be brought to an end and not develop into wider conflict. For this reason US hopes that USSR will exert its influence on Chi-

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/1-2255. Top Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Repeated to London for information. Merchant is indicated on the telegram as the drafter, but handwritten notes by Merchant on the source text state that it was approved by the Secretary, drafted by Bowie, and cleared with Robertson, and that Murphy had been informed of its gist.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 577 to Moscow, January 22, summarized the President's anticipated message to Congress. (*Ibid.*, 793.5/1-2255)

nese Communists to persuade them to refrain from any action inconsistent with this objective.

Dept requests urgently your comments on (a) utility of such an approach, and (b) substance of points to be made.

Dulles

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32. **Telegram From the Ambassador in the Republic of China (Rankin) to the Department of State**<sup>1</sup>

*Taipei, January 23, 1955—1:00 p.m.*

476. Embassy telegram 474.<sup>2</sup> President Chiang invited Chase and me to his house last night and discussed current developments for nearly 2 hours. Madame Chiang and Acting Foreign Minister also present. President asked me transmit his views to Department.

Telegram accepting Tachen evacuation has gone forward but Chiang remains adamant against cease-fire. He would like to see US protection extended to Matsu as well as Kinmen since he regards retention of former closely related to (his expression was interpreted "inseparable from") defense of latter.

Chiang's opposition to cease-fire apparently even stronger than 3 months ago, under influence of impending Tachen evacuation and recent visit of Hammarskjold to Peiping. He explained at length grave effect on troops and civilian morale of giving up without a fight a strong position like Tachen which his men are ready defend to the last. Following this with cease-fire, which carries definite connotation of defeat from experience [garble] Marshall Mission<sup>3</sup> period in particular, would compound bad effect and raise question in every mind whether Free China would ever fight again. All effects of recent years to build fighting spirit would be undermined. Heroic sacrifice of guerrillas on Ichiang who refused President's offer to withdraw them after first heavy air attacks would have been in vain. Effect of cease-fire proposal would be even more serious if it should precede exchange of ratification of mutual defense pact.

President dwelt at length on Hammarskjold trip to which he attaches much significance. He cannot understand how US could

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/1-2355. Secret; Niact. Passed to CINCPAC by the Department at Rankin's request.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 5, Document 27.

<sup>3</sup> For documentation concerning General George C. Marshall's mission to China, December 1945-January 1947, see *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. vii, pp. 745-828; *ibid.*, 1946, vol. ix, and *ibid.*, vol. x, pp. 1-723.

regard this pilgrimage as other than failure. Certainly it was failure in terms of ostensible purpose for freeing American prisoners. But he seems convinced that fate of these Americans is only incidental to larger purposes of "reducing tension" in general and ameliorating "relations between US and Red China." To Chiang all this simply means appeasement and the eventual entry of Communist China into UNO. In such terms he fears Hammarskjold trip was not failure from Red viewpoint.

Chiang does not suggest that in his own opinion there was any direct connection between Hammarskjold Odyssey and proposed Tachen evacuation but he was certain Communists and most others would think so. Timing and sequence such as following would be all but disastrous: (1) Hammarskjold trip; (2) Red capture of Ichang; (3) evacuation of Tachen at US behest; (4) cease-fire proposal in UNO; (5) arrival of new batch of Red Chinese delegates in New York to discuss matters; (6) inevitable broadening of discussions (during which cease-fire as such might well pass into limbo along with US airmen); (7) meanwhile Chinese-American Security Pact still not in effect.

President seems convinced Reds would not simply reject cease-fire proposal out of hand but exploit it to utmost. He believes as matter of principle Free China must oppose it firmly.

When Red China finally enters UNO, which Chiang regards as inevitable result of present trend, US will find that in world organization it has "lost a friend and gained an enemy."

In conclusion Chiang said Free China owed much to US and was ready to make contribution toward obtaining release of airmen from Peiping besides being helpful in other ways, even against its own interest, so long as principles not sacrificed. For example, Tachen was given up to satisfy US. He would be glad to release Soviet tanker *Tuapse* and non-defecting members of crew if this would obtain freedom of US prisoners. (At this point Madame Chiang remarked such an offer would put Reds on spot.)

Chiang noted with wry smile January 20 press despatches from London quoting Foreign Office spokesman as stating cease-fire was "one of a number of possible courses of action which we have discussed with US and New Zealand—over recent months." This appeared to confirm all his suspicions. He evidently thinks US also has been less than frank with Free China about Hammarskjold.

At several points during conversation President and Madame emphasized tragic fate of Tachen inhabitants. She is sending ship next week to evacuate guerilla orphans in whom she has taken special interest. When I got up to leave she repeated hope that US would not overlook humanitarian aspects.

**33. Telegram From the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bohlen) to the Department of State <sup>1</sup>**

*Moscow, January 23, 1955—3 p.m.*

1152. For the Secretary. London for the Ambassador. At certain time and under certain conditions an approach to Soviet Government on question could be useful and at any rate could do no harm if only for record. However, I believe any such approach must make absolutely clear US position in re to offshore islands and I do not see this clarity in the contents of proposed approach (Deptels 576 and 577).<sup>2</sup> Offshore islands are chief issue since I am convinced, particularly after signature treaty with Chinese Nationalist Government, there can be no doubt in Soviet mind concerning US intention to defend Formosa and Pescadores in event of attack. Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Deptel 576 could be read to indicate that US would be prepared to use military force in defense of offshore islands as logical extension its commitment to defend Formosa. Paragraph 3 raises in very general form question of withdrawal Nationalist forces from "certain" offshore islands with US assistance if requested by Nationalist China. Paragraphs 4 and 5 do not make clear exactly what action it will be suggested that UN take to put an end to active hostilities in the area. Thus points listed do not make clear whether chief purpose of statement is to warn that US will use its own forces in relation to Communist attacks on offshore islands or whether emphasis should be on withdrawal Chinese Nationalist forces from some of them.

I fully realize complexity and delicacy of these questions and the psychological and political factors involved. I fear, however, approach along lines indicated would not have best chance of producing result desired—namely, exercise of Soviet influence as restraining factor on Communist Chinese—unless greater clarity can be introduced in re to US position on offshore islands question. It may well be that it is impossible to give definite answer on this point at this time, in which case I would suggest that any approach to Soviets be deferred until we have determined (a) whether Chinese Nationalist Government is in effect preparing to request US assistance in withdrawal from certain of the islands, and (b) exactly what islands are involved.

Another possibility would be to confine approach to Soviets merely to request contained in paragraph 5: i.e., that Chinese Communists refrain from military action in Formosan Straits while matter under UN consideration. This, however, to be effective, would in-

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/1-2355. Top Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Repeated for information to London for Ambassador Aldrich.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 31 and footnote 2 thereto.

volve our ability to give similar assurances on behalf Chinese Nationalists which is not specifically indicated or authorized in telegram under reference. Exact question of withdrawal and regrouping of Nationalist forces would thus be avoided and left for development during course of UN consideration.

It is not necessary in all cases to dot all I's for Soviets who are reasonably quick to understand in some matters, but where issues involve territory of any kind and either its defense or relinquishment, clarity is important and even essential. I am sure that Molotov would ask me questions on offshore islands which under present suggestion I would be unable to answer and thereby leave with him impression that our approach was simply maneuver and not the serious attempt to restore peace in Formosa area which it is.<sup>3</sup>

Bohlen

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<sup>3</sup> Telegram 579 to Moscow, January 24, personally signed by Dulles, states: "I am inclined to agree reasoning expressed your 1152 and accordingly have decided that no approach be made to Soviets re Formosa at this time." (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/1-2355)

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#### 34. Message From the President to the Congress, Washington, January 24, 1955<sup>1</sup>

*To the Congress of the United States:*

The most important objective of our nation's foreign policy is to safeguard the security of the United States by establishing and preserving a just and honorable peace. In the Western Pacific, a situation is developing in the Formosa Straits, that seriously imperils the peace and our security.

Since the end of Japanese hostilities in 1945, Formosa and the Pescadores have been in the friendly hands of our loyal ally, the Republic of China. We have recognized that it was important that these islands should remain in friendly hands. In unfriendly hands, Formosa and the Pescadores would seriously dislocate the existing, even if unstable, balance of moral, economic and military forces upon which the peace of the Pacific depends. It would create a breach in the island chain of the Western Pacific that constitutes, for the United States and other free nations, the geographical backbone of their security structure in that Ocean. In addition, this breach would inter-

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<sup>1</sup> Reprinted from *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1955*, pp. 207-211.



rupt North-South communications between other important elements of that barrier, and damage the economic life of countries friendly to us.

The United States and the friendly Government of the Republic of China, and indeed all the free nations, have a common interest that Formosa and the Pescadores should not fall into the control of aggressive Communist forces.

Influenced by such considerations, our government was prompt, when the Communists committed armed aggression in Korea in June 1950, to direct our Seventh Fleet to defend Formosa from possible invasion from the Communist mainland.

These considerations are still valid. The Seventh Fleet continues under Presidential directive to carry out that defensive mission. We also provide military and economic support to the Chinese Nationalist Government and we cooperate in every proper and feasible way with that Government in order to promote its security and stability. All of these military and related activities will be continued.

In addition, there was signed last December a Mutual Defense Treaty between this Government and the Republic of China covering Formosa and the neighboring Pescadores. It is a treaty of purely defensive character. That Treaty is now before the Senate of the United States.

Meanwhile Communist China has pursued a series of provocative political and military actions, establishing a pattern of aggressive purpose. That purpose, they proclaim, is the conquest of Formosa.

In September 1954 the Chinese Communists opened up heavy artillery fire upon Quemoy island, one of the natural approaches to Formosa, which had for several years been under the uncontested control of the Republic of China. Then came air attacks of mounting intensity against other free China islands, notably those in the vicinity of the Tachen group to the north of Formosa. One small island (Ichiang) was seized last week by air and amphibious operations after a gallant few fought bravely for days against overwhelming odds. There have been recent heavy air attacks and artillery fire against the main Tachen Islands themselves.

The Chinese Communists themselves assert that these attacks are a prelude to the conquest of Formosa. For example, after the fall of Ichiang, the Peiping Radio said that it showed a "determined will to fight for the liberation of Taiwan (Formosa). Our people will use all their strength to fulfill that task."

Clearly, this existing and developing situation poses a serious danger to the security of our country and of the entire Pacific area and indeed to the peace of the world. We believe that the situation is one for appropriate action of the United Nations under its charter,

for the purpose of ending the present hostilities in that area. We would welcome assumption of such jurisdiction by that body.

Meanwhile, the situation has become sufficiently critical to impel me, without awaiting action by the United Nations, to ask the Congress to participate now, by specific resolution, in measures designed to improve the prospects for peace. These measures would contemplate the use of the armed forces of the United States if necessary to assure the security of Formosa and the Pescadores.

The actions that the United States must be ready to undertake are of various kinds. For example, we must be ready to assist the Republic of China to redeploy and consolidate its forces if it should so desire. Some of these forces are scattered throughout the smaller offshore islands as a result of historical rather than military reasons directly related to defending Formosa. Because of the air situation in the area, withdrawals for the purpose of redeployment of Chinese Nationalist forces would be impractical without assistance of the armed forces of the United States.

Moreover, we must be alert to any concentration or employment of Chinese Communist forces obviously undertaken to facilitate attack upon Formosa, and be prepared to take appropriate military action.

I do not suggest that the United States enlarge its defensive obligations beyond Formosa and the Pescadores as provided by the Treaty now awaiting ratification. But unhappily, the danger of armed attack directed against that area compels us to take into account closely related localities and actions which, under current conditions, might determine the failure or the success of such an attack. The authority that may be accorded by the Congress would be used only in situations which are recognizable as parts of, or definite preliminaries to, an attack against the main positions of Formosa and the Pescadores.

Authority for some of the actions which might be required would be inherent in the authority of the Commander-in-Chief. Until Congress can act I would not hesitate, so far as my Constitutional powers extend, to take whatever emergency action might be forced upon us in order to protect the rights and security of the United States.

However, a suitable Congressional resolution would clearly and publicly establish the authority of the President as Commander-in-Chief to employ the armed forces of this nation promptly and effectively for the purposes indicated if in his judgment it became necessary. It would make clear the unified and serious intentions of our Government, our Congress and our people. Thus it will reduce the possibility that the Chinese Communists, misjudging our firm purpose and national unity, might be disposed to challenge the position

of the United States, and precipitate a major crisis which even they would neither anticipate nor desire.

In the interest of peace, therefore, the United States must remove any doubt regarding our readiness to fight, if necessary, to preserve the vital stake of the free world in a free Formosa, and to engage in whatever operations may be required to carry out that purpose.

To make this plain requires not only Presidential action but also Congressional action. In a situation such as now confronts us, and under modern conditions of warfare, it would not be prudent to await the emergency before coming to the Congress. Then it might be too late. Already the warning signals are flying.

I believe that the threatening aspects of the present situation, if resolutely faced, may be temporary in character. Consequently, I recommend that the Resolution expire as soon as the President is able to report to the Congress that the peace and security of the area are reasonably assured by international conditions, resulting from United Nations action or otherwise.

Again I say that we would welcome action by the United Nations which might, in fact, bring an end to the active hostilities in the area. This critical situation has been created by the choice of the Chinese Communists, not by us. Their offensive military intent has been flaunted to the whole world by words and by deeds. Just as they created the situation, so they can end it if they so choose.

What we are now seeking is primarily to clarify present policy and to unite in its application. We are not establishing a new policy. Consequently, my recommendations do not call for an increase in the armed forces of the United States or any acceleration in military procurement or levels of defense production. If any unforeseen emergency arises requiring any change, I will communicate with the Congress. I hope, however, that the effect of an appropriate Congressional Resolution will be to calm the situation rather than to create further conflict.

One final point. The action I request is, of course, no substitute for the Treaty with the Republic of China which we have signed and which I have transmitted to the Senate. Indeed, present circumstances make it more than ever important that this basic agreement should be promptly brought into force, as a solemn evidence of our determination to stand fast in the agreed Treaty area and to thwart all attacks directed against it. If delay should make us appear indecisive in this basic respect, the pressures and dangers would surely mount.

Our purpose is peace. That cause will be served if, with your help, we demonstrate our unity and our determination. In all that we do we shall remain faithful to our obligations as a member of the United Nations to be ready to settle our international disputes by

peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.

For the reasons outlined in this message, I respectfully request that the Congress take appropriate action to carry out the recommendations contained herein.<sup>2</sup>

Dwight D. Eisenhower

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<sup>2</sup> H.J. Res. 159 was introduced in the House on January 24; an identical resolution was introduced in the Senate as S.J. Res. 28 on the same day. H.J. Res. 159 was approved by the House on January 25 by a vote of 410-3, approved by the Senate on January 28 by a vote of 85-3, and approved by the President on January 29; for text, see Document 56. The text of a draft resolution, marked "Sec. brought back from W.H. after 4 p.m. mtg w. President, 1/21/55" is identical to that of H.J. Res. 159. Another copy, marked "Sec. took up on Hill, 1/24/55" is identical except for a handwritten revision, not entirely legible, to the third "whereas" clause. (Both in Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Memoranda)

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### 35. Editorial Note

A statement issued by Premier Chou En-lai on January 24 charged that the United States had "stepped up its military operations to make war provocations" and had been "engineering a conspiracy for a so-called cease-fire through the United Nations, to intervene in the Chinese people's liberation of Taiwan." Declaring that Taiwan was "an inalienable part of China's territory" and that neither the United Nations nor any foreign country had the right to intervene in "the Chinese people's liberation of Taiwan", he asserted that the cause of tension in the Taiwan area was that the United States had "occupied Taiwan, shielded the traitorous Chiang Kai-shek clique and incessantly directed subversive activities and war threats against the People's Republic of China." In conclusion, he declared that to safeguard China's security and peace in the Far East, "the Chinese people must liberate Taiwan, and the United States must stop intervening in China's internal affairs and withdraw all its armed forces from Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits." For this statement, see *People's China*, February 16, 1955, Supplement, or *Documents on International Affairs, 1955* (issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London: Oxford University Press, 1958), pages 445-446.

36. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,  
Washington, January 25, 1955, 12:52 p.m. <sup>1</sup>

SUBJECT

Operation ORACLE

PARTICIPANTS

Sir Robert Scott—Minister, British Embassy  
The Secretary  
Mr. Key—IO, Assistant Secretary  
Mr. Wainhouse, IO, Deputy Assistant Secretary  
Mr. Martin, Deputy Director for CA

Sir Robert said that he had a message from Sir Anthony Eden indicating that the British would be happy to meet the Secretary's request for a slight delay in the contemplated UN action. The Secretary replied that a long delay would be unnecessary and thought that we could go ahead on Friday <sup>2</sup> if the papers were in shape. He said that hearings in the two Senate Committees which were meeting in joint session <sup>3</sup> would probably be concluded today and a vote taken. Debate on the floor of the Senate might take several more days. Once the joint resolution was out of Committee, UN developments would not interrupt progress. However, there was a strong element in Congress opposed to the cease-fire idea and the Chinese Nationalists were strongly opposed.

Sir Robert said their opposition was excelled only by that of Peiping. He then referred to a telegram just received from Trevelyan (British Chargé in Peiping), expressing the view that the UN exercise would do more harm than good and suggesting the possibility that, without going to the Council, Hammarskjöld might be asked to explore the situation. Mr. Eden had asked that Trevelyan's views be brought to the Secretary's attention.

The Secretary replied that we were pretty strongly committed to UN action. The Chinese Nationalists were against it as much as the Chinese Communists but the President was committed and the Secretary himself had reinforced the commitment in Committee hearings. The Secretary emphasized that we were confronted with the

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Secret. The time indicated on the memorandum of conversation is 11:30 a.m., but, according to Dulles' appointment diary (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers), the meeting took place at 12:52 p.m.

<sup>2</sup> January 28.

<sup>3</sup> The Senate Committees on Foreign Relations and on Armed Services held joint hearings on S.J. Res. 28 on January 24 and 25 in executive session; Secretary Dulles appeared before the committees on January 24 and the Joint Chiefs of Staff on January 25. For the record of the hearings and the committees' meeting on January 26, when they reported out the resolution, see *Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Historical Series)*, vol. VII (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1978), pp. 65-283.

threat to peace in the area and we were committed to get some form of UN action. It might be possible, however, to wait a week or so.

Sir Robert said that as an alternative to the New Zealand Resolution, the matter might be brought into the Security Council, which would then suggest that Hammarskjold explore the situation.

The Secretary felt that this would arouse suspicions in this country that there was some sort of a "deal" on, in view of Hammarskjold's mission to Peiping in connection with the release of the imprisoned airmen. The Secretary had the feeling that Hammarskjold had been a bit naive and had really not gotten anything at all but a mandate from the Chinese Communists to tell us to be more reasonable. He said we could not turn over this matter to Hammarskjold at the present stage.

Sir Robert indicated that the British Government does not exclude going ahead with operation ORACLE; if we were ready to proceed, the British were ready. Mr. Eden simply wanted to check on our reaction to Trevelyan's suggestion. Mr. Eden felt it important, however, that we make definite efforts to exercise restraint and to secure Chinese Communist attendance at the Security Council discussions. The Secretary replied that as to the latter we could not contribute but we had no desire to hinder Chinese Communist attendance.

Sir Robert felt the big question was what action to take in the event the Chinese Communists failed to come. Should we drag our feet or push the resolution through?

The Secretary said we would have to feel our way and see what the situation was. We would not want to commit ourselves.

Sir Robert agreed that we should keep an open mind as to what action should be taken in such an event.

The Secretary said that we would not want to press action if it would break up the UN. He recalled that Senator Saltonstall had asked whether putting the matter into the UN might not place too great a burden on it. The Secretary said that if we adopted the theory that the UN couldn't do anything and by-passed it, you couldn't get support for the UN and it would never grow up to its responsibilities. Its main value lay in its being a forum for world opinion where influence was exerted on nations to conform to the standards of world opinion. The Secretary said that we were committed to take this matter up in the United Nations and if we couldn't agree on it the U.S. would have to take action there itself. He had said in Committee hearings that the U.S. would not necessarily take the initiative, but would if a third country did not. The Secretary said that he assumed the UK was with us on this question.

Sir Robert said that the UK was with us but wished to take into account the Chou En-lai statement.

The Secretary said that he thought Chou's statement was stupid and would help get the resolution through.

Sir Robert then asked if we should not go ahead on Friday.

The Secretary agreed it was the consensus that the New Zealand letter should be sent to the Secretary General on Friday and the first meeting of the Security Council be held on Monday. This would be the last day which Ambassador Munro would preside over the Council.

Sir Robert indicated that it was his understanding that there were no commitments as to what action should be taken in certain events, such as the failure of the Chinese Communists to come to the Security Council. The Secretary affirmed that we did not wish to be committed.

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**37. Memorandum for the Record by the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Cutler) <sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, January 25, 1955.*

At my briefing conference this afternoon, I asked the President whether he had devised a mechanism to keep close watch on the implementation of the new Formosa policy (approved at Jan 21/55 NSC Meeting) in the event that there should ensue a deterioration into active hostilities.

I referred to past differences of views among the JCS as to our China policy; to the broad language of our new policy statement and his Message to Congress; to the possibility that in the heat of action and counteraction of hostilities there might arise a choice as to just what his real objective was: to end the current hostilities or to deal a decisive blow to Red China.

He seemed interested in the point which I made, and discussed it for 4 or 5 minutes. He indicated very clearly (1) that if the going got tough, he would expect daily reports from Radford or his representative, and (2) that he preferred to act through the Chairman of the JCS, rather than through the several Chiefs, in order to centralize authority.

(It might be a good idea, under existing circumstances, to ask Radford at each Council Meeting to give a short resume of what was going on militarily, similar to the intelligence estimate received from

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 61 D 167, Formosa. Top Secret. According to the President's appointment diary the meeting took place at 2:45 p.m. (Eisenhower Library, President's Daily Appointments)

Allen Dulles. I did not mention this to the President, but will try it at the next NSC Meeting).

RC

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38. **Telegram From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Hull) and the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Stump)**<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, January 25, 1955.*

JCS 974723. From JCS. The Secretary of Defense has given authority to station a USAF fighter bomber wing in Formosa on a temporary duty basis. The JCS direct that one F-86 wing from forces assigned to COMFEAF be deployed to Formosa at the earliest practicable date. This action is in lieu of the rotation of a FEAF F-86 wing by squadrons to Formosa,<sup>2</sup> details of which have been coordinated between the headquarters concerned. Command relationships and support will be covered separately.

The classification of the deployment is downgraded to unclassified upon implementation.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: JCS Records, CCS 381 Far East (11-28-50) Sec. 25. Top Secret; Operational Immediate. A copy was received in the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs on January 25. (Department of State, CA Files: Lot 59 D 110, Air Force Communications Project—Formosa) No time of transmission is indicated on the source text.

<sup>2</sup> The plan to rotate the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing from the Far East Air Force by squadrons to Formosa for 10-day periods of familiarization and training, in order to prepare for the possible movement of the wing to Formosa and operations in that area, was set forth in a letter of January 15, from H. Struve Hensel, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, to Dulles. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 794A.5/1-1555) Department of State concurrence was conveyed in a letter of January 20, from Robertson to Hensel. (*Ibid.*)



39. Telegram From the Representative at the United Nations (Lodge) to the Department of State <sup>1</sup>

*New York, January 25, 1955—6 p.m.*

391. Re Formosa. Ambassador Tsiang (China) called at his request this afternoon to seek information from me about the cease-fire action, which I was unable to give him.

He said he had talked with Munro and had asked him whether Munro favored a resolution which would embody the idea of an appeal, or would use the legalistic phrase "calls upon". Munro said he favored the phrase "calls upon", and said he hoped that during the debate in the Security Council Tsiang would "not make unnecessary trouble".

Tsiang said: "I cannot remain silent on these issues without being regarded as a traitor by my own people. If the resolution uses the phrase 'calls upon, I must be stiffer. If the word 'appeal' is used, I can be softer. The words 'calls upon' put me on the spot. I also prefer a vague phraseology such as: 'appeals to all the parties concerned' rather than mentioning Nationalist China and Communist China by name. If the latter happens, then the concept of two Chinas is created and this is strongly to be avoided".

I told Tsiang that I thought he would make a great mistake if he vetoed such a resolution and that it would be much cleverer from his own viewpoint to let the Soviet Union veto it on behalf of the Chinese Communists. I said that if the Soviets vetoed it and the Chinese Nationalists did not, this would give Chinese Nationalist prestige a shot in the arm in the United States and would create considerable new sympathy for Nationalist China, which would look like the aggrieved peace-loving party. If on the other hand, the Chinese Nationalists were to veto the resolution, it would make them look belligerent and obstructive and would cost them friends here in America. He said this was a consideration which he would carefully think over.

My present impression is that he will make a speech, the stiffness of which depends upon the phraseology of the resolution, but that he will not veto.

I feel that use of "appeals" rather than "calls upon" is too weak and that the Security Council should not appear to be "appealing" to the Communist Chinese. Tsiang's preference for "all the parties concerned" on the other hand seems to me desirable.

**Lodge**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/1-2555. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution.

40. Special National Intelligence Estimate <sup>1</sup>

SNIE 100-3-55

*Washington, January 25, 1955.*COMMUNIST REACTIONS TO CERTAIN POSSIBLE US COURSES OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THE ISLANDS OFF THE COAST OF CHINA <sup>2</sup>*Note*

On 21 January 1955 the Director of Central Intelligence submitted to the National Security Council a Central Intelligence Agency memorandum entitled "Reactions to Certain Possible US Courses of Action with Respect to the Islands Off the Coast of China." <sup>3</sup>

Subsequently, and after the President's message to the Congress of 24 January, the Intelligence Advisory Committee considered the Central Intelligence Agency memorandum and a coordinated estimate was prepared covering those paragraphs which had not been rendered moot by the adoption of the policy set forth in the President's message. Distribution of this estimate is being made to all recipients of the original memorandum so that they may have the benefit of the views of the entire intelligence community.

The offshore island situation will again be reviewed by the Intelligence Advisory Committee subsequent to action by the Congress and when it will be possible to reappraise this situation in the light of reactions to the policy set forth in the President's message and the actions taken thereunder.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, INR-NIE Files. Top Secret.

Special National Intelligence Estimates (SNIEs) were high-level interdepartmental reports presenting appraisals of vital foreign policy problems on an immediate or crisis basis. SNIEs were drafted by officers from those agencies represented on the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC), discussed and revised by interdepartmental working groups coordinated by the Office of National Estimates of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), approved by the IAC, and circulated under the aegis of the CIA to the President, appropriate officers of cabinet level, and the National Security Council.

<sup>2</sup> A note on the cover sheet reads as follows:

"Submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence. The following organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the Intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff.

"Concurred in by the Intelligence Advisory Committee on 25 January 1955. Concurring were the Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelligence; the Director of Intelligence, USAF; and the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff. See, however, the footnotes taken by various members to specific paragraphs. The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the IAC and the Assistant to the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction."

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 3, Document 26.

### Statement of the Problem

To estimate Communist reactions to certain US courses of actions taken in accordance with the President's message to the Congress on 24 January 1955 and Joint Resolution 159<sup>4</sup> introduced in the House on 24 January 1955; specifically, Communist reactions to the following US courses of action: (a) the US to persuade the Chinese Nationalists to withdraw their forces from the offshore islands with the exception of the Quemoy and possibly Matsus and to assist this withdrawal with US armed forces; (b) the US to assist the Chinese Nationalists with US armed forces to defend the Quemoy and possibly the Matsus from Chinese Communist attacks, including appropriate military action against mainland forces and installations directly supporting Communist attacks, pending action by the UN to restore peace and security in the general area.

### Assumption

Congressional approval of the President's request.

### Estimate

#### *Communist Reactions*

1. The Chinese Communists will continue strongly to reiterate their contention that the status of the offshore islands, as well as Taiwan and the Pescadores, is a domestic matter, and will seek to propagandize international opinion against the US, stressing US intervention, aggressive intent, and desire to maintain tension in the Far East.<sup>5</sup> Simultaneously, the Communists will probably attempt to portray any Nationalist evacuation as a Communist victory, a demonstration of Nationalist weakness, and as evidence of the futility of US support. These propaganda themes will probably be reflected in Communist propaganda worldwide.

2. We believe it is unlikely that the Communists would deliberately attack US forces engaged in the evacuation of Nationalist garrisons, but the possibility of a serious incident cannot be excluded.

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<sup>4</sup> A footnote here in the source text quoted the operational paragraphs of H.J. Res. 159.

<sup>5</sup> Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State, believes that this paragraph, in addition to indicating how the Chinese Communists would attempt to exploit this action propaganda-wise, should also estimate how they would in fact interpret this course of action. The Special Assistant would therefore begin paragraph 1 with the following sentence: "The Chinese Communists, imbued with the suspicions that historically have characterized aggressors, will almost certainly view this action as further evidence of US hostility and aggressive intent against Communist China." [Footnote in the source text.]

3. We believe that even after Congressional approval the Communists will continue probing actions against major offshore islands to test US intentions. If the Communists were convinced that the US was determined to prevent the seizure of a particular island position even to the extent of attacking mainland targets or retaking any lost island positions, they would probably be deterred from attempting such seizure in the near future. However, they would probably continue probing and attempts to subvert the garrison. They would also continue efforts to discredit and isolate the US on the issue of the islands and on the over-all issue of Taiwan and the Pescadores.<sup>6</sup>

4. The Communists will remain firm in their intention to take the offshore islands. Over the longer run, as their capabilities increase, and especially if world and US opinion appears unfavorable to strong US counteraction, the Communists will probably become increasingly impatient and less cautious in their actions. However, they would almost certainly refrain from actions that they believed would lead to full-scale war with the US, but the danger would remain that Pei'ping might miscalculate the extent of US reaction.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> The Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, and the Director of Naval Intelligence, believe that this paragraph should read as follows: "The manner in which the posited US policy is being adopted, with full discussion in the Congress and prior Congressional acquiescence in the use of force in defending Taiwan, the Pescadores, and such offshore islands as were deemed necessary in the defense of Formosa, would seemingly remove from the minds of Communist leaders any doubts as to the consequences of aggression against these positions. Under these conditions, the Communists, although quickly seizing control of evacuated islands, would be unlikely to assault the positions remaining in Nationalist hands. They would almost certainly continue efforts to discredit and isolate the US on the over-all issue as well as concerning those off-shore islands remaining in Nationalist hands. Over a long period of time, and depending upon the resolution with which the posited US policy was maintained, they might be tempted to put US intentions to test. For the short term, however, the risk of war in the Far East would have been decreased, not increased."

The Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army, believe that paragraph 3 should read as follows: "The Chinese Communists would probably not take action that they believed would lead to full-scale war with the US, but they would be unlikely to believe that the seizure of any offshore island, even if the US has indicated it would defend the island, would lead to full-scale war. They would probably not be deterred by fear of a purely local involvement. If, therefore, the Chinese Communists estimated that they had the capability quickly to overrun any of the offshore islands, they would probably attempt to use that capability. In any event, they would probably continue probing action and attempts to subvert the garrison." [Footnote in the source text.]

<sup>7</sup> The Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, believes that the last sentence should read as follows: "While they would probably refrain from action that they believed would lead to full-scale war, they might miscalculate the circumstances that would bring about US reaction. Should this occur, the nature and extent of this reaction would presumably be sufficiently vigorous to discourage early repetition of such a venture."

The Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army, believe that, in spite of US guarantees and the threat of involvement in conflict with the US, the Chinese Communists sooner or later

5. If US forces should launch major attacks against mainland targets, the Chinese Communists would probably counter with their full remaining capabilities against the attacking forces and bases from which attacks were launched. If the US became involved in largescale fighting with Communist China, Pei'ping would probably do all in its power to make the Sino-Soviet treaty operative. The USSR would almost certainly try to keep the hostilities under control but in the last analysis would give the Chinese Communists whatever local military support appeared necessary to preserve the Sino-Soviet alliance and prevent the destruction of the regime.<sup>8</sup>

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might take military action, not as a result of miscalculations, against Nationalist-held offshore islands, and would, therefore, rephrase the last sentence as follows: "They would not be likely to take actions that they were convinced would lead to full-scale war with the US. However, if they believed that they had the capability quickly to overrun one or more of the defended islands, the Chinese Communists might well attempt to exercise their estimated capability." [Footnote in the source text.]

<sup>8</sup> The Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, would substitute the following after the first sentence: "It should be expected that Chinese Communist capabilities would be materially impaired in the course of the action that would ensue. Under these circumstances, the Chinese Communists would look to Moscow and the Sino-Soviet treaty as their remaining hope. Specific USSR reaction would be based upon sober Soviet judgment as to the probability of victory without crippling damage in general war with the US. The USSR does not now desire, nor feel that it could win, such general war. While the USSR might attempt to give the Chinese Communists local military support in order to prevent the destruction of the regime, such support would probably therefore be confined to increased logistic aid and to the commitment of naval, air, and air defense forces not readily identifiable as belonging to the USSR." [Footnote in the source text.]

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#### 41. Letter From President Eisenhower to British Prime Minister Churchill<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, January 25, 1955.*

Respecting the Far East—yesterday I sent a message to the Congress to clarify the intention of this nation in the region of the Formosa straits. It would be a pity if the Communists misinterpreted our forbearance to mean indecision and precipitated a crisis that could bring on a nasty situation.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Extract. Top Secret.

I note that in the memorandum accompanying your letter, <sup>2</sup> your Government fears that during the next two or three years the United States may, through impulsiveness or lack of perspective, be drawn into a Chinese war.

I trust that my message to the Congress reassured you as to our basic attitudes and sober approach to critical problems.

It is probably difficult for you, in your geographical position, to understand how concerned this country is with the solidarity of the Island Barrier in the Western Pacific. Moreover, we are convinced that the psychological effect in the Far East of deserting our friends on Formosa would risk a collapse of Asiatic resistance to the Communists. Such possibilities cannot be lightly dismissed; in our view they are almost as important, in the long term, to you as they are to us.

I am certain there is nothing to be gained in that situation by meekness and weakness. God knows I have been working hard in the exploration of every avenue that seems to lead toward the preservation and strengthening of the peace. But I am positive that the free world is surely building trouble for itself unless it is united in basic purpose, is clear and emphatic in its declared determination to resist all forceful Communist advance, and keeps itself ready to act on a moment's notice, if necessary.

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<sup>2</sup> Reference is to a letter of January 12 from Prime Minister Churchill to the President which enclosed an undated memorandum by Churchill.

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**42. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,  
Washington, January 26, 1955 <sup>1</sup>**

**SUBJECT**

Submission to UN Security Council of Question of Cessation of Hostilities in Chinese Off-Shore Islands

**PARTICIPANTS**

Sir Robert Scott, Minister, British Embassy  
Mr. M.G.L. Joy, British Embassy <sup>2</sup>  
Mr. George Laking, Minister, New Zealand Embassy

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, ROC Files: Lot 71 D 517, 1954-1955, Offshore Islands. Secret. Drafted by Bond.

<sup>2</sup> Michael G.L. Joy, First Secretary, British Embassy.

Mr. Hunter Wade, First Secretary, New Zealand Embassy  
The Secretary  
Assistant Secretary Key—IO  
Deputy Assistant Secretary Wainhouse—IO  
Deputy Assistant Secretary Sebald—FE  
Mr. Edwin Martin—CA  
Mr. Niles W. Bond—UNP

Sir Robert Scott stated that Foreign Secretary Eden had agreed to the Report of the Tripartite Working Party prepared on the previous day,<sup>3</sup> and had approved a recommendation that the Soviet and Communist Chinese Governments be notified of the proposed New Zealand initiative by the United Kingdom representatives in Moscow and Peiping at the earliest possible time on January 28. He said that Sir Anthony Eden had also expressed the views that the invitation to the Chinese Communists to attend the deliberations of the Security Council should be conveyed by the Secretary-General, who should be given sufficient opportunity to make a determined effort to secure their attendance, and that the possibility should not be excluded at a later stage of the utilization of some conciliation mechanism if this were deemed likely to contribute to the attainment of our joint objectives.

Sir Robert then said that he understood that the Secretary had some comments to make on the Working Party Report. The Secretary said that his first comment had to do with the statement in paragraph 4 (c) that the United States representative would "endorse" the suggestion that a Chinese Communist representative be invited under rule 39.<sup>4</sup> He said that while the United States could acquiesce in such a suggestion, it would be difficult for us to give it our endorsement. Sir Robert replied that, although it was probably not a vital point, he believed U.S. endorsement might make a significant difference in the success or failure of our efforts to secure Chinese Communist attendance. After some further discussion it was agreed that the language should read that the United States representative would "agree" to the invitation to the Chinese Communists. Sir Robert asked whether this meant that the United States would vote in favor of such an invitation in the event a vote should be necessary. The Secretary replied in the affirmative.

With respect to the question of instructing Ambassador Bohlen to support the *démarche* of the United Kingdom representative in Moscow, Mr. Wainhouse said that he had already explained to Sir

<sup>3</sup> For text of the report as revised at this meeting and on January 27, see *infra*.

<sup>4</sup> Security Council Rule 39 states that the Security Council "may invite members of the Secretariat or other persons whom it considers competent for the purpose to supply it with information or to give other assistance in examining matters within its competence."

Robert why this would not in our view be advisable. Sir Robert confirmed this and said that he quite understood our position.

With reference to paragraph 5 (a) of the Working Party Report, the Secretary explained the reasons for our wishing to amend the language of the last sentence in order to avoid having our hands tied in perpetuity. He said that for this reason he had suggested that the last part of that sentence should read as follows: "shall at all times be subject to consultation among the three Governments and for a reasonable time shall be subject to mutual agreement." Sir Robert said that he thought that change would be acceptable, since it had never been the intention of his Government that there should be an unlimited commitment.

Turning to the question of the timing of the submission of the resolution,<sup>5</sup> the Secretary said that it was his feeling that the resolution should be submitted at the outset in order to forestall the flood of speculation which would otherwise arise as to exactly what we had in mind in this exercise. He said that since it was not feasible to try to keep the nature of the resolution secret, he believed it would be more clear-cut to make the text of it known from the first. Sir Robert said that this was the most difficult of all the Secretary's suggestions for his Government to accept. He said that there were three possible purposes of the exercise: (1) to rally support for the Chinese Nationalists; (2) to generate cold-war propaganda; and (3) genuinely to attempt to bring about a pacification of the area. He went on to say that, assuming (3) to be our common objective, it would be most difficult, in the event we should fail in this objective, to prevent the exercise from being perverted to serve the other two purposes. He said that Sir Anthony Eden was going into this exercise in the hope of achieving pacification and thereby getting out of the dilemma presented by the problem of the off-shore islands. He said the first big hurdle in achieving this objective was to persuade the Chinese Communists to attend, and that it was the United Kingdom view that we should do everything possible to secure their attendance. After refer-

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<sup>5</sup> The agreed draft resolution, attached as Annex B to the report of the tripartite working party, reads as follows:

"The Security Council

*Having noted* the occurrence of armed hostilities between the Peoples Republic of China and the Republic of China in the area of certain islands off the coast of the mainland of China;

*Having concluded* that these hostilities have resulted in a situation the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security;

*Calls upon* the Peoples Republic of China and the Republic of China forthwith to terminate such hostilities;

*Recommends* resort to peaceful methods in order to prevent the recurrence of such hostilities;

*And declares* that it remains seized of the question." (Department of State, PPS Files: Lot 66 D 70, China)



ring in passing to the House of Commons debate on this subject, Sir Robert expressed the view that, since Chou En-lai had emphatically announced that he would not accept a cease-fire in the area, the prior submission of a resolution calling for such a cease-fire would virtually force the Chinese Communists to reject the invitation. The Secretary said that, since the United Kingdom Government felt so strongly on this point, he would withdraw his suggestion. He added, however, that it would be most important to make the true nature of the exercise clear from the beginning in order to avoid wide-ranging speculation on the subject. Sir Robert expressed agreement with this view and said that, although withholding the resolution itself, we should all make it amply clear that the objective of the exercise was confined to obtaining the termination of hostilities.

After a brief discussion of the timing of the New Zealand initiative, in connection with which consideration was given to the current Senate debate and to the fact that New Zealand would relinquish the presidency of the Security Council after Monday, January 31, it was agreed that, subject to approval of the latest changes in the Working Party Report by the U.K. and New Zealand Governments, we should proceed as planned, with the New Zealand Representative submitting his letter to the President of the Council on Friday, January 28,<sup>6</sup> with the idea of having the first meeting of the Council on the following Monday.

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<sup>6</sup> The agreed draft letter from the New Zealand Representative to the President of the Security Council, attached as Annex A to the report of the tripartite working party, stated that "the occurrence of armed hostilities between the Peoples Republic of China and the Republic of China in the area of certain islands off the coast of the mainland of China has made it clear that a situation exists the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security" and requested an early meeting of the Security Council to consider the matter. (*Ibid.*) It is identical in substance to a letter sent on January 28 from New Zealand Representative Sir Leslie Knox Munro to the President of the Security Council. (U.N. document S/3354)

### 43. Report of New Zealand–United Kingdom–United States Working Party <sup>1</sup>

[Washington,] January 26 [27], 1955.

#### CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES IN THE CHINESE OFF-SHORE ISLANDS

1. The Working Party submit for the approval of the three Governments the following agreed report on the New Zealand initiative in the Security Council. Further consideration by Governments of some of the recommendations may require the advice of their delegations in New York.

##### 2. *Timing of initiative in Security Council*

The operation in the Security Council should be launched on January 28, 1955, by submission of the New Zealand Representative's letter to the President of the Council (text attached at Annex A). <sup>2</sup> At an appropriate time beforehand

(a) United Kingdom representatives in Peking and Moscow will notify the Soviet and Chinese Communist Governments, acting on behalf of the New Zealand Government. The Working Party agreed that the *démarches* should concentrate on the seriousness of the situation, the importance of an early termination of hostilities and the importance of Chinese Communist attendance.

(b) The United Kingdom and New Zealand Governments will inform the other Commonwealth Governments.

(c) The New Zealand representative at New York will inform other members of the Security Council and the Secretary-General.

##### 3. *Notification to French Government*

The New Zealand Representative will meanwhile take the French Representative into his confidence by informing him of the background of the New Zealand initiative and showing him the text of the proposed letter to the President of the Security Council, but will not disclose the existence of the agreed resolution (text attached at Annex B). <sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, PPS Files: Lot 66 D 70, China. Secret. As revised by agreement at the meeting recorded in the memorandum *supra* and, at British request, on January 27. Copies of the report, both with and without the latter revision, were sent to Lodge with covering letters of January 26 and 27 from Key. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 793.00/1-2655 and *ibid.*, ROC Files: Lot 71 D 517, 1954-1955, Offshore Islands, respectively) A memorandum of January 27 from Martin to Robertson states that the British Embassy had proposed a further revision of the last sentence of paragraph 5(a) and that the Secretary had rejected the proposal but had agreed to revise the sentence to read as printed below. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 793.5/1-2655)

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 6, *supra*.

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 5, *supra*.

*4. Initial tactics in the Security Council*

(a) The first meeting of the Security Council should be held on January 31, 1955.

(b) The New Zealand representative will not, in speaking to the adoption of the agenda, refer explicitly to the terms of the draft resolution.

(c) The New Zealand representative, in this speech, will suggest that a Chinese Communist representative be invited under rule 39. The United Kingdom representative will endorse this suggestion and the United States representative will agree. The President will then enquire whether the New Zealand proposal represents the sense of the meeting. If necessary, the proposal will be put to a procedural vote.

(d) Following the adoption of the agenda and of the proposal in (c), the Council will adjourn without substantive debate.

*5. Further tactics in the Security Council*

(a) The present intention is that, if the Chinese Communists accept the invitation to attend the Security Council, the New Zealand Representative will, at the first substantive meeting when they are present, submit the resolution at Annex B. Any other decision on timing, including the timing of the submission of a resolution in any other event, the timing of the first substantive debate, and the timing of any votes shall at all times be subject to consultation among the three Governments and shall, for a reasonable interval, in each particular instance, be subject to mutual agreement.

(b) It is the clear understanding of the three Governments that they will, unless otherwise agreed, make every effort to prevent any amendment of substance to the agreed resolution.

(c) In the handling of this item in the debate they will make every effort to prevent its enlargement to the discussion of the broader issues of Chinese representation in the United Nations and the respective claims of the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China to domestic sovereignty and international status. At the same time the three Governments will be at liberty to make it clear that if the step proposed, namely termination of hostilities in the off-shore islands can be carried out satisfactorily, that would, as a practical matter, increase the possibility of peaceful rather than violent adjustment of the other problems of the area in accordance with the principles and purposes of the United Nations.

(d) There is no commitment on any of the three Governments in regard to action in the United Nations in the event of Chinese Communist failure to attend after a reasonable interval, in the event of a veto of the resolution, or in the event of failure by the Security Council to secure a cease-fire. In any of these events the three Governments undertake to consult together.

*6. Publicity*

The three Governments will maintain close and continuing consultation with respect to publicity through their representatives in New York.

44. **Memorandum of Discussion at the 234th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, January 27, 1955**<sup>1</sup>

Present at the 234th Council meeting were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Director, Foreign Operations Administration; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General (for Items 2 and 3); the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission; Mr. Washburn for the Director, U.S. Information Agency (for Item 4); the Special Representative in Vietnam (for Item 4); the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, an Mr. Douglas for Secretary of the Air Force (for Item 4); the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Chief of Staff U.S. Army, the Chief of Naval Operations, General White for the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, and the Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps (for Item 4); the Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State; the Counselor, Department of State (for Item 4); Assistant Secretary of State Robertson (for Item 4); the Director of Central Intelligence; Robert Cutler, Joseph M. Dodge, and Nelson A. Rockefeller, Special Assistants to the President; the White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

[Here follow brief comments concerning the functioning of the National Security Council.]

*1. Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security*

[Here follows a summary of portions of the intelligence briefing by Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles concerning the Soviet Union and Iran.]

Mr. Dulles then said that he wished to comment on an item . . . . The Council, he said, might be aware of the fact that U Nu, the Prime Minister of Burma, had recently prepared a written proposal giving qualified support of President Eisenhower's recently announced policy with respect to the Nationalist-held offshore islands. He had supported the idea of UN action in this area, but had qualified it by suggesting that the UN action be entrusted to Asian members of the UN. When it had been completed, U Nu's proposal was sent both to Chou En-lai and to Nehru in order to solicit their views before the proposal was made public. The reaction of Chou

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Gleason on January 28.

En-lai, said Mr. Dulles, was by way of being a "stonecrusher." Details were missing, but in effect Chou had told U Nu to mind his own business. U Nu had promptly withdrawn his proposal. All this was an interesting indication of the relationship between Burma and Communist China.

Mr. Dulles indicated that there had been little change in the situation respecting the offshore islands since the last meeting of the National Security Council. There had been indications of a certain amount of sea reconnaissance by the Chinese Communists in the Tachen area. This was reminiscent of Chinese Communist operations prior to their attack on Ichiang Island. On the other hand, there was no evidence of any new preparations by the Chinese Communists for an attack on the Quemoy's. The situation regarding the Matsu group was different. These islands could be attacked at any time without any notable additional preparations by the Chinese Communists. Radio silence recently had made it more difficult for us to ascertain, for example, the concentrations of Chinese Communist aircraft in these areas. Such radio silence could be the prelude to further Chinese Communist attacks on the offshore islands, but this was not necessarily the case.

At the conclusion of Mr. Dulles' intelligence briefing, Mr. Cutler asked Admiral Radford to indicate briefly to the Council significant U.S. military moves in the Formosa area in recent days. Admiral Radford replied that Admiral Pride, in the U.S.S. *Helena*, was still in Formosa making arrangements for the possible evacuation of the Nationalist garrison on the Tachen Islands. He had concentrated four aircraft carriers and twelve destroyers at a point approximately 100 miles north of Formosa and 125 miles south of the Tachens. The aircraft carrier *Princeton* was likely to join this concentration presently, to make a total of five aircraft carriers. An additional U.S. cruiser was also likely to join the task force. Logistic support vessels were standing by, and forty-five F-86's had already landed on Formosa. Additional F-86's expected at Formosa in the course of the present day would bring the total number of these aircraft to seventy-five.

*The National Security Council:*

a. Noted and discussed an oral briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence on the subject, with specific reference to (1) recent developments within the Soviet Union, and (2) the situations with respect to Iran and to the Chinese Nationalist offshore islands.

b. Noted an oral report by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, on U.S. military dispositions in the Formosa area.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> The lettered subparagraphs constitute NSC Action No. 1313. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95)

2. *Exploitation of Soviet and European Satellite Vulnerabilities* (NSC 5505; <sup>3</sup> Annex to NSC 5505; <sup>4</sup> NSC 5501, par. 26 c; <sup>5</sup> Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated January 26, 1955 <sup>6</sup>)

[Here follows a summary of discussion of NSC 5505, especially paragraph 4-c, which the Joint Chiefs of Staff wished to delete. The paragraph in question reads:

["c. Thereby convincing the Communist rulers that aggression will not serve their interests, that it will not pay. So long as the Soviets are uncertain of their ability to neutralize the U.S. nuclear-air retaliatory power, there is little reason to expect them to initiate general war or actions which they believe would carry appreciable risk of general war, and thereby endanger the regime and the security of the USSR."]

The President said that he shared much of Secretary Wilson's view, which agreed with his that some one person must constantly follow and be responsible for the actions designed to carry out the strategy set down in the present report. The President then added that it was his view that paragraph 4-c should not be deleted. Admiral Radford repeated the view that he couldn't see that inclusion or deletion of the paragraph made any significant difference. Governor Stassen complained that the last sentence of paragraph 4-c seemed to him a little overconfident in tone. Secretary Dulles agreed with Governor Stassen, and said he was particularly inclined to question the accuracy of the view that the Soviets would not initiate general war or actions risking general war, in view of the Chinese Communist reaction toward the President's statement to the Congress respecting U.S. policy in the Formosa area.

The President said he believed that the Soviets were undoubtedly doing all they could to involve the United States in Asia and in a general war with Communist China. Secretary Dulles added that this was why he was so inclined to doubt the validity of the last sentence in paragraph 4-c.

With considerable emphasis, Admiral Radford said he wished to point out to the Council that he had been involved for many months

<sup>3</sup> NSC 5505, "Exploitation of Soviet and European Satellite Vulnerabilities," January 18, was approved as amended by the National Security Council at this meeting and circulated as NSC 5505/1.

<sup>4</sup> "Report on the Exploitation of Soviet Vulnerabilities," November 30, 1954.

<sup>5</sup> Paragraph 26-c of NSC 5501, "Basic National Security Policy," January 6, states that the United States should attempt to foster changes in the character and policies of Soviet-Communist bloc regimes by influencing them toward lines of action which did not conflict with U.S. security interests and by exploiting differences between them.

<sup>6</sup> The reference memorandum enclosed a JCS memorandum of January 25 to the Secretary of Defense which states the JCS views on a draft of NSC 5505. (Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5505 Series)

in all the major studies and plans which had been formulated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Never, however, in all this long time, had the Joint Chiefs of Staff planned a U.S. land offensive on the mainland of Communist China. For the life of him, he could not understand why, in the event of a general war between the United States and Communist China, all the worst difficulties would not be on the Chinese rather than on the U.S. side. The great problem of the Chinese in such a war was to "get at us if we don't choose to be got at." The only direction in which the Chinese Communists could mount an aggressive offensive on land would be toward the south or in Korea. Accordingly, the general theory that a war with Communist China would involve the United States militarily to very great depths, was simply incomprehensible to him.

Secretary Humphrey said that this was all very well, but would Admiral Radford explain to him how, if we got into a war with Communist China, you would end it. Admiral Radford replied that he failed to see how the Russians could be anything else but losers if the United States got into a general war with Communist China. The Chinese Communists would have very little offensive capability against us which we could not counter with the exercise of comparatively little military power. It would, accordingly, be a mistake, really, for the Russians to try to involve the U.S. in war with Communist China.

With regard to Admiral Radford's view as to such a mistake by the Russians, Secretary Dulles said that the Admiral's analysis did not take account adequately of the political advantages which the Soviets might well gain in Europe if we should get into a war with Communist China. Admiral Radford quickly admitted that he was speaking from a military point of view and had not taken these other factors into account. Secretary Dulles went on to enlarge on the very great difficulties that Sir Anthony Eden was facing in the British Parliament in his efforts to back up the new U.S. policy regarding the offshore islands, in the face of the combined opposition of Messrs. Attlee<sup>7</sup> and Bevan.<sup>8</sup> This showed, said Secretary Dulles, that the big danger resulting from a war between the U.S. and Communist China was not to be found in the realm of military action, where he agreed with Admiral Radford's analysis. The great danger of such a war was the possibility that it would alienate the allies of the United States and might indeed block all our best-laid plans for Western Europe.

Admiral Radford went on to say that his own analysis of the situation induced him to believe that Russia and China were bluffing,

<sup>7</sup> Clement Attlee, Leader of the Opposition.

<sup>8</sup> Aneurin Bevan, Member of Parliament and a prominent member of the Labour Party.

and that we would succeed in calling their bluff if we proceeded along the lines of the recent decision respecting the defense of Formosa and certain of the offshore islands. The Russians are perfectly well aware that operations of the kind that could occur in carrying out this new policy might give rise to a situation in which the Russians themselves could become involved in a general war. Since he believed that the Russians did not wish to become so involved, he believed that they were bluffing.

Secretary Wilson said that he, on the other hand, was inclined to look at the situation much as Secretary Dulles did. While he approved the recent move by the President regarding Formosa and the offshore islands, we might presently find out in fact whether the Soviets and Chinese were really bluffing. On the other side of the picture, continued Secretary Wilson, if he had the job of killing a rattlesnake he would try to cut off his head rather than his rattles. There was another aspect of this cold war situation, said Secretary Wilson, that also continually bothered him. He believed that in many of the underdeveloped areas of the world the ordinary run of people were likely to make more progress under a communist regime than under the traditional types of dictatorships. This was a troublesome fact, but he nevertheless believed that the common people of China were getting along just as well under the present regime as ever they had under the war lords of the old days.

Apropos of the exchange between Admiral Radford and Secretary Dulles, the President said he himself doubted whether the Russians would permit themselves at this time to become involved in a general war. He also doubted if any such general war could be ended in a week or ten days. Perhaps the Russians felt the same way as he did. Nevertheless, if they continued apparently to egg on the Chinese Communists, there must be some good reason for it.

Governor Stassen said that his explanation as to why the Soviets were apparently egging on the Chinese Communists was as follows: The Soviets may fear that if the Chinese Communists permit themselves to be involved in friendlier relations with the Western world, the Soviets may not be able to control the Chinese so effectively. If this were so, the most desirable course of action for the United States was to try to separate the Chinese and the Russians.

Admiral Radford observed that while it was true that the Russians had had ups and downs in their policy toward Europe since 1945, they had made steady progress since that year in their program to subjugate the Far East. The only way to put an end to this steady progress and to secure peace and stability in Asia, was to carry out faithfully the policy which the President had announced to the Congress last week.



Governor Stassen expressed great skepticism as to the likelihood that the Chinese Communists would make serious attacks on Formosa or on the offshore islands which the United States would assist in defending. If this proved to be the case, and after a certain amount of noise the Chinese Communists subsided and took to peaceful ways, this was the moment for the United States to try to broaden our trade with Communist China and to explore other possibilities of opening up contact with them designed to wean them away from their alliance with the Soviets.

The Vice President, speaking of paragraph 4-c which had given rise to this discussion, said that perhaps the concern of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with this paragraph was that it was too confident in its assumption that the Communist rulers would act like normal people. Communists simply do not react normally. Accordingly, said the Vice President, he was skeptical of the possibility of inducing evolutionary change in the Soviet Union or in the satellites if we believed that the strategy set forth in the present report would ever change the minds and the hearts of the Communist rulers.

Mr. Cutler suggested that paragraph 4-c be deleted as not being necessary to the sense of the paper as a whole.

[Here follow the text of NSC Action No. 1314, in which the National Security Council approved NSC 5505 as amended, and discussion of agenda items 3, "U.S. Policy Toward Russian Anti-Soviet Political Activities," and 4, "Report on Vietnam for the National Security Council."]

S. Everett Gleason

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45. Memorandum of a Conversation, The White House, Washington, January 27, 1955, 12:30 p.m. <sup>1</sup>

PARTICIPANTS

The President, Secretary of State, Assistant Secretary Robertson, Mr. MacArthur, Mr. Hagerty, Mr. Cutler, Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Service Secretaries, and the Chairman and the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

1. The President read a statement <sup>2</sup> which he was about to make public after the Secretary of State had read it to Senator George. It

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5411/1-2755. Top Secret. Drafted by Cutler,

<sup>2</sup> Drafted by Dulles, according to Hagerty's diary entry for January 27, which reads in part as follows:

concerned the deployment by the United States of air and naval forces in the Formosa area and stated: "The President made it clear that these forces were designed purely for defensive purposes and that any decision to use U.S. forces other than in immediate self-defense or in direct defense of Formosa and the Pescadores would be a decision which he would take and the responsibility for which he has not delegated". (This language should be checked to published text.)<sup>3</sup> He pointed out that the Message to Congress already covered the possibility of using our armed forces to aid the Chinese Nationalists to deploy from the Tachens, and that the statement he was now making was supplementary to existing policy and to the positions stated in the Message.

2. The President said that the United States was not seeking a war, and that this point of view should guide all our actions.

3. The President pointed out the necessity of keeping the Department of State in constant touch with all military actions and developments. He referred to the references in the earlier meeting of the Council, where the delicacy of the present operations had been mentioned and where it had been pointed out that actions which the Chincoms or the Soviets might take had political as well as military implications. The President suggested that he would like to have the Department of Defense keep in daily touch with the Department of State, using for convenience the State Department Counselor, Mr. MacArthur.

4. The Secretary of State again referred to the delicacy of the present operations; that the viciousness of the Chincoms had forced the United States to take a strong position which we wished to maintain without becoming involved in war, and to the political re-

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"Dulles came in to see me in the morning during the NSC meeting to say that in his opinion he thought it was necessary for the President to put out a statement saying he had not delegated his authority and would not delegate it as far as ordering the United States troops anyplace in the Formosa area. Some Senators on the Hill and other people have expressed considerable concern that the forces which are moving into that area would be subject to the direction of Chiang Kai-shek or the military on the scene. Others like [Senator Wayne L.] Morse [of Oregon], with his talk of preventive war, were causing a great deal of disturbance in the minds of even those who were supporting our position. Dulles and I talked about this for a short time and then Dulles dictated a short statement which read as follows:

"Following the meeting with the National Security Council the President met with the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Service Secretaries and the Chairman and members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They discussed the deployment of United States air and naval forces in the Formosa area. The President made it clear that these forces were designed purely for defensive purposes and that any decision to use United States forces other than in immediate self-defense or in direct defense of Formosa and the Pescadores would be a decision which he would take and the responsibility for which he has not delegated." (Eisenhower Library, Hagerty Papers)

<sup>3</sup> Parenthetical comment in the source text. The text of the statement issued by Hagerty on January 27, which is identical with that of the draft statement in footnote 2 above, is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, February 7, 1955, pp. 213-214.

percussions in Europe of all actions that were being and would be taken in the area. The Secretary said that it would be very helpful if the State Department could see the traffic in messages and the planned military steps before such steps were taken. He said that there had been excellent cooperation so far and it was especially important that such cooperation continue as matters developed. <sup>4</sup>

5. The Secretary of Defense said that he would arrange for a daily clearing in the morning with Mr. MacArthur through Admiral Carney's operational setup. At the same time, the Admiral could advise him and Admiral Radford of developments. <sup>5</sup>

6. The President said that if it was likely that action might have to be taken beyond policy already cleared, the question should be at once brought to him. He said we would not get much out of fighting, but that if we had to fight to defend our vital interests, of course, we would.

7. The President asked Admiral Radford to give him certain figures as to deployment and possible further deployment. Admiral Radford said he would bring these figures over later in the day.

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<sup>4</sup> An account of the meeting in Hagerty's January 27 diary entry records Dulles' remarks as follows:

"Dulles pointed out that while he was not criticizing at all the sending of sabre jets to Formosa moves like that should be made known to the State Department so that everyone could work together as a team and so that we could keep our allies informed as to every move."

<sup>5</sup> On January 28 and irregularly during the next 2 weeks, MacArthur met with Rear Admiral Howard E. Orem, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Plans and Policy, and Rear Admiral George W. Anderson of Admiral Radford's staff to exchange information; a file of MacArthur's memoranda of the conversations is in Department of State, FE/EA Files: Lot 66 D 225, Relations with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

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**46. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,  
Washington, January 27, 1955, 5:30 p.m. <sup>1</sup>**

**SUBJECT**

1. Off-shore Island Situation
2. Proposed Security Council Action

**PARTICIPANTS**

Dr. George Yeh, Chinese Foreign Minister

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/1-2755. Secret. Drafted by McConaughy and initialed by Robertson, indicating his approval.

Dr. Wellington Koo, Ambassador Chinese Embassy

Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary for FE

Walter P. McCaughy, Director for CA

1. *Off-shore Island Situation.* Dr. Yeh said that eventually a formal Chinese Government announcement of withdrawal from the Tachen Islands would have to be made. The Chinese Government would want this to be timed with some reference to U.S. assistance as necessary in the defense of Quemoy and Matsu, in order to offset the adverse effect of the Tachen withdrawal.

Mr. Robertson reminded Dr. Yeh that the Secretary had made it clear that the U.S. is not committed to make any public announcement regarding Quemoy and Matsu.

Dr. Yeh gave Mr. Robertson a draft Chinese statement about withdrawal from the Tachens. In order to cooperate in full, he wanted the Secretary to see this proposed announcement and to state his opinion regarding it. He said the entire proposal was predicated on the assumption that the U.S. Government, after passage of the Joint Resolution, would make some sort of statement indicating that Quemoy and Matsu were considered essential to the protection of Formosa and the Pescadores. The statement reads as follows:

"Draft Statement of the Chinese Government to be Released at  
Taipei

"In view of the repeated and continuing acts of aggression by the Chinese Communists as evidence by their renewed attacks on the off shore islands since September 3, 1954, and by their recent seizure of Yikiangshan Island, the Chinese Government, after consultation with the United States Government, has decided to redeploy its garrison forces on the Tachen Islands with a view to consolidating its overall military position and to more effectively dealing with further attacks by the Communists.

"The Government of the United States, our ally by virtue of the Mutual Defense Treaty concluded between the Republic of China and the United States of America on December 2, 1954, in Washington, has offered its aid and assistance in carrying out our plan of re-deployment. This friendly offer the Chinese Government has accepted.

"There has been close cooperation between our two countries in recent years to promote the cause of freedom and peace in the area of Eastern Asia and Western Pacific. This cooperation has been consecrated by the above-mentioned Treaty of Mutual Defense. In furtherance of this same cooperation the Government of the United States has indicated to the Chinese Government its determination also to join in the defense of the Quemoy and Matsu areas and such other related positions and territories the safeguarding of which is essential to the defense of Taiwan and the Pescadores. The Chinese Government has expressed its welcome to this participation which it regards as an aided proof of the solidarity of the two countries in

promoting freedom and peace in the Asian and Pacific area and the general cause of the free world."

Mr. Robertson mentioned that the Joint Resolution had encountered some delay in the Senate because of a dispute within the ranks of the Democratic Party. Some Democratic Senators, apparently influenced by the ADA point of view, had introduced restrictive amendments. They were arguing about the authorization for necessary action in the "related area". The amendments had all been defeated in the Committee but they had resulted in a delay. Also it had been necessary to postpone hearings on the Mutual Defense Treaty. It was felt that the resolution must be passed first.

Mr. Robertson mentioned that the Secretary would leave on Saturday the 29th for a week's rest.<sup>2</sup> He would be unavailable during that time.

Ambassador Koo said that his Government felt that early ratification of the Mutual Defense Treaty was very important. There was general apprehension in Formosa that recent events, including the President's Message and the Joint Resolution, might tend to sidetrack the Treaty. He and the Foreign Minister had assured the Chinese Government that all the leaders of the Administration are earnestly supporting the Treaty and there was no intention whatever to defer action on it unnecessarily.

Mr. Robertson confirmed that this view was absolutely correct. No serious opposition to the treaty was anticipated. Senator George had confirmed that he expected no real trouble. The Secretary has been pressing the matter with the Senate leaders at every opportunity. There was no intention to postpone action. It could also be expected that the Senate would pass the Joint Resolution by a large majority, and that the amendments which have been offered would be defeated.

Dr. Yeh reiterated that any announcement about the Tachens must be coordinated with an announcement that Quemoy and Matsu would be held.

Mr. Robertson pointed out that it might be unwise to publicly mention two islands by name and apparently exclude the rest of the area. This might water down the authorization to carry out defense actions as necessary in the entire area. A public announcement was very different from classified operational orders to the armed forces. It might be that operational orders had already been issued. He did not know whether detailed public announcement about our defense intentions would fit in with the planned strategy.

<sup>2</sup> Dulles was in the Bahamas January 29-February 6.

Dr. Yeh said that he wanted to avoid any embarrassment or misunderstanding. He felt that the Chinese Government must make a statement eventually. It was preferable to make the statement after the President had specific power to act. He would like to know if we would go along with Chinese Government mention of Quemoy and Matsu which would associate us in some way with the defense of those islands. Chinese action would have to be governed by the U.S. position after the Resolution is passed. His thinking was all preliminary and he wanted friendly confidential advice from the Secretary and Mr. Robertson as to how the problem should be handled. The evacuation must not be allowed to bring despair and disenchantment to the Chinese forces and people.

Mr. Robertson agreed. He asked if the President's Message and the large favorable vote in the house on the Resolution had not helped morale.

Dr. Yeh answered affirmatively, but said there was still some uneasiness about Quemoy and Matsu.

Mr. Robertson said the Resolution gives express authority for the defense of such islands of Quemoy and Matsu and any other places considered important to the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores. He did not know whether it would be customary or expedient to make a public announcement about defense of only a part of the "related area".

Dr. Yeh felt that some public statement, or at least an official confidential communication as to the U.S. intent regarding Quemoy and Matsu was needed.

Mr. Robertson said the President would have the power to conduct operations for the defense of Formosa as necessary in the related area. This would include any and all islands in that area. The Secretary had already informed the Foreign Minister that in our view under present circumstances Quemoy and Matsu are important to the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores. He felt that the Secretary would state this again if requested by the Foreign Minister to do so. But the Resolution would cover the entire area and its coverage would not be restricted. He did not know whether the President wanted to make a rigid statement of his intentions in a situation which was unstable. There was no question but that Congress understood the wide scope of the authority that would be granted under the Resolution.

Mr. Robertson left the Conference to attend another meeting in the Secretary's office.

2. *Proposed Security Council Action.* Mr. McConaughy explained in general terms the proposed New Zealand course of action in the Security Council. He stated that the New Zealand letter was to be introduced in the Security Council on January 28 and presumably

would be discussed on January 31. It was anticipated that the Chinese Communists would be invited by the Security Council at that time to appear before the Council. The question of when the Resolution would be introduced by New Zealand had been left open. In fact there was no firm understanding as to timing and tactics beyond the debate on the New Zealand letter. There was a firm understanding that the scope of the Resolution, if it should later be introduced, would not be enlarged. Broadening amendments would be resisted by New Zealand, the U.S. and UK, and the effort would be strictly pinpointed at off-shore islands, with everything else rigorously excluded. The Foreign Minister was given copies of the draft New Zealand letter and Resolution.

The Foreign Minister said that in his view the Chinese Communists should not be invited to appear before the Security Council. He felt that this was unnecessary and would give them unnecessary and undesirable "de facto status". He felt that they should be invited only to submit their views in writing. He felt that a written statement from them should suffice. It would meet all the requirements of the Security Council and would prevent the Chinese Communists from exploiting an opportunity to appear at the UN.

He also objected to the fact that the draft Resolution did not brand the Chinese Communists as aggressors, and made no distinction as to responsibility for the hostilities between the Chinese Communists and the Chinese Government.

He said that the Resolution failed to fix responsibility for aggression on the Chinese Communists, and did not make clear the fact that the Chinese Government had only acted in self-defense.

Mr. McConaughy pointed out that the resolution could not be expected to prejudge the case, and all this could come out in the course of the debate.

Dr. Yeh also made the following objections to the Resolution:

1. He did not like the term "peaceful settlement". Its implications were too broad and it seemed to contemplate overall negotiations with the Chinese Communists.
2. He felt the reference to the Chinese Communist regime as The People's Government of China should be in quotes.
3. He objected to the phrase "calls upon". He felt this was too strong as applied to his Government, since it was not at fault and was not guilty of aggression.

Dr. Yeh said he hoped the U.S. representative would make it clear in the course of the debate that the U.S. will continue to oppose the admission of Communist China to the UN, and to repudiate the "two-China concept".

Mr. McConaughy said that of course this was U.S. policy and it could be stated on any appropriate occasion. It could be stated where it was relevant.

Dr. Yeh felt a Resolution should be confined to a general appeal for peace and a cessation of hostilities without naming the Chinese Government. There was no reason for referring to an overall peaceful settlement, which was a broader issue of the sort which was to be excluded from the Resolution.

The Foreign Minister indicated that he did not like the Resolution, but did not say what position the Chinese delegate would take. He intimated that the Chinese delegate, T.F. Tsiang would be in touch with New Zealand Ambassador Munro again on the subject.

Near the end of the interview the Foreign Minister apparently realized for the first time that the Resolution might be used to protect the Chinese Government position on the Tachen Islands or at least delay evacuation of the islands. This thought seemed to moderate somewhat his basic opposition to the proposed Resolution.

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47. **Telegram From the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bohlen) to the Department of State**<sup>1</sup>

*Moscow, January 27, 1955—8 p.m.*

1185. In my 1152<sup>2</sup> I dealt only with the immediate point at issue and did not attempt to discuss what from here appears to be general Soviet policy in re to Formosa issue. The following observations are, of course, not based on any hard information since I have had no conversation on the subject since my return with any Soviet official and we have no contacts with Chinese Communist Embassy here. They are in part based on Soviet press treatment of issue which has been covered in press telegrams from here and in part on deductions from general Soviet policy at present time.

1. Soviet Government has no inclination to become involved in hostilities over an area which does not involve a Soviet vital interest such as Formosa. However, because of special relationship and importance of China to Soviet Union in general world picture, they would be confronted with a terrible dilemma in event of outbreak real hostilities between US and China. Confronted with a choice between involvement in a war in which they had no direct interest and

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/1-2755. Top Secret; Limit Distribution.

<sup>2</sup> Document 33.



abandonment of their chief and possibly only real ally in world, it is impossible in advance to say which decision would be made.

2. It seems increasingly obvious that Soviet Government does not have controlling influence over Chinese actions and even degree of influence is problematical. In last analysis, if issue was war or peace, presumably Soviets would have important if not decisive voice, but only in event that issue was completely clear.

3. With reference to (1) above, AP correspondent a few days ago submitted to censor speculative piece in which it was stated that despite Soviet press support of legitimacy Chinese aspirations to liberate Formosa, most foreign observers believe Soviet Union would not be disposed to engage in hostilities over area not vital to Soviet Union which Formosa was not and that any conflict between US and China would be "Chinese affair". Story was held up for 12 hours indicating that it was referred to higher authority and eventually passed with deletion only of line referring to Soviet press support of Chinese position. This, of course, is not conclusive but is very much in line with extreme caution of Soviet press on Formosa question which, while justifying morally Chinese position and quoting approval Chinese statements on subject, has been careful not to commit even indirectly Soviet Union to any military support of Chinese policy.

4. With reference to (2) above, Soviet handling of Chou En-lai statement<sup>3</sup> does not indicate it was jointly agreed or even issued with advance Soviet approval.

5. Indonesian Ambassador who saw Molotov recently (Embtel 1131)<sup>4</sup> told me yesterday at Indian reception that he genuinely believed Soviets would prefer above all to see cease-fire in Formosan Straits but that in his view Peking is playing independent hand in this matter. I am seeing Indonesian tomorrow and hope to obtain further details of his talk with Molotov.

6. Foregoing leads to repetition of my conclusion in telegram under reference that when and if we have clear-cut position in regard to offshore islands and basis on which we would accept cease-fire with Chinese Nationalist acquiescence therein, there is at least out-

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 1179 from Moscow, January 26, reported that the full text of Chou's January 24 statement (see Document 35) had been carried in all Moscow papers the previous day and that his statement that the "liberation" of Formosa was a Chinese internal affair had been quoted in a January 26 article in *Pravda* attacking President Eisenhower's message to Congress. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/1-2655)

<sup>4</sup> Telegram 1131 from Moscow, January 19, reported that the Indonesian Ambassador had raised the question of the Chinese-held American fliers with Molotov, who made no direct comment but gave the impression that the fliers would eventually be released. (*Ibid.*, 611.95A241/1-1955)

side chance that approach to Molotov on subject might be of real use.

Bohlen

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48. Letter From the United Nations Secretary-General  
(Hammarškjöld) to the Secretary of State <sup>1</sup>

*[New York,] 27 January 1955.*

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I wish to thank you for our talk last week. <sup>2</sup> I feel that it was useful to have had this off-the-cuff report on the Peking talks on the table, although the limited time at our disposal made it impossible to analyze what had been said in such detail as it seems to merit. I regret especially that time did not suffice for an exchange of views of my ideas concerning the next steps or for a discussion of our relationship in this matter as a basis for the necessary co-operation in the follow-up, from my side, of the negotiations.

The weakness represented by the fact that we have not had such a discussion has become increasingly apparent to me in the week that has passed since our talk. I would, in all frankness, like to explain to you this reaction.

In view of the possible essential link which exists between the release of the prisoners and the visit of the families, I feel that we went very far in risk-taking by handling the visit question in the way we did up to last Friday. <sup>3</sup> From another point of view it may be said that I, as Secretary-General, was balancing on the outer margin of the permissible in trying to make the issue more manageable for you. At the time of publication it was essential to put the responsibility for the offer squarely on the shoulders of Chou En-lai, while at the same time not giving any impression of double-crossing him. That I think we achieved in two ways: by indicating clearly that our news release <sup>4</sup> was only a confirmation of Chou's statement and by not releasing our communiqué until Peking was already on the air. As I have written to Ambassador Lodge, I was most surprised to see that this handling of the matter—which I considered to be directly in

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Wang-Johnson Talks. Top Secret; Eyes Only. The classification was apparently added after the letter reached the Department of State.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 3, Document 18.

<sup>3</sup> January 21.

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 3, Document 14.

the interest of the United States and in conformity with the objectives agreed upon in our talks—was criticized in terms of unusual strength. On the other hand, I was concerned when I saw that comments from the State Department<sup>5</sup> were such as to present the Chinese initiative—which, in my view, should be handled with the utmost care as a possible bridge to solutions—as if it had been nothing but a propaganda move. Finally—again to my concern—I was informed yesterday that the United States Government does not intend to issue exit permits for the families' visits.<sup>6</sup>

Without now entering upon the substance, I must confess that I am worried when, in this way, I see issues which may be vital to the further negotiations, handled and settled without any consultation with the negotiator himself. This operation is, under all the circumstances, most difficult and delicate.

Due to questions raised by delegations other than yours, I have been able to follow from a distance the discussion concerning the Formosa problem, especially as it relates to the United Nations. In view of my exposed position in the negotiations concerning the fliers, I have preferred to stand aside for the time being and have not myself put any questions to the United States Mission or to any other government representatives. I have, however, expressed the hope that if any action were taken, it would not be given such a form as to turn the Security Council operation into something which would widen the gulf between East and West as it would do, for example, if a proposed solution were so phrased as to make unavoidable a Soviet veto. I have also expressed the hope that if any action were taken it would be such as to give some momentum to the developments which may arise out of the prisoner talks in Peking. In view of the vital importance of this whole issue to peace, and more specifically to the United Nations efforts to achieve peace, I would, under all the circumstances, have regarded it as natural if some contact had been established with the Secretary-General. As matters now stand, when the Secretary-General has a more direct impression of the Chinese aspect of the problem than anybody else in the West,

<sup>5</sup> For text of a statement made to correspondents by Department of State spokesman Henry Suydam on January 21, see Department of State *Bulletin*, January 31, 1955, p. 192.

<sup>6</sup> A memorandum of a meeting in the Secretary's office on this subject on January 25 states, "The Secretary thought that Chou's statement yesterday, the general uncertainty of the situation in the area, the possibility that the families themselves might be held by the Chinese Communists now made it inadvisable to issue passports. He believed the President would concur." (Unsigned memorandum for the record, January 25, 1955; Department of State, Central Files, 611.95A241/1-2555) The text of a letter dated January 27 from Secretary Dulles to the families of the imprisoned airmen, stating that the government had concluded that "it would be imprudent for the time being to issue passports valid for travel to Communist China to any American citizens", is in Department of State *Bulletin*, February 7, 1955, p. 214.

and, furthermore, is himself already in a certain sense a party as he is negotiating with China at the request of the General Assembly, this view is reinforced. It is obviously for the Governments to decide how they will act, but it seems to me that their decisions should take into account also such aspects of the problem as, in this case, could have been represented by the Secretary-General.

The two points I raise here serve to illustrate what I said in the beginning: I regret that time last Wednesday did not suffice for mutual exploration of lines of action. I hope that it will be possible to engage in such an exploration and to work more closely together in the future. Else I, as Secretary-General, will find it very difficult to serve the member nations in the way which would be possible on a basis of continued and open contact on those issues where the Secretary-General necessarily must have a special responsibility.

Yours sincerely,

Dag Hammarskjold

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49. **Telegram From the Chief of Naval Operations (Carney) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Stump)**<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, January 28, 1955—11:05 a.m.*

281605Z. Exclusive and eyes only to Stump and Pride from Carney. The President, in most serious vein, has emphasized to civilian and military defense leaders the gravity of the Formosan situation and stressed the fact that events in that area have great significance with respect to delicate and important diplomatic and political factors.

His objective is the averting of war and his publicly stated intent to personally retain control of the initiation of combat operations, other than self defense, is assurance to our countrymen and our friends against impulsive action by field commanders. My confidence in your sanity and judgement is such that I would not feel it necessary to remind you of the fact that the significance of the Formosan situation at this time is preponderantly political rather than military; however, I want you to have the feel of the President's leadership and his thinking and I want to emphasize the importance of instilling in your subordinates the restraint and understanding which will surely guide them in the direction of the President's policies.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Miscellaneous Series, Formosa Area. Top Secret; Priority. Drafted by Carney; also sent to the Commander, Seventh Fleet.

There will also be great need for sound judgement in the event that we cover an evacuation from the Tachens and in the further event that our efforts are opposed by Red China forces. I consider that the pertinent provisions of your OP plans are correct and consonant with the President's views and there is no minimizing of your duty to take whatever action may be necessary for the security of your forces. However, even though attack at source should be essential as a measure of self defense, the political consequences of such action could be very grave. Consequently, the decision to initiate such tactics must remain firmly and solely in the hands of the OTC and your procedures for tactical control and direction must be such as to insure against the entrusting of discretion in this matter to tactical subordinates below the OTC. The existing instructions concerning hot pursuit are not modified by this guidance.

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**50. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,  
Washington, January 28, 1955, 11:25 a.m. <sup>1</sup>**

**SUBJECT**

Situation of Off-shore Islands

**PARTICIPANTS**

Dr. George Yeh, Chinese Foreign Minister  
Dr. Wellington Koo, Chinese Ambassador  
The Secretary  
Mr. Robertson, Assistant Secretary, FE  
Mr. McConaughy, Director, CA

Dr. Yeh said it seemed necessary to make some announcement about the Tachens very soon. The Communists had started emplacing long range artillery on Ichiang Island (Yikiangshan) which they had recently captured. They could shell the Tachens from there. He realized that the situation for the U.S. Government was delicate, with debate in the Senate on the Joint Resolution still in progress. The Chinese Government did not want to embarrass the Administration. Still he felt he should warn us that the Tachen situation was becoming more precarious.

The Secretary said that we had to consider the effect of any public announcement on the ratification of the Mutual Defense Treaty, as well as on the Joint Resolution.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/1-2855. Secret. Drafted by McConaughy. The time of the meeting is from the Secretary's appointment diary. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers)

Dr. Yeh said he envisaged the following sequence of events: (1) the "regrouping" operation; (2) ratification of the Treaty; (3) mutual consultations under the Treaty.

The Secretary said that this Government does not now contemplate mentioning Quemoy and Matsu by name in a public statement. He thought it would be preferable to adhere in general to the language of the Resolution and refer perhaps to positions "related to the defense of Formosa". The Secretary mentioned that the Chinese statement should not imply that the Treaty is already an accomplished fact. It should be remembered that it is not yet ratified.

The Secretary thought that the Chinese should be cautious about making any assumptions about the Treaty. The Treaty might not be passed for two or three weeks. Committee hearings on the Treaty would probably start February 7. There might be an extended debate on the floor of the Senate. The issues brought up in the debate on the Resolution might be picked up and repeated in the course of floor debate on the Treaty.

Dr. Yeh said that he assumed that the Resolution will have been passed by the time any Chinese statement is made. The Resolution could be used as a basis.

Dr. Yeh said he wanted to bring up a second matter: Could the Tachens not be denied to the Communists? He thought we should consider whether the UN should not be asked to keep a civil administration there, without complete demilitarization of the islands.

The Secretary said he thought this would be very tricky business. If such a principle were accepted it might be argued that it should be applied to Quemoy and Matsu also.

Amb. Koo said he was thinking of a Chinese civil administration under UN protection.

Mr. Robertson thought this too would establish a bad precedent.

The Secretary said we were trying hard to accomplish one thing and one thing only through the UN action—namely, to induce the Chinese Communists to stop fighting. The effort was to get the Chinese Communists to go back to the pre-September 1954 situation. The off-shore islands situation had been generally quiescent for about 5 years, since the Chinese Communists had been repulsed by the Nationalists when they assaulted Quemoy in October 1949. Any other question as to the general area would simply get you in trouble, possibly leading to arguments over UN jurisdiction, which might prompt someone to raise a proposal for UN trusteeship over Formosa.

Mr. Robertson said undoubtedly that line of approach was full of dynamite. The UN action should call only for cease fire as to the off-shore islands. If the Chinese Communists received such a call

before withdrawal from the Tachens, the request presumably would cover the Tachens.

The Secretary said if a UN Resolution were passed before the evacuation was completed, there might be some degree of UN protection. It might then be possible to retain the Tachens with a civil garrison. But he did not think the Chinese Communists would accept any substantive UN jurisdiction over the question.

Mr. Robertson said it was standard Chinese Communist tactics to launch a big offensive before an anticipated negotiation. This had been done in Korea and in Indochina. The U.S. has never thought the Chinese Communists would comply with a cease-fire request as to the off-shore islands.

The Secretary said nevertheless we felt the New Zealand initiative would put the Communists on the spot and help the U.S. and Chinese positions. The move was partly invented by the U.S., for this reason.

Dr. Yeh asked if we knew anything about a rumored new Eden plan for relinquishing the off-shore islands to the Chinese Communists and setting up a "two China" situation?

The Secretary said we knew nothing about any such plan.

Mr. Robertson thought this newspaper report might have developed from a speech which Mr. Eden made before the House of Commons a few days earlier.<sup>2</sup>

The Secretary said that the British and others would be willing to turn over the off-shore islands to the Chinese Communists. The Kefauver substitute resolution<sup>3</sup> was based on the thesis that the U.S. had an established interest only in Formosa and the Pescadores, and this stemmed from the victory over Japan and the fact that Japan had not transferred sovereignty over Formosa to any other country. Under this thesis Presidential action should absolutely be limited to Formosa and the Pescadores. The ADA thesis and the British official view ran along similar lines. This was not the view we accepted. It had been agreed with the British and the New Zealanders that the UN action would not be based on any agreement as to the status of the off-shore islands or the rights of the contesting parties. The UN action would simply put it to the Communists whether they are will-

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<sup>2</sup> Reference is apparently to remarks by Eden in the House of Commons on January 26 in which he distinguished sharply between the status of Formosa and that of the offshore islands; for text, see *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, Fifth Series, vol. 536, cols. 159-160.

<sup>3</sup> The substitute resolution, introduced by Senator Estes Kefauver of Tennessee and defeated on the Senate floor on January 28, recognized the President's authority to employ U.S. armed forces for the specific purpose of defending Formosa and the Pescadores from armed attack but did not authorize the defense of related positions and territories; for text, see *Congressional Record* (84th Cong., 1st Sess.), vol. 101, pt. 1, p. 981.

ing to stop the fighting in the off-shore islands and go back to the situation existing before the shelling of Quemoy.

Dr. Yeh said he had a third matter to raise:—the UN cease-fire proposal. Pres. Chiang felt it was bad from a psychological warfare standpoint to withdraw from the Tachens on the eve of the UN move. It was tantamount to agreeing to let the Communists have the Tachens. Would it not be better to hang on until a cease-fire move could take effect or at least be considered?

The Secretary said he did not think there would be any cease-fire. He thought the issue would be kicked around in the Security Council for quite a while, possibly with no decisive result. The Communists would claim there was no UN jurisdiction. They would keep up a fuss. He thought the Chinese should announce immediately upon passage of the Joint Resolution that they were making a military withdrawal from the Tachens. The Joint Resolution would constitute a make-weight to throw in the scales on the favorable side. He said he would not pay much attention to the likelihood of favorable UN action. He thought if the Chinese missed a chance to offset the bad effect of the evacuation with the added strength and determination which could be derived from the Joint Resolution, they would have nothing later with which to counteract the letdown of the evacuation.

Amb. Koo asked if the President or the Secretary plan to make a statement?

Dr. Yeh hoped a statement, if made, would characterize the prospective redeployment of the troops on the Tachens as a move to enhance the strength of the Formosa defense.

The Secretary said he thought something along this line could be done. He hoped that the Resolution would be passed tonight or tomorrow. It looked as if the opposition was beginning to crumble. The President might make a statement on Monday after signing the Resolution. The Secretary said "We will bear your interests in mind." He wanted the Chinese representatives to remember that he thought it was a good idea "to get out the bad news when you have good news to cover up with". He suggested that the Chinese Government not let the situation draft. He said we wanted to throw some strength into the balance "when otherwise a bad morale problem might exist".

Dr. Yeh said that President Chiang thought the UN Resolution should contain some sort of condemnation on the Chinese Communists. He remarked that if the Chinese forces held the Tachens, the Chinese Communists would undoubtedly hit them again, thus committing a new aggression.

The Secretary said he anticipated that a regrouping operation would take about two weeks. He suggested that the regrouping be



tioned in with either the Joint Resolution or the statement of the President. Dr. Yeh hoped that the President could indicate that in view of the circumstances now prevailing, the U.S. has decided to help the Chinese Government defend Quemoy and Matsu. "Would the American Government do this, or would it remain mute?"

The Secretary said he could not say. He thought the President might want to let actions speak for themselves. There were some disturbing developments mentioned by our intelligence, including a new Chinese Communist artillery buildup on the Fukien coast near Matsu.

Amb. Koo asked if there would be any objection to a Chinese statement that a civil administration would remain on the Tachens, and that Chinese military forces would be withdrawn as a peaceful gesture?

The Secretary questioned whether the withdrawal should be put on this basis. He thought it was better to put it on a basis of a regrouping for tactical reasons. It was desirable not to let it seem that the Tachens were voluntarily relinquished to the Chinese Communists. He thought it might be well to leave a Chinese Nationalist civil administration there. Then the Communists could only move in by force. They could not simply take over by default.

Mr. Robertson said in that event the Chinese Nationalists would not be renouncing their rights to the Tachens. They would not abandon them, but would only regroup their military forces.

Dr. Yeh said the Secretary apparently wanted the Chinese to avoid naming Quemoy and Matsu. The Secretary said, "in your formal statements, yes". He said there was no formal agreement or commitment between our Governments as to this area. There was no agreement the Chinese Government could hold the U.S. Government to. It is the present U.S. intention to assist in the defense of those islands. But the Chinese Government should not through its public statements get the U.S. in the position of apparently having made a formal commitment. The U.S. Government might have to deny such an implication. Unofficial Chinese quarters could speculate on this. The entire record of the debates in Congress shows that the President has very broad authority to use U.S. forces as he considers necessary in the "related area". This is a matter of public knowledge. But he felt there should be no indication of mutual commitments to defend any specified places in the area outside Formosa and the Pescadores in any official statements, either U.S. or Chinese. The responsibilities which the U.S. was assuming were voluntary and unilateral. The Secretary said he had told Congress that he felt we could not draw an absolute geographic line, or publicly state what islands were considered important and what islands were not important. If you say a place is not important, a new Communist buildup often

makes it important. The Secretary said that he had told Congress that we would regard any significant Communist buildup in the area as of concern to the United States.

## 51. Memorandum From the British Embassy at Washington to the Department of State <sup>1</sup>

*Washington, January 28, 1955.*

### FORMOSAN STRAITS

*Substance of a Message Dated January 28 from Mr. Trevelyan in Peking*

I had a most difficult interview with Chou En-lai who was tense and absolutely uncompromising.

The following were among the points which he made:

(A) The President's message to Congress had made the United States aim clear. It was a war message.

(B) The United States wanted to get United Nations cover for aggression against China.

(C) He could not comment officially until he had seen the New Zealand proposal, but the Chinese Government would not agree to take part in the United Nations discussion before knowing what was to be its basis. If the United Nations were to discuss American aggression the Chinese Government would welcome it. But the United Nations had no right under the Charter to discuss Chinese recovery of off-shore islands which would be interference in a matter of China's internal sovereignty.

(D) They would not separate the question of off-shore islands from that of Formosa.

(E) They would not do a deal over the off-shore islands. They would "liberate" them.

(F) The Chinese Government were not afraid of war threats and would resist if war was thrust on them.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/1-2855. Secret. A copy was sent to the President with a covering memorandum of January 28 from Secretary Dulles, which bears the handwritten notation, "President has seen. 28 Jan. 55. G[oodpaster]." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles-Herter Series) Copies were sent to Wilson, Radford, and Allen Dulles; Radford transmitted the text to Stump, Pride, and Hull. (Memoranda from Walter K. Scott, Director of the Executive Secretariat, to Wilson, Radford, and Allen Dulles, Jan. 28, 1955; Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/1-2855; telegram 975068 from JCS to CINCPAC, COMSEVENTHFLT, and CINCFE, January 29, 1955; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Miscellaneous Series, Formosa Area)

The conversation lasted two and a half hours.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> A more detailed report of the conversation was contained in a message headed "Mr. Trevelyan's Conversation with Chou En-lai on January 28, 1955", received from the British Embassy on January 29, along with a message headed "Sir William Hayter's Conversation with Mr. Molotov on January 28, 1955." The latter described a conversation between the British Ambassador in Moscow and the Soviet Foreign Minister (see telegram 1191, *infra*); both are filed with a covering memorandum from William H. Gleysteen of the Executive Secretariat to Murphy and other principal officers of the Department. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/1-2955) The texts of both messages were sent to the White House with a covering memorandum of January 29 from Gleysteen to Goodpaster for transmission to the President in Augusta, Georgia. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Miscellaneous Series, Formosa Area) Hagerty's diary entry for January 30 states that he gave the two messages to the President that morning and that the President "read them through very carefully and then said that as far as he was concerned, he had no intention of taking U.S. forces out of the area and letting the Chinese Reds have a free hand to walk in anytime they wanted to." (*Ibid.*, Hagerty Papers) For Trevelyan's description of the conversation, see Humphrey Trevelyan, *Living With the Communists: China, 1953-5; Soviet Union, 1962-5* (Boston: Gambit, Incorporated, 1972), pp. 142-144.

## 52. Telegram From the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bohlen) to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

*Moscow, January 28, 1955—8 p.m.*

1191. British Ambassador saw Molotov early this afternoon to carry out instructions received re reference SC (Deptel 589).<sup>2</sup>

Molotov said he would refer matter to his Government but had some preliminary comments to make on subject. After stating Soviet Government was interested in reduction tension anywhere and was interested in any proposals to that end, in this case he felt causes of tension in area of Formosa had been neglected and that these were important. He then proceeded to elaborate standard Communist line that tension was due to US aggressive action, seizure of Formosa in violation Cairo and Potsdam agreements<sup>3</sup> thereby interfering in in-

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 032/1-2855. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Received with extensive omissions at 2:10 p.m.; the complete text was received at 9:45 a.m. on January 29.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 589 to Moscow, January 27, informed the Embassy that Hayter had been instructed to inform the Soviet Foreign Ministry on January 28 of Trevelyan's approach to the Chinese Government in Peking that day and to express the hope that the Soviet Government would cooperate in the Security Council and urge the Chinese Communists to cooperate by exercising restraint and accepting the invitation to be represented at the Security Council debate. (*Ibid.*, 793.00/1-2755)

<sup>3</sup> The reference is to the communiqué issued at Cairo on December 1, 1943, by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, President Chiang Kai-shek, and Prime Minister

ternal Chinese affairs, but did not specifically state that UN had no competence. He repeated he would refer matter to his Government and said he would inform British Ambassador of reply.

Several hours after interview Troyanovsky called up British Embassy to state that Soviets planned to report in press tomorrow Ambassador's visit.<sup>4</sup> Accordingly British embassy here this afternoon informed foreign press of fact of démarche and general outline. It is not clear whether Soviet decision to give publicity in this matter was on own initiative or based on Foreign Office statement in London exact time of which is unknown. According to Kingsbury Smith<sup>5</sup> here who received call from London it was issued sometime this afternoon in London. It apparently gave out not only fact of démarche here, but also its general purpose, to enlist Soviet support in persuading Chinese Communists to accept Security Council invitation.

British Ambassador has repeated to Washington his report and it presumably will be available in full detail to Department.<sup>6</sup> British Ambassador also showed me report of Chargé in Peking of very disagreeable and unproductive interview with Chou En-lai which will also be presumably available to Department. Chou En-lai was absolutely adamant and maintained intact all elements of his January 24 statement.

Bohlen

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Churchill, and the proclamation by President Truman, President Chiang, and Prime Minister Churchill issued at Potsdam on July 26, 1945. For texts, see *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943*, p. 448, and *ibid.*, *The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference)*, 1945, vol. II, p. 1474.

<sup>4</sup> Telegram 1193 from Moscow, January 29, summarized a communiqué issued by the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs describing the interview. Telegram 1194 from Moscow, January 29, reported that the account of the conversation in the Soviet press closely followed the report which Hayter had shown to Bohlen the previous day. (Both in Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/1-2955)

<sup>5</sup> Of the International News Service.

<sup>6</sup> See footnote 2, *supra*.

53. Letter From the Secretary of State to the Secretary-General of the United Nations (Hammarskjöld) <sup>1</sup>

*Washington, January 28, 1955.*

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY GENERAL: I have your letter of January 27th. <sup>2</sup> It illustrates, I am afraid, the difficulty of you and me trying to deal with these matters on a direct personal basis. We were together for over one and one half hours. Yet you feel the time was inadequate. Perhaps it was, in the sense that it would have taken many hours to have covered the subject in detail. That is why I have to do a measure of delegating to Ambassadors and assistants.

I quite realize that China matters have many aspects, any one of which might perhaps influence, for better or for worse, the fate of the prisoners. However, I thought that the United Nations Assembly mandate was to deal with it as a simple issue, namely—will the Chinese Communist régime comply with the provisions of the Korean Armistice? Other issues were, I thought, not to be tied into this prisoner matter.

You refer to a "possible essential link which exists between the release of the prisoners and the visit of the families". I do not recall that this thought was communicated by you during our extended conversation. On the contrary, I recall that you and I were somewhat puzzled as to how to reconcile the invitation to the families with a readiness to release the prisoners; for then, the arduous, hazardous and expensive trip would be unnecessary.

In any event, you will have noted that we merely declined to issue passports "for the time being". That decision was reached in the interest of peace and to avoid affording occasions for what might be further provocations in a sensitive situation.

If you have reason to believe that the visit of the families will, in fact, procure the release of the prisoners, and you feel satisfied that the visits would not lead to provocative incidents, then we would be glad to reconsider the matter.

Won't you talk these matters over fully and frankly with Ambassador Lodge, who has the complete confidence of the President and myself?

Sincerely yours,

**John Foster Dulles**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.95B251/1-2155. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Dulles. The copy sent to Hammarskjöld was apparently not classified; the classification is typed directly on the source text, a carbon copy.

<sup>2</sup> Document 48.

54. **Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Secretary of State and the British Ambassador (Makins), Department of State, Washington, January 28, 1955** <sup>1</sup>

At the dinner with Makins I brought him up to date on the China question. We discussed the situation. He said that the United Kingdom was prepared to stand firmly behind the United States in so far as related to Formosa and the Pescadores. The area of possible difference was Quemoy and Matsu. There we would have to hope that the United Nations cease-fire and lapse of time might bring a solution. He recognized that it would be hard to determine whether or not the Communist operations against these islands were in reality part of an attack designed against Formosa and the Pescadores. We discussed possible motivation back of the Chinese Communists and the Russians. He felt, and I agreed, that we might have to review our basic assumption that neither of them wanted general war at this time.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, FE/FA Files: Lot 62 D 225, Relations with the British Commonwealth. Top Secret. Drafted by Dulles on January 29.

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55. **Memorandum From the Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group, Formosa (Chase), to the Acting Chief of General Staff of the Republic of China (Peng)** <sup>1</sup>

*Taipei, 29 January 1955.*

SUBJECT

GRC Offensive Operations

1. During the current period in which the evacuation of Tachen is under consideration, it is considered offensive operations of your armed forces should be suspended except as indicated in paragraph 2 below.

2. There is no objection to the continued attack by your air force of Chinese Communist islands and surface forces in the immediate vicinity of Tachen due to their threat to Tachen. You should continue combat patrol type operations in the vicinity of other off-shore islands to gain intelligence of the enemy facing you in those areas. There should be no radical alteration of the pattern or tempo of both types of operations mentioned in this paragraph.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Taipei Embassy Files: Lot 62 F 83. Top Secret.

3. In the event of United States participation in an evacuation of Tachen, and there is no Chinese Communist military opposition to that evacuation, you should suspend all offensive operations except combat patrol actions. The obvious purpose of this is based on the undesirability of encouraging the enemy to interpose military opposition to the successful evacuation of Tachen.<sup>2</sup>

4. As in the past, the best interest of your government and my government will be served by complete consultation prior to initiating military operations.

William C. Chase

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<sup>2</sup> Telegram 242025Z from CNO to CINCPAC, January 24, sent to Chief, MAAG Formosa for information, states in part:

"If and when the Tachen evacuation with US participation is initiated and in the absence of ChiCom opposition it is essential that ChiNat offensive operations anywhere be so restricted as not to invite that opposition in Tachen area." (JCS Records, CCS 381 Formosa (11-8-48) Sec. 18)

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## 56. Joint Resolution by the Congress<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, January 29, 1955.*

*Whereas* the primary purpose of the United States, in its relations with all other nations, is to develop and sustain a just and enduring peace for all; and

*Whereas* certain territories in the West Pacific under the jurisdiction of the Republic of China are now under armed attack, and threats and declarations have been and are being made by the Chinese Communists that such armed attack is in aid of and in preparation for armed attack on Formosa and the Pescadores;

*Whereas* such armed attack if continued would gravely endanger the peace and security of the West Pacific area and particularly of Formosa and the Pescadores; and

*Whereas* the secure possession by friendly governments of the Western Pacific Island chain, of which Formosa is a part, is essential to the vital interests of the United States and all friendly nations in or bordering upon the Pacific Ocean; and

*Whereas* the President of the United States on January 6, 1955, submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification a

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<sup>1</sup> Public Law 4, approved on January 29; 69 Stat. 7. For text of a statement issued by the President upon signing the joint resolution, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1955*, p. 24.

Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of China, which recognizes that an armed attack in the West Pacific area directed against territories, therein described, in the region of Formosa and the Pescadores, would be dangerous to the peace and safety of the parties to the treaty: Therefore be it

*Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,* That the President of the United States be and he hereby is authorized to employ the Armed Forces of the United States as he deems necessary for the specific purpose of securing and protecting Formosa and the Pescadores against armed attack, this authority to include the securing and protection of such related positions and territories of that area now in friendly hands and the taking of such other measures as he judges to be required or appropriate in assuring the Defense of Formosa and the Pescadores.

This resolution shall expire when the President shall determine that the peace and security of the area is reasonably assured by international conditions created by action of the United Nations or otherwise, and shall so report to the Congress.

## 57. Memorandum for the Record, by the President <sup>1</sup>

*Washington, January 29, 1955.*

Admiral Radford visited me at the White House in the late afternoon of January 28th. The purpose of the visit was to discuss the instructions going to the C.-in-C. in the Pacific area with relation to activity in the Formosa area. The basic document for discussion at the conference was the operational order to the C.-in-C. in the Pacific which was sent to him by the Chief of Naval Operations. <sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International Series. Top Secret. Sent to Admiral Radford with a covering memorandum dated January 29, 1955, which reads as follows:

"Attached is a memorandum I have just dictated of our conversation yesterday. Please make on it any notations or corrections you believe necessary and return to me. I will furnish you with a copy of the corrected document as agreed upon. DE" (*Ibid.*)

For Radford's memorandum in reply, see Document 64. A second "Memorandum for the Record" by the President, dated January 31, is identical in substance with this one, except that sub-paragraph d. reads as follows:

"It was finally agreed that the United States Commander could attack the airfields from which the Chinese Communist air forces were operating if necessary in defense of his own forces engaged in the operation." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International Series)

<sup>2</sup> The reference is unclear, but see telegram JCS 975067, *infra*.



a. It was agreed that if called upon by the Chinese Nationals, the American forces would assist in the evacuation of the Tachens.

b. It was further agreed that if any attack was made against this operation, that the American forces were, of course, fully authorized to defend themselves as necessary.

c. It was agreed that there would be no attack on Chinese bases unless this was essential to the success of the operation. It was further agreed that if such attacks became necessary, they would be carried out only against air fields positively identified as contributing forces to the attacks against us.

d. Finally, it was agreed that the Commander in the area would authorize no attacks against the Chinese mainland on any initial sortie by the ChiComs. It would first be determined by the Tactical Commander that the purpose of the ChiComs was to continue the attacks before this type of action would be undertaken. However, it was to be clearly understood that if the ChiComs undertook a consistent and persistent air attack against the operation, that the United States forces would be authorized within the limits above stated to take such action as was essential to protect themselves and to assure the success of the operation.

D.D.E. <sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> The initials are typed on the source text. According to Hagerty's diary entry for January 29, the President dictated this memorandum immediately after signing H.J. Res. 159 and before departing for Augusta, Georgia. Hagerty's diary continues:

"The President also asked me to have Andy Goodpaster notify the military to report immediately to Goodpaster any incidents that might occur—if any—so that Goodpaster could immediately notify me who would, of course, in turn, immediately notify the President." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Hagerty Papers)

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**58. Telegram From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Radford) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Stump) <sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, 29 January 1955—12:43 p.m.*

JCS 975067. Exclusive for Stump info Pride. Signed Radford. JCS called attention SecDef and President to provision in CINCPAC Op Order 51-Z-55 <sup>2</sup> par 3, "will include US attack of source or base

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International Series. Top Secret; Priority. Sent to COMSEVENTHFLT for information.

<sup>2</sup> The reference is to CINCPAC OPLAN 51-Z-55, an operation plan for U.S. support of the Chinese Nationalists in the evacuation of the Tachen Islands. CINCPAC's proposed plan was transmitted to CINCPACFLT and Chief, MAAG Formosa in telegram 230306Z from CINCPAC, January 22, and also sent to CNO for information. (JCS Records, CCS 381 (4-16-49) Sec. 7)

from which attack is launched if indicated as essential to success." <sup>3</sup> As a result you are directed to change this part of your order to read, "will include US attack of source or base from which the enemy attack is launched if necessary in defense of own forces engaged in the operation." <sup>4</sup>

With foregoing modification your Op Order less Atomic Annex <sup>5</sup> is approved by JCS; however, this message is not a directive for implementation. Directive to implement is awaiting formal request from ChiNats. When ChiNat request is received it will be considered by President who will then make final decision.

FYI President read CNO 281605Z <sup>6</sup> to you and commented that it was an excellent presentation of his position.

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<sup>3</sup> Paragraph 3(2) concerns the contingency of enemy attacks on Nationalist evacuation forces or supporting U.S. forces; in addition to the provision quoted here, it states that "retaliatory action against other targets on the Chinese mainland will be taken only with the approval of CINCPAC."

<sup>4</sup> CINCPAC OPLAN 51-Z-55 as revised on January 30, included this provision and also stated that such attacks should be made only upon authority of COMSEVENTHFLT and that retaliatory action against other targets on the Chinese mainland should be taken only with the approval of CINCPAC "as authorized by higher authority." Further instructions and restrictions were included: unless U.S. or friendly forces engaged in the evacuation were attacked, U.S. forces were not to operate within 3 miles of the Chinese mainland, Communist forces encountered were not to be attacked unless they demonstrated hostile intent, and in case of isolated incidents such as sporadic artillery fire not interfering with the evacuation, only local counteraction might be taken. It stated, however, that in the event of an actual Communist attack on U.S. or friendly forces engaged in the evacuation, "any Communist forces encountered in Tachen area or in vicinity evacuation and covering forces shall be destroyed" and that in the event of actual engagement in combat, hot pursuit into mainland air space or territorial waters was authorized. (Enclosure to JCS 2054/90, February 14, 1955; JCS Records, CCS 381 (4-16-49) Sec. 7)

<sup>5</sup> Annex A provided for "the use of atomic weapons in the defense of U.S. Forces should such employment be authorized by highest authority." (Filed with a copy of CINCPAC OPLAN 51-Z-55, dated January 30; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Miscellaneous Series, Formosa Area)

<sup>6</sup> Document 49.

59. Telegram From the Ambassador in the Republic of China (Rankin) to the Department of State <sup>1</sup>*Taipei, January 29, 1955—11 p.m.*

496. President Chiang had brief telegram re offshore islands from Minister Yeh in Washington which causing him much concern. He is replying to Yeh but asked me to send his views direct to Department by most urgent means.

Chiang had understood that immediately after passage of resolution by Senate, statements would be issued simultaneously by US and his government. Latter would announce withdrawal from Tachens for strategic reasons and redeployment of forces now there. US statement would announce intention to help in defense of Kinmen and Matsu, making our position clear to all concerned and offsetting, in part at least, unfortunate psychological effect of Tachen evacuation. Now President learns US statement, if any, making no specific reference to Kinmen and Matsu.

He regards this new development as most dangerous particularly in light of recent statements by Eden and Molotov as well as impending cease-fire discussions. President is convinced Soviet purpose is to sabotage new mutual security pact while that of British is to sabotage any extension of US support for offshore islands. He assumes Soviets are putting pressure on British and latter are pressuring us along these lines. Chiang is highly appreciative of President's actions in present case and of overwhelming approval by Congress. He fears any delay or indications of hesitancy at this time would spoil strong effect of our recent actions and perhaps encourage immediate Communist attack on islands. President regards next two or three days as of greatest importance in this respect, after which cease-fire discussions will generate atmosphere of appeasement benefiting only the Communists.

I promised send telegram immediately but expressed hope President's fears not justified. Said I had no information re text of proposed US statement but thought it possible our intentions toward Kinmen and Matsu might be made clear without mentioning them by name; also this might have advantage of not implying all other islands being written off.

*Comment:* Chiang seemed more nervous this evening than I remember seeing him before. He appeared to think US about to let him down on Kinmen and Matsu, presumably at British behest, without

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/1-2955. Secret; Niact. Received at 12:29 p.m. Repeated to USUN for Lodge by the Department as telegram 382 to New York, January 29. (*Ibid.*)

realizing implications in terms of immediate military situation and psychological effect here and elsewhere. <sup>2</sup>

**Rankin**

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<sup>2</sup> A summary record of the conversation was sent to the Department as an enclosure to despatch 384 from Taipei, February 3. (*Ibid.*, 793.00/2-355)

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**60. Telegram From the Ambassador in the Republic of China (Rankin) to the Department of State <sup>1</sup>**

*Taipei, January 30, 1955—5 p.m.*

497. Department's 416, <sup>2</sup> Taipei's 496. <sup>3</sup> President Chiang informed me after luncheon today his government would not request assistance in withdrawing from Tachens until US position re Kinmen and Matsu clarified. Failure to insist on this would betray China. Another telegram from Foreign Minister Yeh apparently confirmed Chiang's suspicions (Taipei's 496) that US had gone back on firm understanding reached prior to President's message to Congress. Essential points of agreement as described to me orally were:

1. After approval of resolution by Congress, two governments would issue simultaneous and complementary statements on offshore islands.
2. Above statements would provide for US assistance in evacuation of Tachens.
3. At same time, it would be made clear US was extending protection to Kinmen and Matsu.

Chiang now understands only statement US proposes to issue is that made by President Eisenhower when he signed resolution. Meanwhile, Yeh has forwarded draft of proposed Chinese statement referring to China's "negotiating" with the defense of unspecified islands.

President Chiang then told me solemnly that cause for Free China based upon principle which more important than success or failure. During conversation he emphasized words (as translated by

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 293.9322/1-3055. Top Secret; Niact. Received at 6 a.m. Repeated to USUN for Lodge by the Department as telegram 384 to New York, January 30. (*Ibid.*)

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 416 to Taipei, January 29, informed Rankin that the formal Chinese request for U.S. assistance in the evacuation of the Tachens was to be given to him in writing and should be transmitted immediately to the Department. (*Ibid.*, 293.9322/1-2955)

<sup>3</sup> *Supra.*

Madame Chiang and Acting Foreign Minister Shen,<sup>4</sup> only others present) such as honor, probity, equity, sincerity. He said Tachen and forces there might be lost, that Formosa where he and his people were prepared to die might also be lost, but that if China's honor were preserved for posterity it would be worthwhile. He had never gone back on his word to United States and never would. He assumed United States to be guided by like principles.

Chiang went on to say he presumed US regarded present developments in this area as important, that we were aware of extent of China's warlike preparations and of our responsibilities in tipping scales for war or peace. Any sign of indecision or weakness on our part would make war more certain and responsibility for precipitating would be ours. He assumed also that in relation with his government US realized it was not dealing with children.

President asked me to report his remarks fully to Department.<sup>5</sup>

I have informed Admirals Stump and Pride of foregoing and all other recent developments of significance. Comment was that Navy is ready to carry out operation as planned on receipt of orders.

*Comment:* I hope additional US statement, coordinated with Chinese, can bridge this difficult situation.

Rankin

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<sup>4</sup> Shen Chang-huan, Political Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs.

<sup>5</sup> In addition to this telegram, a record of the conversation was sent to the Department as an enclosure to despatch 384 from Taipei, February 3. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/2-355)

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61. Memorandum of a Conversation, Washington, January 30, 1955, 10:45 a.m.<sup>1</sup>

SUBJECT

Evacuation of Tachen Islands

PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Hoover  
Mr. Murphy  
Mr. Robertson  
Mr. MacArthur  
Mr. Bowie  
Mr. Key

Admiral Radford  
Admiral Orem  
Admiral Anderson  
Colonel Goodpaster, White House

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 293.9322/1-3055. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Scott, Director of the Executive Secretariat.

Mr. Wainhouse  
Mr. McConaughy  
Mr. Phleger  
Mr. Scott

*Part I*—Meeting at 10:45 preliminary to meeting at 11:00 with Admiral Radford, Admiral Orem, Admiral Anderson, and Colonel Goodpaster

At the preliminary meeting Mr. Robertson expressed his feeling that Chiang had not yet received Yeh's report on his latest conversation with the Secretary<sup>2</sup> at the time of Rankin's conversation with Chiang reported in Taipei's 497.<sup>3</sup> All steps, according to Mr. Robertson, had been taken in the closest possible consultation with Foreign Minister Yeh and the Secretary had chosen to deal with Yeh rather than through Ambassador Rankin purposely. Yeh had told Mr. Robertson yesterday that Robertson was not to be too concerned regarding Chiang's first reactions but to wait on Chiang's receipt of the report of the latest Yeh-Dulles conversation.

After Mr. Murphy expressed some doubts as to the clarity of Yeh's reports to Chiang Mr. Robertson stated that he was certain that Yeh was reporting accurately but that there were many doubts among the ChiNat Government on Formosa as to British influence on us and that these doubts may be coloring Chiang's reaction. After much discussion there was obviously no clear understanding as to the exact status of our planned understanding with Chiang and the British on the question of our support for Quemoy and Matsu.

*Part II*—Meeting at 11:00 with Admiral Radford, Admiral Orem, Admiral Anderson, and Colonel Goodpaster

Admiral Radford and Mr. Hoover agreed that the President need not return early and Colonel Goodpaster called Mr. Hagerty at Augusta to that effect.

All participants at the meeting received and read copies of Taipei's 497 and 496<sup>4</sup> and the Department's 416<sup>5</sup> and 417<sup>6</sup> to Taipei.

Mr. Robertson repeated his comment in the earlier meeting to the effect that there had been a crossing of wires and at the time of Rankin's conversation Chiang had undoubtedly not received a report

<sup>2</sup> See Document 50.

<sup>3</sup> *Supra.*

<sup>4</sup> Document 59.

<sup>5</sup> See footnote 2, *supra.*

<sup>6</sup> Telegram 417 to Taipei, January 29, sent in reply to telegram 496 from Taipei, summarized the conversations between Robertson and Yeh on January 27 (see Document 46) and between Dulles and Yeh on January 28, noting that the reports of the conversations should reassure Chiang. (Department of State, Central Files, 293.9322/1-2955)

of the latest meeting with the Secretary. Foreign Minister Yeh had told him he was sure everything would be in order when this was received.

Admiral Radford determined through a series of questions to Mr. Robertson that the proposals made to the ChiNats were passed in conversation between the Secretary and Foreign Minister Yeh. In this regard Mr. Robertson read the original ChiNat request as given by Foreign Minister Yeh<sup>7</sup> and pointed out that in subsequent meetings between Yeh and the Secretary this request had been greatly modified.

Through a review of memoranda of conversation and telegrams to our Embassy in Taipei the group agreed that Chiang's misunderstanding may be a legitimate one growing out of the change in the United States position as expressed to Foreign Minister Yeh by the Secretary in their meetings of the 19th and 20th [21st].<sup>8</sup> There was considerable discussion as to the real meaning behind the Secretary's decision not to publicly announce that we would support the ChiNats against any attack on Quemoy or Matsu.

At this point Mr. Robertson received a call from Foreign Minister Yeh in New York. Yeh stated that he had just received a telegram from Chiang which emphasized more strongly than before Chiang's concern over our seeming reversal in the commitment to announce publicly that we would help defend Quemoy and Matsu. Foreign Minister Yeh had suggested to us that Chiang go ahead with his formal request for our assistance in the withdrawal from the Tachens and include a request for our public commitment to defend Quemoy and Matsu. It was Yeh's idea that in our reply we could clarify our reasons for not making public this commitment. After some discussion it was generally agreed that this was not a sound course to take and that it would be best to come to grips and solve this problem without having Chiang and ourselves on record as in disagreement.

Admiral Radford pointed out that we had in effect already announced our intention to support the Tachen withdrawal if requested. After discussion it was generally agreed that an announcement that we were beginning our support of the evacuation of the Tachens should be made but that this must await the receipt of a formal request from Chiang and Presidential approval of the request before it could be made.

In reply to Mr. MacArthur, Admiral Radford stated that there were a number of ChiNat ships now available for the evacuation, as well as two or three United States transports in the general area. It

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<sup>7</sup> Reference is apparently to the first conversation between Dulles and Yeh on January 19, see Document 16.

<sup>8</sup> See Document 19 and 28.

was his belief that once the order for evacuation was given it would take approximately twenty-four hours for the evacuation ships to approach the Tachens and it was at this time that our responsibilities for cover and support would begin. He felt that if there were no ChiCom interference the evacuation could be completed in ten to fifteen days. There were many variables in this situation though, concerning the number of civilians to be evacuated, weather conditions, the attitude of the Tachen military command, as well as the always present possibilities of ChiCom interference.

After some further discussion of the technicalities of our decision to support the ChiNats against any ChiCom invasion of Quemoy and Matsu, Mr. Hoover summed up the opinions as follows:

That we were willing to support the defense of Quemoy and Matsu against a real invasion attempt but that this is a unilateral decision on our part pending appropriate action by the United Nations and subject to change under conditions which may exist in the future.

The important point being that this was not a mutual agreement between the ChiNats and ourselves but a unilateral decision on our part. We were willing to state this privately to Chiang but we were not willing to make a public statement to this effect. Mr. Hoover felt that we could and should have Ambassador Rankin clarify this point with Chiang and that the formal request for aid in the Tachen evacuation must await this understanding.

FE was directed to:

1. Prepare a telegram to Rankin filling him in on all blind spots in his background, including a summation of the Trevelyan-Chou conversations.<sup>9</sup>
2. Send Rankin a copy of the agreed statement to be made by the ChiNats with the suggestion of one slight modification in the text.<sup>10</sup> (Mr. Robertson stated that he had discussed this with Foreign Minister Yeh who had agreed to this procedure.)
3. Prepare a complete chronological record of the conversations, discussions, and decisions on this matter over the past week to ten days.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>9</sup> Telegram 420 to Taipei, January 30, transmitted a summary of Trevelyan's January 28 conversation with Chou, based on the message received from the British Embassy on January 29 (see footnote 2, Document 51). (Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/1-3055) Telegram 419 to Taipei, January 30, transmitted the text of the President's statement of January 29 (see footnote 1, Document 56).

<sup>10</sup> See *infra*.

<sup>11</sup> Two brief chronologies were prepared in CA: one, dated February 1, headed "U.S. Commitments to GRC"; and another, undated, headed "Summary of US-UK Conversations on Off-Shore Islands." (Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/8-2958 and 793.5/2-2955, respectively)



4. Prepare a recommendation to the President to be discussed at a further meeting in Mr. Hoover's office at 5:00 this afternoon preliminary to a meeting at 6:00 with the President to include instructions to Rankin to clarify our position to Chiang.

Mr. Key was asked to arrange for Ambassador Lodge to be present at the meeting with the President so that he could be fully informed of all the technicalities and details of this problem in anticipation of his work in the Security Council Monday.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> January 31.

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**62. Telegram From the Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, January 30, 1955—4:18 p.m.*

418. For your information following is preliminary draft statement received from Chinese Embassy January 29, [28]<sup>2</sup> proposed for release when withdrawal from Tachens begins:

"In view of the repeated and continuing acts of aggression by the Chinese Communists as evidenced by their renewed attacks on the offshore islands since September 3, 1954, and by their recent seizure of Yikiangshan Island, the Chinese Government after consultation with the United States Government, has decided to redeploy its garrison forces on the Tachen Islands with a view to consolidating its overall military position and to more effectively dealing with further attacks by the Communists. This step to be carried out for strategic reasons does not affect the civil administration on these islands, which will continue to carry out its duties and functions as heretofore under the authority and supervision of the Government.

"The Government of the United States, whose association with the Republic of China as ally for many years has been further strengthened by the recently concluded Mutual Defense Treaty be-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/1-3055. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution. Drafted and approved in CA. Repeated for information to USUN.

<sup>2</sup> The draft statement, which bears a notation that it was received from the Chinese Embassy at 8 p.m. on January 28, is filed with a memorandum of January 29 from Dulles to Robertson which reads as follows:

"On reflection and in view of the President's statement this morning, I think it questionable whether he should issue a further statement on Monday. I believe that the Nationalists should quickly issue their statement so as to do so under cover of Congressional action and the President's statement of today. I do not believe they will find a better time to combine good news with bad.

"Will you not urge them to get out their statement quickly?" (*Ibid.*, 793.00/1-2955)

tween the two countries now pending ratification in the United States Senate, has offered its aid and assistance in carrying out our plan of redeployment. This friendly offer to the Chinese Government has been accepted.

"In furtherance of the close cooperation between our two countries in the securing and defending of Taiwan (Formosa) and Peng Hu (the Pescadores), the Government of the United States has indicated to the Chinese Government its decision also to join in the defense of such related positions and territories the safeguarding of which is essential in assuring the defense of Taiwan and Peng Hu. The Chinese Government has expressed its welcome to this decision on the part of the United States Government, which it regards as an added proof of the solidarity of the two countries in promoting freedom and peace in the Asian and Pacific area and the general cause of the free world."

Secretary has read statement and indicated he saw no objection to it. Department has suggested change of penultimate sentence as follows: in place of "which is essential" substitute "which Government of United States deems essential". Yeh concurs. However, Yeh does not wish you to quote above draft statement to Chiang since it has not been cleared with him.

Hoover

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63. Memorandum of a Conversation, Washington, January 30, 1955, 6:30 p.m. <sup>1</sup>

PARTICIPANTS

The President  
 Secretary Hoover  
 Assistant Secretary Merchant  
 Assistant Secretary Robertson  
 Ambassador Lodge  
 Mr. MacArthur  
 Admiral Radford  
 Colonel Goodpaster

Mr. Hoover opened by explaining to the President that he wished to bring him up to date on the situation with respect to the offshore islands and to review the understandings and commitments we had reached with Chiang and the British with respect to both our

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/1-3055. Drafted by MacArthur. The list of participants and the time of the meeting are from Goodpaster's memorandum of this conversation, January 31. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International Series) His handwritten notes of the conversation are *ibid.*, Miscellaneous Series, Formosa Area.

actions regarding the offshore islands and the action in the United Nations.

The President said that the world press and world opinion clearly differentiated between Formosa and the Pescadores on the one hand and the offshore islands on the other. Similarly, in the hearings before Congress there had been a differentiation between the two, and the Resolution had been based on the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores, it being made clear that the U.S. would decide itself what related positions might be essential to the defense of Formosa in the light of the circumstances obtaining.

\* Mr. Hoover gave the President the Secretary's testimony as set forth on page 72.<sup>2</sup> The President said this expressed it very clearly. Admiral Radford then read to the President extracts from the Secretary's original opening statement to the Joint Committee. Mr. Hoover observed that the Secretary's subsequent statements in reply to questions modified the interpretation which might be placed on his original statement.

Mr. Hoover explained our commitment to the British that we would make no public statement concerning our present intention to defend Quemoy and Matsu in return for which they would support "ORACLE". At the same time, Mr. Hoover explained we had told the British that we must be free to let the Chinese Nationalists know of our present intention to assist in the defense of Quemoy and Matsu if this were necessary.

The President intervened to say that Britain then does not expect us to say we won't defend Quemoy and Matsu.

Mr. Hoover confirmed that Sir Roger understands that our present intent is to assist in the defense of these islands as essential to the defense of Formosa, but that we will not make any public statement to this effect since in the British view this would nullify any prospect of successful action on the New Zealand UN Resolution calling for a ceasefire.

Mr. Hoover explained that we had a message from Chiang indicating that he believed we had committed ourselves to make a public statement that we would defend Quemoy and Matsu at the same time the evacuation of the Tachens was announced. This message indicated that Chiang would not request our assistance in the evacuation of the Tachens until our position regarding Quemoy and Matsu had been clarified. Mr. Robertson explained in some detail the position the Secretary had taken with George Yeh in the various meet-

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<sup>2</sup> Reference is apparently to the Secretary's testimony at the joint hearing held by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services (see footnote 3, Document 36). The document under reference, apparently an unpublished transcript, has not been found in Department of State files.

ings with him, and stressed the psychological importance of how this question was handled in terms of its impact on the Chinese Nationalist morale and will to resist.

The President said we could not make a public statement specifying we would defend Quemoy and Matsu. While originally he recalled we had contemplated such a statement, we had changed our view on this as a result of further consideration. Furthermore, we should not be committed to hold these offshore islands since such a commitment could be construed as of indefinite duration and we should not tie ourselves down in what was only one incident of the great over-all struggle of freedom against Communist expansion. He went on to say that NATO and what we are trying to do in Europe is vital to our security and we must bear this constantly in mind in what we do in the Formosa area. The President said: "Our purpose in defending these areas is to defend Formosa and the Pescadores if they are threatened. It is not a permanent commitment to defend any of these offshore islands." For example, the President was not certain that the Matsu group were as important to the defense of Formosa as Quemoy. If the present Chinese regime consolidated its power, the offshore islands might eventually fall under their control while Formosa and the Pescadores remained in the hands of the Nationalists.

The President thought we could draft a friendly message to reassure Chiang along the lines that we were pushing hard for the ratification of the Treaty, and that pending the results of the UN action on the off-shore islands we would examine and keep in touch with Chiang on all related areas under Chiang's control so the US can assist in their defense if we believe that a situation has arisen threatening Formosa and the Pescadores. In other words, we will examine the situation continuously and keep under constant study all actions in the areas held by the Chinats and be in constant touch with him so as to see how we can assist in steps deemed by us necessary in the defense of Formosa.

The President said we must be sure we are not hooked into any agreement whereby we would have to join in the defense of Quemoy or Matsu just because they were attacked, by a battalion for example. He explained that the Chinese Communists could throw a relatively small attack against the islands which the Chinese Nationalists could repulse. The US should not be obliged to get into a war with Communist China on this basis. He said: "We must be the judge of the military situation that draws us in whether in Quemoy or elsewhere." The President said that Admiral Stump must know we aren't going to intervene in the defense of Quemoy or Matsu just because they are attacked, for example by a battalion or so. The President said he did not believe he had met Admiral Stump, but understood he was a good man. Admiral Radford confirmed that Stump was one

of our ablest naval officers. The President said the conversation this evening made clear how complicated the problem was, and it was going to be necessary, but it would be difficult, to get this all across in orders to Admiral Stump.

The draft Chinese statement as amended by "it deems"<sup>3</sup> was shown to the President by Mr. Robertson. The President said that it seemed all right.

Ambassador Lodge said there was thought that the President might send a message to the President of the Security Council of the UN, when we had reached agreement with the Chinats, announcing we were assisting in the evacuation of the Tachens. Ambassador Lodge thought this would be a good idea. The President agreed that this sounded useful and was worth considering. He said that in any such message it might be possible in some way to imply that the Tachens were being evacuated because they were off to the flank, and not essential to the defense of Formosa, but that other islands (Quemoy and Matsu, without mentioning them) were in a different category.

Ambassador Lodge said that with the New Zealand Resolution coming up in the UN tomorrow it would be helpful if no statement were made for two or three days.

The President concurred and said we would have to drag things on for at least a couple of days because we would have to send a message to Chiang, receive his reply, and reach agreement, etc.

It was agreed that Mr. Hoover would have a message drafted to send to Chiang which would be referred to the President tomorrow morning.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> See *supra*.

<sup>4</sup> Transmitted in Document 69.

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#### 64. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Radford) to the President<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, 31 January 1955.*

1. Referring to your Memorandum for the Record, attached herewith,<sup>2</sup> it is my recollection that sub-paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) are as I understood them.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International Series. Top Secret. Source text bears the notation in the President's handwriting: "approved for file. DE"

<sup>2</sup> Document 57.

2. With regard to sub-paragraph (d). I recall this discussion and believe that my explanation may have been misunderstood. It is my feeling that the Officer in Tactical Command—the flag officer on the scene—must have discretion in deciding when his forces are in such jeopardy that he is justified in attacking the air bases from which the attackers come. The *initial* attack may be in considerable strength—that is an option the Communist commander will have. The initial attack might be directed primarily against U.S. forces and *might* cause such damage to our own evacuating forces that the U.S. commander would feel that to prevent further damage he had to order an attack on Communist airfields. Certainly there would be no time to communicate with higher headquarters.

3. Attached is a copy of the message sent to Admiral Stump<sup>3</sup> as a result of my understanding of your decision. I therefore recommend that sub-paragraph (d) read:

“It was finally agreed that the United States Commander could attack the airfields from which the Chinese Communist air forces were operating if necessary in defense of his own forces engaged in the operation.”<sup>4</sup>

**Arthur Radford**

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<sup>3</sup> Document 58.

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 1, Document 57. A memorandum of January 31, from Goodpaster to Radford states that he had informed Radford's office that the President had approved his redraft of subparagraph (d) and that “the President had indicated his point concerning ‘initial attacks’ was that we should not show our hand in response to essentially ‘probing’ operations.” (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Miscellaneous Series, Conferences on Formosa)

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**65. Telegram From the Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Bohlen) to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Moscow, January 31, 1955—6 p.m.*

1207. Molotov received British Ambassador at Kremlin this morning and handed him memo setting forth Soviet's comment and reply to British *démarche* (Embtel 1203).<sup>2</sup> It has been wired to British Embassy Washington and will be available to Department there. After repeating briefly Soviet-Chinese version of causes tension and

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/1-3155. Secret; Niact. Received at 12:19 p.m. Repeated to London for information.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 1203 from Moscow, January 31, reported that the British Ambassador was to see Molotov that morning. (*Ibid.*)

danger Formosan area, Soviet Government says it shares British opinion that SC should consider matter and has instructed its representative to that effect and that CPR would be invited. Presence latter necessary since it is object "aggressive action and interference" on part US.

Foregoing seems to imply that Chinese Communist representative will accept invitation to attend. Indeed, one purpose of Soviet resolution attempting to brand US with charges aggression etc., apart from obvious propaganda purposes may have been designed to provide face-saving cover for Chinese Communist attendance without retraction its position that Formosan question insofar as Nationalist Government is concerned is internal affair. It is by no means clear, however, that Chinese attendance would be conditional upon SC acceptance on agenda Soviet formulation of item and charges against US which would certainly appear unlikely. In any event, Soviet's reply to British *démarche* and resolution to SC seems to reflect dual motive Soviet's policy in regard to Formosa situation—namely, to support Chinese Communist position but at same time to seek means whereby major conflict can be avoided.

**Bohlen**

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## 66. Editorial Note

The United Nations Security Council held its 689th meeting on January 31 with a provisional agenda which included Munro's letter of January 28 (see footnote 6, Document 42) and a letter of January 30 from Soviet Representative Arkady A. Sobolev to the President of the Security Council, which requested a meeting of the Council to consider "acts of aggression" by the United States against the People's Republic of China and enclosed a draft resolution condemning "these acts of aggression" and recommending the withdrawal of all United States forces from Taiwan "and other territories belonging to China." (U.N. document S/3355) A Soviet proposal not to admit "the Kuomintang representative" to participate in the discussion was followed by a United States proposal "not to consider any proposals to exclude the representative of the Government of the Republic of China, or to seat representatives of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China;" the Council decided by a vote of 10 to 1 (the Soviet Union) to give priority to the United States proposal and then adopted it by a vote of 10 to 1 (the Soviet Union).

At the 690th meeting of the Council that afternoon, the New Zealand item was placed on the agenda by a vote of 9 to 1 (the Soviet Union) with 1 abstention (China), the Soviet item was placed on the agenda by a vote of 10 to 1 (China), a Soviet proposal to consider the Soviet item first was rejected by a vote of 10 to 1 (the Soviet Union), and a British proposal that consideration of the New Zealand item should be completed before the Soviet item was taken up was adopted by a vote of 10 to 1 (the Soviet Union). The Council then began consideration of the New Zealand item. A New Zealand proposal to invite a representative of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China "to participate in the discussion of this item" and to request the Secretary-General to convey the invitation was adopted by a vote of 9 to 1 (China) with 1 abstention (the Soviet Union). For records of the Security Council meetings, see U.N. documents S/PV. 689 and 690. Lodge remarks concerning the New Zealand and Soviet items and supporting the proposal to invite a representative of the People's Republic of China are printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, February 14, 1955, pages 252-253.

A telegram of January 31 from Secretary-General Hammarskjöld to Premier Chou En-lai informed him of the Security Council's inclusion of the New Zealand and Soviet items on its agenda and of the Council's invitation to the Central People's Government to send a representative "to be present in the Council during the discussion of the first item and to participate in the debate in order to present the views of your Government." (U.N. document S/3358)

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67. **Memorandum for the Record by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant)**<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, January 31, 1955.*

I consider that there has been given the British a firm commitment that the United States will make no public statement concerning its intentions with respect to Quemoy and the Matsu Islands until the results of the action in the Security Council are known, and that it was upon the basis of receiving this commitment that the

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/8-2958. Top Secret. Filed with Howe's memorandum of August 29, 1958, to the Acting Secretary. A memorandum of February 1, 1955, from Merchant to Scott, attached to a copy of this memorandum, states that it had been prepared at the request of Acting Secretary Hoover. (*Ibid.*, 793.5/2-155)



British agreed to support immediate action in the Security Council on Operation ORACLE.

In Sir Roger Makins' letter of January 21 on this subject addressed to the Secretary of State <sup>2</sup> the commitment that they desired from us is stated somewhat differently. The second paragraph of the letter reads:

"The position of Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom is that they are ready (subject to New Zealand agreement) to support immediate action in the Security Council on lines already agreed, if the United States Government is prepared to withhold any promise of help in the defense of Quemoy until the results of the action in the Security Council are known."

I believe that this formulation of the commitment was modified and implicitly accepted by the British Government in the modified form. On January 20 the Secretary had stated to Sir Roger <sup>3</sup> that it might be possible to be less specific than then planned in our public statement but that it was necessary to make clear to the Nationalists our intentions regarding Quemoy. Our intentions were described by the Secretary in that conversation as being under present conditions to assist the Chinese Nationalists in the defense of Quemoy because it is important to the defense of Formosa and it remained the avowed purpose of the Communists to take Formosa.

Against the background of this statement, the Secretary said to Sir Roger on January 21 (at which meeting the Ambassador's letter referred to above was discussed) that at the NSC meeting it was agreed that there would be no statement publicly made regarding the intentions of the United States with respect to Quemoy and the Matsu Islands, and, later in the conversation, that he hoped the British Government would consider that we had substantially met the points which they had raised and that it would thereby be enabled promptly to support ORACLE. At the conclusion of this discussion the British Ambassador then said that in his personal opinion we had met in substance the British position and that he would recommend to his Government that we move ahead promptly on ORACLE. It must be assumed that Sir Roger accurately and in detail reported this conversation to London. The following day the British did in fact move ahead in conjunction with us on Operation ORACLE.

I should add as my own judgment that the British Government, in agreeing to move ahead on ORACLE without acceptance by us of the commitment they sought in the terms they used, was relying on its understanding derived from the series of conversations that the purpose of the United States was to reduce the risk of war and to

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 3, Document 27.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 25.

avoid involving itself in a situation in which it relinquished to the Chinese Nationalists or shared with them the power of grave decision.

Livingston T. Merchant

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68. **Telegram From the Ambassador in the Republic of China (Rankin) to the Department of State**<sup>1</sup>

*Taipei, January 31, 1955—9 p.m.*

499. Deptel 417<sup>2</sup> helpful but problem remains that Yeh's messages apparently mentioned several times and quite definitely a firm agreement that two governments would issue coordinated statements including specific reference to US protection for Kinmen and Matsu to help take curse off Tachen withdrawal. Chiang used this in meetings of National Defense Council and KMT standing committee as proof of sincere and definite intentions on part of US; this to quiet serious opposition which developed against Tachen evacuation.

Yeh's draft of proposed Chinese statement<sup>3</sup> disapproved by Chiang as weak and even if redrafted probably would not be issued unless coordinated US statement put out at same time. One objection may be Chinese dislike of any implication US assuming unilateral responsibilities. (This was major objection to 1950 neutralization.) Would it be possible for Chinese statement, if and when issued, to refer to joining in "protecting such related positions and territories as the two governments agree to be essential to defense of Formosa and Pescadores"? This should appeal to Chinese and yet would leave US entirely free to agree or not in any given case.

Under present highly delicate circumstances I would recommend considering once more issuance of simultaneous US and Chinese statements after coordinating with Yeh and Koo. Assuming revised Chinese draft satisfactory to Department, I might suggest US statement along following lines, using Chinese statement as occasion for issuance rather than Congressional resolution on which President Eisenhower already has commented:

"The Government of the Republic of China's announcing the re-deployment of its military forces from the Tachens, a group of small islands about 200 miles north of Formosa, to other positions which

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 293.9322/1-3155. Top Secret; Priority. Received at 5:41 p.m.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 6, Document 61.

<sup>3</sup> Transmitted in Document 62.

will have the effect of strengthening the defenses of Formosa and the Pescadores. As a further contribution to securing and protecting Formosa, in consonance with the Congressional resolution approved January 29, 1955, the United States Government will extend assistance to the Republic of China, in defending related positions or territories now in its hands which the two governments agree to be essential to the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores. The United States also will assist in the redeployment of Chinese forces from the Tachens.

"These steps have been taken in the interest of forestalling possible further armed attacks upon territories under the jurisdiction of the Republic of China and of contributing thereby to the restoration of peace and security in the west Pacific."

View delay in Tachen evacuation it might be wiser to encourage impression this due to proposal just laid before UNO Security Council which necessitate postponing other action at least few days until prospects these proposals clarified. This might divert some attention from stories emanating from Taipei of US-Chinese differences and from Washington of plans to use off-shore islands for bargaining purposes. Actually Tachen evacuation itself might have some bargaining value if delayed short time.

**Rankin**

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**69. Telegram From the Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China <sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, January 31, 1955—8:08 p.m.*

421. Eyes only Ambassador Rankin. Refurtels 496 and 497. <sup>2</sup> Deptel 417. <sup>3</sup>

1. The following should be conveyed immediately to President Chiang and he should be informed that it has the approval of the President. You are cautioned to exercise the utmost discretion in handling it. (We are disturbed over broadcasts and press reports this

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/1-3155. Top Secret; Niact. Cleared with the President by Acting Secretary Hoover, according to a memorandum of February 1 from Scott to Goodpaster. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Miscellaneous Series, Formosa Area) Drafted by Murphy, Phleger, Robertson, McConaughy, Bowie, and Merchant. Also sent to USUN eyes only for Lodge.

<sup>2</sup> See Documents 59 and 60.

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 6, Document 61.

morning attributed to a high American source Taipei which undoubtedly have come to your attention.)

*Begin Statement:*

2. The Government of the United States has not altered its essential position as set forth to Foreign Minister Yeh in Washington. The United States remains steadfast in its resolve to associate itself closely with the Chinese Government in maintaining the existence of a free China against the growing menace of communist aggression. The presence of US Fleet units in the area and a US Air Wing on Formosa is concrete evidence of the intention of the United States Government in this respect. The Senate is considering on an expedited basis the ratification of the Mutual Defense Treaty and has moved the hearings up from February 7 to February 2.

3. Congress has by overwhelming vote authorized the President to employ the armed forces of the US as he deems necessary for the specific purpose of securing and protecting Formosa and the Pescadores against armed attack, this authority to include the securing and protection of such related positions and territories in that area now in friendly hands as he judges to be required or appropriate in assuring the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores. Under present circumstances it is the purpose of the President to assist in the defense of Quemoy and Matsu against armed attack if he judges such attack is of a character which shows that it is in fact in aid of and in preparation for an armed attack on Formosa and the Pescadores and dangerous to their defense. An attack by the communists at this time on Quemoy or Matsu which seriously threatened their loss would be deemed by the President to be of this character.

4. Our assumption of responsibility with respect to defense of "related areas" is unilateral as fully explained to Minister Yeh by Secretary Dulles. Also our reasons for confining public statements, both US and Chinese, to language of US Congressional Resolution were explained to Minister Yeh by Secretary of State Dulles.

This document is a Top Secret statement of present US position which must not be divulged by the Chinese Government.

*End Statement.*

5. In presenting foregoing to Chiang you should bear in mind that in conversations with Yeh (Deptel 417) Secretary said any formal Chinese statement should avoid implication of agreement or commitment between United States and Chinese Governments. United States responsibilities as to "related area" were unilateral. There was no agreement as to related area, and United States might have to deny any implications to contrary. Chinese unofficial sources could speculate, but there should be no official statement on either

side as to understanding re defense of related area. Secretary felt impossible to draw absolute geographical line or to specify which islands were important to defense of Formosa and which were not important. Relative defensive importance of islands could change. Any significant communist buildup in area would be regarded by United States with concern.

6. This Government recommends that President Chiang consider immediate request to US for aid to which we would respond affirmatively and then promptly issue announcement of Chinese decision to withdraw and regroup military forces on Tachens, in the form of Yeh's draft as amended (our 418).<sup>4</sup> Note that last paragraph of Deptel 418 is a generalized statement of US position which we feel is helpful to Chiang in his public relations. Foreign Minister Yeh has now authorized us to let President Chiang know that we have seen this draft.

7. FYI there is now pending in Security Council action calling for cessation of hostilities in the Formosan area. Our allies who are promoting this are anxious that we make no provocative statements that might be ascribed as the cause of the failure of any such proposal, if this should occur.

Hoover

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<sup>4</sup> Document 62.

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70. **Memorandum of a Conversation, Washington, January 31, 1955, 9:45 p.m.**<sup>1</sup>

SUBJECT

Off-shore Islands

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. George Yeh, Chinese Foreign Minister  
Dr. Wellington Koo, Chinese Ambassador  
Mr. Robertson, Assistant Secretary, FE  
Mr. McConaughy, Director, Office of Chinese Affairs

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/1-3155. Top Secret; Limited Distribution. Drafted by McConaughy and initialed by Robertson, indicating his approval. A note on the source text indicates that this conversation took place at the Chinese Ambassador's residence after dinner.

After a Chinese meal at the Embassy, with only the above four persons present, the participants gathered in the private study in the Chinese Embassy for a short discussion.

Mr. Robertson sketched the background of recent Formosa developments. He expressed regret that the Generalissimo was making a large issue of the inability of the U.S. Government to announce its intention to assist in the defense of Quemoy and Matsu. He felt the Generalissimo was disregarding far more significant favorable developments which showed that the U.S. was very much in earnest in its intention to aid the Chinese against further Communist aggression. It was unfortunate that in the face of such impressive evidence, the Generalissimo should harbor suspicions that he had been double crossed. Mr. Robertson stressed the import of the overwhelmingly favorable vote in both Houses of Congress on the Joint Resolution:— in the House, 400 [410] to 3; in the Senate 83 to 3. One of the "nay" votes in the House was actually based on the argument that the Resolution did not go far enough. The size of this enormous majority was a political phenomenon which Mr. Robertson said was absolutely unique in his experience. It was a striking thing that partisanship between the parties, and differences within the Democratic and Republican parties had been completely submerged in the recording of this impressive vote. The emphatic approval of this Resolution showed better than anything else could the strong backing which the American people accord to free China and the well nigh unanimous resolve to make a firm stand against further Chinese Communist encroachment. This vote should give immense encouragement to the Chinese Government. The positive significance of the Resolution far outweighed the slightly negative impact of the U.S. decision not to make a public commitment about the defense of Quemoy and Matsu. That decision had been taken because of a conviction that it would be wiser to adhere strictly to the language of the Joint Resolution and not create questions as to whether we had deviated from the spirit and intent of the Resolution by apparently singling out and freezing the position as to two points, while seemingly disregarding the rest of the "related area".

