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REFUGEE RELIEF - DEC. '60 to OCT. '62

The Mission relief program began in December 1960 immediately following the battle of Vientiane, although it did not take on national significance until March 1961. Its early beginnings may be likened to Topsy...it just grew. Refugee groups turned up almost daily in unforseen places. Rural Development had no field staff to follow their movements or determine their needs. At the same time, other American agencies moved in with similar activities and from the beginning until the withdrawal of MAAG in early October 1962, it was a cooperative venture with these other agencies. Without their airstrips and their complete cooperation and material aid, the program would never have matured or developed as it did.

In October 1962, it is reliably estimated that the Mission had under care a maximum of 60,000 refugees, 75% of them whom were Meos. Other agencies had an additional 80 to 90,000, with a higher percentage distribution. Care ranged from "full" to "partial", with certain groups completely dependent and others much less so. For the 60,000 under care by US AID, the responsibilities were shared with the other American agencies operating in the same area. Considerable portion of the overall burden was borne by them and at any given moment in the past 18 months, the Mission load was always less than 100% for its 60,000 under care. As a good example, the Mission did not drop a sack of rice in the biggest refugee area in Xieng Khouang Province (7,000 refugees) for the last six months--------it was easier and more practical for others to do it. This simply demonstrates that the American agencies worked closely together and, at all times, each knew what the other was doing.....and where. Other agencies also had more latitude in their operations and were able to "plug up holes" for US AID on many occasions.

The Mission's program was bilateral, conducted in cooperation with the Ministry of Social Affairs, RLG. Other American agencies operated unilaterally, again accounting for further flexibility. However, the bilateral program has been successful and from it the RLG has developed a reasonably well run administrative unit of government.

The US AID refugee relief field "staff" consisted of "pop" Buell and one lao assistant until October 1962. Assigned to US AID from IVS in early 1962, he immediately began his work in areas of greatest refugee concentration..... Xieng Khouang Province and nearby fringes of Luang Prabang Province and the Sam Neua area. Working closely with other American groups in the same areas, he coordinated drop schedules so that the two programs were actually conducted in concert in this area.

THE MEO PROGRAM

Of all the ethnic minorities effected by the war in Laos, the Meos have been the primary resistance group and have suffered the most at the hands of the enemy.

Outnumbering other groups so effected by perhaps 4 to 1, they are largely located in the high mountainous regions of North Laos. Few, if any, live below a line south of Vientiane. This has meant that a great concentration of effort and money has gone into a relatively small geographical area in north central Laos. Inter-mixed with the Meo in this area are certain other mountain tribes, but relatively few in number by comparison. This is also one of the areas in which there is no regional Rural Development center and no American technician in residence. Unlike other accessible areas of Laos, supervision of the program has been on an itinerant basis....not resident. With no useable roads or water transportation, access is by air and until the building of the Helio strips, only by air drop. This has made for a most difficult operation.

Unlike most refugee programs, there are no large concentrations of refugees in any one location. The largest is about 7000 and most range from a few hundred to 2 and 3 thousand. While this has made distribution and control difficult in one sense, it has eliminated largely one of the chief administrative problems of refugee relief.....stockpiling. As a result, we have not been bothered by pilfering and theft, and misuse of materials has been held to a minimum;

The Meo refugee program consists of provision of the necessities of life..... rice, blankets, clothing, cooking utensils, sleeping mats, mosquito nets, tools, bar steel for making tools, matches, candles, seeds, etc. Excess commodity food items under the PL 480 program, such as Bulgar wheat and dry whole milk, have been introduced successfully with the aid of field staff. Vegetable oils from the same source have filled a great need for cooking fat, since so many of the domestic animals have been killed, died or destroyed. One shipment of CARE hand tools (1500 sets of 5 tools each) went largely to Meo refugees. The Christian Missionary Alliance, through its representative in Vientiane, has been of great assistance to us and on more than one occasion, when our own procurement broke down, "lent" us blankets to help out in an emergency. The International Red Cross has also aided materially.

Over and abofe the distribution of commodities, most other efforts have gone toward helping Meo refugee groups with basic agriculture, health and school problems. A major effort has been made to teach and encourage vegetable farming and better sanitation and, at the same time, help build and supply schools. We have also helped where possible in providing drugs and supplies to both medical units and individual refugee groups. As of October 1, 1962, all major refugee areas have prepared vegetable gardens, some on a rather elaborate basis. At the last rice planting season, 25 tons of hill rice seed were dropped into seven areas (all we could find in southeast asia), and the harvest has just begun on what will be a good, but limited crop this fall. As a result, we expect the Meo will need no rice seed next spring.

There are 57 new schools in operation in Meo refugee areas, each built with the help of the US AID staff and furnished through cooperative efforts of the Mission, USIS and interested individuals. With an average attendance of 75 to 100 each, these are schools where no schools were before. Teachers have come from the refugee groups themselves and often work for no salary. There is a real enthusiasm for schools now in areas that never before thought of schooling their children.

In 25 major refugee villages, there is at least a 50% betterment in sanitary conditions. Using each visit as an opportunity to talk to village leaders, staff preached and demonstrated sanitary methods until now there is some semblance of understanding in these areas. Material reductions in some of the more common ailments are the results, although there remains a tremendous need yet for a fundamental medical program.

US AID, through its relief program, furnished blankets, milk and a wide variety of supplies to the 25 military medical units deployed in the north. Tarpaulins for shelter, mosquito nets, pots and pans, etc., helped keep together not only these medical units, but a few others as well. Cooperation with OB Hospital has put medics in Meo refugee centers on a limited basis.

Approximately 1000 Meo refugees have been settled in the Sayaboury area and are making an excellent adjustment in their new home. Flown in from the refugee centers in Luang Prabang, Vientiane and Houei Sai, they have adapted well. 300 others are due in next week to join them.

THE NON-MEO PROGRAM

While the Meos comprise by far the majority of all refugee groups in Laos, there are perhaps 15,000 non-Meo tribes people in refugee status. Noy concentrated like the Meos, they spread from Paksane to Pak Song in the south and are found largely in the Mekong valley and in the mountainous areas of the Attapeu, Saravane, Pakse area. Thakhek houses quite a number.

In Luang Prabang and Sayaboury are combinations of Lao, Lao Tung and Meo tribes people centered in a few areas, each in varying degrees of dependency. Houie Sai, the scene of highly publicized fighting a few months ago, houses a small refugee population, as does Xieng Lom in the same general area.

Unlike the Meo program, services to these refugee groups are provided through normal channels, with cooperative planning and programming between field staff of Social Welfare, RLG and Rural Development, US AID. Many of the groups are accessible and representatives of both governments may visit and observe. Services are similar to those for the Meos, but more concentrated in the area of food and clothing supply. There has been vegetable seed distribution and tool

making. Rice seed has been distributed in limited amounts and planted. Medical services have not been so acutely required to the extent needed by the isolated Meos. The same is true of school and sanitation services. Accessibility to markets is better for the non-Meo groups as a rule, although there are exceptions, thus making the Meo again the most needy and dependent group.

On a few occasions, the Ministry has indicated a little concern that Meo refugee groups were faring better than their non-Meo counterparts. They pointed to the tremendous bulk of supplies going into the airlift and wondered if the distribution was fair. Review of program and distribution ax indicated no inequities except that the Meos have "Pop" and other groups have no "patron" who devoted himself entirely to their welfare.

OCTOBER 6, 1962 to PRESENT

As of October 6, 1962, the relief load required about 10 tons of rice a day. On October 7, the requirement was 40 tons a day. The difference is accounted for in the takeover from MAAG. This does not mean that the number of refugees increased 300%, but that an increase of about 150% in number, plus the overload from our own program, added up to about a 300% increase in requirement. Actual population under care has increased from about 60,000 to about 140,000. In the past 30 days, the requirement has increased another percentage fraction. Non-food requirements will not increase proportionately and it is possible that the harvest now in process may lower rice requirements somewhat .

In addition to "Pop" and the Lao assistant already in the field, two young IVS assistants have joined the Social Welfare staff. One will work with the other two, concentrating on the Meo groups. The other will concern himself with refugee work in other than Meo areas, visiting regional RD offices and other regions where there are concentrations of refugees. In such a manner, we will keep better tabs on about 200 village areas and offer minimum end use controls in one of the Missions's most difficult and effective programs.

Telegram to Dept. Dec. 2, 1961

This reply assumes coalition government by January 1, 1962; effective ceasefire: All areas of country accessible: No reprisals against political or ethnic minorities and channels of trade open in 90 days after coalition government. USOM support to be terminated Dec. 1, 1962.

1. USOM assisting RLG social welfare in support 51,000 refugees and destitute now. Estimated 180,000 refugees and destitute (in NORTH 140,000, south 40,000) will require aid after settlement. On basis of known refugees and destitute plus estimates of USOM field agents, [redacted], Missionaries recently in PL terriroty and RLG provincial officaisl. Emphasize full assistance not required all people. Following figures based activity this magnitude not current USOM operations. Minimum support, i.e., maily rice and salt, also assumed for most. (All dollards and kip figures in thousands).

6. To date USOM has limited experience restllement Laos. Expect most refugees return original villages. However, undetermined amount resettlement necessary and desirable. Resettlement demobilized military probably not necessary. USOM will support rehabilitation destroyed or damaged villages to which refugees return. Anticipate this effort will lead to expanded self-help activities during ~~FY 62~~ FY 63,

Unofficial Translater.

Kingdom of Laos
Xieng Khouang Province
USAID Sam Thong

No. 51/

Transmittal Note

Daily Report

TO: The Minister
The Ministry of Social Welfere

SUBJECT: Refugee Relief.

On July 6, 1962 the USAID mission has sent commodities to help refugees of Muong Om whose area has been recently attacked by the enemy and cousing at heavy damage. The total number of families are 18 consisting of 58 persons.

At present, the said refugees are at Muong Om. Tasseng Muong Om, Muong Khoune in Xieng Khouang province.

Remarks: The list of commodities is attached herewith.

At Thong Sayanakhone July 8, 1962

(Signed) Kong Cheu Koe Hua.

DISTL
The Director of USAID/Laos. 1 copy.

ORA:ps:6-9-71

US Aid to Meo and Other Refugees
October 24, 1962

On October 10 USAID signed with the RLG an agreement bringing under RLG supervision the large Meo relief program previously operated by AAG, and providing for the continuation of refugee aid programs presently carried on by USAID in collaboration with the Ministry of Social Welfare. Successful conclusion of the agreement, announced by the RLG in Lao Presse October 13, confirms that the entire US refugee relief program is on an official basis. The Communists will thus find it difficult to pose convincing objections to the program.

Previously, Phoumi Vongvichit, PL Minister of Information, and the PL radio had several times denounced our supply flights to the Meo, and Vongvichit had spoken of suppressing them, "if necessary by force." Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma, however, told the Ambassador that Vongvichit would not object to the flights if they were all brought under RLG control and Souvanna himself orally expressed the desire for this supervision.

The final accord states that the US, through USAID, will furnish for the second quarter of FY 1963 3.115 million kip of counterpart funds for goods and services purchased within Laos and for the six months ending December 31 will provice $786,000 for necessary imports. The US will also continue to furnish technical and administrative advice as well as air support.

The French text of the RLG announcement of the program is enclosed.

History of Refugees Uncompleted Report by Richard Melville - left upon his departure from post. Jan. 1963?

VILLAGE OF PHUCUM - Phucum is located approximately 50 miles directly north of Xieng Khouang, and is spread out on a hillside at an approximate altitude of 30,000 fet. The leader of the village is Tasseng Bleivu, a trusted Meo senior leader. The population at Phucum numbers 3,010 with 2,610 living in satelite villages. Both the Mao Lie or the straight Mao have the traditional custom of the woman which is a straight skirt and the Mao Khou the distinguishing custom of the woman being bright sashes.

The refugees of phucum began to arrive in the village in December of 1961. The greater part of them had come in stages over the period of one year and a-half. Their original home was the town of Phuou an Eastern Xieng Khouang province not far from Nonghet. After the Pathet Lao advance they moved northwest first to Phuson where they lived for a month until in January of 1961 the Pathet Lao burned the village at which time they moved to Bunlong where they stayed two months and went then to Phuviny where they stayed six months. Many of these villagers had left Nonghet, located on the Vietnamese border, even as long ago as the Mao-French War of 1919. Toblei_____ and Col. Vang Pou came originally from Nonghet. Phu Su had been their home for many years. Here many of the villagers had substantial houses with cement foundations and fine farms and livestock.

In the 12 month period from December 1961 to the present time, the refugees at Phucum have constructed 295 houses ~~xx~~ either in wood or bamboo thatch and most have a garden. Phucum is not wholly a refugee village, some Mao Lei have lived here for many years. Bleivu speaks French and several long conversations ensued during our visits. An inspection of the village revealed one of the cleanest and best organized of the refugee centers; the houses are solid and the lands around them green and free of debris. There are many gardens, some livestock and an excellent spring which provides them more than sufficient water for the village needs. There is a group of Protestants with their preacher and in this section of the village there are two schools,* there is a well stocked clinic at Phucum also, and one of the more dangerous helio strips.

During the meeting with three village leaders including two_____ and one _____, the village records were checked and the rice and commodity stockhouse. There was a good supply of rice on hand; sufficient for two months' ~~xxxx~~ needs with sufficiency for a full rice crop for next year. While discussing the rice supply the _____, evidently embarassed at his villagers seeming ~~xxxxx~~ indolence on the day of our visit, explained at length that they would soon be on the mountainsides preparing the "rai" (a subsequent visit made January 13 showed about 15 acres of surrounding hillsides in preparation, there is also enough corn seed and vegetable ~~xxx~~ seeds for this years crop.* Other facilities in the village also include an excellent blacksmiths shop where machetes and axes were being made and a number of small patches of poppies.

*, with 180 students and two teachers. In the last several months at a great effort on the part of Buell the non-Christina elements, by far a majority, were finally persuaded to send their children to these schools.

In a lengthy discussion following a very good dinner, one of our first visits, I found the _____ very alert to the present political situation in Laos, the Communist means; which they compare to jungle tigers that hide themselves during the day only to come out and hunt at night. Further he is doubely concerned about the problem of making people understand Mao needs sittting as they are on a 100 mountain tops entirely surrounded and made practically immobile by the enemy of law. The _____ said that his people want only one thing, to go back to their original homes and their familiar mountainsides and valleys. He explained that although the soil is not good at Phucum, especially for a large rice crop he determined effort is being made to make the villages self-sufficient. The_____ was doubly concerned about reports which he received from his "scouts" that an American plane had been shot down at the PDJ, he wanted to know why we were supplying Kong Le, he also wanted to know the US position toward the Neutralist coalition and by inuendo if the US were still interested in a deeply committed Mao people.

One day while at Phocum we watched a very orderly distribution of blankets to needy families. 200 blankets had been brought by helio that morning from the distribution point at Samthong together with some needles and thread. According to the village records there were many families which had not had received blankets from prior shipments. Blibue had decided with his association leaders to distribute blankets according to the following minimum: from 1 to 3 persons - 1 blanket; from 3 to 7 persons - 2 blankets; from 8 to 10 persons-3 blankets. This is the only way that he felt distribution could be assured. There was a very orderly distribution of 160 to 200 blankets with 40 of them being put in a storehouse for distribution to other refugees as they might arrive. During the distribution the helio had made a second trip to shuttle in some canned milk to be distributed to sick babies only. Candles, needles and thread.

Although there is some opium now being produced at Phocum, this source of revenue has been reduced by one-half during the past two years because of the movements necessitated by Pathet Lao activity. Production for this year will be very small as a consequence, there will be continuing need for commodities which cannot otherwise be purchased.

VILLAGE OF SANLUONG - Sanloung is a strickly military village with some 600 soldiers and their families living on top of a barren hillside surrounded by trenches and gun implements. It is one of the advanced points of defence lines to the 20 miles west of the PDJ. Here there are also 400 Laothong houses in 74 hastily built thatch huts who were brought here as prisoners and are entirely dependent. Here there is a continuous and urgent need for rice, blankets and working utensils. Nothing is grown at Sanluong and because of very bad sandy soil and the necessity of security, nothing will be grown. The 600 soldiers form a unit of FAR.

VILLAGE OF NAM CHONG - Nam Chong is located directly west from the PDJ a distance of about 4 days walk, south of Sang Luang. Nam Chong is located like most of the villages on a hilltop at about 4,000 ft. altitude where a continuous cloud cover at this time of the year makes helio landing there precarious. The population of Nam Chong is _____. Many refugees have recently arrived in Nam Chong. Houses have been pitched here with little organization all around the hillsides and the village is very dirty. Morale is down continually at a very low level because of poor leadership by a rather ignornant Nai Bam and his not too honest assistants. Buell has always distributed supplies here. Most of the residents here are very poor and seem certainly to be of inferior stuff or therefore, had run hard for many months. They have very few personal belongings Their clothing is half American handouts and ragged and soiled refugee remains. The one village improvement is a school built of thatch, the floor beaten earth of about 15 by 30 feet in measurement and accommodating 123 students. Most of the students have copybooks into which they were carefully copying on the day of our visit Lao characters written on a blackboard placed on a box in the front of the hut. Their desks are rough boards 46" wide and their seats a double row of bamboo poles.

Following an inspection of the village there was a distribution of school supplies and blankets. One blanket for every 5 people, because of the great shortage, the villagers are presently using parachuttes from rice drops and rice sacks for blankets. A part of the blankets, which have been shuttled by helio together with the school supplies on four round trips to Sang Tong (?) were destined for a smaller satelite village on a nighboring peak and will be taken in by foot. The history of Nam Chong began early in 1962 following the Pathet Lao push to the area of Muongsoui and the massacre at Xing Da. The village organization from the start was extremely poor. On Buell's first visit he found the village covered with filth, dead chickens, deseased dogs, dead bloated animals and filth surrounded the huts. Over 100 refugees died in only a few months of ameobic dysentary. With determined _____ Buell demanded a village cleanup and continued sanitation before any supplies were brought in. The _____ with medicine and although the villagers are now reasonably healthy, sanitation remains a problem in Nam Chong.

Because of this fact that because of the impossibility of planting near Nam Chong and strategic conditions, a plan has been brought up by Buell with the advice of Col. Vang Nau and other interested agencies for a mass movement from Nam Chong to the so-called "Golden Triangle" located a days walk to the southeast, between Ban Na and Hoi Kanninh. Details of this movement and resettlement effort have been worked out in utmost detail and with great care and will be effected soon so that these refugees will be able to plant the rice crop this year, hopefully.

BAN SA PA KA - Ban Sa Pa Ka is a mixed refugee center in many respects, although not unique in Xieng Khoung province. Its population of 5,213 includes 564 soldiers, and ethnically is made up of both Mao Lai and Mao Kao and a large percentage of veryy poor and very primitive Lao Toung and some Lao. In 1961 Ban Sa Pa Ka was a village of about 2,000 resident population, there were no Lao Toung only Mao. The refugee population which has come from villages too numerous to list ~~xxx~~ here, but from the nominous area between Ban Sa Pa Ka and Phong Saoy and from such diverse towns as Su Kuk, Hai Chaen and Chung Lon in spite of the rapid growth since June 1961, the several villages have been well organized with good houses constructed and good sanitation enforced. Until 6 months ago there were no schools, but at that time two schools were being constructed ~~with~~ which now accommodate 130 children There are two teachers; one of whom taught 4 years at Xan Nuon City and another who attended a French School and Moung Hine. There are several blacksmiths, two silversmiths and many of the~~xxx~~ women weave.

There are large poppy field here but extremely bad soil and lack of water prevent other agricultural work.

BAN NA - Ban Na is located about three days walk for the PDJ to the west of Xeng Houn City and is at the southern reach of the fertile "Golden Gate" into which the Nam Chong refugees will be moved to. Although it is about a days walkl from this fertile plateua, again Ban Na is composed of several villages, Old Ban Na the resident village and refugee centers including Lao, a Catholic Lao tongue center and a large Mao refugee center. Ban Na is one of the original nine centers which USAID first organized and selected as a drop zone in June 1961. Since that time Ban Na has grown to include 3,940 people. These refugees arrive in groups but most of them came in April 1961 from some 27 villages in the immediate area of the PDJ. Ban Na has always been a distribution point and an administrative center for several villages in the area within a days walk, including Ban Tan Herp with 449 people, Nam Poung with 866 people and Houkaninh with 2,094 people. The resident village of Ban Na, ie._____ of refugees who have arrived in the past year and a half numbers 1,958. At the outset there were political difficulties in administrating this large center. The Nikhen of a resident village of Ban Na was a forceful leader and as the refugees arrived their village leaders, among whom were several capable men, found cooperation difficult. Walt Cowards and Buell, the first Americans to survey this area forced the choice for administrative purposes a young man who is only now 28 years old; he has done so well at Ban Na in administering not only that center, that he is now regarded as the logical choice to succeed Col. Bon Paw. Several attemps have been made to begin subsistence farming, but a curious soil weakens, permits crops to grow well to the point of near maturity, but then the plants wither and die. Ban Na, therefore, has always been a central rice drop point and _____ tons of rice have been flown in since April of 1961.

2,500 ~~resi~~ residents of Ban Na will soon join the refugees from Nam Chong in the move to the "Golden Triangle." Here they will be established, "semi-permanently", To put in a rice crop for the coming year. This experiment

will include Mao Lao and Lao Tong in a cooperative effort. There will be a need for rice and corn seed for about 1,000 of the these 2,500 people in addition to 1,200 bars to make axes and machetes.

On January 11 a meeting was held with Buell and the village leaders where it was decided that 3 lbs. of corn seed, 9,000 lbs. of rice seed and the steel bars will be dropped in from cargo planes as soon as possible. The Nikhu is determined to get a crop this year and has promised that his supplies be flown in quickly enough the village blacksmiths can turn out the tools so that this slashing and burning can begin. The "Golden Triangle" is about a days walk from Ban Na so that any settlements established in the valley will be considered only temporary. The villagers return to Ban Na when the planting is finished. A Group of ADC defense forces will defend the fields in a position to the Northwest which will place them between the "Golden Triangle: and the PDJ.

Refugee Movements - Report 1
April 11, 1963

The following information was presented to me by Mr. Tom Ward. Successive data re subject will be given on a day-to-day basis. In the case of a negative or no-infor report, I will telephone your office.

When possible an accompanying map will show related movements.

Within the last three days April 7- 10, 1963, the following movements are noted:

	Ethnic Origin	Families	People	Origin of Flight	Arrived Destination
1]	50% Meo 25% Lao 25% LT	50	350	4 burned villages near XK City	Ta Lin Noi
2]	90% Lao 10% LT	200	1400	Pho Keng Military families of Kong Le	Houei Ki Nin
3]	100% LT	25	146	Between XK & Thu Thom Route 4	Ban Pha Kha
4]	100% Lao	30	200	Ban Ban	Phu Nong

COMMENT: (Pop, V. P.)

If present situation continues, we can except up to 10,000 refugees to come into the areas of Phu Nong, Ban Vieng and Houei Sa Ann.

The ethnic breakdown will be Lao 50%, Meo 25%, Lao Thong 25%.

The expected areas of flight will be from Ban Ban and Nong Het. (6000 mostly Lao, Ban Ban, 4000, Lao Theung and Meo - Nong Het).

April 25, 1963

Refugee Movement, Report No. 2
April 25, 1963

This report will be in two parts. The first is confirmation of an oral report already given you on April 21.

PART I (Valid as of April 19)

There is an undetermined number of refugees attempting to move from the Ban Ban area toward Phu Nong and Ban Tha. This area lies slightly northwest of Ban Ban.

The total number of refugees expected at Ta Lin Noi should not exceed 500. This supposition is based on the assumption that the Kong Le forces doe not lose the P. DJ.

An unknown ~~xxx~~ number of refugees are expected to flee from the Xing Khouang area and arrive at Pha Khi and Ta Lin Noi. (April 25 - - expected word on this movement is due today or tomorrow.)

It is reported that should the Kong Le troops hold the PDJ, the entire population ~~(55x (99%xLao)~~x (99% Lao) will become refugees. (Reasoning; they cannot plant rice now that it is the time for planting.)

Approximately ~~40000~~ 4000 refugees are moving toward Houie Khouie (UG 3845) from Kho Se (Km. 6 ~~xxx~~ of Route 4). These people are moving despite Col. Vong Pao's orders. They are 90% Lao, 10 Lao Theung.

Another troup numbering about 500 that are primarily Lao are moving to Pha Khe. The Meo in this area are moving to Han Tang.

There are approximately 200 Kong Le families now in the Xieng Dat area west of PDJ.

PART II (Period April 20 to date, April 25)

1500 Lao are moving from Ban Ban area to Phu Nong (Meo site 71).

Part of the expected 10,000 previously reported from the Xieng Khounag area; exact number unknown are moving toward Luat Lang, south of Route 7 near Kang Khay.

Neutralist Requirements for Rice
September 11, 1963

At a meeting in Mr. Keo Viphakone's office September 2, 1963, three representatives of the Neutralists verbally presented their requirements for rice. These were based on claimed military personnel of 10,800 plus wives 3,158, and children 9,183, and a current estimate of civilian refugee families totaling approximately 15,000 men, women, and children.

Of the 10,800 military personnel, the Requirements Division recognizes 7,273 military forces up to Corporal for subsistence support. Of the remaining 3,527, the Neutralists stated there were 402 Officers, about 2,000 NCO's, and about 800 ADC's, leaving 325 unaccounted for, using Requirements Division military forces figure.

Refugee Relief
October 24, 1963

HISTORY OF THE PROGRAM

Refugee Relief in Laos really began as an Emergency Assistance Program to the embattled city of Vientiane in late December 1960. By March of 1961, emergency assistance gave way to refugee relief. It was administered in Laos by the U. S. Mission Task Force and in Bangkok by the BASG. Great quantities of relief supplies (blankets, medicines, and kitchen utensils) were purchased and airlifted from Bangkok to Vientiane and other major provincial cities. In order to meet the growing need for commodity assistance, the airlift was expanded to include rice, salt, and iron bars as well as the original items mentioned previously and flights were made to villages in the interior. Fifhting in Laos extended northward from Vientiane, creating more and more displaced persons; rice fields and villages were over-run and burned. By the spring of 1962 there were more than sixty thousand refugees being totally supported by USAID airdrops. Simultaneously, MAAG was air-dropping rice and salt to eighty thousand hill-tribe refugees farther to the North. When the Geneva Accords were signed and MAAG withdrew from Laos, these refugees were added to the refugee load already being supported by the USAID Mission.

Thus, October 1962, found the U. S. Mission faced with a refugee relief program consisting of approximately 140,000 (reduced to 120,000 between October 1962 and April 1962)* people of varying ethnic origin: Meo, Lao Theung, Lao, Yao, These people had fled their usual places of abode, but tired of running, the majority now ere willing to stand and defend their small rice fields that checkered the mountain sides and valleys in the provinces of Sam Neua and Xieng Khoueng. Militarily, it was essential that these hill tribes remain in the area to prevent the Pathet Lao and Viet Minh from over-running not only the mountainous areas of Laos, but, more important, the rich riparian plains of the Mekong. From a humanitarian standpoint, it was mandatory that these people be given the opportunity to resettle and make new homes for themselves. Moreover, the U. S. had a moral obligation to continue to sustain those who, under the direction of U. S. advisors, had contributed to the fight against Communist military aggression.

* Increased again to 140,000 by a second wave or urban refugees (mostly Lao) from Ban Ban and Xieng Khouang ville subsequent to April 1963.

In spite of sporadic fighting and infrequent incursions of the PL into the villages of the tribes people, it was hoped at the time (October) that the USAID Mission could gradually reduce and eventually cease its activities in the relief field and turn its efforts to less transitory pursuits. From October 1962, to April 1963, fighting diminished sufficiently to give credence to these hopes. However, in April relations between the Neutralists and the PL became severely strained, and the tempo of military action increased. This schism occurred at the crucial period of the 1963 rice-~~ox~~ planting season, It is not conclusively known to what extent the subsequent fighting has affected the 1963 rice harvest; undoubtedly the yield will not be as great as previously anticipated. Early reports, however, indicate certain refugee areas will be able to have a substantial harvest, while others will not realize a twenty percent yield.

RELIEF REQUIREMENTS

It is essential to keep in mind that under the present circumstances any projection of refugee requirements to supplement the Fall harvest would have to be in probables. We estimate that if the PL do not interfere with the harvest, there can be a substantial reduction, beginning in December of this year, in the amount of relief rice required by the original 120,000 recipients (using April 1963, as the base figure). If the harvest is good, approximately 60,000 hill people will be almost self-sufficient by the end of this calendar year, at least with regard to rice requirements. For these people, USAID will be required to provide enough tools, vegetable seeds, and clothing to carry them through the next planting season. Attention is invited to Attachments A and A-1 which show considerable changes in self-sufficiency estimates since July 1963. These changes mainly are a result of the shifting military situation.*

~~Eg~~ There will remain another 60,000 requiring continued substantial assistance through air drops. This group is composed of hill-tribesmen who are strategically located to offer the best protection to the Mekong valley against future attacks by the enemy. Their positions are on mountain tops or in such rugged terrain that it is unreasonable to expect them to do any type of cultivation.

In addition to requirements for the original group of refugees, the USAID has been confronted periodically with the requirements for other refugees (up to 3,000 people) whose lives have been disrupted by continued hostilities in various parts of Laos. These refugees continaulaly move from one area to another. Also, as a result of leaflet programs and other methods of propaganda, groups of people are leaving PL areas and joining friendly forces. (See Attachment B). Recent reports coming from friendly held areas indicate that PL centers and other enemy bivouacs

* Also, the 20,000 urban refugees will continue to require diminishing amounts of subsistence.

(including areas in North Vietnam adjacent to Laos) are suffering from an acute shortage of rice. The shortage has motivated two distinct actions on the part of the PL forces: attack, to gain rice fields; defect, in order to be fed. The approach of the harvest may trigger stepped-up enemy action, or it may result in a marked increase in the number of PL desertions.

It now appears that the planned expansion of military operations on the part of friendly forces to regain areas lost after the signing of the Geneva Accords and to enlarge the sphere of influence of the Government of National Union will surely create new refugees.

Refugee Relief (excluding Neutralists)
November 4, 1963

You will recall that in the FY 1965 Country Assistance Program (CAP) submission to Washington, the USAID indicated that approximately one-half of the Meo refugees would be almost completely self-sufficient by the end of FY 63 harvest season. According to this estimate, the other half of the Meo refugees (about 60,000 people) woold remain dependent on the U.S. for subsistence and an additional 20,000 - 25,000 of other refugees also would be almost completely dependent on U.S. assistance.

As a result of a recent survey of requirements made by Mr. Phillip Gullion, (see enclosure) we find, however, that because of our previous lack of important information, the validity of the CAP estimates is open to question. A projected expansion of Meo activities, which is to include the unifying under central Meo control of additional areas, will result in an additional requirement for refugee assistance beginning in January 1964 and "peaking" in June 1964. In addition, there apparently is an influx of refugees from PL-held areas and from underfed areas of North Vietnam adjacent to the Laos border. The number of new refugees projected as a xxxx result of the factors noted above is 78,000., bringing the total of refugees requiring substantial amounts of U.S. assistance to approximately 153,000 as of 30 June 1964. If one takes into account the possible addition of tens of thousands of refugees as a result of dry season hostilities initiated by the Pathet/Lao/Viet Minh, the U.S. may be faced with a total refugee load of 180,000 - 200,000 (not counting Neutralists) by June of 1964.

I believe that the estimates of additional refugee requirements are open to question. Presumably the people in the area of projected expanded Meo operations will have been able to store rice from the fall 1963 rice harvest. Therefore, they should be nearly self-sufficient at least for the first hal of CY 1964. This obviously would have to be verified.

POPULATION 11/10/63

1 At zone comdrs meeting in Feb, 1963 zone comdrs reported total of 127,000 people currently being fed by rice drops.

2. At same time, estimated total number preferring sang/Poumi faction to be approz 250,000. Additional loo,000 - 120,000 were people who were:

- Self Sufficient
- Lived in border areas too far from DZ's
- Under bu control

3. As of 30 October 1963 estimate we feeding 150,000 increase mainly in areas of:

a.Phou Nong where population tumped from 1800 in Feb to approx 6000 in Sept-Oct due to exodus from Ban Bab-Nong Het

b.Zones 2A + 2B which absorbed most of the PDJ refugees

c.Zone 7 which absorbed majority of refugees from XKV and RTE a soüth.

d.Sone 4C-6A who picked up approx equal numbers from Ban Ban, north+ east PDJ and XKV.

e.Zones 14+15 which aobsorbed refugees from Sam Neua in case of zone 15, refugees from north.

Early this year a large scale exodus of Meo from Nong Het into zone 5B was ~~at~~ sut short by exceptional rains that flooded rivers, extensive enemy control in Nong Het and zone that not particulary rich nor politically strong.

Expansion into totally new areas further contributed to rise in numbers being fed. Priociply:

a. Ban Lao Tha - Sot 38 - with 2000 Meo and 7000 Lao Theung presently under sang auspices.

b. Houei Nam Ngao - Sot 40 - approx 3000 Meo. Few Lao Theing now in the zone though area is heavy in Lao Theing particulary to the north west.

c. Sam Soak - Sot 44 - approx 3000 Meo with more coming.

d. Phou Katta - Pou Se - Sots 43-36 this has produced only 1000 additional but represents a more sizeabel potentential area of growth.

NOTE: Note inclused in increse of friendly civilians are areas of Sayaboury and Nam Than which NK. base has more current figures.

In terms of new areas alone some 16000 people have come under our control since february. This is a FAR more solid gain than the roughly equal number of refugees from PL controlled areas in the PDJ region as these people actively sought our help to resist the PL and took a committing step long before the first weapons drops. However in the case of the refugees from Ban Ban, Khang Khai + XKV it is probable that the PL were just as happy to see them go in many instances. The only military advantage these people have provided has been to reduce the pool of available coolies for the enemy. Other then this they havd been largely a political necessity but a military and economic evil.

As of 30 October. The rest estimate of the total bodies who in varying degrees prefer sang to other alternatives is between 250000-300,000 this varies again if Sayabourry-Nam Tha are included. Roughly half, or 150,000. we now supply rice.

In nine July we estimated about 60% - 70% would be self sufficient next year using the 127,000 figure of last February as a base. By August continued heavy rains made it clear this would be a bad rice year but we still looked for approx 75,000 to become self sufficient. As te original figure of 127.000 had been upped to 150.000 to acconnt for refugees and new zones. 75.000 would not become self sufficient.

We now believe the number of those who will be self sufficient next year to be closer to 50,000 than 75,000 for following reasons.

- Continued rain has ruined a considerabel percent of thisyears harvest.

- Rice seed bought in Thailand was not 100% mountain rice but reportedly contained in equal protions mountian rice, paddy rice, and a cross of these. This rice has not germinated in all places.

- Increased enemy activity - particularly in zones 5A + 5B + 6A - at harvest time has meant an additional Lass.

Assuming the enemy activity is likely to increase rather than decrease in the near future, 50,000 self sufficiant and 100,000 dependent apprears the best that can be expected.

SOURCES OF ADDITIONAL PEOPLE IN THE NEXT YEAR:

As we are now fighing to mainain what we currenly hold in the PDJ + Ban Ban area it is probable that relatively few refugees will come to our zone from enemy areas. Life is certinly not much better on our side now we may even lose some fence sitters.

However in other zones we should pick up another 50,000 minimum in the coming year.

a. 5000 in the DRU on both sides or foute 7 but primarily in the high mountins to the south - most of these will come to zone 10 or to sot 44 at Sam Soak.

b. 2000 mostly Lao Theung in the Sam Soak area who have asked to come as well as Lao in the area between Sam Soak and Paksane.

c. 5000 in the area between routes 4 + 13 and Pha Khao to rittaville.

d. 4000 in the Nong Het area and the Tham Thao region immediately south earlier efforsts of these people to come were thwarted.

e. 10,000 in the Sam Neua area from Sam Teu to the south to Kieng Kor to the north.

f. 13,000 in Lao Thao area - Sot 38 mostly eastward toward Muong Ngoi.

g. 1000 in Houei Nam Ngao - sot 40 mostly westward toward Muong Ngoi.

h. 5000 in area north east of Pak Beng area towards Lao Tha.

EQUIPMENT NEEDED FOR HILSMAN TRIANGLE:

AREAS - POPULATION:

1. Area bounded by routes 4 + 13 and Pha Khao + Rittaville.

   Now = 1000

   Estimated #
   Under our
   Control within = 5000
   3 months.

   TOTAL: 6000

2. Area of Sam Soak sot 44

   Now ' 3000

   Estimated#
   Under our
   control in = 6000
   2 months

   TOTAL: 7000

ORA:ps:8-18-71

ZONE ONE

DZs that will not be self-sufficient December 1963:

A) Military Outposts

1) Hin Tang TG-8827

2) Phou Pha Sai TG-9422

3) Nam Kok TG-9115

These outposts line the western edge of the PDJ on ridges too steep to be resupplied by horse, yet must be held at all costs if Sam Tong Long Thieng and Pha Khao are to remain secure. It is a problem complicated by the fact that none of these areas were former farming areas. There is nothing but rare wild vegetables and bamboo. These positions have been and must continue to be supported from Long Thieng. Long Thieng and Zone One, however, cannot support these positions with meat as livestock here is close to non-existant. Furthermore, these areas do not have a civilian population to serve as a backup.

4) Phou Ban Yai TG-7595

5) Pha Khe TF-8299

Located to the southwest of Pha Khao and Protecting the Zone One area from PL locations at Ban Son TF-5791, these posts face a similar problem as those above to a lesser degree. This area is good farm land and has been used as such before the PL forced the Meo out. Again the protection of the Nam Ngum valley to the north, makes these positions indespensible.

6) The Pha Khao TG-9307

Pha Khao seems designated to the any constructive ideas proposed. The swarning population of 9000 have made any previous attempts at making the aea self-sufficient something less than succeseful. However, the following recent events promise a change for the better. In the next three months, some 5000 will move out of Pha Khao in to sone One's Golden Triangle, a rich area roughly demarkated by Pha Khao, Phou San Yai and Long Thieng. Remaining in Pha Khao will be the families of soldiers, cripples and the "urban population; Local leaders estimate that 2000 of this number can feed themselves. Allowing for over-optimism of this program, by next December we believe that all but 3000 will be self supporting.

B) DZs that will be self-supporting December 1963

1) Sam Thong TG-8226

2) Long Thieng TG-8213

3) Muong Ohm (FAR) UF-1996

4) Pha Phai UG-1710

The area of Pha Phai will be self supporting if the population, currently about 2300ø, remains the same. However, if there is ayy serious disruption in the south PDJ area, this is net likely. The outpost has grown close to 100% in the last year.

ZONE 2A

(A) DZs that will not be self-supporting December 1963

1) Ban Na TG-8535

The land in this araa is extreemely poor and at present supports about one third of the three thousand in the area. A relocation program currently underway will resettle about 1500 in new arable lands. However, Ban Na is the main entry point for refugees from the Plains and it is anticipation that we will get in refugees what we have been able to relocate.

2) San Than Noi TG-9233

3) Phou Tham Noi TG-9140

These two DZs serve as a depot for four to firve outposts in the vacinity that border on the Plains and serve the same function to the Ban Na area that Hin Tang, Phou Pha Sai, and Nam Kok do for Long Thieng and Sam Tong, Distribution to these outposts is done by horse. Maintenance of these outposts is ddd crucial as they about the new KL positons in the western PDJ. As Ban Na cannot support even itself, it quite doubtful that Ban Na can support these positions.

(B) DZs that will be self supporting in December 1963

1) Tham Herb TG-7844

2) Houei Ki Nin TG-8148

ZONE 2B

(A) DZs that will net the sel-supporting in December 1963.

1) San Louang TG-7250

For similar reasons as Ban Na, it is not expected that this area will be able to support itself. Any increase in refugees from the Plains or,

as recent reports have indicated, from the west in the region of Muong Chia TG-4141, will doom any hope of self sufficiency. Moves of the surplus population into the interior are being effected but the outflew is expected to just match the influx.

2) Nam Chang TG-7044

Poor soil is the basic problem in this area. Along the banks of the Nam Ngum, the soil is better but the security poor. Recently Colonel Vang Pao ordered movement into the lowlands and if fully accoplished, the area will be self supporting. This is assuming, however, that the PL buildup in Moung Chia is of a non-aggressive nature - a difficult point to imprese on those who withnessed the Xieng Dat coup last summer.

3) Phou Da Pho TG-5645

Our main outpost between the Xieng Dat valley and the PL at Muong Chim. Strictly military and acting as a secure DZ for numerous smaller positions

(B) DZs that will be self sufficiant in December 1963

1) Sam Sen TG-5841

2) Nam Poung TG-7044

If not overcrowted by refugees, can supply its own needs.

3) Xieng Dat TG-6048

Curently few civilians and therefore can be self-sufficiant. However, this area is extremely fulnerable to both ebemy actibity and any influx of Lao ro Laotheurng refugees.

SONE 3

(A) DZs that will not be self-sufficnet in December 1963

1) Bouam Lao TG-7488

2) Phou Sang Nao TG-8686

Military centers as protecting Zone Threefrom PL to the north and at long distance from rice growing area of the zone.

3) Phou Xieng Pet TG-6165

4) Phou Tin TH-9000. Similar to the above in character.

(B) DZs that will be self sufficient in December 1963

1) Phou Nong Phi TG-7373

2) Houei Tad TG-6880

3) Phou Fa Noi TG-6570

4) Phou So TG-8271

Given the current relations between this zone and the KL in Moung Soui, the more vulnerable DZs such as Phou So, will be albe to plant and grow sufficient rice. Any change in relations, or PL ocupation of Muong Soui would make this optimistic estimate look ridiculous. The four above DZs account for the most of the soldiers and all of the refugees in the zone.

ZONE 4A

(A) DZs that will not be self-sufficient by December 1963.

1) Phou Bia UG-1789

2) San Pa Ja UG-1182

3) Phou Se UG-0481

Aslong as the KL hold the immediate area to the south, the chances for these combined military civilian cutposts to achieve self-suffiency is good especially Phou Se. Distrance however, from main rice areas is a consideration and although horses are used extensively in the area, the terrain around Phou Bia is extremely fugged, thus lisiting their effectivenses.

(B) DZs that will be self-sufficient in December 1963

1) Phou Vieng UG-0884

The zone headquarters and supply point for most of the zone.

ZONE 4B

(A) DZs that will not be self-sufficient in December 1963

1) Houi Chon UH-1519

Primarily a refugee village, but which serves as supply point for zone forces arrayed against Muong Heim UH-2836

(B) DZs that will be self-sufficient in December 1963

1) Ban San Pha Kha UH-0607

2) Phou Cum UH-0404

ZONE 5A

(A) DZS that will not be self-~~suff~~ supporting by December 1963:

Military outpost (1) Nong Onne TG-6186

(B) DZs that will ~~not~~ be self-supporting by December 1963

1) Houei Sa An UG-3995

2) Ban Tham La UH;3911

3) Ban Hin Tat UH- 7000

4) Ban Tha UG-5284

ZONE ~~5~~B

Any estimate in this zone at this time is perhaps immature, due to the current arrivals of Nong Het refugees. Until a better estimate of the number that will eventually come can be made, it is safer to say that this area with the exceptiong of Phieng Liou UG-7393. Will still require some assistance by the end of the year. It is also possiale that the ~~K~~PL in Ban San may take action against the xone. If this happens assiantce will certainly be neded at the following DZs.

1) San Bouac Xang UG-7886

2) Ban Vieng UG-7381

3) Som Poi UG-8980

4) Phou Se Bott UG-7680

ZONE 5C

(A) ZDs that will not be self-supporting by DEcember 1963

1) Pha Tang UG-2785

2) Phou Khe UG-2783

3) Phou San UG-2876

Theze ~~Z~~DZs all in the vacinity of Phou ~~P~~ San are vital to the protection of the zone and have been in centact with the PL frequently since the cease fire. The terrain in similar to that on the east flank of zone One high and rugged making resupply be horse impossible.

(B) DZs that will be self-supporting ~~y~~ by DEcember 1963

1) Bouam Long UG-2686

Currently producing half of its needs, it will be self-sufficint if Phou San remains in friendly nahds.

ZONE 6A

(A) DZs that will not be self=sufficient in December 1963

1) Ban Pha Khe UG-4649

Large refugee centration makes self-sufficiency possible but not rpobable ny next December

(B) DZs that will be self-sufficinet by December

1) Tha Lin Noi UG-3552

2) Kang Heng UG-2847

3) Houei Ray UG-3749

4) Phieng Leuang UG-4642

To date, the PL have made no strong moves against this area. If this continues the sone is fully capable of supplying its own needs. It reains, however, in a vulnerable position.

ZONE 6 B

This zone was organized later than heighboring zones and information on current crops is incomplete.

(A) DZs that will not be self-sufficient by December

-believe none at present time

(B) DZs that will be self-sufficient by December 1963

1) Bor Onne UG-5832

2) Nam Kuang UG-7831

3) Nam Bong UG-7422

4) Han Ka Kang UG-7024

5) Houri Youang UG4832

ZONE 7

(A) DZs that will not be self-sufficient by December

1) Ban Nong UG-3726

Primarily a military position and point through which Xieng Khouang refugees usually pass.

2) Pha Pheung UG-3819

Large refugee population and current inability to provide enough rice for the inhabitants, coupled with the importance of its military position make it questionable if this DZ will be completely self-fupporting.

(B) DZs that will be self-sufficient by December

1) Ban Kai Phou UG-4123

2) Pha Daeng UG-4230

3) Houa Phieng UG-4413

4) Ban Pheung UG-4422

ZONE 8

(A) DZS that will not be self=sufficient by December

1) Tham Sorn Yai TG-3728

This DZ and surrounding areas can and have been attacked by PL uhits located to the north and west. This prassure has shown no siges of slackening. It is unlikely that much rice will be planted under these conditions.

2) Phou Houat TG-4231

This area, close to the one above, but more secure, will in all likely events serve as a refugee center. Not as much help will be needed, yet it is not expected to become completely self-sufficient.

3) Tin Bong TG-4721

At present, this area would be fully self-sufficient by December. However, if the PL make any move which threatens the two positons immediately north (above) this area will be in undated with refugees.

4) Long Pot TG-3539

This DZ has been cut off the drop list following the srash of the PV-2, but remains an important outpost new completely resupplied by horse.

(B) DZs that will be self-sufficient by December

1) Ban Pha Khe TG-6113

2) Nam Deng TG-5613

3) Pha En TG-5418

4) Ban Ma Kaow TG-4811

5) Muong Phoun TG-5914

6) Phou Pha Deng TG-5206

ZONE 9

The area of Phou Jia SG-9848 will be self-sufficient by December.

ZONE 10

The entire zone should be self-sufficient by next December. The only mitigating factors involved is the movement of DRV refugees into the area of Tham Tat VG-9116 and Muong Ngat VG-0311 and PL pressure now being exerted on Muong Xang VG-2203, Sam Tong VG-2708 and Muong Tiouen VF-3685.

The following DZs should be self-sufficnet by December

1) Nam Thon VG-1517

2) San Hgat VF-0698

3) Muong Moc UF-9690

4) Nam Peua UG-7207

5) -------- UG-8107

6) Chiang Sa Ni VF-1989

ZONE 11

Phou Nong will need assistance after December 1963, the soil is good but the Phou Nong leads a precarious existance. Approximately 700 to 800 Ban Ban Lao-theung refugees are expected shortly as well as 600 Nong Het refugees will further complicate the situation.

ZONE 12.

(A) DZs that will not be self-sufficiant by December with any lack, none.

(B) DZs that will be self-sufficient by December.

1) Pha Bong UH-4152

2) Houei Tong UH-1516

3) Houei Ngao UH-1418

4) Houa Muong UH-6329

5) Nam Tat UH-7731

ZONE 13

Of all the Sam Kuea zones, this zone has the cost favorable terrain

military. However, such of the rice producing land lies at low altitudes whre the securing is not assured. Given the uncertain situation, it is not that ~~it~~ either of the two DZs listed below will be self-sufficient by December.

1) Phou Pha Thi UH-6653

2) Houei Ka Moun UH-7068

ZONE 14

(A) DZs that will not be self-sufficient by December

1) Hong Nong UH-8255

2) Phou Kout UH-8225

3) Phou ¢ Bouc UH-9268

The above DZs, lying close to Sam Neua and highly vulnerable, are clearing ground and preparing to plant. Their morale is not low, there seems little question that they will stay if physiclly able to do so. However, they do not have the manpower to provide both crops and protection and it cannot be expected that they will produce all their needs unless enemy pressure completely disappere, something that the PL and VM have shown no particular willingness to do.

ZONE 15

Phia Kham UH-9970

The leaders in this area have recently begun to send their families to more protected areas to begin farming. Phia Kham will likely become accompletely military in the future and remain dependent upon our support to ~~some~~ some degree. As is the case in Zone 14, they have little intention of giving up Phia Kham by default, yet they will need continued assistance to more agree.

SAYABOURY ZONE

Only unforseen difficulties will prevent all of the DZs listed below from attaining full self-sufficiency. Major problems at present are the refugees from Nam Tha and serous lack of salt. The only possible exception to the above is Pho Kong QB-4451 which is to be the Headquarters of the Meo in the area. We are not in the best position at #98 to make recommendations or judgements on this area.

DZs in the area currently receiving support:

1) Phou Houa Moui QB-7961

2) Phou Ming QV-2155

3) Phou Kong QB-4451

4) Phou Cham QB-3542

5) Nong Sa Kha QB-5533

6) Ban Nam Hin QB-5219

NAM THA ZONE

As in Sayaboury Zone, we are not best qualified to judge if these areas will be self-sufficient by December 1963. The following is an estimate made on our limited information:

1) Ban Na Woua PC-7385
Reported heavey concentration of refugees in this area, extent of local farming unknown.

2) Ban Pha Deng PC-6412
No information

3) Ban Kha QD-0614

Situation here is known to be extremely critical. We have reports that PL have burned all the local rice crop and storage. We have not been able to drop rice here with any regularily. It is doubtful if there will be any seed rice to plant or any security to protect it.....

Subject: The degree of rice self-sufficiency that each DZ can be expected to have attained by December 1963.

The following conditions must be met is each zone if the estimate is to anywhere near valid.

(A) The period from January 1963 to June 1963 must be calm enogh militarily to permit adequate slash/burn acerage for next rice crop. Onee planted, the problem becomes one of physical protection and maintenance. Women perform the mountenance of the fields but the clearing and hurning of the land is done by men released from military duty.

(B) Refugees: Any large movement of refugees into a zone after the rice has been planted must obviously effect the per capital rice available after the fall harvest. Zone populations and must remain close to the present levels. Zone 1, 2A, and 2B face the problem of wertual insufficient orable land if defections and refugees in any number arrive from PDJ. Zones 5B, and 10B face a similar situation with respect to Nong Het and P DRV refugess. Such a possibility exists in Sam Neua as well.

(C) Morale: To exert the effort to clear the land, each must have decided that the will be around what it comes time to harvest it. In all zones-including Sam Neua land is being cleared. This appears to indicate that the Meo are optimistic about the coming year and their ability to hold their can land.

Any attempt on our part to relocate large members in new areas would shake

this growing morale and lower their conficents in the willingness of the US to back them this optain and voiced by local leaders here when the discussion of where would the Meo go if.....

(D) Continued effective support of protective military positions around zone rice growing areas and when needed, the ability to resupply with ammunition.

GENERAL:

(A) Use of Horses:

Horses provided some months age are being used extensively in all zones especially in resupplying military outposts from secure, near area DZs. There are two areas, Zones one in the vacinity of Phou Bia and zones 4C in the vacinity of Phou San where the ..... are too steep for horses carrying rice.

(B) a Problem related to that of self-sufficiency is that of the extreme cost and inadequate supply of animals in zone one. This is not a refugee problem but a military one as it is the soldiers on the outpost who need the meat, not the civilians. New livestock we introduced some months ago but have yet not produced any tangible results not can they be expected to for some months. In the interin, supply of meat from .... is recommenden is well as the assistance in transporting a young animals to rebuild live ... supplies for the future.

(C) Accompanying this estimate is a revised drop list and new (lower) quotas. It has been accomplished by much sweat. (ours) and Tears (Meo) but no blood to speak of.

ORA:ps:8-16-71

July 6, 1965

During the past week approximately 3,000 people, Lao, Lao Toung, Yew and Meo, have arrived Site 176 from the area around Site 137 and Site 121, also from north of 121/

This is the movement I anticipated 6 months ago might happen. I am sure this figure will reach 6,000 before this month is over. Blea Vie and Bob Dakan have been on the spot for the last 3 days. We were able to supply at once out of Site 20, which again shows the importance of having supplies on hand.

General Vang Pow has received messages from L. P. and the Lao commander around 121 that they would like to move by chopper 10,000 people from the 121 area to L. P. General Vang Pow tells me this word has also been forwarded to Vientiane. He met with me yesterday asking me to tell you, if you were approached with this, to give it much thought. He and I do not agree with it in any way. It is about such a thing as happened kx in Sam Neua a few months back. Had we let the people go to L. P., Paksane, Vang Vieng, Vientiane, etc. there is no question that Sam Neua would all have been gone. I feel we can take care of these people and eventually relocate them, if only other people would just give us time. It won't be easy, but it never is.

The 121 area at this time is shaky. The enemy is no closer than they were one month ago, but have built up their strength. If 121 goes, it would mean back into 137 and 176; but without the people it would all go.

Van Pow's answer to this message was: I think you have good idea. It would take 3 choppers 3 months, if you know where you can get them.

But I have a better idea. It is rainy season; you could build you a big boat and move them that way. He has received no answer.

October 4, 1965

Subj: Refugee Movements in Sam Neua Province

Things look pretty good in Sam Neua Province. We are now starting to move the men back into the villages we lost. (1) To harvest what rice is left; (2) To start building the villages back up, as every village was burned, about 90% by us; (3) To start as soon as possible to make gardens to help the diet. There are no animals left. We will try to keep the woemn and children in the 36 area as long as possible. One, because of security; second, we have built our schools and many children are going to school. The above peoples amount to approximately 12,000 - all Lao and Lao Tung.

I am now at Site 33 where I spent the night. The order has been given them all Meo who came 6 or 7 months ago will have to leave here during this month and build villages closer to their old area, Site 127 and 23. The reasons being not enough land or water here, plus the big reason to get the people back closer to the soldiers, as this is one of VP's next moves to take back 127 and 23, which I am sure can be done. There will be approximately 2,000 from here which will make approximately 9,000 in and around that area. The remaining Lao people here at 33 will go to 36.

We have demanded all these people walk - it's about 4 days, but no problems. If you get word about those poor peoples walking, back us up. It may come from L. P.

I have checked out here (Site ~~2x~~ 33) the 17 families who left here and went to Sut Thao; they were helped here, the same as everyone else. They were supposed to go to Site 36, but stopped off there, reporting to Moung Him and Vientiane they were again refugees. This was brought up in the meeting in Vientiane. I will not help them again and hope no one else does. This will force them to go back into Sam Neua where they belong.

Things are not as yet too good at Moung Him. I will try to sleep there sometime this coming week. I believe and hope it can be straightened out, if people hold their pants on.

I spent the night threre three or four days ago at Tha Thom and was really impressed, no real refugees, peoples working, soldiers out where they belong. The schools have 380 children and no supplies at all. I bought pencils and notebooks to put in at once. This problem, I am sure, can be solved when I talk to Mr. Green.

I feel there is a job up here Mr. Lang could help with, and I would try to help him if he is willing and ready to put out, as all resettlement is not being done close to the front lines. (1) Be sure he is completely cleared. (2) Put on working clothes and be prepared to spend nights where there are few or no houses and may hear guns crack. (3) Would it be possible if this man could study Lao for a couple of months, as it is about impossible to work up here with an interpreter from Vientiane as no one is trusted. Plus in the past 6 months the ones who have come up here with Americans have flubbed the dub. If he can only learn a little, he could get by.

We are now getting many new refugees into the Site 88 and Site 2 area, who are Lao and Black Thai out of the Ban Ban area, who have been with the other side for over 5 years - this could reach 2 to 3 thousand.

I feel last month even with the increase of refugees we are able to hold our rice drop near the same, in fact lowered it a little. This again shows the number of peoples each year who have become self-sufficient.

Muong Phanh is located on a vast plain in the immediate vicinity of Khang Khay, Kong Le's present headquarters. It is a large military complex compound of Neutralists and FAR troops. The FAR have no dependents in the area but the Neutralists housed their own in the large new ~~cc~~ civilian refugee village located three miles from Khang Khay. I found the previously reported troop strength to be accurate, but the civilian population had recently been increased by the arrival of 25 families (175 persons). Conversation divulged that the Neutralist military received the total montly rice quota and neglected to give a fair share to the civilians. This problem was remedied with the plan to drop civilian rice at their own drop zone and the military at its own.

October eleventh was confined to general discussion at Colonel Vang Pao's, Commandant of Meo ADC troops, headquarters at Long Theing.

The most important part of the discussion revolved around continuing requirements for the refugees and ADC-Neutralist support.

Beginning late December and into the first six months of 1964, an increase in military activity is planned by friendly troops to regain lost areas and expand westward. This action is expected to create upward to seventy thousand new refugees with a monthly rice requirement of approximately 345 tons. This military operation will include the following areas: Pho Bo, 10,000 refugees; Moung Sai, 24,000 refugees; Phou Katta, 7000 refugees; Houei Nam Ngao, 4000 refugees; Na Woua, 16,000 refugees, Thakhek, 7000 refugees; and Sam Neua, 10,000 refugees.

