



LIBRARIES

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN-MADISON

International Voluntary Services miscellaneous memos. 1966/1969

[s.l.]: [s.n.], 1966/1969

<https://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/UPKFVSP247LSG8M>

This material may be protected by copyright law (Title 17, US Code).

For information on re-use see:

<http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/Copyright>

The libraries provide public access to a wide range of material, including online exhibits, digitized collections, archival finding aids, our catalog, online articles, and a growing range of materials in many media.

When possible, we provide rights information in catalog records, finding aids, and other metadata that accompanies collections or items. However, it is always the user's obligation to evaluate copyright and rights issues in light of their own use.

UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
TO LAOS



ACTION MEMO

No.66-134

June 1, 1966

TO : Distribution List

FROM : Joseph A. Mendenhall, Director *JAM*

SUBJECT: IVS/RD Role (Subject Index No. 220)

IVS/RD works in Laos under a contract with A.I.D. The Contractor, on behalf of the United States, renders technical advice and assistance to the Government of Laos.

In cooperation with the Cooperating Government, through the Ministry or the Commissioner of Rural Affairs, or his duly authorized representative, and under the general policy direction of the USAID Director, or his authorized representative, the Contractor provides personnel and advisory services in the planning and implementation of the program of rural development activities as selected jointly by the Cooperating Government, Contractor and USAID. Emphasis in rural development activities is given to rural self-help projects on a village or inter-village level designed to encourage local initiative and promote capabilities for organized community efforts leading to improved living conditions for villagers.

The IVS headquarters team is responsible for the overall policy, direction, fiscal and personnel support of field team members, the assignment of staff members in cooperation with the appropriate Ministry or service and USAID, and maintaining appropriate liaison with USAID and authorized representatives of the Commissioner. The Associate Chiefs-of-Party will maintain the above mentioned liaison between the field team members and IVS headquarters, USAID and the RLG Ministries and Services at the national level by regular field visits. They will be in a position to discuss programs at the local level with full knowledge of the thinking and goals of the RLG at the national level through their contacts with the Ministries and Services.

DISTRIBUTION: D and All IVS/RD Personnel

Team members working on Rural Development projects will work under the general policy guidelines of the ADRD and cooperatively under the general direction of the CDA, administrative organ of the AC. The Agricultural group (including home economists) who are assigned to work with USAID/Agriculture will work under the technical direction of the chief of that division. With appropriate Cooperating Country counterparts, team members will be involved, in planning and implementation of village development activities at the Muong, Tasseng, and village level. They will also, in accordance with their specialties and agreed upon program objectives, assist in making preliminary surveys of areas to be developed in order to determine the needs of the population and prepare recommendations for project plans and activities.

IVS Agriculturists will cooperate with the field personnel of the Cooperating Country's Agriculture and Veterinary Services by giving advice and assistance in planning and implementing agricultural extension programs in surrounding villages and developing agricultural training programs for village leaders, farmers and others.

IVS Home Economists will work cooperatively with the RLG Home Demonstration agents by giving advice and assistance in planning and implementing extension programs dealing with home sanitation, gardening, health and nutrition, sewing, handicrafts, etc. They will also cooperate in developing training programs for village women in the above fields.

IVS Nurses will cooperate with RLG Midwives and PMI Nurses through the Ministry of Public Health in developing and implementing programs of prenatal and child care. Training programs for village women will also be developed cooperatively.

IVS Constructionists will work with Fundamental Educators and other representatives by advising and assisting in the organizing and training of villagers to construct and repair public facilities such as schools, dispensaries, wells, water seal toilets, etc. They will also assist in the development of training programs for the various manual arts.

The IVS Generalists will work with the Fundamental Educators, CRA field personnel when available, local teachers and others as appropriate by giving advice and assistance in planning and implementing information programs including movies, bulletin boards, etc. They will assist local schools in the development of recreational facilities and programs. They will further advise and assist in other areas according to program needs and the particular skills of the individual volunteer.

The field team members will work cooperatively with the CDA, the appropriate RLG personnel and USAID technical divisions in developing and obtaining approval for all projects. To the extent possible IVS/RD will channel requests for project commodities through their RLG counterparts in an effort to strengthen the influence of the Lao Government over the Lao populace. When this proves impractical, the volunteers will request material support through the CDA.

The IVS/RD headquarters staff will strive for better cooperation and understanding with the RLG by direct contacts with the appropriate Ministries and Services in Vientiane. Unilateral programs carried on by IVS will be forbidden in areas where AC's, CDAA's, CDA's and/or appropriate RLG counterparts are present. In areas where counterparts are not present, IVS will conduct programs only with the full approval of the responsible USAID representative and in agreement with the Ministry or Service involved.

To : All IVS Team Members

August 22, 1966

From : Chet Brown, COP/IVS/ *CBW*

Subject: Memorandum from Arthur Gardiner, Executive Director, IVS.

The following memorandum was received from IVS/W and is being distributed for your guidance:

AID officials have expressed concern to IVS about a statement by a volunteer in the May issue of the IVS REPORTER, which indicated IVS volunteers were free, under certain circumstances, to oppose "U.S. Government Policy". In order to clarify this situation, we have agreed with AID on a statement of policy for the guidance for all of us in IVS. The statement reads:

Relationships of IVS Team Members
to U.S. Government Policy

IVS Team members are not government employees, nor are they necessarily qualified to speak on behalf of the U.S. government, nor authorized to do so, except in specific cases directly in the line of duty. IVS is not engaged in politics, either at home or abroad; its role is a limited one, involving only social or economic problems in the host countries.

IVS, however, in Laos and in Vietnam, is working by virtue of government contracts, and its activities must harmonize with U.S. Government policies in the broad sense. There is, therefore, an obligation on the part of IVS team members to endeavor to understand the nature of U.S. policy and to avoid actions or statements to outsiders, that might impair U.S. policy objectives. The best rule we can suggest is that we all focus on the constructive role of helping people in the host country, and keep comments, to non-IVS colleagues especially, always within the bounds of good taste and good sense. That is the least we can and must do in order to preserve the propriety of IVS relations with our principal, AID.

December 27, 1966

TO : Mr. Chet Brown, IVS Chief-of-Party/Vientiane.
FROM : Dennis R. Wilczek, IVS/ADO BP-Thakhek.
SUBJECT : Monthly Report: (December)

I. SIGNIFICANT ACCOMPLISHMENTS:

-We got the month of December off to a clean start, in Thakhek, by sweeping and fumigating out the warehouse, initiating the sale of ADO tools, and starting a new accounting system.

-The ADO Staff, along with the IVS/ADO assistants and several members of the RIG/Agr. staff held several pre rice purchase training sessions and meeting so everyone would be informed as to the purchase procedures, forms and approaches. Mr. Chath, RIG/Agr. Chief, contributed some very good suggestions.

-Close RIG/Agr. cooperation was shown several times in the last month, for example: the assistance of RIG/Agr. personnel in the distribution of rice sacks to the farmers and informing them of the impending ADO rice purchases. At the same time the ADO staff assisted the RIG/Agr. people in the emergency sorting and distribution of a newly arrive shipment of onion and garlic sets which were going bad in the warehouse.

-During the closing days of December, a slightly altered accountability system was set up to afford closer communications and accounting between the RIG/Agr. Chief and ADO.

II. SIGNIFICANT EVENTS:

-On 1, December, Mr. Free, of USAID/Agr., Mr. Chath, Chief of RIG/Agr. Khammouane, and myself held a conference on agriculture and future ADO projects and programs in this province. A report of our overall discussion and recommendations for the ADO tool program has already been submitted through Mr. Free to ADO/BC. Out of this same meeting also came the recommendation to ADO/BC for the base price of 47 kip per kilo for ADO rice to be purchased in the province. This recommendation was based on prior investigations by both the RIG/Agr. and ADO agents of the going price of paddy rice in both the Thakhek and Nong Bok Cluster areas. The final approval of this base price recommendation was slightly delayed because of the absence of the Chou Khoueng who was in Vientiane on business.

-On December, we gratefully received a much needed English language typewriter. A good deal of long overdue paper work can be facilitated as soon as we got it back from the typewriter repair shop.

-On December, Mr. Tom Kattel of ADO/BC stopped to spend a couple days in Thakhek on a field trip. Mr. Kattel interests included: relationships, accounting practices, and current and future ADO programs in Khammouane Province. As the result of Mr. Kattel's visit, we were given to understand that the major emphasis of this office for the time being will be the development of inter personal relationships between RIG/Agr. and ADO.

III. STATUS OF PROJECTS:

A. ADO Tool Sales:

- 1.) Tools sold.....
 - Watering Cans..... 20
- 2.) Cash income..... 6400 Kip

B. ADO Rice Purchase Program:

1.) No. Farmers contacted to date	80
2.) No. Sacks of rice purchased to date	225
3.) Total rice purchased to date	13,412
4.) Total rice collected to date	14,823
5.) Total kip spent for rice to date	724,370 Kip

-We still have the lower Non, Bok Cluster (2D) area to cover - by truck and by boat. We should be finished very shortly. We estimate a total collection of from 18 to 20 tons of seed rice.

IV. and V. PROBLEMS AND STATISTICS:

-We hope that ADO/BC is still considering pay raises for the ADO Secretaire Assistants. One man in Khamouane has worked for ADO for almost a year and a half and is still at the same salary. He has been promised a raise now for six months and is still waiting.

Commodities on hand:

Rice sacks	
Total seed rice	14,823 Kg
Tools:	
Machetes	
Watering cans	
Shovels	
Lao hoes	
Cash on hand.....	23, Dec. 6663,230 Kip

cc: ADO/ BC, Vientiane
Al Kramer, ACAA, Thk.
C. Stone, AG, Svkt.
D. Froe, Agr. Svkt.
B. Loran, IVS, Vto.
IVS/..
File

TO: All Forward Area Team Members

FROM: L. E. Haffner, Chief, Forward Area Program

As all concerned know, we have had a recent unfortunate episode involving the first IVS combat-type fatality in Laos. As is usual with such events, those that are intimately concerned or involved find themselves banging against emotional bullheads on a storm-tossed sea of rumors, fears, concerns, accusations and evaluations of purpose and objectives. I have spent much of my life dealing with such circumstances and have always found it worthwhile to bring the ship back steady on course by departing fancy for fact and taking stock of ourselves and the situation.

The death of the IVSer was a tragedy -- the same as the deaths of two-hundred and seventy-one other Americans killed during the same week in Vietnam. All lost their lives in the same war on different fronts that reflect our nation's international struggle for free peoples' survival against a system that does not recognize fair play or competition based on example and free choice.

The IVSer carried no gun nor was he engaged in offensive action against the enemy, but he was no less dangerous to them -- he was hitting them where it really hurt -- he was outselling the hell out of them by example and deeds. The Commies can never compete and win on this basis -- so they use the gun. We, in turn, revert to force to cover our peaceful efforts and the war continues. Whether it is the Marines, an UN Peace Force, or the FAR, the bullets snap as violently and it is a dangerous environment.

If any American feels that he can come to Laos and create his own quiet Nirvana and somehow become detached from the issues at stake, his personal American responsibilities and the risks attendant thereto, then he has either been highly misinformed or is naive beyond all reason -- or possibly both. Cheydleur was certainly not disoriented in regards the situation at Phakkania and his personal place in it. One of his last reports reflected a change in the security situation for the worse but he made no recommendation for any action other than maintaining our position in Phakkania. Our individual responsibilities as Americans for sharing equally the burdens of our nation's struggle are not apportioned based on pay, titles, attitudes, religion or race. However, by the same token, my American who is exposing himself to danger on behalf of his country is entitled to equal support and consideration for his well being regardless of pay, titles, attitudes, religion or race. That perhaps is what this letter is about.

We haven't identified yet whether the Phakkania incident reflected a definite Vietnamese policy of going after rural developers in Laos as they are doing in Vietnam. The Dong Hene area has always experienced the presence of particularly vicious Commie leadership, as exemplified by the massacre of two busloads of civilians last year. Perhaps the Phakkania incident was more of the same. However, if it is established that there is now a policy of violence directed specifically against Americans in Laos, then an entirely new spectrum has been added to our struggle and major changes will have to be made in our tactics, techniques and procedures for dealing with the situation. Until such changes are necessitated, we will assume we are still on the same course in our programs.

It should be noted here, however, that regardless of precaution taken at any time or place, no persons or area in a war situation such as in Laos can be assured positive safety against attack. The enemy strikes at times and places of his choosing and under circumstances favorable to his efforts. He cases the situation, determines the routine, bides his time and moves with the advantage of surprise. He did this at Phakkanda; he has also done the same thing at the vast fortress of Da Nang and the airfield at Bien Hoa. This is the nature of the ball game, and the best we can do in picking our Forward Area sites is to consider all facets of security and conclude we can go in and operate under conditions of a reasonable calculated risk. In the consideration of these facets of security, we are dependent upon current intelligence. This is intelligence made up from raw information picked up at the local level and also from civil and military briefings at the headquarters level. Given the nature of the war and the mobile and offensive makeup of the enemy, our batting average has been good in the collection of information and the subsequent development of intelligence. Intelligence on a given piece of real estate and on the small mobile enemy units within cannot be perfect, but our record has been good with the work of professional people we have in the field, as well as your constant ear to the ground.

Forward Area Team members, with few exceptions, are not militarily trained and oriented. They have not been brought into the profession to engage in military combat action, not even for purposes of survival. In fact, in accordance with international law, as reflected in the rules of land warfare, their being armed for participation against opposing military forces while they are civilians and not in uniform, or wearing markings easily identifiable as military combatants, can cause them to be subjected to the severest reprisals if captured. This is something all USAID members should be aware of when they run around carrying a weapon in the back country. Many Americans prefer to run the risk of going down in a shoot-out rather than being captured and allowed to rot in a cage on the Plain des Jarres, but they should at least be aware of the entire extent of the ramifications of being armed civilians in combat areas before they decide to carry a weapon. In any event, IVSers and other non-military Americans should not be deployed to danger areas where their safety depends upon their participation in armed action. This has been thoroughly considered in all cases in the Forward Area Program and in the orientation of FA Team personnel. I reiterate again, that your involvement with the military in some local episode does not require your participation as a combatant. For example, your bug-out instructions stress as a primary course that you join the

local military garrison headquarters and move with them until USAID can pick you up. While there, it is perfectly permissible and advisable for you to serve in some non-combatant helpful capacity as a first-aid assistant, etc.,

All Forward Area Teams who have to use airlift as their primary means of communications to and from their posts have been issued small survival kits containing the essentials for first aid and minimum food requirements for a few days in the open. Keep your kits complete by requesting replacement items from the Group Chief. IVS also has a pamphlet on survival instructions pertaining to Laos. If you haven't become familiar with it, do so. All Forward Area Teams involved with aircraft support have air-ground radios. Keep them operable and readily available at all times -- they are one of your major survival items. All Forward Area Teams not on main lines of communications have been given specific bug-out instructions. In most cases, these have been verbal and based on the local defense and terrain situation. In practically all cases they are the same, and I will cover them again to refresh your memory. In the event of brewing enemy action, let us know by SSB, couching your conversation in the simplest terms, i.e. "We anticipate a visit any minute from the boys out in the bush. We are going up and join the colonel in the fort. We will keep you informed by SSB or via the FAR military channel." This action was taken twice at Muong Het last winter and is typical also of one incident at Xieng Lom and the recent episode at Nam Bac. In the case of a sudden attack against your area, walk -don't run - to the military garrison which, in all but one FA Team area, is close by. I say walk, because the soldiers are jittery and trigger-happy in a shooting episode. If you should be cut off from the garrison or for any other reason have to take to the wilderness, remember your instructions. Attempt to grab your survival kit and air-ground radio. In any event, if it is dark, move only far enough into the jungle to hide. At the crack of dawn, move carefully away from the direction of enemy attack, avoid villagers, stay under cover, and when you have moved at what you consider a safe distance from the troubled area, find an open spot (slash-and-burn plot, etc,) and wait for the sound of an approaching aircraft. Remember, we are going to come looking for you with everything available.

When you hear or see the aircraft, use your radio if you have it, or make a signal with your underclothes and get their attention. From that point on, you have been located and your rescue is imminent - more than likely via chopper. If you are in a mountainous area try to pick your rescue site on as high a ground as possible.

As far as radio communications are concerned, don't forget your daily check in, and inform the Area Coordinator and Vientiane operator whenever you are going off the air. If your radio breaks down, come on out by any means available. If more than one day goes by and we haven't seen or heard from you, we will come back in and find out why. Don't forget, all FA Team radios can talk directly to Vientiane and check in at regular times. However, don't hesitate to call in at any hour of the day or night if you are in trouble. Ask for me at my house, which you have all done at one time or another, or ask for Tom Dunton at Leeville. We are the victims of an erratic phone system, so if you can't get us, then ask for Mr. Layson or Mr. Ostertag, his relief, who can be reached at their quarters via radio. Remember, when you make a report of trouble to us down here, we will see that it triggers certain action by support agencies -- air support, attache offices, RO, etc., as necessary to respond to your situation.

Unfortunately, the one flaw in the system is the fact that your immediate closest support echelon, the Area Coordinators, do not maintain an around-the-clock SSB watch. However, by the time you get this letter, certain arrangements will have been made to enable you and us to switch into some alternate channel - perhaps the attache channel - and get the word to the Area Coordinator concerned so that whatever coordination is necessary at that level can be worked out.

As far as enemy intelligence is concerned, we have always had a fairly effective close-in intelligence capability at the result of the FA Teams keeping their ears close to the ground with the villagers and the local military. Keep going with this process and get the villagers thoroughly oriented towards the idea that if they turn their backs on us in the matter of safety, we will move to some other area and bring wells and dams to people who are as concerned with our well being as we are with theirs. This is the one thing that is still foggy about the Phakkania incident. Where were the villagers while hundreds of PL/VM organized and moved through the area towards the target?

We are going to establish immediately a better system of disseminating pertinent enemy intelligence from above down the line to USAID personnel concerned in the field. This will have to be handled primarily at the Area Coordinators' level.

Well that's about it gents - the Forward Area Program continues steadily onward. Some sites will close out this year, others will probably phase into clusters, and we are sighting in on some new areas.

The Forward Area Program hasn't yet been rocked off course by the recent unfortunate incident -- in fact, we are somewhat wiser, more resolute and, like all veterans, more professional. Enemy action on several fronts has buffeted our efforts, but we get stronger by adversity -- so the hell with ho and Go - Go - Go!

Re-issue October 20, 1967
IVS/Vte:PBasler:sp

UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
TO LAOS



ACTION MEMO

No. 67-050

February 1, 1967

TO : All CDAA's and CDAs

FROM : Joseph A. Mendenhall, Director *JAM*

SUBJECT: Program Planning (Subject Index No. 1000)

I want to reiterate our policy that CDAA's and CDAs should maintain continuing contact with the IVSers at their levels in program and project planning and submission. All proposals put forward by IVS colleagues should receive appropriate consideration in this planning process. The IVSers are part of the U.S. family in the Rural Development field and should always be made to feel that they are in on the program and project take-offs as well as landings.

If there are IVS program and project suggestions which, after due consideration of all factors, including relative priorities for the use of limited resources, you feel cannot be recommended, the IVSers can propose these projects to the Chief of Party IVS/RD for further consideration with appropriate USAID officials in Vientiane. You will, of course, be fully consulted in any such instances before any final USAID decision is reached.

DIST: F
ADRD
IVS/RD

INTERNATIONAL VOLUNTARY SERVICES IN LAOS
(Community Development Principles)

Bob Lovan
Associate Chief-of-Party

A 1948 Rural Development conference at Cambridge University brought into popular usage the term "community development." They defined their term as "...a movement designed to promote better living for the whole community." But, if this initiative is not spontaneously forthcoming it is sought through the use of techniques for arousing and stimulating the community's active and enthusiastic response to the movement. Thus, community development can and should be a dynamic force leading to economic improvement, social advancement, and orderly political growth.

In 1957 a VARDIA (voluntary agency for rural development administration) contract was signed with the old United States International Cooperation Administration (now the Agency for International Development) providing for seven teams of seven members each. (Several years later an education team under a separate contract began work at the Sisavang Vong University --- Dong Dok.) These original seven member teams were directed by area team leaders under the general guidance of a Chief-of-Party stationed in Vientiane. The first team of six agriculturists were stationed at an isolated post in Xieng Khouang province. This original approach was a pretty loose concept in which uncoordinated programs grew and limped along. Former team member (1958 - 1962) and Chief-of-Party (1963 - 1965), Walt Coward once remarked that "...back in '58 USAID pretty well considered the IVS team as just a bunch of religious nuts up on the Plaine des Jarres."

Starting in 1961, team strength began to grow and by 1963 IVS numbers in Laos quadrupled. In 1963, USAID began committing more personnel and material to the development of Laos, and the "cluster village" program got under way. At this time more RLG personnel such as Fundamental Educators, Home and Agriculture Extension Agents, and Veterinary Agents were sent to the field. Consequently the original seven member IVS teams operating out of provincial centers were replaced by small teams of two to three IVS'ers and moved into areas where there were natural economic groupings of from five to twenty villages. In 1965, due to the need to diversify to meet the needs of other Lao villages, IVS/RD was asked to send IVS'ers to "forward areas." These areas are usually recently freed from Phathet Lao control and have become relatively secure. Thus, throughout this transition period an integrative approach on a national scope was developed and co-ordinated through the technical services. This integrative approach provides for a large scale technical and financial commitment involving a structure of co-ordinating bodies at each administrative level of government -- RLG and USAID.

This evolution of the Rural Development program brought into existence on a national scale a structure through which community development principles could be used to attempt to bridge the gap between the more affluent people of the cities and the rural population; to overcome traditional suspicions and hostilities between peoples and areas; to foster civic responsibility; and bring about political maturity through experiences in co-operative decision making and action on all levels. To achieve this, local development seeks to up-grade and instrument the motivations and aspirations of the people, to integrate them with national aims and efforts, and to assure social, political and economic evolution through popular involvement in directing and carrying out change.

To illustrate the tremendous potential impact of community development work in developing countries such as Laos, J.D. Mezirow is quoted concerning what he had to say about Nehru's "Silent Revolution."

The ascent of community development as an international movement during the last decade has been little short of spectacular. The quest for a democratic social technology to constructively involve their rural populations in the economic and political processes of nation building has led more than four score of the newly developing countries to foment what Nehru has called "the Silent Revolution." Community development has been ardently championed on every continent as the most practical means of translating the ideological promise of Western democracy into specific attitudes of behavior change in the closed society of traditional village life.

In translating this ideological promise to the villagers the major emphasis should be placed upon those activities for the improvement of the basic living conditions of the community including the satisfaction of some of the villages' non-material needs - health, education, and recreational facilities. In all communities there are resources which can be tapped if the people want to and know how. Often the motivating factor is in the village and idle much of the year. The motivating factor can take the form of hoarded savings; contributions of land and locally available materials; intimate knowledge of the local environment which can be used to complement technical knowledge brought in from the outside; and the local leadership potential. There is in all developing countries under-employed manpower (not unemployed manpower) which can be marshalled in the creation and increase of community assets such as roads, wells, fish ponds, schools, libraries, and community centers. Even if a fraction of the available surplus labor of the rural manpower is marshalled, this voluntary contribution not only will greatly reduce costs, but most important show the villagers what they can accomplish from within their own communities and give them the experience of organizing an effort and working together for mutual civic advancement.

Community development should depend upon things supplied and developed from within, rather than depend solely upon benefits supplied from without. Concern with balance and integrated development of the whole community life implies the integration or co-ordination of technical specialities with planning based upon the "felt" needs of the people. There should be a central concern for identifying, encouraging, and training local leadership and provisions for technical assistance in the form of personnel, equipment, and materials. In so doing an effective community development program will provide the national services with up-to-date information on the wants and needs of the people, and inform the people what national services are available and how they can be obtained.

Again, it should be understood that the basic education of the populace in democratic participation in discussions of co-operative problem solving will in time stimulate material development through the use of latent and unused, or underused labor, skills, and/or knowledge.

There are important factors that in haste are often overlooked in the use of the tools of community development. The cultural factor of religion is one such important factor. Space will not allow any lengthy comment, but by way of illustration a few factors are presented.