Mr. Robertson paid a tribute to the great qualities of the Generalissimo as a Chinese patriot and leader, and as a stalwart foe of Communism. He said that he knew the Generalissimo well and considered him to be one of the foremost figures of this generation. At the same time he felt he could say without disrespect (and the Foreign Minister and the Ambassador knew he would not show any disrespect for their President), that the international view of the Generalissimo was somewhat circumscribed by the fact that he had never been outside of the Far East and had no conception of the complexities of political and diplomatic processes in the U.S. He thought that

in some respects the world view of the Generalissimo was nearly as restricted as that of a typical U.S. mid-westerner. This tended to make him at times unduly suspicious of American motives. He was occasionally inclined to ascribe double dealing intentions to the U.S. and to be tempted to infer we might be ready to sell Free China down the river in concert with the British.

There was no justification for these suspicions and Mr. Robertson hoped that the Foreign Minister and the Ambassador could convince the Generalissimo that his misgivings were groundless, and that recent developments in the crisis have been much to the advantage of Free China.

Mr. Robertson then read the substance of the important message which had just been sent with the approval of the President to the American Ambassador in Taipei for delivery to the Generalissimo (Department's 421).<sup>2</sup> The Foreign Minister and the Ambassador listened carefully. The "statement" portion of the message was reread by Mr. McConaughy while a Chinese secretary (Mr. Wang) took it down word for word.

Dr. Yeh said he felt the message would serve to reassure the Generalissimo that there could be no question of the U.S. winking on the position set out, in view of the fact that it had the express approval of the President of the U.S. The significance of the top secret U.S. statement on Quemoy and Matsu would be fully apparent to the Generalissimo. It would certainly hearten him and his Government. However, the Foreign Minister felt that the message would not provide the public offset to the bad news of the Tachen withdrawal, which the Generalissimo felt was urgently required for public relations purposes, both in the Army and with the civilian populace. The security restriction made it impossible to get any public relations value out of the important U.S. decision. This was the remaining difficulty. All of the Chinese Government decisions and plans had been based on the assurances originally received from Secretary Dulles the week before last that a public announcement would be made of the U.S. intention to assist in the defense of Quemoy and Matsu. The abrupt reversal of the U.S. position left the Generalissimo in an awkward situation and had placed him in a frame of mind which made him receptive to suspicions that the British had persuaded the U.S. to back down, paving the way for an eventual surrender of all the offshore islands in return for a Formosa cease-fire.

The problem was to give the Generalissimo some tangible public evidence of U.S. support to counteract the bad effect of the Tachen withdrawal.

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<sup>2</sup> *Supra.*

Dr. Yeh said that the advice to evacuate the Tachens had gone very hard with the Generalissimo. He was wedded to the idea of holding the Tachens, into which a great deal of Chinese effort and resources have been poured over a period of five years, seeking to make the islands as nearly impregnable as possible. Both the Generalissimo and Foreign Minister Yeh felt that the Tachens were important from a strategic point of view, since they gave ready access to an important section of the China Coast and also lay across sea and air routes from the Shanghai area to the Formosa Strait. He said they would be very valuable in connection with any reconquest of the Mainland. However, he admitted that under present conditions it was practically impossible to supply and utilize the Tachens without air control. We acknowledged that air superiority could hardly be achieved with Chinese Government air bases four times as far away as Chinese Communist air bases. He said the Generalissimo had been offended by a recent reference by the Secretary to the Tachens as "only a bunch of rocks".<sup>3</sup> The Generalissimo had remarked that "Gibraltar also was nothing but a rock."

Mr. Robertson remarked that we were not urging the Chinese to withdraw from the Tachens. But we did feel that the Tachens did not have any real military importance and had decided that we could not use our military forces to hold them. We had offered to assist the Chinese, if asked, in effecting a withdrawal and redeployment, but we were not insisting that the Chinese withdraw.

Dr. Yeh referred to articles by John Hightower of the AP and Walter Lippman of the *New York Herald-Tribune* on January 31 intimating that the off-shore islands were being kept in reserve by the U.S. as a possible pawn to be used in a general cease-fire deal with the Chinese Communists.

Mr. Robertson emphatically branded these rumors as totally without foundation in fact, and as emanating from persons who had no authorized knowledge whatever as to classified policy decisions of the U.S. Government. He remarked that the Chinese Government representatives should decide whether they would deal with and have confidence in the President and the Secretary, or newspaper men who were completely outside the policy councils, and who were writing conjectural stories in ignorance of the actual decisions.

Mr. Robertson said he wanted the Chinese representatives to know of the understanding and sympathy with which the President regarded the cause of Free China. He remarked that the President had said explicitly at the White House conference on the night of January 30 immediately after he returned from Augusta and before

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<sup>3</sup> Reference is apparently to a remark made by Dulles during his second conversation with Yeh on January 19; see Document 19.



he had dinner, that he wanted a warm and friendly message containing strong reassurances sent to the Generalissimo. He did not want to leave the Generalissimo in any doubt as to the firmness of American support as most recently demonstrated by the presence of the Seventh Fleet in the area, and the stationing of a full Air Force wing of jet planes on Formosa.

The President had felt that we should not take a public position which departed from the language of the Joint Resolution. He did not want to seem to freeze a formal public position covering part of the "related area" which might seem in the circumstances to disregard the fluid nature of the situation and ignore the remainder of the "related area".

Ambassador Koo said that he felt that we should seek a formula acceptable to the President and to Congress, compatible with the language of the Joint Resolution, and capable of meeting President Chiang's need for a positive public declaration which would make more understandable to his military commanders and soldiers the unpleasant withdrawal decision. Ambassador Koo then proposed the following formula which he felt all elements could accept:

In the penultimate sentence of the Chinese Embassy draft of January 29<sup>4</sup> he would insert the phrase "including Quemoy and Matsu" after "territories". Thus the penultimate sentence would read, "In furtherance of the close cooperation between our two countries in the securing and defending of Taiwan (Formosa) and Penghu (Pescadores), the Government of the United States has indicated to the Chinese Government its decision also to join in the defense of such related positions and territories, including Quemoy and Matsu, the safeguarding of which the Government of the United States deems essential in assuring the defense of Taiwan and Penghu."

Ambassador Koo pointed out that this language still left the decision to the U.S. It confirmed that Quemoy and Matsu were included in "such related positions and territories".

Mr. Robertson mentioned that the Treaty hearings would begin on Wednesday, February 2, instead of Monday, February 7. He said the hearings had been moved forward at the request of the President in order to speed the ratification of the Treaty. Mr. Robertson cited this as another evidence of the earnestness and singleness of U.S. purpose. He mentioned that any official public statements regarding the Treaty area or the "related area" might have an effect on the Treaty hearings.

Dr. Yeh said that it might be worth while to explore the possibility of effecting an exchange of notes in regard to the defense of

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<sup>4</sup> Transmitted in Document 62.

Quemoy and Matsu. He was not proposing it but simply putting forward the idea informally for examination.

Mr. Robertson said that the formal inclusion of Quemoy and Matsu in the defense area would amount to an extension of the Treaty area. He said there was no question in his mind but that such an extension of the Treaty area would require Senate ratification. Even if such an understanding were merely embodied in notes, the documents would have to be sent up to the Senate as an amendment of the Treaty.

Dr. Yeh said that his Government would prefer some sort of bilateral understanding concerning the defense of Quemoy and Matsu, to a unilateral U.S. declaration.

Mr. Robertson hoped the Chinese representatives would impress on the Generalissimo that our position on the China issue was very different from that of the British. The positions were widely divergent. The Generalissimo must understand that our concurrence in the UN effort to bring about a cessation of hostilities was strictly pinpointed at the offshore islands and did not signify that we had succumbed in any way to British influence.

Mr. Robertson said that the Chinese did not have a better friend than the Secretary of State. Secretary Dulles grasped the magnitude and the nature of the Communist threat with a clear and far ranging vision. No one understood the needs of the present situation better than he. He had a profound understanding of the imperative need for the continued existence of Free China. He stood with the Chinese. The leaders of the Chinese Government need to understand the difficult U.S. political and diplomatic problems, curb their suspicions and negotiate on a basis of full confidence.

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71. **Letter From the President to the Supreme Allied  
Commander, Europe (Gruenther) <sup>1</sup>**

*[Washington,] February 1, 1955.*

DEAR AL: The past two weeks in Washington have been a period of tension—reminiscent of the numerous “flaps” that used to plague us in the old War Department.

The principal cause has been the Administration’s effort to clarify our people’s understanding of the consequences of an attack by

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Top Secret.

the ChiComs on Formosa and its neighboring islands, and to obtain their expressed support of the government's plans to defend those islands effectively. An added difficulty, as is always the case, has been the extreme care with which the public relations angle of this effort had to be handled.

In the present case, we have a Europe that, speaking generally, is fearful of what some Europeans consider American recklessness, impulsiveness and immaturity in the foreign field. In Red China we have a dictatorial regime which seeks every opportunity to develop among its own people and all other Asiatics a deeper and deeper hatred of the West, particularly of the United States. In Formosa we have the remnants of the Chinese Nationalists who are suspicious of any move in the Far East that does not involve an "immediate direct and destructive attack on Red China."

At home we have the truculent and the timid, the jingoists and the pacifists. Underlying the whole is the most important fact of today's life—the irreconcilable conflict between the theories of the Communist dictatorship and the basic principles of free world existence.

Any military man can easily make clear distinction between the defense of Formosa and the defense of the so-called offshore islands. Not only are two different military problems presented, but in the one case we are talking about territories the control of which has passed from nation to nation through the years—and in the other case, about territories that have always been a part of the Chinese mainland both politically and, in effect, geographically. So the political differences are almost as plain as the military differences when we talk about the defense of these two territories.

If there were no other factors than the military to consider, you and I, for example, would study the problem and would very quickly reach a decision that we would permit *no* advance by the Communists beyond the offshore islands, but that in any struggle involving only the territory of those islands, we would see no reason for American intervention.

Such a solution would infuriate the Chinese Communists because of their announced objective to take Formosa; it would infuriate the Chinese Nationalists because the retention of the offshore islands sustains their hope that one day they will go back to their homeland. It would more or less please our European friends because it implies to them a moderate attitude on our part, and the responsible officials in those countries can see the danger to all of us if Formosa should fall to the Communists. (Not that Red China, in her present state, would be a direct threat to the United States, but with international Communism having thus penetrated the island barrier in the Western Pacific and in a position to threaten the Philippines

and Indonesia immediately and directly, all of us would soon be in far worse trouble than we are now.)

At home the hypothetical solution I mention would be accepted by most merely because it is simple to describe, although there is a certain pacifist element that wants us completely out of the Western Pacific. Some people seem to think that we can surrender to the Communists the Japanese productive capacity and all the richness of the South Pacific territories and still be perfectly safe in this country. There are people who did not believe Hitler's threats any more than they now believe those of Chou and the Kremlin.

Now, if the solution we adopt should state flatly that we would defend the principal islands of the offshore group (Quemoy and the Matsus), we would now please the Chinese Nationalists, but we would frighten Europe and of course even further infuriate the Chinese Communists. Not that I think this last particularly important, because they are going to be infuriated anyway.

By announcing this as a policy we would be compelled to maintain in the area, at great cost, forces that could *assure* the defense of islands that are almost within wading distance of the mainland. This defensive problem could be extremely difficult over the long term, and I think that the world in general, including some of our friends, would believe us unreasonable and practically goading the Chinese Communists into a fight. We could get badly tied down by any such inflexible public attitude.

On the other hand, as we consider the problem of defending Formosa, we understand how important to us is the morale of the Chinese forces on that island. Their willingness to fight and to keep themselves in a high state of readiness for fighting is one of the keys to the situation. Consequently, even though we clearly see that our major concern, *so far as territory itself is involved, does not extend beyond Formosa and the neighboring Pescadores*, yet the economical and efficient defense of these islands involves a concern for the areas from which it could most easily be attacked.

You probably read the Resolution that was passed by the Congress, at my request. The wording, as to areas outside Formosa and the Pescadores, is vague. In view of what I have just said, you can understand why this is so.

The Resolution, then, is our publicly stated position; the problem now is how to make it work. The morale of the Chinese Nationalists still remains important to us, so they must have certain assurances with respect to the offshore islands. But these must be less binding on us than the terms of the Chino-American Treaty, now before our Senate for ratification. We must remain ready, until some better solution can be found, to move promptly against any Communist force that is manifestly preparing to attack Formosa. And we

must make a distinction—(this is a difficult one)—between an attack that has *only* as its objective the capture of an offshore island and one that is *primarily a preliminary movement to an all-out attack on Formosa*.

I could go on and discuss a thousand different points, with shadings of each, that we have discussed and hashed over during the past two weeks. Basic conclusions were scarcely involved; there have never been any great differences within the Administration on fundamentals. Most of the talks centered around the question of "what can we say and how can we say it" so as to retain the greatest possible confidence of our friends and at the same time put our enemies on notice that we are not going to stand idly by to see our vital interests jeopardized.

Of course, only time will tell how successful we have been. Every day will bring its problems and many of these will cause much more talking and haggling—even some *thinking!* More and more I find myself, in this type of situation—and perhaps it is because of my advancing years—tending to strip each problem down to its simplest possible form. Having gotten the issue well defined in my mind, I try in the next step to determine what answer would best serve the *long term* advantage and welfare of the United States and the free world. I then consider the *immediate problem* and what solution can we get that will best conform to the long term interests of the country and at the same time *can command a sufficient approval in this country so as to secure the necessary Congressional action*.

When I get a problem solved on this rough basis, I merely stick to the *essential* answer and let associates have a field day on words and terminology. (I suppose that many of those around me would protest that even in this field I am sometimes something of an autocrat and insist upon the employment of my own phraseology when I consider the issue important.) However, I really do try to stay out of this particular job as much as my own characteristics, particularly my ego, will permit.

Whatever is now to happen, I know that nothing could be worse than global war.

I do not believe that Russia wants war at this time—in fact, I do not believe that if we became engaged in rather a bitter fight along the coast of China, Russia would want to intervene with her own forces. She would, of course, pour supplies into China in the effort to exhaust us and certainly would exploit the opportunity to separate us from our major allies. But I am convinced that Russia does not want, at this moment, to experiment with means of defense against the bombing that we *could* conduct against her mainland. At the same time, I assume that Russia's treaty with Red China comprehends a true military alliance, which she would either have to repudiate or take the plunge. As a consequence of this kind of thinking, she

would probably be in a considerable dilemma if we got into a real shooting war with China. It would not be an easy decision for the men in the Kremlin, in my opinion.

In any event, we have got to do what we believe to be right—if we can figure out the right—and we must show no lack of firmness in a world where our political enemies exploit every sign of weakness, and are constantly attempting to disrupt the solidarity of the free world's intentions to oppose their aggressive practices.

Oddly enough I started out this letter with the complacent thought that I could point up, in one or two paragraphs, the salient features of my last two weeks' existence. Now I find that after all these words, I have only vaguely pointed out the biggest ones in this particular "can of worms."

When I see you in a couple of weeks, we can talk these things over more fully.

With love to Grace, and, of course, the best to yourself,

As ever,<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Printed from a carbon copy which bears no signature.

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72. **Telegram From the Ambassador in the Republic of China (Rankin) to the Department of State**<sup>1</sup>

*Taipei, February 2, 1955—6 p.m.*

511. Department's 421,<sup>2</sup> 422,<sup>3</sup> 423.<sup>4</sup> Upon receipt Department's 421, I decided to do as subsequently instructed in Department's 423 re United States position statement on off-shore islands. While asking yesterday afternoon for urgent appointment with President, I gave Acting Foreign Minister verbatim text of actual statement<sup>5</sup> so

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 293.9322/2-255. Top Secret; Priority. Received at 9:20 a.m. Repeated to USUN eyes only for Lodge, by the Department as Telegram 390 to New York, February 2, 1955.

<sup>2</sup> Document 69.

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 422 to Taipei, February 1, reads as follows:

"Your 499 [Document 68] crossed our 421 which sets forth definitive US position. We are now considering what kind official statement can be made here consistent with position taken in 421 in the event President Chiang responds favorably to issuing statement recommended to him by Yeh. You will be further advised." (Department of State, Central Files, 293.9322/1-3155)

<sup>4</sup> Telegram 423 to Taipei, February 1, instructed Rankin to deliver formally in writing that portion of telegram 421 to Taipei which was marked as a statement. (*Ibid.*, 993.72/2-155)

<sup>5</sup> A copy is *ibid.*, Taipei Embassy Files: Lot 62 F 83.

he could prepare personally a careful translation into Chinese for use when I saw Chiang (I talked with President for hour and quarter this morning with Acting Foreign Minister as interpreter.)

After going over text in detail Chiang asked me to explain phrases "under present circumstances" and "at this time" (in third numbered paragraph Department's 421). Did they mean that we would do thus and so now but not in the future? I replied I should not attempt to read anything additional into the statement, but added my personal view was that these phrases were intended to relate our policy to specific conditions, such as existed today, rather than to hypothetical circumstances which were unforeseeable and might never occur. At same time I did not regard statement as applying solely to present situation. President asked that I request further clarification from Department.

Next point on which Chiang laid stress was whether effect of Congressional resolution would continue after ratification of Defense Treaty. I did not comment on this.

Third item President raised was importance of some United States public statement at same time Chinese announced Tachen evacuation. He appears to have sent further instructions to Foreign Minister Yeh in this connection. I referred to paragraph (number 4 in Department's 421) in US statement just given him and asked if he had received details from Yeh of what Secretary Dulles said. He indicated his information was meager. Said I am so sad few actual details at hand but could envisage essential considerations. First, Senate would be willing to leave large authority in hands of President as Commander in Chief, but would not easily yield any of its power over international agreements. Also there was question of relative advantages of formal announcement re 1 or 2 islands and more general position which might avoid appearance of inviting Red aggression on any islands. I supposed military men should favor second alternative. I also reminded President that conversations in Washington had gone through several phases during past two weeks. What had seemed definite at one point might necessarily have changed subsequently in light of new developments. I repeated that while I believed these remarks pertinent they were not based on intimate knowledge of details.

Under above circumstances and view fact defense pact hearings now in progress and should not be jeopardized, I recommended acceptance of position statement I had just given him as satisfactory basis for requesting US aid in Tachen evacuation. I suggested he not insist on further explanation of phrases mentioned above, adding that when good faith is absent no use of words can bind a nation but when good faith present, as in this case, one need have no concern over details of wording.

President expressed appreciation of my remarks and quoted Chinese proverb to effect one never asks friend to do the impossible. He now understood US would not mention Kinmen and Matsu in public pronouncement but urged appropriate statement be issued nevertheless. He expressed hope US might agree to some mention of Kinmen and Matsu in Chinese statement on Tachen withdrawal but I gave him no encouragement at this point.

President then mentioned present Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference<sup>6</sup> and expressed concern over reported proposal Free Chinese give up all of offshore islands in return for ceasefire. He asked US to put UK straight on this point. (I made no comment but cannot imagine US agreeing to reported Commonwealth scheme.)

Finally President said that after Tachen evacuation he was considering proposal in security council condemning Soviet aggression against China. Revival of this project<sup>7</sup> would represent effort to label actual aggressor in fighting of last five months.

**Rankin**

<sup>6</sup> Held in London, January 31–February 8.

<sup>7</sup> The reference is apparently to a resolution originally proposed by the Republic of China at the Fourth Session of the General Assembly in 1949, resubmitted in revised form in 1952, further amended, and adopted by the General Assembly on February 1, 1952, as Resolution 505 (VI), which declared that the Soviet Union had failed to carry out the Sino-Soviet Treaty of August 14, 1945. For the resolution, see U.N. document A/2119, p. 4; for the treaty, see Department of State, *United States Relations With China* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1949), p. 585.

**73. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,  
Washington, February 2, 1955<sup>1</sup>**

**SUBJECT**

Formosa

**PARTICIPANTS**

The Acting Secretary  
Sir Roger Makins, British Ambassador  
Mr. Murphy  
Mr. Robertson  
Mr. Merchant

Sir Roger called at his request. He said that he had received a message from Sir Anthony Eden concerning the desire of the United

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/2–255. Secret. Drafted by Merchant.



Kingdom to find the basis on which to work very closely with us in the Far East. Sir Roger underlined that what he was about to say represented the views of Sir Anthony and did not emanate from the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' meeting on which he so far had only skeletal reports.

Sir Roger went on to say that Eden was reassured concerning our intentions regarding Formosa and that public opinion in Britain was clear on two points, first that the people on Formosa, who were anti-Communist, cannot be turned over to the Communists, and secondly, that the legal status of Formosa differs from that of the off-shore islands. British public opinion, however, is confused by the lack of clarity in U.S. policy with respect to these off-shore islands. It is also uncertain as to the possible future use of Formosa as a base for the invasion of the Mainland. Eden agrees that it is strategically essential to hold Formosa in friendly hands but he raises the question as to whether this facet of the matter should be emphasized publicly as the basis for policy. He is now asking whether it would be possible for the U.S. to clarify its policy with respect to the off-shore islands. He believes that broad support of the British public can be obtained for our Formosa policy if it is reassured that the island will not be used as an invasion base and that it is not our intention that the off-shore islands should be indefinitely held by the Nationalists.

The Acting Secretary replied that, without accepting or rejecting anything that Sir Roger had said, he would like to communicate to the Secretary on his return Sunday<sup>2</sup> night the content of Sir Roger's approach. He added that nothing crucial would arise in the next few days which would require an earlier answer.

Mr. Murphy then inquired whether he had any information or comments on the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' meeting. The Ambassador replied he had received virtually nothing.

The Ambassador then mentioned that he had discussed the question of the evacuation of the Tachen Islands with the Secretary just before the latter's departure.<sup>3</sup> He wondered if this movement was imminent and he expressed the view himself that it would be better accomplished before an attack was launched. The Secretary had indicated that he rather expected the Nationalists would agree on a redeployment the early part of this week.

Mr. Hoover indicated that no decision had been taken by the Nationalists as yet, but that it would probably be forthcoming within the next 2 or 3 days.

Mr. Murphy mentioned the great concern we have regarding Nationalist morale. It would be helpful if the Prime Ministers in

<sup>2</sup> February 6.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 54.

London took this important factor into account in their consideration.

The Ambassador replied that he had fully reported this element of our thinking and believed it was being taken into account. He recapitulated that there is agreement on the central point of the importance of holding Formosa. He felt that the gulf which had been created by British recognition of Peiping<sup>4</sup> and our continued recognition of the Republic of China was tending to lose an [*in?*] importance, particularly since he believed that the U.S. no longer felt that Chiang Kai-shek was likely to regain control of the Mainland. The risk of war is over the off-shore islands which Britain recognizes as Mainland Chinese territory.

Mr. Murphy pointed out the flaw in this logic since the Peiping regime had never had control of these off-shore islands. They had been continuously under the control of the Republic of China which we recognized. To say that they belonged to Mainland China was to fail to recognize the *de jure* or the *de facto* situation.

Sir Roger repeated that in his view war arising from the off-shore islands would not secure general public support in the U.K.

The question was then raised with the Ambassador of the necessity of defending Formosa which it was agreed was necessary. How could a build-up of a magnitude to be clearly directed against Formosa rather than an off-shore island be overlooked or disregarded in light of Peiping's insistence that they were going to liberate Formosa and that this was the objective of all their operations.

Sir Roger closed the conversation by asking again if it would not be best to evacuate the off-shore islands. It was pointed out once more to him that there were military and moral objections to any such proposal.

As the Ambassador left Mr. Hoover reiterated that what he had said would be brought to the attention of the Secretary on his return and that no doubt the Secretary would wish to talk further with the Ambassador.

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<sup>4</sup> In January 1950.

74. Telegram From the Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China <sup>1</sup>

Washington, February 2, 1955—7:35 p.m.

433. Reurtel 511. <sup>2</sup> You are instructed to seek audience with Generalissimo and reiterate that our 421 <sup>3</sup> states definitive US position as approved by President on matters therein covered. Specifically would add following comments re questions raised.

1. Continuance in effect of Congressional Resolution not related to ratification of Defense Treaty. It continues until President shall determine that peace and security of area is reasonably assured by international conditions created by action of the UN or otherwise and shall so report to Congress.

2. In paragraph 3 Deptel 421 phrases "under present circumstances" and "at this time" reflect necessity under resolution that President retain full discretion regarding actions with respect to related areas so that he may act promptly as situations develop. US intentions firm as to situation under present conditions.

3. US position regarding any reference to Quemoy or Matsu in Chinese public statement remains as stated in Deptel 421. Accordingly, you were quite right in not encouraging any hope for US approval of such reference. Yeh and Koo who raised same point night of 31st <sup>4</sup> have since been told we cannot concur in proposed insertion and reasons therefor.

4. You should expressly confirm to President Chiang that British have been apprised of our position as to offshore islands and they understand it fully.

5. Prompt indication re Chinese Government intentions as to withdrawal from Tachens seems to us essential. Further delay risks withdrawal in face Communist attack, which would make difficult to present evacuation as voluntary redeployment for strategic purpose of strengthening defenses of Formosa. Moreover, US Navy cannot continue indefinitely to keep the forces now deployed in the area on

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 293.9322/2-255. Top Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Bowie, Phleger, and McConaughy. Notations in Hoover's handwriting on a draft copy state that he approved and that he read paragraph 5 over the telephone to Admiral Radford, who concurred. (*Ibid.*, ROC Files: Lot 71 D 517, 1954-1955, Offshore Islands)

<sup>2</sup> Document 72.

<sup>3</sup> Document 69.

<sup>4</sup> See Document 70.

an around-the-clock alert basis in their present positions, state of deployment and alert.<sup>5</sup>

Hoover

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<sup>5</sup> Telegram 521 from Taipei, February 3, reported that Rankin requested an interview with President Chiang on an urgent basis but learned that Chiang would not be able to see him until the next day. (Department of State, Central Files, 293.9322/2-355)

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## 75. Editorial Note

At a meeting of the National Security Council on February 3, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles and Admiral Radford briefed the Council concerning aspects of the situation in the area of Taiwan and the offshore islands. The relevant portion of Gleason's memorandum of the discussion reads as follows:

"With respect to the Formosa situation, Mr. Dulles said that the pattern of Chinese Communist conduct was now clarifying a little, though he warned that revolutionary regimes like China's were 'boisterous' and hard to predict. They need foreign devils, and at this point the United States is playing the part of foreign devil. The emerging tendencies were these: (1) Freeing Formosa has become the main propaganda theme; the offshore islands are cast in a role secondary to this. (2) Formosa is wholly an internal Chinese matter, and one not susceptible of legitimate international interference. (3) U.S. policy is deliberately leading to war and accordingly there can be absolutely no accommodation to it.

"Mr. Dulles predicted that the Chinese Communists were likely to maintain international tension for some weeks to come, without actually precipitating significant military action. The general objective would be to occasion maximum pressure on U.S. policy by the allies of the United States. On the other hand, the intelligence community did not estimate that the Chinese Communists were likely to deliberately attack U.S. forces engaged in the evacuation of the Tachens.

"The attitude of Moscow had been revealed to some degree by Molotov's talks with the British Ambassador, Sir William Hayter. In a general way the Soviets seemed to desire to exert a restraining influence on the Chinese Communists.

"Admiral Radford indicated that the task force of the Seventh Fleet still remained in an area approximately 100 miles north and east of Formosa and 125 miles from the Tachens. The situation had been more or less quiet for the last week." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

76. Telegram From the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Aldrich) to the Department of State <sup>1</sup>

*London, February 3, 1955—1 p.m.*

3428. For Hoover. I had half-hour conversation with Nehru this morning. Madame Pandit <sup>2</sup> also present. Atmosphere cordial and friendly but after conversation started intensely serious.

After recalling occasion when we had entertained Nehru and Madame Pandit in New York in 1949 and our talks at that time, I told Nehru that I was sure Washington would be interested in his reaction to present situation in Far East. He smiled and then said very seriously that question was enormously complicated but that fundamental difficulty was that Chiang Kai-shek, who was a man about whom he did not wish to say anything derogatory because he had been his guest and had no personal feelings against him, had been passed by, by history and that his aspirations were no longer attainable but that Mao Tse-tung was nevertheless in constant fear that Chiang Kai-shek might attempt to invade the mainland with the help of the United States. Besides this the air raids on mainland and against shipping constituted continuous pinpricks. This situation he characterized as a running sore. He said that as far as Formosa was concerned Chinese Communists believed that it belonged to China which had held it for 1000 years before it had been taken from them by Japan, and all through the last war China had claimed that Formosa should be restored to them by Japan at end of war. These facts created a most difficult situation for Mao Tse-tung. Moreover India had recognized Mao Tse-tung's Government, which made it impossible for India to consider that Chiang Kai-shek had legitimate claim to occupy Formosa as part of Chinese territory.

At this point he reiterated statement that history had passed Chiang Kai-shek by and compared his position to Indian Princes who had been protected by Britain for so many years and who after the separation of India from empire, no longer had power to protect themselves. He said half facetiously, "we did not treat them badly. We have given them pensions and now, although they no longer have any power they are quite happy." I replied that it did not seem to me that there was any parallel at all between what happened to the Indian Princes and what might happen to Chiang Kai-shek, but that in any event it had already been made entirely clear that the

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/2-355. Secret; Priority. Received at 12:14 p.m. Repeated to Taipei as telegram 436, and to USUN as telegram 398 to New York, February 3 by the Department.

<sup>2</sup> Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, Indian High Commissioner in the United Kingdom.

United States was not prepared to throw Chiang Kai-shek to the Communist wolves. He replied that he of course understood that.

Nehru said that in his own interviews with Mao Tse-tung he had not found him unreasonable. He referred specifically to a conversation he had had with Mao Tse-tung at request of Pope for release of a Catholic Bishop which had resulted in release of Bishop after two days consideration by Mao Tse-tung in what Nehru described as a casual manner. He said he felt certain that the American airmen held by Mao Tse-tung would have already been released if the request from the United Nations had not been coupled with a resolution condemning the action of the Chinese Reds in holding them.

Nehru felt that greatest difficulty in obtaining cease-fire would be to persuade Red Chinese Government to come to New York unless they were first admitted to United Nations. When I observed that it seemed to me that it was obvious that there wasn't chance of that happening, he said that he realized that but that all that could be done was to wait and see what the result of the invitation would be.

I then asked him if anything had happened during the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference so far which he thought might be helpful in bringing about a cease-fire. He replied that after the first discussions the conference had postponed further consideration of the situation until reaction of Chinese Communists to Security Council resolution had become apparent. I asked him how long Prime Ministers' Conference would go on and he said until next Tuesday<sup>3</sup> noon.

I told him that I personally felt that his wisdom and guidance should be most helpful in bringing about a cease-fire which was, after all, what everyone wants. He said in reply he was afraid that in present situation wisdom was not enough, but that I could be assured that he would do everything in his power to be helpful. He said "of course we leaders of the free world must carry our public opinion with us. We are not like the Communists who are able to make decisions without considering such opinion in our own country. This limits our power of action."

I ended interview by saying I appreciated what he had said and told him that if there was anything I could do to be helpful to him I was completely at his disposal.

I believe the manner in which Nehru spoke, as well as what he said, evidenced the fact that his experiences in the past two days in

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<sup>3</sup> February 8.

the Prime Ministers' Conference may have had a very sobering effect upon him.

Department repeat as desired.

Aldrich

## 77. Editorial Note

A telegram of February 3, from Premier Chou En-lai to Secretary-General Hammarskjöld rejected the Security Council's invitation conveyed in Hammarskjöld's message of January 31. Chou's message charged that the purpose of the New Zealand proposal was "to intervene in China's internal affairs and to cover up the acts of aggression by the United States against China" and declared that the People's Republic of China could agree to send a representative to take part in the Security Council's discussions "only for the purpose of discussing the draft resolution of the Soviet Union, and only when the representative of the Chiang Kai-shek clique has been driven out from the Security Council and the representative of the People's Republic of China is to attend in the name of China". For text of the message, see U.N. document S/3358; it is also printed in *Department of State Bulletin*, February 14, 1955, pages 254-255.

James Hagerty's diary entry for February 3 describes a conversation with the President concerning this. It states that Hagerty learned of the statement when he returned to the White House from New York at 3:30 that afternoon; the President had already been informed of it by Senator Knowland. After discussing a possible State Department press release with Acting Secretary Hoover, Hagerty took a copy of Chou's statement to the President, who was in his studio painting. The diary continues as follows:

"When I came in, I told him that Chou En-lai had just rejected an invitation to come to the United Nations. I said that his statement had repeated the usual attacks on the United States for aggression and intervention in Chinese internal affairs, that we had occupied Formosa; and that the Chinese Reds demanded we withdraw our armed forces from Formosa and the Formosan Straits."

Hagerty then read a portion of the statement to the President. The diary continues:

"I told the President that I had talked to Herbert Hoover and gave him the gist of the statement that Hoover would put out. He agreed with that and then said, 'You know, they (the Chinese Communists) are certainly doing everything they can to try our patience. It's awfully difficult to remain calm under these situations. Sometimes I think that it would be best all around to go after them right now without letting them pick their time and the place of their own

choosing. I have a feeling that the Chinese Communists are acting on their own on this and that it is considerably disturbing to the Russians. This Chou refusal must come as a great surprise to our British friends. You know, they were trying to get us in a position where they would solve the whole situation and stop the hostilities. Of course, they're not too interested in Formosa, but Hongkong—that's another story. They'd do almost anything to retain that."

The diary states that Hagerty then called Hoover and told him that the President had approved releasing a statement. (Eisenhower Library, Hagerty Papers) For text of a statement made to the press that day by Henry Suydam, Chief of the News Division, see Department of State *Bulletin*, February 14, 1955, page 254.

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78. **Telegram From the Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China**<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, February 3, 1955—4:26 p.m.*

434. Following U.S. statement, slightly revised since our 432,<sup>2</sup> has been approved by President.<sup>3</sup> It is planned for issuance immediately after Chinese Government makes public announcement satisfactory to us as to redeployment its military forces from Tachens. You should transmit this statement immediately to Chinese Government for its private information.

Chinese statement drafted by Yeh, our 418,<sup>4</sup> with revision mentioned therein would be satisfactory to U.S. If different statement contemplated by Chinese Government we would expect have opportunity to pass on its acceptability before agreeing to proceed.

*Begin statement*

"The Government of the Republic of China has announced that it will redeploy its military forces from the Tachens, a group of small islands 200 miles north of Formosa, to other positions. It has request-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 293.9322/2-355. Top Secret; Niact; Limited Distribution. Drafted by McConaughy and approved by Robertson.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 432 to Taipei, February 2, transmitted for Rankin's information the text of a draft U.S. statement, not yet submitted to the President for approval. (*Ibid.*, 793.5/2-255)

<sup>3</sup> A copy of the statement, with revisions indicated, bears the notation in Hoover's handwriting, "approved, with changes by the President, February 3, 1955, 9:45 a.m." The revisions were in the first sentence, which had previously concluded with a clause reading "which will have the effect of strengthening the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores", and in the second paragraph, which had previously read in part: "defending related positions and territories now in its hands which the United States deems. . ." (*Ibid.*, ROC Files: Lot 71 D 517, 1954-1955, Offshore Islands)

<sup>4</sup> Document 62.



ed the aid of United States forces in protecting and assisting the re-deployment of these military forces and the evacuation of such civilians as desire to leave those islands. The United States Government has given orders to the Seventh Fleet and other United States forces to assist in this operation.

The United States Government has further advised the Chinese Government that with the object of securing and protecting Formosa in consonance with the Congressional resolution approved January 29, 1955, the United States Government will extend assistance to the Republic of China in defending such related positions and territories now in its hands as the United States deems to be essential to the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores.

It is hoped that these steps will contribute to a cessation of communist attacks and to the restoration of peace and security in the West Pacific."

*End statement.*

Hoover

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79. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, February 3, 1955, 4:30 p.m. <sup>1</sup>

SUBJECT

Off-shore Islands Situation

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. George Yeh, Foreign Minister  
 Dr. Tan, Minister of Chinese Embassy  
 Mr. Robertson, Assistant Secretary for FE  
 Mr. McConaughy, Director for CA (latter part of meeting)  
 Mr. Martin, Deputy Director for CA

After stating that he had cabled to Taipei our draft statement <sup>2</sup> on withdrawal from the Tachens, Dr. Yeh referred to the Chinese Government's desire to include specific mention of Quemoy and Matsu in their draft statement. Dr. Yeh said that his draft <sup>3</sup> had been rejected by President Chiang. He had suggested that the negotiations on the wording be transferred to Taipei and be carried out between Ambassador Rankin and the Generalissimo.

Mr. Robertson reminded Dr. Yeh that the Secretary had explained we could not include Matsu and Quemoy in our statement as

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/2-355. Top Secret. Drafted by Martin and initialed by Robertson, indicating his approval.

<sup>2</sup> Transmitted in telegram 434, *supra*. The revised draft statement had been given to Minister Tan by McConaughy that day. (Memorandum of conversation by McConaughy, February 3; Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/2-355)

<sup>3</sup> Document 62.

we did not wish to pinpoint any particular territory. He said that the President was opposed to mentioning any territory by name but made clear that we will defend certain related areas. Mr. Robertson also stressed that we were talking about redeploying Chinese forces from the Tachens, not withdrawing. Mr. Robertson said that the Chinese should not wait until a large-scale attack had begun on the Tachens before beginning redeployment. In case of such an attack the U.S. forces might not be able to assist in the redeployment. If the redeployment were carried out now, it could be described as strengthening Chinese military positions.

Dr. Yeh said that the Generalissimo understood that the United States would not refer to Quemoy and Matsu in a public statement but the Chinese Government would make a unilateral statement in which they would refer to Quemoy and Matsu.

Mr. Robertson said that the U.S. might have to repudiate such a statement. He emphasized that this was not merely his word but the Secretary had said the same thing on January 28. Mr. Robertson read the final paragraph from the memorandum of conversation between the Secretary and Dr. Yeh of that date.<sup>4</sup> The Secretary had said then that he wished the Chinese to avoid naming Quemoy and Matsu in their formal statements. While it was the present intention of the U.S. to assist in the defense of these islands, there was no agreement with the Chinese Government or commitment between the two Governments. The U.S. Government might have to deny any implications which might appear in a public statement of the Chinese Government that the U.S. had such a commitment. Mr. Robertson said that in view of what the Secretary had told Dr. Yeh on January 28 he could not understand how the Generalissimo could make a unilateral statement mentioning Quemoy and Matsu.

Dr. Yeh said he did not say that the Generalissimo would make such a statement; there was no intention to make such a statement unless the United States agreed to it.

Mr. Robertson repeated that we could not agree to it. The Secretary had made this clear. He could not exceed what the President had said and what Congress had authorized.

Dr. Yeh then asked if the President's statement still stood.

Mr. Robertson said yes. The statement which we planned to make with respect to withdrawal of the Tachens, however, would of course not be made until the Chinese decided to redeploy and asked us for assistance.

Dr. Yeh asked Mr. Robertson to inform Ambassador Rankin that he, Dr. Yeh, had requested the U.S. Government to authorize inclu-

<sup>4</sup> Document 50.

sion in the Chinese statement of specific mention of Quemoy and Matsu and that Mr. Robertson had said this would not be possible.

Mr. Robertson reminded Dr. Yeh that it was the Secretary who had said on January 28 that it would not be possible.

Dr. Yeh said that he felt our draft statement on withdrawal from the Tachens did not help much since it did not include the names of the two islands. The problem was to offset the bad effect on morale in Free China of an announcement on withdrawal from the Tachens and he did not feel that the statement would be effective in this respect.

Mr. Robertson pointed out that the statement indicated that the U.S. Government would extend assistance to the Republic of China in defending related positions and territories now in its hands, which was a broader statement than one which would include the names of the two islands.

Dr. Yeh then turned to the situation in the United Nations. He thought there might be a period in which new efforts would be involved to get the Chinese Communists invited. London and other capitals might attempt to inject new elements and the UN cease-fire item might be protracted for weeks or months. In this connection, he wondered whether it would be advisable to pull out of the Tachens. He had mentioned this to the Secretary briefly and the Secretary's reaction was negative. Dr. Yeh thought that it would have a bad public effect to withdraw from the Tachens before a cease-fire.

Mr. Robertson recalled that he had told the Generalissimo and Dr. Yeh that the Chinese Communists would undoubtedly contemptuously reject the UN cease-fire proposal, just as they had now done. They couldn't accept UN jurisdiction over Formosa any more than in the case of Korea. Dr. Yeh was reminded that he himself had said that Chou En-lai does not bluff. Mr. Robertson said that the best conditions existed now for redeployment of Chinese forces from the Tachens and evacuation of civilians. It would be highly desirable for the request to come now. If we wait until the Communists start to attack the Tachens, the President might feel that as no request for redeployment had been received we would not be in a position to help. If this happened the Communists would be given a great psychological victory, as they would be able to pound the Nationalists on the Tachens while the U.S. stood by.

Dr. Yeh asked if a request for U.S. assistance and withdrawal were made and granted, would the U.S. be ready to consult immediately as to the defense of Quemoy and Matsu?

Mr. Robertson said there was a top American Admiral <sup>5</sup> on Formosa. The fleet was waiting on full alert basis. We were ready to start operations as soon as the Chinese made up their minds.

Dr. Yeh asked if we would be ready then to take steps to implement the strengthening of Matsu and Quemoy and begin consulting about it.

Mr. Robertson said that we would assist in bringing the forces from the Tachens to Formosa and from there they could be deployed to other positions. In our statement we would refer to assisting the Chinese in redeploying the troops to other positions.

Dr. Yeh said he thought redeployment was a euphemism for evacuation. He wanted to know if we were ready to formulate plans concerning Matsu and Quemoy.

Mr. Robertson said that was a military matter but in his opinion we were ready to discuss this.

Dr. Yeh asked if discussions had been held on this question.

Mr. Robertson said that as far as he knew the Chinese hadn't asked for discussions.

Dr. Yeh asked whether the redeployment from the Tachens would be confined to withdrawal operations or would consultation also take place on defense of Quemoy and Matsu.

Mr. Robertson said that in his opinion consultations could be held immediately on defense of Quemoy and Matsu.

Dr. Yeh said that he was glad to hear this but recalled no reference to this point in previous conversations.

Mr. Robertson recalled that the Secretary had said in the present situation the U.S. would aid in the defense of Matsu and Quemoy, although we would make no public statement on it. If conditions changed, we would not want to be committed. Mr. Robertson felt there would be an automatic need for consultations when the order went out for the withdrawal of the Tachens.

Mr. Robertson said he felt we would be missing the boat if we did not seize the present opportunity for redeployment. We had to work on a basis of mutual cooperation and good faith. Without these what was said in statements would make little difference.

Dr. Yeh said that we seemed to be stuck on the point of public announcement. He realized that there are U.S. domestic reasons for not making one. He then said the Generalissimo had a nice reaction to the President's message. <sup>6</sup> It had dispelled his fears. There was still the question as to how to meet the psychological impact of the announcement of the withdrawal from the Tachens. Dr. Yeh said he

<sup>5</sup> Admiral Pride.

<sup>6</sup> Transmitted in Document 69.

had been rebuffed by his own Government on his draft statement. He wanted to transfer negotiations to Taipei.

Mr. Robertson thought this would only compound confusion. Mr. Robertson emphasized that the negotiations could best be carried out between the Department and the Foreign Minister here. He assured Dr. Yeh there had been no change in U.S. intentions. He emphasized the unique support which the President's message had received in Congress and the magnificent job the President and the Secretary had done to rally opinion. It was unfortunate that the Chinese were now hesitating.

Dr. Yeh asked what steps would be taken following rejection of the invitation to the Chinese Communists? What was the U.S. Government's opinion?

Mr. Robertson pointed out that the invitation came from the UN and the Security Council would have to consider what steps would be taken. There had not yet been time for formulating U.S. Government opinion.

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## 80. Telegram From the Ambassador in the Republic of China (Rankin) to the Department of State <sup>1</sup>

*Taipei, February 4, 1955—5 p.m.*

526. Off-shore Islands. Deptels 418, <sup>2</sup> 433, <sup>3</sup> 434, <sup>4</sup> 439. <sup>5</sup> Text US statement quoted Deptel 434 was handed to Acting Foreign Minister Shen <sup>6</sup> this morning. Only question that arose was why reference to US assistance at Tachen was now limited to evacuating civilians <sup>7</sup> but Shen and I agreed that this probably need not make any practical difference.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 293.9322/2-455. Top Secret; Niact. Received at 7:55 a.m. Passed to USUN by the Department at Rankin's request.

<sup>2</sup> Document 62.

<sup>3</sup> Document 74.

<sup>4</sup> Document 78.

<sup>5</sup> Telegram 439 to Taipei, February 3, reads in part as follows:

"Inform President Chiang urgently that Chinese Communist attacks against Tachens and implications of Chinese Communist arrogant rejection Security Council invitation emphasize necessity for immediate decision as to redeployment from Tachens. A new situation for both US and Chinese Governments might be created if decision should be delayed." (Department of State, Central Files, 293.9322/2-355)

<sup>6</sup> Shen Chang-huan, Political Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs.

<sup>7</sup> This misunderstanding was due to an error in the transmission of telegram 434; see Document 85. A copy of the statement given to Shen on February 4 is in Department of State, Taipei Embassy Files: Lot 62 F 83. The second sentence reads as follows:

Shen is redrafting Yeh's proposed statement (Deptel 418) to conform with President Chiang's wishes. Revised draft probably will be quite similar but shorter and tighter. Technical reason for delay in this connection appears to be that Chinese Government considers it has received no definitive reply to request that reference to Kinmen and Matsu be included; also insertion of "which Government of US deems essential" being held in abeyance until previous point clarified. Foreign Ministry had been led to believe US reply might be awaiting Secretary Dulles' return to Washington.

I told Shen I felt US position quite firm that no mention be made of any specific islands and that "US deems" is essential. I remarked that in actual fact these two points were of no more than psychological value and in retrospect would seem unimportant. He assured me their draft would be cleared with Department before issuance and expressed appreciation having US statement before him to aid in his drafting. I noted that although US text had been approved by President, its issuance naturally contingent upon satisfactory (to US) Chinese statement.

Shen said both Minister Yeh and he set great store by issuing two statements simultaneously, since this would strengthen effect and demonstrate full agreement between two governments. If US statement delayed some time after Chinese it would appear as afterthought.

This morning Shen saw President briefly and relayed substance of Deptel 434 which I had conveyed to him orally yesterday. Chiang instructed him to pass to me following for Department's attention:

1. Now that Reds have rejected Security Council invitation, US-Chinese cooperation and coordination particularly important.

2. Does Red step (1) alter US views re timing of Tachen evacuation, of announcements in that connection or of formal mention of Kinmen and Matsu?

3. What is US view in same detail re Red action and what course do we contemplate?

I replied that there could be no alternative to agreeing with point (1) and that (3) was matter for reply in due course, but I felt sure answer to point (2) was no, particularly view Deptel 439 of which I gave substance to Shen. I said time was of essence.

Hollington Tong<sup>8</sup> was lunching with President today. I saw him just before he went there and asked him to pass on essentials of above with stress on necessity of quick action.

**Rankin**

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"It has requested the aid of the United States forces in the evacuation of such civilians as desire to leave those islands."

<sup>8</sup> Ambassador of the Republic of China to Japan.

81. Telegram From the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bohlen) to the Department of State <sup>1</sup>

Moscow, February 4, 1955—4 p.m.

1237. There is no information available here on which to base clear answer to question raised in Department's telegram 604. <sup>2</sup> Following views therefore are speculation based on external evidence of Soviet attitude and handling of this question.

Chief evidence is statement in Molotov's reply to British Ambassador: (1) That SC should deal with question and (2) that Soviet representative had been instructed that Chinese Communists should be invited to send representative. This general position, judging from telegram under reference, was adhered to and confirmed by Sobolev in SC meeting January 31. What we had generally anticipated here (and from foregoing apparently Soviet Government also) was Chinese acceptance to send representative to New York to discuss Soviet resolution accompanied by refusal to attend or participate in SC discussion New Zealand item. *Pravda* editorial (Embassy's telegram 1212) <sup>3</sup> seemed to forecast this possibility in paragraph quoted.

There was nothing in Soviet attitude or action which would indicate that they anticipated introduction of question UN representation and demand for expulsion Chinese Nationalist representative on SC which clearly precludes any Chinese Communist attendance or participation in any form SC consideration this question. It is of course possible that affair was carefully contrived maneuver agreed jointly by Soviet Union and Communist China to enhance impact of Chinese refusal in hope that this would produce major point division Western Powers. But this, I believe, unlikely since it is not characteristic of Soviet Government to risk its prestige in an official position which subsequently was repudiated by another country however closely allied. Insofar as effect on West is concerned, while impossible to judge from here, it would seem that adamant Chinese position would react unfavorably against Communists and tend to enhance rather than diminish support for US position.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/2-455. Top Secret; Niact. Received at 12:33 p.m.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 604 to Moscow, February 3, requested Bohlen's views on the significance of Chou's rejection of the Security Council invitation, especially his stress on the issue of Chinese representation in the United Nations, with specific reference to the question of whether it had been coordinated with Moscow. (*Ibid.*, 793.00/2-355)

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 1212 from Moscow, February 1, commented on a *Pravda* editorial of the same day which had declared that the United Nations should occupy itself not with the New Zealand item but with the question of U.S. aggression. (*Ibid.*, 793.00/2-155)

I have already reported (Embassy telegram 1185)<sup>4</sup> our doubts as to degree of influence Soviet Union in these interim and intermediary steps can exercise over Chinese Communists and I consider, on existing scanty evidence, Chinese reply was not that anticipated by Moscow when it adopted Soviet position in SC discussion. It would, however, be a serious mistake to expect that Moscow will not now give full support to Chinese position now that latter has been made public and official. Whatever degree of difference in initial phases of this question, it is highly unlikely that Moscow will give any indication of disagreement with Chinese Communists in any outward form. This does not totally exclude possibility behind scenes efforts by Soviets, possibly along lines indicated by Sobolev, in regard to private meetings,<sup>5</sup> but even this is doubtful in face of Chinese attitude.

Soviet press publishes today without comment full text Chou-En-lai reply and continues to feature news despatches from various parts of world in support Chinese Communist claim to Taiwan and alleged US interference and aggression.

On the larger issues, it is of course possible that Chinese Communists have convinced themselves that they are running no serious danger in turning down SC participation and therefore prefer that possible withdrawal from Tachen Islands forecast in foreign press and radio should take place not as result any UN action but as psychological-political victory for Communist China.

In connection with general subject Chinese attitude, . . . Ambassador yesterday showed me telegram from their representative Peking stating that it was generally believed there that Chinese would accept SC invitation but only for discussion Soviet resolution concerning US. . . . Embassy Peking also stated belief that Chinese Communists realize they would need full and active Soviet support in any serious attempt to attack Formosa and it was very doubtful if they had received any encouragement or assurance from Moscow on this point. In giving me foregoing . . . Ambassador asked that it be held in strictest confidence since he had no authorization from his government to show me this message.

In conclusion, I am of belief that general considerations outlined in my 1185 still obtain in regard to Soviet preferential policy.

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<sup>4</sup> Document 47.

<sup>5</sup> Telegram 604 to Moscow, cited in footnote 2 above, stated that Sobolev had "put out feelers re possibility private meetings between Chinese Comms and some SC representatives." The reference was to a remark made by Sobolev at a Security Council dinner on January 31. Telegram 416 from New York, February 1, reported that Sobolev felt the Security Council was too large a group and that "if the ChiComs did come it would be necessary to set up secret talks with only a few people present." (Department of State, Central Files, 330/2-155)



Whether certain elements in Soviet policy could be turned to our advantage depends, as I have already said, in large measure on degree of clarity we can develop in regard to our position on off-shore islands.

Bohlen

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**82. Telegram From the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Aldrich) to the Department of State <sup>1</sup>**

*London, February 4, 1955—5 p.m.*

3458. Eyes only Acting Secretary and President.

At luncheon today with Eden and Prime Ministers of Australia <sup>2</sup> and Ceylon <sup>3</sup> they asked me to convey to you both feeling which they said had developed at this morning's meeting of Prime Ministers' conference after consideration of character of ChiComs' reply to United Nations' invitation and Eden asked Menzies if he would prepare short note for me expressing these feelings. In accordance with Eden's request Menzies wrote me letter which contains following paragraphs:

"1. I think that further resolutions or debates in the Security Council at present would do harm. The veto would be applied; feelings would be exacerbated; and in debate positions might be occupied from which later withdrawal might be difficult.

"2. Discussions should proceed privately between the British Commonwealth countries and the United States regarding ways and means (by withdrawal of troops or otherwise) of keeping the "off-shore" islands out of the area of armed conflict (either major or local), while firmly preserving the independence of Formosa and the Pescadores. At the same time India, for example, could use influence privately upon Peiping.

"3. While Australian and other British opinion would be much opposed to accepting a risk of war over the "off-shore" islands, I feel strongly that the President should know how greatly we respect and rely upon his coolness, judgment and character at a time when the truculence of China's reply must provoke hostile reactions and possibly some intemperate opinions. It is this feeling about the President which gives me encouragement and hope."

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/2-455. Secret; Niact. Received at 1:57 p.m. A copy in the Whitman File bears the notation in Goodpaster's handwriting that it was seen by the President at 6 p.m. that day. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administration Series, Aldrich, Winthrop) This telegram was repeated to USUN for Lodge by the Department as telegram 401, February 4.

<sup>2</sup> Robert Gordon Menzies.

<sup>3</sup> Sir John Kotelawala.

As you will note this letter expresses opinions as coming from Menzies personally. In fact at luncheon they were expressed as consensus of opinion of ministers present at morning's meeting. Eden stated specifically that all present had expressed themselves as relying absolutely upon coolness, character and judgment of President and encouragement and hope which this feeling gave to them all. <sup>4</sup>

**Aldrich**

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<sup>4</sup> A letter to President Eisenhower from British Ambassador Makins, dated February 4, states that he had been instructed to inform the President that the Commonwealth Conference had that day considered the Far Eastern situation; the letter reads in part as follows:

"The view of all the Prime Ministers was that no precipitate decisions should be taken, nor positions publicly announced, which might make the situation more difficult. The Prime Ministers wanted at least forty-eight hours for further reflection, and this might also give time for public opinion to cool down.

"There were many references by the Prime Ministers to the calm and restrained way in which you have been handling this question." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International Series)

According to a February 4 memorandum of conversation by Merchant, Makins told Hoover that afternoon that the letter reported the consensus of the Prime Ministers views but that the other Conference members had not had the opportunity to approve its text. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/2-455)

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**83. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant) to the Secretary of State <sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, February 4, 1955.*

Both Ambassador Heeney today <sup>2</sup> and Sir Roger Makins on February 2 <sup>3</sup> have taken great pains to emphasize to the Acting Secretary the importance that is attached to making a distinction between the off-shore islands on the one hand and Formosa and the Pescadores on the other. Each has stated that he was reflecting only the views of his own government but I think it is a clear deduction that our position with respect to the off-shore islands is a major point at debate in London. I have the strong hunch that what they are trying to tell

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/2-455. Secret. Sent via Murphy and Hoover. The source text bears Hoover's initial "H".

<sup>2</sup> In the conversation under reference, recorded in a February 4 memorandum of conversation by Merchant, Canadian Ambassador Heeney gave Hoover a message from Foreign Minister Lester B. Pearson, who was attending the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference, emphasizing the distinction between the status of Formosa and the Pescadores and that of the offshore islands and noting the importance attached to this distinction by Canadian and British public opinion. (*Ibid.*, 793.00/2-455)

<sup>3</sup> See Document 73.

us without putting it into words is that they can swing all of the Commonwealth, including a reluctant but sobered Nehru, behind our policy if we will indicate that we are prepared to have the Chinese Nationals withdraw from all the off-shore islands and make our stand on Formosa and the Pescadores. They are certainly saying quite clearly that they are having great difficulty with their public opinions on the matter of the off-shore islands.

Both of these approaches, however, were based on the situation before Chou En-lai's violent rejection of the Security Council invitation and as this sinks in it may modify some of their views.

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**84. Telegram From the Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom <sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, February 4, 1955—8:23 p.m.*

4011. Eyes only Ambassador Aldrich. Deliver Approximately 9 a.m., Saturday, February 5. President has been giving personal attention to your wires, for which he is most appreciative, regarding Formosan situation, and has asked me to convey to you his sense of the extreme importance of the maintenance of Formosa and the Pescadores outside the Communist orbit. He attaches urgent necessity to supporting a high morale on the part of the Chinese Nationalist forces at this critical juncture and in face of persistent and insidious efforts by Chinese Communists to demoralize forces resisting them and to sow dissention between Chinese Nationalists, the United States and our associates of the western world. These forces represent a big investment of our effort, money and weapons.

President believes that there would be a severe blow in lending an appearance of surrender of Quemoy and Matsu at this time and that this would have a most serious effect throughout Far Eastern area. You of course know that the Communists are fully aware of the possibilities inherent in this situation and that they are exerting themselves to exploit fully and to divide the western world.

Foregoing is for your background information and in the hope that it may be of utility to you during the course of whatever con-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/2-455. Top Secret; Niact. Sent at the direction of the President. A memorandum of February 5 by Goodpaster states that he had advised Hoover the previous evening that the President felt a message should be sent to Aldrich and outlined the points which were to be included. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Miscellaneous Series, Conferences on Formosa) This telegram was drafted by Murphy and Hoover and sent to USUN for Lodge as telegram 408, February 5. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/2-555)

versations you may have on this general subject. It is my feeling, in which he fully concurs, that some of the conferees may be overlooking this factor.

Hoover

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85. Telegram From the Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China <sup>1</sup>

*Washington, February 4, 1955—8:32 p.m.*

444. Your 526. <sup>2</sup> One line our 434 <sup>3</sup> unfortunately omitted in code room. <sup>4</sup> Proposed U.S. statement does not limit U.S. assistance to evacuation civilians. You should insure Chinese authorities understand clearly our assistance offer applies to removal military forces as well as civilians. <sup>5</sup> Correct version first paragraph proposed statement reads as follows:

"The Government of the Republic of China has announced it will redeploy its military forces from the Tachens, a group of small islands 200 miles north of Formosa, to other positions. It has requested the aid of United States forces in protecting and assisting the redeployment of these military forces and the evacuation of such civilians as desire to leave those islands. The United States Government has given orders to the Seventh Fleet and other United States forces to assist in this operation."

Necessity of excluding any reference to Quemoy and Matsu in official statements both Governments has been made unmistakably clear in our 421, <sup>6</sup> 422, <sup>7</sup> 433 <sup>8</sup> and 441. <sup>9</sup> You should reiterate decision in terms which will preclude further questions on this score.

We agree that timing of statements should be carefully coordinated and that they should be issued almost simultaneously. U.S.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 293.9322/2-455. Top Secret; Niact; Limited Distribution. Drafted by McConaughy and Murphy; cleared in draft by Murphy and Robertson. Repeated to USUN as telegram 409, February 5. (*Ibid.*, 793.00/2-455)

<sup>2</sup> Document 80.

<sup>3</sup> Document 78.

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 7, Document 80.

<sup>5</sup> A copy of the corrected statement, given to Shen by Rankin on February 5 is in Department of State, Taipei Embassy Files: Lot 62 F 83.

<sup>6</sup> Document 69.

<sup>7</sup> See footnote 3, Document 72.

<sup>8</sup> Document 74.

<sup>9</sup> Telegram 441 to Taipei, February 4, summarized Robertson's February 3 conversation with Yeh, recorded in Martin's February 3 memorandum of conversation, Document 79. (Department of State, Central Files, 293.9322/2-455)

statement is drafted as reply to Chinese statement, making it necessary that Chinese statement slightly precede. However we would expect to have firm arrangement to release agreed statements few minutes apart.

Answers to numbered points last paragraph your telegram as follows:

1. Importance cooperation and coordination emphatically confirmed.
2. Chinese Communist rejection Security Council invitation in our view makes Tachens move more urgent. It does not affect decisions re Quemoy and Matsu.
3. U.S. position re New Zealand item in Security Council following Chinese Communist rejection not yet formulated. Exchange of views with various interested governments contemplated including of course Chinese Government.

We know that in this emergency you need ready and direct access to President Chiang. We note delay of about 24 hours (your 511)<sup>10</sup> apparently occurred after you received our 421 before you saw Generalissimo. You reported in your 521<sup>11</sup> that President Chiang could not see you until following day to be informed of our 433. From your 526 it appears that scheduled appointment did not take place and that you found it necessary to deal indirectly through Shen and Hollington Tong as to our 439<sup>12</sup> as well as our 433.

We have mentioned this apparent coyness of Gimo to Yeh and believe it stems from Gimo's desire to await additional advice from Yeh. Acting Secretary has suggested to Yeh that he urge Gimo be available for direct conversation.<sup>13</sup> In that connection it will be appreciated if you will try persuade Gimo that Yeh has made extraordinary effort to assert Gimo's view regarding need for public reference to Quemoy and Matsu. Yeh said he now informing Gimo urgently there is no possibility this will be done. Yeh and Koo expressed belief possible now Gimo will make request by note for assistance in evacuation Tachens and might refrain from any public statement. We would have no objection to this procedure if he prefers it. In that event U.S. would plan make unilateral statement along lines text already communicated to you.

Re paragraph 5 our 433 Admiral Carney stated at State-JCS meeting this morning present Seventh Fleet deployment and alert basis could not be maintained more than 24 hours longer and asked

<sup>10</sup> Document 72.

<sup>11</sup> See footnote 5, Document 74.

<sup>12</sup> See footnote 5, Document 80.

<sup>13</sup> No record of this conversation has been found in Department of State files.

authority to change present Fleet disposition tomorrow if orders for Tachens operation cannot be issued by then. <sup>14</sup>

Hoover

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<sup>14</sup> According to a memorandum of the discussion at the meeting, prepared in the Department of State, Carney said that the fleet had been on the alert for 2 weeks, that this could not be continued indefinitely without a loss of efficiency, and that if he had no word by the next day, he would redeploy the fleet to Okinawa and Keelung until the negotiations with Chiang were nearing a conclusion. (Department of State, State-JCS Meetings: Lot 61 D 417)

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## 86. Telegram From the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bohlen) to the Department of State <sup>1</sup>

*Moscow, February 5, 1955—1 p.m.*

1243. Press today reports reception British Ambassador (Embtel 1241 repeated London 220) <sup>2</sup> and also Indian Chargé with no indication purpose of visits.

As was to be expected (Embtel 1237) <sup>3</sup> Moscow is falling in line and supporting CPR position on competence SC. This is only rational explanation of shift from January 31 statement (Embtel 1207) <sup>4</sup> to that of yesterday that positions of US and UK in SC made impossible "lawful and impartial consideration by SC". Soviet switch likewise seems to confirm view that adamant Chinese refusal to attend SC deliberations even for consideration Soviet resolution had not been anticipated by Soviet Government.

It is doubtful that Soviets could have any illusions that conference by-passing UN, excluding Nationalist China and in composition suggested would be acceptable to west powers, particularly US.

It is obviously a play for neutralist Asian nations, particularly India, and also in hope causing division between US and UK. In this connection it has been noted that Soviets have made quite a point of

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/2-555. Secret. Received at 7:19 a.m. Repeated to London for information.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 1241 from Moscow, February 4, reported that Molotov had that day given Hayter a statement supporting Peking's rejection of the Security Council's invitation and proposing that the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and India should take the initiative in convening a conference of the United States, United Kingdom, France, Soviet Union, People's Republic of China, India, Burma, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Ceylon, to be held in February in Shanghai or New Delhi, to consider the problem of Taiwan and the offshore islands. (*Ibid.*, 793.00/2-455) The text of the statement is in *Documents on International Affairs, 1955*, pp. 450-452.

<sup>3</sup> Document 81.

<sup>4</sup> Document 65.

Great Britain's position in this matter and have sought to play up to specific British feelings. This was noted in Molotov's preliminary comment to British Ambassador on occasion his first call on January 28, that without British support US would not have adopted its present position, a theme which has since been intermittently picked up in Soviet press comment.

Soviet proposal therefore does not seem to be a serious move towards settlement Formosan question and is primarily of propaganda nature in support of CPR. It does, however, also reflect continuing Soviet concern over Formosa issue and desire to keep its finger in pie.

**Bohlen**

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**87. Telegram From the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Aldrich) to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*London, February 5, 1955—1 p.m.*

3470. Eyes only Hoover and President. Greatly appreciate guidance your telegram 4011.<sup>2</sup> Based upon President's message to Congress and his press conference<sup>3</sup> and upon Secretary's off-record briefing of press I have already taken general line referred to your first two paragraphs in all conversations, although I have carefully avoided specific reference to Quemoy and Matsu. I will of course keep President's views as expressed reference telegram constantly in mind.

I believe as appears from my telegram 3458<sup>4</sup> that, with possible exception Nehru, all Prime Ministers present at conference are completely in accord with President's purposes and have absolute confidence in him. Only doubt arises in connection with state of public opinion referred to paragraph three of Menzies' letter to me. I believe that Eden went as far as he dared in view of opinion here in making following statement in Parliament yesterday (see Embtel 3453):<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/2-555. Top Secret; Niact. Received at 10:32 a.m. Shown to the President by Hoover on February 5, according to a handwritten notation by Goodpaster on a copy of the telegram. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administration Series, Aldrich, Winthrop)

<sup>2</sup> Document 84.

<sup>3</sup> The transcript of the President's press conference of February 2 is printed in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1955*, pp. 223-237.

<sup>4</sup> Document 82.

<sup>5</sup> Telegram 3453 from London, February 4, transmitted the text of a statement made by Eden that day in the House of Commons, in which he stated the British

*Continued*

"Nationalist-held islands in close proximity to coast of China are in different category from Formosa and Pescadores since they undoubtedly form part of territory of People's Republic of China.

"Any attempt by Government of People's Republic of China, however, to assert its authority over these islands by force would, in circumstances at present peculiar to case, give rise to situation endangering peace and security, which is properly a matter of international concern."

I believe therefore that Commonwealth Prime Ministers are not so much overlooking factors referred to your telegram 4011 as they are apprehensive of own public opinion as to possibilities of war arising out of situation regarding offshore islands including Quemoy and Matsu.

**Aldrich**

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Government's view that the de jure sovereignty over Formosa and the Pescadores was uncertain or undetermined and concluded with the paragraphs quoted here. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/ 2-455) The text of the statement is printed in *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, Fifth Series, vol. 536, cols. 159-160.

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**88. Telegram From the Ambassador in the Republic of China (Rankin) to the Department of State <sup>1</sup>**

*Taipei, February 5, 1955—10 p.m.*

530. Off-shore Islands. Immediately preceding telegram <sup>2</sup> gives text of acting Chinese Foreign Minister's note of February 5, 1955, announcing their decision withdraw from Tachen Islands and requesting United States assistance and protection in this operation.

In handing above note to me Minister Shen stated his government had no objection to US issuing statement as transmitted De-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 293.9322/2-555. Top Secret; Niact. Received at 11:47 a.m. A handwritten notation by Goodpaster on a copy of the telegram states that the President was informed by Hoover on February 5. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Miscellaneous Series) The telegram was passed to CINCPAC, COMSEVENTHFLT, and USUN by the Department at the Embassy's request.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 529 from Taipei, February 5, transmitted the text of a note of the same date, handed to Rankin that evening by Acting Foreign Minister Shen, which referred to recent consultations in Washington, stated that the Government of the Republic of China had decided to withdraw its armed forces from the Tachens "for purposes of redeployment and consolidation" and to evacuate civilians who desired to leave, and requested U.S. assistance and protection for this operation. (Department of State, Central Files, 293.9322/2-555) A copy of the note, labeled "translation", is *ibid.*, Taipei Embassy Files: Lot 62 F 83.



partment's 434 <sup>3</sup> (and amended Department's 444) <sup>4</sup> at whatever time US sees fit.

Wording of proposed China statement still under study. Shen assured me it would not depart "in principle" from Minister Yeh's draft as approved by Secretary Dulles. <sup>5</sup> He hoped it would be completed in matter of hours and requests he be informed of our intentions re timing of issuance US statement. One possibility is Chinese note [*statement*] will be shortened to omit any reference to "related positions and territories" as way of avoiding Kinmen-Matsu question at this point. I mentioned again importance of showing text to Department before issuance.

Department's 444 informative but fortunately was not needed in negotiations with Chinese. US case was fully stated in my interview with Chiang February 3 and nothing would have been gained by my seeing him subsequently, although I requested appointment as instructed. Details in subsequent telegrams from Department were passed along promptly to President through Shen, primarily as vehicle for impressing him with urgency of situation.

Obviously Chiang was stalling in hope new developments connected with cease-fire or Secretary Dulles' return might favor him. Although I had made our position quite clear he clung to hope Yeh would be able accomplish something more. In fairness it should be recognized that giving up still more territory is most painful process for free China.

Rankin

<sup>3</sup> Document 78.

<sup>4</sup> Document 85.

<sup>5</sup> Transmitted in Document 62.

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89. Memorandum of a Conversation With the President,  
Washington, February 5, 1955, 12:30 p.m. <sup>1</sup>

OTHERS PRESENT

Secretary Hoover  
Admiral Radford  
General Cutler  
Colonel Goodpaster

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Miscellaneous Series, Conference on Formosa. Top Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster.

Secretary Hoover and Admiral Radford reported the details known of the incident just west of North Korea wherein two U.S. Sabre jets of a force consisting of one RB 45 and four Sabre jets shot down two of eight attacking MIG aircraft without damage to our forces.<sup>2</sup> The incident occurred over international waters in the afternoon of 5 February (Korean time). Secretary Hoover asked authority to make a public statement in the matter, and the President approved this action.<sup>3</sup>

Secretary Hoover then reviewed the efforts to have Chiang initiate his withdrawal from the Tachens before any Communist attack (which from reports might occur at any time). The President indicated he would not want to be dragged into hostilities through deliberate delay on the part of Chinese Nationalist forces. He thought we should consider whether we should inform Chiang that if he delays too long, it may not be possible for us to help in the evacuation; if we were to attempt to carry out an evacuation after an attack by the ChiComs had begun in the Tachen area, we would be close to breaking the terms of his message to Congress.

Secretary Hoover showed the President the message sent to Ambassador Aldrich last night,<sup>4</sup> and Ambassador Aldrich's reply.<sup>5</sup> Mr. Hoover indicated that the U.K. seems to be trending toward a Geneva-type conference. He was inclined to think we should go through with the present effort in the UN.<sup>6</sup> He pointed out that the commitment we have given to the British not to announce publicly our intent to take combat action in case the Chinese Communists attack Quemoy and Matsu in strength was linked to the effort to obtain a UN cease-fire, and that if the latter proves unsuccessful, we are no longer committed on the former. The President pointed out, however, that UK public opinion restricts the choices open to Sir An-

<sup>2</sup> The U.S. planes were under the U.N. Command in Korea; the attacking aircraft were North Korean. A statement issued by the Department of State on February 23, a U.N. Command statement issued on February 21, and a U.N. Command letter to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission are printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, March 14, 1955, pp. 426-429.

<sup>3</sup> No press release on this subject was issued by the Department of State until the February 23 statement cited in footnote 2 above.

<sup>4</sup> Document 84.

<sup>5</sup> Document 87.

<sup>6</sup> A memorandum of February 5 from Hoover to Secretary Dulles reported this meeting and related actions which had been taken; it describes this portion of the conversation as follows: "We discussed briefly the reported desire of the UK to undertake a Geneva type of settlement of the entire Formosa and offshore islands problem. It was the President's preliminary reaction that such an exercise would be highly undesirable from our standpoint and it was his tentative preference to proceed with a cease-fire in the UN, even though the ChiComs would not be represented. He stipulated that this was merely his preliminary reaction and should not in any way prejudice our recommendations after your return." (Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/2-555)

thony Eden. Were he to take too firm a line, public opinion might reverse it through elections.

Admiral Radford stated that it may be necessary to retire our carriers to Okinawa for refueling and resupply. We might then keep them there, since this would involve only twenty-four hours delay, no longer than the ships for the evacuation would take to get up to the Tachens from Formosa.

At this point in the meeting, Telegram No. 529 from Taipei <sup>7</sup> was brought in to Secretary Hoover who read it to the group. Upon request by Admiral Radford, the President confirmed that the CINCPAC had authority to proceed to implement plans at once. The President indicated that State Department should make a brief factual announcement concerning the ChiNat decision to evacuate and request for assistance of our armed forces, together with the fact that we have agreed to do so and are initiating operations. <sup>8</sup> This announcement should be made at about the time Admiral Pride's Naval units begin their movement and operations. Admiral Radford left the meeting briefly to advise Admiral Carney to have the operations initiated.

The President indicated there should be no general notification until the announcement had been made. However, Ambassador Aldrich might be informed if State considers it necessary, together with Ambassador Lodge. The President observed that the initiation of the Tachen evacuation will tend to improve the U.S. position before the world should it now become necessary to take combat action against the Chinese Communists in the Matsu or Quemoy area.

**A. J. Goodpaster**

*Colonel, CE, U S Army*

<sup>7</sup> See footnote 2, *supra*.

<sup>8</sup> The announcement, issued February 5, is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, February 14, 1955, p. 255. It is identical to the draft announcement transmitted in Document 78, except that the phrase "has informed the U.S. Government" was substituted for "has announced" in the first sentence.

90. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,  
Washington, February 5, 1955, 1 p.m.<sup>1</sup>

SUBJECT

Formosa

PARTICIPANTS

The Acting Secretary  
Mr. Murphy  
Mr. Robertson  
Mr. Merchant

The British Ambassador  
Sir Robert Scott

The British Ambassador came in at 1:00 this afternoon to deliver copies of the attached papers: (1) a record of a conversation between Sir Anthony Eden and the Soviet Chargé in London on February 2,<sup>2</sup> (2) Ambassador Hayter's record of conversation with Mr. Molotov on February 4,<sup>3</sup> (3) a rough translation of Mr. Molotov's statement to the Ambassador,<sup>4</sup> and finally an oral communication in which Ambassador Makins made certain points in connection with these texts.<sup>5</sup>

The British Ambassador also stated that the communication given by Mr. Molotov to the Indian Ambassador on February 4 was identical with that handed Ambassador Hayter with the exception of the opening paragraphs which were addressed particularly to the well-known Indian desire for peace. The British Ambassador added

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/2-555. Secret. Drafted by Merchant. Copies of this document and its attachments were given to Dulles upon his return, along with Hoover's February 5 memorandum, cited in footnote 6, *supra*.

<sup>2</sup> Headed "Record of conversation between Sir Anthony Eden and the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires on February 2, 1955" and dated February 5. It states that Eden expressed the hope that the Soviet Government would use its influence to persuade the Chinese to go to New York and urged that the Security Council discussions should aim at stopping the fighting without prejudice to the claims of either side, adding that this would increase the possibility of adjustment of the other problems of the area. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/2-255)

<sup>3</sup> Headed "Record of conversation between H.M. Ambassador in Moscow and Mr. Molotov on the 4th February, 1955" and dated February 5. It summarized Molotov's statement to Hayter (see footnote 2, Document 86) and noted comments by Molotov that he was making a similar communication to the Indian Chargé and that preliminary consultation with the Chinese Government led him to believe that they would not refuse to consider this invitation. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/2-555)

<sup>4</sup> Attached to the document cited in footnote 3 above.

<sup>5</sup> Makins' oral communication, dated February 5, stated that it was important that no misunderstanding should arise with regard to Eden's February 2 initiative, which had been related solely to the Security Council invitation, and had not been a proposal for a special conference. It further stated that Eden commented that although the Soviet proposal in its present form could not be acceptable, it was at least welcome that they were considering ways and means to reduce the tension. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/2-555)

that in Hayter's view this proposal by the Soviets is a serious one and not designed for propaganda purposes.

The Ambassador then handed to the Acting Secretary the attached message from Trevelyan in Peiping giving his analysis of the Chinese attitude regarding Formosa.<sup>6</sup>

The British Ambassador was informed that word had just been received from Formosa that Chiang Kai-shek has formally asked for assistance in evacuating the Tachens. Reference was also made to the MIG incident well off the coast of Korea this morning.

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<sup>6</sup> The message, headed "Message from Mr. Trevelyan in Peking dated Feb. 2", stated that Peking's basic point was that Formosa was Chinese territory and that the whole situation was therefore an internal question; this was a national issue on which no open bargaining or compromise of principles could be expected. Among the points which followed from this basic premise, the message noted, was that the Chinese would not deal with the offshore islands separately from Formosa. They regarded the U.S.-Republic of China Mutual Defense Treaty as the occupation of Chinese territory and would not consider the accompanying exchange of notes to be a reliable safeguard because of their doubts about American intentions. They would not feel internally secure as long as the Nationalist regime existed under American protection. (*Ibid.*)

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## 91. Telegram From the Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, February 5, 1955—3:02 p.m.*

446. Your 529.<sup>2</sup> Deliver immediately following note<sup>3</sup> in reply to Chinese note of February 5:

"I have the honor to refer to your Excellency's note dated February 5, 1955, stating that the Government of the Republic of China has decided to withdraw its armed forces from the Tachen Islands for purposes of redeployment and consolidation and to evacuate such civilians as desire to leave these islands, and requesting the United States Government to assist in and to provide protective cover for such withdrawal of its armed forces and evacuation of civilians.

I have the honor to inform your Excellency that the United States Government agrees to extend protection to and assist in the redeployment of the armed forces of the Government of the Republic of China from the Tachen Islands and the evacuation of such civilians as desire to leave those islands.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 293.9322/2-555. Top Secret; Niact; Limited Distribution. Drafted in CA and approved by Robertson.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 2, Document 88.

<sup>3</sup> A copy of the note to Acting Foreign Minister Shen, dated February 6, is in Department of State, Taipei Embassy Files: Lot 62 F 83.

The United States Government has issued appropriate orders to its military forces in the area to implement this decision." <sup>4</sup>

Hoover

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<sup>4</sup> Telegram 051923 from the Chief of Naval Operations to CINCPAC, February 5, directed CINCPAC to carry out his Operation Plan 51-Z-55 (dated January 30; see footnote 4, Document 58) and stated, "Atomic weapons will not be employed by U.S. forces unless directed by higher authority." (JCS Records, CCS 381 Formosa (11-8-48) Sec. 19)

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92. **Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Key) to the Secretary of State** <sup>1</sup>

*Washington, February 5, 1955.*

SUBJECT

Status of Off-Shore Islands Item in the Security Council.

1. Pursuant to the Working Party agreement <sup>2</sup> which you approved, Ambassador Munro called a Security Council meeting on January 31 to consider "the question of hostilities in the area of certain islands off the coast of the mainland of China". On January 30, the USSR had proposed that the Council consider "the question of acts of aggression by the United States against the People's Republic of China in the area of Taiwan and other islands of China". The Council:

(a) dealt with a Soviet motion to exclude the Chinese representative by deciding not to consider any proposals to exclude the representative of the Government of the Republic of China or to seat a Chinese Communist representative;

(b) admitted both the New Zealand and the Soviet items to its agenda, but decided "that the Council should conclude its consideration of the New Zealand item before taking up the Soviet item"; and

(c) decided to "invite a representative of the CPG of the PRC to participate in the discussion of this item, and that the Secretary General be requested to convey this invitation to the CPG", after which Ambassador Munro stated that "the Secretary General would no doubt take into account the views expressed by representatives as to the desirability of the CPG of the PRC accepting this invitation".

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/2-555. Secret. Drafted by DePalma.

<sup>2</sup> Document 43.

Although the Working Party in Washington had agreed that the Communists would be invited under Rule 39 of the Council's Rules of Procedure (under which the Council may invite persons to supply information or give other assistance in examining matters within its competence), it had been decided in the course of consultations in New York that we would not refer to any article or rule as a basis for the invitation since it was felt that there was no article or rule which precisely covered this situation. It was also agreed that Ambassador Munro, as President, would suggest that the Secretary General take into account the views expressed by members of the Council. The United Kingdom and France wished to have this statement made because they did not believe that the Secretary General should act merely as a transmitting agent, but felt that he should use his judgment in making appropriate use of the contact he had established with Chou En-lai. Ambassador Lodge concurred in the statement to be made by Ambassador Munro, but made it clear that he could not agree to the Secretary General's using his "good offices" in this case.<sup>3</sup>

2. Following the Security Council meeting, Hammarskjöld transmitted through the Swedish Ambassador in Peking a factual telegram to Chou En-lai informing him of the Council's decision.<sup>4</sup> He also sent a personal message<sup>5</sup> in which he stated that, "acting in accordance with the expressed wishes of members of the Security Council", he wished to inform Chou that he believed "we are now at one of those junctures where we may come to grips with some of the political problems which have been harassing us for years" and that the New Zealand initiative should be viewed in this perspective. He added that New Zealand had acted "in the conviction that, once this difficult situation is tackled with good will from a modest start, there are possibilities for development—maybe largely outside the limelight of publicity—which may help us on". We understand that Chou had not received this message when he dispatched his reply to

<sup>3</sup> These points were agreed upon by Lodge, Munro, British Representative at the United Nations Sir Pierson Dixon, and French Representative Henri Hoppenot at a meeting on January 29, which Lodge reported in telegram 409 from New York, January 29. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/1-2955)

<sup>4</sup> In addition to Hammarskjöld's January 31 telegram to Chou, described in Document 66, the Secretary-General sent a message on February 2 to the Swedish Ambassador in Peking for transmission to Chou which again informed him of the Security Council's invitation and requested information as to who would represent the PRC Government if the invitation was accepted and when the representative might arrive. Hammarskjöld's February 2 telegram is in Department of State, ROC Files: Lot 71 D 517, Offshore Islands, 1954-1955.

<sup>5</sup> The personal message described here, which was to be given to Chou orally, was transmitted in Hammarskjöld's February 2 telegram to the Swedish Ambassador in Peking, cited in footnote 4 above.

the Security Council invitation, and we have not yet been informed that it has been delivered.

When shown a copy of the text of Hammarskjöld's message on February 1,<sup>6</sup> Ambassador Lodge pointed out that he had no instructions concerning the manner in which the Secretary General should communicate with Chou En-lai and, further, that he was not aware of any U.S. decision favoring the linking of various contentious issues. On February 2, the Department requested Ambassador Lodge to take appropriate steps to ensure that, if the Communists accepted the invitation, their participation would be limited to that appropriate under Rule 39. Ambassador Lodge was also requested to inform Hammarskjöld that the Department considered his message to Chou as exceeding his authority under the Charter and contrary to the understanding among the United States, the United Kingdom and New Zealand that all proceedings on this item were to be confined to the cessation of hostilities.<sup>7</sup>

In reply, Ambassador Lodge pointed out that the Department had known and approved of the understanding regarding the invitation which he had reached with the United Kingdom, New Zealand and France. As regards Hammarskjöld's message to Chou, Ambassador Lodge conveyed the Department's views to the Secretary General and to the United Kingdom and New Zealand.<sup>8</sup> In reply, the Department acknowledged that Ambassador Lodge had been authorized to omit specific mention of Rule 39, but reiterated the request that he protest to Hammarskjöld regarding his oral message to Chou and his telegram inviting the Communists to "participate in the debate".<sup>9</sup> Ambassador Lodge conveyed this protest to the Secretary General on February 3.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>6</sup> Lodge reported in telegram 418 from New York, February 1, that Hammarskjöld had showed him a draft letter to Chou which he described as similar in substance to the oral message which Hammarskjöld sent the following day. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/2-155)

<sup>7</sup> The instructions were sent in telegram 391 to New York, February 2. (*Ibid.*)

<sup>8</sup> Lodge reported the conversations and commented on the Department's instructions concerning the terms of the Security Council's invitation in telegram 422 from New York and in a letter to Hoover, both of February 2. The letter, which also transmitted the text of Hammarskjöld's draft telegram to the Swedish Ambassador in Peking, comments that there was no doubt that the Chinese would reject an invitation extended exclusively under Rule 39 and states:

"There is nothing in what Secretary Dulles said to me before his departure that leads me to believe that he wanted to make it impossible for them to come. When I talked to him on the telephone he asked me to state in the Council that we agreed to have them invited and that the reason was that . . . , it was obviously impossible to deal with a situation without one of the principal parties to it being present. If the Department did not want him [*them*] to come, I think the Department should have told me." (*Ibid.*, 330/2-255 and 793.00/2-255, respectively)

<sup>9</sup> In telegram 394 to New York, February 2, 1955. (*Ibid.*, 330/2-255)

<sup>10</sup> Reported in telegrams 427 and 433 from New York, February 3. (*Ibid.*, 330/2-355 and 793.00/2-355, respectively)



3. On February 3 the Communist rejection of the invitation became known. In his message to the Secretary General, Chou En-lai repeats the familiar charges of United States aggression against China, rejects the New Zealand initiative as an attempt to intervene in China's internal affairs, and brands as intolerable the fact that China is represented by the Chiang Kai-shek clique. Chou states that "only for the purpose of discussing the resolution of the Soviet Union and only when the representative of the Chiang Kai-shek clique has been driven out from the Security Council and the representative of the People's Republic of China is to attend in the name of China, can the People's Republic of China agree to send a representative to take part in the discussions of the Security Council". The message concludes as follows: "All genuine international efforts to ease and eliminate the tension created by the United States in this area and in other areas of the Far East will receive the support of the People's Republic of China".

4. On February 3, Ambassador Munro urgently requested the views of the United States as to the next steps, indicating he did not believe we could allow the issue to drag.<sup>11</sup> Ambassador Belaunde<sup>12</sup> has informed USUN that he is thinking of a suggestion to "neutralize" both the coastal islands and the Formosa Strait for a distance of 12 miles from the coasts of Formosa and the mainland, with troops being withdrawn a certain distance from the shore of Formosa and the mainland. A UN Control Commission would supervise these neutral areas.<sup>13</sup>

The UK delegation has indicated that while they see the need for another meeting of the Council to "tidy up" the situation, they think it might be delayed until about February 9. The UK doubts that anything of substance can be considered at this meeting and they wish to leave something in suspense for future action.<sup>14</sup>

Indications from London are that the Commonwealth Members do not favor further action in the Council at this time and are thinking instead of possible private contacts and other actions to reduce tension in the area.

There is attached a copy of Mr. Suydam's press statement with reference to a possible Far Eastern Conference.<sup>15</sup>

<sup>11</sup> Reported in telegram 429 from New York, February 3. (*Ibid.*, 330/2-355)

<sup>12</sup> Peruvian Representative at the United Nations Victor A. Belaunde.

<sup>13</sup> Reported in telegram 430 from New York, February 3. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/2-355)

<sup>14</sup> Reported in telegram 437 from New York, February 4. (*Ibid.*, 793.00/2-455)

<sup>15</sup> Suydam's statement, made at a press briefing on February 4, expressed distaste for the idea of a conference similar to the Geneva Conference of 1954; for text, see *New York Times*, February 5, 1955.

93. **Telegram From the Ambassador in the Republic of China (Rankin) to the Department of State**<sup>1</sup>

*Taipei, February 6, 1955—6 p.m.*

532. Off-Shore Islands. Following is verbatim text of proposed Chinese statement approved by President Chiang and handed to me by acting Foreign Minister 4:30 this afternoon:

*Begin statement.*

In order to meet the new challenge of international Communist aggression the government of the Republic of China, in the spirit of Sino-American cooperation in the joint defense of their respective territories in the Western Pacific and after consultation with the Government of the United States, has decided to redeploy the forces defending certain off-shore islands and to strengthen the defense of other important islands such as Quemoy, Matsu, etc. with the forces now in the Tachen area. Through such consolidation, the defense of Taiwan and the other off-shore islands will be further strengthened.

In furtherance of the close cooperation in the security and defense of Taiwan and the Pescadores, the Government of the United States has indicated to the Government of the Republic of China its decision to join in the defense of such related positions and territories which are, in its views, essential to the defense of Taiwan and the Pescadores. It has also indicated its decision to assist in and give protective cover for the redeployment of our forces in the Tachen area.

The Government of the Republic of China, regarding the decision of the Government of the United States as added proof of the solidarity of the two countries in promoting freedom and security in the Asia and Pacific area and the general cause of the free world, has signified its welcome [to] these decisions.

*End statement.*

Shen said they wanted to put it in tomorrow morning's local newspapers but I replied we could scarcely expect answer from Department so quickly view mention of Quemoy and Matsu. However I agreed to ask for answer quickly as possible and to request Department also communicate its reaction to Ambassador Koo so that he might telephone to Shen in Taipei.

Mention of Matsu and Quemoy is of course limited to paragraph dealing solely with Chinese forces while US assistance dealt with in separate paragraph. I hope this may be acceptable to Department and recommend its approval but I told Shen I was by no means certain of this.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 293.9322/2-655. Top Secret; Niact. Received at 7:24 a.m. Passed to USUN by the Department at Rankin's request.

Presumably draft would raises no questions if "such as Quemoy, Matsu, et cetera" were omitted but Chiang attaches greatest importance to mentioning these islands in some fashion.

Rankin

94. Telegram From the Ambassador in the Republic of China (Rankin) to the Department of State <sup>1</sup>

*Taipei, February 7, 1955—10 a.m.*

533. Off-Shore Islands. Department's 449 <sup>2</sup> reached Embassy 6:15 o'clock this morning or over 12 hours after despatch of Taipei's 532. <sup>3</sup> Chinese waited until early morning deadline for local newspapers, took additional precaution of revising statement once more and placing buffer paragraph between reference to Quemoy and to US assistance, and gave text to press, this action obviously taken on direct orders from President Chiang. I was informed by message from acting Foreign Minister at 2:10 this morning. Text as issued in immediately following telegram. <sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 293.9322/2-755. Top Secret; Niact. Received at 11:14 p.m. on February 6. Passed to USUN by the Department at Rankin's request.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 449 to Taipei, February 6, drafted by Robertson and signed by Hoover, requested changes in the proposed Chinese statement. It suggested that the first paragraph should be revised to read as follows:

"In order to meet the new challenge of international Communist aggression the Government of the Republic of China has decided to redeploy the forces defending certain offshore islands and to strengthen the defense of other important Islands such as Quemoy, Matsu, etc. with the forces now in the Tachen area. Through such consolidation, the defense of Taiwan and the other offshore islands will be further strengthened. In the spirit of Sino-American cooperation in the defense of their respective territories in the Western Pacific the Government of the United States is being kept currently informed."

It also suggested the substitution of "as are in the view of the Government of the United States" for "which are in its views". (Department of State, Central Files, 293.9322/2-655)

<sup>3</sup> *Supra.*

<sup>4</sup> Telegram 534 from Taipei, February 7. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/2-655) The first paragraph of the Chinese statement reads as follows:

"In order to meet the new challenge of international Communist aggression, the Government of the Republic of China has decided to redeploy the forces defending certain off-shore islands and to strengthen the defense of other important islands, such as Quemoy, Matsu, et cetera, with the forces now in the Tachen area. Through such consolidation, the defense of Taiwan and the Pescadores and the other off-shore islands will be further strengthened. The Government of the Republic of China, in the spirit of the Sino-American cooperation in the joint defense of their respective territo-

Actually final Chinese text appears to differ in no important respect from revision as suggested Department's 449. "Its view" is less specific than "in view of Government of United States", but from context meaning is clearly identical. I do not regard any of differences as important and hope Department will share this opinion.

**Rankin**

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ries in the western Pacific, has consulted with the United States Government concerning the redeployment of the forces of the Tachen Area."

The complete text of the statement is in *New York Times*, February 7, 1955. The text of a statement issued on February 7 by President Chiang, relating the redeployment of troops to the Nationalist objective of recovering the mainland, was sent to the Department in despatch 386 from Taipei, February 8. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/2-855)

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**95. Telegram From the Representative at the United Nations (Lodge) to the Department of State <sup>1</sup>**

*New York, February 6, 1955—11 p.m.*

447. Re off shore islands. For the Secretary from Lodge. Re USUN telegram 446, February 6. <sup>2</sup> I called on SYG Hammarskjöld tonight on my arrival from Washington. He said that it had been established that three hours after sending his official reply to Hammarskjöld's message conveying the invitation of the SC, Chou-En-lai had sent message to Hammarskjöld saying he had not received Hammarskjöld's personal message to him. Hammarskjöld said that he saw in this a desire on Chou's part to carry the matter somewhat further and he had wired back to Chou saying that while his personal message had been by-passed by Chou's official reply, since he had communicated further he would instruct the Swedish Embassy to deliver it.

Hammarskjöld then gave me the English text of the message he had received from the Swedish Ambassador in Peking containing Chou's statement to the Ambassador in reply to Hammarskjöld, from which he allowed me to take notes which follow almost verbatim:

"Every genuine effort to relieve tension in the world, including the tension in the Taiwan area, will be supported by China. The

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/2-655. Secret; Niact; Limited Distribution. Received at 12:53 a.m. on February 7.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 446 reported that Hammarskjöld had received Chou En-lai's reply to his personal message and that arrangements had been made for Lodge to meet with the Secretary-General that evening. (*Ibid.*)

New Zealand proposal, however, cannot be of any help. On the contrary, it would put China and the Chiang Kai-shek clique on an equal basis, asking for interference in Chinese internal affairs. This whole activity is to put Chinese internal affairs in the international arena and create two Chinas, a theme openly discussed in the USA which would mean violation of the UN Charter. When Hammarskjold was here he said he would firmly oppose any violation of the charter. Because of these reasons we cannot take part in discussions within the UN which has no right to deliberate the matter. The representation of the Chiang Kai-shek clique makes it impossible to accept as a matter of course. As to the question of relieving tension in the Taiwan area the cause is US occupation, intrusion and war provocations. If tension is to be alleviated, persuasion should be directed toward the USA. China would not refuse to negotiate with the USA on this question. If the USA has the slightest wish to negotiate they should accept direct negotiations and give up their war threats. Hammarskjold could facilitate this by persuading his American friends. If the USA would think of using war threats to intimidate China or cause acceptance of the idea of two Chinas or continued occupation of Taiwan, it is a fantasy. If USA like to make war provocations let them do so. We say if the USA insist on war we will resist and never submit."

(At this point in the text the Swedish Ambassador said in Swedish, which Hammarskjold translated, that "he considered two things significant in Chou's statement to him. One, the emphasis on Chiang Kai-shek's representation in the SC, and Chou's apparent real desire for direct negotiations." Also at this point the interpreter had interrupted for a clarification of some of Chou's statements and Chou summed up as follows.)

"As I have indicated there is in principle no refusal on our side to negotiate directly with the USA. As for concrete steps, they would require further study. If I have anything more to say on this subject I will call on you."

Hammarskjold told me that he thought Chou was extremely anxious to have direct talks but did not want to appear to be asking for them himself. He thought it significant that in his statement to the Swedish Ambassador he put the matter three different ways. First, that China would not refuse to negotiate, then, that if the US wished to negotiate they would accept direct negotiations, and finally, if US wished to use war threats China would resist.

Hammarskjold went on to say that he felt that by indicating his wishes for direct negotiations so clearly Chou had shown that he was in a weaker position than one might have thought. Hammarskjold also felt it was significant that, as he put it, with all the possibilities Chou had he had chosen the channel of the SYG to put forward the idea of direct negotiations. It struck Hammarskjold that Chou did not want to use New Delhi or Moscow and that he did not want a

Geneva-type conference. Hammarskjold thought that Chou felt he had thrown the ball to the US and Hammarskjold believed that the ball should be thrown back to Chou. A form should be found, he said, to throw the ball back without allowing Chou to say that the US refused any talks. Of course, he said, in doing this one should not engage in polemics. One possible way to throw the ball back to Chou was a reply from the SYG along the lines of the following draft which he handed me and said that he would not, of course, want to send anything until we had indicated our views:

"I have received a report from the Swedish Ambassador on your comments on my message. I note your views on the possibility of direct negotiations.

From recent contacts with representatives of the USA, I have formed the conviction that at the present moment discussions going beyond the immediate issue raised in the New Zealand item, that is a *de facto* cease-fire around the off-shore islands, could not be proposed with any chance of success. As to the procedure for discussions, I note your reasons for eliminating the SC as a possible forum. I do not take this as meaning that you exclude the possibility of discussions under the aegis of the UN, if another, appropriate form could be found."

Hammarskjold said in connection with the above draft reply to Chou that as a starting point, looking at the matter from our point of view, it should be clear that nothing should be discussed beyond the off-shore islands and that there should be no *direct* negotiations as such between US and China. The negotiations, he felt, should be under the aegis of the UN. I asked him what he meant by this. Did he mean, for example, that he should undertake negotiations? He avoided answering this part of my question but said that he thought that the SC might continue its discussions and end up with a blessing for negotiations which the US might undertake on behalf of the UN. In any case, he felt the matter should remain a UN matter.

Hammarskjold indicated several times that he was struck by the fact that Chou completely misunderstands the US attitude toward the question of two Chinas. He also felt that Chou's request for direct negotiations with the US would not be palatable to Moscow, although he was sure that Moscow would be informed. He considered Chou's message to him as the first indication that there would not be incidents in the evacuation of the Tachens.

At the close of our discussion Hammarskjold said that he felt the SC must meet this week, and must assert itself somehow.

Lodge

96. **Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,  
Washington, February 7, 1955, 11:30 a.m.** <sup>1</sup>

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary	Sir Roger Makins
The Under Secretary	Sir Robert Scott
Mr. Robertson	
Mr. Merchant	

The British Ambassador called at his request on the Secretary at 11:30 this morning. He opened the conversation by stating that Sir Anthony Eden desired to communicate certain thoughts to the Secretary but wished to emphasize these have not been discussed collectively with the Commonwealth Prime Ministers. Sir Roger said that Sir Anthony did not believe it would be profitable at the moment to continue the discussion of substance in the Security Council. He recognizes, however, that some meeting in the near future will have to be held. He is also inclined to believe that the Soviet Union would agree to the wisdom of not pursuing the substance in the United Nations now. However, when the time comes for settling on some new procedure he believes it should be under the aegis of the U.N.

The British Ambassador continued that Sir Anthony's principal concern now was the avoidance of any incident so serious as to involve us all. The important thing is to stop the fighting.

There are various proposals in the air. The one which Sir Anthony now favors is to continue diplomatic exchanges. He would appreciate any suggestions the Secretary might have regarding the form of the reply to the Molotov proposal. <sup>2</sup>

Eden does not consider the Soviet proposal to be acceptable but hopes that no doors will be slammed on the general idea. The immediate step he has in mind is to go back to the Soviets and say that he has noted Molotov's remarks to Hearst and Kingsbury Smith on January 31 <sup>3</sup> when he said "hardly anyone would want to interfere" with the Tachen evacuation, and when he also spoke of their anxiety for a peaceful solution. He would then propose asking Molotov if he confirmed that this is the position of the Chinese Communist Government and say that he would pass on any information received to the U.S. and other interested governments.

Next the British Ambassador said that he was instructed to ask the Secretary as the basis for any such approach (but not to commu-

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/2-755. Top Secret. Drafted by Merchant.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 2, Document 86.

<sup>3</sup> Molotov's remarks in an interview on January 29 with publisher William Randolph Hearst, Jr., and Kingsbury Smith were released to the press by the Soviet Government on January 30 and reported in the *New York Times* on January 31, 1955.

nicate to Moscow or Peiping) if the Secretary could give a confidential statement of longer term U.S. policy objectives. He referred to his letter to the Secretary of January 21<sup>4</sup> in connection with which the Secretary had made an express reservation regarding the future of the off-shore islands. The British hope that eventually a line will be drawn down the Formosa Straits and that Peiping will abandon any idea of an attack on Formosa while Formosa abandons any idea of an attack on the Mainland. He hoped that the U.S. desired to reach a similar long-term position. He then added as his own inference that the British Government realizes it will take time to reach a peaceful atmosphere and solution. Various ideas were in the wind. One is the Molotov proposal. Another is utilizing Hammarskjold as a negotiating instrument. The third is direct talks between the Chinese Communists and the U.S. He recognized that in the immediate future agreement on any basis can probably not be reached.

In reply the Secretary said that on the first point regarding the United Nations there was the matter of the uncompleted action initiated by New Zealand. He inquired if the Ambassador implied a desire of the U.K. not to table at any time the agreed resolution.

Sir Roger replied that as he understood it it was the desire of London not to table it at the present time. When the Secretary pressed him as to London's views on a later tabling, Sir Roger answered that he judged that the British Government had reached no hard view on this subject.

The Secretary then said that he did not believe events should necessarily prevent us from proceeding as agreed with the resolution. Chou En-lai's reply<sup>5</sup> had been no surprise to him. He could see advantages in bringing the fire a little closer to the feet of the Chinese Communists. We should not give the appearance of timidity in the face of Chou En-lai's truculent rejection. He noted also that the Chinese Nationalists disliked the idea of the resolution nearly as much as the Communists. In any event, he did not want to decide today to abandon ORACLE as he felt that there had been no basic change in the situation. It was true that there had been no agreement on tempo but there had been agreement on the resolution. He did not want to abandon the idea at this time.

The British Ambassador said he would convey this reaction to London. It seemed clear to him that London would not want the resolution tabled this week. They hoped that the Soviets might exercise a restraining influence on Peiping and to introduce the resolution now might well result in a Soviet veto.

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 3, Document 27.

<sup>5</sup> See Document 77.



The Secretary said that he had not had time to discuss at length the last week's developments with his staff and all that he desired to say at this time was that he did not wish to abandon the plan for the resolution. He agreed, however, that we should not move hastily.

On the matter of the reply to Molotov, the Secretary said that he would like to give this matter more thought. He said he had earlier told Ambassador Munro that one thing was quite clear and that was that the U.S. was unwilling to accept any proposals, under the aegis of the U.N. or otherwise, which involved discussing matters affecting the Republic of China behind the back of the latter government. Any such procedure was completely ruled out.

On the matter of our long-term policy objectives the Secretary said this was obviously a large subject. We hoped, as probably the UK does, that ultimately there will come about sufficient independence between Peiping and Moscow as to create the beginning of a balance of power relationship. As a result the U.S. would not have to be so fully involved in the Far East as it now is. With Japan weakened by the last war and the two Communist powers closely allied, it was necessary for the U.S. to put its power into the scales. Meanwhile, he felt the return of Japanese power would come slowly.

Sir Roger interjected that he had not been thinking in quite such long terms.

The Secretary then said that, pending developments on the Mainland ending the imbalance of Asian power as it now exists, the U.S. feels that the only acceptable solution to it is a close association with the present non-communist countries. This has been achieved through various treaties. The value of any of them, however, is dependent on the continuation of an anti- or non-communist government in their countries. If such governments are subverted then treaties have little residual value and there would be a corresponding shift in the position in the Pacific. Our primary interest is the offshore island chain. The treaty with Formosa does not cover, as treaty area, the islands immediately off the Mainland. Our interest in them is not in their intrinsic value but in their psychological value and in their relation to the defense of Formosa.

The Secretary continued that we had gone as far as we can in tidying up the situation without collapsing the morale of the Republic of China, the maintenance of which is a large factor. If it were to collapse, a lot of things would break quickly. The result would be serious in Japan, the Philippines, and possibly through South East Asia.

Our actions have included limiting the area covered by the treaty to Formosa and the Pescadores; the exchange of notes with Chiang Kai-shek; and the evacuation of the Tachen Islands. These have combined to put a strain on the Republic of China equal to

what it can bear for the time being. Any action looking like further retreat would be insupportable. He noted also that even our action in the U.N. had been repugnant to the Nationalists, and he said that he felt we had about exhausted our ability to do anything further at the present time. It was up to others to make some contribution.

The Secretary then said he thought we should seriously consider whether Peiping really wanted peace. (Sir Roger said that the British also are considering this problem.) The Secretary noted that it took us a long time to really believe what Hitler had plainly said and written concerning his intentions.

On the other hand, if Peiping really has a peaceful purpose, the off-shore islands lose much of their importance. The Nationalists now appreciate that the only way they can return to the Mainland would be as a result of a change in the internal situation on the Mainland and not on their ability to fight their way back. If the Korean War broke out again, then the Nationalists would have a role to play but only under conditions of general war would that role be one of invaders of the Mainland. If the risk of general war and the threat of a Communist attack on Formosa declines, then the value of the off-shore islands recedes.

Sir Roger thanked the Secretary for a very clear answer to his question.

At this point Sir Robert said he thought the Communists were serious about their intention to destroy the Chiang Kai-shek regime but not about an invasion of Formosa. He thought that if the Nationalists stay on the off-shore islands and the Communists can inflict defeats on them, the result will be weakening of Chiang Kai-shek's prestige and position on Formosa. The possible risk of a Communist take-over on Formosa from within was then briefly discussed.

The Secretary promised again to give Sir Roger within a few days any further thoughts he had regarding the reply to Molotov and the matter of action in the U.N. He expressed the hope that the Commonwealth Prime Ministers would not formalize any position. Sir Roger said he did not expect this to occur.

The Secretary then asked the Ambassador's opinion as to whether Hammarskjöld by his personal activities was actually being helpful or in fact crossing the wires. Sir Roger disclaimed any opinion on the matter. The Secretary expressed himself as feeling that when dealing with Communists and Orientals it was important to keep the channels clear. He doubted that Hammarskjöld's volunteer operations on a free-wheeling basis were contributing much. If he were to play any role in the matter, he felt he would have to operate under instructions.

The Under Secretary commented that prior to the despatch of Hammarskjöld's long personal letter to Chou En-lai Ambassador

Lodge had expressed the firm objection of the U.S. to the letter and had expressed the view that we felt that he was exceeding his authority as Secretary General.

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97. **Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Bowie) to the Secretary of State**<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, February 7, 1955.*

SUBJECT

Formosa Policy

1. The U.S. must reassess its position regarding the Formosa Straits in the light of the situation which now exists.

2. In their attitude toward the problem, the free nations in Europe and Asia distinguish sharply between Formosa and the offshore islands. In general, they support or acquiesce in our defense of Formosa. But they consider the offshore islands do not involve our security interests. They are satisfied that if they were in ChiCom hands we would not consider trying to take them in order to defend Formosa even if it were attacked. They feel that they are important only in terms of a ChiNat intention to attack the mainland and that the ChiComs cannot be expected to acquiesce in ChiNat retention of such strongholds in their harbors. Hence, they look on them as a futile hostage to fortune and the symbol of a rash and quixotic policy. Thus, they feel that our protection of those islands greatly enhances the risk of war and thereby endangers their own security. This fear will tend to strain the coalition and generate pressures to restrain us.

3. This attitude would put us in a difficult position if the ChiComs should attack Quemoy or the Matsus. A war arising over Quemoy would alienate our allies in Europe and much of Asia. The lack of allied support would handicap our conduct of even a limited war and might seriously impair our capabilities if hostilities spread. This situation is likely to tempt the ChiComs eventually to try to seize Quemoy.

4. The ChiCom rejection of the UN invitation indicates that it will probably be useless to try to settle the issue by agreement with them. They have clearly stated as their primary objectives: (a) retak-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, PPS Files: Lot 66 D 70, China. Top Secret. A notation on the source text indicates that it was returned by the Secretary's office on March 7.

ing Formosa; and (b) replacing the ChiNats in the UN. In any negotiation they will surely not renounce these objectives or their efforts to brand the U.S. as the aggressor. If we are committed to defend Quemoy and Matsu, we play directly into the ChiCom hands. While continuing to assert their two primary goals, the ChiComs can focus on the offshore islands. Thus, they can divide us from our friends; confuse the real issues; and hope to create sufficient fear of a "useless" war to enhance the pressures for a new Geneva.

5. Molotov's proposal fits in with this pattern. The ChiComs will continue to threaten and to harass the offshore islands and may even seek to take some of them. Amid rising tensions, they will seek a conference to abate them on their terms. Such a conference would be the worst possible context for a solution. The very fact that the ChiComs took part would brand any outcome as appeasement. Moreover, it would be hard to prevent such a conference from taking up other questions such as ChiCom membership in the UN, especially if the ChiComs made this the price of settlement. To frustrate the Communist design, however, it will not be enough merely to reject Molotov's proposal. The U.S. must adopt some other course of action which will keep the free world with us.

6. In this situation, our policy should be directed to disengaging from the offshore islands in a way which will not damage our prestige or leave any doubts as to our will and ability to defend Formosa and the Pescadores. The free world and communist attitudes seem to me to give us the chance to do just this. U.S. withdrawal of protection from the offshore islands could be used to obtain general support for our position on Formosa. The ChiComs focus on Formosa and the UN seat tends to make the offshore islands a secondary matter.

7. The best forum for such a solution is the UN. In any case, the UN must not appear impotent in the face of the ChiCom challenge to its authority. I suggest the following program:

(a) The Security Council or, if necessary, the Assembly should adopt a resolution denouncing the use of force to alter the status of Formosa, the Pescadores and the Mainland, and branding in advance any use of force as aggression and a threat to the peace.

(b) With UN and allied support for our Formosa position, the U.S. should be prepared to abandon the offshore islands as no longer necessary to the defense of Formosa. For a period (say of three months) we should undertake to protect the offshore islands to enable the ChiNats to evacuate their forces if they wish, and we should state that we would react forcefully to any ChiCom military activity in the Straits affecting the status quo during this period.

8. In order to induce the ChiNats to withdraw we should stress:

(a) The importance to the ChiNats and to the U.S. of allied and UN support for the retention and defense of Formosa and the Pescadores.

(b) The importance of this action in maintaining U.S. public support for the ChiNat's Military Defense Treaty and for U.S. policy relating to Formosa.

(c) The consequences for ChiNat morale of defeat at Quemoy or Matsu as compared to withdrawal.

(d) The effect of the ChiCom publicly focusing on Formosa and the UN seat in sharply reducing even the symbolic significance of the offshore islands.

(e) The negligible military significance of the offshore islands for the defense of Formosa or in the event of wider hostilities.

9. Under such a program, the Seventh Fleet would be maintained in the area of the offshore islands during the specified period so as to make clear our power and our willingness to use it in accordance with our own decisions. If we should conduct an evacuation of the ChiNats we should do so without concealment and without haste. If the ChiComs should attempt any military action in the Formosa Straits during this period, we should respond severely so as to leave a permanent impression.

In other words, our general posture should be that we were acting, with firmness and with strength, in accordance with our own interests as we had determined them.

10. By this course we would make it clear that, in disengaging from the offshore islands, we were not motivated by fear for the ChiComs, but by international support for our major objective in the Formosa Straits, the defense of Formosa. We would have demonstrated both our contempt for the ChiCom military power and our desire not to provoke "useless" conflict.

11. In my opinion, such a course would enhance the respect of the free nations for our judgment, our restraint, and our sense of partnership, without giving rise to doubts in either the free world or the Communist Bloc as to our resolution. If the ChiComs are determined to precipitate a military showdown with the U.S. in the Far East, we could then count on the support of our allies. While their actual help in the immediate area might be modest, the effect on our worldwide position and on the willingness of the USSR to support Communist China in pressing the showdown could be decisive. In short, a program of obtaining the free world's support for our policy toward Formosa in exchange for abandoning the offshore islands would seem to me clearly to serve the U.S. security interest.

RRB

98. Telegram From the Representative at the United Nations (Lodge) to the Department of State <sup>1</sup>

New York, February 8, 1955—1 p.m.

453. For the Secretary from Lodge. Re off-shore islands. In accordance with my discussions with you <sup>2</sup> I called on SYG Hammarskjold this morning. I said that we believed that the SC should not come to a standstill and that something should be done this week, if possible, to keep the momentum going. On other hand, UK and some of our friends appeared to feel that nothing more shld be done in the UN and we did not wish to embarrass them. We had concluded, therefore, that a mtg simply to hear a report by the SYG as to his official correspondence with the ChiComs wld meet the present situation. Such a report, in our opinion, shld be brief and *pro forma*.

Hammarskjold replied immediately that of course he cld do that, but there was the other problem of Chou's personal message to him (see mytel 447, February 6) <sup>3</sup> which had to be handled in some way outside the UN. I said at once that this was something concerning which the US had no comment to make and that, if he undertook it, it would be *on his own responsibility*. Hammarskjold replied that of course the US shld not get involved in the question; that it was his own responsibility but something had to be done to keep the ball rolling and throw it back to Chou. Unless the US objected, he said, he would go ahead and reply. In the absence of an objection from the US he wld do so, but of course he wld not do anything to embarrass US if he knew this was the case. His reply to Chou wld be to clear up the ambiguity as to Chou's attitude toward other UN channels than the SC.

As for my suggestion for a report by him to the Council, he felt that if there were a SC meeting at which he reported only the official communications already circulated, and had made no personal reply to Chou's personal message, Chou could well ask what had happened concerning his personal message. He said that he, Hammarskjold, cld go along completely with the line I had suggested if he made some reply to Chou's personal message to him. He felt he must throw the ball back and he was sure that Chou had, in any case, informed Moscow of his message to Hammarskjold. If my plan were to be followed there must be a sign of life from him on the personal message. The minimum, in his opinion, wld be to tell Chou simply that he

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/2-855. Secret; Niact; Limited Distribution. Received at 2:35 p.m.

<sup>2</sup> Three telephone conversations between Lodge and Dulles on this subject on February 7 are recorded in notes by Phyllis Bernau. (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations)

<sup>3</sup> Document 95.

had received his message. But, Hammarskjöld said, the US would be entirely outside the matter and wld not be involved. What he must be sure of was that the US wld not be embarrassed.

I asked Hammarskjöld if it was clear that if he made his report to the SC, he wld not mention his personal correspondence with Chou. He replied that he wld not, and that in fact apart from the US, the only one who had been informed by him of Chou's personal message had been Dixon (UK).

I then asked him how he would frame his report. He said first of all there was no need for a formal report and he wld say simply that he had transmitted the invitation of the Council to the ChiComs in accordance with the formula used by Munro as Pres and that he had received Chou's formal reply. Nothing more.

I also raised the question of Hammarskjöld's letter to me of February 3 (see mytel 449, February 7).<sup>4</sup> Reading from a letter I had prepared to reply to Hammarskjöld<sup>5</sup> I said that we did not consider that the Pres of the Council had made any summation; that he merely requested the SYG to convey the invitation, taking into account the views expressed by reps as to the *desirability* of the ChiComs accepting. Not only did we believe that Munro had not made a summation, but we had had numerous consultations to avoid a summation. I also pointed out that we believed there was no action by the Council which required or authorized him to send a message of the character of his *secundo*.<sup>6</sup> Hammarskjöld said that that was another matter, as far as the present problem was concerned. His interpretation of his role differed from ours. Of course he did not speak for the US or for the Council; but that was a rather "formal" story and we shld forget about it.

I told Hammarskjöld that as far as his reply to Chou was concerned our position was that we had no comment to make on his proposed reply; that if he sent it he did so on his own responsibility; and that we thought it exceeded his authority. He again said that his interpretation of his authority differed from ours but that what he did would not involve us—it wld be as if another govt had taken action which we might not like but to which, of course, we would not be a party.

<sup>4</sup> The reference telegram reported that Lodge received a letter of February 3 from Hammarskjöld replying to a letter of the same date from Lodge. Lodge's letter, reported in telegram 433 from New York, February 3 (cited in footnote 10, Document 92), restated U.S. objections to Hammarskjöld's February 2 messages to Chou En-lai. Hammarskjöld's February 3 letter cited the record of the January 31 Security Council meetings and stated that both messages were within his authority. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/2-555)

<sup>5</sup> Not found in Department of State files.

<sup>6</sup> The reference is to Hammarskjöld's personal message to Chou.

On the basis of the foregoing, it seems clear to me (1) that Hammarskjöld will make a *pro forma* report to the SC, if such a course is agreed with the UK, France and NZ, but that he will also privately make his proposed reply to Chou unless we go further than we have done and formally object to his doing so. I wld appreciate instructions on this point.<sup>7</sup>

In addition, it seems to me that a mtg to hear so limited a report from the SYG will at least require some speeches from members regretting Chou's rejection of the invitation and expressing the intention to consider the matter further at a later date.

Pending further instructions I have telephoned Munro and filled him in on our view concerning a mtg to hear a report from the SYG and possibly a few speeches along the above lines. He said that this was consistent with his personal view but he was not sure of the NZ Govt's attitude. He planned to talk to UK Ambassador Makins in Wash and call me back later this morning.

I also telephoned Dixon outlining our proposal. I said that we understood Eden's problem with the Commonwealth PriMins, that we did not wish to embarrass him, and that on the contrary, we wanted to accommodate him as much as possible as to timing and tone, but that we did not want to by-pass the UN. It was for these reasons that we thought the kind of mtg suggested would be desirable. Dixon said that all of the Commonwealth PriMins and Eden agreed that no further mtg shld be held. Our suggestion might, however, be a second position. He asked if "I wld forgive him if he simply took note, for the time being, of my suggestion". We agreed to meet in his office at 3:00 this afternoon.

Lodge

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<sup>7</sup> Telegram 412 to New York, February 8, instructed Lodge to interpose no further objection, since his statement to Hammarskjöld had made the U.S. position abundantly clear. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/2-855)

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99. **Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, February 9, 1955, 2:58 p.m.**<sup>1</sup>

SUBJECT

Off-Shore Islands

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/2-955. Top Secret. Drafted by McConaughy. The time of the meeting is from Dulles' appointment diary. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers)



## PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary  
Sir Roger Makins, British Ambassador  
Mr. MacArthur, C  
Mr. McConaughy, CA

The British Ambassador opened by saying he wished to talk about various matters related to the Formosa situation. He said the Soviet proposal for a ten-power conference to consider the situation in the area of Formosa and the off-shore islands had most regrettably leaked in New Delhi. The UK Government considered this leak unfortunate, and Sir Anthony Eden had accordingly felt obliged to get an immediate reply off to Molotov. The Ambassador believed the Secretary would find the reply satisfactory, and gave the Secretary a copy. (Enclosure No. 1.)<sup>2</sup> He said Sir Anthony's objective was to keep the diplomatic exchange with the Soviets going while at the same time pointing out that the Soviet proposal was unsatisfactory. Sir Roger said the UK did not intend to comment to the press on the Soviet proposal, and wished to keep secret the fact that Eden has sent a reply. The Secretary read Eden's message without comment.

The Ambassador then said he had reported to London the Secretary's recent statement of the U.S. position as to the off-shore islands. He has now received the views of the UK Government which he had been instructed to give us orally. Presumably, the statement of the U.S. position and the views of the UK Government had been considered by the Commonwealth Prime Ministers now meeting in London. The Ambassador thought it could probably be assumed that the British views represented a consensus of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers. Since the stated views of the UK Government were carefully framed, the Ambassador thought it desirable to give us the exact wording. Accordingly, he handed the Secretary an "oral communication" (Enclosure No. 2). The communication noted that while the evacuation of the Tachen Islands appeared to be proceeding satisfactorily, the position in regard to the off-shore islands still gave cause for concern. It was noted that the U.S. considered that it had gone as far as it could for the time being "to tidy up the situation". But if hostilities should occur over Quemoy or Matsu the great weight of opinion in the UK, and probably other free countries, would not support U.S. intervention in the off-shore islands, which were regarded as a part of China. The longer the situation was left vague, the greater the danger of incidents. The UK Government was

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<sup>2</sup> The enclosures are not attached to the source text but are in Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/2-955. The British reply to Molotov was summarized in a Foreign Office statement of February 12, printed in *Documents on International Affairs, 1955*, pp. 454-455.

being pressed to define more clearly its attitude as to the off-shore islands. The Government was trying to avoid this for the time being, but could not continue the evasion indefinitely, especially since the off-shore islands are generally admitted to be in a category different from that of Formosa and the Pescadores.

The Secretary said that the defense of Quemoy and Matsu had to be considered in relation to the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores. If HMG could give assurance regarding the security of Formosa and the Pescadores, the UK view as to the off-shore islands would be entitled to greater weight. However the Chinese Communists say emphatically that they intend to take Formosa. They do not make any distinction between the off-shore islands and Formosa, and openly declare that the attacks against the off-shore islands are part of the campaign to take Formosa. The U.S. Government is bound to give some credence to the Chinese Communists' own threatening words. Under the Mutual Defense Treaty and the Joint Resolution we must consider the relationship of the off-shore islands to the defense of Formosa. If there were assurances entitled to credence that the Chinese Communists no longer have designs on Formosa and the Pescadores, that would of course alter our attitude regarding the off-shore islands, for the islands would not then be unquestionably related to the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores. We cannot take a different view of the off-shore islands so long as it seems that an attack on the off-shore islands would be a stepping stone or a prelude to an attack on Formosa. The Chinese Communists could ease the situation if they would give dependable assurances that they do not intend to attack Formosa and the Pescadores. The U.S. position as to the off-shore islands could then be reexamined. Under present circumstances, we must assume that the Chinese Communists mean what they say.

The British Ambassador said the Secretary had made his position very clear. The Ambassador understood, and he thought Sir Anthony Eden and the Commonwealth Prime Ministers understood. The British Government was trying to find a position on which it and the Commonwealth countries could give full support to the U.S. If the U.S. should get involved with the Chinese Communists, the Commonwealth countries wanted a clear issue on which they could stand. The Prime Ministers did not believe that they could get sufficient support in their countries, if the issue were merely the off-shore islands.

The Secretary said he knew it was not an easy problem for the UK. He expressed deep appreciation for the sympathetic understanding which Eden had shown. He was aware that HMG had gone to considerable lengths to support the U.S. position.

The Ambassador concurred, saying that Eden had "risked his neck", politically speaking.

The Secretary said he was not unmindful of the risks Eden had incurred. He hoped something could be worked out but he felt that the U.S. Government had gone as far as it could in the absence of a response from the other side. There did not seem to be much hope in the present attitude of Chinese Communist authorities. Any assumption that the Chinese Communists might now follow a more moderate course would fly in the face of threatening Chinese Communist words and deeds of the most formidable character.

The Secretary remarked that if the Chinese Communists should resort to military action, the U.S. could not again be expected to afford them a "privileged sanctuary". It was not likely that U.S. forces would again be bound by a line such as the Yalu River line of the Korean hostilities.

The Secretary said he would prefer to leave the foregoing statement of the U.S. position oral and informal, if that was satisfactory to the Ambassador.

The Ambassador said that the statement was perfectly clear and he was quite willing to have it left oral. The British statement was really an oral communication.

The British Ambassador said that as to the next steps on the New Zealand item in the Security Council, he understood that an agreement on procedure had been reached in New York between Lodge, Dixon and Munro.<sup>3</sup> This was satisfactory to the UK and he need not bother the Secretary with this point.

The Secretary said he understood that an interim meeting of the Security Council was contemplated.

The Ambassador confirmed this. He remarked that the British Government shared the concern of the U.S. Government at the unauthorized correspondence which Secretary General Hammarskjold was exchanging with Chou En-lai.

The Secretary said that he considered this exchange of correspondence extremely dangerous. We were in a serious affair. The situation was not improved by people meddling in it on their own responsibility. There was a real danger that Hammarskjold's efforts might be misunderstood in Peiping. Every word must be weighed in a delicate situation such as now prevails, and every word needs to come from an authorized source. Hammarskjold seems to think he has a standing function as an arbitrator between the two sides in UN

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<sup>3</sup> Telegram 462 from New York, February 9, reported that Dixon, Munro, Hoppenot, and Lodge had agreed that a Security Council meeting should be held on February 14 to take note of the PRC rejection of the Council's invitation. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/2-955)

matters. This is a new concept, which should not be encouraged. The Secretary expressed gratification that the British Government shares the U.S. view on this.

Sir Roger said the British regarded the role Hammarskjold has assumed as "outside his competence".

The Secretary said that Hammarskjold's intervention with the Chinese Communists was very different from that which the UK had undertaken. The UK representations were highly responsible, and had been made with our knowledge and acquiescence. Hammarskjold's efforts were in sharp contrast.

The Ambassador said that, apart from the question of competence, his Government felt that Hammarskjold's efforts inevitably would "cross some wires".

The Secretary said that he had invited Canadian Foreign Minister Pearson to have lunch with him privately and informally in Washington on Sunday.<sup>4</sup> He thought it would be useful to get his first hand impressions as a result of the London meeting.

The Ambassador thought this was an excellent idea. He said he had suggested to London four days ago that Pearson should stop off here on his way back to Ottawa from London.

The Secretary asked that Eden be informed that he (the Secretary) is aware of the fact that Eden too has his troubles in handling Far Eastern issues. He wanted the Foreign Secretary to know that he is deeply appreciative of the efforts he is making and is not unmindful of the complications he is incurring.

The Secretary expressed regret that Sir Anthony would have to cut short his approaching Far Eastern trip.<sup>5</sup> He felt it would be a good thing if Eden could carry out his schedule of visits as he could exercise very useful influences in certain places. The Secretary mentioned that he was planning to spend a few hours in Rangoon and also make brief visits to the Associated States and Manila.

The Ambassador agreed that the change in Eden's plans was regrettable. It was, however, unavoidable for several reasons including the reluctance of Eden's colleagues in the Cabinet to a prolonged absence.

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<sup>4</sup> February 13. The meeting apparently did not take place. Dulles and Pearson had lunch in New York on February 16; see Document 115.

<sup>5</sup> Both Eden and Dulles were to attend a meeting of the Council established under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, to be held in Bangkok, February 23-25.

100. Telegram From the Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Bohlen) to the Department of State <sup>1</sup>

*Moscow, February 10, 1955—1 a.m.*

1279. Reference Embassy telegrams 1241 <sup>2</sup> and 1261. <sup>3</sup> British Ambassador saw Molotov this afternoon at 2 o'clock to deliver message from British Government point out [*sic*]:

(1) Impossibility of holding conference without representation of "Chinese Nationalist authorities on Formosa", and

(2) That any conference on subject which might develop should be under aegis of UN. Ambassador expressed hope of British Government that incidents in area could be avoided while method of dealing with problem could be worked out.

Molotov made no comments on points 1 and 2 but stated twice during conversation that US activities and actions would be only cause of incidents and repeated Soviet belief that issue with Chiang Kai-shek was internal Chinese affair. Molotov referred to some publicity in London and said he gathered from that Eden was no longer interested in secrecy, adding that Soviet Government would have to consider question of publication. He also asked Ambassador whether British Government was aware of Nehru's suggestion but did not elaborate when Hayter said he personally was not informed.

On publicity question, Hayter told Molotov that leak had come from New Delhi and not as Molotov implied from either British, Dominion, or US Government.

**Bohlen**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/2-1055. Top Secret; Priority. Received at 9:13 p.m. on February 9. Repeated to London for information.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 2, Document 86.

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 1261 from Moscow, February 8, reported that Ambassador Hayter had informed Molotov that his proposal was under consideration. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/2-855)

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101. Editorial Note

At a meeting of the National Security Council on February 10, Admiral Radford commented on the progress of the evacuation of the Tachen Islands. The memorandum of discussion reads as follows:

"Admiral Radford explained that the evacuation operations in the Tachens area had been proceeding very successfully in good weather. Barring a change in the weather for the worse, the task

would be completed at the end of the week. One U.S. aircraft had been shot down, but under circumstances which did not portend serious Chinese Communist operations. The pilot of this plane had become lost in the fog and was flying low over the Communist mainland when he was compelled to ditch his plane after it had been hit by 20-mm anti-aircraft fire. No Chinese Communist planes had actually appeared at the scene of the evacuation operation to this date.

"Secretary Dulles inquired as to the danger of Communist submarines. Admiral Radford replied that despite the report that one periscope had been sighted, our military people on the scene were inclined to discount the danger of submarine attack." (Memorandum of discussion by Gleason, February 11; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

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**102. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,  
Washington, February 10, 1955<sup>1</sup>**

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH

Admiral Anderson  
Admiral Orem  
Mr. McConaughy  
Mr. MacArthur

Admiral Orem said that the Tachens evacuation operation should be completed Friday afternoon February 11, or the next morning, Washington time. This would be considerably ahead of schedule.

Admiral Orem then gave Mr. MacArthur a copy of a proposed press statement planned for issuance upon completion of the evacuation. (Copy attached).<sup>2</sup> He said the statement had already been cleared by Defense, Navy and Air, and by Admiral Radford for the Joint Chiefs. Mr. MacArthur said he would show the statement to the Secretary at once, and let the Admirals know if there were any changes to suggest. It would be understood of course that no statement would be issued without complete agreement.

Admiral Orem said he thought that possibly the Chinese would want to put out a statement of their own.

Mr. MacArthur said it was his own individual view that we should merely inform the Chinese in advance of our statement, and

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/2-1055. Top Secret. Drafted by McConaughy.

<sup>2</sup> The text of the statement, issued on February 11, is in Department of State *Bulletin*, February 21, 1955, p. 290.

not encourage them to put out a related statement over which we would have no control. If they wanted to put out a statement without any encouragement from us, that would be their own affair. Mr. Robertson should have an opportunity to give his views on this matter.

Admiral Orem said the Navy public relations Officer anticipated quite a few questions from the press when the statement was put out. Admiral Carney was willing to answer questions in a generalized way. But he would not get into the particulars of the new disposition of the 7th Fleet, etc.

Admiral Anderson said that it was planned that most of the fleet would go to Subic Bay or Japan. The *Yorktown*, would return to the U.S. as scheduled for some time. Four aircraft carriers would be left in the area. The F-86 Wing now on Formosa would go back to its base except for one squadron. The various squadrons would be rotated to Formosa, one at a time. In answer to a question from Mr. MacArthur, Admiral Orem said that most of the communications personnel sent to Formosa with the Air Wing would stay there. The authorized complement of 600 was never filled, and MAAG would be able to finance the smaller complement which had been sent there. It was needed for other purposes already planned before the F-86s were sent to Formosa.

Admiral Anderson said that the Chinese G-2 had reported a concentration of about 600 junks opposite Matsu, near Foochow. The Chinese wanted to attack this concentration and MAAG had asked Cincpac for authorization. Cincpac had referred the matter to CNO. The attack had been okayed by CNO subject to confirmation by U.S. reconnaissance that it is a real concentration of some military significance. The White House is being informed through Col. Goodpaster, although strictly speaking, this is only required when a mainland attack is contemplated. Admiral Orem doubted whether the concentration had real significance. He thought the Chinese Communists would be foolish to concentrate shipping in the vicinity of either Matsu or Quemoy at this time. Air attacks might make sense from their point of view. However, Admiral Duncan thought the concentration of junks might have some military significance.<sup>3</sup>

*D MacA*

**Douglas MacArthur II**

<sup>3</sup> A memorandum of February 10 from MacArthur to Dulles and several other Department principals, attached to the source text, reads in part as follows:

"Re the concentration of fishing junks opposite Matsu, Admiral Anderson telephoned me later that CNO was inclined to agree with Admiral Pride's estimate to the effect that approval should *not* be given to the Chinese Nationalists unless U.S. reconnaissance confirmed that the concentration of junks was a serious threat aimed at invasion of Matsu. CNO has sent a message to CINCPAC in this sense. I said that Sec-

103. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,  
Washington, February 10, 1955, 2:08 p.m. <sup>1</sup>

SUBJECT

Farewell Call: The Prospects for the Government of the Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Regime.

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary

Dr. George Yeh, Chinese Foreign Minister

Dr. Wellington Koo, Chinese Ambassador

Mr. Robertson, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs (last half of conversation)

Mr. McConaughy, Director, CA

Dr. Yeh said he had called to say goodbye and to express his gratitude for the great contribution the Secretary had made to the important negotiations which had recently come to fruition. He felt that no success could have been achieved without the efforts of the Secretary.

The Secretary commended Dr. Yeh on the large and constructive role he had played in the negotiations.

Dr. Yeh said that he would travel to Taipei via Manila, where he expected to discuss with Magsaysay and Garcia <sup>2</sup> the Philippine legal restrictions on aliens in the retail merchandising trade, which had put Chinese merchants out of business in the Philippines. This law had strained relations between China and the Philippines. He felt he could negotiate successfully with Magsaysay, who was a better man to deal with than Quirino <sup>3</sup> had been. He said that Magsaysay knew he had made a mistake in signing the law, but had done it for political reasons. He understood that a joint committee of officials and Congressmen had been set up at Manila to study the law and consider the case for revision.

Dr. Yeh said he felt it was a matter of urgency for the U.S. and Chinese military authorities to begin joint consultations as to the

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retary Dulles wished to be informed immediately if the Chinese were authorized to attack the concentration and Admiral Anderson promised to let me know at once in such contingency so that I could call the Secretary and Mr. Robertson."

No further documentation concerning this has been found in Department of State files.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/2-1055. Secret. Drafted by McConaughy. The time of the meeting is from Dulles' appointment diary. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers)

<sup>2</sup> Ramon Magsaysay, President of the Philippines. Carlos P. Garcia, Vice President and Foreign Minister of the Philippines.

<sup>3</sup> Elpidio Quirino, former President of the Philippines, 1948-1953.



strengthening of the defense of Quemoy and Matsu. Such consultations could take place quietly so as not to cause any public flurry. They were an imperative necessity since there was much to be done in a little time. The Chinese forces must not be caught in a state of unpreparedness if the Communists should strike unexpectedly.

In answer to a question from the Secretary as to the garrison on Matsu, Dr. Yeh said it was something less than 10,000. He said there was also a small naval station there. He confirmed that Matsu was within range of heavy artillery emplaced on the Mainland. It was not as close in as Quemoy.

The Secretary indicated that he did not have any objections to private military consultations between American and Chinese military representatives.

Dr. Yeh thought that a beginning might be made by sending small joint survey parties to look over the ground. He said that Admiral Radford would undoubtedly have some idea as to the best way to begin joint planning. He would hope to consult him.

Dr. Yeh recalled that it was a classical Chinese custom for a traveler who was saying goodbye to a friend to ask that friend for advice. He wished to ask the Secretary if, out of the wealth of his wisdom and experience he had some advice to tender.

The Secretary said he had not anticipated a request for advice. However it was very good of the Foreign Minister to solicit his views and he would take advantage of the opportunity to set forth extemporaneously some thoughts which recently he had been turning over in his mind. He said that he believed more thought needed to be given to the role which Free China should play in the situation now confronting us. It might be important to prepare the people of Free China for a more realistic and long range view of the situation. The people must be getting a little disillusioned with hearing every year from the Generalissimo and other Government leaders that they would march back to the Mainland in the course of the coming year. When year after year went by without this happening, some cynicism and disbelief must surely be engendered which might tend to discredit the Chinese Government.

The Secretary said the Minister should not think for a moment that the U.S. wanted or expected to see Free China chained to the island of Formosa forever. That small island must not become a prison for Free China. But no one could say with confidence that non-Communist China will expand beyond Formosa this year or next year. As long as there were 10 times as many soldiers on the Mainland as on Formosa, and as long as these Communist troops remained loyal and disciplined, it would be suicidal for the forces of Nationalist China to undertake to win back the Mainland unaided. The resources available to Nationalist China alone were not adequate

for the purpose. It was not realistic to talk in those terms. The Secretary felt that a Government cannot go on fooling its people year after year. There was no idea among the American people in general, and certainly no idea in this Administration, of confining the Chinese Government to Formosa, but no time table could be fixed. The Chinese Government would have to wait for an opportunity and be prepared to recognize and seize it when it came. It would be necessary to wait for the forces of disintegration which are certainly at work in Communist China to have some effect. At some point the structure would be likely to crack. There will be unrest. When people are ruthlessly deprived for a long period of those things which they inately seek, they eventually react.

The Secretary said he could envisage off-hand at least three contingencies which might bring about a crisis for the Chinese Communist regime. He could probably think of more if he had a little more time for reflection:

1. A split among the rulers of the regime. Dissensions might crop out which would have an extremely disruptive effect. The Chinese Government might be able to intervene then with weighty effect. It might wield the balance of power.

2. There might be an upsurge of popular unrest. Forces from below in this case would upset the Communist dictatorship at the top even though the dictatorship remained unified. The ruthless exploitation of the people might lead to an upheaval. In such event the Chinese Government again might be able to intervene so as to affect decisively the power balance.

3. Finally, the possibility of large-scale hostilities could not be ruled out. We earnestly hoped this would not occur. But the contingency could not be dismissed. If the Communist leaders of China should precipitate war, the U.S. would expect the Chinese Communist forces to be hit from many directions—from the South, from Formosa, from Okinawa, and from Korea. The Chinese Government and its forces would have a vital role to play in this situation.

The Secretary said he thought it was important to think in these long-range terms. He was not criticising the Generalissimo for the specific short-range predictions he had felt constrained to make. The Generalissimo of course was the best judge of the requirements of his own situation. He felt that the Generalissimo was a wise man and a farsighted statesman. He had respect for his qualities of greatness. He thought the Generalissimo might wish to consider beginning to condition the Free Chinese people to this longer range and less specific, but more realistic approach.

The Secretary mentioned the very bad conditions undoubtedly existing in Russia. The Soviet Union had been subjected to very heavy demands. Undoubtedly the Soviet Union was overextended. The Soviet Union was trying to match U.S. military power with an

industrial base only one-third or one-fourth that of the U.S. Communist China was undoubtedly pressing the Soviet Union hard for more military and industrial assistance. Through the Chinese Communists, the North Korean and Viet Minh regimes were making large demands. The military requirements in the European satellite countries were heavy. The economy of the European satellite countries had been squeezed. The satellite peoples were squirming under the demands made of them. They were restive. The whole Communist domain was overextended. The Soviets were trying to solve the problem by getting tougher. This might serve as a stopgap measure. But in time it could aggravate the situation. If the Soviet Union was overextended, Communist China undoubtedly was more overextended and an eventual crisis in Mainland China could be anticipated. The importance of having a Free China ready to move into such a situation is tremendous. This situation might develop this year. We hope there will not be a long wait. But no one can be sure that the crisis will come soon. It might be some years away. The important thing is to be ready and patiently bide one's time until the right moment comes.

Dr. Yeh said that some of the Chinese Government leaders have been thinking along somewhat similar lines. Unfortunately it has become traditional for the Generalissimo to make a ringing declaration on the "Double Tenth" every year. Like many senior military men, the Generalissimo likes high-sounding rhetoric. It has seemed to him necessary to hold out some fairly immediate hope of return to the Mainland in order to maintain morale.

The Secretary said that he considered Adenauer <sup>4</sup> to be probably the greatest statesman active today. Adenauer wants desperately to reunite Germany, but he refrains from specific predictions and does not assert reunion will come about by force of West German arms. He does not say it will happen this year or next year. He believes the thing to do is to keep strong, cultivate the necessary alliances, and be prepared for the opportunity. The time will certainly come in both Germany and China.

The Secretary wondered if the Chinese Government would not find the German example worthy of consideration. There would seem to be a danger that skepticism and disillusion might set in if the people are led to believe that a successful invasion will occur in 1955. He felt the Chinese Government must accept the evident fact that it cannot establish itself on the Mainland by its own strength alone. The dislodgment of the Communist dictatorship would have to come about through a conjunction of events. The overextension of Chinese Communist resources probably would become more conspic-

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<sup>4</sup> Konrad Adenauer, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany.

uous because of the youthful fanaticism of the new Chinese Communist regime. Although the recklessness of the Chinese Communists might bring about a crisis earlier than now seems likely, it is still impossible to make predictions. The Secretary feared that the promises of the Chinese Government which were not fulfilled might actually lower morale. While no outsider could speak authoritatively of morale problems in another country, certainly in the U.S. promises which are exposed as a bluff have a negative effect. The Secretary said he would reiterate that this Government "regards the disintegrative process as inherent in the nature of a Communist dictatorship, and as inevitable." The Communist regimes are bound to crack. The leaders will fall out among themselves, or the people will rise up, or both, or the excesses of the regime will eventually cause all the non-Communist world to agree that the Communist dictators must be driven out as enemies of mankind. The Chinese Government is irreplaceable in the array of free world resources. The Chinese Government must be ready for its role when the time comes. It would seem wiser to be reticent about predictions and to husband the strength of free China for the ultimate opportunity.

Mr. Robertson said that some of the Chinese statements probably represented a reaction to inaccurate and irresponsible reporting by press correspondents and columnists in this country. They had created so much confusion as to the real course of our China policy that it could be readily understood why the Chinese Government was confused. The people who have the responsibility for Far Eastern policy in this Government knew that many of the reports freely bandied about in the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post*, and in the columns of such men as Drew Pearson and Herbert Elliston are false. But people who do not have access to policy could not know this. No wonder they were confused and often discouraged.

Dr. Yeh said that he had discreetly used his influence for some time to discourage the Generalissimo from making exact predictions about returning to the Mainland. At one time the Generalissimo and K. C. Wu<sup>5</sup> had vied with each other in fixing precise dates for the return. He thought the Generalissimo was now less addicted to naming an early date.

Dr. Yeh said that off the record he would like to mention certain characteristics of the Generalissimo. First, he was at times highly emotional and temperamental. This accounted for some of his impulsive acts and displays of temper. Second, he believed deeply in his friends. He could not believe that a friend of long standing could betray him or lie to him. This trait was often a good thing but sometimes was unfortunate. A good friend with sound judgment could

<sup>5</sup> Governor of Taiwan, 1949-1953.

talk very frankly to the Generalissimo and often influence his decisions in a very useful way. It so happened that among Americans, the Generalissimo had a special liking for Mr. Robertson and Admiral Radford. He liked them as individuals in addition to having confidence in their integrity and the soundness of their policy positions. They could talk to him with the utmost frankness without giving offense. And they could influence him. On the other hand, some of the Generalissimo's Chinese advisers had been entirely unable to convince him that some of his old Chinese friends were unworthy of his confidence. Third, the Generalissimo had the great attribute of seeing clearly the only right course when a showdown came and a basic decision had to be made. Although he was loath to accept a course distasteful to himself when the chips were not down, he had the remarkable quality of being able to accept an unpalatable alternative if it was in fact the only one which would escape catastrophe. He perceived how certain courses would be disastrous when this was not apparent to lesser men. This was the mark of his greatness, as the Foreign Minister saw it.

Dr. Yeh said that the false and illfounded American press reports which Mr. Robertson had mentioned had a very unsettling and exasperating effect on the Generalissimo. All of the adverse rumors about alleged impending recognition of Red China, admission of Red China to the UN, surrender of the off-shore islands, creation of a "two-China" situation, UN trusteeship for Formosa, etc. were systematically cabled to the Generalissimo every day by the Central News Agency man in Washington, who was very diligent in digging up these reports, from mid-western and Pacific Coast papers as well as those of the eastern seaboard. These were usually read out loud to the Generalissimo every morning before breakfast while he was being shaved. Often they worked him up to a state of great agitation and he would call the Foreign Minister while still at the boiling point. The Foreign Minister would point out that most of these columnists were thoroughly discredited and should not be taken seriously. The Generalissimo would often reply that he knew this, but the writers must have some high level contacts who were talking along these lines. He could not understand how there could be no foundation whatever for such persistent reports.