It was ~~xx~~ confirmed that most of the refugee areas would have a substantial rice crop but some would have only a twenty to thirty per cent~~xxxx~~ yield. Col. Vang Pao intends to visit each village in the area immediately after the harvest and get the individual crop results. I hope to accompany him.

Neutralists need for rice seems justified based on verbal confirmation of troop strength with Co. Vang Pao's headquarters. A revision of the Neutralist drop list is now being prepared.

Col. Vang Pao, whom I had known previously, was most hospitable and insisted that we eat our meals with him and conduct our meetings in his house.

To Study Additional Refugee Rice Requirements (including aid to Neutralists)
Field Trip to: Sam Thong, Long Theing, Phu Nong, Ban Pa Cha, Houei Sa An, Ban Tha, Muong Phanh, [redacted]

Oct. 9 - 11, 1963

I felt that the village of Phu Nong would be representational of other villages in the area since it contained Neutralists, FAR, ADC, military dependents and civilian ethnic minorities.

The total population numbered approx. 8000 persons, 4000 civilians, 3000 military dependents and almost one thousand combined military dependents and civilian ethnic minorities.

The total population numbered approximately 8000 persons, 4000 civilians, 3000 military dependents and almost one thousand combined miliatry. The village is on high ground overlooking Xieng Khouang Ville. The cultivatable land cannot support the present population.* At present this village's monthly rice quota is fifty tons a month. This amount of rice is just short of a full ration per person perday. (Civilian ration .500 gr. - military .800 gr.) Living conditions are extremely poor, and the population had recently undergone a severe epidemic of measles, which resulted in the death of some fifty children after they contracted pneumonia following the measles.

After Phu Nong we visited Ban Pha Cha. This village is composed of sixty per cent Lao Theung with the main support of FAR military. Populations: Lao Theung 2400, 480XXX (ADC-FAR) military, 1000 military dependents. Rice quota was adequate but it was reported that they expected to realize only 80 percent rice yield this season due to poor seed.

Houei Sa An is predominantly an ADC (Neutralists) stronghold. They are the second line of defense for the southeast sector of the Plaine des Jarres. Population 600 ADC, almost 3000 military dependents and about 1000 Lao Theung civilians. Rice for the month of September was 5 tons short of the quota (25 tons).

Ban Tha is another small ADC outpost overlooking the enemy-held city of Ban Ban.** This area is completely untenable and with such poor soil that it can only support a [redacted] minimal crop. The night before our arrival it had been under bombardment and the soldiers requested that the dependents be removed. Arrangements were made for their evacuation to Houei Sa An.

* Since this field trip a movement of 5000 refugees left Phu Nong to walk to Muong Cha, a fertile plain that will support [redacted] many thousand refugees.

** Has since fallen to the enemy.

October 23, 1965

Subj: Report on Sam Neua

1. I have covered Sam Neua Province today not only checking the refugee problem but also the military problem. Approximately two-thirds of the area that was discussed with Gneral Vang Pao the day that the Ambassador and you were in Sam Thong has been retaken. If we continue to be successful, this will allow approximately 10,000 refugees that are now living in the forest to go back to their villages. However, this present operation will cause approximately 6,000 new Lao and Thai Dam refugees to come out of the Ban Ban area, of which 1500 have already come. If the 10,000 can be returned to their former homes, the present refugees will be put into the refugee center that they leave. I feel that this present military operation has not only been one of the most successful but has accomplished the quickest of any that I have ever seen General Vang Pao do. We are alowly moving men and women without children back into the Sam Neua areas that have been retaken in the last three months. They are harvesting what little rice they had planted before they were evacuated. We are, at this point, trying to get vegetable seeds to them to plant and thereby help their diet. If we continue military - and civilian-wise, to give Sam Neua the same support that we have in the past six months, I feel that 90% of the 25,000 people that came out of Sam Neua Province nine months ago will all be able to return to their homes before next rice planting time which will give them an opportunity to become self-sufficient after the next rice harvest.

September and October 1965

Notice prohibiting the use of Lao government money and the purchase of enemy goods signed by Col. Than on behalf of the " true Neutratist forces" and by Khampheuane Tounalom on behalf of the Neo Lao Hak Sat, Khang Khay, 14 Sept 1965: The NLHS and true Neutralist forces make the following announcement in order to with stand the tactics of the U.S. of sending luxury goods into liberated areas:

(1) The use of Vientiane money is prohibited in liberated areas.

(2) The purchase of enemy goods in liberated areas is prohibited because enemy goods are luxury goods. In order to help the merchants with enemy goods on hand, they may sell these goods in their shops until 24 October 1965, after this date, merchants who still have stocks of enemy goods must submit a list of such goods to officials of the local government so that the officials can give the matter their consideration. Merchants who still possess enemy goods and who do not inform officials of their stacks will be sent to court for judgement.

(3) The transport of necessities such as rice, salt, clothing and various kinds of animals into enemy controlled area for sale is prohibited.

(4) Violators of this notice will be sent to court for judgement.

(5) Government officials and officers at the headquarters of the Pathet Lao and true Neutralist forces are to explain this ntoce to their subordinates.

(6) The appropriate government and military officials are to enforce this notice strictly.

Extract from document to be used for training and propaganda, 1 October 1965: The United States and its followers attempt to attack our economy as part of a psychological warfare effort. The enemy sends luxury goods such as flour, soft drinks, rings, combs, perfume, and cigarettes and several types of radios to be put on sale in our liberated areas, at the same time the enemy secretly buys goods such as rice, salt and clothes in liberated areas to transport them secretly back to their areas. The enemy uses these goods to feed troops and followers. Before enemy personnel withdrew or escaped from the liberated area they used Vientiane money to exchange for Khang Khay money in order to buy necessary goods in liverated areas to send back to their areas. In order to counter the enemy's economic policy, the NLHS has made plans for increasing rice production, encouraging animals husbandry, ...=

establishing trade goop stores for the sale of necessities, instituting, instituting a system for the distribution of medicine, rice, salt and cloting, and encouraging people to learn trades, in addition our people must sacrifice some of their rice, salt and cloting, and encouraging people to learn trades, in addition, our people must sacrifice some of their rice for national rice storage. Our people can grow and harvest more rice then before and then sacrifice some of this rice to help the nation. Although under enemy attack we can still maintain our ordenary scale of living. Some people do not realize how the enemy tries to harm our economy; and these people have brought in Vientiane money to use in liberated areas. Doing this, not only depreciates the value of our money, but it increase the value of the enemy's money. Some people have also brought enemy goods into our area. These goods are not like the goods we make and our goods will always be available. The use of enemy goods also affects the political problem. Anyone using enemy goods is making propaganda for the enemy both directly and indirectly as well as eventually destroying his own economy. Our government has outlined the following procedure to protect the economy:

(1) The use of enemy luxury items is prohibited.

(2) The use of enemy money is prohibited.

(3) The purchase or exchange of goods, including foreign items, is to be done by our governmental organizations.

(4) Merchants in our areas are under the supervision of the national economic organization and the grvernmental organization.

(5) The taking of goods from liberated areas to sell them in enemy areas is forbidden.

Memorandum on selling goods signed by Somphanit Thiphavong, acting District Chief of Muong Kham, Ban Ban, 23 October 1965: Recently the agriculture livestock (Kasigam) trade section's store was closed for invetnrory. At present, however, some ite-ms are being sold to help the standard of living. I wish to notify every canton chief to inform every village to make purchases at the agriculture livestock trade section's store, which opened on 26 October 1965 at Ban Tong. The store is open from 0600 hours to 0730 hours and from 1800 hours to 2100 hours every day except Sunday, people should buy necessities during the morning hours and shop for non-essential items in the evening. The store will close of the twenty fifth of every month for enventory and open again on the first of the month, I the District Chief, wish to have goods transported to every village for sale, therefore, the government organization and the front (NLHS) officials should find two or three persons in each Tasseng who have some money and want to work for the ntion. If they are approved, they will be allowed to import goods into their own Tasseng and receive a ten percent profit on all sales. The trade stores are being expanded to improve living conditions.

Notice signed by Soukan Sisoungkham, District Chief of Muong Kham, Ban Ban, 31 October 1965: Because the enemy has been having military political and economic setbacks, air attacks on the liberated areas have increased. In order to safe quard the populace, especially at this time while the rice is being harvested, I the District Chief, request that the people of Muong Kham to carry out the following regulations:

(1) Repair and improve trenches for bomb shelters in order to same lives during air raids.

(2) Safe queard your property and prevent damage to it.

(3) Harvest the rice quickly and store it where it cannot be seen from the air.

(4) Do not wear white or green cloting while working in the field or when transporting the crop. Do not run about when aircraft come. These prohibitions are issued to prevent people from being injured or killed in air strikes.

(5) Dà not lifht fires or hang material in open places during the day. (The PL issued similar instructions at a meeting in Sedone Province. In June 1965). Extiguish fires at night when aircraft are heard keep a lookout for agents who signal by flare to pilots of enemy aircraft. The chief of the guerrilla unit must be informed of any such enemy units at once.

(6) Grow all types of vegetables to improve living conditions.

ORA:ps:6-17-71

November 7, 1965

Subj: The Way I Saw Muong Hiem

After being asked to check out the problems at Muong Hien (Site 48), on November 5 I sent Thongsar in because he was a Laotian to spend the night, check out the problems, and then come back and report to me. Thongsar had many problems. At first he was very unwelcome, the reason being (so the people told him) that many people had come before and asked for lists of refugees and for needs of drugs for the soldiers and refugees, but they either never came back or the commodities they promised the people did not come. Being the great politician Thongsar is, he explained to the people that he was not there to promise anything, only to check out the problems and report back to Mr. Houmpheng what he found. He said then he would try to get any necessary help that we could for them. Thongsar arrived back in Sam Thong the next day with all of the necessary information. He assured Paul Larson and me that the security was all right for us to go in and land the next night.

On the evening of the 6th, Thongsar, Paul Larson and I spent the night at Muong Hiem. We were very well accepted. After we ate, at approximately 6:30 P.M., we called a meeting with the Commander in charge, Colonel Sisavang, who also happens to be a long-time friend of mine. Also present were one of the Chao Muongs, the chief medic, and the head school teacher, I was first presented a message by the Colonel which had been sent by Colonel Sombovn, Chief of the Neutralist General Staff, telling him that he would support him with rice for the soldiers only, not for the refugees or families. I made no comment regarding this note.

The Colonel then talked about the drug situation. Everybody concerned had the same story, that possibly there were enough drugs being sent for the 690 soldiers. After checking their dispensary and the manifests that have been coming, I am very much inclined to agree. This leaves a population of about 4,000 people without enough drugs. We have sent today a small amount of drugs from Sam Thong to take care of their present needs until we find out how to handle the drug situation.

Next we discussed the school problem. They have 439 students in 9 schools with 16 teachers, 14 of these teachers are being paid by the government and 2 are being paid by the military. The Primary School Inspector has never visited Muong Hiem. The Number One teacher told me that he had gone to Vientiane twice this year and each time received a very small amount of supplies. Many of the students who have money bought their own supplies, but the poorer children cannot do this. Here again I only promised that Paul Larson and I would visit Vientiane on Wednesday and try to contact either the Lao Education Ministry or someone with USAID to see what could be done about this problem.

Next we talked about refugees. The military at Muong Hiem have taken over an area about 6 kilometers north of Muong Hiem which has been occuped by the Pathet Lao for several years. In this area there are supposed to be 111 families consisting of approximately 500 people. At this time they feel the people are approximately 50% loyal. There are also 87 old refugee families that we definitely feel have been helped in the past. These old refugee families, the Colonel feels, are about 80% loyal. The first thing that they asked for was salt. I agreed that as soon as we could we would put two tons of salt in the area which will be distributed by the Chao Muong and the Colonel. We feel this will be enough for at least six months. Secondly they asked for seeds. Paul Larson has seeds at Muong Soui now and will immediately give them to the 111 families, to the 89 families, and to 300 dependents of the soldiers. We also agreed to give 111 coupe-coupes and 111 hoes to the new refugees to help make their garden. Approximately 50% of these had to be given out from Sam Thong. We also agreed to give 111 cooking pots to these new refugees for political purpose. These also came out of Sam Thong stock. We found that in this new refugee area there were plenty of chickens, eggs and buffalo, and that the people had plenty to eat. A decision was made that they needed no more. clothing and blankets at this time until they further proved themselves. However, we did agree to give 20 cases of dried milk and 20 cases of butter oil to the Chao Muong and Colonel for use in the Muong Hiem area for the old refugees and families of soldiers.

After discussing the possible use of bulgar wheat and corn meal this morning, we found out that in no way would they accept bulgar whæat as a sustitute for rice. After further discussion, we discovered that the main reason was because they had never been told how it could possible be used in the diet. In the past they had cooked the bulgar wheat by itself - (1) not liking it and (2) complaining that they were getting bloody dysentary. After Thongsar explained the many places that he and the rest of us had been where the people had cookied it by mixing one-third bulgar wheat and two-thrids rice, they not only accepted us putting some in but felt that it would be very helpful in feeding the refugees who were not getting enough rice. We agreed to put in a plane load consisting of at least one-half or possibly more bulgar wheat, the remainder being corn meal or any other surplus foods.

We are also sending in paper for the Chao Muong and other officials to keep records.

Providing Paul Larson has a chopper, the seeds, coupe-coupes, hoes, cooking pots and paper will be taken into Muong Hiem tomorrow. On Wednesday morning Thongsar, Paul Larson and I will go to Vientiane to report and talk

over these problems with Mr. Ruoff, Mr. Gullion and Mr. Houmpheng. I feel it is a very small problem. After our meeting with these people, there is no reason why Paul Larson cannot take care of it.

November 11, 1965

Subj: Miscellaneous Items

This morning Thongsar and I had a meeting with Mr. Houmpheng, Director of Social Welfare, RLG, discussing our visit to Muong Hiem. In the meantime he had already xx had a meeting with the Neutralist Chao Khouang suggesting that Vang Vieng, Muong Soui and Muong Hiem all go through the same channel. Vang Vieng and Muong Soui agreed. The Chao Muong from Muong Hiem agreed in no way. Mr. Houmpheng knowing real well the political situation that is existing between Muong Hiem and the other Neutralists and also the importance of Muong Hiem to Gen. Vang Pao's operation in Sam Neua Province, agreed with the Chao Muong of Muong Hiem that other than soldiers, all refugees and civilian population would be handled through Sam Thong, I agreed only if the Chao Muong would work directly through Sam Thong or the Chao Khoueng at Sam Thong which we both feel that he will do and there will be no problem. Due to the lack of personnel in Sam Thong, I would like to continue, if Mr. Haffner agrees, using Paul Larson at present to take care of this problem and having him work directly through Sam Thong.

We also discussed the past problems that we had had in the Phu Pha Thi (Site 85) area of Lao Chao Muongs coming to Vientiane asking for commodities without first consulting the Chao Khoueng in Sam Neua or the Chao Kheoung in Sam Thong. In the future these people will be helped only by first consulting the Chao Khouengs or whoever is in charge in that area.

We discussed the present refugee movement of the Lao and Thaidam people now coming into Sites 88, 2, 89 and 1 81 out of the Ban Ban area. We both realize there will be repersuccions coming into Vientiane about the way this situation is being handled. These are people who have been under the PL for nearly 5 years. When the hill people moved out 5 years ago, these people had the "baw pen nyang" attitude and thought that it couldn't be too bad under the Communists. Today they have found out differently. In the past two months some of these people have come out and we have helped all the rest, only to find later that they would again return tothe PL. We try to interrogate as many people as we can but it is impossible to interrogate all people. Due to this we are not helping these people as we have regular people in the past. We are only going to give them enough to keep them warm and food to eat until they prove themselves. Approximately 3,000 of these people have already come and we can expect at least 3,0000 more.

In the Sam Neua area we are slowly moving the heads of families of refugees, plus women who do not have small children back into their former homes to not only start building homes but gardens and getting ready to plant next year's rice crop (if we remain secure at all).

In the northwest Sam Neua area and northeast Luang Prabang area, the operations that was was started some three months ago is possibly moving slower than we thought, but we can still think of receiving in the next 6 to 8 months between 10,000 and 15,000 people. If the present operation they are talking about in PDJ does come off, somebody can expect possible between 2,000 and 3,000 people. At present, providing we have the right support of iron bars, hoes, and other tools, I feel that we have a possible chance again this coming year of resettling between 25,000 and 30,000 people.

I made a visit to the north Luang Prabang area approximately one week ago. I feel we doxxxxxx have clost to 30,000 people in the area. At present it doesn't look like we will have many additional refugees in the next six months. At this time I cannot see more than 35% becoming self-sufficient next year. We are holding a meeting in Luang Prabang tomorrow to discuss, due to our lack of personnel, who can handle this area best at this time.

Also in the discussion with Mr. Houmpheng and Thongsar this morning, the subject was brought up to me about the meeting xxxxx of the Chao Khoueng in your office yesterday. The Chao Khoueng of Phon Saly Province suggested that at present, since Sam Thong has been taking care of that area which consists only of a small number of people, it would continue as such. He further suggested that he would like a meeting in Luang Prabang sometime the first of next week consistin of the Chao Kheoung of Luang Prabang, himself, Tom Ward and myself. I agreed to this wholeheartedly, hoping that we can also handle this problem out of Luang Prabang.

I would like for someone in Vientiane to be sure that before ERnie Kuhn returns to Sam Thong that either Dr. Westermeyer or Dr. Kennedy thoroughly checks him out.

If you wish any further discussion on the above mentioned, I hope to be in Vientiane on Sunday or Monday.

TO: Joseph A. Mendenhall, Director

FROM: D. T. Dunton, RDD

SUBJECT: Notes on RDD Activities in Muong Soui
for the Ambassador - per your request

RDD first went into action in Muong Soui in October 1965. Feeling here was that U.S. presence in the area could help ameliorate the very messy situation which was marked with confusion and little cooperation among the civiliam and miltary residents of the area. Work was in the field of impact rural self help and refugee relief.

1. Paul Lerson arrived in Muong Soui with 2,000 pounds of vegetable seeds - 1,000 for the military, 1,000 for the villagers - and GI roofing to finish a school begun and left as it was in the battle zone.

2. First Activity Plan became that school, Muong Soui Group Scolaire, and USAID provided 315 GI roofing sheets and five ton coment at a dollar cost of $850.00. Kip 5,000 was put in place for the purchase of wire screen to be used in the mixing of comerete.

3. The second Activity Plan was for four wells, one of which is in the gound and work getting started on the other three. Estimated dollar cost is $120.00 and Kip expense is at K25,000.

4. The third and fifth Activity Plans involved a combination swine program and fish pond. The pond is in and stocked with the the first batch of fish. Pigs have been purchased from MEC and are awaiting transporation to Muong Soui. Together these two projects

TO: Joseph A. Mendenhall

RDD in Moung Soui

called for in kind commodities valued at about $700,00 and counterpart expenditures at ₭ 60,000.

5. Activity Plan number 4 was written to put in place Kip 72,000 for per diem payment to Social Actions Meutralist troops who ware to work directly under the Forward Area Team. As it turned out the Social Action team was formed and put to work without the need for the kip and the kip was returned to the trust fund.

6. Activity Plan number 6 was for a Market Place in Muong Soui, which is now complete. USAID provided comment, GI roofing and assorted hardware at the cost of $522.00 and Ki 10,600.

7. The most recent Activity Plan was for the Muong Soui Group Scolair - actually in town and not to be confused with the school in AP 1 - and in this case USAIDprovided comment, GI roofing and hardware at a cost value of $2,000,00 and counterpart funds expenditures were not to found in this prject.

In all eases, construction was rural self help and lumber for the project was supplied by the villagers and cut by the rural public works sawmill in Muong Soui. In additon to the aforementioned Activity Plans, Terry Collins has amisted the villagers, along with one PWD carpenter and a trained soldiers, in the construction of over 180 combination schoold deske and banches in 14 villagers thus providing a place to learn for better than 550 students. In one of the cutlying villages, Ban Bone, Terry organized and helped the villagers build a 100% slef

help one rooms school in which the villagers bought their GI roofing. At present, with the aid of a newly hired RDD Field Assistant, Terry is getting a very ambitions agriculture program going with demonstration rice seeds and vegatables.

REFUGEES

In addition to the rural development work, the FAY in Muong Soui serves as Jay Ruoff's man in Muong Soui. Over the last 12 months, approximately 1,000 refugees have been given assistance in the form of rice, rice seed, vegetable seed, tools and basic Social Welfare commodities. A Major ongoing refugee resettlement project in Nam Tiat, west of Muong Soui on RN 7, could prove to be a model refugee resettlement offort. These people walked cut of one of the most difficult refugee areas to date, that being Muong You. They are now getting re-established and vegetable seed and rice seed in on the way to them.

December 23, 1965

Subj: Report on Situation in North Laos

I am sure by now you have heard of the problems that are occurring in North Laos. We are being hit in many areas by the largest number of enemy that I have ever seen in my time in Laos.

At present we are still holding Site 95 at a great loss of personnel. It is very probably that within the next week or two that this area could fall which would create approximately 3,000 new refugees if they get out.

We are being hit hard in the North Luang Prabang area. As of today we have lost no territory but are receiving many new refugees. I am sending one of my men today to go and work in that area.

In Sam Neau Province we have lost much territory. Eighty percent of the enemy are coming out of North Vietnam; 90% of the enemy are Viet Cong. We have at this time approximately 7,000 people trapped, including a large number of soldiers. We have many wounded, some we have got out but 75% are being left to die because we cannot send choppers in because of security. We are again backed up into Site 27 and Site 36. There is also the possibility that either of these can fall at any time which will cause the immediate movement of approximately 14,000 people. I am also taking one of our men out of Site 20 to work with me in that area. It is very important that both of us remain there at all times to keep up the morale and stop any unnecessary evacuations; also to help the native people direct aircraft.

December 27, 1965

Subj: Report on Happenings

Since last reporting to you there has been very little change in the territory actually being lost. On the military side apprximately 65% of the soldiers have been found and regrouped. The chances look good that approximately half of the remaining 35% will get out. As for refugees we have now located approximately only 1500 out of approximately 8000. This is in the Sam Neua area only. At this time it looks as if we will be very fortunate if we can save no more than 2,000 or 3,000. This will be one of our greatest losses we have ever had in the Sam Neua area and the greatest help that we have ever given the enemy.

If the same type of support keeps coming which has been the greatest, I'd feel we would have a 50-50 chance of holding Site 36. We are fired on nearly ~~xxxxx~~ every night by what we feel are only small ambushes. Some people were evacuated but the soldiers remain and don't seem to be too shaky. It is the same old story - the big thing that helps these people stand their ground is the great work and the great effort the few Americans put forth and remain with them.

In the north Luang Prabang area we are getting many more new refugees at all times. I have one of our Americans plus a counterpart at Sam Thong working very closely with these people coordinating it with the ~~xx~~ AC of LUang Prabang Province.

The Site 95 area remains as it was and there is still a very good chance that the area could fall. If it does, I feel that 80% of these people we possibly could save who would again come into the Muong Cha area as they did two years ago.

January 3, 1966

Report on Happenings

Since I last reported to you on December 27, the happenings and changes are as follows:

In the Sam Neua area approximately 85% of the soldiers have been located and are back at their posts. Of the remaining 15 percent we know pretty well where they are, but have no idea at present how many are actually lost. As to the refugees, it still remains a very sad problem. We possibly at this time have gotten out 2,000 of the apprximately 8,000. We do know at this time that somewhere between 3,000 and 4,000 have no chance. We have gotten 111 Chinese people from Ban Ban who walked into Site 36. These people were former merchants and they tell that the population of Ban Ban at this time is nearly zero. We do continue to get many Lao and Thaidom people from the surrounding area of Ban Ban into Sites 2, 89 and 88. The information that all of these people continue to bring is that after 5 years in no way can they stand to live under the Communists again.

As you know, it is very hard to report or guess about the happenings from one day to the next, but the chances the last few days of holding Site 36 and Site 27 (which is the front line) looks much brighter. The support from all agencies, even considering the past holidays, continues to be very good in that area.

A problem has come up, and I feel myself it is very important for you to talk to whomever you can that might get the following support. Due to being run out 10 months ago and again this month, there is absolutely no meat of any kind in the areas where these people are trying to stand off Communist aggression. The Chao Kheoung of Xieng Khouang and Gen. Vang Pao came to me yesterday wondering if in any way Usaid or anybody that I might know could help get meat of some kind, preferably canned meat, to this area during this crisis. If you find this possible, could you possibly send someone here and we would help decide on the quantitities to send. I have exhausted any such commodities I have at Sam Thong.

In the north Luang Prabang area all the refugees, consisting of approximately 3,500 people have had to leave Site 176 and possibly today will be arriving at Site 131 bringing with them nearly all their commodities. Also ~~thxxx~~ there have been approximately 500-600 new refugees who arrived at 131 whose homes were burned by the PL. I talked to the leaders from 176 yesterday. They feel and I hope that it will soon be possible for these people to return to 176, which, if it happens, will not create too big a problem. At

Site 169 there have been approximately 500 new refugees arrive who have already been taken care of with rice and commodities. Also there have been 294 new refugees arrive at Site 121 who also have been taken care of.

All the work in north of Luang Prabang Province has been coordinated very closely through Ernie Kuhn, Tom Ward, the Chao Khoueng of Luang Prabang Province and other officials in that area. We cannot say too much for the great cooperation that Tom Ward has given us since he has been there, making our work so much easier, and we hope that in some capacity he can remain in that area to help as he has in the past.

As for the Site 95 area, the situation looks much brighter. Many more friendly forces have been moved in. We feel at this present writing that it will not fall even though we have received between 500 and 600 people who have come to the strip from north of the Tha Thom area. If 95 does fall, it will create a serious problem; but we feel we are on top of it and ready to take care of whatever may happen.

January 4, 1966

SUBJECT: Phon Ngam (Ban Ban) Report

The village defence forces for a particular area usually consisted of villagers recruited by the PL froma three kilometer area. The village defender's Chief duties were preventing villagers from "escaping" to the RLG and to be ready to serve as porters in the PL supply system.

In April 1964 the PL began recruiting villagers to be soldiers in village defence forces in the district of Ho Kang (UG-4574) in the Ban Ban area. A 30 men platoon was raised in the area of Ban Phon Ngam. Men in the platoon were drawn from villagers no further than three kilometers away from Ban Phon Ngam. The village defence forces received no pay for their services.

The village "guerrillas" were instructed in security function such as checking passes of all visitors to their villages and preventing villagers from escaping the security force commander, who was from Ban Ko Kang (UG-4574), one Km. south of Ban Phon Ngam, was the instructor.

Agriculture:

The 1965 rice crop in the Ban Phon Ngam area was expected to be poor. The villagers would probably run out of rice which they had grown by May 1966.

The village of Phon Ngam owned eight water buffalo, approximately 100 chickens and each family had at least two pigs. In September 1965, the government ordered the village chief to list all animals in the village, except chickens and ducks, and to indicate their owners.

Conscription:

All able bodied villagers, including the village defense force, were subject to conscription.

Villagers numbering from 100-150 were levied to carry 15 Kg. of rice, which had been conscripted from villagers, to deposit at Muong Khao (UG-4288) Phou Nong (UG-5056) and Phou Se Both (UG-8680) during the past two years.

In August, 1965, the PL commander for the Ban Ban area, Major Khamfong, came to to the village of Phon Ngam and gave a lecture to members of the ADO on their duty to serve as porters on the supply system.

Education:

There were two elementary schools in the district of Ko Kang with an enrollment of approximately 110 students and two teachers, a teacher received a salary of 1,150 kip per month. All textbooks used in the schools were published in Houa Phan Province. The education director for the PL Ministry of Education was Nouphan. Bounborom was his deputy for Xieng Khouang Province.

ORA:ms:6-16-71

January 11, 1966

Report on Happenings

Meo New Year is over and things are back to normal.

The refugee situation in the Sam Neua area remains the same as on my last report.

In the Site 95 area we have received approximately 200 more people.

In North Luang Prabang area it still remains very critical. ~~xxtxpx~~ At present we know where approximately 5,000 people are. Ernie Kuhn has helped ~~xpxxxxxxxxx~~ approximately 2,500 of these people with only the necessary things until we find out for sure if we are going to hold or run again. I am having him RON nights at either Luang Prabang or Sam Thong. He still continues to coordinate everything that he is doing in that area through the officials of Luang Prabang Province.

Site 36 at this writing seems the most stable that it has any time since the problems in Sam Neau Province began.

January 18, 1966

Miscellaneous Gleaned from Refugees L. S. 88

Seventy-one families, taking advantage of an air strike, walked out of Ban Ban area. In general the people did not leave before because of attachment to their land. (People with irrigated farms are more reluctant to leave and move than slash/burn farmers.) The bombing finally caused the people to evacuate.

Villagers in this area were not allowed to go to the military areas. The only outsiders were Agitation and Propaganda teams (2) who came and lectured. These AP people were local according to their accents.

Commodities (clothes, etc.) were sold and exchanged for rice (15 kilos for one shirt).

Rice carrying teams were requisitioned from these villages. This village went mainly to the south (Site 2 area) always travelling at night. Other villages went to Ban Tha (L.S. 36 area). It was stated that last year supplies were sent to Ban Tha, but this year they have not yet gone. (Perhaps a big movement can be expected in the near future.)

Village of 11 families who came with this group were formely of Xieng Dat (Ban Xieng Khong), Thai Dam people - Nai Ping leader. They were involved in Somboun coup of 1960.

Five teachers (Lao) came out.

Thao Sivat - old teacher Ban Ban before PL
Thao Khamping - old teacher Ban Ban before PL
Thao Souphon - right in Ban Ban village
Thao Chaw Kham Di)
Thao Phim Pha) PL recruited these men from Ban Ban to teach

Villages:
Ban Lao UG 4274
Ban Hoo
Ban San
Ban Keng Kok
Ban Kai
Ban Muan UG 5267
Ban Kang Ko
Ban Min
Ban Ho Kan UG 3972
Ban Thon
Ban Piak
Ban Ban (2 families)

Tasseng: Houa Neua
Niuak Kua

Moung Khan

Note: Nai Kong Inh - formerly with French. Khamou leader. Speaks Meo fluently. Knows French Has leadership bearing. Proud of Khamou race. All Nai Kongs here state he is No. 1 asset.

Note #2: People at friendly sites extremely afraid of jet bombing. Recommend: (1) Need to be assured no more jets. (2) No jet strikes, Laos area night or day without FAC contact.

One question arises out of this and past experience. Here we have people who have been with the Communists for 5 years. We accept at once with a 15 minute speech on how we must all work together to defeat Communist aggression in Laos. Contrast this with daily lectures of PL Agitation and Propaganda teams. Are these people with us? How many of them are still collaborating with the VM/PL? It seems that we should have a mandatory political oreintation for these people before they are accxx accepted into the community.

January 24, 1966

Report on Site 2, Sam Tiau

During the period from 12/24/65 until 1/16/66, 64 families totalling 273 people made their way out of the enemy held Ban Ban valley to Sam Tiau. They came in small groups, always at night. They came by way of Muong The where they met friendly troops who led them to Sam Tiau.

Twenty of these refugees have enclisted with the friendly troops at Sam Tiau.

The refugees talked freely of their life under the communists. At early dawn each day the people would work the rice fields. Later in the morning all the people were required to go into the forest to attend classes. They were instructed in communist doctrine and general anti-American thought. The younger children were taught reading and writing. The people would return to their houses about 4:00 P.M.

Often the stronger men and women were forced to carry xx rice and ammunition during the night to front line areas. xxxxxxxxxx Usually they went to Ban Tha or the Houie Sa An area, but more recently to Pha Sa Bot near Ban Vieng, Site 89,

These refugees are very uneasy about staying at Site 2. They are frightened that the Vietnamese troops are going to attack Site 2 and kill all refugees that they recognize from Ban Ban. The commander at Site 2 would also like to see the refugees moved on as their presence impairs his ability to defend the position.

Apparently most of the people in the Ban Ban area are unhappy living under the North Vietnamese leadership. Many friends and relatives of those who escaped would like to come out, but they are awaiting assurance that they will be allowed to move into a secure area. They feel that Site 2 is not sufficiently secure to risk escape.

To those who have come out we have distributed rice, medicine, blankets, black cloth, cooking pots, bowls, knives and spoons sufficient xxxxx for their need.

January 26, 1966

Refugee Report on Phou Saly, January 22-23, 1966

On January 22 Nai Kong Nea Ying and I went to Phou Saly, Site 178, to visit a large number of refugees reported to have come into Phou Saly from Communist-controlled areas on November 29, 1965, December 12, 1965 and January 22, 1966. Very little was known about the background of these refugees, all Lao Theung, regarding motives for coming to Phou Saly, past cooperation with the Pathet Lao, number of relatives still in Communist controlled areas, etc. Nea Ying and I, in the company of the local Nai Kong Roi, Sha Ling Lo, and the Roi Tri, Blea Young Noua, visited each refugees/hut, obtaining a census of 978 people, 142 families. In addition, on January 23, everyone was assembled on the air strip where we could determine if the number of people reported the day before was correct. Seventy-four new recruits from the refugee group were also mustered for inspection. These men have been armed but there are still more refugee recruits who have not yet received weapons. Every new recruit has brought his family with him to Phou Saly. It is reasonable to expect that in the next few months there might be a total of 3-4,000 more refugees arriving in Phou Saly from the same area that these refugees have come. The local officials and I feel that these refugees should be helped as soon as possible.

The Lao Theung refugees at Phou Saly have come from the following areas:

Village	Tasseng	Moung	Province
Ban Houei Poun	Bac Law	Pak Sing	Luang Prabang
Ban Houei Yong	"	"	"
Ban Dat Sa Lo	"	"	"
Ban Houei Toun	"	"	"
Ban Houei Sai	Ba Say	"	"
Ban Houei Pek	Pak Sam	Pak Sam	"
Ban Houei Pek Nuen	"	"	"
Ban Houei Gnue	"	"	"
Ban Baaa Mok	Ba Say	Pak Say	"

At the present time the total population of Phou Saly is 2150 people, at 45.4% increase in population since the first of December.

January 26, 1966

Nong Khang, Lima 52

Reports from this area are encouraging. The area commander has been successful in his recruiting program and now has 780 men under his command. Of these, 680 are armed. The new recruits are being trained at Nong Khang.

On January 15, 23 Meo refugee families, 133 people, arrived at Nong Khang from the Pha Cong area. The Tasseng, Mr. Kia Pao, reported that a large movement of refugees can be expected soon from Ban Pha Kha and Ban Nop Gop. Most of the young Meo men from these villages have already enlisted at Nong Khang. The remaining women and children and old men are now harvesting their opium crop and upon completion will certainly move into Nong Khang as the North Vietnamese are very close. One Nai Ban has already been captured as a result of a night raid by 40-50 enemy on the 23rd.

Plans are now being made at Nong Khang to attempt to liberate the Lao population at Muong Het, VH 0298, Kieng Kho, VJ 1202, Muang Long, and Cong Khoun, VH 2290. At present, over 400 Lao families are living at Muong Het. There are no enemy troops stationed in the town, but the administrators are North Vietnamese. I talked at length with Mr. Khampheng, former Nai Kong of Muong Het. He is convinced that the population there is strongly anti-Communist.

Rice is the main problem of the Muong Het people. Although the area is rich in rice, each family is rationed only a small percent of their total harvest. The rest is taken to feed the North Vietnamese troops in the area. The Viet Minh allow each person 60 kilo for the year. Hence, a familu of three is forced to give all but 180 kilos of its harvest to the Viet Minh.

No rice is sold in the market, though buffalo meat, pork and vegetables are available. The currency used are the 50 kip red bills printed for the Neutralists under Kong Le.

Las month there was one jet strike at Muong Met. Three civilians were killed, 17 wounded and 72 houses were burned. The North Vietnamese tried to use this incident to instill anti-Americanism among the people, but met with little success. The people feel that the presence of North Vietnamese in the area was the only reason for the strike.

Mimeographed propaganda leaflets are being distributed by the enemy in villages in the Nong Khang area. The most recent of these celebrate the victory at Houa Muong, Site 58, on December 21. A copy if attached.

TRANSLATION OF LEAFLET DISTRIBUTED IN NONG KHANG AREA

MUONG
INFORMATION OF THE FIRST VICTORY IN THE AREA OF HOUA /

On the morning of the date 21/12/1965, the free force of Lao people, including the groups of the government soldiers, have fought with the groups of American guerillas and servants at the areas of Houa Muong in a great victory. Phu Khon, Phu 1343, Phu Vieng, Wang Me are captured and at the present the fighting continues and our soldiers are moving on to Na Khang, Muong Hien and Tham La. News will be sent to all people when these victories are completed.

Forgetting the new victory, we ask all the people to be happy over our victories. And all should move ahead to work and fight against the American guerillas. This campaign should be finished during this xxxxxxxxx dry season. All our people must be aware of the bad tricks and aggression and destruction by the Air Force of the American imperialists and their servants.

Section of Information
Sam Neua Province

January 27, 1966

Refugee Movements

It is nearly impossible to keep up with the refugee movements at present which also makes it near impossible to have any type of an effective rice quota. This also goes for movement of soldiers as they move from one area to another nearly daily.

Recent movements or refugees are as follows: Approximately 900 new refugees came into Site 179. 800 new refugees came into Site 5. Approximately 300 new refugees came into Site 2. 716 new refugees came into Site 22. 118 new refugees came into Site 6. The old refugees from Site 127 went back to Pha Phoun. In the Lao Ta area, of the some 25,000 people we had under our control, approximately only 8,000 of them are accounted for.

After talking to Gen. Vang Pao and Chao Say Kham last night, my understanding is that approximately 400 of the refugees that walked into Site 22 will go on to Site 113 and be sent to Vientiane. These people are nearly 100% Thaidam. I understnad that these are the xx people that Souvanna Phouma asked Gen. Vang Pao to get to work for him on dam projects. I feel someone down there should check into this so we can all know what is happening.

We have the seed purchasing program well xxxxxxxx underway. We are again going to make a great effort to try and get as many of the Sam Neua people to make farms as possible. In order to accomplish this we are going to have to have good and fast cooperation from Vientiane.

I have been meeting nearly daily with thepeople at Muong Soui concerning the operation that is about to take place, offering any assistance that Sam Thong can give them, especially the use of our hospital. We probably will have to send a medic or a doctor and possibly one of my boys which will be Jack Williamson to help in this operation. I did not contact you before I made this decision, but I was sure this would be your wishes as Dr. Weldon and myself have done in the past. I am sure that it again will make a better feeling between the Neutralists and other peoples.

February 13, 1966
(written 2/12/66)

Information on Houei Thom Refugees

On February 10, 1966 Major Doungtha ordered 5 civilians from Ma Khang to walk into the enemy and lead out however many of the remaining Houei Thom refugees they could find. These 5 men succeeded in contacting 41 families totalling 185 people, and in the early morning of February 11 led them out to Na Khang. ~~Ax~~ These 41 families had been living ~~intxhux~~ in the jungle for 3 nights.

This brings the total number of Houei Thom refugees now at Na Khang to 98 families, 459 people. 110 families and 613 people are still unaccounted for.

These new refugees report that there are no refugees left in Nam Lam and Houei Thom (old), the two major villages in the Houei Thom area. Those who have not escaped have been led off by the enemy toward Sop Kat, Som Lam and Keo Fa Mued. We have as of yet no information as to exactly how many families this group includes.

As these refugees had been 3 nights in the jungle hiding from ~~xhex~~ the enemy they had little information on enemy movements or numbers in the Houei Thom area. They did report that those enemy they did see were mostly Vietnamese, dressed in gray or yellow uniforms, and never in groups of more than 10 or 12. The refugees believe that the enemy has dispersed into small groups and are living in the jungle rather than at the Mouie Thom position itself.

Refugee supplies will be distributed to the new arrivals in the evening, February 12, 1966.

The refugees living in the Na Khang Groupe Scolaire will move out tomorrow and school will be open as usual on Monday.

(written 2/12/66)

February 14, 1966

Refugee Movements during the Past Six Weeks

The situation in Sam Neua Province still remains very critical. There could be a complete pull-out at any time. We are trying to make plans where we would put these people. We have now received approximately 2,000 out of the Site 27 area; approximately 3,000 are still not located. From the Site 127 area, 1100 people (70% Meo and 30% Lao Tung) moved to Phu Vai.

155 additional Thaidom people have come into Site 2 from Ban Ban. Since Site 95 fell, there are approximately 5,000 people (70% Meo and 30% Lao Tung) walking toward Site 22. Many have already arrived. 730 Thaidom people who came from the Ban Ban area into PaDoung are now walking toward Site 113 which we will put in their refugee village at 173. 633 additional Thaidon people from Ban Ban area arrived from 13 approximately one week ago, and we have already sent them to 173. These Thaidom people are people who in the future that Gen. [redacted] Vang Pao hopes to turn over to Souvanna Phouma to work on the dam project.

In the Lao Ta area there were approximately 15,000 people. Ernie Kuhn has now accounted for only about 5,000.

At this time I definitely feel that the situation is going to get worse before it gets betters. I also know at this time that in no way can we expect any people in Sam Neua Province to become self-sufficient during the next year.

March 23, 1966

Refugee Movements and Problems

Since my last memo, we have received approximately 1200 new refugees in the Muong Son area, Site 2 area and Keo Bone. Most of these people have been under PL from 5-8 years. Due to the military situation in the past six weeks or two months, approximately 25,000 of our old refugees have had to move out of their area, of which at least 70% was or would have been self-sufficient before next rice harvest. This definitely causes an increase of people that we will have to be helping next year because based on what has happened in the past, if we are successful we will receive approximately 50-60,0000 new refugees.

This does not only mean an increase in commodities, but it also means that it will take more aircraft to carry out the work if we wish to continue to do the same as we have in the past. I feel in the past three years that we have outdone the Communists in a big way - taking care of refuggees, building schools, dispensaires, etc. I now can see very clearly that in some areas that the Communists again are outdoing us. There are very few present areas that after the Communists take over, they have rice for these people immeidately The Communists are furnishing more medicine and more school supplies and other commodities than they have in the past 3 years.

I have been put in quite a bind and an embarrassing position the last three weeks on the rice seed program. ~~xx~~ I was asked by Vientiane to collect between 50 and 70 tons of seed rice which the people agreed to do without any labor charges in order to help other people in Laos and to show their appreciation for what we do for them. During this period it has been near impossible to get choppers to get this seed out. We still have ~~xxxxx~~ about 10 tons of seed in the field to get out - and about 50% of this has already spoiled. Someboyd is going to have to pay these people for their spoiled rice. I feel that when we work and try as hard as we do for people to ~~xxxxxx~~ become self-sufficient that we could be doing it in no worse way than this. Mr. Houmpheng and Mr. Ruoff have asked if I could not get additional rice seed. Because of what I have already said, I have absolutely refused because I am not going to lose face any more.

I also feel that due to lack of choppers at the right time during the last two months many, many lives have either been lost or taken over by the Communists which definitely we could have saved. This is ~~xxxxxxxx~~ what I call another real face losing situation.

April 4, 1967

TO: Joseph A. Mendenhall, Director

FROM: D. T. Dunton, RDD

SUBJECT: Notes on RDD Activities in Muong Soui
for the Ambassador - per your request

RDD first went into action in Muong Soui in October 1965. Feeling here was that U.S. presence in the area could help ameliorate the very mesay situation which was marked with confusion and little cooperation among the civiliam and miltary residents of the area. Work was in the field of impact rural self help and refugee relief.

1. Paul Lerson arrived in Muong Soui with 2,000 pounds of vegetable seeds - 1,000 for the military, 1,000 for the villagers - and GI roofing to finish a school begun and left as it was in the battle zone.

2. First Activity Plan became that school, Muong Soui Group Scolaire, and USAID provided 315 GI roofing sheets and five ton coment at a dollar cost of $850.00. Kip 5,000 was put in place for the purchase of wire screen to be used in the mixing of comerete.

3. The senond Activity Plan was for four wells, one of which is in the gound and work getting started on the other three. Estimated dollar cost is $120.00 and Kip expense is at K25,000.

4. The third and fifth Activity Plans involved a combination swine program and fish pond. The pond is in and stocked with the the first batch of fish. Pigs have been purchased from MEG and are awaiting transporation to Muong Soui. Together these two projects

TO: Joseph A. Mendenhall

RDD in Moung Soui

called for in kind commodities valued at about $700,00 and counterpart expenditures at ₭ 60,000.

5. Activity Plan number 4 was written to put in place Kip 72,000 for per diem payment to Social Actions Meutralist troops who were to work directly under the Forward Area Team. As it turned out the Social Action team was formed and put to work without the need for the kip and the kip was returned to t he trust fund.

6. Activity Plan number 6 was for a Market Place in Muong Soui, which is now complete. USAID provided comment, GI roofing and assorted hardware at the cost of $522.00 and Ki 10,600.

7. The most recent Activity Plan was for the Muong Soui Group Scolair - actually in town and not to be confused with the school in AP 1 - and in this case USAIDprovided comment, GI roofing and hardware at a cost value of $2,000,00 and counterpart funds expenditures were not to found in this prject.

In all eases, construction was rural self help and lumber for the project was supplied by the villagers and cut by the rural public works sawmill in Muong Soui. In additon to the aforementioned Activity Plans, Terry Collins has amisted the villagers, along with one PWD carpenter and a trained soldiers, in the construction of over 180 combination schoold deske and banches in 14 villagers thus providing a plac to learn for better than 550 students. In one of the cutlying villages, Ban Bone, Terry organized and helped the villagers build a 100% slef

help one rooms school in which the villagers bought their GI roofing. At present, with the aid of a newly hired RDD Field Assistant, Terry is getting a very ambitions agriculture program going with demonstration rice seeds and vegetables.

REFUGEES

In addition to the rural development work, the FAY in Muong Soui serves as Jay Ruoff's man in Muong Soui. Over the last 12 months, approximately 1,000 refugees have been given assistance in the form of rice, rice seed, vegetable seed, tools and basic Social Welfare commodities. A Major ongoing refugee resettlement project in Nam Tiat, west of Muong Soui on RN 7, could prove to be a model refugee resettlement offort. These people walked cut of one of the most difficult refugee areas to date, that being Muong You. They are now getting re-established and vegetable seed and rice seed in on the way to them.

April 12, 1966

Colonel Chansom - Military Planning

Following is reported for the purpose of creating a better understanding between people who might have the opportunity to work with Colonel Chansom, 2nd Military Region.

Colonel Chansom is a strong influence in the planning of strategy in the northern area, especially among Lao/FAR assets and has considerable influence on Meo/FAR assets.

Colonel Chansom asked me to relate the following since he was of the feeling that he had not communicated these ideas successfully to the various representatives of various agencies with whom he has had contact. The basis of Colonel Chansom' s strategy is that an offesnsive is the best defense. However, the key to this strategy is more for damaging political image of the xxxx enemy rather than physical damage.

Two factors enter into this thinking which are usually not present in western planning. High in the value system of western military prowness is the idea of defense to the last man. A position or whatever that holds out to the last man against all odds, even though all is lost is considered "brave", "courageous", etc. In the Asian view this is considered very poor judgment. When the odds are against you, it is folly to stand. How "brave" the losers are is not valued...they lost! This is valued. When the odds are against you, move to a better position.

Second and related to the first factor is the value of "eye for an eye". If the enmy inflicts damage on something of value, one must reciprocate. It is not good enough to defend an area successfully and take losses in men and materials. ONe must attack an equal target of value of the enemy and inflict equal or more damage as the occasion requires.

Applying this value system to the practical tactical problems of North Laos, the following thinking on strategy emerges:

Plain of Jars area: Static defense of L-108 is undesirable. Counter-offensive at vulnerable point that has political value, more important than pitch defense or frontal counter-offensives that are beaten back (e.g. Phou Khout offensive). Colonel Chansom would rather hit Moung Kheung (LS-109) than join in a frontal attack or defense. Better to take Ban Ban and lose Muong Soui.

LS-20 & LS-20A base complex: Any attack directed at this target has immense political implications since it is widely accepted as an American Operational base. Any atempts by the unfriendlies to attack this complex must be balanced with not a face-on defense but a counter military-xx political attack

on Sam Neua city! Even if 20/20A complex was successfully defended, the very fact that the unfriendlies could mount such an attack would have a tremendous political image shattering effect. Therefore it is necessary to stage an offesnive of equal value (in the minds of local people) to demonstrate the weakness of the ~~x~~x enemy , the strength of the friendly forces and negate the unfriendlies' efforts.

Thus the military-political thinking in this area places a great deal of emphasis on Sam Neua~~xxPxx~~ Province as an integral part of 20/20A security as opposed to the separate non-related thinking and treatment given to this area by people residing in the Vientiane area.

An example of this thinking can be seen in the ~~xxx~~ recent maneuvers in Sam Neua area. Upon the loss of LS-48 and LS-36, Muong Son was ~~attacke~~ attacked and taken. This aved morale and balanced the loss. It can be rationalized (and probably is) that it was better judgment to pull out of LS-36 and LS-48 where the enemy was in strength and attack where the enemy was weak. True or not this is the thinking and it keeps everyone going.

The above has been presented not as the writer's ideas but as a direct translation and reporting of a lengthy discussion with Colonel Chansom, Whether or not the reader accepts this thinking is irrelevant, the point is that this is the dominant thinking one encounters in the Second Military Region.

April 18, 1966

Refugees and Resettlement of Refugees

Since Site 36 fell, we have put the following numbers of refugees into areas away from the soldiers where we feel they are secure, but we would like you to keep in mind that due to the time of the year it will be impossible for any of these people to plant rice this year which in turn means that it will be at least another year and half before they can become self-sufficient.

We have put into Site 191, 900 Thaidom who came from the Ban Ban area, 240 Lao from Site 59 and approximately 200 Lao who walked from Site 2. Approximately 5,000 from the Site 95 area and east from the Site 95 area have arrived and built their homes at Site 192. Both of the above areas are not only secure but have very good water and farm land. Anybody from Vientiane or elsewhere, wishing to see how we are resettling these refugees, should visit either one of the above locations. They are very good examples and close to Vientiane for anyone to come and take a look at them.

At Site 173, approximately 700 new refugees have arrived. At Site 22, approximately 350 have arrived. At 20A, approximately 3,000 new refugees have either walked or been hauled in from insecure areas. At Site 20, we have relocated 450 of the former Site 36 people outside of Sam Thong. Also due to the insecurity of military families on the front lines, we have at Sam Thong 1,065 dependents of soldiers who are fighting in the Sam Neua area. We relocated over 1,000 of the Site 36 people in a village called Phong Sai, southwest of Site 20. There have been 954 new refugees walk into the Site 46 area. We have not as yet relocated these people. They are presently safe. They will be relocated in the near future. We feel all o f the above areas are secure.

We have received the following refugees into insecure areas: 125 new refugees have arrived at Site 184 from the Muong Hiem area. Approximately 350 have arrived at Site 179 from east of Ban Ban. 806 have arrived at Site 88 from the Phou Vai area. Over 1,200 have arrived at Site 50 from the Phou Vai area. Approximately 6,000 more of the Phou Vai and Pha Phoun people still remain in the jungles of that area. We are hoping that this area will become secure enough to leave the people in the area. 294 refugees have arrived at Site 178. Over 400 have arrived at Site 111 from the Site 52 area. Site 111 is about 75% secure. 1,206 refugees have arrived at Site 33 from an area north of Site 33 which has been taken over by the enmy. Seemingly Site 33 becomes more insecure by the day. Of all the refugees mentioned in this report, 75% have never been under us before. At least 50% up until now have been under enemy control.

We can count on many more Lao and Thaidom people coming out of the Ban Ban area, also Lao and all different Thai tribes coming from along and across

the Vietnam border, from Dien Bien Phu all the way down to and beyond the Site 46 area.

A breakdown as to types of people we have received would be approximately 50% Lao, 10% Thaidom, 20% Lao Tung and 20% Meo which again tells you that we are working with a different type and group of refugees than we have in the past. 50% of these people have either been merchants or low-land farmers whereas in the past 90% of our refugees were hill type people and easier to work with and relocate.

May 7, 1966

Movement of Refugees since the Fall of LS 179 on April 28, 1966

Site 179 was the front line of the FAR troops in Sam Neua Province. L52 was the foremost site with a combination of FAR and Meo troops. They both fell at approximately the same time, causing not only a quick but a large evacuation of people.

Approximately 1500 people have arrived at Site 185 area, consisting of 50% Meo, 25% Lao Tung, and 25% Lao. After 179 fell, the area of 107 had to evacuate; apprximately 1200 going to Site 76, consisting of 75% Meo and 25% Lao Tung. Also in this same area approximately 3,000 people (50% Lao and 50% Meo) who had wither always been self-sufficient or who had become self-sufficient in the Houei Met area are being asked to remain there until we can figure out where to put them. At Site 111 approximately 450 Lao have arrived from the L52 area and close to the Vietnam border. At L59 approximately 600 Meo and Lao Tung have also come in from close to the Vietnam border and L52 area ~~dx~~ and are taking up residence at L59.

At Site 20 and Site 98 apprxoimately 1000 dependents of FAR soldiers have moved in from the Sam Neua area, assuring the soldiers that their families would be taken care of. This was more or less forced on General Vang Pao. At the same time he gave an order that the wives and families of the hill troops would remain in the Sam Neua area.

In the past two months we have had approximately 1000 people from East Xieng Khouang and many from across the border in North Vietnam came into the Site 89 area. Due to the fact that Site 29 fell yesterday, this whole area consisting of apprixmately 15,000 people will very possibly in the near future become a lost areas as there is no way for the people to get out.

Due to the great job that is being done on the road out of 20A, we feel that it is now only a matter of days until General Vang Pao will give the final order for many ~~exx~~ people to start moving out. We hope that within the year this can reach as many as 15,000 people who will resettle along this road. We must be ready to help these people with tools so they can become self-sufficient after next year's rice planting.

There are still approximately 5,000 to 6,000 ~~xxxxx~~ people in and around the Phu Vai-Pha Phoun area who are still remaining in the jungle waiting to see if the future military movements will be successful to determine what to do. If the future military operations are successful, these people can go back to their homes in these areas and during this year still remain self-sufficient. If not, they will have to move into the Site 50 area. Approximately 1200 have already moved into the Site 50 area.

As you can see from this memo and from my last memo, there has been a terrific movement of refugees. Somebody has got to soon decide are we going to support them and how much support are we going to give them. At present we are lost for the proper refugee commodities to help these people.

During this movement of refugees now and in the past six months we have lost approximately 30,000 people to the enemy. Many of these people were trapped and had no choice; many of them could not get out because of air strikes; however, there were also many who decided that after being run out and moved 5-6 times in the past 3 years that things could not get any worse and have stood still and made no effort to come ou.

May 10, 1966

Evacuation of People in Site 29-89 Area

Over the years the Site of 29 and 89 area and other areas nearby have been the destination of refugees escaping from border areas of North Vietnam and from North Vietnam. This area has suffered mistaken hits from our planes and repeated attacks from the enemy.

During the past five years, though completely surrounded by enemy, they have elected to stay and fight; and as anybody who has followed the situation knows, they have done an unbelievable job with limited support.

The last 30 days the Viet Cong have made it clear that they intend to clear this former pocket of resistence. The men of this area, farmers and kids as well as soldiers, have definitely said they will stay and fight but wish to fight on even terms with the enemy. They cannot do this with their families unable to escape to a safe haven, especially the people who have successfully escaped from North Vietnam. Hundreds of these people who have lived in this area for many years will definitely go into the junble and remain; but because of the great propaganda value for us and against the Viet Cong, it is very important that we get these other types of families out. It is imperative for these people to be removed to a safe area. Our air resources are stretched too thin to do the task. We could not even supply the gas since we can hardly keep present areas supplied. Loss of these people would be a great blow to morale. Even after moving these people, the chances are very great the area will still be lost to the enemy; but at the same time, knowing the job that these people have done in the last 4-5 years, ~~they xx the xxxxxx~~ the enemy will only take this area with great losses.

My suggestion is to immediately set up a form of evacuation which would definitely be handled either through Udorn or Long Thieng to remove these people as past as possible whenever the order is given to move. The only way I know how this could be done would be with the help of large Air Force evacuation choppers.

May 11, 1966

Refugees at Site 76

On April 30 and May 1, after Viet Minh terrorists began military activities to the near east of Houe Mat (XK UH 6069), about 900 people began walking out toward Pha Bong (Site 76). Some of the sick along with the very old and very young were lifted out by air. These poeple were about 80% self-sufficient with fields cleared for rice; corn already planted; and fair numbers of pigs, chickens and other livestock cared for. Most of this as well as some household goods had to be left behind.

Nea Chu, a Sam Thong based Nai Khong, and I flew into Pha Bong on May 2 to begin making lists of people who had made it out and to begin assessment of the people's needs. The Nai Khong at Pha Bong, who is also the military leader, gathered the Tassengs and Naibans together at dinner and Nea Chu explained what data was necessary for our report.

Next day I called for a rice drop which arrived in the afternoon. With rice to satisfy their hunger, working with the villagers became measurably easier, Whereas the Tassengs had only given direct answers to our questions previously, we were now able to get fuller details on old material and new information too. The Nai Khong there, when asked to fix up a dispensary so that we could send a medic up, was able to get several men together and others promised to help with other projects in the future. (Most people were busy constructing semi-permanent housing for their families at that time.)

We made no promises to the people about giving them anything except rice. However, Nea Chu and I had discussed the possibility of getting milk and butter oil for the people and had made a list of those children who were motherless and which mothers had small children but not enough breast milk to feed them.

With our lists and after telling the Nai Khong that we'd try to come back, Nea Chu and I returned to Sam Thong.

Here, the lists were given to the head Nai Khong so that they could be incorporated into permanent records. He also held a short meeting with the two of us to discuss our observations and get ideas about what needs the people had.