Buddhism in Laos is of the Theravada (Hinayana - lesser vehicle) school which is also known as Ceylonese Buddhism. This particular school of Buddhism rejects study and examination and allows many superstitions to live side by side. It is entirely exempt from philosophic speculation. The prevailing individualism of Lao Buddhist life and its implicit emphasis on personal responsibility for self is reflected in the lack of overt guidance the young Lao child receives. Punishment takes the form of shame - "no child of mine would behave that way," rather than sin - "that conduct is wicked." Also, the worth of surplus goods to the Lao lies in the potential it gives him for satisfying his two foremost concerns: religious merit and pleasure. Giving, feasting, and gaiety are not only pleasurable to the Lao, but eminently logical as well. To the Lao the most readily grasped of the Buddhist tenets is its central purpose of eradicating suffering, and pleasure is evidence of success. Thus, it must be kept in mind that communities are highly integrated units held together by religious affiliation, agricultural activity in a contiguous territory, and strong consciousness of identity. Community development must involve all of the community aspects and take into consideration the effects of change in one area upon those in another.

These principles of community development provide the media through which IVS as an organized group of young volunteers can make an important contribution to international good-will. A commitment made through a private, non-profit, non-denominational, service program which the people of the host country want and in which they will participate. While the IVS focus is centered on direct personal contacts, the IVS volunteer has the benefit in Laos of the support of the United States Diplomatic and Aid Missions.

As long as IVS is not swallowed by the larger agencies, the USAID - Embassy support enhances IVS effectiveness. In so doing the IVS team member assists the local population to identify their needs and to obtain & use the assistance available through the RIG & USAID. This IVS assistance at the local level implements & expedites the use of USAID materials & technical resources. Thus, IVS'or goals & motivating principles differ only slightly from those of the Embassy & USAID the difference being more a matter of emphasis than definition. But when the USAID-Embassy principles are transformed into written programs and blown-up by a multi-million dollar budget, the seemingly subtle disparities between the two positions are often thrown into striking relief. These subtle disparities are likely to exist between any two groups for community development approaches will often lead to incompatibilities and conflicts in administration, planning, and evaluation. With this in mind IVS'ers should be a group of thinking, acting, and responsible individuals.

Following are some community development principles as set forth in short statements taken from the U.N.'s bulletin; Social Progress Through Community Development. In application they can be greatly expanded upon.

- Activities undertaken must correspond to the basic needs of the community; first projects should be initiated in response to the expressed needs of people.
- Local improvements may be achieved through unrelated efforts in each substantive field: however full and balanced community development requires concerted action and the establishment of multipurpose programs.
- During the initial stages of development changed attitudes in people are as important as the material achievements.
- Community development aims at increased and better participation of the people in community affairs, re-vitalization of existing forms of local government and transition towards effective local administration where it is not yet functioning.
- The identification, encouragement and training of local leadership should be a basic objective in any program.
- Greater reliance on the participation of women and youth in community projects invigorates development programs, establishes them on a wide basis, and secures long-range expansion.
- Implementation of a community development program on a national scale requires: adoption of consistent policies, specific administrative arrangements, recruitment and training of personnel, mobilization of local and national resources, and organization of research, experimentation and evaluation.

-- Economic and social progress at the local level
necessitates parallel development on a wider national scale.

It was not the purpose of this study to answer any questions, but rather to raise questions and ideas to the reader. If this has been accomplished and the answers are actively pursued in field application, then a positive step has been made. Possibly some of your own statements and ideas appear in the study; if so, no intent at plagiarism was meant nor an attempt made to present all material as that of the writer's. Two books were used as reference works: Social Progress Through Community Development, bulletin of the U.N.'s Bureau of Social Affairs; and Dynamics of Community Development by Jack D. Mezirow.

IVS/RD:BLovan:sp
3/20/67

ROLE OF THE IVS VOLUNTEER

Because of the many and varied tasks assigned to IVS volunteers, it is extremely difficult to define precisely what is expected of him. But for the purpose of better administration it becomes necessary to outline in general terms certain points of emphasis in order that the volunteer be aware of and understand certain areas of expectation.

1. FUNCTION:

For the new IVS team member who has joined IVS to work with his hands in the field with the people the channels of bureaucracy are time-consuming and coldly impersonal. But also the new team member may be naive to the many pitfalls which have caused those channels to be formed. It is imperative that IVS team members be aware of and follow the channels of communication set up for them for development of projects and planning-level contact with both USAID and RLG officials. Our Associate Chiefs of Party know these channels and can tell you what to do. Let them take the responsibility for direction - this will keep you out of trouble. One good rule to remember: avoid making commitments until it is certain they can be fulfilled.

It is important that the team member learn to distinguish his role as that of community development technician from that of an ordinary technician. A community development technician, while concentrating on projects within his special field of training, must understand the human motivation and social system factors for greater assurance of success in his work. The major hurdle, as any agriculture extension man will say, before he can achieve his goals is human acceptance of new methods and ideas, which is in addition to the natural hurdles of the development of these methods and ideas in a new environment as is the primary concern of the ordinary technician. But when one looks at his future and the jobs available to him. He finds that actually very few jobs are for technicians in the true sense of the word, that each position of higher responsibility calls for an increased understanding of these very factors of human motivation and social system.

This experience as an IVS community development technician therefore becomes a very valuable asset in future work, particularly if one wishes to continue in overseas work. It is in this light that IVS hopes the volunteer will approach his job.

2. CONTACT WITH THE LAO

The expression that we are "guests in someone else's house" has a special meaning for the volunteer overseas. A missionary located in a rural area in Laos said recently, "One rash impolite act to these people take years to make them forget." It is important for us to recognize that we are invited to come to Laos by the government, and that we should make every proper effort to be respectable guests.

Cultural shock is defined very descriptively in The Overseas American but no description seems to bring home its real meaning to the new arrival in a foreign country. Perhaps the word shock is misleading because it indicates strong and sudden emotional reaction to visual experiences. It may be better understood to say that cultural shock is not simply the definition for the expression of open-mouthed disbelief at a villager, cooking a jungle lizard alive over a small fire in preparation for the evening meal, but that it is much more comprehensive and encompasses everything related to becoming accustomed to a new environment.

One of the first cultural shocks for the newcomer to Laos is the apparent lack of initiative and industriousness on the part of many Lao people. The immediate reaction is to lose respect for the Lao causing an offensive attitude bordering on contempt which can seriously prejudice working relationships and tend to precipitate withdrawal from working with the Lao. The sooner this attitude can be overcome the faster a person is ready to approach his work constructively and make a contribution. It takes little time in the field to see that few people are busier than the Lao farmer maintaining himself on his subsistence economy. It also doesn't take much study to see that the attitude of the people is a product of their low levels of education and economy. If the Lao were the way we would want them to be, then we wouldn't have any reason for being here.

The team member's closest contact with the Lao is with his interpreter assistant. His interpreter-assistant is the first person with whom he has a working relationship, and from whom he receives his first impressions of what it is (like) to work with Lao people. It is this person who is also the first to bear the brunt of any cultural shock frustrations on the part of his American partner, which are often the results of the American's own mistakes and lack of patience. It is in this working relationship with his interpreter-assistant or with his counterpart in the RLG that it is most necessary to heed the first advice he hears upon coming to Laos, that of the requirement to have "patience, more patience, and still more patience." It is only through patience and understanding, no matter how difficult it may be, that good working relationships and warm friendships can develop.

It is very easy to pass the blame for mistakes or mis-understandings by saying, "my interpreter wasn't any good." What we ask in IVS is for each team member to rationally evaluate his actions by saying to himself, "Is there anything I could have done differently which would have made things turn out better?"

His assistant will be hurt if ordered to work like a coolie, but will pitch in willingly if he is to work side-by-side with the volunteer at coolie-type work or if he is asked politely to do the work.

Remember, our interpreter-assistants and counterparts are hosts in the country in which we are guests.

3. ATTITUDE TOWARD WORK:

It is necessary to develop a positive attitude toward our work in order to become maximally effective. The motto we've found best to use is, "Make the best of what you have with what is available." A great many obstacles challenge the volunteer, both technical and social, many of which are a combination of both. These obstacles, although quite different from those we have experienced at home, are not unsurmountable and with thought and communication can be compromised or avoided. Even negative results have positive value, and must be considered in that manner to guide future efforts.

Each problem needs to be approached constructively. If it is a problem which can only be solved by the team member himself, he should make the best use of the local resources he can. His assistants or counterparts can be very valuable if he is willing to use them. If the problem needs to be referred to someone else for help then the words of an USAID administrator become a valuable guide, "What I appreciate is a written statement describing all the factors relating to a problem, attempted solutions, results, and at the end a list of recommendations which may lead to a solution."

A valuable tool in convincing other people of the merits of a project or the importance of a problem is to present them with written documents (proposals, memos, etc.) The person of responsibility must know the pertinent details of a situation in order to make a judgment. In any situation, whether it be a problem or a project proposal, if it can be outlined clearly and thoroughly in writing, this person is then provided the material he needs to make his decision. Writing thoughts, ideas, problems, etc. on paper serves two purposes: it helps organize and correlate a person's own thoughts toward a specific project or problem, and it established a definite source of reference which can be evaluated and acted upon. Good and frequent communication is the most valuable aid to progress.

One significant difference between the job with IVS in Laos and a job back home is the lack of direct and constant technical supervision. Although this is true for overseas work in general, it particularly applies to the rural development technician. It is a part of his job description to determine projects on the basis of the needs and interests of the people. Although IVS and USAID provide a certain amount of direction, it is not near as much as they would like, and much is dependent upon the initiative of the individual, Chapter nine in The Overseas American deals with this subject very adequately, and the italicized print on page 133 is an excellent summary. For a person who uses his initiative resourcefully and is able to adapt himself to his working environment successfully, many opportunities present themselves both during time of service with IVS and for future work. In general USAID technicians are limited in their personal contact with the basic problems in the field, and they depend upon us to relay pertinent information to them. If an IVS technician, for instance, can gather data leading to the establishment of a project, then follow through to some degree of accomplishment, he has made a valuable contribution and is recognized for it. An effective technician, however, is not one who charges ahead arbitrarily, but one who makes use of all sources available to him and follows channels by consulting those in positions of responsibility. This is the person who is most likely to succeed. For those who do succeed, the future is bright; experienced technicians are in demand for overseas work.

4. PERSONAL CONDUCT :

In general it would suffice to say that we expect IVS personnel to conform to strong moral principles and high personal standards in keeping with IVS tradition and the IVS image in Laos. In addition, we expect the volunteer to be interested in his work, the people about him including their customs, religious activities, and personal interests, the activities of IVS, USAID, RIG and other related missions, the political situation and its implications, and be able to seek information relative to these areas of activity. It is often necessary to be aware of activities in related areas in order to properly exploit one's own field. Also, by exhibiting this interest, the technician gives IVS increased confidence in him to carry out his activities in the field.

Finally, we expect the team member to have respect. For good working relationships conducive to maximum effectiveness it is essential to respect fellow team members, RIG officials, interpreter-assistants, USAID technicians, the IVS headquarters staff, and the Lao people themselves. It is very easy to find fault with administrators and people in other offices, but it should be remembered that each office or person making a decision makes it on the basis of a number of facts relevant to the situation at hand which are not ordinarily understood by the casual observer. Until these relevant facts are understood, it is wise to maintain proper respect and not be critical.

IVS has high expectations of each volunteer who is sent overseas. Because of the level of his work, he experiences a much more abrupt change from life and work at home than higher level overseas administrators, but his willingness to accept these difficulties enables him to seek constructively his most effective use at his assigned post. He works with a cheerful attitude equally well with his Lao acquaintances and his fellow Americans, and is able to follow direction when given. He conducts himself in a respectful manner so that when he has successfully completed his tour, his many friends will help him step out into a career which we hope will be enhanced by his IVS experiences.

IVS/RD:BLovan:sp
3/28/67

To : Members of the Orientation Planning Committee
From : Chip Smith, IVS/Vientiane
Subject : End-of-tour report on the Orientation and Language Training Program.

I. Purpose of the report

This report is intended primarily for those who will plan the IVS orientation and language training programs to be held later in the year. Most of the discussion is directed toward the longer program, the one expected to begin in October and last from eight to ten weeks. But many of the ideas will be applicable to the short September program also. The hope is that the planners will be able to use this material as a point of departure for their deliberation.

My job has more or less been to hunt up, sort, and group the many ideas contributed by IVSers and a few outsiders into what seems a workable pattern. Unavoidably, evidence of my personal biases crops up repeatedly, and to this extent the report is definitely mine. More important, however, is the fact that the content has developed out of IVS as a whole, and thus the ideas must be identified with IVS and not with some particular individual. In similar fashion later in the year, it will be a united IVS which will collect the praise and the criticism when the final version of this exciting, responsible plan is put into action.

II. Significance of the Orientation and Language Training Program (a digression)

The arguments for holding a full language and orientation program in Laos have been reviewed often. Usually such discussions hinge on whether Lao or Washington is better suited for the undertaking; and, thus, the major issue is skirted, touched on only briefly if mentioned at all. That issue can be simply stated: IVS's responsibility for improving the quality of individual performances in the field.

Awareness and acceptance of this responsibility has developed steadily but in piecemeal fashion, over the past few years. The reliability and efficiency of logistic support is far better now than two or three years ago. To this early example of the trend can be added several others: (1) the shift from Team Leaders to ACOP's, with the latter's responsibilities in personnel placement and in maintaining open communication (although in practice communication has been concerned almost exclusively with logistic problems); (2) the move toward closer IVS-RLC counterpart relations on all levels and, consequently, toward a more meaningful identity for IVSers in the field; and (3) the establishment of a Program Committee, an act which reaffirms IVS's responsibility for its own organization and activities, and its concern for issues related to IVS goals in Laos.

Recently, moreover, awareness of still another responsibility has been developing. And this one is at the most fundamental level. All the other changes have involved the IVSer's environment; the aim has been to improve support, counterpart relationships, communication and planning. Attention is now being turned to the IVSer himself. Gains made here will be automatically reflected in each of the areas previously treated separately. A more highly qualified IVSer will make better use of support materials and services; will have smoother counterpart relations, will have more to say and the patience to get it across, and will be more thorough and sensible in arranging his program.

To date this challenge has been only half-acknowledged. Recruitment is mostly a negative process, ruling out those who simply won't make the grade. Also, no real commitment has been made by either Washington or Laos to provide IVSers with the basic skills and attitudes essential for success in the field, working with the RIG and USAID. The first important step is recognition--to say, These attempts have not been enough. IVS-Laos has taken that first step and is presently moving against the situation on two fronts. The cry has gone up that IVS-Washington must actively seek out more qualified people, that they attack the personnel problem positively. And in Laos, once the necessity for more and better training was affirmed, the question of location was grappled with and Laos was selected.

The fundamental responsibility, therefore, has been recognized and action is being taken. Important also is the fact that an amorphous group awareness of group responsibilities is slowly, noticeably hardening into a composite of individual IVSers' recognition, acceptance, and desire to act. The orientation program being discussed here is based on the stated willingness of field team members to participate in all phases of the undertaking. The gap between administration and those whom the administration serves is being attacked from both sides.

When field personnel have often been satisfied to officially register their complaints or, in private, to finely detail their list of frustration, they are now turning their attention to the general measures required to improve their individual situation. It is important that the administration team member gap be closed. Field people hold the experience and the close-range knowledge of specific situations. Administrators have the time, a wider, less obstructed view, and access to policy-making levels of USAID and the RIG. The conclusion: Effective communication between the two groups should result in more informed, more efficient performance on both levels. To date, the emphasis in this respect has been placed on the Vientiane staff's getting out to the field, and this objective has been pursued with some success. It is now important that field personnel complement the previously one-side effort by becoming administrators themselves part of the time. Involvement in the orientation program is a significant step in this direction. Field representation on the Program Committee and the anticipated formation of study groups in several project area are important also.

As a result of these efforts, IVSers are beginning to wake up. Responsibility for improved performance in the field together with its various sub-concerns is beginning to catch their attention and imagination. IVS-the fuzzy, overall image of the organization suggested by its policies, procedures, and the action of a few exposed people - has hinted for some time that a trend was developing. Now it is IVSers who demonstrate the trend. The idea and

attitudes are taking hold in a way that will yield results. IVS-as a group of thinking, acting responsible individuals - is approaching maturity.

And with maturity will come rewards as well as the burden of continuing responsibility. As IVS makes use of its accumulated experience to improve field performance through effective communication, thorough self-criticism and program planning, and, most importantly, by means of a practical, relevant, and determined orientation and language training program - only then can it really expect to win the general respect of USAID policy-makers and the RIG.

A skilled, responsible worker in a difficult and relatively unpopular position can make himself all but indispensable. A skilled, responsible, and indispensable worker will be sought out for his opinion and cannot be ignored when he urges change - especially when he is fifty or seventy workers and not just one. IVS's goals and motivation principles differ only slightly from those of the Embassy and USAID, the differences being more a matter of emphasis than definition. But when the Agency-Embassy principles are transformed into written programs and blown-up by a multi-million dollar budget, the seemingly subtle disparities between the two positions are thrown into striking relief. It becomes clear that IVS would be morally culpable as well as simply foolish if it did not strive determinedly for the power to influence policy-making in accordance with IVS experience and conviction.

To pursue this goal, however, demands thoughtful perseverance, a keen pragmatic as well as moral sensibility, and, primarily, the courage to act. The alternative course is a far, far easier one: unprovocative, busy inaction. It is the dilemma of this fundamental decision which gives the current discussions of the orientation program an extra dimension, an added significance.

III. Organization

A. Overall responsibility rests with the two Chiefs-of-Party. But for practical purposes, general organization and direction of the program will be in the hands of an Orientation Leader, Marty Clish, aided by a second ACOP, Bob Lovan. (Preferably one man, an Ass. Chief-of Party for Programming and Orientation, would devote his time strictly to orientation and language training, including the preparation of study materials, and to the work of the Program Committee, of which he would be secretary. The two jobs go well together and there is certainly enough work to warrant one man's full time.)

B. Materials and the footwork and phonecalls of organizing the program will be handled by Paul Altemus, hopefully up to the time Bob Lovan and the September group arrive in Laos. Preparation of study materials is an especially big job now, before the first run of the program. Later there will be revisions, additions to materials on hand--there will always be something to do in this area--but the big job will be out of the way. Bob Lovan has expressed a definite interest in the orientation and language program, and he can pick up smoothly where Paul leaves off in September.

Someone on the Education Team stationed permanently in Vientiane should also work closely with Marty and Paul in setting up the details of the

program. Pat Basler was mentioned for this position in April (with reference to the summer group that didn't show). Provided he is interested in the job, there is no reason to pick someone else. A suggestion that might conceivably crop up is that Marty and Pat--ED and ED--should share equally the decision-making power at this level. Where there are a large number of day-to-day problems, however, equality tends to jam things up. Final power rests with both Chet Brown and Bernie Wilder.

C. The program plan is an essential first step that has pretty much been finessed up to now. Not that activities to date have been randomly conducted--the objectives outlined in a following section have firmly guided my actions. But the sorting, editing, and the value judgments implied in these operations have rested with one person only. The seriousness of the program, however, demands that the group and not an individual bear the responsibility of major policy decisions. Even if an all-purpose master-mind could be found to handle things, it is doubtful that he would want to separate himself from the ideas and experience of interested team members. A committee of eight or ten is a workable group and, if well-chosen, should be ideal for the critical task of fixing objectives and deciding which system, study subjects, and learning methods are best suited to achieve the objectives.

The committee should include the three men responsible for setting up the program and from four to eight field people representing the various special-interest groups in the combined IVS team. The Program Committee would presumably be included also, as ex-offici members. All the individuals on this Planning Committee should be encouraged to provoke discussion within IVS and with others interested people so that as many opinions and fresh ideas as possible will shape the committee's decisions.

D. Additional help in setting up the program could be provided by team members who find themselves with free time during the coming months. Also, when the program is in session, field personnel who spend a week or so living with the newcomers and participating in their activities are certain to come in handy as administrative field-lieutenants.

IV. Technical personnel

A. Language Training Leader--A capable and qualified person must be found to take charge of training the teachers and working with them throughout the eight-week period. It is not necessary, however, for this individual to be a trained linguist. The essential qualifications are that he, or she,

1. understand thoroughly the PSI method.
2. be able to teach, criticize and bolster the confidence of the Lao instructors.
3. be competent in Lao and English, so that answers will be available when legitimate problems arise which the teachers cannot handle.

The reasons that a linguist is not specifically required for the job include:

1. The FSI lessons 1 to 8 have been prepared for instruction using a native speaker as a model only. He is not expected to "teach" the grammar, the written lessons take care of that. (He would have to be able to read the phonetic system however, unless---and it would probably be worth the effort---he went through his copy of the lessons and wrote down the Lao equivalent next to the phonetic word.) Thus the task of teaching the teachers is not a very demanding job if the right people are selected to be teachers.

2. Fine corrections and revisions of the lessons can be left to the linguists at FSI. Essentially IVS has the services of a staff of linguists by relying on this set of excellent core materials and its authors.

In addition to linguists, then, there are three other types of people who might qualify for the position: (1) an IVSer who knows Lao well and is, or can become, familiar with the FSI method, (2) a Lao who speaks English well, has taught at FSI, and is able to teach other Lao, and (3) a bright, responsible Lao who speaks English well and can familiarize himself with the FSI method.

It is quite possible that a person already holding another job might be borrowed for part-time work as the Language Training Leader. Preparing the teachers will require a concentrated amount of time over a two or three week period. Once the program has started, however, the director could get away with as little as two hours a day at times (an hour observing the teachers and an hour talking over difficult points in the lessons). Most of the session, however, he should be prepared to devote at least one hour more to the teachers at the end of the day, going over the next day's lesson.

This position is an important one and it must be filled with someone with the necessary qualifications. The points covered above, however, should make it evident that such a person will not be too difficult to find (assuming, of course, that the position will pay the salary it deserves).

B. Teachers--The qualifications of the teachers are that they

1. know how to read and write Lao.
2. have sufficient intelligence to enable them to understand what the job of instructor entails. (The position, as was pointed out in IV, A, is not one which demands a grammarian's knowledge of Lao not competence in English. The instructor's function is to serve as a model, to recognize good pronunciation from bad, smooth speech from rough, and to let the lesson and the Language Training Leader handle the res.)
3. have the self-confidence to criticize American students and not accept inferior performance as the real thing.

It was decided at the June 11 meeting of the Program Committee that two people be hired and trained as full-time language instructors. They would be able to serve as the nucleus of the teacher corps required for any

given orientation program. A ratio of five IVSers to one teacher is desirable and fewer than five would be better still. Thus, for groups of ten or less, no additional teachers would need to be hired. For groups of 15, 20, or 25, IVS assistants could be brought in from the field to TDY as instructors without extra cost to IVS.

C. Orientation speakers, seminar leaders, etc.--Vientiane is loaded with interesting and knowledgeable people, and so is IVS.

D. Practical Training instructors--In almost all cases these individuals can be either IVS assistants or IVSers. The best situation would be to have a Lao instructor carry out the training in Lao--the new IVSers would have their training manuals for reference and vocabulary sheets to prepare them for the instruction session. If an IVSer handled the training, he could have his assistant explain the steps in Lao while they and the newcomers go through the actual procedure. Questions asked by the new people should be in Lao also.

E. Other important jobs which IVSers can perform,

1. They can take charge of the new IVSers during their week-long visit to the field before the regular program begins. (See proposed schedule below.)
2. They can spend a week or so living with the new people and participating in their program's activities--attending classes and discussions, listening to speakers; answering questions as they come up and asking some when the main points seem to be overlooked.

Note:

1. Whenever someone (IVSers as well as outsiders) is asked to participate as demoribed in C,D, and E above, they should be (a) carefully selected so that they are equal to the job,(b) fully and precisely briefed as to the date (s), time (s), and nature of the service, the size and make-up of the group, and so on, and (c) sent a reminder restating and confirming the agreement a week or so before the date (s) in question.
2. Especially in the cases of IVSers involved in E,1 or 2 above, a careful discussion of what is expected of them is a must.
3. New people who carry out study projects (eg. on small industry in Laos, the role of the National Assembly) can be used as lecturers, debaters, or discussion leaders. The new people should not be overlooked for any job. The more they can genuinely contribute, the better.
4. In D above, new IVSers who are competent enough to serve as instructors of practical skills should be encouraged to do so. Such abilities should be sought out in order to prevent boredom from setting in and to increase the degree of participation in the program.

V. Objectives

A. Study environment---The aim is to develop and maintain a learning situation where (1) high motivation is sustained through active participation in all aspects of the program; (2) inquiry and independent discovery are encouraged; and (3) competition, mutual distrust, and a buildup of inhibitions are overcome by a genuine sense of cooperation, of community. If the proper environment is established, the newcomers will soon take advantage of the rich sources of information and experience which Vientiane offers. This objective, therefore, should be kept foremost in the minds of those running the program. The actual subjects studied are secondary; to a large degree, they will take care of themselves if the setting is right.