Mr. Robertson remarked that Drew Pearson had been branded for years as an inveterate and malicious liar. Elliston was known to be animated by an almost psychopathic bias against the Chinese Government as a result of having been fired from a position as Advisor to the Generalissimo years ago. Mr. Robertson mentioned the outrageous falsehood perpetrated by Elliston a few days ago when he alleged that Mr. Dulles had had the Yoshida letter about Japanese re-

lations with Nationalist China <sup>6</sup> in his pocket at the time of the San Francisco Peace Conference in 1951. <sup>7</sup> This letter was not written until several months later. It was a falsehood of the grossest and most flagrant character.

The Secretary said that he never read the columnists. It was not worth his while to pay any attention to them. If what they wrote about foreign affairs happened to be correct, he already knew about it and it was a waste of his time to read it. If they were wrong or misrepresented things, it simply made him angry without his being able to do anything about it. It was bad to get angry needlessly so he found that regardless of the circumstances it was better for him not to read the columnists.

Ambassador Koo referred to the earlier exchange of views about showing more patience in regard to the return to the Mainland. He asked if mischief makers among the press correspondents would not misinterpret a more restrained attitude as indicating the development of a "two-China" situation?

The Secretary said that there are two Chinas in the sense that there are two contending Chinese forces, and two rival Chinese Governments. There is still a civil war situation and it takes two to make a civil war. We recognize the existence of the Chinese Communist regime as a fact, just as we recognize the fact of the existence of Communist regimes in East Germany, North Korea and North Vietnam. But there is no diplomatic recognition. We do not recognize any of them as lawful governments. We hope, expect and plan for the unification of Germany, Korea and China under non-Communist Governments. We intend to help the forces of freedom and we believe they will prevail. But we are not trying to force unification by military means. We must be optimistic, awaiting with confidence the chance which will come. There is no implication at all in our awareness of the existence of a powerful Chinese Communist regime that we recognize it as the lawful government of China. We don't recognize it diplomatically for any purpose.

Amb. Koo remarked that while the opportunity to strike is awaited, all the non-Communist countries must do everything they can to prevent the Communist regimes from increasing and consolidating their strength.

The Secretary said that he emphatically agreed. It was important to keep the Communist regimes under economic and other pressures. The pressures add to the strains which will lead to disintegration. He

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<sup>6</sup> Reference is to a letter of December 24, 1951, from Shigeru Yoshida, then Japanese Prime Minister, to Dulles, who was then Consultant to Secretary of State Acheson; for text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. vi, Part 2, pp. 1466-1467.

<sup>7</sup> Reference is to the Conference held at San Francisco, September 4-8, 1951, at which the Japanese Peace Treaty was signed.

thought the current Soviet situation showed this. The pressures had resulted in failures of the Soviet high command to meet their objectives. They had thrown out Malenkov,<sup>8</sup> the fellow who symbolized the failure. The Communist leaders were faced by a dilemma. They could not reduce their commitments, and they could not increase their resources fast enough to cover their commitments. This sort of dilemma tended to lead to a breakdown. Communist China must be in a worse situation. The Secretary said he believed in continuing to subject Communist China to all the stresses we could by applying pressures. Not all of our Allies agreed with us on the efficacy of a policy of pressures, and there were certain differences of opinion in this regard within the American Government. He could not guarantee that every act of the American Government would be consistent with this theory of pressures, but he thought that would be the general approach and he himself was convinced of the soundness of it. He said the evidence of the last few days from the Soviet Union in his view had afforded strong new evidence of the wisdom of keeping the pressures on the Communists. The program of the Communists requires exertions which are beyond their strength. A policy of pressures can increase the gap between their requirements and their resources. The Soviet leaders have just realized that the Soviet economy cannot provide both guns and butter. So they have cut out the butter. This tends to make trouble among the Soviet masses. This trouble will grow. The imminence of a crisis in a Communist dictatorship is never readily discernible. The recent upset of Malenkov took everybody by surprise, including the intelligence experts. There were a few straws, but they did not point to such an early development of a crisis. Many high Soviet officials were unaware that a crisis was in the making.

We must have faith that the dissolution of this evil system is gradually taking place even when there is no surface evidence. The Secretary quoted St. Paul: "Faith is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen." We must know in our hearts that Communism contains the seeds of its own destruction. External pressures hasten the destructive process.

The Secretary said the danger in vigorous application of a policy of pressures was that a totalitarian regime when near the point of break-up may lash out recklessly in order to avoid or postpone an internal crisis. He believed that World War I was brought about more because of such a lashing out by the Austro-Hungarian and the Russian autocracies, which were near the break-up point in 1914, than by Prussian militarism.

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<sup>8</sup> Georgiy M. Malenkov had been replaced as Soviet Premier 2 days earlier by Marshal Nikolai A. Bulganin.

Amb. Koo said he would point out the importance of continuity of pressure. If pressure was applied intermittently, the effects were dissipated.

Dr. Yeh inquired if the British were supporting a plan for a Formosa cease-fire conference outside the UN?

The Secretary said the British had not proposed any such conference as far as he knew. He had informed the British Ambassador that this Government would not take part in any conference as to Formosa at which the GRC was not represented.

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#### 104. Letter From President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Churchill <sup>1</sup>

*Washington, February 10, 1955.*

DEAR WINSTON: I have heard how earnestly you supported throughout the Conference of Prime Ministers the proposition that nothing must create a serious rift in British-American relationships. Not only do I applaud that sentiment, but I am most deeply grateful to you for your successful efforts.

I realize that it has been difficult, at times, for you to back us up in the Formosa question and, for this reason, I want to give you a very brief account of our general attitude toward the various factors that have dictated the course we have taken. You understand, of course, that we have certain groups that are violent in their efforts to get us to take a much stronger, even a truculent position. The number that would like to see us clear out of Formosa is negligible. I know that on your side of the water you have the exact opposite of this situation.

Because the Communists know these facts, there is no question in my mind that one of the principal reasons for their constant pressing on the Asian frontier is the hope of dividing our two countries. I am sure that we, on both sides of the water, can make quite clear that, no matter what may be our differences in approach or even sometimes our differences in important convictions, nothing is ever going to separate us or destroy our unity in opposing Communist aggression.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Eisenhower Correspondence with Churchill. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Sent to Ambassador Aldrich with a covering note from John W. Hanes, Special Assistant to the Secretary, requesting that he deliver the letter to Prime Minister Churchill.



We believe that if international Communism should penetrate the island barrier in the Western Pacific and thus be in a position to threaten the Philippines and Indonesia immediately and directly, all of us, including the free countries of Europe, would soon be in far worse trouble than we are now. Certainly that whole region would soon go.

To defend Formosa the United States has been engaged in a long and costly program of arming and sustaining the Nationalist troops on that island. Those troops, however, and Chiang himself, are not content, *now*, to accept irrevocably and permanently the status of "prisoners" on the island. They are held together by a conviction that some day they will go back to the mainland.

As a consequence, their attitude toward Quemoy and the Matsus, which they deem the stepping stones between the two hostile regions, is that the surrender of those islands would destroy the reason for the existence of the Nationalist forces on Formosa. This, then, would mean the almost immediate conversion of that asset into a deadly danger, because the Communists would immediately take it over.

The Formosa Resolution, as passed by the Congress, is our publicly stated position; the problem now is how to make it work. The morale of the Chinese Nationalists is important to us, so for the moment, and under existing conditions, we feel they must have certain assurances<sup>2</sup> with respect to the offshore islands. But these must be less binding on us than the terms of the Chino-American Treaty, which was overwhelmingly passed yesterday by the Senate.<sup>3</sup> We must remain ready, until some better solution can be found, to move promptly against any Communist force that is manifestly preparing to attack Formosa. And we must make a distinction—(this is a difficult one)—between an attack that has *only* as its objective the capture of an off-shore island and one that is primarily a preliminary movement to an all-out attack on Formosa.

Whatever now is to happen, I know that nothing could be worse than global war.

<sup>2</sup> A memorandum by Secretary Dulles of a conversation with Ambassador Makins on February 11 reads in part as follows:

"I told Ambassador Makins of the President's letter to Churchill and let him read a copy. He asked about the word 'assurances' made to the Nationalists. I said that the word was not used in any technical sense of an agreement or commitment but merely that present circumstances were somewhat reassuring to them and thus partly offset the damage to their morale instant to the evacuation of the Tachens." (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Memoranda of Conversation)

<sup>3</sup> The Senate approved the treaty on February 9 by a vote of 64 to 6. Secretary Dulles testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee concerning the treaty on February 7, and the Committee reported the treaty favorably to the Senate on February 8. The record of those sessions and the report are printed in *Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee*, vol. VII, pp. 309-380 and 782-793.

I do not believe that Russia wants war at this time—in fact, I do not believe that even if we became engaged in a serious fight along the coast of China, Russia would *want* to intervene with her own forces. She would, of course, pour supplies into China in an effort to exhaust us and certainly would exploit the opportunity to separate us from your country. But I am convinced that Russia does not want, at this moment, to experiment with means of defense against the bombing that we *could* conduct against her mainland. At the same time, I assume that Russia's treaty with Red China comprehends a true military alliance, which she would either have to repudiate or take the plunge. She would probably be in a considerable dilemma if we got into war with China. It would not be an easy decision for the men in the Kremlin, in my opinion. But all this is no excuse for fighting China. We believe our policy is the best that we can design for staying out of such a fight.

In any event, we have got to do what we believe to be right—if we can figure out the right—and we must show no lack of firmness in a world where our political enemies exploit every sign of weakness, and are constantly attempting to disrupt the solidarity of the free world's intentions to oppose their aggressive practices.

Though thus sketchily presented, this has been the background of our thinking leading up to the present day. I devoutly hope that history's inflexible yardstick will show that we have done everything in our power, and everything that is right, to prevent the awful catastrophe of another major war.

I am sending you this note, not merely because of my realization that you, as our great and trusted ally, are entitled to have our thoughts on these vital matters, but because I so value, on the more personal side, the opportunity to learn of your own approach to these critical problems.

Again my thanks to you for giving Thomas Stephens <sup>4</sup> so much of your valuable time, and my apologies that he appeared in London in what was, I know, a most difficult and exhausting week for you.

With warm regard,

Your devoted friend,

Ike <sup>5</sup>

<sup>4</sup> Thomas E. Stephens, the President's Appointment Secretary.

<sup>5</sup> The signature on the source text, a carbon copy, is not in the President's handwriting.

105. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,  
Washington, February 11, 1955, 10:39 a.m. <sup>1</sup>

SUBJECT

The Area of Formosa

PARTICIPANTS

Sir Percy Spender, Australian Ambassador  
Mr. F. J. Blakeney, Counselor, Australian Embassy  
The Secretary  
Mr. Walter Robertson, Assistant Secretary, FE  
Mr. L. T. Merchant, Assistant Secretary, EUR  
Mr. H. Raynor, Director, BNA

Sir Percy opened the conversation by saying that he had been instructed by Prime Minister Menzies to come in and relay to the Secretary certain views he held on these matters following the discussion at London and in turn to solicit the Secretary's reaction thereto.

The Secretary said that the sole and only commitment we have is to hold Formosa and the Pescadores. Our treaty with Chiang as well as the Congressional resolution makes this clear. He said we are in agreement with the Australians on the premise that Formosa and the Pescadores must be held. Our only difference, therefore, is as to how this should be accomplished. Until September we had thought it might be accomplished without retaining control of the small off-shore islands. We have altered this after taking into account a number of considerations. First was that it became clear that the evacuation or the conquest of the Tachen Islands would be inevitable as they are not militarily defensible without a commitment of U.S. power over and above their importance. Their location and the Communist air complex relatively nearby would, for instance, have made it necessary for us practically to anchor in the neighborhood of the islands a considerable part of our carrier strength. We then had to appraise the loss of these islands in the light of a number of factors; the important one being how big a victory could we afford to see the Communists win without imperiling the morale and the eventual security not only of Formosa but of the whole region. We had concluded that the Communists could not be afforded more of a victory than the Tachen Islands and that this could be afforded only if ac-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/2-1155. Top Secret. Drafted by Raynor. The time of the meeting is from Dulles' appointment diary. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers)

accompanied by a stronger U.S. defensive posture. The Secretary emphasized that this was a carefully weighed decision.

He commented that we do not yet know the full psychological impact of the loss of the Tachen Islands. When the Communists move in and take over they may launch a propaganda campaign which will multiply its effect on morale and might be very serious.

The Secretary then referred to the Prime Minister's point that the islands are not vital from the military point of view. He said in the technical sense that their loss would not mean the loss of the Philippines and Japan but he said we had to consider the morale of the 400,000 Nationalist troops. He said these forces were vitally important. Neither we nor, for instance, the Australians would be in a position to replace them. We had concluded that additional losses beyond the Tachens would so gravely affect the morale of these troops that a climate might be established under which the Communists could obtain Formosa from within by subversion.

The Secretary then stressed that we are not committed to anybody as to what we do about the remaining off-shore islands. The decision is entirely ours. He said the [*that*] Foreign Minister Yeh had never made a statement such as attributed to him in today's press.<sup>2</sup>

The Secretary then referred to the assumption sometimes made that the Chinese Communists would stop their aggression if they obtained the off-shore islands. The Secretary said there was no evidence whatsoever to back up such an assumption and he thought it was a very dangerous one. The Chinese Communists do not talk about taking Quemoy and Matsu but about conquering Formosa. We are in effect in a war today over Formosa and he thought it was dangerous to think we could win such a struggle by retreat.

Ambassador Spender inquired if we feel the Chinese Communists could mount an attack on Formosa. The Secretary while not replying directly said the important thing was that they might feel that they could do so. The Secretary referred to a statement made by a knowledgeable member of the British Labor Party group which had gone to China<sup>3</sup> to the effect that the Chinese might feel that a considerable expenditure of men and treasure would be worthwhile in such an enterprise even if it failed because of the value they might attach to its propaganda value in Asia and its divisive effect among the Western allies.

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<sup>2</sup> The *New York Times* reported that morning that Yeh told reporters that the United States was pledged to defend all the offshore islands.

<sup>3</sup> A British Labour Party delegation visited the People's Republic of China in August 1954. The reference is apparently to a conversation with a member of the delegation reported in telegram 560 from Tokyo, September 6, 1954; see *Foreign Relations, 1952-1954*, vol. xiv, Part 1, p. 573, footnote 3.

The Secretary repeated that the battle was really on and that there will be no more privileged sanctuary as in Korea. He said the 16 Korean partners were now in agreement on that, as regards Korea. He said we were not prepared to accept a line say in the middle of the Straits beyond which we would have no interest. He added also that in this case there was no UN action and apparently no prospect thereof and that, therefore, the U.S. must use its own best judgment. He said the islands had been held for five years and with the exception of one incident in 1949,<sup>4</sup> there had been no tension during this period. It was only when the Communists started their propaganda about taking Formosa last fall that the tension arose. He added that the islands blocked the harbors which are the natural staging grounds for an invasion. In summary the Secretary said that we felt to disengage from these islands would seriously affect morale in Formosa and in the area generally, there was no assurance that such an action would reduce tensions, that on the contrary it might aggravate the situation even more and that at the same time it would make an attack on Formosa easier. We may be right or we may be wrong but this is our best judgment and it is a considered judgment. The Secretary said our position was not necessarily one to be maintained for all time but that we must continue to use our best judgment on it in the light of developments. When a situation may be reached where the considerations outlined above do not in our opinion have the same force they have today we might be prepared to revise our position.

The Secretary referred to how Hammarskjöld had returned from his mission empty-handed and mentioned to the Ambassador the picture incident.

The Secretary said he hoped that Australia understood that the U.S. was not being reckless and that we did not want war. The Secretary said he felt we had been calm and careful. Our major interest is to see that the Chinese Communists do not succeed in driving a wedge into the island chain of defense. This would be an immediate disaster for a country such as Australia and an ultimate disaster for the U.S. He said in these days when some democracies were weak and divided that he felt countries having a direct interest in this situation should be glad to see the strength and the political unity on the matter which is present here in the U.S. We do not pretend perfection but we are strong and we are united and under the circumstances we deserve the support of countries in peril. He expressed the

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<sup>4</sup> The Nationalists successfully resisted a Communist attack on Quemoy in October 1949.

hope that minor difference with allies not be exploited or blown up into major ones.

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106. **Telegram From the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Aldrich) to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*London, February 11, 1955—6 p.m.*

3578. Eyes only Secretary. I saw Eden this afternoon. He asked me to tell you how thoroughly he appreciated your difficulties regarding Formosan situation and how much he sympathizes with you in having to solve these problems. He had on his desk a copy of Paris edition of *Herald Tribune* for Feb. 10 and he asked me to say that Walter Lippman's article entitled "Toward a Cease-Fire"<sup>2</sup> expressed the consensus of opinion of the Prime Ministers at the Commonwealth conference to an extraordinarily exact degree. He pointed particularly to the sentence which reads, "These considerations apply to the other offshore islands, and the sound American policy would be to follow up what is being done in the Tachens by doing the same thing in Quemoy and Matsu." He said that this sentence expressed the hope of everyone who was at the Conference.

Eden was very much pleased when I told him that you were arranging to see Pearson on Sunday and said that he felt sure that you would find his visit helpful in enabling you to get atmosphere of conference.

Eden would like to get your thinking about what should now be done outside United Nations. He has already taken position that no conference should be held without Chinese Nationalists present, but he would like to know what sort of a conference if any you think might properly be arranged assuming Chinese Nationalists would be invited to participate. If you do not think it wise to have a conference, do you think some sort of a committee or group might be set up to consider possible solutions of present situation.

**Aldrich**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/2-1155. Top Secret. Received at 5:09 p.m.

<sup>2</sup> A copy of the article, from the *Washington Post and Times Herald* of February 8, 1955, is attached to the source text.

107. Telegram From the Deputy Representative at the United Nations (Wadsworth) to the Department of State <sup>1</sup>

*New York, February 11, 1955—6 p.m.*

473. For the Secretary. Reference: Off-Shore Islands. Hammar-skjöld asked to see me this morning to convey further word re his private communications with Chou. He sent a reply to Chou apparently closely along lines of text he spoke to us about as reported our telegram 447, February 6.<sup>2</sup> Content of his message was approximately as follows:

1. "I have formed the conviction that discussion beyond the scope of the New Zealand item could not be proposed with any chance of success". (Hammar-skjöld took pains to emphasize the "I".)

2. He noted the reasons stated by Chou for excluding the SC. He assumed that other procedures under UN aegis were not excluded. (Secretary General emphasized this last point had been formulated as statement rather than question.)

Secretary General then read portions of Chou's latest reply, pointing out that he was not "transmitting" it to us, and commenting that it was "curiously open and non-diplomatic" in its language.

Gist of Chou's message as follows: First, he regretted that situation was as Secretary General supposed. Secretary General's point number two was contrary to what Chou had in mind. In Chinese Communist view even New Zealand item imposing cease-fire cannot go on Council's agenda. A recognition of "two Chinas" was unacceptable to him. "US must sit down with China in face-to-face negotiations."

There followed a long portion, which Secretary General did not read, and which apparently contained standard Communist line regarding "US threats to China". Chou then returned to two China idea stating it was impossible so long as American forces remained in the Straits of Formosa. Chou said that present scheme, which he still attributes to US, to induce Chinese participation in discussions and thereby bring about recognition of two Chinas was out of question.

The UN, Chou said, must not intervene in this internal matter. China was determined to resist the war-like threats of the US.

The UN, Chou went on, would one day have to recognize his government and recognize also the mistake in having excluded him. Chou drew unfavorable comparison between mere invitation to him while Chiang Kai-shek's representatives had seat in Council.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/2-1155. Secret; Niact; Limited Distribution. Received at 8:45 p.m.

<sup>2</sup> Document 95.

Chou then recalled his talks with Hammarskjöld and stated that since he, Secretary General, appeared concerned, he should not "lack understanding" of Chou's attitude. In this there were two elements: (A) The New Zealand item was unacceptable and (B) presence of Chiang's representative was equally unacceptable. For Chou to have someone sit down with Chiang's representative would be to recognize existence of two Chinas. *USUN comment*: Note the repetition.

As for the methods of conducting negotiations, Chou said this was a subject for study in which connection he referred to Soviet role and referred also to Indians. He said China would facilitate any endeavor considered by China to be useful.

Swedish Ambassador Peking commented on above message that Chou's attitude re UN had noticeably stiffened and that in emphasizing negotiations outside UN Chou hoped some means would provide possibility of coming to terms closer to those he desired.

Hammarskjöld's comment re Chou's reply was that it was most interesting in that it clarified that Chou's main trouble was in sitting down with Chinese Nationalists, since that implies to him recognition of two Chinas, with which he was not prepared to agree. This was, in Secretary General's view, new element in situation. Only other new element was that Chou was trying to get things outside UN where he could hope for better deal.

Hammarskjöld felt that relatively informal style of Chou's reply, plus contents thereof were not "the reaction of a man intent on wild adventures". If Chou could not get negotiations, however, that would seem to be another matter, according to Hammarskjöld. But Chou's behavior during Tachen evacuation should be noted as supporting theory Chou really desired negotiation.

Recalling again that he was not "transmitting" it, Hammarskjöld said he regarded this message as the end of their exchange on this subject. In his opinion, therefore, Sobolev (USSR) would not bring up possibility of outside negotiation in his SC interventions. Secretary General also felt Chou would not use his proposal for direct negotiations for propaganda purposes. Hammarskjöld seemed much relieved at this development since he feared this matter might come out in public. In his opinion Chou had barred himself from such development.

Hammarskjöld regards this operation as a useful clarification without having paid any price for it.

*Comment*: Contrary to Hammarskjöld's assumption that Chou has barred himself from making propaganda out of his exchange with Secretary General, it seems to us that Chou may well have laid groundwork for possible future use in public to claim US is not peace-loving.



108. Telegram From the Ambassador in the Republic of China (Rankin) to the Department of State <sup>1</sup>

*USS Balduck, February 10, 1955—8:38 p.m.*

101238Z. Ambassador Rankin at Tachen sends.

Evacuation of Tachens proceeding better than expected. Particularly US Navy and MAAG but also Chinese military and civilian organizations handling troops and refugees are all doing splendid jobs. However this is not operation to be [repeated?] if Formosa and other areas of Asia are to be saved from communism.

Militarily, Tachens may not be particularly important but psychological effect of new Communist advance evidently is most damaging to US cause. Still further enemy advance would compound bad psychological effect and also bring serious military disadvantages to Free China and US. Reds evidently are moving their military strength south once more, this time along coastline. Air bases are being developed to control sky over coastal areas and eliminate any serious interference with coastwise shipping which is essential to supplying those bases and for any other military buildup close to Formosa; this in view of totally inadequate internal communication in Chekiang and Fukien as well as absence any prospect of a significant Communist naval power in this area. Elimination of Nationalists from offshore islands evidently is intended secure coastal supply route and permit eventual dispute air control over Formosa Strait. This would be pre-requisite to attack on Formosa itself or to securing flank during Communist adventures farther south where Formosa being saved for future attention.

Offshore islands have little significance in themselves as jumping off points for possible Nationalist invasion of mainland or as springboards for Red attack on Formosa. But they are extremely important to defense of Formosa. Only valid military argument for evacuating Tachens it seems to me is that distance from Formosa makes fair support and supply difficult and costly. Next significant island group to south (Nanchi or Nanki) is 75 nautical miles nearer and correspondingly easier to support. MAAG is restudying defense of Nanchi as matter of urgency but tentative conclusions are that it can and should be held, along with Matsu and Kinmen groups. "Groups" include nearby positions essential to defense of main island in each group.

When Nationalist Air Force and Navy have received additional equipment already scheduled for delivery in next few months they

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 293.9322/2-1055. Sent through Navy channels. Received at the Department of State at 7:46 a.m. on February 12. Repeated for information to the Naval Attaché in Taipei and to CINCPAC.

be able to assume full responsibility for defense of offshore islands against anything short of major Red effort. Even Nanchi, most distant island, presumably can be given adequate air cover from bases in North Formosa, thus eliminating need for carrier support. Meanwhile, I believe Commander Seventh Fleet should have orders to extend any necessary air and naval support to defenders of 3 principal remaining offshore island groups.

I still do not believe Reds intend to provoke large-scale conflict in near future but it may require some military engagement to convince them of our firm intentions. If such engagement should occur, then Nanchi might well be as favorable location as any since in all probability action would be over in few hours; it would be around friendly rather than enemy territory; it should give us a much longer breathing spell than any new withdrawal: Communist move southward would be interfered with more than 100 miles north of Formosa Strait to advantage of Formosa itself and points south. Essential steps to implementing above include making clear to Chinese Nationalists what kind of effort we want them to make in holding offshore islands; also US undertaking to replace, within reason, military equipment lost by Nationalists in carrying out our wishes.

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#### 109. Editorial Note

At the 691st meeting of the United Nations Security Council on February 14, the Council adopted an agenda which included the same items as on its January 31 agenda. (See Document 66) After discussion relating to the New Zealand item and the People's Republic of China's rejection of the Council's invitation, a Soviet motion for consideration of the Soviet item was rejected by 10 votes to 1 (the Soviet Union); the Council then adjourned. For the record of the meeting, see U.N. document S/PV.691. A statement made by Lodge is in Department of State *Bulletin*, February 28, 1955, page 365.

110. Message From Prime Minister Churchill to President Eisenhower <sup>1</sup>*[London, undated.]*

MY DEAR FRIEND: We have all here been watching with the closest attention your decisions and moves in the Formosan crisis. For the last three weeks I have been wanting to write to you. Your most kind letter of February 10 <sup>2</sup> has reached me and I find that much I had already put on paper still represents my steadily growing theme. Anthony and I, who have composed this message together, wish to do our utmost to sustain you and help you lead world opinion. There is wide recognition of the efforts you have made to keep out of war with China in spite of gross provocation. As you know, I feel strongly that it is a matter of honour for the United States not to allow Chiang Kai-shek and his adherents, with whom the United States have worked as allies for so many years, to be liquidated and massacred by Communist China, who are alleged to have already executed in cold blood between two and three millions of their opponents in their civil war. Our feeling is that this is the prime and vital point. According to our lights we feel that this could and should be disentangled from holding the off-shore islands as bridgeheads for a Nationalist invasion of Communist China. Besides this we do not think that Formosa itself, while protected by the United States, ought to wage sporadic war against the mainland.

2. So the problem before us at this stage centres on what should be done about the off-shore islands, which we here have to admit are legally part of China and which nobody here considers a just cause of war. You know how hard Anthony and I have tried to keep in step with you and how much we wish to continue to do so. But a war to keep the coastal islands for Chiang would not be defensible here.

3. I had understood that the United States Government had so far been resolved to resist Chiang's pressure to give assurances about these islands, even in return for Chinese Nationalist evacuation of the Tachens, and had succeeded in doing so. I hope your last sentence on page 2 <sup>3</sup> does not conflict with this.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International Series. A copy is in Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Churchill Correspondence with Eisenhower. Sent with a covering note from Ambassador Makins to the President, dated February 15 and classified Top Secret.

<sup>2</sup> Document 104.

<sup>3</sup> The sentence reads: "The morale of the Chinese Nationalists is important to us, so for the moment, and under existing conditions, we feel they must have certain assurances with respect to the offshore islands."

4. I cannot see any decisive relationship between the offshore islands and an invasion of Formosa. It would surely be quite easy for the United States to drown any Chinese would-be invaders of Formosa whether they started from Quemoy or elsewhere. If ever there was an operation which may be deemed impossible it would be the passage of about a hundred miles of sea in the teeth of overwhelming naval and air superiority and without any tank and other special landing-craft. You and I have already studied and indeed lived through such a problem both ways.

5. Guessing at the other side's intentions is, as you say, often difficult. In this case of Quemoy, etc., the Communists have an obvious national and military purpose, namely, to get rid of a bridgehead admirably suited to the invasion of the mainland of China. This seems simple.

6. Diplomatically their motives are more fanciful. It may be, as your third paragraph suggests, that the absurd Chinese boastings about invading Formosa are inspired by the Soviet desire to cause division between the Allies in the far more important issues which confront us in Europe. It costs very little to say, as the Chinese are now reported to be doing, that "the possession of the Tachens will help the liberation of Formosa". It adds to the pretence of Communist China's might and is intended to provoke the United States into actions and declarations which would embarrass many of us, and add influence to Communist propaganda.

7. I have already expressed my convictions about your duty to Chiang whom you rightly called your "brave ally". But I do not think it would be right or wise for America to encourage him to keep alive the reconquest of the mainland in order to inspire his faithful followers. He deserves the protection of your shield but not the use of your sword. ("Sword" in this case is a rather comprehensive term.) The hope of Chiang subduing Communist China surely died six years ago when Truman on Marshall's <sup>4</sup> advice gave up the struggle on the mainland and helped Chiang into the shelter of Formosa. <sup>5</sup>

8. We were, of course, glad to see your decision, now bloodlessly carried out, to evacuate the Tachen Islands, but we still feel very anxious about what may happen at the Matsus and Quemoy. The operation of evacuating 50,000 Nationalist troops might present serious dangers especially to the rearguard. On the other hand, to linger on indefinitely in the present uncertainty might well reach the same conclusion by a slower process.

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<sup>4</sup> General George C. Marshall, Secretary of State, January 1947-January 1949.

<sup>5</sup> The Nationalist Government moved to Formosa in December 1949.

9. Before I got your message I had been wondering whether the following threefold policy would be acceptable and I send it now for your consideration.

(a) to defend Formosa and the Pescadores as a declared resolve.

(b) to announce the United States intention to evacuate all the off-shore islands, including Quemoy in the same way as the Tachens, and to declare that they will do this at their convenience within (say) three months.

(c) to intimate also by whatever channel or method is thought best that the United States will treat any proved major attempt to hamper this withdrawal as justification for using whatever conventional force is required.

This would avoid the unbearable situation of your overwhelming forces having to look on while Chiang's 50,000 men on Quemoy and any other detachment elsewhere on the off-shore coastline were being scuppered. To me at this distance the plan seems to have the merit of being simple, clear, and above all, resolute. It would, I believe, command a firm majority of support over here. It puts an end to a state of affairs where unforeseeable or unpreventable incidents and growing exasperation may bring about very grave consequences.

10. To sum up, we feel that the coastal islands must not be used as stepping stones either by the Communists towards the conquest of Formosa or the Nationalists towards the conquest of China. But they might all too easily become the occasion of an incident which would place the United States before the dilemma of either standing by while their allies were butchered or becoming embroiled in a war for no strategic or political purpose.

11. If this is so, the right course must be to make sure that the United States are not put in the position of having to make such a decision over the coastal islands. This can only be done by taking advantage of the present lull to remove the Nationalists from Quemoy and the Matsus—as they have already been removed from the Tachens—before they become the occasion of further dangers. Opinion in this country, and so far as can be judged in the Commonwealth, would regard such a decision as right in law, in morals and in worldly wisdom.

12. Our long friendship made me wish to put these thoughts before you and now I have the generous invitation of your closing paragraph. Anthony and I deeply desire to do our utmost to help you

and our strongest resolve is to keep our two countries bound together in their sacred brotherhood.

With my kindest regards,  
Your sincere Friend,

Winston <sup>6</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> The source text bears a typed signature.

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### 111. Special National Intelligence Estimate <sup>1</sup>

SNIE 11-4-55

*Washington, 15 February 1955.*

#### REVIEW OF CURRENT COMMUNIST ATTITUDES TOWARD GENERAL WAR <sup>2</sup>

##### The Problem

To examine, in the light of recent developments, Soviet and Chinese Communist willingness to assume risks of war, through 1955.

##### Scope

Previous estimates (most recently NIE 11-4-54, "Soviet Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action through Mid-1959") <sup>3</sup> have dealt with this problem on a long-term basis. The present estimate is confined to a short-term, and is written primarily with reference to the situation respecting Formosa and the offshore islands.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, INR-NIE Files. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> A note on the cover sheet reads as follows:

"Submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence. The following organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the Intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.

"Concurred in by the Intelligence Advisory Committee on 15 February 1955. Concurring were the Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelligence; the Director of Intelligence, USAF; and the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff. See, however, footnotes to paragraphs 3, 4, and 8. The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the IAC and the Assistant to the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction."

<sup>3</sup> Dated September 14, 1954.

## Estimate

*Chinese Communist Attitudes*

1. Chinese Communist propaganda and diplomatic representations demonstrate that the regime is strongly committed to the "liberation" of Formosa, the Pescadores, and the offshore islands. The Chinese Communist leaders give every indication of holding to this position. Moreover, Peiping has long regarded the continued presence in the Formosa Strait and on Formosa itself of a Nationalist China supported militarily by the US as at least a long-range threat to its security.

2. We believe that the Chinese Communists will refrain from courses of action which they estimate will involve them in full-scale warfare with the United States.

3. However, we believe that the Chinese Communist attitude with respect to war is bold, sometimes boisterous, sometimes sophisticated, and that the Chinese Communists are therefore likely to test the upper limits of US tolerance with a variety of substantial military actions. Moreover, in the light of Chinese Communist activities in recent months and their reactions to the recent US policy pronouncements on the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores, we are not confident that the Chinese Communists clearly understand which, if any,<sup>4</sup> of the offshore islands the US would defend with its own forces, the circumstances under which the US would defend them, or the extent to which the defense would be carried. We believe, therefore, that the Chinese Communists may miscalculate the degree of risk which military actions on their part in this area would entail.

4. In any event, we believe that the Chinese Communists will probably take military action against the offshore islands of sufficient scale to test US determination to halt their advance at some point. They might even<sup>5</sup> attempt to take Quemoy, Matsu, or Nanchi regardless of whether they estimated that the US would participate in the defense of these islands. They may not be convinced, in the light of the restraint exercised by US policy in Korea and Indochina, that the US would in fact react to attacks on the offshore islands by attacks on the mainland. Or, they may believe that the scale of any US reaction, even if it involved some attacks against the mainland, could be controlled by them, perhaps by diplomatic action at a critical juncture, in which they would count heavily on the restraining influence of US allies on US policy. Finally, they may believe that

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<sup>4</sup> The Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, would delete the words "if any." [Footnote in the source text.]

<sup>5</sup> The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army, believes that the words "might even" should read "probably will." [Footnote in the source text.]

the US would not be willing to react to their actions in ways which could lead by stages to full-scale war against them, and perhaps eventually to war involving the USSR. If the Communist judgments did in fact prove to be mistaken, a series of actions and counteractions might be set in train which could bring about unlimited hostilities between Communist China and the US.

#### *Soviet Attitudes*

5. We believe that the Soviet leaders view general war as a hazardous gamble which could threaten the survival of their system. Accordingly, we believe that they will not deliberately initiate general war, and will try to avoid courses of action which in their judgment would clearly involve substantial risk of general war. We believe that the recent changes in Soviet leadership do not indicate any increased disposition on the part of the regime to risk such a war.

6. The Kremlin would not be deterred by the risk of general war from taking counteraction against any Western action which it regarded as an imminent threat to its security. However, we see no evidence that the Kremlin estimates any recent action by the Western Powers, including progress so far made toward German rearmament,<sup>6</sup> as constituting such an imminent threat.

7. The new Soviet leadership has expressed "full approval and support" for Chinese Communist "policy" with respect to Formosa and the offshore islands, but has left uncertain the extent to which the USSR would support a Chinese Communist effort to take Formosa and the offshore islands by military action. We believe that Moscow might see certain advantages in clashes between Chinese Communist and US forces, at least as long as it believed that the clashes would be limited and localized. Both Soviet and Chinese Communist leaders probably estimate that strictly local conflict between the Chinese Communists and the US, with the accompanying increase of international tensions, would serve their interests. They may estimate, for example, that the US in these circumstances would not have the support of its allies or of world opinion in a defense of the offshore islands, and that the result would be an increasing isolation of the US. Under these circumstances they might believe that US progress toward its objectives elsewhere, including West German rearmament, would be impeded, and that Soviet aims would thereby be served.

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<sup>6</sup> This subject will be treated more fully in NIE 11-55, "Probable Soviet Response to the Ratification of the Paris Agreements," scheduled for completion about 1 March 1955. [Footnote in the source text. NIE 11-55, March 1, 1955, is not printed. (Department of State, INR-NIE Files)]



8. However, the Kremlin would almost certainly be concerned that military conflict between the US and Communist China could not be kept limited and localized. It would almost certainly estimate that unlimited war between the US and Communist China not only would endanger the existence of the principal ally of the USSR, but also would involve substantial risk of spreading into general war. Hence, it would probably attempt to exert a restraining influence if it judged that appreciable danger of unlimited war between the US and Communist China were developing. If such war did occur, we believe that the USSR would support its ally in carrying on the war, but would not assist with its own forces to such an extent as, in its judgment, would cause the US to attack targets in Soviet territory. We believe that the USSR would openly intervene in the war if the Soviet leaders considered such intervention necessary to save the Chinese Communist regime, but the Soviet leaders would still try to confine the area of hostilities to the Far East. <sup>7</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> The Director of Naval Intelligence and the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, believe that the following should be substituted for the last sentence:

"Should the conflict progress so far that destruction of the Chinese Communist regime appeared imminent, we believe that the Soviet leaders would recognize that open intervention on their part against US forces sufficient to save the Chinese regime would involve grave risk of general war with the US. Their decision would probably be based on existing military, political, and economic strengths, with particular emphasis on the current disparities in nuclear stockpiles and delivery capabilities. We believe that the Soviet leaders would probably conclude that if they intervened, the conflict could not be confined to the Far East, and that Soviet strengths were insufficient to risk their own regime in this manner." [Footnote in the source text.]

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112. **Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the President and the Secretary of State, Washington, February 16, 1955, 8:55 a.m.** <sup>1</sup>

Returned Secy Dulles' call.

Dulles will take [Churchill's letter] with him to N.Y., for study on plane, & discuss with Pres. tomorrow morning.

Pres. thought of one question he might ask: "What position would you (Winston) expect us to take if Hong Kong were threatened?" They don't fear that, however, & we may get no reaction.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Probably prepared by Ann Whitman. The conversation is also recorded in notes by Phyllis Bernau on which the bracketed interpolations are based. (*Ibid.*, Dulles Papers, White House Telephone Conversations)

Dulles said they [do not] appreciate the length to which we have already gone. Pointed out that, after all, we did get Chiang's agreement on Formosa treaty; got him to agree to use of no equipment or people we have trained outside Formosa & the Pescadores; got him to acquiesce on the UN move for cease-fire; got him to evacuate the Tachens—in Dulles' opinion, it's very clear that we cannot at this time squeeze any more out of him.

Pres. brought up Walter Robertson stopping there for about week.<sup>2</sup> Thinks he should get an understanding of our own political situation, at home & abroad, & tell the Generalissimo that we're working like dogs in an attempt to keep 75 F-86's up to snuff, & keep training program going along so that they always have 75 pilots to man them. He persists in looking at it as a civil war, & not as a war against Communism; he wants us to recognize it as civil war & to get in on his side. Pres. thinks that if we could get understanding between him & ourselves on the world politically, then we could be very, very strong on the rest of it, on which Winston will go along 100%.

Dulles said Robertson is a little reluctant to undertake this mission—feels he may lead the Generalissimo into thinking wrongly. Pres. said we wouldn't want Robertson to urge anything on the Generalissimo; could, however, give him some guidance.

[Here follows a record of subsequent, unrelated telephone conversations.]

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<sup>2</sup> A February 14 memorandum by Dulles of a conversation with the President reads in part as follows:

"The President said he felt that it was important to develop the thinking of the Chinese Nationalists along somewhat different lines. I told him that I had broached this matter with George Yeh. The President asked whether it might be a good idea for Walter Robertson to stop off at Taiwan and spend a few days there for just an informal chat rather than anything like a negotiation." (*Ibid.*, Meetings with the President)

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### 113. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Representative at the United Nations (Lodge)<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, February 16, 1955—9:03 a.m.*

428. Deliver following message urgently to Hammarskjöld:

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.95A241/2-1655. Secret; Limited Distribution. Drafted in CA; cleared by Secretary Dulles (initialed for him by a member of the Executive Secretariat Staff) and by Wainhouse; approved by Robertson.

"You will recall that when you talked with me on January 19 you told me that the repatriation of the seven castaway Chinese fishermen rescued by our Air Force and now in the Philippines <sup>2</sup> might well contribute to the success of your efforts to obtain the release of the imprisoned fliers. You will therefore be interested to know that we anticipate that arrangements will be completed within the next few days for the return of the seven fishermen to Mainland China. I hope that this information will be useful to you in your further efforts on behalf of the fliers." <sup>3</sup>

Dulles

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<sup>2</sup> The fishermen had been picked up by a U.S. Air Force rescue plane in May 1954 from a reef in the Paracel Islands where they were stranded and had been since then at Clark Field in the Philippines. A memorandum of February 14, from Martin to Murphy states that efforts were made in August and September 1954 to arrange for the return of the fishermen, that the British informed the Department on November 29, 1954, that Peking had agreed to permit their reentry, but that, after the sentencing of the U.S. airmen, the Department had instructed the Embassy in Manila to take no further action concerning them. An inquiry from Peking had been received through the British as to when the fishermen would be returned, and Martin recommended their prompt return. (*Ibid.*, 993.733/2-1455)

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 484 from New York, February 16, reported that Lodge gave the Secretary's message to Hammarskjöld, who said he could make good use of the information. (*Ibid.*, 611.95A241/2-1655)

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#### 114. Editorial Note

On February 16, Secretary of State Dulles gave an address entitled "Our Foreign Policies in Asia" before the Foreign Policy Association in New York City. The portion of the address concerning Formosa and the offshore islands reads in part as follows:

"It is important to note that the treaty [the Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of China], except as it relates to United States territories, covers only the islands of Formosa and the Pescadores, and an armed attack directed against those islands. The congressional authority is to secure and protect Formosa and the Pescadores against armed attack, and to make secure and to protect 'related positions and territories' as the President judges this would be 'required or appropriate in assuring the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores.'

"The President did not use our Armed Forces to help the Chinese Nationalists to hold the Tachen Islands and Yushan and Pishan, lying some 200 miles north of Formosa. These islands were virtually unrelated to the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores. We helped the Chinese Nationalists to evacuate these islands and regroup their forces, so as to avoid a bloody and wasteful battle which would have

inflamed public emotions. Thus, Nationalist China and the United States have made an important contribution to the cause of peace.

"It has been suggested that Nationalist China should go further and surrender to the Chinese Communists the coastal positions which the Communists need to stage their announced attack on Formosa. It is doubtful that this would serve either the cause of peace or the cause of freedom.

"The Chinese Communists have been the initiators of violence in this area. They have already formally declared their intention to take Formosa by force. If the Chinese Nationalists now oblige by making it easier for the Chinese Communists to conquer Formosa, will they be less apt to do so? I doubt it.

"The United States has no commitment and no purpose to defend the coastal positions as such. The basic purpose is to assure that Formosa and the Pescadores will not be forcibly taken over by the Chinese Communists. However, Foreign Minister Chou says they will use all their force to take Formosa, and they treat the coastal islands as means to that end. When the Nationalists voluntarily evacuated the Tachen Islands, the Chinese Communists' comment was: 'The liberation of these islands has created favorable conditions for our People's Liberation Army in the liberation of Formosa.'

"Thus the Chinese Communists have linked the coastal positions to the defense of Formosa. That is the fact which, as President Eisenhower said in his message to Congress about Formosa, 'compels us to take into account closely related localities.' Accordingly, we shall be alert to subsequent Chinese Communist actions, rejecting for ourselves any initiative of warlike deeds.

"It is hardly to be expected that the Chinese Communists will renounce their ambitions. However, might they not renounce their efforts to realize their goals by force?

"Such renunciation of force is one of the basic principles of the United Nations, and the United States had hoped, and still hopes, that the United Nations may be able to effect a cessation of the present hostilities."

The complete address is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, February 28, 1955, pages 327-331.

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115. Memorandum of Discussion at the 237th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, February 17, 1955 <sup>1</sup>

Present at this meeting of the Council were the President of the United States, presiding; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of De-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Dated February 18. The portion of the memorandum printed here was drafted by Bromley Smith, Senior Member of the NSC Special Staff.

fense; the Director, Foreign Operations Administration; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General (for Item 7); the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Director, U.S. Information Agency; the Chairman, Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (for Item 7); the Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (for Item 7); the Deputy Secretary of Defense (for Items 6 and 7); the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Assistant to the President (for Items 6 and 7); Messrs. Cutler, Dodge and Rockefeller, Special Assistants to the President; the NSC Representative on Internal Security (for Item 7); the White House Staff Secretary; the Acting Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Senior Member, NSC Special Staff.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

[Here follows discussion of agenda items 1-5: "A Net Evaluation Subcommittee," "Program of United Nations Action to Stop Aggression," "United States Objectives and Courses of Action With Respect to Latin America," "United States Policy Toward Italy," and "Antarctica."]

6. *Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security* (SNIE 11-4-55)<sup>2</sup>

[Here follows a summary of Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles' briefing of the Council and related discussion; the portion omitted concerned the Soviet Union, Saudi Arabia, and Laos.]

Mr. Dulles read a Special National Intelligence Estimate entitled "Review of Current Communist Attitudes Toward General War" (SNIE 11-4-55). He said this agreed estimate was one of the most important the intelligence community had written in some time.

After asking the President's permission, Secretary Dulles reviewed the British Commonwealth reaction to the situation in Formosa. He said the State Department had received numerous reports of the London meeting of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers, but that the fullest report had been obtained from Mr. Pearson, who had come from Ottawa to lunch with him in New York yesterday.<sup>3</sup> Secretary Dulles said the Commonwealth Prime Ministers were all worried about the situation in the offshore islands. He indicated there was tacit agreement among them to try to get the U.S. to persuade the Nationalists to withdraw from the offshore islands to Formosa. Secretary Dulles stated that there was apparently no realization among the Commonwealth Prime Ministers of the difficulty of doing

<sup>2</sup> Document 111.

<sup>3</sup> Dulles' memorandum of the conversation, dated February 18, is in Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.

this. He added that all of us agreed with them as to how fortunate it would be if these islands sank to the bottom of the sea; but, he added, they do not recognize what we have already done in an attempt to bring about peace in the area and reduce the possibility of conflict.

Secretary Dulles told the Council that he had given the British a draft of his New York speech.<sup>4</sup> This draft had caused Eden to request him to change the text.<sup>5</sup> In response to Eden's concern, the Secretary replaced his wording with that taken from the President's message to Congress, in an attempt to reassure the British that he did not intend to go beyond the commitments contained in the Congressional message. Secretary Dulles said that Mr. Dixon in New York had told him that the British Government appreciated the changes which he had made, and believed that both governments should seek to avoid differences on the Formosa policy. Mr. Pearson appeared to be more sympathetic to our position after Secretary Dulles had explained again to him the various actions the United States had taken to get the situation under control in the Formosa Straits, including the promise of Chiang to take no action against the mainland even from the offshore islands.

Admiral Radford briefed the Council on the military situation in the Formosa area. He began by saying that the Joint Chiefs were watching with great interest all developments at airports in Fukien Province. Three U.S. photo reconnaissance planes had been given Chiang in order to obtain current information about this area on the mainland. Admiral Radford added that if our commanders were unable to get information satisfactory to them by this means, they would put U.S. reconnaissance planes over this area.

Admiral Radford indicated that the Chinese Communists would reveal their intentions to attack Quemoy and the Matsus if they moved their air force to fields in Fukien. He estimated that the Communists might attack the islands separately, or attack all of them at once. He said he was faced with the serious problem of replacing aircraft lost in combat, especially jet planes, which had been given to

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<sup>4</sup> See the editorial note, *supra*. The draft under reference has not been found in Department of State files.

<sup>5</sup> On February 15, Makins left with Dulles a telegram of the same date from Eden, which expressed great concern over Dulles' draft. Eden commented in the telegram that a statement by Dulles that in existing conditions the coastal islands could not be regarded as something apart from Formosa and that the United States could not be indifferent to their fate would, despite the preceding disclaimer, amount to a public commitment. Such a statement would force him to disassociate the British Government from the U.S. position. (Memorandum of conversation by Merchant, February 15, 1955; Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199; and copy of telegram left with the Secretary on February 15; *ibid.*, EA Files: Lot 66 D 225)

the Chinese Nationalists for the defense of the offshore islands. He reported that the Chinese Nationalists were now holding the Matsus and the Quemoy and Nanchi, the latter being the most northern outpost now held by the Nationalists.

Secretary Dulles interrupted to state that Chiang had been told that the United States would not help to defend Nanchi.

Secretary Humphrey asked whether there was any military value in holding Nanchi. Admiral Radford responded that Nanchi did provide a radar location and it was now the most northern outpost of Formosa. He added that it was held by a small garrison, and that its loss would not be comparable to that of the Quemoy or the Matsus because there was very little U.S. equipment on the island. The Chinese Nationalists, he added, state that they cannot withdraw from Nanchi without serious loss of morale. Chiang has taken the position, he added, that he will not voluntarily withdraw from any other island he now holds.

Secretary Humphrey said that everyone agreed that the Chinese Nationalists cannot hold Nanchi against a Communist attack. If this is so, is it not dangerous to the U.S. to face such a defeat?

Secretary Dulles replied that it was necessary to balance the psychological disadvantage of losing Nanchi against the gain to the Nationalists if they put up a good fight. He added that the Chinese Nationalists believed that the demonstration of their willingness to fight for Nanchi was worth the possible loss of the island. He said that if the United States tried to persuade Chiang to withdraw from Nanchi, we would have to stiffen other commitments. He believed we should allow them to go their own way as regards Nanchi. Secretary Wilson said he agreed.

Governor Stassen noted that if the Nationalists fought and lost Nanchi, this would be bad for the United States.

The President admitted that the loss of Nanchi would be bad, but asked what was the alternative.

Governor Stassen asked when did Nanchi get separated out from the Tachen grouping. Admiral Radford replied that Nanchi had always been considered separate from the Tachens. He continued by calling attention to the inability of the military to stay within the programmed limitation on the replacement of U.S. equipment lost by the Nationalists in current fighting. He said adequate funds were available and that the real problem was to get airplanes into the theater quickly enough. (In response to a question asked by Dr. Fleming later in the discussion, Admiral Radford stated that his problem was not one of producing planes or parts, but of delivering the craft to the bases from which they were flown.)

Governor Stassen urged that the United States make known its position on Nanchi.

The President stated that everyone knew the U.S. was committed to defend Formosa and the Pescadores. The question of the offshore islands created a terrible dilemma. If we announced that we would assist in the defense of the offshore islands, world opinion would not support us. On the other hand, if we announced that we would not assist in the defense of these islands, the Communists would immediately attack them and take them. The President stated his belief that there was nothing more that we could now do except to watch the situation as it develops and act on a day-to-day basis.

Admiral Radford said he was concerned about the possibility of an awkward situation developing in Formosa. If the Communists attacked Formosa, military action would have to be taken very fast. Because we do not know the Communist intentions, we face an uncertain situation.

Secretary Dulles replied that NSC policy was clear as to our intention to defend Formosa and the Pescadores, and that we had made a public announcement to that effect. He recalled that the President had decided to retain to himself the decision as to when U.S. forces would be used, rather than delegate this decision to anyone. He said he realized the difficult situation.

Secretary Humphrey again raised the question of Nanchi, and urged that this island could be considered separately—not the same as the Quemoy and the Matsus.

The President stated firmly that we must do our desperate best to avoid committing U.S. troops in this area. He added that we should build up Chiang in every possible way to defend the area. If the Chinese Communists attack Formosa, the President decides when U.S. units get into the fight. No more public statements will do any good now. In addition, the Nanchi decision isn't ours to make.

Secretary Humphrey asked whether we should not guide the Nationalists' decision.

Secretary Dulles said he was looking at his Far Eastern itinerary to see whether it would be possible for him to visit Formosa. If so, he would talk to Chiang about Nanchi. However, we assume great responsibility if Chiang withdraws from Nanchi in response to our coercion. We did not force the withdrawal from the Tachens, Secretary Dulles added, but merely gave counsel and advice when they raised the question of whether they should withdraw from the Tachens. He said it is one thing to give advice, but beyond that, bargaining for additional commitments begins.

Secretary Humphrey said that in his opinion it was not realistic to think of the loss of Nanchi as a defeat for Nationalist China. It is a defeat for the United States.

The President said he disagreed. He pointed out that we have disassociated ourselves from certain actions which Chiang may take.



Secretary Dulles noted that Nanchi is not essential to the defense of Formosa, and that the same arguments apply to it as applied to the Tachens.

The President repeated his belief that the U.S. should increase Chiang's ability to fight as much as we can, including the provision of logistic support.

Secretary Dulles recalled that in negotiations with Chiang the U.S. had asked him not to weaken Formosa by taking a disproportionate amount of U.S. equipment to the offshore islands.

The President smilingly commented on the difficulty of trying to carry out U.S. policy when we were in the hands of "a fellow who hasn't anything to lose".

Governor Stassen said the world assumes that Nationalist forces can be safely evacuated from Nanchi.

The President recalled that Chiang had said he would not retreat another foot. The President repeated that now was no time for any more talk, because we have stated all we can now state.

Secretary Wilson recalled that at the Denver Council meeting on the subject of the offshore islands, it had been stated that actions in the UN might help us out. He wanted to know whether any help from the UN was now possible. The President and Secretary Dulles replied that the UN could not help us in this current situation.

The President added that the world was solidly behind the United States as far as the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores was concerned. Secretary Wilson said the U.S. had to get the Chinese Nationalists off the offshore islands.

The President said we cannot get the Nationalists off these islands in a way which results in Formosa going Communist.

Admiral Radford stated that the Communists were not interested in the offshore islands, but they sought to destroy the strong Nationalist forces on the islands and on Formosa.

The President agreed, and added that if he were a Chinese Nationalist [*Communist*] he would build up airfields opposite Formosa on the mainland and attack Formosa at night. He would not waste men and equipment in trying to take the Quemoy and the Matsus.

The President was asked whether an attack by the Communists on Formosa meant that the U.S. was "at war" with the Communists. He replied yes, but this meant an attack, not one night's foray and more than a casual bombing attack.

Secretary Dulles noted that even if the Nationalists gave up the Quemoy and the Matsus, the problem of Formosa would not be solved. He added that the Communists were worried by the Nationalist Army on Formosa, which was a threat to the middle of their coastal area. He said the Communists wanted to destroy a rival and to disband the present government on Formosa. He added that the

British and the Canadians did not agree with this view of the Communist objective, but that they were wrong on this point.

The President pointed out that the surrender of the offshore islands would result in the collapse of Chiang's government.

Secretary Humphrey again returned to the question of Nanchi, and repeated his request that this island not be included in policy covering the Quemoy and the Matsus. He said the situation in Nanchi was identical with that in the Tachens, and that to evacuate Nanchi would not give the impression of our running off and leaving an ally in trouble.

The President said he thought that he would send Secretary Humphrey to talk to Chiang, since practically everyone else had been to Formosa. Following the laughter, Secretary Humphrey said he would keep quiet under that kind of a threat.

Secretary Wilson said that when Chiang loses Nanchi he will be easier to deal with. The President doubted this, adding that we are always wrong when we believe that Orientals think logically as we do. He cited the mule who walked into the brick wall. He said that face was all-important, and that Orientals would rather lose everything than lose face. He added that he had learned that the only way to deal with Orientals was on an empirical day-to-day basis.

Secretary Wilson asked what had been our advice concerning Nanchi. Admiral Radford replied that we had told them we would not help defend Nanchi, and that it would be difficult for them to hold it.

Governor Stassen referred to Nanchi again, and said that this island presented us with a serious difficulty. It was a "tag end" which would rise up to plague us.

*The National Security Council:* <sup>6</sup>

a. Discussed the subject in the light of an oral briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence, with specific reference to (1) recent developments in the Soviet Union and the reaction thereto throughout the world; (2) the situation in Saudi Arabia, with special reference to the Onassis contract; (3) the situation in Laos; and (4) the views of the Intelligence Advisory Committee regarding "Current Communist Attitudes Toward General War".

b. Noted and discussed an oral report by the Secretary of State on reactions of the United Kingdom and Commonwealth countries toward U.S. policy and action with respect to Formosa and the offshore islands, as indicated at the recent conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers in London.

c. Noted and discussed an oral briefing by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, on the military situation in the Formosa area; espe-

<sup>6</sup> The lettered subparagraphs constitute NSC Action No. 1335. (*Ibid.*, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95)

cially with reference to the offshore islands still held by the Chinese Nationalists.

[Here follows discussion of agenda item 7, "Admission to the U.S. of Certain European Non-Official Temporary Visitors Excludable Under Existing Law." This portion of the memorandum was prepared by J. Patrick Coyne, NSC Representative on Internal Security.]

**Bromley Smith**

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**116. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,  
Washington, February 17, 1955, 2:34 p.m. <sup>1</sup>**

**SUBJECT**

Further Security Council Proceedings on Offshore Islands

**PARTICIPANTS**

The Secretary  
Sir Leslie Knox Munro, New Zealand Ambassador  
Mr. G. R. Laking, Minister, New Zealand Embassy  
Sir Robert Scott, Minister, British Embassy  
G—Deputy Under Secretary Murphy  
L—Mr. Phleger  
FE—Assistant Secretary Robertson  
EUR—Assistant Secretary Merchant  
IO—Deputy Assistant Secretary Wainhouse  
UNP—Mr. Popper

The Secretary remarked that Operation ORACLE should not be discontinued merely because the Chinese Communists would not appear in the Security Council. This would make things all too easy for the Communists. The Secretary felt we should maintain the pressure on them, not necessarily by voting on the tripartite draft resolution, <sup>2</sup> but in any event by tabling it. The prestige of both the New Zealand Government and the UN was involved. The Security Council operation should not be pushed to a point where it would become unproductive or break down, but a slight but steady pressure should be maintained.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/2-1755. Secret; Limited Distribution. The time of the meeting is from Dulles' appointment diary. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers)

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 5, Document 42.

The Secretary noted that tabling a resolution, perhaps the latter part of next week, would help to meet speculation regarding what we had in mind by crystallizing our intentions. He thought the resolution might possibly be modified by leaving out specific reference to the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China, so that the first paragraph would read:

"Having noted the occurrence of armed hostilities [between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China] in the area of certain islands off the coast of the mainland of China; . . ." <sup>3</sup>

Mr. Wainhouse asked whether it would be desirable to add a new paragraph referring to the Chinese Communist refusal to accept the Security Council's invitation. The Secretary did not think it would be helpful, and Ambassador Munro agreed.

The Secretary said he had not been aware of these Chinese Nationalist views. He had been thinking in terms of the reaction of the Chinese Communists. Clearly the concept of "two Chinas" was equally repugnant to both. The point was not terribly important, however, because this resolution would very probably never come into force. At the moment the point was that the three governments should not allow themselves to be so quickly and easily diverted from their purpose by the refusal of the Chinese Communists to attend.

The Secretary doubted that we would feel it wise to take the question to the General Assembly. The subject was so complicated and delicate, and the Assembly so unwieldy and so difficult to manage, that we would be reluctant to raise the matter there. The Secretary suspected that some other state might bring it up at the next regular session but did not envisage our pressing for Assembly action in the near future.

Sir Robert Scott stated that he was not sure his Government would favor early resumption of Security Council proceedings. With reference to the text of the resolution, he asked what was the purpose of the penultimate paragraph recommending "resort to peaceful methods in order to prevent the recurrence of . . ." <sup>4</sup> hostilities".

Mr. Phleger pointed out that the language referred to the injunction upon the parties to a dispute, in Article 33 of the Charter, to seek a peaceful settlement by various methods. Sir Robert thought

<sup>3</sup> Brackets and ellipsis in the source text.

<sup>4</sup> Ellipsis in the source text.

the clause was open to all sorts of interpretations. Ambassador Munro thought its retention would be in accord with the general tenor of the debate in the Security Council.

The Secretary asked why the United Kingdom tended to feel the matter should be dropped in the Security Council.

Sir Robert said that, while he was speaking without instructions, he thought his Government would not feel the matter should be dropped, because that would leave the Russians free to push their own item. However, he wondered what would happen after the tripartite resolution was vetoed. He thought his Government would prefer to see the views of the various parties clarified in the diplomatic discussions now going on all over the world. Meanwhile a military lull might set in. In time some kind of conciliation machinery might be established, possibly through UN procedures. The alternative possibility would be that if fighting broke out, and if the resolution had been voted upon, those who had supported it would be jockeyed into a position where morally, though not legally, they would be committed to support Chiang Kai-shek.

The Secretary said that recent intelligence estimates led him to believe we would be operating under an illusion if we thought the Chinese Communists had any objective except to capture Formosa. The idea that a solution was possible in terms of the coastal positions seemed to him incorrect. He believed the Chinese Communists' objective was to get rid of a rival Chinese Government whose existence would be awkward for them if they engaged in hostilities, say in South East Asia or Korea. The Secretary did not think the Chinese Communists expected to take Formosa by military means alone, but mentioned the possibility that they might first undertake subversive operations to bring about defections in an exposed area, and then launch military operations in that area. In sum, he was inclined to think that the real problem was the security of Formosa itself. The offshore islands were important because of the effect their loss would have on Chinese Nationalist morale. We had to remember that the political stability of Formosa could conceivably be impaired.

In reply to a question from Ambassador Munro, Mr. Robertson explained that there were differing reports on the state of morale on Formosa. On the one hand there was a sense of relief as a result of recent developments. On the other, there was the possibility that in the future Chiang Kai-shek would progressively lose face; that dissidents might be encouraged by unfavorable developments; and that the Generalissimo's son, Chiang Ching-kuo, with his Soviet training and Russian wife, might be one of them. On the basis of his own contact with Chiang Ching-kuo, Mr. Robertson did not agree with this estimate of him. He did believe, however, that it was possible the Chinese Nationalists might conceivably be pushed to a point

where a collapse might occur. This would confront us with most crucial decisions.

Sir Robert Scott admitted that Chinese Nationalist morale might indeed be threatened but reached a different conclusion: namely, that the current American position on the offshore islands would give the Chinese Communists an opportunity to destroy that morale through the capture of successive island outposts.

The Secretary asked his visitors to inform their Foreign Ministers of the discussion, since he would want to consider further steps with the Ministers at a meeting in Bangkok.

#### 117. Telegram From the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bohlen) to the Department of State <sup>1</sup>

*Moscow, February 18, 1955—7 p.m.*

1345. For the Secretary. In view of speculative nature of following telegram and current importance of subject, I am sending this only direct to you for such dissemination as you may see fit.

There has been no noticeable change in Soviet public attitude on Formosa issue since downfall Malenkov and current line seems to be that laid down by Bulganin in his Supreme Soviet speech, <sup>2</sup> particularly the phrase that the Chinese people "count on help from their true friend, the great Soviet people". There has been no elaboration in press on subsequent statements as to exact meaning of word "help". As we have already reported, Soviet reticence and restraint on occasion fifth anniversary of Treaty of Mutual Assistance with CPR <sup>3</sup> was noticeable in all treatment of question. Compared with Soviet reply signed by Khrushchev, Bulganin and Molotov, greetings from CPR leaders were about four times as long and effusive. <sup>4</sup> Whereas CPR greeting included reference to Chinese Communist determination to "liberate" Formosa and American sins et cetera, Soviet reply was confined to generalities concerning their mutual friendship and solidarity. Likewise we have learned from west [*western*] diplomats who attended Chinese celebration that Russian toasts and re-

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/2-1855. Secret. Received at 1:12 p.m. Sent to Secretary Dulles, who left Washington on February 18 for Bangkok, via CINCPAC. A copy bears the notation that it was seen by the Secretary. (*Ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 426)

<sup>2</sup> Of February 9; printed in the *New York Times*, February 10, 1955.

<sup>3</sup> Signed at Moscow on February 14, 1950; for text, see UNTS 226:5.

<sup>4</sup> The messages, dated February 12 and 13, are printed in *People's China*, March 1, 1955, pp. 3-5.

marks were careful to avoid any mention of Formosan issue. It might be noted in this connection that neither Khrushchev nor Voroshilov, titular head of state, attended reception. Specific reference to obligations under 1950 treaty was noticeably avoided in Soviet statement and comment.

There has been, if anything, a drop-off recently in attention given in Soviet press to Formosan issue. Your New York speech briefly carried today in Tass despatch from New York with emphasis on determination of US to defend "with its Armed Forces" not only Formosa and Pescadores but "positions and territories connected therewith", but with no direct comment as yet. There is thus nothing that I have seen recently which would make any clearer real Soviet intentions in regard to Formosan issue and particularly the vital question of what action, if any, they would take in event of hostilities between US and CPR. Soviets continue to choose their words with extreme care and to avoid any implication that they would regard 1950 treaty as operative in event of hostilities. On the other hand they are giving full moral, political and psychological support to current Chinese Communist campaign on Formosa and are faithfully backing all CPR public positions. Soviets are following developments with closest attention and their irritation with British attitude is apparent and was probably cause of Molotov's direct personal attack on Churchill in Supreme Soviet speech.<sup>5</sup> They also have displayed rather hurt surprise at Nehru's recent statement re Chinese Nationalist participation in proposed conference.<sup>6</sup>

I think we can accept as certain that during Khrushchev's visit last October to Peking,<sup>7</sup> subject of Formosa was discussed. We, of course, know nothing of exact details of what, if any, arrangement was reached at that time but judging from subsequent developments, it would appear that Soviets may well have agreed to support Chinese political positions but with no commitment whatsoever as to direct Soviet involvement. It is possible that the concessions to China in agreements signed,<sup>8</sup> including step-up of Soviet assistance in Chi-

<sup>5</sup> Extracts from Foreign Minister Molotov's speech of February 8 are in the *New York Times*, February 9, 1955.

<sup>6</sup> According to the *New York Times*, February 16, 1955, *Prauda* had that day quoted Nehru as having said that he saw no reason why the Chinese Nationalists should not be invited to a conference on the Formosa problem.

<sup>7</sup> Nikita S. Khrushchev, First Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, and then-Deputy Premier Bulganin visited Peking in September and October 1954 for the celebration of the fifth anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China.

<sup>8</sup> Sino-Soviet statements issued on October 12, 1954, included a joint declaration on Sino-Soviet relations and international affairs; a joint declaration on relations with Japan; and communiqués announcing agreements on new Soviet credits and economic aid, the transfer to China of the Soviet share of four mixed companies, the completion of new rail connections between the two countries, new arrangements for Sino-Soviet

nese industrialization program (which may have been factor in recent revision of Soviet economic plans), were integral part of arrangement. It is likewise conceivable that Malenkov and his supporters viewed with some concern even degree of political and diplomatic support involved in any such arrangement. Whatever may be the Soviet intentions at this juncture—and I am reasonably convinced that they do not lightly regard possibility of war in Far East—the extent of their public solidarity with Chinese position is in itself risky and may dangerously encourage Chinese.

**Bohlen**

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scientific and technical cooperation, and the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Port Arthur. For text of the statements, see *Documents on International Affairs, 1954*, pp. 321–328.

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**118. Telegram From the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Aldrich) to the Department of State <sup>1</sup>**

*London, February 18, 1955—6 p.m.*

3670. 1. Foreign Office notes Secretary has indicated interest in having private discussion with Eden at Bangkok on Formosa. Eden understood welcome this suggestion.

2. Foreign Office of opinion nothing further can be done in SC on Formosa under present circumstances and it would be best to mark time pending more favorable developments. Meanwhile Foreign Office hopes keep way open through diplomatic channel for further discussions.

3. With this in mind, Hayter reports that on 14th he lunched with Kuznetsov and Malik. <sup>2</sup> Former commented Chinese Communists could not be expected sit down with Chinese Nationalists nor was this necessary as only parties to dispute were Chinese Communists and US. He said however he welcomed UK initiative and asked that UK use moderating influence on US. Hayter countered by suggesting USSR use its moderating influence on Chinese Communists. Kuznetsov intimated reply to British note might be forthcoming shortly; suggested composition of proposed conference on Formosa should not be taken as fixed and changes could be discussed.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/2–1855. Secret. Received at 4:08 p.m. Repeated to Moscow for information.

<sup>2</sup> Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vasili V. Kuznetsov and Soviet Ambassador to the United Kingdom Yakov A. Malik.



4. When returning Chinese Communist Ambassador's call on 16th Hayter brought up Soviet suggestion for conference. Chinese Communists discussed problem amiably saying chief issue seemed to be composition of conference. Hayter noted he took far less compromising line than *Pravda*.

5. Foreign Office sees little room for encouragement in above except that perhaps Communists themselves seem anxious to keep door open.

Aldrich

119. **Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom** <sup>1</sup>

*Washington, February 18, 1955—8:12 p.m.*

4266. Eyes only for the Ambassador. Please deliver following message from President to Prime Minister:

Dear Winston: I greatly appreciate the message from you and Anthony. <sup>2</sup> I have studied it long and carefully, as has Foster. Quite naturally, it distresses us whenever we find ourselves in even partial disagreement with the conclusions that you two may reach on any important subject. It is probable that these differences frequently reflect dissimilar psychological and political situations in our two countries more than they do differences in personal convictions based upon theoretical analysis. Nevertheless we clearly recognize the great importance to the security of the free world of our two governments achieving a step by step progress both in policy and in action.

Diplomatically it would indeed be a great relief to us if the line between the Nationalists and the Communists was actually the broad Strait of Formosa instead of the narrow Straits between Quemoy and Matsu and the mainland. However, there are about 55,000 of the Nationalist troops on these coastal islands and the problem created thereby cannot, I fear, be solved by us merely announcing a desire to transplant them to Formosa.

Foster and I have been working very hard over recent months, and he has been in close touch with Anthony, in the attempt to lay a

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/2-1855. Top Secret; Priority. The message to Prime Minister Churchill was drafted in the White House and incorporated several revisions suggested by Dulles and Hoover, as set forth in a memorandum of February 18 from Dulles to the President. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International Series)

<sup>2</sup> Delivered on February 15; see Document 110.

basis for what we have hoped may prove a gradual but steady solution.

There are two important points that must be considered at every step of any analysis of this exceedingly difficult situation. The first is that this country does not have decisive power in respect of the offshore islands. We believe that Chiang would even choose to stand alone and die if we should attempt now to coerce him into the abandonment of those islands. Possibly we may convince him in the future of the wisdom of this course, but to attempt to do more at this time would bring us to the second major point, which is: We must not lose Chiang's army and we must maintain its strength, efficiency and morale. Only a few months back we had both Chiang and a strong, well-equipped French Army to support the free world's position in Southeast Asia. The French are gone—making it clearer than ever that we cannot afford the loss of Chiang unless all of us are to get completely out of that corner of the globe. This is unthinkable to us—I feel it must be to you.

In order to make an express or tacit cease-fire likely, we have, with difficulties perhaps greater than you realize, done, through our diplomacy, many things.

1. We rounded out the far Pacific security chain by a Treaty with the Nationalists which, however, only covered specifically Formosa and the Pescadores, thus making it clear to Chiang and to all the world that we were not prepared to defend the coastal positions as Treaty territory.

2. We obtained from Chiang his agreement that he would not conduct any offensive operations against the mainland either from Formosa or from his coastal positions, except in agreement with us.<sup>3</sup> Thus we are in a position to preclude what you refer to as the use of these offshore islands as "bridgeheads for a Nationalist invasion of Communist China", or as a base for "sporadic war against the mainland" or "the invasion of the mainland of China". Under present practice we do not give agreement to any such attacks unless they are retaliatory to related, prior, Communist attacks. In these respects we have done much more than seems generally realized.

3. Furthermore, we obtained an agreement from the Nationalists closely limiting their right to take away from Formosa military elements, material or human, to which we had contributed if this would weaken the defense of Formosa itself.

4. We made possible the voluntary evacuation of the Tachens and two other islands.

5. Finally, we secured the acquiescence of the Chinese Nationalists to United Nations proceedings for a cease-fire, although the Chinese Nationalists were extremely suspicious of this move and felt that it could permanently blight their hopes.

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<sup>3</sup> Reference is to the notes exchanged by Secretary Dulles and Foreign Minister Yeh on December 10, 1954; see Document 3.

All of this was done, as I say, in consultation between Anthony and Foster and in the hope that this would provide a basis for a cease-fire.

However, what we have done has apparently been interpreted by the Chinese Communists merely as a sign of weakness. They have intensified their threats against Formosa and their expressions of determination to take it by force. Also, they continue to hold, in durance vile, our airmen who were captured by them in the Korean War and who should have been freed by the Korean Armistice.

There comes a point where constantly giving in only encourages further belligerency. I think we must be careful not to pass that point in our dealings with Communist China. In such a case, further retreat becomes worse than a Munich because at Munich there were at least promises on the part of the aggressor to cease expansion and to keep the peace. In this case the Chinese Communists have promised nothing and have not contributed one iota toward peace in the Formosa area. Indeed, they treat the suggestion of peace there as an insult.

I am increasingly led to feel it would be dangerous to predicate our thinking and planning on the assumption that when the Chinese Communists talk about their resolve to take Formosa, this is just "talk," and that they really would be satisfied with the coastal islands. I suspect that it is the other way around. What they are really interested in is Formosa—and later on Japan—and the coastal islands are marginal. They do not want to have another Chinese Government in their neighborhood, particularly one which has military power and which poses a threat to their center if ever they attack on their flanks.

Therefore, I think that if the Chinese Nationalists got out of Quemoy and the Matsus, they would not be solving the real problem, which is far more basic. I repeat that it would more likely mean that this retreat, and the coercion we would have to exert to bring it about, would so undermine the morale and the loyalty of the non-Communist forces on Formosa that they could not be counted on. Some, at least, might defect to the Communists or provide such a weak element in the defense of Formosa that an amphibious operation could give the Communists a strong foothold on Formosa.

You speak about our capacity to "drown" anybody who tried to cross the Formosa Straits. However, we do not and cannot maintain at that spot at all times sufficient force to cope with an attack which might come at any time both by sea and by air and which would presumably operate from several different points and be directed against several different points on what is a very considerable body of land. It took us two days to assemble the force necessary to insure the safety of the Chinese Nationalists evacuating from the Tachens. Now most of that force has returned to its normal bases which are

the Philippines, Japan, and Okinawa. The Chinese are past masters at the art of camouflage and, as bitter experience in Korea taught us, they can strike in force without detectable preparations. We must rely upon a loyal and dependable force of Nationalists on Formosa to deal with any who, for the reasons indicated, we might be unable to "drown" before the attackers reached that island.

And if perchance there should be any serious defection on Formosa, that would be a situation which we could not possibly meet by landing Marines or the like to fight the Chinese Nationalist defectors on the Island. Such a development would undermine the whole situation.

All of the non-Communist nations of the Western Pacific—particularly Korea, Japan, the Philippines, and, of course, Formosa itself, are watching nervously to see what we do next. I fear that, if we appear strong and coercive only toward our friends, and should attempt to compel Chiang to make further retreats, the conclusion of these Asian peoples will be that they had better plan to make the best terms they can with the Communists.

. . . But this is a situation which we have worked with and lived with very intimately. We do have considerable knowledge, and the responsibility. Surely all that we have done not only here, but in Korea with Rhee, amply demonstrates that we are not careless in letting others get us into a major war. I devoutly hope that there may be enough trust and confidence develop between our two peoples so that when judgments of this kind have to be made, each could, in the last analysis, trust the other in the areas where they have special knowledge and the greatest responsibility.

It would surely not be popular in this country if we became involved in possible hostilities on account of Hong Kong or Malaya, which our people look upon as "colonies"—which to us is a naughty word. Nevertheless, I do not doubt that, if the issue were ever framed in this way, we would be at your side.

We are doing everything possible to work this situation out in a way which, on the one hand, will avoid the risk of war, and, on the other hand, preserve the non-Communist position in the Western Pacific, a position which, by the way, is vital to Australia and New Zealand. However, if the Chinese Communists are determined to have a war to gain Formosa, then there will be trouble.

I see I have made this as long, and perhaps as complicated, as a diplomatic note. For that I apologize!

With warm regard, As Ever, Ike.

Dulles

120. Telegram From the Deputy Representative at the United Nations (Wadsworth) to the Department of State <sup>1</sup>

*New York, February 18, 1955—8 p.m.*

492. For Key (IO) from Wadsworth. At his request I called on SYG Hammarskjöld this afternoon. He handed me package containing four sets of photographic material covering jet fliers <sup>2</sup> together with covering letter addressed to Lodge. (Package being pouched tonight to Key.) He stated he would not disclose existence this material.

SYG then discussed at some length communication which he is now drafting for transmission to Chou concerning release of all 15 fliers. Final draft as transmitted will be available to USUN probably tomorrow, <sup>3</sup> but major points generally as follows:

1. Four jet fliers not yet convicted: in view of lack of sufficient evidence over long period of incarceration, it would appear they are innocent. As SYG told Chou in Peiping, he considered them as having taken part only in legitimate operations in Korean War and should therefore be released, or parenthetically if Chinese Communists insist on their guilt, should be sentenced only to extradition.

2. The discussion here in US about the fliers issue after SYG's return from Peiping has been moderate and restrained and has created proper atmosphere for progress. This was not achieved without considerable effort. However, public attitude must not be construed to reflect any reduction in public feeling which is just as strong as ever. SYG is convinced that both in the case of *Arnold* crew and the four jet fliers some formula for release would not only be highly proper but could not be misconstrued as disavowing Chinese Communist sovereign rights or impugning validity of Chinese Communist court decisions.

3. SYG calls Chou's attention to fact that US refusal to grant passports for families of prisoners was announced as "for the time being". He felt personally that the time was not favorable for such visits but hopes to be able to revert to proposal if and when such visits might be helpful. (SYG reported that Tchernychev, <sup>4</sup> in a casual conversation on the over-all subject of the release of the 15 fliers, blurted out the opinion that Chou "could not" release them until their families had visited them.)

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.95A241/2-1855. Secret; Limited Distribution. Received at 8:19 p.m.

<sup>2</sup> The four U.S. airmen who had been shot down while flying under the U.N. Command in Korea and were imprisoned in the People's Republic of China but had not been sentenced.

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 499 from New York, February 21, transmitted the text of "Hammarskjöld's communication of February 17 to Chou En-lai referred to in mytel 492". (Department of State, Central Files, 611.95A241/2-2155)

<sup>4</sup> U.N. Under Secretary Ilya S. Tchernychev.

SYG is apparently consulting with members of his staff and possibly UK Delegation on wording of message. He at first gave me copy, but received phone call from unnamed person while I was in office who apparently suggested certain changes.

I told him of proposed US *démarche* in Geneva<sup>5</sup> concerning non-UNC personnel and civilians still held captive. He volunteered the opinion that there should be comparatively little difficulty (given time lags) with 11 Navy and Coast Guard personnel,<sup>6</sup> that Downey and Fecteau would be a far more difficult situation and might take several years, and that there was a definite connection, although unexpressed in Peiping, between US civilians in China and Chinese students in US.

*USUN comment:* During the entire conversation of approximately one hour, SYG was apparently on the defensive against criticism of intervention in the off-shore island situation through the medium of personal communications with Chou. He has also written Eden a lengthy letter<sup>7</sup> from which he quoted passages, largely explaining his philosophy and the reasons why he acted as he did. He is also fearful that over-optimistic statements on the part of US officials expressing "confidence" might prove to be embarrassing to all concerned at a later date.

**Wadsworth**

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<sup>5</sup> Telegram 681 to Geneva, February 18, instructed Consul John C. Shillock to request a meeting with PRC Consul Hsiah Fei to discuss the Americans detained in China, apart from those who had been members of the U.N. Command. If a meeting was held, Shillock was to renew his request for information concerning the detained Americans and to stress the gravity and strength of U.S. opposition to the unwarranted detention of U.S. citizens. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.95A241/2-1855)

<sup>6</sup> Reference is to six Navy personnel whose plane had been shot down near Swatow in January 1953 and five Coast Guard personnel whose plane had crashed the same day during rescue operations.

<sup>7</sup> Not found in Department of State files.

121. Memorandum of a Conversation With the President,  
Washington, February 19, 1955, 11 a.m. <sup>1</sup>

OTHERS PRESENT

Admiral Radford  
General Twining  
Colonel Goodpaster

In response to the President's request, General Twining reviewed the readiness of SAC and the information received from certain flights.

The President indicated an interest in the possibility of controlling air photography of the facilities of military significance in the United States.

Admiral Radford raised the question of provision of reserves of equipment as replacements for operational losses for the Chinese Nationalists, indicating that funds available are adequate for the purpose. The President indicated that he favored provision of such reserves, and mentioned as alternative ways of providing them the addition of a squadron to an air wing or the storing of stocks of supplies against the day of need. The President indicated that he would wish to be advised by the Secretary of State before any action was taken with respect to timing or other arrangements for the provision of such reserves, including informing the Chinese Nationalists as to U.S. policy.

The President indicated he would like to see Chiang make proposals on his own initiative which would ease the situation concerning the off-shore islands and improve the U.S. security position in the Formosa area. If he would do that, the President would be inclined to provide reserves, and would seriously consider maintaining U.S. forces of the order of a battalion of Marines and a squadron of F-86's on the island.

Admiral Radford asked for the President's view with respect to legislation to provide a house for the Chairman of the JCS. The President indicated he favored such action, and suggested that the Defense Department should submit their proposal for legislation to the Bureau of the Budget in the normal way.

A. J. Goodpaster  
Colonel, CE, US Army

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, ACW Diaries. Top Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster. The time of the meeting is from the President's appointment diary. (*Ibid.*, President's Daily Appointments)

**122. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Stump) to the Naval Attaché in the Republic of China (Kilmartin) <sup>1</sup>**

*Honolulu, February 19, 1955—6:18 p.m.*

200418Z. For Amb Rankin info Gen Chase and Adm Carney from Stump. Your Taipei 571 Feb 19 SecState 191844Z. <sup>2</sup> SeventhFlt is now disposed for rapid movement to positions for defense of Formosa. US Air Force jet combat sqdrns are also so disposed and can rapidly move into Formosa ready for action. Last movement in connection with Tachen tested satisfactorily that capability.

It is the intention from now on to rotate US Air Force jet combat sqds into Formosa for training but ready and capable of reinforcement for any ops in case of emergency. Every effort should be made by ChiNats to strengthen and hold Matsu and Kinmen.

Question of Nan Chi Shan has been referred to higher authority.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: JCS Records, CCS 381 Formosa (11-8-48) Sec. 19. Top Secret. Repeated to the Chief of Naval Operations and Chief, MAAG Formosa for information. A copy, apparently given to Dulles by Stump, bears the notation that it was seen by the Secretary. (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 426)

<sup>2</sup> The reference telegram, directed to Admiral Stump and sent to the Department of State for information, expressed Rankin's unhappiness at the "seemingly hasty" withdrawal of the USAF fighter bomber wing from Formosa after the completion of the Tachen evacuation and inquired, "how much effort do we want them to make defending Nanchi, etcetera? I should like to be in position to explain this forcefully to President Chiang, who undoubtedly will decide personally how much of a fight his forces will make." (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 793.5/2-1955)

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**123. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Department of State <sup>1</sup>**

*Manila, February 21, 1955—5 p.m.*

Dulte 2. Eyes only Acting Secretary from Secretary. For President. Stump gave us full briefing at Honolulu on status of Formosa Straits situation. I feel that there is need of clarifying to CINCPAC certain aspects of our policy, namely:

1. That we will not directly assist in the holding of Nanchi Island and would prefer its evacuation unless Nationalists soberly judge that its defense under hopeless conditions will improve Nationalist morale on Taiwan.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 794A.5/2-2155. Top Secret; Niact. Received at 5:11 a.m.



2. That we want to do everything feasible to enable the Nationalists themselves to hold Matsu and Quemoy islands without need for direct United States intervention.

3. That in view of our treaty and Congressional action, we should increasingly make our presence felt in Taiwan as by the stationing there, if only on a rotating basis, of significant US military elements.

I was impressed by the Communist program of steady build-up airfields, artillery emplacements and roads which would be required to take the Matsus and Quemoy islands and by the extent to which we are restraining the ChiNats from attacks which would delay this build-up. If this build-up is to go on without interruption, then there will soon be created a situation such that the Matsus and the Quemoy islands will be indefensible in the absence of massive US intervention, perhaps with atomic weapons, and Taiwan itself will be much more vulnerable. We must, I think, consider allowing the Nationalists to attack by air this build-up, in the absence of any dependable assurance that it will not be used against Taiwan.

We have been restraining the ChiNats largely in hopes that a program of restraint would facilitate a cease-fire through the United Nations. Also, because air attacks based on Taiwan might lead to retaliatory attacks by the ChiComs against the Taiwan fields. However, I doubt that the present one-sided policy can go on indefinitely. I feel that I should be in a position to warn Eden that unless it is possible soon to arrive at a cease-fire, express or tacit, covering the Formosa Straits, we cannot justifiably continue to deny the ChiNats the opportunity to attack the build-up, which, while perhaps in the first instance directed against the coastal positions, could be a menace of much greater scope, particularly since the ChiComs continue to assert their intention to use their full force against Taiwan.

I shall appreciate guidance on this aspect of the matter.

Dulles

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**124. Telegram From the Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Thailand <sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, February 21, 1955—6:27 p.m.*

Tedul 6. Eyes only Secretary from the President. Re Dulte 2.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/2-2155. Top Secret; Niact. Drafted by the President. A memorandum for the record by Goodpaster, dated March 24, reads as follows:

1. Your paragraph 1 correctly states the conclusions of the Security Council and CINCPAC has now been clearly informed that we do not intend to assist in the holding of Nanchi.<sup>2</sup>

2. Likewise your paragraph 2 expresses our intentions. We shall assist Chiang in defending those areas logistically and, should we become convinced that any attack is really a military part of a campaign against Formosa, then we would participate more directly. Any offensive military participation on our part will be only by order of the President.

3. With respect to your paragraph 3, you will recall that I mentioned the desirability of stationing some additional small elements of American forces on Taiwan. Naturally we hoped that this commitment might come about as a result of a closer understanding between Chiang and ourselves respecting the wisdom of their complete or partial withdrawal from Quemoy and the Matsus. You will recall also that you and I talked about certain other things we might do to convince him that his best course of action lay in solidifying his union with us, so as to insure preservation of Formosa and the Pescadores without risking too much of his force in the forward positions. I refer to our readiness to speed up his air development and possibly strengthen both naval and air units above presently contemplated levels.

4. You and I have shared the hope that the Chinese Nationalist government may finally conclude that their situation would be improved by withdrawing from the coastal islands and regarding themselves as a force of opportunity poised and ready to move to the attack whenever ChiCom commitments or actions elsewhere may create conditions of general conflict in that region. As you and I have agreed, any approach to Chiang along this line would have to be so

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"On 21 February 1955 Hoover, Murphy, Radford and Duncan met with the President in connection with a message which had come in from Secretary Dulles concerning points made by Admiral Stump. The President indicated that Secretary Dulles and he had discussed the matter of planting a seed with Chiang out of which might grow in due course the idea of a voluntary withdrawal from Quemoy and Matsu.

"After discussion, a draft message which the President had prepared was sent to Secretary Dulles with an indication that he should advise Admiral Stump." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Miscellaneous Series, Conferences on Formosa)

The conversation with Secretary Dulles to which the President referred has not been identified, but see Documents 112 and 121.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 211759Z from CNO to CINCPAC, for Stump from Carney, February 21, advised Stump that U.S. forces would not be used in defense of Nanchi and that, while it was probably desirable from a military point of view for the Nationalists to withdraw from Nanchi, this decision was entirely the responsibility of the ROC Government. Telegram 221621Z from CNO to CINCPAC and Chief MAAG Formosa, from Carney to Stump and Chase, February 22, confirmed that it had been decided at the highest level that the United States would not assist in holding Nanchi. (Both in JCS Records, CCS 381 Formosa (11-8-49) Sec. 19)

skillfully conducted as to make him ostensibly the originator of the idea.

5. It may be entirely illusory to hope that Chiang will ever acknowledge the wisdom of withdrawing from his forward positions, and I agree that the need for preserving his force as a part of our security arrangements in that region should not be lost sight of in our efforts to make him see the great difficulties involved in the defense of the coastal islands. If he is adamant on this score, then I do not see how we can long continue to prevent him from using available means to interfere with the build-ups obviously designed to attack his positions. I agree that it would be wise to inform Eden that unless we soon arrive at a cease fire, we cannot much longer insist that the present policy be observed which permits major Communist build up or attacks without Chiang reaction. I believe that you should tell him that we do not intend to blackmail Chiang to compel his evacuation of Quemoy and the Matsus as long as he deems their possession vital to the spirit and morale of the Formosan garrison and population. On the contrary we expect to continue our logistic support of Chiang's forces as long as there is no mutually agreed upon or tacit cease fire. Finally, if we are convinced that any attack against those islands is in fact an attack against Formosa, we should not hesitate to help defeat it. Possibly you should tell him too that because of the continuing build-up of ChiCom forces, we cannot tell when any of these emergencies might arise.

6. Any reaction by Chiang to a Communist build up would inevitably mean that he would suffer attrition in his air and possibly naval forces, and we would inherit the necessity of maintenance, repair and re-supply. I merely remark at the moment that in return for such things, Chiang should consider our own views sympathetically and do his utmost to go along with us so far as this is consistent with the morale and spirit of his own forces and population.

7. I understand that Admiral Stump is with you. Will you please see that he is fully acquainted with this entire line of thinking?  
D.D.E.

Hoover

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## 125. Editorial Note

At a meeting of the National Security Council on February 24, Admiral Radford stated that "at four o'clock this morning the Chinese Nationalists had begun to evacuate their forces from Nanchi-

San [*Nan-chi Shan*]. For once he was able to inform the members of the Council of such information before they read it in the press or learned it over the radio. The United States had informed the Chinese Nationalists that it would not assist them in holding Nanchi-San, and in response to this statement they had begun the evacuation." (Memorandum of discussion by Gleason; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

Telegram 584 from Taipei, February 25, stated that the evacuation of both civilians and military personnel from Nanchi had been completed that morning. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/2-2555)

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126. **Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China**<sup>1</sup>

*Bangkok, February 24, 1955—8 p.m.*

60. Taipei eyes only Ambassador Rankin from Robertson. Before leaving Washington Secretary received invitation from Generalissimo through Ambassador Koo to visit Taipei on way home from Manila. Both President and Secretary think visit highly desirable and Secretary now planning arrive Taipei March 3, 11:15 a.m., depart 5 p.m. However, there is remote possibility developments requiring presence in Washington may necessitate bypassing Taipei. Obviously no public announcement should be made until uncertainty resolved. Would 3 days prior notice be sufficient to avoid inconvenience Generalissimo? If you think desirable, you might explain situation to Generalissimo emphasizing that Secretary is particularly anxious to make visit and will certainly do so unless emergency prevents. Would appreciate your comments.<sup>2</sup>

Dulles

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.11-DU/2-2455. Secret. Received in Washington at 2:24 p.m. Repeated for information to the Department as Dulte 7 which is the source text.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 41 from Taipei to Bangkok, February 25, repeated to the Department as telegram 589, stated that President Chiang would be glad to see the Secretary on March 3 and invited him for luncheon. (*Ibid.*, 793.11/2-2555)

127. **Telegram From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Radford) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Stump)** <sup>1</sup>

*Washington, February 24, 1955—3:48 p.m.*

JCS 976576. Following amplifies my 240901Z <sup>2</sup> which may be helpful to you and perhaps to Sec Dulles. Use at your discretion.

Importance Matsu and Kinmen stems from psychological as well as military considerations. They are part of Gimo's defense of Formosa. They are his outposts and warning stations which block two key port areas, use of which ChiComs probably would want in any invasion attempt against Formosa. Their retention by ChiNats makes most difficult secret build-up by ChiComs for invasion of Formosa and Pescadores.

More than that, however, Matsu and Kinmen offer Nationalist leadership their one hope of reestablishing themselves on mainland. Regardless of diverse views on this hope, it represents ChiNat feelings. Should we barter away their one hope so quickly, it could have serious repercussions psychologically amongst ChiNats and all through Far East.

Geographically and militarily, loss might be inconsequential, but diplomatic and psychological repercussions might be out of all proportion to its physical importance. ChiNat military posture on Formosa and their will to resist could begin to disintegrate with result-

<sup>1</sup> JCS Records, CJCS 091 China. Secret; Operational Immediate. Sent via the Naval Attaché in Bangkok. The source text bears the date-time group 242048Z.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 240901Z from CJCS to ALUSNA Bangkok, for Stump from Radford, February 24, replied to telegram 240400Z from ALUSNA Bangkok to CNO, for Radford from Stump, February 24, which reads as follows:

"Secy Dulles asked me send following. In his talks with Foreign Secy Eden he explained US policy re defense Formosa. Said due to expert concealment or camouflage abilities Chinese it might be necessary defend Matsu and Kinmen to prevent surprise attack on Formosa at time fleet not actually present. Also loss would aid ChiComs infiltration and subversion.

"Said your reported recent interview *US News World Report* seemed cut ground out from under him wherein you stated islands not necessary to Formosa defense.

"I expressed view you misquoted or you considered US fleet could defend and if surprise and fleet not present ChiNats could hold off until help arrived. I also said our problem would be much more difficult.

"Secy Dulles would like your views or any explanation which would help him with Anthony Eden earliest."

Radford's telegram 240901Z replied that he agreed with Dulles' statement to Eden, that any implication in the interview that the two island groups were not necessary to the defense of Formosa was unintended, and that the interview had taken place nearly 3 weeks earlier when it was hoped that "evacuation of Tachens would make ChiComs more reasonable which is certainly not the case so far." (Both *ibid.*; copies are also in Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/2-2455) Dulte 5 from Bangkok, February 24, for Hoover from Dulles, reported that Dulles and Eden had spoken privately about the Formosa situation on February 23 and had agreed to discuss it at greater leisure when Eden dined with the Secretary on February 24. (*Ibid.*, 793.00/2-2455)

ant decrease in over-all Western Pacific island chain, which is so important to Free World security. It could even result in an increased burden on United States if chain is to be kept intact in future.

On Formosa, as on other major positions of Island Littoral, it is militarily important in foreseeable future to have strong anti-Communist military forces.

I am still puzzled as to what particular part of my interview gave Sec Dulles the impression mentioned in your 240400Z.

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## 128. Diary Entry by the President's Press Secretary (Hagerty) <sup>1</sup>

*Washington, February 24, 1955.*

In the afternoon went with Roy Howard <sup>2</sup> to see the President. Roy is leaving in a few days for a trip around the world. After visiting Honolulu he is going to the Philippines to see his old friend Magsaysay and then to Formosa for a visit with Chiang Kai-shek and Madam Chiang. He then expects to go to Hong Kong, Karachi, Afghanistan, to the Near East and then home by way of Paris. In many of these areas of the world Roy has good friends among the local people and the President was considerably interested in his trip.

Howard asked the President if there was anything he could do for him and for our country while he was travelling, and the President said that while he realized that Howard was going as a newspaperman and had to remain completely free to operate as a newspaperman he would think that Howard could be helpful in Formosa if in his friendly, informal conversations with the Generalissimo he would stress the following: "Someone—and it could be you—has got to get Chiang to see several things clearly. The first of these is that in holding Formosa and the Pescadores for the free world he must not permit his position to become a fixed one, one which is linked closely to those offshore islands. Secondly, he must realize that he is in a position of great opportunity and that he must keep up his Army and be ready to move if the Communists, as I expect they will sooner or later, make an attack either in Korea or in Indo-China. Then Chiang is in a position to attack and to attack hard the center.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Hagerty Papers. Extract.

<sup>2</sup> Roy W. Howard, chairman of the executive committee of Scripps-Howard Newspapers.

That's the only way he's ever going to get back to the mainland and someone should tell him this."

The President discussed at great length with Howard the position of Quemoy and Matsu. In both instances he admitted that these islands were good for defensive purposes—that Quemoy controlled the harbor of Amoy and Matsu controlled the harbor of Foochow. But it would be extremely difficult since they were just off the mainland to defend them against an all-out Communist attack. Such an attack would endanger American fleet units which would have to be moved in close to the China Mainland. The President said he was not saying that we would not defend Quemoy and Matsu, that he could think of many conditions where we would—but what he was impressing on Howard was that Chiang should not center his whole question of the morale of his people on those two islands. "If he does that and loses that eventually, he will be in exactly the same position as the French were when they tried to defend Dienbienphu, an impossible position, and then lost it. At that time we urged the French not to make a stand, that it could not possibly be defended—but they paid no attention. Chiang must not make the same mistake". As to the position of opportunity which Chiang now holds the President said that he hoped that Howard, in talking to him, would try to get it around so that this idea was Chiang's idea and not Howard's. He said that the Chinese Communists were getting arrogant and were being supplied with material of war by the Russians. We, in turn, are building up Chiang's forces, are building up their air force and are giving matériel to them. The President said that sooner or later he expected that the Chinese Communists would move either south or north and that that was the time when Chiang's great opportunity would come. "If he keeps up the morale of his troops, if he keeps up his Army, he will always be a threat to the Chinese Communists. You know full well that he has 400,000 troops trained and equipped. Now, while Matsu and Quemoy are defensive positions, they certainly would not be used in an offensive by Chiang against the Mainland. In an invasion of a mainland, you don't land on an island because if you do, you just have to get off of it and go forward. When I was in command during the war, we didn't land at Brest or LeHavre; we went around to the beaches of the mainland. That is what Chiang is going to have to do and that is the only way he is ever going to get back to the mainland."

The President also asked Howard if he was going to stop in India. Howard said he was not, that he did not particularly like Nehru and that he had no plans to do so. The President said that was all right but if he was writing stories from that area, to please not knock down the Indians too much. "After all, India is a vast continent of 350 million people. If they are ever added to the great pop-

ulations that the Communists now control, the free world will be up against it, not only in the East but throughout the world. I don't trust Nehru. He thinks he is a kingmaker. But we have got to keep them at least on the neutral side if we can. So please, Roy, don't go slamming the Indians in any stories that you write." Howard promised not to do this and also promised to have a series of talks with Chiang, with Madame Chiang interpreting.

The President told Howard that if he could get Chiang to believe this way, he would really be doing a service to the free world.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup> According to notes prepared in the White House of a telephone conversation on March 10 between the President and Secretary Dulles, the latter said that on his return from the Far East he had seen Roy Howard, then on his way to Taipei, and that Howard had given Dulles the impression that he was on a special mission from the President. The notes record the President's reply as follows: "President did see him, but does not recall anything special—just the usual suggestion to convey his personal greetings, good health & wish them well." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries) Telegram 532 to Taipei, March 10, for Rankin from Dulles, sent shortly afterward, stated that although Howard had seen the President in Washington and talked to Dulles in Honolulu, "you should understand these were merely normal talks and that he is not entrusted with any mission from either the President or me." (Department of State, Central Files, 911.6293/3-1055) Rankin reported Howard's visit in telegram 655 from Taipei, March 23, which reads in part as follows:

"Roy Howard described to me March 19 what he intended tell President Chiang. It was in line with philosophy of free China's existence and future which you outlined to Chiang during March 3 conversation and I encouraged Howard to go ahead.

"Last night Howard told me he spent 8 hours with President which he described as most satisfactory talks with Chiang he had ever experienced. Essential points were covered in news story he sent his papers with instructions to forward copy to you. Chiang apparently convinced Howard that Kinmen and Matsu would be defended with or without direct US aid. (Foreign Minister assures me Chinese Government unanimous on this point which I am inclined this time to accept as true.)" (*Ibid.*, 793.00/3-2355)

## 129. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

*Bangkok, February 25, 1955—5 p.m.*

Dulte 8. For Hoover. Reference: Dulte 9<sup>2</sup> and 10.<sup>3</sup> Thursday<sup>4</sup> evening I discussed Taiwan situation at length with Eden. Following

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/2-2555. Top Secret; Priority. Received at 12:01 p.m.

<sup>2</sup> *Infra.*

<sup>3</sup> Document 131.

<sup>4</sup> February 24.



were present: Eden, Harding,<sup>5</sup> Caccia,<sup>6</sup> Denis Allen,<sup>7</sup> Robertson, MacArthur, Admiral Stump and Young.<sup>8</sup> I led off with following summary.

1. Whereas up to few weeks ago we had believed Chinese Communists were not seriously intending take Taiwan by force, we now believe they intend to do so. So in fact we are in a battle for Taiwan. Admiral Stump's briefing in Honolulu on this situation was disturbing because it showed considerable Chinese Communist build-up and preparation. They are skilled at camouflage and may be able to conceal timing. I informed President of this briefing and pointed out grave responsibility we assuming for holding Chinese Nationalists back from hitting Communist concentrations on mainland opposite Taiwan in face of continuing build-up and that we cannot continue this indefinitely. President authorized me to explain this to Eden.

2. I read to him a memo (see immediately following telegram) indicating the steps the US has taken during past few months aimed at reducing tension Formosa area so as to prevent war, which President of course strongly wished avoid.

3. Despite all these actions Chinese Communists still give every evidence intention take Taiwan by force and no indication willingness seek possible settlement. They have done nothing contribute to peaceful settlement. Thus we have reached situation where line of retreat nears its end. May be from technical viewpoint we are not choosing best position but further retreat would be even worse. If we give up offshore islands, defense Taiwan even more difficult. Further retreat would have grave effect on Taiwan and in Asia. Very considerable factor in situation now is possibility of deteriorating morale at Taiwan. Withdrawal from islands might have critical effect on ability Chinese Nationalists hold islands if morale disintegrated and groups there made deals with Communists. It would be virtually impossible retain islands. US has no ground troops there and is not disposed to put any in. Further retreat could swing Asia. Trends in Japan are already disturbing. Further retreat or loss of Formosa would convince Japan communism wave of future. Consequent effect on Okinawa and other parts of Asia obvious. Overseas Chinese would turn to Peking.

Eden's views during course discussion summarized as follows:

(A) Agreed Taiwan should not be lost to Communists although remarked Churchill does not think island strategically important but will go along with us if we think so. If Chinese attack Taiwan and we resist, Eden believes public opinion in Commonwealth and Free World generally will clearly understand and support US, whereas they will not if war results from defense of offshore islands.

<sup>5</sup> Field Marshal Sir John Harding, Chief of the Imperial General Staff in the United Kingdom.

<sup>6</sup> Sir Harold A. Caccia, British Deputy Under-Secretary of State.

<sup>7</sup> William Denis Allen, British Assistant Under-Secretary of State.

<sup>8</sup> Kenneth T. Young, Director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs.

(B) His only concern is over fighting for offshore islands. Most of his comments and questions revolved around disposition of Matsuo and Quemoy. He reiterated his belief public opinion in Commonwealth and elsewhere does not see necessity of stirring up row over these islands and would not support our fighting for them. This is apparently difficult question for him at home as well as in Commonwealth. Secondly, he emphasized to me several times his speculation Chinese Communists will not become involved with our military power to attack Taiwan but may see advantages in embroiling US over offshore islands. Militarily they can take these islands and will ignore cost of manpower and equipment. Involving US in these islands will put US on weakest ground with its allies and public opinion generally. He also mentioned Russians would probably find this situation to their advantage. Eden made it clear he did not see any necessity hold these islands and pointedly asked Stump and myself why US wants to defend them. He ended his general comments by suggesting some step be taken to seek out Peking's real intention, to see if something could be worked out.

Admiral Stump explained to Eden defense relationship between offshore islands and Taiwan. They block launching attack on Taiwan, provide advance warning and are closer to hostile area in case of fighting. Field Marshal Harding interjected to differ with Stump. Comparing situation to Allied assault in Operation Overlord, Harding expressed opinion critical question is not launching or lodging initial attack across water but in being able afterwards sustain assault forces. He thought Chinese Communists military leaders would advise against attack on Taiwan as long as Seventh Fleet commanded sea and air. Hence he did not believe possession offshore islands would have much to do with whether Chinese Communists would or would not attack Taiwan. I pointed out his analysis neglected critical factor of effect on morale of loss of offshore islands.

Eden's comments on offshore islands led him to suggestion, which he apparently came prepared to make, that something should be done to see if Chinese Communists would give up their declared intentions to take Taiwan by force if certain circumstances developed. He outlined vague proposal that, if Chinese Communists would give assurances not to use force against Taiwan, UK would sound out US as to whether there could be peaceful settlement offshore islands.

He did not know if this feasible or if Chinese Communists would even consider it but thought it worth trying in case it did work. He stressed point we would all be in better public and moral position if we at least tried some such approach should it fail. He had not thought out channel to use but was considering possibility going through UK Chargé Peking rather than Indians.

I said his general suggestion might be worth exploring. I agreed to talk with him further about it before leaving Bangkok. This was

initial approach on his part and he will follow it up for I am sure that he is searching for some formula along above lines.

Dulles

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130. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Department of State <sup>1</sup>

*Bangkok, February 25, 1955—3 p.m.*

Dulte 9. For Hoover. Reference: Dulte 2. <sup>2</sup> In my discussion with Eden last night I read him following memo and permitted him make copy:

*Begin text:*

The US has exerted itself to create conditions which would end active military hostilities in the Formosa area.

1. We made a treaty with the Republic of China which excluded from the treaty area all positions held by the Republic of China except Formosa and the Pescadores, which we committed ourselves defend as against armed attack.

2. We negotiated an agreement with the Republic of China whereby it agreed (A) not to carry on offensive actions from any territory held by it (i.e. Formosa, Pescadores, and the coastal positions) except in agreement with the US, and (B) not to weaken the defense of Formosa by the diversion and expenditure elsewhere of elements of power contributed to it by the US.

3. We contributed essentially to evacuation by the Republic of China of its forces from the Tachen group of islands and their surrender to the Chinese Communists. We anticipate a similar evacuation from Nanchi. We have repeatedly restrained the Republic of China from attacking offensive build-ups on the mainland.

4. We limited the Congressional resolution giving the President authority to use armed forces so that it applied only [to] Formosa and related areas deemed important to the defense Formosa.

5. We made clear the acceptability to us of a UN "cease-fire" resolution and we secured the acquiescence of the Republic of China in this move, despite strong objection to what it thought would blight its future.

6. We have resisted powerful popular and Congressional pressures to take retaliatory action against the Chinese Communists for their flagrant offense to the US in imprisoning our airmen captured in the Korean war.

In the face of this temperate action by the US, the Chinese Communists have become more intemperate. They have made in-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/2-2555. Top Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution. Received at 8:06 a.m.

<sup>2</sup> Document 123.

creasingly official and formal determination to use force to take Formosa; they have treated the islands surrendered by the Republic of China as new facilities to take Formosa by force; and they are making ready a circle of airfields along coast opposite Formosa.

Under the circumstances we feel that we have gone as far as is prudent in making concessions. If the Chinese Communists, while retaining their claims to Formosa, would give assurances that they would not seek a verdict by force, then situation might be different. But as matters now stand, we are compelled conclude the Chinese Communists intend seek take Formosa, probably by a combination of attempted invasion and internal subversion; or at least that they intend probe our intention to the point of finding out whether the US is prepared fight. They would readily sacrifice much manpower in this experiment.

At the moment, [to] pressure the Republic of China into surrender of Quemoy and Matsu would (1) importantly increase attacking capacity of the Chinese Communists by making more available Amoy and Fuchow harbors, the natural staging grounds for a sea attack; (2) greatly weaken morale of the Republic of China on Formosa and increase opportunity of Chinese Communists subversion; (3) probably increase the Chinese Communists' intention probe our resolution by putting it to the test of action.

In other words, further retreat would, in our opinion, both weaken the defense capability Formosa and increase the risk that that capability will be put to the test of battle.

Dulles

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**131. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Department of State <sup>1</sup>**

*Bangkok, February 25, 1955—2 p.m.*

Dulles 10. Eyes only Hoover from Secretary. For President.

"Dear Mr. President:

[Here follow personal remarks and a summary of developments at the SEATO Council meeting. This portion of the telegram is scheduled for publication in the Asia regional compilation in a forthcoming volume.]

Last night Eden and I, each with three advisers, discussed at length the Formosa situation. I read to him a memo, text of which I am cabling to Department and which you may want look at. It summarizes our efforts towards a peaceful solution and total lack of any co-operation from Communist side. Eden asked make a copy, which I

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1 BA/2-2555. Top Secret; Priority.

authorized, making clear however that my memo was merely my own talking paper and nothing like a diplomatic note. I think he may make an effort get Chinese Communists to agree not seek a violent solution of Formosa matter, and I encouraged him do so, because I think that if he makes the effort and fails, he will then be better able justify our position before British Parliament and public. If he succeeds, so much the better.

"He believes that this effort would not be helped if we should press proceedings in UN, and I therefore told him that we would agree to suspend for a further brief period request for a cease-fire resolution so as to permit this other initiative of his to have best chance of success. I said, however, that if this did not succeed at some fairly early date, I felt we would want to have a cease-fire resolution actually introduced and voted upon so as to make even more clear our own desire for a peaceful solution and that responsibility for rejecting a cease-fire rests upon Communists.

"In general, Eden's line was that a further fall-back by abandonment of Quemoy and Matsu would be justified by increased support of resultant position by Commonwealth and Western European public opinion. He naturally attaches to this an importance which I feel fails to appraise adequately dangers to non-Communist morale in Far East, notably in Taiwan, Korea, Japan and the Philippines.

"I told him that as matters now stood, while we hoped Chinese Nationalists would alone be able hold remaining islands, that if they failed do so and if it seemed that attack upon them was part of an attack against Formosa itself, you would have to consider active US intervention. I also told him that in view steady Communist build-up of artillery emplacements and airfields, we had about reached a point where we did not feel we could assume the moral responsibility of preventing Chinese Nationalists from attempting interfere with this build-up by mainland attacks against hostile positions.

"Conversation was throughout in best of spirit with mutual comprehension different viewpoints and difficulty problem.

"I reminded Eden that there must come a time in these matters where will to stand must be made manifest. In case of Hitler, Eden himself recognized that this had come too late. It should have come in relation to Czechoslovakia rather than Poland, and if it had come earlier, there might not have been the Second World War. Eden agreed that there was a parallel but still seemed feel that we could afford a further retreat. I said this was a grave decision where you would have to exercise final responsibility and that all the world could know you would do so with the sober sense of responsibility and dedication to peace with freedom.

"Faithfully yours, Foster"

Dulles

132. Telegram From the Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Burma<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, February 25, 1955—8:06 p.m.*

Tedul 23. Admiral Radford has become increasingly concerned over progress our logistic support to Formosa. He fears Department of Defense may be gearing their efforts to the routine scheduled MDAP program rather than to actual requirements of existing situation, with possibility that needed equipment might not arrive Formosa in time to do any good.<sup>2</sup>

In view numbered paragraph 2 your Dulte 2,<sup>3</sup> Admiral Radford with my concurrence plans have Admiral Carney leave Monday afternoon for Formosa arriving early Thursday March 3 A.M. local time. Admiral Carney will find out actual military needs so that we may be able provide effective and prompt logistic assistance.<sup>4</sup> In addition, Admiral Carney will be able assist CINCPAC in carrying out obligations that you pointed out in numbered paragraph 3 Dulte 2.

**Hoover**

<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5 MSP/2-2555. Top Secret; Priority. Drafted by Walter K. Scott and signed by Hoover. Secretary Dulles visited Burma after his departure from Bangkok.

<sup>2</sup>Telegram DEF 976742 from Secretary of Defense Wilson to the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, February 25, reads as follows:

"It is important that our logistics support of the Chinese Nationalist Forces be directly and immediately related to the exigencies of the present military situation and not solely as previously, to the currently approved MDAP programs. Addressees are directed to cooperate in meeting requests by the Executive Agent (Department of the Navy) for equipment which is necessary to insure effective and sustained Chinese Nationalist military effort.

"The Department of the Navy is also responsible for expediting delivery of such additional equipment as would be necessary to insure effective cooperation between U.S. and ChiNat Forces in joint combat operations if such operations are directed."

A copy bears the President's initials. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Miscellaneous Series, Formosa Area—Admiral Carney)

<sup>3</sup>Document 123.

<sup>4</sup>A memorandum of February 28 by Goodpaster states that he informed Acting Secretary of Defense Anderson by telephone that the President desired that Carney be told he should be "completely non-committal in any discussions with Chiang on U.S. logistic support for China operations" until after he had met with Secretary Dulles in Formosa. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Miscellaneous Series, Formosa Area—Admiral Carney)

**133. Telegram From the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bohlen) to the Department of State <sup>1</sup>**

*Moscow, February 27, 1955—6 p.m.*

1400. Reference Embtel 1397. <sup>2</sup> British Ambassador stated purpose of Molotov's request for him to call yesterday was to give Soviet reply on point one (i.e. composition of conference) of British message of February 9 (Embtel 1279). <sup>3</sup> Molotov stated, and then handed aide-mémoire <sup>4</sup> to Hayter, that CPR could not participate in conference with representative of Chinese Nationalist Government.

Hayter indicated he had impression this was not necessarily final word Soviet Government.

Hayter asked Molotov whether latter could make any statement regarding point two of British message of February 9 and Molotov, without mentioning UN, said that it would be up to Soviet, British and Indian Governments to consult on possibilities of conference on Formosa.

British Ambassador did not know whether Molotov had called in Indian Chargé as well but thought it probable.

Understand substance Soviet aide-mémoire will be available London and Washington.

**Bohlen**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/2-2755. Top Secret; Priority. Repeated for information to London.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 1397 from Moscow, February 26, reported that Molotov had asked Hayter to call on him that afternoon. (*Ibid.*, 793.00/2-2655)

<sup>3</sup> Document 100.

<sup>4</sup> The text of the aide-mémoire was given to the Department by the British Embassy in Washington on February 28. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/2-2855)

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**134. Memorandum From the Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State <sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, February 28, 1955.*

I had a brief visit with the President this afternoon.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/2-2855. Top Secret; Eyes Only.

He had read your cables (Dulte 8 to 16, inclusive)<sup>2</sup> this morning after returning from a weekend out of town. I stated that analysis of all information available here indicated a rapid ChiCom buildup opposite the offshore islands and that we had the feeling time was getting short before we would have to reach a decision to participate in their defense, one way or the other, whether we liked it or not. I said that it looked from here that Quemoy and Matsu were becoming a symbol, throughout Asia, of our intention to back up our allies in the face of Communist probing and expansion.

The President mentioned again that he had discussed with you the possibility that Robertson might stay on in Taipei in an attempt to reorient Chiang's thinking. He thought it was to the Nationalists' own advantage to withdraw from the offshore islands, and consolidate their position on Taiwan.

Herbert Hoover, Jr.

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<sup>2</sup> For Dultes 8, 9, and 10, all from Bangkok and dated February 25, see Documents 129 ff. Dulte 11 from Bangkok, dated February 25, reported that Eden gave Dulles the operative paragraph of a draft message to Trevelyan for communication to the Chinese. The paragraph inquired whether the Chinese Government would state publicly or privately that, while maintaining their claims, they did not intend to prosecute them by force and stated that if so, the British would be ready to approach the U.S. Government with what they believed was a good hope of finding a basis for a peaceful settlement of the situation in the coastal islands. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-BA/2-2555) Dulte 12 from Bangkok, February 25, reported a meeting among Dulles, Australian Foreign Minister Richard F. Casey, and New Zealand Foreign Minister Thomas L. Macdonald, in which Dulles set forth the U.S. position on the Taiwan situation along the lines of his conversation with Eden the previous evening. (*Ibid.*, 793.00/2-2555) Dulte 14 from Rangoon, February 26, and part of Dulte 10 from Bangkok, February 25, concerned the SEATO Council meeting. Dulte 16 from Vientiane, February 27, concerned Dulles' visit to Burma. Dulte 13 from Bangkok, February 25, concerned an unrelated matter. (All *ibid.*, 682.87/2-2555) Dulte 15 from Rangoon, dated February 26, for the President, reported that Dulles had just received a message from Eden stating that London approved the proposed approach in Peking. (*Ibid.*, 110.11-DU/2-2655)

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135. Telegram From the Consul General at Geneva (Gowen) to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

*Geneva, February 28, 1955—8 p.m.*

672. Gowen and Shillock met Chinese Communist officials Shen Ping Acting Consul General, Li Kuang Tze Consul, Yeh Chin Pa offi-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.95A241/2-2855. Confidential; Priority. Received at 7:58 p.m. Repeated for information to London and Hong Kong.



cial and Hsu Wei Chin interpreter February 28 at Hotel Beau Rivage, Geneva.<sup>2</sup> Language French. Meeting lasted two hours. Chinese officials were first to offer handshake before meeting started.

Gowen said, "My Government has directed me to say: As you know according to recent resolution of United Nations efforts are now being made by Secretary General Hammarskjold to obtain release 15 members United States Air Force who were attached to United Nations Command in Korea and who are held by your side. For this reason this meeting here today will be confined only to discussion regarding other Americans in Communist China whose names were indicated on list previously delivered to your side at Geneva. The following names should be added to that list: John Thomas Downey and Richard Fecteau about whom your side makes no mention whatsoever notwithstanding request made to you by American Ambassador Johnson at previous meetings at Geneva in order to determine the names of American civil prisoners mentioned on that list."

The Chinese answer to this was "We have noted your statement. Our Government has already condemned John Thomas Downey and Richard Fecteau who are included in group of 13 spies tried and condemned in our country as we had previously reported."

Gowen said "I desire to express satisfaction on the departure from Communist China of 16 Americans since the first meeting."

Chinese replied "We take note of this."

Gowen said "You have not furnished any information on status of other Americans detained by you. I hereby renew my request for information concerning them."

Answer was "We shall seek advice on this point and let you know in due course."

Gowen said "I wish to emphasize that the opposition of my Government and my people to these unwarranted detentions is grave and strong. I am instructed to demand the liberation of these American citizens."

Answer was "The policy of our Government has been and will continue to be to grant authorization to leave our country after examination to those Americans who wish to depart for the United States provided however that no cases of a civil or criminal nature are pending against them."

[Here follow inquiries concerning individual U.S. nationals from whom no communication had been received or whose illness had been reported and discussion concerning the transmission of letters and packages through the Chinese Red Cross.]

<sup>2</sup> For text of a Department of State press release concerning the meeting, issued on March 1, see Department of State *Bulletin*, March 14, 1955, pp. 429-430.

All Chinese answers were made after consulting lengthy Chinese files and after Chinese side had consulted among themselves. Then reading from prepared Chinese statement which was subsequently translated the Chinese said "The policy of the Government of China regarding Americans wishing to leave China has already been proclaimed during the Geneva Conference. This policy consists in protecting foreigners who wish to leave China provided such foreigners respect Chinese laws. Authorization to leave China is already granted and will be granted after examination to Americans who wish to leave China. But those foreigners who have committed crimes are condemned according to Chinese law. This policy has already been communicated to your side and has always been applied by Chinese Government since Geneva Conference. Furthermore more than 10 Americans have already left China. Therefore your statement about the opposition on your side on this subject is groundless. We cannot agree on subject of the departure of Americans as our policy is clear and already known to you. We do not know if there is any news concerning the departure from China of the 13 American spies. Regarding exchange of small packages including medicines and letters between Americans in China and their families in United States through Chinese Red Cross we have always applied this channel and you can always do so in the future. According to American press agency reports certain members of families of the 13 condemned Americans in China expressed intention to go to China to visit these prisoners. If such relatives wish to go to China our government is in a position to do the necessary for their visas".

Gowen said "This question has been examined by my Government in relation to a similar offer which your side made to enable relatives of American military personnel imprisoned in Communist China to visit them there. My Government for the time being has decided not to issue passports to any Americans to visit Red China in view of uncertainties created by belligerent attitude and actions of Chinese Communists. The situation has not improved since that decision was made. The Chinese Communists could benefit these American relatives most by releasing these detained Americans."

The Chinese answer was "To meet the wishes of relatives of condemned Americans in China who wish to go to China to visit these condemned persons the Chinese Government is ready to undertake the necessary action to procure them visas. But the American Government is fearful lest the relatives of these prisoners as well as the American people will become aware of the reality of the crimes committed by these condemned men and the American Government is also fearful lest these relatives and the people of America get to know that the Chinese Government really desires peace. Thus the American Government has refused to issue passports to these rela-

tives who wish to go to China. The responsibility for this refusal rests with the American Government."

Gowen replied "I reject your accusations against my Government. They are completely false and groundless."

The Chinese did not reply.

*Comments:* Chinese made no reference to their students. Referring to statement made by Chinese that they would seek advice and let us know when they might have news welfare 14 Americans listed above Gowen asked how soon we might expect reply. After somewhat lengthy consultation among themselves reply was "We shall advise our Government about this and when we receive reply we shall communicate with you."

General attitude Chinese side was quite relaxed, calm and not at all tense. When meeting adjourned they again were first to offer handshake all saying single word goodbye. We received clear impression Chinese wished to stress Red Cross channels available for mail, small parcels, including medicines, and that they clearly indicated without saying it, further such meetings might be held here concerning our desire obtaining information re welfare whereabouts detained Americans. We thought Chinese statement quoted above that they do not know if there is any news about departure from China of "the 13 American spies" of special interest especially as it was quite unsolicited.

**Gowen**

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### 136. Editorial Note

At a meeting of the National Security Council on March 3, in NSC Action No. 1346, the Council took note of a Progress Report by the Operations Coordinating Board on NSC 146/2, "United States Objectives and Courses of Action With Respect to Formosa and the Chinese National Government", dated November 6, 1953. (*Foreign Relations, 1952-1954*, volume XIV, Part 1, page 307) (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95) The Progress Report, dated February 18, covered the period June 22-December 31, 1954; a copy is *ibid.*, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 146 Series. Gleason's memorandum of the NSC discussion records the following comments:

"In the course of his briefing of the Council on the contents of this Progress Report, Mr. Cutler pointed out that Formosa was experiencing economic difficulties owing to its inability to export rice. Part of this difficulty stemmed from the fact that U.S. rice exports

had lately been competing with Formosan exports. The President commented that he had never imagined that the United States would get itself involved in the export of rice. Admiral Radford observed that our exports of rice were getting us into difficulties in other parts of Asia, notably in Burma." (Memorandum of discussion, March 4; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

Reference is to United States rice exports under Public Law 480.

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137. **Memorandum From the Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State**<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, March 3, 1955.*

Mr. McConaughy advised me last evening that Ambassador Heenev had called to inform the Department that Mr. Pearson would make a statement in the Canadian House of Commons on the subject of a "cease-fire" along the lines of the attached memorandum.<sup>2</sup>

I asked Mr. McConaughy to pass the following to the Ambassador: That as you and your party would not return until Sunday,<sup>3</sup> and as there had been many developments in your absence with which only you were familiar, we would prefer that Mr. Pearson not make the proposed statement until you had returned and he had an opportunity to check it personally with you.

This morning the Ambassador called me to say that he had talked with Mr. Pearson, who agreed not to make the statement until next week. I promised to call it to your attention soon after your return and to let the Ambassador know as soon thereafter as possible of your reaction.

I also told the Ambassador that our recent intelligence indicated that the Communist propaganda on Formosa and the offshore islands had declined within the last few weeks to the lowest point since last summer. I ventured the opinion that perhaps the Communists were, in effect, adopting a tacit cease-fire rather than a formal one. If such should prove to be the case, it might be better for all concerned if the issue were allowed to lay dormant for a while and we do our utmost to keep from stirring the issue up. The Ambassador agreed

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/3-355. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> Not attached to the source text. Pearson's proposed statement, undated, is attached to a March 3 memorandum by Murphy of a conversation with Heenev. (*Ibid.*, 793.00/3-355)

<sup>3</sup> March 6.

that this might well be the case, and said they would watch developments closely.

Herbert Hoover, Jr.

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138. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Department of State <sup>1</sup>

*Honolulu, March 4, 1955.*

Dulte 29. For Acting Secretary Hoover eyes only from Secretary Dulles. Re Secto 57. <sup>2</sup> Following is memorandum of my talk with Chiang Kai-shek. <sup>3</sup> Please send copy to the President as well as an information copy to Secretary Wilson and Admiral Radford:

Memorandum of Conversation. Place: President's residence, Taipei. Date: March 3, 1955, time: 2:30 p.m., participants: President Chiang Kai-shek, Madame Chiang Kai-shek, the Vice President, <sup>4</sup> George Yeh, Secretary-General of the Foreign Office, <sup>5</sup> interpreter and 1 other; <sup>6</sup> the Secretary, Mr. Robertson, Ambassador Rankin, Mr. McCardle, Mr. Bowie, Mr. MacArthur, Admiral Carney, Admiral Stump.

I opened by asking President Chiang how he wished to proceed and whether he wished me to speak first or whether he cared to do so. George Yeh, interpreting for the President, said that the President wished me to make the initial presentation.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.11-DU/3-455. Top Secret. No transmission time is indicated on the source text. Received on March 6 at 4:15 p.m. A copy bears the notation "File" in the President's handwriting. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International Series)

<sup>2</sup> In Secto 57 from Iwo Jima, March 3, for Hoover, Dulles stated that he would send a full summary of his talk with Chiang Kai-shek from Honolulu and added, "Nothing sensational transpired." (Department of State, Central Files, 110.11-DU/3-355)

<sup>3</sup> The memorandum of conversation was apparently drafted by MacArthur and revised by Dulles. A copy, with revisions in Dulles' handwriting, is *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 429. A brief summary of the conversation by Rankin was sent to the Department in telegram 2319 from Manila, March 4, which states that a detailed memorandum was being prepared by President Chiang's secretary, Sampson C. Shen. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 110.11-DU/3-455) Shen's record of the conversation was sent to the Department as an enclosure to despatch 444 from Taipei, March 15. (*Ibid.*, 110.11-DU/3-1555)

<sup>4</sup> Ch'en Ch'eng.

<sup>5</sup> General Chang Chun, Secretary General of the Office of the President.

<sup>6</sup> The other two Chinese participants were Premier O.K. Yui and Shen. According to Rankin's report, Foreign Minister Yeh acted as interpreter throughout the conversation.

I expressed satisfaction at the bringing into force of the Mutual Security Treaty <sup>7</sup> and said that if it were agreeable to the President, we might treat this as the first meeting of consultation under Article IV of the treaty. He agreed.

I said that I was happy that there were also present Admiral Carney and Admiral Stump who would be able to conduct military conversation with the President's military advisers. I thought that there was probably a need to reconsider present planning so as to put it on to a basis related to the present threat rather than upon some long-term basis.

I said I wished first of all to clear up any doubts that might be in the President's mind with reference to the UN proceedings. The US, as a member of the UN, has perhaps different responsibilities from those of the Republic of China. As far as the US was involved, the threat was international because our defensive undertakings were challenged. Therefore, the US was obliged to seek to resolve peacefully this international conflict. The position of the Republic of China might be different because it might regard hostilities as civil war and therefore excluded from UN competence by Article 2(7) dealing with domestic jurisdiction.

The US was not hopeful of a positive result and indeed we had not clearly decided as to whether or when we would proceed further. We anticipated a Soviet veto. However, we had a duty to ourselves and to our own public opinion and indeed to world opinion to seek to invoke the peaceful procedures of the UN; and if there was a Soviet veto, then the whole world would know where the responsibility lay. I said I wished to make a second point, which was that we did not seek for the UN any jurisdiction with respect to the territory or status of the Republic of China. What we sought was simply a "cease-fire" resolution which would stop the fighting, but not attempt to deal with the substance of the respective claims.

I then went on to discuss the question of the defense of Quemoy and Matsu Islands. I said that perhaps at the beginning of my talks with Foreign Minister Yeh there had been a temporary confusion for which I was prepared to take full responsibility. It was not now profitable to go into the explanation but the matter had developed in the US in such a way that the authority to use the Armed Forces of the US outside the treaty area had to be left to the future judgment of the President of the US and that therefore there could not be any actual present commitment. I said that the position was I thought accurately expressed in the statement which I was prepared to make on leaving Taiwan, and I asked Foreign Minister to translate

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<sup>7</sup> The Secretary and Foreign Minister Yeh had exchanged instruments of ratification earlier that day.

to the President the relevant portion (paragraphs 6 to 10) of my Taipei departure statement.<sup>8</sup> (*Note:* Entire statement had previously been cleared with the Foreign Minister.) The Foreign Minister interpreted this to the President.

I then said that I thought it would be important for the military advisers of our two governments to consider the problem of the defense of Quemoy and the Matsu, to calculate what the chances of success were, what the cost would be in terms of manpower and equipment; and I said I would like to hear the views of the President as to the importance of these islands in relation to the cost of their defense.

As the next matter, I turned to the question of the tanker *Tuapse*<sup>9</sup> and the crew members of the *Tuapse* and of the Polish ship<sup>10</sup> which have been seized. I said I would like to recommend to the President the release of the *Tuapse* and also the crew members who wanted to be repatriated. I said that in the case of the Soviet tanker, it was I thought useful to avoid giving the Soviets additional pretext for helping the Chinese Communists; and while I thought that the particular matter was not in itself important, nevertheless it could be used by the Soviets as a pretext for action with the Communist Chinese. I thought that the crew members should not be held against their wishes. We were complaining about unlawful detentions on the

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<sup>8</sup> In a statement to the press before his departure from Taipei later that day, Secretary Dulles announced that the first meeting of consultation under the Mutual Defense Treaty had taken place; paragraphs 6 through 10 read as follows:

"The decision as to the use of the armed forces of the United States and the scope of their use under Public Law 4 will be made by the President himself in the light of the circumstances at the time and his appraisal of the intentions of the Chinese Communists.

"Since however the Matsu and Quemoy Islands, now in friendly hands, have a relationship to the defense of Taiwan such that the President may judge their protection to be appropriate in assuring the defense of Taiwan and the Pescadores, our consultation covered also these coastal positions of the Republic of China.

"It is the ardent hope of the United States that the Chinese Communists will not insist on war as an instrument of its policy.

"As President Eisenhower said, 'We would welcome action by the United Nations which might bring an end to the active hostilities in the area.' The United Nations is exploring the possibility of a cease-fire, as are also other peace-loving nations.

"I have, however, made clear that the United States will not enter into any negotiations dealing with the territories, or rights of the Republic of China except in cooperation with the Republic of China." (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 429)

For complete text of the statement, see Department of State *Bulletin*, March 14, 1955, pp. 420-421.

<sup>9</sup> See footnote 5, Document 4.

<sup>10</sup> The Polish merchant vessel *President Gottwald* was intercepted by Republic of China naval forces in May 1954. A Polish note of February 12, 1955, charging the United States with responsibility for the seizure of the *President Gottwald*, the seizure in October 1953 of the *Praca* and the detention of the crew members, together with the U.S. reply of February 21, 1955 are in Department of State *Bulletin*, March 14, 1955, pp. 430-432; see also *Foreign Relations, 1952-1954*, vol. xiv, Part 1, p. 472.

part of the Chinese Communists and hoped that the Republic of China would set a better example to the world.

In the conclusion of my presentation, I dealt with the role of Free China. I said that in my opinion, the Republic of China did have a continuing and important role to play but it minimized this role to be constantly talking about an armed reconquest of the Mainland. Opportunities might arise and almost surely would arise, but they could not be created by the Republic of China alone. They would be created by the nature of the Communist regime. For example, there were almost sure to be splits between the Communist leaders as there had been in Soviet Russia when Stalin and Trotsky broke, when Beria was liquidated and now when Malenkov is ousted. If, during this period, there had been a free Russian Government possessed of power in close proximity to the Soviet Union, it might have exerted a possibly decisive influence as between the factions. Such opportunities were likely to occur in relation to Communist China.

Furthermore, there was the possibility that the Chinese people in all or parts of China might sometime be prepared to revolt against the harsh treatment and bad economic conditions which were applied to them. Food conditions were reported as very bad. If that situation came about, then again there might be an opportunity.

Furthermore, there was a possibility that Chinese Communist aggression might create a situation where there was a general war against China. There might, for example, be aggression against Southeast Asia or Korea, in which case again there would be opportunity for the Republic of China. The main point I wished to make was that these opportunities which were quite likely to arise were *[were]* not opportunities which could be created by the Republic of China alone or which could be dated. The opportunities would be created by forces outside the Republic of China. Under these circumstances, it seemed rather foolish for the Republic of China to try to hold out dates when the forces of the Republic of China could successfully conquer the Mainland. This was belittling and exposing the Republic of China to a measure of ridicule abroad, as it seemed to others that it was foolish for the Republic of China to be talking along these particular lines. There was in fact a bigger role for the Republic of China, and we hoped that the President could find it possible to explain that to his people.

The President replied that he fully shared my view regarding the future role of his government. In actual fact, there was nothing else it could do. Now that the Mutual Security Treaty was in force, he wished to assure me that he would take no independent action insofar as the use of force was concerned, and would undertake no large-scale military operations against the Mainland without full consulta-



tion with the US. He said, however, that he had had to give due consideration to another important problem; namely, the public handling of these matters in order to bolster morale and keep hope alive regarding a return to the Mainland. This was another problem.

The President said for me to inform President Eisenhower that he would take no military action against the Mainland without consultation with him. He also asked that President Eisenhower be informed that he could treat Chiang as a true friend and the Chinese Government as one which will cooperate on all matters of major importance. He would not fail the United States in this respect.

Regarding the question of the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores and also the situation with respect to Quemoy and Matsu, he fully agreed on the need for the military people to go into this problem more deeply and actively than had been done heretofore. He recalled that two years ago the US and Nationalist China had engaged in military consultations<sup>11</sup> although nothing much had ever come out of these talks. He felt that a joint military council, consisting of military representatives of the US and the Republic of China, should be established to examine thoroughly military problems. He hoped that Admiral Carney and Admiral Stump would be empowered to discuss the defense of Formosa and Pescadores as well as the defense of Quemoy and Matsu with his military advisers. Although he recognized there might be a difference in the degree of such consultation as it related to Formosa and the Pescadores on the one hand and Quemoy and Matsu on the other, he sincerely hoped however that these matters could be discussed during Admiral Carney and Admiral Stump's present visit to Taipei.

In addition to the above major problems which should be studied by the military representatives of the two governments, there was another small matter. When Admiral Radford was here,<sup>12</sup> the President had discussed with him the possibility of maintaining 21 fully trained and equipped active divisions, and in addition the training and equipping of 9 reserve divisions. This was 2 or 3 months ago, and he had received no word regarding this project. He hoped that I would recommend that this project be carried out since it was important.

I replied that I was not familiar with the details of this matter and that it should be discussed with Admiral Carney during his present visit. The President said he hoped a decision could be

<sup>11</sup> Reference is apparently to staff-level discussions held in May and December 1953; see despatch 660 from Taipei, June 19, 1953, *ibid.*, p. 210.

<sup>12</sup> Radford visited the Republic of China at the end of December 1954 during a trip to several Asian countries; see Document 9 for his remarks concerning Formosa and the Tachens.

reached during Admiral Carney's stay here, to which I made no reply.

The President then said he recalled an Air Force plan worked out last year which had not yet been fully implemented. The objective of this plan was to so equip the Chinese Nationalist Air Force so that it could look out for the defense of Chinese Nationalist-held territory in peacetime without requiring active US Air Force support. This was a relatively small matter in terms of the overall problem, but was nonetheless important.

I replied that I was not familiar with this question, but that immediate military planning should be related to the military threat and perils of today. I said long-term peacetime planning should be postponed because I believed the immediate peril was very great and the study of how to meet it should not be subordinated to overall long-range planning.

The President said he understood me to mean that I did not wish to avoid long-term planning but wished to give priority to planning against the immediate danger. The problem of Formosa's air defense was he felt related to the immediate defense problem.

The President said he wished to comment on the proposed cease-fire effort in the UN. He again reassured me and pledged now that the US-China treaty was in force, he would not initiate any provocative action against the Mainland. However, for political reasons he could never agree to a cease-fire against the Mainland. He fully understood the position of the US, and why we had agreed to the New Zealand proposal in the UN. He also understood and appreciated the moral gain which the Republic of China could derive from a Soviet veto of a cease-fire resolution in the UN. He said that while he could not stop efforts in the UN for cease-fire, he wished to make it quite clear that when it came to substantive discussion there, the Chinese Nationalist Government would not approve such a resolution.

I replied that I did not ask him to support such a UN resolution. It was entirely acceptable that he express his reservations. I must, however, request with the greatest possible strength and earnestness that if such a resolution came to a vote he would not veto it but would let the Soviets veto it. I added that he might feel that the action in the UN was some form of British plot, but the very fact that today the UK was strongly opposed to pressing a cease-fire resolution in the UN, was evidence that it was not such a British design.

The President laughed and said that he had told Mr. Robertson last year when this subject had been discussed that he feared UN action was a UK machination. I replied that when I had recently seen Sir Anthony Eden, he had urged me strongly not to proceed with

this matter at this time. Regarding a Chinese Nationalist veto, the President said he would consider the matter. Perhaps the matter would not come up and a decision would not have to be made, but tactically he would prefer to let the Soviets veto it.

The President said he next wished to comment on my remark that the Chinese viewed the struggle with Communist China as a civil war. He said that he and his government took a different position than the Chinese Communists. His government believes the case should be presented to the UN as a situation threatening peace. He would like to put the responsibility for the present aggression on the Chinese Communists and the Soviet Union. He thought that a cease-fire resolution would open the way for acceptance of the concept of 2 Chinas. If the UN Security Council really meant business, it should treat the present Communist aggression as a matter threatening peace. He said that he did not consider it a civil war but an international affair.

He then said that there was a good deal of plotting and conspiracy to get Red China accepted in the UN. He was aware that much pressure was being brought to bear on the US in this regard. He hoped the US would understand that the Chinese Nationalist Government would never sit anywhere at the same table with the Chinese Communists, much less in the UN. This was a question of principle and character and he would rather lose Nationalist China's seat in the UN than share it with the Communists or sit at the same table with them. He said the UK would doubtless be glad to know of this decision. The UK might view this decision as one of intransigence but he hoped the US, which he regarded as the leader of the free world and the leader in the UN, would understand his view. No matter what other nations like the UK might do to support Communist China's entry into the UN, he hoped the US would oppose it. It would be the irony of fate if after all the sacrifices made by the Allies in the last war and after the creation of the UN by the efforts of these Allies, Nationalist China should be condemned to accept a regime which has used all its aggressive power against it and the rest of the free world in the last few years.

I replied that the US had no intention of supporting Red China's entry into the UN. The President said he hoped I would not only not support it, but would actively oppose it. He observed that since I had been Secretary of State, I had carried out this policy, and he hoped that I would continue so to do with added firmness. I said I did not know how I could possibly add anything to my firmness in this respect. The President laughingly agreed.

The President then said he would like to inquire whether Admiral Carney had anything to say. Admiral Carney replied that he was looking forward to talks with the Defense Minister and others of the

President's military advisers. He hoped that they could identify the problems relating to the proposal regarding joint and combined military planning.

I then observed that the President had made no comment on my suggestion regarding the release of the *Tuapse* and those members of its crew who wished to be repatriated. I said that there was an American proverb which said that silence meant acceptance, and I hoped that this was also a Chinese proverb. The President replied that he would release the *Tuapse* and its crew members at a price. He did not wish to release it as a token of goodwill toward the Soviet Union. The Chinese Communists were holding innocent flyers, had flagrantly violated the Korean Armistice and the US had done nothing about it. He did not believe that the *Tuapse* should be released when the Communists behaved as they did. The price would be the release of the flyers. He could not see why he should release the ship at this time. I asked him whether this also applied to the crew desiring repatriation. He said he would set free those who had not chosen asylum.

Madame Chiang immediately interrupted to say that the crew would not be released unconditionally, but only if the American flyers were released. She added as an afterthought that this was her understanding of what the President had said.

I said that I did not quite like this position. It carried the inference that because the Communists do wrong, the Chinese Nationalist Government would similarly do wrong. I urged the President to set a higher standard than the Communists. This would carry with it moral advantages to his government, and be appreciated by the US. I believed it was better than to hold the crew members as hostages against the release of the flyers.

The President commented that this was the difference between the US as a leader of the free world and Nationalist China as a victim of communism. He said that he and his people had certain sentiments which he could not expect US to share. He would however continue consultations with US through the Embassy in Taipei on this matter. I replied that I recognized that Nationalist China was a victim of communism and that they had been subjected to grave aggravation. However, the driving influence behind the US people, of which Nationalist China is a great beneficiary, is the fact that we abide by, and are governed by moral principles. I suspected that in the case of Nationalist China this might require an especially great amount of Christian charity. The President said he would continue to study this problem. He knew my time schedule and that I was due to depart from Taipei shortly. Therefore he did not wish to make me late for departure. He had not finished all the things that he would like to talk about, but he hoped to continue this at a future meeting.

He hoped that I would make frequent visits to Taipei in the future. I said that I had made 2 trips in 6 months and that if I continued at this cadence, he might soon get tired of me. He assured me to the contrary.

Upon my departure Mr. Robertson, who was not scheduled to depart with me, remained behind at the President's request for an additional few minutes of conversation. Mr. Robertson is reporting his meeting separately.<sup>13</sup>

Dulles

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<sup>13</sup> *Infra.*

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139. **Telegram From the Ambassador in the Philippines (Spruance) to the Department of State**<sup>1</sup>

*Manila, March 4, 1955—8 p.m.*

2318. For Secretary from Robertson. After your departure from President Chiang's house March 3 I had short conversation with him at his request. Rankin was also present. He asked me about British position on various matters—referring to your earlier remark about present UK opposition to pressing for action in the Security Council on New Zealand resolution, he asked reason for this. I replied in my opinion UK earnestly desired find peaceful solution Taiwan question and wanted explore every avenue this end; that while UK did not consider off-shore islands worth fighting for UK conservative government firmly supported our position keeping Taiwan and Penghu out of Communist hands. I further stated UK had apparently become seriously concerned about Communist objectives in Asia; also if New Zealand resolution were argued and voted on and presumably vetoed by Soviets, resolution introduced by Soviets would then come up which British naturally do not desire. Chiang asked if this meant US and UK positions on Far East in general had drawn closer together. I replied, psychologically, although there was still the basic cleavage on policy relating to Red China. I then pointed out current political difficulties of conservative government and importance of not adding to their embarrassments, adding that whatever differences in views between US and present UK Government relating Far East policy a Labor government would be immeasurably more difficult deal with.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.15-RO/3-455. Secret. Passed to CINCPAC for Dulles by the Department, and repeated to Taipei for information.

Lastly President Chiang brought up for discussion recent changes in Soviet Union. He expressed definite opinion military dictatorship had taken over with Bulganin and Zhukov<sup>2</sup> effectively in power and Khrushchev of secondary importance.

Spruance

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<sup>2</sup> Marshal Grigory K. Zhukov, Soviet Defense Minister.

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140. Memorandum of Record and Understanding by the Chief of Naval Operations (Carney)<sup>1</sup>

[Washington,] March 6, 1955.

SUBJ

Chief of Naval Operations' Visit to Formosa, 3-5 March 1955

By prearrangement, I met with Secretary Dulles on his arrival at Taipei and prior to his meeting with Chiang Kai-shek. I informed him that I was deferring my own discussions with ChiNat authorities until after he (Dulles) had seen Chiang. I informed him that U.S. press notices had related our respective visits to Formosa, implying that there was a connection. I showed him the statement that I tentatively planned to give the press if they should ask for it; he approved it.