Nea Chu and I returned to Pha Bong with a load of butter oil and milk which was distributed to the refugees through the Tassengs. The same day a doctor assisted the new medic assigned there in holding sick call. Many people were treated for illness there and those who were real sick were sent down to the hospital.

The rice supply once again was running out so before leaving I requested another drop. We asked the Nai Khong to have some of the refugees try to get back to their old villages, possibly at night, and bring out as much rice and household utensils as possible. If these parties are small and if the Viet Minh are hold off a while longer, a good deal of their property can be brought out. Having given them food and taken care of their immediate health needs, we moved on to work at another locztion.

Now that it is time to go back to check on these people, I feel rather ~~hesitatxxx~~ hesitant about doing it as I'm told I can get no more rice to send up there. As I mentioned earlier, it is so much easier to work with a group of people who have something to eat. We have given these people a promise of a beeter life if they will continue to support their Lao Government, but a lot of our effort will have been in vain if we can't supply them with rice until they are able to maintain themselves. A hungry people will support whoever promises to fill their stomachs.

April-10, May 1966

Beginning in early April and continueing through early May enemy preasure increased in the Ban Song Hong (UG-8583) and Keo Bone (UG-8680), 38 KM. NE of Ban Ban.

Enemy propaganda throughout April followed the line that all friendly positions in the Ban Vieng (UG-7585) Ban Song Hong complex would be attacked and captured by the middle of May. Village chief were encouraged to lead their people to the nearest NLHS official and place themselves under his care before the area was overrun.

The enemy built up his forces and by 20 April an estimated two battalions were threatening Keo Bone, Ban Vieng and Phou Se Both (UG-7681) from the south.

Beginning late on 21 April and continueing through to the morning of 24 April the enemy launched a series of coordinated attacks on Keo Bone and Ban Song Hong.

Pressure continuing as of 10 May, following fall of Na Khang in February, only outpost between Ban Ban and Sam Neua.

Presently friendlies hold enclace running from (UG-6791) east to (UG-8092) southeast to (UG-9085) southwest to (UG-8080) and then northwest to (UG-6791).

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REFUGEE WORK IN LAOS
May 1966

It all started after I finished my Peace Corps work in Indonesia. I had read about Pop, who is the area coordinator for Xieng Khuoang province and also the area coordinator for refugee relief, and this is what I was doing; I was refugee relief officer and this is what the contract with USAID stated that my job was. This entailed working the Meo people out of Sam Thong, which is the base station in Xieng Khuoang province which covers Samneua, and also northern Luang Prabang provinces. This isn't where all the refugees are. The refugees mainly are in Nam Tha province, Xieng Khuong province, Samneua province, Luang Prabang and Sayaboury provinces. There were, four months ago, about 300,000 people. Most of these were people that we had worked with and relocated. By relocation, I mean setting them up in a safe, well fortified village and from the first year, supplying them with basic living essentials- dropping rice to them - regular rice drops on a monthly quota.

Rice, blankets, pots and pans, knives and forks -- these were about the basic things that we gave them. We tried to stress the point that they shouldn't have to be relocated again because of enemy activity. We tried to impress upon them that we were not going to drop them rice indefinitely and this was a big problem up here - with the people and also with the Americans. Many Americans come to Sam Thong and see rice drops still coming into Sam Thong which is a very old, relatively speaking, refugee resettlement camp. We tried to impress this upon the people, whether they be Lao, Lao Thung, Yao, Thai Dang or Thai Dum. There are many different hill tribes people up there we were working for, 60 per cent are Meo, though. They are hill tribes people.

These rice drops were to be only for one year until they got settled, until they got rice planted in the cycle of growing and they were self-sufficient. What happens many times is these people don't stay in these refugee villages. Maybe in six months, they go out and start planting the rice, and then the enemy comes back and they are taken again, and they have to move out to another village, and this has happened for the last six or seven years. We are in the state now, many of these people are where they've been refugees before and they come in and they're refugees in a new site and we come in with refugee relief trying to find out what they need and to help them in any way we can. (This was what we were there for, but many times we had people come into resettlement sites that had

been refugees before. These people usually had supplies we had given before (therefore we try to keep records of who has received supplies before).) We tried to keep track of these people at all times and who they are, so it's not a big, huge problem but it's a pretty touchy subject because many people come into a new refugee site and just kind of walk in - you know, "what do I get?" This is why we have to have records, this is important. Out of these records, the quota of rice is determined per family. From this we work out a quota as to how many grams per person, each subsistence diet as to rice, how much rice they'll need for a month and as to the number of families in the village. We work out a quota and drop this much to them. Also, these records are important for these people coming from other villages. We have fair records of all the people that are in each village.

Question: How do you get such a record?

Answer: Mostly from the Taseang, the Nai Bans and the Nai Kongs, the village leaders. Before it was stable, we had a village here and a village here, and they all had their village heads and leaders. Now then the enemy came and attacked both villages. This village came in together, say, they were both Lao, Lao villages - they came together. Maybe one is Lao and one is Meo and they came together. You have the problem of working the Taseang who was the village leader of the Lao people and the Taseang of the Meo people and trying to get them together to have records of their own people, and they do a pretty good job.

Question: They work cooperatively, yes?

Answer: They work cooperatively to an extent - they work for their people - the Lao Taseang for their and the Meo Taseang work for their people. This is something that Pop and the whole group of Americans that are up there are trying to stress, to get Thai Dung, Lao, Meo, Thai Dang and Yao people, if they're in an area - a refugee resettlement area - to try to get them to work together as much as possible because this is a hope for the future of Laos. We're being criticized all the time - not criticized, but people have said that we were up there just working with the Meo, which is not entirely wrong, although 60 per cent is Meo, the rest is a combination of Lao and other hill tribes people.

Question: Would this be said of Americans?

Answer: It's not only said of Americans; it's said of the Lao. The Meo originally came from China into Laos and its history goes back -

The Lao kings and everything got forces together up to fight the Meo hill tribes people and there has been this animosity and lack of cohesiveness between the two peoples for a long time and the Meo are just a different type people than the Lao. The Lao are low lands people and a more easy-going type whereas the Meo have more of a Chinese type feeling of umph and go. Because of this, Americans and Lao alike say that we are up there just helping the Meo, creating a Meo-Laos rather than a Laos-Laos. We fight this by bringing people up there and showing them what we are doing in every school that is created up there. Lao is the spoken language taught in the school. It's the main language. They don't teach Meo. If Meo is taught it's taught in the family after school. We try as much as possible to work with the Lao officials of each province, in these provinces, such as Luang Prabang, Sayaboury, Nam Tha, Xieng Khuoang, and Samneua. What has happened and is hard for us is that when the Viet Minh-Pathet Lao combination came into their areas from the north, from Phong Saly province, what's happened is many of the Lao officials that were in these provinces before the invasions took place have left. They made it back down to Vientiane and our problem now is securing areas and bringing the officials back up to see what is being done. It's very hard to get them up, out of the capital, to visit their own people. They just don't want to come.

Question: How did you go about this?

Answer: First of all, making very, very sure that it is secure; getting some of the people that had stayed there coming down into Vientiane and talking with these people; getting communication from Vientiane up to the provinces. Then by a friendly gesture on our part, to bring them back up, saying, "why don't we go up to such and such village and visit their school". If the primary school inspector or a Nai Kong of a province was up there before, we go up there with him and show him the schools and the dispensaries that we have built, so he can approve of them. These people are still respected, even though they left. The Lao still feel that they are their leaders.

Question: These are Lao officials who were born in these villages, in these provinces?

Answer: Some of them were born in these provinces and some of them weren't. Some originally came from Vientiane and Luang Prabang. When the invasions of Pathet Lao-Viet Minh came, they made it back to Vientiane and didn't come back.

Question: But people considered them still as the officials from their area?

Answer: Right. You see, the King is in Luang Prabang; the political

capital is Vientiane. Vientiane has its central, what is called the Chao Kuang, and underneath, the Minister of Interior. He assigns people to where they were before. We also tried to bring in the voting type of process where the people are actually voted for in the province. We are gradually getting people that were in the villages at all times. They become the Taseangs and the Nai Kongs and the Nai Bans, the village leaders in the provinces. But this is a slow process.

Question: When you say "we", whom do you refer to?

Answer: "We" are mainly American-Meo-Lao coordinators who are in the whole area. It is, military-wise, under General Vang Pao, who is a Meo. We have working with us four Nai Kongs, who are village leaders (a village leader is a Nai Kong) but these people have areas. Out of Sam Thong, one Nai Kong may have the northern area - others the east, the west and the southern area. When we got to any of these areas, we take this Nai Kong with us. Now he is, by General Vang Pao's order, the leader in this particular area. Now these are the people that we are working with, who are co-partners, co-workers. General Vang Pao is appointed by the King. The Nai Kong is appointed by General Vang Pao.

Question: Is he usually chosen from among the people that he is responsible for?

Answer: Our four are Meo leaders.

Question: How is it known that they are leaders? How does the General make these appointments? On what basis?

Answer: On their past experiences. Most of these people that are leaders who have been either large farmers or who had held many farms or were important people before the invasions took place. One of them was in the French army on the Plain of Jars. His name is Bla Vo. I couldn't tell you exactly how General Vang Pao decided that the other three would cover that area. They are from different areas.

Question: How are they seen by the people they are working with? Are they accepted as leaders?

Answer: Yes.

Question: This creates no problem whatsoever?

Answer: These people are the leaders, leaders in that they are refugee types, helping people. They go with us to find out what is needed in the village. As far as the village politics or general ruling of the

village, there is a Nai Kong in the village but when this man comes, he's got a specific job of finding out what this Nai Kong needs, looking at the Nai Kong's records, checking his records of how many people they have, checking his rice drops, asking if he lost any rice last month from rice drops, looking at the distribution of rice, how it went to different families and just generally seeing what they need and then he comes back to our central base camp, and we gather the information here.

Question: Can you describe a little bit what the central base camp is made up of - what kind of people are there who receive this information?

Answer: Yes. The four Nai Kongs live in Sam Thong. There we have people mainly doing air support work. We have an air strip. The airplanes come in and we load them up with the supplies that are needed for the various areas. We have contact by telephone with the various areas also, so we know all the time the situation in the northern section above the Plain of Jars and all around us. It's important to know this - because you may be flying to some place one day all day long, helping them, supplying them with things and yet knowing that the enemy that night may come in and take it. You better find out before you go in the next day, because this has happened. Before you just fly in and land and find out if it's enemy territory. It goes back and forth. Just recently I understand that it's become very, very bad. They lost a lot of sites during the dry season. Not being there, I wouldn't know how much they lost.

Question: Who is in command of the base camp?

Answer: One Nai Kong is in command. It's a refugee relief camp - it's a military camp; it has its own military leader who happens to be a Lao under General Vang Pao. It has a hospital and also a school. What we're actually trying to do in Sam Thong is to make this into a provincial capital.

Question: When you say "we", what do you mean?

Answer: "We" are the Lao that are there, the Meo that are there and the Americans that are there. It's always stressed when I say "we", I mean not Americans but American, Lao and Meo working together to take care of the refugee problem. "We" doesn't mean Americans - we Americans take virtually all our orders from General Vang Pao - or our local leaders, and this is something that Pop has always stressed there. There was this arrangement there that I have never seen before in any other Southeast Asian country where you work with the locals. Granted

other people say,"yes, you're in a tight spot, you have to do this, because you're fighting a war, you're supporting a war type of affair." Okay, but we have a relationship with the locals, they believe in us and we believe in them and if they say they want something and we say we don't want something, then we talk about it and what results from that. We have meetings there almost every night.

Some problems come up during the day from different provinces and yet, we - meaning the Lao, the Americans and the Meo - get together and see what we can do for the next day to resolve these problems. Say, such and such village asked for 30 blankets, and we look at our records and we see how many families there are, and just why they need these blankets. Maybe we gave them 30 blankets three months ago. They themselves out there mix their records up. They think they need 30 blankets; maybe they don't need 30 blankets; maybe they do. If they do, we send them the 30 blankets but before we send them the 30 blankets, we send somebody with these 30 blankets. 30 blankets being an example- it could be pots and pans all the way up to more rice - to anything that they want. We send somebody with these supplies that they need and go into the village, maybe stay overnight, to make sure that as far as we are concerned, the Americans, that these people know where it's coming from.

Question: That statement you say, "know where it's coming from" - what does this mean?

Answer: Well, that it's coming originally from Sam Thong and that it's coming from the United States.

Question: Why do you want them to know this?

Answer: Because I myself think this is what we're there for. We are supporting these people - the Meo, the Lao, all of them - to do something for us. These people are fighting and losing their lives for us. If we weren't there, supporting them, then it would be all over. There wouldn't be any fighting and I think this is something that a lot of us forget, that these people are giving an awful, awful lot. These are very, very tired soldiers. If they weren't doing it, then it would probably be us doing it. This is what I mean and why I say, "where it's coming from". These people are depending upon our support and they look back at the United States for their support and even if you talk to Zang Dao and Bow Me that are here, they are very worried, as the people up there are, that the United States will pull out of Laos. The Meo and the northern hill tribes people that I worked with, had said this to me many times. "Just,please, don't---"; they didn't even want me to go home. They don't like to see Americans come up

there and get a job done, being able to work with them, and then leave. This is a very rare experience to have, to be able to receive from these people. They really care.

Question: The refugees, of course, are not soldiers?

Answer: There's no difference. Every refugee, if possible, has a gun. It doesn't matter how old he is. You see little kids, ten years old, with a M-1 and they know how to shoot them.

Question: What are their backgrounds? Farmers, mostly?

Answer: Yes. Hill tribes people - hill rice farmers.

Question: And, you suggest, they left their original villages because we asked them - "we" now meaning Americans - asked them to help them fight the war or did they leave because they're being afraid?

Answer: Shot at. This is why they leave. But, you see, the point is that they would continue to leave if somebody didn't support them. Do you see what I mean?

Question: They would go out from the refugee camp?

Answer: If they were fired on in "X" village, they would go back to "A" village, and then they go back to "C", and then pretty soon they would all be in Thailand.

Comment by French: They're in effect guerrillas. When they're hit by an overwhelming force, they withdraw rather than to stand and be annihilated and that's when they come into the refugee status.

Answer: You asked me "why" - I'm not sure you got what I mean why we want them to know that we're supporting them. This is the point I wanted to make-that even though it's 30 blankets, or it might be two spoons - the Americans are there and giving it to them. It's not this idea of the Asian who doesn't want to receive because he'll lose face. This is always an argument that this guy is going to lose face because you just give it to them. But these people, they don't have any face - I mean, really, they're hurting and if somebody doesn't give them these blankets, in a week they may be dead, the little kids, maybe, because it gets very cold. It's not low land, this is 4000 feet that we're talking about. It's cold, very cold at night.

Question: I wondered about the land they're on.

Answer: This is important also, as far as Air America, the air support people working there. All refugee sites are picked mainly for defense to begin with. So most of them are high hills. As soon as the people are in, the first thing they start on is an air strip so we can get the support in to them, by helio, small lightning take-off planes. Some villages are 3,500 up to 4,500 feet above sea level.

Question: Who lived there before they did?

Answer: Sometimes nobody.

Question: Is this government land? Did anyone claim title to it?

Answer: I don't really know whose land it is. It's the people's land that were there before.

Question: It's Meo territory?

Answer: Yes. Mainly Meo territory.

Question: No other tribal groups that make a claim to this area?

Answer: They don't make a claim to an area. What they do is go in and build a village. If it happens to be the Lao that are doing this, it's a Lao village. The area around is unclaimed type area.

Comment by French: The thing that is important here is that these people are semi-nomadic and they practice a slash and burn agriculture. They don't stay in an area. They move from it. The area that they're in up there is real primitive - almost virgin territory. It's steep mountain, forest area and there isn't anybody so much to claim it. It's like wilderness that they move into and nobody's.

Answer: Transportation is only by air. There are no roads at all. The only roads have to be on the Plain of Jars. This is the problem of supporting this war, this refugee relief problem. We have to travel by air. The enemy have the roads. They have the roads into the Plain of Jars; they have the roads coming from Vietnam; old French roads built before.

Question: Let's get back to the camp itself. You have this group - these meetings every day. Who calls such a meeting?

Answer: Well, anybody can call it. It may not be with everybody there. It may just be a couple of the Nai Kongs back from the village and they want to talk to us about their problems. In the early morning

planes get loaded to go out to the villages and they go out, they deliver their goods and they come back again, load again and they go out, and this goes on all day.

Question: These supplies are American controlled supplies or have they already been turned over to the Lao government?

Answer: They are turned over to the Lao government in Vientiane, to the Social Welfare Department. Each month we send in to the Social Welfare Department an estimated need for the next month. And if we go over that we write in a request to the Social Welfare Department. It goes to USAID and then over to Lao, so that both people get a copy of it. If the Lao government in their warehouses don't have it, we ask USAID to give it to us. But, see, there is a direct correlation between Social Welfare and the refugee relief program in Vientiane - Social Welfare being the Lao government - Social Welfare-Chow Sai Kom.

Question: Do you have any control - by "you" now meaning the Americans there under AID contract - any control over the particular goods that are being air-dropped and the amount and the where?

Answer: Yes.

Question: Total control?

Answer: Total control. There isn't one thing that goes out of the warehouse between Sam Thong that isn't known about or where it's going. We have a complete list of where things go, the date they left, and how much; we've got it.

Question: So how would you describe the role of the four Nai Kongs?

Answer: Their role is pretty much the same as my role up there. I mean, I was working for them. They may get reports come in - reports from the radio, from the telephone - that in such and such a village, there's something going on, that rice drops are not getting to all the people.

Question: Who's on the other end of the phone?

Answer: The people in the village.

Question: Who would it be in the village?

Answer: Most of the time the military phone in the problems. It's a military phone. The Nai Kong in that village, the village leader,

would say, "I've got this message, send it to Sam Thong. I got this problem; I don't know what to do about it. Would you ask one of the Nai Kongs in Sam Thong to come up and we'll talk this problem over." Or usually they ask for Pop. You see, this is important. He has been there for about six years now in this area and he is very well known. He's an American that you won't believe, if you work for him, because this is his life. He represents America to the fullest extent. He's always American. He's not the "gone native" type but he just works with these people all day and all night and anything he's got, he gives. His own money too, lots and lots of it, and from this he's built up a reputation - that these people ask for him - "Would you please send Tan Pop up to such and such village. We need help." If he can't go, we go along as his representatives, with the Nai Kong, to discover what the problem is, and try and solve it there. If they need something, we come back and discuss it here and look at our records to see if they really need it. We follow it up. We just don't leave them hanging up there and say no, you can't have it. We tell them why.

Question: But you as Americans make the final decision upon whether they will or will not get it?

Answer: No, absolutely not. Hardly ever do we really make the decision that it's "no" that such and such a village cannot have this. The Nai Kongs know pretty much what has been given this village in the last two years. They understand and they know if somebody in the village is trying to,say,- we have this problem of people wanting to visit somebody in the village. So if we've got a certain amount of commodities going to such and such village and we can fit this guy on, then we send him up. But many times, these people that are going to the villages also have little goodies they've brought up from Vientiane to sell at the village and this has happened before. As far as that, we control this as much as possible, limiting the amount of weight that he can take on the plane.

Question: I am still a little confused. On the one hand, you say that you have the control of the warehouse and supplies. On the other hand, you do not make the final decision. Could you explain this as clearly as possible: Who makes what decision and who is in charge of what operations? What is the role of the Nai Kong who works with you in the camp? Can he tell you - "I need 40 blankets" and you say, "all right, here are 40 blankets" - open the warehouse and load them on the plane.

Answer: Right. This is what happens and this has happened a lot of times. He says what he needs and we give it to him because we have

the trust of these people. I mean, he's just not some "Joe Blow" that walked in the village and says, "up at village X, we need 30 blankets. Can you give them to us?"

Question: Can you give any example where you or Pop or anyone else ever wondered whether the request that someone made was appropriate or not?

Answer: There're a lot of circumstances involved. If it is a village that we've been neglecting because we've had another 15 villages to work on at trouble spots and this guy comes down and says, "I need this and we're in a hurry" or something, we give it to him. Maybe they don't need it - we're not sure but because of the time element involved, it's best to make this guy happy, to give him what he wants. But that isn't what you mean, though.

Question: I tell you what I'm driving at. Very early, at the beginning of our talk, you spoke about really trying to make these people self-sufficient. You don't want to make them too dependent and this suggested to me that you do weigh quite carefully what you give, that in some cases, you don't give.

Answer: Right. We don't give if everybody is in agreement not to do so.

Question: How do you reach agreement? Can you think of any specific instance in which we could follow from the beginning a request in the settlement to the point where it reached you in the camp?

Answer: I see. I can think of one instance involving metal roofing sheets. It rains an awful lot up there. It's very high priority and these people like to have it for their schools if possible. What happened in one instance I know is we had this big refugee center - sort of a forward area base camp in the northern section. There were about 30,000 people in the surrounding area and because they had a big school, we supplied them with something like 280 tin roofing sheets for their school.

Question: How did this happen - that you supplied them?

Answer: We told them if they would build the school, we would supply them with the roofing and also they had their own teachers already. They had in the village their own select teachers, some of them actually had come up from Vientiane. They had trained in Vientiane to become teachers and had come back to the village.

Question: Let's follow this through, then. When you say "we", who amongst you sent to whom to suggest this?

Answer: I went to the Nai Kong of the village and put this proposal down to him.

Question: What was the proposal?

Answer: That we would supply them with roofing sheets and books and materials if they would build their school.

Question: What made you go up there?

Answer: A request that they wanted a school. We knew they wanted a school. It's automatic. As soon as these people get together in their resettlement building, the first thing they want is a dispensary and we supply them with medics and basic medicines, and then they want a school and we try to stress the fact that if they build a school, we will supply them with a teacher if possible from Vientiane. We don't guarantee a teacher from Vientiane. We used to. They usually have somebody in the village who can serve as a teacher but we from USAID Education supply them with books and materials. This is something they want. It's automatic. We knew they wanted a school. They had a small school but more people were coming in and they wanted to build a big school. They said they wanted a big school.

Question: Who said?

Answer: The people of the village.

Question: Who are these people?

Answer: In this particular village, it was Lao people. The name of the village was Na Khan.

Question: Who voiced this?

Answer: The village leaders and the teachers of the school.

Question: Who were the village leaders?

Answer: The village leaders being the Nai Kong, the Taseangs of the village, who are in every village.

Question: And what about the school principal? Was there a principal?

Answer: Right. There was a principal of the school and also when I came, I brought the primary school inspector from Vientiane with me.

Question: All right, so you came to this particular village --

Answer: Flew into the village.

Question: Where did you meet?

Answer: At the Nai Kong's house.

Question: Was he expecting you?

Answer: Oh yes, he knew we were coming. We said we'd come.

Question: So he had set up the meeting?

Answer: Yes.

Question: Who was at the meeting?

Answer: At the meeting were teachers of the school, the principal of the school - one of the teachers was the principal - the Nai Kong and various Taseangs. You see, in this particular village - this wasn't a Lao village - there were Lao Tung, there were some Thai Dum and just an assortment of hill tribes people. They were all to go to this one school and it was too small and they wanted to enlarge it. They told us what they wanted at the meeting and we told them we would supply such and such.

Question: How did this meeting start off - who started talking?

Answer: I guess it was a Lao - Lao leaders - who started talking and they don't talk to me specifically. They talk to the Nai Kong who went with me, the primary school inspector that was with me also. Talked to us and said what they wanted.

Question: And they would translate it for you?

Answer: I understood - I knew what was coming - I knew what they wanted - I understood what they wanted.

Question: They didn't address you directly?

Answer: Oh no.

Question: At no time?

Answer: Yes - sometimes they did - I think nails came up - nails were the problem. They wanted so many nails - roofing nails - and I tried to figure it out. It seemed they wanted six nails for every sheet. I was talking to them and they were talking to me and I said, "these are too many nails; I think you can use four nails for each roofing sheet and that should be enough". And they talked about it amongst themselves and we came up with the proposal that, "yes, this would be all right. You can have this many nails."

Question: Were you talking to them in Lao or through an interpreter?

Answer: No, I didn't use an interpreter. I didn't want any because I would much rather stumble along and do it myself than have an interpreter. The Nai Kongs acted as my interpreters but they only spoke Lao, they didn't speak English. They spoke a little bit of English. And when something came up, he would explain it to me in slow Lao and in this way, I was only there for about two months when this happened and my Lao wasn't that good --

Question: So the request was through the Nai Kong to you.

Answer: Yes.

Question: Did you feel the request was made to you or did you feel that it was made to the Nai Kong?

Answer: No - as far as myself, just being new there, I knew it wasn't to me. They knew who the primary school inspector was, and who this Nai Kong from Sam Thong, the base camp, was. When he comes into the village, people know what he's there for.

It's important here, I think, to state that before I went into this village, we knew what they wanted. We knew it was coming up and we knew what we could give them. So at this meeting, it was my job, as the American representative there, to know what was in back and not say something like, "we can give such and such," and then not give it to them. This is important because many people come in and say, "yes, oh sure, we can get you this, we can get you this" - we had it right in Sam Thong.

Question: Their request was originally for more than what you had in your stock?

Answer: No, they usually ask for more than they need. Before I went, I knew how much we had and I knew what we could supply them. We had

enough - we had plenty to supply them if they asked for twice as much as they needed. This is something that we have to control because so many times, not being used to working with roofing sheet materials, they don't know how much to ask for.

Question: How did they react to your suggestions that this might be too much?

Answer: They accepted it. They accepted it because they knew who I was, who I was representing and there was no problem. I usually said, if they were grumbling in disagreement: " Well, listen. Go ahead. We'll give you so many nails, so many roofing sheets. Go ahead and build the roof and if you need more, then I will get you some more. You tell me or you tell the village leader and he'll get in contact with me". "Telling me" meaning telling me, the Nai Kong I was with or the primary school inspector who was from Vientiane to represent the school supply part of it.

Question: So you go back to the camp, then. What happened next?

Answer: We make sort of an agreement-like, with the people we leave. They can't write; they've got their thumb prints down on a piece of paper to say that they agree on this and that we've had this meeting. Before we leave we set a date as to when they want this. It may be another two weeks before we can get the building up and get ready for the roofing sheets. In the meantime I would always try to stop by and see if they would need anything else or if anything else would come up. Many times I went alone to a village where I knew it was pretty safe. Most of the time if I didn't - most of the villages I went to, I had my Meo co-worker.

When the goods are ready to be delivered, we are notified and we come through with the delivery.

Question: Do they go ahead and build the school up to the point where they're ready to put the roof on and then they let you know when they are ready?

Answer: Yes.

Question: Do you ever have any problems in terms of their maintaining their end of the bargain, in terms of building the school to the point where the roof has to go on?

Answer: Not too many, really. They're pretty eager for this and they built some pretty good schools. Very nice. In fact, on one of the

sites they had walls, and they used a plane, an old pull type plane, on the wood, and they had wooden walls and they did a beautiful job.

Question: Who designed it?

Answer: They did themselves. These people are very good carpenters. In Samneua province and also in the Plain of Jars, Samneua being the northeasternmost province, they had their own sawmills.

Question: In this particular case, you didn't even have to turn the request down? You did it right on the spot. You didn't have to come back later and say, "well, we discussed it and we couldn't supply it." You said "yes" on the spot.

Answer: We knew. This is important. We knew what we could supply them before we went there. It is important that you just don't say, "we can do this" and then not give it to these people because they don't realize the problems involved of getting things through the government, through USAID, or through USIS or whatever - you know, the red tape and the things involved. The paper work that you have to go through, they don't see that part. They see the airplane come in, land, and that's it. They don't even know where it came from many times. They don't know how it flies or - they don't realize the problems involved. Many times we had some very unhappy people that didn't get rice drops for a month, and maybe twenty days out of the month it rained in their area and we could come in only with a little, small plane and land in the mud. We'd get out and explain to them, "I'm sorry, the big airplane can't get in to make the rice drops". We would bring in a little - two bags with us and this type of thing but they don't grasp. They're beginning to now after many years of waiting for the big bird to drop.

Question: I would like to discuss the statement that you are trying to make them self-sufficient. How do you go about it?

Answer: Mainly by stressing that this rice drop is only going until the next season of plant crops, until the rice can be harvested. Almost in all these villages, as soon as they resettle their houses, while some of them work on the school and dispensaries, most were out in the fields. Maybe it's a place where there was some rice before and they were working on it. They work on their own rice. The majority of the people just don't sit and wait for the rice drops, Say, you start out with a village of 500 people resettled, they go out and plant their rice and then another 500 come in and settle beside them and they start out and grow their rice. Well, you stop rice to the first 500 but then you're still dropping to these 500 and then another

500 come in and then it gets bigger and bigger and bigger. And then what happens is - has happened, I guess, in the last three or four months - this whole big village was taken over again, and these people had to be resettled again. So you see, you're stressing the point of them to be self-sufficient but it's pretty tough for them to be self-sufficient.

Question: Who stresses it - are you the teacher or do you go to someone?

Answer: Anything that I ever say goes through my co-worker.

Question: Well, how do you do this? What do you say to your co-worker?

Answer: Well, this is standard. When they get resettled, the co-worker, my Meo Nai Kong, is out with the people, talking with the people, telling them that this has to be done and we have to get out in the rice fields and start working the rice fields, you're in a protected area now, you don't have to worry about going to the rice field and being shot at while you're up beside the hill, or something like that. This slash and burn process is right up the side of the hill and they cut a big patch in the hill, clear it, burn it, let it sit and then clear it off and plant their rice right on the side of the hill. It's pretty open and anybody can be out taking a pot shot at them at any time of the day. So as soon as they realize it is safe, then they go out and start working on the rice fields.

Question: Are there many incidents where you actually cut down or cut off the rice supply because you felt they were self-sufficient?

Answer: Yes.

Question: What happened?

Answer: We did not do it until we were very, very sure. This one incident where we wanted people to move - we had resettled them before, a year or two ago, and we had moved the enemy back and resettled in another place that was much better for them to grow rice, a much better area; the water was there - the important thing is water in available rice fields. We resettled them up into a forward area. These people didn't want to move. They hadn't been there long enough to grow their own rice, they weren't self-sufficient yet and we asked them to walk - it happened to be from Site 33 up to Site 36 - which are two different villages. It's easier for us to go by numbers as by their names. They didn't want to go. We brought the leaders up and they looked for themselves to see that it was safe and that there

weren't any problems, and we asked the leaders to move - "we" being the Lao and the officials in Sam Thong.

Question: Who made this decision?

Answer: Lao, American and the Meo. General Vang Pao, mainly, wanted these people up here in the forward area.

Question: Did the General come down to you and say, "I want these people to move"?

Answer: Yes.

Question: How did he work this out?

Answer: He'd tell his Nai Kong. In this particular case, General Vang Pao came over and talked with Pop and talked with the Nai Kongs together in a meeting and said: "We want these people back up". You see, it's important to remember here that when you have people, you have military. It's just as easy as that. And many of the military have their families with them and if you've got soldiers fighting up here and their families back here, many times when things slow down, they walk back to their village and visit their families and in the meantime, they're needed up here, so we want them closer. And to do this, finally, we had to stop dropping rice to them, to get them to move.

Question: And what happened?

Answer: They were resettled in the forward village.

Question: You started the rice drops then? Again?

Answer: Well, it was already being dropped up here. As soon as they arrived, the quota was increased to take care of them.

Question: It seems you had quite an experiment in human relations going. Can you tell us more about that?

Answer: Yes, most of the resettled villages - when you go into them, if they are Meo and Lao and Thai Dung together, the air strip is, say, centralized, if possible. The Meo usually on the hill on the high side, the Lao would be on the low side of the particular area and maybe the Thai Dung would be in-between. They have their own separate little villages.

Question: Does anyone select these sites for them?

Answer: Someone, before it was Pop, one of the leaders from Sam Thong, the Nai Kongs would go down to the people and walk them into an area that had been selected before because of defensibility, water, and availability of rice fields. We would ask them to stop there and start resettling there, telling them this would be safe. It invariably happens that they just decide to settle that way - the Meo go here and they just don't live together. They live together in their separate little villages. No real problem in living like that. There's never any inter-marriage or anything like that, they don't go that far.

Question: There are two or three separate communities - does each have its own leaders?

Answer: Yes.

Question: How do these various leaders inter-act with each other?

Answer: They usually have meetings - yet there is no schedule, you know. If we would come and have a meeting in the village for a certain problem, like, say, a school or something like that, we would have the village leader from each village in this meeting - the Lao village head, the Meo village head or the Thai Dung head.

Question: Whose community would you meet in?

Answer: Usually we meet in the school.

Question: Where would the the school be?

Answer: In a central location. Because this is for all the kids - whether they be Meo or Lao or Thai Dung or any - they all went to the same school and we were trying to get them together on education, and the dispensary. One problem you run into, if the medics that we train in Sam Thong - we have a training school for nurses and medics - go out and they happen to be Meo, lots of times they will concentrate on the Meo population rather than the Lao population. It just happens that way and it's something that we're trying to stop, to control.

Question: What do you do?

Answer: Mainly just talking to the medics while they're at Sam Thong to give them this, we try to push propaganda into them as much as possible that this is Lao and these are all Lao people.

Question: Again, when you say "we", when you make this pitch, where does this come from?

Answer: Mostly it would be Americans that would be doing this.

Question: What's your follow-up on this?

Answer: When you go into the village, it's pretty easy to follow up on by looking at the medic's list of people that he's treated in that particular month and seeing if they're all Meo or if they're all Lao or if they have Meo names and Lao names.

Question: Who checks this?

Answer: We can see it. He writes it down and sends a report in to the hospital every month.

Question: Are you sure that the report is always on the level?

Answer: No.

Question: Whose responsibility is it to verify this?

Answer: The medic in the village - it's up to him to verify the report. If he doesn't, sooner or later, he's found out. I mean, the Lao people in the village, if they're not being treated, just don't sit there and let it ride.

Question: Can you recall an incident where someone complained?

Answer: Yes.

Question: What happened?

Answer: This happened to be the other way around. The Meo wouldn't go into the village because it was a Lao medic and they didn't trust the guy. He was supposedly selling medicines and this kind of thing. He had some deal to get it back into Thailand and selling it at one time. I didn't know about it - I got in kind of on the tail end of it. But he was removed finally.

Question: Who removed him?

Answer:From reaction from the village back to the hospital - the hospital officials, being Lao and Meo, decided to pull him back to Sam Thong for further training.

Question: What role did the Americans play in this?

Answer: In agreement.

Question: I understand but were they consulted?

Answer: Yes.

Question: How?

Answer: Well, we were told that when the complaint came down, they asked for one of our Nai Kongs to go up and have a talk to the medic. They also asked that he be removed.

Question: When the request came down, how was it delivered - in writing?

Answer: Yes. They write little slips of paper, they write a little note down.

Question: Who did it go to?

Answer: To the Nai Kong.

Question: And what did the Nai Kong do?

Answer: The Nai Kong showed it to us and explained to us what it was.

Question: In what context did he do that? Did he call a meeting?

Answer: We have a meeting almost every day after the planes have set down. It gets dark and we get together and talk it over about what happened during the day and if there is any problems.

Question: So then he submits it to the meeting and then what happens next? What would be your reaction, a typical reaction of the various people there?

Answer: Most of the time, the medics are known. I mean, this guy in this particular problem had done this before in another village and we had pegged out already that he was doing it again. And the Meo leaders and the Nai Kongs said that we should bring him back or get rid of him or something.

Question: Who would report this to General Vang Pao?

Answer: The Nai Kongs, all Nai Kongs would.

Question: In all this, what role does Pop Buell play?

Answer: He's kind of a god up there, actually. He's kind of really respected.

Question: A god to whom?

Answer: To the people there.

Question: Can you explain this at all?

Answer: Well, as I said before, he's a very rare American who is willing to give almost anything, and the people believe in him and look to him for help. It's pretty tough to sit and explain how bad it is there but if you can imagine for somebody since 1959 who really tried through every means possible to help people that really need help, the Meo people that have been pushed from China, the Viet Minh took care of them, they were pushed into Laos and now the Viet Minh are back after them again. The Lao soldiers that are up there are just beat. Amazing to see some of these little guys and all the equipment they have on them, and they just keep going, going, going. Their hair is long - it's part of their custom, of being hit by a bullet to let their hair grow long. And everyone of these people know who Pop is. They've heard of Pop. He's this important.

Question: So they try to come into his vicinity, into the settlements that he is responsible for?

Answer: Yes. He's quite a drawing - Pop. This is something that we have good results in as far as getting people from behind enemy lines to come across because they know now where they could get help. They will take the risk and come. We have people coming in constantly. But I guess they really took it pretty badly.

Question: What did people, the refugees themselves, think about their future and what concept do they have of their own life - let's say, is there any concept of time, in that sense, of the future?

Answer: Well, I think it's significant here to note that these people have not given up, mainly by just seeing what happens when they do get resettled. The first thing they worry about is their children, education. They will always want the school and the dispensary for help. They're eager to learn. They're eager for freedom. And I've never seen anybody with so much stamina. Some of these refugees have been moved six or seven times in the last five years.

Question: When you say "they're eager for freedom", how do the Meo feel about Lao domination because originally they had probably much

less to do with Lao officials than they do now.

Answer: I think they don't feel Lao domination at all and they respect the King. The King, incidentally, has come to Sam Thong, I think twice now in the last five years, and they respect him as their leader. I mean, they realize now that they're in the kingdom of Laos and they accepted the fact.

Comment by French: There is more concern, I think, on the part of the Lao towards the Meo than vice versa because the Lao are afraid the Meo will come off the mountains and come into the lowland. The Meo have the mountain tops and that's what they want. They're happy to live up there and so they don't feel the domination part of the problem.

Answer: They do respect the King as their leader. Mainly it's important here to know that General Vang Pao was actually appointed by the King. He is the first Meo general ever to be in office. And he's quite a man; he's quite a leader.

Question: How many of these hill tribes people trail off into the southern region, down into the towns?

Answer: Some do.

Question: They're free to do that?

Answer: Oh yes.

Question: Any time they want to?

Answer: Yes.

Question: In fact, is there any control on their movement for military security reasons?

Answer: Not really. These people can go down and live in the big cities any time they want to if they feel that they can survive but there're not too many of them that have just said, "well, I don't like this." They wouldn't know what to do if they went and lived in a big city. There is such a communication difference between hill tribes people in Laos and the Lao in Vientiane in Luang Prabang, and some of the people over there have never been to Vientiane. There's not a road down there.

Question: What is the literacy rate among the adults?

Answer: They all speak Meo, of course.

Question: There's no written Meo?

Answer: No, there's no written Meo. I would say that about 60 per cent of the Meo speak Lao and 40 per cent of that can read and write Lao.

Question: Do you have newspapers?

Answer: Yes, through USIS, there are newspapers up for everybody to read.

Question: What about radios?

Answer: Yes, they also have radios. This is another thing we got USIS to hand out portable radios to the village heads to see that everybody in the village had a radio.

Question: Every single family household?

Answer: No. Village leaders.

Question: Every single village leader has a radio. Do you have some kind of central system?

Answer: Yes. There is a Meo radio station set up by USIS. They listen to most of the programs in Thailand but also they listen to a lot of Radio Hanoi and Radio Peiking and Radio Kon Kai, which is the Pathet Lao radio station.

Question: How are working conditions up there and what are the kinds of stresses involved that an individual working up there comes under?

Answer: The refugee relief program goes on seven days a week and there are no hours. Your day starts early in the morning and it may be until 10 o'clock that night and after the meetings are over, you usually have food. Food is no problem at all because during the day, your counterparts' wives are bringing in food constantly. Food comes from may be two or three villages away. People come in for a visit and they just come in and they say "hello" or "how are you" or something like this or would go down to visit somebody in the village.

Question: Where do you live yourself as an American?

Answer: Pop, I guess, since I have left has a little room down by the hospital - I'm not sure.

Comment by French: The quonset hut. Does he not live in the quonset

hut?

Answer: He did at one time. We sort of leave our stuff some place. There was a boy that worked down at the air strip with us at Sam Thong. I slept at his house. Most of the time we worked during the day and then I go out in the evening and spend it at some village.

Question: Then your wife was not with you?

Answer: No. I wasn't married then.

Question: Could a wife live over there?

Answer: I don't know. I guess that's something you really have to talk over with Pop. It would have to be a pretty tough wife.

Comment by French: He's very sensitive about having a pronounced American community there. There is one house that was built for - he has an American secretary who maintains his office operations for him and they built the house for her but that's the only one.

Question: He doesn't want to have an American community?

Answer: No.

Question: In other words, he wants those who are there to be so totally integrated -- that explains what we were just talking about-- that there's a full integration?

Answer: Yes.

Comment by French: Who else sleeps and stays at the quonset there? Don't some of the people stay there?

Answer: The adopted boys. We all had kind of adopted kids that were orphans that we had picked up, and they go to school in Sam Thong and they live with us.

Question: Are the pilots Americans? Were they at the camp?

Answer: Yes.

Question: How do they relate to the local population?

Answer: This is a problem among many of the pilots. High salaries have brought them over there. Some of them over there, I think,

would try and understand the people but the majority of them just really don't care. They just fly the airplane and we can do nothing about it. We need them.

Comment by French: There is an interesting aspect of it that struck me while I was there and that's something I had never seen before and it certainly doesn't exist in Vietnam. The pilots who fly will go into this quonset hut, which is sort of the operations center, and they get their instructions from whoever happens to be there to give them instructions and quite often, this would be one of the locals - the Meo, the Nai Kongs, or one of the Lao, and these guys would go and they would accept from him the coordinates - where they were to go, what they were to load and take there, and everything. You see, this is one of the facets of the operation. There does not necessarily have to be an American present there in the Center to keep things going.

Answer: This is why an American just isn't running the show.

Question: Do you or Buell or anyone else have a conception of the structure or has the structure just emerged or was it there?

Answer: It was encouraged from Pop, just the way his own mind works, and h. realizes the situation, what is needed and it has emerged from this. I mean, there's no written down structure. Sometimes I worked for one of the Nai Kongs, or I worked for Pop, or I worked for one of the Lao government officials, or one of the Lao military officials, or maybe even they worked for me, do something for me. It's just kind of a big happy family and it's what Pop called it - it's a big family.

Comment by French: It's a very difficult thing to see from the outside. I'll give you another example. When I flew up, I went on a Carabao aircraft that had rice on it and when it was off-loaded there, it was stacked at the air strip for onward transport by other planes. The guy who came up with me from Vientiane, the representative of the mission, mentioned in passing - we arrived late in the afternoon - that "you have to have some guards on that stuff tonight", and I think it was Buell, or one of the other people who works for him, said, "don't worry about it, there will be", and sure enough by dusk there were about four or five army enlisted men sitting up on top of this rice with carbines. Now who ordered them to be there or how this came about, as an outsider I couldn't see. I mean, they just sort of emerged and were there and they stayed there through the night.

Question: What happened do you think?

Answer: At the air strip, these police guard the air strip - they don't guard it against people but they guard it as a safety factor.

They keep people from crossing the air field at any time of the day. They keep the cattle, the dogs, the pigs or anything that might run across - they keep them off. It's their job. They are assigned from the military. General Vang Pao has assigned so many people to guard the air strip, and they know that's their job. They work it out among themselves. They have been told that at six o'clock, when it gets dusk, you come down and you have certain people guard the air strip.

Question: They've been told by whom?

Answer: By their own people, by their military leaders.

Question: They have an officer there?

Answer: Yes. We have asked that things be guarded.

Question: So you contacted an officer?

Answer: Yes. A long time in the past.

Comment by French: Yes. That's the point. Nobody has to contact.

Question: You don't have to repeat an order? There has been an arrangement made that the military contingent there takes on this responsibility?

Answer: We kind of occasionally check to see if they're there. If they're not there, we can drive over and ask.

Question: Who do you go to?

Answer: To their headquarters, to the police headquarters. They have a little house that they all live with their families and everything, up above the air strip, and we drive up the hill and ask, "we've got a lot of stuff down there, can we get it guarded?" Not orderly - just "what's up - can we give you a ride down or are you late or what?"

Question: Quite apart from that, coming back to Jerry's earlier question on the physical stress and strain of working 7 days a week, long hours, are there problems that arise otherwise?

Answer: Yes. I had some problems with a co-worker, one of the Nai Kongs I had. Not explaining things to me and it was at a period of time when he was dog-tired and complaining, and not wanting to go out with me. Then we had a problem. He didn't want to go out himself.

Just a family problem, and we tried to talk to him indirectly. Pop would get up and give his "go-go" talk that he's very famous for - gets the people up, so to speak. They're tired. These people have been used for I don't know how many years - by "used", I mean they've worked there and had done just everything.

Question: What language did he talk?

Answer: In Lao. He just was tired. We didn't have any place to send him so he could take a vacation and we tried to talk him up again to get him going. We were frantic a couple of months and then we boost him up again. I think our main problems, the biggest problems we had were with the Air American pilots that were there - they're just not understanding. Some of them get very mad at the locals and push them around and this type of thing, and this just wrecks our image there and what we were trying to do. They don't distinguish between me and American pilots sometimes. It's even gone to the extent sometimes - when I was in a chopper, a helicopter, bringing in rice or something, I don't remember, that General Vang Pao was pushed out by one of the kickers and that was very embarrassing.

Comment by French: What happened?

Answer: You know, the kicker that sits underneath and sees that things get kicked out. We landed at the strip and General Vang Pao - I thought he was there - I was sitting in the cockpit, directing where we were supposed to go next, and he wanted to get in on the plane and we had a load at this particular strip, chopper pad. It could not lift us up and take anybody on. We just had enough weight. We do it - it just comes automatically. We put so many pounds on to go to different strips, different chopper pads, and he wanted to get on at one time and the kicker did not know who he was because he wasn't wearing anything - just regular clothes, they're a little bit nicer than the average guy's but the kicker didn't know who he was.

Question: The kicker being an American?

Answer: The kicker being an American. When the General got on, he just boomed, shoved him off and we took off. And I looked down underneath between the seats to see if the General was on and I just didn't know where he was and I asked the pilot where he was, and then he asked the kicker and he says, "General who? I didn't see any general down here." And we just took off and the next couple hours we came back again and I explained to the General what had happened and he just laughed. He said, "That's all right." But he was a new kicker, he didn't know who was who.

Question: What's a kicker?

Answer: The kicker is the crew chief in the cockpit of a helicopter.

Comment by French: He's the guy who kicks the stuff out.

Answer: Is he also bouncer?

Answer: Well, no - this is what happens. When you land on one of these pads, there may be some military or some refugees or whatever wanting to go to the next pad or wanting to go to the next village or something. They don't know where we were going and we tell them "no, you can't go" and lots of times they just hop on. And if we can take them, then we take them but if we can't, they have to get off. We were late and it was letting dark, this type of thing, and boom - off goes the General. I saw him, you know, he waved to me and said can he come on and I said, "sure, come on" and the pilot knew him and said, "sure, come on" and he gets in between - you know, he doesn't coordinate too well and --

Comment by French: Of course, Vang Pao, as you said, is a Meo and his relationship with the people is more than a general to the population. He's the head man of the Meo.

Answer: He gets right up on the front lines and he's not back at his desk directing and that type of thing.

Comment by French: But he has power not just in the military sense, but he is the chief Meo, is that not right?

Answer: He is becoming this as Mr. Touby who happens to be the king of the Meo right now. He's kind of being faded out by General Vang Pao. But General Vang Pao is actually what you said - military and political leader of his people.

Question: This particular camp and center that Buell is putting together is the only one of its kind or are there others?

Answer: No. It's the only one of its kind in Laos. It's hoped to be the new provincial capital.

Comment by French: They were at one time located at Xieng Khuoang on the Plain of Jars, but they lost that to the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese before the 1962 Geneva Accords and this has become a sort of Xieng Khuoang in exile.

Answer: Yes.

June 8, 1966

Subj: My Views on the LS-193 Situation

As you know, many problems are involved in getting rice out to the Military people and refugees who are dependent upon us for assistance. I have been involved, in a small way, in making out rice quota requirements evern since I began working in refugee relief work with Bill Taylor last year, and while I don't know everything that is taken into consideration the the monthly rice meetings, I feel that I have worked in the field long enough to make recommendations that are at least partially valid. No one has ever pointed out if or where I am at fault in the recommendations I have made, and yet several times what other people have said regarding the number of sacks to be dropped into an area where I was working at the time and where I knew the situation as well as and usually better than they held more weight than that I reported. This espcially got to me in the situation at Mok Play.

On my arrival at Site 193, I introduced myself and explained why I had come and what I expected to do while there. I asked the local Nai Kong, a Lao Thung, to ask all the Naibans and Tassengs to attend a meeting at the fort so we could discuss rice and commodity requirements there. The meeting was well attended. More than ten Naibans and the three Tassengs came up at 5:30, which seemed to be the most convenient time for all concerned; Captain Chua Pao and Pao Lee represented the military. While we were there to discuss al the problems of the area, my primary concern was to get firm numbers of people who were dependent on us in time for the monthly rice meeting at Sam Thong.

These Naibans and the Captain and I talked at great length and each one had an opportunity to tell me how many people they had and to what extent they were able to subsist on what they had. The following figures were arrived at and an explanition was made by me as to how much rice each person was to be alloted per day.

Captain Chua Pou and Pao Lee, the two military commanders at Mok Plai have a total of 957 soldiers under them for whom rice was to be dropped at Site 193. These soldiers have a total of 324 families comprised of 2,268 people to whom support had been given in the past and to whom support was expected for June. There are at present 7,646 refugees at Mok Play who are unable to provide for themselves. (these people have been run from Moung Sai to Lao Ta to Pha Thong to Xieng Ma Noi and Chuck Chong to Mok Plai, moving to a safe area as each place fell or was considered unsafe.) Moving about like this, they were lucky to be able to carry their children and a few items of clothing and household supplies; to be able to carry enough rice to support themselves is totally out of the question. For awhile they grubed for roots and thus provided a basic amount of bulk and caloric intake to keep them alive. However with that many people there the edible roots didn't last very long.

You and Blea Vu had been at Mok Play before I went there and I'm sure these figures approximate those gotten by you. Why was it, then, that when Mok Play was xxxx discussed during the meeting, the word of someone who had never been there held more weight than what I had reported? In order to support these people, a minimum of 3,481 sacks a month should be alloted for the place if you only give the soldiers 700 grams and the civilians 400 grams of rice a day. (A quantity which I personally feel to be below the minimum a person should have if you expect him to do any kind of work at all.) I understand the quota was set at 1298 sacks.

On two xxxx occasions while I was there we had insufficient rice even for them to save out enough for me to eat. After a meagre amount of rice one evening, we had to do without until the next evening because there was absolutely no rice at Mok Play. I went without breakfast and lunch as did the others there, and if a drop hadn't gotten in late in the afternoon, would have had to have gone without supper and the next breakfast and possibly more. The evening before we were run out, there was only enough rice for each person to have approximately three tablespoons of cooked rice for supper.

On June 4th the Viet Minh and Phatet Lao forces in the area struck us at 3:30 A.M. Caught by surprise, the soldiers fought thirty minutes before losing control of the hill top position and our 75mm canon. Once control of the canon was obtained, the communists leveled the gun at us on the lower hill and blasted away. Luckily the gun was improperly aimed and the missile went over our heads and exploded further down the hillside. Pao Lee, at this time, ordered the Sam Thong Nai Kong and I to leave and gave us an escort of about 60 soldiers in case we ran into an ambush. We began walking about 4:00 and kept a steady walking pace until shortly after 7:00 at which time we considered ourselves out of immediate danger. A steady stream of refugees xx was a short distance behind us, by the way.

Feeling ourselves secure, we argued with the soldiers to go back to help Pao Lee try to stave off the enemy attack. This took quite a bit of doing on the part of Nai Kong Suka and myself. The soldiers at first flatly refused. Not once did anyone say he was afraid either for himself or his family; they knew the communist force was small and ill equipped to fight all our men at Mok Play. Their xxxxxxx argument was that they were hungry and there was no prospect of obtaining rice at Mok Play seeing as how we had run out the evening before. The only argument we had to offer was the possible assistance they could offer Pao Lee at the fort.

How, I repeat, How can anyone in his right mind expect anyone, especially fighting men, to have sufficient morale to create a desire in him to return to a battl area if no provision is made for food. If the local leaders can't determine how much rice to give their people, it looks as if their American advisors and counterparts would have enough knowledge to do so.

To me, it seems very important even mandatory that we allow enough rice into an area so that the military have a two days supply at all times, especially if this area is on the front lines and subject to possible attack. Now that we have been temporarily pushed out of Mok Play it is too late to cry over what was allowed to happen there. However, this should be a lesson to remember in regard to tox other similar areas and steps can be profitably taken to correct this fault there now. If some thinking about the problem isn't done in the future with this lesson firmly in mind, then more areas will be lost unnecessarily and the effectiveness of our whole military and refugee assistance program will be seriously impaired.

June 11, 1966

Refugees

During the past month, and especially in the last two weeks, my men at Sam Thong and the leaders working out of Sam Thong has been getting much pressure about people who want to come to our side. General Vang Pao is also getting the same pressure from the commanders in the front line areas as what to do with the thousands of people who keep asking "If we come over on your side, will you support us?" We feel that majority-wise and security-wise these people would not only be able to help us but would take much help and support away from the enemy.

The areas that we are taling about are north of Muong Son (L59), Nong Khant (L52), east of Sam Neua City, east of Ban Ban, and in the Keo Bone-Som Song Hong (LS201) and Nong Het area. There are also many remaining in and around the Ban Ban area who continue to keep coming in whether asked or not but there are many who are still waiting to come if they knew they would be supported. The number of these people could reach as much as 50,000 or more.

These people want to come for many reasons: (1) The recent successes that General Vang Pao and his people have had which for the first time makes a great breakthrough possible for these people. (2) After all these years under the Communist they are fed up. (3) Many of these people are relatives of people who have come before who have done and are going the larger amount of fighting that has been done in this country.

I feel in no way can I or Social Welfare make a decision on what to do about this problem. I do wish whoever the people are who make this type of decision would let us know as soon as possible what to do so that General Vang Pao and our people here who work in those areas can tell the commanders that they can come and will be supported or that we are sorry but at this time we cannot see how it can be done.

July 7, 1966

Maha Kou Souvannamethi is vice presedent of the Neutralist Peace Party, the party formerly headed by Quinim Pholsena who was assassinated in Vientiane on 1 April 1963. The deuanist Neutralist government includes the following officials:

a. Khamsouk Keola Minister of Health
b. Ounheuane Phoumsavath Minister of Public Relations
c. Som Phommachanh Minister of Interior
d. Sisavath Sisane Minister of Finance
e. Nouphanh Sithphrasay Minister of Education
f. Himmakone Manotham Minister of Public Works
g. Maj. Khamliang Pholsena Minister of Public Health
h. Simone Minister of Foreign Affairs.
i. Ounneua Phimmasone Minister of Justice and...
j. Salath Keoissane Minister of Posts and Telegraph.

The makeup of the general staff of the deuanist neutralist armed forces is as follows:

a. Col. Deuane Supreme Commander
b. Col. Than Deputy Commander for Logistics
c. Lt. Col. Kong Sy Deputy Commander for Psy warfare.
d. Lt. Col. Cheng Deputy Commander for training
e. Lt. Col. Pradith Thiengtham Deputy Commander for Intell (G-2)
f. Maj. Thiam Chief of Staff
g. Second Lt. Khamphao Chief of (G-1)
h. Lt. Chanhom Chief of (G-3)
i. Maj. Uthen Chief of (G-4) and.....
J. Capt. Bountheing Thepvongsa Chief of (G-5).

ORA:ps:6-16-71

July 7, 1966

In Xieng Khouang Province their are two sets of officials. One deuanist and the other NLHS working together in civil administration. There is a deuanist governor as well as NLHS governor of the province. Each district has both a deuanist chief and a NLHS chief, as do the cantons and villages, in Sam Neua, Houa Phan Province, there are only NLHS officials.

The people must give 15 percent of their rice crop to the government for use by the troops, the Lao troops have grown rice since 1965 using fields abandoned by people who have fled to RLG territory or fields confiscated from those owning a great deal of land.

The enemy sells goods to individuals and merchants, the money obtained in this way to used to pay the troops who receive subsistence allowance as well as what is termed additional money. The word salary is not allowed by the PL for subsistance, privates through master sergeants receive 25 kip a day, second Lieutenants through Captains receive 30 kip a day and Majors and Colonels recieve 40 a day. As additional money they are supposed to receive 400 kip a day, 600 kip a day, and 900 kip a day, respectively the officers probably receive more than the stipulated amount. Each soldiers is usually given two uniforms a year but some years he gets only one. Goods sold by the enemy to the people include cloth, clothing, household utensils such as pots, plates, bowls, basins and kettles cigarettes, salt and soap. There is no rice on sale, sugar is scarce and there is no coffee. Sugar sells for 300 kip a kilogram, a pair of trousers costs between 1200 and 1400 kip a coat costs between 800 and 1000 kip.

The people in the area do not differentiate between the deuanist and the NLHS. They dislike the administration for compelling them to carry supplies, for conscripting rice and for attempting to abolish well, established customs such as giving rice to monks the administration feels the monks do nothing that is useful.

ORA:ps:6-16-71

7-15-66

Jay,

RE: REFUGEES Moung You

TALKED WITH TERRY AT LS108.
IN AGREEMENT THAT RICE should
BE dropped AT M. You 3 drops per
AMONTH. TERRY has ONE LOCAL ASST.
to check on drops & distribution
RESIDENT M. You. WE have OTHER contacts
to check on distribution will advise.

RICE FOR DISTRIBUTION AT M. SOUIE
SHOULD Be checked CAREFULLY. MAJORITY
OF REFUGEES should Be self SUFFICIENT
By now.