B. Subject matter---The specific learning goals have been outlined before in the minutes of the April 50 program Committee meeting:

1. The Lao language: to prepare the IVSers so that at the time assignment they are thoroughly familiar with the basic sentence patterns of Lao; are able to speak clearly and understand the known words in responses or questions of native speakers; are fully prepared for continued self-study in the field; have mastered a vocabulary covering common conversation topics and key technical words in the IVSers' particular work fields.
2. The Lao people: to familiarize the new IVSers with the Lao and their culture, history, and governmental system.
3. Four additional work tools; to develop in them
 - a. an understanding of the IVSer's job and his relationships with other people---counterparts, assistants, USAID administrators, and technical advisors.
 - b. an ability to perform the basic practical skills required in field work.
 - c. a working knowledge of the power structure of USAID, the RLG, and IVS.
 - d. an understanding of the "big picture"---the political, social and economic situation in Southeast Asia and Laos.

C. Field assistants---Another important goal is to establish a friendly, workable relationship between the new IVSers and their field assistants.

VI. Approach and methods

A. Before entering Laos---The critical period between the time of a person decides to join up with IVS until his arrival at Wattay airport should not be ignored or considered as something separate, without significance for in country training. Rather it should be recognized as the first part of any program Laos undertakes. And since it is first,

it is particularly important. Some points worth considering are

1. A wrong impression of the Laos situation given by IVS-Washington introductory materials and the Harper's Ferry orientation program can cause anger and resentment when the truth is discovered. Such emotions are directed at IVS in general and thus can effect the newcomers' willingness to cooperate with IVS-Laos.

Two things can be done about this situation, one of which is already underway. First, materials which Washington distributes to new IVSers should be rewritten. Second, IVS-Laos should press for full information on speakers, discussions, briefing sessions and other activities held during the Washington phase of orientation. (An IVS-Laos veteran might take part in the program and report his observations to Vientiane.) After the new people arrive, a careful discussion of the Washington program should be first on the agenda. Attempts should be made at this time to feel out the degree of disparity between the newcomers' image of Laos and the real situation. Where differences are great corrections should be made without fanfare. The new people should not get the feeling that truth is being hid from them, but neither should they be given the impression that Washington is incorrigibly "out of it." Confidence can be built up through judicious frankness, but it can be undermined by destroying the sense of continuity of the overall program.

2. Even when the pre-arrival period is handled perfectly by Washington, it is important to keep in close touch. Repetition of material already adequately covered is a sure sign of an amateur. And besides, it's boring. By neatly meshing the Laos and Washington programs the new people will not be irritated into a loss of confidence--in fact, they will probably be highly impressed.

3. The stay in the Phillipines has been highly praised by the most recent group. A week there studying tropical agriculture and community development methods would be a good warm-up for everyone. This visit combined with an immediate trip to the field on arrival in Laos should build motivation to a peak just before in-country training begins.

B. The schedule -- A suggested orientation schedule follows for the period following departure from Washington and continuing through to the final assignment to field stations: (See Appendix at end of report.)

C. Notes on the schedule -- weeks A through D:

1. A one-week stay is included, as was recommended by the April group.

2. After the group's arrival in Laos, a day is devoted to meeting the Director and Deputy Director of USAID and, most important, to a discussion of the new IVSers' activities in Washington and the Phillipines.

3. A one week period in the field is recommended as soon after arrival as possible. The only item which must be covered before this field trip is the discussion of pre-arrival program. No brutal revelations contradictory to Washington pronouncements should be allowed to occur in the field.

4. Language classes begin immediately after the return from the field.

5. There is a thorough presentation and review of the Orientation and Language Training Program at the start of the regular program. Thus, the feed-back process begins at once. The newcomers should discuss the objectives of the program with staff members and veteran IVSers and either decide that the goals settled on before their arrival are the proper ones or alter the objectives to suit their needs. (The point to be stressed here is that disagreements between the staff and new people should be resolved by convincing arguments rather than by apparently arbitrary rulings. Authority is not at question in such discussions; and the less it need be called upon in support of decisions, the firmer will be the control of those in charge.)

The availability and locations of source materials and people should be carefully detailed at the start; and preparations can be made early for IVSer participation in selected work projects (urban development, English teaching, etc.) or study projects (reports, interviews, organizing seminars, preparing for instruction in practical skills, and so on). Committees can be set up or individuals appointed to handle organizational and planning tasks in areas such as recreation, entertainment, special social events, transportation, breakfast or sneaks, clean-up, and others. Any time a problem comes up which can just as well be taken care of by the new comers, they should be encouraged to deal with it themselves, with veteran IVSers standing by for information and advice when snags develop.

The orientation program should be presented to the group as a problem in community development with themselves as the community. They must become actively involved in every aspect of the program and feel themselves responsible for its success or failure.

These statements do not mean that the program should tend toward anarchy. Control is required for two reasons: First, the Lao community must be protected from offensive or improper behavior resulting from cultural ignorance. Second, IVSers will adapt most quickly and successfully to the new environment if inter-cultural tensions are provoked and overcome in a controlled, friendly setting while direct confrontation is readily available nearby.

The task of those in charge is a highly refined and difficult one. Fortunately, there is one saving factor: Proper direction will flow smoothly from an understanding of the whole situation and of the educational goals at stake. The biggest problem is represented by the term flexibility, finding and teetering along on the balance point between freedom and control, recognizing the difference between criticism based on confidence and participation and criticism tending toward anarchy.

The new people will operate well at this early stage only if they sense that things are in safe hands, that the program is serious, and that IVS has put time and effort into working out the best method for their development. First, confidence must be established. Then within this protective shell the group must be allowed, and often prodded, to worry out their own best solution to what's disturbing them.

The functions of the Orientation Leader and other veteran IVSers in this situation will include:

- a. Being a source of reliable information, of facts and not necessarily judgments.
- b. Asking questions which will point out to the new people in an unabrasive manner where they have gaps in their knowledge.
- c. Attempting in other indirect ways to keep the program balanced and motivation high. It has been wisely pointed out that people learn only what they want to learn. If the group is not responding well to certain topics, special efforts should be made to have them discover the importance of the material, to make them want to learn about it.
- d. Sensing the balance point between the pressures of group activities and the newcomer's desire for an individual identity.
- e. Knowing which jobs are best handled by the Vientiane office and which can be left to the group. When failures occur, assessing accurately (and often with the help of the newcomers) where the blame lies and then making the necessary adjustments.

D. Notes on the schedule--Weeks 1 through 8:

1. The period from 9:40 to 10:30 each day may well become the most important hour in the day--again, if one accepts the fact that the learning environment is the primary concern. At this time the IVSers will meet with the orientation leader and discuss such things as:

- a. Problems which have come up in language training or in other aspects of the program.
- b. The speaker or even scheduled for the 2:30 to 4:00 slot in the afternoon. Even better, perhaps, would be to present the background material for the following day's speaker so that questions can be prepared or some reference reading done the before.
- c. Other organizational concerns, such as which groups will go where during the project and recreation period before dinner, and what events are planned for the evening and what preparation is required.

2. The period from 2:30 to 4:00 can be used for language study if no orientation even is planned for that day.

3. From 4:00 to 5:30 the large group should be split up into small sub-groups different from their language-study groups. Activities include: Practical training, project work, recreation, preparation for an evening event, language practice using tapes.

4. The evening slot from roughly 7:30 to 9:00 or 9:30 can be used for additional orientation programs or for group meetings of the 9:40 to 10:30 A.M. variety. There should probably be at least one such meeting a week, at which time problems, suggestions, and complaints can be dealt with in detail. Also, group and inter-personal criticism, with its sometimes pointed give-and-take, should be encouraged in order to break down walls of misunderstanding and build a sense of community.

In general, however, evening events should probably be scheduled rather sparingly, to permit an ample amount of free time for study, for following up on special interests, and for simply exploring Vientiane.

5. Language training sessions should be held Saturday mornings unless a special Saturday or weekend activity is planned.

E. Training--materials and methods--the Lao language:

1. The schedule: At least four hours of language training will be held each day except Sundays for the eight week period. While the IVSers are meeting with the orientation leader from 9:40 to 10:30 each morning, the teacher will have time to meet with the Language Training Leader, IVS assistants, and one or more of the veteran IVSers participating in the program during any given week. They can discuss problems that have come up that morning, criticisms of particular teachers' methods, and difficult material or changes in plans. Afternoons will also be free for extra work with the teachers.

2. Teaching approach: Evaluative comments made by IVSers and USAID people have indicated the following: The FSI method should be used--i.e. controlled introduction of carefully selected materials followed by intense drilling. The Lao writing system should be introduced at the start, at the same time that the Lao sound system is exhaustively presented. The FSI lessons employ a phonetic system throughout, and the students can rely on it if they choose. Written Lao should be used in the classroom, however, and the language supplements all assume a knowledge of the written language.

5. Other methods: As the eight week period comes to a close, attempts should be made to combine orientation activities and language training. In the classroom, this process may take the form of acting out some of the typical Lao scenes that have been written up in the Dialogue section of the language supplements. Or it may involve role-playing or writing and giving speeches for certain mock situations. Veteran IVSers and field assistants could take an active part in these activities. Also, learning games, songs and other boredom breaking methods can be interspersed with regular study.

Outside the classroom, the orientation activities can make use of spoken Lao whenever it will be constructive to do so--in practical training, on field trips, or when questioning Lao speakers. (In the last case, if appropriate, an IVS-assistant could act as a special kind of interpreter and translate the speaker's answer into the class' simple Lao, slowly spoken. Thus, IVSers would become familiar with an important method of using assistants, and the assistants would come to understand better what their role in the field should be.)

4. Additional comments: IVS field assistants and veteran IVSers who are living with the newcomers should spend some time in the classrooms each day to help when problems come up and to participate in conversation with the teacher and students.

F. Training--material and methods--practical skills

Materials are in the process of being prepared. For suggested methods see IV,B; for scheduling, see VI, B. 3.

G. Other orientation topics

Following is a suggested approach for dealing with the four other orientation objectives (Lao studies, the IVSer's job and interpersonal relationships, USAID-RLG-IVS power structure, and the "big picture")

1. IVS should not attempt to prepare papers covering these subjects -- although a written analysis of the power structure might prove helpful.

2. Instead, topical or question outlines should be drawn up which attempt to define the area of study and lay bare the important problems which IVSer should be prepared to grappled with. These outlines should be given to the IVSers to guide their study and aid them in making proper use of the speakers who appear before the group.

3. The orientation Leader or some other veteran IVSer should give full, detailed background information on all speakers, movies, and other sources which appear before the group. Preferably this material would be presented the day before the scheduled event so that the IVSers will have an opportunity to prepare themselves properly for it.

4. A wide variety of information transmission and discussion methods can be used to get the most out of each source and topic. Also, changing the pattern of group activities will help sustain interest and involvement. Certain methods (lectures, forums and debates, for example) are best suited for the direct transmission of information; while others (including seminars, role-playing, and case studies) are useful in testing understanding once most of the facts are in.

5. In most cases the role of the leader is critical if group sessions are to come successful. This person must be selected carefully.

6. If lists of possible speakers, films, and other sources are prepared and presented to the new IVSers with the topical outlines (mentioned in 2 above) and information on group discussion methods, they would have most of the essentials necessary for a do-it-yourself orientation kit. Most of the programs planned for the first few weeks will have to be arranged ahead of time to assure the availability of the speakers. As the new people become more aware of what they don't know, however, they should be encouraged to set up their own programs.

7. A bibliography of books available in the Vientiane area is being prepared. During the actual orientation period, books related to the subjects being studied should be kept on hand in a conveniently located, comfortable reading room.

8. A new IVSer should be assigned to take notes at discussion and planning session. He should then see that his summary of important questions, arguments, and conclusion is printed up and distributed to the group.

H. Field assistants

The following suggestions have been hinted at throughout the preceding pages:

1. IVSers should be introduced to their field assistants as soon as they return from their week's visit to the field.

2. IVSers should be encouraged to establish a close relationship with their assistants during the eight week period. Assistants should participate, whenever it is constructive to do so, in IVSer orientation activities. (It would be constructive for assistants to sit in on language classes for an hour or so each day; go on tours, field trips, and visits to Lao officials; and play volleyball in the afternoons or attend practical training classes. It would not be constructive for them to be present at lectures or discussion sessions, since they don't know enough English to contribute or benefit in any way from them.) In project work the two groups can work together and, in many cases, it will prove profitable for the IVSers to consider their assistants as mock-counterparts during the orientation period. Also, assistants would presumably be helpful in introducing IVSers to Vientiane, to the Lao people and culture.

3. If the relationship does not work out, the discovery will be made in Vientiane and not out in the field; and appropriate steps can be taken early.

I. Follow-up

The Orientation and Language Training Program must not stop when the new people are assigned to the field. It will simply enter a new and final phase. Some items to consider in this respect are

1. The new people should be prepared for continued self-study of Lao by going over helpful learning techniques--how to build vocabulary, how to use assistants in a way that will build language ability rather than make IVSers dependent on interpreters.
2. Two teachers from the language course should be kept on permanently, to make follow-up visits to the field. They will be able to furnish further help as specific field problems arise and, at the same time, will keep the pressure on for continued study.
3. As difficult situations develop in technical areas covered by the orientation program, the ACOP's should keep an eye on how the new people handle themselves. In talking over these situations, relationships should be drawn between the field incident and material covered in the orientation program. In some cases the relevance of the training will be brought home; in others, a gap in the program will be revealed which must then be filled in.
4. Evaluations of the program should be conducted at the end of six weeks and six months. Content, methods, and objectives should be modified in response to valid criticisms.

VII. Logistic Problems

A. Housing

1. The Lido Hotel is available at very reasonable rates for groups of any size.
2. Unusually large groups will be sent over, most probably, only in the summer months when Dong Dok is available.
3. For small groups the IVS house could be used. But the seclusion and privacy needed for study would be hard to find there. IVSers in from the field and looking for distractions would distort or destroy the controlled environment which the program is after. It is almost a necessity that the group be separated off to a certain extent, allowed access to the IVS house and IVSers in their free time, but not inescapably rooted in the middle of the holiday atmosphere.

B. Classrooms and conference rooms

1. The Lido Bar is available during the day and the IVS house is vacant during working hours.
2. It might be possible to convert a couple small rooms at the Lido into classrooms during the day. At night they could be used for reading, study, practice with language tapes. The convenience, quiet, and central location would be worth the cost.
3. The possibility of using Wat classrooms or grounds should be looked into.

4. During summer months Dong Dok and the American school are free.

C. Feeding

1. Contracting with local restaurants is far superior to a simple catering arrangement with the ACA Mess Hall. This statement holds even when the group is quite large. For example, if the group of forty had been sent over and housed at Dong Dok during the summer months, the following set-up would probably have worked out well:

a. Breakfast and snacks: Handled entirely by the group. They would probably have formed a committee to arrange such tasks as purchasing food from the commissary and market, cooking (for those who want hot breakfasts) and cleaning-up.

b. Lunch: Contracted to four or five restaurants for the two month period. The large group would need to be rearranged into smaller ones (different from the language classes, so that people would get a break from the rings of faces), and these would rotate through two-week eating stints at each of the different restaurants. (As many different food varieties would be represented as possible.) A school bus would take everyone in at 12:30 and pick them up along a pick-up route after a specified interval.

The advantages of this set-up are obvious: (1) the IVSers get a break from the school-dormitory setting in the middle of the day; (2) they have an opportunity to try the various kinds of Southeast Asian cooking; and (3) they are put on their own for a while during the day, freed from the group and group pressures.

c. Dinner: Up to the IVSers. Transportation would be provided into town and people could eat where they choose. Some would probably contract with their favorite restaurant for evening meals; those who hanker after American cooking would head for the Compound.

2. Regardless of the size of the group or its location (assuming the availability of transportation), the above arrangements would be possible. They are well-suited to the group and its needs, and the organizational demands on the IVS staff are next to zero.

D. Transportation

1. At Dong Dok:

a. Buses capable of carrying the entire group would be required for four runs a day (before and after lunch, before and after dinner) and for tours, field-trips, etc.

b. A shuttle bus set-up would need to be arranged to connect KM 6 to KM 9 and permit a reliable method of getting to and from the city. (The motor-pool could be called on after hours.)

c. An extra car or two might be required at 4:00 when the groups

move into project work and practical training which may be located off the school grounds. Careful planning would eliminate most of these demands for extra vehicles, however.

2. In town; Transportation is obviously a matter of less concern, especially if the Lido were used for classes and discussions as well as for living accommodations. To be on the safe side, however, attempts should be made to have assigned to the program a vehicle capable of carrying everyone in the group. Dependence on Motor Pool transportation jeopardizes scheduling and the smooth flow of the program. Irritations, even minor ones of this kind, should be avoided when they can be countered with relatively little effort.

VIII. The short Orientation Program

Much of the preceding discussion contains useful implications for the Short Orientation Program. The overall treatment of the problem---determining objectives, assessing resources, and then searching for the best approaches and methods---is certainly applicable. There are a few other observations that also seem to be worth mentioning:

A. Ideally the objectives of the short program would be the same as those for the long one. The time period is too small, however, to permit the kind of direct involvement which is the key to the long orientation program. The short one will, by necessity, be fixed, with almost no flexibility. For this reason it will be important to choose carefully which subjects will be taught and which questions discussed.

B. Since constant evaluation and change will not be possible, it is critical that the judgements and suggestions of the most recent arrivals (the April group) be carefully considered in setting up the September program.

C. Although criticism of the newcomers will have little chance of effecting major change immediately, the Orientation Leader should be aware of the group's reaction and encourage the open statement of objections through evaluation sessions. These free-wheeling discussions can have very beneficial effects on the group's general outlook and on individuals' relationships to one another and to IVS. Moreover, their observation should be of value in setting up the long-orientation program.

D. The group should be presented with a Lao self-study kit (ie, a Lao-American dictionary, language supplements, and FBI lessons which they did not receive in Washington) almost as soon as they get off the plane. There should be at least two hours of language study each day during their stay in Vientiane. (The permanent IVS language instructors can get a good breaking in with this first group. IVS assistants who may be called on in the future to teach Lao to large groups might be brought in for some practice teaching at this time.) The major objectives of these instruction sessions would be threefold:

2. To drive home IVS's concern that field people learn the language.
3. To prepare the new people for self-study at their field stations.

E. Meetings with non IVS people should be restricted to

1. Required visits to the Director and Deputy Director of USAID.
2. Meetings with technical and administrative personnel with whom the IVSers will have to deal during their two year stay. Sub-groupings should set up here: agriculturists going to agriculturists; home economists calling on people in their field. Simply herding people from one speaker to the next should be avoided.
3. Meetings with RIG officials with whose Services the IVSers will be working.
4. Visits by or to interesting people from the Vientiane area who can speak knowledgeably on the Lao culture and history, and on the present political and economic situation in the country.

F. A short visit to the field should not be included in the program. Instead, everyone might possibly be called in for a weekend evaluation and discussion session after six weeks at their posts.

IX. Concluding Observations

This is the place for comments which did not seem to fit in anywhere else. Unless otherwise specified, they refer primarily to the long orientation program.

A. A firm resolution must be made by the Vientiane staff that regardless of the pressure for early assignment to field stations, no premature placements will be made.

B. A high level of maturity, motivation, and responsibility should be a guiding assumption in deciding which methods will be used in the program. Two important implications follow from this:

1. Signs of immaturity and irresponsibility must be dealt with on an individual basis and not through group sanctions, despite the relative ease of the latter course.

2. If a general disaffection for the program develops, the conclusion should be that the program and not the newcomers are at fault.

C. In planning out the detailed schedule, proper attention should be given to what is happening in the city and countryside during the eight weeks in question. Full advantage should be taken of Lao holidays, religious and governmental ceremonies.

D. The dates of the next USAID orientation should be determined in advance, if possible, so that the IVS and USAID programs mesh instead of overlap.

The undertaking discussed in this report is definitely a demanding one. But the resources and personnel are demonstrably available; and so other adjectives predominate over demanding--rewarding, unifying, exciting, and responsible seem more to the point. The contributions of IVSers have been easily shaped into a firm, realistic, and comprehensive program plan. Since you, the planners, have at your disposal the requisite ability and raw materials, in closing I wish you the confidence and courage to see your ideas through to their successful end.

8/30/68:bcp

Frits

TO : Bob Lovan, Chief-of-Party, IVS/RD, Vientiane August 30, 1968
FROM : Marcus C. Bordsen, IVS/Pakse
SUBJECT: END OF TOUR REPORT

I. A HISTORY:

During my two years in Laos, I witnessed some changes which occurred in this southern region: Dry season cropping of rice under irrigation was started and expanded. Fertilizers became more available and farmers began using them. USAID grew from a small work force and operation to a large one, as did the organization and size of the "house next door". Security decreased. The last eight months I was not permitted to go to Paksong by road. Other notables include: the introduction of Coca Cola and Pepsi Cola into Laos, and the coming into being of a ferry at Champassak designed to carry only motorcycles. I have had no connection with the majority of these events.

I applied to IVS for a number of reasons. Basic ones were: a) weariness of university academic study, b) not really wanting to become a soldier, c) not knowing what I wanted as a career, and d) wanting in some way to be of service to man. I chose IVS rather than Peace Corps because I thought that IVS, being an organization which historically had done a good job in contributing to development, (and now being contracted to USAID to continue the same good work), would offer me more freedom in working and perhaps a better chance to use the knowledge (entomology) I had gained through university study and summer jobs. I also thought that maybe I would like a career in developmental work, and perhaps my two years could be a step stone to work with USAID (that great American agency, improved since The Ugly American and doing so much good in the world! IVS can indeed be a step stone, but I have changed my mind about working for USAID. More about that later.). I also appreciated the fact that IVS had its people learn the language in country, which I thought was better than the Peace Corps method of teaching it in the states.

I heard about IVS from two former IVSers (Viet Nam) who were studying in graduate schools at Montana State University. My contact with these two people grew from a mutual association with MSU's International Club, and in Larry Ulsaker's case, the Lutheran Student Association; with Ray Borton, the fact that he was also an IPYE (participant in the International Farm Youth Exchange) who became known to me as I became an IPYE.

In anticipation of going to South East Asia, I enrolled in a one quarter graduate level sociology course: Social Change. That course introduced me to the idea of community development, at least in the world of theoretical ideas.

I had received some newsletters which IVS/Washington sent me. A fellow named Bob Lovan described "sweat soaked beds" and some insights into traditional Lao culture.

The MSU library had a dearth of any kind of publication on Laos. For one of the papers in the course, and for my own benefit, I used the letters as a basis for suggesting what goals and approaches a change agent in Laos might have and use. As it turned out, I had not fully understood the situation and these specific plans about CD in Laos were not very feasible. The course and the exercise of trying to understand, and then formulating a plan of action was later valuable to me during my IVS experience.

I eventually went to Washington D.C. where orientations were held. To my surprise, we settled down into ten weeks of Lao language training at the Foreign Service Institute. This was supposedly a trial, to see if this approach was better than the in-country language training. I was, admittedly prejudiced against language training in the states. But being as objective about it as I can, I believe we were given the poorer choice.

Having had the experience of being plunged into a rural area in a foreign country where nobody spoke English, I knew how rapidly I had learned a second language. (This was my IFIE trip, Poland; 1964). When I made a comparison of my ability in Lao after six months in Laos, I found I was woefully lacking as compared to how much Polish I had learned in Poland in six months. There are several reasons for this difference, but I am firmly convinced that in-country Lao language training would have been many times more beneficial than the FSI fiasco.

Other disadvantages of the FSI program were: 1) the concentration on conversational Lao. To help us remember, we were supposed to use the phonetic writings, which itself was like a foreign language to me. I think that merely learning the Lao alphabet would have been more useful because it would have taught us the phonetics and given us a start in learning to read Lao. 2) The second ridiculous factor was the expense of keeping us in Washington - \$18.00 a day per diem! 3) The third was that the ten weeks in D.C. delayed our jump into Lao culture, and that was dampening to our motivation.

Conversely, advantages of learning Lao in-country are the opportunities of mingling with the Lao population after class, and the chance to become familiar with Lao society.

The training in the Philippines was my introduction to rice culture. This short but effective training gave me the initiative to try working with rice in Laos.

A chopper flight from Nong Khai to the high part of Vientiane, near That Luang, and I was in Laos. The chaos from the flood certainly didn't improve the in-country orientation, which left much to be desired. One of the things our group did do was to make a trek to a village which had been flooded. The fellows were supposed to spray the houses with DDT, the girls ended up by trying to wash mud off the school's desks, the Lao Boy Scouts dug a passable roadway through a wall of trash that the receding waters had left piled across the main roadway through the village, and a health team gave vaccinations.

I believe USIS was taking motion pictures. The whole episode, probably because it was so haphazard and short, and more as a symbolic action than anything else, left a bitter taste in my mouth.