I then outlined for SecState the intended purpose of my visit and my intended manner of approach to U.S. military personnel and to the ChiNats; I stated that it was my opinion that the principal points meriting discussion all had some government-level interest and therefore any guidance which he could give me would be most helpful.

I carefully emphasized that my purpose was only to *identify* the problems and that I could make few, if any, decisions on the spot.

I then explained that it was now Defense policy to relate our assistance efforts to the realities of the current situation and that the Department of the Navy had been made the Executive agent for expediting the correction of deficiencies; there is implicit a greater

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/3-655. Top Secret. Sent to Under Secretary Hoover with an attached note stating that copies had been sent to Secretary Dulles and to Murphy, MacArthur, and Robertson. A note on the source text indicates that it was distributed to Secretary Wilson, Admirals Radford, Stump, and Duncan, and Secretary of the Navy Charles S. Thomas.

degree of urgency than heretofore in view of Communist capabilities for launching attacks on the offshore islands.

I then informed SecState that there were four areas which, in my opinion, required review in the event that the provisions of the Treaty were invoked to commit U.S. forces to combat in defense of Taiwan and the Pescadores, or to the "related areas":

(a) Arrangements for command or direction of combined operations.

(b) Steps for coordination of combined defense operations (e.g. staffing, planning, communications, etc.).

(c) Intelligence. (In this connection, I stated that existing arrangements were not adequate for combined combat purposes, nor were they presently satisfactory from the Washington standpoint, that I had discussed the problem with Radford and Allen Dulles and also expected to see Overesch while in Taipei.)

(d) Build-up of ChiNat defense capabilities; discussions of this item to include augmenting material and training assistance, expediting deliveries, etc.

The Secretary of State recognized that these items were all of potential government-level interest and stated that he concurred in the advisability of early exploration of the subjects.

Admiral Stump was present during these preliminary discussions with Secretary Dulles.

In conclusion, I mentioned to Mr. Dulles that I felt our conclusions, with respect to the defense of the offshore islands, should take into consideration the most objective possible thinking. On the assumption that the ChiNats could not defend the islands without our assistance, it then became very necessary to fully understand what the scope and character of what United States assistance must be in order to insure success; were we to embark on military measures less than necessary for success, we would find ourselves embroiled in a doomed venture. This thought was of importance when counselling the ChiNats as to their offshore efforts, as well as being of importance in determining U.S. courses of action. In other words, I said that it appeared, from a military standpoint, that we must be very factual in our own thinking and the hard facts should always be in mind in connection with any advice or opinions that we might give to the ChiNats in connection with their own efforts to hold the offshore islands.

We then departed for a ceremony incident to the exchange of instruments in ratification of the MDT.

[Here follow sections II and III summarizing the conversation between President Chiang and Secretary Dulles on March 3 and describing Carney's activities for the rest of that day.]

## IV

On Friday (the second day), and again on Saturday, I met with the Minister of National Defense. These two meetings were rather different in character and are therefore separately described.

At the first meeting, I outlined the four areas in which I thought there should be a review in the light of the Treaty and of the actual military situation. I stated that without implying specific intent, or implying commitment on my part, I had in mind appropriate items for exploration such matters as air defense, coordination of Naval operations, staff coordination, actual requirements for mutual planning, development of adequate communications, reevaluation of operational intelligence arrangements, review of end item deliveries, etc.

The Minister of Defense promptly launched into a strong plea for a "combined staff"; I stated very firmly that I was not prepared to sign any blank check for a combined staff setup per se. I stated that we were looking for practical ways of achieving essential planning functions and staff functions and it was necessary that these functions be very clearly delineated as a prelude to any revision or change in staff arrangements.

This question of a "combined staff" came up again and again and was obviously the pet project of the Minister of Defense; in each instance, I was equally firm in my insistence that such a proposal was premature until we had determined what planning functions were necessary. In this connection, I pointed out that CINCPAC was the proper U.S. representative for looking into what might be called strategic planning; as for operational planning, I stated that I attached little value to any operational plans other than those prepared by responsible commanders.

The Minister of Defense then made three specific proposals:

(1) Undertaking, on an emergency basis, plans to cover the contingency of U.S. forces participating in the defense of the offshore islands, as well as the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores. I agreed to the extent that Admiral Pride would enter into discussion of these matters at once with a clear understanding that there was no U.S. commitment with respect to the offshore islands.

(2) The establishment of a combined staff. I reiterated my views on this subject and would only agree to the extent that CINCPAC and VAdm Pride would enter into appropriate discussions of planning requirements at their respective levels.

(3) Stepping up the scheduled April CINCPAC-ChiNat conference<sup>2</sup> to March. I agreed with this insofar as CINCPAC found it

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<sup>2</sup> Reference is apparently to a conference held April 18-22 by U.S. and ROC military representatives, headed by Admiral Pride and Defense Minister Yu. See footnote 6, Document 240.



feasible and CINCPAC tentatively agreed to commencing the conference on 25 March. (This could be considered as an "area" conference which will be brought to the attention of the Department in due time by usual means.)

After this, there was a rather general conversation concerning defense matters in lieu of a briefing which MND had proposed and which I did not consider appropriate at that time and which was deferred at my request. Out of these discussions, there came agreement that the two most important matters requiring resolution at this time were:

- (1) Air defense.
- (2) The preparation of joint codes to permit initiation and conduct of combined operations.

The second meeting with the Minister of Defense was held at *his* request and obviously at the direction of the Gimo and as a result of a discussion which I had with the Gimo on Friday night at a dinner which he gave in my honor.

At this second meeting with the Minister of Defense, he led off by saying that the problem of the first and most urgent importance concerned the Communist buildup across the Straits.

He then conveyed to me the Gimo's viewpoint on four items (the Gimo's views on items one and two, as expressed to me by the Minister of Defense, are of particular interest because they give the appearance of concurring with U.S. proposals which were not, in fact, actually made):

- (1) The Gimo would accept U.S. command of operations in defense of the offshore islands (that is exactly the Gimo's viewpoint as conveyed to me at this meeting. In this connection, see my account of my meeting with the Gimo on the evening of 4 March).

- (2) With respect to air defense, the Gimo would accept, in principle, the assignment of the over-all responsibility to a U.S. commander in time of war, but as a prerequisite, it would be necessary for the terms and scope of such command to be clarified and defined (this is exactly as the message was transmitted to me. In this connection, see my account of my discussions with the Gimo on this subject).

- (3) The Gimo pleads for three groups of F-86's together with U.S. engineers and other U.S. supporting units as may be necessary.

- (4) The Gimo attaches the greatest importance to the plan involving the nine reserve divisions.

There then followed another long plea by the Minister of Defense for a combined staff to which I replied that my own views, as earlier stated, had not changed.

At the end of the meeting, Dr. George Yeh, the Foreign Minister who had attended both of my conferences with MND, suggested a review of the "inventory" of past "agreements" of various sorts to

determine which remained valid, which might have been overtaken by events, and to have them in a convenient package.

## V

On Friday night, 4 March, the President and Madame Chiang Kai-shek gave a very small and intimate "family dinner" in my honor, present: Admiral and Mrs. Stump, General Chase, Vice Admiral Pride, the flag officers of my party, Dr. Yeh, Minister Yu, and Admiral Liang.<sup>3</sup> Pride and Chase said that the atmosphere was uniquely warm and merry. The conversation was completely devoid of problem topics.

After dinner, I talked with the Gimo for the better part of an hour, outlining for him the four areas which I sought to explore with the U.S. military officials and the MND. I carefully explained that I was not here to make decisions, but to insure that we identified items which would be essential to effective operations in the event that U.S. forces were employed in support of the Mutual Defense Treaty. If the interpreting was accurate, and the Gimo's replies and remarks as interpreted to me indicate that it was, there can have been no misunderstanding on the Gimo's part as to the exploratory nature of my discussions or as to the fact that any major decisions of a policy nature would be made in Washington, subject to such recommendations as might be received from CINCPAC.

The Gimo was evidently most concerned about air defense and urged the delivery of more planes to the ChiNats; I pointed out that mere delivery of planes was not the answer in itself because there must be effective parallel programs to meet such functions as early warning, intercept, A.A. protection and the various aspects of logistical support, not to mention the satisfactory training of CAF personnel—all of which was a task of such magnitude as not possible of timely accomplishment should there be an urgent need for air defense in the immediate ensuing weeks. The Gimo then stated, and I must agree, that the only alternative would be for the USAF to take over; in this connection, I pointed out that there would be many matters of high U.S. policy to be decided, not the least of which would be the assignment of responsibility compatible with the obligations imposed. It was obviously this interchange which prompted the message he sent to me the following day, via MND, to the effect that he would accept U.S. command, subject to certain stipulations.

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<sup>3</sup> Vice Admiral Liang Hsu-chao, Commander in Chief of the Navy of the Republic of China.

## VI

On Saturday morning, 5 March, at my request, MND gave me an appraisal of the tactical situation with respect to the offshore islands. This was primarily for my own education and nothing very noteworthy of interest to Washington was forthcoming, except a general discussion concerning intelligence efforts, collection, evaluation, and effectiveness. The three F-86 photo recon planes are now in the hands of the ChiNats and were only awaiting good weather for their first photo flights. I looked at their various photographs of the mainland fields, together with a number of other interesting photographs of the areas in the vicinity of Quemoy and Matsu, and I was favorably impressed with the fact that their efforts in this respect are increasingly progressive and improving in effectiveness. As a matter of fact, there appears to be very little evidence of ChiCom air build-up as yet, except at the large field in the vicinity of Tachen, which appears to be a major air base development.

These and other discussions also pointed up the fact that the reorganization and employment of the ChiNat Navy has been attended by a more aggressive attitude both in MND and on the part of the Navy.

On the completion of this MND briefing, I was once more invited to the Gimo's office, but this was a matter of courtesy and ceremony and did not involve any business. The Gimo was extremely cordial, stated that he considered that my visit had been helpful and timely, expressed his high confidence in Stump, Pride, and Chase, and asked me to convey his warm personal regards to Admiral Radford and Major Carney.

## VII

While in Taipei, I conferred with Admiral Overesch; this meeting is described in a separate memorandum. <sup>4</sup>

## VIII

In addition to the broad discussions described above, I took the opportunity of inquiring into the affairs of the Chinese Navy and had appropriate discussions with Minister Yu, Admiral Liang, General Chase, Chief Navy Section MAAG (Brodie), as well as Admirals Stump and Pride.

The ChiNats responded wholeheartedly to the very critical analysis which I made of their organization and programs on the occasion of my last visit in December 1953. They have now established a

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<sup>4</sup> Not found in Department of State files.

sound framework of departmental and operational organization, their operational training and maintenance planning is on a far sounder basis, and they are manifesting a more aggressive outlook with respect to operations vis-à-vis the Commies. In this connection, the Minister of Defense very forcefully stated that he wanted them to fight and was not holding back.

There is still room for much improvement, but the improvement which they have achieved in the past year deserves commendatory notice which I did not withhold.

At all levels, they beg for more DD-DE ships; I was very frank with them and told them that whereas I sympathetically understood their desire and need, the United States had its own problems in this very valuable category and that I was not prepared to make any promises which I could not fulfill, other than to say that I stood by my earlier promise to Mr. Yu that I would wholeheartedly support replacement of any ship lost in honest combat.

The request for LST's was also very much on their minds and I came to believe that they are still making use of ships that no sailor in his right mind would go to sea in if he could avoid it. I have directed Captain Brodie (Navy Section, MAAG), to make another careful review of this matter of LST's, taking into cognizance actual operational needs, seaworthiness of ships, minimum maintenance requirements, and other pertinent factors as a basis for permitting me to determine what recommendation I should make for any additional procurement of LST's for the ChiNat Navy.

### Conclusion

I have furnished CINCPAC with a copy of this memorandum as an Aide-Mémoire and for his guidance. I intend to await further recommendation from CINCPAC on the items discussed, and hereinbefore described, but I have emphasized to him the necessity for handling his further studies in the premise as a matter of urgency. The only decision rendered on the spot had to do with the initiation, on an emergency basis, by Vice Admiral Pride, of requirements for contingent operational plans and arrangements for combined operations should they be ordered.

I have emphasized to CINCPAC, and informed MND, that air defense and the development of suitable joint codes constitute the two most urgent requirements at the moment.

Pursuant to certain purely U.S. discussions, CINCPAC and CNO concurred in General Chase's opinion that the U.S. should support troops deployed to Kinmen and Matsu.

The need for more full and prompt furnishing of intelligence information to CINCPAC and to the Pentagon was stressed. The intel-

ligence available in Taipei is better than had been apparent in Washington and there can be immediate improvement in the distribution process. There is, however, also an overall need for greater capability for collection, evaluation, and distribution of intelligence and the Department of Defense should be prepared to furnish additional assistance as will be shortly requested by CINCPAC.

Finally, I would again invite attention, as said to the Secretary of State, that U.S. policy with respect to defense of the offshore islands should be based on completely objective appraisal. If the offshore islands can not be held without U.S. assistance, then the character and scope of U.S. assistance required to insure such defense must be thoroughly understood. Otherwise, we run the risk of becoming embroiled in an unsuccessful venture. From a military point of view, I believe that this factor must be kept closely in mind in connection with any counsel we may give to the ChiNats, as well as in connection with any U.S. decision that may be taken.

**Robt. B. Carney** <sup>5</sup>  
*Admiral, U.S. Navy*

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<sup>5</sup> The source text bears a typed signature.

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**141. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the President and the Secretary of State, Washington, March 6, 1955, 5:15 p.m.** <sup>1</sup>

I reported to the President the conclusions from my trip.

With reference to Quemoy and Matsu, I said I did not think that as things now stood we could sit by and watch the Nationalist forces there be crushed by the Communists. I felt that the reaction not only on Formosa but in other parts of Asia would be dangerously bad. On the other hand, I hoped that if there was time, Chiang might reorient his policies so that less importance would attach to these islands. I referred to my statement to Chiang which the President said he had read and thought well of.

The President indicated his agreement with me that, under present conditions, we should help to support these two coastal positions. I said that this would require the use of atomic missiles. The President said that he thoroughly agreed with this, and, indeed, he

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President. Top Secret. Drafted on March 7.

suggested my putting into my proposed speech <sup>2</sup> a paragraph indicating that we would use atomic weapons as interchangeable with the conventional weapons. This did not, of course, mean weapons of mass destruction. He said that with the number of planes that we had available in the Asian area, it would be quite impractical to accomplish the necessary results in the way of putting out airfields and gun emplacements without using atomic missiles.

I asked the President to look over the last pages of my draft report <sup>3</sup> to be sure that the emphasis and tone met with his approval. He did so and indicated that it did have his approval subject to two slight verbal changes. He said he would read the rest of the speech during the evening.

[Here follows discussion concerning possible presidential appointments.]

JFD

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<sup>2</sup> Secretary Dulles reported on his Asian trip in a radio and television address on March 8. For text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, March 21, 1955, pp. 459-464.

<sup>3</sup> The draft has not been found in Department of State files.

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142. **Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Secretary of State and Senator Walter George, Department of State, Washington, March 7, 1955** <sup>1</sup>

I reviewed briefly the impressions of my trip, the overriding impression of the danger from Communist subversion and aggression, and the importance of our standing firm. I said that I felt that under present conditions it would be impossible for us to stand by and do nothing while the Chinese Communists took Quemoy and Matsus by force. I said the psychological repercussions on Formosa and in Southeast Asia would, I thought, make it almost certain that most of Asia would be lost to us. I then said that an effective defense of these islands would require the use of atomic weapons because it would not be possible to knock out airfields and gun emplacements with conventional weapons in the face of Chinese manpower and capacity to replace and rebuild. Senator George said he assumed this did not include any mass destruction weapons, and I confirmed that this was the case. I said that the missiles we had in mind had practically no radioactive fall-out and were entirely local in effect. Senator

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Senator Walter George. Top Secret. A notation on the source text indicates that this conversation took place at breakfast.

George indicated his agreement with my analysis, although he seemed to share my own feeling that it would be preferable if the importance of these coastal positions could be diminished through changed policies of Chiang. He asked about the situation on the island, whether I thought there was much subversion there. I indicated that I feared subversion and also relations between the native Chinese on the island and the new group that had come over with Chiang, particularly the Army people, were not very good.

Senator George said that his Committee would like to hear me and asked if it would be agreeable for me to meet with them Tuesday at 10:30 a.m.<sup>2</sup> I said I would do so. Senator George said they would try to pin me down about Quemoy and the Matsus. I said I would try to maintain a flexible position.

[Here follows discussion of several unrelated matters.]

JFD

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<sup>2</sup> For the record of the Secretary's meeting with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on March 8, see *Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee*, vol. VII, pp. 387-413.

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#### 143. Letter From the British Ambassador (Makins) to the Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, March 7, 1955.*

MY DEAR SECRETARY OF STATE: After discussing the Formosa situation with you on February 24 in Bangkok, Sir Anthony Eden sent a message to Chou En-lai in Peking which was delivered on February 28.<sup>2</sup> I understand that you saw this message.

I have been asked by Sir Anthony Eden to send you a copy of the reply Chou gave to Trevelyan on March 1.<sup>3</sup> Sir Anthony Eden

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/3-755. Secret and Personal.

<sup>2</sup> A copy of the message was sent to Dulles with a covering note of March 14 from Makins. The message stated that Eden was aware of the Chinese claims with respect to Formosa and the coastal islands but that the question at issue was the means by which those claims were to be prosecuted. It inquired whether the Chinese Government would state publicly or privately that while maintaining its claims it did not intend to prosecute them by force and stated that if so, the British would be prepared to approach the U.S. Government with what they believed was a good hope of finding a peaceful settlement of the situation in the various islands. (*Ibid.*, 793.00/3-1455)

<sup>3</sup> A copy of this message, headed "Formosa" and bearing Makins' initials and the date March 4, 1955, apparently enclosed with Makins' letter, is filed separately. The message rejected Eden's proposal, declared that tension in the Formosa area had been

*Continued*

received this when he was in Singapore and sent a short interim reply of which I also enclose a copy.<sup>4</sup>

There the matter rests. Sir Anthony Eden will no doubt discuss this exchange with his colleagues in the Cabinet in London. As you will readily understand he is most anxious that these exchanges should not become publicly known and he has asked me to stress the importance of secrecy.

From Singapore, he went to Rangoon, where U Nu suggested to him that there should be a conference in New Delhi of the United Kingdom, India, China and Russia to exchange views on Formosa. This idea was later discussed between Sir Anthony Eden and Mr. Nehru in New Delhi and they agreed that it was not in present circumstances practicable to contemplate a meeting at which only one of the parties to the dispute was represented, the more so since no basis for agreement seemed to exist at present.

I look forward to seeing you at your convenience. I thought, however, that you would wish to have this information as soon as possible.

Yours sincerely,

Roger Makins

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created solely by the United States, stated that the Chinese Government supported the Soviet proposal for a 10-power conference, and insisted that the United States should cease its intervention in China's internal affairs and withdraw its armed forces from Formosa and the Formosa Strait. (*Ibid.*, 793.00/3-455)

<sup>4</sup> A copy of Eden's message of March 2 to Chou, headed "Formosa" and bearing Makins' initials and the date March 4, 1955, apparently enclosed with Makins' letter, is filed separately. The message stated Eden's regret that there was as yet no common basis on which discussions for a peaceful settlement could take place. (*Ibid.*) Eden's messages and Chou's reply are summarized in Trevelyan, *Living With the Communists*, pp. 144-146.

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#### 144. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, March 9, 1955, 10:30 a.m.<sup>1</sup>

##### SUBJECT

"Operation ORACLE"

##### PARTICIPANTS

Sir Leslie Munro, New Zealand Ambassador  
Mr. G.R. Laking, Minister, New Zealand Embassy

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/3-955. Secret. Drafted by McConaughy.



The Secretary

Mr. Merchant, Assistant Secretary, EUR

Mr. Robertson, Assistant Secretary, FE

Mr. Key, Assistant Secretary, IO

Mr. McConaughy, Director, CA

Amb. Munro said he was anxious to hear how the Secretary felt after his Far Eastern trip about the off-shore islands situation, and what he thought should be done next.

The Secretary said that before getting into that subject he would like to mention that he had enjoyed working with the New Zealand Foreign Minister at Bangkok. The friendly resolution addressed to the Afro-Asian Conference<sup>2</sup> was the idea of Foreign Minister Macdonald. This was a nice move. It would give our friends at the Afro-Asian Conference a card to play with. A theme had been established which delegations at Bandung could support.

The Secretary said he had talked to Eden at length in regard to the problem of the islands. He had told Eden that he felt we should proceed further with Operation ORACLE. Eden had asked that we defer action on ORACLE until he could explore the issue further with the Chinese Communists. The Secretary said the results of that exploration did not strike him as encouraging.

Amb. Munro agreed that the Chinese Communist reaction as he had received it from the British certainly was not encouraging.

The Secretary said that Eden had just returned from his trip and had been quite busy in the House of Commons. There was no personal message from Eden yet. However the Secretary had seen copies of the British correspondence with Peiping, but he did not yet have Eden's views on the Chinese Communist rejection. The Secretary said his own feeling was that there was a likelihood that severe fighting might break out and there was a danger that the U.S. might be drawn in. It was his strong feeling that a more determined effort for a cease fire should be made in the near future. It was essential to get the record clear as to our genuine desire for a cease fire. He remarked that the Chinese Nationalists seemed as about [about as] opposed to a cease fire as the Chinese Communists. Neither side wanted any action taken which would stay its hand in the prosecution of the Chinese civil war. In Taipei the Generalissimo had spoken strongly against a UN cease fire effort. Nevertheless the Secretary felt that we must proceed further. He felt we should first give Eden a little time to catch his breath. Eden had been informed that we would probably want to go ahead with the UN move if the British did not succeed

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<sup>2</sup> Reference is to a statement issued on February 26 by the SEATO Council in Bangkok extending greetings to the countries attending the Asian-African Conference which was to be held in Bandung in April. For text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, March 7, 1955, p. 373.

with their representations to the Chinese Communists. Eden had consistently been more optimistic than the Secretary as to the prospects of getting Chinese Communist concurrence. However the Secretary had not discouraged Eden in his desire to make the approach to the Chinese Communists. Eden had said in his speech yesterday<sup>3</sup> that the time did not seem to be ripe to make progress. The Secretary did not think the situation would remain static. Eden had commended the Chinese Communist restraint, but the U.S. could not perceive any indication that the Chinese Communists would abstain from their declared objectives. The present lull is being used by them for a large-scale build up. U Nu had told the Secretary in Rangoon that he was convinced the Chinese Communists are determined to attack Formosa.<sup>4</sup> U Nu thought that the Chinese Communist attitude was "Formosa or nothing". A dangerous situation would exist if the morale on Formosa should deteriorate. The Chinese Communists might be successful in getting some defections through infiltration combined with military action. A few Nationalist Generals might defect. That could make trouble.

Amb. Munro asked if the Secretary could say anything further about morale on Formosa on the basis of his recent visit.

The Secretary said on the surface morale seemed pretty good. Admiral Carney was just back and he and Admiral Stump might be able to say something more definite on military morale, based on their longer stay.

Amb. Munro said that Eden in his speech yesterday seemed to set forth publicly more or less what he had said privately to Chou En-lai last week.

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<sup>3</sup> For text of Eden's statement before the House of Commons on March 8, see *Parliamentary Debates*, vol. 538, cols. 157-166.

<sup>4</sup> Dulles' conversation with Prime Minister U Nu on February 26 was reported in Secto 41 from Rangoon, February 27; the portion relating to China reads as follows:

"Secretary gave full exposition US position re Taiwan problem. Reiterated US would have to resist Chinese Communist attempt seize Taiwan, but if Chinese Communists genuinely desired peaceful settlement and will give assurance not to use force against Taiwan that would be different situation. However, they give every indication intention try take Taiwan.

"U Nu commented that his visit to China [in December 1954] had convinced him Chinese Communists really fear Taiwan is going to be used as base for launching invasion against mainland. He repeated several times his distinct impression they have firm intention take Taiwan by force. This conclusion made him want to go immediately to Washington to inform Secretary. Various matters had prevented this, so he wanted now to convey this view to Secretary." (Department of State, Central Files, 110.11-DU/2-2755)

Dulles' brief report of the conversation in Dulte 16 from Vientiane, February 27, did not refer to U Nu's statement.

The Secretary said he thought not. The Minute of understanding on "ORACLE" <sup>5</sup> clearly provided that discussion would be strictly limited. The objective of all three would be to stop the fighting. Other items such as the status of the two rival Chinese Governments, etc. would be strictly excluded. We would hope and expect that differences in U.S. and U.K. policy as to China would not come out. It would certainly be unfortunate if they did. Eden had already been informed that as things were shaping up, it seemed that fighting might be in prospect. The U.S. would want to proceed with a resolution in the Security Council, even if the U.S. should have to introduce the resolution itself. The U.S. would want to make it clear to world opinion that it was leaving no stone unturned to obtain a cease fire. This was an essential part of our case. If New Zealand should be inclined to hesitate, the U.S. would be prepared to make the move.

. . . Munro asked if the Secretary could give him an estimate of the likelihood of an imminent Communist attack on the islands?

The Secretary said there was no evidence of any significant new concentration of troops in the Amoy area yet, such as would be required to take Quemoy. Additional heavy artillery is being emplaced. An airfield directly opposite central Formosa is being improved—the runways lengthened and widened. There is nothing to show that an attack may occur in the immediate future, that is the next two or three weeks. Opposite Matsu, it is more difficult to judge the situation. It was reported that heavy artillery of Soviet design was being installed which would bring Matsu within range. The U.S. military people out there think that any assault will be preceded by a prolonged artillery barrage intended to interdict resupply of the islands. It is estimated that Quemoy and Matsu have some 35 to 40 days' supply of food and ammunition. If resupply cannot be maintained, the ability to withstand prolonged artillery bombardment will be reduced. The Nationalists would be in a bad position unless the Communist artillery positions in the Mainland could be knocked out. These positions are well recessed in the hills and it might take atomic missiles to silence them.

. . . Munro said he had told Zaroubin <sup>6</sup> that in his view the Chinese Communists could not wage a war for any length of time without Soviet support and assistance. Munro said he gained two principal impressions from Zaroubin's remarks:

- (1) The Soviets are concerned at the situation.
- (2) The Soviets feel they are unable to control the actions of the Chinese Communists.

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<sup>5</sup> See Document 43.

<sup>6</sup> Soviet Ambassador to the United States Georgi N. Zaroubin.

The Secretary said he could understand such a feeling. He remarked that we know from our experience with the South Koreans and Chinese Nationalists that it is not so easy to control an Asiatic ally even though you have physical control through the supplies which you furnish him. You can not just say, "If you don't do this, you won't get anything more". Rhee and Chiang know that they could precipitate a difficult situation if they wanted to. The Chinese Communists could do the same. The Soviets would not have much choice but to support the Chinese Communists if they get involved.

. . . . .

Mr. Robertson remarked that under the tripartite agreement on Operation ORACLE, there is no further commitment on anybody's part, since the Chinese Communists have rejected the invitation to appear before the Security Council.

The Secretary said he thought the understanding was that we would wait a reasonable time, then consult on going ahead with the operation. He was sure the British would want to avoid debating the larger issues in the Security Council just as we do.

Mr. Robertson agreed that the only commitment was to consult on further steps.

Amb. Munro asked if the Secretary wanted to wait a few days before making the next move?

The Secretary said that this was correct. He wanted to give Eden a chance to think things over in the light of the Chinese Communist reply. Eden knew how the Secretary felt. The Secretary felt we should give Eden a few days more to consider the matter.

Amb. Munro said that Holcombe [*Holland?*] and Macdonald were now back in Wellington and the New Zealand Cabinet would be ready to consider the question promptly when the time came.

145. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, March 9, 1955, 12:30 p.m. <sup>1</sup>

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary  
Sir Roger Makins, British Ambassador  
Mr. Robertson  
Mr. Merchant

The British Ambassador called this noon at his request. He referred briefly to the Secretary's speech the evening before and to Sir Anthony Eden's statement yesterday in the House. He thought the two of them did not hang together too badly.

The Secretary remarked that he considered Bangkok a good meeting and that it had given him the opportunity to have several long talks with Sir Anthony. He said that he had not discouraged Eden from making a private approach to Chou En-lai since he felt that if it were successful it was all to the good whereas if it was a failure it would give Sir Anthony further insight into Chinese Communists' purposes.

Sir Roger agreed and commented that Eden's speech had been well received on both sides of the aisle and that he felt he now had firm bipartisan support on the line he was taking. The Ambassador then inquired where we stood on the matter of ORACLE. The Secretary replied that he had told Sir Anthony at Bangkok that we wanted to proceed with the resolution. He felt it necessary to demonstrate our full efforts to secure a cease-fire and that if New Zealand was reluctant we were willing to proceed with the resolution on our own responsibility. He agreed, however, to suspend action until Eden had had a chance to approach Chou En-lai. This had been done and now he would like to move ahead. In fact he had told Sir Leslie Munro of his attitude in the matter this morning. He recognized however that Sir Anthony had only just returned to London and would need to have a few days to get his bearings. It wasn't an urgent matter in terms of a few days but he would like the Ambassador to report to Sir Anthony his desire to move ahead and secure his reaction. He added that the President felt a very real responsibility in line with his Message to the Congress to push the matter as far as possible in the United Nations, and he did not feel we had yet exhausted these possibilities.

Sir Roger said that he was without instructions but was inclined to think personally that Sir Anthony would consider that British

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/3-955. Secret. Drafted by Merchant. The time of the meeting is from Dulles' appointment diary. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers)

public opinion was now entirely clear concerning the pacific intentions of the U.S. There was consequently no need to make a further demonstration on this point and to raise the issue in the Security Council in the form of a resolution which would ultimately have to be voted on might merely stir things up. The Secretary reiterated his desire to move ahead on the resolution without undue loss of time.

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146. **Memorandum of Discussion at the 240th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, March 10, 1955**<sup>1</sup>

Present at the 240th meeting of the Council were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; Brig. Gen. R.W. Porter, Jr., for the Director, Foreign Operations Administration; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were Mr. H. Chapman Rose for the Secretary of the Treasury; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission (for Item 3); the Director, U.S. Information Agency; the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Acting Secretary of the Air Force (for Items 5 and 6); Assistant Secretary of State Holland (for Item 5); the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, and the Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps (for Items 5 and 6); the Director of Central Intelligence; the Assistant to the President; Robert Cutler, Joseph M. Dodge, and Nelson A. Rockefeller, Special Assistants to the President; the Deputy Assistant to the President; Dillon Anderson, NSC Consultant; Robert R. Bowie, Department of State; the White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

[Here follows discussion of agenda items 1-5: "Coordination of Economic, Psychological and Political Warfare and Foreign Information Activities," "Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security" (not including the Formosa situation, comments on which were postponed until agenda item 6), "Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy," "U.S. Objectives and Courses of Action in Korea," and "Report by the Vice President on Latin American Trip."]

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Gleason on March 11.

*6. Report by the Secretary of State on the Formosan Situation*

Before Secretary Dulles began to speak, Mr. Cutler invited Admiral Radford to make any comment he might wish to at this time regarding the military situation in the general area of Formosa. Admiral Radford confined himself to pointing out that the Chinese Nationalists were currently engaged in reinforcing the garrisons on the Matsu Islands.

Secretary Dulles then took the floor. He explained that he had pretty well covered the general aspects of his Far Eastern trip in his recent speech. He wanted, therefore, to confine himself on this occasion to the Formosa problem, which he had found to be critical and acute. Perhaps, he speculated, we should have taken this problem more seriously at an earlier time. It seemed to him at least an even chance that the United States would have to fight in this area before we were through. Secretary Dulles expressed the emphatic belief that the Chinese Communists were determined to capture Formosa. As to the related problem of Quemoy and the Matsus, it bristled with difficulties. No solution to the Formosa problem would be provided if the United States determined to give up Quemoy and the Matsus to Communist China. We would still thereafter face an unmitigated threat to Formosa itself. So the question of a fight for Formosa appeared to Secretary Dulles as a question of time rather than a question of fact. This, he said, did not necessarily mean general war, but the Chinese Communists would have to put our resolution to hold Formosa to the test before there was any chance that they would give up their determination to seize the island.

Recent reports, said Secretary Dulles, indicated to him very clearly that the real resolve and the ultimate objective of the Chinese Communists was the liquidation of the Chinese Nationalist Government if this lay within their power. Their ultimate objective vis-à-vis Formosa was to rid themselves of a rival power close at hand. Parenthetically, said Secretary Dulles, this was the same impression which U Nu, the Burmese Prime Minister, held respecting Chinese Communist objectives.

Secretary Dulles noted that the contents of a message which Chou En-lai had sent to Sir Anthony Eden<sup>2</sup> substantially restated the familiar position that Communist China took vis-à-vis the United States: It was the United States which was encouraging aggression, and the only solution which would bring peace to the area was the withdrawal of all U.S. forces.

After thus emphasizing the seriousness of the general situation, Secretary Dulles said he now wished to give special consideration to

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 3, Document 143.

certain specific aspects of this general situation. The first concerned the timing of any U.S. intervention. He earnestly hoped that the United States might avoid any armed clash with the Communist Chinese until after the ratification of the London-Paris agreements.<sup>3</sup> Accordingly, in so far as it was possible without sacrificing our vital objectives, we should temporize regarding Formosa until the ratification of the WEU pacts had actually been accomplished.

His second important point, said Secretary Dulles, was to emphasize the importance of making U.S. public opinion genuinely aware of the very grave prospect which the United States faced in the Formosa area. He did not believe that American opinion in general was aware of how critical the issues were.

Thirdly, Secretary Dulles called for urgent steps to create a better public climate for the use of atomic weapons by the United States if we found it necessary to intervene in the defense of the Formosa area. Conversations he had had with our military people in the area, continued Secretary Dulles, had pretty well convinced him that atomic weapons were the only effective weapons which the United States could use against a variety of mainland targets, particularly against Chinese Communist airfields which they would use to attack Formosa, against key railroad lines, and gun emplacements. Accordingly, Secretary Dulles thought that very shortly now the Administration would have to face up to the question whether its military program was or was not in fact designed to permit the use of atomic weapons. We might wake up one day and discover that we were inhibited in the use of these weapons by a negative public opinion. If this proved to be the fact, our entire military program would have to be drastically revised and we should have to develop duplicate programs involving conventional weapons on the one hand and nuclear weapons on the other. There was indeed very great concern on the part of our military people in the Formosa area with respect to this particular problem. It was of vital importance, therefore, that we urgently educate our own and world opinion as to the necessity for the tactical use of atomic weapons. At the President's suggestion, continued Secretary Dulles, he had included reference to this point in his recent speech, but much more remained to be done if we were to be able to make use of tactical atomic weapons, perhaps within the next month or two. Public opinion in Asia was not at all attuned to such a possibility.

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<sup>3</sup> The agreements under reference, signed at Paris on October 23, 1954, but not yet ratified, provided for the establishment of the Western European Union and the accession of the Federal Republic of Germany to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; for text, see *Foreign Relations, 1952-1954*, vol. v, Part 2, pp. 1435 ff.



His next point, said Secretary Dulles, was to point to the necessity that this country pay much more careful attention to the problem of the loyalty of the Chinese Nationalist forces on Formosa itself. Secretary Dulles indicated his view that we had in the past been far too complacent about this matter. If even a small portion of a Chinese Communist military force succeeded in making a landing on Formosa and was thereafter met by the defection of one or more of the Chinese Nationalist armies, the situation could be very serious. Morale on the island was in general not too good and, of course, had lately been shaken by the withdrawal of the garrisons from the Tachens, etc. It was accordingly not inconceivable that with skillful bribery some of the Chinese Nationalist generals could be bought by the Communists. This had happened many times before in the history of China, and indeed one of the reasons for becoming a general in China was to get oneself bought. Chiang Kai-shek therefore faced a very difficult task to maintain or to restore morale.

In the latter connection, said Secretary Dulles, he had undertaken during his visit to paint for the Generalissimo a somewhat different picture, stressing the long-term future of Formosa rather than the prospect of any early return to the mainland; but such a drastic transition of attitude obviously presented difficult problems. The problems would certainly not be settled by any methods of shock treatment. Employment of shock treatment methods would risk the loss of Formosa, and if that island were lost the entire U.S. position in Asia would be lost with it.

All the foregoing, Secretary Dulles indicated, seemed to point up the fact that in some respects our U.S. intelligence material had not been too good. The personnel of our U.S. MAAG on Formosa were too few in number and too busy to give this problem adequate attention, and Admiral Carney was now concerning himself with it personally. Along with this emphasis on more adequate operational intelligence, the Administration must see to it that we do everything we possibly can to develop the capabilities of the Chinese Nationalist Government itself to protect Formosa and the offshore islands, at least until such time as the London-Paris pacts are ratified.

On the whole, Secretary Dulles reiterated, the situation was far more serious than he had believed it to be before he had taken his trip. He again repeated his conviction that the Chinese Communists will not call it quits on Formosa on any terms that the United States could accept. Sir Anthony Eden himself may be beginning to realize that the foregoing is the real position of Communist China. The Communist Chinese will never accept our position in Formosa until they have had demonstrated to their satisfaction that we cannot be dislodged from this position. Therefore, Communist probing will go on, and there will perhaps be no definite answer until the United

States decides to "shoot off a gun" in the area. We may have to demonstrate our position by deeds rather than by words.

In accordance with the foregoing, Secretary Dulles repeated his injunction that we improve our intelligence material and that we give as much matériel support to the Chinese Nationalists as possible in order to avoid the contingency of too early intervention by United States armed forces, and finally, to be ready if necessary to use atomic weapons.

Admiral Radford said that he merely wanted to say that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have consistently asserted that we should have to use atomic weapons. Indeed our whole military structure had been built around this assumption. He said that he was convinced that we could not handle the military situation in the Far East, particularly as regards aircraft, unless we could employ atomic weapons. We simply did not have the requisite number of air bases to permit effective air attack against Communist China, using conventional as opposed to atomic weapons.

Mr. Cutler inquired of Admiral Radford as to the probable timing—that is, the season of the year—most favorable for a Communist attempt to seize the offshore islands or Formosa itself. With regard to the offshore islands, Admiral Radford replied that the attempt could be made at almost any time. The most favorable season for an attempt against Formosa itself would be the interval between April and October.

Mr. Allen Dulles said that he desired to state to the Council that, apropos of Secretary Dulles' observations regarding the short-comings of our intelligence, nothing had been said in the course of the discussion which had come to him as a surprise. The CIA had long since been pointing out all these facts on the basis of intelligence available to it. However, Admiral Radford stated that there was insufficient U.S. personnel attached to General Chase's mission on Formosa to evaluate accurately intelligence materials provided by the Chinese. As Secretary Dulles had said, General Chase has only a small MAAG, with insufficient personnel to handle adequately the operational intelligence which was available.

Referring to Secretary Dulles' comments on the state of morale on Formosa, the President said that of course the United States alone could not save Formosa if its people did not want to be saved from Communism. What Secretary Dulles had had to report on the subject put things in a very different light than he had hitherto regarded them in. Secretary Dulles replied that of course morale on Formosa depended very largely on the United States itself. To this, the President said that at least he thought that Chiang's army was loyal to him. Admiral Radford replied that this was not necessarily the case. The matter of morale was largely a factor of the reality of hopes to

return to the mainland. Such hopes were necessary to sustain these 700,000 military men. The President responded with a statement that while this might be true, he could not see what the Quemoy and the Matsus had to do with the business. Admiral Radford answered that continuing to hold these offshore islands was of immense help to the morale of the Chinese Nationalist forces, for the very reason that in these islands the Nationalist forces came into actual contact with the enemy. This tended to provide some tangible hope of ultimate return to the mainland.

In a philosophical vein, Secretary Dulles observed that of course time changes things; but at this particular moment the United States could not sit idly by and watch the Chinese Nationalist forces on Quemoy and the Matsus sustain a terrific defeat or be wiped out, without such repercussions that we would be likely to lose Formosa itself as a result. Nor, on the other hand, could we force the Chinese Nationalists to agree to evacuate these offshore islands. In this was the dilemma and the danger of the current situation, which, however, could conceivably change in, say, a year's time.

The discussion closed with an unanswered speculation by Admiral Radford as to whether or not the intelligence available to the United States Government provided any answer to the question whether the Chinese Communists were likely to make a major attempt to seize the offshore islands prior to the Afro-Asian Conference. Admittedly, continued Admiral Radford, they had the capability to seize the islands, though they would encounter very great difficulty in the effort to take the Quemoy.

*The National Security Council:*

Noted and discussed an oral report by the Secretary of State on his appraisal of the situation with respect to Formosa and the Nationalist-held offshore islands, based upon his recent trip to the Far East. <sup>4</sup>

S. Everett Gleason

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<sup>4</sup> This paragraph constitutes NSC Action No. 1354. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95)

147. Telegram From the Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Bohlen) to the Department of State <sup>1</sup>

*Moscow, March 10, 1955—6 p.m.*

1509. British Ambassador saw Molotov yesterday to deliver to him orally British reaction to observations of Soviet Government of February 26 (Embtel 1400). <sup>2</sup> Hayter was instructed merely to tell Molotov that British Government was continuing its efforts to find some mechanism for dealing with Formosan question and to express hope that Soviet Government would likewise continue its efforts in that direction.

Molotov replied that process was slow but that efforts should continue and then made the amazing statement that at least one thing had emerged from the exchanges between British and Soviet Governments and that was that Chiang Kai-shek's regime would not be represented at any conference or meeting.

Although Hayter had no instructions on this point, he immediately told Molotov that this did not represent the view of his government and referred him to Eden's latest statement in House of Commons on subject. Molotov then dropped the point.

Hayter's impression of this surprising and even for Molotov somewhat crude attempt to associate British Government with Communist position on this point was that it might be reflection of Soviet desire to show Chinese that it was worth-while continuing to explore possibilities through diplomatic channels. This, of course, is mere supposition on Hayter's part based on impression he has received in these exchanges with Molotov.

Assume Department will receive from British Embassy Washington, as in past, Hayter's account of interview. <sup>3</sup>

**Bohlen**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/3-1055. Top Secret; Priority. Received at 11:17 a.m. Repeated for information to London.

<sup>2</sup> Document 133.

<sup>3</sup> Not found in Department of State files.

148. **Minutes of a Cabinet Meeting, The White House, Washington, March 11, 1955, 9-10:05 a.m.** <sup>1</sup>

[Here follows a list of those present, including the President, the Vice President; Secretaries Dulles and Humphrey; Attorney General Herbert Brownell, Jr.; Postmaster General Arthur E. Summerfield; Secretary of the Interior Douglas McKay; Secretary of Agriculture Ezra Taft Benson; Secretary of Commerce Sinclair Weeks; Secretary of Labor James P. Mitchell; Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare Oveta Culp Hobby; Rowland R. Hughes, Director of the Bureau of the Budget; Dennis A. FitzGerald, Deputy Director for Operations in the Foreign Operations Administration; Arthur S. Flemming, Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization; Philip Young, Chairman of the Civil Service Commission; Arthur F. Burns, Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers; Theodore C. Streibert, Director of the United States Information Agency; Marion B. Folsom, Under Secretary of the Treasury; Deputy Attorney General William P. Rogers; 14 members of the White House staff; and one member of the Vice President's staff.

[The meeting opened with a report by the Vice President on his recent trip to Central America.]

*Report on the Far East*—Sec. Dulles said he was encouraged about our position in the Far East generally, that the treaty organization under the Manila Pact has had a good beginning and is going ahead, and that the people, and particularly the leaders, of Southeast Asia are vigorous and capable. He noted that Burma is an exception from the others in its neutralist spirit.

Mr. Dulles felt he had gotten increased insight of Chinese Communist purposes—that they were much more virulent than he had previously thought. Particularly from U Nu and from Mr. Eden, who has been working for a solution of the Formosa Straits problem, Mr. Dulles obtained the impression that the Chinese Communists have a fanatical determination to obliterate any U.S. influence in that part of the world. <sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Cabinet Papers. Confidential.

<sup>2</sup> This portion of Dulles' presentation was described by Hagerty in his March 11 diary entry as follows:

"I am concerned because the purposes of Red China are more virulent than I realized before I left this country. I had talks with the Burmese Prime Minister and with Eden who has been conducting conversations with the Communists of Peiping, and I must tell you this. The Chinese Reds have a fanatical determination to eradicate any impression of good will for the United States in their part of the world. I disagree with the British and I am sure that we are living in a fool's paradise if we have any idea that we can make an easy trade with the Communists for the offshore islands. Chou En-lai flatly rejected such a trade, brands the United States as aggressors and will have nothing to do with the deal the British were trying to work out on the offshore is-

Regarding Formosa, Sec. Dulles said that he had a distinct feeling, but without tangible evidence, that there could be much subversive activity in Formosa if we press Chiang too hard. Chiang does continue to talk of a return to the mainland, but he accepts the U.S. position and says that he will not attempt any return without U.S. concurrence.

Sec. Dulles thought the Chinese Communists would continue to exert pressure until they found the point where we would have to react by shooting; he added however that this might be merely a war of nerves. He continued to think that the Chinese, with their hatred for the West, aimed to take over Southeast Asia and would prefer to die in the effort than fail to accomplish it.

Mr. Dulles concluded that the United States must be prepared to face a quite serious showdown in that part of the world. While it is not possible to judge whether Russia is backing the Chinese effort or is without control over it, the evidence is that Russian actions are minimal. Nevertheless, there could be secret Russian support of the Chinese. In any event, any acceptance of further defeats or withdrawals, he said, would greatly jeopardize U.S. interests and position in Formosa and all of Southeast Asia.

LAM

L.A. Minnich, Jr.

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lands. As a matter of fact, I received information just before I came over here that Chou En-lai in a recent talk with the Finnish Minister had said that China would be in war with the United States, that the United States would kill 100 million Chinese but that there would still be 500 million Chinese left." (*Ibid.*, Hagerty Papers)

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149. **Memorandum of a Conversation Between the President and the Secretary of State, Washington, March 11, 1955, 10:45 a.m.** <sup>1</sup>

The President had the draft of a possible communication to President Coty <sup>2</sup> which we went over together and which, after making some penciled interlineations, he gave me to bring back to the Department.

I said I wanted to discuss further the question of the Formosa situation. I realized that the decision of what to do was a very diffi-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President. Top Secret; Personal and Private.

<sup>2</sup> President René Coty of France.

cult one. It was somewhat parallel perhaps to the situation in Europe in the Thirties where it was hard to know to what extent one was justified in giving way in the interest of peace and of flouting world opinion. It seemed that in the case of Europe there had been too much retreat and that the timing as to when to stand had been bad. In this situation it was also difficult to know and to pick the correct time. I was satisfied that from the standpoint of the position in Formosa and the general attitude of the Thailand and Indochina States that we could not, without great danger, seem to retreat further. However, I wanted to be sure that my thinking was in line with that of the President. I said I thought I should say there was not complete agreement within the State Department on this matter and that in particular Mr. Bowie was in considerable disagreement with my views. It was, however, essential that I be sure that I was in step with the President's thinking.

The President said that he had the impression that Bowie was generally disposed to take a rather more sympathetic line towards the Chinese Communists than was the President and, therefore, this disagreement with me did not weigh strongly with the President.

With reference to the substance of the matter, the President said that he felt that the Quemoy-Matsu situation was a liability. He did not see any present way to liquidate it. He recognized that we probably could not now get the Chinese Nationalists to evacuate and also that it would be serious there and elsewhere for us to sit idly by as spectators while their positions were overrun by some massive Communist assault. Therefore, he shared my conclusions about the matter.

I referred to the *Washington Post* story<sup>3</sup> attributing to Congressman Richards an allegation that the President and I differed on this matter. I stated that my testimony<sup>4</sup> had given no basis for this whatsoever, and I pointed out that under the law the President was required to exercise his own judgment in the matter and that such a judgment could not be made prematurely. I went on to say to the President, however, that this situation created a problem from the standpoint of public relations in that it inhibited an adequate advance preparation for military intervention in the event that it was judged necessary. I said that probably the President would be faced with a question on this matter at his next press conference. The President said he would be disposed to reply along the lines that we had heretofore followed, mainly that he would make the judgment when circumstances required in the light of all the circumstances, but

<sup>3</sup> Dated March 11.

<sup>4</sup> Secretary Dulles testified before the House Foreign Affairs Committee in executive session on March 8.

that he had not made the judgment yet because there was no need for it.

I said that I felt that it would be useful for the President and for me if we could get a clearer report from the military people as to what their estimate was as to the imminence of attack and the defensive capacity of the ChiNats and also with reference to our Intelligence. I said that from the standpoint of timing it would, I thought, be extremely important to avoid, if possible, any U.S. hostilities, particularly involving atomic missiles, while the WEU situation was still unsettled. After that was buttoned up he could have more freedom of action in Asia. I said also this could be one of the matters where he could do an educational job with the British and others if a meeting was held in Paris in May, as was being considered. The President agreed and said that this was, in his mind, one of the most important purposes of the meeting.

The President also arranged to have a meeting at 2:30 in the afternoon at which the JCS would be present. <sup>5</sup>

JFD

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<sup>5</sup> See the memorandum, *infra*.

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## 150. Memorandum for the Record, by the President's Special Assistant (Cutler) <sup>1</sup>

*Washington, March 11, 1955.*

### *Before Meeting in President's Office*

1. I showed to the President, and he read, the interpretation of NSC 162/2, paragraph 39b, <sup>2</sup> contained in the January 4, 1954, memorandum concerning "Policy Regarding Use of Nuclear Weapons". <sup>3</sup> He stated that he thought this interpretation was suited to

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Miscellaneous Series, Formosa—Visit to CINCPAC. Top Secret; Eyes Only.

<sup>2</sup> Paragraph 39-b of NSC 162/2, "Basic National Security Policy," October 30, 1953, reads, in part: "In the event of hostilities, the United States will consider nuclear weapons to be as available for use as other munitions." For NSC 162/2, see *Foreign Relations, 1952-1954*, vol. II, Part 1, p. 577.

<sup>3</sup> The memorandum under reference has not been found in Department of State files, but a memorandum of January 4, 1954, from Lay to the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission indicates that the President approved the interpretation of paragraph 39-b of NSC 162/2 submitted by the Department of State. (Department of State, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 61 D 167, NSC 162

*Continued*



the present situation. (Because NSC 162/2 has been superseded,<sup>4</sup> a new superseding memorandum should be prepared for the President's approval).<sup>5</sup>

2. I showed to the President, and he read, Section III of my memorandum of March 11, 1955.<sup>6</sup> His reaction to it was that we

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Series) A memorandum of February 2, 1954, from R. Gordon Arneson, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy Affairs, to Murphy states that on December 22, 1953, the President approved an interpretation of paragraph 39-b "which made it clear that the paragraph does not constitute a decision in advance that atomic weapons will in fact be used in the event of any hostilities and pointed out that the President should be in a position to consider each situation on its merits at the time." (*Ibid.*, S/AE Files: Lot 65 D 478) For a memorandum of December 3, 1953, from Under Secretary of State Walter Bedell Smith to the President, which set forth the Department's interpretation of paragraph 39-b, see *Foreign Relations, 1952-1954*, vol. II, Part I, p. 607.

<sup>4</sup> By NSC 5501, "Basic National Security Policy," January 6, 1955; paragraph 34 reads in part as follows:

"As the fear of nuclear war grows, the United States and its allies must never allow themselves to get into the position where they must choose between (a) not responding to local aggression and (b) applying force in a way which our own people or our allies would consider entails undue risk of nuclear devastation. However, the United States cannot afford to preclude itself from using nuclear weapons even in a local situation, if such use will bring the aggression to a swift and positive cessation, and if, on a balance of political and military consideration, such use will best advance U.S. security interests. In the last analysis, if confronted by the choice of (a) acquiescing in Communist aggression or (b) taking measures risking either general war or loss of allied support, the United States must be prepared to take these risks if necessary for its security."

<sup>5</sup> Not found in Department of State files.

<sup>6</sup> Reference is to an unsigned memorandum for the record which summarized Secretary Dulles' comments at the March 10 NSC meeting, quoted the sentences in NSC 5501 quoted in footnote 4 above, and stated that the interpretation of paragraph 39-b of NSC 162/2 in Lay's memorandum of January 4, 1954, should be reviewed or reaffirmed by the President. Section III reads as follows:

"Would it be advisable to request the Joint Chiefs of Staff promptly to make a statement to the National Security Council estimating the military measures which may be involved under several alternative situations which may possibly arise in the Formosan area:

"a. Chincom attacks on the Quemoy and Matsus, separately or combined.

"b. Chincom attacks which are about to conquer the Quemoy and Matsus, separately or combined.

"c. Chincom attacks on Formosa and the Pescadores, either as an initial action or as a retaliatory action.

"d. Prolonged Chincom air and artillery attack on the Quemoy and Matsus, without actual invasion.

"These military measures would include information as to

"(1) types and numbers of US forces to be used

"(2) US logistic requirements

"(3) related military matters, such as deployment of U.S. forces elsewhere in the world

"(4) whether U.S. air attack on a Chincom mainland buildup is essential to the defense of the offshore islands? What magnitude of a buildup? What type of US attack?

"(5) If it is essential for victory or security to use nuclear weapons in the above alternatives:

should not ask the JCS to take on this task at this time. The decision to be taken would rest with him, on the basis of advice from JCS, Defense, and State. I said that the suggestion which I made in Section III was for the purpose of generally informing the Council Members, who were probably uncertain as to the current situation following yesterday's Council Meeting. As my idea did not at this time appeal to the President, I did not press it further.

#### *Meeting in President's Office*

3. At 2:30 p.m. today, a meeting was held in the President's office, attended by J.F. Dulles, A.W. Dulles, Radford, Twining, Carney, Goodpaster, and myself.<sup>7</sup> I mention below the principal points which were discussed:

a. The President said that he had called the meeting because he wanted to discuss how to avoid direct U.S. intervention in the Formosa area, at a time while the Western European Treaties were pending; to limit U.S. intervention as much as possible if it became necessary to intervene; and to discuss what action the U.S. would take if we had to intervene.

b. Radford said there was considerable Chincom mainland build-up near Quemoy and near the Matsus,—artillery positions and tunneling. Twining said it was obvious that the Chincoms were not going to attack Formosa at this time, because there had not been a sufficient build-up of mainland airfields. U.S. surface forces could not be conveniently used to defend against a Chincom attack on Quemoy, but could be conveniently used to defend against Chincom attack on Matsu. The Chinats with our help are planning to lay a cheap type of mine field in the Quemoy Channel, which would be generally effective. We have four destroyers constantly available on Formosa patrol.

c. Apparently the Chincoms are putting in some 250 guns in tunneled emplacements around Quemoy. Because Quemoy is so much tunneled for defense, there is really only one particularly sensitive enemy artillery emplacement,—i.e., the emplacement which can fire directly on the landing beaches on Quemoy which provide Quemoy's logistic support. The Chinats do not have much offensive

<sup>7</sup>(a) how would they be used?

(b) what would be the necessary geographic range of U.S. attack?

(c) If the Chincoms succeed in seizing the offshore islands, despite U.S. counteraction, what U.S. military courses of action would follow?" (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Miscellaneous Series, Formosa—Visit to CINCPAC)

<sup>7</sup> A memorandum for the file by Ann Whitman, dated March 11, which refers to the meeting as "unexpected," included an added note which reads:

"3/14/55. President dictated following on above meeting:

"The discussion centered around the capacity of the Chinese Nationalists to defend Formosa during the coming weeks without active intervention on our part; alternatively, if this should not prove possible, how effective could be our cooperation without the use of the atomic bomb. a." (*Ibid.*, DDE Diaries)

The meeting is also recorded in unsigned notes, apparently by Goodpaster, dated March 16. (*Ibid.*, Miscellaneous Series, Formosa—Visit to CINCPAC)

heavy bombing power. They do have two batteries of 155's. If these batteries were located on the high land in Quemoy, and fired at the Chincom gun emplacement which threatens the Chinat landing beaches, it ought to be possible to wreak havoc with such enemy emplacement. Radford thought we should encourage the Chinats to take action against this enemy emplacement. The President thought 155's were very accurate guns; and that attacking the enemy by artillery had the advantage of doing only what the enemy was doing itself. Therefore, he felt the Chinats should develop a fine counter-battery fire on this dangerous emplacement of the Chincoms. The Military thought the Chinats had sufficient ammunition for 45-60 days, and that we could give them more if needed.

d. Carney said the principal problems facing the U.S. if we had to intervene during the next 6-8 weeks would be:

1. Communications, because of language difficulties and codes.
2. The defense of the Formosan airfields against Chincom retaliation, if it were necessary to attack Chincom mainland bases.

Carney felt that all other questions, such as coordination of Naval Operations, etc., were within our capabilities (if we attack these questions vigorously and imaginatively). However, to defend Formosa from air attack, it will be necessary for the U.S. to improve fire control and warning equipment on Formosa. The Formosa airfields require local anti-aircraft defense and more skilled operating personnel. The equipment might be obtained from our stocks in Japan, but it will probably be necessary to import operating personnel from the U.S. Carney thought that to defend Formosa adequately from air attack, and to improve intelligence, training, and command direction, would require augmenting U.S. personnel on Formosa from something over 1,000, as at present, to around 11,000.

e. Secretary Dulles cautioned that atomic weapons, if possible, should not be used during the ensuing 40-60 days, and the U.S. also should do its best to avoid intervention of any kind on Quemoy and Matsu. The President agreed that we could not use atomic weapons during this period without a bad impact on the European Treaties prospects.

f. Radford thought the U.S. ought to be able to set the stage so as to defer an effective Chincom attack during the next two months. Carney thought an attack on the Matsus would be easier to handle. He felt the Chincom attack would build up slowly, and would not come as a sudden overwhelming action; that the Chinats could hold off a slow build-up and slow attack. The President said if we are going to fight with conventional weapons, Napalm was the best thing to use against landing troops.

g. The President summed up by saying that the U.S. should do every practical thing that could be done to help the Chinats to defend themselves; that if it was necessary later for the U.S. to intervene, it should do so with conventional weapons; that the U.S. should improve the air defense of the Formosa air fields, but should avoid greatly augmenting U.S. troops on Formosa; that we should give the best possible advice and training to the Chinats about how

to take care of themselves; that he recognized that if we had to intervene with conventional weapons, such intervention might not be decisive; that the time might come when the U.S. might have to intervene with atomic weapons, but that should come only at the end, and we would have to advise our allies first. He said that, if we possibly could, we should avoid involvement during the next sensitive weeks, because any U.S. direct involvement might critically damage us in Europe. Radford replied that Stump understood the point of view expressed by the President.

h. Communication between Washington and the tactical forces off Formosa is relatively rapid. The order on the Tachens was received in Taipei one hour and 53 minutes after dispatch, and one hour later it was in the hands of tactical units.

i. The President complained about conflicting intelligence information coming to him. He said he wanted steps taken to centralize and centrally evaluate all intelligence. It was agreed that the NIC should be "beefed up" and put on a 24 hour basis. Secretary Dulles said there are three aspects to intelligence:

- a. rapid communication of intelligence from the field
- b. coordination of intelligence in Washington
- c. obtaining accurate intelligence as to Chinat loyalty on Formosa.

The President said that—under emergent circumstances like the present—he wanted (1) intelligence transmitted from the field to Washington very fast; (2) a prompt evaluation of such intelligence at a central point where all interested agencies were represented, so as to obtain a commonly agreed assessment as quickly as possible; (3) in the case of something "hot", a warning to himself and other key persons, pending such central evaluation.

A.W. Dulles felt that Chiang Ching-kuo was a key figure, and that the Generalissimo was losing stature. Radford said on his last visit he had been told by a leading Chinese General that Chinat army morale was very bad.

k. It was pointed out that there is a civilian population of 20,000<sup>8</sup> on Quemoy. Radford felt they would not necessarily be killed in the fighting, but could hide in caves and holes.

l. Secretary Dulles inquired what would be the effect in Japan of U.S. intervention. He felt the Communists might try to immobilize our air power in Japan by civil disturbance. The Military felt that this danger could be coped with.

m. The President concluded by saying that a number of questions should be accurately posed to Admiral Stump:

(1) Is our assumption correct that at present the greatest danger to Quemoy was Chincom artillery fire on the landing beaches? that the Chinats by counter artillery fire could destroy this threat? how would the Chicoms react to this type of operation?

(2) How much can the U.S. help out the Chinats without becoming directly involved?

<sup>8</sup> Goodpaster's notes here state parenthetically that the figure should be 40,000.

The President then said to tell Stump that we are confronted with an extremely delicate situation, because we could not afford to be isolated from our allies in the world, and that our aim should be to delay Chincom attack in strength on Quemoy and Matsu, without thereby provoking Chincom attack. It was agreed that, if possible, a competent staff officer would be sent over to examine this whole matter with Admiral Stump in Hawaii tomorrow.<sup>9</sup>

R.C.

**Robert Cutler**

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<sup>9</sup> A memorandum of March 16 by Goodpaster reads in part as follows:

"Following the meeting, the President informed me that he would like me to accompany the senior Navy staff officer being sent out to Pearl Harbor, to observe and develop impressions in connection with the staff discussions. He was particularly interested in how fast ChiCom attacks in various forms might develop, if they develop at all, and also how long the situation can be 'handled' through employing ChiNat forces alone, or ChiNat forces supported through feeding in U.S. logistic assistance. Saturday morning the President added to this that while the ChiNats might ultimately see good reason for leaving Matsu and Quemoy, at the present time our concern must be in their defense. He indicated there is need for close analysis of alternatives and courses of action, and that I should observe as to these. He also indicated that he did not think he had ever met Admiral Stump (it later developed that he had, briefly), and said he would like my impressions." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Miscellaneous Series, Formosa—Visit to CINCPAC)

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**151. Letter From the Ambassador in the Republic of China (Rankin) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)<sup>1</sup>**

*Taipei, March 13, 1955.*

DEAR WALTER: At the first opportunity after my return to Taipei<sup>2</sup> I questioned George Yeh as to what he had told you and Secretary Dulles in Washington regarding the prospective effect on morale here if the offshore islands were lost. He confirmed your impression that he had presented the matter in most pessimistic terms, apparently to the extent of indicating that his Government's control over its own military forces would be jeopardized, and its basis of popular support among Free Chinese perhaps irreparably under-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/3-1355. Secret; Official-*Informal*.

<sup>2</sup> Rankin attended a conference of U.S. Chiefs of Mission in East Asia, held at Manila and Baguio March 2-5, except when he accompanied Secretary Dulles on his visit to Taipei on March 3. A record of the meeting, including remarks by Secretary Dulles at the opening session, is *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 434.

mined. Yeh stated his case on instructions, presumably from President Chiang; he did not suggest the extent to which it represented his own views.

I return to this subject because of the evident impression it had made on you and on the Secretary, which first came to my attention during our discussion in the plane flying up from Manila to Taipei on March 3. Obviously we are dealing here with intangibles which do not lend themselves to exact measurement or prediction. I most certainly would not depreciate the psychological factors stressed by George Yeh; but while considering the possibility that he may have exaggerated their importance, I believe other factors are no less significant. Taken altogether these could well place a substantially greater value upon retaining Kinmen and Matsu than would result from giving primary emphasis to upholding morale on Taiwan.

In my brief review of the Chinese situation at the afternoon session in Manila on March 2, I expressed the view that the loss of the offshore islands would be "very serious but not necessarily disastrous". The precise effect, of course, would depend in considerable degree upon the circumstances under which the loss occurred, and the events which might follow in its wake. Subject to this obvious condition, however, I continue to hold the opinion just quoted, which is the same that I expressed to you and the Secretary on the following morning. This is repeated here in the first instance because I believe it to be true, and secondly because the present is not a time to burn bridges. I see no adequate reason for losing Kinmen and Matsu, but if by some ill chance they should be lost, whether by defeat or default, I should not want it to serve anyone as a reason for pronouncing hopeless the cause of Free China.

I hope that you and the Secretary did not carry away the impression that I consider the retention of Kinmen and Matsu as less important than do the Chinese. If anything, the contrary is true, despite the fact that I am not inclined to subscribe fully to the case presented by George Yeh. It is not always easy to evaluate Chinese thinking, as you know, particularly when it is so largely influenced by what they think we are thinking. In terms of their actions, it may be noted that the Chinese have never undertaken to strengthen systematically and substantially the defenses of the offshore islands, other than Kinmen, except in cases where we pressed them to do so. This probably does not reflect the value which they place upon the islands so much as it does the "pawn complex" which all of our smaller and weaker allies develop in the course of time.

Probably much more serious to Free China's morale than the loss of additional small islands would be any formal steps toward the "two Chinas" project. From the Chinese point of view, these might include the entry of the Peiping regime into the United Nations and/

or its recognition by the United States. Any cease-fire, except possibly of definitely limited duration, would have similar implications to them. Obviously, anything which would indicate definitive United States acquiescence in the Communist conquest of the Chinese Mainland would represent irretrievable disaster in Free Chinese eyes. The loss of offshore islands as such undoubtedly would be less important to President Chiang than the danger of the two Chinas idea which he considers implicit in drawing a line down the Formosa Strait. I believe that this must have been very much in Chiang's mind, and also in George Yeh's, when the matter was first presented to you and to the Secretary in Washington. This may explain the forcefulness of his presentation.

Among the most important arguments for retaining Kinmen and Matsu, it seems to me, is the psychological effect on the enemy. It is almost impossible to overestimate the danger of confirming the Reds in a belief that, despite recent strong statements by the Secretary and others, we are for peace at any price. Withdrawal from the Tachens undoubtedly strengthened them in this belief. I have expressed to the Department my opinion that a military engagement may well be necessary to convince the enemy that we mean business. Such an engagement might have been risked at the Tachens or at Nanchi. Resolutely handled, it presumably would have been a localized affair, and might have given us several months of peace in this area—a prospect which we do not now enjoy after the Tachens and Nanchi have been given up and 20,000 more refugees created. We still have opportunity to prepare for positive action at Kinmen and Matsu.

On purely technical and immediate military grounds the surrender of the Tachens probably was wise. Unfortunately, however, almost as good a case could be made out for giving up Matsu and Kinmen, as Admiral Spruance<sup>3</sup> and others, in effect, have pointed out. It is true that our Navy had planned to occupy the Amoy area, including Kinmen, as a base for operations against Taiwan in World War II. On the other hand, it has been stated recently that we would not bother with the Tachens if engaged in a full-scale war against Red China. But for somewhat similar reasons we also decided to bypass Taiwan itself in World War II! And again, largely on technical military grounds, we withdrew from South Korea, thereby making the Korean War more or less inevitable.

All of which seems to confirm once more that major policy decisions should not be based solely or even primarily upon technical military considerations. Otherwise, in the interest of peace with all concerned—including our own less imaginative military experts—we might find in due course that the ramparts we watch in the Pacific

<sup>3</sup> Admiral Raymond A. Spruance (retired), Ambassador to the Philippines.

had been reestablished on a meridian through Hawaii. Much more likely is that we should be at war again—on a large scale but not necessarily World War III—because we finally found ourselves compelled to make a stand somewhere west of Pearl Harbor against the aggressor whom our successive withdrawals had made increasingly bold. In the present case I believe that we should stop him at Kinmen and Matsu.

This brings us to the practical question as to how these islands can be held. I am glad to report that Matsu was reinforced last week, and that four regiments are now stationed on that island group. This action appears to have been taken as a direct result of the visits of the Secretary and of Admirals Carney and Stump. It illustrates the further point which I brought up in our discussion: the necessity of letting the Chinese Government know clearly just what we want done in military matters. Of course, they would have liked to hold all of the offshore islands, but they do not feel strong enough to take such steps without our full approval. In their view, we changed our position quite suddenly with regard to defending the Tachens. They consider that we reversed ourselves on various earlier occasions. Now, there is considerable evidence that, despite successive "stand and die" pronouncements, they will not expend any important part of their limited military assets, except for the defense of Taiwan itself, without our specific authorization and support. Hence the importance of letting them know what we want done. Leadership in military matters must be our responsibility. The pawn complex, to which I have referred, leaves us no alternative.

Perhaps of more immediate importance than the ground defenses of Kinmen and Matsu are the instructions under which the Seventh Fleet may operate in the defense of these islands. If we are to keep hostilities localized, it seems clear that Admiral Pride must have as much authority as was given him when the Tachen evacuation began. In brief, whenever the Reds attack, whether by air, by artillery bombardment or by amphibious operation, the Seventh Fleet should react at once. This might involve no more than the employment of Chinese naval and air units placed at Pride's disposal, but he should have the authority to do on each occasion whatever is necessary to hurt the enemy more than they have just hurt our Chinese allies in the particular attack for which we are retaliating. One or two such engagements, quickly and effectively carried out on our side, should restore the relative stability which obtained along the offshore islands from July 1953 until September 1954. This is based upon the assumption that the Reds do not want a real war at the present time any more than we do; hence that they probably will not undertake any large scale offensive operations against the offshore islands if they think that the United States is likely to oppose them.



To the Communists the offshore islands as such do not seem to be worth a fight with the United States. If and when the enemy attacks in force, therefore, we may assume either that he does not expect us to intervene, and that the islands can be had cheaply, or that his action is a definite prelude to an assault on Taiwan regardless of consequences. Certainly if Kinmen and Matsu should fall in a manner to reveal weakness or hesitation on the part of the Chinese Nationalists and ourselves, an attack on Taiwan would seem inevitable.

The visit of the Secretary and yourself was most helpful and I enjoyed the opportunity of seeing more of you than I had before.

Best regards.

Sincerely yours,

Karl L. Rankin

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**152. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, March 14, 1955, 8:43 a.m. <sup>1</sup>**

SUBJECT

ORACLE

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary  
The Under Secretary  
Sir Roger Makins  
Livingston T. Merchant

Sir Roger came in at his request to give the Secretary the British Government's reaction to the latter's explanation to Sir Roger last week <sup>2</sup> regarding our desire to move ahead with the Security Council Resolution. Sir Roger opened by saying that London was fairly unhappy over this proposal. Whereas the British agreed that the present lull was no true index of the Chinese Communists' ultimate intentions, they believe that there is some reason to think that the present uneasy situation may suit the Communists' purposes in that they may calculate that it places the maximum strain on US-UK relations. To disturb the lull by instituting action in the Security Council might

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/3-1555. Secret. Drafted by Merchant on March 15. The time of the meeting is from Dulles' appointment diary. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers)

<sup>2</sup> See Document 145.

arouse the Chinese Communists to take major military action against the off-shore islands.

Insofar as the Soviets are concerned, the Ambassador went on, somewhat the same situation may prevail as with the UK. In other words, the Soviets may feel that as long as the UK is in some contact with them on the situation, they feel in a better position to use a restraining influence on Peiping. Action in the Security Council presumably would break off the existing rather tenuous contact between the UK and Moscow on this subject. Moreover, the Ambassador said, London was in doubt as to what might be gained by Security Council action at this point and where one would go if, as seemed inevitable, the Resolution was vetoed by the Soviets. One might go to the General Assembly thereafter but it was hard to see where that would lead. Moreover, if the Resolution were put in, the British of course would vote for it and then might find themselves later in a position of being hooked to defend Chiang Kai-shek on Quemoy if there was a demand for further action. They are anxious to avoid being pushed into a position of open disagreement with us in the UN.

The Ambassador then said that his government could well understand the President's desire to seek further action through the UN. He would like further informally to make a suggestion which seemed the least unattractive of various possibilities. This would be to have the Security Council ask three powers—the UK, India, and the Soviet Union—to explore the situation further. He felt that this would put the maximum pressure on Peiping. He asked that the Secretary give the suggestion some thought.

The Secretary replied that he would think it over but that it did not strike him favorably. For one thing an invitation to explore the matter further would run counter to the agreement among the UK, New Zealand and the United States that they would resist an extension of the area of discussion in the UN beyond the search for the cease-fire. A group of the composition suggested would almost inevitably lead to such a widened discussion. They would be in the position of intermediaries. Furthermore, all three of these governments recognized Peiping, which is not true of either the United States or the majority of the members of the UN. The Group would be loaded against Chiang Kai-shek. A narrow mandate to secure a cease-fire would be somewhat different but then there would be need for the exercise of influence over Chiang Kai-shek, which influence this suggested group obviously lacked. He would however consider the matter.

The Secretary then went on to say that on the basic issue of the necessity of defending Formosa there is no real difference between the US and the UK. We differ on Quemoy, it is true. We recognize Chiang Kai-shek as having a proper title to the off-shore islands he

holds. The British, on the other hand, think the off-shore islands belong to the Peiping Government. The Secretary emphasized that our only interest in the off-shore islands is their relevance to the defense of Formosa. The President has made no final decision on this. It involves a factual judgment. He added that if there were explicit or implicit disavowal by the Chinese Communists of their currently expressed intention to take Formosa by force, then our interest in the off-shore islands would greatly change.

The Secretary then said that as a casual thought he wondered whether time would permit Security Council action after a large-scale attack was launched by the Communists. There was some brief discussion of Trevelyan's analysis of Communists' intentions and the Secretary then said that from many indications, including Trevelyan's analysis and Chou En-lai's remark to the Finnish Ambassador in Peiping, he was inclined to think that the Chinese Communists wanted a major show-down. He was concerned that this show-down might be sought in Southeast Asia rather than in Formosa.

As the Ambassador left, the Secretary asked if he could have the text of Eden's original note to the Soviets of around February 25 or 26 which had been worked on at Bangkok. The Ambassador promised to supply a copy.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Reference is to Eden's message of February 28 to Chou; see footnote 2, Document 143.

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### 153. Memorandum From the President's Staff Secretary (Goodpaster) to the President<sup>1</sup>

*[Washington,] March 15, 1955.*

The discussions of Admiral Stump and his staff with Rear Admiral McCorkle<sup>2</sup> and me, held on Sunday, March 13, at Pearl Harbor,<sup>3</sup> covered a wide range of specific points; the following highlights and impressions seem likely to be of greatest interest to you.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, ACW Diaries. Top Secret. A handwritten note on the source text by Goodpaster states that he orally informed the President of the substance of the document.

<sup>2</sup> Rear Admiral Francis D. McCorkle, Director for Fleet Operations in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Fleet Operations and Readiness).

<sup>3</sup> A memorandum for the record by Goodpaster, dated March 18, which reported the discussions in more detail and other related documentation is in Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Miscellaneous Series, Formosa—Visit to CINCPAC.

*Time factor:* In Admiral Stump's opinion, at any time after about 25 March it would take an "all-out" Communist attack against Quemoy and Matsu to succeed against ChiNat opposition alone. (By "all-out" they mean a coordinated amphibious, artillery, air supported attack.) Admiral Stump is of the opinion that such an all-out attack will not occur until after at least four weeks from now in the case of Matsu, and eight weeks from now in the case of Quemoy. During the next ten days while defenses are being built by the regular division now on Matsu, a sudden ChiCom amphibious attack might be sufficient.

Admiral Stump and his staff evaluate the ChiCom artillery threat to Matsu and Quemoy as harrassing but not critical—they do not believe supply can be cut off. They do not believe that ChiNat counter battery is, or in the near future can be, effective. MTB's in ChiCom hands *could* threaten supply operations, but there has been no sign of their use as yet.

In Admiral Stump's opinion, the location and strength of ChiCom air is the key determinant of their capability, and also of the necessity for U.S. intervention. Without redeploying air forces in strength, there is a good chance that any ChiCom attack could be held by ChiNat forces alone, and Admiral Stump considers that ChiNat action supported by U.S. *conventional* operations would give a high degree of assurance against loss of the islands. If, however, the ChiComs move air forces in strength into the area, the U.S. would have to be prepared to employ atomic weapons before or as soon as the ChiComs employ their air against ChiNat forces or U.S. fleet elements.

Admiral Stump rates our intelligence as good concerning ChiCom air strength and location, but poor as to build up of ChiCom assault forces. It is particularly hard to evaluate whether fishing junks are assembling for an amphibious attempt or are simply following their normal pursuits.

Improvements are needed—and are going forward at varying rates—in Formosan air defense; communications; coordination and command arrangements; and intelligence. Admiral Stump believes it will be necessary to advise Chiang of U.S. intentions concerning replenishment of combat losses if the psychology essential to a vigorous and effective defense is to be created.

There is a good understanding of, and deference toward, the special time factors of the next four to six weeks on the world scene.

**Goodpaster**

154. Memorandum of a Conversation, Washington, March 14, 1955, 3:05 p.m.<sup>1</sup>

MTW MC-3

PARTICIPANTS

*Australia*

Robert Gordon Menzies, Prime Minister

Sir Percy Spender, Ambassador to the United States

Arthur Harold Tange, Secretary of the Australian Department of External Affairs

*United States*

John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State

Herbert Hoover, Jr., Under Secretary of State

Livingston T. Merchant, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs

Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs.

Prime Minister Menzies opened the conversation by asking the Secretary to outline the area of differences between his position and that of Australian Foreign Minister Casey and of Eden with reference to Formosa and the offshore islands. The Secretary replied that the differences were compounded of two elements. First, a misunderstanding of the United States approach to the problem and, second, the question of judgment as to the best way of achieving the same objective.

The Secretary said there cannot be at this time a categorical assertion that we are or will not defend Matsu and Quemoy Islands. Under the Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of China, our obligation is to defend only Formosa and the Pescadores. The Senate Resolution (PL 4) gives the President authority and discretion to defend such related areas as he considers to be necessary to the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores. It was not possible to say in advance what kind of action by the Red Chinese may be judged as the beginning of an attack on Formosa. Under present conditions, with Red propaganda emphasising that the "liberation of Formosa" is the objective of its present action, it would be difficult to say that an attack on Quemoy and Matsu was not in fact the predecessor of an attack upon Formosa. When there is a change in these circumstances, we have no obligation to defend the islands per se. The Secretary stated that he felt sure that Eden understood the United States position but that it seemed to be difficult for the English Public to do so.

In the second place, it seems to be the feeling in the House of Commons that the defense of Formosa could never be aided by the defense of Quemoy and Matsu and therefore these islands should be

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 439. Secret. The source text bears no indication of the drafter. Robertson's draft, with handwritten revisions by the Secretary, is *ibid.*, Central Files, 793.5/3-1655. The time of the meeting is from Dulles' appointment diary. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers)

promptly given over to the Communists. It is all very well, said the Secretary, to speak of putting 100 miles of blue water between the Red Chinese and the United States on Formosa but it would be even safer in the eyes of United States isolationists if we put 6500 miles of blue water between the Red Chinese and the United States. If it were possible to renounce the islands with no other factors involved, that would be one thing, but in reality we could not ignore the psychological effect upon the Army and Government of the National Republic of China which would be involved in a succession of retreats in the face of Communist threats. Furthermore, the mainland of China is the ancestral home of the Chinese on Formosa. Hope of being able to return is a tremendous factor in maintaining morale. Any action fostering a spirit of defeatism and loss of hope might well be the cause of serious defection both in the army and possibly in some elements of Government. The United States does not have the troops to take the place of those on Formosa and it is essential that we do everything possible to bolster and maintain the morale of Chiang, his troops and his government.

The Secretary referred to the political rivalry on Formosa and mentioned the Generalissimo's son Chiang Ching-kuo as the possible leader of anti-American defection. (Robertson does not agree with CIA intelligence casting doubt upon Chiang Ching-kuo's allegiance to the free world nor does Ambassador Rankin.)

The Secretary referred to his conversation with Chiang dealing with the role of Free China in which he emphasized that in his opinion the constant talk about an armed reconquest of the mainland minimized the continuing and important role that his government must be prepared to play. Opportunities might arise and probably would arise but they could not be created by the Republic of China alone. Rather, they probably would be created by happenings on the mainland, such as, splits between the Communist leaders as had taken place in Soviet Russia, the possibility that the Chinese people might be goaded into revolt and the further possibility that Chinese Communist aggression might precipitate a general war against China. Chiang agreed with this reasoning and that his government must be kept strong in order to take advantage of such eventualities but stated that this long-range approach presented a most difficult problem from the morale standpoint.

The Secretary went on to emphasize to Menzies the effect which a succession of withdrawals might have upon the morale on Formosa and the possibility of being faced with a situation which would make difficult the defense of Formosa itself. Under present circumstances, he pointed out, we cannot take a positive position as to what we will defend and will not defend. It seemed to us that the British were inclined to look at the problem from the military viewpoint alone, de-

spite these very real political and psychological aspects. Everyone should now understand, said the Secretary, that we do not want to get into a war with Communist China. We were in one in Korea and took great pains to get out. However, we intend to defend Formosa and it seems to us that our friends should be willing to accept our judgment as to the best method of doing so.

Menzies stated that he wished to clear up two points. One, Chiang's army was sometimes referred to as an aging army. Does this mean that there are no recruits? The Secretary replied that until recently this was true but now recruiting was being made from the Formosans. Both agreed that this was a stabilizing factor. Mr. Menzies' second question was what would be the effect on the morale of Chiang's forces if, as a *quid pro quo* for giving up the Offshore Islands, a group of nations joined with the United States in guaranteeing the defense of Formosa. The Secretary replied that he had suggested a similar proposition to Eden but had had no response. The Secretary asked Robertson his opinion as to the effect on morale. Robertson replied that as the UK recognized Red China as the legal government of China, Chiang might interpret such an arrangement as limiting his role to Formosa and for this reason, he thought that the Generalissimo would be opposed. The Secretary, however, said that if the UK, Australia and New Zealand would join with the United States in guaranteeing Formosa, this might perhaps enable Chiang to give up the Offshore Islands. Menzies thought that such an arrangement should help Chiang's morale in that it would be assurance that the fall of the Islands would not be a first step to the fall of Formosa but in reality would represent the last step which the Red Chinese could take. The Secretary agreed with Menzies that the Islands were vulnerable to attack and stated that in his opinion they could not, in the last analysis, be held without the use of atomic weapons. Certainly, if the Islands could be abandoned without seriously affecting morale, it would be highly desirable to do so.

The Secretary reiterated again that constant retreat was likely to have a disastrous effect not only upon the morale of Formosa but upon public opinion of all Southeast Asia as well, citing the uneasiness created in the Philippines and Magsaysay's statement that he could not accept President Eisenhower's invitation to visit the US during the Formosa crisis. The Secretary said he had been thinking hard of some way to offset the unsatisfactory aspects of the situation and he thought Menzies' suggestion had merit. Did he (Menzies) think the UK would be likely to go along? He, the Secretary, did not think so. Menzies agreed saying that he thought Eden's political opposition at home would prevent his doing so at the present time.

Ambassador Spender asked if there was any evidence of a build-up around Matsu and Quemoy. The Secretary replied that guns were

being moved into position around Quemoy but there was no great indication of preparation for an immediate invasion. As to the Matsu Islands, the Reds were apparently bringing into position long-range Russian guns which could reach the Islands.

The Secretary said that he would like to give further thought to Menzies' suggestion. Menzies emphasized that while public opinion in Australia would likely be in favor of holding Formosa, there would be no support for going to war over the islands. He was impressed, however, with the Secretary's point that the morale factor not only involved Formosa but Indochina, Malaya and all Southeast Asia, as well.

The Secretary said that he was impressed on this last trip by the fear which had been inspired by the power of Communist China.

A discussion followed as to the military capability of Red China. Menzies said he thought Churchill under-estimated its strength whereas countries around the perimeter over-estimated it.

The Secretary referred to the different problems posed by public opinion in the UK, Australia, and the United States. Menzies said that Australian opinion would support a war fought in the defense of freedom. There would be no support for a war in support of governments per se and certainly no support for going to war over the offshore Islands. The Secretary replied that the United States is not going to fight for Quemoy and Matsu either. Whatever we do will be done as part of our defense of Formosa. Menzies said that he understood our position and further, if the United States gets involved in a great war, we could count on Australia being in it too. But, he said, there is a great difference in reaching that position by the full support of public opinion and of getting into the war with a half-hearted support.

The Secretary asked what would be the feeling in Australia on the question of a blockade of the China coast as a possible substitute for the defense of Matsu and Quemoy. He pointed out the serious situation posed by the *Aruba* with jet fuel oil and 36 other vessels now on the way to Red China ports with strategic war materials. Menzies asked if we would propose to indicate to Mao that if he attempted to take the islands by force we would impose a blockade. The Secretary said that might be one consideration but we might also suggest to Chiang a blockade in lieu of a defense of the islands. Tange inquired whether this would be an act of belligerency or whether it could be based on the UN resolution barring strategic ma-



terials to Communist China.<sup>3</sup> The Secretary said that he did not know whether the present resolution would cover this case or not.

[Here follows discussion pertaining to Indonesia and Malaya.]

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<sup>2</sup> Resolution 500(V), adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on May 18, 1951; for text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1951, vol. vii, Part 2, p. 1988.

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### 155. Editorial Note

On March 15, New Zealand Ambassador Leslie K. Munro and Secretary Dulles discussed possible courses of action in the United Nations in the light of the British proposal, put forward by Ambassador Makins on March 14 (see Document 152), for a tripartite commission. Dulles commented that while the United States would of course consider any British proposals, it was "most unlikely" that it would "look with favor on a commission all the members of which recognized the Chinese Communists." He stated that the Department had not yet decided whether to proceed with the United Nations resolution in light of the British opposition to doing so. He observed that "as between pressing the UK for action on the one hand or letting the matter coast along for a further period, the question could of course be raised as to what new element had arisen which required urgent action. Communist Chinese propaganda had diminished a considerable amount of late: the volume of propaganda about Formosa had dropped from about 20% to about 5%. It was perhaps not a particularly significant development except that the Chinese Reds would presumably precede any armed attack with a heavy volume of propaganda." (Memorandum of conversation by Key, March 15; Department of State, Central files, 793.00/3-1555)

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### 156. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, March 16, 1955<sup>1</sup>

SUBJECT

ORACLE

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/3-1655. Secret. Drafted by Merchant.

## PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary  
Sir Roger Makins  
Mr. Merchant

During the course of a call on another subject, Sir Roger Makins informed the Secretary that London had said in connection with his report of his last conversation with the Secretary on ORACLE <sup>2</sup> that it did believe it would be possible to galvanize the Security Council into action on a resolution after an attack had been launched on the off-shore islands or after it became clearly apparent that one was impending.

The Secretary reminded Sir Roger of the very great interest that New Zealand seemed to have in pressing ahead with the Resolution now. He said that on the question of timing he would like to consider the matter further and that he would endeavor to give a further answer to Sir Roger on Monday or Tuesday <sup>3</sup> of next week.

The Secretary then said that the British could take it as definite that their informal proposal for the establishment by the Security Council of a group composed of the UK, USSR and India to examine into the Formosan situation was not agreeable to the U.S.

Sir Roger suggested that it might be possible to confine their terms of reference to the exploration of the possibility of a cease-fire. The Secretary gave him no encouragement whatsoever and merely observed that the Chinese Nationalists were themselves strongly opposed to a cease-fire and that the group of three suggested had no influence with the Republic of China. He added that we were prepared to police a cease-fire if it were obtained and felt that this was possible by reason of our exchange of notes with the Nationalists and their dependence on us for supplies. Clearly, the three governments suggested were in no position to accomplish any such policing themselves. On the other hand, if the three powers suggested could successfully exert their influence on the Chinese Communists, then we could exert an influence on the Nationalists. Any position for them as intermediaries was totally unacceptable.

Sir Roger then said he had been interested in his last talk with the Secretary in the expression by the latter of his views on Chinese Communist intentions, particularly with respect to Southeast Asia. He was therefore handing the Secretary a brief memorandum of the British appreciation on this matter. (Transmitted earlier to S/S for attachment to this memo.) <sup>4</sup>

<sup>2</sup> See Document 152.

<sup>3</sup> March 21 or 22.

<sup>4</sup> Not attached to the source text, but see the memorandum, *infra*.

There was a brief discussion of Krishna Menon's talk earlier in the week with the President.<sup>5</sup> The Secretary noted that neither the subject of Formosa nor Communist China had come up. The talk had been confined to internal developments in India, including the recent elections in Andhra, and the reasons why Menon felt for its development India required a socialist economic approach.

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<sup>5</sup> V.K. Krishna Menon, Indian Representative at the United Nations, met with President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles on March 15. A memorandum of the conversation and an incomplete transcript, both apparently prepared by Ann Whitman, are in Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, ACW Diaries.

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157. **Memorandum Received From the British Ambassador  
(Makins)**<sup>1</sup>

*[Washington,] March 16, 1955.*

**UNITED KINGDOM APPRECIATION OF FAR EASTERN  
SITUATION**

Our own reading of the position is as follows. We agree that the Chinese Communists will not accept the retention of Formosa by the Nationalists; but it is our belief that given the clear United States determination to defend Formosa (and the Pescadores) they will not in fact contest the issue by force. In South East Asia the situation is not unsatisfactory from the Chinese point of view and there would seem little advantage for them to launch an attack and thus lay themselves open to probable retaliation by the Manila Treaty powers. It will surely suit them better to try to win over Asian opinion and lull

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/3-1655. Secret. The source text bears a note that it was handed to the Secretary by Makins on March 16.

Asian suspicions by appearing moderate and peace-loving while at the same time pursuing their objectives under cover. The Bandung Conference will give them an opportunity to mobilise Asian opinion on their side in favour of such aims as non-interference, respect for national sovereignty etc. They must know that they cannot take on the U.S.A. in open war with nuclear weapons. Their objective seems more likely to be to isolate the U.S.A. and to consolidate opinion on their side.

Therefore instead of our being faced with a showdown, the prospect in the Far East seems to us more likely to be a long drawn-out struggle for the support of Asia accompanied by Communist subversion and the constant threat of war. There may always be an explosion, but it seems to us that that would be more likely to come at present from miscalculation than deliberate policy on the part of the Chinese.

That is why in our view it is so important to exercise moderation in our statements and attitudes lest we frighten the Asians into China's arms. This is also one of the reasons why we would like to see the coastal islands evacuated. We agree with Mr. Dulles that our difference on this question is a matter of factual judgment rather than principle. But our judgment is based not only on the military case for evacuation, but also on the fact that the American position would be easier to justify vis-à-vis world and Asian opinion were these islands not in question.

RM

158. National Intelligence Estimate <sup>1</sup>

NIE 100-4-55

*Washington, March 16, 1955.*

COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE OFFSHORE ISLANDS AND TAIWAN THROUGH 1955, AND COMMUNIST AND NON-COMMUNIST REACTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE DEFENSE OF TAIWAN <sup>2</sup>

The Problem

(a) To estimate Communist, particularly Chinese Communist, capabilities and probable courses of action with respect to territory occupied by the Republic of China;

(b) To estimate Communist reaction to possible US courses of action in defense of territory occupied by the Republic of China; and

(c) To estimate actions or reactions of the principal non-Communist powers with respect to possible future developments in the Taiwan-offshore island situation.

Conclusions

1. The Chinese Communist regime appears firmly committed to the seizure ("liberation" as they call it) of the offshore islands and Taiwan. It regards as basic and continuing national objectives the final destruction of the Chinese National Government as a symbol of

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, INR-NIE Files. Secret. National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) were high-level interdepartmental reports presenting appraisals of foreign policy problems. NIEs were drafted by officers from those agencies represented on the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC), discussed and revised by inter-departmental working groups coordinated by the Office of National Estimates of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), approved by the IAC, and circulated under the aegis of the CIA to the President, appropriate officers of cabinet level, and the National Security Council. The Department of State provided all political and some economic sections of NIEs.

A note on the cover sheet reads as follows:

"Submitted by the

Director of Central Intelligence. The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.

"Concurred in by the Intelligence Advisory Committee on 16 March 1955. Concurring were the Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelligence; the Director of Intelligence, USAF; the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff; and the Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the IAC. The Assistant to the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of its jurisdiction."

<sup>2</sup> Wherever Taiwan appears in the text it should be taken as reference to Taiwan and the Penghus (Pescadores). [Footnote in the source text.]

resistance to the Chinese regime, and the elimination of Taiwan as a potential base of attack against the mainland. The Chinese Communists almost certainly regard the eventual attainment of these objectives as essential. (*Para. 14*)

2. In view of the US commitment, the Chinese Communists do not have the capability to seize Taiwan, and will almost certainly not attempt an invasion in 1955. However, the Chinese Communists have the capability for air strikes and might undertake air raids against Taiwan either on their own initiative or in retaliation to military action elsewhere. (*Para. 37*)

3. We believe that the Chinese Communists with the forces now in place or readily available in the east China area have the capability to seize the Quemoy and Matsu groups<sup>3</sup> assuming that these islands were defended by the Nationalists alone and the Chinese Communists were willing to risk heavy casualties. Timely warning might not be available that final preparations for an assault on either Matsu or Quemoy had been completed. We believe that the Nationalists cannot absorb sufficient military end-items and training during 1955 to change this estimate of relative capabilities. (*Paras. 22,23*)

4. The Chinese Communists will probably undertake air, naval, and artillery attacks against the Quemoy and the Matsu groups and will probably attempt to seize lightly defended island outposts within these groups. They will seek to erode Nationalist ability and determination to hold these islands, and, more importantly, to probe US intentions. If the Chinese Communists should become convinced that the US was determined to prevent the seizure and retention of these islands, taking whatever military action was necessary, including, if required, all-out attacks on any part of China, they would probably be deterred from attempting an outright seizure during 1955. However, they would make every effort to render the Chinese Nationalist position on the offshore islands untenable by bombardment, interdiction of supplies, and subversion.<sup>4</sup> (*Para. 38*)

<sup>3</sup> In the context of this estimate the term "Matsu Group" or "Matsus" denotes those Chinese Nationalist-held islands lying essentially between 25 and 27 degrees north latitude and consisting of Tung-yin Shan, Lang Tao, Kao-teng Hsu, Pei-kan Tang, Matsu Shan, Pai-chuan and Lieh Tao (White Dogs), Wu-chiu, and Hsia Wu-chiu. "Matsu" used singly applies only to Matsu-Shan proper.

Similarly, "Chinmen Group" or "Quemoy Group" denotes those Chinese Nationalist-held islands lying between 24 and 25 degrees north latitude and consisting of Chinmen Tao (Quemoy), Lieh Hsu (Little Quemoy), Ta-tan Tao, Erh-tan Tao, and Tung-ting Hsu. "Quemoy" used singly applies only to Chinmen-Tao. [Footnote in the source text.]

<sup>4</sup> The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army, believes that this paragraph underestimates the willingness of the Chinese Communists, supported by the USSR, to assume the risks of war to attain their objectives and would substitute for paragraphs 4 and 5 the following text:

5. It may not be possible for the Chinese Communists, as a result of their probing actions alone, to ascertain the full extent of a possible US counteraction to an attempt at seizure of an offshore island. If the US did not respond to initial probing actions, the Chinese Communists might estimate that the US would not in fact commit its own forces to the defense of the island. Or, even though there was some US military reaction to a probing attack, the Chinese Communists might still estimate that US counteraction to an actual invasion of offshore islands would remain limited and localized. Or, the Chinese Communists might estimate that they could overrun an offshore island before effective US counteraction could be brought to bear and that the US would not subsequently initiate major hostilities in order to regain the captured territory. In any of these circumstances, we believe the Chinese Communists would probably attempt to seize or complete the seizure of the offshore islands. <sup>5</sup> (*Para. 39*)

6. If the US and Chinese Communist forces became engaged in hostilities, the Chinese Communists, while taking defensive measures which might include attacks on US and Chinese Nationalist forces and bases directly involved, would attempt to prevent the expansion of hostilities. Initially the USSR would almost certainly give the Chinese Communists political and military support but without open military intervention. (*Paras. 42-45*)

7. Ultimately, if Moscow and Peiping had come to believe that US military actions were gravely threatening the existence of the Chinese Communist regime, we believe that the USSR would openly intervene in the war in the Far East, but would still try to confine hostilities to that area. <sup>6</sup> (*Para. 47*)

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"The Chinese Communists will intensify air and artillery attacks and possibly minor naval operations against Quemoy and the Matsus. They will seek to erode Nationalist ability and determination to hold these islands, and to probe US intentions. If the Chinese Communists should not be able to ascertain the full extent of a possible US counteraction to an attempt at seizure, they might consider that they could overrun either, or both, of these island groups in spite of local US counteraction and that the US would not subsequently initiate major hostilities in order to regain the captured territory. Even though the Chinese Communists were convinced that the US is determined to prevent the seizure of these offshore islands, it is believed they will attempt to seize them, although not necessarily during 1955." [Footnote in the source text.]

<sup>5</sup> See footnote 3 on previous page. [Footnote in the source text. Reference is to footnote 4 above.]

<sup>6</sup> The Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, and the Director of Naval Intelligence believe that this paragraph should read as follows:

"Should the conflict progress so far that the Communists believed the existence of the Chinese Communist regime was gravely threatened, we believe that the Soviet leaders would recognize that open intervention on their part against US forces sufficient to save the Chinese regime would involve grave risk of general war with the US. Their decision would probably be based on existing military, political, and economic strengths, with particular emphasis on the current disparities in nuclear stockpiles and delivery capabilities. We believe that the Soviet leaders would probably conclude that

*Continued*

8. The reaction of most non-Communist governments to US defense of Taiwan would in general be favorable. The reaction of most non-Communist governments to US action in defense of the offshore islands, or to US attacks on Chinese Communist military concentrations prior to a Communist attack, would be unfavorable. If the US bombed military targets throughout east China, non-Communist reactions would be considerably more unfavorable, reflecting a fear of the immediacy of general war. Even in these circumstances, however, and despite increased strains between the US and its allies, we believe existing US alliances would remain intact. However, if the US became involved in defense of the offshore islands before the ratification of the Paris agreements, the ratification might be jeopardized. (*Paras. 48-56, 58-60*)

9. If the US used nuclear weapons against Communist China, the predominant world reaction would be one of shock. These reactions would be particularly adverse if these weapons were used to defend the offshore islands or destroy military concentrations prior to an all-out Communist Chinese attempt to take the offshore islands. However, certain Asian and European allies might condone the US use of nuclear weapons to stop an actual invasion of Taiwan.<sup>7</sup> The general reaction of non-Communist Asians would be emotional and would be extremely critical of the US. In the case of Japan, the Government would probably attempt to steer a more neutral course. (*Paras. 62-66*)

10. If, however, the US succeeded in curbing Chinese Communist aggression in the Taiwan area without becoming involved in protracted, full-scale hostilities, and without employing nuclear weapons, US prestige and the confidence of the non-Communist world in US leadership would be enhanced.<sup>8</sup> (*Paras. 57, 61, 67*)

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if they intervened the conflict could not be confined to the Far East, and that Soviet strengths were insufficient to risk their own regime in this manner." [Footnote in the source text.]

<sup>7</sup> The Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, believes that this sentence should read:

"Certain Asian and European allies would probably condone US use of nuclear weapons, particularly if used tactically, as firm evidence of US determination to put a halt to further Communist expansion wherever occurring."

The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, believes that this sentence should read as follows:

"However, certain Asian and European allies might condone the tactical use of nuclear weapons by the US provided that they were convinced such weapons were necessary to stop an actual invasion to Taiwan and that the US was exercising the utmost restraint and attempting to spare civilians." [Footnote in the source text.]

<sup>8</sup> The Deputy Director of Intelligence, The Joint Staff, believes that the following additional sentence should be added to paragraph 10:

"Even though the US had used nuclear weapons to achieve the result noted above, the non-Communist world's adverse reaction to the use of nuclear weapons would in time be modified." [Footnote in the source text.]



11. In the event the Nationalists, with or without US assistance or pressure, evacuated the Matsu and Quemoy Groups prior to a large-scale Communist attack, there would be a deterioration of morale on Taiwan and great disappointment in the ROK. In the Philippines such an evacuation would stimulate concern that the US was not prepared to commit its forces in forward areas. To a lesser extent this reaction would occur in Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam. However, the dominant reaction among other interested non-Communist states would probably be one of relief followed at least for some time by increased support for US policies with respect to the defense of Taiwan. <sup>9</sup> (*Para. 50*)

[Here follow paragraphs 12-66, consisting of more detailed discussion of the subject matter summarized here; a map of Taiwan and East China with airfields indicated; and annexes "A"- "H", concerning Chinese Communist aircraft strength and performance, estimated Communist and Nationalist aircraft sortie rates, Nationalist artillery and anti-aircraft on the Quemoy and Matsu groups, Communist artillery opposite the Quemoy and Matsu groups, Communist naval strength and port capacity, and weather conditions in the Taiwan Straits.]

<sup>9</sup> The Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, and the Director of Naval Intelligence believe that the last three sentences should read:

"Such an evacuation would stimulate concern in the Philippines, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam that the US would in the future also withdraw from other forward areas. Elsewhere in the non-Communist world, the dominant reaction would probably be one of relief that threatened hostilities had not occurred, but with undercurrents of concern of varying strength in different countries at this further instance of Communist expansion. Particularly in non-Communist Asia, the net impression of an evacuation, whether manifest or latent, would be one of further growth of Chinese Communist prestige and power, with a commensurate decrease in US prestige." [Footnote in the source text.]

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159. **Memorandum From the Director of Central Intelligence (Dulles) to the Secretary of State (Dulles)** <sup>1</sup>

*Washington, March 16, 1955.*

SUBJECT

Chinese Nationalist Vulnerability to Subversion

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, INR Files: Lot 58 D 776, China. Secret.

1. There continues to be reason to believe that the problem of Chinese Nationalist vulnerability to subversion is more serious than is generally recognized.

2. In November 1954 a study<sup>2</sup> by an element of the intelligence community concluded that there is only a negligible amount of subversive activity on Formosa and that Nationalist internal security forces are adequate to cope with current and any likely future subversive activity. It is believed that this is, or at least was, the majority view of the intelligence community in Washington.

4. It is believed that the less optimistic opinions cited in Paragraph 3 are more likely to be correct. The reasons for this belief are set forth below.

5. We believe that the Peiping regime is in earnest in its repeatedly proclaimed intention to "liberate" all Nationalist-held territory. Peiping's propaganda has continued to suggest that further preparations are necessary before a full-scale operation against Formosa and the Pescadores can be launched. The Chinese Communists are regarded as capable, however, of attacking the remaining Nationalist-held offshore islands with little or no warning.

6. The Chinese Communists are clearly conducting a psychological warfare effort against the Chinese Nationalists, parallel with the military effort, as was the pattern in Communist operations during the civil war on the mainland. Since last July Chinese Communist propaganda directed at Formosa—at Nationalist leaders, Nationalist armed forces, the Nationalist bureaucracy, and the Formosans themselves—has greatly increased. It seems probable that Communist efforts to infiltrate Formosa have increased in the same period.

7. There are other actions within Communist capabilities, prior to an all-out military effort against Formosa and the Pescadores, which could increase Nationalist vulnerability to subversion. Among these are the capture of additional offshore islands, air attacks on Formosa, and the assassination of Nationalist leaders (possibly including Chiang Kai-shek).

8. The Chinese Communists themselves apparently expect their subversive efforts to play an important part in Formosa's eventual "liberation." Communist spokesmen have said both privately and publicly in recent months that they believe the island will fall through a combination of Communist military action and internal uprisings. Peiping is apparently attempting to create, well in advance of a military assault, the conditions which would produce such uprisings at the time of an assault.

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<sup>2</sup> Not identified.

9. Since 1949 the hope for a "return to the mainland" has been an important cohesive factor among the Chinese Nationalists. This hope has almost certainly been dimmed since last December, as there have been several developments which the Nationalists must interpret as meaning that the United States does not intend to provide the heavy support required for a large-scale Nationalist operation against the mainland. International pressure for a cease-fire in the China area has been greatly intensified. Taipei has lost one of its three major island groups, and the remaining islands are threatened.

10. Another factor which could promote disaffection is the chronic surplus of both civil officials and military officers, particularly in the higher ranks. This entails the enforced inaction of many men who held important positions on the mainland, and the frustration of many competent younger persons.

11. Another basic factor is the continued austerity of life on Formosa. Although general living conditions are well above the Asian standard, they are not comfortable for the great majority. Economic conditions will deteriorate steadily as the population grows and per capita productivity declines, and conditions could become drastically worse in the event of an inflationary spurt. While all levels of Nationalist military and civil officialdom are probably aware that conditions are hard on the mainland too, many may believe that privation in Communist China would be more tolerable due to apparent progress toward national goals.

12. The elements on Formosa which appear most likely to be affected by the above factors—the dimming of hopes for a return, the chronic surplus of functionaries, and continued austerity—would seem to be the middle and lower levels of the bureaucracy and the younger army officers, including field grade officers now commanding regiments and in some cases divisions. These elements would also seem capable of making their disaffection effective.

13. While Nationalist elements below the level of top leadership appear most vulnerable to Communist subversion, Nationalist leaders do not seem immune. Only Chiang Kai-shek has been officially classified by the Communists as irredeemable. Many other leaders may believe—as a result of Communist promises, their own assessment of their skills, and the continued good health and activity of many one-time Nationalist leaders now associated with the Peiping regime—that they might conclude a mutually profitable agreement with Peiping.

14. The enlisted ranks of the Nationalist armed forces would also seem to constitute a worthwhile target for Communist subversion, despite their continual indoctrination and surveillance by Nationalist political officers. There is no current evidence of widespread disaffection in the ranks. However, one ex-Nationalist leader asserts

that there are "many" dissidents and that it is "generally understood" by Nationalist military leaders that, in the event of a Chinese Communist airborne invasion, such Nationalist dissidents would assassinate their leaders and join forces with the Communists.

15. The native Formosans, who outnumber the Nationalists from the mainland about four to one (eight million to two million), would also seem potentially vulnerable to subversion. Although relations between the Nationalists and the Formosans have greatly improved in recent years as a result of reforms, resentment of Nationalist brutality and misrule prior to 1950 is believed to be still strong in some Formosan circles. The Nationalists continue to treat the Formosans as second-class citizens in many respects, and the costs of government continue to press most heavily on the Formosans. The declining prospects of a Nationalist return to the mainland may well stimulate the Formosans to seek an alternative to Nationalist rule.

16. The Chinese Communists are not known to have made substantial progress in recent months in their efforts to induce Nationalist defections. Known defections since last October have amounted only to three airmen and a handful of troops from the offshore islands.

17. Chinese Nationalist figures relating to subversion present a similarly reassuring appearance. Indeed, if they could be accepted, they would indicate a decreasing problem of subversion. Chiang Ching-kuo's figures for convictions in cases of subversion show a steady decline since 1950.

18. However, these comparatively cheerful figures—both for overt defections and for subversion convictions—may be misleading. The conditions tending to induce defection are expected to grow more serious, and the number of defections may rise sharply. Communist subversive efforts may also increase appreciably, and indeed may already have increased, without a reflection of such increase in Nationalist figures. The current figures may in fact reflect less a decline in subversion than continuing ineffectiveness on the part of Nationalist counter-intelligence.

19. The continuing reorganization of Nationalist intelligence is persuasive evidence that the Nationalists themselves are not satisfied with their counter-intelligence capabilities. The skeleton of a new intelligence organization was constructed last October, and the Nationalists have since been fleshing it out with personnel from the many components of the previous organization. It is doubtful that the Nationalists have corrected the confusion and inefficiency of the previous organization.

21. It is believed that there is insufficient information at hand to permit a confident assessment of the dimensions of the subversive threat on Formosa (a) in the Nationalist leadership, (b) in the armed forces, in all ranks, (c) among civil officials at all levels, and (d) among the native Formosans. CIA has been making an intensive effort since the first of this year to collect intelligence of this kind, much of which is reflected in this memorandum. It is believed that other components of the intelligence community could also contribute substantially both to the collection of intelligence and to the assessment of the threat.

Allen W. Dulles

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#### 160. Editorial Note

On March 18, during a visit to Ottawa, Secretary Dulles discussed the situation in the Far East with the Canadian Cabinet. A memorandum of that date which Dulles dictated summarizing his remarks reads in part as follows:

"Mr. Pearson raised the question of whether or not it would not be better to get out of Quemoy and Matsu. I repeated that from a 'map' standpoint this had advantages but that I could not give any assurance that such a withdrawal could be practically effected at the present time, while at the same time not making the loss of Formosa much more likely because of internal factors. If the Chinese Communists gave time, then a new situation might perhaps be brought about. I was already working with the Generalissimo to try to change the psychology of the National Government. Also, Formosan Chinese were more and more being brought into the Army, and if that happened, there would be more interest in the defense of Formosa and less interest in going back to the Mainland. However, this transition required time, and I did not know the Chinese Communists would give us that time. So far, they had given every evidence of pressing on to the conquest of Formosa itself and were contemptuous of a settlement which might draw a line through the Straits of Formosa." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles-Herter Series. Dulles' summary was incorporated in CV MC-7, March 22; Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 440.)

Dulles also discussed the question of a United Nations-arranged cease-fire in a March 18 conversation with Pearson; a memorandum of conversation by MacArthur, CV MC-3, March 18, is *ibid.*

**161. Memorandum From the Secretary of Defense (Wilson) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff <sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, March 22, 1955.*

**SUBJECT**

Improvement of Military Situation in the Far East in the Light of the Situation Now Existing in Formosa Area.

The determination of the Chinese Communists to destroy the Nationalist Government and incorporate Formosa and the off-shore islands into the Chinese Communist political system has been publicly reiterated and is now reflected in the increasingly tense Formosa situation. Because of the Chinese Communist mentality and the announced U.S. policies regarding Formosa, the Pescadores and the off-shore islands, there exists a real probability of war with Communist China.

If the U.S. could take some steps or measures at this time to clarify the seriousness of its intentions, then possibly the Chinese Communists would be deterred from actions which would lead to war.

In analyzing the problem at this time the following assumptions can be made:

(1) That diplomatic efforts to obtain a cease-fire and to separate the off-shore island problem from that of Formosa and the Pescadores seem to have failed.

(2) That the Chinese Communists will continue to probe the real intentions of the U.S. by increasing military actions against the off-shore islands.

(3) That the Chinese Communists estimate that the loss of Quemoy or the Matsus would produce critically adverse psychological effects on Formosa and that large segments of the Chinese Nationalist armed forces might subsequently defect through Communist bribes, blandishments and subversion.

(4) That the Chinese Communists are likely to believe that U.S. political considerations, both domestic and international, will inhibit the U.S. from reacting militarily to attacks on the offshore islands or at least from using atomic weapons, should they attack, and that consequently they would soon be able to take over Formosa.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Miscellaneous Series, Conferences on Formosa. Top Secret. The source text was sent to Goodpaster with a covering memorandum dated March 23 from Colonel Carey A. Randall, USMC, Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, stating that Wilson had written it as a result of conversations with the Secretary of State on March 21 and with the Armed Forces Policy Council on March 22. A note in Goodpaster's handwriting on Randall's memorandum reads: "President briefed on the attachment 24 Mar. 55. Indicated he thought this was already being done. G." A copy of Wilson's memorandum, sent to Secretary Dulles with a covering letter of March 23 from Randall, is in Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/3-2355.

(5) That there is evidence of increased effort on the part of the Chinese Communists to obtain additional supplies of POL, ammunition and other strategic war materials. Ships now known to be loading or en route to Communist ports with such material pose a related problem.

(6) That there is evidence of a build-up of force around both Quemoy and the Matsus and the Chinese Communists are known to be improving their air fields in the vicinity.

(7) That the Chinese Communists have or are likely to soon have sufficient military strength in the area to take Quemoy or Matsus or both unless the U.S. comes to the assistance of the Chinese Nationalists. (This point should be checked with the best intelligence available and a time schedule of possibility stated.)

In the light of the foregoing the Joint Chiefs are requested to examine the current and prospective situation and to recommend:

(a) What additional measures can be taken to strengthen the Chinese Nationalist military position and to have available in the area sufficient Chinese Nationalist-U.S. military power to prevent the Chinese Communists from taking Quemoy and the Matsus.

(b) What additional deployments of U.S. forces could be made that would:

(1) help convince the Chinese Communists that the U.S. really means to intervene if the loss of Quemoy or the Matsus is threatened,

(2) be of immediate value in the event the U.S. did become involved in war with the Chinese Communists.

(c) What moves could be made in other areas that would bring the Chinese Communists to believe that the U.S. is really serious.

(d) The timing and conditions under which it would be desirable or necessary to blockade Communist China in order to reduce its military potential.

(e) How the U.S. should clarify its real position in order that the Chinese Communists are not misled in regard to U.S. intentions.

These recommendations should indicate:

(1) That which can be done within presently planned force levels and rate of expenditures.

(2) That which is desirable but which cannot be done without increased force levels and rate of expenditures.

The views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the above matters are requested as a matter of urgency, if possible by 25 March, in order to develop Department of Defense recommendations for discussion with the Secretary of State and presentation to the President not later than 28 March.

C. E. Wilson

162. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom <sup>1</sup>

*Washington, March 23, 1955—7:49 p.m.*

4858. Communicate following views to Eden requesting urgent response.

I am concerned at fact UN Security Council not following up New Zealand initiative on ORACLE which was begun on January 31, and that it has not met on subject in more than five weeks. Fortunately military situation in Chinese offshore islands has remained quiet. We cannot be sure how long this will continue.

USSR assumes presidency of Security Council for month of April. This will increase difficulty of pressing ahead with ORACLE or of having recourse to Security Council if Chinese Communists should begin military operations against islands within that period.

In our view it remains as important as ever to keep public attention focused on fact that we all favor and are pushing for cessation of hostilities in offshore island area. This is the strength of our position, and it is ground on which we can all stand united. If we take no further action on ORACLE, we run risk of having public lose sight of fact that Communist aggressive posture is real source of threat to peace in Formosa area and that we are all bound by UN Charter to settle disputes by peaceful methods. Surely a cease-fire is the essential first step when shots are being exchanged.

For our part we would much prefer to secure prompt vote on New Zealand resolution even assuming Soviet veto, in which case it would be perfectly clear who opposes cease-fire proposal. I appreciate UK reluctance carry matters this far at present stage. I do however feel we can gain benefit from another Security Council posting before Soviet representative takes chair. At such meeting New Zealand representative would introduce resolution and we would all speak to it so as to emphasize our common desire for a cease-fire and our hope that, if our restraint is matched by Communists, hostilities could be avoided. We would not put resolution to immediate vote if UK opposed.

I believe New Zealand would agree to this procedure and I hope you will likewise comment so that UN delegations New York can make necessary tactical arrangements for meeting before April 1.

I have just spoken with Sir Robert Scott <sup>2</sup> and informed him of foregoing, emphasising that:

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330/3-2355. Secret; Priority. Repeated for information to New York.

<sup>2</sup> The conversation is recorded in a March 23 memorandum of conversation by Key. (*Ibid.*, 793.5/3-2355)



(a) I hoped UK would realize they would be taking on a heavy responsibility if they were to deny us right to make our views on this matter known to rest of world through Security Council; and

(b) I believed it very important this step be taken within next few days not only because of pending Soviet chairmanship of Security Council but also in order that discussion might take place before opening of Afro-Asian Conference when ChiComs will doubtless present their case.

Dulles

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**163. Memorandum From the Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group, Formosa (Chase) to the Republic of China Defense Minister (Yu) <sup>1</sup>**

*Taipei, 24 March 1955.*

**SUBJECT**

Recommendations Regarding Basic Defensive Policy

1. This subject has been discussed at length recently by high U.S. officials with you and I am sure there is a common understanding of views. It is my purpose now to summarize our U.S. recommendations on the subject. Ambassador Rankin and Admirals Stump and Pride concur in the following:

2. The next few months, or even weeks, may be most critical and I strongly feel that every effort must be given to improving the air defense of Taiwan and the Pescadores, and the defensive capability of the off-shore islands. These projects should receive the highest priority in manpower, material and equipment, money and planning effort. Naturally only your best qualified troops and commanders should be entrusted with the defense of the off-shore islands. They are the advance guard of the free world against Communism, and should have the importance of their task forcefully pointed out to them. When the attack comes, it is of utmost importance that your GRC forces conduct prompt and forceful defense operations to include aggressive employment of your air and naval forces. It is my opinion that U.S. actions (which are necessarily influenced by popular opinion of the citizens of the U.S.) will depend to a large degree on the vigor with which your forces conduct their all-out defense. I regret that I cannot assure you that U.S. Forces will participate in the defense of the off-shore islands, but as you know the U.S. Pacific

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Taipei Embassy Files: Lot 62 F 83. Top Secret. Sent via Acting Chief of General Staff General Peng Meng-chi.

Fleet and U.S. Air Force are prepared to do so promptly, if directed by higher U.S. authority.

3. In support of the defense it is of utmost importance that your GRC reconnaissance operations be expanded to include daily close scrutiny of Communist airfields and critical areas along the China coast, and that prompt, complete and accurate reports be passed to my Headquarters.

4. In conclusion, I feel that it is to our mutual advantage not to change the present moderate tempo of operations but to seize the opportunity to increase our capabilities as related to those of the enemy and to increase, through reconnaissance, our knowledge of his preparations.

**William C. Chase**  
*Major General, USA*

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**164. Memorandum of Discussion of the 242d Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, March 24, 1955 <sup>1</sup>**

Present at the 242nd Council meeting were: The President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Director, Foreign Operations Administration; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General (Items 1 and 2); the Acting Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission (Items 3, 5 and 8); the Director, U.S. Information Agency; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force (Item 8); Col. Lucius D. Clay, Jr., Lt. Col. R.W. Strong, and Maj. R.E. Shearer, Department of Defense (Item 8); Assistant Attorney General Barnes (Item 1); Robert R. Bowie, Department of State; Charles E. Nelson, Atomic Energy Commission (Item 3); the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Assistant to the President; Robert Cutler, Joseph M. Dodge and Nelson A. Rockefeller, Special Assistants to the President; the Deputy Assistant to the President; the NSC Representative on Internal Security (Items 1 and 2); the White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Gleason on March 25.

[Here follows discussion of agenda items 1-3, "Anti-Trust Laws Affecting Activities Outside the U.S.", "Admission to the U.S. of Certain European Non-Official Temporary Visitors Excludable Under Existing Law", and "The Status of Nuclear Power Programs".]

*4. Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security (NIE 100-4-55)*<sup>2</sup>

The Director of Central Intelligence, as the first part of his briefing, read the conclusions of NIE 100-4-55 on "Communist Capabilities and Intentions with Respect to the Offshore Islands and Taiwan through 1955, and Communist and Non-Communist Reactions with Respect to the Defense of Taiwan".

In the course of Mr. Dulles' reading of these conclusions, Secretary Dulles stressed the importance of an estimate of the effect on Chinese Nationalist morale of an evacuation of Quemoy and the Matsu group. Mr. Allen Dulles replied that this was rather a special problem, and he would be glad in a short time to present a special estimate on the subject for Council consideration.<sup>3</sup>

There then ensued a brief discussion of the probable timing of a Chinese Communist attack on Quemoy and the Matsus. In the course of this discussion, Secretary Humphrey inquired as to the likelihood that the Chinese Communists might eventually renounce their attempts to seize these offshore islands.

The President expressed the opinion that the Chinese Communists would in all probability not renounce such attempts, and that we should make up our minds to live with the problem. Secretary Dulles said that the situation might change after a period of perhaps ten years, when native Formosans would largely have replaced mainland Chinese in the Chinese Nationalist armies. These Formosans would be much more concerned with defending Formosa than with defending the offshore islands. The Chinese Communists, moreover, would have less fear of an attack by Formosans on the Communist mainland.

Governor Stassen asked whether it would not be desirable to have a study prepared as to ways and means of destroying the big guns and gun emplacements on the Chinese mainland opposite the offshore islands. No such attempt to destroy these gun emplacements would, of course, take place until after the ratification of the Paris agreements, and the effort would be made with conventional rather than with nuclear weapons. The President expressed the opinion that it would be next to impossible to take out these gun emplacements without resort to nuclear weapons. Admiral Radford expressed hearty agreement with the President's opinion on this point.

<sup>2</sup> Document 158.

<sup>3</sup> Document 204.

Mr. Allen Dulles resumed his intelligence briefing with a brief resume of petroleum shipments to Communist China during the year 1954. Secretary Dulles inquired whether we knew with what the Chinese Communists were paying the Soviets for goods supplied to them. Mr. Allen Dulles replied that it was apparently done by a lend-lease arrangement. Admiral Radford pointed out that the Chinese paid back the Russians chiefly in raw materials.

[Here follow comments by Dulles concerning Vietnam and France.]

Mr. Cutler then called on Admiral Radford for any remarks he wished to make on the military situation in the Formosa area.

Admiral Radford expressed the opinion that the fact that we have so little operational intelligence regarding the Chinese Communist build-up for an assault on the offshore islands, should not be taken to mean that such a build-up is not going on. For example, the mainland airfields could be made ready for use in a very few days in so far as the runways are concerned. Admiral Radford thought that the Chinese Communists were moving in jet fuel and other supplies to these bases, even though such activities were not actually revealed by photo reconnaissance. Accordingly, he concluded, we must assume that the Chinese Communists are getting ready just as fast as they can.

*The National Security Council:*

a. Noted and discussed an oral briefing on the subject by the Director of Central Intelligence, with specific reference to (1) NIE 100-4-55, "Communist Capabilities and Intentions with Respect to the Offshore Islands and Taiwan through 1955, and Communist and Non-Communist Reactions with Respect to the Defense of Taiwan"; (2) petroleum shipments to Communist China; (3) General Collins' difficulties with sects in South Vietnam; and (4) the anti-tax (Poujade) movement in France.

b. Noted an oral briefing by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, on the military situation in the Formosa area. <sup>4</sup>

[Here follows discussion of agenda items 5-9: "Official Statements Regarding Nuclear Weapons", "Review of Policies in the Far East", "The Foreign Information Program and Psychological Warfare Planning", "Effective Bombing of Hostile Airfields", and "NSC Status of Projects".]

S. Everett Gleason

<sup>4</sup> The lettered subparagraphs constitute NSC Action No. 1359. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95)

165. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,  
Washington, March 24, 1955, 3:30 p.m. <sup>1</sup>

SUBJECT

Visit of Mr. Krishna Menon

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary  
Mr. Krishna Menon  
Assistant Secretary Allen

The conversation was held at Mr. Krishna Menon's request. The Secretary gave him full opportunity to open the discussion, but Mr. Menon failed to respond. After a considerable pause the Secretary asked Mr. Menon whether he had seen the latest statement of our Far East policy, as set forth in the Secretary's speech at the Advertising Club in New York three days ago. <sup>2</sup> Mr. Menon said he had seen press accounts but had not read the text. The Secretary said he had made it clear that the choice of war or peace rested with Peking. The United States had stated publicly on several occasions that it would not concur in the use of force in an aggressive manner and had obtained a commitment from Chiang Kai-shek that the latter would not undertake military operations against the mainland without American concurrence. The Secretary added that the United States had made it equally clear that military action by the Chinese Reds directed against Taiwan would be resisted. Hence peace could be had in the Orient if the Reds wished—or they could cause a war.

Mr. Menon said he recognized fully that American public opinion was not prepared for a solution of the "Formosa problem" over night. What he hoped was that talks could be started. He thought that in order to make any progress direct but informal contact would have to be established between Americans and the Chinese Reds. He commented that a third party "might be useful" in this connection.

Mr. Dulles expressed his very deep concern over the situation in the Far East because of the repeated and apparently genuine public statements by the Chinese Communists that they intended to capture

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/3-2455. Confidential. The time of the meeting is from Dulles' appointment diary. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers)

<sup>2</sup> In remarks made at the Advertising Club of New York on March 21, Secretary Dulles declared that the "aggressive fanaticism" of the Chinese Communist leaders contrasted with the "coldly calculated and deliberate" steps of Soviet expansion and that while in the long run the latter might prove more formidable, in the short run, the Chinese method might prove "more dangerous and provocative of war." It was necessary, he said, to peacefully bring the Chinese Communists to realize that the "restraint and patience of the free nations" stemmed not from weakness or fear but from strength and resolution. For text of the statement, see Department of State *Bulletin*, April 4, 1955, pp. 551-552.

Taiwan by force. If they carried out this threat, fighting was inevitable. He hoped very much the Chinese Reds would not do so

The discussion turned to Indochina. Mr. Menon said his Government was most anxious that conversations between Southern and Northern Viet-Nam would begin in June in preparation for the elections to be held next year. Mr. Dulles said he saw no reason why such talks should not start and agreed that they should. Mr. Menon said that Prime Minister Nehru would be most happy to learn that Mr. Dulles felt this way.

The Secretary said he believed the Chinese Reds constituted a greater danger to world peace today than the Soviet Union. He described the Soviets as chess players who calculated their moves in advance, whereas the Chinese Reds, flushed with their successes in Korea, Indochina and the offshore islands, seemed to be exhilarated and to exaggerate their own power. This might constitute the greatest danger to the world at the present time. Mr. Menon said that he and his Government felt absolutely confident that the Peking regime had no expansionist ambitions. He said the Chinese Reds considered Formosa to be an integral part of China and were certainly anxious to extend their control over that island but they regarded their fight with Chiang Kai-shek as a civil war and not aggressive or expansionist. The Secretary pointed out that Formosa had not been Chinese for the past sixty years, that the United States had conquered it from Japan, and that the Peking authorities were presumptuous in demanding that the territory which we had won from Japan should be turned over by us to a regime openly hostile to us. He said the Chinese people were generally supposed to take a long view of history whereas Americans were supposed to be impatient, but in the present instance it was Peking which was demanding an immediate settlement.

Mr. Menon mentioned the imprisoned American flyers and referred casually to the Chinese students in the United States who were said to desire to return to Red China. (In a subsequent talk with Mr. Allen he expanded on this theme, saying that one of these students had told him in New York that from 200 to 500 such students wanted to return to China but most of them did not like to say so openly because they had jobs and did not wish to be branded as pro-communist unless they were certain they would be able to return. Mr. Allen expressed great doubt that any such number wanted to go back.)

After the interview, Mr. Menon expressed to Mr. Allen his considerable satisfaction at the talk and said he felt confident that tensions in the Far East would be relaxed if "people could be brought together and start talking".

166. Telegram From the Representative at the United Nations (Lodge) to the Department of State <sup>1</sup>

*New York, March 24, 1955—7 p.m.*

602. Re American Fliers. For Key (IO) from Lodge. Immediately after SC meeting yesterday, Hammarskjöld spoke to me about his letter to me (see mytel 599, Mar 23). <sup>2</sup> I asked him how he interpreted this latest communication from Chou.

Hammarskjöld reiterated his feeling, expressed in his letter, that the key to Chou's present attitude was that he would inform SYG "immediately" as to the results of the investigations on the four jet pilots. This seemed to reinforce SYG's belief that Chou would take action first on the four. SYG said that Chou's language re US, while still derogatory, had become more civilized. Hammarskjöld said he had acknowledged receipt of Chou's latest communication and in it had referred to the fact that he has received letters from the families of the fliers, addressed to Chou, which he will shortly be forwarding together in a package. He included this reference to the letters in order to keep up what he called his psychological pressure on Chou. He did not want Chou to feel that if he takes action to release the four jet pilots that that would end matters.

Hammarskjöld said he saw a new factor in this whole situation forthcoming at the Afro-Asian conference at Bandung. He feels Chou is clever enough to realize that he will be queried in private discussions there by friends of US and UN about his attitude on the prisoners. Hammarskjöld thought that it was quite possible that U Nu or Nehru would raise this matter with Chou at Bandung. Hammarskjöld has in fact been prodding Krishna Menon to get Nehru to exercise some responsibility on this matter and to prod Chou with regard to it.

Hammarskjöld regards the Bandung Conference as an important step in the development of this matter. He feels that the receipt of the letters from the families about the first of April is well-timed, coming as it does just before Bandung. Chou should, in his opinion, be ready to act on the fliers by that time. If nothing has developed by the time the Afro-Asian Conference is finished, however, Ham-

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.95A241/3-2455. Secret; Priority.

<sup>2</sup> Received at 7:58 p.m. Telegram 599 transmitted the text of a letter received on March 23 from Hammarskjöld, informing Lodge of a message he had received from Chou En-lai in reply to Hammarskjöld's last message (summarized in Document 120). According to Hammarskjöld's letter, Chou's message stated that China's handling of the case of the four flyers would not be influenced by clamor in the United States, that it was unfortunate that the families of the flyers had been prevented from coming to China, and that he would inform the Secretary-General immediately as soon as the case of the four flyers had been dealt with. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.95A241/3-2355)

marksjold feels that that would be the proper moment for reassessing the utility of his approach in this case.

This is the first time that Hammarskjold has indicated to me any possibility of a concrete deadline for the present phase of his activity on the fliers. Since that possible deadline is only about a month from now, I recommend that we cooperate with him to best of our ability in keeping public temperatures down on this subject for another month. I told Hammarskjold that I was not as confident as he appeared to be regarding Chou's eagerness to move on the fliers matter.

**Lodge**

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**167. Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State (MacArthur) to the Secretary of State <sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, March 25, 1955.*

In compliance with your instructions, I met this morning with Admiral Anderson and Admiral Orem and told them that you had asked me to take up with them, within the framework of the liaison arrangements directed by the President, the following three matters:

*1. Information with respect to existing instructions on authorizing the Chinese Nationalists to take military action against the mainland.*

In response to my query, Admiral Anderson indicated that Admiral Stump had been given paragraph 11 of NSC 5503,<sup>2</sup> which reads as follows:

"11. Do not agree to GRC offensive actions against mainland Communist China, except under circumstances approved by the President. Agree to GRC actions against Communist China which are prompt and clear retaliation against a Chinese Communist attack; provided such retaliation is against targets of military significance which meet U.S. criteria as to feasibility and chance of success and which are selected with due consideration for the undesirability of provoking further Chinese Communist reaction against Formosa and the Pescadores."

With respect to the second sentence of the above NSC paragraph, Admiral Anderson informed me that existing instructions to CINCPAC permitted him to authorize the Chinese Nationalists to retaliate without referring the decision to Washington if in CINCPAC's

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, EA Files: Lot 66 D 225, Relations with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Top Secret.

<sup>2</sup> Document 12.



judgement such retaliation were within the frame of reference of the above NSC paragraph.

I told Admiral Anderson that you desired to be informed immediately through me of any request, whether for retaliation or other action against the Chinese mainland, which might be made by the Chinese Nationalists. Admiral Orem and Anderson confirmed that they would inform me immediately of any such request.

*2. Information regarding military conversations in Formosa.*

I told Admirals Anderson and Orem of your desire to be kept informed of military discussions which our senior military people have with the Chinese Nationalists on Formosa. I said you felt that information contained in such reports supplemented information which we received through our channels and that you would like me to see such reports so that I could judge whether you might wish to see them personally. I mentioned Admiral Pride's visit to Formosa,<sup>3</sup> which was reported in the press yesterday, as a case in point, and said you would be interested in knowing the scope of his conversations there. It was agreed that Admiral Orem would keep on the look-out for any pertinent reports of conversations and would get in touch with me regarding them.

*3. Continuing liaison.*

It was also agreed that while Admiral Anderson and Admiral Orem and myself need not meet every day, we would keep in close touch with each other and check several times a week by telephone. It was also agreed that if anything came up on either side we would feel free to suggest a meeting at once.

Douglas MacArthur II

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<sup>3</sup> See Document 240.

**168. Message From British Foreign Secretary Eden to the Secretary of State <sup>1</sup>**

*[London,] March 25, 1955.*

Winthrop Aldrich has given me your message about ORACLE <sup>2</sup> for which I thank you.

I quite recognise the force of your desire to explain the United States position before the world and you have every right to do so. But I do not think that a debate in the Security Council will make the position any clearer or better from our point of view.

Moreover, I see immediate and serious danger if we were to press ahead with ORACLE in the next few days. First, attention would be focussed on Quemoy and Matsu. If the Nationalists were prepared to offer to abandon these islands once a cease-fire were agreed, that would indeed be a new element in the situation. But as things stand now a move in the Security Council would tend to look simply as though we were trying to guarantee Chiang's position in these islands. This was always a danger in ORACLE but we could risk it while ORACLE was on its original basis and there was a chance of the Chinese appearing before the Security Council. As things are, however, there can be no doubt that public opinion in this country certainly, and I believe in Asia as well, would not support action that seemed designed to confirm Chiang Kai-shek in Quemoy and Matsu. Thus a further move in the Security Council now instead of focussing attention on our desire to have a cease-fire, might simply focus attention on the difference between the United States on one hand and other free nations on the other regarding the coastal islands.

There is a further point which Makins and Scott have already made to you, namely if we were to go ahead and the Russians vetoed the New Zealand Resolution, what action could we then take? To leave matters as a vetoed resolution would surely weaken the authority of the Security Council and there would be demands for further action. We agreed some time ago that action in the General Assembly might be dangerous, but what other action could be taken in the United Nations? I do not like the idea of going ahead without a clear understanding of subsequent steps. The situation might be different if I thought that ORACLE could still contribute to restraining the Chinese from hostile action. But I do not think it can. Nor does your message suggest that you think it might do so. As I read your message your main object in going ahead with ORACLE would be to put

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Memoranda. Secret. A copy is also in Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 66 D 70, China. Received with a covering note of March 25 from Scott to Dulles.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 162.

the United States position before the rest of the world in the hope of increasing support for it. But as I have already said above this is surely possible without a political move in the Security Council. I have a fear that the latter, instead of improving our position before the Afro-Asian Conference might worsen it by alienating the Indians, Burmese and others whose views may not be without influence in Peking. It also seems unlikely to me that Soviet Presidency of the Security Council would be an unsurpassable bar to action in April if it became necessary.

I am sorry to go on disagreeing with you about this question of the next move. I can assure you that I have given it very serious thought and I really do not see that to proceed with ORACLE at this stage would do any good and it might do much harm to the relations between our two countries and to our common cause.

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**169. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,  
Washington, March 25, 1955, 5:34 p.m. <sup>1</sup>**

**SUBJECT**

Operation ORACLE

**PARTICIPANTS**

The Secretary

Mr. Merchant, Assistant Secretary, European Affairs

Mr. Robertson, Assistant Secretary, Far Eastern Affairs

Mr. Key, Assistant Secretary, International Organization Affairs

Sir Leslie Munro, Ambassador of New Zealand

Mr. R.H. Wade, First Secretary, New Zealand Embassy

The Secretary replied that it was extremely difficult to appraise the situation accurately: We were dependent on aerial photographs which in the past had taken three or four weeks to be evaluated. Now the time has been cut down to six days, which, however, is still too long. This time lag has perhaps given an appearance of greater buildup than has actually occurred. The present situation is that work of a military nature is going forward methodically but without indication of any last-minute haste. It looks, therefore, as if the Chinese Communists would not start an attack until everything had been well prepared. Nevertheless, the capabilities are there and it

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/3-2555. Secret. The time of the meeting is from Dulles' appointment diary. (University Library, Dulles Papers)

would be possible for operations against the offshore islands to start on short advance notice. Possibly the signs would not be clear until two or three days before the actual attack. On the other hand, an attack might be preceded by a long, protracted bombardment. Nobody could tell for sure, but a guess would be that no attack would take place until after the Bandung Conference is ended.

The Secretary mentioned that earlier today that he had spoken with Mr. Cameron, correspondent of the London *News Chronicle*, who had recently been in Peking. Cameron had been deeply impressed by the inflexible determination of the Chinese Communists to take Formosa. This determination was so widespread and deep that he could not see how the Chinese could abandon the idea. There was, therefore, not much reason to hope that the Communists would not make a military attack.

With respect to artillery bombardments directed from the mainland, the Secretary observed that of late these had been of a sporadic and not very serious character.

Ambassador Munro asked for the Secretary's reaction to Mr. Eden's decision. The Secretary replied that the message<sup>2</sup> had only just been received and had not yet been studied, but he would say that he was disappointed with it. He added that it would seem that perhaps Sir Anthony does not feel to the same degree as do we that presentation of the case in the Security Council might have a deterrent effect on the Chinese Communists. Ambassador Munro agreed. The Secretary feared that once the Chinese Communists return from the Bandung Conference, they will proceed with an attack. In the meantime, we will have lost a valuable opportunity to act because of British opposition and fear that a debate would provoke the Chinese Communists.

The Secretary said that before coming to a final decision as to the course which we would wish to take he would wish to speak to the President. Both . . . and the Secretary felt that if the Security Council is to proceed with operation Oracle before April 1, notice would have to be given not later than Monday, March 28, bearing in mind that the Security Council was meeting on the Gaza item on Tuesday, March 29.

The Secretary agreed to get in touch with the Ambassador as soon as we had come to a decision.

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<sup>2</sup> *Supra.*

**170. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,  
Washington, March 26, 1955, 11:30 a.m. <sup>1</sup>**

SUBJECT

Situation in the Far East.

PARTICIPANTS

Secretary Dulles  
Under Secretary Hoover  
Mr. MacArthur

Secretary Wilson  
Deputy Secretary Anderson  
Admiral Radford  
Colonel Randall (USMC)

Secretary Wilson said he had asked Secretary Dulles to meet with him to discuss the Joint Chiefs of Staff reaction to Mr. Wilson's memorandum of March 22 <sup>2</sup> on the subject of how to improve the military situation in the Far East in the light of the situation now existing in the Formosa area. Secretary Wilson then circulated a draft memorandum from the JCS to him. <sup>3</sup> (Since this was a draft memorandum, we were requested at the end of the meeting not to take copies with us.) In essence, the draft memorandum contained "suggestions" on steps to improve the situation and exercise a greater deterrent effect against Chinese Communist action in the Formosa area. There were the following three specific suggestions around which the discussion centered:

1. Inform the Chinese Communists and also the Chinese Nationalists through diplomatic channels that the US would join in the defense of Quemoy and Matsu.
2. Make a public announcement to the effect that further proposed reductions in the strength of US military forces were suspended indefinitely because of the situation in the Far East.
3. The JCS should take such further steps as are necessary to ensure the defense of Formosa.

The draft report of the JCS indicated that its suggestions and views were based on the assumption that atomic weapons would be used. General Ridgway had not concurred in this assumption, but from the draft paper it was not clear what General Ridgway's views were since he did not express a definite assumption with corresponding views. Also, General Ridgway had suggested that instead of secretly notifying the Chinese Communists through diplomatic channels as to US determination to defend Quemoy and Matsu, the US should make known publicly its views and position with regard to

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/3-2655. Top Secret. Another memorandum of this conversation by Colonel Randall was sent to Secretary Dulles with a covering memorandum of March 28 from Randall. (*Ibid.*, 793.00/3-2855) The time of the meeting is from Randall's memorandum of conversation.

<sup>2</sup> Document 161.

<sup>3</sup> Not found in Department of State files, but see Document 173.

the situation there. In other words, General Ridgway's proposal did not specifically recommend that we take a position to defend Quemoy and Matsu, but it did not specifically say that we should not.<sup>4</sup> But, he seemed to imply that we should clearly and publicly state our position.

In a general discussion that followed, Secretary Wilson said there were two courses of action which seemed open to us. On the one hand, should we speed up taking certain actions which might bring the situation to a head? Such actions might include letting the Chinese Nationalists operate against the airfields build-up and against Communist shipping that was bringing in strategic supplies, etc. Or, should we let the situation go along very much as at present for a period of, say, sixty days, during which the Bandung Conference would take place and we might be able to get the European situation straightened out. Secretary Wilson said his reaction was against making any public statement or using diplomatic channels to say that we would defend Quemoy and Matsu. He felt that any public statement that we were suspending the proposed reduction in our force levels because of the situation in the Far East would stir up a very considerable turmoil in the Congress and in this country. He said that as a practical matter he could take steps which would prevent the further reduction of forces during this immediate period, but that he doubted the wisdom of a public declaration in this sense. He discussed briefly the difficulties the Army has encountered in reducing to the proposed force levels, and pointed out the problems which are connected with such reductions if hostilities subsequently occurred. Secretary Wilson said that if hostilities occurred he would not immediately increase the Army but would concentrate on stepped up aircraft production. Admiral Radford replied that this would not be sufficient and that both aircraft production and the Army would have to be increased simultaneously. With respect to the proposed force reductions, Admiral Radford said the President's presentation on the force levels as well as his own and Mr. Wilson's had made clear that it was predicated on the international situation not deteriorating. Since the force levels had been established, the situation had deteriorated very markedly in the Far East. Therefore, the Chiefs felt (as

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<sup>4</sup> General Ridgway stated in a memorandum of March 26 to Secretary of the Army Robert T. Stevens that information he had received the previous day appeared to establish that the President had made a decision that any attack on the Quemoy or Matus would be considered the preliminary to an attack on Formosa, thus automatically resulting in U.S. participation in their defense. Ridgway had therefore concluded that: "the recommendation I had intended to make in the strongest terms, to wit, 'that United States armed forces NOT participate in the defense of Quemoy or the Matus, regardless of the scale of attack', would no longer be proper, since decision by proper authority had already been made." (United States Army Military History Institute, Ridgway Papers)

was pointed out in the draft paper) that the situation justified force levels at a higher level than had been contemplated in the Administration's plans.

Secretary Dulles then said that the very basis of all his thinking is how we can best prevent a war from developing in the area. Commenting on the JCS draft, he indicated that he doubted that the President would wish to approve suggestion 1, above, since this would involve his taking a position immediately on the defense of Quemoy and Matsu, whereas he believed the President did not wish to take this decision until a situation occurred which would clearly indicate that the defense of Quemoy and Matsu were related to the defense of Formosa. With respect to suggestion 2 above, the Secretary felt, and Admiral Radford strongly concurred, that such an announcement that we were suspending the reduction of our forces would do more than anything else to impress on free world opinion that we are serious in our intention to defend Formosa. It should also aid in convincing the Communists of the seriousness of our intention and might result in more free-world pressure against the Chinese Communists. He said that such a statement would bring our actions into conformity with what we are saying. He also approved of suggestion 3, above, that we should take steps to increase the ability to defend Formosa. However, he asked Admiral Radford if such steps involved action against the Chinese Communist build-up on the mainland, particularly with respect to airfields. Admiral Radford replied in the negative.

Admiral Radford said he understood that diplomatic efforts to reduce the possibility of hostilities through UN action had failed, and he inquired whether this understanding was correct. Secretary Dulles replied that the British were opposed to pressing forward with a resolution in the UN and that he was in touch with Eden on this matter. He felt it was important to take some further step in the UN, but while the present prospect of UK agreement was not bright, we were continuing our efforts.

Secretary Wilson then said that he thought the Chiefs, when they reconsidered the memorandum on Monday,<sup>6</sup> might drop suggestion 1, above, and rely on the Congressional Joint Resolution as the basis of our position. They might then go ahead to develop suggestions 2 and 3 above.