Jack

ADD: 7-15-66

LAO OFFICIALS CAME BACK FROM MEETING IN L.P.: AT THE MINISTRY LEVEL A REQUEST WILL BE MADE FOR EITHER THE EVACUATION OF NEUTRALIST SOLDIERS AT M. YOU OR EVACUATION OF REFUGEE 2' OR OLD RESIDENTS. WILL PROBABLY BE THE LATTER - AND PEOPLE WILL PROBABLY SETTLE NEAR VICINITY LS 50. THIS WAS ALL BROUGHT UP BY THE LAO CHAO MOUNGS (including CHAO MOUNG OF M. YOU). NO AMERICAN INFLUENCE INVOLVED.

ANY REQUEST BY NEUTRALIST FORCES FOR EVACUATION OF CIVILIANS FROM M. YOU OR UNUSUAL REQUESTS FOR CHOPPERS FOR THAT AREA SHOULD BE BROUGHT TO MY IMMEDIATE ATTENTION

THANKS

Jack.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Muong Soui file

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : E. G. Rueff
Refugee Relief and Resettlement

DATE: 16 July 1966

FROM : Terry Collins
RD/Muong Soui

SUBJECT: Muong Yeu Refugees

1. Population Figures

Home village	No. Fams.	No. Persons Over Age 15	Under 15	Total Pop.
Na Ngoi	28	116	18	134
Ban Phang	13	47	13	60
Ban Leum	13	124	62	186
Na Mat	32	196	149	345
Buak Kham	28	86	60	146
La Sa	6	33	6	39
Na Man	8	33	3	36
Via Sang	8	26	9	35
Houei Tahle	11	54	2	56
Houei Gok	5	18	0	18
Sem Luang	10	48	13	61
Ban Muong Yeu	79	319	60	379
12 villages	241	1100	395	1495

These figures correspond to those of the military in the area and their accuracy remains to be checked by an actual head count.

2. Medical

5 July - was informed that 22 refugees from Muong Yeu had been admitted to military hospital in Muong Soui and that three of these had died already.

6July - Visited Muong Yeu and then asked for Public Health doctor to visit the area. Thirteen villagers from Ban Muong Yeu had died in the last three months and 84 of the new refugees in the same period. Of the latter group, eleven were over 50 years old, while the remainder were under fifteen.

7 July - Dr. Weldon visited and looked at about forty patients.

8 July - Dr. Weldon and Dr. Becker brought a large quantity of medical supplies and stayed overnight for the distribution.

13July - one death

14 July - two deaths

3. Commodities distribution

a. Rice - 8 July 3560 kg. Total distributed: 6780 kg.
12 1440
13 1180
15 600

b. Other commodities

13 Jan - Butter oil (96 cans), dried milk (96 boxes), salt (200 kg), small cooking pots (86), hoes (86), blankets (86), small wash basins (86), candles (98 pkgs), soap(9 cases).

6 July - Butter oil (120 cans), salt (400 kg), soap (5 cases).

13 July - Axes (2 boxes), shovels (80), candles (2 boxes), lettuce and chinese cabbage seed.

4. Method of Distribution

a. Previously, I am told, commodities were given to the military commander of the area, who distributed them.

b. With the agreement of the Chao Muong and the military commander, I have established an assistant at Muong You, on a permanent basis, who will handle all distribution.

c. A problem has arisen as to the location of the warehouse: the refugees want it in their village; the soldiers want it near them for "security" purposes. This will be straightened out next week.

5. Political situation

a. The Chao Muong says that the refugees (other than Ban Muong You) had been under enemy administration for four years and were driven from their homes during the recent Muong Hiem operation. He emphasizes that they did not leave voluntarily and would go back were it not for the Neut. soldiers keeping them where they are. He stated also, that their is bad blood between the soldiers and this latest group because they had fought each other; villagers used to shoot at these soldiers and whenever the soldiers engaged the enemy, it was always villagers they captured.

b. The military commander, Major Bcua Sy, says that probably 80% of the refugees are friendly. He says, though, that even with the present problems, he wants to continue helping these people; their attitude, he continued, is to be expected from "ban maukers" who have been under the other side for four years. Once they see that we are really trying to help them, which he thinks will take about six months, they will be 100% with us and will realize that were fed only lies by the enemy.

6. Resettlement

If Col. Sing will send a company, presently undergoing training ~~there~~, to Muong You upon their return, an effort will be made to retake the refugees' home villages. If this does not come about, they will be resettled at Jome Thua on Route 7 near Phou Vieng.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : E.G. Rueff
Refugee Relief and Resettlement

DATE: 26 July 1966

FROM : Terry Collins TC
RDD/Muong Soui

SUBJECT: Refugees, Vang Muang

Within the next couple of weeks, after I have visited these people, you will probably receive a request for assistance, primarily in the form of rice and salt. I received a note from the Chao Muongputting their numbers at 103 (55 adult, 48 children) and a delegation from the village.

They are Thai Dam (Tha Vieng-type Thai Dam, not the Dien Bien Phu variety) from Ban Ban (the one northeast of Xieng Khouang city), who say they were brought out by the Meo on a route north of the PDJ and ended up at Pak Vang (TG 91.94). I do not know the total numbers that came out, only that the 103 with friends and relatives here were allowed to come to Muong Soui by the Meo and the others were sent to 20 and 20A. They spent fifteen days in Muong Soui (until the shelling started and while Paul was still here) and then proceeded to Vang Muang. They have been living off the villagers there so far, but it appears that the villagers themselves are almost out of rice; these refugees have enough land for planting next year, but arrived too late to do much this season.

This note is to give you some background on these people and will be followed by an official request after I have been to their village, which is a day's walk south of route 7 at Phou Vieng and in tasseng Xieng Deth.

Sam Neua Province — Monthly Report - July 1966

During the month of JUly this officer visited the following locations:

Phou Vai, Pha Phoun, Site 36, Site 89, Site 48A, Site 111, Site 87, Site 179, Site 76, Site 185, Site 59, Site 196, Site 178, Houie Moun, Phou Den Din, Houie Nha, Site 198, Site 85 and Site 107. The primary purpose of these visits was to obtain an accurate count of refugees, soldiers, and military dependents in each area. Follow up visits were made to several of these locations where support was needed with regard to schools, dispensaries, and commodity distribution.

1. Rice Problem:

During July new DZ's were opened at Houie Moun and Phou Vai. In addition, the DZa at Houie Nha, Phou Den Din, Site 179, and Site 107 were reopened and now have monthly quotas.

Rice problems that still persist in Sam Neua Province can be atrributed to one or more of the following three causes.

a. The tendency for area commanders who have a rice supply on hand to ~~ex~~ send rice into neighboring areas experiencing a temporary rice shortage and who, in turn find themselves short at the end of the month.

b. The tendency for refugees to walk from their own area to an area which has just received a drop to ask for rice.

c. The failure of the FAR to provide sufficient rice for their troops.

The first two cases present only small problems. The third is the major problem we face at Site 36. During July we kept a record of rice consumption at Site 36. Las month the FAR troops consumed more refugee rice than the refugees. After discussing the problem with both FAR and refugee leaders it was agreed that no distinction should be made between FAR rice and refugee rice once it reaches NaKhang and there it should be stored collectively. A shortage among FAR troops while the refugees, SGUs and ALCs had a surplus would cause serious ill-feeling between the two groups. However, increased effort must be made to get sufficient FAR rice into Site 36 to meet their need. It is ~~sxxx~~x suggested that FAR rice for Sam Neua be put on a quota rather than a request basis, since the FAR commander at Site 36 tends to neglect to ask for rice as long as refugee rice is available.

2. Refugee Movement:

In general there has been little refugee movement in Sam Neua this past month. Exceptions include the following:

a. 756 Black Teeth Lao from the Tham La areas south of Site 36 were moved into Site 36. This was done for security reasons as there was previously considerable enemy infiltration into the Tham La area. Since the sentiments of many of these people are questionable, they are now under close surveillance and are restricted to the area. Twenty men have been recruited into SGU companies.

b. 450 Meo have returned to Houie Moun from Site 76 and 500 more are expected to move this month.

c. Several hundred more Lao Teung have come into Site 196 from PL territory. A full company has been recruited and the Site 196 commander has an impressive training program in progress. The refugee count at Site 196 has now reached 1300.

d. Small groups of Meo have been periodically making their way into Site 179, the total number now about 300.

Attempts are being made to liberate approximately 900 Lao from the enmy held Muang Larb area and also more than 2,000 Lao, Meo and Thaidom from Joung Pern. Friendly ~~xxxxxx~~ troops have been in contact with these people and will lead them out as soon as it is feasible to do so.

3. Schools:

With the opening of the school year next month a total of 14 primary schools will be operating in Sam Neua Province. New schools are being built at Site 198, Site 196 and Site 178.

4. Medical Support:

During July Sam Thong medical teams were sent into Houei Moun, Site 198, Houie Nha, and Phou Den Din to combat the high incidences of malaria, dysentary, and typhoid in these areas, which as of yet have no local medical facilities.

Five girls were brought into Sam Thong from Sam Neua Province to study nursing. Several more are ready to come if needed.

The FAR medics at Site 36, whose presence was more detrimental than of value to the capability of the NaKhang hospital to save lives, have been successfully transferred to Site 48A and a Sam Thong medic is now in charge of the NaKhang hospital.

5. Military Activity:

During this past month enemy activity was lulled by the heavy rains which restrict their ability to mount and supply large operations. On the other hand, the friendly forces did make some gains. Significant changes that occurred in July are as follows:

a. Meo forces attacked and recaptured Houie Sa An, Site 127, and have secured the area.

b/ FAR forces are sweeping north of Site 36 in an attempt to eliminate pockets of PL in the Pha Deng and Pha Nang areas.

c. Highly successful guerilla activity has been carried out by Lt. Baccri and his Meo soldiers of Zone 14. Working of HOuie Nha they have captured Phou Pha Mu and Pha Mang and have inflicted considerable damage to the enemy's strength in areas east of Houie Wha.

August 11, 1966

Report on Activities in the Past Month

The military side in Xieng Khouang and Sam Neua has been quiter than usual although we have many ambushes daily which seemingly is the method that the enemy is using at present. Our forces keep moving ahead slowly but surely. We have information that in may places the enemy is building up for some kind of a drive in dry season.

We have had no large refugee movements. Approximately 800 new people have come into the Site 88 area, approximately 500 into the Site 2 area. 200 into Site 46 area, 400 into the Site 111 area, 400-500 into the L59 and 36 areas, 200-300 in the Site 192 area. If you look on the map, tbis will tell you that these people have come out mostly because of fear of bombings or that the bombings have given them a chance to get out. This is also due to the fact that General Vang Pao's troops have moved forward and have done a tremendous job.

During the past 2 months we have probably had the most serious medical problem that we have had in years. Hundred of people have died, and as you know, many Americans have become ill. This has been diagnosed as either malaria or typhoid. Also in Sam Neua and our borderline areas in Xieng Khouang we continue to notice much malnutrition.

I don't think at present that we should get any feeling that the enemy has slowed up because of the past couple months, but I feel that right now we should be getting ready for any push that they might be making when dry season comes.

I have cut 2 helios from working on Sundays, not only thinking of the cost of the helios but also thinking of my personnel, Americans and natives as well, who I personally feel are being overworked, possibly the cause of many of them getting sick. This in turn will give part of them a free day. If this works and we don't have big problems I am going to try and do the same thing on Saturdays. However, if I do this, I want it understood in Vientiane that I must have a back-up place both days on the ground in Vientiane for any emergencies, especially if something would go wrong with the plane I am using. I also want it understood that if big trouble arises that I would have to go back immediately to my three planes a day, seven days a week. I have discussed this in part with Mr. Sparks and Mr. Cody.

September 25, 1966

Report on Activities

Due to the confusion there and here in the past two months, I have failed to write you any type of report.

~~As~~ At this time we continue to not have any large refugee movements. They do continue to dribble in in practically every area in Sam Neua and East Xieng Khouang. In Sam Neua they are coming out of the Sam Neua city area. Most have been under communist control for as long as 5-7 years. In East Xieng Khouang they are practically all coming out of North Vietnam. In the past month I would say that refugees would amount to 1000+. These people are 90% Lao or Thaidom.

It is beginning to look like we are going to have the same problems that we had a year ago, if not worse. We are still advancing in the Sam Neua area, but have good information that the enemy has built up much bigger than a year ago. In the past two weeks we have been hit 4 places within 20 miles of Sam Thong, and three places within 40 miles.

Don Sjostrom has brought out some very valuable information as to how the communists are working with refugees. I will have him write his own report on this and give it to you.

Due to the flood in Vientiane which immediately caused a rice shortage, I feel we have done an unbelievable job getting rice drops. At one time we were down to 40% of our quota of which we put nearly 100% of the rice to the front line soldiers and refugees in these areas. Due to this any supply of rice that the Meo themselves had on hand was bought and distributed to other people which has cut their supply to nearly zero. We are now operating with between 60-70% of our quota. Most refugees are living on 300 kilograms per day. I feel due the the fact that these people have ben living under these conditions for over a month that as soon as we can we should get back up to at least 500 grams per person or we will again run into a malnutrition problem. I feel Blaine Jensen should be highly commended for the work he has done and is still doing in Udorn, practically running the operation for all organizations.

According to the information that we have, I feel we should be ready to receive between 25,000 and 30,000 refugees in the next 3 months. They will either be coming from the other side or again driven from their homes. I hope my figure is very high.

We all up here appreciate the good support we received rom Vientiane during the flood crises.

~~Wex~~ It is not too long until I go on home leave, and I hope you agree with Mr. Ruoff, Mr. Gullion and myself that Jack Williamson will be made Acting Area Coordinator in my absence.

Your condolence letter to the family of Nea Ying who will be buried tomorrow had a very good effect.

September 26, 1966

Communist Refugee Relief and Primary School Program in Sam Neua Province

This past month we have received intelligence from several sources that the communists are carrying on an active and organized relief program in the enemy-held portions of Sam Neua Province. Their program has been concentrating mainly on commodity distirbution and support of primary schools.

1. Commodities: During the months of July and August a large percent of the people under communist control received the following commodities:

   a. Rice, 100 kilograms per family. This rice went only to families who came under the communists as a result of the enemy's dry season push last year.
   b. Black cloth, 1/2 yard per person.
   c. Cooking utensilskx; bowls, spoons, pots, etc.
   d. Field knives.
   e. Plows, distributed to some Lao in low, rice areas.

   These supplies were brought into and out of Sam Neua by truck on Route 6 and most had Chinese markings. At present the enemy refugee supply storage base is located at UN 7535.

2. Schools: It has long been known that the enemy places particular emphasis on building and maintaining primary schools. On September 6 at Phia Kham, Site 87, I met with a Mr. Thao Nit who had 6 days before escaped from Sam Neua city with his wife and baby. Of the group of 13 who attempted the escape, 8 successfully made it to Phia Kham. Mr. Thao Nit had since 1962 been the Director of School in Central and Southern Sam Neua Province. His duty was to travel to various parts of Sam Neua setting up primary schools. His superiors who accompanied him on all field visits were two ranking VN officers. Thao NIt supervised 19 primary schools, totalling over 1300 students and one secondary school of 200 students which, curiously enough, is being held in Father Bouchers's old house in Sam Neua city. These figures do not include Northern Sam Neau (Yieng Kho, Muong Het, etc.) which were out of Thao Nit's area. Although all of the teachers are Lao, both the subject matter and teaching schedules are set up by the North Vietnamese advisors. Thao Nit said that at least 50% of class time was devoted to anti-government and anti-American propaganda. Exceptional students are sent for advanced study to ~~Hanoi~~kx Hanoi, many of whom return as medics, nurses, or teachers themselves. North Vietnamese officers are used as teachers in military cadet schools.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : E.G. Ruoff
SW/Vte.

DATE 29 Sept 66

FROM : T. Collins
FAT/M. Soui

SUBJECT: Resettlement of Muong You (TG 73.93) Refugees, Difficulties

A. Nature of the problem

1. Where to resettle the refugees
   a. There is not enough cultivable land to support the 241 families if they remain in the Muong You area.
   b. Jome Thoua
      1) This is the site, west of Muong Soui on Route 7, originally proposed by the Chao Muong.
      2) The soldiers stationed at Muong You would like to have the families resettled at this location.
   c. Pak Vang (TG 89.93)
      1) The tasseng here says there is enough land in the area to support over 200 families for 8-10 years.
      2) The soldiers stationed here and the local population would like to have the Muong You people resettle at Pak Vang.
      3) The only objectors to date have been the soldiers at Muong You, who say this location is too close to the enemy.
2. Jurisdictional problems
   a. The Muong You soldiers say it is the responsibility of the Chao Muong to decide where to resettle these people, though they would strenuously object to any decision not in accord with their wishes.
   b. Before assuming refugee status, these families were under the jurisdiction of the Chao Muong of Muong Hiem (a neutralist). This man has, within the past month, made efforts to look after the welfare of these people, but the soldiers (neuts.) do not recognize his authority, saying the Chao Muong of Muong Hiem is at Site 33 (This individual, if he exists, is a rightist). The soldiers will, however, recognize the authority of the Chao Muong at Muong Soui (a neutralist), but this man contends that Muong You is not within his jurisdiction. So, an impasse has resulted.
3. Crux of the matter
   a. These families had lived under the Pathet Lao for four years and were forced to evacuate to Muong You by a neutralist commando group (those presently stationed at Muong You) about six months ago without any of their personal possessions.
   b. The refugees say they will resettle anywhere, provided they have the opportunity to return to their homes for their personal possessions (gold, buffaloes, money, etc.).

B. Possible solutions

1. Col Sing talks about retaking their home area (Nam Mat, Na Ngoi), but says he has not enough troops available for such an operation.
2. Col. Boua Sy (head of the 2nd B.C.S., a unit of which is stationed at Muong You) talks of mounting a small commando operation to go back to the Nam Mat-Na Ngoi area long enough for the refugee family heads, who would accompany the operation, to gather their belongings. He says he does not have at the present, though, an assured food or ammunition supply to undertake such a project.
3. The refugees could be told they would be moved to Jome Thoua, without going back for their belongings, and whoever did not like the idea could go back with the Pathet Lao. This thought has gone through Col. Boua Sy's mind.
4. They could be allowed to move to Pak Vang.

C. A Recommendation

1. It appears imperative to get these families out of Muong You as soon as possible because their relations with the soldiers are not good, and I have received reliable reports that soldiers are stealing rice from the refugees and forcing them to do things at the point of a gun.
2. Pak Vang would appear to be the best place to resettle these families for the present
   a. Land is plentiful and the area is close to their former homes so that the people could return if there developed an improved security situation.
   b. The lieutenant commanding one of the two companies at Muong You said that if these people were sent to Jome Thoua, USAID would have to provide helicopter transportation. If they had to walk, he said further, soldiers would have to accompany the exodus to prevent anyone from returning to the Pathet Lao. This lieutenant, who has been a prime cause of our headaches, also flatly stated that if these people were resettled at Jome Thoua and had to walk there, it would have to be at the point of a gun.
   c. Three months ago, Col. Boua Sy told me that about 20 % of the refugees still sympathized with the Pathet Lao, but after living with his people for about six months no sympathizers would remain because they would have realized that life was better on our side of the line. That six months is just about up now and, recently, when I reminded the Col. of his words, saying it should not now be [redacted] necessary to move these people at the point of a gun, he agreed. He also agreed that it would be better to allow someone to return to the Pathet Lao than to stay on our side as a virtual prisoner, and to be resettled under the aforementioned conditions.
   d. USAID should get involved in this as little as possible, letting Lao officials make the final decision as to resettlement and not allowing a helicopter to be used to transport anyone against his will. Americans will lose less friends by not interfering and the neuts. will win or lose a sizable number

of "minds and hearts" by the way they handle this matter.

3. A decision, nevertheless, must be made soon, so that people can start cutting fields for next year's planting season. If one has not been made by December 1 as to where to resettle these families, I would recommend cutting off all refugee assistance, barring unforeseen circumstances.

Late September 1966

NLHS authorities arrested Somphanit, the Chao Muong of Muong Kham and took him to Khang Khay. Also arrested Khamkeo, the NLHS rep. for the same area. Khamkeo's replacement was Chanthavong, who was from the Nong Het area, and Somphanits' replacement was Oudom, a Lao and native of the Nong Het area.

ORA:ps:6-16-71

February - August 1966

In February 1966 Neo Lao Hak Sat officials in Xieng Khouang Province notified a minor official that he might join the NLHS. He agreed and began a six-months probationary period. During the period his colleagues observed his performance closely and reported their findings to the secretary of the Neo Lao Hak Sat. Authorities gave to probationer guide lines to follow and pamphlets on the revolution to read. In late august the minor official recerved a summons to report to the office of the governor of Xieng Khouang, who was also the provincial Rep. for the NLHS. The ceremony of admittance was brief and only two Neo Lao Hak Sat officials were present.

The new NLHS member was obliged to observe the following guide lines during the probationary period:

(1) Work well and have a sense of responsibility when doing assigned jobs.

(2) Have t he proper attitude towards the enemy and towards the revolution.

(3) Follow and believe in the party's leadership.

(4) Carry out party policy diligently

(5) Carry out party instructions diligently.

(6) Preach that the party is the leader of the revolution and that without the party there can be no revolution.

The probationer was informed that the secretary general of the party must interview him, a document that the probationer was required to read specified that members must be poor to carry on the revolution successfully and those selected for membership met conditions drafted by the party. Capitalists were not acceptable because they would not assume whole headtly the burdens of the revolution. Capitalists would not lower themselves to labor. Only those with proper attitudes would be selected for membership. The party leads the people throughout the country to made revolution in order to make Laos a socialist country. The members of the party will not sell themselves to the enemy.

NLHS officials gave the official pamphlets with the following titles to read during his prolationary period: The revolution; the care of the revolution; how to make people join the party; how to fight against the enemy; how to ecadicate people who possess a lot of land; how to form a party; Laos, the wealthy country; how to persuade members to do their duty; how to eliminate agents and the foundation of the revolution.

In late August 1966 NLHS officials summoned the official to the NLHS office at Ban Na Thong (UG-5174), 4 Km. NE of Ban Ban, to be admitted officially to the party Gov. Da, who was the provincial Rep. for the NLHS as well as the governor, and Maj. Nhia Vu, the NLHS secretary for Xieng Khouang were the only two persons present.

ORA:ps:6-16-71

To: L. Haffner, ADRD
From: T. Collins, FAT/M. Soui
Re: Monthly Report, September, 1966

AGRICULTURE

1. Vegetable seed distribution
   a. chinese cabbage, lettuce, cucumber, pole beans, onions, peas given to 2nd B.I., 85th B.P., 8th B.I., and Ban Na Luang.
   b. Persistent requests are continually received from the military.
   c. The present seed distribution program should be completed early in November.
2. Veterinary
   a. RLG vets from Sam Thong vaccinated 60 buffalo at Ban Soui and 32 at Xieng Nga in response to an outbreak of disease.
   b. Villagers at Xieng Nga did not bring all their buffalo in to be vaccinated, fearing the soldiers would make a head count and appropriate accordingly.
3. Rat and Insect control
   a. Large areas are reporting a loss of 2/3 of this year's rice crop due to rats and worms.
   b. Vegetable gardens were sprayed at Vang Kham and Muong You.
   c. Paddy fields were sprayed at Ban Soui and Vang Kham; hill rice was sprayed at Pak Vang and Vang Muang.

REFUGEES

1. Muong You
   a. Soldiers take rice from the refugees
   b. The company commander won't let the medic treat villagers in their homes, instead insisting on sick people climbing the hill for treatment at the soldiers encampment; 18 deaths this month.
   c. Ban Muong You considers itself one step above the others and tries to exert a proportionate amount of control of refugee activities
   d. Everyone in Muong Soui is passing the buck on what to do with these people.
   e. This place is a big headache.
2. Pak Vang
   a. The tasseng voluntarily asked to have rice drops stopped in December, because the village rice crop will have been harvested.
   b. A self-help local materials school was put up; people have started digging a well.
3. Phou Vieng, Vang Muang, Ban Khoun, Xieng Nga
   a. Rice distributed
   b. Medical assistance rendered
   c. Fields sprayed

EDUCATION

1. Schools put up at Pak Vang and Muong You; self-help, all local materials used.
2. Transportation was provided for teachers to the far-flung reaches of this muong.
3. Main school in Muong Soui opened ten days late because the soldiers had appropriated all the school furniture; most students are soldiers' children.

CONSTRUCTION

1. The market is coming along fine; five villagers work on the project daily together with five soldiers from the engineer batallion, who are receiving training in carpentry and masonry from the PW technician.
2. Work has started on a well at Pak Vang.

Information

1. Usual distributions of USIS materials to soldiers and villagers everywhere.
2. Movies shown eleven times to approximately 2375 (including 1113 military) in five villages (Ban Nong, Ban Soui, Phou Vieng, Pak Vang, Ban Khai) and at four military installations (Pang Pang, Service Company, Engineers, 8th B.I.).
3. Soldiers are always bothering us for movies then howl when we don't come up with war films or lots of girls.

OBSERVATIONS (after three months in Muong Soui)

1. In the Muong Soui area, due to the large numbers of soldiers and the shortage of food and phusaos, existence is of the dog-eat-dog variety. Petty thievery is rampant, cooperation is non-existent for the most part and everybody wants a handout, items personally worth noting because they were not part of the daily scene when I was in Xieng Lom.
2. Self-help projects will be most successful in areas away from Muong Soui, e.g. Pak Vang, Phou Vieng, Tasseng Xieng Dat; transportation problems, however, must always be considered.
3. The average soldier here, while more intelligent than the average Lao can be less disciplined, more obnoxious and a better expert at harassing those trying to help him.
4. To me, the presence of Col. Sing is what makes Muong Soui tolerable; should he be removed from the scene this place would probably go up for grabs.
5. Transportation problems are ever-present.

October 6, 1966

Monthly Report for August-September 1966

The months of August and September brought the end of the rainy season, the opening of the school year, and the first indications of what promises to be a heavy, enemy dry season offensive in Sam Neua Province. During September, the friendlies own offen sive was highly successful in terms of area gained.

A. Refugee Movements:

1. August - The only major movement was that between Pha Bong (Site 76) and Houie Moun (UH 5845). On August 14 the Houie Moun ADC ✱ (32 men) attacked and secured Ban Pha Kha (UH 5840) thus making Houie Moun secure for rice drops and also making it possible to cultivate the fields on Pha Kha ridge. As a result 300 more Meo from Site 76 moved into Houie Moun, bringing the total to over 800.

   Small groups of Lao continued to make their way into Boum Long (Site 88) and from Ban Ban.

2. September - Since all intelligence reports indicate that the VM will make a big push this year in Sam Neua, we made in September initial attempts to maneuver the populations groups into areas behind the front lines. We have learned that this year the enemy will attempt to capture large groups of refugees in order to resettle them in the Sam Neua city area where they would be redoctrinated and used as labor groups. If we can keep these people from falling under enemy control we deny the enemy:

   a. The labor they require to maintain their supply lines.
   b. A valuable source of intelligence regarding friendly forces.
   c. The political gains inherited from having control of the population as well as geographic area.

   Also, most important, we save these people from the terrorism and hardships that result from being captured by the enemy.

   However, this maneuvering of people does not mean evacuating them from the war area entirely. These people, particularly the Meo, play too active a part in the war for that. It does mean keeping them in areas where, should the enemy attack, they have both time and a way out to safety.

With this in mind the following movements were initiated:

a. Approx. 200 Lao Teung from Nhat Phat (Site 179) have been moved to Muong Hiem (Site 48A). An additional 80 Lao Teung chose to walk to Houie Hok (Site 198). The Meo from LS 179, approximately 350, are walking to Houie Ma (Site 107). This leaves only BV 26 at Site 179 and, hence, cancels the need for refugee drops at that location.

b. The Meo refugees and dependents of Zone 14, Pha Hang (UH 7645) in particular, are moving to Site 107. This move may involve up to 1,600 people.

c. The 300 plus Meo dependents from Phia Kham (Site 87) will move to Houie Kha Moun (Site 111) then on to Phou Keo Mat (UH 5056) where an airstrip is now under construction.

d. Over 500 Meo from Phou Che (Site 185) have already moved to Phou Keo Mat and are working on the helio strip.

B. Military Activity:

1. August - During August, one battalion of FAR troops, BV 28, cleared out the areas of Pha Deng and Pha Nang (UH 4344). During this operation the friendlies captured 6 PL and 212 PL dependents. These people (Lao Teung) are dependents of the ubiquitous 705th PL Battalion. Most of the PL and dependents in this area (estimated 2,000 people) fled to the Hua Muong (Site 58) area, leaving behind several hundred pigs, water buffalo, and cows and many acres of unharvested hill rice. The 212 dependents were moved to Muong Hiem.

2. September - Early in September one battalion of Meo SGU attacked and secured Houie Thom (Site 27) but because of the large number of enemy mines (over 40 found so far) the helio strip is not in used. 104 Lao Teung from Ban Houie Thom left behind by the retreating enemy and these have been resettled at Muong Hiem.

After a short rest the Meo moved 12 kilometers due east until they reached the road known as Route 6. They have secured a 9 kilometer section of Route 6 from UH 6812 to UG 6592 and are now blasting it.

At the same time a second battalion of Meo SGU moved southeast from LS 36 and secured Phou Sa Vai (UG 6598), overlooking Site 29. This move coincided with the movement of the Ban Vieng (Site 89) ADC troops northwest to Pha Khi Nin ridge UH 6495. Fighting continues in this area.

North of Sam Neua city the XXXX ADC troops of Phia Kham (Site 87) are moving north in an attempt to recapture Nong Khang (Lima 52).

Enemy activity has been restricted to probing of various areas (Site 179, Pha Hang) but intelligence reports indicate a heavy build up on Route 6 south of Sam Neua city.

C. Rice Problems:

In general, rice support was very good during August and September. However, a shortage of FAR rice at LS 36 continues to be a problem. In August FAR troops consumed 21 - 100 kilo bags and 241 - 40 kilo bags while receiving only 130 - 40 kilo bags of their own. Although the September figures are not completed there was no improvement.

Recommended Action: That an American representing FAR and FAR support be stationed at Sam Thong or Long Thieng. Also that the FAR battalions operating in the north be put on a rice quota rather than request basis and that someone be made responsible that the quota be met.

D. Despite the delay in getting school supplies to Sam Neua Province most of the schools are now in session. These include three schools in the Houie Kha Moun (Site 111) area, Pha Thi (Site 85), Houie Hok (Site 198), Phou Che (Site 185), Pha Bong (Site 76), Houie Moun, Houie Theng Kho (Site 184), Phou Vai (UH 2301) and Pha Phoun (UH 3300). Blackboards are being made from rice pallets collected at Site 36.

D. Dispensaries: This past two months new dispensaries have been built at the following locations: Phou Vai (UH 2301), Pha Hang (UH 7646), and Houie Moun (UH 5845).

October 17, 1966

General Information on Life in Sam Neua City

This report was compiled from conversations I've had recently with various groups of Lao who have excaped from Sam Neua city. It deals only with the living conditions xxxthe population faces under the enemy. Military intelligence obtained from these groups has been omitted.

1. Civilian Rule in Sam Neua:

At present the civilian authority is the Chao Choueng of Sam Neua, Mr. Thao Ma, formerly of Pakse and a PL for many years. He has three North Vietnamese advisors who work in civilian clothes and who may or many not be military officers. The hierarchy of rule beneath the Chao Khoueng parallels that of provincial rule under the Lao government, i.e., Chao Muong, Nai Kong, Tasseng, to Nai Ban, with the exception that whereas the Nai Bans, Tassengs, and Nai Kongs in the free provinces are elected by the people, in PL areas they are appointed by the Chao Khoueng. The people in Sam Neua have no voice in the slection of civilian leaders.

2. Rice Production and Distribution:

During the year 1965-66 a land reform program was carried out in enemy-held Sam Neua which distributed the acreage of usable rice land (hill and paddy) according to population. A similar program for water buffalo will be carried out next year. Areas with a large population of buffalo will have to move some to areas where the animal is scarce. This rice land and water buffalo distribution program will be revised each year in accordance with population changes.

Each farmer is required to give 30% of his total rice crop to the PL government. This percentage may be much higher in areas close to the front lines where rice is confiscated according to need but in Sam Neua city itself the requirement is 30%. The remaining 70%xxxthe farmer is free to sell or consume as he wishes. Although there is a perpetual rice shortage in Sam Neua city, the shortage is not acute. A great deal of rice from North Vietnam is brought into Northern Laos by truck and this Vietnamese rice is available in the market of Sam Neua. It is, however, a reddish colored variety of white rice and distasteful to the Lao. It sells for 100 kip a kilo in Sam Neua city. Sticky rice sells for 135 kip a kilo. I am referring here to the PL kip (printed for Kong Le) which exchanges at approximately 100 kip Lao = 150 kip PL.

3. Livestock and Poultry:

No cows, pigs, horses, goats, chickens, or ducks are confiscated by the PL and people are encouraged to raise as many as possible. Livestock raising is, however, rigidly controlled by the PL and the owner is forbidden under heavy penalty to either sell or consume any of his animals. If the owner wishes to kill a chicken or pig on a special occasion such as a wedding he must first ask for permission from the Chao Khoueng's office to do so. The number of livestock and poultry belonging to each farmer is diligently recorded in the Chao Khoueng's office.

Livestock and poultry cannot be sold and are raised solely for the purpose of trading to the PL army in exchange for goods. A cow will bring four meters of cloth, one cooking pot, and five kilos of salt. A goat gets you 4 meters of cloth and 5 kilos of salt. A chicken or duck is worth one meter of cloth. A pig is the only animal that will get you a ready made shirt and a pair of pants.

4. Additional Restrictions Enforced on the People:

a. The most rigid control placed on the people is that of movement. It is now nearly impossible to get permission to travel anywhere even if only to the next village a few kilometers away. Police and military guards patrol all roads and trails and a letter from the Chao Khoueng's office is necessary in order to pass freely. Civilian travel permits are extremely rare. Any violations are interpreted as attemps to "go to the enemy". The first violation results in lecturing and being kept under watch. The second invites 6 months imprisonment. The third invariably means execution. Some violators caught in obvious attempts to escape, however, may be killed on the spot.

b. The PL, in word, forbid the people to practice their Buddhist religion, but, in fact, are unable to enforce it. Young men enter preesthood freedly and the begging for food goes on as usual.

c. Anyone caught listening to friendly radio broadcasts is arrested.

5. Working for the Government:

All PL government workers, whether teachers, soldiers, medics, cooks, or the Chao Khouang himself receive the same salary 300 kip per month. Each worker also receives a monthly rice ration of 18 kilos (Vietnamese rice) and 500 grams of salt. Generally, anyone who is old enough or

strong enough to work for the PL does so in order to receive the rice quota.

6. The Draft:

Military service is mandatory for all males strong enough to hold a gun, but here again the PL have difficulty enforcing the rule. Most village men enrole in local militia but their participation is often desultroy at best. The hard-core PL army has had difficulty recruiting this past year.

This year in Sam Neua city all girls between the ages of 15 and 20 xxx have been called to serve as military guards and police. They undergo training and are issued arms. I know of at least one case of a group attempting escape being captured by one of these teen-age police girls. Two of the group were subsequently executed.

7. Propaganda Schools:

Three days a week from 7:00 P. M. to 10:00 P.M. progaganda classes are held in Sam Neua city and attendance for all civilians is mandatory. The theme of the lectures generally centers on the air strikes which, it seems, are aimed at destroying the civilian population and the rice crops. The people are advised to store their rice and belongins in the jungle and are taught how to dig.

Special propagands teams periodically visit each village (generally twice a month) to show movies and distribute literature.

Propaganda lectures make up a large part of the primary school curriculum. Two secondary school girls from Sam Neua city I recently met knew a little of the writings of Marx, Lenin, and Mao Tse Tung. Vietnamese language is taught in the secondary school one hour per week.

8. New Refugees:

Refugees newly captured by the VN and PL are treated very well. Village leaders known to be strongly anti-communists may be imprisoned or executed but most of the people fine the first few months under the enemy easy living. The only restriction imposed upon them is restriction of movement. The VM officers take pains to avoid incidences of VM soldiers bothering the village girls. Confiscation of rice and animals is discouraged unless absolutely necessary, although the VM can't seem to resist stealing the village dogs, the meat of which they prefer to

pork or beef. Often VM officers assign one or two soldiers to each family in a sort of "get to know each other" program. This was true at Ban Na Kut, 1 kilometer south of Site 36, when NaKhang fell last February. These soldiers would help the family work the rice field, plant gardens, and dig bomb shelters. In exchange, the VM soldiers would share the family's meals.

This "easy treatment" of new refugees may last as long as 6 months.

9. Miscellaneous Information:

a. The defector pass leaflets that we have dropped in enemy territory are now selling for 500 kip a pass in Sam Neua city.

b. The people in Sam Neua have been told that Gen. Vang Pao was killed during the fall of NaKhang, February 18, 1966.

c. There is one civilian hospital-dispensary in Sam Neua city. The six medics assigned there are Lao Teung trained in Sam Neua. The supply of medicine is very limited.

d. Most of the shops in the Sam Neua market are run by Chinese-Lao. The commodities sold are Chinese or North Vietnamese.

e. The secondary school in Sam Neua is down to 50 students. The three classroom teachers are Lao Teung trained in Haoni.

f. Each group of people from Sam Neua city I've talked with stated that most of the people in the Sam Neua area would like to escape.

November 1, 1966

Inta - NLHS Chief of Muong Kham between 1960 and 1964. Is presently Chief judge of Xieng Khouang Province.

NVA forces planned to move to closes quarters to facilitate massing of NVA troops. Were in process of enlarging caves in the vicinity of Ban Ban for purposes of reorganizing and redeploying its forces for better security, as well as for centralizing its position to move toward the LS-2 and LS-36 area.

During the November 1 meeting of guerrilla leaders, Savan, the Deputy Rep. of NLHS in the Muong Kham District, called for increased security controls throughout the Muong. Guerrilla forces were to impose stricter controls on travel by villagers. Under the old system PL guerrillas were responsible for security of the assigned villages. This responsibility consisted of checking the identity of unfamiliar travellers. The villagers were required to travel in groups of at least three each person a member of a different family. Savan said under the new system, groups of 12 Vietnamese would be organized and sent to various villages in the M. Kham district where they would be responsible for village security. The Viets would remain in an area until they felt the local ADO could perform satisfactority. The Vietnamese would then move to another village to establish better security.

Savan proposed that the following measures be instituted immediately.

(1) The security of the M. Kham district was to be improved by laying fields of pungi stakes of bamboo and steel with each family in selected villager providing 50 stakes. The groups of 12 Vietnamese were to supervise the positioning of the stakes, and the project was to be completed before "the leaves began to fall". Numerous camouflayed pits containing pungi stakes were to be dug in areas of approach.

(2) Greater emphasis was to be placed on travel controls with only essential travel authorized.

(3) Vietnamese in groups of 5-12 were to be responsible for security in peupheral areas where villagers might have contact with Laos government agents or troops they were responsible for preventing defections.

ORA:ps:6-16-71

Report for October 1966 November 1, 1966

The following report is divided into related geographical areas or areas of mutual interest:

1. Houei Thong (LS 196), Phou Saly (LS 178), San Pha Kha (LS 33, Houie Tong Khao (LS 184)

Five days were spent with the Chao Muong of Muong Hiem visiting the above sites in his muong. On orders from the Chao Khoueng of Luang Prabang, the Chao Muong invested 7 men as Tassengs for his muong - thus officially eliminating many unofficial tassengs and those who had defected to the enemy when Muong Hiem fell in March. It was learned that many minor village officials (Nai Bans, secretaries, etc.) had not been paid since 1959.

New schools are being built at Houie Thong, Phou Saly, San Pha Kha and Phi Nog and XXX Nam Gua (near San Pha Kha) in addition to Muong Hiem. School supplies were distributed to the above sites. As Luang Prabang has no extra teachers, Gen. Vang Pao will supply teachers for this school year only.

Teams from Houie Thong are bringing in refugees from the Ban Mak Kha-Ban Makchari area (TH 8637 and TH 8238). Before the Chao Muong went to Vientiane, he was preparing letters and leaflets which will be duplicated by USIS Luang Prabang to be dropped at Bac Um (UH 0286) and Sop Xeng (TH 9279).

2. Ban Na (LS 15), Khang Kho (LS 204)

Two brief, separate probes on Ban Na and Khang Kho in September were not followed by any large scale attack. Nea Ban Na, a position at Pha Pong (TG 9338) was lost. Ten days ago approximately 80 people left their homes in the Pha Pong area due to continued mortar shelling. They are now at Ban Na. This past week a Lao Tung tasseng was shot and killed in his fields near Pha Pong. Positions at Pha Tha Nai (TG 9140) and Muong Pat (TG 9234) held.

Enemy harrassment at Khang Kho has increased in the past few days. The increased use of mortars by the enemy is irritating to the inhabitants of Khang Khao. Colonel Le Duan, former member of Kong Le's army, is in command of the enemy troops. The road from Xieng Khouang Ville to Ban Hai has been extended south of Ban Mai (Ug 0332). Increased truck activity has been noted recently. Intercepted enemy reports say that Khang Kho will be attacked November 6, if supplies are sufficient. If not, the attack will occur November 12. Enemy troops have moved to a

position approximately TG 9730 - putting them in striking distance of Hin Tang (TG 9731) or Khang Kho. Another company is located approximately UG 0431, near Ban Souan Lai.

Village life ~~is~~ in the Ban Hai area is reported to be rather harsh. Villagers must give 1/2 of their rice to the PL/VM. Money "donations" are collected from the villagers to buy food for visiting officials. Villages are divided into sections of about 4 houes each so that personal activities can be closely watched. The schools, using only blackboards, teach the "Lao ABC's" by means of anti-American slogans. Both children and adults must attend.

3. Phou Moun (UF 4888)

Phou Moun is remaining stable, refugee-wise. During September-October only 155 refugees moved from Keo Manang (LS 192) instead of a predicted several hundred. These people, along with the old Ban Phoung (LS 95) refugees, make a total of 587 refugees at Phou Moun. Land is plentiful, with good soil and abundant rivers and streams. The leveling off of a mountain top for a STOL strip is progressing well.

4. Som Song Hong (LS 201)

Som Song Hong, the "cleanest village in Laos", continues to flourish under Lt. Vang Fouang. Teams from Som Song Hong continue to probe enemy-held territories. During October, 63 Meo were led out of the Nong Het area to Som Song Hong. Nai Kong Roi Khampheng, Lao Tung, is preparing leaflets to be dropped to Lao Tung villages south, east and northeast of Som Song Hong.

Enemy trucks continue to use ~~Route~~ Route 7 from Muong Sen (North Vietnam) through Nong Het to a point near Phu Phah Khe (UG 7667) where cargo is off loaded and the trucks return to NVM. Other trucks pick up the cargo from here to Ban Ban. On October 2 and 6 two enemy battalions reached Phu Phah Khe and 9 DCA (anti-aircraft guns) arrived at Phu Phah Khe, making a total of 15 AA guns. The enemy gets salt from Baan Keopatou, UG 9061, which is also thought to be an enemy operations center for the Nong Het area.

November 9, 1966

Xieng Souk, age 35 fled from the Ban Ban (UG-4971) area of Xieng Khouang Province in September, 1966. He said he left because he disliked PL food and rice collection's, villagers were recruited to transport ammunition, rice, salt and other commodities to the soldiers. All livestock was considered the property for the PL. and the villagers were not allowed to kill or sell their animals without permission from the PL. The villagers were short of clothing be-cause trading was prohibited.

Population control in the Muong Kham District was accomplished by assigning the villagers to a certain section. The old people had to watch the houses and report anyone who refused to work in the fields. Those who refused to work were given a political subject to study. Men were appointed as guerrillas to prevent enemy agents from contacting villagers. The girls were conscripted to cook food and provide entertaimment forthe PL. soldiers who went to the villages.

Souk said that the people were always in trouble and desired to returned to the way they lived before the Pathet Lao came.

ORA;Ps:6-16-1971

Refugee Movement

November 23, 1966

Note that the following refugee movements have been caused by either enemy activity forcing the people out of their homes or by friendly activities giving people opportunity to escape enemy controlled areas (sometimes hiding in jungle).

This list includes only people who have not been on refugee relief rolls.

Arrived Site	Date	From	Remarks	Total
LS 15	10/25/66	Perimeter LS 15	Enemy Attack	78
LS 22	11/11/66	LS 2	Enemy Attack	198
LS 88	9/1/66 to present	Ban Ban	Escapees	344
LS 201	10/1/66 to present	Ls 3	Escapees	400
LS 207	11/11/66	LS 2	Enemy Attack	383
LS 108	10/15/66	DRV	Friendly Action	104
LS 184	11/14/66	UH 0565(Approx)	Friendly Action	~~77~~ 144
LS 178	11/4/66	TH 9970 (Approx)	Friendly Action	77
LS 198	11/11/66	Unknown	Friendly Action	18
LS 205	10/25/66	Area east LS 205	Friendly Action	228
LS 48A	11/2/66	Area north LS 36	Friendly Sweep	340
				2,314

The time lag of actual arrival of people and our adding them to our roles is due to drafting of lists and our verification of name. Thus the above total will reflect an increase in the December quota.

The relatively small decrease in the over-all rice tonnage after the harvest this year is due to several factors. A quick review of the enemy's activity shows that their timing and extensive thrusts made it impossible for large numbers of people to get in any kind of rice crop. In addition, those who did manage to get in a crop, results were poor due to factors ranging from non-germination of rice seed provided from Vientiane to floods and other natural farming hazards. In normal times farmers plan for bad years, but a refugee has no such backup.

LSs 36, 48A, 179 and L-52 were lost in early March and April; LS 29 was lost the first week of May, with heavy attacks on LS 89 and LS 201. These extensive attacks coupled with intensive propaganda claims of complete takeover of the north by Pathet Lao-Viet Minh caused a great refugee movement in every area of Sam Neua Province and Northern Xieng Khouang Province, just at the time that people should have been planting their rice. This movement was more widespread than reported at the time since we are still finding areas where people have been hiding in the jungle unaware that the friendly forces have retaken control of the contested areas. Thus we had our movement of refugees this year at the worst possible time creating a rice requirement for a minimum of one year and six months for the majoirty of the refugees. Since the time of the initial refugee movement to date, the people in question have been working putting in temporary airstrips, housing, gardens and schools. From now until their harvest comes in one year from now, all refugees will be putting in extensive rice fields to assure 100% self-sufficiency by 1968.

Another factor which has kept the rice tonnage high this year is the recuriting of military from refugee groups. OUr office is not in a position to state the numbers involved, but without a doubt it involves several thousand people this year.

Additional enemy activity at the beginning of the year caused an abrupt movement of 4,000 people from Sites 95, 21, 35 and 14. Shortly after the loss of these sites, GM 13 (a FAR unit) refused to fight in the area any longer and walked out. This left no defensive forces in the area between the refugees and the enemy and the people refused to consider the area as permanent relocation because of fear of enemy incursion. Thus we have the area of LS 192 with little rice crop to speak of.

A quick reappraisal of present rice tonnage and refugee situation indicates that the high point of the year's rice will become next year's base. With any refugee movement at all, it would be extremely realistic to plan that by FY 68 -69 (Calendar Year July 1967) USAID refugee rice tonnages for this area will be double that of present tonnage! For example, from July 1967 until November 1967 we should program for twixe the present tonnage, with appropriate increase in air transport. After harvest 1967 we should be back at old level and perhaps lower depending on the success of our present refugee movement planning. This estimate was not picked out of the air.

Our estimates are based on known population figures of people in contested areas, past enemy activity, indications of enemy strength this year, and possible combinations of enemy or friendly activities which would produce movements of civilian population.

Muong Het - Xieng Kho Operation December 16, 1966

1. Troops involved: BV 28, four companies, under the command of Major Sawat. Three companies of ADC, Zone 15, based at Nong Khang, Lima 52, led by Nai Kong Ly Lao.

2. Objective: The primary objective is to recruit from the Lao population the Muong Het (UJ984) and Xieng Kho (UJ1202) areas. The Friendlies will not attempt to hold the area for longer than it takes to move out the recruits and their families. The recruits themselves will be trained and armed at Lima 52. Dependents of these men and whatever other people who may be collected in this operation will be moved to Muong Hiem, Site 48A. Col. Phan, Far Commander in Sam Neua Province, plans to open the Muong Het airstrip in the hopes that the young children and the very old can be transported to Site 48A by Caribou. Those people who are strong enough will walk southwest along the Nam Het River to Site 111 to await further transportation there.

3. The Operation: The Friendly move will involve three separate groups. The first, two companies, will attack Muong Long, VH 8489, then move northeast to the Nam Het River and cut the road at that point. Another two companies will move directly to Xieng Kho. The third group, also two companies, will move directly to Muong Het. The operation is scheduled to begin on December 15. Col. Phan estimates that the Friendlies will reach their objectives by December 17.

4. Remarks: I have little confidence that these objectives will ever be realized. The final plans for the operation were made in the absence of Nai Kong Ly Lao, the ADC commander, and I doubt that he will agree on the kick-off date which falls in the middle of Meo New Year. Also; since only a small token force will be left behind to defend Lima 52 and Site 87, and since should Lima 52 be attacked and fall those troops on the operation would find themselves in a very hazardous position. I think the operation will be carried on hesitantly with considerable looking back over the shoulder. The slightest probe at L52 or threat of attack would probably cancel the operation and bring the troops back to their base.

November 1966 Monthly Report December 20, 1966

This report will not be definitive in the exact figures and records were lost in the Sam Thong warehouse/office fire.

Report by Areas:

1. Ban Na and Khang Kho: There has been no further brouble at Ban Na since last month's incidents. Khang Kho, LS 205, 15 miles east of Sam Thong remained stable in spite of increased enemy shelling of positions. Shell fragments have been sent to the U. S. for tests. Appropriate action has been taken to curtail truck traffic on the road north of Khang Kho. This situation has not resulted in any refugee movements.

2. Phou Saly and Houei Thong: Dribbles of refugees continued to come into Houei Thong, LS 196, all Lao Tung. At Phou Saly, LS 178, about 75 Meo walked in from the northeast requesting help. Loss of records and commodities has prevented further help here.

3. Tha Thom: The fall of Tha Thom, LS 11, on the morning of the 24th resulted in the movement of the entire tasseng, about 1670 people. 467 Lao walked to Phou Moun, LS 212, and stayed there. Other Lao civilians and 2 brave companies, 150 men, of GM 17 fled to Phou Moun, arriving on the morning of the 28th and continuing on to Muong Bo at 1700 hours the same day! Interestingly enough while GM 17 was running away, GM 19 reoccupied Tha Thom with some "opposition". An extra rice drop was put into Phou Moun to cover the extra refugees. As no commodities were available at Sam Thong, no help was given the refugees except rice. The Lao civilians are extremely afraid to return to Tha Thom due to the action of the soldiers there. When Tha Thom was reoccupied, I personally saw Lao soldiers looting villagers' houses.

Schools:

New schools were opened on a teaching basis at the following places: Phou Moun (LS 212), Phou Saly (LS 178), Houei Thong (LS 196), San Pha Kha (LS 33), Muong Hiem (LS ~~48~~ 48A), Phou Nog and Nam Gna. The last 6 were opened with the cooperation of the PSI of Xieng Khouang and Luang Praband and Bligh de Brisby, AID Educational Advisor in Luang Prabang.

Interview with Former RLG Soldier December 24, 1966

The following is an interview with a former RLG soldier, Sip Thao Bho Van. Bho Van was a soldier in GM 13, 11th INfantry Battalion, 4th Company, commanded by Colonel Chansom and Colonel Boon Noi. In 1964 GM 13 was routed by the enemy near Phu Nong. Several men escaped, including Bho Van, who, while wounded in the left shoulder, made his way to Ban Pha, UG 165210, approximately 23 miles east of Sam Thong. Bho Van was taken in by a villager at Ban Pha who treated his wounds. When the PL/VM captured Ban Pha, Bho Van passed as one of the local villagers. He continued to live at Ban Pha, passing as a farmer and later marrying a local girl. He and his wife managed to escape from Ban Pha in mid-December, reaching Khang Kho, IS 204, UG 0524, 16 miles east of Sam Thong. There he was reunited with his former commander, Major Khongsavan, now commander of BV 23. Major Khongsavan brought Bho Van to Sam Thong on December 19, and I talked to him on December 20.

The government of Xieng Khouang Province is in Xieng Ville, UG 291375. There are also legations there from the People's Republic of China and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. There are 2 Chinese and 2 Vietnamese in these legations. Also in Xieng Khouang, Ville is the CHQ for a special group of 1100 men, mixed Lao and Viet Minh, who act as back-up troops for important attacks in Sam Neua and Xieng Khouang. Some of these troops were reported to have taken part in the attack on NaKhang, LS 36, in February-March 1966. Losses were reported to have been 300 men XXXXXXX KIA! These troops have a complete range of weapons. Their actual GHQ is the former house of the Chao Khoueng of Xieng Khouang and at a place, Phu Jam Phet, whose exact location I could not find out.

The Chao Khoueng of Xieng Khouang is a military man, but his name was unknown to Bho Van. Nia Bans, Tassengs and Chao Muongs are appointed by the central government. However, if the villagers do not like the man, he is sent away for six month study. When he returns, he is then reinstated in his old position. There is also a kind of 12 man "court" presided over by Nai Vin Lao from Ban Na Hin Nam in Savannakhet, Laos. These lower officials seem to have complete control over the actions and movements of the people. If a person wants to travel to a nearby village he must get a travel permit from the Nai Ban. If he wants to remain overnight, he must see the Tasseng. If a man is caught traveling without a permit he is interred at the Nai Ban's house for investigation. If the indifidual is known to the Nai Ban, he will be kept 3 days and released. If he is not known to anyone in the area, the man is sent to Xieng Khouang for 6 to 12 months. Bhe Van had never heard of anyone ever being shot or interred longer than 12 months for travel violations.

The average village has no dispensary or medical personnel. There is a large hospital, along with a rice an ammo dump, at Tham Khap, approximately UG 268407 and 269408, northwest of the air strip at Xieng Khouang Ville.

The hospital is located in caves and bunkers around the entrance to the caves. The hospital is staffed by Vietnamese, Chinese, Lao and Meo doctors and nurses. Anyone with minor illnesses such as headache, etc., most likely would go untreated. However, if one is really sick, a letter must be obtained from either the Tasseng, Chao Muong or Chao Khoueng for admittance to the hospital at Than Khap. The average villager could not afford to buy his own medicine as a phial of "cough sytrup" (cocaine derivative) costs 1700 "Kong Le" kip. There is a training school of nurses and medics at Khang Khai, UG 1758. The course lasts 6 months and can take 70 girls and 40 boys at one time.

The villagers are required to act as coolies carrying rice, ammo, salt, clothing etc., from main supply dumps to PL outposts, etc. The principle dumps are at Tham Khap, mentioned above, and Houei Kha Ma, UG ~~273404~~ 283361. Tham Khap is reported to be the GHQ for the Viet Minh. Fifty trucks work out of here a day, going to Khang Khai and Ban Ban. Pha Thon, UG 273404, is reported to be the GHQ of all integrated Lao, Meo and Viet Minh factions. Houei Kha Ma is the main dump for troops working the Ban Pha, Tha Viang, LS 13, and Muong Cha Nam (UG 184205) areas. Every house in the Ban Pha areas is required to ~~provide~~ provide 10 trips from the dump to an outpost per month. Some villagers have been killed by air strikes, but the figure is apparently quite low.

Ban Pha is located in the area commanded by Colonel Jang, former officer under Kong Le, 4th Airbourne Battalion, with 3 companies. Each company has about 75 men. However, the PL troops usually visit Ban Pha, Ban Mai (UG 185281) and Ban Poung (UG 203308) about 3 times a month.

Villages are divided up into groups of 3 houses each. One house is responsible for keeping an eye on the other 2 houses 24 hours per day.

Money is very scarce. Only officials and soldiers receive wages. A A Nai Roi in the army receives only 300 kip per month. Villagers obtain money by selling meat, eggs, etc., to officials or soldiers. A kilo of water buffalo meat sells for 206 kip, pork 300 kip per kilo, and chickens 300 kip each. Those who have money can buy North Vietnamese goods from a central makret. One man controls the market and only he is allowed to sell commodities. The range of goods is inclusive of most every type of merchandise, if one has the money to buy it.

Each household is allowed to keep 10 mun of rice per year. (One mun equals 12 kilos.) All rice is under the control of the Nai, Ban, Tasseng, etc. At harvest time Military Police and a NLHS official inspect the rice fields and storage bins. Rice is redistributed later if one house needs more than 10 mun, or another leeds less, etc. Rice mills are located at Nam Lin Soong and Ban Na Khaw, whose locations I could not determine. The confiscated rice is sent to the storage dumps at Houei Kha Ma and Tham Khap, with most of the rice at

the latter place given to the hospital. The people are allowed to grow vegetable gardens and raise animals.

Everyone in the Ban Pha ~~x~~ area is required to attend school every day except those days when they must act as coolies, and on Sunday morning when they have the morning off. Children are required to attend school from the age of 3-4 years old and up. The school is conducted by 12 "Military Police" (NLHS cadres). The ~~xx~~ principle subject is political indoctrination of NLHS policies, anti-American propaganda, what to do when planes attack, etc. Three times a year 100 children are sent to Khang Khai to learn to be clerks, typists, etc. These students are collected from the entire Communist-controlled areas, not just Ban Pha. After being graduated, these students are sent to work with government officials, governmen offices, military offices, etc. No children from the Ban Pha area are known to have been sent abroad to study. Children of Chao Muongs, the Chao Khoueng and other government officials have been sent to Hanoi to study, particularly medicine.