Finally, I was in Pakse and at the IVS mansion at Km. four. I had anticipated something else, you know, ...the bamboo hut in the village. But here it was: hot and cold running water, electricity and all its associated conveniences, a houseboy, and the best cook in southern Laos! I must confess that I had misgivings as to whether I could survive in a village, eating mainly Lao foods. And so, when I was pointed to the IVS House, that problem vanished. To this day, however, I feel it would have been better had I lived in a more humble setting. I could survive on village foods, especially since we had access to the Pakse market. Many IVSers are doing what I should have done, and I commend them.

We employed three Lao for the purposes of cooking, housecleaning and washing, and yard maintenance. This enabled us to run the house as a guesthouse for the field's personnel to stay when they came to Pakse. It also accommodated the orientation groups which visited southern Laos. The guesthouse was intended only for IVSers, and it was paid for by those who used it. First, jointly with EJ, and later by myself, I learned the practicalities of minor administration: the operation of the house, bookkeeping, and management of employees. I had a lot to learn and it's good the Lao had a lot of patience. I am grateful to Howard Lewin, who was boarding with us at the time, and whose help I enlisted several times because of my inadequacy with the Lao language.

Living in the "mansion" was a barrier to communication with the neighboring village. The same obstacle probably existed concerning Lao Agr. personnel, although that was effectively overcome. Agr. agents freely call on me, either for business, for a bit of relaxation, or a drink of cold water. The house and grounds also served as a place for working on projects. I set aside a room for entomology work, and we threshed, winnowed, and weighed rice here since the Lao Agr. office did not have facilities to conveniently handle these operations.

I first regarded IVS grounds as the property of IVS and it infuriated me when my Lao neighbors freely picked the fruit from the trees, and washed on top of the well, thus contaminating it. All my cries merely served from time to time to lessen the incidence of infraction and never stop it. The one way of stopping it would have been to make the place off limits to the Lao. I considered that but decided that I didn't wish to alienate the villagers that much. I'm glad I didn't.

When EJ and I first started managing the house, we replaced two employees.

I also tried later to replace our cook. These efforts taught me the value of skilled and responsible labor, and about the problems of training new personnel.

Two more comments: I think that it is better for IVSers to try to eat and/ or live with families (Lao) rather than to become an employer for personal services. In my isolated situation, I think it was good to hire from the village. I believe that the one man in the village who would take the effort to warn or help me in an emergency is the man we employ for yard work.

It wasn't until my arrival in Laos that I understood what I would be doing. USAID wanted IVSers to staff ADO (Agricultural Development Organization) field positions. I had been told that ADO would involve me with farmers, and we would be working to set up a cooperative. That wasn't exactly in my line of experience, but it sounded worthwhile, so I agreed to try it. Later, I learned that the only "cooperation" in this thing was that between USAID/Agr. and RIG/Agr. They cooperated to set up ADO! Another revelation was that the IVSer's main responsibility as ADO field secretaries was to be a bookkeeper, accounting for ADO funds and commodities!

I shall not recount what happened in detail. There are memoranda on file which adequately describe how the six IVS/ADO appointees felt about their jobs. In due time, USAID agreed that the ADO position was really not suitable for IVSers and we were replaced by direct hire contract personnel.

With the ADO assignment came a new form of transportation for me. I probably never would have driven a motorcycle had it not been my official transportation. I eventually purchased my own cycle, a 90cc Honda sport model, and used it for my work purposes. One of the by-products of that experience was my decision to learn to make minor repairs on the cycle myself. I am not much of a mechanic now, but I am ten times improved over what I was.

My monthly reports describe the aspect of transportation. I need only add that a cycle was perfectly appropriate and adequate to my work at Lao Agr. When, for special projects, I needed a jeep, or when Lao Agr. urgently needed extra transportation, I usually could be provided with a jeep from the USAID Motor Pool. The use of a cycle, I think, helped me be closer to agr. agent who also had only cycles for their transportation. I think it gave face to the Lao Agr. chiefs for me not to have a vehicle matching theirs, and therefore not be their equal. And not having a jeep kept me out of the role as chauffeur for RIG Agr. errands.

During the time I was assigned to ADO, some significant events occurred (with regards to me, personally). These stemmed partly from my frustrations with and my desire to get out of the bookkeeping job.

One source of frustrations was my lack of Lao language ability. In ADO/Pakse, I was replacing Bob Griffin, who spoke Lao very well. Thus, I had little contact with the majority of personnel at Lao Agr. who didn't speak English.

Secondly, the ADO work was full of many problems. The fledgling bureaucracy was just beginning to know itself, and the systems of paper work, forms, etc., were in a state of change and resulting mis-understandings. It was frustrating also to be called to Vientiane to discuss ADO's part in the rice program, only to discover that the program had already been decided and the purpose of the meeting was merely to dictate it to us. It was also very disturbing to be told to participate in a program which I felt was more useless than good for Lao agriculture.

(The national meetings in Vientiane did serve to bring the six IVS/ADO secretaries and their common complaints together. It was at these meetings that we began formulating our resistance. In our demand that we be removed from ADO, we also presented some judgements on ADO's policies, and some recommendations as to how we thought it could be improved. Happily, we were removed, and some of our recommendations were acted upon.)

There were the little frustrations in the execution of the job. Like the many times, for example, when I arrived at the warehouse to move rice out. That little task required in addition to my presence: the Lao ADO secretary, a couple of Lao Agr. ADO agents to assist us, the RLG/Agr. agent with the key to the warehouse, the commercial truck, and the coolies. Invariably, one of the persons came late, i.e., the man with the key shows up at 0900 instead of 0730. So the next day, the coolies come an hour late. And so on

Another deep frustration came from the refusal of Lao Agr. personnel to listen to my ideas. I didn't know much about rice, and I didn't try to say much about that. But I did know about insects and insecticides. I could see from very short field trips that agents did not understand entomology. And I saw many cases of mis-applied insecticides. I tried to say something about that. But no one would listen, my BS degree in Entomology, never mind!

I decided that since I found no Lao who was willing to let me try to help him, that I would best make use of these two years according to my own selfish interests. Thus, what I wanted to do became top priority. So I began to devote my time to general insect collecting, reading, sports, and other activities which I found interesting. I considered working with youth and tried to start something with students at the EMP. Of course, this attitude only made me much more irritable when someone at Lao Agr. came late and therefore wasted my precious time.

Then, a remarkable change in my attitude occurred. I am not sure why or how this came about, but surely it was a milestone. Perhaps because I had grown to dislike USAID so much, I decided that if I was going to work on anybody's programs, it would not be USAID's, but those of the Lao people. It was easy to see that USAID was politically oriented, and

that its activities frequently did not coincide with what the Lao themselves wanted. So I decided to try to be of service to Lao agriculture, the RLG/Agr. I was here in Laos not for myself, but for them. So what if they came late? I would wait for them because I came to be of help to them.....

Still, RLG/Agr. found no use for me.

EJ Johnson, the IVS'er assigned to the LNP, was also feeling frustrations from his job. We had been in the Philippines together. A result of our mutual bitching sessions was a decision that if as agriculturalists, we were going to make a contribution, it would be with rice. Is it not true that nearly 90% of the Lao population are farmers and that their main crop is rice?

There was an irrigation system (the Km 3 project) which had been completed sufficiently enough to get water down to one of the Ban Nahak flats. Taiwan seed, shipped from that country to Laos in order to permit farmers to raise a crop after flood waters had receded, was nonsensitive to photoperiod and could grow in the dry season. Since the time was shortly after the start of the dry season, we thought that paddy land not normally used at this time of year would be cheap to rent. So EJ and I decided to try to grow Taiwan rice in the dry season under irrigation!

The main purpose for this was for our benefit. We wanted to learn about rice. We would do everything, except the plowing and harrowing, ourselves. We also decided to try a few new ideas, like Dapog seedbeds and fertilizer.

A secondary purpose was to spite USAID and ADO. We wanted, if successful, to prove that farmers could get commodities from other sources besides "Uncle Santa" USAID or ADO. So, with our own money, we purchased fertilizer from a Pakse business.

Of course, we sought permission from Lao Agr. for this project. They themselves were not interested in doing it, but Mr. Keopraseuth, the Provincial Agr. Chief, gave us his approval. He instructed his Irrigation agent to help us locate land that was irrigable, and introduce us to the owner.

Those four paddies of Taiwan rice yielded many things besides rice; Mr. Keopraseuth was impressed enough to go right out and buy three hectares of land that could be irrigated. The use of fertilizer was shown to more than quadruple the reported average yield of local Lao rice. It was shown that certain kinds of rice could be grown in the dry season, with irrigation. And EJ and I learned a lot about rice. (A report on the project was written up and filed.)

For me, there was an even more important result. The project served to prove my credentials in knowing something about agriculture. Lao Agr. personnel now recognized that maybe I had something to offer. Mr. South, Chief of Extension, began to invite me to accompany him on his field trips.

All this occurred while I was assigned as ADO. After Wayne Johnson arrived to take over ADO work, I began to spend full time with Mr. South and his extension program.

It seems very boring to recount what has perhaps been my most significant contribution; that of the last 14 months. Mr. South and I worked mainly on getting demonstrations of fertilized IR-8 rice established, and then in getting farmers organized to visit these sites.

Mr. South and I achieved a real counter-part relationship. I was useful to him and he was useful to me. We complemented each other in many ways. He learned more English and taught me more Lao. He showed me aspects of rice that he had learned only from long experience. And I, with my scientific education, was able to understand the new innovations in rice culture being tried, and helped him to understand and use them.

At the end of the rainy season of 1967, Mr. South found himself deluged with the paper work his office requires. I instigated a sampling of rice yields to determine exactly what local rice yields were. Mr. South and Mr. Keo agreed to this project, and authorized six agents to help cut, thresh, and weigh the rice. This project has also been written up and the report is on file.

The completion of that project left me without anything particular to do. While I recognized that many agents really did not understand some important aspects of rice culture, I could hardly propose a training class without perhaps causing loss of face and embarrassment. It was my thought to approach this through an English class. In teaching English to the agents, I would also emphasize certain technical words, hoping to instigate a discussion and understanding of the things I felt agents were unsure of. (It included from "safe use of insecticides" to "how does an extension agent operate in the field and what are his goals and responsibilities.") Mr. Keo and Mr. South (and the agents) were enthusiastic for the English class. However, they refused to make attendance mandatory, and occasionally would send agents off on errands during classtime. This is not their fault (except that better administrative planning could have lessened the number of interruptions) because they had an office to run. None-the-less, it effectively sabotaged the classes because of constant student turnover and the lack of continuity. The English classes did permit me to become much closer to the agents than I had ever been before.

It should be noted that I undertook this English teaching attempt after having had some experience teaching two and a half terms through the USIS sponsored Lao-American Association. I enjoyed these classes immensely. Often, they were the bright spot of my day.

While I never did manage to set up a disguised training program, I did somewhat cause a little discussion by occasionally taking the role of the farmer: "I want to apply some fertilizer, so how much do I apply?" And we'd discuss kinds of fertilizer, etc. Then, "200 kg. per hectare, but how much is that for one paddy?". And so forth. When agents didn't know the answer, I would help them work it out or send them to ask their superiors.

This was, however, nothing like what a good training program could have accomplished.

I noticed that Pouthane (the agent assigned with me on entomology) was envied for being able to study with me. Had I had more time, I might have been able to organize sessions for agents on that subject because the agents were aware that Pouthane was learning new ideas. Also, Mr. Keo and Mr. South were coming to realize that I did have special, useful information about entomology, and they might have consented to holding training for the agents. Mr. South's and Mr. Kouthong's visit to the Philippines increased their awareness of the complexity and importance of entomology in rice.

For a long time, I had been wanting to try working in earnest on an entomology project. Mr. Keo and Mr. South agreed to this, but they did not appoint a man to work with. Mr. Oroth's appearance on the scene, with Dr. Bell, resulted in Oroth's authorization to Mr. Keo that I be given two agents to work with. How this came about is somewhat interesting and frightening: I overheard a conversation at the Lao Agr. office. A suspicious sounding Mr. Oroth was demanding to know what the IVSer was doing. He asked it in such a way that it seemed as if he thought I was secretly trying to undermine the Agr. service. Mr. South and Mr. Keo were both present, but neither of them said a word. Then one of the USAID men said that I was working on some kind of entomology project. Later, face to face with me, Mr. Oroth spoke not of wanting to know what I was doing, but that I take agents with me where-ever I go. He told me that I should have agents working with me on the entomology project, at which time Dr. Bell asked how he thought that action should be implemented. That's when Mr. Oroth gave the order to Mr. Keo. Mr. Keo told Mr. South, and he appointed one agent from Crops and Soils, Phouthane, and one agent from Extension, Khamphouk.

I still don't fully understand that incident. Mr. Oroth told me that he wanted agents to go along with me because I could teach them much. However, I suspect that he wanted to know in detail what I was doing, and that having agents with me, he would have a source. The confusing fact for all this is that I have taken agents along with me. I have really tried to avoid having my own unilateral programs, and I have cleared all of my projects with Mr. Keopraseuth. Those ideas he didn't agree to, I forgot about. Lao Agr. in Pakse has known what I have been doing. But apparently they don't communicate this to Lao Agr. in Vientiane.

The purposes for the entomology project were several: The main objective was to teach the two agents something about entomology. As they learned, I was having them make a little field guide to paddy insects, with the insect specimens numbered and labeled. I also planned to teach them proper spraying, how to be safe with insecticides, and repair and maintenance of spraying equipment. I was also endeavoring to demonstrate that certain kinds of minor pests did not damage rice sufficiently to warrant spraying. Based on these goals, the two agents and I sprayed and made larva counts, collected specimens and white heads and reared insects to obtain the various stages of the life cycles.

Since my emphasis was on training instead of producing a material thing, we didn't get the field guides made. The month long tour I took around Laos also interrupted the project.

Khamphouk was sent off to training in Thailand. When Mr. Kouthong returned from his study, the 1968 rainy season was commencing, and he required Phouthane to work on the Crops and Soils activities. That ended the entomology project. The only results I can claim are a few more skills known by Phouthane and Khamphouk, and an increased awareness on the part of the Lao Agr. staff that entomology does indeed play an important role in improved rice culture, and that is a discipline that must be fully understood in order to deal with it correctly. While I attempted very strongly to communicate a good understanding of the hazards of insect poisons, I must conclude that these efforts failed to provoke any action on Lao Agr.'s part that might have reduced the hazards. I recently devoted an entire memo to this subject, also on file with IVS/Vtn.

Mr. Kouthong's return from Thailand gave him a new attitude about working with IVSers. He was exposed to a little entomology in Thailand, and he came back with a greater appreciation for me and my studies. He invited me to work closely with him on this season's field (variety and fertilizer) trials.

Then we learned that Mr. Kouthong and Mr. South would be going to The Philippines for a month-long study at IRRI. Mr. Kouthong requested me to assist his agents to correctly set up the field trials. I found I was again working with Phouthane. He was placed in charge of the variety trials. Mr. Ky Nouné and I worked together on preparations for the fertilizer trials. During all of July and the first week in August, this consumed my time and efforts. Transplanting of the variety trials was completed before I left on a trip to Viet Nam. Mr. Richardson, USAID/Agr. returned from home leave, and I left him the responsibility for ensuring that the fertilizer trials were properly established.

The week after my return from Viet Nam has been spent in trying to close out two years of life and labors, and prepare for departure to the U.S.A.

II. A SUMMARY OF CONFLICTS WITH THE BUREAUCRACY:

I once described my problems to a friend, and in a return letter he wrote, ... "looks like a classical case of the bureaucracy intruding into the domain of personal rights." He was a sociology who was studying bureaucracies. Apparently, I am not the only person who has had this kind of problem. But had they not been satisfactorily resolved, my IVS experience would have been a lot unhappier.

The first began by moving into a house where the former IVSer, Gary Haynes, had established an irrigation office in one of the rooms. Since we had a USAID/Irrigation man living with us (Don Kobiyashi, who was replacing Gary), he continued to use the room. USAID/Irrigation at this time did not have an office at the main USAID building. In fact, the room in the IVS House soon became the USAID/Irrigation office. For awhile, we ate breakfast with Lao trainees roaming freely through the house. IVS tools were considered Irrigation's tools and disappeared along with USAID's tools. It became a nightmare of little, but unsettling incidents until I finally demanded that USAID/Irrigation move out lock, stock, and barrel. ACOP Ken Lewis really backed me up

on this, a support I appreciated.

I also had problems with USAID/Public Works. I learned one day, (they started building a shed on IVS House grounds) that they were going to set up a 24 hour operation machine powered woodshop. They also took it for granted that IVS grounds was to be a storage area for PWD equipment. It was my opinion that they could build their shop and storage area on the Area Coordinator's House grounds instead of at IVS. I hollered loud and long, wrote memos, and nothing was built at either place.

Also, at one time, the PSO notified us that we should get prepared to move to a new location. More memorandums raising a fuss thwarted, or at least postponed that plan. Now, however, USAID says IVS has to move as a matter of security. I wonder if maybe it isn't more a matter of the FSO's bureaucracy trying to make things more convenient for them. Unfortunately, one cannot argue the matter of security.

III. SOME CONFLICTS FROM AMERICAN-LAO CONFRONTATION:

Whenever persons from two distinctly different cultures get together, it is possible a confrontation will manifest itself. Once I heard an American state that, "They must be communist. Why else would they be so interested in knowing where we are going? They are always asking, "Where you go?", ". This person obviously did not understand that a common form of greeting is the "Pi Si?" or "where you go?" question. Admittedly, when the question is phrased in English, it becomes the kind of question that strangers usually don't ask, and to which Americans might commonly reply, "None of your business!" I thought that perhaps I was above such cultural conflicts. The following examples show that I was not immune.

I came from a society where people respected each others' possessions. To my dismay, I discovered that Lao friendship includes a "what's yours is mine, vice versa, and bopenyung" concept. That's a pretty nice relationship if you don't have much and the other guy has a lot. I could never quite accept that, and I rigidly refused to lend or give out what I considered my more precious possessions. Perhaps I was wrong in having such things as a camera, record player, etc.

I quickly discovered that the American concept of "giving" in the USA and "givin" in Laos had to be different. I settled for what I called "judicious" giving. The Lao astounded me by the requests they made. As most children know, the Lao know that it doesn't hurt to ask; especially when Americans obviously have unlimited resources.

For a while I was distressed about the non-work use of Lao Agr.'s motorcycles. I had worked for the US government, and I knew that US government vehicle for only work purposes? I think not. And especially when the employee can never expect on his low salary to buy a vehicle on his own. It is possible, however, to draw some lines of control. For example, make the employee pay for his own gasoline when he uses the cycle for non-work purposes. Such a control would be reasonable, and would help not foster corruption.

It is important that if such regulations are imposed on the Lao, the rules must also apply to Americans.

I am troubled by corruption. It isn't a Lao custom. If we ever reach the stage when we must overlook and support corrupt officials in order to stop communism, it seems to me that we've already lost out.

This might not be the most appropriate place to record this incident, but it also reveals a confrontation of sorts. Mr. Sang, our cook, had a cough which we thought might be TB, so we had OB Hospital in Pakse give him a physical. The X-ray was poorly done and thus began a veritable circus in events, trying to determine if indeed Mr. Sang had TB. I finally had him committed to Pakse's hospital with the understanding that he would undergo tests for TB. A couple days later I discovered that no testing had been done, but that they were feeding him medicine! For what? I intervened, had the hospital take a better X-ray, and sent it to the Embassy Medical Health Unit in Vientiane for diagnosis. There was no TB. The moral of this, that Laos has no means of diagnosing an early case of TB, is a fact that still astonishes me--the American who comes from a country where the fight against disease has a top priority.

IV. AGRICULTURE - RICE:

The following discussions and recommendations are based on my contact with rice agriculture in the Pakse area. I believe that anyone involved in planning a national rice program ought to consider these comments about a local situation, or at least permit enough flexibility in national programs so that various areas could try using the approaches or methods which would suit them best.

1. Get in gear with regards to insecticide safety training.
2. There is work to be done in teaching agents extension techniques.

The Lao Agr. agent views his job as that ordered by his superiors. He (and maybe his supervisors) does not realize that an extension agent has a responsibility to farmers, and should work to create communication between farmers and himself. At present, the way the system works if it works at all, is for the farmer to seek out the Agr. chief, who then responds and directs the agent to a specific task. It may be that Lao Agr. service would prefer to retain this authority. In my opinion, however, agents will never be effective extension agents unless they are given limited freedom, authority, and initiative to respond to local needs.

I realize that an agent will not be effective if he has no real confidence in what he is supposed to recommend. And agents do have a lack of training. But I think that most of the agents in the Pakse office are competent in advising about fertilizer applications, and they could begin to be extension agents with just this minimum knowledge. Incidentally, I commend the training that RIG/Agr. agents have been getting in Thailand and The Philippines. This training will enable the agent to be sure of himself, and become a real extension agent. Extension in Lao Agr.'s definition, considers its function one

of establishing demonstration plots and organizing farm tours.

3. For fertilizer demonstrations, use small ones, maybe one paddy in size. Get them on as many farmers' lands as possible. This year I tried fertilizing half a paddy, and then planting two varieties so that four comparisons resulted: 1) local rice with fertilizer, 2) local rice without fertilizer, 3) improved rice with fertilizer, and 4) improved rice without fertilizer. These plots should be evaluated, as should the farmer's reaction to these plots' results. Such a demonstration as this has the benefit of being on the farmer's land, and of showing whether or not a particular local variety will respond to fertilizer. (Note: a couple plots were all I managed to get set up as I started this late in the transplanting season. For evaluation purposes, see Chandler Edwards, IVS/Champassak, as he knows the locations of the plots there. If this method is to be used again, I suggest again the use of an improved variety. But who ever tries this should plan on growing his own seedlings, not dapog either because many paddies have too much water for short seedlings, of improved varieties and take them along with him when he established the plots.)

4. Give one agent in each provincial center thorough training on the safe use of insecticides and entomology. He should also be responsible for sprayer maintenance. Then he should be given the authority and responsibility at the Agr. office.

5. Try using colored slides as an extension device. Slides taken in a local vicinity have the effect of publicizing a good farmer whom everybody knows (thus making him happy). They also will catch the interest of local people to see someone from their area, whom they know, in a slide show. Also, a series of slides often can easily demonstrate some technical steps, i.e., how to fertilize. USIS has agricultural films of a more general nature and slide shows often go well with them. Also, USIS would probably cooperate in providing slide projectors and generators.

5. Try using farm plans as an aid to farm development. Encourage the use of farmer kept records, written (Possible CD/IVSer project).

6. Encourage farmers to experiment with fertilizers and varieties on their own. Let them try all sorts of changes, i.e., spacing, water level, etc (But don't let them experiment with pesticides!) so that they learn from experience. Keep in contact with such trials, because they may discover useful information.

7. Encourage a rice competition for farmers. Have a rice fair, with prizes for the best yield. (Note: this is something a CD/IVSer in a village could help organize for the village.)

8. Keep experimenting with upland rice.

9. USAID should set up a soils and entomology laboratory.

10. Markets for rice, and fair prices must be guaranteed. I have heard that ADO is not buying IR-8 rice because it has poor milling qualities. However, all is not wasted because the kinds of practices needed for IR-8 are applicable to other high yielding varieties. But at this time, markets for

IR-8 ought to be guaranteed at least until another high yielding variety can replace it.

11. Determine if the wornout Hudson sprayers are really repairable. I discovered that those I helped repair had a very short life afterwards. Perhaps I did a poor job, or perhaps these sprayers are not repairable. If they are repairable, make certain that parts are available at the stores where they are sold.

V. AGRICULTURE - VEGETABLES:

An old IVSer once told me that in his time all IVSers were required to plant their own gardens. He further informed me that none of them ever grew. And that, likewise, has been my experience. This is not to mean that vegetables cannot be grown in Laos. The Lao and the Vietnamese do a marvelous job of supplying the Pakse market. But, I think that improvements could still be made.

1. Get qualified personnel. I had no problems growing gardens in Montana. Presumably a skilled technician, horticulturalist, would have overcome my problems.

2. Use compost. If you're going to raise a garden, absolutely the first thing to do is to start producing compost.

3. Get a seed source other than the US. Many US plants are not adaptable to this climate.

4. Consider the use of row irrigation. I believe that the hard work of watering is the limiting factor on vegetable production in Laos. I also know from experience that most common Lao watering practices are poor; i.e., they tend to wet only the surface soil. Woody Friesen and his IVS assistant had a fine demonstration of row irrigation in gardening until buffalo broke through the fence and ate the vegetables.