Admiral Radford then said he was seriously disturbed by the build-up of the Chinese Communist airfields which would enable them to attack Formosa and do great damage. This airfield build-up was not related to action against the offshore islands, but to action against Formosa. He believed that we must be in a position to pre-

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<sup>6</sup> March 28.

vent this build-up. He felt that we should tell the Chinese Communists that if they did not cease the build-up, we would consider the build-up as an active preparation for war and would be forced to act accordingly. Secretary Wilson said he did not feel that the improvement of airfields could be considered as an act of war, and pointed out that we were constantly improving and strengthening airfields in various parts of the world. Mr. Anderson said to Admiral Radford that as he understood him, Admiral Radford did not believe the situation could be stabilized in the Far East without hostilities and without the Chinese Communists getting a bloody nose. Admiral Radford concurred that this was his view. He went on to say that if, as he believed, hostilities would take place in the Far East, the US might initially receive a set-back if the Chinese Communists were permitted to go on with their build-up on the mainland. Any such initial setback would lead immediately to a Congressional inquiry of the Pearl Harbor type as to where the responsibility lay for the set-back. Therefore, it was important that the record be clear that the US, in the light of a pre-Pearl Harbor type of situation where an attack might be expected, had taken every precaution and every action to ensure the security of its forces prior to an attack.

Secretary Wilson then said he would like to refer to a point Secretary Dulles had brought up earlier in the conversation. This was how, if Formosa was vital to US security, we could hold the island regardless of Chiang Kai-shek. He noted that the JCS draft paper had indicated that we should not commit further forces to Formosa other than possibly an additional air wing. Secretary Dulles had stressed that the great danger was the defection of certain of the Chinese Nationalists on Formosa, and had suggested that the stationing of a division there might be a determining factor in preventing such defection. Admiral Radford said he did not believe a division could prevent 24 Chinese divisions from defecting. Secretary Wilson and Secretary Dulles replied that it was not a question of 24 divisions defecting all at one whack, but the fact that certain leaders might be tempted to defect. The presence of a US Division might prevent this situation from arising. Admiral Radford then pointed out that a Marine division could be deployed there but that it would raise all kinds of questions, including: the permission of Chiang Kai-shek; the construction of semi-permanent quarters which would be expensive; the problems raised by the introduction on Formosa of a good many thousand American soldiers who were paid far in excess of the Chinese Nationalist troops and would take away all the girls; and the fact that once the division was stationed there, it would probably have to be kept there for an indeterminate and long period of time. Secretary Wilson believed that despite these problems the Chiefs should take a very hard and careful look at this question, since he



was inclined to agree with Secretary Dulles that it might have considerable merit. Also, he would be prepared to recommend the deployment of some additional air wings to the Pacific.

The meeting adjourned with the understanding that Secretary Wilson would be in further touch with Secretary Dulles next week on this matter, after the Chiefs had reviewed their draft paper, which Admiral Radford indicated would undergo a number of draft changes as well as some of the changes which would stem from the present meeting.

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**171. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom <sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, March 26, 1955—4:41 p.m.*

4929. For Ambassador from Secretary. Please deliver following message to Eden:

"Dear Anthony: I rather expected the Soviets to veto the Resolution but I must confess I did not expect that you would. In deference to your views we will hold up immediate action but you should know that the President and I doubt that circumstances will permit of indefinitely leaving the matter moribund in the Security Council. Moreover, if fighting should break out on the China coast I have grave doubts that with the Soviet in the chair we could in the month of April secure the rapid action which would then be required of the Council.

I am surprised that you feel our agreed Resolution <sup>2</sup> looks as though it was designed solely to confirm Chiang's position in the offshore islands. The purpose of the Resolution to stop fighting was thoroughly gone into before we both and New Zealand agreed to it and you will recall that our minute of understanding of January 26 <sup>3</sup> said that, unless otherwise agreed, we would make every effort to prevent any amendment of substance to the Resolution as it had been painstakingly agreed.

If now you believe the language should be amended in order to lay the emphasis elsewhere then I would welcome your suggestions.

Our purpose in seeking this further step in the Security Council is to use that solemn forum to create and rally the forces of world opinion so that those forces will become a moral deterrent to the breach of the peace by anyone in the China area. This is not an academic matter. Nor is it a desire just to make a speech. The risk of

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/3-2655. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Dulles.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 5, Document 42.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 43.

hostilities is very real and if they do break out there can be no assurance that they will not become extended. That is what we want to prevent. We fear that at Bandung the ChiComs will get what they consider a green light for violence unless there are some counteracting opinions.

I can understand your desire to foresee every future step should the Resolution fail. In a situation as serious and uncertain as this I think that is impossible. It will have to be left to events and future agreement between us and our other friends. Moreover, as you have seen from my last message to you we are willing to defer a vote on the Resolution. The important thing is that it would be on the table so that later we could move more rapidly in the Council if need be and meanwhile we would have made clearer to the world our purposes.

Already now, but I trust not, it may be too late to do what we had hoped before April first. Please let me have your suggestions urgently so that we may try to reestablish agreement for the future. Faithfully Foster"

Dulles

## 172. Diary Entry by the President <sup>1</sup>

*[Washington,] March 26, 1955.*

Lately there has been a very definite feeling among the members of the Cabinet, often openly expressed, that within a month we will actually be fighting in the Formosa straits. It is, of course, entirely possible that this is true, because the Red Chinese appear to be completely reckless, arrogant, possibly over-confident, and completely indifferent as to human losses.

Nevertheless, I believe hostilities are not so imminent as is indicated by the forebodings of a number of my associates. It is clear that this gloomy outlook has been communicated to others because a number of articles in the papers state that the Administration is rather expecting hostilities within a month.

I have so often been through these periods of strain that I have become accustomed to the fact that most of the calamities that we anticipate really never occur. No period was more illustrative of this truth than the six months following upon the outbreak of our war in 1941. Every prophet in those days was one of gloom. Only two or

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Apparently dictated by the President to Ann Whitman.

three of the eventualities that sprung up in the mind or in the imagination came to pass.

(President had not a chance to finish this).

a.

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**173. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense** <sup>1</sup>

*Washington, 27 March, 1955.*

**SUBJECT**

Improvement of the Military Situation in the Far East in the Light of the Situation Now Existing in the Formosa Area.

1. Your memorandum of 22 March 1955, <sup>2</sup> subject as above, requests the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in regard to an improvement of the U.S. military situation in the Far East in the light of the situation now existing in the Formosa area.

2. The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force; the Chief of Naval Operations; and the Commandant of the Marine Corps have decided that certain simple actions *might* have a deterrent effect which is desirable from a U.S. and world standpoint and that, in any event, these simple actions should precede any more extensive and expensive military moves on our part. These actions follow:

a. The United States, through diplomatic channels, advise both the Chinese Communist Government and the Government of the USSR that it will join the Chinese Nationalists in the defense of the offshore islands with all means available.

*Note:* The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force; the Chief of Naval Operations; and the Commandant of the Marine Corps arrived at the above after carefully considering a public statement to the same effect. They concluded that the Chinese Communists might consider a U.S. public statement, even from the highest source, as propaganda rather than as a firm statement of intent, since Orientals operate in that manner themselves. Furthermore, a direct public statement would give the Chinese Communists no opportunity to save face and might well harden their determination to attack.

With reference to advising the Communists through diplomatic channels of U.S. intentions, they feel that the United States, by also notifying the Government of the USSR, would probably force consultations between these two governments

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<sup>1</sup> Source: JCS Files, CCS 381 Formosa (11-8-48) Sec. 20. Top Secret.

<sup>2</sup> Document 161.

and, as a result, not only might get an indication of Soviet reaction but also would avoid a possible later accusation that the United States had not given the USSR an opportunity to consult with the Chinese Communists.

b. Simultaneously with the above, make public announcement that the present reduction in military forces is suspended indefinitely due to the situation in the Far East.

c. Publicly direct the Joint Chiefs of Staff to take all steps necessary to *protect* Formosa.

3. The Chief of Staff, U.S. Army does not concur with the views expressed in paragraph 2 above. The question as to whether or not the United States will defend the Quemoy and Matsu Island groups is essentially a political decision because of the overriding importance of the political and psychological factors involved, and therefore must be answered by the President. Militarily, the loss of any or all of the coastal islands would not vitally affect the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores. If the decision is to defend these coastal islands, the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army believes that a public announcement should be made at the earliest practicable date, of authoritative U.S. intentions with respect to use of its armed forces in their defense and concurrently, a public announcement that further reduction of U.S. armed forces will be suspended immediately and indefinitely.

*Note:* The Joint Chiefs of Staff have not been formally notified that a decision has been made to consider *any* attack on Quemoy and the Matsu Island group a prelude to an attack on Formosa. If such a decision has been made, the initiation of implementing actions necessary to evidence a real intent on the part of the United States to oppose Chinese Communist operations in the area is at once required.

If the decision is not to defend the islands, or simply to defer decision, then no public announcement of intentions should be made.

4. It is obvious that suspension of the present reduction in military forces would require increased expenditures, the amount of which would depend upon the time the suspension must be sustained. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that these expenditures would be warranted in view of the gravity of the situation.

5. In the Enclosure to this memorandum <sup>3</sup> an attempt is made to answer your specific questions. This form is preferred in our reply in order to point up in this memorandum what are felt to be the simple essentials of the present situation. You will note that the answer to the question designated as (e) reflects the divergent views expressed in paragraphs 2 and 3 above.

<sup>3</sup> Not attached to the source text and not found.

6. The views of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force; the Chief of Naval Operations; and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, as outlined above, are predicated on the assumption that U.S. forces engaged in combat will be authorized to use atomic weapons as necessary against military targets. The Chief of Staff, U.S. Army does not concur with the foregoing assumption and would substitute the following:

In the event of an all-out attack by Chinese Communist forces against any Chinese Nationalist controlled territory, the successful defense of such territory would be dependent upon the employment of U.S. armed forces. Such a defense could be executed with, or without, the employment of atomic weapons, though execution with non-atomic weapons would require a much greater force build-up and greater time, and it might be that time would not be available.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

**Arthur Radford**<sup>4</sup>

*Chairman*

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<sup>4</sup> The source text, a carbon copy, bears a typed signature.

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#### 174. Editorial Note

Presidential Press Secretary James Hagerty's diary entry for Monday, March 28, records that he discussed with President Eisenhower that morning "the rash of stories which broke out in the press and on radio and television over the weekend to the effect that the Chinese Reds would invade Matsu Island by April 15th and would invade Quemoy within a month after that", stories which, Hagerty stated, had originated with Admiral Carney. He told the President that he was meeting that evening with a group of newsmen and would undoubtedly be asked about the story. His diary entry continues as follows:

"When I was talking to the President, he took off his glasses and characteristically chewed on the end of the earpiece. When I finished, he said, 'I couldn't agree with you more. Are you sure that this came from Carney?' I told him that I was and that I had been so informed by several of my newsmen friends in Washington. He then exploded, got up from his desk and walked around the room. As he walked, he talked rapidly and forcefully and said: 'By God, this has got to stop. These fellows like Carney and Ridgway don't yet realize that their services have been integrated and that they have, in addition to myself, a boss in Admiral Radford who is Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They are giving just their own service's viewpoint and presenting it as the entire Administration viewpoint. I'm going to see Radford in half an hour, and I'm going to tell him to tell Carney to stop talking. I'm also going to see Charlie Wilson at 11:00 and I'm going to tell him the same thing.' The President then said, 'I think that you should tell the reporters you are meeting with tonight the following: Of course, there is always a danger in the Far East.

The Chinese Reds are fanatical Communists and have publicly stated that they are going to try to take Formosa. But we are trying to keep the peace. We are not looking for war and I think the stories like the ones they get from Carney, when published, are a great disservice to the United States. They're going to look awful silly when April 15th comes along and there is no incident, because honestly our information is that there is no build-up off those islands as yet to sustain any attack, and believe me, they're not going to take those islands just by wishing for them. They are well-equipped and well-defended and they can only be taken, if at all, by a prolonged all-out attack. I would also tell them that you are not normally a betting man, but if any of them wanted to bet a thousand dollars that we would be in war on any of the dates they wrote about, you would be happy to bet them.' I interrupted laughingly to say, 'If you'll let me say a hundred dollars, I'll do it.' He said O.K."

According to Hagerty's diary entry, the President discussed the subject with Admiral Radford and Secretary Wilson that morning. Hagerty's diary entry for the following day states that his discussion with the newsmen the previous evening was reflected accurately in articles in the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* that morning and that the President told him "he had read them and thought they did the job that was necessary." (Eisenhower Library, Hagerty Papers)

For the President's comments at his press conference on March 30 in response to questions concerning Admiral Carney's remarks and Hagerty's session with the newsmen, see the transcript of the press conference in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1955*, pages 368-381.

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175. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,  
Washington, March 28, 1955, 4:30 p.m. <sup>1</sup>

PRESENT

The Secretary  
Mr. Hoover  
Mr. Murphy  
Mr. Phleger  
Mr. MacArthur  
Mr. Bowie  
Mr. Merchant  
Mr. Bissell (FOA[?])  
Mr. Hanes  
(Arrived later, as indicated, Robertson and Allen Dulles)

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Memoranda. Secret; Personal and Private. Drafted by Hanes. In the list of participants Bissell is identified with the Foreign Operations Administration, presumably this is Richard M. Bissell, Jr., Special Assistant (for Plans and Programs) to the Director of Central Intelligence.

The Secretary began by outlining a proposed new Resolution for the Security Council, <sup>2</sup> and indicated that it was designed to try and break our present stalemate which resulted largely from Great Britain's refusal at this time to honor her earlier commitment concerning "Oracle". He said that the purpose of the Resolution was (a) to restrain the Chinese Communists from an attack or (b) gain allied support for our position if the ChiComs did attack.

Mr. Bowie, emphasizing that the important thing was to line up the free world behind the defense of Formosa as opposed to the off-shore islands, said that he felt the operative paragraph in the Resolution calling for a statement of "intent" by the ChiComs was dangerous (a) because they would not give such a declaration and (b) because someone might then call for a declaration of "intent" by the ChiNats, which they also would never give.

(Mr. Robertson came in at this point)

The Secretary commented that we do not, of course, know the JCS war plans for China, if there should be an attack on the islands or other hostilities in that area. He made the point, however, that atomic or thermonuclear weapons would undoubtedly figure in these plans, and he wondered whether Chiang might not have a feeling that an atomic attack on the mainland as a beginning would be a poor way to gain the support of the Chinese people for his cause. He emphasized that Chiang might, of course, be bothered by no such feelings, but he felt that this idea might profitably be explored with the Gimo.

Mr. Phleger said that we should consider the true and ultimate effect of this Resolution. Either of two things might happen:

(1) The ChiComs would agree not to attack Formosa. In this event, we would effectively be giving them Quemoy and Matsu for such a declaration, and would be placing ourselves in a better moral position at a later date when the ChiComs actually attack Formosa. (This assumes, naturally, that a ChiCom agreement not to attack Formosa is meaningless.)

(2) The ChiComs refuse to agree to any guarantee concerning Formosa (as is most likely). We are then virtually placed in a position where we have to defend Quemoy and Matsu, by having had our alternative suggestion rejected.

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<sup>2</sup> Reference is apparently to a draft resolution dated March 27, which bears no indication of the drafter but was based on several previous drafts by Phleger with extensive revisions in Dulles' handwriting. The operative portion reads as follows:

*"Calls upon the People's Republic of China promptly to make clear its intent not to attack Taiwan (Formosa) and the Penghus (Pescadores) with force, and to abstain from any such attack;*

*"Calls upon the Republic of China reciprocally to abstain from using Taiwan (Formosa) and the Penghus (Pescadores) as a base for armed attack against the Mainland of China;*

*"And declares that it remains seized of the question." (Ibid.)*

Mr. Phleger pointed up the need for a broader decision as to the ultimate ends we wish to achieve before we can profitably speak of tactics.

The Secretary agreed with Mr. Phleger's conclusion that, if the ChiComs rejected the Security Council Resolution, as is likely, this would virtually commit us to the defense of Quemoy and Matsu; and pointed out that our world position would then be that we were defending these islands only because, and clearly because the ChiComs would not agree to say that they are not going to attack Formosa. It would be clear to the world that all the ChiComs had to do to stop (or not start) a war is to say that they are not going to attack Formosa. Therefore, this entire course of action, the Secretary agreed, would probably result in a military engagement in defense of Quemoy and Matsu, but under optimum conditions of world opinion.

Mr. Bowie felt that this was forcing us into an unnecessarily rigid position, and reverted to his theme that our most important objective should be to line up free world support behind that part of our policy which it would support—namely, the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores. He felt that we should and could line up such support by holding out the bait of a peacefully controlled evacuation of the offshore islands which would be accomplished at our recommendation and under our protection.<sup>3</sup> He said he felt that Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and quite probably even Britain, might be induced to come out and give a specific guarantee concerning Formosa under these circumstances. In this connection, he pointed out Morrison's<sup>4</sup> recent statements, indicating his support of the continued freedom of Formosa, and said that this led him to believe that the Conservatives could take such a position, even before an election, without serious fear of making it an election issue.

The Secretary then raised the question of the desirability of placing certain United States ground forces on Formosa—possibly a Marine Division. He commented that some felt this would be a powerful aid to ChiNat morale, as an indication of our intention to stay and to defend that island; and that this would also be an effective anti-subversion weapon, in that a local commander might be willing to deliver over an army if he felt that no fight would be involved, but he would be much more hesitant if he knew that this would mean a full-scale battle. If we had troops there this would unquestionably mean a full-scale battle with American troops.

He also pointed out that when this question had been raised last Saturday in his meeting in Defense, Admiral Radford had raised a

<sup>3</sup> Bowie recommended this course in a memorandum of March 28 to Dulles. (*Ibid.*)

<sup>4</sup> Herbert S. Morrison, Deputy Leader of the Opposition in the United Kingdom.



number of objections, largely on matériel and logistic grounds: the already crowded conditions in Formosa, the high comparative pay of American troops vis-à-vis Chinese, and resultant social and morale problems.

Mr. Bissell concurred that although the danger of subversion from the top was probably ever-present in the Chinese Army, the prospect of a hard fight would undoubtedly make a real difference in preventing the delivery of an army to the enemy. It would not be any deterrent to the defection of a General as an individual, but this is, of course, a far less serious problem.

He raised the possibility of having Anzus troops, and possibly Philippine troops on Formosa, as well as our own.

The Secretary then threw in for discussion the additional possibility of a blockade of the China Coast.

Mr. Phleger felt that PL 4 granted sufficient authority to institute a blockade.

The Secretary agreed, and indicated that such a blockade must include a major portion of the China Coast, and specifically all the great ports such as Shanghai and Canton.

Mr. Bissell asked if such a blockade would be directed primarily against the ChiCom buildup endangering Formosa.

Mr. Phleger pointed out there is no such thing as a limited blockade, except in geographical terms. Within the blockaded area, all cargoes are stopped. However, he conceded that the most direct and noticeable advantage from our point of view would probably be in terms of crippling the ChiCom buildup endangering Formosa.

He pointed out that a blockade is an act of war.

The Secretary then reverted to the more general theme, and emphasized his unwillingness to get forced into the position wherein the time, the place and the manner of fighting all belong to the enemy. He pointed out that such would be the case if we were to fight in direct defense of the offshore islands, and specifically if we extended the fighting on to the immediately adjacent Chinese mainland which has (presumably) been fortified, built up and prepared by the ChiComs for just such an eventuality. The Secretary asked how we could get away from this position in the present situation.

Mr. Robertson commented that morale is a two-sided matter and that we here are dealing not only with ChiNat morale, but also with ChiCom morale, which has already been fed an exhilarating diet of success, and might well become completely euphoric if given any more success—specifically Quemoy and Matsu. He also pointed out that Quemoy and Matsu are more defensible in military terms than was Berlin; but that Berlin was saved by the resolution of the free world.

The Secretary then threw out the idea of making our response to an attack on Quemoy and Matsu a generalized rather than local response. He said that we might destroy the great POL dumps in China (which, incidentally, can be done with conventional weapons), cut bridges, rail lines and communications generally . . . ; and generally engage in a severe punitive action across the length and breadth of China.

Mr. Phleger again raised the question of where this ultimately end us up, what kind of a permanent solution it produces, and what kind of a permanent solution we are seeking.

The Secretary emphasized that it would be a deterrent to a ChiCom attack on the islands if they knew that our reaction would not be limited in area. He felt that it was no particular deterrent to such an attack for them to be convinced that we would fight, but in a limited area where they are well dug in and prepared.

The Secretary emphasized that another factor not to be ignored was that we cannot splurge our limited supply of atomic weapons without serious danger to the entire international balance of power; and therefore any use which is made of them must be very carefully planned and thought out. The Secretary complained that he felt that none of these things had been adequately thought out in connection with this situation—he had the feeling that we are drifting in very dangerous waters without an adequately prepared chart—that we have not given sufficient thought to the most effective deterrents to a possible war originating in this area. He pointed out, in support of his feeling, that a limited defense of the islands was no great deterrent, that such a limited defense might have to be done two or three or even more times—and it obviously provides no permanent solution. . . . All of these matters should receive much more consideration and thought.

Mr. Robertson commented that he saw no difference in principle, assuming the islands were attacked, if our retaliation was in the vicinity of Amoy or in the vicinity of Canton—both were on the mainland of China. He would feel that such retaliation should be in the area calculated to produce the greatest effect, rather than the area of closest proximity to the attack.

Mr. Bowie pointed out that if such a policy of generalized punishment were adopted as our reaction to an attack on the islands, this would mean that the islands themselves would probably be lost.

The Secretary agreed, and emphasized that the islands must not be allowed to become a psychological symbol, as in the case of Dien Bien Phu. He outlined his theory of  $X$  and  $2X$ —that any time the enemy wished to attain  $X$ , we would exact a cost of  $2X$  from them.

Mr. MacArthur said that he had grave worries as to the political and psychological effect of such a “generalized retribution” policy

against the mainland of China. He said that if, in response to a local attack, we send our bombers ranging China (and particularly if we use atomic weapons) our purpose may be felt by our allies (and possibly by our enemies) to be the destruction of the Chinese Communists' regime, rather than the repelling of an attack on the islands. Our allies are confident that any genuine threat to the integrity of the Chinese Communist regime would bring the Soviet Union to her aid, in a military sense, which would mean the beginning of a world war. Any such policy of ours would, therefore, cause our allies to back away, not only in the Far East but probably in Europe, in Africa and all over the globe.

Mr. Hoover commented that our allies have been backing away from our Far Eastern policies in any case, and will probably continue to do so anyway whenever we take a firm line.

The Secretary agreed to an extent, and cited the recent case of the British in Laos, when they undermined our encouragement to the Laotian Government by telling that Government that they felt no outside aid would be forthcoming in the event of a Vietminh invasion of Laos, assuming that such invasion was caused by the Laotians militarily seeking to regain their two Northern provinces.

He reverted to the matter of the new Security Council draft, and raised several questions: Do we want to take any UN action? If so, is this a good draft? The Secretary commented that he thought it was, and he felt it would improve our position—but he agreed that it would only be effective and should only be put forward if we were actually prepared to react to an attack on Quemoy and Matsu, assuming one came. If we were prepared to react to such an attack, however, the putting forward of this Security Council Resolution, he felt, would better our legal and moral position before the world, both in present circumstances and under such an eventuality.

Mr. Bissell commented that if we make a decision to make our reaction to any attack on the islands general across China, rather than specific in defense of those islands, we should take certain specific actions: (1) we should reduce the island garrisons, so that their loss will not be so severe. Such reduction of garrisons will also serve notice that we consider these as outposts rather than as defensible positions. (2) We should institute an obvious air buildup in other parts of the general area, which will demonstrate our intention and preparedness to make such a generalized reaction.

The Secretary commented that, of course, it was essential that if we intended to make such a generalized reaction, we should see that the enemy was fully informed of our intention, as otherwise such a decision would be no deterrent whatsoever.

(Mr. Allen Dulles came in at this point)

The Secretary outlined certain portions of the foregoing for Mr. Allen Dulles' benefit.

Mr. Robertson commented that if we are (if the President is) going to change our (his) mind about defending these islands, we have an awful lot of work to do on Chiang. Mr. Robertson pointed out that we have given Chiang a commitment that we would defend the islands under present conditions.

Mr. MacArthur demurred and said he felt we had given no such commitment.

Mr. Robertson reiterated that we had given such a commitment to his own certain knowledge.

The Secretary emphasized that he did not want this discussion interpreted to mean that the President had necessarily changed his mind. He pointed out, however, that the President is intensely disturbed by the entire situation, and wants every possible avenue of action leading to a possible peaceful and successful conclusion explored thoroughly.

Until now, much of our thinking has been in terms of the presumption that a "declaration of intent" on our part to defend the offshore islands was sufficient to deter an attack, and therefore effectively to achieve their defense. The Secretary feels that this may no longer be a valid assumption, and we must therefore think in other terms.

Mr. Phleger once again brought up the question of our basic objectives. He cited our mutual defense treaties with Korea, Japan, Southeast Asia and other areas of the Far East and of the world; and he pointed out that this situation is a current test of what was actually to be done to defend a threatened area, at least part of which was a treaty area. What type of permanent over-all solution are we striving for in this area and within the context of our treaty obligations in this area—and therefore, by implication, in all other endangered areas within our treaty framework. What are our basic objectives? Which of these possible courses of action we have been discussing best furthers our achieving them?

J. W. Hanes, Jr.

176. Message From British Foreign Secretary Eden to the Secretary of State <sup>1</sup>

[London,] March 28, 1955.

Thank you very much for your further message about the off-shore islands. <sup>2</sup> My colleagues and I are grateful for your willingness to defer action in the Security Council at the present moment. Please do not think we do not understand the difficulties of your position. We recognise the danger that the Chinese Communists may precipitate a conflict. That incidentally is one reason why we are anxious to find some means of getting Chiang Kai-shek out of the coastal islands before an attack can develop. Meanwhile we are at one with you in wanting to deter the Communists from attacking. But I do not consider that action in the Security Council will deter them. Our Chargé d'Affaires at Peking thinks that it is more likely to cause them to attack than to restrain them.

As regards the wording of the draft resolution, a number of things have happened since our minute of January 26 was agreed. The Chinese have shown us clearly that they are not prepared to agree to any cease-fire and the Soviet Union have equally made clear that they do not think any solution can be found through the Security Council. Moreover, in my statement of March 8 <sup>3</sup> I stated Her Majesty's Government's position on this whole question. It would be very difficult indeed to debate this issue without any reference to our formally expressed views. Pearson's recent speech <sup>4</sup> shows how the free nations differ over Quemoy and Matsu. We share the Canadian's views. Thus any debate in the Security Council far from rallying world opinion might only serve to reveal our differences. No amendment of the wording of the resolution could avert this danger.

You are worried about Bandung. I agree. The Chinese will certainly do all they can to get the conference to give them its approval and we must try to stop this. But I believe that if we initiate a debate in the Security Council the Asians will simply regard us as expressing Western views and as trying to forestall them at Bandung. I am sure that the effect on Nehru and U Nu for example would be

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Memoranda. Secret. Received with a covering note of March 29 from Scott. A copy, attached to a memorandum of conversation by Key, dated March 29, is also in Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/3-2955.

<sup>2</sup> Transmitted in Document 171.

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 3, Document 144.

<sup>4</sup> In a statement on March 24 in the Canadian House of Commons, Foreign Secretary Pearson had stated the Canadian view that a distinction could be made, politically and strategically, between Formosa and the coastal islands and had urged a peaceful solution to the crisis. The text of the statement is in Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Memoranda.

bad. I think we would do far better to work on the Asian leaders themselves to warn them against giving the Chinese the green light and to urge them to press for the renunciation of force. This is likely to appeal particularly to the Asians. Pressure from the Asians is likely to be more effective in deterring the Chinese than anything we can say in the Security Council, which they have discounted already. I have therefore instructed Her Majesty's Representatives in the countries in which I think we may have some influence to urge this on the Governments to which they are accredited. It would be very helpful if your Ambassadors could do the same.

In all this I do not want you to think that we are trying to exercise a veto on you. We are not. We are concerned only about the best means of achieving our common objective. I understand your desire to bring in the Security Council at the shortest possible notice if there should be a flare-up. It occurs to me that the New Zealanders might help in this now by instructing their delegate to send a letter to the President of the Council on the following lines:—He had hoped for a meeting of the Security Council at which all interested parties would have been represented; since this could not take place he thought that his colleagues would be interested to see the resolution which he would have put forward had the meeting happened; he was therefore circulating it but he was not asking for it to be discussed at present, particularly since fortunately no fighting was now taking place. If something like this were put forward I have it in mind that it might enable you to claim the necessary priority for the resolution to be discussed first at a later meeting if the need arose. If you think there is anything in this perhaps our experts in New York could examine the idea more closely. I assume of course that we would not press the issue to a debate without further consultation as envisaged in paragraph 5(D) of the Working Party's report. Will you let me know what you think of this? It might go part way to meet your objective though I still think the less action we take in the Security Council before Bandung the better. <sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Telegram 5023 to London, April 1, transmitted the following message for delivery to Eden:

"Dear Anthony:

"Thanks for your message of March 28. We are considering the suggestion that the present Resolution should be submitted by New Zealand in a letter to the President of the Council. I appreciate that in making this suggestion you have gone a considerable way to meet our point of view and for this I thank you. On the other hand I see difficulties in explaining why this curious and novel course is being followed. Foster." (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/4-155)

177. Letter From President Eisenhower to British Prime Minister Churchill <sup>1</sup>*Washington, March 29, 1955.*

DEAR WINSTON: I have no doubt that you and your Cabinet find it necessary, just as we do, to ponder daily on the world situation and to calculate as carefully as you can every move to be made as you strive to straighten out some specific portion of the tangled mess that we call international relations.

Of one thing I have always been completely confident—that you are as fully dedicated as I am to promoting between our two governments and our two peoples clear unity of purpose and common understanding of the obstacles we face so as to double our strength as we push forward in the search for an honorable peace.

It is because of this confidence in our common intent—indeed, I hope I may say our indestructible personal friendship—that I venture to bring up an apparent difference between our two governments that puzzles us sorely and constantly. Although we seem always to see eye to eye with you when we contemplate any European problem, our respective attitudes toward similar problems in the Orient are frequently so dissimilar as to be almost mutually antagonistic. I know that you could make the same observation regarding us; possibly this fact troubles you and your associates just as much as it does us. <sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International Series. Top Secret; Eyes Only. A memorandum of conversation by Secretary Dulles, dated March 29, 1955, reads in part as follows:

“I went over with the President the draft of his letter to Churchill about Far Eastern matters and suggested one or two minor verbal changes on the passage dealing with Laos.

“We discussed a memorandum of George Humphrey about Formosa and I pointed out that it would be quite unrealistic to demand formal acceptance by the Chinese Communists of the persistence of the Nationalist régime on Formosa and that while this gambit might be good from the standpoint of domestic opinion, it would almost surely be treated as an insincere effort on the part of foreign countries. I pointed out that I had several times said that we would not require the Chinese Communists to renounce their claims to Formosa, but merely to renounce the effort to take Formosa by force.” (*Ibid.*, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President)

The memorandum under reference has not been found.

<sup>2</sup> In a letter dated March 22, to Prime Minister Churchill, the President made the following comments relating to the Far East:

“As you know, I am dedicated to the idea that unless the free world can stand firmly together in important problems, our strength will be wasted and we shall in the long run be ineffective in our struggle to advance freedom in the world and to stop the spread of Communism. I believe it to be especially important that we seek to understand each other’s viewpoints in Southeast Asia, because in that region we have a very delicate—sometimes dangerously weak—situation and one to which the future welfare and fortunes of the free world are definitely related. If we can achieve the kind of common understanding and thinking that we should, then I feel that there will

I beg of you *not* to think of this letter as a complaint, or as any effort to prove that we are right and you are wrong. In writing to you in this vein I am interested in one thing and one thing only—how can we and our two governments come closer together in our thinking so as to achieve a better result in matters that are serious and fateful for both our nations? I know that frankness on my part will not be interpreted as accusation or recrimination.

I assume that the existence of the differences I mention is so clearly, even sadly, recognized on both sides of the water as to require no elaboration. The words Formosa, Quemoy and Matsu typify them today, as Manchuria did in 1931.

The conclusion seems inescapable that these differences come about because we do not agree on the probable extent and the importance of further Communist expansion in Asia. In our contacts with New Zealand and Australia, we have the feeling that we encounter a concern no less acute than ours; but your own government seems to regard Communist aggression in Asia as of little significance to the free world future.

As I once explained to you, we are not interested in Quemoy and Matsu as such. But because of the conviction that the loss of Formosa would doom the Philippines and eventually the remainder of the region, we are determined that it shall not fall into the hands of the Communists, either through all-out attack or, as would appear to be far more likely, through harrassing air attacks, threats and subversion.

The only way in which pressure of the latter type can be successfully resisted is to sustain a high morale among Chiang's forces. The danger of internal subversion and consequent collapse in Formosa is always present; Chiang feels this keenly and we believe it necessary to help him combat it.

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never be any doubts as to this country's readiness to stand firmly by the side of any other free nation opposing aggression in that region. We have no possessions in that immediate area. Consequently, we cannot be accused of any support of colonialism or of imperialistic designs. We recognize situations that have been properly and legally established and we certainly want to halt Communism dead in its tracks.

"To do this, one of the essentials is a strong and continuous land defense of Formosa. This can be done—certainly under present conditions—only by Chiang Kai-shek and his troops. This in turn means that their morale and their vigor, their training and equipment, must all be adequately assured. Until the time comes that they themselves feel that their morale can be sustained, even though their forces are withdrawn from all of their outlying positions, we must be exceedingly careful of the pressures we attempt to apply to Chiang to bring about such a result.

"Except for this one feature, I agree entirely with the thoughts you have expressed in your former letters on this touchy subject, and I hope also that you have no difficulty of seeing the importance of this morale feature in Formosa." (*Ibid.*, Whitman File, DDE Diaries)



In fact, we feel this is vitally important to the interests of the entire Western world.

Of course I would personally be very happy, both as a political leader and as an ex-soldier who may have a bit of competence in the strategic field, to see Chiang, *voluntarily* and in accordance with what he believed to be his own best interests, withdraw from Quemoy and the Matsus.

But I am just as unwilling to put so much pressure on him that he might give up the entire struggle in utter discouragement. It's at this point that you and ourselves seem to part company. But we cannot understand how the free world can hold Formosa except as Chiang provides the necessary ground forces.

Another apparent difference between us that added to our bewilderment occurred in connection with Foster's recent visit to the Far East. He urged the Government of Laos, while it still has the ability to do so, to clean out the areas in that country where Communist elements are establishing themselves in some strength. The Laos Government is fully justified in taking such action under the terms of the Geneva agreements. When Laotian officials expressed to Foster some concern lest such action on their part provoke attack from the Viet Minh and the Chinese Communists, he assured them that aggression from without would bring into play the Manila Pact. This would mean assistance from the other signatories of the Pact to preserve the territorial integrity of Laos.

Some time after this conversation, we heard that both the British and the French Ambassadors in Laos informed that Government that under no circumstances could Laos expect any help against outside aggression, under the terms of the Manila Pact, if such aggression should result from their own efforts to rule their internal affairs.

As a result, we have a situation in which the Communists, in the affected areas of Laos, grow stronger and stronger, and we face a possibility of ultimately losing that entire territory to the Communists, just as we lost North Vietnam.

Another point bothers us. This country believes that the existence of the ChiNat Government confers upon all of us one advantage that is not often publicly noted. Throughout the Far East there are great numbers of "émigré" Chinese. These people, in most cases, possess sort of a dual citizenship—one pertaining to the country in which they reside; the other to China. Up to date, millions of these people have preserved their allegiance to Chiang and have not become Communist cells menacing the countries where they are now residents. This affects the Philippines, Indonesia and, of course, other areas such as Malaya and Hongkong.

This is another fact that points to the very great desirability of sustaining Chiang's prestige and the morale of his followers. If the

Chinese National Government should disappear, these émigré Chinese will certainly deem themselves subjects of the Chinese Communist Government and they will quickly add to the difficulties of their adopted countries. Indeed, where their numbers are quite strong, I believe that their influence might become decisive and that no outside aid that any of us could bring to bear could prevent these regions from going completely Communist. Do not such possibilities concern you?

As we consider such developments and possibilities, it seems to me we cannot fail to conclude that the time to stop any advance of Communism in Asia is here, now.

We have come to the point where every additional backward step must be deemed a defeat for the Western world. In fact, it is a triple defeat. First, we lose a potential ally. Next, we give to an implacable enemy another recruit. Beyond this, every such retreat creates in the minds of neutrals the fear that we do not mean what we say when we pledge our support to people who want to remain free. We show ourselves fearful of the Communistic brigands and create the impression that we are slinking along in the shadows, hoping that the beast will finally be satiated and cease his predatory tactics before he finally devours us. So the third result is that the morale of our friends crumbles.

Of course it is easy to say that this is a gross overstatement of the case. Because the ChiComs have no great fleet and cannot now attack across the seas, it is natural to underestimate their potential strength and the fearful eventual results of the crumbling process. So I believe it critically important that we make a sober estimate of what we are up against.

Two decades ago we had the fatuous hope that Hitler, Mussolini and the Japanese war lords would decide, before we might become personally involved, that they had enough and would let the world live in peace. We saw the result.

Yet the Communist sweep over the world since World War II has been much faster and much more relentless than the 1930[s] sweep of the dictators. I do believe that all of us must begin to look some of these unpleasant facts squarely in the face and meet them exactly as our Grand Alliance of the 40's met our enemies and vanquished them.

You and I have been through many things where our judgments have not always been as one, but, on my part at least, my admiration and affection for you were never lessened. In this long experience, my hope is rooted that the two of us may bring up some thought or idea that could help us achieve a personal concord that could, in turn, help our two governments act more effectively against Communists everywhere.

My warm greetings to Clemmie, and, of course, my very kind regard to yourself.

As ever

Ike

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178. Letter From President Eisenhower to Lewis W. Douglas <sup>1</sup>

[Washington,] March 29, 1955.

DEAR LEW: Thank you for your most recent letter <sup>2</sup> on the tangled situation in the Formosa Straits. Incidentally, your former letter was read by Foster Dulles, and I believe that he wrote to you at some length. I am taking the liberty of sharing your second letter with him also.

Your presentation is, of course, most persuasive, but you do not tell me *what to do if we lose Formosa*. I feel that, after all, here is the crux of the matter, and I must say that you seem to brush off this very grave possibility far more lightly than I possibly can.

Another point: While you say that the Asian public opinion would be shocked beyond measure at the thought of the United States participating in a so-called "civil war," yet in point of actual fact the never-ending problem we are up against is to convince these Asian nations that there is validity to our protestations of friendly support even when we urge their gradual abandonment of area after area to the greed of the Communists.

I have come to the conclusion that some of our traditional ideas of international sportsmanship are scarcely applicable in the morass in which the world now flounders.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Personal and Confidential. Douglas, chairman of the board of directors of the Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York, had served as Ambassador to the United Kingdom, 1947-1950.

<sup>2</sup> The letter, dated March 21, replied to a letter from the President, written in response to an earlier letter from Douglas. In that letter, dated March 3, Douglas argued that while title to Formosa and the Pescadores was "unresolved", Quemoy and Matsu had always been Chinese territory, and U.S. defense of Nationalist forces on those islands would be "taking sides in a Chinese civil war." (*Ibid.*, Dulles-Herter Series) In his reply, dated March 9, Eisenhower stressed strategic considerations in the defense of Formosa. (*Ibid.*) In his March 21 letter, Douglas commented:

"Still, generally speaking as a principle of international behavior, for us to deploy our military strength on one side or another in a foreign civil war would be a shock, I believe, to the sentiments of the peoples of the Orient and of our own great Atlantic community." (*Ibid.*, Administration Series)

The central fact of today's life is that we are in a life and death struggle of ideologies. It is freedom against dictatorship; Communism against capitalism; concepts of human dignity against the materialistic dialectic. The Communists, and I mean Marx, Lenin, Stalin and now their successors and offshoots—such as Mau [*Mao*] and Chou—have all announced their adherence to the theory of world revolution and overthrow of all other forms of government by force and violence. They have complete contempt for any of those concepts of honor, decency and integrity which must underlie any successful practice of international law and order as we have always understood it.

I say again that I do not believe any other person occupying an important political position in this world gives more thought and more hard study than I do to ways and means of preserving and strengthening of peace. No one is more jealous of America's good name, both as of today and in the pages of history. Yet it is quite clear that if the Communists achieve their world aims, there will be no American history as we know it. Whatever account may appear in a Communist history concerning this great land will serve only the doctrinal aims and ambitions of Communist masters.

Now I am sure you will not think for a minute that I am trying to be hysterical and emotional in the effort to avoid cold-blooded analysis and conclusions. The clear fact is that though we must fight this battle without losing our self respect or violating our concepts of duty and of right, or of breaking faith with our friends, we cannot forever permit the Communists to achieve success and expand their territories merely because we refuse to employ effective methods to defeat ruthless peoples who are for aggression and for capturing the minds and bodies of additional millions.

Truth, honor, justice, consideration for others, liberty for all—the problem is how to preserve them, nurture them and keep the peace—if this last is possible—when we are opposed by people who scorn to give any validity whatsoever to those values. I believe we can do it, but *we must not confuse these values with mere procedures, even though these last may have at one time held almost the status of moral concepts.*

I believe that Mr. Truman was right to oppose the invasion in South Korea, even though at that moment the Communists attempted to make it look like a "civil war." A good many other nations thought he was right, and some fifteen of them sent at least token forces to help us on the battleground.

By no means am I saying that we must—that we should—fight for Quemoy and the Matsus. What I am asking you is this: If you became convinced that the capture of these two places by international Communism would inevitably result in the later loss of Formosa to the free world, what would you do? Beyond question the

opinion in Southeast Asia is that the loss of Formosa would be catastrophic; the Philippines and Indonesia would rapidly be lost to us. Incidentally, the offshore islands do have a defensive value to Formosa. I spoke only about their lack of value in any program of attack against China proper. Defensively they practically block almost any Communist attempt to use the two available harbors immediately west of Formosa for the initiating of amphibious operations.

As you can see, I have not attempted to develop any really logical chain of thought in this letter; I have no great argument with the presentation that you submit. I merely say that I think there are important facets of this whole tangled question that you have not stared squarely in the eye and that when you do so, you will find that some of the department that was once an essential part of international relationships cannot be faithfully and stubbornly maintained by ourselves when the other side insists on practicing the habits of a thug.

With warm regard,  
Sincerely,<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> The source text is unsigned.

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179. Memorandum of a Conversation, Washington, March 30, 1955, 12:30 p.m. <sup>1</sup>

BIPARTISAN CONGRESSIONAL LUNCHEON MEETING <sup>2</sup>

THE FOLLOWING WERE PRESENT:

President Eisenhower

Rep. Carl Albert	Sec. Dulles, State
Rep. Leslie C. Arends	General Persons
Rep. Clarence Cannon	
Rep. Robert B. Chipfield	
Rep. Thomas S. Gordon	

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Legislative Meetings. Confidential. According to a note on the source text, Minnich prepared the memorandum from notes supplied by the office of Major General Wilton B. Persons, USA (retired), Deputy Assistant to the President.

<sup>2</sup> A similar luncheon meeting with Senate leaders, held on March 31, was recorded in a memorandum of conversation by Minnich. (*Ibid.*)

Participants listed below not previously identified include: Carl Albert of Oklahoma, House Majority Whip; Clarence Cannon of Missouri, Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee; Thomas S. Gordon of Illinois, member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee; John Taber of New York, ranking minority member of the House Appropriations Committee; and John M. Vorys of Ohio, member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

Rep. Joseph W. Martin, Jr.  
Rep. John W. McCormack  
Rep. Sam Rayburn  
Rep. James P. Richards  
Rep. Dewey Short  
Rep. John Taber  
Rep. Carl Vinson  
Rep. John M. Vorys

*Agenda*—The President pointed out that the meeting had no formal agenda but would be a full and free discussion of any and all problems pertaining to our foreign relations. He emphasized his desire to conduct our foreign relations on a truly bipartisan basis and stated that he and his people are always willing and eager to have the comments and suggestions of anyone on both sides of the Aisle.

[Here follows a summary of Secretary Dulles' presentation concerning European developments and a possible four-power conference.]

*Formosa*—Mr. Dulles then discussed fully and frankly the situation with respect to Formosa. He indicated that he had returned from his recent trip with great concern as to the Formosan situation—that the Chinese Communists were arrogant and more or less drunk with power because of their recent successes in that part of the world. He mentioned, in this connection, the following:

- a. The Korean War when the Allies were on the Yalu River at the time of entrance of the Chinese Communists—and concluding that war in control of virtually half of Korea.
- b. Spectacular success at Dien Bien Phu—resulting in communication of a large portion of Vietnam.
- c. Evacuation of Tachen Islands by the Nationalist Chinese for which the Communist Chinese take the credit.

He indicated that in their mind (Chinese Communists) these and other successes had been obtained with practically no interference on the part of the Allies and are almost an indication that the free world was not only taking reverses but "almost asking for more." Mr. Dulles quoted a diplomat as saying that Chou En-lai had made the following statement: "There will be a war with the United States and we may lose as many as one hundred million men (Chinese) but there will still be four hundred and fifty million left." Mr. Dulles pointed out that this sort of statement may be for propaganda purposes, but on the other hand might well indicate the thinking of the people who are now heading the Chinese Communist movement. He was frank in saying that we did not know just what the Soviets are thinking and doing with possible respect to the encouragement of the Chinese Communists in their intentions to capture of Formosa. He made it clear that all the Communist propaganda had been directed to the capture of Formosa and the elimination of Chiang Kai-shek,

but that none of it had been specifically directed to the capture of Quemoy and the Matsus as such. He stated that the men in the Kremlin might well be considering the idea that a move to capture Formosa by the Chinese Communists would serve the purpose of engaging the United States in that area, causing us to use atomic weapons with the resulting great propaganda value to the Communists that would come out of such an approach. He pointed out that the artillery replacements [*emplacements*], etc., now being constructed by the Chinese Communists could be knocked out only with atomic weapons and that the use of these weapons could well result in a "fall out" which in turn might kill many thousands of Chinese. Mr. Dulles further pointed out that we must consider the effect on our atomic stockpile of any appreciable use of atomic weapons in such a manner. On the other hand, he indicated that the Soviets must recognize the fact that a war on Formosa would require them to greatly step-up their delivery of military equipment and supplies to the Chinese Communists and that they may not be ready to do this.

In bringing out the factors that must be considered in an effort to determine the Soviet intentions, he referred to a visit last winter of Khrushchev and Bulganin to Peiping on which occasion Khrushchev made a ringing speech in denunciation of the United States for interference in the Formosan situation and the necessity of Formosa being made a part of the Chinese Communist State.<sup>3</sup>

In discussing the possible timing of an attack on Formosa, Mr. Dulles spoke of the coming Asio-African conference and indicated that the Chinese Communists might well like to attend such a conference as "a great peace loving nation" and consequently not take any action until after the conference was completed. He further indicated that one good factor in assessing what might take place was the propaganda line being put out by Peiping—that before any new move on their part, the Chinese Communists usually went to some length to condition their people and the world through very strong propaganda. He stated that, whereas the propaganda aimed toward an attack on Formosa had until very recently been 25% of the total propaganda being put out, it now had dropped to roughly 5%.

*Formosa Resolution*—Mr. Dulles pointed out that the resolution which the Administration had requested of the Congress and which the Congress had practically unanimously approved was deliberately made to indicate that we were going to assist in the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores Islands. He emphasized that these areas and only these areas were included in the resolution and that the United

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<sup>3</sup> Reference is to a speech made by Khrushchev in Peking on September 30, 1954; see telegram 483 from Moscow, October 2, 1954, in *Foreign Relations, 1952-1954*, vol. xiv, Part 1, p. 674.

States has no specific obligations as such to assist in the defense of Quemoy and the Matsus. He stated that this was done so that the Flag and the prestige of the United States would not *necessarily* be involved in any operations pertaining to these islands. He further indicated that this line of action was taken so as not to make known to our enemy just what our plans and moves would be in case they took offensive action. Mr. Dulles pointed out that the speedy and practically unanimous approval by the Congress of the Formosa resolution was in his opinion one of the greatest factors in deterring military action on the part of the Chinese Communists and in building up free world morale in that area.

*Quemoy and the Matsu Islands*—Mr. Dulles indicated that our allies really had comparatively little knowledge of the intricacies of the situation which we face with respect to Quemoy and the Matsus. They look on them as comparatively contiguous islands which by nature belong to the mainland. They fail to consider the tremendous morale effect that the loss of these islands might well have on all the peoples in that part of the world—that we also have to consider most seriously the morale effects of the loss of these islands on the Chi-Nats on Formosa—that there are adequate troops available to defend Formosa unless there are some internal defections in Chiang's Army. We must remember that all of his people came from the mainland and left their families there in many instances and hope sometime to return to the mainland. Mr. Dulles indicated these as some of the factors involved in the decision we would have to make with regard to Quemoy and the Matsus in case they were attacked. In reply to a question, he indicated that the only way in his opinion there could be a withdrawal before hostilities from Quemoy and the Matsus without incurring most serious morale reaction would be for Chiang Kai-shek to decide on his own that such a withdrawal is in the best interest of the Chi-Nats—otherwise, the morale reaction on the Chi-Nats and other people in that part of the world would be very bad.

### Questions

After Mr. Dulles' presentation, the President opened the meeting to questions—indicating that he and Mr. Dulles would attempt to answer as fully and frankly as possible any questions anyone might have. Practically all of the ensuing questions were directed to the Formosan situation with particular emphasis on our possible participation in the defense of Quemoy and the Matsus.

Speaker Rayburn stated his understanding of Mr. Dulles' remarks to indicate that in the event of an attack on Quemoy and the Matsus, the United States would find itself participating. The President elected to answer this question. He stated that actually we have not made that decision and will not make it until we are in posses-



sion of the particular circumstances surrounding such an attack. He stated that it is a problem that he and Mr. Dulles live with 24-hours a day and actually is the most difficult problem with which he has been faced since he took office. The President further discussed the possibilities, depending upon the type of attack. He stated that if an attack developed of such proportions that there was a reasonable chance of the Chi-Nats winning it by themselves with the equipment which we have and will make available to them, he personally would hold off and give them the opportunity. He feels that such a victory by the Chi-Nats would have a tremendous morale effect not only on Formosa but throughout that part of the world. On the other hand, he indicated that it would be necessary for the Chinese Communists to either capture or neutralize the islands before carrying out an attack on Formosa, as these islands blocked the two most important harbors from which an attack could be launched.

Mr. Richards asked Mr. Dulles how much consideration was being given to the morale effect on Formosa and that part of the world in case we let Quemoy and the Matsus fall into Communist hands. Mr. Dulles emphasized that this is one of the most important factors involved in the entire situation and again reiterated that it is a factor that is not understood by our Allies. He spoke of his efforts to clarify this on his recent visit to Canada.

Speaker Rayburn indicated that our Allies are not giving us any support in that part of the world. The President brought out that in his opinion the British and the French and our other Allies would support us wholeheartedly in the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores and that there are no indications that they would be just lukewarm about it, but that the question bothering them was the possibility of beginning a war over Quemoy and the Matsus.

Mr. McCormack stated that he was not sure in his own mind just what should be done, but he recognized that the Congress had put the matter in the hands of the President and that whether or not he (Mr. McCormack) agreed with the President's decision when made, he certainly would support it.

Mr. Gordon and Mr. Vorys asked questions similar to the foregoing on the Formosan situation.

Mr. McCormack told the President that he would like to ask a question but that he would understand the President's reasons if the President did not feel he was in a position to answer such a question. The question was: "Have developments in the international situation caused any change in the Administration's proposal to reduce the size of the Army?" The President stated that he would be glad to answer such a question. He stated frankly that there had been no change in his plans to reduce the size of the Army. He felt that such a reduction was justified. He indicated that in the kind of warfare in

which we would find ourselves engaged, he foresaw no chance to transport divisions to overseas bases in the early stages of such a war. He indicated his strong hope for a ready Reserve but went on to state that such Reserve, as well as the National Guard troops, would undoubtedly find itself initially in the position of restoring order around our major cities after an attack. He further stated that if there were a desire to spend an additional \$2 or \$3 billion on defense he (the President) felt that this money could be used to much greater advantage in extending and improving our early warning service (even with the knowledge that the equipment would become obsolete at an early date), and the procurement of more aircraft. He went on to say that he has given great consideration to the particular matter of the size of our Armed Forces and that his decision comes in part from his experience acquired as an infantry soldier.

The general discussion was free and frank. All the questions indicated a genuine concern and there were no efforts made to put anyone on the spot. Everyone was permitted to ask any questions that he might have, and the meeting was not broken up until Speaker Rayburn indicated to the President that it was necessary for the Members of Congress to get back to the House Floor.

*Possible Remarks to the Press Re Meeting*—Regarding what might be said to the Press as the meeting was breaking up, Speaker Rayburn stated that he didn't propose to say anything to the Press and didn't think that anyone should say anything unless the President himself wished to do so. The President indicated that he would not make a statement but he saw no reason why any member of the group should not tell the Press that the group had discussed all matters of interest with respect to the foreign situation.

L. A. Minnich, Jr.

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180. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,  
Washington, March 30, 1955, 3:35 p.m.<sup>1</sup>

SUBJECT

Operation ORACLE

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary

Mr. Merchant, Assistant Secretary, European Affairs

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/3-3055. Secret. The time of the meeting is from Dulles' appointment diary. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers)

Mr. Robertson, Assistant Secretary, Far Eastern Affairs  
Mr. Key, Assistant Secretary, International Organization Affairs  
Ambassador Leslie K. Munro of New Zealand  
Mr. G. R. Laking, New Zealand Minister

The Secretary observed that we also were "not enamored" with the proposals. The situation, as he saw it, was that there were now three main courses open to us: (1) We could go ahead and table a resolution under circumstances which, however, might compel the UK publicly to dissent; (2) we could accept the Eden proposal which, in the Secretary's opinion, was evidence that Mr. Eden had moved forward to a certain extent, or (3) we could do nothing.

The Ambassador asked for the Secretary's view about the possibility of moving ahead in April when the USSR is in the Chair. The Secretary replied that he would not consider this an insurmountable obstacle: On previous occasions it had been possible to obtain action in the Security Council when the Soviet was in the Chair and Sobolev appeared to be more reasonable than some of his predecessors.

The Ambassador then asked whether the Secretary felt as strongly as he had previously about proceeding in the Security Council.

The Secretary replied that he would be inclined to go along with Mr. Eden's view that it would be inadvisable to stir up a row in the Security Council before the Bandung Conference. It would, of course, have been preferable had a resolution been tabled since this would have enabled our Asian friends to point at something definite when the subject of Formosa is raised at Bandung. It would have enabled them pointedly to ask why the Chinese Communists were opposed to a cease-fire. However, in the present circumstances, the Secretary felt it would perhaps be better to sit it out a bit longer.

The Secretary stated that consequently we are trying to bring our viewpoint to the attention of free Asian governments since there appears to be little doubt that the Chinese Communists will speak about U.S. aggression on Formosa in the Bandung Conference. Our Asian friends would be given a good briefing. They would be reminded for example that under the terms of the Japanese Peace Treaty no benefits inured to non-signatories and that consequently so far as third powers are concerned, the title to certain islands still remains with Japan. This had purposely been placed in the treaty because of the Kuriles but of course it applied equally to Formosa so far as Chinese Communist pretensions to title might be concerned.

The Secretary stated that if a big-scale attack looked imminent then we would want to move in the Security Council. . . .

The Secretary expressed doubt whether it would be possible short of coercion to persuade the Chinese Nationalists to relinquish the off-shore islands. Certainly this would not be possible unless there were some adequate makeweight and even then there would remain doubts about the morale and reaction of the Chinese forces on Formosa.

The Secretary repeated that for the moment he thought it would be best to defer any action at least until we had heard from Australia about the Menzies proposal <sup>2</sup> and he suggested therefore that for the time being no action be taken on Eden's proposals. . . .

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<sup>2</sup> Document 154.

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**181. Memorandum of Discussion at the 243d Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, March 31, 1955 <sup>1</sup>**

Present at this meeting of the Council were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Director, Foreign Operations Administration; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Others present were the Secretary of the Treasury; Mr. J. Walter Yeagley for the Attorney General (for Items 1 and 2); the Postmaster General (for Item 1); the Secretary of Commerce (for Item 1); the Acting Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Director, U.S. Information Agency; the Under Secretary of State; the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Assistant Secretary of Defense Hensel, the Acting Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of the Air Force (for Items 2-6); the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, and the Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps (for Items 2-6); the Director of Central Intelligence; Special Assistants to the President Cutler, Dodge and Rockefeller; the Deputy Assistant to the President; the White House Press Secretary (for Item 1); Mr. Dillon Anderson, NSC Consultant; Mr. Robert R. Bowie, Department of State; the NSC Representative on Internal Security (for Items 1-4); the White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Gleason on April 1.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

[Here follows discussion of agenda items 1-4: "Importation of Communist Periodicals," "Study of Possible Hostile Soviet Actions," "Review of Military Assistance Program," and "Government Employee Security Program."]

*5. Significant World Developments Affecting U. S. Security*

[Here follows Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles' briefing of the Council with comments relating to Germany.]

As the second item in his briefing, Mr. Dulles read the current report of the IAC Watch Committee<sup>2</sup> on the situation with respect to the Nationalist-held offshore islands. There was no indication, according to the report, of a major assault on any of these islands in the near future.

*The National Security Council:*

Noted an oral briefing on the subject by the Director of Central Intelligence, with specific reference to (1) the imposition by the East German Government of new taxes on trucks entering Berlin from West Germany; and (2) the Watch Committee's current estimate with respect to the possibility of Chinese Communist attack on the offshore islands.<sup>3</sup>

*6. Presentation by the Joint Chiefs of Staff*

Admiral Radford briefed the National Security Council on the kind of war plans which the United States might resort to if it became involved in hostilities with Communist China in the Formosa and related areas.<sup>4</sup> He described the status of the Chinese Nationalist forces and the change in priorities for U.S. equipment for these Nationalist forces since the situation had become serious last September. He went on to describe both the Chinese Communist and the Chinese Nationalist order of battle before going into the plans of the United States.

At the conclusion of Admiral Radford's report, Secretary Dulles expressed considerable concern about the political repercussions of

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<sup>2</sup> The Watch Committee of the Intelligence Advisory Committee was an inter-agency committee with the mission of providing the earliest possible warning to the U.S. Government of hostile action by the Soviet Union or its allies endangering U.S. security. The report under reference has not been found in Department of State files.

<sup>3</sup> This constitutes NSC Action No. 1369. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95)

<sup>4</sup> A memorandum dated March 26, from Cutler to the President stated that Admiral Radford would present the "Formosan matter" at the March 31 NSC meeting. Cutler sent a copy to Secretary Dulles with an attached copy of Section III of his March 11 memorandum, quoted in footnote 6, Document 150. The attachment bears a note in Cutler's handwriting, "as sent by me to Radford for whatever assistance it may be". (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/3-2655)

the proposed use of atomic weapons against Chinese Communist military targets which would be used against the offshore islands and Formosa. Admiral Radford replied that precision atomic weapons would be used, and that except in one or two instances no large cities or concentrations of civilian population were involved in the targets.

Secretary Dulles then inquired about ways and means of "taking out" Chinese Communist artillery emplacements in areas adjacent to the Nationalist-held offshore islands. Admiral Radford thought that these might be taken out by resort to conventional weapons, but that such a decision would have to be taken by the Commander-in-Chief.

General Ridgway suggested the desirability of a coordinated intelligence estimate as to the probable number of civilian casualties which might be estimated if the plans outlined by Admiral Radford were to be implemented.

The President said that he could not help but feel that we are underestimating the sanity of the Chinese Communists. It seemed to him that our very great military capabilities against them should surely give them pause before they undertook a resort to military measures to seize the offshore islands in defiance of the United States.

Governor Stassen said that he was quite sure that if the Chinese Communists clearly understood the intentions of the United States they would not move.

*The National Security Council:*

Noted and discussed an oral presentation by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. <sup>5</sup>

S. Everett Gleason

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<sup>5</sup> This sentence constitutes NSC Action No. 1370. (*Ibid.*, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95)

**182. Memorandum From the Director of the Executive Secretariat (Scott) to the Secretary of State <sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, March 31, 1955.*

SUBJECT

Summary of Taipei Telegram 671 <sup>2</sup>

An informal survey of American military and civilian officials in Taiwan <sup>3</sup> reveals that these officials do not think that morale in Taiwan has changed significantly over the past year. Native Taiwanese tend to feel that the Mutual Security Treaty has increased the security of their home island and are not overly concerned with developments tending to decrease the likelihood of a counter-attack on the mainland. Mainland emigres have been heartened by the Treaty and disturbed by developments which appear to defer even further their chances of returning home. Most of this group, however, has long realized that a return to the mainland will be long and hard so were not greatly shocked by recent developments tending to confirm that view. Subversion is well under control in Taiwan, according to the officials surveyed. The state of Chinese-American cooperation continues to be satisfactory despite some recriminations over our attempts to get a cease-fire in the Taiwan Strait and our failure to commit ourselves on the defense of Matsu and Quemoy. The Taiwan public has however, become increasingly confused about the direction of US policy toward China as the result of press reports from Washington in the past few days. What effect this confusion will have, our Embassy says, is not discernible at the moment.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, White House Central Files, Confidential File, Formosan Question. Secret. Also directed to the Under Secretary. The source text is a carbon copy.

<sup>2</sup> Dated March 30. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/3-3055) A copy is attached to the source text.

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 671 from Taipei stated that 30 key officials, drawn from all the U.S. agencies represented in Taipei and selected on the basis of experience and interest, had been consulted in the survey.

**183. Telegram From the Consul General at Geneva (Gowen) to the Department of State <sup>1</sup>**

*Geneva, March 31, 1955—7 p.m.*

786. Gowen and Shillock met Chinese Communist officials Shen Ping Acting Consul General Li Kuang Tze, Consul Yeh Ching-pa official, and Hsu Wei Chin interpreter March 31 at Hotel Beau-Rivage Geneva at their request.<sup>2</sup> Language French. Meeting lasted two hours. Shen Ping opened meeting by reading prepared Chinese statement which was translated into French:

"During and after Geneva conference US Government three times gave promise for 27 Chinese students in US to return to their country. However, up to now only ten students have actually returned their country. This is not satisfactory. There are over 5,000 Chinese students in US. According incomplete statistics 316 such students have asked permission leave US for their country. Not only have they not been allowed leave US but they have been subjected to oppressive measures and continue to be ill-treated. The fact American Government continues prevent these students return their country and to ill-treat them is absolutely unjustifiable. These students have right return their homeland and not to grant them this right is violation their rights and causes great anxiety to their families especially as these students have been in US for long time. To prevent members these families to become reunited is violation human rights. I solemnly declare to US Government my government and people my country insist in declaring their objection to such American action against these students and that such action is unjustifiable illegal and inhuman. This action on part American Government has caused great indignation among people China. US Government must forthwith grant freedom these Chinese students to return their homeland. I hope you will inform your government this situation and let me know at earliest date that arrangements for granting permission our students in US to return their homeland have been made. Referring our meeting Geneva February 28 and your query concerning welfare certain Americans in our country my answer is as far as I know up to now they are all in good health except Mrs. Wilda Bradshaw<sup>3</sup> who has however already received medical care."

Gowen replied "I have noted what you have said and will inform my government accordingly. Pending such formal official

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 211.9311/3-3155. Confidential; Niact. Repeated for information to London and Hong Kong.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 781 from Geneva, March 31, reported that the Chinese had just requested a meeting for 3 p.m. (*Ibid.*, 611.95A241/3-3155)

<sup>3</sup> Dr. and Mrs. Homer V. Bradshaw, Presbyterian missionaries, were imprisoned in March 1951.



reply as my government may wish to make to what you have just stated I wish to tell you that what you have just said about alleged unjustifiable illegal and inhuman treatment of your students in the US is not based on any facts and is not at all true. Actually it is groundless. Can you furnish any concrete facts in support of what you have said about alleged ill-treatment and oppression of your students in the US? I have noted what you have said about the welfare Americans mentioned in our previous meeting February 28 and would ask you to continue furnish us information concerning their welfare."

Chinese replied "If we consider certain facts we can state that what we have said about oppression against our students in the US is true because last year during similar meeting in Geneva between our side and your representatives Ambassador Johnson declared US Government had refused 120 exit permit applications for Chinese students to return to their homeland. <sup>4</sup> He then also said that he would propose to American Government to reconsider these 120 refusals. Up to now nothing has come of this. Such a situation is not good." At this point Gowen interrupted to say that this cannot be construed to be considered oppression or ill treatment. The Chinese made note of this and did not make any specific reply. The Chinese then went to say "on August 5, 1954 twenty-six Chinese students in the US after their exit permit application had been refused wrote to Mr. President Eisenhower appealing to him to let them return to their homeland. However their appeal has not been granted. On September 2, 1954 nine students also wrote to Mr. President Eisenhower to be allowed to go home but to no avail. We consider these refusals unjustifiable. Thirty-one Chinese students in the US also wrote to Secretary General UN asking him to support their sacred right to repatriation to enable them to join their families but again in this case the US Government has done nothing. In view these refusals I wish to repeat my request that US Government must grant these students permission to return their homeland. Their desire join their parents wives and children cannot be violated. Why does US Government still hold these innocent students and prevent them to return to China? As you know these Chinese students were sent to the US only to study there and many are now prevented from going home. This we discussed fully during our meeting at time Geneva conference here. There have also been cases in which Chinese students in US have been arrested or detained even when they were just leaving

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<sup>4</sup> Johnson stated this at a meeting with Ambassador Wang Ping-nan on June 15, 1954, but at subsequent U.S.-Chinese meetings in Geneva in 1954, U.S. representatives stated that U.S. objections to the departure of a number of the 120 students had been withdrawn and that the students had been so informed. For documentation, see *Foreign Relations, 1952-1954*, vol. xiv, Part 1, pp. 338 ff.

en route their country. In some cases they were notified by US Government that if they attempted to leave US they will be fined over \$5,000 or imprisoned for 5 years and their passports have actually been taken from them. I again repeat Ambassador Johnson had told us he would ask US Government reconsider 120 exit permit refusals for Chinese students but this reconsideration has not taken place and we do not know if the letter addressed to President Eisenhower has ever been answered. We ask you to communicate what I have said to your government promptly and to let us know at earliest date when we can expect a reply through you from your government." In reply Gowen said "I shall communicate what you have stated to my government and let you know any reply I may receive for you. You said 10 students have already left the US. Actually, basing myself on information which I had as of February 28, last number Chinese students who up to that time had left US was 14. Again as of that time 10 other students had not yet completed their travel plans and 3 had voluntarily decided remain in US. Situation your remaining students who had applied for exit permit was still being examined as of time our previous meeting. I am not aware any ill-treatment oppression or unjustifiable measures against your students in US. Many are pursuing chosen studies or other occupations and no cases are known of unfair or unusual treatment. All are well treated. Are you interested in receiving information about welfare any particular Chinese students in US?"

Chinese replied "should our government be interested in welfare any particular Chinese students in US we shall let you know. Do you have any other matter or question to submit at this meeting?" Gowen said "during our last meeting you stated Americans in your country may freely communicate with relatives in US. I then asked you to request your Red Cross do everything possible to expedite transmission letters from these Americans to their families. Have you received any information this subject?" Chinese answered "we have every reason believe such letters can be freely exchanged through Red Cross channels." Gowen asked whether small packages containing medicines and food stuffs sent to Americans in Red China might be receipted by addressees and if such receipts bearing their signature could be mailed back to families or Red Cross in US. Chinese said "we shall ascertain from our Red Cross if this procedure can be followed and let you know". Gowen said "I stress strong opposition my government and my people to unwarranted detention Americans in your country and repeat demand made under orders from my government for liberation these Americans as I stated here on February 28". Chinese said "we confirm policy our government is to grant Americans permission to leave China after examination provided no cases criminal or civil nature pending against them. By this policy it

protects foreigners who wish leave China but those foreigners who committed crimes against our laws are condemned according our laws".

I followed Department's guidance your niact 817 March 31<sup>5</sup> which explains why I repeated items previous meeting.

Chinese stressed they expect receive early reply and actually asked if I could indicate when next meeting would be held. I said I would promptly communicate with them on being instructed do so by my government. They carefully wrote this down and again said they wished early reply.

On this occasion, despite what they said, all of which was written and discussed in Chinese and then written in French and then checked again with Shen Ping, they seemed more relaxed than at previous meeting. They were first offer hand-shake on our arrival and again on departure.

No press release issued by me.

**Gowen**

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<sup>5</sup> The reference telegram authorized Gowen to meet with the Chinese that afternoon and instructed him to follow the lines laid down in his instructions for the last meeting and to merely note any information or request from the other side for transmittal to the Department. (Department of State, Central Files, 211.9311/3-3155)

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**184. Memorandum for the Files by John Goodyear, Special Assistant to the Deputy Under Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, April 1, 1955.*

On March 31 Admiral Smedberg<sup>2</sup> called to obtain clearance from Mr. Murphy on a proposed signal from JCS to CINCPAC and CINCFE (information CINCSAC) implementing a series of aerial photo reconnaissance missions over Communist China.

The operations would make optimum use of Chinese Nationalist RF 86 capability (three planes). CINCPAC would undertake the operation south of the 30th parallel (but including Shanghai) as necessary in order to determine the buildup of the threat in that area. CINCFE, if requested by CINCPAC would perform similar operations north of the 30th parallel. Operations from Formosa were to be authorized. The results were to be transmitted to JCS in flash re-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5411/4-155. Top Secret.

<sup>2</sup> Rear Admiral William R. Smedberg, Director, Politico-Military Policy Division in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Plans and Policy).

ports. Every precaution was to be taken to avoid detection. The JCS was to be informed of any unusual incident, or detection, or interception during flights.

Admiral Smedberg amplified this instruction by saying that only one plane would go over at a time, that the pass over enemy territory would probably take not more than 20 minutes, that consequently there was little point in including in the signal (as has been done in previous cases) a requirement that if unusual incident, detection or interception occurred, the flight be curtailed in mid-passage and the aircraft returned to base. He said that it was not clear whether, if unusual incident, detection, and/or interception occurred during one flight, and a report of such circumstances were made following return of the aircraft to base, a subsequent overflight would be made without prior clearance from JCS.

Admiral Smedberg added that he had just cleared the signal with FE (Mr. Sebald).

I discussed the matter with Mr. Murphy who also gave his concurrence.

I then telephoned Admiral Smedberg and informed him that the Department had no objection to the signal as presented to me.

## 185. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Hoover) to the Secretary of State <sup>1</sup>

*Washington, April 1, 1955—9 a.m.*

### SUBJECT

White House meeting, April 1, 1955. <sup>2</sup>

The Quemoy-Matsu situation was discussed this morning at the White House. The following were present:

The President  
 Secretary Dulles, State  
 Secretary Humphrey, Treasury  
 Secretary Wilson, Defense  
 Deputy Secretary Anderson, Defense  
 Admiral Radford, J.C.S.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President. Top Secret; Personal and Private. The time of the meeting is from the President's appointment diary. (*Ibid.*, President's Daily Appointments)

<sup>2</sup> Also recorded in a memorandum of conversation by Goodpaster, April 4. (*Ibid.*, Whitman File, ACW Diaries)

Under Secretary Hoover, State  
(Colonel Goodpaster, White House Staff)

The specific reason for the meeting was to discuss Admiral Radford's proposal to send approximately 10,000 U.S. troops to Formosa for manning anti-aircraft and aircraft warning equipment which has recently been delivered, and to train Chinese Nationalist personnel in its use. The President suggested consideration of a more limited number of U.S. troops, with the thought that the Chinese Nationalists would have to fill in more quickly, and the training cycle would thereby be expedited.

The entire Formosa and offshore island situation was then explored in some detail. After an extended discussion, and without coming to any decision, the President summarized the U.S. position in the following terms:

1. The paramount consideration was to preserve the morale and the desire to fight on the part of the Chinats. An immediate withdrawal of potential U.S. support for the Nationalists on Quemoy and Matsu would probably result in the collapse or subversion of their forces, with a correspondingly drastic impact throughout East and Southeast Asia.

2. On the other hand, it was recognized that an all-out fight with the Chicoms, involving the United States, in an effort to retain Quemoy and Matsu, would be undesirable from the following viewpoint:

(a) The military position of the islands is not favorable and the ultimate objectives of such an operation are obscure.

(b) Little or no support from our allies is forthcoming to support our position.

(c) Public opinion within the U.S. would be divided.

(d) Impact on the domestic economy could be serious.  
(Secretary Humphrey)

3. A desirable solution would be to convince Chiang that he should:

(a) Voluntarily evacuate Quemoy and Matsu.

(b) Entrench himself on Formosa, await internal developments on the mainland, and provide a constant military and psychological threat to the Chicom régime.

4. To aid Chiang in reaching such a decision, the U.S. would be willing to:

(a) Land a division of Marines on Formosa.

(b) Augment the U.S. Air Forces and aircraft defenses on the island.

(c) Extend the U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty with the Nationalists to include other powers, such as Australia.

5. The President suggested having someone like General Wedemeyer,<sup>3</sup> who had Chiang's confidence, attempt to convince him of the U.S. sincerity of purpose, and the desirability of following a course such as that outlined.

6. While no decision was reached in the discussion, it was pointed out that time for action by the U.S. was becoming acute. Further Chicom build-up of airfields on the mainland posed a real problem as to whether or not the U.S. would permit the Chinats to attack and neutralize them before, in turn, they were used by the Chicoms for mounting an attack on the offshore islands. It was entirely possible that the U.S. could be drawn into a fight to protect the offshore islands, whether it liked it or not.

Herbert Hoover, Jr.

*Note:* If an exercise such as (5) above were attempted, it seems to me we should drive as hard a bargain with the UK as is possible. Some ideas are:

- (a) Strengthening blockade against Chicoms.
- (b) Greater UK support for U.S. position in Indochina, Korea, Japan, etcetera.

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<sup>3</sup> Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer (retired), served from 1944 through 1946 as Commanding General, U.S. Forces, China Theater, and Chief of Staff to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, Supreme Commander, China Theater. In 1947 he headed a fact-finding mission to China and Korea for President Truman,

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## 186. Letter From the Secretary of State to the Representative at the United Nations (Lodge)<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, April 1, 1955.*

DEAR CABOT: I have received your letter of March 28, with which you enclosed copies of your latest letter to the Secretary General and of his communication to Chou En-lai transmitting the letters from the families of the fliers, together with Mr. Hammarskjöld's letter to you appraising the general situation at this time.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.95A241/3-2855. Limited Official Use.

<sup>2</sup> Lodge's letter of March 28 to Dulles, his letter to Hammarskjöld of March 28 acknowledging the Secretary-General's letter of the same date, and Hammarskjöld's letter of March 25 to Chou are filed with the source text. Hammarskjöld's letter of March 28 to Lodge reads in part as follows:

"To sum up: I have still the same view of Mr. Chou En-lai's frame of mind as I had immediately on my return from Peking and which I expressed publicly as well as privately to you. This is that my exposition of the prisoners' case during our talks at

*Continued*

Please tell the Secretary General that I was very glad to receive his thoughtful appraisal of the situation, which I have read carefully. I want him to know that we appreciate all that he has done. Of course we share his hope that his efforts will result in the early release of the fliers, though so far there seems little reason for optimism. I agree that Mr. Hammarskjold should continue for the time being along the lines indicated in his letter, that is, to pursue what he calls "inner pressures" and "quiet diplomacy". However, if neither the families' appeals nor the need for the Chinese Communists to appear in the best light at Bandung results in the fliers' release, I strongly concur in Hammarskjold's view that we must then consider where we stand and whether there are other approaches that may bring about the fliers' release.

Personally, I share your feeling that events so far are not particularly encouraging, but at the same time I think that Mr. Hammarskjold makes a convincing case that warrants our going along with him at least until the end of April.

Sincerely yours,

*Foster*

**John Foster Dulles**

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Peking did succeed in correcting Peking's misunderstandings as regards facts, and miscalculations as regards the political reactions to their handling of the case; that this had given rise to the prospect that he would find it to his own advantage to release the prisoners provided he could do so without loss of face; and that the question of prestige would weigh even more heavily with his Party than with him."

The Secretary-General recommended that "as long as Mr. Chou En-lai maintains the channel that was established as the result of our Peking conversations we should continue to use it for exercising the maximum inner pressure, attainable by 'quiet' diplomacy, till we are convinced that all the possibilities of achieving our goal have been exhausted." He added that if after the Bandung Conference no progress had been made, it would be useful to review the situation. (*Ibid.*, FE Files: Lot 56 D 679)

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**187. Memorandum From the Secretary of State to the President**<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, April 1, 1955.*

**SUBJECT**

Action Relating to Chinese Students Who Have Been Refused Permission to Leave the United States

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles-Herter Series. Confidential. Seen by the President on April 4 according to a handwritten note by Goodpaster on the source text.

With reference to Mr. Hoover's memorandum of March 3,<sup>2</sup> thorough consideration has been given to the question of the detention of technically-trained Chinese students in the United States in relation to the problem of Americans imprisoned in Communist China. It has been concluded, in the light of our discussions with the Chinese Communists at Geneva, UN Secretary General Hammarskjöld's negotiations at Peiping, and of other evidence, that detention in the United States of students who have been found eligible for departure by the Immigration and Naturalization Service under existing regulations would not contribute to the release of the imprisoned Americans. On the other hand, release of the students would enable the U.S. to press its case against the Chinese Communists more effectively in the United Nations and elsewhere. The Department of State has, therefore, informed the Immigration and Naturalization Service<sup>3</sup> that it has no objection to the departure of any of these Chinese students who have been found eligible for departure or who may hereafter be found so eligible by that Service. Simultaneously, the Department concurred in the rescission of restraining orders which had been issued with respect to 74 Chinese students.

While cases of technically-trained Chinese students who wish to return to the Chinese mainland will continue to be screened under the provisions of Section 215 (a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952,<sup>4</sup> under present criteria few, if any, applicants are likely to be denied permission to depart.

JFD

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<sup>2</sup> The memorandum under reference, from Acting Secretary Hoover to the President, summarized the situation concerning the technically-trained Chinese students who had been denied permission to leave the United States. It stated that the question of their detention had been re-examined when direct talks were initiated with the Chinese Communists at Geneva in June 1954, that their cases had been reviewed and 27 had been granted exit permits as of October 1954, but that since the sentencing of the U.S. airmen, there had been no further action. It concluded that the Department of State was studying the problem and would have recommendations ready in the near future. (Department of State, Central Files, 211.9311/3-355)

<sup>3</sup> In a letter of March 24, to INS Commissioner General Joseph M. Swing. (*Ibid.*, IO Files: Lot 60 D 113, Chinese Students)

<sup>4</sup> Approved June 27, 1952; 66 Stat. 163.



188. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the President and the Secretary of State, Washington, April 4, 1955, 3:30 p.m. <sup>1</sup>

[Here follows discussion concerning Vietnam and other unrelated matters.]

5. We discussed at great length the Formosa situation and related coastal positions. The President said he was dictating a memorandum of what he thought would be a proper position which might appeal to Chiang. <sup>2</sup> I said I had done the same thing and that we might exchange our memoranda. I then gave the President a copy of my memorandum of April 4. <sup>3</sup> The President said his was not yet typed, but that he would give it to me.

The President said he hated to see us drifting into what might be a very bad situation. I said that I was exploring every possibility and that we were working through the British, the Australians and the Canadians, and hoped to bring some pressures to bear at the Bandung Conference.

The President said that Radford had told him that I had conceded that "diplomacy had failed". I said this did not correctly reproduce what I had said. What I had said in answer to an inquiry about the cease fire at the UN was that for the time being that particular effort was stalled, but that not for a moment did I concede that diplomacy had failed. <sup>4</sup>

We agreed that a major problem was to find someone who had Chiang's confidence and who could persuade him that the coastal positions were, in the President's words, "outposts, not citadels". I agreed to check on Wedemeyer, and the President said he would send me a letter from Wedemeyer which had discussed the China

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President. Secret. Drafted by Dulles.

<sup>2</sup> See the memorandum, *infra*.

<sup>3</sup> Secretary Dulles' memorandum, headed "Preliminary Draft of Possible Statement of Position for Communication to the Republic of China, 4/4/55 (3)", is not printed. The substance of most of the memorandum was incorporated into paragraphs 1-15, 19, 21, and 25 of the draft statement of April 8, Document 194. The concluding portion states that the United States would continue to give logistic support to Nationalist forces on Quemoy and Matsu but would fight to defend them only if the President judged this to be required or appropriate for the defense of Taiwan. In the event that they should not be held, the United States "would expect to replace their military role by naval craft and to offset the loss in any other practicable ways". It recommends that they should be regarded as "outposts to be held so long as there is advantage in doing so" but "subject to relinquishment if and when this will serve the major cause." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles-Herter Series)

<sup>4</sup> Reference is to the March 26 conversation recorded in Document 170.

position.<sup>5</sup> I also said I would try to talk with Representative Judd if he were in Washington.<sup>6</sup>

JFD

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<sup>5</sup> Wedemeyer's letter to the President of February 21 expressed support for the President's policy in the Far East but urged that U.S. forces should not become involved in fighting for offshore islands like Quemoy and Matsu. (Eisenhower Library, White House Central Files, Confidential File, Formosan Question)

<sup>6</sup> A memorandum of April 6 from Dulles to the President stated that he had talked that day to Judd, who was "sympathetic to the general line which you outlined in your memorandum to me" and suggested "that he might go out to Taipei perhaps with Wedemeyer to talk to the Gimo." (*Ibid.*, Whitman File, Dulles-Herter Series)

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## 189. Memorandum From the President to the Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, April 5, 1955.*

### SUBJECT

Formosa.

Inspired by the enlightened self-interest of the United States, this country has committed itself, by treaty with the Chinese Nationalist Government, to the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores. The treaty area does not include other islands held by units of the Chinese Nationalist forces. But it is only fair to say that during the course of the past several years, particularly since June 1950, the inter-mixture of warfare, negotiations, public statements and military understandings have given the Chinese Nationalists some right to assume that the United States would probably participate in an active defense of the Quemoy and the Matsu groups of islands.

To do so would commit United States military prestige to a campaign under conditions favorable to the attacker. Because the world generally regards the coastal islands as part of the mainland, our active participation would forfeit the good opinion of much of the Western world, with consequent damage to our interests in Europe and elsewhere. There is much opposition in our own country to becoming involved militarily in defense of the offshore islands, and in

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Memoranda. Top Secret. Sent with a covering memorandum of April 5 from the President, complimenting Dulles on his April 4 memorandum (see footnote 3, *supra*) and suggesting that the two might be combined into one paper which could "form the basis of discussion with other interested officials and associates, so that we can get something started promptly." (Department of State, PPS Files: Lot 66 D 70, China)

the event of such involvement our people would be seriously divided at the very time when increased risk of global war would underline the need for unity. Finally, even a successful defensive campaign would not stabilize the situation; a new attack could be expected at any time. But with American prestige committed to the success of the defense, a disproportionate amount of our disposable, mobile, reserves would be tied down indefinitely to this one spot.

On the other hand refusal to participate in the defense of the offshore areas might have equally disadvantageous results. First, most observers assert that it would dismay the ChiNats, *whose morale and military efficiency are essential to the defense of Formosa—and the security of Formosa is essential to the best interests of the United States and the Western world.* Moreover, further retreat in front of the Chinese Communists could result, it is alleged, in the disintegration of all Asian opposition to the spread of Communism in that continent.

So, today, the Formosan situation presents a hard choice to American political and military leaders; the only logical course of action is to attempt to bring about reasonable changes in the situation rather than to remain inert awaiting the inevitable moment of decision between two unacceptable choices.

The Formosa problem cannot be considered in a vacuum; it is not isolated from the rest of the world. The Chinese Communists have repeatedly announced their determination to capture the island. Opinion in the free world appears to back the American determination to assist the ChiNats in the defense of the main position, that is, Formosa and the Pescadores. But, as stated before, world opinion most emphatically repudiates outside interference in any Communist attack on Quemoy and the Matsus.

As you know, for many weeks I have been devoting time and attention to this problem in the hope of finding some solution. Most of what follows we have often discussed.

#### *Existing Situation*

Since last September, when the Formosan question first came before the National Security Council for intensive study, we have agreed that the defense of the offshore islands presented to the United States very unpalatable problems, both political and military. I have already alluded to some of these.

Geographically the islands are difficult to defend, and their location minimizes rather than maximizes the usefulness of our overwhelming sea strength, which strength would be particularly effective in defending Formosa against the ChiComs.

The offshore islands are subject to constant harassing and concentrated destructive artillery fire from the mainland, and are so situated that an amphibious attack against them could be carried forward

to the landing stages during the hours of darkness of a single day. In view of the overwhelming land forces available to the Red Chinese and the strength of the bombardment that could be brought to bear on the islands, any successful defense would necessarily require counteraction against the mainland of China itself.

We have ample forewarning of the adverse character of world reaction that would follow any such action on our part, especially if we felt compelled to use atomic weapons—which we probably would in order to insure success. The Chinese Nationalists would share our loss of free world support through such an operation, while public opinion in the United States would, to say the least, become further divided. If conflict in that region should spread to global proportions, we would be entering a life and death struggle under very great handicaps.

Even though a defensive effort might be temporarily successful, it would in no way remove the existence of the permanent threat; both governments would be led to immobilize more and more military strength for the single purpose of defending the offshore islands, because our prestige would have become involved, even though involuntarily. We would be isolated in world opinion, and this could affect very disadvantageously our treaties with Japan and in the SEATO region.

As long as Chiang has powerful forces deployed on these offshore islands, he is committed to full-out defense. He is gambling his whole position in Formosa and his future as a useful agent in helping to drive Communism from China against a local and possibly temporary success in a precarious defense of two island groups which are militarily weak.

All of these risks and disadvantages exist because of the calculation that for us to persuade Chiang to adopt any other plan *would result in a collapse of morale on Formosa and the loss to the free world of that bastion of strength.* In other words, the principal military reason for holding these two groups of islands is the estimated effect of their loss upon morale in Formosa.

An added consideration is, of course, the *psychological* effect of such abandonment on other Asiatic nations. It is generally accepted among our associates that retreat from the Matsus and Quemoy—if occasioned by any influence of ours—might create consternation among our friends in Asia, particularly in Thailand, the Philippines, Laos and Cambodia. This, I suspect, is true, and such a result could, of course, counter-balance any gains we might make in winning to our side public opinion elsewhere in the world.

This circumstance, however, in no wise refutes the clear conviction that militarily and politically we and the ChiNats would be much better off if our national prestige were not even remotely com-

mitted to the defense of these islands, and if greater force, ready to take advantage of unforeseen opportunity, were concentrated on Formosa and the Pescadores. Moreover, if Chiang should develop a satisfactory alternative so that it would, under his leadership, be accepted in Formosa and in Southeast Asia as a shrewd move to *improve* his strategic position, his prestige should be increased rather than diminished.

### *The Problem*

The real questions to be answered are these:

(a). What would be the characteristics of a situation that would appear most advantageous to us from the standpoint of treaty obligations in the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores, solidifying American and free world opinion behind us, sustaining the morale of Chiang and his forces on Formosa, and securing the approval and support of friends in Southeast Asia and in the neighboring islands?

(b). What can we do to bring about, in cooperation with Chiang, the essentials of such a situation?

I believe that the situation best calculated to sustain the interests of ourselves and the free world, and to damage the Communists can be roughly described as follows:

(a). Without abandoning the offshore islands, make clear that neither Chiang nor ourselves is committed to *full-out* defense of Quemoy and the Matsus, so that no matter what the outcome of an attack upon them, there would be no danger of a collapse of the free world position in the region. (Incidentally, there is room to suspect the sincerity of Chiang's contention that the retention or loss of the offshore islands would spell the difference between a strong and a destroyed Nationalist government on Formosa. If this is so, his own headquarters *should* be on the offshore islands.)

(b). Initiate, immediately, the process of bringing to Chiang's attention the great advantages, political and military, that would result from certain alterations in his present military plans, as follows:

(1). To regard the offshore islands as outposts and consequently to be garrisoned in accordance with the requirements of outpost positions. This involves vigilant reconnaissance and a maximum of protective works and with properly sited automatic weapons and light artillery, together with effective obstacles, defensive mine systems, and so on. All this should be reinforced by adequate stores of ammunition, of food and medical supplies, all thoroughly protected and available to the garrison as needed. Excess personnel (except such civilians as might decline to leave) should be removed from the islands.

(2). The Nationalist forces on Formosa should assist these garrisons by aerial and sea reconnaissance and fighting support. Plans for defense should be fully coordinated between the forward units and the mobile elements in Formosa.

(3). Adequate plans should be made for determined and persistent defense, and evacuation should take place (if this

finally becomes necessary) only after defensive forces had inflicted upon the attackers heavy and bloody losses.

(4). The process of concentrating, equipping and training of troops on Formosa itself should be expedited. The United States could and would help in this process so as to give to Chiang the greatest possible strength in support of his outpost troops on Quemoy and the Matsus, and in preparing and sustaining the bulk of his forces as a weapon of opportunity, ready to take advantage of any political, military or economic circumstance on the mainland that would give to an invasion a reasonable chance of success.

(5). To protect the prestige of Chiang and the morale of his forces, any alteration in military and political planning should obviously be developed under his leadership; above all, there must be no basis for public belief that the alterations came about through American intervention or coercion.

#### *General Comment*

The worldwide political advantages of such an arrangement would be incalculable. These advantages, I think, are so clearly implied in the earlier parts of this memorandum that I shall not attempt to enumerate them. But for ourselves one of the greatest advantages would be a practically solidified public opinion in the United States.

To bring about the desired situation in the Formosan area, the United States would be prepared to help materially. Such help could take any or all of the following forms:

(a). Acceleration of all plans heretofore approved for the development of Chiang's forces on Formosa.

(b). Stationing of certain elements of American forces on Formosa, particularly of the kinds useful in the protection of that island against external attack and to maintain internal morale. For example, the aircraft squadron we presently have there could be increased to a wing. This would allow Chiang's own air forces to devote their exclusive attention to the support of the forward positions. We could station some additional anti-air craft artillery for the protection of fields, allowing Chiang's units of this kind to be devoted to the protection of cities. We could also station there a couple of regiments of Marines. All of this would be supported by certain logistic formations. Such a layout should have a very fine internal effect, particularly in giving visible evidence to all that the United States is irrevocably committed to the defense of Formosa.

(c). The presence of these troops would likewise be of great assistance in speeding up the training of Chiang's forces, in making certain of prompt replacement of losses, particularly in the air force. Likewise, with this contingent of American forces on the island of Formosa, our own naval units would tend to take a more active part in defensive arrangements, allowing Chiang's forces to be devoted more to active support of the forward positions.

(d). As a final consideration, Chiang would be assured of a much firmer political support throughout the free world than he now enjoys.

While it is true under this system one or more of the forward positions might eventually be lost, such loss would occur only after the defending forces had exacted a fearful toll from the attackers, and Chiang's prestige and standing in Southeast Asia would be increased rather than decreased as a result of a gallant, prolonged and bitter defense conducted under these circumstances. His own losses would be inconsequential both in personnel and in material—the loss of the Communists should be very great indeed.

Finally, an essential ingredient of success will be the skill of the American negotiator picked to present the whole matter to Chiang. The crux of the negotiations must be that "Chiang must sell himself on the validity and value of the suggested program." This means that the negotiator must be a man whom Chiang trusts and who is himself convinced of the soundness of this program.

As you and I have fully agreed, there is no time for unnecessary delay.

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## 190. Editorial Note

At a news conference on April 5, Secretary Dulles replied as follows to a question as to whether the overall world position of the United States would necessarily be weakened or might in fact be strengthened if the United States were to base its commitments in the Formosa area exclusively upon Formosa and the Pescadores:

"I have said many times, and I am glad to have a chance to say again, something which I can repeat by heart: The only commitment of the United States in that area is based exclusively on Formosa and the Pescadores.

"We have a treaty which confines the treaty area to Formosa and the Pescadores. We have a law which says that the armed forces of the United States can be used in that part of the area for the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores. We have no commitment of any kind, sort, or description, expressed or implied, which binds the United States to anything except the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores.

"Now you get to the question—if there seems to be an attack against Formosa and the Pescadores, how do you defend against that attack? That is the only question. Some people say that we should announce in advance precisely how we are going to defend and carry out our commitment on Formosa and the Pescadores and to say we will carry out that commitment by doing this or by not doing that. Once you extend your commitment to defend Formosa to a commitment as to particular means which you may use for defense, then

you are getting into very difficult ground. We have a commitment, certainly, to defend the United States of America. But nobody yet has required us to state publicly precisely what the means would be of defense in the event of certain types of attack which cannot be predicted. I repeat—again and again and again—that our only commitment is to defend Formosa and the Pescadores and if there were no challenge to Formosa and the Pescadores, then there wouldn't be any question as far as we are concerned of fighting in that area." (Department of State *Bulletin*, April 18, 1955, pages 643-644)

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191. **Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs (Young) and the Indonesian Ambassador (Notowidigdo), Department of State, Washington, April 5, 1955**<sup>1</sup>

SUBJECT

Remarks of Soviet Ambassador to Washington on Quemoy and Matsu

At lunch today the Indonesian Ambassador told me, on the basis of strict confidence, that he had recently had a long conversation with Ambassador Zaroubin on various matters including the question of whether or not the Chinese Communists would actually attack Quemoy and Matsu. Ambassador Moekarto said that during this conversation he began teasing Zaroubin, as he put it, about the Soviet Union letting the Chinese attack these two little islands and threatening to bring on a general thermo-nuclear warfare as a result. At first Zaroubin ducked the whole issue but then he finally became rather annoyed and suddenly blurted out that this was not true because the Chinese Communists were not going to attack Quemoy and Matsu. Realizing what he had said, Zaroubin abruptly changed the subject of conversation. Moekarto was sure Zaroubin had let this remark slip unintentionally in a moment of provocation.

In any event Moekarto thought this slip was particularly revealing. It conformed to the reports of the Indonesian Ambassador in Peking who has been telling his government in Djakarta that in his opinion the Chinese Communists would not attack the two islands or Formosa.

On the other hand, Moekarto said that this question of whether they would or would not attack was very confusing. Krishna Menon has told Ambassador Barrington<sup>2</sup> who told Moekarto that the Chi-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/4-555. Secret. Drafted by Young.

<sup>2</sup> James Barrington, Burmese Ambassador to the United States.



nese Communists had the intention of attacking the two islands. When I asked Moekarto whether or not he could tell from the reports of the Indonesian Ambassador in Peking that the Chinese Communists do or do not fully understand the readiness of the United States to help in the defense of Taiwan, Moekarto said that the position of the United States with respect to the two islands is so ambiguous in Washington that neither he nor any of his colleagues with whom he has discussed the matter can evaluate the intentions of the United States and so report accurately to their governments. Moekarto told me quite frankly that he has been sounding out this question with several Asian and European diplomats in Washington all of whom appear completely confused, he said, regarding the United States position on the two islands. He acknowledged that our position on Taiwan is clear but he felt that was not a crucial issue. The question of whether the Chinese Communists will attack the offshore islands and whether the United States will intervene against that attack is the basic problem. He thought it would be better for the United States to announce clearly that it would resist or that it would not. He is afraid that in this "confusion" that the Chinese Communists may become reckless and decide to launch an assault on the offshore islands.

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## 192. Editorial Note

A memorandum of April 5 from the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Ridgway, to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Radford, on the subject "Deployment of Honest John Units to the Island of Formosa", responded to a request from Radford's office for information concerning the possible deployment of "Honest John" rocket batteries to Formosa. The memorandum concludes as follows:

"a. One Honest John battery available for deployment to Japan in June 1955 can be diverted to Formosa.

"b. Up to a total of six Honest John batteries now in Europe could be deployed to the island of Formosa.

"c. Honest John batteries deployed to the island of Formosa will require adequate security and support forces.

"d. Honest John batteries would provide a significant contribution to the defense of the island of Formosa. Their most effective use would be with atomic warheads."

A note in Goodpaster's handwriting attached to a copy of the memorandum noted a conversation on April 4 between himself and

Brigadier General Barksdale Hamlett, Assistant for Planning Coordination in the Office of the Army Chief of Staff. It indicated that on April 5 Goodpaster "Advised Pres Army not look with favor on turning over to ChiNats—but could be effective on Formosa in U.S. units." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Miscellaneous Series, Formosa Area)

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193. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,  
Washington, April 7, 1955 <sup>1</sup>

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary  
Sir Roger Makins, British Ambassador  
Douglas MacArthur II

[Here follows discussion concerning changes in the British Government; on April 6 Eden succeeded Churchill as Prime Minister.]

The Secretary then said he had asked Sir Roger to come in to talk to him primarily about the Bandung Conference. The Secretary felt that the Bandung Conference could exercise a real influence for peace with respect to the Formosa situation if something constructive came out of it. On the other hand, the Secretary had received a recent indication, from Burma he believed, that at Bandung it was probable that a resolution might be adopted which neither the US nor the UK would like. If any resolution or statement came out of Bandung which seemed to give a green light to the Chinese Communists to take Formosa, the possibility of hostilities which could not be confined to the offshore islands and Formosa was greatly enhanced. If, on the other hand, some resolution or statement could come out of Bandung calling for a cease-fire and calling on both parties not to resort to force, the chances of maintaining peace in that area would be very considerably enhanced. In other words, the question of war or peace in the Far East could be significantly affected by what happens at Bandung.

In strictest confidence, the Secretary said he could tell Sir Roger that if assurances could be obtained through the Bandung Conference that the Chinese Communists would agree to a cease-fire regarding Formosa which would leave the islands to be fought for, this would in itself be a considerable contribution, although it would ob-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 670.901/4-755. Top Secret. Drafted by MacArthur. Approved in draft by the Secretary, according to a marginal notation on the source text.

viously be nowhere near as good as an over-all cease-fire such as envisaged in the draft New Zealand Resolution prepared for presentation to the UN. The Secretary said he had decided to urge certain friendly countries which would be represented at Bandung to propose a cease-fire if the subject of peace or the subject of Formosa came up at the Conference.

Sir Roger asked if the Secretary would suggest a general cease-fire or indicate that even a cease-fire for Formosa leaving aside the question of the offshore islands would be helpful. The Secretary replied that he did not contemplate suggesting that the friendly countries propose a cease-fire for Formosa and the Pescadores only, but rather a general cease-fire.

The Secretary then said he had been considerably depressed last evening in thinking over the general situation in Asia. He felt that there were signs that Asian solidarity in an anti-Western sense might be hardening. He did not like Nehru's speech<sup>2</sup> at all. He had attacked the Manila Pact as an organization which increased tension and might lead to hostilities; he had attacked NATO, claiming it gave Portugal Western support in Asia with respect to Goa; he had attacked the Union of South Africa; he had attacked the West for "meddling" in the Middle East. Nehru's speech had in spirit, though not in content, reminded him of a speech made by a Czech, Hromadka,<sup>3</sup> during the 1948 World Council of Churches at Amsterdam. Hromadka had taken the general line that Western civilization had failed and that some new type of civilization was necessary to replace it. Nehru's speech had the same general ring. With respect to Asia, the Secretary felt we were up against a bigger and more long-term problem than the details or incidents which make daily headlines in the press. In effect, he felt that there were Asian elements that were pushing for a pan-Asian movement which would be by its very nature and concept anti-Western. He hoped that the British might, prior to Bandung, also use their very considerable influence with certain friendly Asian countries so that both the Formosa situation and the over-all problem of pan-Asianism might not become more aggravated.

Sir Roger said he would report this conversation to his Government, and he personally felt that they would wish also to take a similar line.<sup>4</sup> He asked to what countries the Secretary contemplated

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<sup>2</sup> Reference is to a speech made by Prime Minister Nehru before the Indian Parliament on March 31; see the *New York Times*, April 1, 1955.

<sup>3</sup> Theologian Joseph L. Hromádka.

<sup>4</sup> On April 11, Peter A. Wilkinson, First Secretary of the British Embassy, informed J. Jefferson Jones, Director of the Office of South Asian Affairs, that the Foreign Office had previously taken steps to urge upon some of the governments which would be represented at Bandung the desirability of a renunciation of force by both

sending messages with respect to a cease-fire between the Chinese Communists and the Chinese Nationalists. The Secretary replied that he had not decided as yet, but had in mind Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, possibly Iraq, and Lebanon in the event that Malik <sup>5</sup> represented that country at Bandung. If Malik went to Bandung, the Secretary would urge him to take a position as indicated above. <sup>6</sup> Sir Roger said that if the Secretary could let him know the sense of the instructions we sent out, and the countries to which they were sent, it would be most helpful. The Secretary replied that he would hope to be able to pass this word on to him tomorrow, giving a list of the countries and the tenor of our instructions. <sup>7</sup>

The Secretary reiterated his grave concern regarding the Formosa situation and his belief that the action of the Chinese Communists will be influenced to a very considerable extent on what backing or approval they believe they will get from other Asian powers. He then mentioned and described in some detail the Chinese Communist activity in building up and improving their air fields along the coast and in the interior area opposite and just to the north and south of Formosa.

[Here follows discussion relating to Burma.]

*D MacA*

**Douglas MacArthur II**

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sides in the Formosa dispute. (Memorandum of conversation by Jones, April 11; Department of State, Central Files, 670.901/4-1155)

<sup>5</sup> Charles Malik, Lebanese Ambassador to the United States.

<sup>6</sup> Dulles talked to Malik on April 8 and 9.

<sup>7</sup> See Document 197.

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## 194. Draft Policy Statement Prepared in the Department of State <sup>1</sup>

[Washington,] April 8, 1955.

### FORMOSA

#### *I. Basic U.S. Interest in Taiwan (Formosa)*

1. The security of Taiwan (including the Pescadores) is essential to the best interests of the United States and the Western world. In

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles-Herter Series. Secret. The document, labeled "Draft", was a revision by Dulles of an April 7 draft prepared in

*Continued*

unfriendly hands, it would seriously threaten the security of the U.S. and its allies in the Pacific.

2. The U.S., as a matter of enlightened self-interest, is resolved to help to maintain a Free China Government on Taiwan. This is a fundamental position. It is based not only on loyalty to a faithful ally and a sense of responsibility to the people of Taiwan, but also on the desire to see the restoration of freedom to the Chinese people on the mainland. We believe that opportunities to restore freedom will arise, and that they can be most effectively used if there is a Free China Government on Taiwan.

3. For a year or two after the Chinese Nationalists had gone to Taiwan, when the Communist revolution had not yet fully consolidated its hold on the mainland, hopes could realistically be held of an early overthrow of the Communist régime by armed invasion of the mainland by the Chinese Nationalists on their initiative. This possibility seems now to have disappeared. The Communists have had more than five years to consolidate their position and entrench their police system. Now, the Republic of China may have to await an opportunity of a different character and one that cannot be wholly of its making or timing.

4. While the precise nature and timing of such opportunities cannot be forecast, they might arise from:

(a) a schism within the top leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, of the sort shown by Soviet and Chinese experience to be chronic in societies which have no orderly means of effecting a change in government;

(b) uprisings by the Chinese people against the economic or other hardships to which they are subjected by the Communist régime;

(c) a Communist attack upon Taiwan of such a character that the effort, coupled with the inevitable reply, would dislocate the inadequate sea and land communication system of mainland China and break the hold of the Chinese Communists on all or important parts of the mainland; or

(d) the outbreak of a general Far East war through Communist armed attack which would bring into play the Manila Pact or bring about renewed warfare in Korea, thus engaging the Chinese Communist forces on more than one front.

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the Policy Planning Staff, which combined Eisenhower's April 5 memorandum, Document 189, and Dulles' April 4 memorandum. Concerning the latter, see footnote 3, Document 188. (April 7 draft with Dulles' handwritten revisions: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Memoranda; copy of April 8 paper: Department of State, PPS Files: Lot 66 D 70, China) The draft was sent to the President with a covering note of April 8 from Dulles stating that he planned to discuss it with Radford at lunch. (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Memoranda) The source text is filed with a note by Ann Whitman, April 9, stating that the Secretary discussed it with the President and was to confer with Walter Judd and possibly General Wedemeyer. The document was not revised as was apparently intended; see Document 207.

5. An alert and well-placed Free Chinese Government, with power at its disposal and with influence on the mainland by reason of its conduct and example, might be able to profit from these opportunities. That the ChiComs are aware of this fact is shown by the intensity of their antagonism toward the Republic of China.

## *II. U.S. Policies with Respect to Taiwan*

6. The U.S. has given support—moral, economic and military—to the Republic of China on Taiwan in an ever-mounting degree. Total economic aid over the last five years amounts to \$527,000,000, and military aid can be valued at \$948,000,000. Both economic and military aid are now at a new peak.

7. In 1950, after the Communist aggression in Korea, the U.S. Seventh Fleet was ordered to protect Taiwan against possible attack. It is true that at the same time it was ordered to prevent attack from Taiwan against the mainland, but this provision was withdrawn in February 1953, while the orders to the Seventh Fleet to protect Taiwan remained in force.<sup>2</sup>

8. In 1954, the U.S. concluded a Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of China, so as to bring its treaty relations with that Republic into harmony with the system of mutual defense treaties linking the U.S. with other countries of the Western Pacific area.

9. The U.S. has continued to recognize the Republic of China as the Government of China and its influence in this respect has doubtless been an important factor in leading to the continuance of such recognition by some forty other countries. The U.S. has also taken the lead in preventing the substitution of the Chinese Communist régime for the Republic of China in the U.N.

## *III. U.S. Position with Respect to the Offshore Islands*

10. The U.S. has never considered that retention by Nationalist China of the offshore islands was essential to the U.S. interests described in Section I and the U.S. policies described in Section II.

11. The U.S. did not agree to the proposal of the Republic of China that these coastal positions be included in the treaty area defined by the Mutual Defense Treaty, and that position was in turn accepted by the Republic of China. In consequence, the only treaty obligation of the United States to the Republic of China is to defend Taiwan and the Pescadores and to react to an armed attack "directed against" those islands.

12. Public Law 4, which authorizes the President to use the armed forces of the United States in the Taiwan area, conforms to

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<sup>2</sup> See the extract from President Eisenhower's message to Congress of February 2, 1953, printed in *Foreign Relations, 1952-1954*, vol. xiv, Part 1, p. 140.

the treaty. It authorizes the defense of areas related to Taiwan only if their defense is judged by the President to be "required or appropriate in assuring the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores".

13. It follows from the foregoing that it would be very difficult for the President to make an unconditional decision to defend the coastal positions. If, for example, future developments should lead the President to judge that the Chinese Communists did not have the intention of taking Taiwan by force, he would not be justified in using the armed forces of the United States to defend the coastal positions.

(#14 deleted)<sup>3</sup>

#### *IV. Factors Favoring U.S. Participation in Defense of the Offshore Islands*

15. The offshore islands are useful, though not essential, to the defense of Taiwan itself. They block exit from two harbors, Amoy and Foochow, which would be natural points for the staging of a sea invasion of Taiwan. Possibly, however, this function could largely be replaced by an increased use of naval craft which could blockade the two harbors.

16. The principal military reason for seeking to hold the two groups of islands is the estimated effect of their loss upon morale in Taiwan. That morale and the military efficiency of the Chinese National Army are essential to the defense of Taiwan. From the combination of recent military operations, negotiations, public statements and military understandings the Chinese Nationalists may well have the impression, and certainly have a strong hope, that the United States would participate in an active defense of the islands. The risk exists, therefore, that for us to refuse to participate in the defense of the offshore islands and to seek to persuade Chiang to adopt any other plan than all-out defense, would result in a collapse of morale on Taiwan and the loss to the free world of that bastion of strength.

17. Further retreat in front of the Chinese Communists could result in mounting aggression on the part of the Chinese Communists and the discouragement of Asian opposition to the spread of communism. Loss of the Matsus and Quemoy—if attributed to our timidity—might create doubts in Japan and concern among our friends in Asia, particularly in Thailand, the Philippines and Korea.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>3</sup> Parenthetical insertion in the source text.

<sup>4</sup> The statements in paragraphs 16 and 17 go beyond the agreed intelligence estimates. Alternative paragraphs based on those estimates are being prepared. [Footnote in the source text.]

*V. Factors Against U.S. Participation in Defense of Offshore Islands*

18. Geographically, the offshore islands are difficult to defend. Their location minimizes rather than maximizes the usefulness of our overwhelming sea strength, which would be particularly effective in defending Taiwan. The offshore islands are subject to constant harassing and concentrated destructive artillery fire from the mainland, and are so situated that an amphibious attack against them could be carried forward to the landing stages during the hours of darkness of a single day. In view of the overwhelming land forces available to the Red Chinese and the strength of the bombardment that could be brought to bear on the islands, any successful defense would necessarily require counteraction against the mainland of China itself. For the U.S. to undertake their defense would commit our military prestige to a campaign under conditions favorable to the attacker.

19. It is the view of U.S. military advisers, based on recent intensive study, that a defense of the coastal islands cannot be assured without the use of atomic weapons. It seems likely that certain of the major offensive capabilities of the Chinese Communists as against the coastal positions could not be nullified without so considerable a use of atomic weapons that there would be risk of large civilian casualties through after-effects, and indeed the inhabitants of Quemoy and even Taiwan might not be immune under certain atmospheric and wind conditions. Aside from the effects on U.S. interests, it would seem doubtful that the long-range interest of the Republic of China would be served by a defense of the coastal positions involving a use of atomic weapons with consequences which might destroy any hope of good will and future favorable reception of the Republic of China by the Chinese people.

20. Even though a defensive effort might be temporarily successful, it would in no way stabilize the situation or remove the existence of the permanent threat. Both the U.S. and Nationalist Chinese governments would be led to immobilize more and more military strength for the single purpose of defending the offshore islands. A disproportionate amount of our disposable, mobile reserves would be held down indefinitely to this one spot, because our prestige would have become involved, even though involuntarily.

21. The islands are not important for a return by the Chinese Nationalists to the mainland, assuming opportunities as described in Section I above should make this feasible. The mainland area immediately opposite Taiwan is largely separated by mountains from the portions of China which are economically and politically significant, and there are few means of communication. If it were intended to have a landing operation from Taiwan to the mainland, a direct operation, preferably south of Amoy or north of Foochow, would be



more appropriate. Yet, as long as Chiang has significant forces deployed on these offshore islands, he is committed to full-out defense. He is gambling his whole position in Taiwan and his future as a useful agent in helping to drive communism from China against a local and possibly temporary success in a precarious defense of two island groups which are militarily weak.

22. The Taiwan problem cannot be considered in a vacuum; it is not isolated from the rest of the world. Western opinion appears to back the American determination to assist the Chinese Nationalists in the defense of the main position, that is, Taiwan. But world opinion preponderantly questions outside intervention to resist any Communist attack on Quemoy and the Matsus. Because the world generally regards the coastal islands as part of the mainland, our active participation would forfeit the good opinion of much of the Western world, with consequent damage to our interests in Europe and elsewhere; it could affect very disadvantageously our treaties with Japan and in the Southeast Asia region. We have ample forewarning of the adverse character of world reaction that would follow any such action on our part, especially if we felt compelled to use atomic weapons. Moreover, there is much opposition in our own country to becoming involved militarily in defense of the offshore islands, and in the event of such involvement our people would be seriously divided at the very time when increased risk of global war would underline the need for unity. If conflict in that region should spread to global proportions, we would be entering a life and death struggle under very great handicaps.

23. It is desirable that the Chinese Nationalists rather than the United States assume the burden of any fighting near the China mainland. There are two important reasons for this:

(a) It is the Chinese Nationalists, not the Americans, who are contenders for the support of the Chinese people. It is the discipline, loyalty, and will to fight of the Chinese Nationalists which has been consistently disparaged by Communist propaganda. A battle which they won, on their own, or even a battle which they lost under conditions which would reflect high honor on the vanquished in the face of overwhelming odds, would be far more advantageous to the Chinese Nationalists than a defense which could be sustained only by United States might, particularly if that was expressed in atomic terms.

(b) It is furthermore of the utmost importance that the issue should not take on the appearance of a struggle between races. A strong effort is being made by the Chinese Communists to create all-Asian sentiment against the white West. This anti-Western attitude was strongly reflected by Nehru's recent speech. It is important that if there is fighting around Taiwan, it should be primarily a fight between the Chinese Nationalists and the Chinese Communists, and

not a fight between the "white" Westerners and the "yellow" Chinese.

#### *VI. The Basic Problem*

24. Analysis of the above factors leads to the clear conviction that militarily and politically we and the Chinese Nationalists would be much better off if our national prestige were not even remotely committed to the defense of the coastal islands, and if greater force, ready to take advantage of unforeseen opportunity, were concentrated on Taiwan and the Pescadores.

25. It is in the interest of the Republic of China, as well as in our own, that the Republic of China not commit its prestige to the defense of these perhaps indefensible positions so deeply that, if they should be lost, all future possibilities now represented by the Republic of China would also be lost. The lesson of Dien Bien Phu should not be forgotten. Originally conceived to be an outpost of transitory value, it gradually became converted into a symbol, so that when it fell, all else fell with it. The same mistake should not be repeated in regard to Quemoy and Matsu, islands which without U.S. aid are probably indefensible, and even with it may not be defensible except by means which would defeat the larger common purpose.

26. The only logical course of action is to attempt to bring about reasonable changes in the situation rather than to remain inert awaiting the inevitable moment of decision between two unacceptable choices.

27. The real problem is to determine:

(a) What solution would be most advantageous to the U.S. from the standpoint of treaty obligations for the defense of Taiwan and the Pescadores, solidifying American and free world opinion behind us, sustaining the morale of Chiang and his forces on Taiwan, and securing the approval and support of friends in Southeast Asia and in the neighboring islands?

(b) What can we do to bring about, in cooperation with Chiang, the essentials of such a solution?

#### *VII. Proposed Course of Action*

28. The offshore islands should be regarded as outposts to be held so long as there is advantage in doing so. Whether they should be evacuated or held, and if held, how strongly held, should be decided in these terms. The islands should, however, be regarded as subject to relinquishment if and when this will serve the major cause: the defense of Taiwan. The U.S. should seek to persuade Chiang to adopt this point of view.

29. Without suggesting that the offshore islands should now be abandoned, it should be made manifest that neither Chiang nor the U.S. is so committed to the defense of Quemoy and the Matsus that,

if they should fall, there would be danger of a collapse of the free world position in the region.

30. If Chiang prefers an outpost role to evacuation, the offshore islands should be garrisoned in accordance with the requirements of outpost positions: vigilant reconnaissance, a maximum of protective works, properly sited automatic weapons and light artillery, together with effective obstacles, defensive mine systems, etc., all reinforced by adequate stores of ammunition, food and medical supplies, thoroughly protected and available to the garrison as needed. Excess personnel (except such civilians as might decline to leave) should be removed from the islands.

31. The Nationalist forces on Taiwan should assist these garrisons by aerial and sea reconnaissance and fighting support. Plans for defense should be fully coordinated between the forward units and the mobile elements in Taiwan. Adequate plans should be made for determined and persistent defense. Evacuation should take place (if this finally becomes necessary) only after the defensive forces had inflicted upon the attackers heavy and bloody losses.

32. The process of concentrating, equipping and training of troops on Taiwan itself should be expedited. The United States should continue to help in this process, in order to give to Chiang the greatest possible strength in support of his outpost troops on Quemoy and the Matsus, and in preparing and sustaining the bulk of his forces for the defense of Taiwan and ready to take advantage of any favorable political, military or economic circumstances on the mainland.

33. Certain additional elements of American forces should be stationed on Taiwan, particularly of the kinds useful in the protection of that island against external attack and to maintain internal morale. For example, the U.S. could: (a) increase the aircraft squadron presently there to a wing, thus allowing Chiang's own air force to devote its exclusive attention to the support of the forward positions; (b) station some additional anti-aircraft artillery for the protection of fields, allowing Chiang's units to be devoted to the protection of cities; (c) station there a couple of regiments of Marines; (d) support all these forces with certain logistic formations. The presence of these forces would have a very salutary effect in giving visible evidence to all that the United States is irrevocably committed to the defense of Taiwan, would be of great assistance in speeding up the training of Chiang's forces and making certain of prompt replacement of losses, particularly in the air force, and would enable our own naval units to take a more active part in defensive arrangements, allowing Chiang's forces to be devoted more to active support of the forward positions.

34. To protect the prestige of Chiang and the morale of his forces, any alteration in military and political planning should obvi-

ously be developed under his leadership; above all, there must be no basis for public belief that the alterations came about through American intervention or coercion.

35. An essential ingredient of success will be the skill of the American negotiator picked to present the whole matter to Chiang. The crux of the negotiations must be that Chiang must convince himself of the validity and value of the suggested program. This means that the negotiator must be a man whom Chiang trusts and who is himself convinced of the soundness of this program.

#### *VIII. Benefits of Proposed Course*

36. The worldwide political advantages of such an arrangement would be incalculable. These advantages are so clearly implied in the earlier parts of this memorandum that it is not necessary to enumerate them. For ourselves one of the greatest advantages would be a practically solidified public opinion in the U.S. As for the Republic of China, Chiang and his government would be assured of a much firmer political support throughout the free world than they now enjoy.

37. While it is true that under this proposal one or more of the forward positions might eventually be lost, such loss would occur only after the defending forces had exacted a fearful toll from the attackers, and Chiang's prestige and standing would be increased rather than decreased as a result of a gallant, prolonged and bitter defense conducted under these circumstances. His own losses would be inconsequential both in personnel and in material—the losses of the Communists should be very great indeed.

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#### 195. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, April 8, 1955, 2:35 p.m. <sup>1</sup>

##### SUBJECT

Asian-African Conference

##### PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary of State  
General Carlos P. Romulo <sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 670.901/4-1455. Confidential. Drafted by Bell on April 14. The time of the meeting is from Dulles' appointment diary. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers)

<sup>2</sup> General Romulo, President Magsaysay's personal representative in the United States, was to represent the Philippines at the Bandung Conference.

Mr. Niles Bond, UNP  
Mr. James D. Bell, PSA

The Secretary complimented General Romulo on the fine opening statement which the General plans to make at the Bandung Conference (General Romulo had read this statement to Ambassador Lacy,<sup>3</sup> Mr. MacArthur and Mr. Bond on April 7.)<sup>4</sup> The Secretary observed that the Bandung meeting might be very dangerous to which General Romulo agreed.

The Secretary stated that he believed it possible that the Chinese Communist decision as to whether they should attack Quemoy, Matsu and Taiwan might depend on the attitude which they found among the powers meeting at the Bandung Conference. If this is the case a resolution deploring the use of force in the Taiwan Strait area and urging a cease-fire might deter an over [over] attack. The Secretary gave General Romulo a short draft resolution (copy attached)<sup>5</sup> which might be considered at the Bandung Conference. General Romulo after reading it said he thought it was fine and indicated that he would make use of it at the Bandung meeting.

The Secretary pointed out that the Chinese Communists have publicly and at great length announced their intention of attacking Taiwan. He stated that if the Communists were to refrain from such announcements and were to announce they had no intention of attacking Taiwan, at the same time agreeing to a cessation of all hostilities, our position with respect to Quemoy and Matsu would be subject to change.

The Secretary stated that the Chinese Communists have an exceptionally poor claim to Taiwan which has not been controlled by Mainland China for 60 years. He pointed out that the Japanese Peace Treaty provided only that the Japanese relinquish Taiwan. He said that at Cairo it was agreed that Taiwan would go to Chiang Kai-shek's government which was then and is the "Republic of China".

The Secretary gave General Romulo a statement reviewing the development of U.S. policy toward Taiwan with 43 documentary attachments.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>3</sup> William S.B. Lacy, appointed Ambassador to Korea and former Counselor in Manila.

<sup>4</sup> No record of the conversation has been found in Department of State files.

<sup>5</sup> The attached draft resolution reads as follows:

*"Considering that the occurrence of armed hostilities in the area of the Formosa Strait has created a situation the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security;*

*"Calls upon the parties concerned to renounce forthwith the use of force or the threat of force as a means of securing their stated rights and interests."*

<sup>6</sup> Reference is apparently to a document entitled "Materials Relating to Taiwan (Formosa)", dated April 7, 1955, which included an account of U.S. policy with regard to Taiwan from 1950 through 1955, a discussion of the status of Taiwan, and 43 an-

196. Telegram From the Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group, Formosa (Chase) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Stump) <sup>1</sup>

*Taipei, April 8, 1955—4:14 p.m.*

080814Z. Exclusive for Adm Stump, Adm Carney, Adm Pride. Cite 6901. Subj is msg fr Min Yu Ta Wei:

"1. The vital necessity of control of strait. Our hitherto air and naval control of Taiwan Strait has made it impossible for ChiComs to touch off another war by invading this island. The maintenance of status quo depends entirely on retention and strengthening of this control.

2. Significance of ChiCom air bldup. A ChiCom air bldup across strait would challenge this control. (An event I anticipated in my conv with Adms Carney and Stump, 3 Mar 55.) <sup>2</sup> My apprehension is justified by fol air recon repts of recent ChiCom air bldup across the strait:

a. About 60 MIGs in Siang Tan airfield near Nan Chang (see photos taken 17 Mar 55.)

b. 42 MIGs in Lu Chow airfield (see photos taken 5 Apr 55.)

c. Construction of airfield in Chenhai near Swatow (see photos taken 5 Apr 55).

d. Expansion of Foochow air field (see photos taken 5 Apr 55).

e. Movements of enemy jet bombers fr Manchuria to Tsinan in Shantung Province and further southward movements are contemplated (fr our technical info sources).

3. Conclusions from the above:

a. The ChiComs are rushing their air bldup across the strait.

b. POL supplies obviously must come in to these coastal fields by tankers and other coastwise shipping.

c. Our control of Formosan Strait will soon be challenged and localization of war here will no longer be possible.

d. The fatal mistake of acquiescing in Yalu sanctuary must not be repeated.

4. Rqsts to US govt: early concurrence in: a. our bombing of enemy air bases in Swatow, Foochow and Luchow."

nexes, consisting of treaties, public statements, and U.N. documents. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/4-755)

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/4-855. Top Secret; Priority. Received at the Department of Defense at 2:56 p.m. Repeated for information to the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commander, Formosa Defense Command. A copy is also in JCS Records, CCS 381 Formosa (11-8-48) Sec. 21.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 140.

*MAAG comment:* 1. The bldup across the straits is genuine and becoming more and more threatening. ChiCom dependence for logistic spt on tankers and coastal shipping is obvious.

2. ChiNats are becoming very disturbed and restive in face of this bldup and our present US restrictions on their opns against ChiCom harbors and airfields.

3. I recommend approval of their rqst to attack these three airfields (Luchow, Foochow, and Swatow). This is justified fr a purely mil viewpnt and also fr the viewpnt of psychological reaction upon East Asia.

4. Amb Rankin and I recommend a blockade of the China coast of all shipping, Swatow incl to Chekiang-Fukien boundary.

5. Amb Rankin and I feel strongly that it is time for some ChiNat counteraction to be taken and that it is not right to require the ChiNats to stay here and do nothing in the face of this obvious bldup and threat.

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197. **Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Embassy in Turkey**<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, April 8, 1955—8:33 p.m.*

1295. From Secretary. Decision on part of ChiComs whether to resort to force to make good their claims against Formosa and off-shore islands, with resultant hostilities which probably could not be confined to these islands, may in large part be determined by ChiComs' judgment on whether majority of Asian nations would feel resort to force by ChiComs justified. Therefore Bandung Conference (where ChiComs may form their estimate of Asian reaction to use of force against islands) may have decisive effect on ChiComs' subsequent action and on whether there is peace or war in Far East.

If you believe it appropriate please convey foregoing orally to Foreign Minister or head of Bandung Conference delegation<sup>2</sup> as my estimate and express strong hope that if at Bandung Conference subjects of peace or Formosan situation are discussed his delegation would find it possible to urge strongly that Conference call on par-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 670.901/4-855. Secret. Drafted by MacArthur; cleared with Assistant Secretaries Robertson and Allen; and approved and personally signed by the Secretary. Also sent to Cairo, Baghdad, Tehran, Karachi, Bangkok, and Tokyo and repeated for information to Jakarta.

<sup>2</sup> Reports from the addressee missions, all of which, including the Embassy at Jakarta, reported that they conveyed the message to an appropriate person, are *ibid.*, 670.901 and 793.00.

ties concerned to renounce threat or use of force in Formosa Straits area. Such action at Bandung could in final analysis be deciding factor whether or not war breaks out in Pacific.

Dulles

198. **Telegram From the Consul General at Geneva (Gowen) to the Secretary of State**<sup>1</sup>

*Geneva, April 8, 1955—10 p.m.*

805. Today, April 8, had meeting Hotel Beau Rivage, Geneva, with Chinese Communist officials, Shen Ping, Acting Consul General, Yeh Ching-pa, aide, and Hsu Wei-chin, interpreter. Meeting lasted four and half hours. Language French. After stating I requested this meeting by order my government in whose name I am speaking, I delivered to Shen English text Department's April 2 press release<sup>2</sup> on Chinese students. I orally translated release into French. Text was then translated into Chinese. After lengthy discussion among Chinese themselves during which Shen made copious notes, I in strongest terms categorically rejected Chinese Communists' groundless allegations about illegal, inhuman and oppressive treatment Chinese students in US. I most emphatically stated and stressed all facts stated for my guidance in Department telegram 828.<sup>3</sup> In doing so, I took every occasion vigorously to impress upon Shen and his associates very grave and deep indignation and resentment American people and my government at pitiful plight Americans detained in Red China. I bitterly deplored failure Chinese Communists furnish satis-

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.95A241/4-855. Confidential; Niact. Received at 9:37 p.m. Repeated for information to London, New Delhi, Hong Kong, and New York.

<sup>2</sup> The press release stated that the cases of those Chinese students who had been previously refused permission to leave the United States were under reexamination, that on March 31 the Immigration and Naturalization Service rescinded restraining orders in the cases of 76 students, who were consequently free to depart, and that it was anticipated that action would soon be completed on the few remaining cases. For text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, April 11, 1955, p. 627.

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 828 to Geneva, April 4, instructed Gowen that at the meeting he had requested with the Chinese representative, he should 1) give him the April 2 press release; 2) reject categorically the accusation of mistreatment of Chinese students in the United States; 3) state that the total number of Chinese students whose departure had been temporarily restrained but who had left or were now permitted to leave was 103 and that, except for several cases still under review, no Chinese student who desired to return to the mainland was being prevented from doing so; and 4) emphasize that the Communist failure to take action on the cases of the detained Americans was a major concern and had incurred the deep resentment of the American people. (Department of State, Central Files, 211.9311/3-3155)



factory and prompt information re welfare these Americans and also failure explain their illegal detention which is causing and has caused so much sorrow and anxiety their families. Communist treatment these Americans contrasts sharply with excellent treatment, I said, consistently extended Chinese students by US Government. I said treatment extended Americans in Communist China is abhorrent to all principles justice, humaneness and fairness.

Following every item in Department telegram 828 and stressing every point I most vigorously again rejected all Communist Chinese charges about alleged illegal, inhuman and oppressive treatment Chinese students. Interpreter translated all I said sentence-by-sentence. Shen Ping, when I concluded, went into long discussion with his aides and after consulting various files prepared written statement in Chinese which was translated.

"First of all, I wish make declaration about press release you have handed me. I shall send this release to my government. I reserve right let you know some future date my government's reaction. I had not previously received press release. Now about our students in US: They number about 5,000. They all have full right return their homeland. US Government should not have prevented them from going home. US should also have re-established promptly right these 5,000 students return their homeland and should not have ill-treated them."

(At this point I interrupted him to repeat Chinese students in US have not been ill-treated but on contrary have been treated very well, indeed, as I had previously stated. Shen said he would make note my objection and report to his government).

[Here follows a continuation of Shen's statement with periodic interruptions by Gowen. Shen cited cases of Chinese students in the United States who had allegedly been mistreated and charged that those Chinese who had found employment in the United States had done so only because they had been prevented from returning to China. Gowen disputed his allegations and requested further details concerning the cases.]

Shen noted my interruption and continued:

"I wish repeat US Government must grant permission our students to return their homeland and must not refuse their applications leave US. I also wish declare our attitude towards Americans in China who respect our laws is friendly and that we accord them all proper protection. Exit permits will be granted these Americans after prescribed examination provided they actually apply for exit permits. Those Americans in China who have committed crimes must be tried and condemned according our laws. Chinese Government in all such cases is inspired and guided by principles of justice. American protests about treatment we extend to Americans in China is groundless and is categorically rejected. Regarding Americans in China who have been tried and condemned and are in prison for their crimes, I

wish to repeat what I said: Namely, all foreigners who commit crimes in China are sentenced to prison terms according our laws. Regarding Mrs. Bradshaw, I wish confirm she was released from prison because she was in poor health and that she has received medical care from our government."

(Here I repeated my previous protest pointing out despite several such meetings Geneva since August 1954 Communists failed inform us Mrs. Bradshaw released from prison because ill-health in August 1954. I stressed utter lack any plausible reason for not giving us this information promptly.)

Shen noted my remarks and continued:

"Treatment extended Mrs. Bradshaw is human [*humane*]. Now I wish confirm except Mrs. Bradshaw who is ill, all other Americans in China are in good health. Your side should always consider great difference between Chinese students in US and those Americans in China who have been condemned because they violated Chinese laws. As I said before, our students went to US to study and have all right return their homeland. They have nothing in common with Americans who have committed crimes in China. I now wish tell you if Americans who have been condemned in China behave well a reduction their sentences can be envisaged in each case. According to press release you handed me today restraining orders were rescinded March 31 last regarding 76 Chinese students and release states they are free return their homeland. I ask you let us know names these 76 students and if they have actually left US. If they have not left, let us know date their coming departure in each case. You told us today only 60 out of group about 120 Chinese students expressed desire leave US for their homeland. We wish know why these 60 students do not wish go home. This, we do not understand."

(I repeated though my government had legal right force early departure these students, it has always allowed them freedom make their own travel arrangements or remain in US if they so desired. This was noted by Shen without comment.)

He then continued:

"Your press statement April 2 also states there is one student among group 31 who petitioned UN Secretary General who case expected be settled shortly and 30 this group have been granted permission leave. We ask you give us name this single unsettled case this group and if he will obtain permission leave. We also wish know how many pending cases there are now; namely, how many students who have applied for permission return their homeland have not yet received this permission. We wish to know their names and whereabouts. As to group 26 students who petitioned President Eisenhower, you say 24 have been given permission depart and one case has not yet been completed and that there is no record other ever refused permission depart. We ask you give us names these two unsettled cases and let us know whether their applications to leave will be granted. On September 2, 1954, 9 Chinese students petitioned President Eisenhower for permission leave. We ask you let us know if

their petition was answered and, if so, if they will be allowed leave. As to parcels for Americans in China, Chinese Red Cross can arrange return receipts be sent to senders through available Red Cross channels if such receipts are requested. However, receipts for these parcels can only be signed by Chinese Red Cross officials. We shall report to our government that you have said about February 10 telegram sent by American Red Cross to Chinese Red Cross proposing action expedite deliveries mail and packages from US to American prisoners in China. We shall let you know when we receive reply this case. Now I wish refer again Americans sentenced in China and inform you they always receive good treatment. This is confirmed by all Americans and other nationals who have left China. I have noted all you have stated today and wish confirm I shall report this to my government."

At this point I pointed out extremely few isolated cases alleged incidents involving Chinese in US have not been proved and in any case would not in any way disprove excellent treatment always so generously extended to Chinese students in US. I again vigorously rejected all Chinese Communist charges to contrary.

Again I urged Chinese Communists give us prompt and complete information welfare whereabouts Americans in Red China, to let us know promptly names those who apply exit permits, to expedite their release and again urged action be taken also expedite exchange letters through Red Cross channels. I again stressed deep American resentment for Chinese Communist failure take favorable action on cases Americans detained. I vigorously repeated our patience and magnanimity should not be misconstrued as situation Americans in China is very grave concern my government and people and longer this situation remains unsettled more serious becomes our indignation. This matter is very important and urgently demands prompt favorable solution by Chinese Communists, I stressed. Today, I added, your side has requested much detailed information which you say you expect to receive from us. Our side shall likewise expect you to furnish us detailed information we have today requested you to furnish us. Shen made a note of this and meeting ended. All three Chinese in order rank then offered handshake and all solemnly muttered single word goodbye. No press release issued by me.

I attended meeting unaccompanied. Shillock in England on leave.

**Gowen**

199. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Stump)  
to the Chief of Naval Operations (Carney) <sup>1</sup>

*Honolulu, April 8, 1955—5:59 p.m.*

090359Z. Exclusive for Adm Carney from Adm Stump.

Part 1. As I see the situation from the international and national viewpoint, it is the desire of our government to have the minimum possible combat activity between the ChiComs and ChiNats.

Up to the present time and for some time in the past, ChiCom-ChiNat combat activities have been limited to action at sea or very close to the coastline of the mainland. Such actions have been largely supported by ChiCom water transport with very little build-up within striking distance of Taiwan nearer than the Ningpo and Canton complexes. By my 082103Z <sup>2</sup> and by other messages and other means, CNO is cognizant of a radical change in ChiCom dispositions, facilities and concentrations of war-making potentials directed toward ChiNat territory and which ChiNats are desirous of striking in the formative stages. Such a course of action if permitted represents a radical increase in tempo from previous coastal actions by ChiNat air units to actions in the interior against ChiCom potentially offensive dispositions which are near enough to strike Taiwan and supposedly have that end in view.

As I see it our government is immediately faced with the necessity of making one of two vitally important decisions, as follows:

a. Grant permission to ChiNats to conduct airstrikes against ChiCom airfields which are inland from the coast but near enough and in such state of completion or concentration of aircraft and supporting facilities as to constitute a direct threat against Kinmen, Matsu and even Taiwan itself or

b. Restrain the ChiNats and permit the ChiCom build-up to continue unopposed.

Part 2. While I do not pretend to know Communist intentions, I do not think that they will do anything that is not a cold and calcu-

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/4-955. Top Secret. Received at the Department of Defense at 11:30 a.m. on April 9. A copy is also in JCS Records, CCS 381 Formosa (11-8-48) Sec. 22.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 082103Z from CINCPAC to CNO, April 8, reads as follows:

"Exclusive for Adm Carney from Adm Stump.

"There is unmistakable evidence as to ChiCom increased build-up Luchiao and Foochow airfields. In addition, there appears new airfield construction vicinity Pai An Fou near Swatow. Minimum 42 MIG-15s at Luchiao can support ChiCom attack Matsu group. I am causing maximum surveillance on priority and continuing basis to be maintained. In addition, ChiNats have been advised to prepare plans for air attack to prevent build-up, however, authority for such attack has to be obtained from CINCPAC or higher authority. Anticipate possible early request for conduct such attack." (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/4-855; also JCS Records, CCS 381 Formosa (11-8-48))

lated furtherance of their long-range objective. I do not think that they will willingly enter into a major war until they are ready for it, and that when they are ready for it, it will be too late for us to do anything about it except to resist to the utmost. In other words I do not think that our resistance to ChiCom aggression will of itself bring on a general war. I also think that the non-Communist world as a whole will be more disposed to respond to strength than to weakness on our part, on which statement particularly applies to Southeast Asians. I can think of no greater stimulus to Communist aggressive action than the belief on their part that the democratic nations, and particularly the US, are afraid to risk war in order to avoid it.

Part 3.

a. Discussion. The ChiNat Air Force, under the present state of build-up, can be used effectively against inland airfields within easy striking distance from Taiwan. Such use against nearby mainland objectives, where transportation is slow, tedious and laborious, is bound to slow down ChiCom build-up and, therefore, reduce the effectiveness of, or postpone major ChiCom attack. If restricted to objectives and under conditions where there is a high likelihood of success and a minimum of combat losses, such action should be stimulating to the ChiNats, whereas total restriction might have a deleterious effect morale-wise. There would appear to be more chance of success utilizing conventional weapons against the ChiComs in the build-up state rather than later after the build-up has been effected. It must be realized that an increase in combat activity is more likely to involve the United States. Whether the United States-ChiNats capability or the ChiCom capability will more rapidly improve under quiet conditions during the coming weeks and months will largely depend upon decisions which you are in the process of making in Washington: i.e., additional forces, construction of facilities, etc. I would like to emphasize denial of ChiNat request for permission to strike build-ups while they watch them grow will certainly not improve morale.

Part 4.

b. Discussion. If the ChiComs are allowed to continue their build-up through unopposed construction of airfields, depots, with concentrations of men, materials and aircraft, I would expect them to welcome a very low tempo of combat activity until they are ready to strike. When they are ready they will then strike with such a tremendous force that a most immediate and strong American retaliatory effort will be required, the decision for which must be made in Washington without delay. Under these conditions there is a much greater likelihood that success will depend upon the immediate use of atomic weapons. While I would hope that we could limit our retaliatory action to military targets near Taiwan i.e. Luchiao, Fouchow

and Swatow airfields, it may be necessary to extend the object of our attack to Ningpo Canton Nanchang air complexes.

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**200. Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Bowie) to the Secretary of State <sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, April 9, 1955.*

**SUBJECT**

Comments on Proposed Offshore Island Solution <sup>2</sup>

1. The proposed solution for the offshore islands is based upon the implicit conclusion that the U.S. should not participate in their defense and that militarily and politically both the U.S. and the ChiNats would be better off if their prestige were not committed to the defense of the islands. The solution calls for disengagement of U.S. and ChiNat prestige through persuasion of Chiang to regard the islands as expendable outposts.

2. Chiang recognizes that his only hope of achieving his paramount ambition of return to the Mainland lies in large-scale U.S. military involvement with the Chinese Communists. To Chiang the offshore islands are important not so much for defense of Taiwan or for demonstrating Nationalist military prowess but because they offer the most likely means for involving the U.S. in hostilities with the Chinese Communists which could expand to create his opportunity for invasion. To treat the islands as expendable outposts would forfeit the prospect of such U.S. military involvement. Consequently, Chiang can hardly be persuaded to do so unless he is completely convinced that the U.S. has no intention of participating in their defense. And only a forthright public statement to the effect would be likely to convince him.

3. Moreover, under the proposed course of action, in order not to impair its own prestige and the confidence of its allies and the free world, the U.S. would have to make publicly clear in advance its intentions regarding the coastal islands. Even if the U.S. succeeded, without a public statement, in persuading Chiang to treat the islands as outposts, U.S. intentions toward the islands would not be clear to U.S. or free world opinion. If in such circumstances the Communists were to attack the offshore islands, the proposed action would

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Memoranda. Secret; Personal and Private.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 194.

appear to reflect timidity, irresolution or weakness. U.S. opinion would be torn between the belief that participation in defense of the islands was not in the national interest and the feeling that we should not desert, under fire, an ally who might have had some reason to expect our assistance. Free world loss of confidence in U.S. resolution would be acute and the neighboring countries would suffer considerably greater shock to their morale than if the U.S., prior to an attack, had made clear its intention not to defend the islands. Moreover, failure to clarify our position in advance of an attack would forfeit the chance of solidifying our allies in support for our defense of Taiwan.

4. Thus a U.S. public statement of its firm intention not to participate in defense of the islands will be required both to persuade Chiang to regard them as expendable outposts and to prevent damaging effects upon free world support for U.S. objectives and upon U.S. opinion.

5. From the point of view of avoiding U.S. dictation of Chiang's actions it would be preferable to leave to Chiang a choice as to whether, with no expectation of U.S. defense, he would prefer to hold the islands as outposts or to withdraw from them. From the point of view of U.S. interests, however, it would be preferable if Chiang decided to withdraw. Nationalist withdrawal would preclude the possibility that Chiang, even though agreeing to regard the islands as outposts, would continue to work to improve the prospects of subsequent U.S. involvement. Nationalist withdrawal would avoid the unsettling effects upon U.S. opinion inherent, even with a prior U.S. statement that it would not intervene, in standing by if the Communists should actually attack. Nationalist withdrawal would maximize the possibilities of securing broad international support for U.S. protection of Formosa and the Pescadores.

6. In presenting Chiang the choice between withdrawing from the islands and regarding them as outposts, the U.S. should offer to provide military cover for an orderly withdrawal if such should be his choice. Protection with strong U.S. military forces of a Nationalist withdrawal could, moreover, be valuable in maintaining U.S. prestige despite the withdrawal.

7. Accordingly, to implement the proposed offshore island solution Chiang should be privately informed that:

(a) For the reasons set forth in the analysis from which the proposed solution is derived the U.S. has decided that it is not in the interests of either the United States or the Republic of China for the U.S. to participate in the defense of the offshore islands;

(b) Because of the world-wide damage that might otherwise accrue to the U.S. and Chinese Nationalist position it will be necessary for the United States shortly to make its decision publicly clear;

(c) The United States believes that in these circumstances Chiang should not commit the prestige of his government to all-out defense of the islands but should choose either to regard them as expendable outposts or to withdraw from them;

(d) If Chiang elects to withdraw the United States will provide military cover for an orderly withdrawal of Nationalist forces;

(e) In either case the United States is prepared to accelerate its assistance to Nationalist China and to station U.S. forces on Formosa.

RRB

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**201. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the President and the Secretary of State, Washington, April 11, 1955, Noon<sup>1</sup>**

[Here follows discussion concerning a Presidential appointment.]

2. I discussed at length with the President communications received by the Defense Department from Admiral Stump and General Chase with reference to the Chinat request for authority to attack air field build ups by the Chicoms on the mainland of Fukien Province.<sup>2</sup>

The President said that he had already told Admiral Radford that he was opposed to giving such authorization at this time.<sup>3</sup>

I recalled to the President the measures which we were taking through friendly governments to try to bring pressures for peace to bear on the Chicoms at the forthcoming Bandung Conference. I referred particularly to the recent talks I had had with Romulo<sup>4</sup> and

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President. Top Secret; Personal and Private.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 196. Telegram 092255Z from CINCPAC to the Chief of Naval Operations, April 9, recommended approval of the request provided that "(1) the nature of the buildup is such as to indicate their early employment as bases for an attack against the off-shore islands and/or Formosa and the Pescadores, (2) expectancy of reasonable degree of ChiNat success and (3) possible ChiCom retaliatory reaction is acceptable as calculated risk". It also commented with regard to Chase's and Rankin's recommendation for a blockade that the Nationalists "should be encouraged to increase their naval and air operations against unmistakably enemy naval and merchant shipping, but not to seize or attack non-belligerent ships." (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/4-1355) See also Document 199.