Sports play a big role in village life, although participation is mandatory and done without much enthusiasm by the villagers. Participation includes both sexes. Large sporting events are followed by big parties in the evening. Each house has to furnish one chicken, or three houses give one pig for the party. "Stray" animals are also collected for the parties. Bho Van said that the villagers do not like these parties and that only the officials seem to have any fun. People who show active displeasure at the games are sent back to school for special studies to correct their thoughts. If this happens often, the local official is taken to the Chao Khoueng's house in Xieng Khouang Ville and lectured to, whown movies (especially anti-American movies) and admonished to keep his people in line. No organized road show or touring troopers had been to Ban Pha. The only other entertainment is provided by local villagers who can play the kene or perform the mohlam.

The local officials are concerned about the bombing raids in the area. All people have been advised to build huts and dig bunkers in woods near Ban Pha. People are told to cook their food before dark so that the lights won't be seen by aircraft flying overhead. At the close of the interview, I asked Bho Van what reactions the villagers had to the anti-American campaigns by the Communists, and by the bombing raids made by American aircraft. He said that the propaganda campaigns made little effect on the villagers and that there was a lack of resentment towards America. He said that the villagers looked back a few years before they were occupied by the Communists and realized that they had never been bombed at that time. Also they had heard of areas where there were no PL/VM troops and that these areas have not been bombed, but that bombing occurred only where there were Communist troops. Thus the blame fell not on America, but on the Communists for bringing trouble to the village. He had not known of any villager being killed in raids, other than those acting as coolies.

Muong Het Operation December 24, 1966

The operation began on December 17 with three groups moving out of Nong Khang, L-52, with the following objectives in mind:

1. One group of 113 men (1 Co. B. V. 28 and 1 Co. ADC) moved toward Muong Het to secure the town and open the airstrip.

2. 1 Co. of B. V. 28 with ADC guides (a total of 71 men) were to attack and secure Xieng Kho. They would then lead the population (estimated 3,000-4,000 people) to Muong Het for evacuation.

3. 1 Co. of B. V. 28 and 1 Co. ADC (85 total) were to attack and secure Muong Long then move north and cut the road east of Xieng Kho.

Only the first group achieved their objective. The town and airstrip at Muong Het were secured on December 19 with no enemy resistance. Group two got to within 5 kms. of Xieng Kho then veered off and joined the first group at Muong Het. The third group reached Phu Nguen, where they stayed for 3 days then returned to Nong Khang.

The friendlies stayed in Muong Het for 4 days. Their objective at Muong Het was to recruit soldiers from the population (estimated ✱ 5,000 - 6,000 in the area) and to evacuate the people to Site 48A. The old, sick, and children would be evacuated by air. The others, it was planned, would walk to Site 111. Major Savat, the Commander, found, however, that the majority of the people did not want to leave. The town itself had been all but evacuated since last year and the people were living in the forest bordering the rice fields. By the second day only about 90 people had accumulated at the strip asking to be moved, and these were dependents and relatives of friendly soldiers (mostly B. V. 26 and B. V. 28). There was a conspicious absnce of young men to be seen anywhere in the area. Most of the people merely sat and watched.

Major Savat soon found that his 150 men were not nearly sufficient to secure the area. The area was just too large, the population too great. Villagers brought word of two battalions of VM moving down from the North Vietnamese border town of Xieng Khuang, only 8 kms. (an easy 3 hour walk) from Muong Het. Savat wanted to pull out the night of the 22nd but he was ordered to stay.

On the 22nd, we evacuated the 90 dependents by porter and helio to Sites 111 and 48A. On the morning of the 23rd friendly soldiers swimming in the Nam Ma River came under sniper fire from the opposite bank. The fact that this happened within a few hundred yards of the airstrip indicated the poor security of the area. We landed that morning and found that an additional 150 people had come to the strip to be moved. These again were mostly relatives of friendly soldiers. Priority for the morning, however, was to move the 30 Adc at Muong Het back to L-52 for the night before the enemy had taken Site 87 and was threatening L-52. Due to a shortage of aircraft on that day only a few of the 150 people were finally moved. Major Savat was ordered to stay one more day and plans were made to move these people on the 24th.

On the night of the 23rd, however, Major Savat was attacked by an unknown number of enemy and he began an orderly retreat out of the Muong Het area. He reached L-52 by evening the 24th with no casualties.

General Information On Muong Het:

There had been no force of enemy in the area for more than a year although a large percentage of the population were dependents and relatives of PL soldiers. The town itself had 375 houes and a population of about 4,000. Most of the people left last year to live in nearby forests becasuse of a single airstrike that killed amonth others they say, "The best looking xxx girl in town". In the forest they lived quite well. They grew their own cotton for clothing, their own ~~xxxx~~ tobacco, and had sufficient iron left over from the French occupation days for hand tools and plows. They valley is rich in rice land; and they had more buffalo, cows, chickens, and ducks than they could consume. Fish in the river ran up to 40 pounds. They lacked only salt and medicien which had to be purchased from the PL. 120 of their children went to school which went up to Pratom 5 although they had to buy their own school books (100 kip per copy at the market in Xieng Kho). Pots, plates, spoons, etc. were purchased from Xieng Kho and were made, they say, from the metal of downed aircraft. The road which runs down from Xieng Khuang in North Vietnam to Muong Het, then on to Xieng Kho and points beyond is in good shape although the people say that they haven't seen a truck on it for several years. The airstrip, completed under French supervision in 1950, could accommodate C-46s.

Results of Operation:

Liberated for four days one of the finest R and R areas in Laos. Fishing and swimming were excellent. Sightseeing at the central wat was also interesting and the main Chedi was a graceful subject for color slides.

No casualties, friendly or enemy, during the extent of the operation.

Approximately 100 Lao were successfully evacuated to Site 48A and reunited with relatives.

Five B. V. 28 soldiers found rather attractive girls and were married in Muong Het.

Three B. V. 28 soldiers defected to the enemy the day Major Savat pulled out. One friendly killed by a land mine while pulling out.

Monthly Report December 1966 January 5, 1967

December saw a marked increase in both friendly and enemy military activity in Sam Neua Province. The long expected dry season enemy offensive has still yet to materialize, nevertheless, there was heavy fighting in several areas. As a result we had groups of people on the move.

It began early in December with the loss of Ban Vieng (Site 89), and Phou Sa Bott (UG 7581). Fighting continued off and on in that area throughout the month especially in the area of Tham Hok (UG 6579). In mid-December there were enemy probes in the areas of Phathi (Site 85), Houei Met (UH 5867), and Phou Den Din (UH 7859). The biggest loss of the month was on December 23 when the enemy took Phia Kham (Site 87). Of the 130 soldiers and 300 dependents at Phia Kham only 17 soldiers have been found. Nong Khang (L-52) has also seen heavy fighting (22 KIA in the past two weeks) and a large attack seems likely at this ~~x~~site soon.

The friendlies also had their moments of success. On the 19th BV 28 and ADC from L-52 took Muong Het (L-13). They held this prize for four days before pulling back to L-52. A more significant advance was made on the last day of the month when General Vang Pao personally directed a successful attack on Phou Chik Mok Lok (UH 7638). Bad weather, lack of supplies, and an extremely aroused enemy, however, forced the friendlies to retire from this dreaded mountain top after only a few hours of occupation. That same day Lt. Baccri and 250 ADC from Pha Hang (LS 205) marched through Muong Pern (L-31), then moved to the top of Phou Dane (UH 8537) to await better weather.

Refugee Movement

1. Tham Hok (UG 6579). The 80 soldiers and 800 plus villagers (mostly Meo) in this area are now completely surrounded by enemy forces. They have been forced to move three times in as many weeks and have had more than twenty civilian casualties. A large scale helicopter evacuation of these civilians is impossible at present because of the marginal secrutity of the area. We will attempt, however, to move the small children and very old when weather and security permit. About 30 have been taken out thus far.

~~[illegible]~~

2. Houei Tong Ko (LS 184). Twenty families of Lao, 127 people were bought into Site 184 from Ban Nam La (UH 2027), by the Houie Tong Ko commander, Lt. Shong Ge. These people had been under the PL for several years. Distribution of clothes, blankets, etc. was made on December 20.

3. 20 families, 148 Lao were moved by porter from Lima 13 to Muong Hiem (LS 48A) on December 20 and 21. These people are all dependents and relatives of friendly soldiers. Distribution is being made this week.

4. Because of the increase of enemy activity in the Nong Khang (L-52) area, since the loss of Site 87, we have been evacuating some of the civilian population of the area to Houie Hin Sai (LS 215). About 120 have been moved thus far. More than half of these are dependents of Lima 52 ADC. About 100 remain to be moved.

STOL Strips

The strip at Houie Hin Sai (UH 5056) Signal H was opened early in December and is now Site 215. The 900 foot strip at Houie Moun (UH 6246) Signal L is near completion and we should be landing there within a week. Phou Vai (UH 2301) Signal V is finished and witing to be checked out.

Schools

Mr. Mounty, the Primary School Inspector of Sam Neua Province, and I met early in December. I gave him information on those schools in Sam Neua that he, because of the transportation difficulties involved, had been unable to visit. Mr. Mounty brought with him several hundred pounds of school supplies. Each school now has sufficient chalk, notebooks, and pencils for the year. The only shortage is that of P2 and P3 x textbooks and P1 blackboard slates. Mr. Mounty says they will be delivered as soon as they are available.

Report on Status of Refugees - December 1966 January 5, 1967

Unfriendly activity caused the following movements:

1. LS 89 area people moved to LS 206 and LS 201 area. This included 1500 former refugees from LS 89 and 1200 new refugees from surrounding areas. After pressure is off, half of these people will return to their villages and their own rice supply.

2. In the LS 2 area approximately 1400 people have come in from the Route 7 area.

Iron bars and blacksmithing tools have been distributed to every refugee group which needed steel to make machetes for clearing land for this year's rice planting. This involved approximately 20,000 people.

Rice dropping went off fairly well this month. Rescheduling some drops next month should help timing problems at sites.

Corn seed needs reviewed. Distribution planned for March 1967.

A report from Thakhek states there are refugees at a place south of LS 126. Our check indicates there are indeed people wanting assistance in this area. However, since we have no active program of military/political nature in this area we have referred the problem to the Thakhek area. We will give assistance in accordance with their decisions.

Approximately 200 people moved out of LS 98 to greener pastures LS 207 area.

People moving into Muong Hiem now has put the total number of refugees at 3,000 people.

At the present rate of bringing in logs for cutting, we will be fortunate to finish the school in 6 months. Sawmill operating at one-fourth of its capacity. Request for additional logging equipment apparently tabled.

HB
File
Muang Suoi

L. E. Haffner
RDD/Vientiane

January 1, 1967

T. Collins
FAT/M. Soui

A Request from Xieng Dat

Background

1. Our contacts with the area this year have included looking after a hundred refugees at Vang Muang, showing movies at six villages in the tasseng, and a project to put desks and chairs in the tasseng schools.
2. For quite some time, the tasseng has been encouraging me to come and stay a couple of nights in his village, though I have not, as yet, done so.
3. When the PW carpenter went to the tasseng's village last week to show how to make the school furniture he was approached by the schoolteacher. According to the latter individual, the villagers want to discuss with me the possibility of going over to the rightists (this would involve 2000-3000 people)

Nature of the Request

1. Because they receive minimal support, assistance or interest in their affairs by being with the neutralists, this tasseng would like to switch allegiances.
2. They do not want to come under the Meo in the Xieng Dat valley, but are interested in making contacts with Vang Pao.

Problems

1. They are willing to take any course of action proposed by the Americans, but because of past troubles in Xieng Dat and Col. Sing would consider this a case of rather overt interference, we would do best by not getting involved.
2. To bring these people out of the neutralist camp might exacerbate tensions with the Meo or the FAR.
3. How do these people switch allegiances in their present geographical area when they do not want to work with the people who constitute the only alternative to the neutralist, i.e., the Meo in the valley?

Recommendations

1. Don't get involved.
2. Neutralist military-civilian relations are not good anywhere and I can sympathize with the aspiration to break away from the incumbent "protectors". There is a definite land shortage in the area (since the Meo will not let these people back in to farm the paddies) and after classifying them as refugees, normal channels can be used to move them to an area (in rightist territory) where land is available.

cc: Arma(Blodgett)
Emb (Reid)
RR&R
file

Ca. 1967

CAROL, JAN. 26 1945 HRS.

LIST OF PEOPLE AT MUONG XON (L-59)

ZONE	FROM	NO. CO.			
12/C	HOUEI THONG (L.S. 196)	12005	—	103	MEN
12/B	HOUEI THONG KHO (L.S. 184)	12013	—	70	MEN
12/A	PHA BONG (L.S. 76)	12011	—	33	MEN
	"	12012	—	7	MEN
		ADC ?	—	30	MEN
	SGU 4	2 CO.S (1+2)		111	MEN
	TOTAL	6 CO.S + ADC?		354	MEN

B.V. 27 (4 CO.S) — 280 MEN

NOTE: THE ABOVE LIST IS VERY ACCURATE

OTHER PLACES

I L-52 VIRTUALLY ALL THE CIV. POPULATION HAS LEFT AND GONE TO SITE 215 HOWEVER THERE ARE SOME "A FEW" THAT WENT TO III I WAS TOLD 2 DAYS AGO WHEN I WAS AT L-52 THAT THERE WERE ABOUT 300 MEO ADC's AND 4 CO.'s OF B.V. 28 THERE. (100 ADC's LOST AT SITE 85)

II 76 + 184 — V.P. SAYS THEY AREN'T GETTING ENOUGH RICE I COULDN'T SAY FOR SURE I THINK IT IS THE CASE AT 76 (RICE FOR 195 COMES FROM 184 STILL)

III 178, 196 - ERNIE KNOWS
185 I PRESUME THE SAME UNLESS
ALOT OF THOSE PEOPLE HAVE MOVED TO 215
ERNIE SHOULD KNOW

IV 85, HOUIE MOUN, DEN DIN; 205; 102; HOUEI MAT; 198
HOUIE KA DOAK - SHOULD ALL BE THE
SAME I BELIEVE, BUT YOU CAN
NEVER BE SURE ABOUT 205 WITH BACRI
(THE HUMAN SQUID) GIVING INFO.

524

V 179 SHOULD BE THE SAME (NONE I GUESS)
I SUPPOSE ALL THE FAR DEPENDANTS WILL
SOONER OR LATER COME OUT OF THE WOOD
WORK TO SHOW UP AT L-59

VI PHU VAI AND PHA DOUN ARE ALWAYS
BITCHING, BUT I REALLY DON'T KNOW OF
ANY INCREASE IN PEOPLE OTHER THAN
75 PEOPLE FROM BAN THA AREA AND APPROX.
75 PEOPLE FROM THOM HOUK AREA
127 SAME

LS 215 #331
LS 215 342

VII 201 & 206 AREAS - JACK

VIII L.S. 36 SAME SGU #1 CAME, SGU #3
WENT TO SITE 5, WE STILL FEED
THE 800 PEOPLE FROM THE THOM HOUK
AREA WHEN THEY CAN BE FOUND, BUT
I SAY NO PROBLEM; ALL 40 KILO
LANDED AT SITE 36

~~FYI~~ SITE 33 HAS MOVED ADC's 402 TO
48-A AS FOLLOWS: CO. 4021 42 MEN
CO. 4022 66 MEN
(B.V. 24 MOVED OUT) CO. 4023 52 MEN
3 CO.'S 160 MEN

FYI PARU TEAM 2-20 REPORTS 2376 REFUGEES AT 48-A (OK BY US FOR ALL 100 KILO BAGS AT 48-A)

L-54 - PREFER 40 KILO BAGS LANDED
L-52 - MUST HAVE 40 KILO BAGS LANDED.

Hope this helps you out in the monthly Rice battle

Jerry

28 January 1967

Ban Bong (UG-044764) - 2 platoons and ammo depot.

Ban Boum (UG-023694) - 2 platoons with 9 A.A.

Ban Poung (UG-034715) - 3 soldiers with one 105.

ORA:ps6-16-71

TO : Z

FM : Z - 15 (34 - 281115 JAN. 67)

TM- HIN POUN VIC PHA RUAM UH: 9216 ABLED TO PURSUADE THE POPULATION OF 22 VILLAGES IN A NUMBER OF 435 HOUSES AS FOLLS.

- BAN PA KHA UH: 929 171	:	32	HOUSES
- B. NA LAENG UH: 844 207	:	27	--"--
- B. NA MUANG UH: 830 209	:	17	--"--
- B. JA PONG UH: 853 196	:	15	--"--
- B. DONG UH: 878 144	:	9	--"--
- B. HOUEI SA KA UH: 925	:	8	--"--
- B. THAM UH: 995 165	:	30	--"--
- B.BHOK UH: 987 140	:	30	--"--
- B. PHAO UH: 827 279	:	15	--"--
- B. PA JA UH: (~~832~~) 839 232	:	40	--"--
- B. NA KHAM UH: 826 250	:	14	--"--
- B. KHAMI UH: 779 220	:	30	--"--
- B. KOR HAI UH: 919 262	:	52	--"--
- B. HOUEI SAI UH: 734 260	:	8	--"--
- B. HOUEI LANG UH: 954 207	:	10	--"--
- B. KANG UH: 977 131	:	18	--"--
- B. PHO UH: 791 179	:	23	--"--
- B. OR UH: 837 246	:	8	--"--
- B. HUA NA UH: 790 272	:	10	--"--
- B. HOUEI WAEK UH: 853 301	:	14	--"--
- B. KAEO LOM UH: 859 290	:	13	--"--
- B. NA KENG UH: 879 307	:	12	--"--

B. HOUEI SUAOK UH 7617

==========

FOR MISS CAROL

Z - 15

FYI

Z

291630 JAN. 67

KATE, 291615 JAN. 67

January 1967

A NVNA civic action company was at Ban Ke (UG-1652), two Km south of Khang Khay. The company taught the people how to harvest two rice crops a year and helped to build a dam at Ban Kung (UG-1551). A cooperative store and a NVNA sewing unit was also at Ban Kung.

ORA:ps:6-16-71

January 1967

In January 1967 Somvang was still the governor of Xieng Khouang Province. Although he was ostensibly the key figure in the Province, the NLHS provincial rep. had more power, the NLHS provincial rep. controlled departments for military and economic affairs and for rice storage and rice mills, the governor's office was divided into sections for education and police and for military, judicial and economic affairs. At district level the administration and the NLHS representative had paralled structions, in the Muong Kham District of the province the district representative used the administrative personned of the district chiefs office. A Vietnamese advisor had been assigned to the district office since 1964.

In January 1967 in Xieng Khouang Province the NLHS had two branches at provincial level, one concerned with the military army of the party and theother with the administration of the province. The civil administration at provincial level was in turn divided into two parts with the governor heading one and the NLHS provincial rep. (Neo Khouang) heading the other. The governor was ostensibly the leader of the province, and the NLHS officials pointed out that by retaining the power in this position they were not attempting to destroy the established order. The NLHS provincial rep. who was a political oversees, actually controlled the power. He insured that the governor carried out his duties of administering the province in accordance with the NLHS policy. The NLHS representative had the final decision whenever there was a difference of opinion. He consequently commanded much more respect from the other officials than did the governor.

Should a delay occur in conscripting soldiers of in the movement of supplies, the Neo Lao Hak Xat rep. would assume centrol and issue orders to assure the orders from the Neo Lao Hak Xat center were carried out to the letter.

The NLHS had a branch for each district in the province. The Muong Kham District had military, economic, rice storage and rice mill departments, and the following officials headed the various departments:

(1) Khamon was the NLHS rep. for the Muong Kham district. He was born in Ban Nam Neun in the district. He was about 54 years old and was married, he became Muong Kham District rep. in 1965, he could speak, read and write Vietnamese.

(2) Thongphet was the chief of the military department. He was a native of Sam Neua and was about 38 years old. He became chief of the military department in 1964. He was married.

(3) Maha Sivai was the chief of the economic department. He was from southern Laos and was about 40 years old. He became chief of the economic section in 1965. He graduated after five years of religions study, hence his religions title. He was not married.

(4) Maha Khamfong became chief of the rice storage department in 1964. He was about 29 years old and came from southern Laos. He had graduated after five years of religious study, he was married.

(5) Khampon became chief of the rice mill department in 1963. He was a native of Sam Neua and was about 28 years old, he was responsible for seeing that conscripted rice was milled for the PL. Khampon had completed five years of religious study.

The administrative system under the governor had sections at district level for education, police, military, judicial and economic affairs. Somvang was the governor of Xieng Khouang Province. He was a southerner about 46 years old and had been governor since 1962. Somvang was married, Som, the Director Geneal of Interior, issued orders to Somvang.

The following officials headed the various provincial sections:

(1) Phieng Sisoulath was the chief of the educational system for the province. He was a Lt. Colonel and had received five years of training in North Vietnam. He could speak, write and read Vietnamese and had been chief of Provincial Education since 1963.

(2) Sai Sompheng was the head of the police section. Sai was a captain. He came from Sam Neua and had been chief of police since 1963.

(3) Captain Bounmy was the chief of the military section. Bounmy was about 35 years old, and had assumed his post in 1963.

(4) Intha was the chief of the judicail section. He was about 42 years old and came from Ban Long Met, he had four years of schooling and had been the district cheif of Muong Kham in 1963 and 1964, Intha was married.

(5) Boutsabong, the chief of the economic section, had been in that position since 1963, he was about 52 years old and had attended hight school in Paris. He was married.

At the district level adminstrative and Neo Lao Hak Xat structure was paralled, the two officials heading these structures had powers similar to the superiors at the provincial, level. The NLHS representative again had greater authority than did the district chief in case of disagreement. The district chief's office had sections for police, coop. stores, the military and education, the officials heading these sections were as follows:

(1) Oudom was the district chief for the Muong Kham District. He was about 43 years old, his deputy was Bounthan, who was 39 years old. Both men came from Ban Nam Neuan.

(2) Bountheung was the chief of the police section and had been in that in that position since 1964. He was 35 years old and had three years of primary school. He came from Ban Nam Neun.

(3) Thit Phan, a native of Nam Neun, was head of the coop stores and had been in that position since 1965. He was a 39 years old and had completed three years of primary school.

(4) Thao Phomma was chief of the military section and assumed that post in 1965, he was 36 years old and came from southern Laos.

(5) Somphan Chanthavon, a native of Ban Chom Thong (UG-4970) had been head of the education section since 1964, he was about 28 years old and graduated from the sixth grade in 1959.

The office of the NLHS rep. in the Muoug Kham District used the administrative personnel of the district chief's office. The two officials shared the same office to avoid duplication of personnel at district level. The two offidials employed the same department heads; Savan was the NLHS rep. for the district. He was a native of Nam Neun, but lived in Ban Na Thang in the same district in Jan, 1967 he was about 35 years old and had completed four years of education.

The following officials, all of whom had not been long in office, were attached to the office of the district representative:

(1) Khamdy aged about 32 years old, joined the office in 1966. He was a native of the district and came from a family fo poor farmers. He had worked as administrater at canton level until he acquired his present position. He passed the education requirement, which was equivalent to class six, with difficulty.

(2) Y, aged 43 was a farmer official under the French in the Nhot Keua Tasseng. He joined the district representative office in Oct, 1966, he had finished three years of primary school. He had two wives and the NLHS regime permitted him to keep them both since old marriages were not changed under the present regime. Y was considered rather wealthy.

(3) Ve, aged about 50, also joined the office in Oct, 1966.

(4) Ban, aged 49 was a native of Ban Na Son and had worked in the office since Oct, 1966. He was illiterate.

(5) Bounthon, about 27 years old, was from Sam Neua.

(6) Chan Seo, a native of Ban Na Neum, was about 50 years old and blind. Seo was a farmer merchant who had set aside about 3 millions kip. Seo was married and had two sons, on of whom Haikham, was studying at the secondary school at Khang Khay since September 1966. Seo's other son had been studying in Sam Neua since 1964. He was responsible for authorizing marriages.

(7) Nang Khamta, a native of Ban Na Neun, was about 20 years old. She was unmarried and had completed four years of primary education. She began to work in the district office in Oct, 1966.

(8) Nang Cham, a woman about 25 years old, was in Change of female propagandists and had worked in that capacity since Oct, 1966. She was not married and had completed three years of primary school education at her village school.

(9) Phophet, a 29 years old native of Sam Neua, was chief of PL querrillas in Ban Na Oung. He could not read or write.

(10) Khamman was the Lao name of a Vietnamese advisor who had been attached to the district reps. office since 1964 he could speak Lao fleuntly.

ORA:ps:6-17-71

Monthly Report January 1967 February 1, 1967

The general situation in the north remained relatively stable during the month of January. Most significant were the two Viet Minh attacks on NaKhang (LS36) and Nong Khang (L 52). Both attacks resulted in decisive defeats for the Viet Minh. Body count showed 31 Vietnamese killed at NaKhang and 23 killed at Nong Khang, in addition to 2 prisoners (one Thai Dam and one Vietnamese). Neither attack produced any refugee movements. However, the Nong Khang attack prevented, or has at least delayed, the evacuation of more Lao and Lao Thung from the Nong Khan area to Houei Hin Sa (LS 215). Small enemy probes were from the Nong Khang area to Houei Hin Sa (LS 215). Small enemy probes were made during the month at Pha Thi (LS 27) and in the area of Pha Hang (LS 205). None of these probes produced any refugee movements. The areas to the south and west of Lima Sites 201 and 206 remain critical following the loss of Ban Vieng (LS 89) and Phou Se Bott (LS 82) in December.

The areas northeast, east and southeast of Sam Thong (LS 20) have remained stable and calm with the exception of Khang Khao (LS 204) 18 miles east of Sam Thong. Increased shelling and mortaring of friendly positions has been reported the past 2 weeks. Tha Vieng (LS 13) was reoccupied in early January as was Tha Thom (LS 11) in late November. The situation at Tha Thom is at a critical stage now. The local villagers in the Tasseng, 1670 people from 16 villages, are threatening to leve Tha Thom for Paksane. The soldiers there are on the shole worthless as is shown by their actions when Tha Thom was lost in late November. As reported earlier friendly soldiers systematically looted Tha Thom before the villagers returned. Relations between the military and the villagers is growing worse. Many people are threatening to move to Paksane. This would be bad for several reasons. One, it would create a problem for Paksane. Two, it would leave void a very fertile rice-producing area. Three, it would be extremely bad publicity for the RLG if the area were evacuated. Four, it would create a vacuum in the strategic southeast approach not only to Long Thieng (LS 98) and Sam Thon, but might also affect the very successful resettlement program we have east of Tha Thom. I think that serious consideration should be made ASAP to putting an experienced Forward Area Team in Tha Thom. Certainly its location, ahub for both ground and river travel for Paksane and Sam Thong area, should warrant immediate attention in Vientiane as to the seriousness of the problem.

During January STOL sites in the north were opened at Phou Vai (LS219 - UH 2303). Phou Pha Louam (LS 220 - UH 9116), and Houei Moun (LS 221 - UH 5845).

During January more refugees from the Ban Vieng (LS 89) and Phou Se Bott (LS 82) areas continued to drift into Houei Soong (LS 206) area. There are 1366 Ban Vieng refugees at Phou Sam Soun (UG 8290) three kilometers from the Houei Soong airstrip who came from 7 villages near Ban Vieng. Many of these people have been living in the forest for several weeks and are not in the best physical condition.

January 17-19 Pha Phoun (UH 3201) received 222 new refugees from the Tham Hok (UG 6779) - Ban Tha (UG 5284) area. For security reasons, and due to the lack of good fields, it is hoped that these people can be moved to Phou Vai (LS 219), a few days walk from Pha Phoun. Phou Vai now has a poulation of 908 people (208 dependents, 520 refugees and 180 people who are partially self-sufficient). With any luck at all, Phou Vai and Pha Phoun should be self-sufficient next year.

At Houei Hin Sa (LS 215) refugee commodities were distributed to 884 people. 202 Lao and Lao Theung were evacuated from Nong Khang (1 52) in early January to Houei Kha Moun (LS 111) and then to Houei Hin Sa. The additional 682 are Meo.

The above are perhaps typical of the way the people in the north have had to move around. In late 1963 these people were forced to leave Hong Non (LS 86) to Den Din (UH 7961). In 1964 they fled to Phathi (LS 85). Since then they have been to Houei Ma (LS 107) and then to Phu Che (LS 185). Finally they have been relocated in Houei Hin Sa where they should be secure and free to clear rice fields.

On January 21 seven Lao Theung refugees came into Nhot Phat (LS 179) from Ban Houei Ta, 3 kilometers north of the enemy-held Houa Muong (LS 58). More people are planning an escape attempt but it is not known how many people might be involved, if any. (A short paragraph, Appendix 1, is added to this report concerning a brief conservation with these 7 people.)

In mid-January refugee commodities were distributed to 119 refugees (20 Lao Theung and 4 Meo families) at Houei Thong (LS 196). Houei Thong now has a population of approximately 2405 people. (Another paragraph, Appendix 2, is added to this report concerning a talk with a refugee from Ban Mok Hx Kha - TH 8638 - which has been under PL control for the past 6 years.)

One of the most encouraging events of the past few months occurred on January 27 when Companies 12031 and 12033 launched "Operation Linkup" from Houei Thong (LS 196). The objective of this operation is to secure the area between the Nam Seng and Nam Ou in eastern Luang Prabang Province, which would in effect "linkup" eastern Luang Prabang and western Sam Neua. It is hoped that by securing this area, enemy communication and supply lines will be cut to the areas east of Luang Prabang. As of this time, February 1, these ADC's have crossed the Nam Seng at Ban Tha Vane (TH 7758). 30 men went upstream to Ban Se (TH 6964) and have occupied the immediate area. The remaining 170 men proceeded from Ban Tha Vane to Phou Luam (TH 6[illegible]xx 6864) where they have spread out to secure the area. The ADC's have suffered 1 KIA, and have captured 8 KX "PL" in addition to getting 12 defectors with weapons and ammo. While this operation should not produce any influx of refugees, it would be to our advantage to show some interest in these people, particularly the Lao people along the Nam Seng. In early January 25,000 surrender passes and leaflets from the

Chao Muong of Muong Hiem (LS 48A) were dropped along the Nam Seng. These were obtained through the cooperation of USIS. Further plans are underway, with the help of USIS, to further provide this area with papers, posters, phamphlets, etc. The Area Commander of Houei Thong, S/Lt. Blea Yang Moua, has asked for newspapers and pictures of the King for his men to pass out as they ~~xx~~ enter new areas. Projected plans call for the operation to proceed to Ban Sop Ban (TH 5580) on the Nam Ou, if possible. This area contains an estimated 3 -4 thousand Meo and Lao Theung and possibly 4-5 thousand Lao who have expressed a desire to come under RLG protection and control.

Monthly Report January 1967 February 2, 1967

With no major refugee movements this month, emphasis was placed on moving refugees to new farming areas where adequate food production would be possible. This involved checking of new sites, setting up new drop zones and taking census of people moving. Approximately 2,000 to 2,500 people have moved already. Sources estimate up to 10,000 people are yet to be moved around the area south of Sam Thong.

A general plan is being developed by Win McKeithen for assistance with schools, dispensaries, agriculture development, etc. An operation involving a "scorched earth" policy will be launched by selected forces of M. R. 2 to rid this area of PL effectives still in the area.

Various schemes have been discussed for increased agriculture production for settled areas. Among those chosen as feasible is H. A. D. A. (Highland Agricultural Development Association) an agricultural commodity-selling co-op. Holds promise of success.

Briefly, agricultural commodities will be made available at Vientiane prices xx to local farmers interested in buying improved stock, seeds, tools, fertilizer, sprays, etc. Through these outlets Ag Wx Extension advice will be offered. Eventually through these contacts it is hoped that farmers groups can be organized into marketing co-ops. Kirk Dimmitt is organizing the administration of this program. However, it is essential that a full-time extension man be available for technical advice. Recommend that Larry Wilson, a man with experience, many technical talents, and an intimate knowledge of the northern Laos program, not to mention language capability, be retained to fill this position.

January seemed to be the month for annual meetings to kick the New Year off right. Not be be outdone by the Annual gathering of the Patriotic Lao Froces on Jan. 29 celebrating their founding (and no doubt planning their next "liberation" offensive for this dry season) the Free World Allied Forces countered with 2 meetings. The first, the Zone Commanders meeting of MR 2; and the second, the Refugee Operations Officers meeting in Vientiane. Unfortunately I was only about to attend 2 out of the 3. It would have been interesting to compare notes!

The deteriorating situation in the Tha Thom area, referred to in Mr. Kuhn's report, is of such a nature that the consequences should be considered carefully by all concerned. Two years ago Tha Thom area was retaken by the forces of MR 2 with considerable losses incurred. A great deal of work went into rehabilitating the area after occupation. Subsequent political changes brought MR 5 forces into the area. Their conduct has been a disgrace to the Lao Army and put our support of these units in a bad light. The Chao Khoueng of Xieng Khouang Province is pulling out all government services from this area, no doubt the people will leave. This is an unfortunate situation for these people over the years have exemplified the village/farmer resistance to enemy pressures by staying in an area under constant danger

of enemy attack, carrying on their every day life in the face of enemy threats. These people have been loyal to the Rlg and showed a willingness to stick it out, returning many times to their village despite constant attacks. This stubborn refusal to be forced off their lands has been the stopper which has given the entire area from Tha Thom south to Paksane the security it has enjoyed to date. It has always been an early warning post for MR 2's assets in the hills to the west/east. Should this area "fall" because of the actions of irresponsible FAR soldiers, I feel this would jeopardize the American image in this and contiguoue areas; it would afford the enemy a propaganda line and would open the entire area south of Paksane to enemy infiltration and subsequent insecurity. Little wonder that the enemy did not bother anything when they attacked last November 24. They knew the area would fall without their help! I full endorse Mr. Kuhn's recommendation that an experienced Forward Area Team be established at Tha Thom Asap to provide the necessary buffer between the soldiers and the people in order to preserve this area. The Chao Khoueng has assured me that if this steop is taken, he will return his officials, teachers, etc. to this area. Sam Thong is prepared to offer background info, liaison concerning security, etc. with whomever works at Tha Thom. In addition whatever material or air suppprt we can given within our capability.

Operation "Linkup" referred to in Mr. Kuhn's report opens up the possibility of working with up to 7,000 people in the area involved. It is not envisioned at the present time that any additional commodities will be needed. We are working closely with the L. P. reps on this operation. If successful, this could "dry-up" a lot of unfriendly activity south of Luang Prabang all the way to Vang Vieng.

Another Far guerilla operations east of Route 6 in Sam Neau Province (UH 9216) which has been going on for about 3 months has, through its activities, contacted about 22 villages with approximately 3,000 people. It was necessary to obtain the loyalty of these people in order to carry out blocking activities against Route 6. No additional commodities are envisioned for these people at the present time.

A meeting between USIS officials and General Vang Pao gave birth to a plan to organize information teams that would travel by horseback to outlying villages from our air serviced bases to bring information to the many villages which are seldom contacted because of their distance from base camps. USIS has agreed to start on a trial basis. It was felt that wider contact was needed than our present two info teams that now visit some 95-100 sites on a rotating basis. Up to 10 teams may be formed, each team would stay in one area for 10 days to 2 weeks. hauling their projectors, etc. to remote villages by horseback. Much training and organizing remains to be done, but Stacy Lloyd, USIS/Xieng Khouang, is starting to get the project off the ground.

Nai Ban-Tasseng school opens February 6. About 40 people are expected to attend.

Norman Green's January report on status of schools in Sam Neua was received. While the report has some interesting statistics, it does not give the sad state that the education program is actually in in north Laos. This subject I intend to deal with in some detail in a separate report. This is not intended to disparage the efforts made by USAID Education, but rather to focus attention on the problems as they exist under present policy.

This month brings to an end my short but "interesting" reign in the unenviable role of AAC/Sam Thong. I wish to express my thanks to the staff at Sam Thong and all others who support us for their cooperation and effort to keep this unusual operation moving.

L. E. Haffner
ADRA/Vte

February 5, 1971 (1967) RLL

T. Collins
PAT/M. Soui

Monthly Report, January, 1967

SYSOPSIS

1. Rural Development is taking place in Moung Soui. The the general reader, this may not be an earth-shaking statement, but those aware of the military situation, civil-military relations and sympathies of the local populace, can appreciate any accomplishment.
2. It never ceases to amount to that, despite the adversities of living in the Muong Soui area, villagers are not resigned to their lot in life, but reamin eager and willing to improve it. The enthusiasm shown on various self-help projects and the deep-seated motivation for further development prove it.

CONSTRUCTION

1. Market
   a. It is being need.
   b. We also had refugees from Muong You camp there for three nights before moving to Nam Tist.
2. School Furniture
   a. 59 desks built in 7 villages this month.
   b. 140 desks built to date, covering one-third of student population (1250) in the area,
   c. Significance of the program
      1) Like the well program in Xieng Lom, this project provides something for each village and is not with greater enthusiam than wider community projects (Groupe Sclaires, markets, etc.).
      2) This has generated much interest in other aspects of the rural development program
3. Schools
   a. Carpenter arrived fo finish work one at Ban Khai (Activity Plan=1).
   b. Organization presents the major obstacle to getting the new Groupe Scolaire construction going. Once the local authorities find a stady labor supply, the situation should improve. (Plan #6)
4. Wells-this program moving slowly at present.

AGRICULTURE.

1. Fish Ponds
   a. Mong Tang - Like last month still completed and waiting for fish
   b. Other place have exprece an interest but will not go ahead without assurances that the soldiers won't steal the fish.
2. Pig program - Like least month completed pens are waiting to be filled.

3 Experimental rice program
   a. USAID/AGR is giving as excellent support is our efforts to see if a second rice crop, using Taiwan seed, can be grow in this area.
   b. The denomstrations are being carried out by 1) Naiban, Ban Bone, 2) school principal, Ban Khai, and 3) Naiban, Nong Keng. There is much interest in this project, not only among these concerned, but also these ethers who like to run the experiments.
   c. Fields have been selected, irrigation ecanals have been opened and the seedbeds will by planted shortly.
4. Vegetable seed distribution had one plus fectors by giving seeds to the military, villagers were able to plant their own gardens in comparative safety.

GIVING ACTION
1. Visits were made to many villages in Tasseng Xieng Bet, most of which are at least a half day's from the center at Phou Vieng. Medical care is being given in refugee areas, the home economist is working on a sanitation and baby care program among the Lao-teung, and an information program is getting started among these former Pathet Lao sysmpathisers.
2. Our carpenter trainee from the Engineer company worked on school furniture in the Xieng Bat area and at these schools in the Muong Soui area up towards the front. He has also become competent at showing movins.
3. Col. Sing conducted a meeting on the 31st of civiliam and military leaders here, the upshot of which was a promise to make a concerted effort to improve relations.

Information
1. Movies shown in four villagers and at two battalian headquarters.
2. USIS publications are getting to village leaders, government officials and front line troops.

Refugees
1. The Muong You refugees have moved to various places.
2. The Vang Muong group wants to go back to Muong Khiem (Xieng Dat) where there is paddy land, but the Meo have other ideas.
3. Eighteen families at Phou Vieng have move to paddy land at Na Nam, between Sites 156 and 197.
4. The Meo at Ban Khoumn want to move and may go to Nam Tiat.

A more complete report will follow on the refugee situation.

February 1967

Action Against PL/VM as related by Captain at LS 65 On 3 January 1967

On 30 December at 1500 a patrol working out of UG 133136 spotted two groups of PL/VM at UG 143154 and UG 146154. (Men from these groups were seen getting water from the stream - Nam Siem; the patrol was at UG 142147 when they spotted the enemy). The patrol returned to their post at UG 133136 and had a 57 mm brought up from LS 65.

On 1 January at 1515 27 men attacked the PL/VM as follows:

6 men hit UG 146154, where there were an estimated 50 enemy; and 10 men hit UG 143154 where there were an estimated 30 enemy. The rest of the friendlies stayed with the 57 mm at UG 142147.

Action broke off at 1715, but the attack was resumed shortly after dark and continued until 2 January at 1435, when the enemy retreated. The friendlies followed them as far as UG 153160 and then returned to LS 65. The enemy was presumed to have retreated to Ban Pha - UG 1621 - 1720 area.

3 enemy were confirmed KIA, 2 Lao and 1 Vietnamese. One of the Lao was PL Captain Thong On. The VM was found stripped of all his clothing.

No friendlies were wounded.

The following eqipment was captured:

400 kg. cooked rice
6 full AK clips
3 full belt machine gun canisters (300 rounds)
100 3.5 mm rounds
4 flare shells
8 packs
1 cooking pot
1 pair binoculars
10 pair shoes
5 cans fish - Russian labels
4 cans Span - Chinese labels
3 hats
3 canteens
7 ponchos
2 shovels
1 map (French 1=100,000 series)
40 bandoleers for carrying rice.

Refugee Movements March 9, 1967

In the past month the regular dry season migration pattern has begun to develop in the BHS area. There have been approximately 2,000 people migrate to friendly-held areas.' This migration is directly connected to military activities on both sides.

Of these 2,000 people, I estimate about 40 percent have been forced to leave because of actual fighting in their villages, with the remaining 60 percent coming out from enemy-held areas when the opportunity presented itself. These people have come primarily from three areas, namely: Moung Sing, Nam Tha, and the buffer come above the Mekong between the Luang Praband the Houei Sai operations. If the situation remains the same, I expect an additional 3,000 - 5,000 over the next 3-4 months.

After the area operations meeting in Vientiane, I explained to all the local leaders that wexx were not to encourage more refugees. Also, a letter was sent by the Colonel explaining that the people must stay in their established villages unless they were subject to extreme enemy action. These people, however, would rather face starvation, due to the lack of adequate refugee rice, instead of facing additional persecution from the Communists.

At the present time, I feel I can cut present rice quotas, due to rice harvest this year, and xx be able to partially feed the new people.

I am in the process of trying to get these people into areas where they can make a rice crop this year. Also, I am trying to find suitable areas for increased rice production among the semi- and permanently-settled people. However, as thin as the rice is stretched now, in the future it will be necessary for me to ask for additional rice.

BHS

Site 50 A

March 10, 1967

The original idea of building a strip at 50A which could accommodate caribous and possibly 123's was the result of many discussions. It was the opinion of this group that we should establish a permanent base north of the Pdj for the following reasons:

1. The vulnerability of 36 and 48A (SeKhong and Moung Heim) made these sites unsitable for a permanent operation and by the same token if they should fall we would be pushed back to the south of the PDJ as far as field operations and logistic support to the area would be concerned. This would be unweildy, economically costly and psychologically ~~disas~~ disastrous.

2. A base north of the PDJ where every-day operations were going on with continuing American presence would give a certain stability to the area which has not existed since we were kicked out of Boun Moung (58) almost two years ago.

3. Some de-centralization of the operation in the Long Thieng-Sam Thong area would be beneficial as it would have a tendency to free local leaders and Americans from sone of the time consuming, harassing and often non-productive involvement at 20 - 20A.

Vang Pao picked 50 as the proper site for carrying out ~~xx~~ these ~~xxxx~~ plans and started the Meo at 50 to building a caribou strip with hand tools. It soon became obvious to Williamson and to the CPHD that the strip could not be accomplished unless some assistance in equipment was given (Pop had left on home leave). As a consequence we made arrangements for a dozer to be put into 50 with Chinouks. Unfortunately the dozer was plagued with breakdowns and during the period it was there only about 5 to 6 days of actual work was done on the strip. Since availability of Chinouks could only be assured on a certain day, it was necessary to take the dozer out prior to the completion of the work.

We feel the original reasons for undertaking this project are still sound and some means for completing the strip should be found. It was realized from the inception that if the very best strip was built under the existing ~~cirxx~~ circumstances, it could only be used in the early morning and evening hours but this is true of a large percentage of the strips in the mountainous areas.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Phil Bullion
SW/Vte

DATE: 12 March 1967

FROM : T. Collins
FAT/M.Soui

SUBJECT: Current status of refugees in this area

A. Muong You Group - 142 families

	ADULTS		CHILDREN			
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Total	
Walked to Nam Tiat	83	93	57	47	280	
Choppered to Nam Tiat	30	49	19	35	133	
Moved to Meo Village	28	26	20	16	90	
Went back to PL	31	31	23	15	100	
	172	199	119	113	603	603

	Adults	Children	
Na Ngoi	2	3	
Ban Pong	2	3	
Ban Muong You	297	54	
Still at M. You	301	60	361
Died over 10 month period			120
			1084

Rundown by villages

	Nam Mat Adults		Children			
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Total	
Walked	6	6	4	3	19	
Rode	15	24	8	16	63	NAM MAT
With Meo	1	1	0	2	4	
With PL	1	1	1	0	3	
	23	32	13	21	89	
Walked	12	14	9	12	47	
Rode	4	2	1	3	10	
With Meo	2	1	1	0	4	
	18	17	11	15	61	BAN HIAN

	Adults		Children		Total	
	Male	Female	Male	Female		
Walked	27	36	13	10	86	
Rode	1	3	0	0	4	
With Meo	4	1	1	1	7	BUAK KHAM
	32	40	14	11	97	
Walked	1	2	1	0	4	
Rode	5	14	4	7	30	
With Meo	1	1	0	3	5	BAN MANE
	7	17	5	10	39	
Walked	17	20	13	12	62	
Rode	2	3	2	7	14	NA NGOI
With Meo	5	5	5	3	18	
	24	28	20	22	94	
Walked	0	0	0	0	0	
With Meo	2	2	0	0	4	HOUEI KOK
	2	2	0	0	4	
With PL	18	20	11	9	58	SEN LUANG
With PL	12	10	11	6	39	LA SA
Walked	16	11	12	5	44	
Rode	1	1	2	2	6	BAN PONG
	17	12	14	7	50	
Walked	3	3	5	3	14	
Rode	1	1	1	0	3	
With Meo	3	3	4	2	12	VANG SANG
	7	7	10	5	29	
Walked	1	1	0	2	4	
Rode	1	1	1	0	3	
With Meo	10	12	9	5	36	HOUEI TAMLO
	12	14	10	7	43	

Comments

1. Those still at Muong You are not on refugee relief, though we did send up lumber to make school furniture once most of the people had moved out.
2. The reason given for the two villages going back to the Pathet Lao was that they had strong differences with the tasseng at Muong You and did not want to be under him if they moved to Nam Tiat. It has subsequently been decided that the refugees will elect their own leaders.

3. The reason given for Houei Tahlo going in with the Meo was that these people had worked for the Meo before and planned on hiring themselves out again.
4. Deaths were attributed primarily to climatic differences between Muong You and the refugees former homes; poor sanitation no doubt was also a significant factor.
5. One old man at Muong You, performing an agitprop function for the Pathet Lao, was held in detention until the refugees had been moved. It was he who was held responsible for those who had gone back to the PL and he was warned that if any more of those still at Muong You went back, he would be shot.
6. The Chao Muong's list shows some villages as being Lao and others as Lao-teung, but my assistant is convinced they are all Lao-teung.

B. Pak Vang Group

	Adults Over 18		Children 17 and under		
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Total
56 families	72	73	68	62	275

1. Rice drops were made through November, at which time a good crop, the first in three years, was harvested.
2. Cooking pots, shovels, blacksmith kits, insecticide, and vegetable seeds had also been distributed.
3. A school was built that now has 69 students and lumber was sent up for school furniture.
4. Movies are shown about once every six weeks.

C. Vang Muang Group

	Adults Over 15		Children Under 15		
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Total
25 families	27	28	24	24	103

1. Rice was supplied in small quantities until February, when they were put on the drop list.
2. A one-room school, with 50 students, is in operation and lumber was sent for school furniture.
3. Blankets, cooking pots, soap, eating utensils, blacksmith kit, vegetable seeds and rat poison were also distributed.
4. This group came from Muong Kham (PDJ) early last wet season.

D. Phou Vieng

1. Eighteen families, 72 people, they are originally from Muong Khiem (Tasseng Dat) and have been wandering since 1962 (Vientiane, Vang Vieng). XIENG
2. Four of these families are opening up paddy land at Na Nan, between Sites 197 and 156.
3. Previously, I gave them about one ton of rice; I would like to assist those families attempting paddy cultivation.

E. Xieng Dat

1. There are about 2600 people in the hills north of Xieng Dat, about 1500 of which came after the 1962 incident in the valley. Quite sometime back they received some goodies from Sam Thong but the

former tasseng sold them.

2. Desks have been built for the schools at Tham Khong, Nam Tom, Vang Muang, and Na Phoung.
3. Enough land remains for one more year of hill rice farming.
4. They are interested in buying 2 or 3 tons of salt.
5. They are looking for a way to get out from under the neutralists (as are most civilians in the area).
6. Movies are shown occasionally to keep up contacts with these villages.

F. In and Around Muong Soui

1. Tasseng Ang
   a. 162 families (1211 people), according to Paul Larson's account.
   b. The only assistance they have asked for is to haul rice in from the paddies, which are still being farmed up on the front. We hauled 1780 bags of unmilled rice from there to the resettlement area at Xieng Nga.
   c. Their children are not attending school, which may or may not be due to their being PL sympathizers (keeping in mind that what passes for a PL sympathizer elsewhere is usually an anti-neutralist here).
   d. Medical assistance was attempted and ceased when I found that the civilian medic was distributing it elsewhere.
2. Ban Khoun (Tasseng Nam Pe) - Meo
   1. 38 families, 186 people, originally resettled here by Jack Williamson
   2. Since I came here some powdered milk, vegetable seeds, rat poison and cooking pots were distributed.
   3. School furniture was built for the twenty-five students at the school.
   4. Due to problems with the military and a shortage of land, this group wants to move further west.
3. Muong Kham Group
   1. People periodically filter in in small groups from Site 88, where the Meo have an arrangement to bring people off the PDJ for K6000 a head. The problem is that they are dropped here, where there are relatives, and then I am asked to feed them; it seems to me some coordination should exist between here and Site 88.
   2. At least seventeen families (97 people are involved), fourteen of which want to move to Nam Tiat if we will feed them in the meantime.
4. Phou Douk - Meo
   1. 12 families, 69 people
   2. This group was resettled by Long Tieng and they are originally from the PDJ area.
   3. Previously they had difficulties with the neutralists stationed in the area (stealing pigs, shooting villagers; the Meo retaliated by shooting four neuts), but a new battalion is stationed there now and relations have improved.
   4. The 5th B.I. received a request for rice and passed it on to me.

Tha Thom and Xieng Dat March 26, 1967

I met with Chao Khoueng Saykham this morning. Major Khongsavanh has moved from the Khang Kho area (LS 204) into the Tha Thom area, not Tha Thom itself. He is waiting until the rest of the FAR soldiers who were in there are completely moved out. After this is done, he will move in plus 300 soldiers who will move from the Muong Moe area (LS 46) to occupy the further outposts. Chao Saykham and I both feel that under the leadership of this young Major that for the first time in approximately 3 years we may be able to assure Tha Thom security. ~~Thomxxxxx~~ Chao Saykham says that as soon as the remainder of the old Far troops Tha Thom have been removed and Major Khongsavanh moves in, he will move his officials back to Tha Thom immediately. He advised me this morning that he hopes that no Americans go into there ahead of his officials. After his officials have moved in, the word then should be given for the people who have moved out of the Tha Thom area into Paksane and other places to return to Tha Thom. He advised that they still had approximately two months to make paddy rice. He suggested to leave the people this year, not knowing what the security might be, to plant what rice they can on their own without USAID's help with buffalo, etc. I will advise you in 3 or 4 days as to the happenings.

In the past two weeks I have met with two or three embassy people concerning the Xieng Dat area. My advice to them as well as to the Americans at Muong Soui has been for us to keep hands off of this situation. I have definitely found that no one presently in the embassy has any knowledge of what happened ~~this~~ at Xieng Dat some 4 or 5 years ago. After discussing this with Chao Saykham this morning, he agreed with me that this was strictly a military problem to be handled between military people at Muong Soui and Gen. Vang Pao. I understand that this has been discussed between Colonel Singh and Gen. Vang Pao. At a later date I will discuss this with Gen. Vang Pao. I was asked by the embassy to write a history on the incident that occurred at Xieng Dat, but I feel that without your permission I should not do this. Personally I think that it should not be done. If you wish, I will tell you what happened at Xieng Dat.

March 1967

On 27 March about 200 refugees from Phou San Canton in the Muong Pek District fled to a pro-Lao base at San Tian (UG-5054), 17 Km South of Ban Ban. The refugees left their villages because of the many restrictive measures that the Pathet Lao had imposed upon them. NLHS authorities required that the populous register the animals they owned with their village chief buffaloes, oxen and other cattle could not be slaughtered or sold without official permission; and this permission took about 15 days to obtain. Business transactions were therefore, difficilt because a buyer might not wait 15 days. Villagers also had to register pigs, ducks, and chickens, but could not kill them without prior approved from government authorities. The PL. quartermaster could order owners to sell animals to him at his price. In one instance the quartermaster paid only three bars of soup for a 50 Kg pig.

Each villager was required to provide and to tend animals for the PL. In 1966 in one village everyone was forced to contribute 300 kip to purchase animals for the PL. The village provided two oxen, two buffalo, two pigs and two hens and two ducks. The village chief maintained a current record of the status of each head and each plock.

The authorities also regulated the amounts of rice and corn families could plant and eat. A family wity three or more members was to plant 50 kilograms of rice seed and 15 kilograms of rice seed and 15 kilograms of corn seed per planting season. At harvest time government officials collectee the crops. They then distributed rice for food according to the size of the family and the size of the harvest. A 15 per cent tax was imposed on each man in the family for his rice quota each resident of the village was reguired to work a certain number of hours in government controlled fields which grew rice solely for the PL forces. The time he was required to work depended on the size of the village and the size of the government controlled fields.

Education was mized with propaganda. Boys underwent military training and political instruction and girlsreceived political instruction and learned to sew. The instruction of the youth was combined with propaganda lectures in the villages. Children attended the propaganda courses in smallgroups to give them an understanding of compartmentation and cell struction.

These refugees had also been dissatisfied with restrictions on travel. Anyone wishing to travel within his canton had to obtain permission from his village chief. If he wished to go outside his canton, he obtained the canton chief's approved. Any traveller wishing to go beyond his distruct obtained permission from the district chief after he obtained a note of recommendation from his canton chief. The canton chief often was reluctant to approve a journey outside the district because he feared reprisals should the traveler defect. It usually took a traveler about 15 days to obtain permission to go outside his district.

He then had to contend with constant checking by soldiers and civilians officials along the road to his final destination.

Villagers who voiced opposition or who refused to cooperate were required to undergo political reeducation, two dissenters from Ban Lat Theun (UG-2863) were sent to Hanoi in September 1966 and had not returned by late March 1967. If the PL believed that a person would not benefit from re-education, he was executed, the man to be excuted was usually called out at night and murdered and his death was attributed to units from FAR. Between September 1966 and January 1967 five men in the Muong Pek district were considered beyond re-education and excuted.

In the face of the increasing number of villagers who fled from the Muong Pek area, by March 1967 the PL had announced the forced relocation of about 50 percent of the people, or about 900, from the vicinity of Ban Sala and Ban Pa Kieo to Nong Het and Khang Khay.

Informant former tasseng of Phou San, Muong Pek.

ORA:ps:6-21-71

April 30, the enemy began hitting the perimeter of the village between 8 and 9 A.M. What limited troops were on hand quickly retreated into the village in face of what they must have felt was an overwhelming attack. There was also a heavy mortar barrage. They say that the village was effectively surrounded, and therby cutting off any possible escape route to the east. In the end, approximately 50 enemy troops (assortment of Lao, Lao Theung, and Meo - no VM) came in and secured the village. The people I talked to felt that in addition to these there must have been a heavy contingent of support forces out in the sidelines.

There were only two friendly casualties; the medic, and one small boy who was killed when a mortar exploded nearby.

There were unconfirmed reports of light enemy casualties.

The enemy forces proceded to assemble all the refugees and friendly soldiers and confiscated any remaining armament. Once this was done they subsequently set fire to all the houses, not allowing the refugees to save any of their personal belongings.

The refugees reported no physical mistreatment by the enemy. They were initially told they would have to stay within the vilage, but when they expressed their fear of an air raid, they were allowed to leave, ostensibly only to go into the surrounding jungle. In actuality all of the refugees took advantage of the opportunity to make themselves scarce. Most of them feel that the enemy expected them to do what they did given the chance. Control of the refugees themselves may not be what they had in mind, at least for the time being. The unarmed ADC's were allowed to leave with their families.

In securing Ban Se the enemy captured over 6 tons of milled rice that had been dropped in on the 26th. Also 40+ weapons were lost, plus ammunition.

The people were warned against taking refuge at 178 or 196 as they said that they were next to be hit.

As of 1400 today, approximately 190 refugees and 15 of the ADC's had arrived at 178. They were short on rice and we have called a drop in for them tomorrow. Also I plan on taking some other commodities up (blankets, pots, clothing, etc.).

As of 1400 today, approximately 190 refugees and 15 of the ADC's had arrived at 178. They were short on rice and we have called a drop in for them tomorrow. Also I plan on taking some other commodities up (blankets, pots, clothing, etc.).

On talking with Nai Ban Siany Ohn Sri, one of the ADC leaders, at 178 today there seems to be some substantial indications of collaboration with the

enemy on the part of the Tasseng of Ban Se, Nai Tit Ken Can. He is reputed to have made contact with them through his younger brother, an emeny soldier. Contact was made while the refugees were still at Houei Poung. After that meeting he supposedly used his influence to get the refugees back to Ban Se ASAp. After returning to Ban Se and receiving two rice drops Nai Siang Ohn Sri related much reluctance on the part of the Tasseng to distribute the rice as if in contemplation of the enemy coming in.

The Tasseng has yet to show up at 178, and possibly won't at all.