5. Try to get information on some factors vital for certain varieties of vegetables, especially for new varieties: 1) sensitivity to photoperiod, 2) improper temperature for setting of fruits, 3) susceptibility to wilts and other diseases.

6. Keep careful records. These ought to be consolidated in a common information center. I am afraid that most vegetable attempting growers start at the beginning and everybody makes the same mistakes over and over again.

7. Make an inventory of all vegetables produced. I'll bet there is not one person in IVS or USAID who can go to the Pakse market and give correct common names for all the various types of vegetables which are sold there. (I'll make the same bet for scientific names, too.)

VI. IVS ASSISTANT:

When I first came to Pakse, I was sent a Lao boy to be my Interpreter-Assistant. I wanted to be sure that he was a good man and that he understood that if he was working for me, he would be expected to work as hard as I worked and without me; and that he should get used to getting his hands dirty. It developed that there was a "housing problem"

in Pakse. He said he could find no place to stay, and he wanted to go to Vientiane. Since he was reluctant to try to find a family to live with in one of the villages near Pakse, I took the "housing problem" as an excuse. I advised IVS/Vtn and they told me that if the Assistant returned to Vientiane, he would be fired. I told him that. He went to Vtn anyway, and in my travels around Laos, I discovered that he was still employed by IVS. The IVSer to whom he was assigned told me that his assistant was pretty worthless. I think that IVS/Vtn should have backed me up and fired him, or at least advised me why they kept him. If he is incompetent, he should be dropped.

The next man sent to me as Interpreter-Assistant was Boun Seuy. He was an exceptionally good worker. He was no doubt most necessary to the success of the Rice Experiment. At that time, he was our key to the Lao language and Lao people. And his basic knowledge about rice was most practical and helpful. Boun Seuy also assisted me on other projects: The Yield Measurement survey, The check on measurement procedures, Entomology, a small fertilizer trial, my vegetable gardening attempts, and so forth. Those which were successful owed a part of that success to him.

A problem developed when I found myself working with Lao Agr. Boun Seuy did not have the initiative to launch a project on his own. I thought transportation might have been a problem, so I arranged for him to use a USAID/AGR cycle. Another limiting factor was poor security. He did manage to spend 30,000 Kip from Social Welfare, and build by himself a very nice pig house at Oudonsouk. But he never got the pigs, and thus never proved himself capable of attaining the Special Assistant rating and the ability to work on his own. Consequently, IVS has decided to release him upon my departure. He currently has gotten a job with USAID on a one month trial period.

Another problem concerned pay raises. Boun Seuy had been given a raise every year for four years and had come to expect them automatically. He knew that I had to approve the raise and he felt quite let down when it didn't come. I explained that had I given him the raise, it would have delayed his promotion to Special Assistant to a year from the date of his last raise, if he qualified. I preferred to wait until he proved himself, and then nominate him for Special Assistant. I'm not sure he understood this although I tried explaining it several times.

I had other reasons for delaying the raise. Boun Seuy was a good worker, but I wasn't sure he qualified for 27,000 Kip a month, which is twice to quadruple the salaries of Lao Agr. personnel with whom I worked. There was even one agent who applied through me for a job with IVS. Attempting to be diplomatic, I let the IVS staff handle that one, and they wrote a negative reply and the reason why. I never delivered the reply because I never saw the agent for a long time. When I last talked to him, he told me he was being transferred to Vtn.

Granted, that at 6,000 Kip a month, government salaries are low. But it remains important that IVS does not pay its personnel wages excessively higher than what government employees get. IVS presently uses USAID salary grades, but they ought to make their own and handle the subject more carefully.

IVS Interpreter-Assistants should not come to think of that job as a career. I affirm the new IVS policy of leaving an Interpreter-Assistant with a new IVSer for a maximum of six months, and then moving him elsewhere or dropping him. I suggest that if the Interpreter-Assistants does not show himself worthy of becoming a Special Assistant after two years of employment, he ought to be dropped. IVS should view them as trainees, and after two years they should have learned enough in new skills to be able to pursue another line of work.

At various times, I had other personnel working for me. Some were hired under petty cash and one was under the Student Summer Trainee program. Mainly, these boys worked with me on entomology. At most, I could say that they received some insight into biology and perhaps pricked their curiosity a little more.

VII. POSSIBLE POSITIONS FOR IVS'ERS:

Opportunities for IVS work abound all over this region. At the Lao Agr. office itself, there could be one IVSer assigned to extension activities and another assigned to crops and research. These are both technical positions and the IVSer so assigned must expect to spend at least one growing season, maybe planting his own paddy, before he should try to make any contribution. Perhaps he ought to be assigned to the Agr. Chief for 5 months, and let the Chief use him as an agent. I think Lao Agr. in Pakse now would welcome qualified IVSers.

There is a need for an IVS/Home Economics person to work with the Lao Home Ec girls. They would also welcome an IVSer.

It is conceivable that in cooperation with RIG Agr. and a fertilizer company, an IVSer could be responsible for setting up fertilizer demonstrations. Perhaps the company would be willing to set up a special fund for IVS use.

A person skilled in handicrafts could find opportunities among Lao and Hill Tribespeople refugees. Possible markets might be found in Vientiane, Pakse, or Ubon, Thailand. Transportation of these commodities to market would be a major difficulty.

With a sericulture station located (I understand) in nearby Thailand, it would seem worthwhile to investigate the possibilities of silkworm production. Charley Whalen, SW, is having mulberry trees planted in Oudomsouk.

In my travels throughout Laos, I saw the need for training on the use of insecticides and equipment for both IVSers and Lao. This is important enough that a position to solve this problem should be created and filled. In cooperation with Lao Agr. and IVS, a trained Entomologist could travel to every Lao Agr. and IVS field station, set up safe facilities, and run a training program until Lao Agr. and IVS personnel are qualified to safely handle insecticides. If ought to be withdrawn from their responsibility. This job could be a continuing position as follow-up would be necessary. And perhaps that individual could eventually graduate to a position of roving entomologist. Of course, this position would eventually be filled by a Lao who has been counterparted to the IVSer.

Since there is so much work to be done in the area of basic scientific study, perhaps IVS ought to consider assisting Masters and PHD candidates. (I know there is a need in the area of entomology. I suspect the same of other sciences: forestry, wildlife, botany, grasses, and such studies such as sociology.) This IVSers' main responsibility would be to study something about which little or nothing is known, (i.e. how to control the rootworm on upland rice) and which would ultimately be of value to Laos (i.e., how best to control the rootworm). The IVSer would also be living in the area he was working, and be responsive to the needs and wants of that community in so far as this did not interfere with his main work.

VIII. EVALUATION OF IVS/LAOS RD TEAM:

IVS/LAOS has improved itself immensely during my two years. The RD leadership now has a staff which is very conscientious and responsive to the volunteer. IVS/Laos, however, still has a long ways to go in order to reach the state of being the organization that it could and should be.

IVS has begun to stand for something. The efforts of the Program Committee and the staff to search out the meaning of IVS has been important and helpful. People and organizations must have definite goals. Once IVS establishes a policy and maintains it, the other agencies with whom we work (including the Lao ones as well as USAID) will then know how to respond to IVS, what IVS is willing to support, and perhaps in the future, Lao ministries will seek out IVS for help. (I might add that IVS/Viet Nam is already counted this among their achievements, so why can't we?)

IVS has started to try for internationalization of IVS. The more of this, the better. (Here again, IVS/Viet Nam has taken the lead. I was most impressed with the non-American IVSers serving there.)

IVS's move to handle its own affairs is commendable. This is sorely needed, and will continue to be a fight just to keep what has been gained. The additional staffing positions IVS has recently won will help this.

IVS ought to give more consideration to the needs of adequate staffing. The present staff, while admirably dedicated and hardworking, has lacked experience. Also, there is the very real problem of discontinuity and retraining caused by the rapid turnover of young leadership. Perhaps IVS will have to pay higher salaries in order to get a more professional and permanent staff. On the other hand, I would almost prefer the present situation to a professional, permanent staff that lacked the dynamic drive and close contact to the volunteer which our present youthful leadership displays because IVS needs that vigor very much.

The problem of continuity of field projects is a tough one. IVS must take a long hard look at this and try to solve it. I admit that I myself preferred to start my own programs, to be an adventuresome pioneer, rather than inherit somebody else's old project and continue it.

How many other IVSers think as I do? What steps can be taken to ensure continuity? It seems that some kind of overlap might be necessary. There's no question that this is vital to any long range development contribution. This is also where a professional staff could be of value in determining how, if, or when IVS has worked itself out of a job.

I also think there is value in informing people that IVS is unique; that it is not the same as USAID. We've got a comparison here to exploit which can help us. I have told Lao people I am a volunteer, and it has made a difference. It has gotten me Lao prices for things I've purchased and it has resulted in appreciation for my being here, and thus a greater willingness to cooperate with me. I do think that IVSers' actions and ways of living set us apart from USAID. But the Lao are not going to understand why that is so by our deeds alone. It has to be told.

IVS/Viet Nam uses attractive insignias on their vehicles, homes, etc. where IVSers want them. I think it helps.

IVS annual meetings should continue. The Program Committee is aware of possible improvements.

IVS Orientation-improved a hundredfold!

IVS Recruitment: Long suffering volunteers (a result of deceptive recruitment in the past) shall, I hope, become an extinct creature. I have tried to get all ideas on recruiting and I shall endeavor to recruit in such a manner which will be mutually beneficial to IVS volunteers and IVS/Laos.

IX. COMMENTS ON USAID:

I really wonder if it is worthwhile to constructively criticize USAID? I recently saw an A.I.D. publication which superbly explains the best approach to development (something like "Points a Technician Overseas Should Consider"). It seems some what ridiculous to repeat those opinions, especially since the booklet says it better than I can.

There are all indications that USAID should know better. TRAINING is a sacred word, and yet genuine training never catches up to material inputs, most of which go to waste because no one knows how to properly use them.

But....maybe someone will listen to this and try for improvements. Besides, the IVS handbook solicits End of Tour comments on USAID.

Force account projects, by those I mean that which is built, financed, completed, entirely without local Lao support, are OUT! If USAID continues resorting to such "development", they should realize that the only way these projects will be effectively used is if the people are dictated to use them. If the US must resort to promoting change in underdeveloped countries by that means, then perhaps it would be better to let the communists do it; they'd undoubtedly be more effective.

Force Account projects ruin conditions formerly favorable for self help. The countryside cries out its witness to this in every place that there has been

force account work. (I would exempt some things from this ban, such as roads and some irrigation systems. Please note and understand that my use of the phrase force account is not meant in the same way by which USAID labels some of their work. I would call a lot of USAID's self help projects force account, because when the Lao refuse to provide labor, USAID usually ends up hiring paid laborers to complete the project. And if that's the case, then the projects weren't really self help to begin with.)

USAID programs in places which have qualified personnel, are sometimes good. Conversely, a number of potentially good programs are wasted because of inept or unconcerned personnel. Programs can only be as good as the people who effect them. It would be better for USAID not to have unqualified personnel and no program than the present situation. I must point out that IVS must try to get the most out of its personnel, but I am also emphasizing that useless USAID personnel are a much greater expense to American taxpayers than are volunteers, and these USAID employees aren't sent back home after a two year period, either.

USAID cannot rely upon yearly Congressional appropriations. Even if USAID does become development-oriented, as all its propaganda describes it as being, it could not be effective without good basic planning, and a commitment of funds for a long period of time, i.e., three years or more, or as long as it took to complete a specific plan.

Training. I am the first to agree that material inputs are vital to development. But as has been said many times before, "Fertilizer does no good if the farmer doesn't know how to apply it." Flooding Laos with materials and without matching effective training only leads to waste, corruption, and negative attitudes toward development. Training should be increased, and the supply of material inputs reduced until the two aspects equally complement each other.

I have had experience with government agencies before coming to Laos: the ASCS program, the Soil Conservation Service, and the Agricultural Research Service, all of USDA (U. S. Department of Agriculture). None of these organizations (at least to my experience) were plagued with the problems of poor personnel and bad programs. And unlike USAID, these organizations really had to account for what they did. USAID unfortunately enjoys the benefits that accrue from being the "FRONTLINES" against the communist Advance. If the coffers get a little low, scare tactics about the Looming Red Tide are the magic words which get the heavily flowing financial well flowing again. It is a paradox that while USAID employs so many accountants, there is still tremendous waste of materials and money.

I think this goes back to the lack of longterm goals. The USAID bureaucracy has become notorious for cranking out national programs without regard for different field conditions. I'm not claiming to know the answers, but I do have some ideas. Only once in my entire two years has a USAID man visited me in Pakse, intentionally seeking me out to hear my ideas about conditions in the field. That man was Dr. Bell of USAID Agr., and I remain overwhelmingly awed and grateful for his consideration.

The USAID bureaucracy is notable for all sorts of blunders, basically the result of poor timing and/or planning. Some examples that I remember include ADO tools arriving just after the gardening season was over. Seed and fertilizer has arrived too late for programs. USAID has also spent much money by double transportation; rice has been shipped in and shipped back out. And that has been the case with other commodities. I also watched a Lao build a very nice house because USAID was either unaware or closed its eyes to the fact that this particular Lao was ordering twice as many commodities as the institution he worked for actually required.

Of course, my humbly offered suggestions will be somewhat impossible to fulfill as long as USAID objectives remain political instead of developmental.

I do want to give credit where credit is due. It is my opinion that USAID's emphasis on rice is one of the best actions the institution has taken. For once, a program is being offered that has the capability of raising incomes, and thereby, the standard of living in rural communities.

Look at the facts: Approximately 90% of the population is estimated as rural. And a high percentage of rural dwellers are rice growing farmers.

Perhaps with additional incomes beyond subsistence, villagers may even decide to spend their own money to build their own schools, etc. Perhaps in the distant future, these incomes could be taxed to support the Lao government.

USAID must not let this agricultural program fail through some fault of USAID's. I have said this before, but it bears repeating: Fertilizer inputs must continue to be made available and personnel must be trained to teach its proper use. The same applies to insecticides, although extreme caution must prevail with its use. New varieties of rice must be received and tried. Investigations into Lao culture should be undertaken and the information gotten should be applied. All these facets: new methods, machinery, and credit should be equally developed. And finally, the market for excess rice must be maintained. USAID has done much good work in this already. May it continue and improve.

9/9/68:bc

Mr Al Best, ACOP/Admin

The undersigned

Monthly COL Allowance

This memorandum concerns the cost of living check which all IVSers receive each month. It is our consensus that the money allotted is insufficient in light of the relatively high cost of living in urban, as opposed to rural, areas. IVSers are finding it increasingly difficult to make ends meet; indeed, it is not uncommon for an IVSer to be in the red at the end of any given month. Below is a sample cost analysis for a typical month.

Food (purchased primarily from the local market and supplemented by goods from the commissary, with occasional meals in restaurants)	\$50.00
Maid (cleaning house, washing clothes, marketing, cooking)	^{25.00} 20.00
Transportation (taxi, motorcycle)	15.00
Misc. items (reading matter, film, soap, haircuts, shaving cream, etc)	20.00
Entertainment (movies, guests, gifts, beer etc)	20.00
	<hr/>
TOTAL	\$130.00

On the basis of the above it is quite obvious that the present COL of \$100 per month is inadequate to meet the needs of an IVSer living in an urban area. In some cases IVSers can get by on less than the above figure, in other cases IVSers must spend more money. In either case, however, a financial pinch is present.

And there are vacations to consider. In spite of the fact that an occasional change in environment is necessary for all IVSers, few find that they are really able to afford financially to take a vacation.

In short, we, the undersigned, feel that the present monthly COL is inadequate to meet the exigencies of urban living. We propose that, in light of the above statement, the COL be reestablished at \$150 per month.

Mr. Frederick C Benson
IVS /Thalat

ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF IVS FROM LAOS

Introduction

Within four months , three IVS volunteers have been killed in acts of political assassination. It is tragic that it has taken these three deaths to force all of us in IVS/Laos to examine our role here and to recognize the extremely political nature of our work here. But the question here is no longer whether IVS is political ,every volunteer agrees to that ,but what we should do about it. The question has become: Can IVS become sufficiently non-political to justify staying in Laos.

We believe that IVS cannot now become sufficiently non-political and that it should withdraw from Laos. We believe in the non-political humanitarian ideals of IVS. We feel these ideals have been irrevocably compromised here. We feel that if IVS is to perform a constructive, non-political role in other countries in the future that it should now end its involvement in Laos.

We do not believe that the damage to the integrity of IVS is compensated for by the small good that we can now do for the people of Laos. No changes in job locations or job descriptions can significantly change this . We recognize that no organization like IVS can function completely non-politically . But in Laos the degree of political involvement is unacceptably high, however one defines "non-political".

Some individuals feel that they can perform a useful service by remaining in Laos. This may or may not be so. But the question facing IVS now is what it should do as an organization. We do not believe that IVS as an organization should be backing up ~~one~~ side in a war, even if it feels that side is be right. It may well be that the people of Laos would be better off if the RLG wins its war. But it is not IVS's role as a non-political organization to back up the RLG any more than to back up the PL.

The basic fact is this: neither now nor in the near future will IVS be able to serve all the Lao people. It will always be working for one side here with its work therefore taking on unacceptable political overtones.

If IVS is to mean anything as a non-political, people-to-people organization, it cannot take sides. It must do so in Laos, and therefore has no honorable alternative but to withdraw.

1. IVS is politically involved here in Laos to an unacceptably high degree. No change in job description or job locations can change this.

Laos is a nation at war. Two factions, - the RLG supported by the Americans, and the Pathet Lao supported by the North Vietnamese - are engaged in a struggle for political power. As an organization - made up mostly of Americans, funded by the American government, working only in RLG territory, and working in the name of the RLG, IVS's role simply carries too many political implications for it to function as an honest volunteer organization here.

As Director Mann has pointed out, the entire American aid program to Laos was jeopardized in the early 1960 by revelations in the United States of widespread corruption in RLG circle. Unable to stem this corruption directly, the American government decided to set up its own structure parallel to the RLG and channel aid money and commodities from Washington down to the village through American hands. IVS, as the organization providing village-level personnel, always has and always will be, an integral part of this parallel American structure.

The expressed goal of the American aid program is to strengthen the RLG in its political battle with the Pathet Lao. By involving itself in this aid program, IVS has unavoidably involved itself in the political conflict as well. We do not question that some may feel that the RLG or American government should counter the insurgency of the Pathet Lao. We do question whether such counter insurgency is IVS's role.

The fact is that IVSers have found themselves in the anomalous role of working to strengthen the RLG politically in rural and urban areas. Through their presence they have often encouraged RLG officials to go into areas they might not visit otherwise. Through their presence they have often helped maintain an image of the RLG in village eyes which was simply not true when the RLG functions alone. IVSers work along side the RLG, in support of programs designed to build up the RLG in the eyes of its people, to win their hearts and minds.

In addition to strengthening the RLG politically to some extent IVS's role carries political implications vis-a-vis American intentions towards Laos. Most Laotians identify IVSers as Americans first and volunteers second, if ever. In fact, volunteers are often taken for USAID employees or even soldiers. Laotians tend to interpret IVS activities as a sign that the American government has long-term, irrevocable commitments to Laos.

The political implications are obvious. The IVS's role in the American counter-insurgency effort here is not negligible. IVSers make up some 13-15% of all Americans working for the U.S. government here in Laos. More than that, IVSers comprise close to 70% of all Americans operating in day-to-day contact at the village level. Moreover, former IVSers occupy many USAID and other government posts here in Laos. As a result, IVS as an organization has been and is, making a sizable contribution to the American counter-insurgency program.

Of course, any volunteer organization must be politically involved to some extent. But when a group like IVS in Laos finds itself actively engaged in a political struggle, with its volunteers systematically singled out for political assassination by one side in a political war; when moreover, it finds itself closely identified with one of the major blocs in the cold war in the midst of a shooting war with the other side, the level of political involvement is clearly too high to justify remaining.

2. The proposed changes in job descriptions and job locations would in no way change the current unacceptably level of political involvement.

For example, it is suggested that IVSers work directly with lower and middle level officials. This has been tried before; indeed the majority of IVS work to date has probably been with such officials. It is only recently that USAID has left the field to IVSers so that they have begun dealing daily with higher-ranking officials, such as district and provincial governors. Previous IVS experience in working with lower and middle-level officials suggests that there is little likelihood that IVSers can have much influence on the basic problems facing the RLG, and even that the lower they work the less of an influence they can have. Moreover, continuing to work with RLG officials at whatever level, IVS will be continuing its political involvement and identification with one side in a political war.

Whether IVS pulls back to the cities or not, it will still be made up mostly of Americans funded by the American government, and work in support of the counter-insurgency program to strengthen the RLG against the Pathet Lao. I

Moreover ,the danger of political assassination will only be reduced by a pull-back to the cities,not eliminated. It is highly unlikely that IVSers will not be called upon to travel out to villages as long as they remain in Laos, even if they sleep in the towns- and it is quite possible that even the suburbs of Mekong River valley towns will not remain free of political assassination in the future.

The basic objections to IVS's political role in Laos will remain whether or not IVS pulls back to the towns.

3. As for the education team,the political nature of the job is a bit more subtle, but there nonetheless. It is perhaps not so obvious due to the safer locations in which IVS/ED members work.

It is true that there is nothing inherently political about teaching English or math or perhaps even civics. It becomes political however,when the schools we teach in take their pupils from the RLG side,when students we train must sign contracts to teach for the RLG in the future,and when the pictures on the wall are of RLG officials only.

The educational opportunities offered by either side to the most capable and ambitious of rural youth is a key to success in the political struggle currently being waged here. By engaging itself in teaching on one side only IVS has irrevocably ranged itself on one side of the political struggle also.

4. Due to its political involvement,IVS brings undue danger upon the Laotians with whom it is associated. Two Laotians employed by IVS have been killed in political assassinations. Dozens of other Laotians -government officials and simple villagers alike- have been killed,wounded,or endangered due to association with IVS. As we pull back to the cities and make new friends with Laotians who presently have no association with Americans,this problem is in no sense eliminated. Rather we are endangering people who are now safe from this problem.

5. Some volunteers argue that, although it is true that IVS is political,it can still do some good in Laos. We do not deny that some individuals can be of some help to the Laotian people. But we feel that once the level of IVS's politicality is admitted,that it as an organization has no business in Laos.

Individuals who are willing to function politically while doing good might more logically think of joining an organization like USAID which is openly political. This makes more sense to us than trying to change the non-political, humanitarian ideals of IVS, which is after all one of the few non-profit volunteer organizations in existence.

USAID has a \$48m. budget to administer this year. It is clear that if IVS pulls out of Laos they will be forced to find anyway to administrate it. There is every reason to believe they will, probably by making contract positions available. Clearly, former IVSers who knew the country and language would have top priority in obtaining such positions.

6. There are others who argue that IVS is duty-bound, by its humanitarian principles, to remain in Laos. They argue that in this time of war the Laotian people need our help even more.

There is no doubt that the Laotian people need all the help they can get. The question is, however, whether IVS as a non-political volunteer group is in a position to give it.

Even if it is Agreed that IVS cannot remain in the present situation, there is nothing to prevent individuals truly conscience-bound to remain on in Laos from doing so. Even if our proposal for pulling out is adopted, it will be 6 months to a year before the step is taken. During this time any individuals wishing to remain on in Laos could easily save enough money to support themselves for another year or two here on their own. In such a case they would individually be in a position to offer non-political, disinterested aid.

Moreover, we see a basic contradiction between position that IVS should stay in Laos due to the ravages of War upon it, and the position that IVS should pull back to the cities. Clearly, if a major reason for IVS to remain in Laos is to help it in a time of war, we should not pull back to the cities which are relatively untouched by the war. Either we stay out in the villages in the war zones, risking our own lives, helping the sick and wounded, or we pull out of Laos. Pulling back to the cities will in no way meet the needs of war-torn Laos.

7. Some other volunteers argue that IVS should remain in Laos because it offers more "leeway" to volunteers than would USAID

This is, to begin with, a highly questionable assumption. The amount of leeway given to IVSers seems to depend far more upon the personality of individual superior than whether they belongs to IVS or USAID. But even if it were true that individual volunteers have more leeway under IVS than USAID, we do not feel that this is sufficient reason for IVS as an organization to remain in Laos. The current level of political involvement of IVS in Laos compromises its very integrity as an organization. That certain individuals find it more convenient and free than they would find USAID cannot compensate for this threat to IVS's identity.

8. There are those who suggest that we should wait another six months or a year before making a decision on whether to pull out or not. But, why? Either the basic contradictions of IVS's position in Laos, between its non-political goals and its highly political role, call for it to pull out of Laos or they don't. Another six months or year won't make a difference, any more than a pullback to the cities can alter IVS's political role.