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 131929Z from the Chief of Naval Operations to CINCPAC, April 13, informed Admiral Stump that "governmental policy at highest level at least for time being is to avoid initiating attacks on any mainland airfields." (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/4-1355) Telegram 132212Z from CINCPAC to COMFORM DEFCOM and Chief MAAG, Formosa, April 13, transmitted this message to General Chase and Admiral Pride. (*Ibid.*, Taipei Embassy Files: Lot 62 F 83)

<sup>4</sup> See Document 195.



Charles Malik.<sup>5</sup> I said that these efforts would go for naught if prior to or during the Bandung Conference the Chinats should attack the mainland. Furthermore, because of our agreement with Chiang Kai-shek,<sup>6</sup> it would be known that such attacks were made in agreement with us. I said that after the Bandung Conference we might be able to see more clearly ahead and judge either that there would be war or peace in the area. The President said he was in complete agreement. He referred to the fact that it is oftentimes necessary to take heavy liabilities from a purely military standpoint in order to avoid being in the position of being an aggressor and the initiator of war. This is a price which often has to be paid and which may have to be paid in this case.

[Here follows discussion concerning Vietnam.]

JFD

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<sup>5</sup> See footnote 6, Document 193.

<sup>6</sup> Reference is to the notes exchanged by Secretary Dulles and Foreign Minister Yeh on December 10, 1954; see Document 3.

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## 202. Editorial Note

Notes apparently prepared by Ann Whitman of the President's telephone conversations on April 11, read in part as follows:

"4:30. Called Adm. Radford, in N.Y. about the draft statement on Formosa. Radford said he thinks it describes the ideal situation we ought to have & work for. His only doubt is that it would be accepted. President told him Walter Robertson had agreed to go, & that he put down Radford as his first choice of an associate. Radford would like to talk with Dulles & Robertson, & will contact them tomorrow."

There follows a note that the President called Secretary Dulles to inform him of the conversation. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries) Notes by Phyllis Bernau of the conversation between the President and the Secretary read in part as follows:

"The Pres. said he talked to Radford and he says yes. This describes the ideal situation we ought to have and work for. His only doubt was getting acceptance. The Pres. told him Judd [*Robertson?*] agreed to go and try to sell it and this man was his first choice and associate (?). R. will be over to see the Sec. first thing in the a.m." (*Ibid.*, Dulles Papers, White House Telephone Conversations)

Notes apparently prepared by Ann Whitman of a telephone conversation on April 13 between the President and Secretary Dulles read in part as follows:

"Guarded talk about the Quemoy-Matsu matter. Apparently 'The Admiral' and Walter Judd [*Robertson?*] had agreed to go—President thought if so, without further word from him, they should go no later than this weekened. Secretary pointed out that Chiang might not take to suggestion in conference, that there might have to be a quid pro quo arrangement."

A marginal note in an unidentified hand reads: "Radford & Robertson?" (*Ibid.*, Whitman File, DDE Diaries)

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203. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, April 14, 1955 <sup>1</sup>

PARTICIPANTS

Sir Percy Spender  
The Secretary  
Mr. Blakeney, Counselor, Australian Embassy  
Mr. Robertson  
Mr. Merchant

Ambassador Spender, who had called at his request, opened the discussion by saying that he had just received a message from Prime Minister Menzies reporting that the Australian Cabinet considers that a joint declaration regarding the defense of Formosa, accompanied by an evacuation of the off-shore islands, is worth exploring. The message went on to say that the UK had been consulted and had raised certain points. Sir Percy, however, was not informed as to what these points were. The Ambassador then asked whether or not the Secretary wanted to encourage the pursuit by Australia of this matter with the UK and the rest of the Commonwealth.

The Secretary replied that he could not give an immediate answer. The key would be the attitude of the Republic of China. In fact, the issue here is really the morale on Formosa. The subject has not been raised with Chiang Kai-shek and the Secretary said he did not feel he could give an affirmative answer before exploring the subject with the Chinese Nationalists. For its part, the U.S. would consider that the added value of such a declaration would more than offset the strategic value of Quemoy and the off-shore islands. How-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/4-1455. Secret. Drafted by Merchant.

ever, he could not undertake to speak for the Chinese Nationalists until after they had been consulted.

Sir Percy answered that if the matter, once raised by the Australians with the British, were now allowed to drop, it would be difficult to revive it later.

The Secretary repeated that he could say no more than he had already said at this moment. He would, however, like to consider Sir Percy's question for a day or two.

The Ambassador indicated that he would prefer to wait for a considered reply than accept the Secretary's immediate reaction.<sup>2</sup>

The Secretary expressed doubt that the British were in any position to act on a matter of this importance and controversy prior to elections. He inquired whether Menzies had any real reason to suppose that the UK could reach such a decision before the elections.

The Ambassador indicated that he was inclined to share the Secretary's point of view on this aspect of the matter.

Sir Percy then introduced a new subject. He said that the Australian Parliament sits on April 19 and on the following evening Prime Minister Menzies intends to give a radio broadcast on Australian defense policy. In the course of it he will use the agreed text of the statement which the Secretary had given him just before he left Washington.<sup>3</sup> The Secretary indicated his assent. There was some brief discussion as to what effect on the Bandung Conference Menzies' speech might have but there was agreement that it was better to continue our normal business without regard to Bandung.

Sir Percy then inquired whether or not there was any evidence that the Soviets were exercising a restraining influence over the Chinese Communists in the Formosa area.

The Secretary said we had no evidence on this one way or the other. It was a fact that Soviet military assistance in the form of guns and planes were flowing in volume into China. He supposed that if they were being sent there, there was the intention ultimately to use them.

As Sir Percy rose to leave he remarked that the situation in Vietnam from latest reports seemed depressing. The Secretary agreed.

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<sup>2</sup> An April 20 memorandum of conversation by Merchant states that he told Ambassador Spender that day that the Secretary still felt it was not desirable at that time for the Australians to press the British on the subject. (*Ibid.*, 793.00/4-2055)

<sup>3</sup> Enclosed with a letter of March 18 from Dulles to Menzies scheduled for publication in the documentation on East Asian security in a forthcoming *Foreign Relations* volume.

204. National Intelligence Estimate <sup>1</sup>

NIE 100-4/1-55

*Washington, April 16, 1955.*MORALE ON TAIWAN <sup>2</sup>

## The Problem

To analyze the pattern of morale and subversion on Taiwan, and to estimate the extent and intensity of the reactions which may occur in Taiwan, and in certain other countries of free Asia, <sup>3</sup> if the Matsu and Quemoy groups should be lost or evacuated under certain given conditions. <sup>4</sup>

## The Estimate

*I. General Conclusions*

1. On the surface the general state of Chinese Nationalist morale remains fairly good despite recent events. We have not detected Communist subversive activity of major proportions on Taiwan, and strong countermeasures are being enforced throughout the island. Nevertheless, the National Government has undergone many frustrations and disappointments during its six years on Taiwan, and adverse psychological forces are almost certainly at work beneath the surface of Nationalist society. (*Paras. 20-21, 23*)

2. The islands of Quemoy and Matsu have recently assumed such importance in the eyes of the Nationalists that their loss during

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, INR-NIE Files. Secret. An advance copy, dated April 16, bears the President's initials and his marginal notations and underlinings. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International Series)

A note on the cover sheet reads as follows:

"Submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence. The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.

"Concurred in by the Intelligence Advisory Committee on 16 April 1955. Concurring were the Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelligence; the Director of Intelligence, USAF; and the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff. The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the IAC, and the Assistant to the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction."

<sup>2</sup> "Taiwan" as used herein includes the Penghus (Pescadores). [Footnote in the source text.]

<sup>3</sup> Japan, the Philippines, the ROK, Thailand, South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. [Footnote in the source text.]

<sup>4</sup> These contingencies have been given the intelligence community as a basis for making this estimate. [Footnote in the source text.]

the current crisis would be a severe blow to morale, irrespective of the circumstances or conditions under which the loss occurred. The effect would probably be considerably greater if the islands fell to Communist attack, especially if US forces were involved, than if they were evacuated without armed conflict. In any event, however, we believe that the blow would not be so great as to cause the Nationalists to fold up. We believe that they would continue their resistance to Communist pressures, at least for a time.<sup>5</sup> The behavior of the Nationalists would depend in large measure on specific US actions with respect to Taiwan, and on US reactions to subsequent Communist moves. (*Paras. 23-31*)

3. Among the other Asian governments under consideration (Japan, the Philippines, the ROK, Thailand, South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos), *evacuation of the offshore islands without armed conflict* would probably not lead to significant changes of policy; it would be greeted with relief in Japan, but would arouse some concern elsewhere in the area under discussion that the US was not prepared to commit its forces to forward areas. (*Para. 37*)

4. *Loss of the islands to Communist assault without US participation in their defense* would cause a widespread feeling among the countries under discussion that if the islands were not to be defended by the US, the Nationalist garrisons should have been evacuated rather than sacrificed. US prestige would suffer. Laos, South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Thailand, in which the US does not maintain forces or bases, would probably feel increased doubts as to whether the US would defend them in case of need. These countries would probably be disposed to increasing caution in their policies toward the Communists. (*Para. 38*)

5. *If US forces had been actively involved in defense operations*, loss of the islands would severely damage US prestige throughout the area. There would be a tendency in the states under discussion, except in the ROK, to adopt a somewhat more neutralist position and to move less vigorously in situations risking Communist counteraction. (*Para. 39*)

6. Among the overseas Chinese loss of the offshore islands would increase Chinese Communist prestige and the number of active and passive Communist supporters. We believe, however, that the mass of overseas Chinese would tend to remain uncommitted

<sup>5</sup> The Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army, believe that these two sentences overly emphasize the probable effects of possible changes in morale on the future courses of Nationalist action, and would rephrase these sentences as follows: "In any event, we believe that the blow would not be so great as to destroy the Nationalist will to resist or to set in motion forces that would cause the Nationalists to fold up. We believe that they would continue their resistance to Communist pressures as long as they had confidence in the determination and ability of the US to defend Taiwan." [Footnote in the source text.]

unless the state in which they reside made a decision to accommodate or was under an immediate threat of a takeover by the Communists. (*Paras. 41-42*)

7. In summary, we feel the effect of the loss of Quemoy and Matsu would depend largely upon whether prior and subsequent US actions gave or failed to give convincing evidence of a US determination to resist further Communist aggression.

## *II. Present Situation*

8. The people of Taiwan fall into two main categories, the Taiwanese and the Mainlanders. The former are a largely passive, non-governing element, harboring some resentment against the mainland "invaders" and their past policies, but in present circumstances generally constituting a psychological factor of little importance. Among the Mainlanders, there are four overlapping components: (a) Chiang Kai-shek and his close subordinates; (b) the military and the security forces; (c) the bureaucracy; and (d) non-official persons, including especially the intelligentsia.

9. Of these components, the morale of the first two is most important, since they determine political action. Chiang Kai-shek and his close subordinates, by their deeds, their expression of resolve, and by the expectations which they can in part create, determine in large measure the spirit with which decisions are made and implemented throughout the bureaucratic and military chains of command. The military and the security forces constitute the key elements since they will largely determine the effectiveness of defense, and the likelihood of mass defection or a coup d'état. The rank-and-file bureaucracy plays a lesser role in determining morale, as do the intelligentsia, the press, and other non-official elements. Nevertheless, widespread disaffection or demoralization among these groups would tend eventually to weaken the National Government.

### *The Current State of Morale*

10. Surface moods and public utterances do not necessarily reflect the true state of Chinese Nationalist morale and willingness to resist Communist pressures and inducements. The principal factors affecting the state of mind of key groups on Taiwan appear to be the following: (a) prospects for a return to the mainland; (b) prospects for US defense of Taiwan and support of the National Government; and (c) alternatives to a Nationalist return to power on the mainland. (See paras. 15-19).

### *Return to the Mainland*

11. All elements have been sustained by the hope that the National Government will return to the mainland. For several years, however, actual expectations appear to have been dimmed, notably

among the higher civil and military echelons. There has been little assurance at any time among Chinese Nationalist officials that the US, except through involvement in a general war, would assist the Nationalists to establish a beachhead. As long as three years ago officials in private conversations would admit that, contrary to public assurances, they actually harbored little hope of ever returning to the mainland except in the event of general war. More recently, US official statements probably have increased Chinese Nationalist doubts regarding their prospects for a return to the mainland.

12. Chiang Kai-shek is the outstanding symbol of hope for return to the mainland, and the chief creator and perpetuator of this hope. Chiang has been uniquely successful in preserving a sense of unity and purpose on Taiwan. Unlike the situation on the mainland before 1949, there are few sources of independent power or influence within the regime, and politics and personal relationships revolve almost exclusively about his person. His steadfastness in personifying return to the mainland has been responsible for sustaining this objective, however remote or infeasible it might be.

13. Actions which clearly reduce the likelihood of return to the mainland will have an erosive effect on Chinese Nationalist morale. If the Chinese Nationalists on Taiwan come to believe that there could be no return to the mainland, the effect upon morale and upon Chiang Kai-shek's personal prestige would be seriously adverse. Nevertheless, Chiang would almost certainly be able to maintain his authority. Practically speaking, however, it would be almost impossible for Taipei to acknowledge any settlement which would in fact signify that the National Government no longer had de jure claim to the mainland. While Nationalist officials and civilians no longer live out of suitcases, they have as yet made no serious accommodation to an insular existence. However, certain programs which they have undertaken would tend to facilitate adjustments to continued life on the island.

Prospects for US Defense of Taiwan and Support of the National Government

14. Among the most basic requirements for maintenance of morale on Taiwan is visible evidence of a firm US intention to defend Taiwan and to support the National Government as the legitimate government of China. The Mutual Defense Treaty has largely met the first of these requirements. But with respect to the second, apprehensions exist among the Nationalists. For example, there are doubts as to US intentions regarding the defense of the off-shore islands, US attitudes toward the "two-Chinas" formula, and long-term US policy concerning recognition of the Communist

regime.<sup>6</sup> Top echelons on Taiwan probably view with alarm what they believe to be a US tendency to avoid direct military engagement with Communist China, and a US willingness to discuss a peaceful solution of the Taiwan Straits problem. They fear that these developments indicate an eventual abandonment by the US of support of the National Government as the legitimate government of China and perhaps even of the independent existence of the National Government itself.<sup>7</sup>

Alternatives to a Nationalist Return to Power on the Mainland

15. Although all groups maintain the hope that the National Government will return to the mainland, many individuals almost certainly have considered certain alternatives. The principal alternatives would be: (a) defection to the Communists; (b) resignation to continued life on Taiwan; and (c) emigration to other non-Communist areas.

16. The attractions of Communist China are probably primarily psychological. The Chinese Nationalists on Taiwan regard the mainland as home where the families of many still remain. In addition, there are many dissatisfactions with the situation on Taiwan, in particular, lack of opportunity for many intellectuals, minor bureaucrats, and military officers. Finally, Peiping exercises a powerful appeal through its apparent dynamism and its enhanced stature in world affairs.

17. Since July 1954, and especially since the evacuation of the Tachens in February 1955, the Chinese Communists have been conducting a high-pressure propaganda campaign aimed at inducing defections from Taiwan and the offshore islands. This effort has included specific appeals from former friends on the mainland to high-level Nationalist officials and officers, as well as general assurances of pardon and of full use of any defector's talents. This campaign has not as yet had any visible success, but Communist spokesmen have recently claimed that such a campaign, added to continued military pressures against the Nationalists, will in time result in the subversion of Taiwan.

18. However, most Chinese on Taiwan are aware that the repressive controls of the Peiping regime are much more onerous than those to which they are subjected on the island. In economic terms also the increasingly austere life on the mainland holds no inducements for the emigres on Taiwan, where the standard of living is

<sup>6</sup> On the copy initialed by the President, cited in footnote 1 above, this sentence is marked, and a marginal notation in his handwriting reads "Here's the rub."

<sup>7</sup> On the copy initialed by the President, cited in footnote 1 above, this sentence is underlined, and the words "perhaps even of the independent existence of the National Government itself" are marked, with the marginal notation in his handwriting, "not this."



second only to that of Japan in the Far East. The theme of return has not precluded some degree of adjustment by mainland Chinese to their present existence which has gradually come to appear more acceptable and less transitory. Moreover, the Nationalist leadership now on Taiwan constitutes the most uncompromising anti-Communist element among the Chinese.

19. In view of these considerations, we believe that the number of Chinese on Taiwan who would leave for the mainland at the present time, even if it were possible to move freely out of Taiwan, would be small.

#### The Present State of Morale

20. On the surface the present general state of morale on Taiwan remains fairly good despite recent events. Aside from some pessimistic editorial comment in the Nationalist-controlled press, there have been few visible evidences of lowered morale. We nevertheless believe that this relatively satisfactory state of morale may be more apparent than real. The adverse psychological forces analyzed above, in particular the disappointments over certain US policies, are almost certainly at work beneath the surface of Nationalist society. These forces do not appear as yet to be of serious proportions, but their erosive effect may prepare the way for an accelerated deterioration of morale in the event Nationalist China should suffer additional setbacks.

#### *Effectiveness of Internal Security*

21. Although our intelligence on the subject is not full or conclusive, we believe that Communist subversive activity on Taiwan at the present time is not of major proportions and apparently is being effectively suppressed.<sup>8</sup> The substantial threat which was posed by Communist activities on Taiwan in 1949-1950 has since been markedly reduced by vigorous Nationalist countermeasures. Nationalist knowledge and surveillance of Communist activities is believed good. Countermeasures are probably most effective in the ranks of the military, reasonably so among the civil population at large, and somewhat less effective among high officials on Taiwan. Recent defections have been few.<sup>9</sup> Over and above the effectiveness of Na-

<sup>8</sup> Cases of Communist subversion resulting in conviction have been halved in the past four years, from an average of 22 per month in 1951 to 13 per month in 1954. There is no necessary correlation between the number of "cases" and the number of individuals convicted. The Peace Preservation Headquarters at Taipei stated on 16 November 1954 that 858 cases of subversion involving 1,745 persons had been tabled in the first three quarters of 1954. Of these individuals, 597 were later convicted. Possibly included in the above figures are individuals convicted for anti-Nationalist activities not attributable to Chinese Communist efforts. [Footnote in the source text.]

<sup>9</sup> Known recent defections consist of only 3-5 airmen, and a very few ground troops from offshore islands. General Wei Li-huang, who took off from Hong Kong in

tionalist security controls, defection is inhibited by a number of practical considerations: distance from the mainland, few means of egress from Taiwan, and the difficulty of establishing channels of communication with Communist agents.

22. The chances of Communist success in subversive activities depend not only on the general state of morale on Taiwan, but also on the manner in which Nationalist leaders maintain controls, and themselves stand firm against Communist inducements. The chief figure in the Nationalist security system is General Chiang Ching-kuo, son of the Generalissimo. Ching-kuo spent 12 years as a young man in the USSR and his wife is Russian. He is strongly disliked by many Nationalist leaders, and some of them have suggested that, in a future emergency, he might defect or might even try to deliver Taiwan to the Communists. However, Ching-kuo has had opportunity to defect before, he has acted ruthlessly against the Communists, and, most importantly, he appears to have the full trust of his father, the Generalissimo. We believe it highly unlikely that he will defect.

### *III. Effect on Nationalist Morale of the Loss of the Offshore Islands and of Other Possible Developments*

#### *General Considerations*<sup>10</sup>

23. Loss of the offshore islands during the current crisis would be a severe blow to Chinese Nationalist morale, irrespective of the circumstances or conditions under which it took place. Since retiring to Taiwan in 1949, the Chinese Nationalists have experienced a series of crises and frustrations, of which the current offshore island crisis is but the most recent. The frustrations and disappointments of the past six years, together with the more recent hopes that the US would become militarily involved in the defense of the offshore is-

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March 1955, has long been an equivocal character. He has not been associated with the Nationalist leadership since he fled to Hong Kong from the mainland in 1949. [Footnote in the source text.]

<sup>10</sup> The Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, believe that Nationalist confidence in the willingness and ability of the US to defend Taiwan is the main general consideration affecting developments in Chinese Nationalist morale as well as the significance of such developments. They believe that paragraphs 23, 24, and 25 taken as a group obscure the key importance of this factor and would substitute the following for those three paragraphs: "Loss of the offshore islands during the current crisis would adversely affect Chinese Nationalist morale, as would any development that appears to lessen the chances of an ultimate war between the US and the Chinese Communists or to indicate that the US was moving further away from support of Nationalist aspirations for a return to the mainland. The extent of this loss of morale as well as its significance, will depend in large part on how these developments affect the Chinese Nationalist estimate of US policy. So long as Chinese Nationalist confidence in the willingness and ability of the US to defend Taiwan remains firm no one of the contingencies considered below is likely alone to destroy Nationalist will to resist or to cause the Chinese National Government to fall from within." [Footnote in the source text.]

lands, have so increased the psychological importance of the Quemoy and Matsus that the loss of these islands would have varying adverse effects upon Nationalist morale depending upon the circumstances of their loss as described in paragraphs 27-31 below.

24. Loss of the offshore islands would probably be taken as evidence that the US was moving further away from support of Nationalist aspirations for return to the mainland. Nationalist leaders, and perhaps the Nationalist rank-and-file, probably do not have any deep conviction that the US will in fact support such a return, except in the event of war between the US and Communist China. It would be a different matter, however, to admit finally to themselves that a cherished hope had been without foundation. We do not believe that the Nationalists have yet come to such an admission, or that they would be driven to it even if the offshore islands were lost and the US appeared to regard the loss as final. They would be forced closer to it, however, and the impact would be great among all elements on Taiwan. There might not be any sudden increase in defections or other manifestations of changing loyalties, but the leadership would find it much more difficult to sustain its own morale and the loyalty of lower levels.

25. Nevertheless, it is our estimate that the Nationalists would not fold up, but would continue their resistance to Communist pressures. The behavior of the Nationalists would depend in large measure on specific US actions with respect to Taiwan and US reactions to subsequent Communist moves.

*Particular Contingencies*

26. Reactions on Taiwan to the loss of the offshore islands would vary according to the circumstances of the loss. We have considered the following contingencies.

27. *Nationalist forces in the offshore islands evacuated at US instigation and with US assistance prior to the application of substantial and sustained military pressure by the Communists.* Evacuation of the offshore islands at US instigation and with US assistance would be strenuously resisted by Chiang Kai-shek and Nationalist officialdom. Such an evacuation would pose for the Nationalist leaders a serious problem of justification. Failure to defend the offshore islands would damage the prestige and self-respect of the military. The evacuation would greatly reduce hopes for early US-Chinese Communist hostilities and for a return to the mainland. Many Nationalists would evince frustration and bitterness in a situation in which they would consider that their interests were being subordinated to the purely defensive interests of the US. Cooperation between the US and the Nationalists would be adversely affected. Nevertheless, all elements on Taiwan would probably continue to estimate that the US would defend Taiwan. Hope of

eventual conflict between the US and Communist China would remain. In these circumstances, we believe that Nationalist leaders would continue to control loyalties, limit subversion, and reduce Communist military pressures.

28. *Nationalist withdrawal accompanied by a multinational guarantee by certain non-Communist states of the security of Taiwan.* The reaction to this contingency would not differ appreciably from that of paragraph 27 above. Evacuation would be no more acceptable to the National Government if other non-Communist countries participated in a guarantee of the security of Taiwan. While such a guarantee might give some additional assurance of security, it would almost certainly be unwelcome to the Nationalists because it would tend to reduce the chances of war between the US and Communist China, and thus decrease the chances of a return to the mainland. It would, in the Nationalist view, appear to associate the US with the British "two-Chinas" policy, or even indicate a drift toward international trusteeship for Taiwan.

29. *Prolonged attrition of Nationalist strength on the offshore islands as a result of severe Communist bombing and shelling, without attempted seizure and without US counteraction.* During a prolonged period of attrition, the Nationalists would increasingly resent the fact that some of their best forces were being gradually weakened in combat with Communism while the US stood by.<sup>11</sup> This resentment would be aggravated if the US maintained present restrictions on Nationalist military operations against the mainland. Should Nationalist leaders become convinced that the US would not intervene, they might request US assistance to evacuate the islands. In any event there would be mounting bitterness against the US and a feeling that the US was interested in holding Taiwan only for its own security. In time, this contingency would probably have a seriously adverse effect upon Nationalist morale. Nevertheless, we believe that they would continue to believe that the US would defend Taiwan, and the leadership would continue to control loyalties and limit subversion.

30. *Nationalist forces in the offshore islands defeated and the islands seized with no intervention by US forces.* The reaction to this contingency would be sudden and even more serious than the reaction we have noted in paragraph 29 above. The loss of up to one-fifth of the Nationalist combat forces would materially reduce Nationalist forces available for the defense of Taiwan. The loss would greatly increase Nationalist vulnerability to propaganda themes of Communist invincibility,

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<sup>11</sup> There are 80,700 regular troops located on the 11 offshore islands. These troops are deployed as follows: 800 on the two islands of the Tungyin Group, 12,300 on the three main islands of the Matsu Group, 2,000 on the two islands of the Paich'uan Group, and 65,600 on the four islands of the Quemoy Group. [Footnote in the source text.]

Nationalist weakness, and the undependability of the US as an ally. While Nationalist leaders might entertain serious doubts as to US intentions with respect to the defense of Taiwan, we believe that over the short term they would continue firm in their determination to defend Taiwan. However, continuation of this determination, and the ability of the Nationalist leadership to retain loyalties and to limit subversion on Taiwan would depend, in large measure, upon whether (a) the Nationalists had believed, at the time of the Communist assault on the offshore islands, that the US was morally committed to the defense of these islands and would in fact defend them; and (b) the nature of US measures taken concurrently with and immediately following the loss of the offshore islands.

31. *Offshore islands lost to a Communist assault against which the US intervened locally and subsequently disengaged.* In this contingency, the effect upon Nationalist morale would be extremely grave. The Nationalists would be concerned for the very existence of their regime. The symptoms of disintegration would quickly develop. Nevertheless, we believe that Chiang Kai-shek would probably be able in the short term to maintain control on Taiwan. Nationalist will and determination to resist Communist pressures and inducements over the longer term would depend in large degree upon US measures on Taiwan following the loss of the offshore islands and upon subsequent US actions in response to Communist moves.

32. *If the US should fail to take counteraction against Communist air raids on Taiwan carried out subsequent to the loss of the offshore islands under any of the above contingencies,* there would be an accelerated deterioration of morale and loyalty on Taiwan. If the Communist air raids were heavy and long continued without US counteraction, the Nationalists would lose all faith in the US.

33. We have been asked to estimate the effect upon Chinese Nationalist morale if the *Chinese Communists established a surprise lodgment on Taiwan subsequent to the loss of the offshore islands.* We estimate that the Chinese Communists cannot in the near future establish a surprise lodgment in sufficient force either to overcome Nationalist military resistance, including US support if necessary, or to attract major defections.

34. *Death or retirement of Chiang Kai-shek.* Chiang is so important to the unity and determination of the Nationalist government that his death or retirement would introduce serious uncertainties into the situation on Taiwan. Present indications point to the likelihood of a constitutional succession by Vice President Ch'en Ch'eng, probably followed by jockeying for power behind the scenes. The probable initial loss of unity in the top leadership of the Nationalist government after Chiang Kai-shek's death or retirement would be reflected at all levels of the population, and might make them more suscepti-

ble to Communist moves. US policy and actions would be of key importance in restoring stability and confidence in the government. In any event, it is unlikely that Chiang's death or retirement would by itself lead to a rapid collapse of the will of the leaders and people on Taiwan, since the external unifying factors—particularly the Communist threat—would remain, and since Chiang's retirement from the scene would presumably not alter the US commitment to support the Nationalist government.

35. *The stationing of additional US forces, including a ground force division, on Taiwan, with the concurrence of the Nationalists, following the loss of the offshore islands under any of the circumstances described under the above contingencies (paras. 26-34), would have a beneficial effect on morale and would increase determination to resist. The presence of these forces would somewhat offset the effects of the loss of the islands and would greatly increase Nationalist confidence in the security of Taiwan.*

[Here follows Part IV, "Effect on Certain States and Groups in Asia of the Loss of the Offshore Islands," paragraphs 36-42.]

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## 205. Editorial Note

Presidential Press Secretary James Hagerty's diary entry for April 12-20, a period which the President spent in Augusta, Georgia, states that Admiral Felix B. Stump, Commander in Chief, Pacific, who was in Washington briefly for consultations, met with the President on April 16. Hagerty's diary entry reads in part as follows:

"Stump flew down to Augusta, arriving at the airport at 8:00 A.M. Draper and I met him and brought him to the National, arriving there at 8:30. The President and Stump had a private conversation for one hour. It mainly dealt with the build-up which the Chinese Communists are conducting on the Mainland opposite Quemoy and Matsu. Aerial reconnaissance has shown that the Communists are moving in fighter aircraft, including jets and moving some of their bases. Neither Stump nor the President believe that an attack is directly imminent, although the Chinese Coms are increasing their potential." (Eisenhower Library, Hagerty Papers)

206. Telegram From the Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group, Formosa (Chase) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Stump) <sup>1</sup>

Taipei, April 17, 1955—9:02 a.m.

170102Z. CINCPAC excl for Adm Stump, info CNO excl for Adm Carney, info COMFORMDEFCON(US) excl for Adm Pride. Cite mg 7060. Subj is another msg fr Min of Def Yu Ta Wei.

"Our recent intensified aerial recon has confirmed feverish enemy air bld up in Southeast China. Presence of IL-28 jets in Han Chow [*Hangchow?*] air fld as revealed by air photo on 14 Apr, and continuous deployment of enemy AF towards south are particularly significant. The above can have only one meaning—namely, they will soon be fully prepared and are capable of another act of aggression, aimed at Taiwan and or the off shore islands. I have recd fr Gen Chase urmsg advising us not to bomb enemy air flds at this time. <sup>2</sup> However, I consider pres situation extremely grave, pregnant with most disastrous consequences since time, space, force and the initiative—all the elements of strategic advantage—are in hands of our enemy. It calls for immed action. I wish you would take up the matter with your Jt Chiefs. I rely on your wisdom and experience to advise me a course of action. Meanwhile presence of SeventhFlt and elements of Fifth US AF would act as psychological deterrents, I hope."

*MAAG comment:* Your ans bombing rqst was given Min Yu and this is his further rqst. Within a very few months the air situation along China coast opposite Formosa will become very favorable to ChiComs and CAF air spt over the Matsu and Quemoy islands will

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/4-1755. Top Secret; Priority. Received at the Department of Defense at 2:50 a.m. on April 17. The source text bears a note by Phyllis Bernau that it was seen by Secretary Dulles.

<sup>2</sup> A letter of April 14 from General Chase to Minister Yu states that Chase received a reply from CNO stating that it was U.S. policy, decided at the highest level, "that attacks on mainland airfields should not be initiated *at this time.*" It further stated that Chase considered it most important "that complete and detailed plans be prepared by your Air Force to neutralize all mainland airfields that threaten control of the Straits", that this should be done on a priority basis with plans submitted to Chase's headquarters for review, but that no attacks should be made without U.S. approval. (Department of State, Taipei Embassy Files: Lot 62 F 83) The message from CNO to which Chase referred is the message transmitted in telegram 132212Z from CINCPAC to COMFORM DEFCON and Chief MAAG, Formosa; see footnote 3, Document 201.

be difficult. Senior ChiNats are becoming alarmed at ChiCom air capability which is building up. ChiNat announced intention is to extend Matsu and Quemoy complexes and I have reason to believe that they are sincere. The Gimo has recently visited both. By early fall both Matsu and Quemoy will have a ChiCom airfield within 30 or 40 miles. This calls for frank reappraisal of our US position and our US strategic advice to the ChiNats. Request guidance.

Chase

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207. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the President and the Secretary of State, Augusta, Georgia, April 17, 1955, 12:30 p.m. <sup>1</sup>

I showed the President a draft of a statement of position with reference to the defense of Formosa. The paper which I gave him was a copy of the annexed paper marked "A". <sup>2</sup> This paper in turn was a slight variant from the annexed paper marked "B", which had been prepared by Anderson, Radford, Hoover, Robertson and myself on Saturday, <sup>3</sup> which I had shown to Mr. Allen Dulles on Sunday morning.

We discussed this paper at some length.

The President was hesitant about giving up his idea of a temporary holding of Quemoy and Matsu by the Chinese Nationalists as "outposts". He said he disagreed with Radford's view that this was impractical. He said that Malta had held out.

I expressed the view that if we were not going to allow the Chinese Nationalists to attack ChiCom build-ups before they were completed and if we were not going to help the Chinats after they were completed, then it would be better to encourage a clean break and a substitute of the sea "interdiction".

The President finally agreed that we would leave this up to the Chinats. He was very insistent that we should not be in the position of exerting coercion upon them, but that we should make clear that

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President. Top Secret; Personal and Private. Drafted by Dulles on April 18.

<sup>2</sup> Of the five annexes, only Annex "E" is printed.

<sup>3</sup> April 16.



we were not willing to have our side strike the first major blow as between Formosa and the Mainland, and that also we would not defend merely Quemoy and Matsu.

The President personally interlined on page 1 of Annex A a suggested rewording of paragraph 2. This page with the President's handwriting on it is annexed hereto as "C".<sup>4</sup>

The President also felt that before we had gone into the program of paragraph 5,<sup>5</sup> there should be a paragraph emphasizing the importance of cooperation between the Chinats and ourselves to win US and world opinion. He outlined what he had in mind, and I dictated it as a new paragraph 5. See Annex "D".

The President expressed some doubts about the "blockade". I said that I felt that this could clearly be justified as a measure of self-defense, particularly after Quemoy and Matsu had been evacuated so that there could be no question but what the Chicom build-up was for an attack against Formosa, and so long as we made clear that if the Chicom Government renounced the effort to take Formosa by force, the interdiction would be lifted.

After some discussion on this matter, the President agreed.

Also, the President suggested that paragraph (a) and (b) of the program should be reversed so that the "interdiction" paragraph should come after a paragraph indicating that the Chinese Nationalists would first take the decision as to whether or not to attempt to hold Quemoy and Matsu under the conditions indicated. Paragraph 5 and the renumbered paragraph 6, with subparagraphs (a) and (b) reversed, I dictated to Miss Bernau in the President's presence. They are in the above-referred-to Annex D.

The President approved this with a couple of linguistic changes indicated in pencil. Thereupon, the entire paper was retyped by Mrs. Whitman as "E".

After the President read over this document, he raised a question as to whether the stationing of atomic capabilities on Formosa should be done "with public knowledge". He put parentheses, with a question mark, around this phrase on the original.<sup>6</sup>

With reference to the proposed restatement of US policy, the President indicated that he would be prepared to make this, although he believed that in the long run, unless the unexpected happened, it

<sup>4</sup> The President did not reword paragraph 2 but added two sentences. The first two sentences of paragraph 2 of Annex "E" are identical with paragraph 2 of Annex "A"; the last two sentences of paragraph 2 of Annex "E" appear in the President's handwriting on Annex "C".

<sup>5</sup> Similar in substance to paragraph 6 of Annex "E".

<sup>6</sup> The President's copy, labeled "President's Draft" and marked as here indicated, together with several earlier drafts, including preliminary notes in Dulles' handwriting, are in Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Memoranda.

might be necessary to accept the "Two China" concept. He spoke of "5-10 or 12 years."

With reference to the "high level meeting" [6(e)],<sup>7</sup> I said that this might require him to go somewhere to meet the Generalissimo. He asked where I had in mind. I said possibly Honolulu. He suggested San Francisco as [was?] as far as he would care to go; but later on indicated that he would not absolutely hold out against Honolulu. He recognized that this meeting would be important from the standpoint of the Generalissimo's prestige.

The President and I had a little discussion about the question of procedure and timing. He said he did not think there was any necessity for Admiral Radford or Mr. Robertson to come down to Augusta to see him, but that he thought they should proceed promptly to Taipei. We both recognized that time was of the essence. I said that at some stage, it would be necessary to feel out the Congressional leaders, and I might in a vague way mention the project to Senator George at breakfast next Monday morning (April 18),<sup>8</sup> but that in general I did not think there should be any disclosure until it was found out whether the idea was acceptable to the Generalissimo. The President asked whether I thought of mentioning it to Roger Makins. I said that I might hint at it, but that I doubted whether it was wise to push the UK on this matter at this stage, particularly when they were very sensitive to their domestic political situation.

I expressed the opinion that in fact the program outlined would immeasurably serve to consolidate world opinion, and the President said that he shared that view.

The President authorized me to proceed accordingly.

JFD

### [Annex] "E"

1. Since January the Chicoms have been engaged in an intensive build-up of an arc of jet air fields in and surrounding the Fukien area opposite Formosa. This build-up, unless checked by heavy, continu-

<sup>7</sup> Brackets in the source text.

<sup>8</sup> A memorandum of conversation by Dulles dated April 18 states that he told Senator George the President's view that the Nationalists should not be authorized to attack the mainland airfields. The Senator said "he supposed that was the correct course although he himself was not entirely clear but what we should let the Chinats attack the Chicom buildup" and expressed concern that Quemoy and Matsu could become a "generally divisive force" in the United States. Dulles then told the Senator in confidence that the President planned to ask Radford and Robertson to go to Taipei to discuss the problem with Chiang and that "we were seeking a solution which would minimize the Quemoy and Matsu aspect of the matter." (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Senator Walter George)

ing and costly air attack by the Chinats, will soon (perhaps by June) create a situation such that the Chicoms would, in all likelihood, dominate the air over Matsu and Quemoy.

2. It is the United States view that the military disadvantages of this build-up should be accepted at this time rather than that the United States now be responsible for initiating active hostilities which could readily spread into a major war. It is believed that the moral and political advantages of this avoidance of the fighting initiative offset the military disadvantages. A principal reason is the certainty that such initiation of hostilities would react unfavorably, perhaps to a decisive degree, upon American public determination to support Chiang. Neither is it part of American policy to engage in hostilities merely to defend Quemoy and the Matsus.

3. The Chinats cannot properly complain of this decision. In connection with our Mutual Defense Treaty, it was agreed:

(a) that Quemoy and Matsu would not be included in the treaty area;

(b) that the use of force from the territories under Chinat control would be a matter of joint agreement subject to action of an emergency character which is clearly an exercise of the inherent right of self-defense;

(c) that military elements which were a product of joint effort and contribution of the two parties, and which are needed for the defense of Formosa (such as the Chinat air force), will not be used outside of Formosa without mutual agreement.

4. The problem is how to meet the situation without seriously impairing the defensibility of the treaty area through either (a) loss of the value of Quemoy and Matsu as defensive outposts; (b) loss of Chinat troops and equipment; (c) loss of "face" to Chinats and United States.

5. In this connection it is important that the leaders of the Republic of China should recognize that our common interests require the recognition that public opinion in the United States, in particular, and the other friendly countries, in general, should be favorable to them and that this in the long run is indispensable to the realization of their aspirations; that this opinion is now gravely disturbed about Quemoy and Matsu; and that the United States and the Republic of China need to cooperate to bring about a more acceptable posture.

6. Accordingly, the following program is suggested:

(a) If, under the conditions outlined in paragraph 2, the Chinats desire to evacuate Quemoy and Matsu, the United States would provide air and naval cover for the orderly evacuation of the Chinat troops and equipment and, to the extent the civilian population desire, for their evacuation, all as in the case of Tachens.

(b) If Quemoy and Matsu are thus evacuated and unless and until the Chicoms in good faith renounce their avowed purpose to

take Formosa by force, the United States will, as a measure of self-defense, join with the Chinats to institute and maintain an interdiction of sea lanes along the China Coast from and including Swatow in the south to approximately Wenchow in the north, so far as contraband is involved. This would be designed to prevent the seaborne receipt by the Chicoms of supplies, which would promote their aggressive build-up on the Mainland opposite Formosa.

This interdiction would serve a triple purpose: it would replace Quemoy and Matsu as defensive blocks to the staging of a seaborne attack on Formosa from Amoy and Foochow harbors; it would materially curtail the present heavy seaborne movement of POL and like supplies into the Fukien air field area—an area which cannot be easily supplied by land; it would demonstrate that the United States is prepared to take strong measures in the defense of Formosa.

(c) In order further to reinforce its serious intentions regarding Formosa, the United States would station on Formosa, (with public knowledge.)<sup>9</sup> atomic capabilities in the hands of U.S. units, additional anti-aircraft equipment, an air wing, and forces of United States Marines.

(d) Further to avoid any inference that there is weakening political support of the Republic of China, President Eisenhower would publicly reaffirm the present policy of the United States not to recognize the People's Republic of China and to continue to seek to prevent its admission to the organs of the United Nations, and, in this connection, his willingness to invoke, if necessary, the veto power in the Security Council. (This would be a statement of United States policy, not a bilateral commitment.) Furthermore, the United States would seek further diplomatic and treaty support for the Republic of China.

(e) A high level meeting will be arranged to confirm the foregoing, if this seems desirable.

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<sup>9</sup> On the source text, the question mark appears above, rather than after, the words in parentheses. The parentheses and question mark were added by hand to the typed copy, just as on the President's copy (see footnote 6 above).

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## 208. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, April 20, 1955, Noon <sup>1</sup>

### PARTICIPANTS

Sir Robert Scott  
The Secretary  
The Under Secretary  
Mr. Merchant

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/4-2055. Top Secret. Drafted by Merchant.

The Secretary requested the British Chargé to call at noon today. The Secretary opened the conversation by noting that Mr. Robertson and Admiral Radford had left this morning for talks on Taiwan.<sup>2</sup> They would be of a general character covering both political and military matters. It was expected that the talks would touch particularly on the dangers inherent in the intensive build-up of the airfields on the mainland opposite Taiwan. We were under considerable pressure from the Chinese Nationalists to hit by air this build-up before it assumed even larger proportions. We were reluctant to give our approval to such action but it was admittedly awkward to refuse approval without incurring some moral commitment to defend the Nationalists against a later attack which might be the consequence of the build-up. The purpose of the U.S. is to prevent or postpone the outbreak of major hostilities.

The Secretary said that he could not be specific but if the U.S. were able "to work something out", he would hope that the UK would find it possible to make some contribution to a result which would end the danger of fighting. He noted that so far the Bandung Conference seemed to have gone rather well. The Chinese Communists might return to Peiping lacking any feeling of general Asian backing and support.

The Secretary then said that there were two points or angles which he would like to underline. The first related to the use of British registered shipping to carry supplies such as POL and other strategic materials to the Chinese Communists for their build-up opposite Taiwan.

There followed then some little discussion with Sir Robert maintaining that the British controls on the loading and transport of embargoed items at Hong Kong and elsewhere were extremely tight and firmly enforced. In the discussion it developed that we had more in mind cabotage operations whereunder small British flag ships in the coast-wise trade might carry from Hong Kong and return to Hong Kong with innocent cargoes but during the course of the voyage transship POL and such items from one Communist port to another.

In any event, the Secretary said that what would be required were more restrictive measures in the area to prevent a further build-up.

The Secretary said his second point was in connection with a possible guarantee. If the UK could give some form of guarantee or assurance covering Taiwan and the Pescadores this might be a very

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<sup>2</sup> The Department of State announced on April 20 that, in view of the tense situation in the Formosa area, Robertson and Radford were proceeding to Taipei for consultation under the Mutual Defense Treaty. For the substance of the announcement, see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 2, 1955, p. 732.

useful contribution at some stage. He had gathered from the Australians that there had been some talk between Canberra and London on this subject and that the British response had been favorable. Sir Robert commented that the Embassy here was not aware of the details of any such conversations.

Reverting to the question of British shipping engaged in contra-band transport, Sir Robert brought up the case of a small British ship which had been sunk in Swatow Harbor by Chinese Nationalist bombing.<sup>3</sup> The Nationalists had apologized and the British had asked U.S. support in their effort to secure compensation. He noted that the ship had entered Swatow Harbor empty and was engaged in picking up foodstuffs for Hong Kong. The Secretary stated that he had been talking only of strategic material. Sir Robert reiterated that the British controls were effective on this.

Sir Robert said that they would look into this matter immediately and meanwhile wondered if the Secretary could be more specific on the question of the U.K. guarantee.

The Secretary replied in the negative but remarked that he assumed that it would be very difficult to do anything of this nature in the pre-election period.<sup>4</sup>

Sir Robert said that speaking more or less personally he felt that the British Government believed that the main trouble surrounded the off-shore islands, and that they would like to help achieve their evacuation. He had the impression, however, that they would like to accomplish this in a way which avoided a reversal of the entire British Far Eastern policy of the past six years, which was fundamentally designed to achieve some sort of *modus vivendi* with the Chinese Communists.

In closing the conversation on this subject, the Secretary said that the results of the Bandung Conference might throw some additional light on Chinese Communist intentions. Their part at Bandung so far had appeared mild.

[Here follows discussion concerning Austria and Indochina.]

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<sup>3</sup> The *Edendale* sank on January 19, 1955. Documentation relating to subsequent British protests and attempts to secure compensation is in Department of State, Central Files, 941.73.

<sup>4</sup> A British general election was scheduled for May 26.

209. Telegram From the Ambassador in Indonesia (Cumming) to the Department of State <sup>1</sup>

*Jakarta, April 21, 1955—4 p.m.*

1935. During third day conference rumors concerning behind scenes meetings on Taiwan continued circulate widely but little solid foundation or confirming evidence discovered. Rumors vary from report series 2-power negotiations, e.g. Chou-Nehru <sup>2</sup> to further elaboration on allegedly proposed meeting between China, Colombo powers, Thailand and Philippines (Embassy telegrams 1895 and 1913). <sup>3</sup>

However member Turkish delegation reports absolutely no knowledge any such meetings or proposed meetings. However, reasonably reliable American correspondent states that Ceylonese did come armed with proposal to put Nationalist Government "on ice", place Taiwan under guardianship Colombo powers, and hold plebiscite under unclear terms of reference after five years. <sup>4</sup> Local press reports meeting indefinitely postponed. Number of meetings among chief delegates being held tonight but as yet no information on topics for discussion or results.

**Cumming**

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 670.901/4-2155. Secret. Received at 9:36 a.m.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 1958 from Jakarta, April 21, stated that previous reports of a Sino-Indian meeting on the evening of April 19 on the subject of tension in the Taiwan area were correct, but that Chou had met only with Menon, and Nehru had not been present. (*Ibid.*)

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 1895 from Jakarta, April 19, which reported developments at the conference that day, stated that Sir John Kotelawala had reportedly invited the other Colombo powers (Burma, India, Indonesia, and Pakistan), China, Japan, Thailand, and the Philippines to meet on April 21. Telegram 1913 from Jakarta, April 19, which reported a conversation with a member of the Turkish Delegation, referred to the yet-unconfirmed report. (Both *ibid.*, 670.901/4-1955)

<sup>4</sup> Telegram 1971 from Jakarta, April 22, transmitted a report that Prime Minister Kotelawala had said at a press conference that Ceylon would propose such a plan, although he had not specified trusteeship under the Colombo powers, and that Ceylon would propose a conference sponsored by the five Colombo powers, China, the Philippines, and Thailand. (*Ibid.*)

## 210. Message From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Secretary of State <sup>1</sup>

*Honolulu, April 21, 1955—10:55 a.m.*

[Message No. 1.] It would appear that next pressures to be brought upon President by some allies and certain sections of US public opinion (such as ADA) will be for neutralization of Formosa under auspices of 48 nations signing Japanese peace treaty. It is possible ChiComs would accept such solution for following reason:

1. Would liquidate military forces on Formosa which now act as constant deterrent to Communist overt aggression in Korea and Southeast Asia and elsewhere.

2. Would permanently remove concept of a free China as alternative to Red China for millions of overseas and mainland Chinese.

3. Would be a face-saving out (for ChiComs) of present threatening situation involving possible atomic war with US.

*Question:* What assurances can we give Chiang that US will not be party to such neutralization plan which would mean end of Chiang and his regime. <sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.5800/4-2155. Top Secret; Eyes Only; Operational Immediate. Transmitted in telegram 212055Z from CINCPAC to CNO. Received at the Department of Defense at 5:37 p.m. This is the first of a series of messages sent to and from Robertson and Radford during their trip to Taipei, all sent through a secure channel prearranged by Admiral Radford. (Memorandum from Radford to Dulles, *et al.*, April 20; *ibid.*, 711.5893/4-2055) The source texts for the messages printed here are in a file labeled Secretary's Book (Admiral Radford-Mr. Robertson Trip). Copies of the messages, together with memoranda of conversations and related documentation, apparently brought back from Taipei by Robertson, are filed with a covering memorandum of April 27 from Robertson to Dulles. (*Ibid.*, 611.13/4-2755) An incomplete file of the messages, apparently brought back from Taipei by Radford, is in JCS Records, CJCS 091 China. Some of the messages in the Secretary's file and all of those brought back from Taipei by Robertson and Radford are numbered as separate incoming and outgoing series; the bracketed numbers on the messages printed here appear on those attached to Robertson's April 27 memorandum to Dulles.

<sup>2</sup> Acting Secretary Hoover replied in message no. 1 to Robertson and Radford, transmitted in telegram 222045Z from CNO to CINCPAC, April 22, which bears the notation that it was noted and approved by the President. It reads as follows:

"I discussed your cable to Secy CINCPAC 212055Z with the President today.

"It was clear from our conversation that any plan such as the one proposed at Bandung and referred to in your cable by which Formosa would be neutralized has never entered his mind, and that he would not consent to becoming a party to any proposal to liquidate our allies on Formosa. You may advise Generalissimo of our full realization of the implications of such a plan and our intention to oppose it." (Department of State, Central Files, 711.5800/4-2155)

Dulles was at his vacation retreat, Duck Island; he left Washington April 20 and returned April 25.



211. **Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Sebald) to the Acting Secretary of State**<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, April 21, 1955.*

SUBJECT

Vice Admiral Pride's Comments on Chinese Nationalist Request for Blockade and Bombing Operations

In the course of a conversation with our Ambassador at Taipei on April 12,<sup>2</sup> Vice Admiral Pride, Commander 7th Fleet, expressed himself strongly in favor of the Nationalist request to blockade the mainland but described bombing of the coastal airfields as "a foolish idea". Admiral Pride pointed out that losses to attacking Nationalist aircraft would be disproportionate to any advantage gained by bombing the coastal airfields, which were little more than runways without facilities or discernible ammunition or fuel storage areas. A serious weakness of the airfields was the fact that there were no railroads or adequate highways leading to them; consequently fuel supplies must be brought in by sea. Communist use of the airfields would be virtually stopped if the Nationalists cut off the coastal shipping by naval blockade and air action.

Admiral Pride also commented on the remarkable Communist radar coverage along the entire coastline which extended to a depth of some 400 to 450 miles. The Admiral remarked that during the Tachen exercise he learned of take-offs of planes from 7th Fleet carriers by hearing the Communist radio reporting radar contacts before messages reached him through his own communications system.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/4-2155. Secret. Initialed by Hoover.

<sup>2</sup> A memorandum of the conversation by First Secretary of Embassy John J. Conroy, with no covering despatch or letter, is *ibid.*, CA Files: Lot 59 D 110, U.S. Aid to Nationalist China, 1955.

212. **Message From the Acting Secretary of State to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Radford), at Taipei** <sup>1</sup>

*Washington, April 22, 1955—3:43 p.m.*

[Message No. 2.] The President returned to Washington and in conversation expressed himself along the following lines:

He reiterated that your mission is to find in conversation and mutual exploration some solution to the Formosa-Quemoy-Matsu problem that will be acceptable both to Chiang and to US. Beyond doubt the Generalissimo recognizes that a strong and favorable American public opinion is necessary to his continuing existence and future success. While the point could be made on your own initiative

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.5800/4-2155. Top Secret; Eyes Only; Operational Immediate. Transmitted in telegram 222043Z from CNO to Chief MAAG, Formosa. A memorandum of April 23 from Hoover to Dulles, not sent, records the origin of this message. It states that on April 21 the President discussed with Hoover the instructions given to Robertson and Radford and dictated a message, attached to Hoover's memorandum, labeled "President's 1st Draft" and dated April 21. It reads as follows:

"The President wants me to reiterate that your mission is to induce the Generalissimo to propose some solution to the Formosa-Quemoy-Matsu problem that will be acceptable both to him and to us. Beyond doubt he recognizes that a strong and favorable American public opinion is necessary to his continuing existence and success. While the point could be made on your own initiative that the participation by the United States in conflict merely to save the offshore islands would cause a serious damage, if not a loss, of American public opinion, it is highly desirable that we avoid the position of urging upon him a solution in which he himself does not believe. The President agreed to the general purport of the paper that Secretary Dulles gave to you before your departure but he, the President, goes back to the proposition that politically and psychologically, we should lead the Generalissimo into making a proposition that will neither commit the United States to war in defense of the offshore islands nor will constitute an implied repudiation of the Generalissimo by this government.

"These are the reasons that the President has so much favored an outpost conception for the offshore islands, highly organized and well supported by Chiang's main forces and with assurances to him of the additional American help, as well as other general commitments, that you already know about.

"Under no circumstances should there be allowed to develop an atmosphere which would preclude further conversations and negotiations."

"The Secretary's message will emphasize the need for sympathetic understanding in dealing with Chiang."

Hoover's memorandum states that he thought that "there were so many inconsistencies between this message and the instructions which had been given to Robertson and Radford, that it would be impossible for them to carry out their mission without an entirely new approach." He and Deputy Secretary of Defense Anderson redrafted the message and gave it to the President, who made further revisions in it. This draft, as revised by the President, is also attached to Hoover's memorandum, labeled "2nd draft" and dated April 22. Hoover, Murphy, and Phleger made additional revisions in this draft, and Hoover cleared the final message with the President. (*Ibid.*) A copy of the Hoover-Anderson draft is in Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles-Herter Series.

that the participation by the United States in conflict merely to save the offshore islands would cause a serious damage, if not a loss, of American public opinion, it is highly desirable that we avoid the position of urging upon him a solution which he cannot accept.

The President is anxious that an area of understanding be reached that politically and psychologically avoids any indication of a lessening of our interest in the Generalissimo and at the same time achieves his recognition of the fact that the United States cannot be committed because of reasons important both to him and to this country to going to war in defense of the offshore islands. If the Generalissimo thought it necessary or desirable, he probably could reorganize the island defense so as to diminish markedly the numbers involved and depend mainly on field fortifications and intensive firepower for the islands' defense supported by his own air and naval forces. With such an arrangement and with United States forces contributing to the defense of Formosa proper he could inflict tremendous losses on any attackers of the offshore islands.

Under no circumstances should there be allowed to develop an atmosphere which could preclude further conversations and negotiations, nor should there be any appearance of trying to force the Generalissimo to adopt a course which is unacceptable to him.

The President further asked me to convey his warm personal greetings to the Generalissimo and Madame Chiang Kai-Shek, and to tell them how intensively and sympathetically he has studied this and its related problems.

FYI In connection with the conversation outlined above, there is, I am assured, no intention to alter instructions transmitted to you by Secretary, <sup>2</sup> but rather an amplification of certain points already covered. I will of course immediately discuss with Secretary upon his return Monday. <sup>3</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Neither any written instructions nor any record of oral instructions given to Robertson and Radford before their departure has been found in Department of State files or the Eisenhower Library. Robertson apparently took with him to Taipei both the document printed as Annex "E" (attached to Document 207) and the draft policy statement of April 8 (Document 194). Both are in the file sent to Dulles with Robertson's April 27 memorandum, cited in footnote 1, *supra*.

<sup>3</sup> April 25.

213. Memorandum of a Conversation With the President,  
Washington, April 22, 1955, 4:25 p.m. <sup>1</sup>

OTHERS PRESENT

Under Secretary Hoover  
Admiral Carney  
Captain Mott (?) USN <sup>2</sup>

I joined the meeting when it was about half over. Discussion centered on possible formulas for controlling the sea area between Formosa and the Chinese mainland, in connection with questions left by Admiral Radford and Secretary Robertson on their departure—the idea apparently being to avoid the use of the term “blockade,” because of its closely defined international significance, in favor of a more flexible term such as “maritime zone.”

There was discussion of the military feasibility of instituting and maintaining such control, with mines, surface vessels, air support, etc.—this in conjunction with the feasibility of and support requirements for any attempt to evacuate ChiNat forces under ChiCom attack from the forward islands. There was also discussion of the legality of the “maritime zone” proposal. It was brought out that the proposal could only be effective with full cooperation of Chiang.

The President indicated that the considerations are so elusive that the matter is difficult to put into writing. He is hoping that Chiang comes to see the value of changing his stand voluntarily; Chiang must realize that his greatest asset in his present situation is U.S. public opinion. He felt that the “maritime zone” proposal could not be considered, except after a voluntary evacuation from the offshore islands or their capture after serving as out-posts. The President stressed, however, he did not wish to force Chiang into anything for which the U.S. would then be responsible, but wanted Chiang’s decision to be made voluntarily. He regarded the islands as being fairly valuable and appropriate for defense with small forces, supported to the maximum with mines and obstacles and other artificial items, and given ChiNat air support in case of ChiCom attack.

**A. J. Goodpaster**  
*Colonel, CE, US Army*  
*Staff Secretary*

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Miscellaneous Series, Conferences on Formosa. Top Secret. Drafted and initialed by Goodpaster.

<sup>2</sup> Parenthetical insertion in the source text. Apparently Captain William C. Mott, Special Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

**214. Message From the Chief of Naval Operations (Carney) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Radford) <sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, April 22, 1955—6:29 p.m.*

[Message No. 3.] In regard to a message going to you and Robertson from State concerning the maritime zone of defense, I have brought the following practical factors to the attention of SecDef, SecState, and the President. I have been directed to convey them to you so that you will have them in mind in connection with your impending conversations.

A. The purpose and scope of the objectives. (As related to measure of controls to be applied to restriction of sea and air traffic and nature and extent of measures to be invoked for its enforcement).

B. Operational factors. (Normal coastal junk traffic moves close to shore in shoal water. Its volume and traffic pattern make it impossible to control by visit and search. Interdiction involves surface penetration and continued operations in waters close to coast. Interdiction ocean shipping feasible but there is very little such in this area. Reaction to interdiction could include minor surface operations, submarine operations and air attack. Air threat most significant. Continuation of operations in face of such threats requires appropriate destruction of enemy air capability. Maintenance of cap by carrier air over interdicting forces for extended periods neither desirable nor practicable. Possible expansion enemy air operations should be viewed in light present unsatisfactory state air defense Formosa).

C. Results to be gained by proposed local interdiction. (Seaborne cargoes could enter China at ports other than those abreast Formosa for distribution by overland means).

D. Problem of sustaining blockade. (DDs and supporting ships could be provided on continuing basis. Air cover by carriers could be sustained only if operated in unsuitable areas and maintained continuously on station. This is unsound. Maintenance of adequate air cover would require USAF augmentation in area).

E. Eventuality of evacuation off shore islands. (Two conditions to be considered: first unopposed evacuation which presents no insurmountable problem and second opposed evacuation. Latter could develop if imposition interdiction measures results in ChiCom military reaction. Evacuation under these conditions not within capability of NGRC. Augmentation by U.S. in lift and supporting forces required. Success of operation would require attainment of air superiority throughout the operations. Not believed this can be achieved solely by local aerial combat and use of conventional weapons).

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.5800/4-2155. Top Secret; Exclusive; Operational Immediate. Drafted by Carney; transmitted in telegram 222329Z from CNO to Chief MAAG Formosa. An April 23 memorandum from Hoover to Secretary Dulles states that Carney read the draft message to the President at a meeting at the White House, apparently the meeting recorded in the memorandum, *supra*. (*Ibid.*)

215. **Message From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Anderson) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Radford) <sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, April 22, 1955—6:59 p.m.*

[Message No. 4.] Following for information Admiral Radford from Governor Brucker and Mr. Phleger

"In reference to questions submitted before your departure we have considered the legal status of a Zone of Defense in the Formosa Straits area and found no precedents for such a zone. However we consider that there is nothing in the U.N. Charter or in international law which prohibits such a zone. Interference with vessels of third parties will no doubt be challenged and while our legal right to do so is doubtful we feel that it can be justified as a matter of self-defense. A blockade is permissible only in time of war, or when authorized by the United Nations and therefore the use of that term should be avoided, as the measure under discussion is defensive and not intended as an act of war. The following is submitted as a basis of discussion but would of course have no application except after voluntary evacuation of the offshore islands or their capture while serving as cover or outpost positions under some plan of Chiang's:

"The continued aggressive and accelerated military build-up by the Chinese Communists on the mainland opposite Formosa, accompanied by their repeated and menacing threats to use armed force to attack Formosa have compelled the United States to join the Chinese Nationalist Government in establishing and maintaining measures of self defense in order to ward off attack and to lessen the possibility of all out war.

"In the interest of mutual self defense a Zone of Defense in the Formosa Straits between Formosa and points A and B on the China Coast is being instituted immediately. In this Zone all transportation by sea of war useful materials destined to the Chinese mainland between points A and B and all other maritime activity in aid of the Communist build up in the area opposite Formosa will be interdicted and prevented.

"This Zone of Defense will be maintained until the Chinese Communists give evidence in good faith that they will not attack Formosa. The institution of the Zone of Defense is a purely defen-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.5800/4-2155. Top Secret; Priority. Transmitted in telegram 222359Z from CNO to Chief MAAG Formosa. The source text indicates Brucker as the drafter, but Hoover's April 23 memorandum to Dulles, cited in footnote 1, *supra*, states:

"In view of the President's active interest in the Formosa situation during the past few days, I took the message to the White House for his clearance. The President made some changes after a good deal of discussion, and they were indicated on the draft in his own handwriting. It was transmitted in the form which he approved."

The draft with the President's handwritten revisions has not been found. The discussion to which Hoover referred apparently took place at the meeting recorded in Document 213.

sive measure taken to meet the announced threat of armed aggression against Formosa."

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**216. Telegram From the Ambassador in Indonesia (Cumming) to the Department of State <sup>1</sup>**

*Jakarta, April 23, 1955—10 p.m.*

2005. Romulo sent for me urgently evening April 23 to pass me results informal luncheon meeting delegations Colombo powers plus ChiCom, Philippines and Thailand. In response Sir John question re how tension over Taiwan might be eased, Chou made following points:

(a) Taiwan internal question which could be solved by China same way as liberation mainland, but complicated by intervention US.

(b) China does not want war and willing enter into negotiations with US. Repeated this several times and agreed make his statement publicly.

(c) Method or forum of negotiation not important, but noted US rejected Soviet proposal ten-power discussion.

(d) US proposal re evacuation off-shore islands in return for ChiCom guarantee not to liberate Taiwan out of question. Also flatly rejected Sir John's question re acceptability plebiscite. US and Chiang must leave Taiwan, ChiComs willing work out reasonable future status for both China and its forces.

Romulo said he declined comment in absence instructions. Asked me send above to Washington and Robertson at Taipei soonest. Said he sending to Magsaysay and Mohammad Ali <sup>2</sup> sending to Pakistan Ambassador Washington.

While foregoing being coded Bandung for phone transmission to Djakarta, received Chinese statement <sup>3</sup> sent Embtel 2004 repeated Taipei 31. <sup>4</sup>

**Cumming**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/4-2355. Secret; Niact. Repeated for information to Taipei for Robertson.

<sup>2</sup> Prime Minister of Pakistan.

<sup>3</sup> The statement, issued that afternoon by the Chinese Delegation, reads as follows: "The Chinese people are friendly to the American people. The Chinese people do not want to have war with the United States of America. The Chinese Government is willing to sit down and enter into negotiations with the United States Government to discuss the question of relaxing tension in the Far East and especially in the Taiwan area." (*New York Times*, April 24, 1955)

<sup>4</sup> Telegram 2004 from Jakarta, April 23, transmitted the substance of the statement quoted in footnote 3 above. (Department of State, Central Files, 670.901/4-2355)

217. Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Sebald) to the Secretary of State <sup>1</sup>

*Washington, April 25, 1955.*

SUBJECT

Developments Over Week End Relating to Chou En-lai's Negotiation Proposal.

Word of Chou En-lai's offer at the Bandung Conference to negotiate with the United States on relaxing tension in the Far East, including the Taiwan area, reached the Department early on the morning of Saturday, April 23. The Acting Secretary called a meeting of Departmental officers to consider the matter at 9:30 A.M. While a draft statement was being worked out, word was received from Presidential Assistant Hagerty that the President might wish to make a statement on the matter. Mr. Hagerty gave the Acting Secretary the text of a statement (Tab A) <sup>2</sup> which he proposed to recommend that the President issue from Gettysburg, where he was spending the week end.

After some discussion of the matter in the Department, Mr. Hoover strongly urged Mr. Hagerty not to advise the President to issue a statement. Mr. Hoover pointed out that the Chou En-lai statement was merely issued as a press release by the Chinese Delegation at Bandung. The British had commented on it only through a Foreign Office press release. It would dignify the statement unduly for the President to comment on it directly. Mr. Hoover suggested that a statement, substantially as drafted by Mr. Hagerty but with certain changes recommended by the Department, be issued as a Departmental press release. After some further consideration of the matter Mr. Hagerty agreed to the drafting changes suggested by the Department and also agreed that it should be put out as a Departmental press release. The statement (Tab B) <sup>3</sup> was issued to the press

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 670.901/4-2555. Top Secret.

<sup>2</sup> Hagerty's proposed draft statement reads as follows:

"The President has been informed of the press reports concerning the statement of Chou En-lai at the Bandung Conference. The United States always welcomes any sincere efforts by any nation desirous of bringing peace to the world. In the Formosa region we have an ally in the Free Republic of China and of course the United States would insist on Free China participating as an equal in any discussions concerning the area.

"If Communist China is sincere it could now take several steps which would clear the air considerably and give evidence before the world of its good intentions. It could immediately release the American airmen and others who are being held unjustly within the country and it could place an immediate cease-fire in effect in the area."

<sup>3</sup> The statement reads as follows:

"The Department of State has received press reports concerning the statement of Chou En-lai at the Bandung Conference. The United States always welcomes any efforts, if sincere, to bring peace to the world. In the Formosa region we have an ally in

*Continued*



at 12:30 P.M. on April 23. It was telegraphed priority to Djakarta and Taipei, and also was sent by USIA to all our principal posts.

Subsequently messages were received from Cumming which quoted the reports of Romulo and Mohammad Ali on their meetings with Chou En-lai (Tabs C<sup>4</sup> and D<sup>5</sup>). A reply to the latter telegram was sent to Cumming on April 24 stating that we do not intend to go beyond the press release of April 23 at this time, and indicating our interest in any additional information regarding Chou's position which Ali might be able to obtain in further conversations (Tab E).<sup>6</sup>

*Comment:*

Chou's proposal apparently was designed to leave the Bandung conferees with the impression that Communist China, without modifying in the slightest its basic demands for the "liberation" of Taiwan and the liquidation of the Government of the Republic of China, had gone more than half-way in a constructive effort to relax tensions over Taiwan. It was designed, as were the Chinese Communist tactics at Geneva, to establish a basis for throwing the onus for Far Eastern tensions on the United States, thus enabling the Communist propagandists to utilize the fear of war as a means of isolating the United States.

Initial reactions from abroad indicate at least partial success for Chou's tactic. Bandung conferees were reportedly "stunned" by this "reversal" of Chinese Communist policy. The British reaction, while reflecting skepticism about Chou's real intentions, makes it likely

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the free Republic of China and of course the United States would insist on free China participating as an equal in any discussions concerning the area.

"If Communist China is sincere there are a number of obvious steps it could take to clear the air considerably and give evidence before the world of its good intentions. One of these would be to place in effect in the area an immediate cease-fire. It could also immediately release the American airmen and others whom it unjustly holds. Another could be the acceptance of the outstanding invitation by the Security Council of the United Nations to participate in discussions to end hostilities in the Formosa region."

<sup>4</sup> Telegram 2792 from Manila, April 24, not attached to the source text, transmitted the text of a message of April 23 from Romulo to Magsaysay, concerning the luncheon meeting that day with Chou En-lai, which Magsaysay had given to Ambassador Homer Ferguson. (Department of State, Central Files, 670.901/4-2455)

<sup>5</sup> Telegram 2006 from Jakarta, April 23, not attached to the source text, reported that Cumming met that evening with a member of the Pakistani Delegation who had passed on a message from Prime Minister Ali that he had met several times and planned to meet again with Chou En-lai on the subject of Taiwan and was convinced of Chou's sincere desire for Sino-American negotiations leading to a peaceful settlement. Cumming made clear his understanding that the United States "could not undertake commitments re negotiations as to disposition off-shore islands without reference to Chiang whose control of islands we recognize". He recommended that the Department send a message at once to "prevent confusion or misunderstanding during these crowded last hours of conference." (*Ibid.*, 793.00/4-2355)

<sup>6</sup> Telegram 1837 to Jakarta, April 24, not attached to the source text. (*Ibid.*)

that allied reaction to a "negative" American attitude toward the proposal will be at best one of mild disappointment. Various foreign reactions are summarized in Tab F. <sup>7</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> Not printed.

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**218. Message From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Secretary of State <sup>1</sup>**

*Taipei, April 25, 1955—11:15 a.m.*

[Message No. 3.] We arrived Sunday <sup>2</sup> 11 am in tense atmosphere of speculation. News reports from US had indicated object of our mission to be to pressure Gimo to give up Quemoy and Matsu. We are informed Hong Kong Chinese papers for days have been stating British pressure was being applied US to this end. Gimo and Yeh had conference shortly before our arrival to discuss purpose of our trip. Gimo had concluded in view President Eisenhower's message to him January 31 <sup>3</sup> and since there had been no change in "present circumstances" our purpose was probably to discuss what in fact constituted an attack which was "in aid of and in preparation for an armed attack on Formosa and the Pescadores and dangerous to their defense". Gimo visibly shaken to learn that advance news reports accurately reflected purpose of our visit. Report on 5-hour conference follows in separate message. <sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.5800/4-2155. Top Secret; Operational Immediate. Transmitted in telegram 250315Z from Chief MAAG Formosa to CNO. Received at the Department of Defense at 12:15 a.m.

<sup>2</sup> April 24.

<sup>3</sup> Transmitted in Document 69.

<sup>4</sup> *Infra.*

219. **Message From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Secretary of State**<sup>1</sup>

*Taipei, April 25, 1955.*

[Message No. 4.] Present at meeting<sup>2</sup> beginning 4:30 p.m. ending 11 p.m. with 1 hour and half interruption for dinner were President Chiang, Madame Chiang, Foreign Minister Yeh, Secretary General Chang Chun, Presidential Secretary Sampson Shen, Admiral Radford, Ambassador Rankin, Rear Admiral Anderson, Assistant Secretary Robertson.

Robertson in opening statement said we had come discuss certain grave problems confronting 2 governments. There had been so many speculations in press to effect that US was being pressured to consider neutralization Formosa he would like to state in beginning (1) that President Eisenhower would not be party to neutralization plan for Formosa, (2) President Eisenhower reaffirms US policy of non-recognition Red China and will continue efforts to prevent admission to UN, (3) that US will continue look upon National Government as lawful government of China and only alternative to Red China for millions mainland and overseas Chinese.

Robertson continued situation now one which might well lead to war involving atomic weapons. If war came it was essential that US, which must bear large share responsibility, enter war with full support US public opinion and world opinion to greatest extent possible. To insure such support President Eisenhower convinced it essential (1) that US and Chinats not strike first blow, and (2) that if US goes to war it will be in defense of Formosa and not off-shore islands.

President Eisenhower convinced that both US and world opinion can be marshalled behind war in defense Formosa. Such opinion can not in his opinion be marshalled in support of war in defense off-shore islands. We should like emphasize overriding importance world opinion. If hostilities should bring Russia into war we would require use bases in other countries which might be denied US unless countries concerned supported our position. If Communists continue buildup airfields unchecked they will eventually dominate air over Quemoy-Matsu making them indefensible. If Chinats or US and Chinats together attack mainland to prevent buildup such attacks

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.5800/4-2155. Top Secret; Emergency. The source text is a copy made at the direction of the Secretary of a message in four parts from Robertson to Dulles, transmitted in telegrams 250905Z, 251010Z, 251201Z, and 252315Z from Chief MAAG Formosa to CNO, all dated April 25. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International Series)

The four telegrams were transmitted between 5:05 p.m. and 9:15 p.m. and received at the Department of Defense between 6:22 a.m. and 10:38 a.m.

<sup>2</sup> On April 24.

would bring down upon our heads the charge that we are aggressors in starting war. Weighing all these factors, President Eisenhower with reluctance has come to decision that military disadvantages of unchecked buildup should be accepted at this time rather than we should be held responsible for initiating active hostilities which could readily spread to major war. President Eisenhower strongly feels that the moral and political advantages of avoiding the initiative if [in] the fighting would more than offset the military disadvantages.

Problem is how can we meet this situation without seriously impairing the defensibility of treaty area without (a) loss of the value of Quemoy-Matsu as defensive outposts, (b) serious loss of Chinat troops and valuable equipment, (c) loss of face by both Chinats and US. Obviously only solution lies in finding substitute for islands which would strengthen rather than weaken overall position. President Eisenhower wished to emphasize that this was problem to be talked out with Gimo without attempting pressure Gimo into position not acceptable to him. If in view all circumstances as outlined Gimo would agree to evacuation Quemoy-Matsu US would provide cover such evacuation and President Eisenhower would publicly announce that until it was evident Red China had renounced avowed purpose take Formosa by force US will as measure of self-defense join with Chinats to institute and maintain interdiction of sea lanes along China Coast from and including Swatow in south to Wenchow in north for all contraband and war-making materials. Interdiction would serve triple purpose:

- (1) would replace Quemoy-Matsu as defense blocks to staging seaborne attack from Amoy and Fuchow harbors,

- (2) would materially retard present heavy seaborne movement POL and heavy supplies into Fukien area,

- (3) would demonstrate to Communists and world US prepared take strong measures in defense Formosa. Gimo asked in reply if main feature of President Eisenhower's proposal was to give up Quemoy-Matsu and substitute therefor interdiction limited area China Coast. Robertson replied such was proposal emphasizing that under present circumstances attack on Communist buildup would involve US striking first blow whereas interdiction would put Communists into position of striking first blow.

Gimo stated Chinats will honor all treaty obligations and keep all promises such as not attack mainland without US consent. He was not in position to consider any undertaking which might place his government in bad light with his own people. He had agreed to evacuation Tachens but he will defend Quemoy-Matsu with or without US help. Therefore, he cannot accept US proposal. He is fully aware of danger of Chicom buildup but is prepared to take risk of receiving full onslaught of attack rather than give up two positions which would go against best Chinese tradition of patriotism. If

he abandoned Quemoy-Matsu Chinese people would lose respect this government. Speculation in US press indicates US decision has already been made which has placed Chinat Government in untenable position. Soldiers must choose proper places to die. Chinese soldiers consider Quemoy-Matsu are proper places for them.

Robertson stated US government could not be held responsible for speculation in press. Question here was not one of US decision whether Quemoy-Matsu should be held but whether US should participate in their defense. If Gimo decided to defend islands US will continue give logistical support. US does not presume tell Chinats what they must do. He reiterated that if situation evolved into larger war it would be essential US Government have full support of both political parties and of American people. This would not be possible if we should enter war in defense Quemoy-Matsu.

Gimo reiterated he would defend own territory but would carry out treaty obligations. He had no right to inquire what US would actually do but would like to know whether US had changed mind or altered policy relative assistance in defense of Quemoy-Matsu.

Admiral Radford stated that President Eisenhower had in fact changed his mind with reference to US participation in defense of Quemoy-Matsu which was his intention under circumstances prevailing at time of his January 31 message. However President had not come to this conclusion lightly. He made new proposal with sincere feeling of offering solution which would best serve purpose free China and US. There was no question that if US assisted Chinats we had military power to hold Quemoy-Matsu. However in addition to consideration of striking first blow it would undoubtedly be necessary to use atomic weapons. If these were used President Eisenhower would have to consider feeling generated throughout the world and in China too, particularly if many civilians were killed. He was sure Gimo could well appreciate terrible responsibilities of President Eisenhower in this regard. Furthermore we must both recognize that Russia is a principal enemy and US must not jeopardize its ability to cope successfully with Russian military power in event of major war. Our considerations must include factor of allied bases and hence allied opinion.

Gimo asked whether President Eisenhower has considered psychological effect on rest of free Asians if US proposal adopted. He mentioned that at the time of withdrawal from Tachens President Eisenhower had indicated US would assist in defense of Quemoy-Matsu. New proposal now involved abandoning more territory Quemoy-Matsu to Communist. This will have grave psychological reactions throughout Asia detracting from position of US as leader if latter will not hold line against Communist. Minister Yeh interjected to ask whether a defense of Quemoy-Matsu required use atomic

weapons or whether a defense could not be accomplished with conventional weapons alone.

Admiral Radford replied that from military standpoint he could not guarantee their defense without use atomic weapons. At this point Gimo suggested short break and he and Madame Chiang withdrew.

Conversation continued Robertson reiterating salient points to Minister Yeh and asking if he (Yeh) thought Generalissimo fully appreciated US position as to importance of US and world opinion and implications of US proposal. Minister Yeh recalled the psychological reactions to the evacuation of the Tachens, at which time indications were US would assist defending Quemoy-Matsu. US now apparently renege on this understanding although this is not publicly known. He indicated that further evacuation by military forces would result in loss of morale and deterioration government position. He said he felt that to lose islands in battle would be less serious in effect upon morale than evacuation without fight. He mentioned that overseas press had predicted US would pressure Gimo give up Quemoy-Matsu. This in itself had had serious effect upon morale.

Robertson replied that proposal for joint interdiction would represent position of strength—not weakness—and involved serious commitment on the part US Government. He reiterated that interdiction would likely be more effective in long run than holding islands. He urged that Gimo give full consideration to US position and to all implications of interdiction proposal. If Gimo should accept proposal announcement would be more effective if it followed meeting between President Eisenhower and Gimo in some mutually agreed upon place. Gimo should not assume US is abandoning its obligations to the free world. Problem should be considered as whole not in isolated parts.

Yeh expressed doubts as to the effectiveness of limited interdiction in interfering with Chicom buildup. Admiral Radford indicated that measures could be taken to stop junk traffic and added that Communists as a matter of fact would find it difficult to accept what would amount to a blockade of their coast. (Radford pointed out that recently Chinats have lost much support in world opinion which US seeks to restore.)

At this point President Chiang returned to conference. He stated that he would now give his answer to President Eisenhower's proposal. He fully comprehends military and political reasons for US plan including intention of offsetting bad influence of evacuation of Quemoy and Matsu by including the specific proposal involving interdiction of Chinese Communist seaborne traffic. He is particularly sympathetic to position that President Eisenhower be supported by public opinion in US. He fully appreciates President Eisenhower's

difficulties. As an ally he cannot disregard President Eisenhower's domestic problems. As proof of his spirit he would like to recall circumstances of agreement to withdraw from Tachens. This originally included on part of US public announcement that US would participate in defense of Quemoy and Matsu. Subsequently, President Eisenhower had explained to him why he was not able to make such an announcement. Gimo had accepted President Eisenhower's word that US would participate in the defense of Quemoy and Matsu without such public announcement. In his relations with US he had always been guided by principle that where matters were in doubt China should be loser rather than US. He does not want US to be embarrassed. He had made this clear to Secretary Dulles during course of his last meeting with Secretary. He had no desire to involve us in any armed conflict on behalf of Government of China. He does not want to see us lose prestige or lose in any way by becoming so involved.

Recently he and Madame Chiang made trip to Quemoy and Matsu. During this trip he realized that Chinese Communists could attack these islands any time. It was not necessary for them to wait completion of airfield development program in vicinity. Chinese Communists were not building fields along China Coast in preparation for attack on Quemoy and Matsu, but rather to attack Formosa and to prepare for general conflict. He has concluded that Communists will not attack Quemoy and Matsu in immediate future. It is his judgment that when and if they attack Quemoy and Matsu they will also attack Taiwan at same time. They would not attack Quemoy and Matsu simply as an independent action. Thus there is no need to get jittery or to worry over these two islands or buildup on Chinese Coast at this time.

If at this time and in absence of state of war Chinese Nationalists were to withdraw from Quemoy and Matsu they would suffer loss of prestige vis-à-vis overseas Chinese, free people throughout South Asia, and in their own armed forces which could not be offset. Unfortunately, Quemoy and Matsu have become a touchstone (symbol) of US prestige in Far East and if US urges his Government to abandon these islands the effect on Asiatics throughout world and on US prestige would be very bad.

Some time ago he had talked with Roy Howard, whom he had informed that Chinese Communists would not launch an attack in Quemoy and Matsu without green light from USSR. They would not attack unless USSR was prepared to fight world war. The Soviet Union is not so prepared at this time. The Gimo reiterated that if he were to fight on Quemoy and Matsu and were he defeated it would not be so shameful as to abandon these positions without a fight.

This is in consonance with Chinese tradition which is shared by all the overseas Chinese.

Gimo cannot believe that interdiction would serve as an offset to abandonment of Quemoy and Matsu, particularly in view of ineffectiveness of blockade in application and because of precedent of half-hearted manner of carrying out earlier United Nations embargo on shipment of goods to Communist China. He has not examined details of interdiction proposal but pointed out that while limited blockade might slow down buildup on Chinese Coast it could not prevent it.

When Minister Yeh was in Washington, Gimo had pointed out to him that evacuation of Tachens would ultimately lead to proposal to withdraw from Quemoy and Matsu. He predicted that British pressure on certain elements in US would inevitably lead to such proposal. Inasmuch as his Government has announced its own determination to defend these islands if they were now to abandon them, could anyone believe that Formosa itself would actually be held. He thinks not. If his forces pulled out of Quemoy and Matsu, even a child would not believe that his Government would be assisted by US in holding Taiwan itself. If he abandoned Quemoy and Matsu, it would only lead to further pressure for establishment of a trusteeship for Formosa.

Speaking among friends and in greatest confidence, Gimo stated that if decision were to be made by Chinese Government to abandon Quemoy and Matsu none of Chinese people would support Government's decision. He would be unable to lead them, and the United States would have to find another Chiang Kai-shek—adding that US would be unable to find another leader who is such a friend to America or as anti-Communist as he is.

In order maintain his own position and more important the confidence and trust of his people in General Eisenhower, the Gimo will defend those islands. Thus, he will defend President Eisenhower's position throughout the Far East for in reality he places it of greater importance than his own. There will be many ways to counter Communist aggression in Far East if President Eisenhower trusts Gimo. He will be very happy to talk to President Eisenhower, but this proposal itself can be described in a Chinese simile, "Trying to bore without a buffalo's horns—it gets nowhere."

Robertson stated he would like to set record straight relative to conversations in Washington in January regarding evacuation of Tachens. During exploratory conversations Secretary Dulles had advised Minister Yeh that in event Gimo decided evacuate Tachens President Eisenhower would consider public announcement US would assist defense Quemoy-Matsu. However, before decision had been made as to evacuation Secretary Dulles informed Minister Yeh that President



Eisenhower had concluded that public announcement would be inadvisable, although US under present circumstances would assist in such defense. Secretary made it clear to Yeh, however, that the commitment of US to participate in defense of Quemoy and Matsu was a unilateral decision on part of United States and could be withdrawn by United States at any time United States considered conditions had changed and without charge bad faith.

In his message of January 31, President Eisenhower had confirmed that under the then prevailing circumstances he would come to aid of Chinese Nationalists if major attack were made against Quemoy and Matsu. Now, however, there has built up US tremendous opposition to United States participating in defense of offshore islands. This opposition is prevalent both in Congress and in large sections public opinion. Therefore, Robertson is informing Gimo today that circumstances have changed and that President Eisenhower could not now use US forces in defense of these islands without large loss public support at home and abroad.

Gimo stated he understood present situation. He had agreed to pull out Tachens because at the time he was given assurance by United States that it would assist in defense of Quemoy and Matsu. As a result, he had made pledges to his people. If United States feels that situation has changed United States has perfect right to alter its decision. From his own standpoint, he considers that military situation itself is unchanged even though he recognizes that domestic political situation in United States may have changed.

Robertson stated that President Eisenhower's support of Chinese Nationalist Government has not changed. He desires to render support in manner which will have full endorsement of American people rather than cause great division of US public opinion at this critical time. He reiterated that if President Eisenhower's proposal were accepted it was his firm belief that the Gimo would gain more friends and more support.

The Gimo concluded by stating that he would like to go along with any plan by which prestige would gain, but he does not believe in this specific proposal. Gimo stated that Communists would welcome such a plan, to which both Radford and Robertson expressed astonished disagreement.

Robertson concluded by urging Gimo not dismiss US proposal without further serious consideration. It is very sincere and very significant proposal. He hopes Gimo will give it his full consideration.

Meeting adjourned at about 8 p.m. for dinner. Following dinner Gimo indicated quite firmly that he considered his answer to have been definitive and that he did not desire to resume discussions for the present.

Conversation continued with Minister Yeh alone. He stated that Gimo had not anticipated any proposal from US which would involve abandoning Quemoy and Matsu to Communists inasmuch as Gimo was so firmly convinced that he had been given positive assurance by President Eisenhower that US would participate in their defense under conditions such as now existed.

Dining with Gimo tonight (Monday).

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220. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the President and the Secretary of State, Washington, April 25, 1955, 5:15 p.m.<sup>1</sup>

I brought to the President the four-part message from Walter Robertson.<sup>2</sup> I told him that in essence the reaction of the Generalissimo was negative to the proposals that have been put up to him. The President said that he was sorry that Radford did not find any merit in the "outpost" theory and said that he himself had never expected that the Generalissimo would give up outright on Quemoy and the Matsus.

I referred to the statement made by Chou En-lai at Bandung and the State Department statement which had been issued on Saturday. I said I thought that we should be prepared to indicate receptivity to any "cease fire" proposal and that our Asian friends at Bandung who had brought about the apparently more pacific mood on the part of the Chinese Communists would expect this of us. The President agreed that I should take this line at my press conference on Tuesday.<sup>3</sup>

[Here follows discussion concerning the proposed Bricker Amendment to the Constitution.]

JFD

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President. Secret; Personal and Private. Drafted by Dulles.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra*.

<sup>3</sup> April 26.

221. Telegram From the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Aldrich) to the Department of State <sup>1</sup>

*London, April 25, 1955—11 a.m.*

4724. For Key and Lodge from Wadsworth. <sup>2</sup> Request limited distribution. SYG Hammarskjöld came to see me yesterday at his request to tell me the outcome of his conversation in Stockholm with the ChiCom Ambassador to Sweden. <sup>3</sup> He will give more details upon his return, <sup>4</sup> but wanted US Govt to have immediate news of four points he thought were significant and hoped this information would be treated most confidentially.

(1) At ChiCom Amb's request meeting was private, almost clandestine, with only persons present SYG, ChiCom Amb and interpreter. Since SYG had originally asked for appointment far in advance, this meant to him that he would be given Chou's personal views.

(2) ChiCom Amb asked SYG how he, SYG, would handle release of airmen if he were in Chou's position. SYG considered this highly significant since ChiComs had now moved from question of whether to release to the question of how to release. I pointed out that SYG had already given the answer in his letter of some two months ago, <sup>5</sup> but he insisted that this was usual procedure and that suggestion contained in letter would be confirmed by face-to-face statement rather than other way around.

(3) SYG, in his answer, attempted to put himself in Chou's place, saying that he would have to do so since he did not accept major premise of airmen's guilt. However, on basis of Peiping attitude airmen should be released by commuting sentences without weakening position Chinese courts which had found them guilty. This would also apply to four airmen not yet considered guilty of anything but intrusion over ChiCom territory. SYG wants US to know he made clear that he did not believe in espionage charges and that his answer would have been drastically different had he not attempted put himself in Chou's place.

(4) At end of conference, after several other minor points discussed, <sup>6</sup> SYG asked ChiCom Amb to send word to Chou asking him

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.95A241/4-2555. Secret. Received at 4:42 p.m. Repeated for information to New York.

<sup>2</sup> James J. Wadsworth, Deputy Representative to the United Nations, was representing the United States at a meeting in London of the Subcommittee of Five of the U.N. Disarmament Commission.

<sup>3</sup> Hammarskjöld's meeting with Ambassador Keng Piao on April 23 was held at the Secretary-General's request.

<sup>4</sup> An aide-mémoire by Hammarskjöld, dated May 2, was sent with a covering letter of the same date to Lodge; both were sent to Dulles with a covering memorandum of May 4 from Key. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.95A241/5-455)

<sup>5</sup> See Document 120.

<sup>6</sup> According to the aide-mémoire cited in footnote 4 above, Ambassador Keng asked about the Chinese students in the United States, and Hammarskjöld replied that that problem seemed to be resolved, since only two requests for exit permits were still pending, and he had reason to believe that they would be resolved in due time. Tele-

whether he would like SYG to take any specific action which might facilitate airmen's release. This, thinks SYG, puts ball back on ChiCom side of net.

ChiCom Amb told SYG that Chou was ready to release airmen after SYG Peiping visit and "the Chinese people would have supported him in this", but that other cases intrusion plus "incident of sabotaged airplane"<sup>7</sup> had intervened. SYG not impressed but forebore to argue. I believe UK FonOff will probably brief SYG on evidence ChiCom foreknowledge airplane crash.

**Aldrich**

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gram 612 to New York, April 20, suggested that Lodge inform Hammarskjöld, in case Keng Piao raised the subject, that only two Chinese students were still under restraining orders, that the review of those two cases was continuing, and that the rest of the students previously denied permission to leave were all free to depart. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.95A241/4-1455)

<sup>7</sup> Reference is to the *Kashmir Princess*, an Air India plane chartered by the PRC Government which crashed on April 11 on a flight from Hong Kong to Jakarta, killing all 11 passengers, several of whom were staff members of the Chinese and North Vietnamese Delegations to the Bandung Conference. For text of a statement issued on April 12 in Peking, charging that the crash was due to a plot by "secret agent organizations of the United States and Chiang Kai-shek", see *People's China*, May 1, 1955, p. 40; see also Trevelyan, *Living with the Communists*, pp. 157-161.

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## 222. Editorial Note

At a press conference on April 26, Secretary Dulles made a statement which reads in part as follows:

"The Bandung Conference, as we had hoped, seems to have exerted a restraint on the Chinese Communists. I had always felt that it would be salutary if the Chinese Communists were confronted with the opinion of the free nations of Asia. That opinion was powerfully expressed in favor of peace and against direct and indirect aggression. There seems now a chance that the Communist Chinese may be deterred from pursuing the course of violence which has characterized their action in relation to Korea, to Tibet, to Indochina, and, more recently, in relation to the Taiwan (Formosa) Straits.

"The Chinese Communists found no backing for their announced program of seizing Taiwan (Formosa) by force. On the contrary, they felt it useful in the last hours of the Bandung Conference to propose to negotiate a peaceful settlement. Whether or not that was a sincere proposal remains to be seen. Perhaps the Chinese Communists were merely playing a propaganda game. But we intend to try to find out. In doing so we shall not, of course, depart from the path of fidelity and honor toward our ally, the Republic of China."

In response to questions, the Secretary indicated that the United States would be willing to enter multilateral or bilateral discussions with the Chinese Communists without the presence of the Nationalists, although, he stated, "We are not going to deal with the rights of the Chinese Nationalists, and their claims, in their absence." In response to another question, he replied:

"The first thing is to find out whether there is a possibility of a cease-fire in the area. That is a matter which can be discussed perhaps bilaterally, or at the United Nations, or possibly under other circumstances. But I regard a cease-fire as the indispensable prerequisite to anything further. When you get into further matters, then the interests of the Chinese Nationalists would naturally come to play a very large part."

Referring to a statement by Premier Chou En-lai, made in a speech at Bandung on April 24, that China and the United States should enter into negotiations "to settle the question of relaxing and eliminating the tension in the Taiwan area" but that this should not affect "the just demand of the Chinese people to exercise their sovereign rights in liberating Taiwan," Secretary Dulles said:

"Now, I have said previously that we would not expect the parties to this struggle, whether the Chinese Nationalists or the Chinese Communists, to renounce their ambitions. We don't expect that to be done any more than we expect that to happen in the case of Germany or Korea or Viet-Nam. But even though they retain their ambitions—retain their claims—they might renounce the use of force to satisfy their claims and their ambitions. Now I don't know whether what Chou En-lai said was intended to be responsive to what I had previously said on that phase of the matter, or not. That is one of the things which I think deserves further exploration."

For a complete text of the Secretary's statement and a transcript of the portions of his press conference relating to the possibility of a cease-fire, see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 9, 1955, pages 754-759. The text of Chou En-lai's April 24 statement at the Bandung Conference is in *Documents on International Affairs, 1955*, pages 427-429.

223. Message From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Secretary of State <sup>1</sup>

*Taipei, April 26, 1955—9 p.m.*

Msg nr 8. Radford, Rankin, and I met for hour with Yeh on 25. Substance follows:

We surprised Chiang's reaction to proposal as meaningless and his statement Communists would welcome it. Yeh repeated Chiang meant give up islands without struggle welcome to Communists and interdiction not offset disadvantages. We pointed out lowered ChiNat prestige throughout world and fact some allies might leave us if provoked too far. Made point active United States support main factor keeping ChiNat prestige from going lower. United States and world opinion strongly against war. US Government and Congress sensitive to public opinion and successful policy must have public support.

Any act of ChiNats or United States and ChiNats which precipitates war will set public opinion against us. We think if proposal accepted and announced at Eisenhower-Chiang meeting most of our allies will get behind us. Stressed fact that interdiction very serious step and one which might evoke Communist reaction. Said that war evolved we would be on defensive side and be backed by United States and allied opinion.

Yeh said he not think interdiction would hurt Communists much nor did he think it would bring any Communist reaction except talk. Said he sure present Communist peace offensive will continue until they sure cannot detach Formosa by talk, then they will attack; not before. He pointed out Chiang plus all of Cabinet have publicly pledged to defend off-shore islands and would lose support at home and with overseas Chinese if evacuated without fight. Said with bigger air force ChiNats could hold islands several months even though would eventually lose them. Felt loss after fight better politically than evacuation.

We stated we willing stay for further talks with Chiang if desirable or leave now if no further talks desired.

No opportunity for more than general talk after dinner last night. Meeting tonight for what may be final conversation. Unless otherwise instructed may leave for States tomorrow (Wednesday). No word from you today.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.5800/4-2155. Top Secret; Eyes Only; Emergency. Transmitted in telegram 261300Z from Chief MAAG Formosa to CNO. Received at the Department of Defense at 9:45 a.m.

224. **Message From the Secretary of State to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson), at Taipei** <sup>1</sup>

*Washington, April 26, 1955—2:12 p.m.*

[Message No. 7.] Your no. 8. <sup>2</sup>

1. Appreciate your and Radford's good presentation and effort.
2. We assume Gimo clearly understands that President's earlier decision communicated January 31 (last part para. 3 our 421 to AmEmbassy Taipei) is now altered and that there can be no future charge of bad faith.
3. Does Gimo understand and accept President's decision not to agree to preventive attacks to interfere with mainland air field build-up?
4. Have you explored at all the "outpost" theory and logistical assistance we could give in its implementation if Gimo adopted it?
5. I have impression Gimo will prefer to gamble that an attack on coastal islands will not come or if it comes will be combined with attack on Formosa itself so that in fact we will be involved.
6. You are authorized return your discretion. <sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.5800/4-2155. Top Secret; Eyes Only; Emergency. Drafted by Dulles. Transmitted in telegram 261912Z from CNO to Chief MAAG Formosa.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra.*

<sup>3</sup> Notes prepared by Phyllis Bernau of a telephone call from Secretary Dulles to the President at 12:23 p.m. read as follows:

"The Pres. said he was just getting to read the cables from Taipei. The Sec. said he has another one which says they had a talk with Yeh—there was no further opportunity to talk with the Gimo. In absence of other instructions, they plan to leave tomorrow. The Pres. said he has no further instructions." (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Telephone Conversations)

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225. **Letter From the President to the Secretary of State** <sup>1</sup>

*Washington, April 26, 1955.*

DEAR FOSTER: I have now read the cables that you brought to my office bearing on the conversations between Chiang, Robertson and Radford. <sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Correspondence with the President. Top Secret; Eyes Only; Personal and Private. The source text bears a handwritten notation by Phyllis Bernau that it was seen by the Secretary.

<sup>2</sup> See Documents 219 and 220.

Chiang's answer to the specific proposal made is not only what I predicted but what I think I would have made had I been in his place. As long as our representatives did not feel they could suggest any attractive position between evacuation on the one hand and a "fight to the death" on the other, there was no possibility of a meeting of minds. For one thing there was left no way by which Chiang could possibly save face.

I had hoped that the Gimo himself might have seen the wisdom of trimming the garrison on the offshore islands down to the leanest fighting weight possible, organizing them highly, and in the meantime making the necessary public statements that would clearly set forth his determination to fight for the islands' positions, but *not* to make them the sine qua non of the ChiNats' existence. I had thought also that while he was doing this, if he could be assured of our reinforcing Formosa with air, some marines and logistics, that he would have been in better position both politically and militarily than he now is. Certainly this would have been better for us.

It is, of course, possible that no presentation could have brought Chiang to recognizing the wisdom of some arrangement as this—much less to propose it. But it is clear that as long as Radford and Robertson themselves could not grasp the concept, we simply were not going to get anywhere, and there is nothing in the cables to suggest that such a thought was discussed.

So, in a sense, we are still on the horns of the dilemma that you and I have discussed a number of times.

D.E.

226. **Message From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Secretary of State**<sup>1</sup>

*Taipei, 27 April 1955—11 a.m.*

Message nr 9. Following dinner with Gimo Tuesday<sup>2</sup> night, Radford and I had 2 1/2 hour conversation with Gimo with Minister Yeh and Madame Chiang present.

I reiterated main feature of US proposal emphasizing:

(1) Urgent need to restore world opinion in favor of ChiNats,

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.5800/4-2155. Top Secret; Eyes Only; Operational Immediate. Transmitted in telegram 270300Z from Chief MAAG Formosa to CNO. Received at the Department of Defense at 2:15 a.m.

<sup>2</sup> April 26.



(2) Absolute necessity having US public support any military actions undertaken by US government,

(3) Specific proposals would lead to position of strength by clearly placing responsibility for any hostile actions on Communists, thus to achieve 1 and 2 above.

Gimo indicated he understood fully details and implications of our proposal. He stated primary consideration was one of confidence and trust, secondly that any proposal must be within reasonable bounds of compliance to each party. He lacked faith in US ability to adhere in face of outside pressures to proposed interdiction of sea-borne traffic after having given up islands. The abandonment of his little remaining territory at this time would be completely unacceptable to his people and to overseas Chinese everywhere shattering their confidence in him as well as United States.

Chiang reviewed long history of US-Free China relations, mentioning specifically Yalta<sup>3</sup> and Marshall mission, pointing out that by series of agreements to meet expedient proposals by United States he found himself at point where further concessions would lead to ultimate calamity. He did not question motives of United States in past or in present situation but indicated very strongly and emotionally his conviction that further concessions impossible.

While Radford and I did best to gain approval, we were unable to sway Gimo from his rejection of our proposal. Separately Madame Chiang and Minister Yeh informed us Gimo's decision unshakable.

Gimo concluded by requesting that I convey to President Eisenhower his great respect and personal faith in US motives, but offered his humble apology for not being able to go along with proposal give up Quemoy-Matsu which would be "surrender to Communists which would endanger support of overseas Chinese and his own people."

Answering your number 7.<sup>4</sup> Para 2. Gimo clearly understands President has altered his earlier decision and will not use US military forces in defense offshore islands. Para 3. Gimo reiterated several times he would abide by obligations mutual defense treaty and would not attack mainland airfield buildup without US consent. Para 4. If you refer to President's earlier idea the answer is in negative. Gimos firm opposition to withdrawal strength from islands precluded such exploration.

Gimo and Yeh clearly understand US military forces will not be used in defense of offshore islands. They strongly urge and hope however that President will not make announcement to this effect

<sup>3</sup> Reference is to the Yalta Conference of February 4-11, 1945, among President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and Marshal Stalin.

<sup>4</sup> Document 224.

either publicly or to members of Congress. If his decision should leak they consider it would mean green light to Communists to attack. We are departing today.

227. **Telegram From the Ambassador in Indonesia (Cumming) to the Department of State** <sup>1</sup>

*Jakarta, April 27, 1955—5 p.m.*

2061. For Robertson. Saw Prince Wan <sup>2</sup> this afternoon. His version luncheon meeting April 23 with Chou En-lai in general confirms versions given me by Romulo and Mohammed Ali. Wan does not think that plans or systematic thinking regarding Taiwan can be complete without also taking into account Korean problem. On latter point he believes UNCURK should be reorganized by next General Assembly so as to include all Colombo Powers.

Regarding Taiwan he says he suggested to Chou that American airmen be released in such a way as to save Chinese face to give US evidence of Chinese sincerity in proposing negotiations on Taiwan. Chou replied that he had seriously been considering airmen's release but *Kashmir Princess* incident had so inflamed Chinese press and public opinion against United States that action was presently impossible. (Wan did not comment on fact that Peking can inflame and quiet Chinese public opinion at will). Wan believes Chou really wants to come to a peaceful solution of Taiwan problem but a formula must be found that will save Chou's face as well as take United States desiderata into account. In this connection Wan said Chou once during conversation referred to "peaceful liberation" of Taiwan.

Wan does not believe Chou will publicly announce or agree to a formal cease fire but that what Wan calls a de facto cease fire might be brought about if groundwork carefully laid. Chou several times mentioned to him fact that Chinese and American Consuls General Geneva had been in touch with one another over POW question. This led Wan to believe that we should very seriously consider some similar contact with Chinese elsewhere and perhaps at a higher level. He thought that while a third party might be of assistance in bringing about such a contact, the contact should be continued without

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/4-2755. Secret; Priority. Repeated for information to Taipei and Bangkok.

<sup>2</sup> Thai Foreign Minister Prince Wan Waithayakon Krommun Naradhip Bongsprabandh.

the presence of third country or group of countries. Wan said Chou had rejected suggestion that Nehru might be such an intermediary.

I gave Prince Wan copy of Secretary Dulles' press conference of April 26,<sup>3</sup> which he read carefully and thought excellent. Prince Wan said he had sent his Prime Minister,<sup>4</sup> now in United States, summary of his conversations with Chou but had not yet prepared a full report for his government or completed his own reflections as to what conversations really meant and what might next best be done.

Cumming

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<sup>3</sup> See Document 222.

<sup>4</sup> P. Pibulsonggram.

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228. Memorandum of a Conversation, Washington, April 27, 1955, 6 p.m.<sup>1</sup>

I met at my house with Senators Knowland, Hickenlooper<sup>2</sup> and Alex Smith.<sup>3</sup> I gave them the background of the position I had taken with reference to the Chou En-lai statement on negotiating with the United States, namely, that:

The buildup of airfields was going ahead and unless interfered with would create a situation where the Chinese would have air dominance over Quemoy and Matsu in the absence of an all-out United States atomic attack.

The President was very reluctant to authorize the Chinese Nationalists to hit the airfields in their development stage with United States planes based upon Formosa. This would seem in the nature of "preventive war" and make us seem responsible for the hostilities which would doubtless ensue.

The President was also reluctant to see a wholesale use of atomic weapons against the densely populated mainland where land bursts would be required which would have a fall-out which might involve

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Memoranda of Conversation. Top Secret; Personal and Private. Drafted by Dulles on April 28.

<sup>2</sup> Senator Bourke B. Hickenlooper of Iowa, member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

<sup>3</sup> Senator H. Alexander Smith of New Jersey, member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Secretary Dulles invited the three Senators to meet with him after Senators Knowland and Hickenlooper expressed concern in telephone conversations earlier in the day concerning Dulles' statements at his press conference the day before. (Notes by Phyllis Bernau of telephone conversations with Senators Knowland and Hickenlooper and Vice President Nixon, April 27; Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations)

heavy casualties. This might alienate Asian opinion and ruin Chiang Kai-shek's hopes of ultimate welcome back to the mainland.

Therefore, it seemed that diplomacy and not merely force might be required to avoid a misfortune of considerable proportions in relation to the coastal positions which might either be lost or only held at a prohibitive cost.

I went on to speak about the Bandung Conference, of the feeling which I had had that the Conference would either give the Chinese Communists the "green light" to go ahead with force to seize the coastal positions and perhaps Formosa, or that the Conference might set up restraints upon the Chinese Communists. I said that we had worked very hard to produce the latter result and that our friends had pitched in and done a job which had led Chou to follow a pacific rather than belligerent course. They felt pleased with the result and a complete turn-down by the United States would alienate our Asian non-Communist friends and allies.

The combination of these considerations led me to feel that we should be prepared to talk with the Chinese Communists merely to the extent of ascertaining whether they would make a "cease fire".

I pointed out that the Chinese Nationalists in return for getting the Security Treaty had in effect authorized us to bring about a cease fire in that they for their side had agreed not to attack unless they were attacked or unless we agreed to their attack on the mainland. Therefore, all that remained was to find out whether the Chinese Communists would do the same. As far as the substance of the rights of the Chinese Nationalists was concerned, we made it perfectly clear that we would not deal with those rights behind the backs of the Nationalists.

Senator Knowland indicated the feeling that Senator George was being excessively deferred to and that the Republicans in the Senate were being too much ignored. He also felt that we could not trust a cease-fire agreement and that the Armistices in Korea and Indochina were already being broken.

While I did not feel that my presentation had convinced the Senators, except perhaps Senator Smith, the meeting was cordial and in good spirits.

April 28, 1955.

I met again in my office this morning with Senator Alexander Smith. We reviewed somewhat what I had said the evening before. Senator Smith asked whether what we had in mind would tie our hands in the event there was a resumption of fighting in Korea or Indochina. I said I thought that any "cease fire" for the Formosa area should be contingent upon non-aggression by the Chinese Commu-

nists elsewhere. Senator Smith said he thought it was an important point that we should keep open a threat to the center in order to protect the two flanks.

JFD

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229. **Message From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Secretary of State** <sup>1</sup>

*Honolulu, April 27, 1955—6:01 p.m.*

[Message No. 10.] I am greatly concerned over repercussions in Taiwan if and when US decision not to assist in defense Quemoy and Matsu becomes known.

Evacuation of Tachens very unpopular move and was strongly opposed in Cabinet. Gimo forced decision on what he termed "personal word of President to assist in defense of Quemoy-Matsu in lieu of public announcement first expected." Gimo fully understood US was not making permanent commitment to defend islands thus enlarging treaty area, but he confided to Yeh "that never in his darkest moments did he expect US to alter decision as to immediate situation." Aside from difficulty of conditioning Cabinet and public to idea of abandonment of islands, interdiction proposal did not appeal because Gimo feared US "would again back away under allied pressure."

When we left Taipei, US decision not commit US forces in defense of islands had not been communicated to Cabinet. Yeh greatly worried how situation is to be handled and is particularly anxious that no US announcement be made at this time. I strongly urge that US accede to his request. Gimo does not control either Cabinet or party to extent generally thought and we are dealing with highly explosive situation which could seriously jeopardize US interests in the Far East.

Unless conferences desired with Radford and me on Saturday, <sup>2</sup> Radford planning arrive Washington Saturday evening in which event I will drop off Richmond returning Washington Sunday evening. <sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.5800/4-2155. Top Secret; Eyes Only; Operational Immediate. Transmitted in telegram 280401Z from CINCPAC to CNO. Received at the Department of Defense at 12:15 a.m. on April 28.

<sup>2</sup> April 30.

<sup>3</sup> Dulles replied in message no. 8 to Robertson, transmitted in telegram 281440Z from CNO to CINCPAC, April 28, stating that there was "no present intention of making any announcement" and approving Robertson's travel plans. (Department of State, Central Files, 711.5800/4-2155)

230. Memorandum for the Record, by the Ambassador in the Republic of China (Rankin) <sup>1</sup>

*Taipei, April 29, 1955.*

SUBJECT

Visit to Taipei, April 24-27, of Admiral Arthur W. Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Mr. Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs.

*Note:* This memorandum is being written, while the impressions of the Radford-Robertson visit are fresh in my mind, to supplement the telegrams sent to the Department at the time, as well as the memoranda of conversation prepared by Rear Admiral Anderson and Mr. Sampson Shen. <sup>2</sup>

After their arrival at Taipei Airport at 11 a.m. on April 24, Radford and Robertson asked to see me alone. We drove directly to the Embassy and conferred in my office for about an hour. (Vice Admiral Pride and Major General Chase waited outside in the reception room, which was noted by correspondents and others.)

Robertson outlined to me their instructions and showed me a memorandum which he said had been dictated by President Eisenhower. <sup>3</sup> The essential proposal in the memorandum was that if the Nationalists should withdraw from Kinmen and Matsu, the United States would be prepared to join with them in establishing a defense zone along the China Coast, from Swatow to Wenchow, in which the movement of all seaborne traffic of a contraband or war-making character would be interdicted. Admiral Radford said that it was proposed to lay mine fields which would force coastwise junk traffic to come out where it also could be intercepted and controlled.

I remarked that this proposal meant war. <sup>4</sup> Whatever the practical aspects of an effective interdiction of seaborne traffic, the Chi-

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Taipei Embassy Files: Lot 62 F 83. Top Secret. Rankin sent a copy to Robertson as an enclosure to a letter of May 5. (*Ibid.*)

<sup>2</sup> Memoranda of Robertson's and Radford's conversations of April 24 and 26 with Chiang and their conversation of April 25 with Yeh, all apparently prepared by Anderson, are filed with Robertson's April 27 memorandum to Dulles, cited in footnote 1, Document 210.

<sup>3</sup> Apparently Annex "E" to Document 207.

<sup>4</sup> My concurrence in General Chase's recommendation of April 8, 1955, that the China Coast be "blockaded" from Swatow to the Chekiang border, envisaged direct action only by Chinese Nationalist forces, in continuation and intensification of their "port closure", with full logistic (including ships, as necessary) and avowed moral support from the United States. Direct participation of the United States Navy in an ef-

*Continued*

nese Communists could not now accept a partial blockade of their coast by U.S. Forces, if only for reasons of face. Radford indicated agreement, adding that it would be only a matter of time until their aircraft attacked our ships. He had expressed this opinion quite clearly to President Eisenhower.

They asked me about President Chiang's prospective reception of the new proposal. I replied that his first reaction would be one of surprise that the United States was withdrawing its assurance of support in the defense of Kinmen and Matsu. He had persuaded himself that no change in the situation had occurred which could possibly justify such a course. His general reaction would be against the new proposal. Whether they eventually could win him over with the shipping interdiction scheme, I did not know.

Robertson then raised the question of whether I should accompany them when they presented the proposal to President Chiang. He did not expect me to support a position with which I disagreed. I said that I ought to go with them, and that of course I would say nothing against the proposal during the conversations with President Chiang. Robertson asked me to accompany them.

The talks with President Chiang have been fully reported elsewhere. His reactions were as I had predicted, although the shipping interdiction scheme seemed at first to make no impression on him. While I took no part in the conversations during his presence, I did take advantage of the first break (on April 24) to suggest to Foreign Minister Yeh that the implications of this part of the proposal should be carefully studied. Later in the conversations it became evident that President Chiang had given further thought to this feature, but had dismissed it as unrealistic. He evidently had no confidence that the United States would actually participate in an effective shipping interdiction scheme in the face of strong and inevitable opposition by the British and others. In his view, the proposal meant giving up Kinmen and Matsu in return for another undertaking from which the United States would find reason for withdrawing.

This morning (April 29), Foreign Minister Yeh gave me his opinion that it would require a great deal of effort to repair the damage to Chinese confidence in the United States which had resulted from the above proposals. It is evident that President Chiang and his close advisers are puzzled and disturbed. They cannot understand why fol-

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fective blockade, under whatever name, would have been very definitely in order during the Korean hostilities, in my opinion. Since the 1953 armistice, however, it may be questioned whether any occasion has arisen under which such action could be justified before world opinion. At the very least, a convincing public explanation by the United States Government of the developing Communist threat to Kinmen-Matsu-Penghu-Taiwan would be required. [Footnote in the source text. For the Chase-Rankin recommendation of April 8, see Document 196.]

lowing a course of action authorized by an almost unanimous vote of the American Congress as recently as January 28, should three months later threaten to "split the United States wide open". They are aware of no significant change in circumstances except for a certain amount of emotion generated in the American press and elsewhere, supposedly as a result of influence brought to bear by fellow-travelers, Europe-firsters and the inevitable British. President Chiang evidently interprets all of this as indicating either that the domestic position of the United States Government makes it incapable of pursuing a firm and consistent Far Eastern policy, or that the Administration's ultimate aim is the liquidation of the "Formosa Problem", via neutralization, trusteeship or what have you?

Before their departure, I ventured to summarize to Radford and Robertson what I believed to be President Chiang's attitude toward the current situation. I thought that as matters are developing at present, President Chiang regarded war next year as a probability. With this in mind he would seek to hang on to everything he now had and get as much more as possible, in the form of United States aid, etc., in preparation for the event.

Throughout the conversations President Chiang made a great effort to restrain himself, in deference to his visitors from Washington. He put his case frankly but with fewer outward signs of emotion than I have sometimes observed in talks with him when I was the only American present. However, in actual fact, I have the distinct impression never before to have seen him more deeply affected.

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**231. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Murphy) to the Secretary of State <sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, April 29, 1955.*

The President in his Wednesday's <sup>2</sup> press conference has indicated that the U.S. would be willing "to talk with Red China about a Formosa cease-fire and anything else not affecting Nationalist China's own affairs". <sup>3</sup> You indicated in your press conference that

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/4-2955. Top Secret. Also sent to Hoover. A handwritten notation by Phyllis Bernau on the source text indicates that it was seen by the Secretary. Another notation in an unidentified handwriting states that the Secretary made no decision.

<sup>2</sup> April 27.

<sup>3</sup> The quotation is not exact but expresses the substance of the President's remarks. For a transcript of the press conference, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1955*, pp. 425-440.



we would try to find out more about Chou En-lai's intentions relating to his public comments at Bandung.

No doubt the President's and your remarks have not gone unnoticed in Peiping. It would be reasonable to suppose Chou En-lai awaited with some eagerness a reaction of the Washington "barbarians" to his initiative at Bandung. No doubt also his was a carefully studied move into which could be read a whole complex of Chinese fears, hopes and aspirations.

Volunteer intermediaries are not wanting, i.e., Mohammed Ali, Prince Wan, Romulo and the British who lost no time despatching Trevelyan to the Foreign Office in Peiping on the theory that "there will have to be an intermediary simply to bring the two parties together to start their talks on a Formosa settlement."<sup>4</sup> This might be profitable brokerage for them and no doubt would be in the most friendly spirit.

Supposing our objective is a favorable psychological impact at Peiping which could eventually lead to an improvement of the specific question of Formosa, and also to other features including a release of imprisoned Americans, it would seem unquestionable that a direct, secret contact would perhaps stimulate Chou En-lai and company to further elucidation.

We have no reason for haste in establishing the contact. Having announced our willingness to talk, we are for the present in a good position. It is the Chinese Communists, not ourselves, who wish to force a change in the status quo. The announcement of our acceptance in principle of the idea of conversations tends to keep the onus for any worsening of the situation on the Chinese Communists.

The case for proceeding deliberately is reinforced by the fact that we have not yet obtained any favorable action from the Chinese Communists in regard to the American prisoners. While we cannot make the release of the prisoners an absolute precondition for holding the talks, we are undoubtedly in a poor position to enter talks if none of our prisoners has been released first. Pursuant to this line of thinking a circular telegram has been drafted (Tab A)<sup>5</sup> to a number of our missions at capitals where an interest has been shown in the prisoner issue.

It is believed that Chinese Consulate General at Geneva is suitable place for an initial contact with the Chinese Communists. The Chinese Communist Consul General at Geneva has no particular rank, authority or influence so far as we know and he could be noth-

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<sup>4</sup> Foreign Secretary Macmillan stated in the House of Commons on April 27 that Trevelyan had been instructed to discuss the situation with Chou En-lai. For text of his remarks, see *Parliamentary Debates*, vol. 540, cols. 911-913. He did not make the statement quoted here.

<sup>5</sup> Not attached to the source text. No such telegram was sent at this time.

ing more than a post office box, but that would serve the immediate purpose. We have used this channel for direct talks regarding the American prisoners which provides useful cover.

It is believed that either Wang Ping-nan, Chinese Communist Ambassador at Warsaw, or Huan Hsiang, Chinese Communist Chargé in London, could eventually provide channel for discussions of a substantive nature should they develop. Both men were on the Chinese Communist delegation at the Geneva Conference, apparently enjoy the confidence of Chou En-lai, and are accustomed to dealing with Westerners. Wang Ping-nan was Secretary General of the Foreign Office before he was appointed Ambassador to Poland. He dealt with Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson at Geneva on the prisoner question. Trevelyan had spoken rather favorably of Huan Hsiang, with whom he dealt regularly at Geneva. Wang Ping-nan, for example, later could be met by our Ambassador at Warsaw, Joseph E. Jacobs, who was a China language officer many years ago (but who has had no China service since 1930). Alternatively, Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson at Prague, who is well qualified through his long background of Far Eastern negotiating and experience could make an unobtrusive trip to Warsaw or London to meet either official.

It is recommended that after a decision is made as to where and with whom we wish the contact made, we use Gowen at Geneva to request the appointment through the Chinese Communist Consul General at Geneva.

If an approach of this type is considered wise, our representative at Geneva making the initial contact should limit his efforts to probing Chinese Communist tactics and objectives looking to a cease-fire understanding. He might make his initial approach along the following general lines:

1. We hope that through this channel you may be able on a *confidential* basis to amplify the interesting statement made by your Prime Minister at Bandung. Does he have in mind any special procedure or plan? His remarks lead us to suppose notwithstanding many things which have been said in various places that your principals really desire tranquillity in the Formosa area as we do.

2. Your principals no doubt fully appreciate that the U.S. has a long and honorable tradition of loyalty to its allies. In the war against Japan, Chiang Kai-shek fought a terrible and costly struggle. Your principals are well aware of the part played by the U.S. forces in the liberation of the Chinese mainland and the American conquest of the many island positions in the Pacific, including Formosa. Have your principals forgotten that the U.S. enabled Chinese nationals to occupy Formosa? Do they recognize this proof, if proof is needed, of lack of American interest in the occupation of Asiatic territory?

3. In the eyes of your principals is our loyalty to our ally, the Republic of China, an alliance formed to liberate China from the Japanese invader, to be a bar to some reasonable form of *modus vivendi*

in this area? This alliance does not in any sense constitute intervention in internal Chinese affairs, or an infringement of Chinese sovereignty.

4. The basic prerequisite to relaxation of tensions and restoration of tranquillity in the Taiwan area is a renunciation of the use of force by all parties. This can be done without prejudice to their asserted rights or claims. My principals may be willing to consider such a renunciation and to urge our allies to do the same. Are your principals willing to make such a declaration? If so, a basis will have been laid for the termination of hostilities in the Taiwan area.

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**232. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Embassy in Pakistan <sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, April 30, 1955—3:51 p.m.*

1811. Regarding Djakarta's 2044 repeated Karachi 1771, <sup>2</sup> following is for your guidance in event Mohammad Ali requests your views.

We should not encourage Ali accept Chou's invitation or seek definitely to dissuade him since either course might be misunderstood and possibly misused by him. Decision must essentially be his own, after consideration all factors. We are concerned implications visit by Ali at this time since it would be first visit Peiping by Asian leader whose government clearly aligned with anti-Communist camp and party to Manila Pact. As such would be feather in Chou's hat since important objective his performance Bandung was to elicit public evidence Peiping's acceptance in community of nations. We assume Ali aware these factors and will give them consideration.

With regard Prime Minister's offer mediate he may be informed we have given most careful consideration to his offer and deeply appreciate his willingness be of assistance. While we do not believe necessary utilize at this time, we will keep in mind his desire to be of assistance. You are also authorized inform Prime Minister United States is not utilizing services any intermediary at present and specif-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/4-2655. Secret. Repeated for information to Jakarta, New Delhi, and Taipei. Drafted in CA, cleared with the addition of the last sentence in NEA, and approved in FE.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 2044 from Jakarta, April 26, reported a conversation the previous day in Bandung between Cumming and Mohammad Ali, who had seen Chou En-lai that day. Ali told Cumming that the whole tenor of Chou's conversation was "that he had made a gesture and US had not responded." Chou invited Ali to visit Peking, and Ali expressed interest in receiving U.S. views on the advisability of his accepting the invitation and "pursuing further his conversations with Chou on subject Taiwan." (*Ibid.*)

ically Krishna Menon's prospective trip Peiping<sup>3</sup> not undertaken at our request or with our knowledge.

Dulles

<sup>3</sup> Prime Minister Nehru announced on April 30 that Menon would visit Peking within 10 days to continue his talks with Premier Chou, begun at Bandung, concerning the Taiwan situation. (*New York Times*, May 1, 1955)

### 233. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Embassy in Australia<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, April 30, 1955—4:27 p.m.*

250. Spender delivered message Menzies to Secretary re Taiwan<sup>2</sup> stressing importance Cabinet places on following up Chou En Lai's proposal. Suggested might afford opportunity explore settlement wider than off-shore islands and Taiwan. Suggested specific possibility including Commie Chinese in four-power meeting<sup>3</sup> to attend "in respect of Asian matters".

Secretary told Spender orally<sup>4</sup> our position this matter made clear his April 26 and President's April 27 press conferences. We intend to try to find out if proposal is sincere. We are considering now best way accomplishing this. The Secretary added public opinion this country would be opposed adding Commie Chinese to Big Four meeting explained this proposal made by Russians at Berlin<sup>5</sup> debated and defeated.

Secretary answering message through Spender<sup>6</sup> reiterating above points and explaining we against Big Five proposal for following reasons: (a) do not desire give Commie Chinese prestige and interna-

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/4-3055. Secret. Drafted in BNA and cleared in EUR and FE. Approved and signed by Dulles. Repeated for information to London.

<sup>2</sup> Dated April 27. (*Ibid.*, 793.00/4-2755)

<sup>3</sup> Reference is to a proposed meeting of U.S., British, French, and Soviet heads of government; the meeting was held in Geneva July 18-23.

<sup>4</sup> On April 27, when Spender delivered the message from Menzies; the conversation was recorded in a memorandum of conversation by Raynor. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/4-2755)

<sup>5</sup> The Berlin Conference of Foreign Ministers, January 25-February 18, 1954; for documentation, see *Foreign Relations, 1952-1954*, volume vii.

<sup>6</sup> Raynor gave the message to Australian Counselor F.J. Blakeney on May 2; a copy is filed with a covering memorandum of April 29 from Merchant to Dulles. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/4-2955)

tional standing which would result, (b) hope to confine possible Big Four meeting to limited agenda on specific European problems.

Texts messages being pouched.

Dulles

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234. **Telegram From the Ambassador in India (Cooper) to the Department of State**<sup>1</sup>

*New Delhi, May 1, 1955—3 p.m.*

1662. On Friday<sup>2</sup> evening at Nehru's residence, as reported,<sup>3</sup> Krishna Menon said he would like to talk to me after Prime Minister's statement in Lok Sabha following day.<sup>4</sup> Saturday afternoon he called at my residence and talked one and a half hours.

Menon said he had talked at Bandung with Chou En-lai many times, sometimes with Nehru present, oftener alone, and that at least one talk lasted five hours.

Speaking of official attitudes, Menon said GOI convinced Communist China not expansionist. When I asked for facts he said he would not argue about Korea, but today Communist China was not aggressing against any country; had declared at Bandung it would not aggress; had concluded overseas Chinese nationality agreement with Indonesia, and would do so with Thailand, Philippines and others if permitted. He said India and Burma had no fears of Communist China.

Regarding Taiwan Menon said GOI considers Chou's Bandung statement made in good faith. Said Chou's statement did not represent new attitude as he (Menon) had told Secretary Dulles in Washington China would negotiate. As stated in Nehru's April 30 speech, GOI was willing use good offices if requested, but whether requested or not would continue explore possibilities negotiation and that was reason he would go to Peking.

At this point Menon remarked further statements to be made by him did not necessarily represent GOI's views on Chou's position, but his own thinking, which was tentative. Said Communist China appeared not desire hostilities at this time but would not be "bul-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/5-155. Secret; Priority.

<sup>2</sup> April 29.

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 1646 from New Delhi, April 29, reported on the dinner held the previous evening. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/4-2955)

<sup>4</sup> In his April 30 statement, Prime Minister Nehru reported on the Bandung Conference and announced that Menon would be visiting Peking. (*New York Times*, May 1, 1955)

lied". Said he did not see any possibility of formal negotiations at this time, or statement by Communist China receding from announced position, or agreement to cease-fire in words . . . <sup>5</sup> i.e., a formal agreement, or submission to UN. He foresaw steps, not necessarily publicly agreed, which could relax tensions and later permit negotiations.

First step suggested by Menon as exploratory was to ascertain whether both parties will accept in good faith idea of negotiations and some preliminary basis therefor, and make certain no hostilities break out. He suggested period of around two months for exploration.

Second stage would be one where actions by both sides would be taken to relax tensions. He said return of Chinese students was one step taken by the US. Next step might be release of US airmen, followed by US restraint on Nationalist firing on Chinese Communists. Speaking of possible steps to relax tensions Menon said he and GOI had urged Chou release US airmen, and that if they were released Chinese Communists would probably continue to insist they were spies. (Said Chinese Communists did not consider evacuation Tachen peaceful action because they said it was purely military, accompanied by "scorched earth" action, and forcible evacuation civilian population.)

Menon said if foregoing and other steps materialized more definite proposals for negotiation could be initiated by GOI or the UK. Said Chinese Communists in his view would ask that negotiations cover total US-Chinese relations. Further that Chinese Communists would not at any stage surrender idea of sovereignty over Taiwan but this should not prevent steps going forward over a period of time lasting from one year to as much as ten years to reach final settlement. Said such a process was only alternative to war.

Menon said GOI believes Communist China will never be Russian satellite and that possibility of US-Communist China settlement greater than US-Soviet settlement. Said purpose of his trip to Peking was to explore flexibility of Chinese Communist position.

Menon asserted again and again that GOI position, as stated in Nehru's April 30 speech, was not biased and that he was not biased. Menon's tone was moderate. Nevertheless it seems clear to me that he accepts Chinese Communist position re sovereignty over Taiwan and holds that ultimate settlement would require ousting Nationalists. Menon was vague as to channels for bringing about US-Communist China understanding, as to subject matter, and as to limits on various stages of negotiations.

<sup>5</sup> Ellipsis in the source text.

Menon said he would ask Nehru to talk with me, though Nehru would discuss only general principles and not details. I think there is possibility that Menon may tell Nehru more has been accomplished by his talks than the facts would justify. In this connection Nehru's statement April 30 that governments concerned (presumably including the US) have not been unaware of Chinese Communist willingness to negotiate may be result of an exaggerated report by Menon to Nehru re Menon's conversation with Secretary.<sup>6</sup> Nevertheless it is clear that Nehru is confiding subject to Menon. Menon ended by saying he was talking to me because "they" believed I had been sent to India not merely as Ambassador but as a "listening post". My response was that I would report our conversation.

At one point in the conversation Menon remarked that he had great respect for the Secretary and his integrity. At another point he urged that our conversation also be brought to the personal attention of the President.

Menon said he would likely want to see me again before leaving for Peking. In view possibility of further talk with Menon and fact I am to dine with Nehru May 5 I should appreciate all pertinent background and guidance Department may be able to provide.

Cooper

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<sup>6</sup> Reference may be to Menon's March 15 conversation with President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles; see footnote 5, Document 156.

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**235. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, May 3, 1955<sup>1</sup>**

**PARTICIPANTS**

Sir Roger Makins, British Ambassador  
 The Secretary  
 Livingston T. Merchant, Assistant Secretary, EUR  
 Douglas MacArthur II, Counselor  
 C. Burke Elbrick, Deputy Assistant Secretary, EUR

*Formosa.* The Ambassador said that the British Government greatly appreciates the Secretary's recent statements regarding Chou En-lai's offer to discuss the Formosan Strait's situation with the United States. As the Secretary was aware, Trevelyan in Peiping had been instructed to sound out Chou on this subject. While the United

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/5-155. Secret. Drafted by Elbrick.

Kingdom Government does not wish to engage in "back seat driving", it was anxious to do anything it could to help. Trevelyan had not been able to see Chou as yet due to the fact that the latter had not yet returned to Peiping.

The Secretary said that he had observed the interest taken by the United Kingdom in this matter, as well as that of Krishna Menon and Mohammed Ali. He said that we had had no direct report of Mohammed Ali's conversation with Chou and the Ambassador said that his Government was unaware of the exact details of that talk. The Secretary said that we are very anxious to produce a de facto cease fire in the area, perhaps without a formal agreement. A détente at this time might change the situation and it is in our interest to play for time. The suggested talks might help cool off the situation.

[Here follows discussion relating to the forthcoming British elections, disarmament, and a possible four-power meeting of heads of government.]

## 236. Memorandum of a Conversation, Taipei, May 4, 1955<sup>1</sup>

### PARTICIPANTS

President Chiang Kai-shek  
 Madame Chiang  
 Foreign Minister George K. C. Yeh  
 Mr. Sampson Shen  
 Ambassador K. L. Rankin

### SUBJECT

Situation Following Radford-Robertson Visit of April 24-27.

*Note:* Upon receipt this morning of the Secretary's telegram 662 of May 3,<sup>2</sup> authorizing me to advise President Chiang that "we understand his position" with reference to the defense of the offshore islands, that Admiral Stump would shortly be conferring with him on the subject, and that he would continue to enjoy strong United States support, I immediately called on the Foreign Minister. He telephoned to me half an hour later that President Chiang would receive me at 5 p.m. today. The Foreign Minister suggested that, if I felt that I could do so, my opinion expressed to him last Friday that there had

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Taipei Embassy Files: Lot 62 F 83. Top Secret. Rankin sent a copy to Robertson as an enclosure to his letter of May 5, cited in foot-note 1, Document 230.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/5-355)



been no fundamental change in the situation might be repeated to President Chiang.

I arrived at Shihlin at 5 p.m. and, after a few pleasantries, remarked to the President that in my opinion the recent Radford-Robertson visit had produced no fundamental change in the situation as it had existed since the Korean Armistice in 1953. Prior to that date Chinese Communist strength had been very largely tied down in Korea. Subsequently they had been able to redeploy their forces and to build up the military strength in Fukien and Chekiang which now threatened the offshore islands and Taiwan. Meanwhile, the military strength of Free China had been increasing also. No one could be entirely sure of Communist intentions, except that they were always bad. It seemed to me that if a Red attack developed it would be either a probing operation primarily for psychological effect against some small island or islands, which the Nationalist forces could handle without our help, or it would be a major offensive involving not only the offshore islands but other areas as well. In the latter event, both of our governments would have to consider the whole picture anew in the light of actual developments. The defense of this or that minor island would be only incidental to the general situation and would fall into proper perspective.

Pursuing my argument, I said that since the shelling of Kinmen last September 3, I had many times expressed the opinion that there probably would be no major Communist assault in the near future. Much was being said about the five airfields under construction opposite Taiwan. I understood that they would not all be operational for several months, and that when completed would not provide for more than about 50 MIG-15s each. By that time the Nationalist Air Force would have more aircraft also, and the situation would not be so one-sided. I did not suppose that the Reds would be fully prepared for a major operation before fall—possibly in October—and very likely not until some time next year.

In brief, I considered that there had been no fundamental change and that the actual military situation was not unfavorable to Free China.

I then conveyed the substance of the Secretary's telegram 662 to the President. He asked whether the telegram meant that President Eisenhower would actually commit United States forces to help in the defense of Kinmen and Matsu. I said that I thought not, but suggested if my previous analysis was correct, this might not make much practical difference. President Chiang emphasized the effect on morale, and I remarked that President Eisenhower also had a "morale" problem in the form of a difficult domestic political situation. By request, I then dictated to Sampson Shen a paraphrase of the Secretary's telegram.

President Chiang next reverted to the thesis that the Communists would try to destroy his Air Force and Navy by attrition. Once the Reds had assumed local command of the air, the protection of the offshore islands would cause excessive losses to the Nationalist Air Force and Navy. Moreover, the Communists undoubtedly would attack air and naval bases on Taiwan in this connection.

In reply I repeated my belief that the military situation was by no means so one-sided, and that any air attacks on Taiwan presumably would be carried out by bombers based in the Shanghai area rather than by MIG-15s from the nearby fields in Fukien. It seemed to me that such a development would open the question of our treaty obligation to defend Taiwan.

Referring to the statement in the Secretary's telegram regarding the early visit of Admiral Stump, President Chiang asked what this signified. I remarked that specific reference was made to the defense of the offshore islands. There were various measures which might be taken. I said that I was no military expert, but that an admiral had given me his opinion that the defensive strength of Kinmen could be doubled by the systematic use of beach obstacles. Steel was said to be lacking for this purpose. Admiral Stump might be able to help in this and other problems.

In conclusion, I repeated once more that I could not predict Communist courses of action with certainty. I had no crystal ball. But I thought we should not jump to the conclusion that the current Red build-up in Fukien was directed solely against Taiwan. It seemed to me that the five airfields were being constructed as part of a general plan to gain control of the air along the China Coast. This could serve various purposes, including the support of a supply line for new adventures in Southeast Asia now that the port of Haiphong was passing into Communist hands. The Reds knew that an attack on Taiwan would bring them into conflict with the United States. But if incidentally to the general development of their military strength in this area they could use it as a threat, thereby obtaining possession of Kinmen and Matsu with little or no actual fighting, they could be expected to do so.

President Chiang indicated agreement with much that I had said as to Communist intentions.

The President said that he would reserve comment on the Secretary's message until he could discuss matters with Admiral Stump. He hoped that the Admiral would come to Taipei as soon as possible.

237. **Telegram From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Radford) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Stump)** <sup>1</sup>

*Washington, May 4, 1955—5:31 p.m.*

042231Z. Exclusive for Admiral Stump from Admiral Radford.

Robertson and I reported on Formosa trip to President yesterday. <sup>2</sup> President not surprised ChiNats desire make stand on offshore islands and actually favors it as being in line with an outpost strategy. His feeling is that perhaps their defense could be equally effective with fewer men if their defenses were properly laid out and constructed. I told him that in opinion of Army officers on the spot the number of troops was not excessive and also that I felt you were in fact giving ChiNats advice and assistance in connection with improving island defense plans. State has sent msg to Rankin with President's approval however saying in part that "Admiral Stump will soon be conferring with him (Gimo) to discuss military ways in which such defense effort (offshore islands) can be improved". <sup>3</sup>

President wishes us supply what is needed. He mentioned for instance a recent graduate of Ft. Benning going over basic design of defense works, increasing automatic weapons and underwater obstacles, laying antipersonnel mine field on beaches, increasing barbed

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Miscellaneous Series, Formosa Area. Top Secret; Priority. A copy is also filed with Robertson's April 27 memorandum to Dulles; see footnote 1, Document 210.

The source text is filed with a covering note of May 4 to Goodpaster from Colonel Leroy H. Watson, USAF, Executive Officer to the JCS Chairman, asking Goodpaster to tell the President that the message had been sent to Stump as the President had directed and asking Goodpaster to let him know if the President desired that any changes in the message should be communicated to Stump. A handwritten notation by Goodpaster, May 5, states, "President indicated this was generally OK. G"

<sup>2</sup> This meeting was recorded in a brief memorandum by Goodpaster, dated May 3, which reads in part as follows:

"The principal points of policy significance were:

"1. Chiang did not wish to accept the proposition of withdrawing from the offshore islands concurrently with the imposition of some kind of interdiction of the Formosa Strait sea area.

"2. Chiang did not consider it advisable that a force of U.S. Marines be stationed on Formosa.

"3. He did, however, appear reconciled to accepting that the offshore islands, if they were to be defended, would be defended by his forces alone.

"4. As a next step, at the President's direction, Admiral Stump should visit Formosa and advise Chiang as to ways in which defense preparations in the offshore islands can be improved.

"5. Concurrently the State Department will communicate through our Ambassadors the President's assurances of our willingness to provide logistic support for the build-up of the offshore island defense." (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, ACW Diaries)

<sup>3</sup> The quotation is from telegram 662 to Taipei, May 3, summarized in the memorandum, *supra*. The parenthetical insertions appear in the source text but not in telegram 662 to Taipei.

wire defenses etc etc. The President also called attention to fact that our plans to station US aircraft on Formosa would release ChiNat aircraft for better defense of offshore islands.

I feel that you are doing approximately this but if there are needs that have not been met assume you will request. For instance George Anderson reports that ChiNat commander on Quemoy in answer to question as to why had not expanded underground facilities in hill stated he lacked hard rock drills. These certainly could be supplied quickly.

President's basic theory is that ChiNats prepare put up determined defense in order make capture exceedingly costly but avoid implication of a Dien Bien Phu by perhaps withdrawing if necessary at time of own choosing. I pointed out that in my opinion feasibility of such withdrawal would depend on capabilities ChiNat Air Force and Navy at that time and cannot be predicted with accuracy.

With reference to conference with Gimo President feels that for morale purposes the sooner you go out the better.

FYI This msg will be shown to JCS and copy given to Carney but otherwise info will be closely held. No report of our trip is to be given out here and info on that also will be closely held. On Taiwan only Rankin knows details of our discussions.

**238. Telegram From the Representative at the United Nations (Lodge) to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

*New York, May 4, 1955—8 p.m.*

750. For the Secretary and Key (IO). Re American fliers in China. I called on Hammarskjold today at my request, following my conversation with the Secretary.<sup>2</sup> I began by recalling that he had said his trip to Stockholm would be a "climax" in his effort to secure release of the US fliers.<sup>3</sup> I asked him whether he thought there had been such climax.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.95A241/5-455. Secret; Priority.

<sup>2</sup> In telephone conversations earlier that day, recorded in notes by Phyllis Bernau, dated May 4. (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations)

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 691 from New York, April 14, reported that the Secretary-General told C. Stanton Babcock, Counselor of the U.S. Mission at the United Nations, that he had requested the meeting with the PRC Ambassador in Stockholm on April 23 at which he intended to make a "much sharper démarche" than he could do in writing and that "he wished his trip to Stockholm to create in Chinese Communist minds impression of kind of climax." (Department of State, Central Files, 611.95A241/4-1455)

He said he felt his trip to Stockholm had brought the whole matter closer to the "ultimatum stage", that Chou had clearly indicated he had made up his mind in January to settle the question, but had laid the delay to US over-flights in connection with the Tachen evacuation and the incident of the plane to Bandung. Chou had done this with both himself, Hammarskjold, and Prince Wan and had gone even farther with Wan and said his intention had not changed.

At present, Chou had not replied to two sets of communications, which Hammarskjold felt he must reply to. The first were the letters from the families of the fliers, and the second was the question which Hammarskjold asked the Chinese Communist Ambassador in Stockholm: "Is there anything that I (Hammarskjold) can do to facilitate the release of the prisoners"? Hammarskjold emphasized this question was based on the fact the Chinese Communist Ambassador was talking about "how" and not "whether" the fliers should be released. He felt it was clear to the Ambassador that Hammarskjold's question was based on the assumption that Chou intended to release the fliers.

In reply to my questions, Hammarskjold said he had made it clear that the Chinese Communists understood that they were expected to provide a reply in writing to his question. He felt Chou could not reply by a simple yes or no. He now either had to say he was going to release the fliers or say how Hammarskjold could help him do so. If Chou should not answer, Hammarskjold, as a result of his Stockholm talks, could increase the pressure and demand to know why Chou had not gone ahead and released them, since he had not replied. He said that he felt there was a 99 percent probability of the Chinese Communists' intention to release the fliers.

I said that an intention to release was all well and good, but the question of time was very vital, that maybe it was true that in China time was not a factor, but in this country, time was a factor and we could not wait forever. I therefore asked him what further steps he contemplated.

He said that a report to the GA was a "must". I dwelt on this and said: "you mean you definitely intend to file a report which will lay it on the line"? He said emphatically: "of course, of course". He would intend to do it "in due time" before the GA, although, he said, "maybe the report will be much earlier".

He feels his trip to Stockholm has brought the whole thing much closer. He said if there was no reply before he went to Europe, which is May 21, he would then send a message to Chou by the Swedish Ambassador in Peiping. "I will tell him that I must make a report", Hammarskjold said, "if there is no answer by June 1, then I will feel constrained to report that it has been a failure".

In reply to my question, he said he had no objection to our mentioning the fliers at the same time we negotiated for release of civilian prisoners, but cautioned that we should make it clear that the fliers were in a different category than the civilians and that the fliers were military POWs.

When I asked him how he felt about using intermediaries such as India or Pakistan to bring moral pressure to bear on the Chinese Communists, he said, "not on the fliers just now. I have as much chance as the US has to get India or Burma or Thailand into play and I have had no response at all from India or Burma to my request. After this next phase is over, it may be opportune".

I said that we were drawing near to the end of our rope here in the US and the situation could become ugly. I pointed out that for a people that was as intense as the American people, we had shown great self-control from the beginning of this whole episode. I pointed out that men of very different political viewpoints had now joined in active condemnation of the retention of the fliers.

He said he was well aware of this. He recalled that on his return from Peking in January I had said that what he wanted me to do was to prevent politicians from acting like politicians and newspapermen from acting like newspapermen.<sup>4</sup> He thought that a lot had been achieved and that both politicians and the press had shown great forbearance. He gave every impression of being determined not to let all of his efforts go to waste and not to let the matter peter out. I believe that he intends, if his efforts fail, to say so in a candid manner.

Lodge

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<sup>4</sup> On January 13; see Document 11.

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**239. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, May 5, 1955, 4 p.m.<sup>1</sup>**

**SUBJECT**

1. Prospective Cease-Fire Talks with Chinese Communists.
2. Inclusion of Far Eastern Items on Agenda of Paris Meetings.

**PARTICIPANTS**

Dr. V. K. Wellington Koo—Chinese Ambassador

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/5-555. Secret. Drafted on May 10 by McConaughy. Initialed by Robertson, indicating his approval.

The Secretary

Walter S. Robertson—Assistant Secretary for FE

Walter P. McConaughy—Director for Chinese Affairs

Ambassador Koo called at his own request. He said he wished to make two inquiries: (1) as to U.S. intentions concerning talks with the Chinese Communists; and (2) the inclusion of Far Eastern items on the agenda of the forthcoming Paris meetings.<sup>2</sup>

As to (1), the Ambassador said he realized that public opinion in general had made necessary some U.S. statement in response to the Chou En-lai declaration at Bandung that he was prepared to negotiate with the United States for easing of tensions. He said that his Government would like to know if the U.S. Government contemplated entering into direct bilateral talks with the Chinese Communists, or proceeding through a third party?