One of the ADC's was also reputed to have sided with the enemy as soon as they came in. I couldn't get his name, but was one of the boys recently trained at LS 113.

At this point it looks like the refugees will continue to come into 178 in small groups.

L. E. Haffner
ADRA/Vte

April 4, 1967

T. Collins
PAT/M. Soui

Monthly Report, March, 1967

It is worth reiterating that rural development is taking pace in Muong Soui, because not only does a visid picture present itself but also a comparatively sizable percentage of the espital input is being enerated locally.

An RD sawmill, run by PWD technicians assisted by FAN engineers, has been operating for six months. At the outset, on average of 600 pine logs per month were turned into lumber, though the rate over the past three months has jumped to 30-40 a day Arrangments were made with the 60% of all lumber obtained; this has built battalion headquarters, a sub-regional office couples, werehouse and officers' quarters. One battalion how been particularlysambitions about bringing in logs and, consequently, has received enough lumber to build new houses for all its company commenders. Occasionally, I will supply both a vehicle and a driver for which and extra 20% lumber is charnged (making a total 60% to us). My lumber, in turn, has built 190 school desk sets, a demgroupe at Ban Khai, a market, a government office, pig pens and a pier across a fish pond; has asmisted a construction project in Som Thong (at no air cost); and is in the procees of erecting a 7-room Groupe Scolaire, a military hospital, a civiliam dispensary, a USAID werehouse and a school and dispensary at the Nam Tiat refugee conter. Villagers out their own logs and the Ban None school with their 40% (and bought roofing sheet for it), while some of the lumber at the Ban Khai demi-groupe same from logs cut by the villagers themselves. One man at Ban Khai brought is eleven logs and the lumber he received from the frour returned to him (as these four were especially big we took the seven smaller logs for ourselves) saved two man four months labor had they been sawn by hand.

Tow MTS tricks were driven here from Vientiane recently, carrying 4.5 tons of rice (the equivalent of a C-46 load) to the Nam Tiat refugees and five drums of gas to FAT/M Kassy. They were used in Muong Soui, for four days, to haul logs for some of these unable to get a vehicle from the military; we were thus enabled to obtain on extra 20% lumber for our project. One appreciative villager at Ban Khai gave us a small pig, which was sent to Nam Tiat as the "imauguration" of a pig program.

Fifteen bunches of garlic were bought at Hong Sa for K100 apiece (the same size bunch would sell for K250 here) for introduction to Muong Soui; reception was so faverable that 200 more were ordered. The Nam Tiat refugees, who left their houses a year age with only the clothes on their backs, gave us K20,000 to buy ducks and chickens in Xieng Lom. Salt, formerly purchased in Tha Thom, Xieng Khouang, and Luang Prabang when these markets were available, will be purchased in Ban Keun for K15,000 a tom. Five tons have been ordered initially. Inquiries have been made about buying mechanical plows (which were advertised over the radios), a rice mill and water pumps. Informal co-ops would be formed in the interested villages, handed by the naibans, to raise the money. Arrangements have been made with RLG/AGR to distribute 200 kg of Indian potatees, which would be paid back at harvest time.

In an effort to bring more feed into Muong Soui are (hopefully taking away the soldiers's excuse for robbing the villagers), with the assistance of Col. Sing, RO/Transportation, the Chao Khoueng of Sayaboury and the Chao Muong of Xieng Lom a sizable amount of feedstuffs will be purchased in Xieng Lom for shipment to Muong Soui.

This report is intended to illustrate the progrees here, over and above the number of scheols, wells, markets, dispenseries or pieces of school furniture built to date. Though the construction project in Muong Soui are not inconsiderable by any means and would compare faverably with USAID efforts in other areas, they do not convey, adequately, the <u>real</u> development taking place. Of far more considerable significance, I think, are the attempts to bring together buyens and sellers in different parts of the country and to reduce the monetary costs to USAID of maintaining a rural development program in Muong Soui. A motor pool mechanic paid, what I consider to be the highest compliment when, after observing operations for a few days, remarked that this program "was not a Khet <u>Phatanakhone</u>, but a business". And that, in sum is how we try to run Forward Area Ops/Muong Soui.

April 4, 1967

Story on Tha Thom: Troops of MR 5 have the responsibility for the security in the villages and perimeters of the areas with the Province of Borikhane. Generally this means most of the valley area south of Tha Thom proper. Unit strength: BI 12 - 4 Co's (full strength); BI -21 - 2 Co's (full strength). Major Khongsavanh's units are responsible for the security north of Tha Thom.

Refugees arrived from Muong Ngan 3/27/67. Total of 66 people. Former RLG Tasseng led the group out. The people have been under PL control for several years. For the most part they have been ~~and~~ excluded from PL affairs and have little to offer in the way of information. They did confirm that trucks can use the road all the way to Muong Ngan now. The unfriendlies have apparently dug in and are well supplied in the high mountain positions (UG 555075, UG 556072, UG 632065) overlooking Tha Thom which were formerly occupied by GM 13, but were abandoned due to no support and differences between MR 2 and MR 5.

Infiltration route for support unfriendlies at Pha Le Vec (UF 153669) comes direct from XK and bypasses Muong Phan and Muong Ngan. Little info was available on this. The route generally goes through LS 95 area, thru Phong Than (UG 5010), crosses Nam Sane north of Tha Thon (Ug 4804) and on to Nam Nhiep across to Pha Pha Le Vec. No villagers are used for this supply mission. Rumor had it that BN 5 (Lao) also a Meo Bn and VC Bn have made this trip, but is unconfirmed by eye witness.

Separate paper will be written on political organization of Muong Ngan area. Additional specific info (names, places, etc.) available from these people, but not included in this general report.

Source states that the majority of the people dislike the 3 years they have been under the PL control. However, daily propaganda has convinced people they will be massacred in the worst way by RLG forces.

Source states that he will ask if any of the refugee group will be willing to return as intermediate for contact penetration of Muong Ngan. Source's sone is soldier there. Refugee list will include families which still have relatives in Muong Ngan that are Issara officials, teachers, etc.

Tasseng of Tha Thom states that people who have left Tha Thom (those who have paddi) will return and plant. Those who make highland rice will stay wherever they are.

The village ADC's are still there, about 70 men, but there is some question as to what happened to their weapons. I requested a report on this.

Fm : Team 151

No. 473 - 06 1300 April 67

To : Maj. Youa Vang Ly.,

Number of refugee at 'Houei Hin Sa':

- Old number of refugee at 'Houei Hin Sa', 162 families (919 persons). And on 23 - 24 Mar. 67, refugee from 'Nong Khang', 17 families (44 persons) come to add.

Now 'Houei Hin Sa' has 179 families (963 persons).

Team 151

April 7, 67 - ss.

1966 - March 1967

Informant: Buddhist monk Bounsi Vanthavon who escaped to RLG on a April 1967.

Immediately following the appointment of Pali as head of Buddhist priests in areas of Xieng Khouang Province under PL control, new regulations controlling the behavior of priests appeared, some of the provisions of the regulations were as follows:

(1) Priests were not to conduct religious services in the Wats and were to discontinue religious practices. Priests were to remain in the priesthood, but were to discontinue all religious practices.

(2) All priests, without exception, were to work in the fields or on labor projects for the good of the nation.

(3) Prayer before meals was to be discontinued until further notice.

(4) Donations to the Wat were forbidden. Priests were obliged to cook for themselves the rice they earned by working, only those priests who obeyed orders would receive food.

(5) Priests who travel must have a travel permit signed by Pali. violators were to be arrested.

The priests were disturbed when these regulations were premulgated, but most priests obeyed them. One priest and three novices fled to the Wat under gorvernment control in Ban Na (TG-8436) in March 1967, the informant believed that others would leave also if they knew how to escaped.

ORA:ps:6-17-71

Mid - April 1967

A resident of Ban Sam Kene (UG-5231) about 3 Km north of Muong Phan (UG-5328), told another villager in Ban Houei Ong (UG-5134) in mid-April 1967 that PL forces in Muong Phan were having disagreements with the NVA personnedl there because members of the NVA had ordered the PL ADO soldiers to tranport supplies to the front line daily. In addition the Vietnamese made all attack plans without consulting the PL and had conscripted rice, domestic animals and other iteme of food from the families of ADO soldiers and other villagers without compensating them.

ORA:ps:6-17-71

3 - 9 May 1967

At 0400 on 3 May the enemy began shelling a Meo ADC position at Ban Nong La (UG-5941), 16 Km NE of Muong Phan (UG-5328). After heavy fighting, friendlies withdrew recaptured Nong La on 6 May at 1700.

There have been many recent reports of enemy movements NE of Muong Phan toward this area around Nong La. Also numerous reports have indicated movements toward San Tiau (LS-2).

ORA:ps:6-17-71

Tom Barnes
Emb/Pol

3 May 1967

T. Collins
ROD/M. Soui

Xieng Dat

This will, hopefully, fill in whatever gaps exist on information concerning the subject and is the result of interviews with some of those on the side of the "bad guys" during the 1962 incident.

A. What is Xieng Dat?
Xieng Dat (locals pronounce it Xieng Deth) is a tasseng (in Muong Peck) west of Muong Soui encompassing a valley of that name and those villages on the surrounding hillsides. Thai Neua lived in the three valley villages (Xieng Khong, Xieng Deth, Muong Khiem) while Meo and Lao-teung were on the higher levels.

B. Background
1. According to a former resident of Xieng Deth, Kong Le occupied the valley in early 1961 and when he was attacked by the Meo, the Xieng Deth people, together with nine families from Xieng Khong, hid in the woods (No mention was made of Muong Khiem). The remaining twenty-five families from Xieng Khong fled to Muong Kham (Ban Pan area) on the PDJ "to get as far away from the fighting as possible." As it turned out, this group had it worse out on the Plain.
2. When hostilities had died down, the FAR commander in the area created a refugee center at Xieng Khong and brought the aforementioned families out of hiding (with the exception of those who fled to the PDJ).
3. Personalities involved
a. Capt. Somboun - FAR commander and a native of the valley
b. Boun Et - tasseng and father of Capt. Somboun
4. According to the present tasseng (a Lao-teung at Thae Khong), Somboun drafted everyone in the tasseng and formed seven companies of village militia (taham ban).

C. The incident (as stated by the present tasseng)
Somboun decided to defect and requested assistance from the Pathet Lao at Phou Soung (site 156) to carry out the murders which subsequently resulted from his decision. When I asked what was the role of the Muong Khiem villagers (Somboun was a native of this place), the tasseng replied only that "they were all friends and relatives of Somboun." How did the incident affect the relationship between Boun Et and Somboun (father-son). "Boun Et tried to kill his son." What was the role of the Lao-teung? "This incident took place in the valley and we did not know of it until the PL came through, pointed guns at us and told us to get moving out of here." Why did not the Lao-teung do anything to stop the course of events. "We were only Lao-teung with no powers. Boun Et was the tasseng and his son was the military commander."

D. Immediate aftermath

1. According to the present tasseng, the Lao-teung went to Phou Vieng (site 197) for a short time, then fled from the PL back to their old homes and were not bothered or held responsible for the incident By the Meo.
2. Somboun fled to Phou Soung, later defected from the PL and threw in with Kong Le. Events are hazy after that but the tasseng thinks Kong Le turned him over to authorities in Vientiane and he was finally shot at Long Tieng.
3. The Muong Khiem people fled to Phou Soung and then went to Muong Soui with Somboun.
4. The former Xieng Deth resident said the Xieng Deth and what was left of the Xieng Khong group fled to Phou Vieng and later returned to Vang Vuang (YD 56.52; on the Nam Ting north of the valley).

E. Subsequent events

1. Large quantities of refugee relief supplies were given to the tasseng (Boun Et) for distribution, but he sold them instead. He was subsequently thrown out in 1964 for his wrongdoing and the present Lao-teung tasseng was installed (Boun Et was a valley-type Thai Neua).
2. The Muong Khiem group wandered (Vientiane, Vang Vieng) until early 1966, always moving when it came time to get off refugee relief and a rice crop in, when they settled at Phou Vieng (18 families). Six families have opened up new paddy land (including the former tasseng, who is still living) at Na Nam, west of Phou Vieng; the Meo allowed four families to return to Muong Khiem and then refused to let them get the land ready for a crop or to let them return to Phou Vieng (three went to Ban On near Vang Vieng and one escaped back to Phou Vieng).
3. The group that fled to the PDJ in 1961 (before the 1962 incident) escaped in June, 1966 through site 88 and has been relocated at Vang Vuang; they had hopedto return to their former paddy lands. They have been provided with rice and other SW-type goodies.
4. The Lao-teung are on apparently good terms with the local Meo, would like to get out from under the neutralists and are still ignorant enough of world political realities to have asked to "kaun kop American because they don't seem to be getting anywhere by working through the Lao."

re: earlier report re 13 Jan 69 report

F. Conclusions and recommendations

1. It appears from the above account that the main local culprits involved were the villagers from Muong Khiem and the others were forced to retreat with the PL. From past accounts it seems that everyone in "Xieng Dat" was held responsible; if the foregoing narrative can be considered credible, a definition of Xieng Dat is essential to an understanding of the situation.
2. As previously mentioned this report is based on interviews with some of the reputed "bad guys". It should, therefore, be presented to the reputed "good guys" (i.e. Meo) for clarification and verification.
3. As no current problems seem to center about the Lao-teung, there should be no reason why they cannot be brought within the scope of our rural development efforts, and especially that of promoting the establishment of a Lao-teung center at Phou Vieng.
4. The major problem at present is the pressure being exerted by the valley Thai Neua (Xieng Phong, Xieng Deth, Muong Khiem) to be allowed to return to their former paddy lands. The Muong Khiem, Xieng Deth (and nine families from Xieng Khong) should be told to fend for themselves as they have no one else to blame for their present plight. The group that came in from the PDJ apparently was not involved in the incident in any way and some effort might be made to resettle them back in the valley; if such a solution will generate friction with the local Meo other possible paddy areas might be explored.

CAPTAIN TOU YIA, DEPUTY FROM XIENG KHOUANG PROVINCE May 24, 1967

When I arrived in Lat Houang in early 1960, Tou Yia was one of the first people I met. He was head of a police group in the Xieng Khouang area. He not only did his job well, but was liked by all types of people, which were about 90% Lao.

After Plaine des Jarres fell, he evacuated approximately 6,000 people into the Ban Na (LS 15) area. Here he became the leader over these refugees as well as the military leader. He was responsible for holding Kong Le back plus the PL. He did it and did it well, with mostly refugees as soldiers. He became my Refugee Relief Assistant in that area, which later consisted of approximately 15,000 people. In the following 3 years he resettled most of these people making them self-sufficient. He also started the first refugee school for hill people, a small school with 27 children. The area now has 1,600 children in school.

In early 1965, General Vang Pao realized his value and had him come to Long Thieng as his assistant, working in Long Theing and Vientiane.

I think the election showd how the people felt about this man. He received a majority of votes in an area where about 75% of the votes were cast by Lao people, and he is a Meo.

Ernie

The List of ~~Chools~~Schools and Students for Province
SAM-NEUA. 1966-1967.

Nº	The Names of Schools	The Class-Rooms	The Students Boys	The Students Girls	Total	Obsrvatios
1	School Phonxay	P.6	25	2	27	
	- -	P.5	11	1	12	
	- -	P.4	22	5	27	
	- -	P.3	13	4	17	
	- -	P.2	12	6	18	
	- -	P.1	47	24	71	
			130	42	172	
2	School Ban Sone	P.1	14	7	21	
3	School Ban Houei	P.1	17	13	30	
4	School Muong Hièm	P.3	6	00	6	
	- -	P.2	15	00	15	
	- -	P.1	65	I7	82	
			86	17	103	
5	School Yoth-Fath	P.3.P2.	35	5	40	
	- -	P.1.	22	10	32	
			57	15	72	
6	School Phathy	P.4	I8	00	I8	
	- -	P.3	22	4	26	
	- -	P.2	II	00	II	
	- -	P.1	38	5	43	
			89	9	98	
7	School Houei- Ma	P.3.P.2.	36	00	36	
	- -	P.1.	35	3	38	
			71	3	74	
8	School Houei-Hok	P.3.P.2.	33	2	35	
	- -	P.1	36	25	61	
			69	27	96	
9	School Muong Yut	P.2.P.1	26	5	31	
I0	School-Pano	P.2.P.1	I2	00	12	
11	School- Ban-Na	P.2.P.1	I0	00	I0	
I2	School Sop-Ka	P.2.P.1	12	00	12	
13	School Houei-Meth	P.1	28	00	28	
14	School Phou-Chè	P.2.P.1	35	4	39	
15	School Houei-Moune	P.2.P.1	47	3	50	
16	School Houei-Hin-Xa	P.3.P.2	23	00	23	
	- -	P.1	70	4	74	
			93	4	97	
17	School Sala	P.2.P.1	24	2	26	
18	School Pa-kha	P.2.P.1	39	00	39	
I9	School Houei-Pa-Thath	P.1	28	00	28	
20	School Pha-Hang	P.2.P.1	47	3	50	
21	School Pha-Bong	P.3.P.2	35	00	35	
	- -	P.1	60	00	60	
			95	00	95	
22	School Houei-Kham-Moune	P.3	37	1	38	
	- -	P.2	46	1	47	
	- -	P.1	98	3	101	
			181	5	186	
			1210	159	1369	

Phonxay, le 24 May I967.

The Director of Groupe-scolar School,

Chanhoumar HOUNG NAKHONE

Muong Kassy Refugees June 7, 1967

Essentially, the refugees, numbering 1,408, people of 252 families, at Muong Kassy were created by a decision of the FAR commander to relocate these people within the security perimeter of Muong Kassy in January, 1967.

Col. Liet has had years of experience dealing with these security problems and has demonstrated that he knows what he is doing and how to do it. The people involved in this exercise were all Lao Teung. Their villages, scattered 10 - 20 kms. (1-2 days' walk) around the Muong Kassy valley, were being used by unfriendly elements based roughly south of the Muong Nan area (RB 0157). These elements have been utilizing their brethren L. T. as small staging areas for harassment of friendly security forces. Advantage of having food, bearers, current intelligence, etc., so handly obviously put friend at disadvantage. Co. Liet had little choice but to deny this refuge to the unfriendlies if he expected to maintain full security in his area of responsibility.

Incidental Information: The commander confirmed that supplies and command direction for the unfriendlies south of Muong Nan comes down the oft suspected route from Muong Ngoi (TH 5891) --running north and southeast of L. P. --across the Nam Khan river on down to the hills south of Muong Nan and west of Muong Kassy. This is the extension of the trail which supplies unfriendly activities in the area LS 225(lost recently), and harasses FAR stationed at Sop Tiek. (TH 4527) and roving bands north of junction of Rts. 7 and 13. Reportedly this "trail" goes onsouth inland from the Mekong and crosses into Thailand at various points.

The general condition of the "evacuees" was good. Most families were able to bring foodstuffs with them. Two villages of 278 people will probably run short on rice within the next month or so. (Ban Houei Lan and Ban Muong Tong). With the Forward Are Teams already well established at Muong Kassy, the integration of these people into the community should be no problem. All groups have planted crops this year and will be totally self-sufficient by the end of this year.

19 - 20 June 1967

Enemy attacks in Ban Na (LS-15) and Khang Kho (LS-204) areas.

Security of Sam Thong June 27, 1967

I have did much checking on the enemy situation in and around Site 20.

The enemy has taken an outpost outside Site 15, plus burnt one village that had over 150 people in it. Overran another village with approximately 150 people. These people plus others have reached Site 15 and sleeping outside in the jungle, in all approximately 400. Some more are coming in today because of airstrikes, it will be a few days before we know how many. Yesterday the enemy was on a mountain overlooking Site 15. These were air strikes put in. Seemingly this morning they have backed off some. But all this has caused Site 15 to completely evacuate. We are presently feeding these people out of Site 20. This consists of about 1,000 people.

The soldiers at 15 are presentlyholding and doing O.K. If they continue to do so, I cannot see Site 15 falling. The enemy again has come in closer between Site 15 and Site 72. Am waiting to see what there moves may be. OUr side has put additional troops in this area.

As for Site 20 itself there ~~hebexxxxxxxxxx~~ have been additional troops put out on the ridges, plus more troops have been put in Sam Thong proper, especially on night duty. Extra guns have been set up in Sam Thong. The small villages surrounding Sam Thong have been given more arms.

Sam Thong and especially the surrounding villages are probably more tense and shook more than I have ever saw them.

I cannot at this time see any immediate problem here. But it sure is worth being very cautions.

I feel we are taking all precautions as for Americans security. I don't feel it is the time for sight-seers, etc. The natives have told me the fewer US type the better, which makes their responsibility less.

MR. ERNIE KUHN

PHOUDENEDINE

5/7/67

①	REFUGEES.	27 F.	157 PEOPLE
②	ADC	13011	50 MENS
③	ADC	13012	50 MENS
④	ADC	13013	50 MENS
⑤	ADC	13014	50 MENS.

July - August 1967

During the first part of August 1967 there were indications of a possible enemy build-up in the Ban Nong La (UG-5941) Na Xieng (UG-5348) and San Tran (UG-5053) areas of Xieng Khouang. These areas are important in that they area headquarters of ADC troops.

San Tran, the closest base to Ban Ban, was lost and recaptured in late 1966. Since that time the enemy has boasted that he would attack and drive the friendly forces out of the area and has made treatening moves from time to time. In early May 1967 Ban Nong La was lost and recaptured.

The successful operation of VP's troops in the Muong Ngan and Muong Phang (UG-5329) area probably disturbees the enemy because of their inability to retake the area.

ORA:ps:6-21-71

8 August 1967

A PL defector, from Ban That (WB-8126), Tasseng Done Talat, Muong Champassak, at Muong Ngan (UG-6418).

Somsak, with 10 other men from his village, was tricked into going to Vietname for military training in 1961, a man named Sai came to Ban That and asked if any young men would like to learn to be truck drivers. Ten young men volunteered for training and walked together to North Vietnam. Once there they were told that they must first learn to be soldiers, and would then taught to be drivers. The men were all angry because of the deceit of the recruiter, but could do nothing to avoid conscription. After the completion of the basic military training the students were trucked from Vinh to Phong Savan, Laos. He defected in August, 1967.

The RLG propaganda themes which most impressed Somsak were those describing the harsh restrictions imposed on the people living in PL controlled areas, that soldiers could not visit their families, could not get married and had no money to s end home. Most of the soldiers preferred musical prpgrams (Radio) and rarely listened to propaganda messages, finding them boring.

ORA:ps:6-21-71

11 - 12 August 1967

The August 9 raid a Muong Ngan was apparently an inside job. Military commander at Muong Ngan is Ly Pao.

Three Meo came to Tha Thom on 11 August from Keo Set (UG-5513) with a note. They were sent to see VP. by one of his relatives who is Nai Ban. The Nai Ban stated in the note that he and his people are tired of living under the PL and wanted to help the RLG by defeating the PL. Once friendly forces have taken Keo Set the enemy will experience great difficulty in any attempt to retake the Muong Ngan valley.

ORA:ps:6-21-71

Refugees in Muong Ngan Area August 30, 1967

This is in reference to the refugees coming into the Muong Ngah area or better known as the Red River Valley.

There have been 267 people moved with most of their commodities from Thong Phan (UG 4918) to Phou Moun (Site 212) and still more to come. It probably will reach over 400. These peoples have been under the P. L. for over 5 years and asked to come out.

In the Red River Valley itself due to the fighting and bombing outside the area, 800 to 1000 people have or are leaving their homes, who will need help with rice. If we hold the Red River Valley, these people possibly will be able to go back and harvest their rice.

The ones going into Site 212 will become refugees, but I feel there is enough land to take care of an additional 1000 people.

New Refugees September 7, 1967

The following is a list of new refugees who have come in the past six to eight ~~weeks~~ weeks:

Houei Kha Moun (LS 111) - 121 people from Houei Pha Thap North and Houei Pa Thap South.

Pha Hang (LS 205) - 125 people from Khang Khao and Pha Pat. 134 people from Phou Louam/Khang Khow.

Nyet Phat (LS 179) - 52 people from Phou Pha Louam. 18 people from Khang Khow.

San Tiau (LS 2) - 127 people from Ban Ban.

Nam Song (LS 199) - 32 people from Sam Noi.

Phou Pha Louam (LS 228) - 180 people from general area Route 6.

Houie Hin Sa (LS 215) - 592 people from Nong Khang/Phu Bak area.

Houie Thong (LS 196) - 100 refugees from Ban Mok Pa (TH 9750), Ban Houie Sa (TH 9245), Ban Ken Sa (TH 8036), Ban Houei Soum (TH 7855).

Muong Hime (LS 49A) - 33 people from PL area to north. Will move to Phou Say.

Phou Say (TF 6072) - 257 people, all formerly with PL. Have mostly come from east of Sam Neua city, close to or over the border.

Phou Moun (LS 212) - Approximately 350 people. Soon will be more from PL ~~Texxiox~~ Territory north of Red River Valley.

Muong Ngam (LS 236) - At this time there are approximately 800 people who need help. This figure could rise considerably or could lower. If we keep winning or holding, it will get larger. If we lose, I am sure most of these people will stay where they are because of the rich valley.

Moung Soui Rice Deficit Sept. 28, 1967

PROBLEM: The population in the immediate Moung Soui area (encompassing some 4,000 people, of which approximately 3,400 are indigent types, and the remaining 600 refugees from other areas) are experiencing an acute rice shortage. This figure represents resident civilians, and they should not be confused with Neutralist military dependents.

BACKGROUND: Up until recent times, the area in and around Moung Soui had traditionally had a rice surplus economy. Livestock was prolific, with the average family owning at least 20 to 30 head (combined cattle, buffalo and horses). These animals served a dual function. Aside from tilling the land, the farmers were dependent on the natural fertilization afforded by the animals as they grazed during the off season in the rice paddies which otherwise would go unreplenished.

With the advent of open fighting on the PDJ, and the eventual retreat of the neutralists forces en masse from their abandoned positions back to Moung Soui, the delicate balance of the agricultural stability in the area was upset. Farmers were forced to sell their animals to feed the garrisoned troops. A small percentage were expropriated outright. This drain went unchecked and eventually led to the exhaustion of over 95 percent of the local herd (which the Chao Moung indicated at one time was as high as 10,000 animals). Along with it went a drastic reduction in rice production, which has led to the situation as it exists today. In short, Moung Soui is incapable of producing enough food to feed itself, at least at the present time. (There have been some encouraging indications that the economy has been able to recoup itself somewhat in recent months. The upcoming rice harvest looks to be one of the best that the area has had in the past few months. USAID RDD has also bee involved in some experimental programs involving improved varieties of rice, primarily the Philippine "miracle rice", artificial fertilization on existing types, and fish ponds to produce a protein supplement in the local diet).

The influx of refugees into the area was also a contributing factor to the area's present plight. Most were paddy farmers and were not accoustomed to the upland agriculture that they were forced to revert to. This led to some giving up farming altogether, to try and eke out a living in some other menial way, and thereby becoming a liability on an already sick economy. Those who preserved, on the other hand, have never been able to achieve self-sufficiency.

STEPS TAKEN: For quite some time the FAR in conjuction with the Neutralists, and under the auspices of RO were using "grant" aircraft to bring rice and other commercial cargo into Moung Soui for open market consumption. This was done for a number of reasons, most

ostensibly because there was a definite need on the part of the people for these commodities. However, the underlying political motivation was to keep commercial aircraft out of the Moung Soui area, which is considered "sensitive", especially in view of the high level of Royal Thai Army activity. These flights became very lucrative sources of income for anybody and everybody who was in a position to get his fingers into the pie. It was rumored that Col. Sing put the franchise for these flights up for grabs, charging a flat K 200,000 per flight commission. From there the winner of the contract would have to deal with FAR transportation Div. in Vientiane who would normally extract another 80 - 90,000 Kip in the flight. What this led to, obviously, was an unrealistically high price scale for the commodities when they were finally sold, and which was certainly not indicative of the gratis air lift supplied by RO.

It was never any secret that any of this was going on, but it was tolerated for what must have been the primary reason that the projects were started; to keep out commercial traffic. However when Sing began to supplement his free flights with commercial ones as well the free flights were cut off.

This solved the one problem of aircraft misuse, however rice became an even greater scarcity afterwards. At this point, people were willing to buy rice at just about any price that was charged, but none was available in quantity; only limited amounts of bootleg Neut rice.

USAID RDD Muong Soui was approached and an agreement was worked out where we would help to coordinate the purchase of rice in Vientiane for the people and that this operation would be sponsored by the Chao Moung working with the local tassengs and nai bans. I was told that the Neut liaison officer in Vte., Col. Somboun, would arrange for the shipment on RO aircraft, coordinating through FAR transportation channels. According to plan, Somboun was notified when the first 20 tons were ready for transshipment but the rice did not move. The best indications that I received as to why were to the effect that no "kickback" was in the offing. Finally, when pressures were brought to bear from other American interests, specially, ARMA, an airlift request was submitted to RO. So far 19 of the first 20 tons have arrived and was distributed to the people in Moung Soui,

PROPOSED FUTURE COURSE OF ACTION: If it be in our interests, I feel it would be worthwhile to continue to make rice available for sale to the people in question here, at least until the upcoming rice harvest in December when the situation will alleviate itself somewhat. This would amount to approximately 60 tons over the next two months. There are several justifications for doing this. Most obviously it will help to reduce the underlying resentment that the people here feel towards the

Neuts for being primarily responsible for their present predicament. Secondly, we will be giving some direct support to the local moung infrastructure which can stand some bolstering at this point, and which is integral in the execution of an effective RD program.

11 - 13 October 1967

On October 7, were attacks in the Muong Ngan area and on 8 October Ban Dok Mai (UG-6026) was captured by the enemy. By the afternoon of 11 October there was no other military activity in the Muong Ngan area. The enemy succeeded in taking high ground around Muong Ngan.

ORA:ps:6-21-71

26 - 27 October 1967

At 1745 hours on 26 October 1967 friendlies recaptured a key position on Phou Hom Chong (UG-587215) overlooking the Nam San valley and the Muong Ngan airstrip, this position was retaken during the enemy's 8 and 9 October attacks against positions around Muong Ngan.

ORA:ps:6-21-71

27 October 1967

During the week 21-27 October ADC forces succeeded in regaining the hight ground substantially assuring control over the valley.

The Muong Ngan valley is a rich fertile area which the enemy atempted to seize prior to rice harvest. FAR has retaken all the high ground around the valley which is now completely under thier control. VP. has encouraged the former inhabitants of Muong Ngan to return to harvest the rich rice crop thus denying it to the enemy. At present the rice harvest in half finished. The inhabitants of Tha Thom have aided in the harvest which has been estimated to be almost 1000 tons.

ORA:ps:6-21-71

CHRONOLOGY OF REFUGEE MOVEMENTS SAM THONG 1966

October

List of refugees during years 1962, 63, 64, are still at sites used and are 100% S.S., with exception of dependents does not include people in Sam Neua or north of PDJ in areas of flux.

LS-20 - 4,500
LS-65 - 3,000
LS-5 - 4,00
LS-14 - 13,~~000~~
LS-113 - 3,000 (15,000 dispersed status unknown)
LS-57 - 3,000
LS-50 - 4,500
LS-6 - 1,500
LS-33 - 6,000
Ls-117,26 - 41
123 - 78 -3,000
LS-15 - 5,000
LS-110,37,51
90,97 - 3,500
LS-46 - 3,500
LS-1 - 3,000
LS-71 - 3,500
LS- 25 - 4,000
LS- 38 - 2,500
LS-108 - 2,000
LS-16 - 3,000
Tha Thom/Paksane 2,500
LS-72 - 1,000
LS-126 - 2,500
LS-101,161,112, - 103 -2,000
LS-98 Ca 30,000 of which 15,000 100% S.S.; bal are deps.

November

Refugees that have become S.S. M. You - 1500
Pak Vang - 50
LS-173 - 800
Houei That - 200
Hat Khan - 500
LS- 28 - 3000
LS- 109 - 320
Nam Hau - 1430
PC 9797 - 900
Vang Khoma - 530
M. Cap - 130

CHRONOLOGY OF REFUGEE MOVEMENTS SAM THONG 1967

March

Refugees being relocated from 20A
Nam Pha Bridge (TG-8689) 155/555
Van Fong Gulch (TG-8605) - 50/344
Houei Nam Yen 19/115
Pha Khe (TF-8399) 44/294
M. Yon TF-8093) 126/628

* S.S. = SELF SUFFICIENT

Houei Kam Lang (TF-8282) - 20/146
Houei Nam Om (TF-8179) - 46/344
an additional 35/240 will go to Nam Om.

TOTAL: 2,666

April 20 — 420 Lao theung refugees from LS-33 to B. Sop Ba (UH-1105) unable to get good rice crop at LS-33

April 30 — Tham Hoc refugees since 1966 Dec 1966 - Pha Phoun 25/138
April 67 - to Pha Phoun 19/112
April 15 - 17, 1967 to Pha Phoun 59/298

Began filteving out after lost to enemy. These who did not leave the village after its fall reported extensive Laotheugg and rough treatment by the enemy (one village cited that all village animals had been shot and left to die a few cases of villagers being murdered were reported. Almost everybody out, now, 40 people who arrived on April 7 were ambushed just east of LS-127. One family received minor wounds.

Are also reports of 7/76 Tham Hoc people at Houei Chon (UH-0912)
Also at Pha Phoun (LS-230) are Lao from B. Tha Who came in January totally 16/85.

April 20 — Old Pha Phoun (UH-3201) refugees Meo - 75/389 Lao - 115/498 Laotheung - 212/1084

TOTAL: 402/1971

First left LS-127 area in February 1965, and went to LS-33 for 7-8 months. In September 1965 back to Pha Phoun, When Nakhang (LS-36) fell in March 1966, 50% went to Phou Vieng (LS-6) and half to Phou Cum (LS-50) In July - August back to Pha Phoun.

June (?) — Are 25,000 refugees in X.K. and Sam Neua Provinces. Are about 125,000 mil deps. Since Jan 1966 have been movements totally 10,000 refugees. For example M. Jarb: M. Larb was lost on Dec 22, 1965, most of the 900 civilians there were able to make them way to LS-27. On February 2 the NVA took LS-27; about 200 people were able to excape into the jungle and began making their way to Na Khang (LS-36)

The healthiest made it to Na Khang in 4 days put the majority of the people took up to three weeks to travel thought the jungle some of them moves made it at all. Several of the first arriveds at Na Khang then accompanied soldiers back to the LS-27 area to bring out as many of their relatives as possible. In one case they ran into a

Woman on the trail who had been caught by the NVA as she tried to escaple. They had ripped her neck less off, had forn her baby from her arms and shot him, and had then broken her legs with rifle fire. These small groups of returnees were able to bring out about 90 people, but not without loung several KIA. Of the original 900 people at M. Larb, a total of 300 eventually made it to Na Khang, where many more died of exposure and lack of nourishment. Those who had been unable to escape were taken by the NVA to the LS-58 area for re - education.

October 12

Thai Phouan refugee from M. Ngan and B. Dok Mai:
from 236 - 78/414
from Dok Mai - 14/100
total an at 199 - 92/514

When M. Ngan was retaken over 600 of the people in M. Ngan people went with the PL according to Tasseng Sieng Ba 2165 stayed behind, and when the PL hit on 7-8 Oct. only 414 were able to get out immediately to 199. Hence, 1750 people unaccounted for.

On Oct 6 most of the people from B. Dok Mai (UG-6028) moved up to a nearby position because of deteriorating security around the village. Village fell on Oct 7, and 6/52 who had not moved out were taken by PL others walked to 199 arrived on 9th according to Nai Ban, Nai La, village never considered important by PL and they never visited on a regular basis until last year.

November 3, 1967

VP. intends to distribute rice at Muong Ngan in the following manner:

(1) Approximately 150 refugees now at Tha Thom (UG-5300) will walk to the Muong Ngan valley to aid in harvesting the rice crop. The approximately 1,300 refugees and villagers at Muong Ngan will be asked, on a volunteer basis, to aid in the quickest possible harvest.

(2) The refugees and villagers from Tha Thom and Muong Ngan will be paid in rice for their part in harvesting the crop.

(3) The rice will be milled and stored at Muong Ngan in one place so that it may be destroyed quickly if the enemy should make a major effort to recapture the valley.

(4) After the harvesters have been paid in rice, one-fourth of the remaining crop will be given outsight to the Muong Ngan populace, with the other three fourths made available, at a very low price, to all military and civilians in the Muong Ngan valley.

(5) The kip from this sale will be distributed in equal measure between the civil administration and the military command at Muong Ngan. Consumes goods from the Xieng Khouang Phanit Co. will be purchased from the portion of the sales profit. These goods will be turned over to the canton chief at Muong Ngan where they will be distributed without charge among the general populace.

Of the approximately 2,700 people at Muong Ngan, about 1,400 fled to Muong Phan (UG-5329) when RLG troops reoccupied the valley. Since the time of its recaputure, several ralliers to the RLG have pointed out that the people who fled from Muong Ngan atempted to push on to Xieng Khouang town, however, this movement was stopped by the enemy because there was not enough rice in Xieng Khouang town to feed them. One villager stated that the same was true of Myong Phan, so he returned to Muong Ngan.

In addition to the 1,300 people who remained at Muong Ngan when the RLG recaptured the area, there are the villagers who continue to trickle in from their hiding places. No precise figures are available at this time on the total number of people in the valley. Muong Ngan administration is now being handled by a Lao tasseng who was proposed by VP. and was accepted by the village leaders in the Muong Ngan valley. The Tasseng is a native of the area and has been a civil administrator in this area for many years.

ORA:ps:6-21-71

Refugee Movements — Jan. 2, 1968

The following are people who have been moved during November and December into areas where we feel the security will be such that after next rice harvest can become self-sufficient, or partially so:

From	Through	To	No. of People	Month
Hin Tang		Na Luang	64	Nov.
Hin Tang	Sam Thong	Na Luang	400	Dec.
Sop Khao		Na Luang	22	Dec.
Ban Ban	Sancho	Na Luang	99	Nov.
Long Thien		Na Luang	31	Dec.
Nam Mo		Na Luang	20	Nov.
Phou Pha Louam		Muong Hiem	305	Dec.
Ban Se	Houei Thong	Muong Hiem	58	Dec.
Thong Phan	Tha Thom	Phu Meun	217	Nov.
Muong Tam	Tha Thom	Phu Meun	41	Dec.
Tham Hua Lae	Muong Ngan	Phu Meun	54	Dec.
Ban Na Khouang		Houei Thong Kho	98	Nov.
Se of Houei Thong	Houei Thong	Phon Saat	505	Nov.
Ban Kang		Muong Ngan	45	Nov.
Ban Sang		Muong Ngan	51	Nov.
Na Bong		Muong Ngan	25	Nov.
Ban Ko		Muong Ngan	34	Nov.
Ban Dok Mai		Nam Song	52	Oct.
			2,221	

During January and February we will possibly have the following movements int Tha Thom, Xieng Dat, Muong Song, area around Site 196 plus relocating approx. 1,000 people from Site 205. This movement could reach 5,000 or more people.' Very few of these people are new refugees, but cannot grow rice where they are.

Royal Arms Force
MR II
Sub Sam Naue Zone

Nr 232

Monthly Report

The rice issue in the month of Feb. 68, as follows ;

Unit	40 KGs.	100 KGs.	Salt	Corn Meal
BS. 201	144	22	02	-
BS. 202	102	08	03	-
BS. 206	100	07	02	-
BS. 209	28	-	-	-
21st Regiment	08	-	-	-
BV. 26	113	69	02	-
BV. 27	172	55	08	-
BV. 28	132	04	02	-
Club	13	06	-	-
Sub Zone	16	-	-	-
Hospital	20	08	-	-
Pha Pone	28	04	-	-
Keow Bon	20	-	-	-
Bouom Long	17	-	-	-
Phaxn Hung	08	08	-	-
Houei Mah	10	-	-	-
San Pha Ka	15	-	-	-
Pha Thi	07	-	-	-
Houei Huk	07	-	-	-
Pha Bong	16	-	-	-

Unit	40 KGs.	100 KGs.	Salt	Corn Meal
Phu Chom	-	-	-	10
Refugee at 'Moung Haim'	12	-	-	-
Total	988	191	19	10

The rice received in the month of Feb. 68, as follows ;

40 KGs.	1,149	sacks.
100 KGs.	216	bags.
Salt	20	sacks.
Corn Meal	55	sacks.

S. 4

Na Khang

On 01.3.68

12 and 13 March 1968

The enemy forces in Houa Phan Province continued to attack and capture positions in the area around Phou Pha Thi (UH-6860),site 85, after taking the crest of the mountain on the morning of 11 March 1968, the enemy took Houei Kha Moun (UH-6868), site 111, on 12 March and then immediately began to put pressure on Houei Thong Kho (UH-1853), site 184. On 13 March the defenders of Phou Che (Tia) (UH-4364), site 185, evacuated their positions because of heavy small arms and mortar fire. The retreating troops were moving toward Houei Hin Sa (UH-5056), site 215.

On 12 and 13 March the flow and numbers of refugees and soldiers attempting to reach sanctirary from known concentrations in Houa Phan Province were as follows:

(1) 761 refugees were at Houei Tong Kho. This group had been moved by helicipter to Houei Tong Kho.

(2) 1,500 refugees were in the vicinity of (UH-1664).

(3) 1,500 refugees were at Houei Hin Sa, about 1,000 soldiers were also at Houei Hin Sa.

(4) 300 soldiers with dependents were moving toward Houei Hin Sa from the east.

(5) About 50 refugees and /or soldiers were in the vicinity of UH-5557.

(6) 64 refugees andlor soldiers were in the vicinity of UH-5856.

(7) 40 refugees were in the vicinity of Pha Hang (UH-7546) site 205.

(8) About 500 refugees were under enemy control in the vicinity of UH-5860. The enemy had turned this group back to the east and had attached an escort of troops to the groups.

In Xieng Khoueng Province the defenders evacuated Ban Pha (UG-1622), site 239, at 2100 hours on 12 March after the enemy had subjected it to heavy enemy mortar bombardment. On 13 March sporadic but heavy enemy artillery fire continued to harass Khang Kho (UG-0524), site 204.

People were becoming frightened because of the enemy's pressures throughout Houa Phan Province and on the southern edge of the PDJ. A delegation of civilian leaders met on 13 March with VP. and requested that consideration be given to moving some elements of the civilian population to Sayaboury Privince from the area just south of the PDJ. VP. relayed this request to his superiors in Vientiane but no action was expected.

ORA:ps:6-21-71

For Info Ambassador Sullivan per your request March 28, 1968

The recent movement of refugees from Sam Neua Province to Sam Thong was executed under the most hazardous and trying circumstances of any which we have witnessed in the past five years. Over eight thousand of these poor terrified people who had lost their homeland to the North Vietnamese Communists and who were fleeing for their lives were extricated from the grasp of the enemy. These people were picked up and moved to safety from areas surrounded by the enemy and at times from areas actually under enemy fire. The success of the operation was due to the coordinated effort of local Lao leaders and Americans who work in various aspects of the Northern Regions Program. This effort was characterized by a devotion to humanity in distress and actual heroism in some instances to a degree which we have ~~dx~~ seldom seen demonstrated in the past. We are pleased to suggest to you the following people and groups of people who in our opinion are worthy of commendation for their effort inthis instance.

1. Mr. Ernest C. Kuhn, OOA Refugee Relief USAID - For Sam Neua Province
Ernie has worked with the Sam Neua people since his assignment to Sam Thong and developed a love and affection for them which was clearly demonstrated during the above movement. He had overall supervision of the operation in the Sam Neua area and risked his life on several occasions to insure that as many people escaped as possible. He was air evacuted from Site 111 while it was under heavy enemy attach. His friend and co-worker Captain Gia Tou was killed by enemy~~xfirex~~ fire while he and Ernie were searching for ~~ex~~ refugees in a helicopter.

2. Dr. Frank Becker, Dental Consultant - USAID PHD
Frank stayed with Ernie in Sam Neua and with the refugee group throughout the operation and in addition to coordinating medical care for the refugee group performed innumerable tasks to insure success of the operation.

3. Edwin T. McKeithen, III - OOA Refugee Relief USAID
Win has spent about 24 hours a day assisting in Sam Neua and supervising the logistic support from Sam Thong. His remarkable ability to communicate in Lao, Meo and Lao Tueng is invaluable.

4. Paul White, IVs Education
Paul voluntarily assisted in the operation and refused to leave his post at Sam Thong. He handled the bulk of the radio communication both day and night and did an excellent job of moving the refugees from Moung Soui to Sam Thong. He obtained cooperation from the Neutralists at Muong Soui that many of us have been unable to obtain in the past.

5. Blaine W. Jensen, OOA Refugee Relief USAID
Blaine was called from Houei Sai to assist in the movement. His experience, skill and overall capability was invaluable in the ~~experience~~ Sam Neua and Moung Heim Areas. He has again demonstrated that he is one of the outstanding young men in the mission in field operations.

6. Anne C. Bradley, Secretary USAID
Anne has worked continuously from before dawn until late at night to insure communication to facilitate support from Vientiane and Sam Thong. In a trying and harassing situation she has not lost her equanimity or good humor and her efforts made a major contribution to the success of the operation.

7. Patricia McCreedy, M.D., PHD
Pat has done her usual top-notch job of coordinating the medical support for the operation and assisting in coordination of the many other aspects of support, both in Vientiane and upcountry.

8. Edgar M. Buell, A/C Xieng Khouang
All things taken into consideration, Pop's know-how and leadershil and his ability to develop these qualities in both the locals and Americans makes such an operation as this possible. His devotion to and love of the Lao people is the spark that sets the fire. This is particularly true in respect to the following group of local leaders who have worked in the most dangerous circumstances day and night without rest. This is a unique group who have risen above ethnic and tribal considerations and think of Laos and all its peoples as one country and their country.

(219) MEO (~~Ban Sala~~)

April 11, 1968

SITE	FAMILIES	PEOPLE	
111	70	458	
Houei Ka Dok	52	313	
85	186	1071	1271 (1221)
107	27	77	Most to Phu He
~~86~~ 205	19	80	420 Families
Ban Sala (Near 85)	34	258	2398 People
Houei Nam Oun (Near 205)	23	94	465 type ~~420 - 2507~~ 294 - 1026
Phu Kong (Near 111)	9	47	
			466 type 246 - 1481
Houei Loi	29	203	
215 Houei Poak	24	127	
Chom Kup	41	217	
Phu Bok	77	443	Most at Pha Khe; Pha Nok Kok Nam Pha Noi
185 (~~Near 76~~)	83	630	465 Families (mostly mil. dep.)
Houei Meui (NEAR 76)	17	120	2912 People
~~205~~ 76	194	1172 (1292)	
	885	5310	

There are the zones 12 + 15 (+ perhaps others) people sitting on their asses down the road that we have been trying to move. We have given them written orders, approved by V.P. that we will help no one after 20 April; i.e, ~~we~~ be at Phu He by 20 April or forget about assistance. (We will not stick to this strictly, but we will make a distribution to those at Phu He shortly after the 20th) → over

The police at 20 have found the following people around here:

Pha Bong	134
~~Pha Thi~~ Phu Che	199
Houei Khammoun	16
Pha Thi	23
Sala	55
	427

We don't know about 20A. Several small groups have walked from ~~the~~ Nam Yen (truck terminus) up to site 161, + others say they are on their way to 50! (They walked around Sam Thong several nights ago)

Most of ~~these are~~ the people around 20 + 20A are part of the zones 12+15 crew.

~~Bo~~

D

LAO

LAO AT HOUEI SAI:

SITE	FAMILIES	PEOPLE
Muong Yut	15 14	53 72 (241)
Houei Nen	48	182 ~~193~~
Keo Sang	9	61
Nong Khang	17	98
Na Then —	26 25	127 128
Khua Din	8	44 45
Muong Et	8 3	24
Ban Chat	18	86
Ban That	11	62 68
Hua Sieng	12	44 55
	186	883

Original villages

50 - 219

465- ~~460 - 420 - 2507~~

466 - 155 - 660

Ban Na	15	72
Houei Tong	5	24

Refugee Movement from Sam Neua Province April 23, 1968

I have received the following information from Sam Thong concerning the movement of combatants, dependents, and refugees from Sam Neua Province. These figures are not yet complete as all of the refugees coming from Sam Neua have not yet been permanently relocated. However, this is the best information we have to date. At the present time the figures show the following:

Combatants*	Dependents	Refugees	Total
420	2,130	4,000	6,590

Attached to this memorandum is a chart showing the breakdown of the above figures, including previous and present locations.

Attachment

* Combatant figure estimated since Combatants and Dependents mixed together in information from Sam Thong.

Sam Neua Refugees (as of 4/22/68)

	Combatants	Dependents	Refugees	Total
Located at Phu He	170	920	1,680	2,770
From				
Houei Kha Moun (Site 111)	20	130	310	460
Houei Kha Dok (Site F)	30	140	150	320
Houei Ma (Site 107_	20	40	20	80
Sa La	20	110	120	250
Phou Pha Thi (Site 85)	60	430	940	1,430
Pha Hang (Site 205)	20	70	140	230
Located at Sam Thong and Road	200	1,030	1,690	2,920
Houei Hin Sa (Site 215)	80	340	580	1,000
Phu Che (Site 185)	30	180	420	630
Houei Meui	-	20~~20~~	100	120
Pha Bong (Site 76)	90	490	590	1,170
Located at Houei Sai (DZ "O")	50	180	670	900
Na Muong	-	10	70	80
Muong Ut	-	10	50	60
Houei Men (Site 198)	20	50	110	180
Keo Sang (Site 215)	-	-	60	60
Nong Khang (Site 111)	-	-	100	100
Na Thene (Site 215)	-	10	170	180
Muong Et (Site 111)	-	-	30	30
Houei Thong	-	-	20	20
Ban That (Site 76)	30	100	60	190
GRAND TOTAL	480*	2,130	4,040	6,590

*Combatant figure estimated since Combatants and Dependents mixed together in information from Sam Thong.

05 JUNE 68

ERNIE/

SITE 36 REPORTS FOLLOWING NOS. OF PEOPLE

RECEIVE RICE DISTRIBUTION OUT OF SITE 36.

(1)	BS201	159	420
(2)	BS 202	215	247
(3)	BS 206	220	223
(4)	~~BS 209~~		270
(5)	BV 26		224
(6)	BV 27		210
(7)	BV 28		108
(8)	BS 204		315
~~(9)~~	~~ZONE 5A~~		70
(10)	~~ZONE 11~~		97
215 (11)	~~ZONE 15A~~		56
76 (12)	~~ZONE 15B~~		20
(13)	~~ZONE 14A~~		30
(14)	~~ZONE 14B~~		20
(15)	TEAMS		50
(16)	OFFICE/HANGSAO PERSONNEL		20
		TOTAL	2380 PERSONS.

King dom of Laos
Xieng Khouang Privince
USAID/Sam Thong

No. 39

Transmittal Note
Daily Report

TO: The Director
Ministry for Social Welfare, Vientiane

SUBJECT: To support refugees from Phu Vai, Meo Region Xieng Khouang.

There are 24 families or 156 refugees have moved from KS. area to seek asylum with the RLG. On July 11, 1968, the refugees are provided with commodi-ties

Remarks: A list of commodites provided to the refugees is attached herewith.

Sam Thong July 12, 1968

DIST:

(Signed)

The Director of USAID

Kong Cheu Koe Mua.

ORA:ps:6-9-71

UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION

Kingdom of Laos
Khoueng Xieng Khouang
Sam Thong USAID, Office.

No. 48

Transmittal Note:

Daily Report

TO: Minister of Social Welfare , Vientiane

SUBJECT: Refugee Relief.

On 8/1/68, USAID has provided an amount of commodities for relief of refugees totalling 85 families, 557 persons, who have evacuated in Phu Moun, Muong Meo, Khoueng Xieng Khouang.

They have now settled at Ban Nam Fan, Muong Meo, Khoueng Xieng Khouang. The list of commodities is attached herewith.

Thongsayanakhone, 8/1/68.

(Signed) (Illigible)

Nai Kong Chi Heu Hua.

Copy to:

Maj. Gen. Vang Pao, Cdr, 2nd MR.
Chao Muong of Xieng Khoueng
Director of USAID/L
Chao Muong of Muong Meo

- for infor

ORA:ps:6-9-71

Kingdom of Laos
Khoueng Xieng Khouang
Sam Thong USAID Office

No. 49

Transmittal Note

Daily Report

TO: Minister of Sicial Welfare, Vientiane

SUBJECT: Refugee Relief.

On 7/31/68, USAID has provided an amount of commodities for relief of refugees totalling 12 families, 57 persons, who have evacuated from Ban Dene Din, Phak Tok, Pha Keo, Hom Pheung, Tasseng Kham Neua Muong Kham, Khoueng Xieng Khouang.

They have now settled at Bouam Lung, Khoueng Xieng Khouang the list of commodites is attached herewith.

Thongsayanakone, 8/2/68

(Signed) (Illigible)

Na[1] Kong Chi Keu Moua

Copy to:

Maj. Gen Vang Pao, Cdr. 2nd MR.
Chao Khoueng of Xieng Khouang
Director of USAID/L.
* for info.

ORA:ps:6-9-71

General report on northern Sam Neua — December 16, 1968

HOUEI HIN SA - LS 215

VILLAGE	ORIGINAL LOCATION		PEOPLE
B. Pha Kha	UH 8262	H-34 Pick up at UH 8071 to #215	280
Dok On	UH 6946	H-23 Pick up at UH 6947 to #215	238
Houei Moun	LS 221	Walked to LS #215	173
Houei Kha Moun	LS 111	H-34 Pick up at UH 6974 to #215	172
Houei Hu	UH 6946	H-34 Pick up at UH 6547 to #215	70
Phu Tia	LS 185	Walked to LS 215	31
B. Sala	UH 7959	50% walked to LS #215	
		50% A-34 Pick up at UH 6974 to #215	292
Houei Ma	LS 107	30% Walked - 70% Pick up	
		H-34 Pick up UH 6547 to #215	504
Houei Kha Dok	UH 6974	H-34 Pick up UH 6277 to #215	390
Hong Non	LS 86	H-34 Pick up UH 6547 to #215	170
Na Pheng	LS 86 Area	H-34 Pick up UH 6547 to #215	74
Houei Nam Oun	LS 86 Area	H-34 Pick up UH 6547 to #215	59
Houei Yha	UH 7552	H-34 Pick up UH 6146 to #215	237
Pha Thi	LS 85	Walked to #215	101
Houei Khi Lin	L 04 Area	CAS / Pick up with Air	
		USAID?/ Cover to #215	135
Keo Sang	UH 6840	H-34 Pick up at UH 6146 to #215	Lao Theung 17
Moung Yut	UH 7056)		
Ban Na	UH 6160)	H-34 Pick up at UH 6974 to #215	10 men
B. Phan No	UH 6768)		Lao/Thai Khaw
			2968*

With the one exception as noted, all evacuations were made by USAID/ Contract aircraft. Some pick-ups were made by CAS/Contract aircraft on a space available basis only with prior consent of USAID Ops Officer. All decisions to move refugees were made by USAID and RLG officials - generally military officers or zone commanders. No moves were initiated by CAS or undertaken by them except as noted. Approximately 20-25% of the total refugees walked to LS 215 and nearly all walked from their original areas to areas under RLG control before being picked up by aircraft.

*With the two exceptions as noted, all refugees are Meo.

HOUEI MOUN - LS-221

During the past week or more the following villagers in the LS 221 - #179 area have been forced by enemy action to leave their villages or have been cut off from their rice fields:

Houei Moun Neua	68 People (Meo)
B. Houei Ung	27 People (Meo)
Phu Din Kha	57 People (Meo)
Pha Kha Neua	98 People (Meo)
Keo Sang	27 People (Meo)
Houei Moun Kang	48 People (Meo
Houei Moun Dai	31 People (Lao Theung)
Pha Kha Dai	49 People (Meo)
Houei Nok Kook	59 People (Meo)
Total	463

These people are remaining in the LS 221 area.

PHU LIK - UH 8071

VILLAGE	ORIGINAL LOCATION	WALKED TO PRESENT LOCATION	PEOPLE
Houei Hak	UH 8573	UH 8770; UH 8572	124 Lao Theung
Houei Sa Bou	UH 9073	UH 8071	94 Meo
Pha Khom	VH 0168	UH 8171	44 Meo
Houei Too	UH 9573	UH 8071	49 Meo
Nam Song	UH 9181	UH 8071	43 Meo
Ban Biat	UH 9575	UH 8071	72 Meo
Long Maow	UH 9883	UH 8071	28 Meo
B. Pha That Neua	UH 8262	UH 7770	129 Meo
B. Pha That Dam	UH 7670	UH 7770	229 Lao Theung
Chom Khoup	VH 0466	UH 8071	339 Meo
Houei Lak	UH 9274	UH 8071	42 Meo
Yhot Thong	UH 9367	UH 8071	32 Lao Theung
			1225

Most pro-RLG Meo in the general area east of Pha Thi have gone either to Phu Lik or LS 215. However an increase in Lao Theung refugees is ~~xxxxxxxxx~~ expected. No evacuation is planned for this group. However I have agreed that if the area is heavily attacked we would try to move the refugees by H-34 a short distance to the north across the Nam Het. (The river here is almost impassable due to rapids and a narrow gorge with steep cliffs on both sides of the river.)

HOUEI KHA DOK - UH 6974

At Phu Houei Kha Dok, UH 6974, there are 200 Meo refugees from the general area of LS 111 and Houei Kha Dok. There are an additional 80 Lao Theung refugees at UH 7474 whose original location is unknown at this time. There are an additional 220 Lao Theung (Thai Phyag) refugees at UH 6174, originally from UH 5973, Ban Phian Khai. No aircraft has been used to move any of these people.