As it is, the present proposal for IVS to pull back will take six months to a year to implement. During this period IVS will continue functioning politically and not incidentally--more IVSers may die.

We see little reason to put off a decision on this basic issue.

9. We would like to stress that the decision of what IVS is to do in Laos must be taken of Laos itself.

There are some, for example, who suggest that because IVS has remained in Vietnam it should do so in Laos as well.

Looking from the outside, we feel that any comparison between IVS's position in Laos and Vietnam is inexact at best. For one thing, IVS's political role in Vietnam has been lessened by the arrival of 550,000 American troops and tens of thousands of civilian personnel. In Laos, as we have shown, IVS's role is of far greater significance. Moreover, there is no evidence that the Viet Cong have systematically selected IVS as targets for political assassination as have the Pathet Lao here. In any event, IVS/Vietnam is also doing a good deal of soul-searching about its role, and more and more of its members seem to feel that it has no future there unless it can become truly internationalized.

But this is only looking from the outside. We do not feel that any decisions made about IVS/Laos should be taken with reference to what is going on in Vietnam, the situation here should be evaluated in and of itself.

10. Finally, it must be stressed that there is no foreseeable alternative for IVS as an organization in Laos that does not involve employment by USAID. Such employment will always involve IVS/Laos politically to a degree which is simply not acceptable.

It is not that employment by USAID is unacceptable per se. In countries at peace an IVS contract with USAID might be judged by the board as an acceptable level of politicization for IVS.

But it must be clear that in a country at war like Laos, where IVS is unavoidably identified with one side in a highly political war, that IVS can simply not remain.

Conclusion

IVS should withdraw from Laos. It is functioning politically here in a way that is simply not consonant with its most basic principles. Some individuals may feel that they can be of service to the Lao people even, though they are functioning politically. It is only logical that such individuals accept the contract positions with USAID that would most likely become available were IVS to withdraw from Laos.

Others individuals may wish to function in a humanitarian way, free of political considerations. It is logical that such individuals remain on in Laos at their own expense, living on what they can save in the next 6 months to a year from a rather considerable IVS salary in terms of the cost of living here.

But whatever individuals may do, there is no doubt that IVS can no longer function here as an organization dedicated to people, non-political volunteer principles.

We stress that if IVS remains in Laos, it must no longer mask the political implications of its work here. It must make clear to all, particularly prospective volunteers long before they come to Harper's Ferry, that IVS is backing up one side in a counter-insurgency effort.

It would be inconscien~~ci~~able to send any more volunteers to Laos and a possible death without their having a through understanding of the political issues at stake. But such a course of frank honesty to all would do incalculable harm to IVS both in attracting new volunteers and seeking new positions elsewhere. Since this is therefore not an acceptable course for IVS, the only honorable alternative is withdrawal.

We believe in the future of IVS. We believe that as one of the few private volunteer organisations with any kind of standing and experience, IVS has a future throughout the developing world. But the trend throughout Asia, Africa, and Latin America is against politically-oriented groups. Unless IVS takes a clear stand against politicization of its role, it is jeopardizing future opportunities in developing countries. Many nations in Africa, for example, have either ejected the Peace Corps or expressed their distrust of it. Such nations might be much more amenable to a group like IVS if it can demonstrate its political independence.

Of course, neither IVS nor any other organisation can ever be completely politically independent. But by directly involving itself in a counter-insurgent effort here in Laos, by doing so, moreover, on behalf of one of the two great blocs in the midst of the cold war, IVS has exceeded an acceptable level of political involvement.

It may well be that IVS should never have allowed its role to become what it has in Laos. But what's past is past and can't be undone. What is important now is that we look to the future. Such a perspective demands a clear and firm decision to withdraw from Laos.

In closing, however, we wish to stress that IVS involvement in Laos is unfortunate in and of itself. Even if withdrawal from Laos did not have appreciable effects on contract possibilities in other countries, IVS would be duty-bound to terminate its present operation here.

IVS's organizing principle, its *raison d'être*, is as a private non-political, people to people organization. Continuation in Laos violates this most basic tenet.

In closing, we would note that many of us who favor withdrawal of IVS from Laos feel a deep personal commitment to the Laotian people. Through our collective years of service here, we have come to respect them as individuals and collectively. Many of us have close personal attachments many have other reasons for staying, and do not plan to leave as individuals. We feel as acutely as any the needs of the Laotian people but this in no way diminishes our conviction that IVS, our organization, should terminate its commitment here. Neither the interests of the Laotian people, or of IVS itself, are served by the continue presence of IVS in Laos.

A Brief History of International Voluntary Services, Inc.

by

Galen S. Beery

IVS/Washington - 1959-1962
IVS/RDD-Laos - 1962-1967
USAID/RDD-Laos - 1967-1969

As one who has been closely involved with IVS for almost ten years, it has been interesting for me to witness the development of International Voluntary Services as a not-for-profit organization working in technical assistance abroad. Since there is a tendency to forget the steps in the growth and history of such an organization unless it is put down in black-and-white, I here have put down a rough outline of IVS' history in various countries. This represents my memory and is not to be considered infallible, nor is it to be considered an official history of IVS.

IVS' roots, and goal of community development, may be traced back through time, through the antecedents for foreign technical assistance dating back to St. Paul's "Come over into Macedonia and help us". The idea of assistance and construction grew up through World Wars I and II. William James explored the idea of an international constructive group in his "A Moral Equivalent to War". And missionary work throughout the 18th and 19th centuries fostered many technical assistance programs, largely educational and on a small scale.

The actual organization of IVS came about as the result of a comment made by John Foster Dulles in a speech he made early in the 1950's. While talking about international development, he indicated that the U.S. government was interested in securing the same type of dedicated

missionary personnel which the churches had recruited to work in missionary and church work overseas. A small group of men, representing six or seven church denominations, later asked what it was, more specifically, that he was searching for, and how they could help. Delles indicated that, if there was an independent organization which could recruit such personnel, the U.S. government would be interested in contracting with them for teams of personnel. However, since contracts would be governmental, there would be no proselytizing or propagandizing.

As a result of these discussions, the denominational representatives went ahead and set up an organization termed International Voluntary Services, incorporated under the laws of the District of Columbia in 1953. Dr. W. Harold Row, of the Church of the Brethren, and Dr. William Snyder, of the Mennonite Central Committee, handled many aspects of organization and planning. Dr. J. S. Hoffsinger, a Brethren educational leader, with a long history of work in the International field, became the first Executive Director.

The young organization relied on precedents set up by various church relief organizations which had been set up to meet refugee needs after World War II. The IVS application form was patterned closely after that used by Brethren Volunteer Service, of the Church of the Brethren. The two major organizations of this type were the Brethren Volunteer Service (BVS) of the Church of the Brethren, and the Mennonite Central Committee. Both organizations recruited and supported personnel in European relief construction and work camps. The majority of the IVS'ers for the first two years, since recruitment was largely through the churches, were from these two denominations and the Society of Friends (Quakers).

And many of the men recruited, usually those with a farm background and a degree in agriculture, were conscientious objectors, doing IVS work "in the national interest", as an alternative to military service.

IVS "aspect during its first seven or eight years was that of a small, tightly-knit organization. The Washington office was small, with only the Executive Director and one secretary until 1959. Recruits were personally contacted through local ministers' recommendations, and carefully screened. Teams were small, there was little more than a two-day orientation in Washington before new workers were sent overseas, and in the field, teams worked and lived almost as family units.

First Teams

The first teams IVS fielded were in the Near East, had very few personnel, and were on a limited village level.

Egypt

In 1953 or 1954, IVS sent two young agriculturists to Assuit, in Egypt, where they helped the Egyptian government operate agricultural stations. Their role was that of working directly with government officials in the department of agriculture, and with villagers. When the Executive Director visited Egypt in 1954, a high official in the Egyptian government told him that "The fame of your two boys has spread up and down the Nile. We could use fifty like them". Unfortunately, the government soon suffered a political upheaval, and was unable to fund additional personnel. The two IVS'ers were withdrawn later in 1954 or early in 1955.

Jordan

During the same period, IVS sent several men to work on the Jordan

Valley Development Project, in Jordan. This project, located near Jericho, was the work of one man, a progressive-minded Arab named Musa Bey Alami. Against others' advice, he sunk a series of wells in barren areas, struck water, and instituted large-scale farming on a modern, scientific basis. When traditional farmers refused to learn "new tricks", he started a boys' training school, and adopted large number of orphans from the streets of Jerusalem. The boys were able to learn modern farming methods and received technical training by working on the land being reclaimed from the desert.¹ But in the same year, nationalist and anti-American feeling rose high. Thousands of Arabs rioted and wrecked the station, killing some 20,000 purebred Leghorn chickens being raised as a poultry project. It was felt by IVS that the IVS'ers could no longer work under the conditions, and they were withdrawn. One man was transferred to a new team in Iraq.

Iraq

The teams in Egypt and Jordan consisted of no more than two or three men each. The first actual IVS "team" was fielded in Iraq in 1954, to work in Community Development. A "Chief-of-Party" directed and coordinated the work of several team members, each of whom was a technician in a specific field. The Iraq team included a nurse, home economist, and agricultural technicians in livestock and poultry. Most of the men on the team were conscientious objectors.²

1/ The work was featured in an article in the Reader's Digest for May or June, 1954, under the title "Musa Bey Fights the Battle of Jericho".

2/ For the record, the Iraq team members included Don and Cherrie Mitchell, Ed and Betty Wiser, Martha Rupel, Ed Harmon, Dr. Burke, Don Goodfellow, Carl Jensen, Everett Jennings, Peter Barwick, and Rudd Hamm. Goodfellow was stricken with polio shortly after arriving and has been bedridden at his home in the states ever since. Don Mitchell is presently working with USOM Thailand.

The IVS contract for the Iraq team was with the U.S. International Cooperation Administration (ICA), which was expanding American technical assistance programs, and the Iraqi Ministry of Social Affairs. The greater part of the program consisted of the training of Iraqi Community Development personnel. These "Village Level Workers" received both formal training and follow up work with the IVS'ers in rural villages. Projects were centered primarily in the villages of Shalaqwa, Erbil province, northern Iraq, in Sulimineah province, east of Kurkuk, in eastern Iraq, and in Mahawhil, Hillah Province, southern Iraq, near the barren mound which marks the site of the ancient city of Babylon.

Operations ended in 1957, despite some successes, when the ICA contract terminated and was not renewed. The main reason for nonrenewal appears to have been that certain Iraqi government officials felt that the work of the IVS team posed a threat to their own jobs, either by takeover or by comparison.

Nepal

A second Community Development team was fielded in Nepal from 1954 through 1957. This team was stationed in what is now northern India, where the hot plains meet the foothills of the Himalaya mountains. The Nepal team also included six or seven persons. Inoperation, the team was left pretty much to its own devices, although there was some assistance from governmental agencies. An abandoned movie theatre in a provincial center was secured and renovated as a community development center. Women team members taught sewing classes. Some agricultural projects were undertaken. But, as with the first three teams, work ended after the two-year contract. Under a new boundary agreement signed between

India and Nepal, the area became part of India, and India, at that time, was not interested in community development work.

Programs in Southeast Asia

While IVS teams operated in Iraq and Nepal, IVS Executive Director Dr. J. S. Moffsinger, made periodic inspection tours and was also able to investigate other possibilities in the Near East and Southeast Asia for IVS teams. He found that the U.S. had begun sending technical advisors to Laos and Vietnam under ICA programs, and was interested in IVS'ers to work in these two countries.

Two contracts were signed with ICA. That in Laos with the Rural Development Division of USOM - United States Operations Mission ³ - the local country branch of ICA. In Vietnam, the USOM Agriculture Division contracted for teams of agriculturists.

Laos

The IVS "RD" team in Laos was assigned to the town of Lat Houang, on the Plaine des Jarres, Xieng Khouang province, and team members began setting up an agricultural and community development station as a center for the cattle industry on the plain. The ag men supervised the building of corrals, and Lao boys were hired to help vaccinate livestock. Purebred Brahama cattle were imported to improve local breeds of cattle. An IVS nurse set up a dispensary and began to train Lao and Meo girls as nurses.

The program was isolated by transportation and location from other

3/ ICA, under the Kennedy administration, became in 1961 the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID or USAID), and local designation of "USOM" was abandoned for the term USAID, except, for some reason, in Thailand.

American programs, and marked by the "missionary-type" relationship which has since been lost. Walt Coward, a member of this early team and later a Chief-of-Party, recalled that the attitude of many USOM employees was that IVS was "a bunch of religious nuts somewhere on the Plaine des Jarres". As for transportation, "flights were few and far between: when an airplane arrived, it was a red-letter day. If we ran low on gas for the generator, we'd give a pilot a five gallon can and he'd siphon some out of the wing tanks for us. In return, we'd give him a good meal".

The IVS "Education Team" started under a contract signed with ICA in 1957, under USOM Education Division. Teachers were recruited to teach various technical subjects at Laos' highest educational institution, the National Education Center (now Ecole Superior des Pedagogies or Sisavang Vong University), being built nine kilometers outside Vientiane. A Public Health nurse taught health and nursing and ran the school dispensary. An IVS'er skilled in carpentry began teaching wood shop, and a plumber and electrician taught and worked in their fields. An important facet of these operations was that, as a new university in an underdeveloped country, much of the work had to be a "work while you learn" type. Students not only learned carpentry, auto mechanics, plumbing, but they built and repaired dormitories, wired them and installed plumbing, and repaired school equipment.

While the ED and Education teams went about their work, the period from 1956 to 1959 was a period of growth, corruption, and change. The rapid increase in Aid programs led to mismanagement and corruption, with led to widely-reported excesses and, inevitably, to a Congressional investigation. IVS was not involved, but as a result of charges of "American

imperialism" and a reaction against the personal aggrandizement of local officials and military leaders, who were 'fighting communism', a neutralist reaction developed and fractured the government into three parts, Leftist (the "Pathet Lao" or PL), Rightist, and Neutralist. The first phases of IVS Work in Laos were brought to an abrupt end in 1960 due to the changed military situation and civil war.

In August, 1960, Neutralist troops under the command of Captain Kong Le took over Vientiane. The Education team continued work as usual, but the Xieng Khouang team was pulled in to Vientiane, where they assisted USOM personnel in regular development activities. The Lat Houang livestock station, turned over to government officials, rapidly reverted to weeds. Cattle on the station were later killed and eaten by military units in the area.⁴

In December, 1960, Rightist forces clashed with Kong Le's paratroopers in Vientiane. Most IVS and USOM personnel were evacuated in a long convoy of civilian cars to the border city of Thadeua, and crossed the Mekong River to Hong Khai, from where they were flown to Bangkok. Only two, Dayton Maxwell and Edgar M. ("Pop") Buel, remained in Laos to work in refugee operations.⁵

For the next five or six months, most IVS Laos operations stagnated

4/ Work has never been re-initiated in Lat Houang due to the political situation. An interesting description of the IVS headquarters is given in "Reported to Be Alive", a book by an American reporter who was held captive there by Pathet Lao troops.

5/ "Pop" Buell shortly transferred to USAID and has continued working in refugee operations in Xieng Khouang province. The Saturday Evening Post carried a two-part article on him in 1962 under the title "An American Hero". Maxwell presently works in the USAID Training Branch.

as the morale of people housed in Bangkok hotels and receiving a high per diem collapsed. Several IVS'ers transferred to the IVS team in Viet-Nam. This marked the low point of IVS/Laos work.

IVS and the U.S. Peace Corps

In 1959, a Congressional investigating committee visited Laos to observe America's foreign aid program in action. The success of IVS in working with people at the village level did not go unnoticed. The committee, consisting of Senator Humphrey and Congressmen Reuss and Neuberger, were very favorably impressed by the work of the IVS teams. In an enthusiastic report, they indicated that the IVS work was the best program they had seen, and recommended that the U.S. government consider the possibility of setting up some agency to recruit and send young Americans overseas to do such technical assistance work.

Senator Humphrey, in particular, promulgated the idea. In 1960, after a series of conferences with IVS Director Hoffsinger, he sponsored a bill in the U.S. Senate for the establishment of a "Point Four Youth Corps". Reuss and Neuberger introduced a similar bill in the house. So much interest was generated by this proposal, that Humphrey suggested to presidential candidate John F. Kennedy that it be included as part of his platform. Kennedy did so, in a speech in San Francisco, and later at the University of Michigan. It was reported that the volume of mail he received regarding the Youth Corps proposal exceeded the mail on all other issues combined.

While the Peace Corps, officially established in 1961, did appear to be similar to IVS, IVS remains a private, non-governmental, not-for-profit organization. While there was a joint IVS-Peace Corps project in

1961-1963, in Liberia, this was not too successful and work has continued since then along separate paths. IVS relations with the Peace Corps have remained cordial: several IVS'ers have gone on to administrative jobs with the Peace Corps: far more Peace Corps Volunteers have elected to return overseas after their terms ended, with IVS. This has meant a slow absorption of some Peace Corps thinking and terminology in IVS. IVS'ers are now known in Laos as "volunteers" rather than team members, and the "Chief-of-Party" and other administrative personnel are known as the "Staff".

There was initially some Peace Corps interest in working in Viet-Nam and in Laos. However, working in these "War Zones" would be politically repercussive and the Peace Corps has not entered these areas, leaving the field to IVS and a multitude of other private, voluntary agencies.

Ghana/Nigeria Team

An IVS two-man team worked in Nigeria from 1960-1961 under the auspices of the Rockefeller Brothers Foundation, demonstrating the "Cinva-Bam", an earth-block machine. The team was originally slated to go to Ghana, but at the last moment was sent instead to Nigeria. The machine, developed for use in underdeveloped countries, used ordinary earth, with a small amount of cement, to be formed under pressure into strong blocks useable in quality tropical construction.

The IVS'ers demonstrated the machine to government and village leaders in rural areas throughout Nigeria. While the machine proved excellent, it was found that the cost of the machine and the small amount of cement required was still beyond the means of the villagers. The contract terminated in 1961 and was not renewed.

Liberia

15 IVS teachers taught in Liberia in 1960-61, under a USOM contract, to assist the Liberian government solve the problem of a teacher shortage at the elementary level. While the original contract called for 27 men, only some 15 single men, each with a degree in education and teaching experience, were recruited and sent, over a 6-8 month period, to Liberia.

When the contract came up for renewal, and expansion by some two score teachers, IVS was faced with a continuing problem of finding new teacher recruits. Representatives contacted the new U.S. Peace Corps, which was interested in moving into Liberia.

GSE/mn
February, 1969

DI18915 PATHET LAO NEWS AGENCY (CLAM STINE) IN ENGLISH 0645 GMT
11 AUG 69 D

(TEXT) SAN NEUA AUGUST 10 TEN (KPL)--GUERRILLAS IN VIENTIANE PROVINCE IN A WAYLAD (AS RECEIVED) ON AUGUST 5 FIVE ON HIGHWAY 13 THIRTEEN LEADING FROM VIENTIANE TO PAKSANE KILLED 2 TWO AMERICAN SPIES DISGUISED AS MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL VOLUNTARY SERVICE IN LAOS AND 2 TWO PUPPET OFFICERS ACCOMPANYING THEM.

PAGE 2 RUMOPBA 0014 UNCLAS

THIS, TOGETHER WITH THE WELL-DESERVED PUNISHMENT INFLICTED ON AMERICAN ADVISERS AND PUPPET TROOPS STATIONED AT THALAY ON JULY 24 TWENTYFOUR, HAS CAUSED ALARM AMONG THE U.S. AND THE VIENTIANE PUPPETS.

TO HIDE THE ODIOUS CRIMES OF THE U.S. SPIES IN LAOS, THE U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT ON AUGUST 6 SIX CLAIMED THAT THEY WERE ENGAGED IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS OF BENEFIT TO THE LAO PEOPLE.

BUT, THE LAOTIAN PEOPLE AND THE WORLD'S PEOPLE HAVE LONG SEEN WHAT ROLE THE AMERICAN PEACE CORPS OR INTERNATIONAL VOLUNTARY SERVICE HAVE PLAYED IN LAOS AND OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD. TO PUNISH THE U.S. SPIES ENGAGED IN ACTIVITIES AGAINST THE INDEPENDENCE AND PEACE OF THE LAOTIAN PEOPLE LIES WITHIN THE LEGITIMATE RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENCE OF THE LAOTIAN PEOPLE. 110645 ERICKSON LP 110921Z AUG 69

0014

NNNN

Mr. Benson

Office Memorandum *International Voluntary Services, INC.*

TO : Walter B. Johnson, Director IVS

FROM : IVS Board meeting, November 20, 1969
(Adm. #24-69)

SUBJECT:

The Board of Directors on November 20th took the following action:

- "1. Rigorous review of security conditions must be carried out continually, using USAID, RIG, and IVS sources of information. The COP has ultimate responsibility for decision on sites of work or travel for IVSers, and would be encouraged always to take a cautious position in any case of doubt. In general this means using workers in or near major population centers where security is more assured. Education volunteers are less affected than AG and RD men whose tasks in urban and suburban areas would have to be reappraised. Forward areas are out for the duration.
- "2. The USAID connection in Laos would be further minimized. The corollary would be closer ties to the RIG. Volunteers, wherever possible, would be assigned to positions under the appropriate ministry and would be on their payroll so far as base salary is concerned (the amount paid a Lao counterpart). Supervision would naturally follow from RIG officials rather than immediately from USAID. These salaries would be supplemented by a cost of living allowance paid by IVS in dollars in Laos plus a "topping" supplement on salary accumulated in the States. The total amount received would be the same as the present.
- "Present USAID benefits and perquisites would be drastically reduced, minimized and possibly eliminated. This would include housing, transportation, APO, PX and commissary privileges, etc.
- "Safety and health of volunteers is a proper concern for the Board and this requires a connection with USAID. Medical supplies and services, communication facilities, and possibly customs clearances may be too important to drop.
- "3. The corollary to de-involvement with U SAID would be a more austere mode of life, less conspicuous evidences of affluent American living, getting away from material aids into more practical services, and finally, closer contact with Lao people. Volunteers would seek to avoid becoming cheap manpower for USAID programs and also try to escape primarily political activities such as USIS propaganda.
- "Advocates of this position suggest that this more independent and creative role for IVS would permit greater utilization of USAID resources and actually a better posture from which to help our Lao friends and to build understanding of the American people's value."

IVS: WBJohnson:mn 12/11/69

Basic Survival Techniques for Laos

Survival in Laos in the event of an accident---usually a plane or copter being forced down---falls into two phases:

1. Immediate action after survival of the crash landing
2. Movement to safety

First, survival in either of the above phases may depend upon your having a light survival kit on your person. Such kits have been made available to members of Forward Area Teams, and it is anticipated that similar kits will be assembled for other IVS members. There have been several plane accidents in the last few years in which survivors endured unnecessary agony and privation awaiting rescue because they did not have the basic means available to treat their injuries or sustain themselves until help arrived or until they had worked their way to safety. It is no fun to wander aimlessly around the jungle attempting to make a splint for your arm while both hands have third degree burns.

The survival kit, small enough to carry comfortably on your belt, should include:

1. Water-proof matches (covering the tips with candlewax will do the job) or matches in a waterproof container
2. Penicillin tablets
3. Diarrhea pills
4. Codeine sulfate or other pain-killer*
5. Antiseptic
6. Burn ointment
7. Gauze
8. Adhesive compresses
9. Thin rope for use as a tourniquet
10. Razor-blade or incision blade (such as an ASR Sterisharp)
11. Tweezers
12. Water-purification tablets
13. Vitamin tablets
14. Bullion cubes
15. Salt tablets (optional---bullion cubes will provide some salt; but should be included if you sweat profusely; may prove useful in treating heat cramps, heat exhaustion or sunstroke)
16. Paper drinking cones
17. Nylon fishing line and hooks
18. Small nylon mesh net (optional---if space permits)
19. Insect repellent (optional---if space permits)

Two other essentials which are usually carried separately are (1) a knife and (2) a compass.

Immediate action after surviving a crash: Treat yourself and others that may be injured. Do not move too far away from the wreckage, which will be searched for when it is realized your plane is missing. In insecure areas it is advisable to move some distance from the wreckage, but stay close enough to enable you to use your white underclothes to signal

*In dangerously insecure situations, these pills should be used sparingly if at all. They will dull your thinking as well as the pain.

search planes. You cannot trust the natives that live beyond the known secure areas of Laos. If you are found by them and they act suspiciously don't hesitate to offer them a bribe to escort you to safety or in return for other kinds of aid. Let them know there will be a reward for your safe delivery to friendly elements.