The Secretary said that the U.S. Government had been seeking a cease-fire arrangement for some time. He was aware that the Chinese Government had a somewhat different view of the problem. The views of the two Governments were not fully in accord on the question of the desirability of a cease-fire in the area. The New Zealand initiative in the Security Council had not been followed up because the Chinese Communists had refused to appear. The President, in his message to Congress on the Joint Resolution on the defense of Taiwan, had said that he hoped a situation of stability could eventually be created in the area so that it would not be necessary to fight. If we could get a commitment from the Chinese Communists not to use force, naturally we would be glad to receive it. There is no present program for following up the Chou En-lai offer. Several foreign government representatives on their own initiative are trying to find out what Chou En-lai meant. The United States Government is not pursuing the matter.

Ambassador Koo said he had heard of efforts by the British, the Pakistani, the Indians, and the Indonesians to follow up the Chou En-lai initiative. He asked if he was correct in understanding that there had been no action by the United States Government in response to the Chou En-lai statement.

The Secretary said that this was correct. He referred to the President's statement that we should "wait and see".<sup>3</sup>

Mr. Robertson said he assumed that the Ambassador had read the Secretary's remarks at his press conference of April 26.

<sup>2</sup> Reference is to the ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council held in Paris, May 9-11; see Document 246.

<sup>3</sup> At a press conference on May 4; for text of his remarks, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1955*, pp. 459-475.

The Secretary said that he was surprised that the press had construed his remarks as being in conflict with the Department's press release of April 23. The Secretary said there was nothing in his statement which was in conflict with the Departmental release. The Secretary felt that the press interpretation of his reaction was misleading. He had not contradicted the Departmental statement concerning the necessary role of the Chinese Government in any discussions where its interests were involved. On the contrary, he had confirmed this. His statement had emphasized that we were concerned with ascertaining if there was any good faith in Chou En-lai's offer, and he had tried to make it clear that the items mentioned in the Departmental statement were not preconditions for talks. We are still seeking a cease-fire. If the Communists agree to a cease-fire, naturally we will be very happy.

Ambassador Koo said he was pleased to hear this explanation. He observed that a cease-fire agreement is usually considered to require more than one party. He did not understand precisely how a cease-fire agreement could be achieved when there would be only one contesting party involved in the talks.

The Secretary said that the Ambassador's point was well taken. The term "cease-fire agreement" was loosely used. What we wanted was a Chinese Communist assurance that they would not attack Taiwan and Penghu, Quemoy or Matsu. We would be glad to have such an assurance.

Ambassador Koo said it was clear that his Government would not be a party to any cease-fire talks or arrangements with the Chinese Communists. His Government was the other party in the hostilities, not the United States. He asked how the United States could participate in cease-fire talks when it was not engaged in hostilities?

The Secretary said that what the United States wants in effect is a unilateral renunciation of the use of force by the Chinese Communists. He doubted if we would get it. He thought that a situation of *de facto* cease-fire might be achieved. The Chinese Communists might refrain from a major assault. But he did not expect to get any signed document embodying a cease-fire pledge from the Chinese Communists. He said that we have no present plans to take any initiative as to talks with the Chinese Communists. We have not authorized any representative of any other Government to act in our behalf. He stated that the United States Government did not know in advance of Trevelyan's recent attempt in Peiping to explore the Chinese Communist offer.<sup>4</sup>

Ambassador Koo asked if he could take it that the United States has not asked any one to act as an intermediary in this matter?

<sup>4</sup> Trevelyan saw Premier Chou on May 9; see Document 248.



The Secretary confirmed that this understanding was correct.

Ambassador Koo observed that Chou En-lai after his first statement appeared to have retracted part of it. He had made a differentiation between discussions on the easing of tensions, and the "liberation" of Taiwan. He appeared not to have given any ground on the latter, stressing that it was a domestic issue and not subject to any outside interference.

The Secretary mentioned that he had noted this matter in the course of his press conference.

Ambassador Koo asked if the Department had received any reports from representatives of other Governments which might throw light on the Chou En-lai offer.

The Secretary read from a confidential report of a representative of a friendly Government who took part in private conversations with Chou En-lai at Bandung. The extract read by the Secretary quoted Chou En-lai as having said that negotiations must lead to the "liberation" of Taiwan. If the negotiations went forward peacefully, there would be no war. Chou En-lai was further quoted as saying the Chinese Communists would not be intimidated. The report attributed to Chou En-lai a statement that the Chinese Communists in accordance with a saying, "do not act but rather react".<sup>5</sup>

Ambassador Koo then took up his second topic, asking if the Secretary planned to discuss China issues in Paris the following week?

The Secretary said that at the NATO Council there would be a general report on the world situation. The general statement would include something on the Far East. Mr. Robertson was going to Paris

<sup>5</sup> Reference is to a report by Lebanese Ambassador Charles Malik of an interview with Chou on April 25 which Malik had given to Dulles during a meeting earlier that day. Malik stated that Chou gave him permission to report the substance of their conversation in detail. According to Malik's report, he responded to the statement summarized here by asking if Chou envisaged, as a result of the proposed negotiations, a complete U.S. withdrawal from the Taiwan area. Chou replied that that would certainly be the Chinese proposal and that the United States would doubtless have a counter-proposal. Chou objected to the Department of State press release of April 23, declaring that the Department was laying down conditions for negotiations—the presence of Chiang at the negotiations and the acceptance of a cease-fire—which his Government could never accept, because Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan was involved and because the quarrel with Chiang was an internal matter. Malik told him that the U.S. Government was complex and required time to reach a final decision; he urged Chou not to regard any response as definitive until it came from the President or the Secretary of State. A copy of Malik's report, bearing a notation in President Eisenhower's handwriting that it should be returned to Dulles, is filed with a covering memorandum of May 10 from Special Assistant to the President Dillon Anderson to Dulles. (Department of State, Central Files, 683A.93/5-1055) Dulles' May 5 conversation with Malik, an exchange of views of the Bandung Conference, is recorded in a memorandum of conversation by Parker T. Hart, Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs. (*Ibid.*, 670.901/5-555)

because Indochina matters, especially the Viet Nam problem, would be taken up.

Mr. Robertson pointed out that Taiwan was not on the agenda. But he anticipated that foreign government representatives would ask about developments in the Taiwan area, just as so many Ambassadors in Washington do.

Ambassador Koo said that all sorts of speculations regarding Taiwan were current. His Government was glad that U.S. officials had not contributed to the speculation. He said his Government took it that there was no intention on the part of the U.S. Government to alter its China recognition policy.

The Secretary confirmed that this was correct.

Mr. Robertson said that he was going to Paris solely to discuss Indochina matters.

The Ambassador said he felt that with both Macmillan and Pinay<sup>6</sup> present, and with Britain and France both interested in Taiwan questions, discussions related to China would be difficult to avoid.

Mr. Robertson said that China matters were not on the agenda.

The Secretary reminded the Ambassador that the Chinese Government had explicit assurances that no negotiations involving the essential interests of the Chinese Government would take place without that Government's participation. The Secretary said he did not wonder that the Chinese Government was occasionally somewhat anxious. Many meetings and conversations necessarily take place without the presence of Chinese representatives. The Secretary told the Ambassador that the U.S. Government intends to work with the Chinese Government and when there is anything of a concrete nature to discuss, it will be taken up with the Chinese Government.

The Ambassador said his Government was always ready for consultations under Article IV of the Mutual Defense Treaty.

The Secretary recalled that there had already been two such consultations under the treaty: The first when he was in Formosa in early March and the second when Mr. Robertson and Admiral Radford made a special trip to Formosa in late April.

The Ambassador said in leaving that he believed that he could confidently report that "there would be no second Yalta".

The Secretary indicated that there should be no grounds for concern along this line on the part of the Chinese Government.

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<sup>6</sup> French Foreign Minister Antoine Pinay.

240. Despatch From the Ambassador in the Republic of China  
(Rankin) to the Department of State <sup>1</sup>

No. 540

Taipei, May 5, 1955.

REF

Embassy Despatch 412, February 28, 1956. <sup>2</sup>

SUBJECT

Operation Plan "Rochester"

There is enclosed for the Department's information a single copy of a report entitled "Operation Plan Rochester". <sup>3</sup> This document is the result of combined planning by the United States forces, representing the Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC) and headed by Vice Admiral Arthur M. Pride, Commander, U.S. 7th Fleet, with representatives of the Ministry of National Defense, of the Republic of China. Conferences resulting in plan "Rochester" were held in Taipei from March 15 through 28, 1955 and were based on a verbal agreement between the Chief of Naval Operations, United States Department of Defense and the Minister of National Defense of the Republic of China. Conferences were held on the military level without participation by an Embassy representative.

The plan, as agreed upon between the U.S. and Chinese military representatives provides for the combined operations of U.S. and Chinese forces in the event of hostilities in the Taiwan area in which both forces are engaged. It defines the basic responsibilities under combat and combat-planning conditions, of the various elements of the U.S. and Chinese forces which it is contemplated will be deployed in the defense of Taiwan, Penghu and, possibly, the off-shore islands. What it does *not* do—despite MND desires in the matter and extensive press speculation throughout the course of the conference, is to establish a combined staff or combined command intermingling Chinese and U.S. officers in staff and command positions in a single headquarters.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/5-555. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> Despatch 412 transmitted a copy of a draft military agreement between the ROC Ministry of National Defense and the Senior U.S. Military Representative on Formosa (the Chief of MAAG acting for CINCPAC) concerning the utilization of facilities and services by the U.S. Armed Forces in connection with their mission to assist in the defense of Taiwan and the Pescadores. It was intended that this would be an interim agreement and that it would provide the basis for the negotiation of a base agreement under Article VII of the Mutual Defense Treaty. (*Ibid.*, 793.5/2-2855) Article VII of the treaty reads as follows: "The Government of the Republic of China grants, and the Government of the United States of America accepts, the right to dispose such United States land, air and sea forces in and about Taiwan and the Pescadores as may be required for their defense, as determined by mutual agreement."

<sup>3</sup> The enclosure, unsigned and undated, is not printed.

In summary, the plan contains a general estimate of the military situation, including enemy capabilities and Chinese-U.S. potential, a listing of U.S. forces which it is expected will be deployed in the event of hostilities, and an outline plan of how the U.S. and Chinese forces will coordinate their individual planning so that an efficient combined combat operation might be possible. Operational responsibilities are allocated, the Chinese assuming the burden of ground activity and the United States the major task of air defense and naval support and bombardment. Understandings appear to have been reached that Chinese Naval and Air Forces shall be employed under U.S. operational control in the event of a combined effort.

The operations plan stresses coordinated action by the two forces, a maximum of control by the "parent" country and a return of integrated Chinese air and naval forces to such control whenever combat conditions permit. The U.S. forces have, in the conference leading to plan "Rochester", given assurances to the Chinese Government that the U.S. accepts primary responsibility for air defense, naval surface action and offensive air action in the Taiwan area in the event that U.S. forces are ordered engaged. During pre-hostilities operations, unilateral but closely coordinated operations are stressed, with a view towards a smooth transition into operations on a combined basis when and if required.

The Department's attention is invited to Appendix 1 to Annex I of the enclosed plan (see tab)<sup>4</sup> which the Department will recognize as the draft military agreement which MAAG prepared earlier this year and which it proposed be signed with the Ministry of National Defense on a military level. A copy of this draft agreement and the Embassy's comments thereon were forwarded to the Department in the despatch in reference. When execution of this agreement was delayed due to lack of CINCPAC approval, it was apparently decided to include it as a part of plan "Rochester" in the hope that, viewed in connection with an operation plan of a scope which would require some type of base rights agreement for its effectuation, the draft agreement would receive immediate approval. However, the opposite result may have obtained, for CINCPAC, after referring the question of the draft agreement to Washington and receiving a negative reply, has as yet to signify his approval of any portion of plan "Rochester". The Ministry of National Defense was apparently quite confident that the draft agreement would receive instant approval from the higher headquarters (US), as it scheduled a signing ceremony which, after receipt of CINCPAC's first message referring the matter to Washington, was postponed at MAAG request and, after receipt of the second message stating that no military agreement could be en-

<sup>4</sup> Not printed.

tered into pending inter-departmental action, was called off entirely.<sup>5</sup>

Plan "Rochester" was reviewed and discussed during the third U.S.-GRC Coordination Conference which took place in Taipei from April 18 through 22 and which is being reported in a separate despatch.<sup>6</sup> The plan as it appears in the enclosure was forwarded by Admiral Pride to CINCPAC for final approval before putting it fully into effect. MAAG anticipates that approval will be forthcoming after CINCPAC has had an opportunity to study the plan and to make certain revisions based on recommendations made during the April conference.<sup>7</sup>

For the Ambassador:  
**Donald E. Webster**  
*First Secretary of Embassy*

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<sup>5</sup> The attempt to conclude an interim military agreement was suspended when the Embassy was instructed on June 22 to negotiate a single comprehensive status of forces agreement; see Document 275.

<sup>6</sup> Despatch 560 from Taipei, May 16, reported on the conference between U.S. and ROC military representatives, headed by Admiral Pride and Defense Minister Yu, the purpose of which was "to coordinate U.S. and Chinese plans and operations in connection with the defense of Taiwan and Penghu". The despatch concludes:

"The conference was apparently successful, not because it solved the myriad of problems involved in planning and executing combined wartime operations, but because it demonstrated willingness on the part of the U.S. to bring the problems into the open, and to take positive steps toward their solution. Arrangements were made for coordinated US-Chinese planning and action, some of which to the lay observer, seem so basic that he might be inclined to question why such arrangements were only now being settled. The answer undoubtedly is that until the U.S. and the GRC individually had reached the present stage of planning, staffing and preparation, the details of a combined effort could not rationally have been approached.

"The bugaboo of lack of a base rights or status of forces agreement with the GRC made its presence felt throughout the conference. Planning for exclusive U.S. use of certain airfields, for stationing of additional military units and their equipment on Taiwan, for supplementing Chinese defensive efforts with supporting American forces, for the establishment of a POL depot, and for construction, with U.S. military funds, of the various installations and improvements necessary to the foregoing, was seriously hampered, if not deadlocked, by the fact that the U.S. planners had no firm base rights arrangements with the Chinese. The U.S. representatives felt they had nothing on which they could rely for a definition of their rights, privileges and immunities in general and as a basic understanding with the Chinese on such matters as acquisition of, title to and disposition of property and improvements acquired with U.S. funds. Although, as the Department is well aware, U.S. forces brought into Taiwan under Article 7 of the Mutual Defense Treaty of December 2, 1954, have been accorded the privileges of the 'MAAG Agreement', this arrangement was clearly understood by the U.S. and the GRC to have been a temporary one and the GRC is now requesting the replacement of this arrangement by a status of forces agreement to be negotiated by the two governments. Until some permanent understanding can be reached on this question it seems doubtful that U.S. plans for the defense of Taiwan can be fully implemented." (Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/5-1655)

The "MAAG Agreement" refers to an exchange of notes dated January 30 and February 9, 1951, and a supplementary exchange of notes dated October 23 and November 1, 1952. For texts, see 2 UST (pt. 2) 1499 and 3 UST (pt. 4) 5166 respectively.

<sup>7</sup> No record has been found in Department of State files indicating whether or not the plan was put into effect.

241. Memorandum of a Conversation, Washington, May 6, 1955,  
10:30 a.m. <sup>1</sup>

PARTICIPANTS

The President  
Secretary of State  
Secretary of Defense  
Deputy Secretary Anderson  
Admiral Radford  
Under Secretary Hoover  
Assistant Secretary Robertson

Secretary Wilson presented a JCS split paper with reference to anti-aircraft defense on Taiwan, <sup>2</sup> and a majority of the Joint Chiefs recommended primarily training and instruction of the Chinese rather than putting a large US force on the island for this purpose. Rankin's cable #790 <sup>3</sup> was shown to the President who concurred in the decision of the Chairman and the majority of the Joint Chiefs. <sup>4</sup>

The President suggested that consideration should be given to an experimental unit of "Nike" anti-aircraft sites on the island. <sup>5</sup>

[Here follows discussion relating to NATO.]

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/5-655. Top Secret. Drafted by Dulles.

<sup>2</sup> Reference is to a JCS memorandum to Wilson, dated April 22, on the subject "U.S. Support for the Air Defense of Formosa" (JCS 2147/142), which presented divergent views on recommendations submitted by CINCPAC for improved air defense on Formosa and for support of U.S. Air Force forces to be deployed on Formosa. Carney and Twining recommended providing the Nationalists on a priority basis with 90-MM antiaircraft batteries and training teams; Ridgway recommended the deployment of one antiaircraft artillery brigade and logistic support troops to Formosa, stating that this was "the only solution which will provide effective antiaircraft artillery protection and logistical support for U.S. Air Force wings in less than one year." (JCS Records, CCS 381 Far East (11-28-50))

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 790 was sent in reply to telegram 668 to Taipei, May 5, which requested Rankin's views on a pending decision as to whether U.S. antiaircraft batteries to be sent to Taiwan should be fully manned by U.S. personnel, totalling approximately 12,000, or accompanied only by U.S. instructors. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/5-555) Rankin replied in telegram 790 from Taipei, May 6, that Chase and Pride concurred, that the "political and administrative disadvantages of stationing sizeable US tactical forces on Taiwan would outweigh possible military advantages." (*Ibid.*, 793.5/5-655)

<sup>4</sup> A memorandum of May 6 from Wilson to the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved Carney's and Twining's recommendations. (JCS Files, CCS 381 Far East (11-28-50))

<sup>5</sup> A memorandum of May 6 from Wilson to the Joint Chiefs of Staff requested JCS views on a proposal "that the United States consider sending an experimental Nike Unit to Formosa to participate in the air defense of Formosa in order to afford a possible opportunity to test this weapon under combat conditions." (*Ibid.*) A memorandum of June 15 from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Wilson stated the JCS view that the Army Chief of Staff "should make plans for deploying a special Nike unit to Formosa in case of need, to arrive there within thirty to fifty days after a decision is made for such deployment" but that "no Nike unit should be deployed to Formosa at this time." (*Ibid.*)

242. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,  
Washington, May 6, 1955, 3:08 p.m.<sup>1</sup>

SUBJECT

- 1) Clarification Chou En-lai Statement<sup>2</sup>
- 2) New Guinea—Irian
- 3) Offer of Good-Offices for Negotiations on Formosa
- 4) Confidential Indonesian comment on Chou En-lai's Intentions as to Negotiations

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary  
The Indonesian Ambassador, H.E. Mukarto Notowidigdo  
Assistant Secretary Robertson  
PSA—Mr. Philip E. Haring

1) Ambassador Mukarto reiterated Prime Minister Ali's statement to Ambassador Cumming that his government intends to support only "the peaceful efforts" of the Peoples Republic of China in safeguarding its sovereignty and territorial integrity.<sup>3</sup> He expressed embarrassment that his Government had failed to spell out that its intention was limited to peaceful efforts but added he felt that everyone in the world realized that Indonesia itself had only peaceful intentions. The Secretary expressed appreciation for the clarification.

[Here follows paragraph 2, a discussion of United States policy concerning the Indonesian-Dutch dispute over West New Guinea, or West Irian.]

3) The Ambassador said that he had a personal message from Prime Minister Ali to the Secretary. He said that Prime Minister Ali felt that the Bandung Conference had created a very favorable atmosphere for the peaceful settlement of problems. Prime Minister Ali, as the unanimous choice to be Chairman of the Conference, had further extended his efforts with the other four Colombo powers, Chou En-lai, and Philippine representative General Romulo, to further peaceful settlements. In the course of a dinner with these participants, Chou En-lai advocated direct negotiations with the US on the Formosa question. Prime Minister Ali said if Chou En-lai meant

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.56D/5-655. Secret. Drafted by Haring. The time of the meeting is from Dulles' appointment diary. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers)

<sup>2</sup> Reference is to a joint statement issued on April 28 by Indonesian Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo and Premier Chou En-lai at the conclusion of a visit by the latter to Jakarta; see *Documents on International Affairs*, 1955, pp. 469-470.

<sup>3</sup> Prime Minister Ali made the statement during a conversation of May 2, when Cumming asked him to clarify the meaning of paragraph 4 of the statement cited in footnote 2 above. The conversation was reported in telegram 2113 from Jakarta, May 2. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/5-255) In the paragraph under reference, the two Prime Ministers expressed sympathy and support "for the efforts of either of the two countries in safeguarding its own sovereignty and territorial integrity."

this he should state it publicly, which Chou En-lai later did. The Prime Minister believes Chou En-lai is sincere, and therefore, since Ali is accepting his invitation to come to Peiping on May 23 he offers his good-offices "if the US and China wish to use his services".

The Secretary said he was extremely grateful for the offer but could not reply at the moment as three or four other Governments have indicated that, on their own initiative, they are finding out Chou En-lai's thinking and what information is available. He added that we are not making up our minds just now but we would appreciate being informed by Prime Minister Ali of anything he might also learn of Chou En-lai's intentions. The Secretary said we have not asked and have not as yet decided to ask anyone to act as intermediary. We are anxious to have information which may be acquired on the initiative of other countries. We will gather the information as we can and then decide on the next step. He opined that possibly some further initiative will come from the Chinese Peoples Republic itself.

4) Ambassador Mukarto offered the following information in confidence from his Government. He said that Prime Minister Ali on the basis of private conversation with Chou En-lai found that Chou En-lai divided the problem into two parts: a) international, and b) domestic. Chou En-lai regards settlement of the issue as falling into a) direct negotiations with the US, and b) direct negotiations with Chiang Kai-shek. The Ambassador quoted Chou En-lai as willing to meet Chiang Kai-shek and negotiate a peaceful settlement of their problem *after* he had negotiated with the US and the international aspects were settled. He interprets Chou En-lai's reported statement as an intention to negotiate with the US on the Seventh Fleet and presence of American troops in Formosa but as meaning that other issues would be for negotiation only with Chiang Kai-shek. He asked that this matter be kept in confidence and the Secretary expressed appreciation for his reporting the information to us.

(On leaving the Secretary's Office, Ambassador Mukarto added to Mr. Haring that Prime Minister Ali was additionally influenced to regard Chou En-lai as making a genuine and sincere offer in that it appeared to have been on his own initiative. He said that when Chou En-lai advocated direct negotiations Nehru "became furious" as he had felt all along that direct negotiations between the US and Chou En-lai would not be possible.)



**243. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,  
Washington, May 6, 1955, 3:37 p.m. <sup>1</sup>**

**SUBJECT**

Further discussions of Ambassador Malik's Memorandum to the Secretary Regarding his talks with Chou En-lai at Bandung

**PARTICIPANTS**

Ambassador Charles Malik, Lebanon  
The Secretary  
NE—Mr. Hart

The Secretary thanked Ambassador Malik for coming in, explaining that he had asked him to call in order to verify certain points regarding the very interesting memorandum which the Ambassador had left with him giving a detailed report of his talks at Bandung with Chou En-lai. <sup>2</sup> The Secretary had handed it to the President, who had agreed to read it.

The Secretary commented that he had to "salute" Chou's performance at Bandung although he was by no means convinced of Chou's sincerity. Several countries, the UK, India, Pakistan and Indonesia, had proffered their good offices to the U.S. to facilitate a peaceful solution in the Far East. Meanwhile, the Department was gathering information by "probing". At an appropriate time it could contact the Communist Chinese through the Embassy of a friendly country such as one of those just mentioned, or it could utilize the intermediary of the USSR. Did Ambassador Malik have any thoughts on this subject?

Ambassador Malik agreed that the intentions of the Communist Chinese should be probed with the expectation that there would have to be an eventual face-to-face meeting. The Secretary replied that in his view a face-to-face meeting should not come soon, but be preceded by exchanges of messages through intermediaries and further probing as to intentions. Ambassador Malik agreed. He could hardly advise as to whom to use as intermediary. The USSR was hardly an intermediary who would satisfy the requirement of being one in whom both parties could have confidence.

The Secretary asked whether Malik had any idea as to Chou's thoughts on the mechanics of negotiation. Malik replied in the negative, but had the strong impression that Chou's idea was to meet around the table somewhere, sometime. The Secretary indicated that

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 670.901/5-655. Secret. Drafted on May 9 by Hart. The time of the meeting is from Dulles' appointment diary. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers)

<sup>2</sup> Reference is to the report which Malik gave Dulles on May 5; see footnote 5, Document 239.

while the four previously mentioned countries (the UK, India, Pakistan and Indonesia) were acting voluntarily in probing the intentions of the Communist Chinese, this process could not continue indefinitely.

Malik asked whether the Secretary General of the UN might be a suitable intermediary. Had he done a good job in connection with the American flyers? The Secretary replied that Hammarskjold had not done a good job. Malik asked about Mohammed Ali. The Secretary responded that so many countries which might be intermediaries have interests of their own, which they would wish to see served. There was the friction between Pakistan and India and the fact that Pakistan would like to neutralize China as far as India is concerned. The Secretary had merely wished to be sure before going to Paris that he had all Malik's thoughts, since the topic would come up at Paris and if he then went on to Vienna, Molotov might bring it up there. Malik replied that if he personally could assist in any way, he would be glad to ask his Government for permission to proceed to Communist China. The Secretary expressed his appreciation for this offer without accepting it.

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**244. Telegram From the Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in India <sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, May 7, 1955—1:07 p.m.*

1756. Your 1662 <sup>2</sup> and 1713. <sup>3</sup> Deptel 1703 sent Karachi 1811 <sup>4</sup> Djakarta 1833 Taipei 655 set forth our views regarding use of any intermediary at present in probing Chinese Communist intentions on Taiwan problem. Those views and following comments can be used as background for future conversations with Nehru and Government

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/5-155. Secret; Priority. Repeated for information to Jakarta, Karachi, and Taipei. Drafted in CA, cleared in PSA and SOA and with Deputy Under Secretary Murphy and approved by Robertson.

<sup>2</sup> Document 234.

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 1713 from New Delhi, May 6, reported a conversation the previous evening between Prime Minister Nehru and Ambassador Cooper and requested guidance. Nehru told Cooper that Menon was going to Peking at Chou's request and that Nehru had asked him to explore China's attitude and position. Nehru also stated that he had urged Chou at Bandung to release the American airmen, whereupon Chou had said the matter would again be considered upon his return to China. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.95A241/5-655)

<sup>4</sup> Document 232.

India. Djakarta (in connection Djakarta's 2113)<sup>5</sup> and Karachi should also be guided accordingly. We should avoid allowing any of them believe they have mandate speak for us when and if they visit Peiping.

Transcript Secretary's April 26 Press Conference which transmitted in wireless bulletin gives general lines our present thinking. Our objectives in probing Communist intentions will be to assess prospects for achieving a lasting cease-fire and general acceptance of necessity for peaceful solution to Taiwan problem.

Regarding Menon's comments on difficulties public agreement to cease-fire we agree that initially this may not be possible but at some time this and other negotiated points would have to be made public somehow. We believe there is no need to concern ourselves unduly with this problem now, however, and we should seek initially only to find out whether realistic basis for cease-fire exists.

Regarding imprisoned American airmen we appreciate action taken by GOI on their behalf and regard Peiping's continued failure act as serious matter.

Hoover

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<sup>5</sup> Telegram 2113 from Jakarta, May 2, reported a conversation between Prime Minister Ali and Ambassador Cumming, in which Ali offered his good offices in furthering a settlement of the Taiwan problem. (Department of State, Central Files, 756D.00/5-255)

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245. **Telegram From the Ambassador in the Republic of China (Rankin) to the Department of State**<sup>1</sup>

*Taipei, May 9, 1955—5 p.m.*

799. Reviewed cease-fire possibilities once more with Foreign Minister Yeh today, emphasizing I was not acting under instructions from Department. He believes GRC must continue oppose any formal cease-fire agreement and any negotiations between his government and Reds. However Yeh noted GRC commitments to US would bring about actual cease-fire if we so desired and if Communists stopped shooting.

It would if some other country could obtain commitment from Chinese Reds corresponding in effect to that we have from GRC, de

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/5-955. Secret. Repeated for information to London, New Delhi, and Hong Kong and repeated to Paris for Robertson by the Department as Tosec 13, May 9. (*Ibid.*)

facto cease-fire would be possible without need for direct negotiations between Communists and either US or GRC.

I remarked to Foreign Minister that to obtain de facto cease-fire along above lines it presumably necessary US ask GRC suspend its "port closure" as applied to portion of China coast since 1949. Latter not particularly effective in any case due limitations of GRC Navy, to British action which encourages Chinese-owned Hong Kong ships in breaking port closure and to US reluctance extend avowed support, even moral, to GRC in this connection. Suspension of port closure for duration of cease-fire therefore would involve yielding no important present advantages but should please British and provide face-saving device for Reds if they were ready for any reason to stop shooting at least temporarily. Perhaps more important, GRC willingness suspend port closure should remove, for many of our friends, what doubtless appears as major objection to GRC retention of Kinmen and Matsu. There are numerous similar "offshore islands" situations but where they do not serve as bases for active interference with nearby territory there is no urgent case for transfer of sovereignty.

Yeh pointed out that since UNO imposed embargo on Red China, port closure had been in effect GRC's contribution to its enforcement, although not at UNO request. I observed it not generally so regarded and that GRC suspension of port closure need not affect UNO embargo.

I doubt Chinese Communists would go along in good faith with above scheme or any other practicable cease-fire proposal, but such approach might help us with our friends. <sup>2</sup>

**Rankin**

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 800 from Taipei, May 9, reads as follows:

"If cease fire effort along lines mentioned Embtel 799 proved abortive, thereby making clear once more who was aggressor, better basis should exist for tightening control on traffic of military significance along China Coast with avowed purpose strengthen defense of Taiwan and points south. With adequate moral and logistic support from US, including replacement of equipment lost in action, it should be possible GRC Navy to do creditable job from Swatow to Wenchow without direct participation US forces.

"Understand US Navy prefers any shipping interception in which it directly involved should be maintained at some distance, outside range shore-based fighter aircraft, which would imply blockade of entire China Coast." (*Ibid.*) It was repeated to Paris for the Secretary and Robertson by the Department as Tedul 11, May 9. (*Ibid.*)

## 246. Editorial Note

The situation in the Far East, especially with regard to Taiwan and the offshore islands, was a subject of discussion at the May 10 sessions of the North Atlantic Council, during the ministerial meeting of the Council in Paris, May 9-11, 1955. Secretary Dulles gave an exposition of United States policy, stating that the United States was not committed to defend Quemoy and the Matsus unless an attack on them was part of an attack on Formosa and the Pescadores but noting that the Chinese Communists had never made any distinction between the offshore islands and Formosa. He expressed the hope that a situation would develop in which both the Communists and the Nationalists continued to assert their claims but neither side tried to pursue them through the use of force.

During the subsequent discussion, Belgian Foreign Minister Paul-Henri Spaak asserted that opinion in Europe differed from that in the United States on two points: 1) Europeans saw a great difference between the defense of Formosa, the juridical status of which was at least debatable, and the defense of Quemoy and Matsu, which were clearly Chinese; and 2) they differed with the United States view of Chiang Kai-shek, considering that his role in Asia was over and that his statements were frequently dangerous. Spaak suggested that recognition of the People's Republic of China was inevitable. It would be necessary to deal with Chou En-lai to resolve the Formosa question, just as it had been necessary to deal with him to make peace in Korea and Indochina.

In reply, Dulles again noted that the Communists did not accept any distinction between Formosa and the offshore islands and declared that, in case of an attack on the offshore islands, the decision as to whether the attack was directed against Formosa would be made by the President. He defended Chiang Kai-shek as a man of personal integrity, sincere anti-communism, and loyalty to his friends and commitments. He also pointed out that Chiang had made a formal agreement not to attack the mainland except in the case of imminent necessity of self-defense or in agreement with the United States. Records of the discussion (NATO Secret Verbatim Records (C-VR(55)20 and 21)) are in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 444. The discussion was summarized in Poltos 2279 and 2282 from Paris, May 11 and 12, 1955. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 790.5/5-1155 and 790.5/5-1255, respectively)

In his report to the National Security Council on May 19 concerning the Paris meetings, Secretary Dulles stated, according to Gleason's memorandum of the discussion, that "he had had a quite lively conversation with Spaak, the Belgian Foreign Minister, on the

subject of U.S. policy in the Far East, of which M. Spaak had inclined to be critical.

"The President inquired in what respects Spaak had been critical of our policy in this area. Secretary Dulles replied that Spaak did not hold a high opinion of Chiang Kai-shek. In response to this point of Spaak's, Secretary Dulles asked the Foreign Ministers if they thought highly of Chou En-lai. Secretary Dulles said he then went on to defend Chiang Kai-shek as a stalwart Christian, a man of personal probity, and a statesman who had been consistently loyal to the engagements and commitments he had made to the United States. While there were, of course, many European statesmen who were thus loyal, they were relatively few in Asia. Secretary Dulles commented that this exchange had been productive of healthy results." (Memorandum of discussion by Gleason, dated May 20; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

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247. **Telegram From the Ambassador in the Republic of China (Rankin) to the Department of State**<sup>1</sup>

*Taipei, May 11, 1955—9 p.m.*

803. Admiral Stump departed today after three-day visit devoted entirely to military affairs until in final conversations this afternoon President Chiang brought up important question involving policy. Foreign Minister Yeh, General Chase and I also present.

Chiang expressed appreciation Stump's assurances of continued US support and high priority to be given Free China's MDAP requirements. Then he referred to recent US refusal concur in bombing by CAF of new Communist airfields under construction in Fukien. Said he would comply with US wishes for time being but when enemy airfields become operational it would be within inherent right of self-defense to attack them.

I referred to importance of not striking first blow as emphasized during recent Radford-Robertson visit, unpleasant as it might be to wait for enemy to attack. Admiral Stump pointed out that appearance of MIGs on nearby Communist airfields did not necessarily imply hostile intent; they might be intended for defense. While desirable militarily to bomb airfields before enemy struck, he said, there could be offsetting political considerations.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/5-1155. Secret. Received at 10:21 a.m. Passed to CINCPAC by the Department at the Embassy's request. Repeated to Paris for Robertson by the Department as Tosec 32, May 11. (*Ibid.*)

President said he would consider concentration of fighters on these fields sufficient evidence of hostile intent. I observed matter was complex and must be considered carefully from every angle. From purely military standpoint, prospective accomplishments of Chinese Air Force fighter-bombers must be weighed against probable losses.

In conclusion Chiang said he would do nothing "provocative".

**Rankin**

**248. Telegram From the Chargé in the United Kingdom (Butterworth) to the Department of State** <sup>1</sup>

*London, May 11, 1955—4 p.m.*

4975. Dept will have seen press accounts Trevelyan's call on Chou En-lai in order request elaborating his offer negotiate relaxation Far East tensions and Chou's promise of an answer "in due course". <sup>2</sup>

Telegram from Brit Emb Peiping reports Chou said he would study Trevelyan's request and would give an official reply later. Chou then reportedly made following general remarks:

a. Chou had taken note of Secretary's statement participation GRC rep not essential.

b. He felt that no need elaborate on GRC announcement that it would under no circumstances be represented in any such discussions. <sup>3</sup>

c. He noted US was ready to discuss cease-fire; this completely irrelevant, as what Chou said at Bandung was he prepared discuss relaxation of tensions.

d. Chinese Communists do not want fight US and are not at war with US. Chou nevertheless willing discuss relaxation of tensions.

Trevelyan's response was merely Chou's Bandung statements had raised hopes for peace; he reiterated UK wish to be helpful.

**Butterworth**

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 790.00/5-1155. Secret. Received at 4:23 p.m. Repeated for information to Taipei and Hong Kong.

<sup>2</sup> The Foreign Office announced on May 10 that Trevelyan had seen Premier Chou the previous day; see the *New York Times*, May 11, 1955.

<sup>3</sup> Foreign Minister Yeh had so stated in a press interview on April 25, reported in telegram 761 from Taipei, April 26. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/4-2655)

249. Memorandum of a Conversation, Vienna, May 14, 1955<sup>1</sup>

## PARTICIPANTS

Secretary Dulles, Molotov, Troyanovsky (interpreter), Merchant, Robertson.

In an aside conversation with the Secretary and Robertson, Molotov facetiously brought up the question of Formosa. Merchant joined the group and Troyanovsky acted as interpreter. The Secretary said he wanted to talk about that matter seriously. He asked whether Mr. Molotov remembered the conversation the two of them had had alone at Berlin<sup>2</sup> when the Secretary had said that he saw danger signs and that events of the Far East might develop grave results which none of us wanted. Molotov said he did remember. The Secretary said we were very close to that danger point now. Molotov said it would take time to work out. The Secretary replied that it would also take patience and restraint.

The Secretary asked Molotov what suggestions he had for settling the Formosa question on a peaceful basis. Molotov replied that he had already suggested that the question be discussed in a five-power conference. The Secretary answered that it could be better discussed in a six-power conference. Molotov replied that the Chinese Communists would not agree. (Apparently referring to being unwilling to sit down with Chiang Kai-shek.) The Secretary countered by saying in no event would we discuss the interests of the Chinese Nationalists without their participation. Just as the Soviets might feel it necessary to be loyal to the GDR, we would be completely loyal to the Government of the Republic of China. Molotov nodded his head. He then said "if a conference of five is too small, we could have one of ten." (Presumably he was referring to a ten-power conference which had at one time been suggested in other quarters.)<sup>3</sup>

Molotov said "we want peace" and asked along what lines did we expect his suggestions to be made. The Secretary replied that in Korea, Germany, Viet Nam we believed in achieving unification by peaceful means and not by violence. So too in Formosa, without

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/5-1755. Top Secret. The source text, dated May 17, bears the following note: "Originally drafted by Secretary with later additions by Merchant. This final draft has been approved by the Secretary, Merchant, and Robertson." The conversation took place in Vienna, at a dinner at the American Ambassador's residence for the British, French, and Soviet Foreign Ministers; Dulles and the other Foreign Ministers were in Vienna for the signature of the Austrian State Treaty the following day. Dulles sent a brief report to the President of this conversation and other discussions at the dinner in Dulte 46 from Vienna, May 15, scheduled for publication in documentation on U.S. relations with Austria in a forthcoming volume.

<sup>2</sup> On February 13, 1954, at the Berlin Conference.

<sup>3</sup> Reference is apparently to the Soviet proposal for a 10-power conference, made to the British on February 4; see footnote 2, Document 86.



prejudice to conflicting claims, the parties should renounce force and attempt a peaceful solution.

The Secretary continued that in so far as Formosa was concerned, there need be no great hurry. It has been 60 years since China had held Formosa and the fact that Formosa was not still Japanese was wholly due to the fact that the US had had the power to take Formosa away from Japan. Indeed the control of China over Formosa before the Treaty of 1895<sup>4</sup> had been tenuous for centuries. Surely the situation could continue another decade or longer if the alternative was the risk of war within a year.

Molotov then said "But Quemoy and Matsu don't belong to Formosa." The Secretary said that they were now in the possession of what we recognized as the lawful government of China.

Mr. Robertson said that they had been held indefinitely by the Republic of China except for the brief wartime occupation by Japan. The Communists had made one effort several years ago to take Quemoy and had been bloodily repulsed. Apart from that their lawful possession by the Government of China had never been challenged.

The Secretary said that what he was talking about was Formosa and not Quemoy and Matsu. He reminded Molotov that our Treaty with the ROC only covered Formosa and the Pescadores and that our interest in the islands arose from their relation to the defense of the Treaty area. Molotov nodded his head. The Chinese Communists had themselves refused to make any distinction between Formosa and the offshore islands. In all their statements they declare that their purpose is to liberate Formosa and that the capture of the offshore islands will facilitate this object.

The Secretary then referred to the Communist build-up of airfields on the Mainland opposite Formosa. Ostensibly they were for attack on Formosa. The US had used its influence with the Chinese Nationalists to restrain them from attacking these positions. It was difficult to keep this situation from breaking out into war. The Secretary went on to say that the Chinese Communists were dependent upon Russia for various strategic supplies and planes and could not develop their plans without Russian support. The Secretary said that we had obtained from the Chinese Nationalists arrangements which we thought would enable us to influence the situation for peace from our side and he suggested that the Soviet Union could do the same with the Chinese Communists.

Molotov replied that the build-up of airfields was an internal affair with which he had nothing to do. The Secretary said that he

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<sup>4</sup> Text of the Sino-Japanese Treaty signed at Shimonoseki on April 17, 1895, is in *Foreign Relations, 1895*, vol. I, p. 199.

hoped the Soviets would exercise restraint on the Communists. At this point dinner was announced. Before the subject was abandoned, the Secretary asked Molotov to give further consideration to the problem and let us know what he thought could be done towards a peaceful solution. The Secretary said that if Mr. Molotov had any further ideas he could communicate them privately either through Ambassador Bohlen in Moscow or the Soviet Ambassador in Washington.

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250. **Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China**<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, May 18, 1955—3:50 p.m.*

686. Department concurs position adopted by you and Admiral Stump as reported your 803.<sup>2</sup>

In absence actual employment new Fukien airfields in attacks on GRC territory, bombing of fields could not be considered "action of emergency character which clearly exercise of inherent right self-defense" (exchange of notes December 10), but would constitute use of force requiring joint agreement. US would consider bombing new Fukien airfields under such circumstances without prior US agreement as violating understanding contained December 10 exchange of notes.

As stressed in Robertson-Radford April 1955 conversations with President Chiang Taipei President Eisenhower considers it is of utmost importance maintain onus for hostilities in off-shore island area on Chinese Communists. President Chiang assured Robertson and Radford he would respect Mutual Defense Treaty obligations and would not attack Mainland installations without US consent. Any GRC offensive action which is not clear-cut retaliation for Chinese Communist attack would greatly complicate issue in US and abroad. Hostile intent Communist China against off-shore islands and Taiwan was indicated at time exchange of notes took place but was not and is not considered adequate basis for offensive action by GRC in absence prior attack by Chinese Communists. Improvement of Chinese Communists capabilities resulting from making new

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/5-1155. Top Secret. Approved and signed personally by Dulles, drafted in CA with revisions by Robertson, and cleared by Murphy and Phleger and with the Department of Defense. Repeated for information to CINCPAC.

<sup>2</sup> Document 247.

Fukien airfields operational likewise not considered adequate basis of itself for GRC initiate offensive action. On same basis Chinese Communists could claim increase GRC air and naval capabilities warranted their initiation offensive action.

You should convey foregoing views to President Chiang at early opportunity.

Dulles

251. Letter From the Secretary of State to the President <sup>1</sup>

*Washington, May 18, 1955.*

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: On May 13, Chou En-lai made a long report on the Bandung Conference, in the course of which he talked about Taiwan and said, among other things, "The Chinese people have two possible means of liberating Taiwan—namely, by war, or by peaceful means. The Chinese people are willing to strive for the liberation of Taiwan by peaceful means as far as this is possible."<sup>2</sup>

This is, I think, significant. It may be a response to the statements we have often made that just as in the case of divided Germany, Korea and Vietnam, unification must be sought only by peaceful means and not by force. It might mean an attempt to differentiate Taiwan from Quemoy and Matsu so that they could attack the latter

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles-Herter Series. Official Use Only. A copy is also in Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/5-1855. Drafted by Dulles. The source text was initialed by the President, indicating he had seen it.

<sup>2</sup> Premier Chou's report on the Bandung Conference was made at a meeting of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on May 13; the text, as printed in a supplement to *People's China*, June 16, 1955, reads in part as follows:

"Taiwan is China's territory, the people living in Taiwan are Chinese people, and the liberation of Taiwan by the Chinese people is a question of China's domestic affair. The United States occupation of Taiwan has created tension in the Taiwan area and this constitutes an international issue between China and the United States. The two questions cannot be mixed up. There is no war between China and the U.S., so the question of a so-called cease-fire does not arise. The Chinese people are friendly with the American people. The Chinese people do not want to have a war with the United States. To ease tension in the Taiwan area, the Chinese Government is willing to sit down and enter into negotiations with the United States Government. As to the form of negotiations, the Chinese Government supports the Soviet proposal for a ten-power conference and is also willing to consider other forms. However, no negotiations should in the slightest degree affect the Chinese people's exercise of their own sovereign rights—their just demand and action to liberate Taiwan. At the same time, the Chinese Government can at no time agree to participation by the Chiang Kai-shek clique in any international conference. The Chinese people have two possible means to liberate Taiwan, namely by war or by peaceful means. The Chinese people are willing to strive for the liberation of Taiwan by peaceful means so far as it is possible."

without the attack being considered directed against Formosa so as to justify you in invoking the Treaty and P.L.4. However, the speech did not itself mention Quemoy and the Matsus or suggest a differentiation.

Faithfully yours,

JFD

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## 252. Editorial Note

At a meeting of the National Security Council on May 19, Secretary Dulles reported on his meetings in Vienna; his description of his May 14 conversation with Foreign Minister Molotov is recorded as follows:

"Perhaps the single most interesting event at Vienna had been a dinner which Secretary Dulles had attended with the three other Foreign Ministers. The occasion had provided a private conversation with Molotov on the situation in China. Secretary Dulles had indicated to Molotov the United States view and line on China—namely, that China was a divided country, that there were several other divided countries in Asia such as Korea and Vietnam, and finally, that such divisions should not be the occasion for solutions reached by force. Secretary Dulles had then appealed to Molotov to induce the Soviet Government to use its influence with Communist China to prevent Communist China from resorting to force. In the course of this he had pointed out the build-up of war potential in the areas of Communist China opposite Formosa.

"Molotov, continued Secretary Dulles, was interested but reserved in response to these comments. He used the familiar argument that the actions of the Chinese Communists were an internal matter in which the Soviet Government could not interfere. Secretary Dulles had responded to this by pointing out that, after all, the Russians were supplying the Chinese Communists with the stuff by which they were carrying on their military build-up.

"At a later point in the conversation, Molotov suggested a Five-Power conference (to include Communist China) which could deal with Far Eastern problems. Secretary Dulles replied that he would much prefer a Six-Power conference (including the Chinese Nationalists). All in all, this had been quite a talk, although it probably produced no result other than Secretary Dulles' own statement as to the gravity of the situation in the area of the Formosa Strait. Molotov at least said that he would think about the points Secretary Dulles had raised, a statement which the latter said he had welcomed."

Later in the meeting, during a discussion related to the forthcoming four-power heads-of-government meeting, Dillon Anderson asked whether the NSC Planning Board should study the problem of

China and Far Eastern security in connection with the preparations for the conference. The President replied "that he did not believe that Far Eastern problems should be studied as a matter of urgency at this time. He said he was determined not to take part in any Five-Power conference at present." (Memorandum of discussion by Gleason, May 20; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

**253. Telegram From the Ambassador in the Republic of China (Rankin) to the Department of State <sup>1</sup>**

*Taipei, May 23, 1955—6 p.m.*

831. Deptel 685. <sup>2</sup> Regarding mine fields in territorial waters off-shore islands, Chase and I agree most unlikely Chinese would agree to give British assurances. In eyes Chinese Government ships carry supplies to Red Chinese soldiers these ports, which cannot easily reach them any other way. Further, any assurance to British would surely soon become known to Communist Chinese thus defeating at least in part effectiveness of this measure.

As for similar action by US, decision to provide and lay these mines was taken at high levels US Government, certainly as high as JCS, and Defense knows precisely where mine fields are. Any decision on disclosure location should certainly be taken same high level. We recommend against such US action which would be unilateral, contrary to Chinese wishes and involve violation of Chinese confidence.

Is it not sufficient that Premier Yui in press conference last Saturday <sup>3</sup> declared mine fields "covered only territorial waters off-shore islands without interrupting high seas shipping" according *China Post*? Other local newspapers report similarly, *Express News* quoting him as saying "mining was in waters within three-mile limit off territories held by government, . . . <sup>4</sup> not interfere navigation

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/5-2355. Secret; Priority.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 685 to Taipei, May 18, states that a British Embassy officer expressed concern to the Department at a May 6 announcement by the ROC Government that the territorial waters of the Nationalist-held offshore islands had been mined. The Department informed the British representative that this action violated no treaty or other U.S. rights, but the Department thought the British should be reassured that the mines were within 3 miles of the Nationalist-held islands and not in normal shipping lanes and that a warning would be issued if any were laid in shipping channels. It requested the Embassy's comment. (*Ibid.*, 793.5/5-1855)

<sup>3</sup> May 21.

<sup>4</sup> Ellipsis in the source text.

beyond internationally recognized territorial waters limit". This slightly expands official statement, see Embassy's 798.<sup>5</sup>

British Consul has been instructed protest sowing these mines questioning legality Chinese action, although (for your information) he himself believes it would have been better pass over in silence. United Kingdom concern evidently relates solely to principle involved since no respectable British-flag shipping companies have operated to and from these ports past several years.

**Rankin**

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<sup>5</sup> Telegram 798 from Taipei, May 9, transmitted the text of a memorandum received that day from the ROC Foreign Office stating that mine fields had been laid in the territorial waters of all the Nationalist-controlled offshore islands and requesting all governments concerned to warn their shipowners against entering those waters. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/5-955)

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**254. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, May 23, 1955.*

**SUBJECT**

Flights Near to Chinese Communist Territory.

At our meeting today with the Joint Chiefs of Staff<sup>2</sup> Mr. Murphy raised the question in connection with the last MIG incident<sup>3</sup> whether the military advantages of flights near territory held by the Communists are sufficient to offset the political disadvantage of appearing provocative. I specifically questioned whether such flights are consistent with the President's policies with respect to Communist China.

Admiral Radford replied that he and General Twining had discussed the matter with the President, and the President was acquainted with what was being done.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President. Top Secret; Personal and Private. Filed as an attachment to Document 258.

Sent via Murphy, who initialed, indicating his approval; a notation on the source text indicates that it was seen by the Secretary.

<sup>2</sup> The meeting took place on May 20; a memorandum of the substance of discussion is in Department of State, State-JCS Meetings: Lot 61 D 417.

<sup>3</sup> Reference is to an attack on May 10 by PRC planes on U.S. planes under the U.N. Command flying a reconnaissance mission off the Manchurian coast. A Department of State press release of May 11 stated that a protest was being made to the Military Armistice Commission. For text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 30, 1955, p. 891.

You may wish on a suitable occasion to confirm the President's understanding on this subject.

**255. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Secretary of State <sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, May 24, 1955.*

**SUBJECT**

American Fliers Detained in Communist China

According to a memorandum received this morning from USUN,<sup>2</sup> Secretary General Hammarskjöld informed Ambassador Wadsworth on May 21 that he had received a new communication from Chou En-lai concerning the imprisoned American fliers, and asked that this information be brought to your attention. The communication acknowledged receipt of Hammarskjöld's last communication to Chou (sent a few days earlier)<sup>3</sup> in which Hammarskjöld had asked if there was anything specific which Chou felt Hammarskjöld could do regarding the fliers. Chou's new communication stated that he was giving very close attention to the matter and expected to have an answer by the end of this month.

A telegram received from Paris today reports that Mr. Hammarskjöld had failed to inform Ambassador Wadsworth, in the conversation referred to above, that he had sent a letter to Sobolev reporting this latest development in the negotiations with Chou.<sup>4</sup> Hammarskjöld said that the last paragraph of his letter to Sobolev was intended to convey to Molotov the idea that Molotov's appearance in San Francisco<sup>5</sup> would be under a serious cloud unless Chou had pre-

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 293.1111/5-2455. The source text bears the notation that it was seen by the Secretary.

<sup>2</sup> Memorandum for the files by Charles D. Cook of the U.S. Mission at the United Nations, dated May 23. (*Ibid.*, UNP Files: Lot 58 D 742, American Fliers in China)

<sup>3</sup> Summarized in telegram 783 from New York, May 16, which stated that Hammarskjöld showed Babcock a message to Chou which he had sent that day. It reminded Chou that Hammarskjöld had received no reply to his question whether there was anything he could do to facilitate the release of the prisoners, pointed out that no replies had been received to the letters from the fliers' families, and emphasized the importance of early action for the fliers' release. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 611.95A241/5-1655)

<sup>4</sup> Telegram 5112 from Paris, May 23, reported a conversation with Hammarskjöld in which he informed the Embassy of his letter to Sobolev. (*Ibid.*, 611.95A241/5-2355)

<sup>5</sup> At the meetings commemorating the 10th anniversary of the signing of the U.N. Charter in San Francisco, June 20-26.

viously acted on the fliers. Mr. Hammarskjold is reported to have expressed a reasonable degree of confidence that Chou would agree, in his reply, to release at least four fliers.

Hammarskjold expects to return to New York, Saturday, May 28.

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256. **Draft Letter From the Secretary of State to the Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China (Chou)**<sup>1</sup>

*[Washington,] May 24, 1955.*

At the Bandung Conference you suggested that we should enter into negotiations to settle the question of relaxing and eliminating tension in the Taiwan Area. Subsequently you indicated that the Chinese people so far as possible seek by peaceful means their goals with relation to Taiwan.

The people of the United States also favor any honorable action which will promote peace. The United States has a deep and abiding interest in Taiwan and its people, since it was above all the armed effort of the U.S. which brought about (cite treaty) with Japan and Repb of China,<sup>2</sup> and are therefore willing to discuss the relaxing and elimination of tensions in the Taiwan Area. An important step to that end is abstention from the use of force in that area and agreement that peaceful means shall be employed in the settlement of outstanding differences.

For its part the United States has not resorted to the use of force, and has brought about conditions under which there is no use of force against the Chinese Mainland. The United States is prepared to assure the continuance of these conditions and to arrange for mutually agreeable negotiations, on the assumption that you on your part are also prepared to abstain from resort to the use of armed

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Wang-Johnson Talks. This letter was not sent. The inside address reads: "His Excellency Chou En-lai, Foreign Minister, Peking, China." The source text bears no indication of the drafter but includes handwritten insertions in Secretary Dulles' handwriting: the second sentence in the first paragraph, the word "also" in the first sentence in the second paragraph, and the second sentence in the second paragraph through the word "China". The second paragraph originally began with the following sentence: "The people of the United States favor any honorable action which will promote peace and are therefore willing to discuss the relaxing and elimination of tensions in the Taiwan Area." No documentation indicating the origin of the draft or recording any discussion of it has been found in Department of State files or Eisenhower Library.

<sup>2</sup> Apparent reference to the peace treaty between Japan and the Republic of China, signed April 28, 1952; for text, see UNTS 138:3.



force pending agreement on the larger question of relaxing and eliminating tension in the Taiwan Area.

If you are agreeable to these suggestions, conditions should exist under which it would be possible to go forward to seek more permanent arrangements to insure peace in the Area.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> The source text bears no closing or signature.

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257. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Embassy in India<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, May 24, 1955—7:32 p.m.*

1865. Your 1830.<sup>2</sup> Following may be helpful as background your conversations with Menon and Nehru.

There have been no new developments U.S. policy regarding negotiations since Deptel 1756 repeated Taipei 671.<sup>3</sup> President confirmed this his Press Conference last week. We remain willing explore possibilities cease-fire Taiwan area but unabated Chinese Communist propaganda for liberation Taiwan not promising augury. Moreover Chou En-lai's report on Bandung to CPR People's Congress indicated no flexibility or apparent desire achieve reasonable solution to problem beyond his statement intent use peaceful means so far as possible. See London's 5070 repeated New Delhi 119<sup>4</sup> for British reaction. This recalcitrance and continued Communist failure release American airmen despite nearly year direct talks at Geneva and UNSYG's efforts not encouraging. U.S. continues prepared examine prospects sincerely however.

We have no information on Chinese position, including Menon-Chou talks, other than Chou's Bandung report<sup>5</sup> and brief conversa-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/5-2355. Secret. Repeated for information to Jakarta, Karachi, London, and Taipei. Drafted in CA, cleared with the Secretary and in substance with Robertson, and approved in NEA.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 1830 from New Delhi, May 23, reported that Krishna Menon was en route from Peking to New Delhi and requested background information for the talks which Cooper anticipated with Menon and Nehru. (*Ibid.*)

<sup>3</sup> Document 244.

<sup>4</sup> Telegram 5070 from London, May 18, reported that Foreign Office spokesmen in replying to press inquiries were taking the position that Chou's statement was a step backward and was unnecessarily insulting to the countries which were trying to promote the relaxation of tensions but that it was largely meant for domestic consumption. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/5-1855)

<sup>5</sup> Premier Chou's May 13 report to the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress; see Document 251.

tion between Chou and UK Chargé Trevelyan in which Chou indicated unwillingness discuss cease-fire and insistence on vague formula "relaxation of tensions".<sup>6</sup> We have had no further reports from London.

As Secretary indicated his April 26 Press Conference we intend obtain maximum possible information regarding Communist intentions before deciding our exact course. We are therefore interested fullest possible reports regarding Menon visit but not prepared accept any specific intermediary at present (Embtel [*Deptel*] 1756).

In probable event Nehru or Menon suggest latter proceed Washington believe we should not encourage such visit. You can point out that Secretary and Menon will be at San Francisco and can exchange views there. You may also assure him and Nehru his reports and GOI attitude will be communicated highest level Washington.

FYI Department's view is that specific proposals currently undesirable. Chances for tacit cease-fire better if situation kept quiet and evolves gradually. Doubtful if any concrete formula could be helpful. On contrary any formula such as Menon likely propose probably would lead impasse and might afford Communists pretext for terminating de facto cease-fire.

Dulles

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<sup>6</sup> On May 9; see Document 248.

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**258. Memorandum From the Secretary of State to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, May 25, 1955.*

At luncheon today, I spoke to the President about your memorandum to me of May 23 on flights near Chinese Communist territory. The President said he would discuss this matter further with Admiral Radford.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President. Top Secret.

<sup>2</sup> An unsigned memorandum of May 26 to Robertson, apparently from Dulles, filed as an attachment to the source text, reads as follows:

"The President spoke to Admiral Radford about the question of flights in the Far East, and Radford is taking steps to limit any such to purposes of real military significance."

Telegram JCS 982226 from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to CINCFE, May 27, directed that aircraft operations in the Sea of Japan and the Yellow Sea should be so conducted

Also, I discussed with the President our present policy of letting things "simmer" and avoiding efforts to arrive at a formalistic arrangement, which efforts would probably break down and provide an excuse for Chinese Communist hostilities. The President said he completely agreed with this policy.

JFD

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as to minimize involvement with Communist aircraft. It is scheduled for publication in the Korea compilation in a forthcoming volume.

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### 259. Letter From the Indian Ambassador (Mehta) to President Eisenhower <sup>1</sup>

*Washington, May 27, 1955.*

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have the honour to convey the following message from my Prime Minister:

*Begins.* Dear Mr. President: I have received from Krishna Menon, on his return today from Peking his report on his talks with Prime Minister Chou En-lai and others. His visit to Peking was in response to an invitation from the Chinese Prime Minister and he went there on our behalf.

2. While we were *not* speaking on behalf of any country or Government, we have at the same time felt that we have contacts with and the friendship of the main parties concerned, namely United States and China, and some knowledge of their respective positions. This as well as recent developments in respect of this problem on both sides also encouraged the belief that ways of fruitful negotiations could be found.

3. The decision of the United States Government to remove restrictions on some 58 Chinese students now in the United States, of which Krishna Menon was informed after his talks with Secretary of State Dulles in March last <sup>2</sup> and the impressions that he formed then which he reported to me, also encouraged the belief that progress towards peaceful approach and solutions should be attempted.

4. The recent talks in Peking have led me to the belief that steps both to reduce tension and to pave the way for negotiation can be established and the desire to bring about this exists.

5. Progress was made in regard to the main issues integral to the solution of the problem, namely:

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International Series. Top Secret; Most Immediate. Received in the Department of State on May 27 and forwarded to the President with a covering memorandum of that date from Hoover. A copy is also in Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/5-2755.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 4, Document 234.

- (a) Reduction of tensions and definite step towards this end.
- (b) Finding of a basis for negotiation acceptable to both sides.
- (c) Progressive steps and procedures for bringing about negotiations.

6. If after discussion the progress made in this direction appears acceptable to the United States, then advance towards solutions will become possible.

7. The Chinese Government have decided to release four of the United States airmen of the Fischer group "as a first step" and as a contribution to easing tension.<sup>3</sup> Announcement of this will be made on the evening of the 30th May. Until then this decision is secret and this communication to you is made on that basis. This decision with regard to the four airmen paves the way for the further and final solution of this issue and the return of the United States Nationals including the airmen, in a reasonably short period, therefore, appears possible, given goodwill.

8. Progress has been made in regard to the abstention from use of force pending negotiations and while negotiations continue. This is a distinct gain.

9. The talks have been private and it is the understanding that this character should be maintained. It is my hope that by informal and private talks between you Mr. President and your Secretary of State, we may be able to communicate more fully and to pursue to useful purpose on a friendly basis the progress made in Peking. I hope therefore, subject to your approval, it will be possible without delay to engage in informal conversations in Washington. I express the hope that as a result of further endeavours in this way progress towards a peaceful settlement will be made.

Mr. President, I assure you of my best wishes and high regard.  
Jawaharlal Nehru. *Ends.*

With my high regard and esteem,

Yours sincerely,

G.L. Mehta

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<sup>3</sup> Reference is to the four airmen, including Captain Harold E. Fischer, USAF, for whom no sentences had been announced.

## 260. Telegram From the Ambassador in India (Cooper) to the Department of State <sup>1</sup>

*New Delhi, May 27, 1955—11 p.m.*

1874. Eyes only George Allen. Menon and Pillai, <sup>2</sup> at Pillai's request came to see me 5 p.m. today (May 27). Menon opened conversation saying Prime Minister Nehru had asked them to call. Pillai then said that he had come at Prime Minister's request, emphasize GOI support of Menon's statements.

Menon then said that at early hour today Prime Minister Nehru had sent messages to President and Secretary <sup>3</sup> which he read to me. Messages were sent to Indian Ambassador Washington for delivery.

With respect to GOI announcement of sending and content of messages, Menon said no announcement would be made by GOI, until his press conference Monday <sup>4</sup> afternoon when he would announce fact. Until that time GOI would respond all inquiries with answer, "There is no official announcement".

Menon said he had talked this morning to Middleton and Williams, Acting High Commissioners UK and Canada, and informed them that messages had been sent by Nehru to Eden and Pearson. When I asked if he had told them of messages to President and Secretary, his answer was "No".

They said purpose of visit was to request me inform US Government that subject matter and scope of Menon's conversations with Chou; Menon's impressions; atmosphere of meetings, were so difficult to convey by messages that conversations at Washington were necessary if progress was to be made.

Commenting on substantive matters, Menon said one concrete result obtained was agreement of Chinese Communists to release four US airmen of "Fischer Group".

He said that announcement release would be made by Chinese Communists May 30 and he would also make statement at his press conference New Delhi same day. When I asked why not all prisoners released, Menon replied that he had found Chou had to deal with public opinion and there was much news there of US-Chinese Communist air fight off Korea; and US negotiations Cambodia <sup>5</sup> which

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/5-2755. Secret; Niact; No Distribution.

<sup>2</sup> N. Raghavan Pillai, Secretary-General of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs.

<sup>3</sup> For text of the message to the President, see *supra*. The message to the Secretary, similar in substance, was transmitted in a letter of May 27 from Ambassador Mehta to Dulles. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/5-2755)

<sup>4</sup> May 30.

<sup>5</sup> A military assistance agreement between the United States and Cambodia had been signed on May 16; for text, see 6 UST (pt. 1) 995.

made release difficult. Further that it was opening step by Chinese Communists. Menon said flatly he was sure all airmen would be released if relatives permitted to visit them, visits being interpreted by him as moderator of "public opinion". Said he felt sure Chinese Communists willing reach settlement respecting release all US nationals in China. His comment on this not clear but I understand it was settlement in connection Chinese nationals in US which could be restatement of old Chinese Communist position.

Only other comment bearing on substance was that he felt sure there would be no initiation of hostilities Formosan Straits by Chinese Communists during time subject of possibility of negotiations being discussed.

He said he had talked six times Chou, averaging three hours each talk, on subject negotiations. In addition, had talked once with Mao and several times with other officials on subject. Chou had expressed no enmity to "American people", atmosphere of talks had been good, and he was convinced Chinese Communists wanted peaceful solution of issues.

At this point, Pillai made his single comment during hour talk, saying it was belief of GOI that Chinese Communists wanted peaceful solutions.

Menon again citing importance of "Chinese opinion" said it important his view that:

(1) Release of four US airmen would not result in US "hard" statements or demands that would cause Chinese Communist statements and reactions which would make progress difficult. Said this very important and he hoped US Government would exercise restraining attitude. Also urged strongly that US statements and action on whole subject of negotiations be moderate.

[(2)] Without elaboration suggested that a method of negotiations had been opened in his talks. On this point said "While Chinese Communists must continue to say they will not discuss 'cease-fire' because there is no firing between Communist China and US—nevertheless it is possible to discuss subject".

Menon said he wanted his comments to be taken as reporting of facts, and not as an argument "for or against" Chinese Communist or US positions whether they were right or wrong, that he had acted at direction of Prime Minister Nehru, he had not reported to him until his return, and he had made no statements on substance of talks to anyone else but Nehru.

Menon asked me my personal views on possibility negotiation.

I responded by giving US position based on Department messages. I suggested that he would have opportunity talk to Secretary at San Francisco. He said impossible talk there, as satisfactorily and fully as required, and that was reason put in Nehru message. Said he

would leave for New York in seven to ten days as if on way San Francisco and any meetings with Secretary at Washington could be handled without undue notice. Said his attitude and that of GOI was not to act in way which could be interpreted as putting pressure on US or making consultations difficult.

His attitude throughout hour talk was courteous, reasonable, apparent frankness, desire to talk with President and Secretary indicated throughout conversation. Have no doubt that he convinced Prime Minister Nehru of necessity of talks at Washington to present full impression of his talks with Chou, and also convinced him necessity of Prime Minister sending messages to secure fullest consideration by US.

Today, Vincent Sheean<sup>6</sup> informed Hall<sup>7</sup> and sent me note saying that Prime Minister had sent messages to President and Secretary. When I asked Pillai and Menon about this leak to Sheean, both denied any leak from GOI. Sheean had told Hall that Matthei, one of Nehru's secretaries had told him of sending of messages, but nothing about content. I believe Pillai and Menon had no knowledge of the leak.

After talk, Pillai sent me copies of Nehru's messages. Verbatim text follows:

[Here follow the texts of Prime Minister Nehru's messages to President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles.]

Cooper

<sup>6</sup> An American journalist.

<sup>7</sup> Counselor of Embassy Graham R. Hall.

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**261. Memorandum From the Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, May 28, 1955.*

Late yesterday afternoon Ambassador Mehta delivered messages to the President and yourself at the Department. I endeavored to catch you in Watertown by telephone, but you had left for the island sometime previously.

We drafted a tentative statement, to be held for release until:

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.551/5-2855. Top Secret. This memorandum was apparently taken to Secretary Dulles at Duck Island by Hugh G. Appling of the Executive Secretariat. It bears a handwritten notation by Appling that it was seen by the Secretary on May 29. Dulles was at Duck Island May 27-June 2.

(a) A formal announcement was made by the Indians or the Chinese Communists; or

(b) Actual release of the flyers had taken place;

whichever came first. <sup>2</sup>

I called the President in Gettysburg about 7:00 o'clock and, after giving him a résumé of Nehru's messages, I read him a draft message to Nehru. He made a few minor suggestions and the wire was despatched to Cooper last night. <sup>3</sup>

The President called about Noon today and I brought him up-to-date on developments and read him a proposed press release. He made a few minor suggestions and approved the general attitude we were proposing to take. I also read the President a draft which we had prepared of a more direct message from himself to Nehru. He made a number of corrections and additions to this message and asked that we send it off immediately. This was done. <sup>4</sup>

I called Ambassador Lodge at his home in Massachusetts to advise him of developments. He felt that our proposed statement was entirely satisfactory. He believed that Mr. Hammarskjöld would be "quite burnt up" at Mr. Menon for having moved into his act and taken over his role of mediator. We decided that we should not tell Mr. Hammarskjöld of these developments until possibly Sunday <sup>5</sup> evening, in view of the request that they be kept confidential which Mr. Nehru had imposed on us. <sup>6</sup>

In view of Ambassador Cooper's latest advice to us that the airmen may be released in Hong Kong Monday morning, the Air Force has agreed to fly a C-54 from Manila to Hong Kong on

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<sup>2</sup> Menon announced the imminent release of the fliers on May 30. An announcement in Peking a few hours later stated that the four airmen had been convicted by a military tribunal on May 24 of violating Chinese air space and had been sentenced to immediate deportation; see the *New York Times*, May 31, 1955. The four men were released in Hong Kong on May 31. A statement made on May 30 by a Department of State spokesman expressed gratification at the news, expressed the hope that it signified the intention of the Chinese Communist regime to act swiftly to release the other imprisoned American citizens, and stated that such action would eliminate one cause of international tension. For text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, June 13, 1955, p. 953.

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 1901 to New Delhi, May 27, asked Cooper to convey to Nehru the President's gratitude for his message. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.95A241/5-2755)

<sup>4</sup> The message from the President to Prime Minister Nehru, transmitted in a letter of May 28 from Hoover to Mehta, thanked Nehru and Menon for their kind offices and expressed willingness to have Menon come to Washington for informal and private talks. (*Ibid.*, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Eisenhower/Dulles Correspondence with Prime Minister Nehru)

<sup>5</sup> May 29.

<sup>6</sup> A message from Dulles to Hammarskjöld, expressing appreciation for his efforts to bring about the release of the imprisoned U.N. personnel, was transmitted in telegram 703 to New York, May 30. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.95A241/3055)



Sunday. We also believe it is significant that the Chinese Communists have requested the American Red Cross to have its representatives present the parcels destined for prisoners in China at the Hong Kong border at 10:00 a.m., Monday morning. The plane would return with the prisoners immediately and probably proceed as far as Honolulu, where it is tentatively planned to give them a brief medical check-up and possibly also some of them would have a reunion with their families.

We have hesitated very much to bother you during your vacation, but believed you might wish to know about this matter and its implications prior to your return.

A file of the messages and some additional matters are attached hereto.<sup>7</sup>

If you wish to have a message sent to Mr. Nehru during your absence, Mr. Appling can bring it back when he comes, or if you prefer we can draft up a more general Departmental answer.<sup>8</sup>

*Herb*

**Herbert Hoover Jr.**

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<sup>7</sup> A note in Hoover's handwriting on the source text states that a copy of the proposed press release was attached. None of the attachments are filed with the source text.

<sup>8</sup> A message from Dulles to Nehru was transmitted in a letter of May 29 from Hoover to Mehta, which indicates Appling as the drafter. The substantive part reads as follows:

"I am happy to receive your message of 27 May and to know that in your opinion the talks between Mr. Krishna Menon and Mr. Chou-en-Lai indicate that it is possible to put the relations between Communist China and the U.S.A. on a basis which will be free from the threat of the use of force.

"That is and always has been the strong hope of the U.S. We do not believe that these differences should be sought to be resolved by force.

"I am glad that you feel that my talk with Mr. Menon in Washington last March helped in making progress.

"I am always anxious to know of all relevant facts, and since you feel that Mr. Menon's talks at Peiping do not easily lend themselves to report by telegram I should be happy to talk to Mr. Menon again, either at San Francisco or at Washington, as is most convenient." (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Eisenhower/Dulles Correspondence with Prime Minister Nehru)

262. Memorandum of the Substance of a Conversation, Peking,  
May 26, 1955<sup>1</sup>

On May 26 Chou En-lai gave Mr. Trevelyan his reply to Sir A. Eden's message.<sup>2</sup> Chou En-lai said that the passage in his speech of May 13 to the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress<sup>3</sup> gave the relative position of the Chinese Government on the basis of which he had made his statement at Bandoeng. He would like to give Mr. Trevelyan the result of his discussions with Krishna Menon on the following four points:

(a) In order to bring about negotiations between the Chinese and United States Governments, both sides should take some action directly or indirectly connected with the Formosan situation which would release tension. This would not be a pre-condition of the negotiations but rather an expression of sincerity by each side. The Chinese Government had already made a statement at Bandoeng and a number of statements since, and might soon be able to take other steps which would make clear that China wished to release tension. They hoped that Her Majesty's Government could induce the United States Government to take steps on their side which would release tension and commence negotiations.

(b) After consultations with Krishna Menon, the Chinese were in favour of diplomatic contact prior to negotiations such as had already gone on through the Governments of the Soviet Union, India and the United Kingdom. At the same time, diplomatic representatives of China and the United States in Moscow, New Delhi and London should make contact with each other through the introduction of the three Governments. These views had been explained to the Indian and Soviet Governments. He asked Mr. Trevelyan to convey them to Her Majesty's Government. The Chinese Government would like to know Her Majesty's Government's views on this.

(c) The Chinese Government considered that the main topic in the negotiations between the United States and the Chinese Governments should be the easing and removal of tension in the Formosa area. They had not come to a final view on the form of negotiations but would see how things develop. They had agreed to the Soviet proposal for a 10-Power conference, but the number of countries taking part could be smaller or larger or there might be direct negotiations between the United States and Chinese Governments, with other countries assisting "on the side". The form would have to be determined by events.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/5-2955. Secret. The source text bears the heading "Formosa: Substance of a conversation between Chou En-lai and Mr. Trevelyan in Peking on May 26". It was given to Hoover in Washington by Makins on the evening of May 29, according to a memorandum of May 30 from Hoover to Dulles. (*Ibid.*, 793.00/5-3055)

<sup>2</sup> Reference is apparently to the request conveyed by Trevelyan on May 9 that Chou should elaborate his offer of negotiations for the relaxation of tensions in the Far East; see Document 248.

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 2, Document 251.

(d) The "Chiang Kai-shek clique" could at no time and in no circumstances take part in any international conference. But the Chinese Government did not refuse and in fact suggested direct contact with them. As the Chinese Government had made clear many times, the liberation of Formosa was an internal question. The Chinese people were willing to strive for its liberation by peaceful means as early as possible and this meant negotiation with Chiang Kai-shek. They were, however, two types of negotiations entirely different by nature, internationally and internally. The Chinese would strive for both. They could be held in parallel or in succession. They could not be mixed up although they might have some relation to each other.

Chou En-lai stressed that these four points were confidential and not for publication and said that they should be helpful to Her Majesty's Government in their efforts to promote the easing of tension in the Formosa area. Mr. Trevelyan said he would transmit to Mr. Macmillan Chou En-lai's message.

Subsequent discussion on the four points was as follows:

(a) When asked whether he wished to elaborate at this stage his idea of possible action by the United States Government which would relax tension, Chou En-lai said that they would have to wait and see the reactions of the United States Government. He had discussed this with Menon who would pass through London and would no doubt have talks with the new United Kingdom Government on his journey to Washington.

(b) Chou En-lai said in amplification that the first method of proceeding was that the three Governments should use their good offices in the matter. For instance, Menon had come to Peking and was now going to Washington. Her Majesty's Government had asked for a clarification of the Chinese Government's attitude and would no doubt pass appropriate information to the United States Government. They could then inform the Chinese Government of the United States Government's attitude. Molotov had mentioned the question to Mr. Dulles in Vienna. The second method was that there should be contact between the United States and Chinese Missions in the three capitals through the introduction of the three governments. But without the first form of contact between Governments, the second would have no significance and would perhaps even be impossible. Chou En-lai agreed that the Chinese Government would not mind whether discussions took place in one, two or three capitals. Mr. Trevelyan asked for a clarification of the expression "diplomatic contact". Chou En-lai said that he meant the kind of contacts which we were now having as opposed to a conference.

(c) Mr. Trevelyan asked whether he was correct in assuming that the Chinese Government did not wish at this stage to elaborate any further the scope of negotiation. Chou En-lai said that discussion at an international conference should include questions which all parties wished to bring up. It would not be easy to find a definition of subjects to be discussed more appropriate than that which he had used.

(d) Mr. Trevelyan said that he understood the Chinese Government's position that there would be two sets of negotiations, one

international and one which they regarded as internal. Would timing of these negotiations be a matter for consideration in the preliminary discussions which the Prime Minister contemplated in his point (b)? Chou En-lai replied that when he spoke of "diplomatic contact" he was thinking mainly of international negotiations. Contact required for internal questions could be made at any time internally within China. But question of how Formosa could be peacefully "liberated" could be touched on during preliminary diplomatic contact.

RM

### 263. Telegram From the Consul General at Geneva (Gowen) to the Department of State <sup>1</sup>

*Geneva, May 30, 1955—6 p.m.*

1034. Re urtels 1012, 1019, 1035, and 1046 to Geneva. <sup>2</sup> Today I had meeting at Hotel Beau Rivage Geneva with Communist representative Shen Ping and his aides Hsiou and Yeh. <sup>3</sup> I was accompanied by Shillock. Meeting lasted about three hours. Language French.

I said I had called meeting by order my government and reverted Communist action in delaying this meeting <sup>4</sup> especially as we had told them we had urgent matters to communicate. I thereupon delivered revised lists detained Americans. I then made prescribed statement your 1012 very strongly emphasizing my government's and

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 293.1111/5-3055. Confidential; Niact. Repeated for information to London, New York, and Hong Kong.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 1012 to Geneva, May 14, instructed Gowen to request another meeting with the Chinese Communist consular representative in Geneva in order to present a revised list of Americans detained in China and to make representations on their behalf, and to state that U.S. restrictions had been removed in every case of a Chinese student expressing the desire to leave the United States. The telegram stated for Gowen's information that all restraining orders previously issued to Chinese students had been rescinded except for two individuals who no longer wished to leave the United States. (*Ibid.*, 293.1111/5-1455) Telegram 1019 to Geneva, May 17; telegram 1035, May 19; and telegram 1046, May 23, supplemented and corrected the instructions in telegram 1012. (*Ibid.*, 293.1111/5-1655, 293.1111-Gordon, Frederick A./5-1955, and 293.1111/5-2355, respectively)

<sup>3</sup> For text of a statement concerning the meeting, made to the press on June 1 by a Department of State spokesman, see Department of State *Bulletin*, June 13, 1955, pp. 953-954.

<sup>4</sup> Telegram 970 from Geneva, May 16, reported that a meeting had been requested for May 17, but telegram 975 from Geneva, May 17, reported that the Chinese had replied that that day was "not convenient" and that "We will let you know when time is convenient". Telegram 1030 from Geneva, May 30, reported that the meeting had just been arranged for that day. (Department of State, Central Files, 293.1111/5-1655, 293.1111/5-1755, and 293.1111/5-3055, respectively)

people's deep grave concern prolonged tragic plight Americans in Communist China.

I repeated our previous urgent requests we be furnished prompt detailed up-to-date news re welfare whereabouts these Americans that they be permitted to correspond with their families and expressed our very strong view all be released and repatriated. I contrasted tragic status these Americans in Communist hands with excellent treatment extended by US to Chinese students still in USA who are entirely free to return to Communist China if they wish do so and pointed out how very well and generously they had always been treated. I fully recited and stressed every point in your 1012 and 1045 [1046]. After I had completed my statement Hsiou read it back to me and then translated it to Shen who reading from prepared statement said "First of all I wish to say I am authorized to inform you that on May 24 of this year Military Tribunal of Supreme Court of Popular Republic of China ordered following Americans immediately expelled from our country, namely: Rowland Williams Parks, Lyle Willis Cameron, Edwin Louis Heller, and Harold Edwin Fischer, all members American Air Force. While piloting American military planes, they had repeatedly and illegally penetrated air space over our country during period from September 1952 to April 1953. From this action of ours your side can well see our side is desirous to make efforts insofar as that may be possible with a view to contributing to relaxing international tension."

I so confined myself to saying his statement would be reported to my government and asked if these men had already left Red China or if not when they would leave and whence and by what means and if he knew state their health. Shen said he did not know whether they had actually left but that he would inquire and let me know. He then repeated with a smile of complacency his government is desirous to relax international tension. I said we are anxious to see all Americans in Red China released and repatriated. I added their tragic plight continues to cause greatest concern my government and people and that his side could well furnish us with full timely news as to their status and welfare, facilitate exchange correspondence and take action to send all of our people home. (In view delicate political factors involved which only Department can evaluate I did not go beyond this in replying to Shen's statement. <sup>5</sup> I felt his complacency

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<sup>5</sup> Telegram 1082 to Geneva, May 30, instructed Gowen to express appreciation for the release of the four airmen but to stress U.S. concern with the detention of the remaining Americans and to point out that the American public's resentment was bound to grow if immediate corrective action was not taken. (*Ibid.*) Telegram 1035 from Geneva, May 30, reported that telegram 1082 had been received after the meeting. (*Ibid.*)

was certainly out of place. The ordered release of four innocent Americans after such a long painful period illegal detention reflects no generosity of course and is nothing in my opinion Communist can brag about. Obviously Communists exploiting every move to spread their well-known propoganda to subserve their own ruthless purposes and nothing else).

Shen continued: "I have noted your statement under orders of your government and shall inform my government accordingly. Any delay in holding these meetings stems from having await orders our respective governments. This procedure established during Geneva Conference. When my government receives report today's meeting with lists you gave me today, all matters mentioned by you will be examined and we shall give you our government's reply. Today we have given you good news as we desire relax international tension. We cannot consider any protest as all Americans in China who have not committed crimes are perfectly free.["] Here I said if they are free why do they not get permission to leave and why do families fail to receive news from them. After some hesitation Shen said all I said would be reported to his government and also my mention to expedite exchange letters and our desire remove restrictions Red Cross parcels would be reported Chinese Red Cross.

As soon as we sat down at meeting Shen very hurriedly read statement re expulsion four aforesaid Air Force men. I interrupted saying I had called meeting and therefore wished make first statement after which I would note their statement. To this Shen readily agreed and meeting took proper course. Fact Shen immediately referred to airmen denotes his desire give this special significance.

Shen and his aides seemed more relaxed than previously and again were first to shake hands on arrival and departure.

Gowen

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264. Telegram From the Acting Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations <sup>1</sup>

*Washington, June 2, 1955—3:14 p.m.*

709. For Lodge from Hoover. Re fliers.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.95A241/6-155. Secret; Niact.

1. I have taken up Hammarskjöld's proposed message to Chou-En-lai re the 11 imprisoned airmen (urtel 843, June 1)<sup>2</sup> with our own staff and the Dept of Defense. Subsequently, and without reference to opinions expressed by the above groups, I had an opportunity to present it to the President.

2. Everyone concerned is most appreciative of the efforts which the Secretary General has already made in this matter, as well as his desire to continue to be helpful. Nevertheless the President, as well as State and Defense, feel that the original decision not to enter into any deal with the Communists for the families of the prisoners to go to China was a proper one and was based upon fundamental principles. The conditions which govern this situation are the same today as when the decision was first made.

3. We have done everything possible to cooperate in making the Secretary General's job as easy as possible. We arranged, for instance, to have the fliers families write supplicant letters to Chou, asking him for the release of the men, and have kept controversial statements and press comments to a minimum, on the assurance that such measures would facilitate the men's release.

4. While we do not feel we should comment on Hammarskjöld's letter in any detail, you should inform him of our position as indicated above. We will always be glad to receive any suggestions from him and hope of course to be kept fully informed of his activities.

<sup>2</sup> The telegram under reference transmitted the text of the Secretary-General's proposed message, which expressed gratification at the release of the 4 airmen, urged the release of the 11 airmen, and discussed the possibility of visits to the latter by their families, a subject which Chou had again raised in a May 30 letter informing Hammarskjöld of the release of the 4 fliers. The proposed message argued that release of the 11 airmen would contribute most effectively to the relaxation of world tension if it were arranged before the French, British, U.S., and Soviet Foreign Ministers met in San Francisco on June 20. It concludes as follows:

"5) Hoping that you agree with my analysis I trust that under these circumstances you will see your way to favorable solution of the question of the eleven before 20 June. On this assumption it is obvious that visits by families at this late stage would no longer serve a useful purpose.

"6) If you agree with my conclusions I believe that, if desired, Washingtons consent in principle to visits by the families which I presume could now be obtained, could be made a matter of public record."

Telegram 843 continued with Lodge's recommendations. He recommended that the United States should "raise no objection to any part of this message including paragraph six because the message clearly shows that our 'consent in principle' is in return for agreement of Chou to liberate the prisoners, and does not involve the actual physical presence of a single relative at any time. In other words, under the Secretary General's note we get the prisoners and they do not get the family visits." He also recommended that after Hammarskjöld's message had reached Peking, Trevelyan should be requested to call on Chou and ask what the British should say when they were asked at San Francisco why the Chinese had not released the prisoners. (*Ibid.*) A copy of Premier Chou's May 30 message to Hammarskjöld is attached to a memorandum by Cook of a June 1 conversation between Lodge and Hammarskjöld. (*Ibid.*)

5. We do not believe your own suggestion with regard to an approach by Trevelyan to Chou En-Lai would be very likely to be productive, and it might possibly complicate efforts being made by the Secretary General. Trevelyan himself has paid his farewell calls at Peiping and presumably has already left the city. We would therefore prefer to hold this idea in abeyance.

6. I will be discussing the matter with you shortly by telephone.<sup>3</sup>

Hoover

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 848 from New York, June 2, reads in part as follows:

"4. I saw Hammarskjold at 3:00 this afternoon . . . , and he told me as I was leaving that he regarded paragraph 6 of his proposed message to Chou En-lai so important that he would be perfectly satisfied if I were to tell him: 'The US cannot sanction what you propose and whatever you do is on your own responsibility'. That therefore is all that he expects from us.

"5. In accordance with your OK in our telephone conversations of 3:30 and 4:30, I have therefore told him this, making it also clear, as you suggest in paragraph 4 of your niact 709, that our position on prisoners families is still what it always was; that the American people cannot understand why release of the fliers should depend in any way on family visits; that to go along with the family idea plays into Menon's hands; and will complicate release of future prisoners.

"He replied: 'I must take the responsibility'." (*Ibid.*, 611.95A241/6-255)

## 265. Telegram From the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bohlen) to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

*Moscow, June 6, 1955—8 p.m.*

2175. . . . Ambassador, who recently returned from visit to China, and who saw Chou En-lai, told me nothing of any importance occurred during his call which he said was of purely protocol nature. Chou raised no specific point of international affairs, made no mention of Formosa or US but dealt solely in platitudes expressing admiration of progress and position in . . . with certain observations concerning China and difficulties in attempts to modernize China's economy.

Of somewhat greater interest was conversation he had with Yudin, Soviet Ambassador in Peiping, during which latter stated that while Soviets had given Chinese scientific and technical know-how in atomic field which would eventually enable them, if they so desired, to produce nuclear weapons, they had not given Chinese either bomb itself or facilities for its manufacture.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/6-655. Confidential.



Yudin also remarked to . . . that in his opinion in another one to five years China would be so strong that no other country would be able to tell her what to do, which is remark of some interest coming from Soviet Ambassador.

Bohlen

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**266. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the President and the Secretary of State, Washington, June 10, 1955**<sup>1</sup>

[Here follows a brief discussion concerning two scheduled speeches by the President.]

I gave the President to read the memorandum which Makins had left with me, giving Macmillan's account of his talk with Menon.<sup>2</sup> I said that I felt that we should take a very stiff position on the 11 airmen and not allow this to get mixed up with the civilians. The President said he was not sure that we were on very strong grounds. I said we had no agreement to return the Chinese civilians here whereas we did have an agreement for the return of our POWs.<sup>3</sup> The President said he thought that the Chinese had come here with an implied understanding that they would be allowed to go home. I said that was balanced by the implied understanding that American civilians could go home but that the POWs were an explicit undertaking. The President said we had not been able to live up to part of that ourselves, as evidenced by the release by the Koreans of many of the North Korean POWs so that they could not be returned.<sup>4</sup> He

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President. Confidential; Personal and Private.

<sup>2</sup> The memorandum from Ambassador Makins, dated June 9, attached to the source text together with a covering note of that date from Makins to Dulles, summarizes the proposals which Menon had given to Macmillan in London. It stated that Menon assumed that both parties wished to enter negotiations and that the Chinese would accept the removal of tension in the Formosa area as the subject of negotiations. Menon suggested the initiation of negotiations by contacts between U.S. and Chinese diplomatic representatives in London, New Delhi, or Moscow, and steps on both sides to reduce tensions. The United States, for example, could make it clear that any Chinese student who wished to return to China could do so and, in addition, could grant permission to the airmen's relatives to visit China. A further measure, Menon suggested, would be gradual Nationalist withdrawal from Quemoy and Matsu; while Chou was opposed to a formal cease-fire, he was willing to agree tacitly to a continuation of the current lull in the area while the Nationalist forces withdrew to Formosa.

<sup>3</sup> The Korean Armistice Agreement, signed at Panmunjom, Korea, on July 27, 1953; for text, see 4 UST 234.

<sup>4</sup> On June 18, 1953; for related documentation, see *Foreign Relations, 1952-1954*, vol. xv, Part 2, pp. 1196 ff.

said he thought we should let all of the Chinese go back. I said there were two that Defense was dubious about because they had highly classified information. The President thought that this should not be an obstacle, that perhaps the information was not as valuable as we thought. I said I would look into this matter further.<sup>5</sup>

[Here follows discussion concerning presidential appointments.]  
JFD

<sup>5</sup> A memorandum of June 12 by Dulles' secretary Mildred Asbjornson records that in a telephone conversation on June 11 Dulles told Deputy Secretary of Defense Anderson that the President "was in a strong mood when he saw him yesterday and indicated a 'give them all back' attitude". Dulles urged that the Department of Defense should discuss the matter with the President if necessary and "try to get it in the clear" before Menon's arrival. (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations) A memorandum of July 29 from Phyllis Bernau to Dulles informed him that she had checked with Goodpaster's office to learn the outcome of this conversation and that Goodpaster's secretary had found a Department of Defense memorandum of June 11 concerning the two Chinese "students" with a handwritten note that on June 13 Goodpaster had discussed it with the President, who had "indicated approval of the Defense decision to agree to release" them. (*Ibid.*, Wang-Johnson Talks)

267. Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Sebald) to the Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>

Washington, June 10, 1955.

SUBJECT

Meeting with Krishna Menon on June 14

Following are FE's views on certain aspects of the talks to be held with Krishna Menon, based on the information given Mr. Macmillan by Menon (London's 5364),<sup>2</sup> Chou En-lai's conversation with Trevelyan in Peiping, and Ambassador Cooper's talks with Nehru and Menon. A paper dealing with the problem of the Chinese stu-

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.9111/6-1055. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 5364 from London, June 7, summarized Menon's position as told to Macmillan; it was similar in substance to Makins' June 9 memorandum, summarized in footnote 2, *supra*.

dents in the United States, supplementing FE's memorandum of June 3, <sup>3</sup> is being forwarded separately (attached Tab A).<sup>4</sup>

Our objectives in the talks with Menon should be: (1) to obtain early release of the remaining airmen and, if possible, of the American civilians, (2) to extend as long as possible the present tacit avoidance of major hostilities in the Taiwan area and to seek to perpetuate this de facto situation, (3) to convey to Menon (and to the world generally) the sincerity of our intention to seek peaceful solutions to world trouble spots, including Taiwan, and (4) to avoid specific commitments which might limit prematurely our freedom of action in the Taiwan area and in our relations with the Chinese Nationalist Government until we have been able to consider Menon's views carefully.

If our reports from London about Menon's views are an accurate reflection of Chou En-lai's remarks to him, it would appear that Peiping has, in fact, a real desire for direct negotiations with the U.S. even at the expense of an indefinite postponement of its "liberation" of Taiwan. Chou's willingness to adopt a more flexible position for the sake of negotiations with us may indicate a shift in emphasis in his strategy against the Chinese Nationalist Government to a campaign of psychological attrition and subversion. This would be consistent with the continuing Communist objective of destroying Chinese Nationalist prestige by presenting that Government in the light of a mere defeated insurgent regime.

The London report of Chou's remarks to Menon contains the first hint of Chinese Communist willingness to permit peaceful evacuation of the off-shore islands, with the consequent strengthening of Taiwan defenses by these garrisons and equipment. While the Chinese Communists have until recently attempted to focus attention on the status of Taiwan as the real issue for negotiations rather than a cease fire, the Chou-Menon talks suggest at least the possibility that the Chinese may be prepared to accept a continuation of the status quo with respect to Taiwan in return for some sort of normalization

<sup>3</sup> Reference is apparently to a memorandum of June 2 from Robertson to Dulles commenting on statements by Menon to Cooper, reported in telegram 1889 from New Delhi, May 30. Menon had expressed the view that the release of all U.S. nationals could be secured in a framework which could dispose of the question of Chinese nationals in the United States and that the remaining airmen would be released if their relatives were permitted to go to China. (Department of State, Central Files, 791.13/5-3055) Robertson's June 2 memorandum recommended taking steps to lift the restrictions on the two Chinese "students" still under restraining orders and telling Menon that the fliers' release should not in any way depend on a visit by their families. (*Ibid.*, 611.93241/6-255)

<sup>4</sup> Not attached to the source text. Reference is apparently to a memorandum entitled "Treatment Accorded Chinese Students in the United States", sent to Dulles with a covering memorandum of June 10 from Sebald. (*Ibid.*, FE Files: Lot 56 D 679, January thru June)

of their relations with us, with the prospect that time will be on their side in achieving their ultimate goal regarding Taiwan. Time may, of course, benefit the Communists through deterioration of the situation on Taiwan and through growing world sentiment for a solution which does not accord with our present views, but this need not necessarily be the case. In the present world situation we should be prepared to exploit any reasonable prospect for solving this problem peacefully and seek to make time play for us by demonstrating flexibility in our views. This is particularly necessary with respect to the off-shore islands. Because of the vulnerability of these islands to Communist military attack and because of the prevalent feeling among many of our major allies, to say nothing of the so-called neutralist countries of Asia, that the off-shore islands are not worth fighting for, it seems unlikely that the Communists will be content to extend a de facto cease-fire situation indefinitely. We should avoid being pushed into a position where we (a) either must negotiate under disadvantageous conditions or (b) face increasing Communist military activity against the off-shore islands putting us in the dilemma of allowing them to be lost or engaging ourselves in hostilities which would not have the support of our allies.

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**268. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,  
Washington, June 13, 1955 <sup>1</sup>**

**SUBJECT**

Conversation between Prime Minister Ali of Indonesia and Chou En-lai on May 27 regarding Taiwan and negotiations with the United States <sup>2</sup>

**PARTICIPANTS**

Mr. Moekarto Notowidigdo, Indonesian Ambassador  
 Mr. Robert Murphy, Deputy Under Secretary of State  
 Mr. Kenneth T. Young, Jr., Director, Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs

Ambassador Moekarto came in on instructions from Prime Minister Ali to convey the result of the latter's conversation with Chou En-lai as follows:

1. Chou En-lai said that several other countries had also approached his government in an effort to solve the Taiwan problem peacefully. The United Kingdom had suggested that Communist

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/6-1355. Confidential. Drafted by Young. Initialed by Murphy, indicating his approval.

<sup>2</sup> Prime Minister Ali visited the People's Republic of China, May 26-June 3.

China abandon its claim to Taiwan if the United States persuaded Nationalist China to give up the off-shore islands. Chou En-lai stated that his government had refused this proposal. Burma had suggested direct negotiations with the Chinese Nationalists. Chou En-lai rejected this but had told U Nu that Communist China would be willing to negotiate with Chiang Kai-shek after settlement had been reached with the United States over the international aspects of the problem.

2. Chou En-lai told Ali that there are two aspects to the problem: the international aspect, or the dispute with the United States in the area, meaning the presence of the 7th Fleet and U.S. forces in and about Taiwan; and the domestic aspect, which is the dispute with the Chinese Nationalists over Taiwan.

3. As to the means of negotiations with the U.S., Communist China had accepted the ten-power conference proposed by the USSR. However, Chou En-lai told Ali that Communist China would accept the addition of Thailand and the Philippines to discuss the Taiwan problem if the U.S. desired. Communist China would also agree to a proposal from some other for a Geneva-type conference provided it excluded Chiang. Furthermore Chou En-lai told Ali that the Chinese Communist Government would maintain its position taken at Bandung to have direct negotiations with the U.S.

4. Ali asked Chou En-lai what the agenda for direct negotiations would be. The latter replied that it involved the relaxation [*relaxation*] of tension in the Taiwan area. However, if the U.S. proposed another agenda the Peiping Government would consider it.

5. Ali reported that he advised Chou En-lai before starting negotiations it would be better to make a gesture of good will to the United States and to take more concrete action such as the release of prisoners. Chou replied that he had already decided on the release of four prisoners as a good will gesture and now it was the Americans' turn to make a good will gesture toward China. Specifically, Chou proposed the lifting or the relaxation of the embargo from China.

Ambassador Moekarto then asked Mr. Murphy for the views of the United States on Chou's suggestion for lifting the embargo and the views of the United States on the procedure for organizing a conference with Chou En-lai. These questions appeared to be part of his instructions from Ali. Mr. Murphy replied that it was very incongruous for Chou En-lai to ask for negotiations while holding Americans as hostages. There is no reason for them to be held except as political hostages. Mr. Murphy stated that the United States does not do business that way. The sooner Chou En-lai and others realized that we could not negotiate by blackmail the better off for everybody. Furthermore, Chou's proposal shows a peculiar mentality not to see the wrongness of methods which are similar to gangster's. The United States does not intend to accept any such position and American public opinion would find it extremely difficult to negotiate with American boys held as hostages. The Ambassador asked if this meant there would be no negotiations before all prisoners are re-

leased. Mr. Murphy replied that he did not wish to make any categorical statements since the issue of negotiations is a very large one and since the prisoners had really nothing to do with it.

As to the next steps on negotiations with the Chinese Communists, Mr. Murphy referred the Ambassador to the two public statements of the President and Secretary Dulles.<sup>3</sup> The Ambassador asked if the U.S. would accept a proposal from a third party for negotiations. Mr. Murphy replied that we would have to examine the proposal first and that we were not making "A" priority conditions. Ambassador Moekarto again asked if there would be any conditions attached to our position. Mr. Murphy replied that the Secretary had taken a very reasonable attitude towards this matter and that in any event the U.S. is never against peaceful resolution of international problems.

Ambassador Moekarto also explained that following the talk with Prime Minister Ali, Chou En-lai had issued a public statement<sup>4</sup> clarifying their joint communiqué<sup>5</sup> issued in Djakarta after the Bandung Conference. Chou En-lai clarified it to indicate that it did not mean the use of force to bring about a settlement of the Taiwan problem.

Mr. Murphy asked what impressions Prime Minister Ali had gained from his trip. The Ambassador replied that the Prime Minister felt Chou En-lai was sincere in his intentions to seek peaceful ways to settle the Taiwan problem. Mr. Murphy commented that it was really up to the Chinese to show they had peaceful intentions. It was they who attacked us in Korea, not the reverse. As for trade between Indonesia and Communist China, Ambassador Moekarto stated that it was very slight at this time, although an agreement for one year was being concluded in the amount of \$56 million to be paid in Swiss francs.

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<sup>3</sup> On April 26 and 27; see Documents 222 and 231.

<sup>4</sup> The text of the statement, issued to the press on June 10, was sent to the Department in despatch 728 from Jakarta, June 10. (Department of State, Central Files, 656D.93/6-1055)

<sup>5</sup> Dated April 28; see footnote 2, Document 242.

269. Memorandum of a Conversation With the President,  
Washington, June 14, 1955, 10:30 a.m. <sup>1</sup>

PRESENT

The Indian Ambassador, Mr. Mehta  
Krishna Menon  
Secretary Dulles

Mr. Menon made clear that he was not acting as the authorized representative of either Communist China or the United States. He was merely trying in a friendly way to prevent a tense situation from becoming worse and developing into war. He reported his talks with Chou En-lai and the attitude toward the Formosa area. He felt that if direct negotiations should begin, then what he referred to as "lesser" problems such as the prisoners could easily be resolved. The President interrupted at this point to emphasize that the problem of the prisoners was not a minor one but involved principles which were very fundamental and which deeply engaged United States sentiment.

There then occurred considerable general discussion between the President, Mr. Menon and myself as to the status of the prisoners and the non-negotiability of their return. The President emphasized that the Armistice Agreement already provided for this and we did not feel we had to negotiate twice for the same result. The President also mentioned the fact that there were several hundred additional persons from our armed forces who were unaccounted for and who might still be prisoners as to whom no information was obtainable. The President also emphasized that all of the Chinese in this country were free to go if they wanted to.

At this point Menon became rather rambling. The President at one point interrupted to say, in relation to Formosa, that the United States was going to be 100% loyal to its obligations; that we were not going to sell anyone into Communist captivity, and that whether our friends were great or small we were equally loyal to our commitments and to our principles. There were some things that we could not negotiate about and still stand upright in the world. Mr. Menon pleaded for "magnanimity".

It was arranged that I would talk with Mr. Menon further in the afternoon. Mr. Menon said he hoped to be able to see the President again. The President said that if this would serve a useful purpose he was agreeable in principle. However, he pointed out that his schedule

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.91/6-1455. Confidential. The time of the meeting is from the President's appointment diary. (Eisenhower Library, President's Daily Appointments) The source text is an unsigned carbon copy. A transcript of the President's remarks during the conversation are *ibid.*, Whitman File, International Series.

would be very full until at least early July. Menon said he would be prepared to wait that long and come back after the San Francisco Conference.

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270. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,  
Washington, June 14, 1955, 3:10 p.m.<sup>1</sup>

SUBJECT

Menon's Trip to Peking

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary of State  
Mr. Krishna Menon  
Ambassador Mehta of India  
Mr. Kenneth T. Young, Jr.

Mr. Menon and Ambassador Mehta spent an hour and a half with the Secretary this afternoon. As Mr. Menon did not seem disposed to begin talking himself, the Secretary opened by going over the views of the United States in general terms. He said that the American Government and people have no desire for war with Communist China. This Administration was the one that stopped the war in Korea by concluding the armistice despite some criticism. It had been difficult for the United States to keep those hostilities limited to Korea since there was much pressure in the United States for widening them. If the armistice had not come about when it did, the war probably would have spread. Mr. Menon nodded agreement. The Secretary then pointed out that, with regard to China, it would be even more difficult than in Korea to limit hostilities for China is an extremely large country and it is difficult to see just where military operations would stop. Furthermore, it is doubtful that the Russians would not be involved. Such hostilities would mean the use of atomic weapons which would lead to the total devastation of Chinese communications and other facilities, leaving 600,000,000 Chinese destitute, and in ruins. Since the United States would then have to sustain the very existence of all the Chinese, there would not be any constructive purpose to such a war.

A few months ago the Secretary feared that hostilities with China were inevitable. An ugly situation seemed to be developing

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/6-1455. Secret. The time of the meeting is from Dulles' appointment diary. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers)



which would lead to war. However, there now appeared to have been a change for the better in recent months. While Mr. Menon might disagree, the Secretary felt that the Bandung Conference had had a beneficial effect in that regard. Whatever intentions Chou En-lai might have had when he came to Bandung, at least it could be said that the opinions expressed by the delegates there must have had a moderating influence. The perceptible improvements in the general situation had been due to the various factors in addition to Bandung. The United States itself had taken several steps to contribute to this atmosphere. The Secretary mentioned the following:

1. We helped the Chinese Nationalists to evacuate the Tachen Islands.
2. Our Treaty with the Republic of China covered only Taiwan and the Pescadores although the Chinese Government had pressed to have the treaty cover the offshore islands.
3. We have restrained the Chinese Nationalists from attacking airfields on the mainland opposite Taiwan despite the fact that the Chinese Communists have been constructing a large airfield complex there which for jet aircraft constitute a real threat to Taiwan. This Chinese Communist air buildup is an extremely serious matter of great concern to the Chinese Nationalists. Nevertheless, we had decided in the larger interests of the situation to restrain the Chinese Nationalists in this regard. So far we have been able to do this. Nevertheless, the Chinese Communists are still continuing to rush completion of additional jet airfields in this area. The Chinese Communists are mounting a large military buildup across from Formosa which had the very opposite effect of lessening tension in this area.
4. The Secretary mentioned that the United States Government was looking into the possibility that U.S. aircraft might be operating too close to or, perhaps, even by mistake, over Chinese Communist areas, but that the military orders in this regard now had some revision in order to eliminate this possible provocation.
5. Finally, the U.S. Government had taken steps to facilitate the return of the Chinese students in America who wish to return to mainland China.

The Secretary told Mr. Menon that he was outlining this information for Mr. Menon in order to show him the extent to which the United States, itself, had gone in this whole matter. The Secretary then asked Mr. Menon what he thought might be done, particularly by the Chinese Communists, in the light of his discussions in Peiping.

Mr. Menon said that India's interest was precisely the same as that outlined by the Secretary, namely, to avoid war and to reduce tensions. The question is not which side would win a war but how it could be prevented from occurring. He agreed that it would be difficult to keep the war from spreading and that it undoubtedly would involve atomic weapons with all the obvious consequences not only for China but for the rest of the world, even India. He said that

Russia, at least, would supply Communist China with war materials and, perhaps, do even more. As he put it, "we cannot stop the wind and the rain". So the problem is to see if this dangerous situation can be avoided.

Mr. Menon said that he had been greatly encouraged by his talks with the Secretary on his previous visit to Washington. The Secretary's views had been of great help to him in his discussions with the Chinese because he knew the attitude of the President and the Secretary. He then said that in his discussions with the Chinese and Americans there were the following things to ascertain:

1. Is there a possible basis for agreement on entering into direct negotiations;
2. What conditions should be established precedent to such negotiations;
3. What should be the form of such negotiations.

Menon several times made it clear that he did not wish to get into any discussion of the status and disposition of Formosa, although he had his own personal ideas about that. He also felt that this question should not be made part of the initial process of getting direct negotiations started.

With respect to the first point, direct negotiations, Menon felt that the first important element was to determine quickly whether or not they are possible. He felt they are. He reiterated throughout the afternoon's conversation the hope that the United States Government would now agree to the idea as well as to some of the other points. On the basis of his talks in Peiping and Washington, he had found a common desire to reduce tensions and to find some way of achieving this objective. Therefore, direct negotiations could be agreed to on the basis of "reducing tensions" but not on the future status of Formosa. The Chinese Communists are really firm, he believes, in wanting peace and in not desiring war. They will refrain from hostilities as long as talks are going on and until negotiations fail. Menon emphasized that, in any event, the Chinese Communists will get the offshore islands and that we should make no mistake about that. They now have the force to take the islands if they desire. And if there are negotiations, Menon implied that the assumption of Communist control over the offshore islands would be one of the matters to be worked out peacefully. Because of that, the Chinese Communists would be willing to forego use of force to take these islands as long as the talks go on. If the talks fail, then that would mean war. However, he believed it would be better to try negotiations since we would all be no worse off than we are now. At least we would buy time.

The Secretary commented that it often happens that some issues should not be forced prematurely into negotiations in an effort to seek a solution, for such negotiations only lead to a break-off and undesirable results. If matters have not ripened to a point where some settlement can be envisaged, it is better to wait for time to work things out. The Secretary noted that the Chinese traditionally have had the faculty of letting time work things out and have been known for their patience in not pressing for premature solutions. He hoped the Chinese Communists would realize this now. Menon agreed. The question of Formosa is one of these issues. The Secretary said he could conceive of no solution at this time, since neither side would disavow their claims. Perhaps Mr. Menon had a solution but, in any event, the Secretary felt this whole question might take a long time, perhaps several years to work out. He thought it would be helpful for everybody concerned to realize this. Since the Chinese have lived without Formosa for some sixty years, they can get along without it for some more. Their authority over it was always very tenuous for centuries anyway. Moreover, the United States virtually alone had wrested Formosa away from Japan and we were not now going to return it to a regime proclaiming its hostility toward us. However, while there were advantages in buying time in this kind of situation, that did not mean we were willing to wait indefinitely for the release of Americans unjustly and illegally held by the Chinese Communists.

As to creating the conditions precedent to such negotiations, Menon believed that there were certain things that the United States could do and that they were primarily of a negative character. These were:

(a) To let relatives enter China to visit the American prisoners. Menon expressed his personal opinion several times that this would soon result in the release of all the prisoners, although he specifically said this unofficially and not for the record. He suggested that India, if it were desirable, would seek safe passage or other guarantees that the relatives would be able to leave China and that they would not be mistreated.

The Secretary explained that such a proposal would be extremely difficult for us to accept. The American public opinion would not see why the prisoners should not be let out in the first place and why more Americans would have to be involved in China. The Chinese Communists are illegally and unjustly holding American prisoners. When Mr. Menon demurred, the Secretary said that he thought the question of the prisoners had been settled in the Korean Armistice negotiations. The American people could not be expected to trust the Communists with another promise after they had broken a previous one. It would be like sending another child to the kidnap-

pers of one's baby. In short, the Secretary said he did not believe the United States could consider this proposal but at least he would think it over. Menon, however, urged this proposal on the Secretary several times.

(b) To permit American reporters or columnists to go into China to see for themselves and write their impressions. The Indian Government would also try to arrange safe passage or other guarantees for them.

The Secretary cited the difficulty of changing recently established passport regulations which prohibit American nationals from entering Communist China.<sup>2</sup> He said it would be difficult for Americans to understand why we had reversed this ruling with Americans still in jail in China. How could we be sure, he asked, that they might not also get into trouble? Menon tried to explain that such a step on our part would help the position of the Chinese Communists internally and create a better atmosphere for developing direct negotiations. He believed that the Chinese Communists also have a problem with respect to the release of the prisoners and the creation of suitable conditions for trying to negotiate the reduction of tensions.

(c) To persuade the Chinese Nationalists to abandon the "scorched-earth" policy in the off-shore islands.

While this reference was not altogether clear, Menon said that the Chinese Nationalists must not destroy the means for civilian existence on the off-shore islands, if they evacuate them, as they had the Tachens. If they indicate they will insist on such a policy it will make negotiations extremely difficult.

(d) The United States should not set prerequisites to negotiations such as the prior release of American prisoners, although Menon again said he was sure that all prisoners would be released if his general courses of action were initiated.

As to the form of negotiations, Menon strongly advised against seeking any formal diplomatic arrangements with delegations, agenda, etc. Instead, he suggested we use the pattern established in Geneva between the American and Chinese Consuls. There are questions of a consular nature which could be used as an initial basis for commencing direct exchanges. The question of how many Chinese students there are in the United States actually desiring return to China would be a basis for discussion from the Chinese viewpoint.

<sup>2</sup> The Department of State announced on May 1, 1952, that all new passports would be stamped not valid for travel to China, the Soviet Union, or the Eastern European Soviet bloc countries unless specifically endorsed as valid for such travel. The text of the announcement is in *American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1957), vol. II, p. 2084.

While the question of the treatment of American prisoners, the arrangements for Red Cross contacts or even getting the relatives into China, would be a basis for discussion from the American viewpoint. He suggested that the United States and the Chinese Communist Ambassadors in New Delhi, London, and Moscow might begin to have contacts with each other to discuss such questions. Since he could speak only with respect to New Delhi, he felt he could say that New Delhi would be a useful place to begin such contacts since they could be facilitated by people friendly to both sides. As such diplomatic exchanges proceeded, they might move on to wider matters.

In a general exposition of the point of view of Prime Minister Nehru and himself, Menon quite intently explained that India wanted to help increase and promote the prestige of the United States throughout Asia and that India was not opposed to the United States. They hold a different point of view on Formosa than the Americans and they also maintain friendly relation with the Chinese Communists, but the latter fully realize India has a policy of non-alignment and also friendship with the West. India is a much more stable country now than when he was there two years ago. While the Communists in India may win some votes, here and there, Menon felt sure that they could no longer take over India, as might have been the case some time past. The leaders of India understand the people and the people support the Government. India will not go the way of Chiang Kai-shek because of ignorance of the people and corruption. Thus, India is following its own way of freedom and can help the United States in Asia. India desires peace and not war.

In trying to promote a base for negotiations between China and America, he and the Prime Minister are not trying to establish the rights or wrongs of either party. They are only trying to get the parties together if possible. In approaching this whole matter the United States must also realize that while the Chinese are Communists, they do have strong support of the population throughout China. It will be dangerous to assume otherwise. For all these reasons Menon hoped that the Secretary would give full consideration to the suggestions outlined today. Menon said that he came from Peiping with some hope that it would be possible to work something out.

The Secretary responded that he hoped Menon's hope was justified.

Menon replied intensely that his statement of hope was said in utter seriousness and that he wished the Secretary would share the same feelings.

During the course of the conversation the subject of American prisoners in China came up at numerous times.

The Secretary pointed out that this is a fundamental problem for the American Government and people. It seemed to the Secretary that it was very nervy of the Chinese Communists to make these suggestions while Americans languish illegally and unjustly in Chinese jails. This has now become a common pattern of Communist behavior. They use prisoners as hostages to bargain for political advantages. The Russians started doing it in the 1945 surrender terms with the Japanese and Germans. Ten years later the Russians are holding up the return of prisoners to wrangle concessions out of the Japanese and German Governments. The Chinese Communists are doing the same thing. The United States cannot tolerate such behavior. Formerly the United States could use force to protect American Nationals mistreated by foreign powers. There is great pressure in America today for getting the American prisoners out. However, the use of force in the modern world is a different story than it used to be. Menon acknowledged the importance of releasing these prisoners but said that India is not going into the rights and wrongs of either party, his talks in Peiping had been much more broadly based than the release of prisoners, which indeed had been the narrow and unsuccessful base for the UN Secretary General's unfortunate efforts, the United States should not insist on the release as a precondition to everything else, and, finally, the question of prisoners would have to be solved in the larger context that he had been talking about. He told the Secretary that the Chinese Communist decision to release the prisoners had been taken on May 19. Menon asked Chou En-lai to hold up the release and its publicity until May 30 to enable him to return to New Delhi and relay the information to Washington and to arrange the desired publicity. This had all worked to create better conditions. Therefore, Menon hoped the United States would do the same thing *again* to capitalize on any additional steps to reduce tensions in order to improve the general atmosphere. He referred to the visits of relatives in China and to the release of all Chinese students in this country wanting to return to China. The Secretary said that there was one Chinese student deliberately held back because he had highly classified material and because he had also improperly used it. However, the United States might consider waiving this objection under certain circumstances if it would help.

With respect to the effect of the Bandung Conference on the Chinese Communists, Menon went to some length to explain that Chou En-lai had not come to Bandung to get support for issues vital to the Chinese Communists. Whether this was a matter of policy or not, Menon said it was a fact that Chou En-lai had refrained from asking support or asking the Conference to endorse his stand. The issues were deliberately avoided. Menon apparently considered this significant.

In conclusion Menon asked the Secretary to study his suggestions and said that he would have to have several more discussions with the Secretary and, if possible, with the President. Menon said he would like to see the Secretary again in San Francisco and that perhaps they might meet in New York.<sup>3</sup> The Secretary thanked Menon for the efforts which he and the Prime Minister had made, and indicated they might talk again perhaps in San Francisco.

<sup>3</sup> Dulles was in New York June 15-17 for meetings with the British Foreign Secretary and French Foreign Minister. He met with Menon on June 15; see Document 272.

## 271. Telegram From the Ambassador in the Republic of China (Rankin) to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

*Taipei, June 15, 1955—5 p.m.*

906. Deptels 686<sup>2</sup> and 751,<sup>3</sup> Embtel 806 [803].<sup>4</sup> After receipt of first reference telegram re prior US agreement for GRC bombing of Fukien airfields I conveyed substance of Department's position to Foreign Minister and requested interview with President Chiang where three of us could discuss matter. He immediately informed President of Department's attitude and I have since referred to matter in conversations with Chiang on several occasions. However, President's annual inspections of military establishments and spate of US official visitors resulted in others being present before whom it was preferable to avoid detailed discussion. Shortly before second reference telegram was received I learned President would see me this morning with Foreign Minister before latter's departure for San Francisco later today.

Meanwhile I took precaution on June 9 of summarizing Department's position in memo to Foreign Minister which Chiang today told me had passed on to him.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/6-1555. Top Secret. Passed to CINCPAC by the Department at the Embassy's request.

<sup>2</sup> Document 250.

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 751 to Taipei, June 13, instructed Rankin that if he had not yet conveyed to Chiang the views set forth in telegram 686 to Taipei, he should seek an appointment with him, as it was important there should be no misunderstanding of the U.S. position. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/6-1355)

<sup>4</sup> Reference is to telegram 803 from Taipei, Document 247. Telegram 806 from Taipei, May 13, concerned a possible visit to the United States by the mayor of Taipei. (Department of State, Central Files, 033.9311/5-1355)

In this morning's conversation I stated once more US position that offensive action by GRC against Fukien airfields requires our prior agreement except in clear-cut case of retaliation.

I went on to say that without in any way diluting US position as stated, it would seem to me unfortunate for our governments to become involved in argument over hypothetical case.

Fact that Fukien airfields in question are near seacoast and vulnerable to attack suggest their primary purpose is for staging and that concentration of aircraft such as to provide suitable bombing target seemed unlikely.

I proposed in future that matter be lifted to higher level and considered part of broader question of retaining control of air over Taiwan Strait which essential to defense of Taiwan as well as Kinmen and Matsu. I assumed responsible GRC and US Air Force commanders would continue close consultation as situation developed and would make recommendations re any appropriate action to meet given situation as it arose. I assumed in this connection there would be prior consultation with US before any offensive action taken.

In reply President Chiang took note of US position. While he did not now wish to alter what he said during Admiral Stump's visit, he thought matter could be left in abeyance. He indicated agreement with my proposal that question be considered hereafter in broader terms of maintaining control of air over Strait.

Rankin

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272. **Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Secretary of State and Krishna Menon, New York, June 15, 1955, 6:15 p.m.**<sup>1</sup>

I saw Mr. Menon alone. He said he would assure me that he would not quote or attribute to me anything I said to him privately. He made four points:

1. It would greatly help if the families could go.
2. It would greatly help if some press or radio people could go.<sup>2</sup>
3. Would it be possible to discuss hypothetically the situation which would exist if the prisoners were released?

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Memoranda of Conversation. Secret; Personal and Private.

<sup>2</sup> A marginal note in an unidentified handwriting reads "(e.g. [Edward R.] Murrow or [James] Reston.)"



4. Could he be officially informed that the Chinese students in this country who wanted to go would be free to do so?

I said that I did not think that what happened to the prisoners was as important as the way in which it happened. If the Chinese Communists wanted to begin to gain respect as decent people, they would let the prisoners go. If they would only let them go on condition that we did things that we would not otherwise do, then they were using human lives for blackmail purposes. Even if we acceded and got the prisoners out, the result would not be to improve relations. We would have demeaned ourselves, and the Chinese Communists would have given another illustration of their unwillingness to act in a civilized way. The release of the prisoners under these circumstances would make matters worse, rather than better.

As regards the press, I said we could not give passports by whim as he suggested to one or two people—either we gave passports to China or we did not. If we gave passports, then anyone was entitled to go unless there was some legal reason to prevent him. Mr. Menon said he had not realized this, and thought that issuing passports was purely discretionary.

I made no comment on the "hypothetical" case.

I said I did not want yet to tell him officially that all the Chinese students could go, as I wanted to think the situation over a little bit more.

He asked if he could see me again in San Francisco. I said that if he were out there, we could probably set up some time when we could talk further.<sup>3</sup>

I suggested that some arrangement might be made whereby some third government could look after the interests of Americans in China generally and also look after those Chinese in this country who wanted to go back to Communist China. I said the latter were not now represented because since we did not recognize Communist China, there was no third government to look out for their interests here as was normally the case when diplomatic relations were broken.

JFD

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<sup>3</sup> No record of any conversation in San Francisco between Dulles and Menon has been found in Department of State files or Eisenhower Library, but see Document 283. Memoranda of conversations between Menon and Allen on June 21, 22, and 25 in San Francisco are in Department of State, Central Files, 790.00/6-2155.

**273. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the President and the Secretary of State, San Francisco, June 19, 1955, 9:30 p.m. <sup>1</sup>**

[Here follows discussion relating to the forthcoming meeting of heads of government in Geneva.]

I told the President that Menon was troublesome, because he was mixing up the channels of communication, and no one knew quite where we stood, particularly Hammarskjold and the UN. The President agreed, but said that he did not see that we could do any less in view of the personal plea from Nehru.

I told the President that I had thought of the possibility of having an exchange of Commissioners from Communist China and the United States with a view to clearing up the situation on both sides and dealing with the PW's and also the civilians in China, and also letting them check up on the Chinese students in the United States. I said I thought this might perhaps be a way out of the present impasse. The President said he thought this was a good idea and would favor it. I said I thought of this as an alternative to using representatives of third powers. The President said too he thinks that direct dealing was apt to be more effective.

[Here follows discussion relating to the meeting in San Francisco and the forthcoming Geneva meeting.]

JFD

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President. Secret; Personal and Private. Drafted by Dulles on June 20. A note on the source text indicates that the conversation took place en route from the airport to the President's hotel and at the hotel. The President was in San Francisco to address the United Nations the following day.

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**274. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Secretary of State and British Foreign Secretary Macmillan, San Francisco, June 20, 1955, 4:45 p.m. <sup>1</sup>**

Mr. Macmillan raised the question of China. He said he felt that Menon was messing things up and perhaps giving the Chinese Communists the feeling that some precise formula could be arrived at, and that if it did not work out that way, then they might feel that the alternative was to resort to force. I said I agreed that Menon had

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Memoranda of Conversation. Secret; Personal and Private. Drafted by Dulles.

not helped the situation. We had seen him because Nehru had written both the President and me urging that we should do so<sup>2</sup> and also Sir Anthony had done the same.<sup>3</sup> He has certainly crossed wires with the UN in his efforts on behalf of the 11 prisoners, and I felt that situation had slipped backwards as the result of Menon's meddling.

Mr. Macmillan asked what I had in mind for the future. I said the only thought I had about the prisoner situation was that possibly we might have, either directly or through third countries, an exchange of commissioners, one from each side; that our commissioner would go to China with a view to getting out the Americans, both military and civilian, and the commissioner from the Communist side could come here to check up on the Chinese students and be sure that the ones who wanted to return had authority to leave the country. It had occurred to me that this exchange might serve to save the face of the Chinese. I said this was just a vague idea, and it had not been cleared in any way in the Department. Mr. Macmillan thought that this idea had merit. He suggested that anything we did along these lines could better be done through the British than through the Indians. He did not think the Indians were very reliable and that they talked a great deal without accomplishing anything.

He then asked as to the other aspects of the matter. I said I thought that there was nothing to be done but to wait [for] the processes of evolution, that it might be a five-year matter before we knew whether the Chinese Communists would really maintain their hold on the country or possibly break down; or on the other hand, whether they were going to adopt standards of conduct such that they could be received into decent society. The processes of time would also have a bearing upon the Formosan situation. At the present time, Chiang had to speak in terms of using his army to recapture the Mainland because otherwise it was difficult to hold their loyalty. However, as those who came from the Mainland were gradually replaced by Formosans, their interest would shift more to defense and away from offense. No one could know just how the future would evolve. The main thing was to give it a chance to evolve without war. Mr. Macmillan said that one of the troubles was that they were so close together, and he spoke of Quemoy and Matsu. I said that I was sure it was not feasible to bring about any

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<sup>2</sup> For text of Prime Minister Nehru's message to the President, see Document 259; regarding his message to Dulles, see footnote 3, Document 260.

<sup>3</sup> An undated message from Prime Minister Eden to the President, sent with a covering note from Ambassador Makins, stated that Menon's main idea was to find ways of reducing tension in the Far East without discussing any particular solution to the problem of Formosa and expressed the hope that Eisenhower would see him. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International Series)

evacuation of these islands at the present time. I said that if it was apparent that there was not going to be fighting, there might be a reduction in the size of the Chinese Nationalist forces on the islands, but that I thought that evacuation must be regarded as out of the question at least for the time being.

Mr. Macmillan said it was very interesting for them to know how our mind was working on these matters, because they could accommodate themselves to our thinking if they knew what it was.<sup>4</sup>

[Here follow two paragraphs concerning subsequent unrelated discussions and a paragraph describing a brief conversation with Chinese representative Tsiang concerning a possible visit to Washington by Foreign Minister Yeh.]

John Foster Dulles<sup>5</sup>

<sup>4</sup> Macmillan comments on this conversation in *Tides of Fortune, 1945-1955* (New York: Harper & Row, 1969), pp. 613-614.

<sup>5</sup> The source text bears a typed signature.

## 275. Instruction From the Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China<sup>1</sup>

CA-9112

Washington, June 22, 1955.

SUBJECT

Chinese Base Negotiations

1. Careful review of recent communications from the Embassy has resulted in the following conclusions:

a. We concur in your suggestion that the activities of the various U.S. military elements in Taiwan, other than the MAAG, be regularized in a single set of arrangements under Article VII of the Mutual Defense Treaty, applicable to all such United States elements.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.56393/6-2255. Secret. Drafted in CA, cleared in draft with the Department of Defense and with L, and approved by Robertson. Repeated for information to CINCPAC, COMFEAF (Tokyo), CINCFE (Tokyo), and CGAFEE (Yokohama).

<sup>2</sup> A letter to Robertson, May 4, from Counselor of Embassy William P. Cochran, Jr., stated that the United States now had one "permanent" and four "temporary" agreements or arrangements with the ROC Government concerning the status of U.S. forces in Taiwan and Penghu: 1) the "MAAG Agreement" (see footnote 6, Document 240); 2) an exchange of notes dated February 2 and 14, covering U.S. forces assigned to Taiwan in accordance with Article VII of the Mutual Defense Treaty (enclosed with despatch 189 from Taipei, September 23; Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/9-2355); 3) an exchange of notes dated March 30 and April 26, agreeing to the establish-

*Continued*

b. Arrangements at government level should be limited as much as possible to statements of broad principle, and to matters which cannot be handled at the CINCPAC-MND level. It is assumed that the MND has or can get the necessary competence or authority to enter into necessary firm understandings at the military level covering a wide area.

c. All arrangements should be "open ended"; i.e., if new United States elements are brought into Taiwan with GRC concurrence, these arrangements should apply to them automatically, except that special arrangements would, of course, have to be worked out for necessary physical facilities and accommodations on a case-by-case basis at military level.

2. For Your Information, we consider that the emergency situation existing in Taiwan necessitates arrangements for the United States Forces which will permit the performance of any mission required; and we expect the GRC to make the necessary arrangements. The United States is not prepared to send United States units to assist in mutual defense efforts unless the GRC can make firm and satisfactory arrangements as to their status, and can guarantee the operational freedom necessary for accomplishment of their mission.

3. In particular, we would expect the GRC to make significant concessions in customs, tax and fiscal matters for the forces and for the United States personnel involved, including dependents and United States contractor personnel for whom such exemptions are essential to facilitate personnel recruitment for service in Taiwan. Defense is additionally unwilling to consider anything less than de facto exclusive United States criminal jurisdiction for the above personnel. On this latter score, any reasonable formula would be acceptable so long as the practical result is achieved. While we appreciate GRC reluctance to extend the MAAG umbrella as such to all the above personnel, we suggest that the variation of this formula as proposed in the attached draft note<sup>3</sup> can cover a majority of points which if

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ment of a Navy Medical Research Unit (for texts, see 7 UST 173); 4) an exchange of notes dated February 23 and April 28, continuing the operation on Taiwan of an electronic countermeasures unit (enclosed with despatch 533 from Taipei, May 2; Department of State, Central Files, 793.5-MSP/5-255); and 5) an exchange of notes dated April 5 and April 26, agreeing to the operation of certain radio communications units on Taiwan (reported in telegram 765 from Taipei, April 27; *ibid.*, 793.5/4-2755). In the case of each of the four latter exchanges of notes, Chinese permission was granted on a provisional basis, pending the negotiation of a single agreement covering all military units, and the personnel concerned were granted the same privileges and immunities as MAAG personnel, who, under the "MAAG Agreement", operated "as a part of the U.S. Embassy". (*Ibid.*, CA Files: Lot 59 D 110, Air Force Communications Project—Formosa)

<sup>3</sup> Two draft notes and a draft military agreement, none printed, were attached. The first draft note, undated, concerned general arrangements for U.S. forces in and about Taiwan and the Pescadores. The Chinese Government was to furnish such areas and facilities as were required for the U.S. forces, their exact location to be determined

*Continued*

spelled out in detail, might be much more difficult for the GRC to accept politically. This new formula in no sense implies that we expect the above personnel to be part of the Embassy or of MAAG, for administrative purposes or otherwise. It merely asks that they be guaranteed the same treatment in practice, spelling out certain details and interpretations of such practice in a separate understanding, which can be classified and closely held if the Chinese so desire.

4. If under Chinese law it is possible that the members of the United States forces, as defined in attachment 1, would be subject to arrest or confinement in connection with civil proceedings, a provision against this should be inserted in attachment 2. End—For Your Information.

5. The Acting Secretary on June 2, 1955 approved the negotiation of an executive agreement on base rights.<sup>4</sup> Attached are the texts of two notes for negotiation which have been drafted with the foregoing considerations in mind. Suggested modifications of the MND level agreement forwarded with Embassy Despatch 412<sup>5</sup> are also attached, and Defense will forward appropriate instructions through its channels. We believe that negotiations at the government and service levels should be initiated concurrently to guard against the possibility that the GRC might find that certain matters cannot be handled at the MND level.

6. In our view these negotiations should be concluded with greatest dispatch. You should accordingly approach the Foreign Office at the earliest opportunity to present the United States position, making clear the urgency of the project and the importance we attach to a favorable GRC response, and should proceed to the negotiation of the exchange of notes, final texts ad referendum to the Department. Please report results of this approach and subsequent developments by cable for the Department and Defense.<sup>6</sup>

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by agreement; members of the U.S. forces were to be accorded the same treatment in jurisdictional matters as MAAG personnel. A supplementary draft note, undated, set forth an understanding that in criminal matters the ROC Government would in all cases waive any right of jurisdiction over members of the U.S. forces in favor of the U.S. military authorities.

<sup>4</sup> Acting Secretary Hoover's approval was indicated by his initials on a memorandum of May 23, from Robertson to him. (Department of State, Central Files, 711.56393/5-2355)

<sup>5</sup> See footnote 2, Document 240.

<sup>6</sup> The Embassy reported in telegram 87 from Taipei, August 3, that the U.S. draft notes and draft military agreement had been presented to the Foreign Ministry on August 2. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.5-MSP/8-355) Recommendations by the Embassy, MAAG, Defense, and CINCPAC representatives for revisions were transmitted in telegrams 12 from Taipei, July 8, and 13 and 15 from Taipei, July 11. (*Ibid.*, 711.56393/7-855 and 711.56393/7-1155, respectively)

7. This is a joint State-Defense Message. It is requested that the Embassy make copies available to Chief, MAAG and COMFORM-DEFCOM.

Dulles

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276. Memorandum of a Conversation, San Francisco, June 23, 1955, 1:15 p.m.<sup>1</sup>

PMCG (SF) MC-10

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary  
Mr. Molotov  
Mr. Troyanovsky (interpreter)

7. *Far East.*

Mr. Molotov then said the three topics he mentioned for discussion at Geneva were illustrations and would not necessarily preclude their bringing up other matters. He thought also that the Soviets would propose a six-power conference on Far Eastern matters. I asked whether the number had been increased from five to six to make place for the Chinese Nationalists. Mr. Molotov said no—the number of six was proposed to include India.

In the course of our discussion, Mr. Molotov also raised the question of the *Tuapse* ship and crew. He said he wished the United States could do something to relieve that situation. I replied that I had already mentioned this topic to George Yeh, the Chinese Nationalist Foreign Minister,<sup>2</sup> but pointed out that the United States was not in a position to give orders to the Chinese Nationalist Government. Mr. Molotov said he believed the United States had certain influence. I said that we, of course, were greatly concerned over the Americans who were held prisoner by the Chinese Communists. I mentioned that Krishna Menon was working on this subject but I

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1 GE/6-2355. Extract. Top Secret. Apparently prepared by the Secretary, although the source text is unsigned and bears no indication of the drafter. The conversation took place during and after luncheon at Foreign Minister Molotov's residence during the San Francisco meetings in Hillsborough, California. The other subjects of discussion related to the forthcoming conference at Geneva and to the United Nations.

<sup>2</sup> In a conversation on June 21 between Dulles and Yeh, recorded in a memorandum of conversation by Sebald, which touched on a variety of subjects. Yeh had told Dulles that he thought the *Tuapse* seamen would be released within a few days. (*Ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 480)

did not think he was improving matters much. Mr. Molotov replied that he had the impression that Menon was trying hard and making some progress. He also said he was interested that Krishna Menon was getting a much better press in the United States than was the case a month ago.

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277. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,  
Washington, June 23, 1955 <sup>1</sup>

SUBJECT

Constancy of U.S. China Policy

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Wellington Koo, Chinese Ambassador  
Mr. Robertson, Assistant Secretary, FE  
Mr. McConaughy, Director, CA

Ambassador Koo said that his Government felt some anxiety at the prospect of U.S. negotiations with Communist countries. This concern was a natural result of the efforts being made by Menon and others who were known to be sympathetic to the Communist side. He said he would like to be able to report to his Government that the U.S. position on Far Eastern policy questions, particularly those directly affecting his Government, remained unchanged. Specifically he would like to be able to report that there was no change in U.S. opposition to the seating of Communist China in the UN, and in the U.S. policy of non-recognition of the Chinese Communist regime.

Mr. Robertson said there was no change in attitude on the policy matters mentioned by the Ambassador. The Secretary has explicitly stated that this Government would not negotiate on matters affecting the essential interests of the Government of China without the participation of that Government.

The Ambassador said he was convinced that the Chinese Communists are using the American prisoners as political pawns. He hoped that the U.S. would not compromise its principles as a result of Chinese Communist attempts to use the American prisoners for

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/6-2355. Secret. Drafted by McConaughy. The source text bears Robertson's initials. Separate memoranda of conversation by McConaughy record discussion of two other subjects during the same conversation: a proposal for the construction of a new airbase at Kung Quan (Kung Kuan), in which Ambassador Koo expressed interest, and a Chinese request for supplemental defense support funds. (*Ibid.*, 711.56393/6-2355 and 793.5/6-2355, respectively)



political purposes. He recalled that the Secretary had stated that the U.S. desired peace, but that it would have to be "peace with honor".

Mr. Robertson said that he of course agreed that the Chinese Communists were trying to exploit the prisoners for political gain. He said that he considered the Chinese Communists to be gangsters, kidnappers, and extortioners. There were three courses which we could follow: (1) we could use force against the Chinese Communists if the prisoners were not released; (2) we could appease and accommodate the Chinese Communists, thus probably securing the release of all our people by giving in completely to the Chinese Communist demands; (3) we could use a policy of pressures, diplomatic representations through friendly third countries, and direct conversations with the Chinese Communists, as we are now doing. The first two alternatives are of course out of the question. Use of force would probably not bring about the release of the prisoners. It would more likely have an opposite effect and might easily spread into the disaster of a global atomic war. Appeasement of the Chinese Communists would also be catastrophic in a different way and was equally unthinkable. The only sensible course was No. 3, which we have been following consistently. This takes much patience because it is exasperating and frustrating, but it gradually gets some results. 23 Americans have been released since last June. There is no sound alternative to this course, unsatisfactory as it is. We intend to continue working along this line.

Mr. Robertson asked if Foreign Minister Yeh would come to Washington after the termination of the UN special session in San Francisco.

The Ambassador said he had urged Dr. Yeh to come to Washington for at least a brief exchange of views, with Mr. Robertson and other Departmental representatives. This would undoubtedly be very useful. However, Dr. Yeh felt that he could not well spare the time to come to Washington now. The Ambassador doubted that he would come, although no final decision had been made. The Ambassador mentioned that Dr. Yeh intends to stop off at Saigon en route back to Taipei.

278. Telegram From the Consul General at Geneva (Gowen) to the Department of State <sup>1</sup>

*Geneva, June 23, 1955—9 p.m.*

1159. Your 1195. <sup>2</sup> Today I had meeting with Chinese Communist representative Shen Ping and his aides Hsu and Yeh at Hotel Beau Rivage, Geneva. Accompanied by Shillock. Meeting lasted two hours forty-five minutes. Language French.

Shen opened meeting reading prepared Chinese statement which Hsu translated French as follows:

[Here follows the first portion of Shen's prepared statement. In response to inquiries which Gowen had made at their May 30 meeting, Shen stated that any request to increase the weight limitation on parcels to American prisoners in China should be made by the American Red Cross to the Chinese Red Cross, that American prisoners had been informed previously that they could send letters to their families, and that Americans who were not in prison could leave the country if they settled their debts. He also commented on the status of several individuals about whom Gowen had inquired.]

Shen continued: our attitude has never changed since first meetings with your side during Geneva Conference. We have always treated all cases Americans in China as expeditiously as possible.

Since Geneva Conference twenty-three Americans have left our country. These are concrete facts showing our side wishes settle effectively all pending cases between our country and U.S. in order relieve tense situation between our respective countries. However the efforts of your side in this sense have not been satisfactory. (I said our side had done everything consistently possible expedite departure all Chinese students wishing to leave our country and we had repeatedly stated our readiness furnish information concerning any Chinese in the U.S. in whom his side interested. I also confirmed information this subject given our previous meeting and asked Shen indicate any particular case in which his side felt we had not done best to expedite matters. Shen noted this).

He then continued: referring Chinese students in your country I wish stress following: no student who wishes to return China includ-

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/6-2355. Confidential; Niact. Repeated for information to New York, London, New Delhi, Hong Kong, and the U.S. Delegation at the U.N. meeting in San Francisco.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 1195 to Geneva, June 22, transmitted instructions for a meeting between Gowen and Shen Ping, scheduled at Chinese request for June 23. Gowen was instructed to acknowledge with appreciation the release of the four flyers and one recently-released civilian, to repeat his request for information and action on the persons whose names had been given to the Chinese representatives at the May 30 meeting, and to reiterate the representations he had made at that meeting. (*Ibid.*, 293.1111/6-2255)

ing those students and other Chinese having knowledge special techniques should be prevented returning China. June 30, 1955 must not be final date for Chinese students to apply for permission leave or date on which they should leave U.S.<sup>3</sup> After June 30, 1955 some Chinese students and other Chinese should still have right to return freely their homeland. No unreasonable pressure should be exercised against Chinese students who wish go home. Necessary give them sufficient time receive funds for passage and other matters and make necessary travel arrangements. From letters sent by students to their families our side knows American authorities gave them only one month time leave your country. This causing difficulties our students not giving them sufficient time prepare to go home. This we consider extremely unreasonable. I ask you inform your government in order this unreasonable pressure cease promptly. Shen here said he had completed his statement.

In reply saying I was speaking for my Government I acknowledged with appreciation release four flyers and Bishop Donaghy.<sup>4</sup> I expressed disappointment so few Americans released to date and emphatically repeated request for information and action on persons whose names submitted last meeting. I also inquired about whereabouts Mrs. Bradshaw and why she not departed China following her release prison. I inquired status Marcella Eileen Huizer, Nadeshda and Irene Romanoff and reasons they remain China. I reiterated all points raised last meeting (Deptel 1012)<sup>5</sup> including points 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 your 1195. As Shen had raised subject Chinese students I stated that at last meeting U.S. action regarding students had been fully explained. I again repeated our willingness promptly look into any case Chinese students their side claimed being prevented return China.

Shen replied: I wish stress again our side always inspired maintain spirit of first Geneva contacts between our two sides. We are disposed to settle pending cases between China and the U.S. I again repeat we have treated these cases of condemned Americans and others as promptly as possible. We think that to relieve tension and to settle pending cases between our two sides both sides must make every effort. Within our possibility we have made best efforts and

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 67 to Geneva, July 8, stated that there was no such requirement but that a misunderstanding might have arisen from the fact that a program of emergency financial aid to Chinese students (in existence since 1949) had ended on June 30 and no new obligation of funds from that program was possible for travel or other expenses. (*Ibid.*, 293.1111/7-855) The termination of the program was announced in the Department's April 2 press release which Gowen gave to Shen Ping at their April 8 meeting; see Document 198.

<sup>4</sup> Bishop Frederick A. Donaghy, a Catholic missionary, imprisoned from December 1950 through June 1951, had been deported to Hong Kong on June 10, 1955.

<sup>5</sup> See footnote 2, Document 263.

we expect your side to do the same. Madame Huizer is Dutch national. If Nadeshda and Irene Romanoff are identical with women same given names but Romanova family name they have not applied our local officials for permission to leave. We so informed you June 21, 1954.

I again said fact nearly year direct discussions at Geneva concerning detained American civilians and military personnel has produced such meager results has caused not only grave personal tragedy for prisoners and families but likewise profound disappointment and serious resentment among entire American people. I again stressed and urged all detained Americans be allowed freedom return home.

In reply Shen again said his side wishes relieve tension between his country and U.S. He added Chinese students who have not been able complete travel arrangements buy their passage and settle matters and arrangements for their repatriation should be given every opportunity do so and no rigid time limit to complete these arrangements should be set. I reiterated our willingness examine case any Chinese student who claims being prevented repatriation and added some students had voluntarily elected remain U.S. or to proceed country other than Red China. Shen again repeated his side wishes relieve tension by settling pending cases within limits their possibilities.

Shen made it special point emphasize desire settle pending cases to relieve tension between China and the U.S. At one point his interpreter referred to international tension but after checking back with Shen and writing down his reply he said "tension between U.S. and China". Shen gave me the impression this distinction had been especially featured in his instructions.

Gowen

279. **Telegram From the Chargé in the Republic of China (Cochran) to the Department of State**<sup>1</sup>

*Taipei, June 28, 1955—5 p.m.*

952. During long final interview with General Chase last night,<sup>2</sup> President Chiang again raised subject his intention reinforce his

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/6-2855. Secret. Passed to CINCPAC and CNO by the Department at the Embassy's request.

<sup>2</sup> General Chase retired from active duty on July 31.

troops on offshore islands by one division.<sup>3</sup> Said he hoped Chase understood his position (in over-ruling him). Chase reassured him on this point. President continued matter had two aspects:

(1) Military, in that if attacked, and US not to intervene, and forces thus to be without adequate air and naval support, troops would need the additional division to help morale and convince them they could indeed defend islands successfully; and

(2) Political, in that if public and military learned US and MAAG opposing transfer this division, would deduce we thinking of not defending islands (with inference we might urge another Tachen-like withdrawal). Latter particularly important because since last Robertson visit both public and military now fully aware US not committed aid in defense Matsus and Kinmens.

Chase expressed qualms regarding ability Chinese furnish adequate logistic support. Chiang replied that he did not plan to move the division immediately. Chase then suggested division's officers down through battalion level make reconnaissance island in interim and prepare alternative plans for division's role in defense. As for basic decision, Chase said Admiral Stump informed that we had made known our views frankly but that in view President's decision nothing more to be said.

At President's request, Chase promised convey Chiang's ideas and comments to General Taylor.