C-46 rice drops are put into LS 215, Houei Kha Doic, UH 6974, and Phu Lik, UH 8071. Rice dropped at #215, in addition to local refugees, is redropped by porter to all refugees and para-military at LS 221, and the refugees located at UH 7474 and UH 6174. Rice redropped to refugees is done by USAID aircraft except at #221 where the drops in the past have been by CAS aircraft for para-military combatants. However, now that there are several hundred refugees in the #221 area, USAID porter drop requirements will increase.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Philip Gullion
Chief, RR & R, RDD

DATE: 13 January 1969

FROM : Terry Collins
RDD/Sam Thong

SUBJECT: Tasseng Ang, Muong Soui

Background

Tasseng Ang, which originally comprised about 1300 individuals from twelve villages (according to my predecessor, Paul Larson) in the Phou Khout region of Muong Soui, was removed to the rear areas of Xieng Nga and the New Market place during a neutralist offensive in early 1966. It was argued at the time, that this move would take these people out of the line of fire, afford increased protection against enemy infiltration, and make it easier to keep an eye on those whose loyalties the neutralists claimed were suspect.

Prior to this attempt to retake Phou Khout, and dating from the advent of the large-scale neutralist occupation in April, 1964, no reasons had been advanced for moving these people. They were, however, allowed to go back to bring in the 1966 rice harvest, but since then have tilled hillside plots and hired themselves out as day laborers. They have not received any significant relief assistance.

Current Situation

A deputation from Tasseng Ang, led by Pia Sim, the neutralist assistant Chao Muong (Muong Pek), recently journeyed to Vientiane and requested Ministry of Social Welfare assistance to resettle in Vientiane province. Shortly thereafter, at a meeting arranged by Mr. Gullion, I expressed to the Ministry's Mr. Houmpheng, Col. Sing's willingness to allow this group to leave Muong Soui together with his reservations concerning possible land tenure and/or flooding problems in the desired resettlement area. My own suggestion, at the time, was that an attempt should be made to keep them in the Muong Soui area because 1) if anyone resettled successfully outside neutralist control, many others would want to leave also and 2) if everyone departed, the military might feel scant responsibility for defending Muong Soui any longer. The upshot of the meeting was that I was urged to "check around" upcountry and submit a report outlining recommendations as to what to do with these people because the Prime Minister was pressuring Mr. Houmpheng for a decision.

The Chao Muong at Muong Soui noted, during my subsequent visit, that the order had been given for these people to return to their villages but no one had gone back, which immediately aroused my curiosity as to why the people had been petitioning the Ministry to go the other way. So I went to see Pia Sim, who indicated that the order was true but that "the people have no buffalo for plowing." When I pressed further, inquiring as to whether they would return if buffalo were made available, the truth finally spilled out. "Thanh", he said, "even if they have buffalo the people won't go back because of the soldiers. You know how it is. The unit stationed in Tasseng Ang now appears to be a good one and their commander has promised security against enemy harassment, but what guarantee have we that this unit will always be stationed there. Up at the front, there's really little control over the soldiers' actions; that's why all the buffalo are gone. No, Thanh, the people can't go back. If it was at all possible to make a living in peace and security they would return; for sure, among those who depart Muong Soui, there will be much weeping because the people love their homes and some will even starve to death rather than leave. The only reason anyone wants to go at all is to be able to make a living, which is no longer possible in Muong Soui."

Conclusions

1) The Tasseng Ang people are not so much refugees from enemy activity as they are victims of the neutralist occupation forces. While in their villages, they were subject to continual "requisitions" of buffaloes, pigs, chickens, rice, garden produce and personal possessions until little was left when they were removed to the rear areas in 1966 "for their own good."

2) Other Muong Soui naibans, not as yet uprooted but subject to the same pressures, have indicated if Tasseng Ang is resettled in Vientiane province, most of their own people will want to follow "because we work from sunrise to sundown and still do not have enough to eat." It is worth noting, incidentally, that many villagers are planting gardens again this year "because the soldiers only steal 50% of the produce now instead of 100% when you first came here, Thanh."

3) Allowing these people to move out will be comparable to treating persistent headaches with aspirin rather than going to the bother of determining the cause of the pain. Some of the population will leave and military-civilian relations in Muong Soui will continue, for those left behind, just like always.

It becomes more readily apparent with each passing day that the "forgotten war" here is coming down to the wire --for the present at least-- and the current victory will go to the contender who wants it the most. If we really want Laos to be free, it is high-time to quit proposing stopgap solutions to fundamental problems -- in this classic case, removing civiläans from an area as a solution to the problem, in actuality a national migraine headache, of poor military-civilian relations.

Recommendations

With the foregoing in mind, I propose three realistic (provided we really do want to come out on top) alternatives, leaving the ultimate choice, or combination thereof, to be made at a higher level.

1) Instead of allowing the Prime Minister to pressure the Ministry of Social Welfare to "do something about those refugees", he himself should be encouraged to straighten out his neutralist contingent in Muong Soui who are, for the most part, no better or worse in their relations with civilians than FAR units I have seen throughout the country.

2) Train and arm selected individuals in Tasseng Ang as a Village Self-Defense Force under the tasseng and naibans, and send the people back to their former homes. The national army being as undependable as it is, give the local villagers a greater share in their own security.

3) To keep this particular group in Xieng Khouang province and those left behind satisfied to remain in Muong Soui, together with fulfilling the people's desire to get out from under the neutralists, moving Tasseng Ang to Xieng Deth, Xieng Kong and Muong Chim would offer an ideal solution -- but for the politics involved. When Kong Le came through the area in 1961, the Thai Dam village of Xieng Kong went with him to the Plain of Jars after troops wiped out one entire Meo village nearby. In 1962, the ADC unit under Somboun,

the son of tasseng Xieng Deth, killed six Thais at Muong Chim, looted local villages, and drove the civilian population north with it before throwing in with the Pathet Lao at Phou Soung. Since that time the Meo have not allowed any of those who were around in 1961-62 to return to their former paddy fields, though a small group of refugees from another area was resettled in Xieng Deth in 1967.

The Chao Khoueng promised to discuss with the Meo leadership the possibility of resettling other families, who had no part in the events of 1961-62, in this area. I have done all in my power to improve Meo-neutralist relations over the past two and one-half years but I cannot, nor will I even attempt to, force the Meo to open these areas to resettlement. It is a shame that such good paddy land is going to waste, but I have neither the status nor the authority to do anything about it.

Final note

If we really want to keep Laos free from communism, let us discover what causes the headaches and cure them instead of continually prescribing aspirin for "temporary relief of headache, neuritis and neuralgia."

cc: ADRD/Vte
AC/XK
Emb/Pol
ARMA/Mg. Soui
RO/Mg. Soui
file

Dist.
Beyond his authority??
PG

Contingency

January 27, 1969

POTENTIAL EVACUATIONS

The following is an analysis of potential major evacuation situations related to major security changes:

Sam Neua Project Area

There are two main movements of people that would develop if the enemy chooses to increase their pressure in either the LS 215-184 enclaves or the LS ~~3~~6x 36 - LS 88 base areas. (Refer attached map.)

Briefly, people numbering approximately 10,000 in number would move on foot towards the LS 233, LS 33, LS 50 secure areas, in the event of increased enemy pressure at LS 215 - 184 vicinity.

If enemy pressure develops at either LS 36 or LS 88, or both, there will be a movement of 17,000 people towards the same LS 33, 50 enclave, from east to west. (Presently 3-4 thousand people have already made this move due to the pressure which collapsed the Ls 6 outpost.) These people will be moving from the LS 88, LS 219, LS 230 Phu Bia and in Moung Hiem Valley areas.

In the event that enemy pressure continues on to the LS 33 and LS 50 areas, we would have a total of well over 30,000 people moving on trails toward the abandoned LS 102 STOL strip and probably continuing westward on the Phu Fa ridge line. Probably Vang Pao would try to hold in this area, but if there was continued pressure, the people would eventually reach the Xieng Dat Valley area (LS 17). Another 10,000 would be accumulated along this route.

The above exodis assumes that a possible enemy blocking movement from the PDJ through the LS 6 or between LS 6 and LS 57 would not block this route. In the event the enemy could successfully block this ~~s~~x routes, we would have an evacuation problem with these trapped people.

NOTE: The enclave made up of LS 201, 231, 206 have no overland exist routes in the event of general collapse of defenses north of PDJ. These 4,000 people would have no way out other than airlift.

In the event LS 178 and LS 198 people decided to join a mass exodus, this would add, 5,500 people to the LS 50A area if they were not blocked by the enemy.

Xieng Khoueng

Continued pressure from the PDJ and east of Route 4 would continue to force people out of the Ls 2 and LS 208 areas. This move would end at LS 46. Pressure from the south could bring 3,000 people from LS 91, LS 45 areas.

Increased pressure on frontal areas of Ls 72, LS 5 with a main thrust at the Moung Cha Valley complexxx would create a rather large movement of people westward, depending on the extent of the enemy thrust. This would be difficult to project as panic might cause larger movements than actual situation warrants. Estimate of 75 to 100 thousand people within and around Sam Thong, Long Tieng complex could become involved.

Luang Prabang

Since there are few, if any, secure areas in this project area, if enemy pressure increased any more than at present, it would be unlikekly that any personnel could be evacuated either on foot or by air. Of the 15,000 people we now support in this project area, the possibility of more than 2,000 getting out would be remote. (More would possibly filter out over extended period of time.)

South Laos

Small refugee moves are expected if enemy pressure increased in Paksane and Thakhek. These will be on foot to the towns.

The only airlift requirement that might develop is in Saravanne where a total population of 15,000 people are being compressed into this valley. Attopeu estimates run to 3,000.

We would not expect any other moves since historically, these peope, both highland tribes and lowland Lao, stay in their home areas and have accommodated to the communist regimes.

PS1 / Houa Phan

APPROVAL NUMBER 9091 FOR HOUA PHAN PROVINCE
ACTIVITY PLAN NO. 2

ACTIVITY: DEVELOPMENT OF RURAL ECONOMY No. 9062

Sub-Activity: Rural Self-Help No. 9062-1

Funding: None

Title: Construction of 45 classrooms in 9 refugees villages.

Approval is hereby given to the Activity Plan numbered above which is attached hereto.

Purpose: To help villagers from evacuated areas to construct schools in new refugee settlements.

Local Currency Contribution: None

In Kind Contributions: Villagers will provide labor, lumber and local materials. RIG will provide roofing sheets. US AID will provide nails, tools and hardware valued at $898.00

APPROVED:

Kenneth R Monroe 1/3/69
US AID Controller Date

S. Douglas Martin 12/31/68
US AID Program Officer Date

MTD

James B. Chandler 1/8/69
US AID Acting Director Date

Plan 2

HOUA PHAN PROVINCE

By this Activity Plan No. 2, to be funded from Development of Rural Economy (Rural Self-Help) Activity, 9062-1 , the Provincial Administrative Council of Houa Phan, represented by the Chao Khoueng, and the US AID Area Coordinator, recommend:

Construction of 45 Classrooms in 9 Refugee Villages.

I. Objective:

To help villagers from evacuated areas construct schools in new refugee settlements.

II. Background:

Refugee movements in 1968 created the need for the following number of classrooms in the villages listed below:

Phou He	6 rooms
Thong Mieng	6 "
Houei Sai	6 "
Han Houei	2 "
Vang Kham	4 "
Na Sou	3 "
Phone Sa- At	3 "
Phone Xay	12 "
Houei Ngone	3 "
TOTAL:	45 rooms

All of these schools, which are under the jurisdiction of the PSI/Sam Neua can be considered as replacements for schools in insecure areas.

III. Plan of Action:

A. General:

The provincial administration of Sam Neua has already received about 2350 roofing sheets from CRA for the construction of the new classrooms.

The villagers will provide all of the labor and local materials needed to construct the buildings. They will also construct the needed school furniture from local materials.

USAID will provide nails, hardware, and some tools for construction of furniture, doors and windows, and to complete the buildings.

Teachers, who evacuated from their former locations with the village population, are available for all of the new schools.

B. Estimated Timing:

Start: January 1969
Completion: June 1969

Chief, Education Division/USAID

Date: 12-13-68

Director, Primary & Adult Edu., RIG

Date: 17/12/68

In addition to the clearances above, this Activity Plan was approved on Draft Activity Plan forms by the following officials:

RIG : Chao Khoueng/Houa Phan, PSI/Houa Phan, Commissioner for Rural Affairs

USAID: CEA/ Sam Thong, CDA/Sam Thong, AC/Sam Thong ,Chief/EDU, AD/RD.

These original copies are kept on file at RDD for reference. This final document is for your file.

APPENDIX A.

Obligations Summary:

A. Villagers will provide:

1. Personnel: Labor	1,500,000
2. Commodities: Lumber, local materials	4,500,000

B. RIG will provide:

1. Commodities: Roofing sheets 2350 sheets	1,410,000

C. US AID will provide:

1. Commodities: Nails, tools, hardware	$ 898.00

Summary of Total Estimated Costs.

	Dollars	Kip	Source	At market rate kip/dollar
A. Villagers:		6,000,000.		$ 12,000.00
B. RIG :		1,410,000		2,820.00
C. AID :	$ 898.00			898.00
TOTAL:	$ 898.00	7,410,000		$15,718.00

APPENDIX B

USAID Commodities:	Amount Each:	Dollar Value:
Nails, common, 1½ " 4d	15	75.00
" " 2" 6 d	25	125.00
" " 3" 10 d	25	125.00
" " 4½" 30 d	5	25.00
Hinge, Door butt 4" x 4"	45	18.00
Hinge, butt 3"x 3"	100	30.00
Barrel, Bolts 6"	45	14,00
Barrel, Bolts, 4"	100	14,00
Hook and Eyes 4"	10	5,00
Saw, Crosscut 24"	40	40,00
Hammer, Carpenter	40	64.00
Plane fack 2"	40	240.00
File, Triangular 6"	40	10.00
Padlock, 1½' w/o CH	30	20.00
Nails, Roofing (525 nails/Bx.)	50	60.00
Hasp, 3½"	30	33.00
Total :		898.00

H E Thomas
Final RDD Clearance

Date: 12/18/68

ແຜນປະຕິບັດງານເລກທີ ๘

ໂຄງຮ່າງຕາມແຜນການປະຕິບັດງານອັນນີ້ ຈຶ່ງຈະໄດ້ອາໃສເງິນຈາກແຜນການພັທນາເສຖກິຈແບບຮ່ວມມືຕົນເອງເລກທີ ๓๐ສ.๘-๑, ກອງປະຊຸມປຶກສາຫາລືນແຕ່ງ ແຂວງຫົວພັນ ຈຶ່ງມີທ່ານເຈົ້າແຂວງເປັນຫົວໜ້າ ແລະຫົວປະຊານງານຫ້ອງຖິ່ນ ຂອງວິຊາການຢູ່ເສດ ອໍານົດແນະນໍາດັ່ງຕໍ່ໄປນີ້:

ກໍ່ສ້າງຫ້ອງຮຽນ ๔๔ ຫ້ອງໃນໝູ່ບ້ານອົບພະຍົບ ๑ ແຫ່ງ.

๑. ວັດຖຸປະສົງ:

ເພື່ອຮ່ວຍເຫຼືອຊາວບ້ານໃນເຂດອົບພະຍົບຕ່າງໆ ຈຶ່ງໄດ້ຍ້າຍມາຈາກຖິ່ນອື່ນ ສ້າງໂຮງຮຽນຫຼັງໃໝ່.

๘. ຄວາມເປັນມາແຕ່ກ່ອນ:

ການອົບພະຍົບໃນປີ ๑๙๖๒ ເຮັດໃຫ້ມີຄວາມຕ້ອງການຈໍານວນຫ້ອງຮຽນໃນບ້ານຕ່າງໆດັ່ງມີລາຍຊື່ຕໍ່ລົງໃປນີ້ :

ນຸ່ນໃຕ	๗	ຫ້ອງ.	ທົ່ງມຽງ	๒	ຫ້ອງ.
ຫວຽງຊາ	๒	"	ຍານຕອງ	๘	"
ວົງຄໍາ	๔	"	ນາຫູ	๗	"
ໂພນສະອາດ	๗	"	ໂພນໃຊ	๑๘	"
ຫວຽໂວ	๗	"			

ລວມທັງໝົດ: . . . . . ๔๔ ຫ້ອງ.

ໂຮງຮຽນຕົ້ນໝໍ່ຢູ່ພາຍໃຕ້ເຂດກວດການຂອງຜູ້ກວດການຂອງຜູ້ ກວດການປະຖົມສຶກສາຈໍາເດີມ ຈຶ່ງໂຮງຮຽນຕົ້ນໝໍ່ສ້າງຂຶ້ນແທນໂຮງຮຽນຕ່າງໆທີ່ຢູ່ໃນເຂດທີ່ບໍ່ມີຄວາມປອດໄພ.

๗. ແຜນການປະຕິບັດ:

ກ. ທົ່ວໄປ:

ການປຶກສາຫາລືນແຂວງແຂວງຈໍາເໜືອ ໄດ້ຮັບສົ່ງກະສິເປັນຈໍານວນ ๘๗๔๐ ແຜ່ນຈາກຫຼືນຍີປຸ່ງຫມຸ່ນ ເພື່ອນໍາມາຫໍ່ຫຸ້ມສ້າງຫ້ອງຮຽນໃໝ່. ຊາວບ້ານຈະຈັດຫາແຮງງານທັ້ງໝົດ ແລະ ອຸປະກອນພາຍໃນຫ້ອງຖິ່ນ ຕາມທີ່ຕ້ອງການເພື່ອສ້າງອາຄານຕ່າງໆ. ພວກຊາວບ້ານຍັງຈະສ້າງໂຕະຕັ່ງສໍາຫຼັບໃຊ້ຮຽນ ພ້ອມຈະຈັດຫາອຸປະກອນພາຍໃນຫ້ອງຖິ່ນ.

ຢູ່ເສດຈະຈັດຫາຫຼັກຕຸ້ມ, ແລະເຄື່ອງເຫຼັກ ພ້ອມເຄື່ອງມືຊ່າງສໍາຫຼັບການສ້າງໂຕະຕັ່ງ ປະຕູ ແລະ ປ່ອງຢ້ຽມແລະ ສ້າງອາຄານຕ່າງໆໃຫ້ສໍາເລັດລົງ.

ຈະມີພາຊນະສໍາຫຼັບໂຮງຮຸ້ນ ຫຼັງໃໝ່ເຫົ່ານີ້ ຈຶ່ງພາຊນະເຫົ່ານີ້ໄດ້ອົບພະຍົບມາຈາກຖິ່ນເດີມຂອງພວກຂະເຈົ້າ ໃນເວລາຕ້ອນຮັບກັບພວກຊາວບ້ານ.

ຫົວຫນ້າສຶກສາທິການ ຝ່າຍປູ່ເສດວຽງຈັນ ແລະ ຄະນະຄົ້ນຄ້ວາປະເມີນວິທະຍາ ແລະ ການສຶກສາຢູ່ໃຫຍ.,

ໃນການຕື່ມລາຍເຊັນຂ້າງເທິງນີ້ ໄດ້ຕົກລົງຕົ້ນຕີຢູ່ໃນຮ່າງ ຂອງແຜນການປະຕິບັດງານອັນນີ້ ຈຶ່ງໄດ້ ສະເນີແລະຕົ້ນມາ ໃຫຍ່ເຈົ້າຫນ້າທີ່ ງົມຈຸ່ຕໍ່ລົ່ວໄປນີ້:

ຝ່າຍຮັຖບານ: ຫ່ານເຈ້ົາແຂວງ/ແຂວງຫົວພັນ, ຫ່ານເຈ້ົາເມືອງ, ຫ່ານຜູ້ກວດການປະຖົມສຶກສາ/ຫົວໜ້ ຫ່ານອະທິບໍດີງົມປົ່ນປຸ່ງຫມູ່ບ້ານ.

ຝ່າຍປູ່ເສດ : ທີ່ປຶກສາຝ່າຍປົ່ນປຸ່ງຫມູ່ບ້ານ, ທີ່ປຶກສາການສຶກສາຊຸມນຸມຈົ່ນຫຼີ່ຈຳເພາະ, ຜູ້ປະສານຫ້ອງຖິ່ນ ທີ່ຈຳເພາະ, ແລະຫົວຫນ້າບ່ອຍການແຜນກປົ່ນປຸ່ງຫມູ່ບ້ານຢູ່ເສດ.

ສຳເນົາຄັ້ງເລີ່ມຂອງແຜນການປະຕິບັດງານອັນນີ້ ໄດ້ຮັບຫຼືກສາໄວ້ທີ່ແຜນກປົ່ນປຸ່ງຫມູ່ບ້ານທີ່ຢູ່ເສດ, ເພື່ອ ເອົາໄວ້ເປັນຫຼັກຖານອ້າງອີງ ສ່ວນສຳເນົາສຸດທ້າຍແຈກຢ່າງໂຕ້ຫານ.

ສຳເນົາເພີ່ມ...ອ.

ພັທນາໂຄງຮ່ົ:

ກ. ຊາວບ້ານຈະຈັດຫາ:

๑. ພະລັງງານ:	ແຮງງານຊາວບ້ານ	๑,๕๐๐,๐๐๐
๔. ເຄື່ອງຂອງ:	ໄມ້ ອຸປະກອນໃນທ້ອງຖິ່ນ	๔,๔๐๐,๐๐๐

ຂ. ຮັຖບານລາວຈະຈັດຫາ:

๑.	ເຄື່ອງຂອງ: ສັງກະສີ ๘ฟ๕๐	๑,๔๑๐,๐๐๐

ค. ປູ່ເສດຈະຈັດຫາ:

๑. ພະລັງງານ:	ບໍ່ມີ	
๔. ເຄື່ອງຂອງ:	ເຫ້ັກຕາຫູ່, ເຄື່ອງມື, ເຄື່ອງເຫ້ັກ	ฐฑ๑.๐๐

ຂ້ອມຕ່າໃຊ້ຈ່າຍໂຄງປະມານ:

	ໂດລລ່າ	ກີບ	ໂດ້ເຢ້ັນ	ຄົນ/ໂດລ່າຕາມອັຕຣ່າໃນຕ່ລາດ
ก. ຊາວບ້ານ :		๒,๐๐๑,๐๐๐		$ ๑๔,๐๐๐.๐๐
ข. ຮັຖບານ :		๑,๔๑๐,๐๐๐		$ ๔,๑๔๐.๐๐
ปูเสด :	ฐฑ๑.๐๐			ฐฑ๑.๐๐
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FROM TASSENG OF DAN KHOUA

TO

THE DIRECTOR OF USAID AND THE PARTY WHO CAME TO SAMTHONG, LONGTIENG

SUBJECT: The construction of the School at Ban Pha Houng.

I am real honored to infrom you that, on January 2, 1969 Second Lt. Vang Yi, the commander of the company 8/c of Region 2 reported to me that USAID at Samthong will send some woodtto build one new school at Ban Pha Houng. In responding to the information, I had asked the village offical for a meeting on January 5, 1969 in the office of the company commander. The officals who came to the meeting were:

1. Secodnd Lt. Vang Yi.....President.
2. Tasseng Dan Khoua.....Vice-President.
3. 3. First Lt. Vang Neng.....committee.
4. Nai Ban Pha Muong.....committee.
5. Tasseng's Sereatry.....Secretary.
6. Nai Ban (Village leaders) who came to the meeting were:

1. Nai Ban Keng Khay.
2. " " Phak Leng.
3. " Phou Soung.
4. " Houai Pane
5. " Hin Tang
6. " Long Khouang
7. " Houai Tioun.

The meeting decided to consider collecting the money to buy

the tin for the roofing which amounted 75.000K, and to buy food for the workers which amounted 39,500K. The toal sum was 114,500K of which is litle are included. The people from the neighboring villages who came to give a hand were as follow:

1.	Ban Pha Houng sent	169	people.
2.	" Keng Khay sent	39	people.
3.	" Hin Tang sent	43	people.
4.	" Houai Toy sent	22	people.
5.	" Long Kang sent	17	people
6.	" Phak Leng sent	34	people.
7.	" Houai Pane sent	17	
	Total	338	people

Besides, the USAID Chief of party had sent some wood for floor, wall, ceiling, and 3 workers. In addition, USAID gave 2 teacher's desks and chars, 24 student's tables and chairs.

The construction began on Janury 10, 1969 and completed on February 2, 1969. Everyting is now completed. The schools has 2 classes, 2 teachers. First year (P 1) has 63 students and the sencond year (P 2) has 12 students. On March 6, 1969 we invited tou to come to preside over the offical opening ceremony of the school. We are more than glad that you did come and we, the Tasseng and Nai Ban appreciate very much of what you had done for us and for our children to have a chance for the education as in other part of the country.

We are fortunate to have the government help in this matter. We surely will remember your kindness to us.

Finally, we wish you and your party good health, long life, and prosperity.

List of Contribution

1. Second Lt. of the Company constributed 2,000K
   " " " 5 cnas of unpolished rice.
2. First Lt. Vang Neng sent one "worker to help.
3. Sergent Neng May sent 4 workers to help.
4. Nai Ban Pha Houng give 2 pigs, 6 chickens, 900K, and 3 cans of polished rice.
5. Thao Koun of Pha Houng gave 1 chicken.
6. Bama Thao Koun of Pha Houng gave 1 chicken.
7. Thao Kia Pao Thao Koun gave 1 chikcen.
8. Lao Sia Fong Thao Koun gave 1 chicken.
9. Pia Leng Thao Koun gave 1 chicken.
10. Lao Poua Nai Thao Koung gave 1 chicken.
11. Lao Sia Li Thao Koung gave 1 chicken.
12. Nai Ban Hin Tang gave 1 chikcen and plished rice (1 cup).
13. " Keng Khap " "
14. " Houai Toun " "
15. " Houai Pane " "
16. " Phak Leng " "
17. " Long Kang " "

Villages that are not sending their children to Pha Houng school

contributed thses:

1.	Nai Ban Sob Tioun	contributed	1,850K
2.	" Samang	"	740K
3.	" Houai Heua	"	1,480K
4.	" Phou Ngoua	"	5,920K

Dan Khoua March 6, 1969

Tasseng Dan Koua.

Evacuating the civilians of San Soak March 14, 1969

SUMMARY

Approximately 3,400 people from the San Soak area (LS-126) which fell last October, have been driven to the south, deeper into enemy terriroty, and are in real danger of being gradually killed off if they are forced to stay in their present location. If the civilian population were evacuated by air, there is a good chance that the 250 soldiers would be able to sneak/fight their way out of the area, but encumbered by their families, they would never make it without severe losses. We are requesting USAID and USAF helicopter time to move the civilians to Muong Chuan (LS-91) as soon as the weather allows it.

BACKGROUND

In 1960-61 as P.L. strength began to grow in the San Soak areaxdn and the people had to take a stand one way or the other, the Meo under Tong Shua opted for the RLG. They were xxxse unsuccessful in gaining support from the Savannakhet and Thakhek authorities but were favorably received by Touby Lyfong, who referred them to Major Vang Pao. Vang Pao armed them and has continued to provide them minimal but sustained support ever since.

As traditional partisan forces relatively isolated from areas of large scale' fighting, they have been primarily interested in protecting their families and crops from the local P.L. who surround them. They but vaguely resemble infantry soldiers, having had no training in tradtional tactics and little use for static defense arrangements, and the only kind of security they have been able to provide have been raids and ambushes that have tended to keep the enemy off blaance. Patrolling has been looked on as more of an enjoyable hunting trip than as an exericse in perimeter defense, and the soldiers assigned to the airstrip were forever trying to wrangle a patrol assignment to escape the boredom of outpost duty. Their raids on other villages served to settle old grudges, as well as to upset P.L. security, but the cattled they stole and the burned villages they left behind made them no new friends among the P.L.

Thus, when the P.L. were finally able to secure the assistance of NVA regulars, they had a lot of old scores to settle with the San Soak partisans and used the NVA infantry to cripple the friendlies by hitting them at their two xx weakest points--their defensive positions and their civilian dependents.

THE LOSS OF SAN SOAK

At 2400 hours on 28 October, 1968, a mixed PL/VM battalion hit the main positions at San Soak and by 1800 hours on 29 October, the airstrip and all the positions around it had been lost. The friendlies retreated to the old airstrip and the karst cliffs to the southeast of LS-126. In the initial attack, airstrip and the karst cliffs to the southeast of LS-126. In the initial attack,

10 soldiers and 23 civilians were killed, and 7 soldiers and 14 civilians were wounded. ~~Annnnkth~~ Among the killed were three of the four company commanders present at the time; thus almost the entire partisan leadership structure was destroyed during the first several hours. The zone commander was at Long Cheng, where he had gone to plead for air strikes on the enemy buildup and the 100 individual weapons that his unit had been short of for over a year.

On 5 November, the partisans launched a counter-attack on 126 but were not able to hold it because of the enemy;s superiority in crew-served weapons and the friendlies' need to protect their dependents to the south from enemy probes. Again on the 16th, partisans, with the largely ineffective help of 100 reinforcements from LS-46 and LS-1, made another unsuccessful effort at capturing LS-126 after the oft-promised air strike packages that were to precede the attack had been diverted elsewhere. By this time the enemy force had increased in size to an estimated 300 NVA and 200 P. L. soldiers, while the friendly forces had become increasingly tied down to their demoralized and frightened civilian dependents. Concern for their families led to fewer patrols and harrassment raids, and in January the friendly forces in the areas nearest them lost sites 241 and 263 (241 was soon recaptured).

On 28 February the old strip at VF 6256 (that had been their base of operations since the fall of LS-126) became wholly untenable and the soldiers and civilians moved further south to their present location in the high karst area of VF 6446.

In spite of the destruction of their leadership and the battered condition of their dependents, the partisans made quite a record for themselves during the four months ending on 1 March. They captured 14AK's, 2 B-40's, 1 light machine gun, various pieces of field gear, explosives, mortar and AK ammunition, and over two tons of rice, and they reported killing over 200 enemy soldiers. In nearly all cases, the actions were ambushes and the enemy casualty estimates were invariably exaggerated, but the captured equipment represents a better performance than most of the other homeguard units in M. R. II. While they excelled in this sort of warfare, they were unable to beat the PL/VM in traditional infantry actions, where they lost 38 KIA during the four-month period (including the casualties of 28-29 October).

THE PRESENT SITUATION

There are now some 3,400 people in the area of VF6446. About 250 of these are soldiers, 3,200 are dependents and villagers from the San Soak area. They are located in a small bowl 4,000 feet high in a region of rugged limestone peaks and are completely surrounded by enemy forces. They are, in fact, closer to the main enemy base areas than they were at LS-126. Since they arrived on 1 March, they have been dispersing at night and sleeping in small groups under makeshift shelters and eating what food they could find in the jungle. As of 10 March, the only support they had received had been one C-46 and one Caribou load of rice (enough for about two days) and fifteen cases of canned meat. Attempts have been made almost daily to drop, parachute, or land (by chopper) additional supplies but the weather has thwarted these efforts. The USAID niakong who accompanied the reporting officer on the only successful helicopter trip to the pad reported that he had never before seen refugees as bad off as these people. Their physical situation, however, is still not as bad as their tactical situation, which has steadily deteriorated since the fall of LS-126.

The burden of their dependents, the proximity of the enemy, and the apparent determination of the enemy to kill as many of the San Soak people as possible, makes the position of the partisans quite impossible. They say that if the civilians could be evacuated by air, they would be able to fight and sneak their way out unencumbered by their families; this is their only hope for survival and is what General Vang Pao and the C.A.S. officers in the area have been advocating for several months. The General wants to move them to Muong Chuan (LS-91) where they would be able to farm the hills to the southwest of the strip, and wants the soldiers to move either there or to the area of LS-241, from where they would be able to continue their harassment activites. The main point, however, is that if the people are left where they are now, it is all but certain that they will be slowly but surely killed off by the PL/VM.

WHAT TO DO

The options open to the U.S. Government are fairly clear--support them in place, hoping they will survive where they are; or ~~xxxxx~~ move them to an area where:

1. their families would be relatively safe and could grow rice.
2. the would be closer to existing logistical channels, and
3. the talents of the soldiers could be used effectively to harass the P.L. in areas of more long-term interest to the population loyal to the R.L.G.

We believe that Muong Chuan offers the best location in terms of fulfilling these basic objectives. To move them farther into safe areas would reduce the damage that the partisan troops could cause in enemy areas, and to leave them in more exposed areas would tie the troops down protecting the civilians. Site 91 is a good compromise that would leave them tactically available for harassment activities and would still provide their dependents a meaure of security and a good chance of withdrawing, should that areas be threatened later on.

A decision to leave them in place would not only put them at the mercy of the PL/VM, but would also indicate our unwillingness to help out one of the more outstanding partisan groups when the chips are down.

A move to LS-91 would be no easy matter. Assuming good weather, we estimate that the move would require on the order of 45 H-34 days. (6 round trips per day times 12 people per trip = 72 divided into 3,200 people.) We believe that such an evacuation should be done in as few days as possible in order to allow the P. L. as little time as possible to assault the position during the move. We would advise the use of as many Pony Express helicopters as possible in order to speed up the evacuation, and would hope that CAP would be available, given the insecurity of part of the route to LS-91.

The biggest question mark is the weather. We assume, however, that it can't go on like this forever, and hope that we will be ready to act when it clears up.

15 March - P. White March 19, 1969

I think the immediate problem will be in the 32 area. The enemy at Soph Khao (UG 1699), approximately 800 men, are making propaganda that they are going to hit 50A and capture all the refugees. I feel this is a diversionary measure to take our minds off of 32.

At this time enemy forces have moved from the Muong Seng (UG 1783) area up the Houei Lung to Keng Mong rivers cutting off our strong point at Phou Bia (UG 1790) from Ls 32. There is a build-up at Ban Muani area (UG 2093) from Muong Seng and I think the enemy build-up at Soph Khao will also move in this direction, down the Nam O north of 32.

Enemy forces, approximately 200 men, have been reported at Ban Savang (UG 3393) on the Nam Vang. They have filtered down from the 36-230 area.

There have been reports of movement from the road down the Nam Khao just to the south of 127 (UG 4089 area).

Friendly troops in the area, 3 companies at 32, 1 company at Phoui Bia. Refugees approximately 1,500; dependents, 2,500; villagers in area approximately 2,000.

The 32 people are surrounded and if there is trouble in the area they will have to be airlifted out unless cover and troops can provide a safe exit to Phou Via, Site 6, to 50A.

1 April 1969:

The allocation of 5 H-34 choppers has been approved to commence the movement of refugees and dependents from LS-126 to LS-91.

Based on an average availability of five helicopters and seven round trips from LS-126 to LS-91, approximately 420 people a day should be able to be moved. Since there are approximately 3,200 people involved the operation should be completed within approximately eith to nine days allowing for weather, breakdown of helicopters, etc.

ORA:ps:7-8-71

18 April 1969:

1. Strong enemy force began early offensive prior to December harvest in NE. Laos. In spite of strong defense VP. forced retreeat. 9,000 refugees fled from LS-215 Houei Hin Sa, LS-184 Houei Tong Ko. Further threats to the area caused an additional 3,000 refugees to fled rounding out 12,000 people proceeding SW. to LS-33 and LS-233 but were stopped by an enemy blocking action. LS-36 fell in early March and most of the 3,200 refugees in and around this site have not yet been located.

2. Additional enemy attacks coming from the east threatened several refugee villages in the enclave of LS-88 Bouam Long which includes LS-50A Phou Cum, and LS-6 Phou Vieng. Ebemy ambushes and skirmishes forced the people out of these villages and 5,000 to 7,000 more refugees fled westward tl LS-33, but the enemy had interdicted many of the trails and the r eugees scattered. Today they are turning up in the vicinity of 50A and LS-26 Xieng Dat. As of April 15 50A has been retaken, LS-88 still holds, as well as LS-184, it is planned to put all civilians west of the PDJ with some troops remaining north of the PDJ for harassment activities.

It is hoped that a line can be firmed running NE to SE between sites 50A and 88 until troops have regrouped.

3. Increased enemy pressure in the LS-1 area caused approximately 3,000 people to move toward the safe haven LS-46 Muong Moc. An enemy encircling movement trapped 3,200 people in the LS-126 San Soak area. With limited resources 1,800 people were evacuated before the enemy attacked and contact was lost with this group .

ORA:ps:7-8-71

S-184 Area 18 April 1969

"A" - As of 16 April had 1800 refugees.

1. The 973 Lao from FH area that had moved to "L" three weeks ago arrived "A" morning of 18th.

2. About 500 Meo from "L" arrived "A" on 15th and 17th.

3. New "U" signal set up at UH 1543 for drops on call to "L" refugees who are remaining, for the time being. About 7500 refugees.

4. Bad guys from 2 Km East and NE of the old "L". Gunships coming each night but don't know if they're doing any good.

5. BV-27, what' left (100 troops?) in area of old "L". Maj. Doung Ta returned on 17th to try to reorganize his people and coordinate with SGU 15B people at "F" UH 1442 area. "F" now has a 4.2 mortar and may do some good.

6. ~~xx~~ As normal, the refugees are asking, Where to go? and What to do? VP is still saying wait. Things don't look good at "L" but there's nothing we can do ~~xxx~~ without VP's OK.

   The refugees could probably walk out to the south on a line west of 50, 33 and 233 if 200 to 300 troops went with them. CAS is' against this as it would weaken the S-184 area, but we're still talking about 12,000 friendlies. Perhaps we can wait, but for how long.

April 28, 1969

The village of Hat Kon, TG-8694, 'L', has come to be the settling place for a great deal of the Lao and Lao Theung population of NW Xieng Khouang and SW Luang Prabang Provinces. These people are under 3 Chao Muongs; 3074 people under the Chao Muong of Muong Hiem, 2010 people under the Chao Muong of Muong Pek, and 274 people under the Chao Muong of Muong You.

They are under the direct supervision of Kham Sawn, Naikong from Kang Keng, a big Lao Theung village on the Nam Khan River below 50-A, Phou Cum. Kham Sawn is one of our strongest civilian leaders in the north, and he also does a large part on the military side of things. He supervised clearing the land at Phou Tawk for the caribou strip, and when LS-50-A fell, it was his village militia that secured the Nam Khan valley so that the refugees could safely cross on their way south.

Since arriving at Hat Kon, Naikong Kham Sawn has led his people in cutting out a porter strip which was opened yesterday, LS-271. He also has his 40-man army on constant patrol along the Nam Khan River from Site 6 - 50A area down to Pak Vang, TG-8894 and LS 261, Muong You, and also at Phou Tawk, TH-9102 and other areas important to the security of Hat Kon and the general area.

He has refused to leave the general 50-A area even though almost all other civilian, including the 50-A people, have gone. He feels that if he could get some carbines to arm more of his people, he could make a go of it and hold the area for sure, but even if he can't get any arms help he will stay and try to hold the area.

I feel that this is a man that USAID should support to the hilt. He not only is intelligent and dynamic, he commands the respect of everyone, not only his own Lao Theung people, but also the Meo and Lao. He has already played an important part in keeping us in the LS-50A area, and he will play a larger part in the future.

Of the 534 8 people at Hat Kon, almost half, 2428 are ethnic Lao, the other 2930 are Lao Theung. All of the Meo, about 6000 people are at Phou Sig Ngao, LS-80 because the river area around Hat Kon is too hot for them.

One very interesting set of statistics from the Hat Kon area is the number of people that the different groups have lost to the enemy over the last few years. After talking to all of the 9 tassengs represented at Hat Kon, and going over all of their old records, I came up with the figure of 9715 people under their control 4 to 8 years ago. At the present time they only have 5358 people, they have lost 4357. Most of these people have been lost in the last year. This is about 1/2 of the entire population !!!!

About 35 percent of the people lost to the enemy have either voluntarily gone with them or have not resisted their advances, the other 65 percent were either captured by the enemy or have been killed by them. There is a chance that as many as 10 percent of these people, approximately 4-500 people might still be in the jungles and may have a chance to get out to us, the others are thought to have no way to escape.

It is also interesting to note that these 5358 people have lost 36 leaders (naikongs, tassengs, naibans, or company commanders) over the last few years. This is a sizable loss, especially considering the small number of leaders that we have, and the even smaller number of good leaders.

A good example of voluntary moves to the enemy happened ~~xxx~~ 2 nights ago at Ls-261, Muong You. A group of 380 refugees living on the outskirts of Muong You left on 16/4/69 at 2300 hours and jointed enemy forces in the area. In this group of 380 were 37 soldiers. These people had been with the enemy for many years and 2-3 years ago our soldiers'liberated' them and they were resettled at Muong You. Their young men were recruited and sent to LS-113 for training, and they were then sent to LS-36. When LS-36 fell these 37 soldiers went AWOL to Muong You and have never reported to their unit or commanders. Af ter 2 years of living with our side these 380 people have decided to return to the 'enemy'!

The fact that we are losing more and more people all the time to the enemy, and many of them are going voluntarily, indicztes a serious lack of something in our program. Undoubtedly we offer a better life to the people near the roads and big centers where they have access to commodities and can enjoy the benefits of our various programs. People in these areas are leading the good life. The question is what do we offer the people in places like Hat Kon, and what don't we offer them?

The main thing that we don't offer them is protection and security. I have a man sitting in front of me now that has fled from the enemy 9 times in the last 4 years, and he has lost 10 of his blood relatives. Our small amount of commodity support, a few pots, pans, and blankets, and our rice, salt, and canned meat are all good, but what he and many others keep asking me for is security for his family.

We were talking about the 380 people from LS-261 that went with the enemy. His comment was this:

"THEY PROBABLY DID THE RIGHT THINGS. I HAVE WORKED WITH YOU PEOPLE TOO LONG, I AM ALREADY BRANDED AS HAVING AMERICAN BLOOD IN MY VEINS AND MONEY IN MY POCKET, I CAN'T GO TO THEM NOW, THEY WOULD KILL ME. BESIDES, I KNOW THAT YOU PEOPLE ARE DOING THE RIGHT THING FOR US, I WANT TO BE WITH YOU.....BUT, BY GOING WITH THE ENEMY THOSE PEOPLE CAN PROBABLY STAY TOGETHER AS A FAMILY ON ONE PLACE, BUILD A GOOD HOME, GROW SOME RICE, AND LEAD A FAIRLY NORMAL LIFE. SURE THE ENEMY WILL TAKE MOST OF THE RICE AND TAKE THE YOUNG MEN AWAY TO THE ARMY, BUT A REFUGEE WITH YOU DOESN'T XXXXXX GET MUCH RICE EITHER AND OUR YOUNG MEN ARE ALL AWAY WITH YOU BEING SOLDIERS. THE THING IS, WITH THEM WE WOULD HAVE A FAIRLY STABLE HOME LIFE AND SOME RELEASE FROM THE FEAR THAT WE HAVE NOW, AND WE WOULDN'T HAVE TO LIVE IN THE JUNGLES LIKE THIS. I AM NOT BLAMING THE AMERICANS FOR NOT DEFENDING US OR OUR SOLDIERS FOR NOT BEING GOOD FIGHTERS, I DON'T KNOW WHY, BUT WE HAVE NO SECURITY OR PROTECTION FOR OUR FAMILIES ON THIS SIDE."

This could go on and on because almost everyone you meet has the same story to tell. I have written this to inform people in Vientiane what we have to face every day upcountry. There are no answers that I can give to this man or any of the other hundres that ask questions like this every day.

I think that looking over the last few months and extending on into the future, we can expect more and more refugees all of the time to stay in their areas with the enemy rather than come out to us. Especially the people that have been unsettled so many times already. Someone said that this is good, less mouths to feed, but if this is our attitude, should we even be here?

Statistics on the Lao and Lao Theung refugees at Ban Hat Kon

Tasseng	Native area	Race	Province	People with us	People with Enemy	Leaders Killed or Captured
Tai	50A	Lao	XK	916	172	2
Pung Nok	33	LT	LP	517	260	5
Pak Vang	50A	Lao	XK	401	759	7
Hang Keng	50A	Lt	xk	967	46	3
Yhat Ngaw	33	LT	LP	920	350	4
Phou Tin	50A	LT	LP	276	0	0
Pha Lam	50A	LT	LP	250	0	0
Pan Lo	48A	Lao	LP	661	520	3
Sa Kok	48A	Lao	LP	450	2250	12
				5358	4357	36

Luang Prabang people	2074
Xieng Khouang people	2284

Mid - April 1969

The Deuanist Political office was about two miles north of Khang Khay (UG-1755) as of mid-April 1969, the office was divided into staff, message and burrial sections, operational and intelligence offices were about three miles north of the political office.

ORA:ps:6-21-71

Foll
June 10 1969

TO: Mr. Charles A. Mann;; Director/USAID

THRU: Mr. Phil Guillion/ADRD

FROM: Mr. Blaine W. Jensen/Acting AC Xieng Khouang

SUBJECT: Situation Report; Xieng Khouang-Sam Neua Area

The refugee situation has somewhat stabilized due to a lull in the military activity and I shall point out only minor movements which may affect us in the future.

The Xieng Khouang-PDJ refugees are getting pretty well settled now. Due to the sickness that developed at site66, most of these refugees have moved into the site 252 area. Figures for site 66, 252, and site 191 are now being finalized and will be sent down as soon as available. We are distributing refugee supplies to site 252 today and tomorrow and will continue to do so at the other sites as the supplies are available.

The 1,670 refugees from the site 236 area will remain at site 46 for the present. Problems are beginning to develope with these people, however. Arms which have been smuggled in by the enemy, have been discovered and political problems are arising at site 46. Enemy movements and intelligence indicate that an attempt to regain these people will be made by the enemy in the near future. Chao Khoueng Saykham and General Vang Pao are currently discussing the possibility of moving these people to either the new dam site or Sayaboury area. If this occurs, we could be directly affected by aircraft requests.

The situation at site 26 remains confused. Approximately 2,300 refugees have moved to site 112 where they claim they intend to stay. Dependents of soldiers and some refugees at site 26 have requested transportation back to site 32 since the situation has improved in that area. So far, we have not provided aircraft for this move.

Due to the fall of site 261 and pressure on 271, approximately 2,000 refugees have moved into the site 80-57 area. Approximately 2,200 are in the process of walking back to site 32.

General enemy harrassment continues in the site 178-196 area as well as the site 184 area. Enemy movements along the river and in the site 261, 271, and 50 area indicate that the enemy maybe attempting to cut any possible escape route between sites 50, 6, and 57.

If this should occur and a general attack should be launched in the 184, 32, 178-196 area, the possibility of an air refugee evacuation could result. However, we will have to watch the situation and hopefully this will not occur, however, at the present time we are against such a move.

We have evacuated approximately 200 refugees from the site 2 area in the past two weeks. These people have been put at site 207 and will be helped there.

There are 224 new refugees at site 201 from the Nong Het area. If the present operation against BanBan is successful, I feel that this number could greatly increase in the next week. General Vang Pao has not indicated what he plans to do with these people, but the possibility of a request for airlift could develope.

These are about 280 new refugees from the Muong Phan area in Muong Soui at the present time. Col. Sing has requested that they remain in Muong Soui. We are awaiting a decision from Chao Saykham on these people. I am, however, somewhat opposed to leaving these people in Muong Soui since refugee relief does not have an operations officer available to see that commodities and rice for these people are not lost in Muong Soui. If the current operation from Muong Soui continues and is successful, it could result in a large number of refugees from the Muong Phan, Muong Kheung areas and at that time other plans would have to be made regarding an area operations officer working the Muong Soui area. Knowing how Col Sing feels, I doubt that resettlement in Vang Vieng would be a possibility.

Regarding security around Sam Thong and Long Tieng, everyone feels that three factors are involved. The most important is how well Gen. Vang Pao can pull area attacks to keep the enemy from consolidating their forces; secondly, how successfully the attacks from Muong Soui and Paksane are carried out; and thirdly, the amount of material the enemy is able to stock-pile before the roads become impossible.

We all feel that the next month will tell the story.

Air support for Sam Thong has been very good and I certainly appreciate it. However, the problem of delivering supplies from Vientiane to Sam Thong concerns me. The back-log of refugee supplies, POL, and medicine, as well as other supplies in Vientiane is tremendous. For political purposes, the proper treatment of refugees from communist controlled areas is of utmost importance. We cannot accomplish this if supplies are not on hand in Sam Thong. I fully agree with the possibility of dropping certain supplies whenever possible from Vientiane, however, a great deal of coordination will be necessary.

Within the next two weeks, I understand that PWD will be ready to apply the chemical to the strip at Sam Thong. This will require that the airstrip be closed to large aircraft for certain periods of time. This coupled with the bad weather we have been experiencing, further complicates the situation. Comments or suggestions on getting the back-log from Vientiane to Sam Thong would be greatly appreciated.

The purchasing of rice locally for refugees is finished for the present time. All stocks of any size have been depleted and it is now necessary to drop rice to these places from Vientiane. This program can be started again in October or November when the new rice crop is harvested. All indications at the present time, show that we will be able to buy quantities comparable to the past year or maybe even a little more depending on weather, insects, or military developments.

With the start of the rainy season and the fact that we are almost a week behind on our rice drops from Vientiane already, I request that we work out a reasonable stockpile of rice at Sam Thong and Long Tieng. We can get enough rice into important areas with small aircraft to supply troops and dependents until the weather breaks for large aircraft to drop. This has meant the difference between losing a site or holding it many times in the past and considering the situation at the present time, I feel that this is extremely important.

dist. ADRD, Mr. Jack Williamson, Mr. B. Leonard/Air Support,
Dr. McCreedy, C & R-1, Mr. Carr/ Mgt.

11-6-69

I am not here, because, I will leave to Samthong, therefore I couldn't came to the Meeting. Will you excuse to Mr. Ministor, for me please.

About the Refugees from Muong Phueng 43 families to 262 persons. These Refugees would like to live in Muong Suoir, and they don't want to go anywhere. But my idea, I would like them to live in Xieng Daeng (collection there) there, there were 8000 Refugees already. I want them to wŗk and save themselves not to beg somebody eat foward. But this matter is not possible, so that, I dicided, it depend on their mind. They can live anywhere. In the part of helping it depend on the Social Welfare. Because the Province have nothing. But only can Request for them.

I think that, leaving or living it's up on the officer of Muong Suoir and that helping will belong to the Ministry of Social Welfare,

I want your decision as soon as possible, for these Refugees have food to eat. Because they were very poor.

Chao Say Kham.

Mr. Blaine Jensen, A/AC, Sam Thong June 12, 1969

Phillip P. Gullion, A/Chief, RDD

M. Souie Refugees

Refugee Relief staff met today with RLG Chief, Social Welfare (Houmpheng), rep. from Neutralist Army and Chao Moung of M. Phua.

In reference to refugee activity at M. Souie, the following was agreed:

That a formal refugee committee be formed consisting of:

Chao Moung M. Pek (Chairman)
Chao Moung M. Phua
Military representative
Other Government Ministry representatives

Chao Buapha is Chairman and we understand that Col. Bounsi has taken Col. Sing's place as commander.

After the proper lists are made, the usual distribution can be made. Since rice distribution is always a problem at M. Souie, we suggested and agreed that rice could be distributed once a month with USAID representative present and rice flown in from Vientiane on coordinated basis.

Houmpheng thought that Kuhn and Swigart should be contact representatives from San Thong, two people in case one is sick to give continuity and avoid misunderstandings with neutralists. Houmpheng so advised neutralists of the Kuhn/Swigart assignment.

We appreciate all problems connected with M. Souie, however, you can appreciate necessity of keeping in contact. We also stated that we wanted "Refugee Committee" to take the responsibility of getting a place for these people to farm.

Copy of Chao Say Kam's letter to Houmpheng re: this subject, enclosed. (He was unable to attend meeting.)

RDD/RR:JLWilliamson:ms:6/12/69

ERNIE

LS 57 → LS16 3000.

POPULATION -- JUNE 1969

XIENG KHOUANG

13,288 74,474 185,324 97,562 157,644

SITE NO.	COORDINATES	NAME	COMBATANTS	DEPENDENTS	REFUGEES	TOTAL
LS-1	VG0212	Muong Ngat				
LS-2	UG5055	San Chaw	248		228	476
LS-5	UG0212	Pa Dong	1,736	516	1,009	3,261
LS-6	UG0789	Phou Vieng				
LS-14	TG9107	Pha Khao	30	1,103	200	1,333
LS-15	TG8536	Ban Na	293	1,019	555	1,867
LS-20	TG7924	Sam Thong		3,928	550	4,478
LS-20A (30)	TG8214	Long Tieng	2,374	25,521		27,895
LS-22	UF1796	Muong Cm	570		809	1,379
LS-26	TG6049	Xing Dat			8,150	8,150
				32,087	11,501	48839

× 32 100 KILO PER PAR DEFOLIOR OPNS.

SITE NO.	COORDINATED	NAME	COMBATANTS	DEPENDENTS	REFUGEES	TOTAL
LS-32	UG2686	Boum Long	440 +220 217,18,19	2,438	3256	2,878 +220 6584
LS-33	UG0709	San Pha Kha	~~103~~ 180 24B		180 5/14/69 PHON KHAM	18
LS-38	TG8247	Houei Ki Nin	70 + 500 BP101	530		600
LS-40	UG4747	Ban Pak Ha				
LS-41	TG7149	San Louang	207 + 230 SGU 206			207
LS-45	VF1989	Chieng Sa Ni				
LS-46(Sig. I)	UF9591	Muong Moc			501	501
LS-46(Sig. F)	UF9591	Muong Moc	309	829		1,138
LS-46(Sig. H)	UF9591	Muong Moc	---		1,600	1,600
LS-50	UH0301 UH 0303	Pha Peck	~~500~~ 50		1951 (7000)	500
LS-51	TG6317	Pha Khe	78	219		297
				4016	7488	7721

SITE NO.	COORDINATES	NAME	COMBATANTS	DEPENDENTS	REFUGEES	TOTAL
LS-57	TG8174	Pheu So	343	1,190		1,533
L-59	UH2862	Muong Son				
LS-65	UG1810	Pha Phai	74	181		255
LS-66	TF6992	Ban Na Luang			4,000	4,000
LS-72	TG8827	Hin Tang	351		620	971
LS-74	TG4133	Than Sorn Yai	104	620		724
LS-76	UH3653	Pha Bong				
LS-81	UG9315	Tham Tat				
LS-85	UH6860	Phu Pha Thi				
LS-88	UG2686	Boun Loum			3,256	3,256
			1951		7876	10735

SITE NO.	COORDINATES	NAME	COMBATANTS	DEPENDENTS	REFUGEES	TOTAL
LS-90	TG5020	Tin Bong	76	424		500
LS-91	VF3587	Muong Chuan	55	330	682	1,067
LS/02		PHU FA NOI				
LS-107	UH6455	Houei Ma			2000	
LS-111	UH6868	Houei Kah Moun				
LS-112	TG6037	Sam Sen			4242	
LS-113	UF0091	Moung Cha				
LS-126	VF5959	San Soak				
LS-170	TG2967	Pha Lang Mou	72	190		
LS-178	TH9363	Phou Saly	174	173 882 1055	173	1,229
LS-181	UG5348	Nha Xieng				
LS-184	UH1853	Houei Tong Ko	186	1,078		1,264
				5068	7097	4060

SITE NO.	COORDINATES	NAME	COMBATANTS	DEPENDENTS	REFUGEES	TOTAL
LS-185	UH4364	Phou Tia				
LS-191	TF9586	Thong Keum			3,108	3,108
LS-192	UF2497	Khieu Manang				
LS-196	TH8750	Houei Tong	288	1,056 (164) 1224	168	1,512
LS-198	UH6561	Houei Hok				
LS-201	UG8483	Sam Song Hong	480	1,369 (224) 1593	~~148~~ 224	1,997
LS-202	VF0095	Thong Phut	151	565	426	1,142
LS-204	UG0524	Khang Kho	229	431	124	784
LS-206	UG8192	Houei Song	216	1,069 (1690) 2759	1,690	2,975
LS-207	TF8287	Nan Mo			1,620 (1689)	1,620
LS-208	UG7718	Nam Keio	179	908		1,087
				7480	7360	14,225

11 50A ↕ 11 50

GET NOW FIGURES

81 50% FEED.