Moving to safety: If circumstances cause you to have to move through the wilderness of Laos, the main thing is to know in which direction you will have to go to reach the Mekong; Routes 13, 9, or 7; or other routes or valleys which you personally may be familiar with. Your kit should contain a compass--it can be a life-saver. It is a peculiar and helpful circumstance that with the exception of northern Sieng Khouang and Sam Neua (or Houa Phan) provinces, all streams in Laos ultimately run to the Mekong. In southern Laos they wander considerably, but even there they eventually find the big river. KEEP GOING DOWN-STREAM. The streams will get larger and larger and finally you will up on Laos' main waterway, along which most villages are friendly.

When traveling by airplane, always try to stay oriented, knowing generally where you are at all times. The streams-following technique can mean a long journey out to civilization. If you know your approximate location when you become lost, a compass course might save you many a mile. But you should make yourself a bamboo canteen before you strike out away from water. Avoid villages and don't assume all Meos and other hill tribes are friendly--some aren't. If you can observe a village from a distance and see natives in our utility uniforms, you have found a FAR or ADC military unit and you are safe.

General considerations: Food--The jungles of Laos do not teem with life, nor are edible fruits and nuts plentiful. There are many wild banana trees, but few of them bear fruit. Coconut trees abound only around inhabited areas. There are so many fire arms in Laos and so many hunters shooting at even the smallest game birds that a person would have a better chance of sustaining himself by hunting in the forests in the States than he would in the wilderness of Laos. Snakes and frogs, particularly frogs can be found and eaten on a survival basis. A bamboo spear, fashioned from a thin pole and sharpened to a long needle point, can prove helpful here. Like the Lao, you can use it to prod into cracks and crevices in a stream where frogs, fish or snakes may be hiding. Remember that all fur-bearing animals, birds, and snakes are edible but these should be eaten only when freshly killed and after having been inspected for signs of disease. Most mountain streams have small edible fish which can be trapped with a fine mesh nylon net, purchased locally for your survival kit. Placed across a small stream, it will snare fish which you drive in its direction.

A better course, however, is to depend again on your survival kit for food the four or five days within which time you should be found or have worked your way to friendly help. Each forward Area Team kit has four bullion cubes and eight vitamin tablets. For bulk there is one food that can be found almost anyplace in Laos--bamboo shoots. Look at the base of most bamboo clumps and you will see shoots pushing up through the ground. Dig down about a foot and

cut off the tender bottom. This underground part can be sliced in small pieces like tough cabbage. Mix them with water and a bullion cube or a vitamin tablet in a cup made from a bamboo joint. This will provide food with both bulk and vitamins. One batch a day will keep you going.

Protection from wild creatures: This will be a low priority on your list of worries. Snakes hear you coming and get out of the way. Tigers, although plentiful seem to prefer deer, buffalo and pigs to man. If you see bear cubs, get out of the way. The mama bears of Laos have mangled more humans than tigers have. If it will make you feel more secure, you can carry the pointed, bamboo hunting spear as a defensive weapon. Leeches are plentiful and annoyingly bloody. A few of them can be burned off with a cigarette or scraped off with a cigarette or scraped off with your knife. It is possible, however, to become so beset by them that your only recourse, (time-wise) is to pick them off and touch the spot up with your antiseptic. Tucking your trousers into the tops of your boots is the best preventative. (Wellington boots, which appear so glamorous, are open-funnel receptacles, made to assure your collecting every insect along the trail.)

A final word of advice: Don't become careless in following common safety and health precautions while in a tense, survival situation. At the time, getting out seems to be all that is important. But in the long run the amoebas or blood-flukes you pick up drinking untreated or poorly chosen water, the infected burns or wounds, or the parasites and diseases picked up through body filth may prove more troublesome. By dealing carefully and thoughtfully with both the common concerns and the uncommon ones, you will keep yourself in better physical and, one might add, in better mental condition. A few things to remember in this respect are:

1. Don't travel at night unless you are in a very insecure area and are thereby forced to take exceptional precautions. A sprained ankle, exhaustion, a gouged eye, or minor cuts and bruises that can become major ones may result. It's bad sense to be in this much of a hurry.
2. If it has been raining, try to find shelter for the night and dry out your clothes before sleeping in them. The heartwood of dead limbs or trees can be used to start a fire.
3. Stop moving early enough to find a comfortable place to sleep at night. When it's dark, it's tough to know if there are red ants around until they're biting you.
4. Keep as clean as possible. Wear your clothes loose but keep as much of your body protected as possible--long sleeves should be rolled down--to avoid sunburn, scratches, and insects.

Besides taking the precaution of preparing a survival kit ahead of time, you should also familiarize yourself with the basic elements of First Aid. The most important (in that they are the most serious) situations you should be ready to deal with are:

1. Shock
2. Fractures---simple and compound
3. Arterial bleeding
4. Heat - or sunstroke---distinct from and much more serious than.
heat cramps or heat exhaustion
5. Snakebites

Simply, then, survival in Laos depends on preparation, common sense,
and a cool head.

May 12, 1967

FIELD WORK
LAOS

FIRST AID KIT

Suggested Contents:

- 1 Bandage Compress 4"
- 1 Bandage Compress 2"
- 1 Adhesive Absorbent Bandage - 1 "
- 2 Triangular Bandages - 40"
(with pins)
- 1 Eye Dressing Unit
- 1 Tweezers
- 1 Antiseptic Liquid Soap Unit
- 1 Box Aspirin Tablets
- 1 Forest Service First Aid guide

(Duplicates of all these items included in Standard First Aid Kit.)

Add:

- 1 Scissors
 - Chloroquin Tablets
 - Diarrhea Tablets
 - Eye Ointment
 - Skin Ointment
 - Bottle Boiled Water
 - Bottle Merthiolate
 - Bar Soap
 - Metal spoon (or Tongue Blades)
 - Eye Dropper
 - Gauze roller.
-

IDEAS, CUSTOMS AND PEOPLES

**A Fundamental Discussion Prepared for
IVS Team Members**

International Voluntary Services, Inc.

**1555 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20036**

IDEAS, CUSTOMS AND PEOPLES

A Fundamental Discussion Prepared for
IVS Team Members

* * * * *

- I - Basic Human Characteristics
- II - Why People Are Different
- III - Is There Such A Thing As a Superior "Race?"
- IV - Why and How People Change
- V - Culture Shock

International Voluntary Services, Inc.
1555 Connecticut Avenue N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

Copies are available on application
at 50¢ each

IDEAS, CUSTOMS AND PEOPLE

I. Basic Human Characteristics

Despite the differences in ideas and customs which we find among people in various parts of the world, it is still true that human beings tend to share more characteristics in common than not. For example, there are no peoples in the world who do not want to be liked or who enjoy being in a position of inferiority to others. They may accept a position of social inferiority, but they will not like it. As another instance, we find that the institutions of marriage and the family exist everywhere, even though in some areas husbands will own the family property, and in others it will be the possession of the wives. In some areas the family will arrange the marriage, in others the young people will be free to choose their mates. In most regions the father will support his wife and children and yet there are places where the wife's brother, rather than the husband, will be the family provider. Again, we find that although human beings everywhere love children, they will bring them up somewhat differently. In many regions children are disciplined with a good deal of physical punishment; in others parents will never strike a child. In some areas parents will instill high expectations in their children; in others they will discourage any ambition on the part of their children. This list could be extended on and on.

What are some of the basic characteristics which all human beings will have in common? First of all there will be very much the same biological equipment and the same physiological urges which need to be satisfied. Human beings all over the world have dances, music and the same desire for artistic forms, even though what one group will like will appear "outlandish" to another. We may find Arabic music boring to listen to, but Arabs will look upon our music as noisy, strange and too varied in sound. The waltz may appear very graceful to us, but other peoples may look upon it as vulgar and shocking because of the

close proximity of the dancing partners. People all over the world may have the same institutions, such as social organizations and religion, but we are aware that their forms as well as their content will differ considerably. The point of all this is that it is human to have marriage, the family, economic, social and political organizations, the arts, law, religion and so on.

Basic, too, for all human beings is their desire to be closely identified with a group. Normal human beings everywhere want to "belong," to be considered part of a group; the non-conformist everywhere is in a minority. Individuals like to do the things the other members of their groups do. They take their cues from what other individuals feel the standardized behavior of the group to be, and they want approval from those closely associated with them in the group. There is no greater punishment anywhere than being exiled from the group. To be ostracized or ignored by the other members has always been considered by most people as a punishment second only to death. While individuals also like to have the goodwill of other groups, basically they prefer to receive it from their own members first.

What we mean by groups may differ in various parts of the world. In most areas it generally means the geographic village area where most of the individuals are related by family ties or by common background of origin. Examples here would be most of the rural areas of Asia and Europe, but not the United States, Australia or New Zealand. In other places it might mean the class, caste or occupation that individuals have in common. Here we have the situations which exist in the cities of Asia and Europe, in which individuals tend to associate in groups with those with whom they feel a mutual area of interest. People in the cities will take their cues on how to think or behave from those with whom they feel identified. Identification, though, is a personal matter and it is the individual himself who will determine to which group he feels most closely tied.

A point that we must remember is that few individuals in most areas of the world will identify themselves with our point of view or our way of doing things if these run counter to what the group considers as "right." With

few exceptions the individuals in the group can change only if other members in it change, and this is rarely a rapid process. If most individuals are reluctant to change, then those who identify themselves with us will be compelled to leave the group, thus losing an eventual opportunity to influence the others.

Perhaps the most basic human characteristic is that which is called "ethnocentrism," which is "egotism" on a group level. There are no special examples which need to be mentioned, since it is found among all people. "Ethnocentrism" is the common trait which assumes that no group has the virtues or the specific talents and genius which "ours" possesses. In this situation "we" are the truly human people, while "other" groups are a little less human. What "we" do is the only "normal" and "intelligent" way of doing things; what others do that is different is considered as "inferior." "We" represent the forces of "good;" "others" the forces of "evil." "Others" are judged mainly in our terms; that is, how close they come in approximating the way "we" do things, or the way "we" think.

There are two sides to this coin of ethnocentrism. Others judge us the way we judge them. For example, when Europeans first met the Chinese in the sixteenth century their attitude was that the latter was "a strange and wondrous creature, undoubtedly possessed of many human attributes, but yet in no sense truly human."

The other side of this coin was a letter which a scholarly Chinese wrote to his son after a meeting with Jesuit friends in the same century: "These Ocean Men" as they are called, are tall beasts with deep sunken eyes and beaklike noses . . . But the strangest thing about them is that, although undoubtedly men, they seem to possess none of the mental faculties of men. The most bestial of peasants is far more human, although these 'Ocean Men' go from place to place with the self-reliance of a man of scholarship and are in some respects exceedingly clever. It is quite possible that they are susceptible to training and could with patience be taught the modes of conduct proper to a human being."*

* Quotes from LaPiere and Farnsworth. "Social Psychology." N.Y., 1942, p. 152.

Ethnocentrism, while universal, is not considered the mark of mature, intelligent individuals. Its prevalence, unfortunately, is more common than its absence. Primitive tribes display it in the names they give themselves. For example, the Sioux Indians do not call themselves by that name. They call themselves "Nakota," or "Dakota" or "Lakota," all of which means just "People;" the implication being "we are the only real people." In the Southwest are found the Zuni Indians. Zuni means "people." The Eskimo call themselves "Innuits" which, again means "people." In Africa, one of the largest linguistic groups is the Bantu. "Bantu" means "people." In reverse, the Slavic groups in Europe call the Germans, "Nemets," which means "the dumb ones - the ones who cannot understand our human speech." One of the prime examples of ethnocentrism at the present time is that of Russian Communists who insist that the Russians first discovered all of the important inventions of the past two centuries. The world, too, is full of "chosen people" who react strongly against others using this term since they are convinced that only their groups is the "chosen" one in ability and genius.

On the more optimistic side another basic human characteristic is the tendency to utilize new inventions after they have been demonstrated as convenient and valuable. Consider how little resistance there has been to the building of railroads all over the world, and how quickly it was accepted even by the most backward coolies or fellahin. Look how rapidly the telephone, the telegraph, the radio, the bicycle, the electric light, the streetcar and the ambulance have been integrated into the cultures of Southeast Asia. Public health and modern medicine may hit some initial resistance, but over a period of years they tend to be accepted as being superior to what were had previously. Tobacco spread all over the world from the American Indians and resistance to it on religious or moral grounds was shortlived. The point here is that new items are accepted if there is a need for them, if they are readily obtainable and their practical values can be demonstrated. Iron, for example, was first brought into use about 100 B.C. in Asia Minor; despite the difficulties of travel at that time it spread all over Europe and Asia by the time of Christ. Its use was quickly picked up by the American Indians because of its superior

qualities to the flint knives, arrow heads and the stone clubs which they had previously used. Consider, too, how rapidly the gun spread even to the most primitive and backward people. Once its use was demonstrated, the demand for it increased tremendously.

If new ways of doing things are not taken up quickly, it may be that others may not be able to see their possibilities or uses because of the social organization they have, or the land use systems, or the fact that the new ideas or inventions do not fit into the human factors as these people know them. Many times, too, a new and valuable idea may hit resistance because the people we talk to initially may be the wrong ones to carry through in action, or our meeting them may antagonize others who may be in a better social situation to initiate a new development. But over a long period of time one good idea will displace an inferior one.

Human beings, then, have very much the same basic reactions. They want to belong to a group; they desire approval from their fellow humans; they want a sense of importance; they judge others in terms of themselves and they are interested in taking over any invention or any idea which demonstrably helps them enjoy life more, cuts down the amount of pain and hardships and builds up better relationships with the people around them. As in the United States, human beings in other parts of the world seek "happiness," too. Their concepts of what is "happiness" though, are personal in the sense that they want more of what they have, greater prestige and importance within and of the group, more opportunities to enjoy the pleasures of adequate food, clothing and shelter and the reflected glories of hospitality, ornamentation and the possession of status-giving material possessions. Freedom from want and a sense of personal well-being are as basic to human beings in the rest of the world as they are to us in the United States.

Why People Are Different

In going from the United States to Asia or Africa, the first thing that strikes us is that the people there not

only look different, but also that they behave and think differently from ourselves. As we remain longer we will begin to notice that within each country there is a variety of physical types and different ways of thinking and behaving. While the populations of southeastern Asia will as a whole be quite different from Americans; within themselves they will show a good deal of variation. We should attempt to understand these differences, but not condemn them because they are not closer to ourselves in appearance, behavior or thought.

We do not know why people differ physically. The causes for this go back hundreds of thousands of years ago in hoary antiquity and are only of academic interest. For most of us physical differences have little or no meaning in terms of getting along with people. We all know that intelligence and character have nothing to do with whether an individual is fat or thin, tall or short, brunette or blonde. Within the United States our friends and relatives differ considerably in physical appearance but our liking for them is based on other factors.

But all these physical factors are unimportant in working with people. Physique or skin color has nothing to do with intelligence or aptitude. Only among whites are the white standards of beauty acceptable. Asiatics tend to look upon their physical types as being closest to their ideals of what they consider "beauty." Whites, they feel, have too long noses, pasty skins, are too tall, and have the strangest hair and eye colors. In the eyes of most people in the world, whites are considered deviant physical types. And even among whites there are no common standards as to what makes a man "handsome" or a woman "beautiful." These are all "values" and differ from people to people in terms of what they are accustomed to. On the other hand a sympathetic observer will find that after a short period, he, too, will be able to see "beauty" in their standards. He will find that "beauty" is relative and exists everywhere.

The vast majority of people anywhere tend to have very much the same variations in intelligence and aptitudes. What we call "intelligence" is in most cases "acquired

knowledge." We can measure aptitudes, but there is little agreement as to what is "native intelligence" or how it can be measured. Let us put it this way: what the vast majority of Americans can do, the vast majority of people elsewhere can be taught or trained to do. Even in America, no one, no matter how qualified he is in "intelligence" and aptitudes, can do any piece of complicated work without training and practice. If we want people to do certain jobs we must train them, or give them the knowledge; we must help them plan or organize their jobs, and we must do a good job in public relations, so that there will be receptivity, rather than resistance to us as personalities and the ideas we carry with us. The scientific proof is aptly summed up by the statement that if all humans were placed into superior, average or inferior groups, there would be found in each group representatives from every race.

Since people are fundamentally the same in intelligence, aptitudes and fundamental desires to get something out of their lives, where, then, are the differences between them, other than the physical which are found everywhere? People do differ in behavior and ideas about themselves, about others and the world about them. What would be considered the ideal way of bringing up children in one area would be considered as bad pedagogy in another. Asiatics generally eat noisily. To eat silently as we do is impolite, a lack of appreciation. The Japanese regard burping after a meal a sign of polite approval. What would be thought of as the best way to greet a stranger in one area would be considered as rude in another. The Masai of East Africa spit in the visitor's face by way of greeting. Since there is as yet no exact science on how people ought to behave, think or work, there are bound to be great variations in various parts of the world.

Peoples differ because their traditions tend to be different. Each people tends to judge others in terms of the way it behaves and things. It is human to feel that we have all the virtues, and few vices, while the other groups tend to have most of the vices and few of our virtues. In terms of the way human beings are brought up, it is considered natural to assume that the way we are taught to do things is the way they should be done everywhere else.

This whole complex of believing, behaving, acting and doing, which makes peoples different from each other is called "culture." It is the man-made part of our environment. It is transmitted by parents, schools, age-mates, churches, friends, and the various media of communication. It deals with the role of the individual, the behavior of group or class to their groups or classes, goals, values, meanings and ideas which are part of the accepted usage in getting along with people, whether relatives, friends, or strangers. It defines how individuals must behave in given situations and from its own basis it states what is the right way of doing things. In other words, the "culture" that we are born in determines the type of human beings we are going to be and what our personality, in a social sense, will eventually become.

"Cultures" are different because their vast experiences have been different. People have various ways of dealing with very much the same problems. They tend to codify those ways, to give them the sanctions of law and finally come to believe that the heavens would fall on their heads if they made any attempts to change them. "But it is the custom, Senor," is a phrase that could apply to most cultures everywhere.

The individual human being cannot think out all aspects of how he is going to behave. He is molded by those who launch him into life as an adult, which in an abstract fashion we call "culture." The molders themselves were molded in very much the same fashion, for unlike animals man transmits his experiences and ideas from generation to generation. The changes that take place are made by a few individuals over a long period of time and are slowly woven into the fabric of the culture. Culture change, then, is a training or educational process which has taken place in the past and will continue to take place in the future. With the same sort of training, people will tend to react and behave in very much the same way.

Individuals are very much influenced and molded by the culture they are born in, but this does not mean to say that they are in the position of automations. Let us put it this way: man is influenced by his culture, but man can also change his culture. Whenever human beings develop new concepts concerning the world about them, they have changed their mental environment that much. New ideas about people, about doing things, about goals in life, are all part of culture change. But the changes are generally slow and are most often geared to roots in the past. Take our own culture, for example. Lest we consider ourselves as unique and superior let us look at our debt to others in terms of what we have received from them. To illustrate this point, we can use the typical day of an average American:

"Our solid American citizen awakens in a bed built on a pattern which originated in the Near East but which was modified in Northern Europe before it was transmitted to America. He throws back covers made from cotton, domesticated in India, or linen, domesticated in the Near East, or wool from sheep, also domesticated in the Near East, or silk, the use of which was discovered in China. All of these materials have been spun and woven by processes invented in the Near East. He slips into his mocassins, invented by the Indians of the Eastern woodlands, and goes into the bathroom whose fixtures are a mixture of European and American inventions, both of recent date. He takes off his pajamas, a garment invented in India, and washes with soap invented by the ancient Gauls. He then shaves, a masochistic rite which seems to have been derived from either Sumer or ancient Egypt.

"Returning to the bedroom he removes his clothes from a chair of southern European type and proceeds to dress. He puts on garments whose form originally derived from the skin clothing of the nomads of the Asiatic steppes, puts on shoes made from skins tanned by a process invented in ancient Egypt and cut to a pattern derived from the classical civilizations of the Mediterranean, and ties around

his neck a strip of bright-colored cloth which is a vestigial survival of the shoulder shawls worn by the seventeenth-century Croations. Before going out for breakfast he glances through the window made of glass invented in Egypt, and if it is raining puts on overshoes made of rubber discovered by the Central American Indians and takes an umbrella, invented in southeastern Asia. Upon his head he puts a hat made of felt, a material invented in the Asiatic steppes.

"On his way to breakfast he stops to buy a paper, paying for it with coins, an ancient Lydian invention. At the restaurant a whole new series of borrowed elements confront him. His plate is made of a form of pottery invented in China. His knife is of steel, an alloy first made in southern India, his fork a medieval Italian invention, and his spoon a derivative of a Roman original. He begins breakfast with an orange, from the eastern Mediterranean, a canteloupe from Persia, or perhaps a piece of African watermelon. With this he has coffee, an Abyssinian plant, with cream and sugar. Both the domestication of cows and the idea of milking them originated in the Near East, while sugar was first made in India.

"After his fruit and first coffee he goes on to waffles, cakes made by a Scandivavian technique from wheat domesticated in Asia Minor. Over these he pours maple syrup, invented by the Indians of the Eastern woodlands. As a side dish he may have the egg of a species of bird domesticated in Indo China, or thin strips of the flesh of an animal domesticated in Eastern Asia which have been salted and smoked by a process developed in northern Europe.

"When our friend has finished eating he settles back to smoke, an American Indian habit, consuming a plant domesticated in Brazil in either a pipe, derived from the Indians of Virginia, or a cigarette, derived from Mexico. If he is hardy enough he may even attempt a cigar, transmitted to us from the Antilles by way of Spain. While smoking he reads the news of the day, imprinted in characters invented by the ancient Semites upon a material invented in China by a process invented in Germany. As he absorbs the accounts of foreign troubles, he will, if he is a good conservative citizen,

thank a Hebrew diety in an Indo-European language that he is 100 per cent American."*

This borrowing of both ideas and material things has been going on since man came on this earth. One can imagine early prehistoric man learning how to make fire from his neighbors who in turn learned it from other sources, or fashioning arrowheads after the device had been passed on from primitive tribe to primitive tribe because of the demonstrable merits involved. In fact the development of man has always been the result of education and training, even though no formal classrooms were used. Primitive fathers as always trained their sons to take their places as hunters, herders, agriculturists or fishermen. The oldest basis of training was by doing. All human beings have had two sets of ancestors; the biological ones who gave us our physical bodies, aptitudes and early attitudes and our spiritual ones who gave us our ideas, techniques and general run of knowledge. Even the most primitive tribes have learned to do things by borrowing them from their neighbors, who in turn borrowed them from others. But even though items are borrowed and used, they will not be made in exactly the same way; the outer forms will differ. Not all dishes are made in the same fashion, nor clothing, nor furniture.

Ideas will endure when they have many defenders. The broader the basis of civilization, the more likely it is to endure. Many of the ancient civilizations fell because their carriers and supporters were too few. An invasion or an overturn of the government meant the end to these few supporters. Intensive training and a broad basis of education are the best guarantors that good ideas and techniques will survive and be improved at the grass-roots level. And it is upon the latter level that an enduring democratic life will be built.

* Ralph Linton, "Study of Man," N.Y. 1936, pp 325-27

III. Is There Such a Thing as a Superior "Race?"

From a strictly scientific point of view it is as absurd to speak of a "superior race" as it is to say that there are "superior" languages. There are no standards developed so far which can help us measure what we mean by "superior" or "inferior." We can speak of gifted individuals, but is there such a thing as a "gifted Race?"

There is a good deal of mythology in the field of "race." There is no doubt that "stocks" of men exist. These "stocks" have been broadly classified as Caucasian, Mongoloid, Negroid and Australoid (the aboriginal inhabitants of Australia and the Dravidian population of southern India). In the field of biology the term "race" is used to describe living organisms that resemble one another physically through their descent from common ancestors. There is little doubt that there are human "races," if we use this term in a broad sense. For example, there are physical differences between the brown-skinned Malay who is classified as Mongoloid and the light-skinned northern Chinese, or the long-nosed species of Japanese. In Europe one can distinguish between a blond Norwegian and a brunette Portuguese. But after one has made these distinctions can one say that a Malayan Filipino is "superior" or "inferior" to a Chinese or a Japanese? Or that a Brazilian Portuguese is "superior" or "inferior" to a dark-haired western Norwegian?

One can speak, then, of rough physical differentiations among the various stocks and perhaps types which exist among human beings in all parts of the world. But is a highly trained Filipino physicist less of a physicist than a German one or a Japanese one? Is a light-skinned Hindu from Kashmir innately "superior" to an Annamite from Indo China? How can we take millions of individuals from one area and compare them with millions elsewhere? The variations within both groups are so great and our standards of measurement so poor that our evaluation would be next to meaningless. "Racial" thinking is a transference from biological thinking. It is true that physical heredity sets limits to the potentialities of individuals, but it is not true that the social "peculiarities" of various groups of individuals are the direct result of their biological inheritance. What are the errors involved in this type of thinking? Mainly these, that we are mistakenly transferring

the inadequate knowledge we have of individual biological inheritance to group social inheritance; that we are underestimating biological complexities and overestimating biological complexities and overestimating our present scientific knowledge of the processes of inheritance.