Cochran

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<sup>3</sup> Chase reported in telegram 150730Z (MG 7954) from Chief MAAG Formosa to CINCPAC, June 15, that he had just learned of Chiang's intention to send an additional division to Quemoy and that he had already stated his opposition to the move and intended to do so again in an interview with Chiang the following day. He commented that the five divisions currently on the island were more than adequate, that their logistic support was already a difficult problem, and that the shift would increase the proportion of Nationalist Army combat strength on Quemoy, Matsu, and the Pescadores from over 30 to almost 40 percent. (JCS Records, 381 Formosa (11-8-48))

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## 280. Editorial Note

At a meeting of the National Security Council on June 30, during a briefing of the Council by Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles, there was intermittent discussion relating to China. According to the memorandum of the discussion,

"Mr. Dulles discussed developments noted on the airfields in Communist China, the transfer of additional jet bombers and MIG 15's to Communist China, and the similar transfer of four Russian submarines and two destroyers. Mr. Dulles also called attention to

the rapid strides being made by Communist China in improving the road and rail network from the interior to the coast opposite Formosa.

"At the conclusion of Mr. Dulles' above comments, the President said that the Burmese Prime Minister had made a very odd remark to him at lunch yesterday. He said that the Chinese Communists were getting absolutely nothing from the outside world that they were not obliged to pay for. Mr. Dulles said that this was probably true even of what they obtained from the Soviets, but the significant question was the price. The President replied that he understood that all the trade of Communist China was in goods, not cash. Secretary Dulles called attention to the existence of a Russian loan to Communist China. Mr. Allen Dulles acknowledged the existence of this loan, but said that CIA believed that it was pretty well exhausted. He added that the Chinese were selling rice in order to get rubber from Ceylon, despite the grave food shortage in Communist China."

After some unrelated discussion,

"Secretary Dulles interrupted to say that he wished to put a question to Admiral Radford. Secretary Dulles said he understood that the Chinese Nationalists were preparing to send another division to reinforce the troops already on Quemoy. We had opposed this move but had apparently been overruled. This was a serious matter, in Secretary Dulles' view, and the United States had a legitimate right, based on the exchange of notes in connection with the mutual defense treaty, to prevent such moves. Secretary Dulles believed that this Government should give very serious attention to this matter.

"In reply, Admiral Radford pointed out that no precise time had been set for the transfer of this division; nor, indeed, had U.S. authorities in Formosa agreed to such a move. The Generalissimo had simply insisted that the division would be sent. Secretary Dulles again stressed the right of the United States to block the move. The President said he would like to be kept informed of developments in the affair."

At the conclusion of Director Dulles' briefing, the discussion reverted to China:

"Dr. Flemming said that he wished to revert to Mr. Dulles' analysis of the build-up of Chinese Communist air capabilities in areas opposite Formosa. He asked Mr. Dulles if his remarks should be taken to indicate that the Chinese Communists could launch an attack on the off-shore islands or Formosa with little or no notice. The President answered that of course they could if the attack were launched from the air.

"Dr. Flemming then inquired whether any intelligence available to the U.S. indicated the likelihood of a Chinese Communist attack in the immediate future. Mr. Allen Dulles replied that the build-up to which he had referred in his briefing had been a very gradual build-up, and that there were no intelligence indications of the likelihood of an attack in the near future.

"Admiral Radford was inclined to take some issue with Mr. Dulles' reply to Dr. Flemming. He pointed out that the build-up was

something less than gradual. Work on the five new airfields had all begun towards the end of March or the first of April of the present year. Moreover, it was proceeding rapidly and urgently. The Chinese were even resorting to the use of pre-cast concrete slabs for the runways on these fields. Finally, all of them would be ready in another month or six weeks." (Memorandum of discussion by Gleason, July 1; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

Burmese Prime Minister U Nu visited Washington from June 29 through July 3. For his conversations with Secretary Dulles concerning the Taiwan situation, see Documents 282 and 286.

The discussion above concerning a Soviet loan to the People's Republic of China apparently refers to a long-term credit announced on October 12, 1954; see footnote 8, Document 117.

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**281. Telegram From the Representative at the United Nations (Lodge) to the Department of State <sup>1</sup>**

*New York, July 1, 1955—1 p.m.*

2. Re US fliers held in Red China. In conversation with Hammarskjöld today he informed me that he will be sending another message to Chou En-lai concerning the fliers. He intends to remind Chou that no action has yet been taken regarding the remaining fliers still held prisoner and expressing the hope that action can be taken soon.

Hammarskjöld will send me a copy of this message which will be transmitted to the Department upon receipt. <sup>2</sup>

**Lodge**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.95A241/7-155. Confidential; Priority.

<sup>2</sup> The message, the text of which was transmitted to the Department in telegram 3 from New York, July 1, stated Hammarskjöld's conviction that continued delay in the release of the 11 fliers would "create a situation where a constructive approach to wider problems is likely to be seriously hampered" and that "while a release of the eleven now would facilitate a future discussion of other problems, it is not a measure which would be recognized as an appropriate part of a broader settlement." It also stated that Hammarskjöld had thus far refrained from making a report to the United Nations because he believed the contacts between Chou and himself to be in the interests of all parties concerned and expressed the hope that it would be possible for him to avoid a report of failure with regard to the 11, "with all the obvious consequences that such a report to the United Nations would have." (*Ibid.*)

282. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,  
Washington, July 1, 1955, 2:27 p.m. <sup>1</sup>

SUBJECT

1. MDAP Agreement with Cambodia.
2. Lessening of Tension in the Taiwan Area.

PARTICIPANTS

U Nu, Prime Minister of Burma	The Secretary
U Thant, Secretary to U Nu	FE—Walter S. Robertson
James Barrington, Ambassador of Burma	FE—William J. Sebald

[Here follows discussion of item 1, "MDAP Agreement with Cambodia."]

U Nu raised a question about our attitude towards Chou En-lai's proposal for direct talks. The Secretary said that he had publicly replied to Chou's suggestions and he wished to make clear that we would be willing to have direct talks on limited matters of concern to our two countries, with the understanding that no recognition is involved. Some five intermediaries, however, have been attempting to explore these problems further. We have therefore postponed action until such time as all possible information has become available. Some difficulties will be presented by discussions on when, how and where to meet, and the agenda. On the other hand, we are not willing in such talks to deal with the interests of third parties. Reference was made to the direct talks already taking place at Geneva between our Consul General and the Communist Chinese representative there, these talks being limited to the civilian prisoners in China. U Nu said that Chou En-lai referred to talks at a higher level. There is a difference of opinion on one point: the United States desires to discuss a cease-fire when no firing is taking place between the United States and China.

The Secretary said that we had in mind talking about the possibility of avoiding armed clashes. We certainly would not talk about the disposal of Taiwan. What we want is to assure that the problems can be worked out peacefully. As for the substantive aspects of the problems we must await the evolution of time, for if substantive matters are forced, no decision can be reached under present conditions and an armed clash would surely result. The CPR wants to get Taiwan which they haven't had for 60 years. Even the juridical position of Taiwan is in doubt. The United States also has an interest in

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751H.5-MSP/7-155. Secret. Drafted by Sebald. The time of the meeting is from Dulles' appointment diary. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers) For the one revision made on the source text by the Secretary, see footnote 3 below.



Taiwan which we got away from Japan. Japan has merely renounced sovereignty over Taiwan which has not been disposed of by the peace treaty and not ceded to anyone. Consequently the United States also could assert a legal claim until Taiwan is disposed of by some means. We cannot, therefore, admit that the disposition of Taiwan is merely an internal problem.

U Nu said that the Chinese Communists are willing to have direct talks with Chiang Kai-shek regarding a cease-fire. They would be willing to receive representatives of the Chinese National Government in Peiping or to send a mission to Taipei. Chou En-lai said he was quite prepared to do this. The Secretary responded that we would not try to stop such negotiations but evinced some doubt that U Nu was correctly informed on this point. U Nu reiterated that he had discussed this matter with Chou En-lai, first at Bandung and subsequently at Rangoon.<sup>2</sup> He had then waited until his Embassy at Peiping could confirm again Chou En-lai's willingness for direct negotiations before making any further communication on the subject. He hoped that the Secretary would find it possible to persuade the Chinese National Government to have such talks although he understood that pressure would not necessarily cause Chiang to follow our advice. The Secretary commented that both parties had publicly refused to have talks of the kind envisaged and that U Nu's proposal represented a new departure. U Nu underscored the fact that the United States would not be a party to such discussions, which would be considered an internal affair.

The Secretary referred to our treaty relations with Formosa and explained that we are in a position to assure the CPR that they will not be offensively<sup>3</sup> attacked. He pointed out that the fighting had almost stopped except for a few rounds a day. In general the situation has quieted down. He referred to Chiang Kai-shek's desire to use his air power to interfere with the buildup of the Chinese Communist air power opposite Taiwan and spoke at length of our refusal to give our consent to such action. In response to U Nu's question regarding a general lack of Chinese Communist planes, pilots, etc., Mr. Robertson spoke of the buildup of Chinese Communist air strength as well as the continued violation of the armistice in North Korea. The Secretary referred to the problem of disarmament when no arrangement under which the Communists can be trusted appears feasible. He said that this was the greatest obstacle to carrying out agreements with the Communists.

U Nu thought that it would be advisable to divide the talks into two parts: (a) direct talks between the Chinese Communists and

<sup>2</sup> Premier Chou visited Rangoon in mid-April on his way to Bandung.

<sup>3</sup> The word "offensively" is added on the source text in Dulles' handwriting.

Taiwan, and (b) direct talks between the United States and the CPR on a higher level and on an agreed agenda. The Secretary again expressed doubt regarding the offer for talks between Taiwan and the CPR, but U Nu reaffirmed what we had previously said. He commented that he had offered to visit Taiwan but that Chou En-lai had asked him not to go.

Reference was made to the prisoner problem, the Secretary saying that it is difficult to know just where we are in view of the conflicting information which we receive.

The Secretary asked U Nu whether he thought the CPR wishes to avoid fighting. U Nu said that he cannot read their minds but had learned a lesson in the Korean war. He had then felt the Chinese would not intervene. He said that the Secretary had stated in a speech that the United States would interfere if there were intervention in Indochina, but that the Chinese had nevertheless intervened. The Secretary read the relevant excerpt from his speech of a year ago.<sup>4</sup> He had actually said, in effect, that if Red China were to send its army into Indochina it could not do so without grave consequences.

U Nu said that fear of war apparently does not deter the Chinese Communists. On the other hand they made it plain to him that they understand that the United States is not bluffing. He also felt that the Chinese Communists likewise are not bluffing. The mere threat of war therefore, would not act as a deterrent.

The Secretary spoke at length regarding the necessity to be patient and to let time take care of some of these problems. He felt that there will be an evolution in both places, i.e., on the mainland and on Taiwan, and that we should not force the issues because to do so would cause a break and only war would result. He pointed out that the Chinese Nationalists, too, are impatient and feel that they must attack the mainland. We have used our influence in that respect and have obtained an agreement from them that they will not attack. If the CPR is not willing to let time contribute towards a solution, the situation will eventually lead to war. He felt that it does not make sense to push things too fast as with time the situation in that area will change, although we do not know how at this time. He recalled that President Rhee also desperately wishes to unite Korea. We also believe Korea should be united, but not by force. We stopped any movement towards use of force by withholding ammunition, equipment and supplies. In Germany, a similar situation exists: Adenauer agreed to give up force as a means to reunite Germany. In conse-

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<sup>4</sup> Reference is apparently to the Secretary's address of June 11, 1954, before the Los Angeles World Affairs Council. For text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, June 28, 1954, pp. 971-973.

quence, it is not understandable why the Chinese Communists should be allowed to take territory by force while they preach peace. They wish peace only on their terms. To our way of thinking, if peace means anything it means the renunciation of force in accordance with the United Nations Charter. He felt that we should allow the situation to evolve for in this way these divided countries will eventually be united. He hoped that the Chinese Communists would be patient. If they are not, they will bring about the consequences of force.

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**283. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, July 1, 1955, 4:10 p.m.<sup>1</sup>**

SUBJECT

Far Eastern Situation

PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Krishna Menon  
Ambassador G. L. Mehta, India  
The Secretary  
Mr. George V. Allen—NEA

After inconsequential remarks lasting perhaps five minutes, during which each participant gave the other full opportunity to begin discussions of substance, the Secretary remarked that one of his chief difficulties was to decide who, among five or six people who had indicated to him that they could speak with authority as to Chou En-lai's views, did in fact have such authority. He said that some responsible individuals presented quite different and even contrary views from others. He mentioned that Prime Minister U Nu of Burma had just given him some new thoughts. He was beginning to wonder whether Peking had many lines out, hoping to reap the best advantage it could from the reports which all these people brought back.

Mr. Menon said that there was no trick. It was up to the United States, of course, to draw its own conclusions, but he himself had not heard any divergence in the presentation of Chou En-lai's position.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 790.00/7-155. Secret. Drafted by Allen. The time of the meeting is from Dulles' appointment diary. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers) The source text bears a notation which indicates it was seen by the Secretary.

The Secretary referred to the competition which seemed to be building up with regard to handling the question of American prisoners in China. He did not believe that a half dozen people working on this problem could accomplish as much as one person charged with full responsibility.

Mr. Menon asserted that he had no desire whatever to enter into any competition, that Mr. Hammarskjold could say and do what he liked on the subject.

The Secretary pointed out that there was a domestic problem inside the United States regarding the prisoners. Their relatives had appealed to members of Congress, many of whom were demanding strong action. He had taken the position before Congressional committees that the primary responsibility for obtaining their release rested with the UN, at least in the first instance. He asked Mr. Menon if the latter thought we should now say that the UN had failed. This would be a serious decision since demands for punitive action by the US would undoubtedly become stronger.

Mr. Menon said he did not think the UN should withdraw from the matter and he did not believe that several persons working on it did any harm.

As regards the larger problem, Mr. Menon said the question was to determine whether there existed a basis for negotiation leading to a relaxation of tensions. He did not think that negotiation could take place while serious fighting was going on. A climate must therefore be created for the cessation of violence. Since practically the only violence now taking place was around Quemoy and Matsu, those two islands seemed to be the crux of the immediate problem. If the Chinese Communists tried to take the islands by force, the United States would either have to intervene or suffer a loss of prestige. Both he and his Prime Minister were anxious, he said, to avoid such loss of prestige by the United States. He was aware that no actual talks about the islands or anything else could take place while the American prisoners were in jail, but the basis for the talks could be discussed.

The Secretary said that it was not necessary for the prisoners to be released in order to enable talks to take place. He pointed out that in his statement, following the Bandung Conference, expressing willingness to negotiate with Peking, he had attached no conditions. He agreed that the conversations would be carried on in a much more favorable atmosphere after the prisoners were released, but he had never demanded their release as a prior condition.

Mr. Menon asked how a state of non-violence could be achieved until the question of the islands was settled. The Secretary asked what islands he had in mind. If Mr. Menon took the position that coastal islands off China had to be turned over to Peking in order to

achieve peace, what about Hong Kong. It was geographically, ethnically and economically as close to China as Quemoy and Matsu. He pointed out that the Chinese Communists had occupied the mainland for five years, 1950-1954, without fighting for Quemoy and Matsu. Why had they suddenly become so excited about them? Perhaps it was because they had been waiting for the buildup of their air bases nearby in order to take them by force. The use of force could not achieve peace in the Far East any more than in any other area of the world. Force could only be met with force. "The United States not only will not but cannot now bring about the evacuation of Quemoy and Matsu", he said.

Mr. Menon asked, "Then, what is your idea of the future?" The Secretary said that the present situation should be accepted, since the problem was one which could only be solved by time. If a solution were sought by force, the only answer would be by the sword. He said he could not understand the sudden demand for an immediate solution since now there was no solution to the basic problem except war.

Mr. Menon referred to the buildup of military strength on the islands. The Secretary said there was also a buildup on the mainland opposite. If a different trend could be started in one area, it also might be achieved in the other.

Mr. Menon said he could see no backdown by the other side (i.e. Peking) if the coastal islands remained as they were. He felt that there must be some possibility for a peaceful settlement. The Secretary said he sincerely hoped so. "We are doing everything in our power to prevent the use of force to achieve unification of Korea, Germany and Vietnam. Why should the Chinese Communists be the only ones to use force to achieve unification?", he asked.

Mr. Menon referred to the use of force by Formosa. The Secretary said we were trying to avoid the use of force by both sides.

Mr. Menon said that the Secretary could win debater's points but what was needed was a peaceful settlement. "Then we agree", said the Secretary. He repeated that he could no more discuss the evacuation of Quemoy and Matsu than he would expect Mr. Menon to discuss withdrawal of the Communists from the mainland. He emphasized that time and time alone was the only answer. If the Communist Chinese took the position that a solution must come now, they would have to take the consequences.

Mr. Menon asked whether Quemoy and Matsu were a part of China. The Secretary asked again whether Hong Kong was a part of China. He agreed that Quemoy and Matsu were geographically a part of China but said they were not politically a part of Red China any more than Hong Kong was. He declared that if a person does not

love peace enough to let time have its curative opportunity, that person was not a very devout lover of peace.

Mr. Menon remarked that in the beginning of the conversation the Secretary had questioned his right to speak for the Chinese Communists. He declared that he had never tried to do so. If anyone had different views regarding the position of Chou En-lai, he would be interested to learn them. The Secretary said he could not divulge what others had said in confidence, but that he had received four or five reports. Some people, for example, thought that the best means of finding a solution would be through direct talks between Chiang Kai-shek and Mao.

Mr. Menon asked whether the Secretary was saying to him in polite but frank terms, "Thank you for nothing". The Secretary said he was not. He said he was merely pointing out that he did not know who really represented the views of Peking. On the question of prisoners, he said he hesitated to negotiate behind the back of the UN. Mr. Menon said he was not "negotiating" regarding the prisoners or regarding anything else. The Secretary said Secretary General Hammarskjold might have a different opinion on this subject. If the Chinese Reds thought they could get something out of us through Mr. Menon or someone else, they would never talk to Mr. Hammarskjold.

Mr. Menon remarked that Mr. Hammarskjold had gone to Peking and had had his say. The Secretary asked "Is it your position that the UN has failed? If so, what do I say to the United States Senate?" Mr. Menon said he thought, with all respect, that the Secretary could say that both the UN and others were active on the prisoner question. The Secretary said that four or five channels could not be pursued effectively.

"If our efforts have been harmful", Mr. Menon replied, "we can withdraw". He asked whether the Secretary felt that India's efforts had been harmful. The Secretary said that he did not think the intent had been harmful—quite the contrary. He was confident that the Indian motives had been the best, but the result had been that Hammarskjold's efforts had been nullified. Mr. Menon commented that Mr. Hammarskjold represented an organization of which the US was a party. He said the messages which President Eisenhower and the Secretary had sent to his Prime Minister had not indicated any feeling that India was interfering. He declared that it was extremely embarrassing to him that Mr. Hammarskjold took a contrary view. He thought that if one side took the position that one particular channel had to be used, the talks might not progress favorably.

The Secretary said that he was willing to look at the question from every angle. It might, in fact, be that Hammarskjold's efforts had been harmful. If so, they should be called off. Mr. Menon said

he did not think so. The Secretary then asked him directly "Do you think the UN efforts have been harmful or not?". Mr. Menon said he could not answer that question. The Secretary said he understood that Mr. Menon did think the UN efforts were harmful. Mr. Menon said he should not be required to answer that question. As for himself, he could not discuss the general situation in Peking without also talking about the prisoners. The Secretary said that all he could say about the prisoners was that their release would improve the atmosphere, but he was not willing to bargain for their release. He said he had presumed that Peking wanted to obtain international recognition to get into the UN and to achieve relaxations and peace. Perhaps he was wrong. If so, we must face the consequences.

Mr. Menon said that he had not pressed the prisoners question but that it had been pushed forward by public opinion in the US. He thought the American public had an incorrect idea of Communist China. He said China was quite different from Russia, and asserted that different political parties exist in China today. He was confident that Peking wanted good relations with the US because it was not happy to remain dependent on the friendship of only one great power.

The Secretary said he had seen no evidence of such a desire on the part of Peking. It was entirely within the ability of Red China, within the next few years, to achieve recognition by the US and membership in the UN, but they were certainly not acting now in a manner to achieve those ends. They could not shoot their way into the UN. If anyone wished to join a club, he should not go about it by insulting the members of the Admissions' Committee.

The Secretary emphasized that negotiations at this time designed to bring about a quick solution to the entire problem could be very dangerous because they would be more likely to end in war than in peace. If negotiations could deal with marginal aspects of the question and were very carefully handled, they might be helpful, but if matters were brought to a head now, the results might be catastrophic. He emphasized once more that he could not negotiate the evacuation of Quemoy and Matsuo.

The discussion terminated with an expression by the Secretary of his belief that the discussions with Mr. Menon had been useful and a readiness to receive any further thoughts Mr. Menon might have regarding marginal subjects which might be discussed without precipitating a crisis.

Mr. Menon asked when he might see the Secretary again. The Secretary suggested July 6 at 11:00 a.m.

284. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Secretary of State <sup>1</sup>

[Washington,] July 1, 1955.

SUBJECT

Exchange of Commissioners Between United States and Communist China for the Purpose of Settling the Prisoner and Student Issues <sup>2</sup>

The exchange of commissioners with Communist China for the purpose of settling the prisoner and student issues would have a certain appeal and would probably be acceptable to the Communists but on balance, I believe, it would be undesirable for the following reasons:

1. Acceptance by us of a Communist commissioner to inquire into the status of Chinese students in this country would, it seems to me, be inconsistent with our position that the Chinese Nationalist Government is the only legitimate Chinese government and accredited representative and protector of Chinese Nationals and Chinese interests abroad. It is for this reason that we have gone to some lengths to maintain this thesis and have resisted the idea of accepting a "protecting power" to represent Peiping's interests in this country. We are making a major effort to prevent overseas Chinese from giving allegiance to the Peiping regime by stressing that the Chinese government on Taiwan is the sole appropriate representative of Chinese Nationals and Chinese interests abroad. For us even by implication to acknowledge the right of the Chinese Communist regime to claim the allegiance of or extend protection to Chinese Nationals in this country, would, in my opinion, tend to impair morale on Taiwan and elsewhere in the Far East and appreciably weaken the position of the Chinese Nationalists Government.

2. There is danger that the move would be widely construed as the first step toward the establishment of regular diplomatic relations. Commissioners traditionally have had a representative and quasi diplomatic status of sorts and the term carries a connotation which could be misleading.

3. The great majority of the Chinese students in this country reject the Chinese Communist regime and would resent being subjected to inquiries by or on behalf of a Chinese Communist commis-

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, FE Files: Lot 56 D 679, Communist China. Secret. The source text is an unsigned carbon copy.

<sup>2</sup> The suggestion for an exchange of commissioners was apparently made by Secretary Dulles; see Documents 273 and 274. An unfinished draft paper by Dulles, dated June 27, apparently not sent, stated that an impasse had been reached for the moment on the problem of the Americans in China, suggested that "the time may have come to deal with this matter directly by ourselves sending a representative to Communist China to look into the situation and try to bring about the return [of the Americans], while at the same time we offer to allow a representative of the Chinese Communists to come to this country to check on the freedom to return of the Chinese students", and declared that this "would not involve any elements of recognition." (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Wang-Johnson Talks)



sioner in this country who presumed to represent them or to claim the right to protect them.

I suggest as alternatives that we either upgrade our negotiators who have been carrying on the prisoner conversations at Geneva, as suggested by Mr. Phleger, or that accredited Red Cross officials be designated to arrange the release of the Americans held in Communist China and to satisfy themselves that Chinese students in this country are not maltreated as charged and are free to return to the Chinese mainland if they wish.

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285. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China <sup>1</sup>

*Washington, July 2, 1955—12:40 p.m.*

5. Your memo June 20 conversation Ambassador and President Chiang re proposed transfer of additional division to Quemoy. <sup>2</sup> Dept. regrets Ambassador indicated ultimate responsibility for decision lay with President Chiang. Under exchange of notes of December 10, transfer of military elements in certain circumstances is not to be effected without mutual agreement. Question whether proposed transfer calls for mutual agreement under exchange of notes now under consideration here. You should be careful to take no action and make no statement tending to prejudice this question. <sup>3</sup>

**Dulles**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/7-255. Top Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted and approved in CA and cleared in substance with Robertson.

<sup>2</sup> The memorandum of conversation, drafted by Cochran and dated June 21, recorded a conversation on June 20 between Rankin and Chiang prior to Rankin's departure on home leave, in which Chiang stated that he considered the transfer of the division necessary for military and psychological reasons but regretted that Chase did not agree. Rankin replied that he "was confident that General Chase fully realized that the ultimate responsibility for decision lay with the President." (*Ibid.*, CA Files: Lot 59 D 110, Offshore Islands, 1955)

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 10 from Taipei, July 6, replied that the Embassy would be guided by the last sentence of telegram 5 to Taipei but noted that planning was underway for the transfer of the division, which had been alerted, and stated the Embassy's view, in which the Military Assistance Advisory Group and the Formosa Liaison Center concurred, that the transfer would not sufficiently effect the defensibility of Taiwan to warrant representations on a matter which was of great sensitivity to the Chinese. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 793.5/7-655)

286. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Secretary of State and Burmese Prime Minister U Nu, Blair House, Washington, July 3, 1955, 7 a.m.<sup>1</sup>

I said that following our talk at the State Department on Friday,<sup>2</sup> I had talked at length with Mr. Menon. I said I find it very difficult to make progress with Mr. Menon because he was so vague. U Nu asked what he had sought. I said nothing very specific, but in general he wanted to bring about a quick solution of the existing differences through negotiation. I said that I was convinced that only trouble would come from attempting to bring present issues to a head by negotiation at the present time. A lapse of time was needed to make problems more manageable. If the Chinese Communists really wanted to be accepted and dealt with as respected members of the community, then they would have to take time to persuade others that they had decent intentions. At the present time, the record was overwhelmingly against them. They had been aggressors in Korea and were so found by the United Nations. They had promoted the fighting in Indochina. They had threatened to use force to achieve their objectives in the Taiwan area. They had held our prisoners in a manner which every impartial student of the subject recognized was a violation of the Korean Armistice Agreement. They were holding United States civilians against their will. In this atmosphere, little could be accomplished. On the other hand, the future was largely for the Chinese Communists themselves to make. The American people were traditionally willing to forget and forgive; and no doubt in time the Chinese Communists, if they were really capable of, and disposed to, acting decently, could win a considerable measure of acceptance. This, however, was a question of their own character and will and of time; and meanwhile I saw no possibility of a negotiated solution of major issues. There were marginal issues which might perhaps be dealt with on a negotiated basis as, as I had indicated we were prepared to discuss, a cease-fire in the Formosa (Taiwan) Straits.

U Nu said that he was well aware of the fact that the American people were generous and friendly in character. He hoped, however, that negotiations could proceed in the interest of peace. He again spoke of direct negotiations between the Chinese Communists and

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.90B11/7-355. Secret. For another description of this conversation, see U Nu, *U Nu: Saturday's Son* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1975), pp. 250-251. U Nu states that Dulles "volunteered the information that recognition of the People's Republic of China could not be withheld forever" and that he suggested to Dulles raising the consular-level talks with the Chinese to the ambassadorial level.

<sup>2</sup> July 1; see Document 282.

the Chinese Nationalists with reference to a cease-fire, pointing out that the Chinese Communists took the position that there was no "firing" between them and the United States, but only between them and the Chinats and that therefore the matter was essentially a domestic issue to be discussed merely between the two of them. U Nu said that he was again cabling to Chou En-lai to get confirmation of the fact that they would indeed be willing to sit down and negotiate with the Chinats. I said that if they were willing to talk with the Chinats at all, why would they not be willing to do so in the context perhaps of a conference including others. I pointed to the fact that although the fighting in Indochina was considered by many to be essentially a civil war, nevertheless the participants had sat down at Geneva with others, such as Soviet Russia, the UK and the US, which were not participants in the civil war.

I mentioned again the matter of the flyers, pointing out that while I did not formally connect the handling of the flyers with the Taiwan matters, nevertheless, obviously, the Chinese Communists' conduct with reference to the flyers affected the atmosphere.

I referred to the direct negotiations going on at Geneva between the United States and the Chinese Communists, and said that there was a possibility that the level of these talks might perhaps be raised. U Nu indicated he thought that would be a good idea.

I again emphasized the importance of maintaining peace for a time during which it could have a curative effect.

I spoke briefly of the Geneva Conference and problems of disarmament. I felt that the main issue was whether any agreement could be properly policed. I spoke of my experience under the Treaty of Versailles, in the making of which I had participated.

U Nu expressed his warm appreciation of our hospitality.

JFD

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**287. Memorandum From the Secretary of State to the Under Secretary of State (Hoover) <sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, July 3, 1955.*

I am wondering whether it would not help the general situation, and ward off undesirable proposals, if we should indicate to the Chi-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Wang-Johnson Talks. Secret. Drafted by Dulles; also sent to Murphy, Robertson, Phleger, and MacArthur.

coms that during the presence of Mr. Phleger at Geneva, the US would be prepared to let him carry on the current talks there with the Chicoms, in the event that the Chicoms would correspondingly raise their level. They could then deal more authoritatively, and perhaps bring about some positive result in terms of release of US citizens now detained. I am getting fed up with all the intermediaries. <sup>2</sup>

JFD

<sup>2</sup> A memorandum of July 6 from Murphy to Dulles expressed support for the Secretary's suggestion and called his attention to Murphy's April 29 memorandum (Document 231). (Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/7-655)

A memorandum of July 5 from Dulles to Robertson, copies of which were sent to Hoover, MacArthur, Murphy, and Phleger, replied to Robertson's July 1 memorandum (Document 284). It stated that there was "a good deal of cogency" in Robertson's arguments and continued as follows:

"I wonder whether it might not be a good idea to notify the Chinese Communists either through the UK or through their representative at Geneva that Mr. Phleger will be at Geneva for the Big Four Conference and that if the Chinese Communists designate someone of comparable rank, he will talk with them about the subject matter.

"As you know, I think there is need to do something and I feel that some direct contacts are less dangerous than the kind of ineffectual intermediary activities of such persons as Menon and U Nu, who, I think, are not hard-headed enough to report accurately to us what the Chinese Communists really think or vice versa.

"If it would be useful for the President or me to throw Menon a 'bone', we could let him be the bearer of the news re Geneva." (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Wang-Johnson Talks)

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**288. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, July 6, 1955 <sup>1</sup>**

**SUBJECT**

Far Eastern Situation

**PARTICIPANTS**

Mr. Krishna Menon  
Ambassador G. L. Mehta, India  
The Secretary  
NEA—George V. Allen

Mr. Menon said his Government felt it important that the Far Eastern situation should not be brought up "in a big way" at the forthcoming "Summit" conference at Geneva. He hoped we could give the impression there that the matter was being handled "on an-

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 790.00/7-655. Secret. Drafted by Allen.

other track". He said he had talked with Mr. Molotov along this line at San Francisco, and indicated that Molotov concurred.

The Secretary said that following his talk with Mr. Menon on July 1, he had been thinking the matter over, and one idea had occurred to him as a possibility. He wanted to throw this idea out merely as something to talk about, since the United States had reached no firm decision on it. His idea was that the direct contacts now being maintained between United States and Red Chinese representatives on a sporadic and low-level basis at Geneva might be raised to a higher level and the scope of the talks expanded. Mr. Menon said he thought Moscow or New Delhi might be a suitable location for such expanded discussions since the Red Chinese had responsible Ambassadors in both places. The Secretary asked what was wrong with Geneva, where the initial contact had already been established. The United States could send someone of higher rank to Geneva for the purpose.

Mr. Menon said he thought the success of such talks would depend on the subject matter to be discussed. The Secretary responded, in emphatic tones, that he had made it abundantly clear in public declarations as well as in private conversations that the United States would not negotiate behind the back of Formosa. If our position on this point was still not clear to Mr. Menon, he wished to repeat it again so there could be no doubt on the point or reason for raising it again. He said that there were a number of marginal things which could be discussed if the Red Chinese wanted to talk. For example, the press this morning had spoken of U.S. maneuvers around the Islands of Penghu.<sup>2</sup> If this disturbed Peking, we were quite ready to talk about it.

Mr. Menon said the question of general relations between the United States and Red China would have to be discussed sometime. The Secretary agreed, but again emphasized that timing was of the greatest importance. Moreover, he was confused regarding the subjects the Peking authorities wanted to talk about. He had received some information indicating that they did not want to talk with the United States about Formosa since they regarded Formosa as an internal matter. If conversations could be started at Geneva, we would soon find out what they wanted to talk about.

Mr. Menon characterized the Chinese as great compromisers and expressed the opinion that once talks were started, they would be

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<sup>2</sup> According to notes of the Secretary's staff meetings, Dulles asked at his July 5 staff meeting whether the United States was holding naval maneuvers near Penghu "as the Chinese Communists charged". At the July 7 staff meeting, Robertson stated that he had been informed by the Pentagon that there was no basis for reports of U.S. naval maneuvers in the Taiwan-Penghu area. (*Ibid.*, Secretary's Staff Meetings: Lot 63 D 75)

willing to discuss many things. To make the talks fruitful, the question of the Americans in China and Chinese in the United States should be disposed of, in order to create an atmosphere conducive to favorable results. If it should happen that the Red Chinese released the American flyers, he thought the situation would be much better.

The Secretary agreed heartily. He could not guarantee that the American public would, even then, be enthusiastic about Red China, but at least a negative force would have been eliminated.

Mr. Menon asked whether it was possible for the Secretary to make a public declaration stating that all Chinese nationals in the United States were free to return to China if they wished. The Secretary said that if direct talks were to be undertaken, he would prefer to reserve such a public declaration until that time. He thought the Chinese Communists themselves might prefer to have any declaration grow out of the talks. He pointed out that the latest complaint we have had from Peking was not that we are holding Chinese in the United States but that we are pushing them back to China. Mr. Menon said this highlighted the need for machinery to handle the question, to satisfy both sides that their nationals were given adequate consular protection. He did not think that higher-level discussions would be adequate until a more favorable basis for them was established.

The Secretary asked whether Mr. Menon thought the Red Chinese wanted to talk with us directly or through intermediaries. Mr. Menon thought they were ready to talk directly with us, but he felt confident that in the meanwhile steps towards a relaxation should be taken. He mentioned the questions of prisoners of war and the embargo against trade with Red China were subjects on which progress might be made now.

The Secretary said that if all points of disagreement could be disposed of before-hand, direct talks would not be necessary. He emphasized again that if the Peking authorities did not want to talk, his suggestion should be dropped and no more time wasted on it. He asked Mr. Menon once more whether he thought the Chinese wanted to talk with us directly or through intermediaries. Mr. Menon repeated that he thought they wanted to talk directly, but commented that the level of the officials to carry on the talks would have to be considered. The Secretary said he was quite open-minded on this point and that if the Red Chinese did not like Geneva, some other place could be considered.

Mr. Menon returned to the question of trade embargoes and the American flyers. The Secretary pointed out that there were two kinds of restrictions on trade with Red China, the international restrictions imposed by a number of nations, and an additional embargo which was self-imposed by the United States. Mr. Menon thought it would

be helpful if trade with China could be placed on the same level as trade with Russia. The Secretary replied that this was already true, in effect, since the trade which the United States voluntarily renounced did not hurt the Chinese Communists, who could buy the commodities from any one else they wished. We were merely losing business to Hong Kong. The only embargo which really hurt the Chinese was the international one.

Mr. Menon reverted to the question of Chinese in the United States, and asked whether the United States position was that they were free to go back to China. The Secretary said that his statement was correct. There might be one or two cases in which some question was still pending, but he did not believe we would insist on holding the individuals involved even in these cases. Mr. Menon mentioned that the Peking authorities thought that many Chinese in the United States wanted to return to China but were not able to do so. The Secretary said the Red Cross or somebody else could find out whether this was correct. Referring again to the Red Chinese complaint that we are forcing Chinese to leave, he said he would be very happy if the Chinese would reciprocate by putting "pressure" on Americans to get out of China. He thought that if Chou En-lai really wanted better relations with the United States, he would release all the Americans in China within twenty-four hours.

Mr. Menon said that Chou En-lai was a reasonable man and wanted good relations with us. The problem was to convince Chou that Americans reciprocated this desire. He asked whether Americans who wanted to visit China would be permitted to do so. (He probably had in mind American journalists but he may also have been thinking of relatives of the flyers.) The Secretary said that he did not think it made much sense for additional Americans to go to China as long as those already there were being held as prisoners. With reference to the Indian offer to assure that Americans visiting China would be treated properly, he said that the United States could not rely on third countries to protect American citizens.

Mr. Menon then asked directly, "Then, there is no likelihood of a relaxation to enable Americans to visit China?" The Secretary said he saw none at the moment.

Mr. Menon then said that the only concrete result of his several talks with the Secretary seemed to be the Secretary's suggestion for a step-up in the level and scope of direct conversations. Was any progress possible on the question of a cease-fire? The Secretary said that the United States had stated many times that it desired a cessation of hostilities and declared that he was not impressed by people who were ready to agree to a cease-fire only if they got what they wanted without firing. Mr. Menon said that the shooting and threats of shooting were not only from one side. The Secretary reminded

him that the United States had obtained a commitment from Chiang Kai-shek to avoid initiating hostilities without our consent. He then reenforced his previous statements that the use of force should be renounced by Peking. He had certainly expected India to support this position. He was therefore greatly surprised that Mr. Menon seemed to be supporting the Peking thesis, which openly avowed the use of force.

Mr. Menon answered, with considerable emotion "No, no, no! As recently as last week, my Prime Minister even persuaded the Russians to join in a communiqué in Moscow condemning the use of force in settlement of the Formosa question".<sup>3</sup> Mr. Menon said India's support for Peking extended only to the fact that China should be united. He recalled that India had supported this position when China was governed by Chiang Kai-shek. He declared that he had never said that Peking should take the islands by military action. He added that he was determined, above everything else, not to allow his conversations in San Francisco and Washington to affect United States-Indian relations adversely. He did not want India's motives to be suspect by either side.

The Secretary said he had gained the impression that Mr. Menon thought Chou's position was a reasonable one. Yet Chou's avowed position was that if he could not get the islands by peaceful means, he would take them by force. If he had misunderstood Mr. Menon's position, he would be glad to be corrected. Mr. Menon repeated that India had stated, in Moscow of all places, that it was wrong to use force. The Secretary said he was very glad that Mr. Menon was not endorsing Chou En-lai's position.

Mr. Menon said he did not wish to see the United States become involved in the Chinese civil war. The Secretary pointed out that Soviet Russia had taken the position that the Korean war was a civil war, but the world knew that it was something much bigger. He said the problem of the unification of China was similar to that of Korea, Germany and Indochina and that the United States opposed the use of force in any of these situations. Mr. Menon repeated that his Government's position in opposition to the use of force was well known. The Secretary said he had always thought that was India's position. He did not believe that India would use force, for example, to take Goa. Mr. Menon said this was entirely correct. The Secretary said, "Then let Red China take the same position regarding Quemoy and Matsu". He thought that until Peking began to see that there

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<sup>3</sup> Reference is apparently to a sentence in a joint statement issued on July 22 by Nehru and Bulganin at the conclusion of a visit by Nehru to Moscow expressing the hope "that it will be possible by peaceful means to satisfy the legitimate rights of the Chinese People's Republic in regard to Taiwan." For text, see *Documents on International Relations*, pp. 472-475.



were moral principles higher than the use of brute force, they would probably not get along with the United States very well.

Mr. Menon, still excited by the Secretary's implication that India supported the use of force, declared that in twenty years the United States would recognize the correctness of India's position in the present discussions. He said his role was not to justify the attitude of either side. The Secretary said he did not doubt in any way whatsoever the Indian Government's good intentions in undertaking to achieve a settlement. He repeated, however, that the World must be held together by some sense of principle. He remarked that he had fought for economic aid for India on a basis of principle, despite the fact that many people questioned this aid in view of India's foreign policy. He had also supported aid for Yugoslavia even though, as he had pointed out in San Francisco, the United States Government differed from that of Yugoslav Government in every respect except one—the Yugoslav determination to defend its independence. The principle involved was the democratic one of allowing Governments to differ on foreign policy without affecting the United States attitude on the aid question. The renunciation of the use of force was another high moral principle that civilized nations should adopt.

Mr. Menon asked whether reconciliation was not also a high principle. The Secretary said it was, and that if India could help remove the concept of force from the minds of the Chinese Communists, steps towards reconciliation would be possible. Mr. Menon said that India had already used its strong endeavors in this direction. "If you could let us impress Peking", he added, "that we had access to your mind, we could be more effective". The Secretary said he had opened every possible recess of his mind to Mr. Menon during their several long conversations.

Mr. Menon said he was leaving for London tomorrow and would like to return to Washington to talk with the Secretary again on July 12 or 13, before the Secretary left for Geneva. The Secretary said he would be able to give very little attention to anything except the Geneva Conference during these days. He remarked that he had spent more time talking with Mr. Krishna Menon during the last three weeks than he had with any other foreign diplomat during a similar period since he had been Secretary of State. Mr. Menon protested that he was not a diplomat. The Secretary said, smiling, "Well, whatever you call yourself". Mr. Menon said that in view of the Secretary's schedule, it probably would be useless for him to return to Washington before Geneva.

When Mr. Allen was accompanying Mr. Menon to the elevator, Mr. Menon remarked in a tone of hopelessness, "Your Secretary has said to me in so many words: 'Go away, you are not serving any useful purpose' ". Mr. Allen said that the Secretary had given him a

very direct and simple task, which should be easy and agreeable for any Indian to carry out. His task was to persuade the Red Chinese to renounce the use of force. Mr. Menon said he could not go back to Peking without something more than this in hand.

Subsequently, Mr. Menon informed Mr. Allen that he planned to return to Washington July 24.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Krishna Menon, together with Ambassador Mehta and Secretary Dulles, saw President Eisenhower at 4:15 p.m. on July 6, according to the President's appointment diary. (Eisenhower Library, President's Daily Appointments) No memorandum or telegraphic report of the conversation has been found in Department of State files or Eisenhower Library, but Eisenhower's diary entry for July 14, 1955, states that Menon had visited him twice, in the company of Secretary Dulles, "to talk about establishing some basis of mediation between Red China and ourselves. I have bluntly told him, both times, that the American people will not consider using the lives and freedom of their own citizens as a bargaining material. Since Red China, in violation of her solemn word given in the Korean Armistice, unjustly held some of our men prisoners—men that China herself admits were in uniform when captured—we will not make important political concessions on the grounds that this would be recompensed by the return of some of these men. We maintain that China cannot be regarded by us as a civilized nation ready to work with us in good faith until *after* they have released these prisoners, such release to be without any promise of concessions on our part other than the assurance that all Chinese in our country are free to go back to China whenever they may desire. This Menon does not accept." (*Ibid.*, DDE Diaries)

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## 289. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Embassy in Italy<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, July 7, 1955—7:53 p.m.*

55. For Ambassador only. Deliver following message from President to PriMin Nehru.

"My dear Mr. Prime Minister: I wish to acknowledge your cordial note which I received through your Embassy here under date of the twenty-seventh of June.<sup>2</sup> Yesterday, Secretary Dulles had an-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.11-EI/7-755. Secret. Drafted by Dulles.

<sup>2</sup> The message from Nehru to Eisenhower, transmitted in a letter of June 27 from Mehta to Eisenhower, expressed the hope that the President had found Krishna Menon's report encouraging and that some advantage might be taken of the existing situation to advance the cause of peace. It further stated that Nehru's visit to the Soviet Union had convinced him that the Soviet Government sincerely desired peace, that "a marked change had come over Soviet policy . . . which was not a mere temporary phase", and that "more than at any other time in the past, there was substantial reason for hoping for peaceful approaches and settlements." Mehta's letter is filed with a letter of July 7 from Dulles to Eisenhower, enclosing a draft message to Nehru and stating, "I think it is useful to be sure that Nehru gets an accurate statement of

other long talk with Mr. Menon, after which the Secretary and I had a conversation with him, and I took the occasion to send by Mr. Menon to you my very cordial greetings. We have followed with interest your travels and statements which you have made in connection therewith, and we know that in these matters you are actuated by high and noble purpose.

I believe that the talks which we have had with Mr. Menon may have served a useful purpose, at least in clarifying our minds. Also we have had talks here with Prime Minister U Nu.

You will, of course, recall that Mr. Chou En-lai at the Bandung Conference suggested direct talks with the United States with reference to items of tension, and both Secretary Dulles and I responded by saying that we also would be willing to have such talks, provided that we could not deal with the rights of third parties in their absence; but that matters of direct concern to the two of us could be discussed.

Since then Mr. Chou En-lai has reiterated his desire for direct talks, and I am inclined to think that the best step now to take is to explore this course. Secretary Dulles and I are therefore thinking of suggesting that a designated Ambassador of the United States should meet at Geneva with a representative of the Chinese Communist régime of comparable rank with a view to dealing in the first instance with the question of the citizens of each of our countries in the territory of the other who want to return. This topic has, indeed, already been discussed intermittently at Geneva, at the consular level, with some, though meager, results. Further progress in this matter could lead to discussion of other topics which the Chinese Communists might want to suggest and which would be discussable within the limits of the principle which I indicated above.

I hope you will feel that such a move would in fact advance the cause of peace in the Far East, as your letter urges.

I am particularly interested in hearing of your observations in Russia and the conclusions which you draw from them. I hope indeed that you are right that a marked change has come over Soviet policy and that this is not a merely temporary phase. Certainly as I go to Geneva I will be strengthened and encouraged by your feeling that there is substantial reason for hoping for peaceful applications and solutions.

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what we have in mind. Menon himself may warp it, preferring himself to be the 'chosen instrument' as intermediary." The draft message, with a minor revision in Eisenhower's handwriting, is identical with the message sent. (Eisenhower Library, Dulles-Herter Series)

I am, my dear Mr. Prime Minister, with kind regards, Sincerely,  
Dwight D. Eisenhower."

Dulles

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290. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Secretary of State <sup>1</sup>

*Washington, July 8, 1955.*

SUBJECT

United States Support for GRC Reserve Training Program

George Yeh spoke to you at San Francisco <sup>2</sup> about the Chinese concern over delays in implementing a United States-supported program for nine reserve divisions. The United States is not at fault in this matter.

Working level agreement between our MAAG and the Chinese Ministry of National Defense was reached in April on a reserve training program. <sup>3</sup> While both JCS and CINCPAC support a reserve program in principle, the plan submitted from Taipei to Defense was inadequate in several respects. As submitted, the plan could and probably would be construed by the Chinese as committing the United States to equip nine "reserve" divisions in addition to the twenty-one now supported by us. These nine divisions would tie down much costly equipment. An indication that the Chinese are thinking in terms of standing forces rather than a genuine reserve training program is furnished in Taipei's 953 of June 28 (attached) <sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5-MSP/7-855. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> Sebald's memorandum of Dulles' June 21 conversation with Foreign Minister Yeh, cited in footnote 2, Document 276, records no discussion of this subject.

<sup>3</sup> The working-level agreement was described in despatch 252 from Taipei (see vol. III, Document 83) as follows: "The bargain was more or less struck that the U.S. military authorities would agree to the formation of nine reserve divisions, to train on a one-month basis per year, with the understanding that the personnel of the various non-supported units was to be transferred to these nine reserve divisions, so that the non-supported units would, in fact, disappear. The United States was to furnish training equipment for one division. These recommendations were subject to higher approval in Washington, as was made clear not only in the talks themselves but also in a personal letter from Ambassador Rankin to Foreign Minister Yeh." The letter from Rankin to Yeh has not been found in Department of State files.

<sup>4</sup> Telegram 953, not found attached to the source text, reported that at the interview with General Chase reported in telegram 952 from Taipei (Document 279), President Chiang had "reviewed his continuing interest in having three reserve divisions in training" and had urged that the United States provide the necessary equipment. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/6-2855)

reporting that President Chiang has urged the immediate equipment of three reserve divisions. The divisions to which Chiang has reference are believed to be three non-supported units, already in being, to which the Chinese have already diverted much MDAP equipment, contrary to the understanding with which aid was furnished and to United States military recommendations.<sup>5</sup>

I believe that Defense is continuing to work for the modification of the reserve training plan into something more in accord with sound doctrine and the needs of Taiwan, and will be prepared to go ahead with such a modified program, if and when it can be worked out.

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<sup>5</sup> Telegram 030119Z from CINCPAC to CNO, May 2, stated that in addition to the ground forces for which U.S. military assistance had been approved, the Nationalists had a number of units not approved for U.S. assistance, with a total personnel strength of approximately 55,700, including many ineffective personnel kept on the rolls for political reasons. It also reported that, while critical shortages of equipment existed in many units approved for U.S. support, including some deployed on Matsui and Kinmen, equipment which had been programmed and delivered to meet those very deficiencies was being diverted to non-supported units. The telegram concluded as follows:

"It is recommended that representations be made to Department of Defense to the effect that ChiNat government be approached by appropriate high US officials and strongly induced to take necessary steps in conjunction with initiation of NGRC reserve program. As approved by US, to remove US provided equipment from hands of ChiNat units not approved for US support, to utilize all US provided equipment to fill those ChiNat requirements for which it was intended and to reassign ineffectives currently on military roles to appropriate non-military support tasks." (JCS Records, CCS 381 Formosa (11-8-48))

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## 291. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, July 8, 1955—7:47 p.m.*

132. Eyes only Ambassador from Secretary. Personal from Secretary to Macmillan.

"I refer to your personal message which I received through Roger Makins on June 30 with reference to getting something moving in the line of direct talks with Chou En-lai.<sup>2</sup> I am asking

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/7-855. Secret; Priority. Drafted, approved, and signed by the Secretary; cleared with EUR.

<sup>2</sup> Macmillan's message was conveyed in a letter of June 30 from Makins to Dulles, which states in part:

Ambassador Aldrich to show you concurrently the text of a message which the President sent to Nehru which was delivered at noon and which he has acknowledged stating that he would reply from London.<sup>3</sup> I am all ready to request your Govt as representing US interests at Peiping to make suggestion to Chou En-lai along the lines of the President's message to Nehru but before doing so would be glad to get any views which you might have either independently or following such talk as you may have with Nehru. I do not, however, want to get Nehru in the position of being our intermediary in this matter and also I think it desirable, as you apparently do, to get something under way soon, as suggested, so that it will be in the works before we get to Geneva and, as you suggest, will provide the best answer to the Russians, as your June 30 message indicates. Foster Dulles."

Text in question in next following message.<sup>4</sup>

Dulles

"Harold Macmillan . . . is still a little concerned as to the progress that may be made in the Far East towards relaxation of tension. He does not know whether you have yet been able to think out plans on the lines of your talks with him in San Francisco. But if you are able to get something moving, he does feel it will be a great help in resisting Russian efforts at Geneva to open up the Chinese question or to press for a separate conference about the Far East. He feels that the best answer would be that things were going along nicely and that it would be wise to leave them alone. It would also, of course, help to prevent any foolish or headstrong action by the Chinese Communist Government." (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Eden-Macmillan-Lloyd Correspondence, 1955-56)

<sup>3</sup> Nehru's acknowledgement was reported in telegram 77 from Rome, July 8. (Department of State, Central Files, 711.11-El/7-855)

<sup>4</sup> Telegram 133 to London, July 8. (*Ibid.*)

## 292. Message From British Foreign Secretary Macmillan to the Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>

[London, July 10(?), 1955.]

Many thanks for your personal message.<sup>2</sup> Unfortunately this reached me after Nehru had left Chequers for Windsor. However, in the course of our long talk on Saturday morning, Nehru had shown us the President's letter<sup>3</sup> and we had discussed the proposal at some length. Nehru was obviously pleased and flattered by the gracious

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Eden-Macmillan-Lloyd Correspondence, 1955-56. Secret. A copy is filed in Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Macmillan to Dulles. Sent with a covering note of July 10 from British Embassy Counselor Adam Watson.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra.*

<sup>3</sup> Transmitted in Document 289.

terms of the letter, but he seemed himself doubtful whether Chou En-lai would regard the scope of the proposed talks as quite wide enough to achieve your purpose. Nehru felt that your suggestion only raised the level of the talks now going on, without extending their scope. We argued strongly that this was a new move and ought to be welcomed as such. But of course not having received your message and thinking from the President's letter that you meant to use Nehru as intermediary, we did not press the argument with full vigour, although we made our position quite clear. Thinking over our discussion and knowing something of the legalism and hair-splitting of the oriental mind, I feel that perhaps the formula as phrased is rather too rigid. Of course it is obviously right to bar any discussion of Formosa and its future. The question of "citizens of each of our countries . . . <sup>4</sup> who want to return" is clearly the first point for discussion but if all went well on this presumably you would wish the talks to go on to other matters, such as cessation of attacks on shipping, peaceful use of the seas and various other matters connected with "reduction of tension". You indeed suggest this, but I feel that the restrictive formula, which is obviously right for the great issues, such as the future of Formosa, might be phrased in a way that will at least allow some fairly general and perhaps useful conversations without prejudice to your obligations to Chiang and the Nationalists. It is not easy to think of "other topics" to reduce tension in this part of the world, which would not have at least an indirect bearing on the rights of third parties. Your ingenuity may be able to suggest a formula which might open up useful talks without prejudice to your obligations.

Anthony <sup>5</sup> is seeing Nehru for a few minutes at the airport this afternoon when Nehru leaves. I will telegraph tomorrow when I have had a further talk with Anthony. Meanwhile we shall of course be glad to act at Peking as representing your interest, but we shall not move until I hear again from you as to the precise form the suggestion should take.

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<sup>4</sup> Ellipsis in the source text.

<sup>5</sup> Prime Minister Eden.

**293. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom <sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 11, 1955—6:21 p.m.

171. Eyes only Ambassador from Secretary. No distribution. For prompt action.

1. Please thank Macmillan for his message about Nehru <sup>2</sup> which I received on Sunday. <sup>3</sup> Please further advise Macmillan that we request him to instruct British Chargé Peiping to deliver on our behalf oral communication in following sense:

"Your and our consular representatives at Geneva have been having intermittent talks during the past year regarding the repatriation of civilians who desire to return to their respective countries. The results have been disappointing to us. It has been suggested that it would aid in settling this matter if these talks were conducted on a more authoritative level, and that this could facilitate further discussion and settlement of certain other practical matters now at issue between the two of us. If you think well of this, we will designate a representative of ambassadorial rank to meet on the above basis with your representative of comparable rank at Geneva on a mutually agreeable date."

2. Please further inform Macmillan that we assume it will be understood at Peiping, but if there is any doubt it should be made clear, that just as the consular representatives of the US and of Communist China have been meeting at Geneva without this implying diplomatic recognition, the same would obtain with respect to the meeting here suggested.

3. We do not plan to give any publicity to our communication to Peiping until after we have received Peiping's reply and then only as mutually agreed. We hope that Peiping will treat matter in same manner.

4. Please further inform Macmillan that in drafting the foregoing we have tried to take into account the point made by him with reference to formula dealing with scope of possible conversations. We have omitted any express reference to the proviso in President's letter to Nehru that "we could not deal with the rights of third parties in their absence". We leave this thought implicit in the phrase "practical matters now at issue between the two of us" in the hope that this treatment will give a lesser impression of rigidity.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/7-1155. Top Secret; Priority. Drafted, approved, and signed by Dulles; cleared with Robertson and Merchant. Dulles' preliminary drafts of the first two paragraphs are in Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Wang-Johnson Talks.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra*.

<sup>3</sup> July 10.



5. If Macmillan wishes to communicate with me further on this matter before giving instructions to his Chargé at Peiping this is acceptable to me and he may defer such instructions accordingly.

Dulles

294. **Telegram From the Ambassador in Egypt (Byroade) to the Department of State**<sup>1</sup>

*Cairo, July 11, 1955—7 p.m.*

60. Eyes only for the Secretary. Prime Minister Nehru is today in Cairo en route Delhi. I have just been requested by Indian Ambassador here to transmit the following message from Nehru to President Eisenhower. Text follows:

"My Dear Mr. President.

I am grateful to you for your letter<sup>2</sup> which was handed to me by your Chargé d'Affaires in Rome three days ago. I much appreciate this cordial message and I am glad that the talks Krishna Menon had with you and with Secretary Dulles served a useful purpose. I am now on my way back to India and I hope to send you a fuller reply from Delhi.

There is one point, however, to which I would venture to draw your attention. You have been good enough to inform me that you and Secretary Dulles are thinking of appointing a designated Ambassador of the United States to meet at Geneva with a representative of the Chinese Communist regime of comparable rank with a view to dealing, in the first instance, with the question of citizens of each of the two countries in the territory of the other who want to return. As you have stated, this topic has already been discussed at Geneva at the consular level. But the results so far obtained have been meagre. It would certainly be better for these discussions to take place at a higher level. But it is doubtful if any further results are likely to be obtained by merely raising the status of the representatives on either side. It has been the hope and the intention of your government, as of other governments, to lessen tension in the Far East progressively so that this might lead to a better atmosphere for negotiations in some form or other. Fortunately there has been a lull in the Far East and practically a cease-fire. To take advantage of this position and to further it in the right direction, I would venture to suggest that some further step is desirable.

Premier Chou En-lai mentioned to us some little time ago that negotiations through diplomatic representatives as at Geneva had

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/7-1155. Top Secret; Priority. According to a handwritten notation by Goodpaster, a copy was seen by the President on July 12. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International Series)

<sup>2</sup> Transmitted in Document 289.

served little purpose. It would not be helpful if he is led to believe that nothing further is intended now than raise the status of diplomatic representatives at Geneva and to discuss only the question of detained nationals. The possible further progress to which you have referred in your letter might actually be impeded.

You have referred to certain limitations under which discussions should take place. I would submit that even within those limitations it might be possible to discuss other issues. I am not suggesting that any solution will be found at this stage by these talks. But you will no doubt agree that it is important to maintain, if not to improve, the present lower tensions in the Far East and thus prevent a conflict arising in respect of the coastal islands.

Because of the apprehension I feel in this matter, I am taking the liberty of drawing your attention to this aspect in the hope that this whole matter will receive further and fuller consideration by you before any definite step is taken.

Thanking you again and with my regards, I am, Mr. President, Sincerely yours, Jawaharlal Nehru".

Original of message being pouched Department. <sup>3</sup>

Byroade

<sup>3</sup> Filed with the copy in the Eisenhower Library cited in footnote 1 above.

## 295. Telegram From the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Aldrich) to the Department of State <sup>1</sup>

*London, July 12, 1955—5 p.m.*

133. During call on Macmillan this afternoon I delivered to him the message contained in your 171 July 11. Macmillan expressed complete agreement with text of oral communication to be delivered to Chou En-lai, lending to proposed conversations increased flexibility. Although he had not seen text of Nehru's message from Rome [Cairo] <sup>2</sup> in reply to the President's communication, he had understood from discussions at Chequers that Nehru had felt original draft too restrictive. He expressed gratification action could be initiated before opening of "summit" meeting.

Macmillan noted that O'Neill, new British Chargé d'Affaires, had now arrived in Peiping and this would serve as excellent occasion for delivery of message. He suggested that telegram to Peiping

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/7-1255. Top Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution. Received at 2:08 p.m.

<sup>2</sup> Transmitted in telegram 60, *supra*.

be repeated to New Delhi with added personal message to Nehru asking him give proposal his warm support.

After consideration, I volunteered to recommend to Department that Macmillan be authorized to request Nehru, *if consulted by Chinese Communists*, give proposal his warm support.

Please instruct urgently.<sup>3</sup>

**Aldrich**

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<sup>3</sup> Dulles replied in telegram 201 to London, July 12, marked "Eyes only Ambassador from Secretary," which he drafted and signed. It reads as follows:

"Assume that Macmillan now instructing Chargé Peiping according to Para 1 my 171 [Document 293.]

"President is cabling Nehru as repeated to London 200 [telegram 80 to New Delhi, Document 297] and you may show to Macmillan. I think that this renders unnecessary repeating to New Delhi telegram to Peiping but see no objection to Macmillan cabling to Nehru that Macmillan is authorized by me to let Nehru know about the message and that Macmillan urges Nehru to give proposal his warm support." (Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/7-1255)

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**296. Memorandum From the Secretary of State to the President<sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, July 12, 1955.*

I have sent you my cable to Macmillan with reference to a communication to Chou En-lai,<sup>2</sup> designed to carry out that portion of your letter to Prime Minister Nehru<sup>3</sup> which speaks of designating an ambassador to carry on the talks at Geneva with the Chinese Communist régime.

I gather that both Nehru and Macmillan have misinterpreted this statement as indicating that the Chinese Communists know that we were not prepared to discuss other topics unless and until the question of exchange of citizens was satisfactorily worked out. That had never been my intent, nor I think yours, and I think the text of the suggested message to Chou En-lai contained in my cable to Macmillan makes this clear.

I am suggesting that you might want to make a reply to Nehru along the lines of the attached.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles-Herter Series. Top Secret.

<sup>2</sup> Document 293.

<sup>3</sup> Transmitted in Document 289.

<sup>4</sup> The attachment, not printed, was a draft of the message to Nehru transmitted in telegram 80, *infra*.

I have just heard from Macmillan <sup>5</sup> that he is in complete agreement with the text of the proposed oral communication to be delivered to Chou En-lai.

JFD

<sup>5</sup> See telegram 133, *supra*.

## 297. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Embassy in India <sup>1</sup>

*Washington, July 12, 1955—7:47 p.m.*

80. Eyes only Ambassador from Secretary. Please deliver promptly following message from President to Nehru:

"My dear Mr. Prime Minister: I have your message from Cairo. <sup>2</sup> I thank you very much for your thoughtful comments with reference to the suggestion contained in my earlier message to you. <sup>3</sup> I note that you feel that little would be accomplished if we merely raised the status of diplomatic representatives at Geneva and discussed only the question of detained nationals.

"We are quite prepared to make it clear in our communication to Chou En-lai that if our Geneva talks were conducted on a more authoritative level this could facilitate further discussion and settlement of certain other practical matters now at issue between the two of us. I trust that this will meet the concern <sup>4</sup> which you express.

"With very kind regards, in which Secretary Dulles joins, I am my dear Mr. Prime Minister, Sincerely, Dwight D. Eisenhower"

Dulles

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/7-1255. Top Secret; Niact; No Distribution. Drafted and signed personally by Dulles. Repeated to London for information as telegram 200 for the Ambassador from the Secretary. The message to Nehru was sent to the President in draft with the memorandum *supra*; he made one change, as indicated in footnote 4 below.

<sup>2</sup> Transmitted in Document 294.

<sup>3</sup> Transmitted in Document 289.

<sup>4</sup> On the draft message cited in footnote 1 above, the word "concern" appears in the President's handwriting as a substitute for the word "preoccupation" in the original draft.

**298. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Secretary of State <sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, July 12, 1955.*

**SUBJECT**

Macmillan's Message on Proposed U.S. Talks with Chinese Communists <sup>2</sup>

Macmillan's message points up the difficulty we will encounter in finding topics for conversation with the Chinese Communists going beyond the prisoner and Chinese student questions. It is difficult to think of any additional topics which might be fruitful and do not either directly involve the rights and essential interests of the Chinese Nationalists or else open a Pandora's box.

The matter of the seizure of American Government and commercial properties on the China mainland might be broached, but this would give the Chinese Communists a good platform from which to launch an attack on our Foreign Assets Control regulations, and the trade embargo. Furthermore, it might seem a prelude to possible diplomatic recognition. We might demand an accounting for the death in prison of several American missionaries who were probably murdered by the Chinese Communists, including the Presbyterian medical missionary, Dr. Wallace, in 1951 and Catholic Bishop Ford in 1953, <sup>3</sup> and other outrages perpetrated against American citizens. But this would not be helpful in this context, and would be more calculated to exacerbate than to relieve tensions.

The British have suggested that a later topic of discussion could be the "cessation of attacks on shipping" and "peaceful use of the seas". The British have an axe to grind in bringing up these topics, in that they are now arguing with the Chinese Nationalists over interception of British vessels trading with south China ports, and in connection with Chinese Nationalist mining of the territorial waters of the off-shore islands.

The British undoubtedly hope to get us to induce the Chinese Nationalists to terminate their blockade and "port closure" attempts. It is questionable whether we should take action which would estop the Chinese Nationalists from interfering with the supply by sea of the mainland bases opposite Taiwan and the off-shore islands. Hence, while we do not officially support the Nationalists' interdiction efforts, we should not become involved in bilateral talks with the Chinese Communists on this subject.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/7-1255. Top Secret. The source text bears a notation that it was seen by the Secretary.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 292.

<sup>3</sup> Dr. William L. Wallace died in prison in February 1951; Bishop Francis X. Ford died in prison in February 1952.

I am inclined to think that the best fall-back topic for us to suggest is simply the renunciation of force by the Chinese Communists in the entire area of the Taiwan Strait. This could be taken up concurrently with the prisoner and student questions. With our established desire to avoid the use of force and to urge a policy of restraint on the Chinese Nationalists under the exchange of notes of December 10, we are on sound ground in insisting upon a like restraint on the part of the Chinese Communists. If this topic were urged upon the Chinese Communists, they would be on the defensive in rejecting it, as they would probably feel compelled to do.

It is highly unlikely that the release of all the Americans, military and civilian, held by the Chinese Communists will materialize in the near future or that they will agree to a renunciation of the use of force with maintenance of the status quo in the area of the Taiwan Straits. Such being the case, we would have good ground for refusing to discuss other topics until these are settled. We need not accept Macmillan's argument that our formula is too restrictive. We could take the position as to other topics that we will cross that bridge when we get to it. In the meanwhile I suggest that we be careful to avoid any indication that we think there is a wide range of marginal questions or questions not involving the essential interests of the GRC which might fruitfully be discussed. Insofar as I can see, there is no wide range of such questions which could be taken up with profit to ourselves at this time.

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**299. Telegram From the Chargé in the United Kingdom  
(Butterworth) to the Department of State <sup>1</sup>**

*London, July 14, 1955—1 p.m.*

176. Re Embtel 150, July 13, <sup>2</sup> following from FonOff:

Brit Chargé O'Neill, having received only 45 minutes notice, called on Chou En-lai at 5:30 pm on 13th and delivered President's

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/7-1455. Limited Distribution. Repeated for information to Paris for the Secretary. Dulles was in Paris for meetings with the British and French Foreign Ministers in preparation for the Geneva Summit Conference.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 150 reported that the Foreign Office had cabled O'Neill the previous day instructing him to seek an interview with Chou En-lai as soon as possible. It also reported that the message contained in telegram 201 to London had been delivered to Macmillan that morning and that the Foreign Office was sending a message to Nehru as suggested therein. (*Ibid.*, 611.93/7-1355) For telegram 201 to London, see footnote 3, Document 295.

message; <sup>3</sup> he made points about no publicity until Chinese reply and discussion not implying diplomatic recognition. He added UKG thought message constructive and hoped Chinese would give favorable consideration to it.

In reply, Chou said he would not at present make formal reply to US communication but wished make following 3 preliminary comments.

(a) Talks between US and Chinese consular representatives at Geneva had from the beginning been confined to question of Chinese nationals in US and US nationals in China, and exchange of information about them. Chinese side had provided information about US nationals in China. US now admitted disappointment over results of these talks. Chinese had, however, far more reasons express disappointment; they had not been given definite information on question of Chinese students in US.

(b) For this reason the Chinese had suggested to Krishna Menon a reciprocal arrangement by which a third country such as UK would act for US in Peiping in matter of US nationals in China, and another country such as India would similarly act for Chinese in Washington in the matter of the Chinese nationals in US. Chou recalled that some years ago US had proposed that HMG should look after US interests in China, but circumstances at that time were different and Chinese had not responded and that year ago at Geneva Chinese had proposed that third party should look after Chinese interests in US but on that occasion US had not responded. It seemed to him that proposal he had made to Krishna Menon, which latter had probably mentioned in London, was more practical and helpful than that now made in US communication.

(c) He undertook not to publish US communication before the Chinese had replied to it.

Since Chou En-lai's remark seemed to indicate that he regarded American proposal as confined only to question of US nationals in China and Chinese nationals in US, O'Neill drew his attention to third sentence of US message and read it out to him again.

O'Neill added that he would report that Chou had reserved his formal reply to US communication. If, after necessary study, he wished make any further communication through O'Neill no doubt he would send for him. Chou said that as this communication had been made through O'Neill he would of course send his reply through him.

**Butterworth**

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<sup>3</sup> Reference is to the communication transmitted to London in Document 293. It is apparent from the form of the Chinese reply, transmitted in Document 302, that O'Neill did not describe it to Chou as a message from the President.

300. Letter From Burmese Prime Minister U Nu to the Secretary of State <sup>1</sup>

*San Francisco, July 14, 1955.*

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have recently received through our Ambassador in Peking a delayed message from Premier Chou En-lai which is causing me considerable concern.

The message began with Premier Chou En-lai's charge that the United States-Cambodian Military Assistance Agreement constituted a violation of the Geneva Agreement. <sup>2</sup> You will recall that we discussed this during my visit to Washington. The message then refers to the fact that consultations had not yet begun with a view to making preparations for the General Elections to be held in Vietnam in July 1956, although the Geneva Agreement required that such consultations and preparations should begin in July 1955. It adds that the release of the four American pilots did not seem to have contributed to relaxation of tensions; rather it was Premier Chou En-lai's impression that China's action in releasing these pilots had been interpreted as a sign of weakness. Indeed, his message carried the insinuation that the hope which I had expressed at Bandung to the effect that the release of the air-men would bring about a reduction of tensions had not been fulfilled. Premier Chou En-lai further complained that Kuomintang harassment of the Chinese coast had been on the increase recently.

As I said in opening this letter, China's attitude in general as reflected in this message is causing me considerable concern. It seems to me that we just cannot let the situation drift, and that we need to do something to check the threatened deterioration in the situation in the Far East.

I am particularly concerned with the situation in Cambodia and Laos, for reasons which are well known to you. The recent reports in the newspapers of the renewal of fighting in Northern Laos have done nothing to allay my concern. I am anxious that something be done immediately to prevent a worsening of the situation in these countries. I have given the matter much anxious thought, and have been forced to fall back on my former conclusion, which is that the

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 790.00/7-1455. Top Secret. Text was transmitted to Secretary Dulles in Tedul 12 to Geneva, July 16. (*Ibid.*, 611.93/7-1655) This letter was apparently classified by the Department of State.

<sup>2</sup> The text of the Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference on Indochina, signed on July 21, 1954, and the Cambodian Armistice Agreement, signed at Geneva on July 20, 1954, are in *Foreign Relations, 1952-1954*, vol. xvi, pp. 1540 and 1531. The United States was not a signatory of either agreement, but see Secto 711 from Geneva, July 21, 1954, which transmitted the statement by Under Secretary of State Walter Bedell Smith, made at Geneva in the Eighth Plenary Session of the Conference, on July 21, 1954, *ibid.*, p. 1500.



only way to arrest the drift is for discussions to take place, at the highest possible level, between the United States and China as soon as possible. I do hope that you will use all your influence to bring about such discussions. I personally do not believe that there is any danger that Asia, and for that matter the whole world, would regard United States agreement to enter into discussions with China as evidence of weakness since no man in his senses today could possibly regard America as weak. On the contrary, I sincerely believe that it would be regarded as a magnanimous act.

It may be that it would be advantageous to bring some other countries into the discussions. In that event, Cambodia, Laos, France and India would seem to be appropriate—the first two for obvious reasons, France because of her continuing interest in Cambodia and Laos, and India because of her role under the terms of the Geneva Agreement. But of course the question of which, if any, of these countries should be invited is something which must be left entirely to the United States and China to decide.

I should be glad to know your reaction to this suggestion. In view of the urgency and importance of this matter, I am trying to ensure that this letter reaches you before you leave for Geneva. As you know, we are strictly "peace brokers" in this matter. We want peace because we abhor war with all its sacrifice in blood and treasure, and because peace is a pre-requisite to the amelioration of the conditions in which live so large a proportion of the world's population. It is this, and this alone, which prompts me to address this letter to you.<sup>3</sup>

With kind regards to you and Mrs. Dulles  
Sincerely yours,

Maung Nu<sup>4</sup>

<sup>3</sup> A message from Robertson to U Nu, transmitted in telegram 50 to Rangoon, July 18, states that his message had been relayed to Secretary Dulles, who had "requested me to tell you that he has already taken certain steps along the lines you have recommended" and that "the U.S. shares your concern regarding the tenor of Chou En-lai's message to you because the analysis of the situation expressed in that message seems totally incorrect and represents a dangerous approach." (Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/7-1855) A letter of August 1 from Secretary Dulles to Prime Minister Nu noted that direct talks with the Chinese were beginning that day at Geneva and added, "I do not expect any major results, at least not quickly, but the fact of talking about our differences may help prevent their developing for the worse."

A letter of August 19 from U Nu to Dulles thanked him for his letter, with its message on the Geneva talks, and said he had sent a quotation of it to Premier Chou En-lai, since he thought Chou would be interested in it and that it would be useful to communicate it to him. (Both *ibid.*, 033.90B11/8-2955)

<sup>4</sup> The use of the subordinate prefix "Maung" rather than the honorific "U" was a courtesy.

**301. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Department of State <sup>1</sup>**

*Paris, July 15, 1955—11 a.m.*

Secto 9. Eyes only Acting Secretary. Eyes only Ambassador. At after dinner meeting last night with Macmillan, following subject was mentioned:

Re ChiComs, Secretary reiterated our position that while U.S. willing discuss concrete problems with them if they are ready, U.S. not prepared accept them in role settle other problems. Macmillan mentioned British Chargé Peking had delivered certain message and British P.M. had asked Nehru support it. Chou En-lai had said more formal reply would ensue. Macmillan promised furnish us first reaction soonest, saying it was good to get things moving before Geneva.

**Dulles**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/7-1555. Top Secret; Niact. Repeated for information to London for the Ambassador.

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**302. Telegram From the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Aldrich) to the Department of State <sup>1</sup>**

*London, July 15, 1955—6 p.m.*

196. Re Embtel 176 to Dept 18 to Paris. <sup>2</sup> Following from FonOff:

1. Chou En-lai asked O'Neill to call on him at 3 p.m. QT [GMT]. Chou gave him text of his reply to US message <sup>3</sup> which O'Neill had delivered on 13th. His reply which is headed "reply of the Government of the People's Republic of China to the US Government through the British Government" and dated July 14 is as follows:

"Talks held between your and our consular representatives at Geneva have been conducted on basis of the agreement reached last year at Geneva by China and the US. During the past year we have given you timely and concrete information about US nationals in China. But regarding Chinese nationals in the US especially Chinese students in the US we have not received due and proper reply.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/7-1555. Top Secret; Niact; Eyes Only. Repeated for information to Paris for the Secretary.

<sup>2</sup> Document 299.

<sup>3</sup> Transmitted in Document 293.

Therefore resulting talks at Geneva in the past year between China and the US have been more negative to us.

It is our view that suggestion mentioned in your message is useful i.e., talks at Geneva between China and the US be conducted on a more authoritative level so as to aid in settling the matter of the return of civilians of both sides to their respective countries and to facilitate further discussions and settlement of certain other practical matters now at issue between the two of us.

In accordance with this suggestion we shall despatch a representative of ambassadorial rank to meet with your representative of comparable rank at Geneva. We propose that date of first meeting be July 21 of this year. We would like to know your views."

2. Chou then added:

a. In making this reply Chinese Govt had taken account of the view of HMG that US proposal was most useful and had accordingly taken speedy action to state their agreement.

b. Chinese Govt agreed there should be no publicity until mutual agreement thereon had been reached with US.

c. Chinese Govt proposed that, after agreement had been reached on date July 21 suggested by them for original meeting in Geneva, US and Chinese Govts should agree on an announcement and issue it simultaneously. He then read out draft of this announcement proposed by Chinese Govt as follows:

"China and America having had consultations with each other agree that the talks held in the last year between consular representatives of both sides at Geneva be conducted on ambassadorial level in order to aid in settling the matter of the return of civilians of both sides to their respective countries and to facilitate further discussions and settlement of certain other practical matters now at issue between both sides. The first meeting of ambassadorial representatives of both sides will take place on July 21, 1955 at Geneva".

d. Chou observed that in preparing this draft he had followed exactly much of language of US communication. He confirmed that his idea was simultaneous publication in Peiping and wherever the US chose to publish. He added good humoredly that as there was some difference between Chinese and US time it might be best agree on time of publication in terms of G.M.T.

3. O'Neill thanked Chou for his communication and said he would at once report it.

Acting UKHC New Delhi has reported that, subsequent to Nehru's conversation with Amb. Cooper (New Delhi's 81 July 14 rptd Paris 5) <sup>4</sup> he delivered to Nehru text of revised note from Presi-

<sup>4</sup> Telegram 81 from New Delhi, July 14, reported a conversation that morning between Prime Minister Nehru and Ambassador Cooper. Nehru predicted that the Chinese would not consider the U.S. proposal an advance because it seemed to limit the scope of discussion to the release of nationals and because it would apparently cut off the existing exchange of views through the Indian Government. He also expressed

dent to Chou. <sup>5</sup> Nehru still thought Chinese would not consider message an advance. FonOff therefore especially requests Dept's authorization inform Nehru of Chinese reply.

**Aldrich**

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concern that the Chinese might turn to the use of force if they believed there was no possibility of fuller negotiations. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/7-1455)

<sup>5</sup> See footnote 3, Document 299.

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**303. Memorandum for the File, by the Deputy Director of the Executive Secretariat (Barnes) <sup>1</sup>**

*Washington, July 15, 1955.*

In the course of another conversation with the President this afternoon, the Acting Secretary informed him that we had just received a message relayed through the British Foreign Office to the effect that Chou En-lai had accepted our proposal to conduct further negotiations in Geneva at the Ambassadorial level. The Chinese have proposed that the first meeting be held on July 21. They have also confirmed that there should be no publicity until mutual agreement on the question had been reached between the U.S. and Chinese Governments.

The President expressed great interest in this message but felt it might create serious complications if these bilateral U.S.-Chinese Communist discussions were to commence during the meeting of the Heads of Government. After further discussion of this point, the President and Mr. Hoover agreed that the earliest practicable date would be July 25 and that we should stall the Chinese Communist on some such grounds as our inability to get our representative to Geneva earlier than this.

I subsequently placed a call for Mr. O'Connor <sup>2</sup> in Paris and failing to reach him, talked to Mr. McAuliffe <sup>3</sup> who was familiar with the telegram from London. I informed him of the sense of the above and told him that unless I heard further from Paris we would

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/7-1555. Top Secret; Eyes Only.

<sup>2</sup> Roderic L. O'Connor, Special Assistant to the Secretary.

<sup>3</sup> Eugene V. McAuliffe of the Executive Secretariat.

assume that follow-up action would be taken by the delegation in Paris and that it would reflect the President's wishes in this matter.

Robert G. Barnes <sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> The source text, a carbon copy, bears a typed signature.

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### 304. Telegram From the Consul General at Geneva (Gowen) to the Department of State <sup>1</sup>

*Geneva, July 15, 1955—7 p.m.*

89. My telegram 79. <sup>2</sup> Today I had meeting with Chinese Communist representative Shen Ping and his usual aides private sitting room top floor Restaurant Perle du Lac at Geneva. Usual meeting place at now overcrowded Hotel Beau Rivage not available. Accompanied by Shillock. Language French.

Saying I was speaking under orders my government I recited facts stated your 67 <sup>3</sup> and also referred to urgent case of Sister Theresa. <sup>4</sup> Speaking through his interpreter Shen said:

Recently my government has received many letters from our students in US and their families. These letters show many Chinese students in US have been notified by your emigration authorities they must leave US by September 6, 1955. These notifications threaten our students with arrest if they do not leave your country by that date. If they do not leave by that date they are to appear before your authorities. This action is arbitrary and does not facilitate departure our students. On the contrary it causes hardship and does not give them sufficient time to make their travel plans. This is because many students do not have funds to purchase transportation home before September 6 and consequently if they do not leave at their expense

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 293.1111/7-1555. Confidential; Niact. Repeated for information to London, Hong Kong, New Delhi, and the U.S. Mission at the United Nations.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 79 from Geneva, July 14, reported that a meeting which Gowen had requested with Shen Ping had been scheduled for July 15. (*Ibid.*, 293.1111/7-1455)

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 67 to Geneva, July 8, instructed Gowen to request a meeting with Shen Ping and provided his instructions for the meeting. He was to inform the Chinese that there was no U.S. requirement that Chinese students had to apply for permission to leave before June 30 (see footnote 3, Document 278), provide further information concerning several U.S. nationals in China, welcome Shen's statement at the June 23 meeting that the Communists wished to relieve tension by settling the remaining cases of U.S. nationals, and reiterate U.S. concern at the detention of Americans in China. (Department of State, Central Files, 293.1111/7-855)

<sup>4</sup> Eva Stella DuGay.

before that date they will be arrested. This is harsh maneuver of your government and pretext for the arrest of our students and to cause them grave hardship. Over one year has elapsed since first Geneva meetings with your side started. We have always opposed unreasonable actions of your government towards our students, the ill treatment they have suffered and brutal and senseless way in which many of them have been arrested and detained. These actions of your government ignore our protests and are unreasonable. My side wishes to stress once more our students are in the US to study, that they have committed no crimes and that they should all be free to return to their homeland whenever they wish to do so. Your government must not mistreat them nor arrest and detain them nor limit time within which they should depart. Fact your government has deprived these students right to return their homeland to rejoin their families is contrary all humane principles and contrary to legal rights our people to return home. This conduct of your government has caused most profound indignation of our students, their families and the people our entire country. In the name of my government I hereby register solemn protest against treatment extended our students in your country as I have just explained.

Regarding Americans in China we always protect those who respect our laws. On condition they settle their personal debts many Americans in China can apply for exit permits. This we have previously explained to you. My government has always done its best to relieve tension and our efforts that effect are well known by entire world. However, to relieve tension it is necessary for both sides to cooperate. Therefore, we request American Government cease all action limiting time within which our students should leave US. Your government should also refrain from arresting or expelling those students who can not make travel arrangements and carry them out before September 6. Your government must not in any case ill treat our students who wish to go home and join their families.

I have noted what you said about Sister Theresa. Her case will be brought attention my government.

I replied I would report my government what Shen had said and that such reply as my government might wish to make would be communicated to him in due course. I again took occasion to emphasize how very well and generously Chinese students in US are treated that they are free to depart if they wish to do so, that some have elected of their own free will to remain in the US while others have elected to leave the US but not to return to Communist China. (I was guided by your 828<sup>5</sup> where appropriate.) I said with very few excep-

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<sup>5</sup> See footnote 3, Document 198.

tions no adequate news had been received as to welfare and whereabouts of Americans in Communist China, that families have received no letters and that very many Americans in China have likewise received no communications from their families. I sharply contrasted very fine and generous way in which we have treated Chinese students in US with way Americans have been treated in Communist China. I again emphatically expressed hope every effort would be made by Shen's side to effect early repatriation all Americans in Red China and that prompt complete information be furnished us concerning their welfare. With regard Americans he said are free to apply for exit permits provided they settle certain alleged personal debts I inquired whether he knew names and addresses these Americans and exact nature and amount in each case alleged unsettled personal debts. I said our side prepared furnish information status, welfare whereabouts Chinese student cases in which Shen's side interested and added all people my country are most anxious see their relatives in China repatriated and to have complete information concerning them. I emphatically stressed all Department had previously instructed me to say with regard our people in Communist China. I impressed upon Shen very grave and deep indignation and resentment American people and my government sad tragic plight Americans in Red China and also sorrow and anxiety which failure his side to furnish any requested information continues to cause. Shen noted my remarks. No press release issued. Meeting ended after about two hours.

Gowen

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305. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Department of State <sup>1</sup>

*Paris, July 16, 1955—noon.*

Dulte 7. Eyes only Acting Secretary from Secretary. Reur Tedul 5.<sup>2</sup>

1. Agree on postponement date.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/7-1655. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> Tedul 5 to Paris, for the Secretary, July 15, stated that the President desired that the ambassadorial-level meetings with the Chinese should not begin until at least July 25, after the conclusion of the Summit Conference, and that Robertson would prefer a date after all other principals had left Geneva. It also requested guidance as to whether and what to advise Congressional leaders. (*Ibid.*, 611.93/7-1555)

2. I expect to draft reply to Chou En-lai later today, and shall handle direct through Aldrich with information copies Washington.

3. Suggest Congressional leaders be advised in strict confidence and without exaggerating importance. Remember that this is implementation of the statement of Chou En-lai at Bandung and my subsequent statement, implementation of which has deliberately been allowed to drag for three months during which intermediaries have been very active, notably Menon and U Nu. We have come to the conclusion that operating through intermediaries is dangerous, particularly these intermediaries, and that direct contact is preferable. You will note from Cooper that Nehru would have preferred to keep Menon in the picture. <sup>3</sup>

We plan use Ambassador Johnson, who originally started these negotiations at Geneva a year ago, so that really there is nothing very new except that it gives the Chinese Communists an opportunity to raise other questions at some stage. This they could always do through intermediaries to whom we would have to listen. It is minimum needed to preserve de facto cease-fire in Formosa Straits.

It has, of course, been made explicitly clear that these talks as the prior ones, involve no diplomatic recognition. Whether or not POW's should be included has not been decided and should not be until clearance with Hammarskjold. <sup>4</sup>

4. I believe that there should be some explanatory press release in addition to formal concurrent announcement and that it should in general follow the foregoing lines. Will you handle this in Washington or shall we draft it here. Prefer former.

Dulles

<sup>3</sup> See the summary of telegram 81 from New Delhi in footnote 4, Document 302. Telegram 90 from New Delhi, July 15, which commented further on the conversation reported in telegram 81, stated that Nehru thought of "Menon perambulations as having positive value in maintaining de facto cease fire and would like for him to have further talks United States, and perhaps Peking, for that reason." (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/7-1555)

<sup>4</sup> Dulte 9 from Paris, for Hoover from Dulles, July 16, reads as follows:

"Supplementing Dulte 7, paragraph 3, bear in mind that this arrangement gives us greatly needed answer to demands for a conference which would be loaded against us and that it has been made clear that the matters which might be raised would involve only matters of bilateral concern, not involving the claims or interests of ChiNats, and that we may, by this method, get our nationals out." (*Ibid.*, 611.93/7-1655)

Tedul 17 to Geneva, to Dulles from Hoover, July 18, reported that Hoover and Assistant Secretary Morton had talked with Congressional leaders, stressing that "subjects covered would be only of bilateral nature, and would not involve such issues as Formosa, diplomatic recognition or membership in the UN"; they had "experienced no serious difficulty," although several Congressional leaders had expressed "varying degrees of apprehension." (*Ibid.*, 611.93/7-1855)



306. Letter From the Secretary of State to British Foreign Secretary Macmillan <sup>1</sup>

[Geneva,] July 16, 1955.

DEAR HAROLD: Please ask your Foreign Office to transmit the following message to Chou En-lai on our behalf as proposed identic announcement:

"As a result of communication between Peiping and Washington through the diplomatic channels of the United Kingdom, it has been agreed that the talks held in the last year between consular representatives of both sides at Geneva should be resumed on ambassadorial level in order to aid in settling the matter of the repatriation of civilians who desire to return to their respective countries and to facilitate further discussions and settlement of certain other practical matters now at issue between both sides. The first meeting of ambassadorial representatives of both sides will take place on August 1, 1955, at Geneva."

We are glad that our proposal commends itself. The announcement above proposed is substantially identical with Chou En-lai's proposal except that the words "China" and "America" are obviously inappropriate and the time of July 21 is too soon for us. In view of preoccupations with reference to Geneva, we cannot designate and instruct our representative and get him to Geneva prior to the end of July.

I would suggest release GMT 2 a.m. July 19. Please let us know when you have obtained confirmation.

Sincerely yours,

John Foster Dulles <sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 515. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Dulles. The text of the letter was transmitted to London for Aldrich in telegram 10 from Geneva, repeated to Washington for Hoover as Dulles 10, dated July 16. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 611.93/7-1655)

<sup>2</sup> The source text, a carbon copy, bears a typed signature.

### 307. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Department of State <sup>1</sup>

*Geneva, July 16/17, 1955—midnight.*

Dulte 11. Eyes only Acting Secretary from Secretary. Re Tedul 7.<sup>2</sup>

"Other matters" which we might want to bring up are treatment of POW's, anti-American propaganda, ChiCom air attacks upon commercial planes such as have cost American lives, air attacks from Chinese or North Korean territory against our aircraft over high seas and possibly violations of Korean Armistice Pact, although here we should be careful because possibly other countries are involved. I think Walter Robertson could fill in. ChiComs may want to raise such questions as interference with Chinese peaceful trade and perhaps alleged overflights and possibly our radio propaganda. They might perhaps raise question of alleged provocative US maneuvers off China coast, which we believe to be non-existent. Again, Walter Robertson might fill in.

These are reflections without benefit of documentation or advisers.

Dulles

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/7-1755. Top Secret; Niact. Received at 9:10 p.m., July 16.

<sup>2</sup> Tedul 7 to Geneva, for Dulles from Hoover, July 16, reads:

"Re Ambassadorial talks with Chicoms in Geneva:

"Anticipate sharp questioning from press and Congressional leaders as to just what you envisage as 'certain other practical matters'. Advise urgently." (*Ibid.*, 611.93/6-1655)

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### 308. Memorandum of a Conversation Between President Eisenhower and British Prime Minister Eden, Geneva, July 17, 1955 <sup>1</sup>

*About Quemoy and the Matsus.* Eden expressed himself as very much alarmed that this was going to lead into real conflict and stated that

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Secret. The source text, unsigned and dated July 19, bears the heading, "Notes dictated by the President regarding his conversation with Sir Anthony Eden, held Sunday, July 17, in the afternoon. There was no one else present during the talk." A memorandum of conversation by Dulles, dated July 17, summarizes what the President had told him about the conversation and records a conversation at the same time between Dulles and Macmillan.

it would create a terrible problem for Britain if the United States should get into a war with Red China on this issue. He said the British government would always hope to be on the American side in every quarrel. This is their fixed and firm policy. But the British people as a whole look on the offshore islands as belonging to Red China, and consider that we are foolish to be supporting Chiang even indirectly in possession of those areas.

I tried to explain the United States position to Eden. I told him of the great importance that Chiang attached to these islands as "symbols" to his own forces. Since Eden agrees that we cannot afford to give up Formosa, he had no trouble understanding the importance of morale in Chiang's army on Formosa. I also brought out the importance of Chiang to other emigre Chinese in the many countries of Southeast Asia. Likewise I pointed out that our people felt that another single backward step in the region would have the gravest effects on all of our Chinese friends.

Finally, I outlined to him the attitude we had taken and the efforts we had made in attempting to get Chiang to be somewhat more flexible with respect to those islands. I told him why we sent Radford and Robertson out to the region and how earnestly we hoped that Chiang would not only change his pronouncements concerning the indispensability of the islands and, militarily, that he would hold them more as strong outposts than as a *sine qua non* to his government's existence.

[Here follows discussion under the headings "Mid-East", "Bicycles and generators", and "Floating pound".]

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It is scheduled for publication in the Summit Conference compilation in a forthcoming volume. For Eden's comments on this conversation and other conversations at Geneva relating to China, see Anthony Eden, *Full Circle* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1960), pp. 342-345.

309. Telegram From the Ambassador in India (Cooper) to the Department of State <sup>1</sup>

*New Delhi, July 17, 1955—8 p.m.*

102. Re Paris niact 10 received Delhi 1 p.m. July 16. <sup>2</sup> I saw Nehru 5:45 p.m. same day and delivered message.

He had been informed by Communist Chinese and UK. Told me message from Chinese Communists received by him after our talks July 14. Nehru read applicable parts of Chinese message and copied for me a portion which is substantially same as that sent Washington.

Nehru seemed pleased with Chinese Communists acceptance but called my attention to following excerpt: "British Government thinks this proposal is most useful. We are prepared to agree to this proposal. But it must be pointed out that contact between China and US at a higher level should in no way be made to hamper but to facilitate continued rendering of good offices by India, Soviet Union and UK for improvement of relations between China and US".

Prime Minister proceeded describe Communist Chinese message as "rigamarole" and quoted ChiComs on following points: (1) Chinese Communists noted there had been no reciprocation by United States after release of four US prisoners; (2) referred to Chinese students stating date fixed by US for students decision return Communist China was limited and therefore US statements regarding their freedom to return had no practical meaning; (3) complained Hammarskjöld's activities saying they appeared to be threats. At last point Nehru again suggested some US gesture respecting Chinese students along lines suggested by him and set forth in Embtel 81 repeated London 8. <sup>3</sup>

As I was leaving Nehru said he was very pleased with President's Washington message re Summit talks, saying it was a "great speech." <sup>4</sup>

Cooper

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 703.00/7-1755. Secret; Niact. Repeated for information to Geneva for the Secretary, and to London.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 10 from Paris to New Delhi, for the Ambassador from the Secretary, sent to the Department as Dulte 5, July 15, transmitted the text of the Chinese message of July 14 and instructed Cooper to inform Nehru. (*Ibid.*, 611.93/7-1555) For text of the Chinese message, see Document 302.

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 4, *ibid.*

<sup>4</sup> Apparent reference to a radio and television address given by the President on July 15 before his departure for Geneva; for text, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1955*, pp. 701-705.

310. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>*Geneva, July 18, 1955—10 p.m.*

Secto 39. Hammarskjold today handed to President and Secretary<sup>2</sup> texts (1) Swedish Ambassador's talk with Chou En-lai on July 8 and (2) Hammarskjold's reply.<sup>3</sup>

First text follows:

"At the request of Mr. Hammarskjold, the Swedish Ambassador to Peking saw Mr. Chou En-lai on 8 July 1955 and transmitted to him orally a message from Mr. Hammarskjold of 2 July.<sup>4</sup> In summary Mr. Chou En-lai replied as follows:

The Chinese Government had thoroughly examined Mr. Hammarskjold's previous message of 2 June<sup>5</sup> and had found that the development had not corresponded to the views expressed therein by the Secretary-General. The Chinese Government had reached the conclusion that the U.S. Government feared that China after release of the prisoners would continue to take other steps in order to lessen the tension. Such a development would not be welcomed by the United States. In support of this opinion Mr. Chou En-lai made the following points:

1. Through the conference at Bandoeng it had become clear that an increasing number of states wished to restore the rights of China in the United Nations. This had worried Mr. Dulles who in San Francisco had concentrated his attacks against China.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-GE/7-1855. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> The President's appointment book indicates that he met with Secretary-General Hammarskjöld and Secretary Dulles at 12:30 p.m. on July 18. (Eisenhower Library, President's Daily Appointments.) A memorandum of conversation by Dulles, dated July 26, which apparently refers to this conversation, reads as follows:

"At Geneva, on a date I have now forgotten (probably July 18) I spoke to Mr. Hammarskjold and asked him whether or not he thought it would be helpful or the reverse if we should through direct contacts with the Chinese Communists seek to reinforce his efforts to get back the eleven US prisoners of war. He said he thought that it would be helpful." (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 516)

No other record of this conversation has been found in Department of State files or Eisenhower Library. A memorandum of July 18 by Goodpaster of a subsequent luncheon conversation between the President and the Secretary-General, at which China was a subject of discussion but the question of the fliers was not directly discussed, is scheduled for publication in the Summit Conference compilation in a forthcoming volume.

<sup>3</sup> The two documents, both dated July 11 and bearing notations that they were handed to the President and the Secretary at the Palais des Nations on July 18, are in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 515.

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 2, Document 281.

<sup>5</sup> See footnotes 2 and 3, Document 264.

2. Mr. Lodge had made complaints about steps taken by China in the Straits of Formosa and had without any foundation feared China.
3. Members of the Secretariat of the United Nations had expressed themselves in favor of pressure against China. The American intentions obviously aimed at stirring up Chinese public opinion and counter-acting those efforts towards a relaxation of the tension, which had been made by persons with good intentions. Specifically, the Americans aimed at preventing China from releasing the prisoners. In the event that they were released, propaganda would be made to the effect that China had given in to pressure.

Mr. Hammarskjöld's message of 2 July had presented a new example of pressure. To make a report on the prisoners issue to the United Nations, which had illegally deprived China of its seat, would not have this effect on China. If a contribution to the relaxation of tension was intended, it would not be right to exert pressure through the United Nations. China would certainly not yield to any pressure. The Chinese authorities would follow its own rules and be led by its own judgment as to what would best serve the purpose of lessening the tension. The pressure policy of the United States was borne out by the American military provocations and manoeuvres in the Formosa Straits which aimed at intimidation.

Mr. Hammarskjöld had been in Peking and it ought to be clear to him that China conducted a peaceful policy. The Chinese Government had announced its wish to negotiate with the United States, which country had demonstrated the greatest antagonism against China. It had not been China that had taken an ambiguous position. It was now for the United States to show a spirit of conciliation, which would not be rejected. However, the attitude taken by the United States at present could not lead to a relaxation of the tension.

In conclusion, Mr. Chou En-lai expressed his great appreciation for having had an opportunity to make his views clear to Mr. Hammarskjöld and stated that he would be willing to continue the discussions on the basis of the friendly attitude, which had inspired the conversations in Peking."

Second text follows:

"I received on 9 July 1955 from the Swedish Ambassador in Peking an account of your recent talk with him. Your willingness to continue our discussions on the basis of the friendly attitude, which inspired our talks in Peking as well as our subsequent contacts in the course of the spring, is fully shared by me.

The central point of my letter of 2 June was my question what—if anything—I could do in order to facilitate a solution of the prisoner problem. In that letter and in my most recent message I tried to give you, with great frankness, my personal reasons for feeling with growing urgency my responsibility under the Charter to contribute to

a relaxation of tensions by doing what I can along the line indicated by my question.

The basis on which I approach this problem remains in all respects the same as it was in Peking. Although I act in my own right in my contacts with you and although I recognize that you reject the General Assembly resolution on the prisoners, this resolution—as noted also in the course of the Peking talks—necessarily has binding force on me as concerns the relationship between the General Assembly and the Secretary-General. In this context that relationship constitutes the only basis for an element of pressure which is a pressure on me as an officer of the organization, explained by the fact that I have a formal duty towards the General Assembly to account for my activities.

I have given serious consideration to your comments on the present situation. My interpretation of the attitude of the United States authorities differs from yours. This difference of opinion between us, however, should be considered rather as a reason to continue our discussions than as an obstacle to further contacts which in my view represent a bridge to which there is no equivalent.

As I shall remain in Geneva, where I arrived yesterday, until the end of next week and I intend to be back here at the beginning of August, the Consulate General of the Peoples Republic of China in Geneva may, during that time, present the simplest line of communication between us."

*End verbatim text.*

Dulles

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### 311. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Department of State <sup>1</sup>

*Geneva, July 19, 1955—4 p.m.*

Dulte 23. Eyes only Acting Secretary and Assistant Secretary Robertson. Macmillan gave us this morning copies 2 messages from O'Neill: <sup>2</sup>

Text first message:

"Chou En-lai was unable to see me until 4:30 p.m. today when I carried out instructions in your telegrams Nos. 1 and 2, leaving with him text <sup>3</sup> given in your telegram No. 2.

We ran into trouble over 'Peiping' on which Chou En-lai expressed considerable indignation. The Americans were unreasonable in seeking to use this word; he meant, of course, their rulers, not the

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/7-1955. Top Secret; Niact. Repeated for information to London eyes only for Aldrich.

<sup>2</sup> The two messages, unsigned and undated, are *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 515.

<sup>3</sup> Apparently the message transmitted in Document 306.

American people. Peking had been known as Peking for hundreds of years. Why should Americans seek to impose their will on other people in this matter? He thought the British, as a matter of courtesy, should have declined even to transmit a proposal for using this word to the Chinese Government.

I replied that the word the Americans proposed to describe this town was the name which has been current in America of it. They were not seeking to impose use of this word on anyone but themselves. They did not expect the Chinese Government to use the word 'Peiping' in any English text or statement they might issue.

Chou En-lai continued to complain, saying that though China had no monarchy they always described the British Government as Her Majesty's Government. I pointed out that these two Governments recognized and were in relation to each other.

After a good deal more grumbling, and after I had pointed out other changes in the new American text, Chou En-lai eventually said he would study the matter further and let me have his considered views. He thought it unlikely that it would now be possible to issue announcement at the time proposed by Mr. Dulles, namely 2 a.m. GMT July 20.<sup>4</sup>

On the new date proposed for the first meeting, he said only that he regretted America had been unable to accept his proposal, but would give this point further consideration also.

He asked me to report to you the feeling he had expressed but to tell you that he was grateful to you for having transmitted Mr. Dulles' message".

Text second message:

"My immediately preceding telegram:  
United States talks with China.

We must now await the considered Chinese view. But if it were acceptable to America we could, I think, overcome these complications of geographical nomenclature by a formula such as:

'As a result of outlines exchanged between Mr. Dulles and Mr. Chou En-lai through diplomatic channels, it has been agreed, etc.'"

I have given following<sup>5</sup> to Macmillan:

<sup>4</sup> Dulles proposed July 20 as the release date in response to a British message of July 17, The message and Dulles' response were reported in Dulte 14 from Geneva, dated July 17, which reads as follows:

"British have informed us they just received message from O'Neill reporting that Chou En-lai unable receive him today (Sunday). Meantime O'Neill enquired whether in English text proposed announcement there was any latitude which would permit use of 'Peking' as opposed 'Peiping' which is in present text. Also in view delay in communicating with Chou En-lai O'Neill raised question of timing proposed announcement.

"In reply we have informed British text should remain as proposed. As for timing of announcement, we have told British we would be agreeable to release 2 a.m. GMT July 20." (Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/7-1755)

<sup>5</sup> The unsigned message, dated July 19, is *ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 515.



"Please inform O'Neill as follows:

'If Chou En-lai after reflection rejects proposed text, we would accept as alternative 'As a result of messages exchanged through the diplomatic channels of the United Kingdom, it has been agreed, etc' ''.

Unless Department sees objection, I would be prepared to use the spelling "Peking" in our release since this is in fact now the spelling adopted by those in authority in the City. <sup>6</sup>

Assume no release July 20 unless we hear in time Chinese accept text and new date first meeting.

Dulles

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<sup>6</sup> Tedul 27 to Geneva, July 19, 1955, commented that Robertson and the Office of Chinese Affairs believed that the spelling issue although it was in itself insignificant and of small consequence to the American people, had symbolic significance to the Chinese, as shown by Chou's reaction to "Peiping"; sudden U.S. acceptance of Chinese Communist nomenclature would add to Taipei's suspicions and fears. It recommended the use of the compromise language proposed by Dulles for the proposed identic announcement and added, "As for our own follow-up press release, we see no reason why Chou En-lai should be allowed to dictate change in our nomenclature established for over twenty years." (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 611.93/7-1955)

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### 312. Outline Plan by the Operations Coordinating Board <sup>1</sup>

Washington, July 20, 1955.

#### OUTLINE PLAN OF OPERATIONS FOR NSC 5503 WITH RESPECT TO FORMOSA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA

##### *I. Introduction*

1. *Reference:* U.S. Policy Toward Formosa and the Government of the Republic of China (NSC 5503).

2. *Present Situation:* Although the Communists continue their military build up, including increases in air and ground capabilities, and

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430. Formosa & GRC, 1955. Top Secret. The source text is filed with a covering memorandum dated July 28 from OCB Executive Officer Elmer B. Staats to the Board, which states that it was revised and concurred in by the Board on July 20, and an introductory page, which states that the purpose of the Outline Plan was to set forth courses of action, responsibilities and timing prepared by the OCB in order to carry out NSC 5503 (Document 12) and that it was intended to serve as guidance for the participating agencies and overseas missions concerned.

although there is no renunciation of the Communist line of "liberating" Taiwan, there appears to be no immediate threat to our fundamental strategic objective with respect to Taiwan: that of keeping it from the Chinese Communists. However, successful Chinese Communist seizure of the GRC-held coastal islands and the elimination thereby of a significant portion of the GRC armed forces, would directly and indirectly result in a substantial weakening of the GRC position in Taiwan. Attempts are being made to cause the Chinese Communists to accept tacitly if not explicitly a renunciation of the use of force in pressing their claims respecting Taiwan. However, even should these efforts succeed, the security of Taiwan will continue to depend upon the United States determination to commit its own forces to the defense of Taiwan. Short of military attack, the Chinese Communists will continue their efforts to bring about the fall of Taiwan through the subversion or defection of the Nationalists, but these efforts are not likely to succeed in the foreseeable future.

The current situation does present serious difficulties in the way of the pursuit of other objectives of our policy. The maintenance of the international position of the GRC and the exertion by it of a strong political attraction as an alternative to the Communist Chinese regime are rendered more difficult by the growing international prestige of the Peiping regime, declining faith (particularly among the overseas Chinese) in the possibility of a Nationalist return to the mainland, and the growth of influences making for stagnation of the forces on Taiwan. Despite a heightened recognition among free world nations of the strategic importance of Taiwan, there is a discernible trend towards disregard of the importance of the GRC as a political entity. To a considerable extent the widespread desire for peace in the Far East has been mobilized behind unrealistic demands for concessions, all at the expense of the Nationalists—the abandonment of Nationalist-held off-shore islands, the admission of Communist China to the United Nations, or even the institution of a United Nations trusteeship over Taiwan. Until recently Communist China's all-or-none attitude and its insistence upon the purely domestic character of the Taiwan issue had prevented it from deriving much benefit from these popular demands. Since the Bandung Conference, however, there have been signs that a more flexible tactical approach is in the making. The possibility is thus raised that Communist China might take the tack of expediency, heading for the eventual destruction of the GRC and the "peaceful liberation" of Taiwan via temporary furtherance of the "two Chinas" concept. Such a tack would not rule out local actions against the off-shore islands, however, and the progressive development of the Chinese Communist military capa-

bilities and operations to establish air superiority over the Formosa Straits.

3. *Timing, Emphasis, and Special Operating Guidance:* Programs and measures underpinning a situation of military strength must continue to receive a high priority. At the same time more and more emphasis must be shifted to economic, psychological, and diplomatic programs and actions which can shore up the GRC's defenses against the more subtle inroads of stagnation, erosion of morale, and frustration, and which can develop Taiwan as an attractive alternative to Communism.

U.S. actions in all fields should be taken at every opportunity to counteract the peace offensive of the Chinese Communists, and to cope with the flexible approach towards the destruction of the GRC which the Chinese Communists seem to be developing.

[Here follows a detailed list of actions to be taken, with the assignment of responsibility for each action to one or more agencies.]

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### 313. Memorandum of Conversations, Geneva, July 21, 1955 <sup>1</sup>

At dinner, I discussed with Marshal Bulganin a number of matters about China. He spoke of his visit there with Krushchev a year ago and made some comments about the economics in the country. He said he thought we should get in touch with the Chinese Peoples Government. I said that we had already taken steps toward doing so but they had apparently bogged down because the Chinese thought we had misspelled the word "Peiping". We had quite a little discussion about that, and Bulganin was obviously ignorant of the significance which the Chinese Communists apparently attach to the spelling. He asked whether we would talk just about the nationals on both sides or whether talks could be broader. I said we expected first to talk about the nationals but we had not excluded some broadening of the talks. However, I said do not expect much very fast. I mentioned to Bulganin that it had been 17 years before the United States recognized the Soviet Union, and I also asked whether there had not also been a long period of time when the Soviet Union did not recognize the Swiss Republic. He admitted this was so.

I spoke of the large amount of aid that Russia was apparently giving to China. He said they were giving a good deal of economic

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State Central Files, 793.00/7-2255. Secret. Drafted by Dulles. The conversations took place during and after a dinner given by the Swiss Government for the four delegations at Geneva.

aid to help them industrialize. I said: you were also giving a lot of military aid. He said: we were doing that, but we had now stopped. I said China is full of MIGs. He said: we are not giving them MIGs any more. We find the more we give them, the more they want. I repeated my inquiries so as to be sure there was no misunderstanding, and again got a categorical statement that they were no longer supplying direct military aid.

Later after dinner, Marshal Bulganin, Prime Minister Eden, Mr. Molotov and I sat together and resumed talking about China. We referred to the spelling matter, and no one of the group seemed to know what it was all about. Someone suggested that perhaps "Peiping" had been the spelling given by the Japanese.

Bulganin said he would look into the situation right away, as he was greatly interested in the matter and wanted talks to get started.

I spoke to Molotov about the release of the *Tuapse* crew. Molotov said he knew about the plans and that some were supposed to come to the United States. He said this would make a very bad impression in the Soviet Union. I said that I had worked very hard on this matter since he had talked to me in San Francisco and that I understood about 30 were going back to Russia. He said the number was 29. In reply to his statement that it would make a very bad impression that some were going to the United States, I said that it had made a bad impression when some American POWs had decided to go to Communist China, but that these were things one had to accept.

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<sup>2</sup> Initialed for the Secretary by O'Connor.

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**314. Memorandum of a Conversation, Geneva, July 22, 1955,  
8:30 a.m. <sup>1</sup>**

**PARTICIPANTS**

Secretary Dulles  
Sir Anthony Eden  
Foreign Minister Macmillan  
Mr. Phleger

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-GE/7-2255. Secret. Drafted by Phleger. Headed "Memorandum of Breakfast Conversation—Sir Anthony Eden's Villa at Geneva."

Eden said that he would like to discuss the China situation.

The Secretary recalled that the Chicoms had not yet agreed to the Geneva meeting. Their stated objection was the use of the word "Peiping" in the communication, which seemed out of proportion; perhaps it indicated that they had changed their minds. Macmillan said their acceptance might have been to get to Geneva when the Conference was in session, and when the date was put after its adjournment, they might have decided not to go ahead.

The Secretary explained the US position. The offshore island situation was serious. The Chicoms were building up positions, and threatening to take the islands by force. The US had been attempting to pacify the situation by influencing the Chinats not to be provocative.

Eden said the President had expressed the view that it was not wise to build up forces on the islands so that they assumed a prestige aspect, but they should be placed more in the position of outposts. The Secretary said this was so and the US had tried to convince the Chinats of the wisdom of not continuing to build up the islands, so as to make their holding a matter of importance and prestige. Assistant Secretary Robertson and Admiral Radford had gone to Taipei to urge this but with negative results.

The Secretary said the situation in China was no different than in other countries that were divided, like Germany and Korea, where no attempt was being made to use armed force. Time would be necessary to bring a solution. Many things could happen with the passage of time. Those who had influence with the Chicoms should point this out and the danger of attempting to force the matter by military means. Others do not resort to force, why should the Communists? "Because they have the means", Eden remarked.

Macmillan asked if the offshore islands were attacked, would the U.S. intervene. The Secretary said this could not be answered categorically. If they were overrun in 48 hours, the U.S. would not have time to act. However, if the Chinats made a heroic defense and held out, public opinion for intervention would build up and might well get to the point where action by the U.S. would follow. U.S. reaction was strong about Dien Bien Phu where U.S. interests were not nearly so great. Those islands might well be considered by the U.S. people as a symbol, somewhat like Berlin was considered when blockaded.

The Secretary said that if the Chicoms wanted to make progress, they should act like civilized people, that their attempts by pressure and violence to achieve their ends was the wrong way to go about it so far as the American people were concerned. When Nehru had suggested there should be some quid pro quo for the release of the prisoners, the Secretary had pointed out that this was like paying a

kidnapper and would have a very bad effect on the American public view of the Chicoms. Both Eden and Macmillan agreed with this.

The question was raised as to what had become of the Soviet suggestion for Six-Power Talks to include the Big Four, the Chinese Communists and India. Eden said that he thought this had been dropped, because when Nehru was in Moscow and the Soviets brought the matter up, he had said that he did not think well of it.

The Secretary told of U Nu's statement <sup>2</sup> that the Chicoms desired direct negotiations with the U.S. on matters affecting the U.S. and direct negotiations with the Chinats on matters affecting the Chinats. He was not sure that this correctly represented the Chicom's view, although there had been some rumors to this effect. Macmillan said it was quite possible, and he also had heard such rumors. This was the way deals were made in the old days, and the Chicoms would make Chiang a Marshal in their Army.

The Secretary told of his talk with Bulganin <sup>3</sup> in which Bulganin had said that the Soviets were not furnishing any military aid to the Chicoms at this time. He also said that Bulganin did not seem to have any previous knowledge of the offer of the U.S. to have direct talks in Geneva with the Communists.

Before the meeting broke up, Eden said that when he had dinner with the Soviets tonight he would point out the seriousness of the situation and of the consequences that might result were the Chicoms to resort to the use of armed force. <sup>4</sup>

<sup>2</sup> See Documents 282 and 286.

<sup>3</sup> On July 21; see the memorandum, *supra*.

<sup>4</sup> For Eden's account of his discussion of this subject with Bulganin and Khrushchev that evening, see *Full Circle*, pp. 344-345.

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### 315. Memorandum of a Conversation, Geneva, July 23, 1955, 9:30 a.m. <sup>1</sup>

#### PARTICIPANTS

The President  
Ambassador Bohlen

Marshal Zhukov  
Mr. Troyanovsky

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers. Extract. Top Secret. Drafted by Bohlen. The complete text is scheduled for publication in the compilation on the Geneva Conference in a forthcoming volume.

The President said he had one more point to raise before the conclusion of the interview, though he felt sure the Marshal was as busy as he was. He said he was convinced the Soviet Government wants peace just as we do, and did not wish to have any wars, big or little. He said that among the problems were those of divided countries—that they had been able to settle Austria, the fighting had been ended in Korea and Indochina, and there were hopes for some progress on the German question. There was also the problem of a divided China, and in regard to that he wished to ask only that the Soviet Government should use its influence with the Chinese in order to persuade them that problems should not be settled by fighting. These problems take time and might be long in settling, but since we had settled Austria, Korea, and Indochina, it was important that the Chinese not do something which all would subsequently regret. He said he did not suggest that the Soviet Government was responsible, but was merely asking it to use its good offices to that end. Zhukov said he agreed and held similar views. He said insofar as he was aware the Chinese had no intention to have recourse to armed force. They had been waiting patiently for settlement of these matters and if some hope could be given them there was no doubt that they would continue to wait with patience. He felt that the initiation of direct conversations between the United States and China, possibly at first on minor matters and then later on larger questions, would give such hope. The President said we were not averse to such talks but that the Marshal should understand that the United States was very angry at the fact that the Chinese were still holding soldiers from the Korean War prisoner, but that he did not reject the idea that there might be some hope in negotiation. <sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> In a conversation with Marshal Zhukov on July 20, the President raised the subject of the American prisoners in China and asked Zhukov to do what he could to bring about their release. Zhukov raised the questions of U.N. membership, the offshore islands, and Taiwan, commenting that delay in settling these questions was not advantageous even to the United States. The President replied that the matter was extremely complicated but pointed out that "in spite of extreme provocation, he had restrained [*refrained*] from sending powerful forces to the area since there was no desire to become involved in war in that area." Bohlen's memorandum of the July 20 conversation is scheduled for publication in the compilation on the Geneva Conference in a forthcoming publication.

### 316. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Department of State <sup>1</sup>

*Geneva, July 23, 1955—8 p.m.*

Dulte 34. Eyes only Acting Secretary from Secretary.

1. British informed us today July 23 Chinese Communist Vice Foreign Minister called in O'Neill at request Chou En-lai to communicate his reply on text of press announcement. Subject to two amendments Chinese government accept text. These amendments are to substitute "Peking" for "Peiping" and "conducted" for "resumed". If first change unacceptable to Secretary Dulles, Chinese Government would revert to language of their original draft "China and America". Second change is in original US draft, they point out.

As to timing, O'Neill reports Chinese propose 1400 GMT July 24 or 24 hours later if first day too soon.

O'Neill reported he explained reasons why US prefers "Peiping" stating it was a real difficulty for US Government, which he was sure did not insist on this point out of any desire of ill will or intention insult Chinese. Vice Minister was obdurate and repeated it was absurd and wounding to refer to "Peking" by any other name.

O'Neill then suggested our alternate formula (Dulte 23) <sup>2</sup> as acceptable to US. Vice Minister said he would repeat this suggestion to Chou En-lai, but pointed out alternative omitted any reference to America or China so that no one would know who the two sides were. O'Neill said it would be clear enough since the announcement would be issued from Washington and Peking. Vice Minister said proposal would be considered, but he hoped first to hear US reactions to his latest proposals.

O'Neill told him he would seek instructions.

In subsequent telegram of July 23, O'Neill commented to Foreign Office he assumed Americans would not accept "America and China" and that Chinese might remain difficult. To reconcile point, O'Neill suggests changing "consular representatives of both sides" to "Chinese and American consular representatives".

2. If above alternative formula unacceptable to Chinese on nomenclature, then we would propose substituting "United States and Peoples Republic of China" for "Peiping and Washington". Second Chinese change acceptable. O'Neill's suggestion unacceptable.

3. Release can be made 1400 GMT July 24 or July 25 as soon as Chinese acceptance text confirmed in Washington.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/7-2355. Top Secret; Niact. Repeated for information to London eyes only for Aldrich.

<sup>2</sup> Document 311.



4. Above approved by President, and British requested convey to O'Neill immediately.<sup>3</sup>

Dulles

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<sup>3</sup> A message, addressed to the Foreign Office and dated July 23, bears notations indicating that it was signed by Dulles and delivered to a member of the British delegation at Geneva. It requested that O'Neill should be informed as follows:

"We accept second change proposed by Chinese. If they reject alternative formula on their first amendment, we would propose substituting 'United States and Peoples Republic of China' for 'Peiping and Washington' in our original draft.

"Release can be made 1400 GMT July 24 or July 25 as soon as final text confirmed both sides." (Department of State, Conference files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 515)

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**317. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (McConaughy), and the First Secretary of the British Embassy (Joy), Washington, July 24, 1955<sup>1</sup>**

**SUBJECT**

Proposed Talks with Chinese Communists at Geneva.

Mr. Joy telephoned me at 1:10 p.m. to report that the Embassy had just received a message from the British Chargé at Peiping. He quoted the message as stating that the Chargé (O'Neill) had seen the Chinese Communist Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs on the morning of July 24 local time and delivered the latest US message.<sup>2</sup> Joy said that he was certain that the message referred to was the one sent from Geneva. O'Neill reported that the Vice Minister rejected the compromise version suggested by the US which omitted reference by name to either party. O'Neill said he then put forward the second US suggestion which named the two countries involved. The Vice Minister stated that he would refer the proposal to the Foreign Minister immediately and communicate with the Chargé later in the day. The Vice Minister recognized that it was too late to release an announcement on July 24. He thought that there would be sufficient time for the release to be made at both places on July 25 at 1400 GMT. The Vice Minister told the Chargé that his government would mention the Chinese People's Republic first, and he assumed that the US government would mention the United States first.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-GE/7-2455. Top Secret. Drafted by McConaughy.

<sup>2</sup> The reference is apparently to the July 23 message as relayed to O'Neill; see footnote 3, *supra*.

Mr. Joy indicated that the British Chargé anticipated a very early acceptance by the Chinese Communists. He thought that a message to this effect might come through at any moment.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup> A memorandum of conversation by McConaughy, dated July 25, states that Joy telephoned him at 2:15 a.m. to report the receipt of a message from O'Neill stating that the Chinese had agreed to the U.S. proposal to refer to the United States and the People's Republic of China in the identic announcement. The Chinese wanted final reconfirmation of U.S. agreement to the text and to simultaneous release at 1400 hours GMT, July 25, and McConaughy told Joy he could so inform O'Neill. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/7-2555)

### 318. Telegram From the Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China<sup>1</sup>

*Washington, July 24, 1955—1:53 p.m.*

58. Eyes only Cochran. Appears probable that announcement on subject Deptel 42<sup>2</sup> will be made July 25 at 1400 GMT although complete agreement on text not yet reached. You should convey message quoted reftel to Foreign Minister immediately, asking him to treat it as classified until announcement released here. Text of an-

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/7-2455. Top Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted and approved for transmission by McConaughy; cleared in substance with Hoover.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 42 to Taipei, July 18, for Cochran from Robertson, transmitted a statement for Cochran's private information, stating that he would be instructed by telegram if and when it should be released to the Chinese Government. The statement reads in part as follows:

"Negotiations are under way through British Foreign Office channels for resumption of talks at Ambassadorial level in Geneva between US and Chinese Communist representatives. Talks would represent continuation at higher level of conversations between Consular representatives at Geneva which have taken place intermittently during past year. Primary object would be to settle matter of repatriation of civilians who desire to return to their respective countries. Anticipated that talks might facilitate further discussions and settlement of certain other practical matters now at issue between the two sides.

"Date of first meeting has not been settled. ChiComs proposed July 21 but US did not want any discussions to take place during Summit Conference therefore proposed Aug 1. US Ambassador to Czechoslovakia U. Alexis Johnson, who held talks on same subject with Chinese Communists at Geneva last year, is to be designated to represent US.

"Talks of course will not imply any degree of diplomatic recognition. US will not agree to discuss any matters involving claims, rights, or essential interests of Republic of China. Only matters of bilateral concern to US and Chinese Communists are to be discussed. US Government hopes that talks may result in release of all American nationals held in Communist China civilian and military." (*Ibid.*, 611.93/7-1855)

nouncement and Department's follow-up press release will be sent you niact soon as possible for advance delivery to Foreign Minister. <sup>3</sup>

Hoover

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<sup>3</sup> Sent in telegram 59 to Taipei, July 25. (*Ibid.*, 611.93/7-2555)

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### 319. Editorial Note

An identic announcement issued by the Governments of the United States and the People's Republic of China at 10 a.m. Washington time on July 25, reads as follows:

"As a result of communication between the United States and the People's Republic of China through the diplomatic channels of the United Kingdom, it has been agreed that the talks held in the last year between consular representatives of both sides at Geneva should be conducted on ambassadorial level in order to aid in settling the matter of repatriation of civilians who desire to return to their respective countries and to facilitate further discussions and settlement of certain other practical matters now at issue between both sides. The first meeting of ambassadorial representatives of both sides will take place on August 1, 1955 at Geneva."

A Department of State announcement issued at the same time stated that the talks held from time to time during the previous year in Geneva between United States and Chinese Communist representatives concerning the return to their respective countries of those civilians who desired to do so were to be resumed at the ambassadorial level. It stated that following Chou En-lai's announcement at Bandung that he was willing to have direct talks with the United States, "several governments have indirectly in Peiping and Washington explored the possibilities of such talks. It was suggested that it would be desirable to resume the Geneva talks at the ambassadorial level in the hope that this would bring about agreement on the return of U.S. civilians detained in China and facilitate further discussions and settlement of other practical matters now at issue. This may include U.S. reinforcement of the effort being made by the United Nations to secure the release of U.S. prisoners of war.

"It has been made clear that these talks, as in the case of all our prior discussions with the Chinese Communists, do not involve diplomatic recognition."

The complete text of the announcement is in the Department of State *Bulletin*, August 8, 1955, pages 219-220.

At a press conference on July 26, Secretary Dulles stated that the United States had proposed on July 11 to Chou En-lai that the talks that had been going on in Geneva should be "somewhat raised in level and enlarged in scope". It was made clear, he said, that the United States offer implied no diplomatic recognition and that "we were not prepared in any way in these talks to make arrangements which would prejudice the rights of our ally, the Republic of China." The Secretary referred to United States concern with the American civilians detained in China and interest in reinforcing the United Nations efforts to bring about the return of the American flyers, but, he continued,

"Of course, the basic thing is that which I pointed out in my press conference of April 26, namely, 'whether we must prepare for war in that area or whether there is apt to be a cease-fire in the area.'

"The United States believes that whatever may be the differences which now divide countries, these differences should not be settled by recourse to force where this would be apt to provoke international war. The United States has itself consistently acted on that belief. Wherever we give any military assistance, it is under the explicit condition that it will not be used for aggressive purposes. There is no doubt but what East Germany is part of Germany, but Chancellor Adenauer has given solemn assurance that he will not use force to unite his country. There is no doubt that North Korea is a part of Korea, but the security treaty which we made with the Republic of Korea makes clear that the United States will not extend its protection other than to areas which we recognize as having been lawfully brought under the jurisdiction of the Republic of Korea, and we do not believe that aggressive force is such a lawful means. There is no doubt but that North Viet-Nam is part of Viet-Nam, but we stated in connection with the Indochina armistice that we were opposed to any renewal of aggression to bring about the unification of Viet-Nam.

"Both the Republic of China and the Chinese People's Republic claim that the area held by the other is part of China. But in connection with the mutual security treaty which the United States made with the Republic of China, it was agreed that the Republic of China would not use force except as a matter of joint agreement, subject to action of an emergency character which was clearly an exercise of the inherent right of self-defense.

"We believe that the principle of nonrecourse to force is valid not merely for the United States and its allies but that it is valid for all.

"We shall hope to find out in the forthcoming talks whether the Chinese Communists accept the concept of a cease-fire in accordance with the United Nations principle of avoiding any use or threat of force which could disturb the peace of nations.

"No doubt the Chinese Communists will have matters of their own to bring up. We shall listen to hear what they are, and if they directly involve the United States and Communist China we will be disposed to discuss them with a view to arriving at a peaceful settlement.

"As President Eisenhower said last night,

" 'The United States will go to any length consistent with our concepts of decency and justice and right to attain peace. For this purpose we will work cooperatively with the Soviets and any other people as long as there is sincerity of purpose and a genuine desire to go ahead.'

"That is the principle which will govern the continuation of our talks with the Chinese Communists at Geneva."

At the same press conference, when the Secretary was asked about the possibility of a meeting between himself and Chou En-lai, which Senator George had suggested on the television show "Meet the Press" on July 24, he replied that he did not think there was currently any place for talks at the Foreign Minister level but that he did not exclude the possibility. His remarks on this subject were quoted in telegram 63 to Taipei, July 26. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/7-2655)

At President Eisenhower's press conference on July 27, the President responded to a question about the possibility of a meeting on the ministerial level as follows:

"Well, I couldn't guess at this moment as to a meeting at the ministerial level.

"I think you know the record of this whole project up to this moment. I read this morning Secretary Dulles' statement, so to my knowledge it is exactly accurate all the way through, what has come about, why we did raise this level of meeting, and sent Mr. Johnson to Geneva to carry it out.

"Now, what will come from there, what the next step will be, I am not quite sure."

A little later, in responding to another question concerning the ambassadorial talks, he said,

"We must find out, though, what they want to talk about. Then there would have to be a next advance; and it might be, as someone else suggested, eventually you have to go to a ministerial level of meeting to get these straightened out.

"I wouldn't know."

The complete transcript of the press conference is in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1955*, pages 731-744.

**320. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,  
Washington, July 27, 1955 <sup>1</sup>****SUBJECT**

China—Negotiations Beginning at Geneva on August 1st.

**PARTICIPANTS**

The Secretary  
Sir Roger Makins  
Mr. Barbour—EUR

In the course of a call on another subject the British Ambassador asked the Secretary whether he could give him any indication of the nature of the instructions which would be given to Amb. Johnson for the negotiations with the Chinese Communists at Geneva beginning on August 1. The Secretary said that the instructions have not yet been prepared and he has not in fact discussed their possible content in any detail with Asst. Secretary Robertson. Generally, however, he commented that the objective will be to focus on obtaining the release of American citizens in Communist China, the course of the negotiations to be determined to a considerable extent by the success achieved in that matter. If some progress is made, the Secretary thought that it might be possible to envisage some sort of an understanding as to a cease-fire in the Formosa Strait and other subjects which might be touched upon could be some arrangement for a neutral, that is probably Swedish, Swiss or International Red Cross, verification of the voluntary decisions of the Chinese students to remain in the U.S., obstacles to shipping (e.g., mine fields), and a relaxation of restrictions against Americans entering Communist China. The Secretary did not envisage that this meeting at Geneva would be of short duration but on the contrary assumed that it might well take a considerable length of time.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Wang-Johnson Talks. Top Secret; Personal and Private. Drafted by Barbour.

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**321. Editorial Note**

At a meeting of the National Security Council on July 28, during a briefing of the Council by Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles, there was some discussion relating to China. The relevant portion of a memorandum of the discussion reads as follows:

"Mr. Allen Dulles then asked Secretary Dulles to relate to the Council the Secretary's conversation with Premier Bulganin in Geneva. Secretary Dulles said Bulganin told him the USSR was no longer sending military equipment to China. Secretary Dulles, thinking he had misunderstood Bulganin, replied that we were aware that China was 'lousy' with MIG's and other equipment which could only have come from the USSR. Bulganin repeated his statement that no military aid was being extended by the USSR to China now. Bulganin added that considerable Soviet equipment had been sent to China, but that this had turned out to be a very expensive operation. He said only economic aid was now being given to China.

"The President interposed at this point to relate part of a conversation which he had had with Khrushchev. The President said he told Khrushchev the USSR should use its good offices to keep China from undertaking a course of action which would be disastrous for the entire world. Khrushchev replied that the President was probably right.

"The Director of Central Intelligence, commenting on Secretary Dulles' conversation with Bulganin, said that the Soviet leader was either lying, ignorant of the true situation, or that military aid to China had ceased the day the statement was made. Mr. Dulles then read a detailed listing of Soviet military aid shipped to China, including planes, ships, submarines, and aviation fuel.

"Secretary Dulles said there did exist the possibility of his having misunderstood Bulganin, because the interpreter was very poor. Possibly the interpreter had failed to distinguish between giving equipment and selling Soviet equipment to the Chinese." (Memorandum of discussion by Bromley Smith, July 28; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

For Dulles' memorandum of his conversation with Bulganin on July 21, see Document 313. No other record of the exchange with Khrushchev to which the President referred has been found in Department of State files or Eisenhower Library.

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**322. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, July 28, 1955<sup>1</sup>**

**SUBJECT**

Forthcoming Negotiations Between American and Chinese Communist Representatives at Geneva.

**PARTICIPANTS**

Dr. V.K. Wellington Koo, Ambassador, Chinese Embassy

Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary, FE

Ralph N. Clough, Acting Director, CA

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/7-2855. Secret. Drafted by Clough on July 29 and initialed by Robertson, indicating his approval.

Ambassador Koo said that he had just received a personal memo from Foreign Minister George Yeh for Secretary Dulles.<sup>2</sup> It had just been decoded and he expected to get it to Mr. Robertson before noon. He then summarized the contents of the message.

The Ambassador stated that he understood Ambassador Johnson would not be authorized to discuss anything involving the rights and interests of the Republic of China. Mr. Robertson assured him that he would not.<sup>3</sup>

The Ambassador then asked whether the question of a cease-fire in the Formosa Strait would be raised by us or be left to the Communists to bring up. Mr. Robertson replied that the President had been asked at a press conference last April his views concerning the cease-fire. He said at that time that the Communists must renounce the use of force in the attainment of their objectives.<sup>4</sup> When the Secretary was asked the other day<sup>5</sup> what were "other practical matters" which might be discussed at Geneva, he declared that one of these is the principle of the renunciation of the use of force.

The Ambassador asked whether Ambassador Johnson would be authorized to discuss a cease-fire, adding that this could not be an issue between the U.S. and Communist China since the forces of these two countries were not shooting at each other. Mr. Robertson replied that it was very much an issue since we have a Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of China which binds us to aid in the defense of Taiwan. If the Communists should attempt to take Taiwan by force, we would be bound to take action in accordance

<sup>2</sup> The message from Yeh to Dulles was transmitted in a note of July 28 from Ambassador Koo to the Secretary. Yeh's message expressed concern at the possibility of discussion of a cease-fire at the pending Geneva talks; it reads in part as follows:

"Our two Governments have a formal understanding that no major military action will be undertaken in this area by either of us except by mutual agreement. The withdrawal from the Tachens has not brought about peace. Aggressive action in the Taiwan Strait has come and can only come from Peiping. Any offer from your representative to discuss cease-fire is likely to invite further demands from Peiping.

"We shall abide by the understanding reached with you as our trusted ally, but may I emphasize again that any open cease-fire pledge on our part will destroy the very basis of our being and kill all hope of our brethren on the mainland for eventual liberation. I believe it is to our interest and yours to keep such hope alive. Our pledge to you must not be used or hinted at to trade for any Communist promise, which we know they will not honor. I shall much appreciate your assurance on this point." (*Ibid.*, 793.00/7-2855)

<sup>3</sup> A note dated August 28, from Sebald to Koo, acknowledged his July 28 note and confirmed Robertson's assurances that the United States was not prepared in the Geneva talks "to make arrangements would prejudice the rights of the Republic of China." (*Ibid.*)

<sup>4</sup> Reference is apparently to the Secretary's press conference of April 26; see Document 223.

<sup>5</sup> On July 26; see Document 319.



with our constitutional provisions and would find ourselves at war with the Chinese Communists.

The Ambassador inquired further what would follow if they should agree to renounce the use of force. Mr. Robertson replied that they have so far refused to do so, but if they should, it would mean that they would have to negotiate for territory they wanted rather than to take it by force. Of course, we could not enter into any such negotiation with respect to Taiwan except in company with the Government of the Republic of China. While the juridical status of Taiwan is in limbo, certainly the Chinese Nationalists have the best right to it of anyone.

The Ambassador interjected that the status of Taiwan had been determined by the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations which turned the islands over to the Republic of China. Mr. Robertson pointed out that it is just those declarations on which the Communists rely in pressing their claim to Taiwan. The Chinese Communists, and other Governments which recognize them, insist that they are the China referred to in those agreements, while we insist that it is the Republic of China.

The Ambassador asked whether he could inform his Government that we intend to raise the cease-fire question at the Geneva talks. Mr. Robertson replied that he would repeat the Ambassador's words to the Secretary. He emphasized that the chief cause of tension in the Far East is the threat of force and that by the renunciation of the use of force, tension could be relieved. He went on to say that we have today a divided Germany and a divided Korea. We believe in their unification but the American people are not willing to go to war to unite them. The same applies to China. The American people would not support a war against the Chinese Communists for recovery of the mainland. We are, of course, obligated by treaty to go to the defense of the Government of the Republic of China if it should be attacked. Furthermore, we believe that the GRC has a very important role to play as a symbol of freedom to millions of Chinese all over the world. We know that there is deep unrest on the mainland and we think that the GRC should hold itself in readiness to take advantage of developments, but we cannot support an armed conquest of the mainland. So far, both contending Chinese sides have refused to renounce force. The Ambassador asked again whether the cease-fire question would be raised at Geneva. Mr. Robertson replied yes, he expected so, although he emphasized that this was just a personal opinion. He said that we are still in the process of developing the tactics we will use at Geneva and it is impossible to say now what problems will come up. He referred to the Secretary's repeated statements that renunciation of the use of force was neces-

sary in order to release tension. He said that he would take up the question with the Secretary.

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323. Letter From the Secretary of State to Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson<sup>1</sup>

[Washington,] July 29, 1955.

MY DEAR AMBASSADOR JOHNSON: In your forthcoming talks at Geneva, Switzerland, with a representative of the Chinese Peoples Republic (CPR), you will be guided by the following considerations:

(1) The talks are a continuation of the talks held in the last year between representatives of both sides at Geneva.

(2) Through you and the appropriate representative of the CPR, the talks are now being resumed at the ambassadorial level.

(3) The agreed purpose of your talks is "to aid in settling the matter of repatriation of civilians who desire to return to their respective countries and to facilitate further discussion and settlement of certain other practical matters now at issue between both sides."

(4) You should seek agreement that the talks will be conducted in an atmosphere of privacy and that no other than routine public statements will be made regarding them, except as may be approved by both sides or after prior notification by one side to the other. The approval or notification from our side is to be authorized by the Department of State. In the main, you will discourage publicity about, and exaggeration of, the meeting.

(5) You may in your discretion meet socially with the CPR representative.

(6) It is, of course, understood that the conversations upon which you are to engage do not involve diplomatic recognition.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/7-2955. Confidential. The source text indicates that it was drafted by Dulles and handed to Johnson by Robert G. Barnes, Deputy Director of the Executive Secretariat, on July 30. A memorandum of conversation by Johnson, dated July 29, of a meeting that day with the President and the Secretary states that the President approved the draft instructions but records no further discussion relating to China. It is scheduled for publication in the Eastern Europe regional compilation in a forthcoming volume. Ambassador Johnson stated in an interview in 1966 that he read the instructions in draft at the Secretary's request and added some suggestions, which Dulles approved, and that at his meeting with the President, the latter gave the instructions only "a cursory glance". Johnson also stated that Secretary Dulles gave him oral instructions to keep the talks going as long as possible and that he "made a particular point of getting the Secretary's and the President's approval for taking the forthcoming personal attitude towards the Chinese which I did." (Transcript of interview with Johnson, May 28, 1966, pp. 21-33; Princeton University Library, John Foster Dulles Oral History Project)

(7) Since the scope of your talks is "practical matters now at issue between both sides", i.e., the U.S. and the CPR, you will not discuss issues which involve the rights of the Republic of China. If you are in doubt as to the practical application of this instruction, you will seek guidance from the Department of State.

(8) The U.S. is willing to talk about "other practical matters" than the repatriation of civilians because we do not want to have unnecessary differences with anyone if these differences can be honorably resolved.

(9) Direct talks have been preferred to carrying on discussions through intermediaries. The reason is that there is more apt to be misunderstanding when matters are dealt with through intermediaries; therefore, we believe direct dealings should, in the first instance at least, be tried.

(10) The first agreed purpose of the meeting is already the subject of bilateral talks, i.e., "settling the matter of repatriation of civilians who desire to return to their respective countries". You will seek immediate authorization to U.S. civilians to return to the U.S. You may point out that so long as American civilians are held under restraint on the mainland of China, there is bound to be ill feeling in the U.S. We are not, however, willing to promise political concessions to obtain their release. Only voluntary action by the CPR would really serve to remove the widespread resentment now felt in the U.S. because of the mistreatment by the CPR of U.S. citizens.

(11) You are authorized formally to assure the CPR representative that the U.S. does not impose restraints upon Chinese civilians who desire to return to the Mainland. The U.S. is prepared to authorize some mutually agreeable government through its embassy in the U.S. to assist Chinese students who desire to return to the China mainland and to be a medium for the transmission of funds required for this purpose.

(12) One of the "other practical matters now at issue between both sides" is the prisoners of war who were under the UN Command in Korea, and as to whom an initiative has been taken by the United Nations. The U.S. wishes to reinforce that initiative and you should raise this matter concurrently with the matter of the U.S. civilians. The considerations above (paragraph 10) alluded to in reference to U.S. civilians apply with equal or greater force with respect to the U.S. military, who are deemed covered by the Korean Armistice agreement.

(13) You may, if and as you deem appropriate, mention that if U.S. nationals, civilian and POW's, now held within China, are released that might facilitate the U.S. voluntarily adopting a less restrictive policy as to U.S. citizens going to the China mainland.

(14) As another of the "practical matters" which you should take up at a later stage of the discussions is the matter of assuring instructions which will prevent a repetition of such incidents as the shooting down of the Cathay Pacific airliner with death and injury to U.S. citizens.<sup>2</sup>

(15) You will also, at whatever times you deem appropriate, emphasize the deep concern of the U.S. in getting assurance that the CPR is prepared to renounce force to achieve its ambitions.

If the CPR representative contends that the use of force in the Formosa area is justifiable because this involves a domestic matter, i.e., the unification of China, you may point out that the fact of a divided China is not basically different from the fact of a divided Korea, Germany, and Vietnam. It could be argued in each of these cases that unification is purely an internal matter. But in reality resort to force would endanger international peace and security. The same applies to China. The U.S. believes that the principle of non-recourse to force is valid not merely for the U.S. and its allies, but for all.

(16) If the CPR questions the acceptance of the foregoing principle by the U.S. and its allies, you may in response point to the purely defensive character of our arrangements with the Republic of China, particularly exemplified in our 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty.

(17) If the CPR has practical matters at issue with the U.S. which they would like to bring up, you are authorized to take note of what the CPR representative has to say in this respect and report to me and await appropriate instructions.

(18) You will seek to arrange your talks with the CPR representative so that you will be able to return from time to time to your regular post at Prague, for I deem it important that the people of Czechoslovakia should not feel that the U.S. is disinterested in their fate, the fact being quite the contrary as the President has personally made clear to you. If you should feel that you cannot adequately discharge your responsibilities as Ambassador to Czechoslovakia and at the same time discharge your present special mission, you will promptly inform me.

Sincerely yours,

**John Foster Dulles**

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<sup>2</sup> Reference is to a British commercial airliner shot down on July 23, 1954, by two Chinese Communist fighter planes.

## 324. Editorial Note


On July 30, Premier Chou En-lai made a speech before the National People's Congress concerning the international situation and Chinese foreign policy. The text of his speech reads in part as follows:

"After the Korean armistice and the restoration of peace in Indo-China, the situation in the Taiwan area has become the most tense in the Far East. It must be pointed out that this tension has been caused by the United States' occupation of China's territory Taiwan and its interference with the liberation of China's coastal islands. This is an international issue between China and the United States. The exercise by the Chinese people of their sovereign rights in liberating Taiwan is a matter of China's internal affairs. These two questions cannot be mixed up. During the Asian-African Conference, the Chinese Government already proposed that China and the United States should sit down and enter into negotiations to discuss the question of easing and eliminating the tension in the Taiwan area. There is no war between China and the United States; the peoples of China and the United States are friendly towards each other; the Chinese people want no war with the United States, so the question of cease-fire between China and the United States does not arise. After the Asian-African Conference, the Chinese Government has further stated that there are two possible ways for the Chinese people to liberate Taiwan, namely, by war or by peaceful means. Conditions permitting, the Chinese people are ready to seek the liberation of Taiwan by peaceful means. In the course of the liberation by the Chinese people of the mainland and the coastal islands, there was no lack of precedents for peaceful liberation. Provided that the United States does not interfere with China's internal affairs, the possibility of peaceful liberation of Taiwan will continue to increase. If possible, the Chinese Government is willing to enter into negotiations with the responsible local authorities of Taiwan to map out concrete steps for Taiwan's peaceful liberation. It should be made clear that these would be negotiations between the central government and local authorities. The Chinese people are firmly opposed to any ideas or plots of the so-called 'two Chinas.'"

Concerning the pending ambassadorial talks, Premier Chou stated that, if both sides sincerely desired negotiation and conciliation, "It should be possible in the forthcoming talks at the ambassadorial level to reach, first of all, a reasonable settlement of the question of the return of civilians to their respective countries. The number of American civilians in China is small, and their question can be easily settled. . . . We are of the opinion that since there are no diplomatic relations between China and the United States at the present time, each of them can entrust to a third country the task of looking after the affairs of its civilians in the other country, and primarily the return of these civilians to their own country."

Noting that the ambassadorial talks were also to "facilitate further discussions and settlement of certain other practical matters now at issue between both sides", and referring to President Eisenhower's words quoted by Secretary Dulles at his July 26 press conference (see Document 319), he declared that if those words signified that the United States was prepared to cooperate with China, "the Sino-American talks at the ambassadorial level should be able to make preparations for negotiations between China and the United States for relaxing and eliminating the tension in the Taiwan area."

The complete text of the speech is in *People's China*, August 16, 1955, pages 3-8.



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
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
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