Men are animals, it is true. But man is a very special kind of animal and it is neither scientific nor logically valid to transfer knowledge of nonhuman beings to human beings. Social heredity is not very important to animals; it is extremely important to human beings. A diving bird brought up in complete isolation from all other birds of its species will still dive like its ancestors when released near a body of water. An Indo Chinese boy brought up in an American household will speak English, attend a Christian church, read comic books and use a knife and fork rather than chopsticks.

In fact, the biological heredity of human beings is so uniform that an American physical anthropologist has estimated that less than one per cent of the total number of genes is involved in the physical differentiation between any two existent "races." Another geneticist expressed the differences as follows: "If the time from the divergence of human and ape stems to the present be represented by an ordinary pack of playing cards placed end to end, all racial differentiation would be on less than one-half of the last card."

"Racial" thinking in terms of "superior" and "inferior" stocks is of comparatively recent origin. Thus although the Romans commented on the fact that the Gauls were as an average taller and more blond than themselves, any Roman could find tall, blond individuals among his own neighbors while, conversely, there were plenty of short, dark types in Gaul.

From the sixteenth century on Europeans were everywhere conquering native peoples and setting themselves up as ruling aristocracies. Although members of the subject groups could readily adopt the language and customs of their rulers, they could not change their physical type, and for the first

time in European history race became an infallible criterion for the determination of social status. Since any white man was a member of the ruling group and any brown or black one a member of the subject group, both sides became very conscious of their physical differences. This consciousness was even further stimulated by the importation of large numbers of Negroes who soon became a distinct caste at the bottom of the social scale.

There are perhaps two broad reasons for the tendency to rate biological groups as "inferior" or "superior." Almost from the first Europeans have attempted to prove to themselves that their subjugation of other racial groups was natural and inevitable. Perhaps they have been stimulated to this by the realization that anything which has been won by the sword can be lost by the sword.

The second reason has been that "racial" thinking is in part a holdover from Darwinism. Just as the conceptions of heredity among educated people have not yet caught up with the facts and theories of present-day genetics, so also most of us tend to cling to vague notions about straight-line evolution. We have a tendency for ranking everything in a "scale of evolution," although we are usually very careful to put our own group at the top of this "scale."

All of us know how quickly attitudes toward different groups can change. In the early 1930's most Americans characterized the Japanese as "progressive, intelligent and industrious." By 1942 these adjectives had given place to "sly" and "treacherous." Now it is the fashion to describe them as "industrious," "law-abiding" and "democratic." During the last war the Japanese were considered "inferior" to the Chinese. Now the roles are reversed. When the Chinese were wanted as laborers in California they were "thrifty," "sober" and "law-abiding," when the Exclusion Act was being advocated in the 1880's they were described as "filthy," "loathsome," "clannish" and "dangerous."

It is difficult to separate the social, or the acquired intelligence, from the "native" intelligence in any of our

psychological tests. Let us assume that a Chinese taking one of these tests is confronted with the simple problem of copying a figure within a given time. The paper on which he works will be familiar to him, but the pencil will be quite unfamiliar. He will not know how hard he has to bear down to make a mark, and the technique for turning corners will be quite different from that of his accustomed brush drawing. Also, the design may be totally different from anything with which he is familiar, requiring preliminary study and a conscious decision where to start. He is thus handicapped at all points, and his score will be no index of his real ability. We can understand this situation better if we imagine our being required to copy a simple row of Chinese characters with Chinese writing materials while a Chinese psychologist held a stop-watch on us.

But even intelligence tests, despite their inability to measure innate intelligence, do show that highly gifted children turn up among all peoples. One American Negro child was found to have an I.Q. of 200. Japanese and Chinese children in California have tested a little higher than "white" children. Even group ranges differ. Negro children in Tennessee averaged 58, those in Los Angeles 105. In World War I, Negroes from certain northern states had higher averages on Army Alpha Tests than did literate whites from certain southern states. For example, Negroes from Ohio and Indiana proved superior to whites from Kentucky and Mississippi in both Alpha and Beta Tests. These figures show too closely to be mere coincidence the correlation between education and "intelligence." In 1935-36 California expended more than \$115 per year per child, Mississippi spent less than \$30 per white child and about \$9 per Negro child. It has been proved that Negro children who move from the south into the north are not superior in "intelligence" as measured by these tests, when they first come north.* And yet tests from independent testers show that the I.Q. of migrant Negro children increases the longer they stay in the north and the more schooling they have.

* Data quoted from Clyde Kluckhohn, "Mirror for Man," N.Y., 1949, p. 127.

We Americans like to personalize. It is much more satisfying to blame "Wall Street Operators" than the "laws of supply and demand," "Stalin's clique" than "Communist ideology," or to feel that we understand labor problems better if an unpopular labor leader can be singled out. Given a personalizing psychology, we feel better if we can identify definite persons as our enemies. A "racial" group can all too easily be identified as our opponents. There is, to be sure, a grain of truth in the hostile stereotypes which are created and this helps us swallow the major portion of untruth. The motive for accepting these stereotypes is that it helps us find a partial escape from confusion, but it prevents us from trying to understand how best to get along with peoples different from ourselves.

We must not forget that four-fifths of the world's population consists of colored peoples. Nor can we expect to continue to treat them as subordinate. We must learn to get along with them. This demands mutual respect. It does not mean pretending that differences do not exist. It does mean recognizing differences without fearing, hating, or despising them. It means not exaggerating differences at the expense of similarities. It means understanding the true causes of the differences. It means valuing these differences as adding to the richness and variety of the world. Mere acquaintanceship does not, unfortunately, always bring friendship. Antagonisms between peoples were of theoretical interest as long as differing peoples did not need to have relationships with one another, but under contemporary conditions the issue is vitally practical.

Even though the United States has not been a colonial power on the continent of Asia, we Americans have been identified with the European administrations of native peoples there. We are sharing the onus of European failures, and in most countries of Asia are paying a fairly high price at present for the previous misunderstanding of Asiatics by Europeans. If we are to build a more secure world for our descendants we must make certain that they become the recipients of goodwill, rather than hostility from the large numbers of

individuals who are still free from Communist domination. It is up to us to see that those who come after us do not pay for any mistakes we make in not being able to get along with peoples different from us and in not assisting them to travel on the road which they, rather than we, want.

IV. Why and How People Change

Human beings all over the world have definite standards as to what is right or wrong, what goals are possible, what they mean by "happiness," and what satisfactions they feel they should get out of life. These will differ from people to people, but all will have values of some sort which determine for them when they should feel frustrated, and when contented. Inability to reach goals which they feel are obtainable will make most human beings discontented with their life. Discontent can take three forms: self-depreciation, open hostility against other individuals felt to be responsible for the frustrations, or a strong desire for knowledge. It is this last factor which is our best ally in assisting others to change.

We are rarely in a position to judge what individuals living in other countries want out of life. Only those concerned are qualified to state what it is they want. We can only assist them with our specialized knowledge to achieve the day-to-day goals they have expressed.

Let us assume that there is a good deal of discontent and dissatisfaction in an area in which we will work. How do we use these dissatisfactions to bring about the changes we want to inaugurate?

First of all, we must see change within the context of what is possible with the minimum of effort, capital expenditure and training. It is far easier to encourage simple changes than complex ones, whether we are dealing with rural or industrial societies. Simple changes tend to develop less resistances, are more readily acceptable, are more adjustable, and are in a better position to gather momentum, as a snowball, than more complex ones.

Secondly, whatever suggestions we make must be adjusted to the goals and aims of the people we are working with. If their expectations are low, and advantages gained are correspondingly low, there is little incentive for change. Put in other words it means that poverty-stricken peasants who do not expect to get much are not going to develop incentives to work harder in order to get more than they can ever expect. Where there is a rigid class system in which mobility is discouraged by those on top, those on the bottom will be apathetic about their chances of improving their lot. Rewards are as important to Asiatics as to Americans. The ideal situation is one in which expectations slightly exceeds the normal rewards, but where even high expectations can be met occasionally.

Third, if we work in terms of high expectations, which have never been achieved for that people, there will be a tendency on the part of the latter to give up trying and to consider our suggestions as so many words with little meaning for them. People who live on the margin of economic safety have few incentives to take risks in changing the way they have always done things. It takes a good deal of demonstration to convince individuals with little confidence in their future to become interested in non-immediate rewards. An optimism which welcomes change is rare unless benefits are obvious. What most Asians want may not be revolutionary change, but rather slightly more than they have at present in terms of land of their own, more food and opportunities to avoid pain, crippling disease and early death. In helping people achieve significant gains against a background of modest expectations, we are proving again the validity of the old adage that nothing breeds success like success.

Fourth, we cannot do our best work with people who are satisfied with the "status quo." Unless they are willing to see the need for change, they will feel threatened by our actions and will consequently do all they can to sabotage our efforts and resist our ideas. We must either win this group over by pointing out that change is in their best interest, or else we must neutralize them as much as possible

by playing down their fears of us. Wherever it can be done without arousing antagonisms, our efforts ought to be directed toward working with those who have no spokesmen for themselves in court. Our interests should be in the common man as much as the one who has reached the top of the social ladder.

Fifth, "influential" people are not always the leaders who inaugurate action. The most important individual in any society is the informal leader, who for want of a better term is called the "little Joe." The "little Joe" exists everywhere. In the United States, for example, the "little Joe" is the farmer who is watched by other farmers to see when he plows, plants and markets. If a "little Joe" thinks something is a good idea, most of his neighbors will follow suit. In business, the "little Joe" is the one people look to for guidance on social and political issues. The "little Joe" is much more likely to be a clerk or teller than the bank president, a librarian than the mayor of the town, a moderately successful small farmer than the richest farmer with the most land. In the United States there is one "little Joe" to each 20 to 30 persons.

The "little Joe" is the man who speaks up after everyone else has had his say and to whom the group listens. He is neither too rich nor too poor in comparison with his fellows. His intelligence and talents are slightly above the average but not so much so that people cannot identify with him. He is usually a little, but not too far ahead of everyone else.

"Little Joe" is hard to find because he does not stand out. He may not even know that he influences other people because he is more interested in discovering the facts to the best of his ability. In every area he needs to be identified; not as the formal leader, but as the one to whom people come for advice, or whom they watch for what he says or believes. He and his family are generally well liked, but they are rarely elected as leaders in the community; their function in molding public opinion is far more important.

Look for "little Joe." Listen to him. Try to tell him what you are doing. Work with him as much as you can. His cautions generally will be those of his group.

"Little Joe" can also be the local schoolteacher, the priest, or even the locally elected mayor. He can also be the "opinion" leader who sets the path for the other "little Joes" to follow. In most cases, though, the "little Joe" takes his cue from the opinion leader who acts as the custodian of group traditions; such as, the village intellectual, the schoolteacher, or the expert on any phase of the group's life. "Little Joe" may or may not be in this category of "expert."

At any rate, look for both the opinion leader, who fashions opinions, and "little Joe" who takes action on these ideas. To find these two we must spend some time in the community: Know how it operates and observe whom it is that others look to for ideas as well as action. A good rule to follow is that these two most important individuals will rarely occupy top positions, and will not even be known by those who are above them in social rank. It will be your job to ferret them out, and work with them as much as with those who are your governmental counterparts.

V. Culture Shock and the Problems of Adjustment to New Cultural Environments*

We might almost call culture shock an occupational disease of people who have been suddenly transplanted abroad. Like most ailments it has its own etiology, symptoms, and cure.

Culture shock is precipitated by the anxiety that results from losing all our familiar signs and symbols of social intercourse. These signs or cues include the thousand and one ways in which we orient ourselves to the situation of

* By Dr. Dalervo Oberg, Anthropologist, Health, Welfare and Housing Division, United States Operations Mission to Brazil

daily life; when to shake hands and what to say when we meet people, when and how to give tips, how to give orders to servants, how to make purchases, when to accept and when to refuse invitations, when to take statements seriously and when not. Now these cues which may be words, gestures, facial expressions, customs, or norms are acquired by all of us in the course of growing up and are as much a part of our culture as the language we speak or the beliefs we accept. All of us depend for our peace of mind and our efficiency on hundreds of these cues, most of which we do not carry on the level of conscious awareness.

Now when an individual enters a strange culture, all or most of these familiar cues are removed. He or she is like a fish out of water. No matter how broadminded or full of good will you may be, a series of props have been knocked from under you, followed by a feeling of frustration and anxiety. People react to the frustration in much the same way. First they reject the environment which causes the discomfort: "The ways of the host country are bad because they make us feel bad." When Americans or other foreigners in a strange land get together to grouse about the host country and its people - you can be sure they are suffering from culture shock. Another phase of culture shock is regression. The home environment suddenly assumes a tremendous importance. To an American everything American becomes irrationally glorified. All the difficulties and problems are forgotten and only the good things back home are remembered. It usually takes a trip home to bring one back to reality.

Some of the symptoms of culture shock are excessive washing of the hands, excessive concern over drinking water, food, dishes, and beddings; fear of physical contact with attendants or servants; the absent-minded, far-away stare (sometimes called the tropical stare); a feeling of helplessness and a desire for dependence on long-term residents of one's own nationality; fits of anger over delays and other minor frustrations; delay and outright refusal to learn the language of the host country; excessive fear of being cheated, robbed, or injured; great concern over minor pains and irritations of the skin; and finally, that terrible longing to be back home, to be able to have a good cup of coffee and a piece of apple pie, to walk into that corner

drugstore, to visit one's relatives, and, in general, to talk to people who really make sense.

Individuals differ greatly in the degree in which culture shock affects them. Although not common, there are individuals who cannot live in foreign countries. Those who have seen people go through culture shock and on to a satisfactory adjustment can discern steps in the process. During the first few weeks most individuals are fascinated by the new. They stay in hotels and associate with nationals who speak their language and are polite and gracious to foreigners. This honeymoon stage may last from a few days or weeks to six months depending on circumstances. If one is a very important person he or she will be shown places, will be pampered and petted and in a press interview will speak glowingly about progress, goodwill, and international amity, and if he returns home may well write a book about his pleasant or superficial experience abroad.

But this Cook's tour type of mentality does not normally last if the foreign visitor remains abroad and has seriously to cope with real conditions of life. It is then that the second stage begins, characterized by a hostile and aggressive attitude towards the host country. This hostility evidently grows out of the genuine difficulty which the visitor experiences in the process of adjustment. There is maid trouble, school trouble, language trouble, house trouble, transportation trouble, shopping trouble, and the fact that people in the host country are largely indifferent to all these troubles. They help but they just don't understand your great concern over these difficulties. Therefore, they must be insensible and unsympathetic to you and your worries. The result, "I just don't like them." You become aggressive and band together with your fellow countrymen and criticize the host country, its ways, and its people. But this criticism is not an objective appraisal but a derogatory one. Instead of trying to account for conditions as they are through an honest analysis of the actual conditions and the historical circumstances which have created them, you talk as if the difficulties you experienced are more or less created by the people of the host country for your special discomfort.

You take refuge in the colony of your countrymen and its cocktail circuit which often becomes the fountainhead of emotionally charged labels known as stereotypes. This is a peculiar kind of invidious shorthand which caricatures the host country and its people in a negative manner. The "dollar grasping American" and the "indolent Latin American" are samples of mild forms of stereotypes. The use of stereotypes may salve the ego of someone with a severe case of culture shock but it certainly does not lead to any genuine understanding of the host country and its people. This second stage of culture shock is in a sense a crisis in the disease. If you come out of it you stay; if not, you leave before you reach the stage of nervous breakdown.

If the visitor succeeds in getting some knowledge of the language and begins to get around by himself, he is beginning to open the way into the new cultural environment. The visitor still has difficulties but he takes a "this is my cross and I have to bear it" attitude. Usually in this stage the visitor takes a superior attitude to people of the host country. His sense of humor begins to exert itself. Instead of criticizing he jokes about the people and even cracks jokes about his or her own difficulties. He or she is not on the way to recovery. And there is also the poor devil who is worse off than yourself whom you can help, which in turn gives you confidence in your ability to speak and get around.

In the fourth stage your adjustment is about as complete as it can be. The visitor now accepts the customs of the country as just another way of living. You operate within the new milieu without a feeling of anxiety, although there are moments of strain. Only with a complete grasp of all the cues of social intercourse will this strain disappear. For a long time the individual will understand what the national is saying but he is always sure what the national means. With a complete adjustment you not only accept the foods, drinks, habits, and customs but actually begin to enjoy them. When you go on home leave you may even take things back with you and if you leave for good you generally miss the country and the people to whom you became accustomed.

Now before going on to consider the nature of culture shock, it might be well to point out that the difficulties which the newcomer experiences are real. If individuals come to a tropical area from a temperate one they quite often suffer from intestinal disturbances. Strange food sometimes upsets people. In Rio, for instance, water and power shortages are very real. When these physical difficulties are added to those arising from not knowing how to communicate and the uncertainties presented by strange customs the consequent frustrations and anxieties are understandable. In the course of time, however, an individual makes his adjustment, you do what is essential about water, food, and the other minutiae of daily life. You adapt yourself to water and power shortages and to traffic problems. The environment does not change. What has changed is your attitude towards it. Somehow it no longer troubles you, you no longer project your discomforts onto the people of the host country and their ways. In short, you get along under a new set of living conditions.

Another important point worth considering is the attitude of others to a person suffering from culture shock. If you are frustrated and have aggressive attitudes to the people of the host country, they will sense this hostility and in many cases respond in either a hostile manner or try to avoid you. In other words, their response moves from a preliminary phase of ingratiating to aggressive ridicule and onto avoidance. To your own countrymen who are well adjusted you become somewhat of a problem. As you feel weak in the face of the host country people you tend to wish to increase your dependence on your fellow countrymen much more than is normal. Some will try to help you, others will try to avoid you. The better your fellow countryman understands your condition the better he is able to help you. But the difficulty is that culture shock has not been studied carefully enough for people to help you in an organized manner and you continue to be considered a bit queer until you adjust to the new situation. In general, we might say that until an individual has achieved a satisfactory adjustment he is not able to fully play his part on the job or as a member of the community. In a sense he is a sick

person with a mild or severe case of culture shock as the case may be. Although I am not certain, I think culture shock affects wives more than husbands. The husband has his professional duties to occupy him and his activities may not differ too much from what he has been accustomed to. The wife, on the other hand, has to operate in an environment which differs much more from the milieu in which she grew up, consequently the strain on her is greater.

In an effort to get over culture shock, I think there is some value in knowing something about the nature of culture and its relationship to the individual. In addition to living in a physical environment, an individual lives in a cultural environment consisting of man-made physical objects, social institutions, and ideas and beliefs. An individual is not born with culture but only with the capacity to learn it and use it. There is nothing in a newborn child which dictates that it should eventually speak Portuguese, English, or French, nor that he eat with a fork in his left hand rather than in the right, or use chop-sticks. All these things the child has to learn. Nor are the parents responsible for the culture which they transmit to their young. The culture of any people is the product of history and is built up over time largely through processes which are, as far as the individual is concerned, beyond his awareness. It is by means of culture that the young learn to adapt themselves to the physical environment and to people with whom they associate. And as we know, children and adolescents often experience difficulties in this process of learning and adjustment. But once learned, culture becomes a way of life, the sure, familiar, largely automatic way of getting what you want from your environment, and as such it also becomes a value. People have a way of accepting their culture as both the best and the only way of doing things. This is perfectly normal and understandable. To this attitude we give the name ethnocentrism, a belief that not only the culture but the race and nation form the center of the world. Individuals identify themselves with their own group and its ways to the extent that any critical comment is taken as an affront to the individual as well as to the group. If you criticize my country you are criticizing me. If you criticize me you are criticizing my country.

Along with this attitude goes the tendency to attribute all individual peculiarities as national characteristics. For instance, if an American does something odd or anti-social in a foreign country which back home would be considered a purely individual act, this is now considered a national trait. He acts that way not because he is Joe Doak but because he is an American. Instead of being censured as an individual, his country is censured. It is thus best to recognize that ethnocentrism is a permanent characteristic of national groups. Even if a national criticizes some aspect of his own culture the foreigner should listen but not enter into criticism.

I mentioned a moment ago that specific cultures are the products of historical development and can be understood not by referring to the biological or psychological peculiarities of its human carriers, but to an understanding of the antecedent and concomitant elements of the culture themselves. Brazil and the United States, for instance, have different cultural origins and different culture histories which account for present-day differences. In this case, however, the differences are not great, both cultures being parts of western civilization. It might be useful to recognize here that the study of culture *per se* is not the study of individuals. Psychology is the study of individual personality. Sociology is the study of groups and group behavior. The student of culture studies not human individuals but the inter-relationship of cultural forms like technologies, institutions, idea and belief systems. We are interested not so much in the study of culture as such, but its impact upon the individual under special conditions.

Any modern nation is a complex society with corresponding variations in culture. In composition it is made up of different ethnic groups, it is stratified into classes, it is differentiated into regions, it is separated into rural and urban settlements, each having its distinctive cultural characteristics. Yet superimposed upon these differences are the common elements of official language, institutions, and customs which knit it together to form a nation.

These facts indicate that it is not a simple matter to acquaint oneself with the culture of a nation. Similarly the culture of one's own nation is complex. It, too, differs by region and class. Americans, for instance, who go abroad in various governmental and business capacities, are usually members of the middle class and carry the values and aspirations of this class, some of which are an accent on the practical or utilitarian, work as means to personal success, and suspicion of personal authority. Accustomed to working in large hierarchical institutions like business corporations, governmental agencies, or scientific foundations which have a life of their own and persist in time, Americans tend to become impersonal. Individuals no matter how able are replaceable parts in these large institutions. To Americans, personalism which emphasizes a special individual, like a political leader or a business leader or religious leader, as solely responsible for the existence and success of an institution is somewhat strange. To the American it is the organization that counts and individual beings are judged according to their ability to fit into the mechanism. This difference in inter-personal relationships often becomes at least a minor shock. A new pattern has to be established which has to take into consideration class society the symbols of individual status, the importance of family relationships, and the different importance given work, leisure, and the values people strive for.

The rather sketchy remarks I have made here about culture and its elements is for the purpose of showing how important an objective treatment of your cultural background and that of your new environment is for the understanding of culture shock. There is a great difference in knowing what is the cause of your disturbance and not knowing. Once you realize that your trouble is due to your own lack of understanding of other peoples cultural background and your own lack of the means of communication rather than the hostility of an alien environment, you also realize that you yourself can gain this understanding and these means of communication. And the sooner you do this, the sooner culture shock will disappear.

The question now arises, what can you do to get over culture shock as quickly as possible? The answer is to get to know the people of the host country. But this you cannot do with any success without knowing the language, for language is the principal symbol system of communication. Now we all know that learning a new language is difficult, particularly to adults. This task alone is quite enough to cause frustration and anxiety, no matter how skillful language teachers are in making it easy for you. But once you begin to be able to carry on a friendly conversation with your maid, your neighbor, or to go on shopping trips alone you not only gain confidence and a feeling of power but a whole new world of cultural meaning opens up for you.

You begin to find out not only what and how people do things but also what their interests are. These interests people usually express by what they habitually talk about and how they allocate their time and money. Once you know this value or interest pattern it will be quite easy to get people to talk and be interested in you. When we say people have no interests we usually admit the fact that we have not bothered to find out.

At times it is helpful to be a participant observer by joining the activities of the people, to try to share in their responses; whether this be a carnival, a religious rite, or some economic activity.

Yet the visitor should never forget that he or she is an outsider and will be treated as such. He or she should view this participation as playing a role. Understanding the ways of people is essential but this does not mean that you have to give up your own. What happens is that you have developed two patterns of behavior.

Finally, a word on what your fellow countrymen can do to help you get over culture shock. It is well to recognize that persons suffering from it feel weak in the face of conditions which appear insuperable; it is natural for them to try to lean heavily on their compatriots. This may be irritating to the long-term resident but he should be patient, sympathetic, and understanding.

Although talking does not remove pain I think a great deal is gained by having the source of pain explained, some of the steps towards a cure indicated, and the assurance given that time, the great healer, will soon set things right.

International Voluntary Services

recruits young men and women to work abroad on
"People to People" programs in the developing
nations.

For further information about International
Voluntary Services write to:

International Voluntary Services, Inc.
1555 Connecticut Avenue N.W.
Washington, D.C.