SITE NO.	COORDINATES	NAME	COMBATANTS	DEPENDENTS	REFUGEES	TOTAL
LS-211	TF6299	Phon Sai				
LS-212	UF4590	Phou Moun				
LS-213	TG4374	Pha Hong	312			312
LS-215	UH4457	Houei Hin Sa				
LS-219	UH2303	Don's Strip				
LS-220	UH9116	Phou Pha Louom				
LS-221	UH5845	Houei Moun				
LS-222	UG9419	Ban Poungmay	52	359		411
LS-223	UF1491	Nam Feng		499	1,366	1,865
LS-227	UF0781	Muong Aow Neua	137	545		682
LS-229	TG7304	Phong Tha	11	97	181	289

1500 8907 17,784

SITE NO.	COORDINATES	NAME	COMBATANTS	DEPENDENTS	REFUGEES	TOTAL
LS-230	UH3201	Pha Poum				
LS-231	UG8291	Phou Sam Soun	360	1,999 (2759)	545	2,904
LS-232	UG7426	Phu Nguie		4758 641 5399	96 641	
LS-233	UH1013	Ban Lee				
LS-238	TG7744	Tham Heup	116	528	741	1,385
LS-239	UG1622	Ban Phang				
LS-240	UG7622	Nam Song		2,352		2,352
LS-241	VF4276	Pha Hom	58	313	443	814
LS-245	VF3896	Pha Kat			180	180
LS-246	TF5995	Ban Son			339	339
LS-248	UH3042	Ban Lou				

get new figures

8592 2344 7974

SITE NO.	COORDINATES	NAME	COMBATANTS	DEPENDENTS	REFUGEES	TOTAL
LS-252	TF7292	Neo San Luang			3,105	3,105
LS-255	TF9377	Phou He			2,636	2,636
LS 254			119		164	
LS-261	TG7394	Muong You				
LS-265	VF6356	Old San Soak				
LS-266	TF8987	Thong Miang				
LS-269	UH2312	Ban Sop Siem				
LS-270	UF0990	Phu San Gop				
LS-271	TG8693	Hat Khon			4,400	4,400
LS-272						
LS-273	TF6392	Pak Mouie				

10345

10,141

SITE NO.	COORDINATES	NAME	COMBATANTS	DEPENDENTS	REFUGEES	TOTAL
DZ-001	UG1699	Sop Khao				
DZ-002	UG5605	Nam Deng	80	120	148	348
DZ-003	UF0279	Muong Aow Tay	61	87		148
DZ-005	TG8674	Pha Kut	100	20		120
DZ-009	TF6472	Phou Se				
DZ-010	UG8680	Keo Bone				
DZ-012	TG4610	Sam Ma Kok	120			120
DZ-013	TH0761					
DZ-014	UH6972	Houei Ka Dok				
DZ-015	UH5867	Houei Mat		~~415~~ 227	148	~~415~~ 736

SITE NO.	COORDINATES	NAME	COMBATANTS	DEPENDENTS	REFUGEES	TOTAL
DZ-016	TG8605	Vang Fong		422		422
DZ-017	TF8499	Phu Khe				
DZ-020	UH7052	Phu Vi				
DZ-021	UH2313	Ban Erk				
DZ-023	TF5594	Houei Sai			1,001	1,001
DZ-024	TF8986	Thong Miang		618	1,359	1,977
DZ-025	TF6194	Ban Na Su			1,482	1,482
DZ-026	UH3021	Tham La				
DZ-027	TG6101	Houei Ngon			1,221	1,221
DA-028	UG9221	Ban Tham Nong	47	286		333
				1826	5063	6436

SITE NO.	COORDINATES	NAME	COMBATANTS	DEPENDENTS	REFUGEES	TOTAL
DZ-029	TG8609	Nam Pha Bridge			1,200	1,200
DZ-030	UG1300	Pha Hia			332	332
DZ-031	TF7991	Phu Houei Kham			431	431
DZ-032	VG1508	Pha Ket	100	405		505
DZ-033	VF5071	Pha Dou				
DZ-035	UH1105	Sop Pa				
DZ-036	TG7325	Muong Peng	60	218	626	904
DZ-037 II	UH1519	Houei Chein			681	
DZ-038	UG0719	Ban Pha Lai				
DZ-039	UH6974	Houei Ka Dok				
DZ-040	UH2312	Phon Kham				

623 3270 3372

SITE NO.	COORDINATES	NAME	COMBATANTS	DEPENDENTS	REFUGEES	TOTAL
DZ-041	UF0687	Phu Sa Ngop			504	504
DZ-043	UH8071	Phu Lek				
DZ-045	VF5951	San Soak Area				
DZ-046	TF7896	Nam Yon			1,457 ~~916~~	916
DZ-047	TF7892	Muong Yong			465	465
DZ-048	TF6392	Sop Mouie			630	630
DZ-049	UH0301					
DZ-050	UH1853					
DZ-051	UH3012	Tham Za				
DZ-053	TF6892	Sop Dou			273	273
DZ-056	UH1345	Phu Louei			3,813	3,813
					9962	6601

SITE NO.	COORDINATES	NAME	COMBATANTS	DEPENDENTS	REFUGEES	TOTAL
DZ-057	UH1543	Nam Hong			6,000	6,000
DZ-062	VF1477	Pha Du			320	320
DZ-064	TG7303	Pha Daeng			692	692
DZ-065	VF0298	Buam Luad			600	600
DZ-066	UH1651	Who Dat	609		400	1,009
DZ-068	UG8711	Sop Mo		350		350
DZ-069	VF3482	Nam Tang	233	907	3,082	4,222
DZ-070	TG8587	Phu Sang Nao			3,021	3,021
DZ-071	VF0699	San Ngad			600	600
DZ-078	UH1441	Foxtrot Pad	200		700	900
DZ-079	UH1549	Papa Pad			1,272	1,272

1257 10,291 18,986

SITE NO.	COORDINATES	NAME	COMBATANTS	DEPENDENTS	REFUGEES	TOTAL
DZ-080	VG0407	Ban Kimosabi				

Vientiane, 17 July 1969

To: Director General of Ministry of Social Welfare at Vientiane.

Subject: Report about the survey and asking the newa from Refugees from Xieng Khoang resettled at Ban Na Luang, Natou and Thong Khoun.

I have a honor to inform you that during I took my leave 7 days to pick up my parents from Ban Na Luang to Vientiane.

I arrived Naluang on 11 July 1969 and stayed over there 2 days. In your order , I observed and asked the news about the standard living of the refugees from Xieng Khoang. Every body came to see me and told me about 8,000 people resettled at Naluang, Natou and Thong Khoun and they get misfortune and very poor by the different of climat and have shortage of food and also have Malaria desease. Since thay have been resettled at that area about 3 months, there was more than 400 peole already died, and at present time there are 5 or 6 peoples die a day. There are also more than 4,000 people are serious sick by this desease I have inpected with my real eyes, and the refugees request me to request with the Government and the Ministry of Social Welfare to consider to assist them as following:

1. Medicines, to protect the Malaria desease, injection and swallow medicines, and other medicines including 6 medics because there are more than 4,000 sick people.

2. There are more than 7,000 people who have shortage of food, Ministry of Social Welfare assist them only on rice and salt, they have to sell theire trush and some of them sell the supplies that the Ministry of Social Welfare gave to them for buying some more food. so they request the Government to consider to assist them on this matter.

3. Xiengkhoang currently money that they brought with them and they submitted to the Government Officials, they request to exchange and send back to them to buy food.

4. All of the refugees request to remove to an other place which have large land near the river like Phone Hong or some other place for field paddy. They would like the Government consider this matter urgently.

5. The refugees said that they requested with their Chao Muong and Chao Khoueng in June 1969 but at present time they never got any answer from them that what/they consider to assist them. So they are very unhappy and worry about (did) the death of the Malaria and also about the shortage of the food.

That is the true that I saw by my real eyes, so I report to you for consideration in the nesessary way to assist them./.

Reporter.

Khampong

Agent of Social We far

July 1969

Muong Souei:

Hundred of VN-Neuts mixed with villages. All in line of fire
Nai Ban Khay killed saw 150 VN bodies. Hsi house bloun up.

Nai Ban Nong Kane fred up and marched off. Nai Ban Ban Sak also killed.
Bounyo, 29 years, 5 kids, captured held three days, airstrikes
liberated all family lost. Tasseng Souri survived but family didn't.
Ban Khay leveled.

ORA:ps:6-21-71

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. C. A. Mann, Director DATE: September 2, 1969

FROM : C. L. Weldon, M.D., Chief PHD

SUBJECT: Your Memo August 30, 1969 - Sam Thong Refugees

During the last two years and particularly during the last ten months we have seen the land available to support the civilian population in the Northern Region shrink by cause of deteriorating security conditions until we have a population of 250,000 people compressed into an area which has the potential of supporting about 70,000 to 80,000 people who must subsist on a slash and burn economy. Also the livestock which normally supplemented the dietary of these people has been lost during their displacement. Because of the attrition of manpower as a demand for soldiers, the civilian population is having increasing difficulty exploiting the meager amount of land available. The work force is composed of old men, women and children with few young able-bodied men to carry the burden of hard work necessary for subsistence. Much of the hai has been planted for four to five straight years and as a result produces an ever decreasing yield.

All factors considered, compression of population, loss of livestock, loss of manpower, no new hai, and decreasing yield in old hai has produced a desperate situation which we believe can only be ameliorated by the expediency of importation and distribution of supplementary foodstuffs particularly protein.

At the present time we are most concerned about the group of refugees in the 66, 252, 255, 266, 191, 161 area. This group comprises about 80,000 to 90,000 people who are mostly ethnic Lao, Lao Toung, Thai Dam with a small number of Meo. These people are in a desperate state of nutrition and as a consequence are suffering an appalling morbity and mortality. We estimate that 35,000 to 40,000 of the above group are in immediate need of food supplements.

We recommend that 60 tons of protein food be procurred monthly to feed these people. The cost would approximate $120,000/month. This amount of foodstuffs would give each individual roughly 25 grams of protein supplement which would be the minimal amount to maintain a reasonable state of health.

Within the next six months this amount of food supplement may need be doubled as the population continues to compress and flow into the shrinking enclave of security.

NOTE: See our memo to Mr. Gullion of August 15, 1969

Clearance: Chief, RD

PHD:CLWeldon:jts

October 9, 1969.

Xieng Khouang

Xieng Khouang Status:

(1) No further increases at LS-72

(2) Lat Sen has approximately 2,300 people.

(3) Still moving people from Muong Souri to LS-57; estimated 1,100 people have arrived.

(4) 117 people (Chinese, Vietnamese, etc) were sent to Vientiane on October 5 from PDJ.

(5) Approximately 1,000 people at Nong Pet are still in place.

ORA:ps:6-25-71

27 = villages.

LS 103
LS 78

THE REFUGEE LIST THAT WAS DISTRIBUTED FOR THE REFUGEE AT THE AREA TA SEANG XIENG DAD ON NOVEMBER, 1969 AT ABOUT 12:30

BAN	TOTAL OF PERSONS
Tham Kong.....	127
Nam Ta.....	152
Nam Pol.....	104
Houei Thoi.....	61
Pha Wai.....	98
Ho Vang.....	131
Houei Phai.....	73
Nam Hon.....	135
Chom Thoi.....	113
Phou Vang.....	170
Nam Thom.....	187
Boc Mou.....	56
Seng Teng.....	30
Tham Bea.....	75
Hin Lak.....	113
Nam Burn.....	118
Keo Yoi.....	70
TG5847 — Xieng Dad.....	70
Phou Vang Noi.....	127
TG5448 — Na Kam.....	14
TG5447 — Kang Ton.....	19
Sang Si.....	116
Na Nan.....	80
Nan Pat.....	73
Houei Ski.....	78
Tham Koung.....	172
Phou Yan.....	146
Village-Soldier.....	120
Total.....	2801

Seen By [illegible]

Mr. Charles A. Mann, Director — December 26, 1969

Thru : Mr. Edgar M. Buell, AC/Xieng Khouang
Edwin T. McKeithen, III, RR&R/Sam Thong

Schools at Refugee Villages on the PDJ and Muong Soui

Pop has requested that I keep you advised on the status of the refugee schools on the PDJ and Muong Soui. At the present time seventeen classrooms have been completed and are in use, and we expect that at least that many more will be built. Over 2,000 students are now in class, many in double session, and at least 1,500 more are waiting for the construction of additional buildings. We have ordered additional roofing sheets and nails for these facilities, and the Primary School Inspector has requested more teachers from the Ministry.

Following is a breakdown on the various locations:

1. Muong Soui (L108)

Grade 1	233
Grade 2	150
Grade 3	106
Grade 4	97
Grade 5	38
Grade 6	25
	649 (none in school yet)

Two buildings (6 rooms) built, awaiting roofing.

2. Lat Sen (LS 276)

Grade 1	773
Grade 2	127
Grade 3	104
Grade 4	16
	1,020 (757 presently in school)

Three buildings (6 rooms) completed.

3. Si Siang Mai (LS 277)

Grade 1	879
Grade 2	194
Grade 3	130
Grade 4	31
	1,234 (905 presently in school)

4. Lat Khoi (TG 9744)

Grade 1	252
Grade 2	35
Grade 3	27
Grade 4	13
	327 (232 presently in school)

Three buildings (3 rooms) completed.

5. Lat Khai (LS 280)

Grade 1	206
Grade 2	54
Grade 3	25
Grade 4	4
	289 (all in school)

Two buildings (4 rooms) completed.

Education Division is trying to get the textbooks printed as fast as possible, and we are going to ask the American Women's Club for 35,000 pencils.

The Primary School Inspector has decided to transfer the old PL teachers, some of whom are quite good, to schools in other areas of the province, and to staff the PDJ schools with long standing RLG teachers. This is not to say that he doesn't trust them; rather he is afraid that they may subconsciously continue to use the PL rhetoric and pedagogy that they have been using for years, particularly since we will not have RLG textbooks available until February at the earliest.

CC: Mr. Gullion, RR&R
Dr. Hart, EDU
M/CR

Aragain Draft Bullion 1/22/70

move
Jan 5-14

8 115 persons curlift 25 278 // 284 → 272
7 715 → 272
400 - L108 ave walk

272 → TG4901, TF 5594,
TF 7294, TG 6101, TG5209

Wilder → Mann

19 March 1970

204 people to 207 – LT
20 people to 37 – Overlaps
—
to 272

Buell → Mann March 27, 1970

F. Benson

LS-184 (11,600 Meo) → 9000 by plane to 272 in Jan, & after; 2600 walking to LS 50.

LS-46 (22,500) → 2000 Meo; 5,800 Lao am Paksane; 15,000 Meo → 113

LS-37 area 39,000 on way to LS 37 or are there: 14000 Meo fm 20/20A area ARR 37; 9000 Meo at 161; 6000 Meo at 212 10,000 fm 20/20A en route.

40,000 Meo bet 20A & 207 awaiting outcome of sit at 20A 7000 LT ARR 207

LS 272; 3000 Lao FM 108 → end of Feb walk to Vte; 5000 Sam Neua Lao FM 211 & 246 for Vte; 3000 LT fm 20A will stay in 272; 3000 Meo from 20/20A stay; 11,350 Lao & TD transit to Vte (6000 FM 20; 2000 fm 20A officials etc; 800 FM 207; 500 FM 113; ~~800~~ FM 14; 250 FM 66; 1500 ~~T~~ TD FM 207.

7000 FM ~~78~~ area waiting outcome at 20A

1500 Meo FM Phou Bia → 6; 2,400 LT & Meo FM 219 → 32 morning; 5000 Meo FM 57 morning to 102

Grand total 8900 moving in LS 50 area

LS 37 area - 39,000
LS 207 area 47,000
LS 272 area 25,350
LS 78 area 7000
LS 50 area 8,900
127,250

184 mow - 11,600
P&J - 15,000
46 area - 22,500
49,100

GT - 176,380

Buell ⇒ Marion April 24, 1970

to Bad Guys

51,000

46 area 2000 L; 10,000 LT; 8000 Mus

1968/178 area 5000 LT; 5000 Mus

201, 204, 231, 82 2000 Lus; 12,000 LT, 7000 M.

Chessin → Buell 4 May 1970

F. Benson

46 area

1) San Soak Meo LS 126 6500 persons

LS-126 - LS-91 (chopper) → VF1575 area walk → south of LS 46 after fall of LS 28 in December → LS-46 fall Jan. → north of 28, and to West of 61 → attempted move to Borikane, were hit → UF6188 & UF 6168 → 61 hit & bad guys to UF6188 in May. → (VP wants go to Paksane → 20A → 113

2) Sang Ngat Meo LS-1 3600

after LS 1 → south to VF 0699 → couldn't move West (enemy line thru 1, 46, 45, 28; move to VF1059 & VG1408 → 2000 brought out by chopper to LS 63 → 212 → 22 now (May)

3) M. Ngan LS-236 & M. Mo LT 6700

LS236 → walk LS182 → Paksane

current figs	May 4 1970
LS-63	1,100
UF 8398	4261
UG 7901	4000
UF6188	3800
UF6168	2200
LS-212	1200
UF1395	1700
Paksane	7030 → 25,291

ca 20,700 unaccounted for dead or captured almost all people in 28, 45, 91 areas & ½ of LS-1 people.

*Most Important

Ca Aug 1970

XIENG KHOUANG

A marked escalation in NVA military activity in Sam Neua and Xieng Khouang Province during 1969 and early 1970 precipitated an uncontrollably large movement of refugees southward toward the LS-272 area. The situation thus created was compounded by the loss in March of Sam Thong, the base of refugee operations in MR II.

Emergency measures were taken to meet the critical sutuation which had arisen. Rice was dropped to refugees en route to secure areas, the largest of these relocation sites having been pre-selected on the basis of water availability and their ability to accommodate large numbers of people. Now that these people have become settled in their relocation sites, all of them are receiving medical attention, and many are receiving canned meat and vegetable oil to supplement their protein defficient diet.

Now that the situation has more or less stabilized for this season in MR II, and a new forward base of operations established at LS-272, the RLG and USAID have directed their efforts toward reestablishing government services in the area, and are attempting to move the some 160,000 military dependents and refugees on the road to self-sufficiency. Offices for Xieng Khouang and Sam Neua Provinces are presently under construction, as are schools and dispensaries. An agriculture training program has been initiated by RLG Agriculture, and a fisheries program is underway. Refugees have built houses, and have planted hill rice and small vegetable gardens.

In spite of efforts presently underway, the basic problem confronting the refugee program in MR II still remains; namely, overpopulation due to land pressure. Ninety percent of the refugees previously supported in Xieng Khouang and Sam Neua are now concentrated in an area one-fourth the size of the area they previously occupied. The problem of sanitation which will arise in this type of crowded environment should not be overlooked.. While schools and dispensaries can easily be made available refugees cannot hope to attain self-sufficiency given their present resources and the lack of arable land.

Even though the more than 100,000 refugees who were forced to flee their homes have now relocated themselves in the LS-272 area, the future stability of this area is far from predictable and hinges completely on North Vietnamese strategy. A military initiative by the NVA could again result in a population displacement of major proportions. By the same token, increased long-term stability in the area would have a similar, though not so drastic, effect insofar as refugees would be encouraged to move either back to their old homes or to less populated and more hospitable areas. Therefore, given the numerous variables involved, it is obviously quite impossible that the status quo will remain constant during the coming months. The recommendations stated below must, therefore, be considered in this light.

The only viable solution to the problem of land pressure is economic diversification. A program designed to expand the economic base through crop diversification and animal husbandry is the most feasible answer. With technical advice and assistance, small plots of presently unproductive

land could become agriculturally productive through the use of fertilizer and insecticide. (Much of this year's highland rice crop has been destroyed by grasshoppers and caterpillars.) Terracing of hill sides could be effective in making maximum use of existing land area. Fruit trees and vegetables could be grown, and improved varieties of highland rice could be planted.

A reforestation program could be initiated in connection with hill rice cultivation. As is presently being done in the Houei Nam Phak (Sedone Province) national forest reserve, refugees could be paid a nominal fee for clearing land and planting teak seedlings along with their highland rice.

Assistance in the form of providing small animals to refugees would, given their animal husbandry capability and know-how, provide them with a self-perpetuating source of protein. Fish ponds are still another answer to the problem of protein shortages.

While inputs into the fields of agriculture and animal husbandry would assist military dependents and refugees to become self-sufficient, it would also create surpluses which could be marketed. Given the existence of the Sam Thong road, produce could easily be transported to such places as Vang Vieng, Phone Hong and Vientiane.

The establishment of cooperatives would have a great deal of potential in terms of producing and marketing produce.

It is strongly believed by this office that serious consideration should be given to seeking ways to promote economic diversification in the LS-272 area in order to: 1) alleviate the problem of critical land shortages, and 2) assist refugees to become self-sufficient as soon as possible.

DATA ON XIENG KHOUANG DEP - REFS

Dependent and/or Refugee Sites	70	
Military dependents (Refugees)	82,597	
Refugees (Civilian)	75,097	
Ethnic Breakdown:		Meo 70%
		Lao Theung 30%
Dispensaries	58	
Medical Personnel	162	
Access to Medical Assistance	All Villages	
New Classrooms	164	
Students	15,941	
Teachers	528	
Wells	None	
Water Availability	All villages have access to streams or rivers	
American Staffing	AC, Asst/AC, CDAA, 3 Operations Officers; 1 vacancy	

Commodities Distributed during August, 1970:

Item	Tons/Cases
Rice, dropped from Vientiane	1,660
Rice delivered to LS-272	140
Canned Meat, dropped/Del	14,600
Corn Meal, dropped from Vte.	200
Salt, delivered to LS-272	64

AIR DROPS

AC/BHS. Ernie

OFFICE MEMORANDUM UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO: Mr. E. M. Buell, AC/Xieng Khouang DATE: December 1, 1970

FROM: B. Chessin, Refugee Relief Officer, Xieng Khouang

SUBJECT: Monthly Report for November, 1970 B. Chessin

I. Though plans for expanding my visits to sites around LS-272 were on the drawing board, the situation in the Muong Moc-Muong Ngam area held me fairly close to those sites. As of this writing, the area was still in our hands; but the enemy attacks had driven many of the people in the 46 area to take refuge a few miles south. With the situation as precarious as it is, it seems as if we may have to face a new refugee move in the near future. Any such move would probably be southward; and it might be of use for the Paksane office to do a bit of preliminary planning just to be on the safe side. - Has been done

II. Refugees from the Ban Done (LS-28) area continue to filter in with information on the situation in that area. The reports remain basically the same. Many of the people wish to come out, but are watched fairly closely by the enemy, and are not able to move too freely. Still, those that can come do, and more than 150 have come out in the last month. Most of these have moved to Paksane, trying to get as far from the war as possible.

III. LS-5 (Pha Dong): After the enemy attacks on November 16, 1970, we visited this site on a number of occasions. The refugees spent a few restless nights in the hills; but enemy failure to return led them all to return to their homes within a week of the attack. The dispensary was hit, and some medicine lost, but life was back to normal by the end of the month.

LS-50 (Phu Cum): The enemy continues to make nuisance raids in this area, but as of last month had made no large scale effort to dislodge troops, or make life difficult for the refugee population. Therefore, things are still relatively calm in this area.

IV. Once again, it would assist operations in the Paksane area, and for ourselves, if the airstrip at LS-61 (Ban Thasi) could be reworked and reopened.

cc: ORA (2), PHD (2)
C&R-3

XK:BChessin:bms:12-9-70

LS-5 JG-0212 Pa Dong 1171

Original Village	No. of F&P.	Present Village	Tasseng	Muong	Ethnic Gr.
Ban Thing	22/121	Pa Dong	Sam Keo	Pangxay	L.T.
Pha Lay	19/128	"	Pha Lay	Vangxay	Meo
B Ban Thim	39/205	"	San Keo	"	L.T.
Ban Cheu	13/76	"	Pha Xay	"	Meo
Pa Dong	14/83	"	Pha Phay	"	Meo
Nam Xat	13/72	"	"	"	"
Nam Ohn	11/79	"	"	"	"
Pa Dong	47/286	"	Pha Xay	"	"
Ban Na	9/57	"	"	"	"
Nam Su Noi	10/70	"	"	"	"

LS-6 UG-0789 Phou Vieng 1880

Original Village	Tasseng	Muong	Present Village	No. of F&P.	Ethnic Gr.
Pa Cha	Phone Kham	Nong Pet	Phu Vieng	14/103	Lao
Phone Kham	"	"	"	11/76	"
Houei Xe	"	"	"	15/92	"
Ni Kho	"	"	"	14/67	"
Houei Thorn	"	"	"	20/147	"
Phong Noi	"	"	"	10/63	"
Pong Nhai	"	"	"	14/95	"
Houei Neua	"	"	"	11/71	"
Pong Tao	Long"Khan	"	"	29/187	"
Nam Peum	"	"	"	36/257	"
Houei Kham	Pa CHa	"	"	11/71	"
Phong Phieng	"	"	"	17/110	"
Ban Ham	Hang Keng	M. Pek	"	10/70	"
Ban Houei Ping	"	"	"	14/80	"
Nam Huong	"	"	"	15/79	"
Lan Chong	"	"	"	19/118	"
Houei Cha	"	"	"	21/143	"
Pom Ket	Phong Thong"		"	14/101	"

Phu Vieng LS-6 UG-0789 (345/1953)

Old Village	Tasseng	Muong	Present Vil.	No. F&P.	Ethn.
Pa Cha	Phone Kham	M. Pek	Phu Vieng	13/77	LT
Phone Phieng	"	"	"	15/89	"
Phone Kham	"	"	"	11/62	"
Pong Nhai	"	"	"	8/41	"
Pong Noi	"	"	"	10/48	"
Say Nua	"	"	"	11/54	"
Houei Se	"	"	"	12/57	"
Houei Noc Kho	"	"	"	12/65	"
Houei Kham	"	"	"	11/54	"
Houei Thouane	"	"	"	18/96	"
Long Chong	Hang"Keng	M."Pek	"	12/84	"
Houei Cha Tai	"	"	"	25/141	"
Houei Madith	"	"	"	11/64	"
Houei Ping	"	"	"	13/70	"
Sop Beuac	"	"	"	16/84	"
Nam Hung	"	"	"	15/83	"
Nam Tao	Long"Khan	M."Pek	"	33/170	"
Na Peum	"	"	"	46/270	"
Pom Khe	Phone Thong	"	"	16/106	"
Houei Cha	Phu Vieng	Vieng Fa	"	1/6	Meo
Houei Se	"	"	"	4/28	"
Phu Vieng	"	"	"	16/103	"
Houei Ton Kho	Houei Moon	Hong None	"	16/101	"

LS-14 TG-9205 Pha Khao 981

Original Village	Tasseng	Muong	Present Villgge	No. of F&P.	Ethnic Gr.
Ngoa Tai	Sen Noi	Khoune	Pha Khao	5/31	Lao
Na Do	"	"	"	6/31	"
Thang Ngao	"	"	"	1/8	"
Na Hay	"	"	"	1/9	"
Ban Tong	"	"	"	1/5	"
Na Phia	Khăngsen	"	"	17/107	"
Ban Boua	Nhune	"	"	7/41	"
Ban Nhune	"	"	"	5/29	"
Ban Nong	"	"	"	7/57	"
Long Chehg	Long Cheng	"	"	3/20	"
Long Cheng	Pha Xay	Vang Xay	"	16/109	Meo
Hinh Tang	"	"	"	4/33	"
Pha Hi	"	"	"	1/9	"
Nam Kane	"	"	"	1/9	"
Pha Pong	Pha Pong	"	"	7/58	"
Tham Tam Leung	Pha Xay	"	"	2/25	"
Sam Thong	Na Vang	"	"	2/14	"
Pha Li	Pha Xay	"	"	1/10	"
Lom Xay	"	"	"	3/24	"
Nam Fay	Lee Lay	Fongsaly	"	1/6	"
Noad	Na Vang	Vang Xay	"	18/128	"
Long Cheng	Phu Ke	"	"	9/66	"
Pa Dong	Pha Xay	"	"	1/8	"
Khang Khai	"	"	"	2/17	"
Pha Hi	"	"	"	2/11	"

Pha Phai	Phu Ke	Vang Xay	Pha Khao	1/7	Meo
Pha Lay	Pha Xay	Vang Xay	"	4/42	Meo
Nong Luang	Na Vang	Vang Xay	"	10/67	Meo

LS-16 TG-7175 Phou Nong Phi 1523

Original Village	Tasseng	Muong	Present Village	No. of F&P.	Ethnic Gr.
M. Phieng	Phu Pene	Pek	Nong Phi	28/148	Lao
Ban Soad	"	"	"	12/61	"
Ban Thang	"	"	"	10/55	"
Keo Kuang	"	"	"	13/68	"
Nam Nhao	"	"	"	12/65	"
Houei Mat	"	"	"	19/90	"
Houei Lian	"	"	"	12/70	"
Phu Pao	Phu Fa	Vieng Fa	"	5/31	Meo
Phu So	"	"	"	4/18	"
Keo Bang	"	"	"	26/19	"
Phu Pha Chao	"	"	"	12/84	"
Phat Kit	"	"	"	6/43	"
Houei Na Phanh	"	"	"	12/93	"
Houei Tad	"	"	"	5/60	"
Phu Kong	"	"	"	5/41	"
Bo Nam	"	"	"	7/41	"
Houei Chom	"	"	"	1/6	"
Sam The	"	"	"	9/51	"
Phanh Tai	"	"	"	5/49	"
Houei Sa	"	"	"	9/59	"
Kio Hang	"	"	"	5/26	"
Phu Kong Tai	"	"	"	4/28	"
Mak Phet	"	"	"	5/37	"
Phu Sy Nhao	"	"	"	20/117	"

Phu Sy Nhao Neua	Phu Fa	Vieng Fa	Nong Phi	8/60	Meo
Houei Ta Leung	"	"	"	5/31	"
Phu Sy Nho Tai	"	"	"	2/24	"
San Sao	"	"	"	9/48	"

LS-32 UG-2686 Bouam Long (493/3476)

Old Village	Tasseng	Muong	Present Vil.	No. F & P.	Ethn.
Houei Hom Noi	Phu San	Vieng Fa	Bouam Long	14/105	Meo
Keo Leuk Tai	"	"	"	22/140	"
Phu Kang	"	"	"	22/151	"
Phu Laem	"	"	"	16/104	"
Bouam Long	"	"	"	15/105	"
Houei Hom Khang	"	"	"	15/94	"
Houei Hom Nhai	"	"	"	18/192	"
Houei Hom	"	"	"	11/81	"
Houei Sa Khai	"	"	"	8/99	"
Houei Piat	"	"	"	14/117	"
Ban Chanh	"	"	"	13/81	"
Meo Leuk Nhai	"	"	"	16/106	"
Houei Tom	"	"	"	7/49	"
Nam Paeng	"	"	"	6/31	"
Phu Moc	"	"	"	15/116	"
Nam Hom	"	"	"	11/81	"
Nam Kohn	Phu Do	Vieng Fa	"	12/103	"
Nam Lao	"	"	"	13/140	"
Pa Sam	"	"	"	9/66	"
Nam Kha	"	"	"	1/6	"
Nam Fane	"	"	"	12/111	"
Ban Sai	Na Mone	M. Pek	"	38/246	Lao
Nam O	"	"	"	19/118	"
Na Mone	"	"	"	15/85	"
Sop O	"	"	"	20/175	"
Houei Xat	"	"	"	11/46	LT
Khong Kham	"	"	"	10/50	"
Khone Thor	"	"	"	10/57	"
Phu Kang	"	"	"	20/123	"
Ban Khom	Nhot Keua	M. Kham	"	9/64	TD.
Ban Sam	"	"	"	6/32	"
Ban Cho	Heuang Nua	"	"	18/81	TN.
Na Vang	"	"	"	18/122	LT
San Kang	"	"	"	34/199	"

LS-32 UG-2686 Bouam Long (602/4388)

Old Village	Tasseng	Muong	Present Vil.	No. of F&P.	Ethn.
Na Luang	Dong Savang	M. Kham	Bouam Long	18/89	LT
Na Luang	"	"	"	19/95	"
Nam Kha	Phu Do	Vieng Fa	"	2/10	Meo
Ban Kang	Dong Savang	M. Kham	"	9/72	LT
Ban Phan	Phy Do	Vieng Fa	"	14/125	Meo
Nam Kom	"	"	"	22/169	"
Pa San	"	"	"	11/85	"
Nam Lao	"	"	"	17/203	"
M. Khan	"	"	"	5/53	"
H. Hom	Phu San	"	"	15/118	"
H. Hom Kang	"	"	"	25/182	"
H. Hom	"	"	"	13/95	"
H. Hom Nhai	"	"	"	23/257	"
Keo Leuk Tai	"	"	"	17/115	"
Houei Pa Piat	"	"	"	25/224	"
Keo Leuk Nhai	"	"	"	21/152	"
San Kang	"	"	"	34/199	"
Phu Leam	"	"	"	17/129	"
Phu Moc	"	"	"	23/175	"
Ban Chah	"	"	"	11/76	"
Phu Kang	"	"	"	24/208	"
Pha Tang	"	"	"	13/90	"
Sop O	Na Mong	"	"	22/111	Lao
Bouam Long	Phu San	"	"	15/122	Meo
Phiang Kome	Heung Nua	M. Kham	"	8/43	Lao
Nhot Phat	"	"	"	21/121	LT
H. Sakhay	Phu San	Vieng Fa	"	15/153	Meo
Na Kat	Heung Nua	M. Kham	"	10/43	Lao
Ban Khome	Nhot Keua	M. Kham	"	11/75	TD.
Ban Liang	Na Mone	M. Pek	"	20/137	Lao
H. Ling	Dong Savang	M. Kham	"	9/62	LT
H. Phe	"	"	"	15/89	"
Phu Wai	Phanh Lo	M. Hiem	"	26/186	LT
H. Manit	"	"	"	8/51	"
Phu Wai	Phanh Lo	M. Hiem	"	17/104	"
Phu Van	"	"	"	22/141	"
H. Thouane	Pa Cha	M. Pek	"	5/29	"

LS-46 UF-9591 Muong Moc 2905

Original Village	Tasseng	Muong	Present Village	No. of F&P.	Ethnic Gr.
Bot Tam	Phu Tham Hukt	M. Moc	M. Moc	7/49	Meo
Pha Tai	"	"	"	9/90	"
Ban Thong	"	"	"	19/134	"
Nam Xay	"	"	"	10/67	"
Nam Nga	"	"	"	23/159	"
Nam Hing Nhai	"	"	"	9/49	"
Nam Hing Noi	"	"	"	10/67	"
Nam Heng	"	"	"	15/91	"
Nam Xa Noi	"	"	"	20/133	"
Phu Tong	"	"	"	12/74	"
Tham Houat	"	"	"	15/80	"
Pha Ke	Pong Xang	"	"	97/600	"
Nan Lan Nhai	Phu Sung	"	"	76/441	"
Houa Phu	"	"	"	26/177	"
Nam Tem	"	"	"	99/694	"

LS-50 UH-0400 Phu Cum 2935

Original Village	Tasseng	Muong	Present Village	No.of F&P.	Ethnic Gr.
Keng Mo Neua	Hang Keng	M. Pek	Phu Cum	10/44	L.T.
Sob Beua	"	"	"	10/44	Lao
Hang Keng	"	"	"	17/96	"
Hang Keng	"	"	"	12/53	"
Keng Mo	"	"	"	14/88	"
Hang Keng Tai	"	"	"	15/89	L.T.
Na Khone	Pong Noc	M. Hiem (LP)	"	34/305	"
Ban Keo	"	"	"	19/111	"
Houei Sanone	"	"	"	15/107	"
Pong Noc	"	"	"	21/257	Lao
Houei Bone	"	"	"	11/96	"
Nhot Ngo	Nhot Ngo	"	"	15/131	"
Houei Hia	"	"	"	14/101	"
Vang Hi	"	"	"	5/26	"
Houei Pa	"	"	"	5/37	"
Pa Vane	"	"	"	14/122	"
Houei Thong	"	"	"	8/63	"
Nam Ngo	"	"	"	13/115	"
Pha Deng	Tham La	M. Kham	"	6/28	"
Suane Pane	Dong Savang	"	"	6/30	"
Phu Vang	Phanh Lo	Hiem	"	7/34	"
Phu Vanh	Dong Savang	M. Kham	"	9/45	"
Phu Kum	Phu Kum	M. Nhu (LP)	"	17/126	"
Houei KKou	"	"	"	4/30	"
Phu Kum Nhai	"	"	"	7/48	"

Nong Khab	Phu Kum	M. Nhu (LP)	Phu Cum	10/59	Lao
Kio Pheuang	"	"	"	4/19	"
Houei Ang	Houei Chem	M. Hiem	"	38/124	Meo
Houei Yen	"	"	"	7/38	"
Houei Mu	"	"	"	10/61	"
Houei Ho	"	"	"	9/87	"
Houei Nhao	"	"	"	10/63	"
Na Khy	"	"	"	19/102	"
Houei Ton Kho	Hoie Ton Kho	Hong None	"	23/156	"
Kieng Ong	Phu				

PHU CUM NUA LS-50 (UH-0301)

Tasseng Pha Keo

Old Village	Tasseng	Muong	Present Vil.	No. of F&P.	Ethnic Gr.
Tham Theuk	Pha Keo	M. Hiem	Phu Cum Nua	8/77	Meo
Keo Nhom	"	"	"	3/16	"
Pong Sang	"	"	"	5/23	"
Pha Keo	"	"	"	8/75	"
Houei Hinh Deng	"	"	"	5/25	"
San Pa Kha	"	"	"	6/36	"
Pa Hoc	"	"	"	2/18	"
Houei Hinh Lap	"	"	"	12/68	"
San Pa Kha Noi	"	"	"	6/51	"

Tasseng Houei Chem

Houei Ngao	Houei Chem	M. Hiem	Phu Cum Noi	10/75	Meo
Houei Ho	"	"	"	13/99	"
Houei Pong	"	"	"	8/55	"
Houei Chem	"	"	"	18/103	"
Houei Meua	"	"	"	9/59	"
Houei King	"	"	"	11/70	"
Houei Be	"	"	"	5/36	"
Houei Ang	"	"	"	28/184	"
Houei Yen	"	"	"	5/59	"
Pha Soi	"	"	"	6/38	"
Pa Dong	"	"	"	13/101	"
Na Khi	"	"	"	15/91	"
Nam Tho	"	"	"	11/74	"
Phu Saway	"	"	"	11/81	"
Pha Noi	"	"	"	14/59	"

Tasseng Pong Noc

Houei Sanone	Pong Noc	M. Hiem	Phu Cum Nua	10/65	Lao Theung
Houei Aeng	"	"	"	24/143	"
Houei Bonn	"	"	"	10/49	"
Houei Lam	"	"	"	6/34	"
Houei Thing	"	"	"	12/61	"
Houei Puac	"	"	"	7/37	"
Houei Tat	"	"	"	9/45	"
Keo Kap	"	"	"	8/41	"
Ban San	"	"	"	7/57	"
Bo Keo	"	"	"	8/36	"
Nam Pang	"	"	"	18/88	"
Pong Noc	"	"	"	22/125	"

Tasseng Nhot Ngo

Nhot Ngo	Nhot Ngo	M. Hiem	Phu Cum Nua	16/148	Lao Theung
Sam Soum	"	"	"	12/131	"
Houei Hia	"	"	"	14/100	"
Vang Hi	"	"	"	5/26	"
Houei Pa	"	"	"	5/37	"
Pa Vane	"	"	"	14/110	"
Houei Thong	"	"	"	8/63	"

Tasseng Phu Cum

Phu Cum Noi	Phu Cum	M. Nhu	Phu Cum Nhai	20/131	Meo
Kio Pheuang	"	"	"	4/19	"
Phu Cum Nhai	"	"	"	21/107	"
Phu Kom Noi	Phu Cum Tai	"	"	5/44	"

Tasseng Hang Keng

Sop Beuak	Hang Keng	M. Pek	Phu Cum Tai	11/56	Lao Theung
Hang Keng Nua	"	"	"	9/72	"
Nang Keng	"	"	"	8/45	"
Keng Sa Ngeo	"	"	"	20/68	"
Keng Mo Nua	"	"	"	9/43	"
Keng Nua	"	"	"	6/30	"
Keng Mo Tai	"	"	"	14/100	"

Tasseng Houei Moon

Houei Tong Kho	Houei Moon	M. Nong None	Phu Cum Nua	31/194	Meo
Houei Moon	"	"	"	19/142	"

LS-51 TG-6317 Pha Khe ~~(112/120)~~ (66/212)

Old Village	Tasseng	Muong	Present Vil.	No. of F&P.	Ethn.
Phak Khe	Nam Cham	Vang Vieng	Phak Khe	25/117	Meo
Keo Dam	M. Phone	"	"	10/24	Lao
Nam Cham	Nam Cham	"	"	3/9	Meo
Nam Kho	"	"	"	2/7	"
H. Tha Ma	"	"	"	10/26	"
Nam Pi	"	"	"	16/29	"

LS-56 TG-4243 M. Chim (213/1158)

Old Village	Tasseng	Muong	Present Vil.	No. of F&P.	Ethn.
Tham Keuang	Sieng Det	M. Pek	Muong Chim	24/187	Lao
M. Chim	"	"	"	25/115	"
Pha Vang	"	"	"	7/44	"
Bouac Mu	"	"	"	3/16	"
Sen Sy	Phak Pa Pang	"	"	20/113	"
Phu Yang	"	"	"	14/32/185	"
Nam Kene	"	"	"	14/74	"
Ban Sack	Soui	"	"	16/127	"
Ban Bouam	"	"	"	12/59	"
De Tai	Tha Choc	Vieng Fa	"	14/40	Meo
Nam Lo	"	"	"	6/38	"
Pa Banh	"	"	"	6/40	"
Phu Mieng	"	"	"	34/120	"

LS-63 UF-7496 M. Nham 1355

Original Village	Tasseng	Muong	Present Village	No. of F&P.	Ethnic Gr.
Sy Boun Heuang	Tha Thom	M. Moc	Muong Nham	4/31	Lao
Ban Done	"	"	"	2/13	"
Na Khoune	"	"	"	2/15	"
Thine Noon	"	"	"	2/13	"
Lat Khoai	"	"	"	1/9	"
Xieng Tong	"	"	"	1/7	"
Houei Hawai	MO	"	"	9/36	"
Dok Mai	Nham	"	"	6/36	"
Tha Sa La	"	"	"	17/89	"
Pa Hoc	Mo	"	"	9/48	"
Kham Keut	Kham Keut	Kham Keut	?	10/61	Meo
Pa Tong	M. Ngane	M. Moc	"	19/125	Lao
Sy Boun Heuang	Nham	"	"	27/138	"
Khang Na	NGang	"	"	24/196	"
Ban Peune	"	"	"	16/105	"
Mieng	"	"	"	16/79	"
Na Lane	"	"	"	3/14	"
Na Houane	"	"	"	2/10	"
Yiam	"	"	"	1/3	"

LS-66 TF-6992 Na Luang 471

Original Village	Tasseng	Muong	Present Village	No. of F&P.	Ethnic Gr.
Khang Sy Nua	Na Khoune	Pang Xay	Na Luang	19/109	L.T.
Khang Sy Tai	"	"	"	13/80	"
Nam Xay	"	"	"	9/49	"
Nam Liang	"	"	"	6/23	"
Nam Tiang	"	"	"	7/43	"
Nam Daeng	"	"	"	2/10	"
Houei Pham	Song Ke	"	"	2/11	"
Houm Pheung	Nam Kko	"	"	1/10	"
Khang Meua	Hat Nam	"	"	4/28	"
Phiang Dee	"	"	"	5/29	"
Ko Ngiu	"	"	"	5/29	"
(Teacher's)	"	"	"	9/50	"

LS-74 TG-4133 Tham Sorn (86/801)

Old Village	Tasseng	Muong	Present Vil.	No. of F&P.	Ethn.
*	*	*	Tham Sorn	86/801	*

LS-102 TG-6570 Phu Fa Noi 467

Original Village	Tasseng	Muong	Present Village	No.of F&P.	Ethnic Gr.
Phu Vieng Neua	Phu Do	Vieng Fa	Phu Fa Noi	6/49	Meo
Phu Vieng	"	"	"	9/54	"
Phu Vieng Khang	"	"	"	14/44	"
Hinh Lak	"	"	"	3/17	"
Phu Do Neua	"	"	"	2/12	"
Tham Pane	"	"	"	8/34	"
Phu Pha Hit	"	"	"	5/42	"
Phu Do	"	"	"	13/84	"
Sam Song	"	"	"	7/40	"
Phu Do Nhai	"	"	"	14/91	"

LS-112 TG-6037 Sam Sen 811

Original Village	Tasseng	Muong	Present Village	No. of F&P.	Ethnic Gr.
Sam Sen	Xieng Det	M. Pek	Sam Sen	29/203	Lao
Nam Keng	Na Khoune	Pang Xay	"	8/108	Meo
Phu Kong Khao	"	"	"	2/16	"
Houei Kho	Tha Choc	Cieng Fa	"	27/152	"
Sam Sen	"	"	"	49/312	"
Nam Song Dong	Na Vang	"	"	2/20	"

LS-112 TG-6037 Sam Sen Nhai 40

Original Village	Tasseng	Muong	Present Village	No. of F&P.	Ethnic Gr.
Sam Sen Nhai	Phou Kong	Khao M. Vieng Fa	Sam Sen Nhai	6/32	Meo
Nan Sen Kang	"	"	"	2/8	"

LS-113 UF-0091 Muong Cha 1035

Original Village	Tasseng	Muong	Present Village	No. of F&P.	Ethnic Gr.
Pong Sang	Muong Ngat	M. Ngat	Muong Cha	3/12	Meo
Long Cheng	Pha Xay	Vang Xay	"	14/93	Meo
Na Vang	Kang Sen	Khoune	"	1/11	Lao
Na Moune	"	"	"	3/21	"
Na Houng	"	"	"	1/4	"
Ban Xoi	"	"	"	1/5	"
Na Thiang	"	"	"	2/6	"
Xieng Dy	"	"	"	1/5	"
Xieng Neua	"	"	"	1/5	"
Ban Thang	"	"	"	3/~~31~~ 13	"
Ban Phone	"	"	"	1/9	"
Ngoi Tai	"	"	"	6/37	"
Ban Boua	"	"	"	4/32	"
Boua Tai	"	"	"	4/25	"
Na Phia	"	"	"	16/89	"
Tat Keo	M. Noi	M. Kham Keup	"	9/53	Meo
Tham Savang	"	"	"	4/27	"
Tham Khing	"	"	"	5/29	"
Yot Yang	Pha Bo	"	"	5/35	"
Kio Kha Sang	"	"	"	4/26	"
Houa Phu	"	"	"	4/29	"
Pha Lay	"	"	"	13/83	"
Tham Vieng	"	"	"	8/64	"
Kachoua	"	"	"	14/93	"

Yot Ke	Pha Bo	M. Kham Keup	M. Cha	13/88	Meo
Phu Lom	Phu Lom	"	"	5/39	"
Nam Sung	Phu Xao	M. Xieng Houng	"	9/54	"
Phu Lom	Phu Lom	M. Borikhan	"	4/32	
Nam Ngan	Phu Huat	M. Moc	"	2/16	

LS-161 TG-6259 Ban Nam Tao 3802

Original Village	Tasseng	Muong	Present Village	No. of F&P.	Ethnic Gr.
Nam Chong Neua	Tham Heup	Vang Xay	Nam Tao	2/11	Meo
Nam Chong Tai	"	"	"	10/53	"
Sao Tan	"	"	"	3/12	"
Keng Kang	"	"	"	10/51	"
Keng Tai	"	"	"	8/46	"
Mai Luang	"	"	"	3/12	"
Houei Lke	"	"	"	1/7	"
Houei Tha	"	"	"	4/16	"
Houei Na Mong	"	"	"	6/39	"
Phu Khune	"	"	"	5/29	"
Tham Choc	"	"	"	3/15	"
Phu That	"	"	"	3/22	"
Long Xay	"	"	"	5/20	"
Houei Bo	"	"	"	9/47	"
Tha So	"	"	"	5/16	"
Nam Pong	"	"	"	7/37	"
Nam Pong Neua	"	"	"	3/15	"
Nong Kio	"	"	"	6/34	"
Tham Heup	"	"	"	17/87	"
Houei Tong Cheng	"	"	"	7/36	"
Bona Nong Tai	"	"	"	6/34	"
Houei Ky Nine	Houei Kynine	Vieng Fa	"	8/55	"
Nam Cheng	Na Khone	Pang Xay	"	10/59	"
Nam Yune	"	"	"	20/78	"
Ban Na	Pha Pong	Vang Xay	"	22/168	"

Pha Dong Noi	Pha Pong	Vang Xay	Nam Tao	20/144	Meo
Phak Houa Nam	"	"	"	10/77	"
Tham Noi	"	"	"	8/51	"
Boua Ban	"	"	"	11/75	"
Lee O Kang	"	"	"	8/39	"
Houei Hong	"	"	"	10/70	"
Phu Lu Ngai	"	"	"	23/152	"
Pha Hum	"	"	"	4/25	"
Lee O Neua	"	"	"	10/69	"
Nam Mai	"	"	"	9 /86	"
Phu Keng	"	"	"	6/43	"
Houei Sa Tho	"	"	"	24/130	"
Houei Svin	"	"	"	19/108	"
Houei Tou	"	"	"	10/70	"
Phu Lu Noi	"	"	"	9/58	"
Tham Ta On	"	"	"	16/110	"
Houei Ngot	"	"	"	10/58	"
Boua Nong	"	"	"	8/61	"
KPhu Kom	"	"	"	7/38	"
Nam Cha	"	"	"	16/101	"
Long Xay	"	"	"	21/135	"
Phu Kune	"	"	"	24/159	"
Ban Na	"	"	"	28/168	"
Pha Sy	Phu Kong Khao	Vieng Fa	"	6/39	"
Nong Ohn Kang	"	"	"	5/25	"
Hinh Tang	"	"	"	6/32	"

Phu Kong Khao	Phu Kong Khao	Vieng Fa	Nam Tao	1/5	Meo
Pha Sung	"	"	"	2/13	"
Nam Lap	"	"	"	7/43	"
Nam Tao Noi	"	"	"	2/8	"
Soud Lom	"	"	"	6/29	"
Houei Sou	"	"	"	4/20	"
Tham Lek	"	"	"	4/18	"
Nong Ohn Nhai	"	"	"	2/16	"
Nam Tao Noi	"	"	"	5/37	"
Pha Sy	"	"	"	10/60	"
Hinh Tang	"	"	"	14/92	"
Phu Kong Khao	"	"	"	7/44	"
Pha Sung	"	"	"	9/56	"
Nam Lap	"	"	"	6/23	"
Soud Lom	"	"	"	4/21	"
Houei Sou	"	"	"	9/45	"
Tham Lek	"	"	"	7/39	"
Nong Ohn Nhai	"	"	"	12/75	"

45-161

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CIVILIAN REFUGEES IN TASSENG THAM HEUP (1971)

Ban	Male Adult	Male Youth	Fem. Adult	Fem. Youth	Total
San Tang	20	27	22	27	96
Nam Keng Kang	26	37	31	36	130
Nam Keng Tai	26	42	29	36	133
Nam Chong Neua	21	31	28	24	104
Pa Mai Long	18	18	27	48	111
Nam Chong Tai	20	23	22	20	85
Houei Lek	13	16	15	14	58
Houei Tham	7	13	8	7	35
Houei Na Mon	14	27	15	20	76
Phou Theun	14	20	17	24	75
Houa Nong (Neua)	12	13	10	14	49
Nam Poung	20	33	24	25	102
Phou That	11	30	17	28	86
Nam Poung Neua	11	15	15	14	55
Nong Kiao	18	19	20	21	78
Sam Heup	20	27	21	23	91
Houei Tong Ching	12	14	15	13	54
Houa Nong Tai	29	35	27	37	128
Tham Heup Tai	14	19	12	22	67
Phou Ta Phong (LT.)	17	15	19	25	76
Phou Ta Phong Neua	12	10	11	14	47
Nam Keng (LT)	26	20	23	33	102
Nam Yin (LT)	21	12	24	32	89
Tham Heup (LT)	8	10	12	8	38
TOTAL:	410	526	464	565	1965

CIVILIAN REFUGEES IN TASSENG PHA PONG (1971)

Ban	Male Adult	Male Youth	Fem. Adul	Fem. Youth	Total
Pha Pong	21	58	26	47	152
Pha Pong Kang	19	16	15	24	74
Pha Pong Noi	30	58	44	33	165
Boua Bouan	17	38	25	35	115
Boua Bouan Noi	15	21	14	24	74
Tham Noi	11	21	17	19	68
Lio Kang	26	18	22	24	90
Houei Hong	9	24	13	20	66
Phou Leu	37	65	45	60	207
Pha Hom	17	19	20	25	81
Lio Neua	19	33	17	29	98
Na Mai	22	39	28	42	131
Houei Na The	9	11	9	13	42
Houei Sa Thou	27	35	35	42	139
Houei Savin	24	27	26	38	115
Houei Hou	17	23	20	31	91
Houei Hou Noi	13	23	20	21	77
Tham Ta On	22	34	26	26	108
Nong Phak Nam	15	30	15	23	83
Houei Tao	23	53	27	42	145
Long Sai Noi	14	15	15	16	58
Nam Cha	20	30	25	29	103
Long Sai Nhai	27	34	32	36	129
Phou Sieu	4	11	4	7	26
Houei Yok	13	17	19	24	73
Noua Nong	15	15	13	15	58
Phou Koum	6	14	7	7	34
Total:	492	782	581	750	2605

LS-202 VF-0095 Thong Phut 487

Original Village	Tasseng	Muong	Present Village	No.of F&P.	Ethnic Gr.
Nam Nhao	Phu Suong	M. Moc	Thong Phut	32/221	Meo
Thon Lot	"	"	"	23/159	"
Pha Kai	Tam Huat	"	"	4/29	"
Ko Ø Pheua	"	"	"	12/78	"

LS-218 Nam Pha Noi 724

Original Village	Tasseng	Muong	Present Village	No. of F&P.	Ethnc Gr.
Phu Do	Phu Do	M. Pek	Nam Pha Noi	51/460	Meo
Pha Pong	Pha Pong	Vang Xay	"	3/25	Meo
	Phang Hong	Xieng Hong	"	7/64	"
	Ba Vang	Vang Xay	"	32/175	"

LS-223 UF-1491 Nam Feng 1174

Original Village	Tasseng	Muong	Present Village	No. of F&P.	Ethnic Gr.
Phak Lung	Khak Lung	Xieng Hung	~~53/222~~ Nam Feng	53/222	Meo
Phu Huat	Phu Ka Bo	"	"	11/93	"
Phu Then	Houa Yorn	"	"	7/62	"
(Tha Hane)		"	"	150/797	"

LS-227 UF-0781 M. Ao Neua (71/323)

Old Village	Tasseng	Muong	PresentVil.	No. of F&P.	Ethn.
*	*	*	Muong Ao Neua	71/323	*

LS-244 TF-7195 Phu Sang Noi 994

Original Village	Tasseng	Muong	Present Village	No.of F&P.	Ethnic Gr.
Phu Vieng	Phu Vieng	Vieng Fa	Phu Sang Noi	10/104	Meo
Phu Kham	"	"	"	1/11	"
Sam Thong	Phu Dou	"	"	1/12	"
Sam Thong	Kaeng Kwai	Nong Het	"	21/174	"
Nam Lan	Nam Lan	"	"	35/175	"
Phu San Noi		Vieng Fa	"	45/360	"
Nam Kwuai	Pha Pong	Vieng Xay	"	9/59	"
Pha Ko Yong	Pha Venh	Nong Het	"	10/72	"
Tham Heup	Tham Heup	Vang Xay	"	4/27	"

LS-252 TF-7292 Na Tu (132/720)

Old Village	Tasssang	Muong	Present Vil	No. of F&P.	Ethn.
Nam Nhom	Sam Khone	Pang Xay	Na Tu	4/21	LT
Tha Vieng	Tha Vieng	"	"	11/53	"
Houei Ong	Houei Ong	"	"	15/106	"
Muong Phane	Phang	"	"	20/108	Lao
Houei Sou	Sam Khone	"	"	11/63	LT
Sy Phome	Xieng Khouang	M. Khoune	"	17/73	Lao
Sieng Det	Sieng Det	M. Pek	"	5/28	"
Ban Hoc	Nhot Keua	M. Kham	"	13/73	"
Sam Tong	Pheung Sam	"	"	7/43	"
Ban Hoc Hi	Lat Boc	"	"	1/8	"
Ban San	Kham Nua	"	"	4/20	"
Muong Khome	*	*	"	15/82	"
Muong Tang	*	*	"	9/42	"

LS-255 TF-9377 Phy He (98/2819)

Old Village	Tasseng	Muong	Present Vil.	No.of F&P.	Ethn.
*	Ka Dok	Nong None	Phu He	42/249	Meo
*	Sa La	"	"	22/166	"
*	Houei Moon	"	"	17/134	"
*	H. Kham Moon	"	"	9/50	"
*	Phu Che	"	"	3/36	"
*	Houei Ma	"	"	3/11	"
*	Cha Ko	"	"	1/6	"
*	Houei Sam	"	"	1/7	"

LS-270 UF-0990 Phu Sa Ngop (4/41)

Old Village	Tassegn	Muong	Present Vil.	No. of F&P.	Ethn.
Houei Tong	*	*	Phu Sa Ngop	2/25	*
Phu Mune	*	&	"	2/16	*

Ban Xon LS-272 (503/3052)

Old Village	Tasseng	Muong	Present Vil.	No. of F&P.	Ethn.
Phanh Lo	Phanh Lo	M. Hiem	Ban Xon	14/93	Lao
Pong Hi	"	"	"	6/30	"
B. Kiang	"	"	"	6/24	"
Houei Phe	Dongsavang	M. Kham	"	7/48	Meo
Sam Thong	Na Vang	M. Vang Xay	"	8/47	"
Phu Cum	Phu Cum	M. Nhu	"	1/7	"
Phu Saly	Phu Saly	M. Hiem	"	12/39	"
Hang Keng	Hang Keng	M. Pek	"	27/155	LT.
Phone Thong	Phone Thong	"	"	10/60	"
*	(Soldier F.)	*	"	114/437	*
*	(Medics)	*	"	28/150	*
*	(Agr. Branch)	*	"	4/32	*
*	(Veterinary)	*	"	/19	*
*	(Police Military)	*	"	15/80	*
*	(Police)	*	"	25/207	*
*	(Police Fr. Houa Phanh)		"	6/41	*
*	(Instructors)	*	"	7/69	*
*	(Widows&Disabled)	*	"	205/1427	*
*	(Students)	*	"	/33	*
*	Dong Savang	M. KHam	"	8/54	Lao

Pak Mouie LS-273 (498/2744)

Old Village	Tasseng	Muong	Present Vil.	No. of F&P.	Ethn.
Sam Thong	Pheung Sam	*	Pak Mouie	4/19	*
Keo Ping	"	*	"	2/14	*
Ban Ang	"	*	"	5/23	*
*	(Instructors)	*	"	41/209	*
*	(Soldiers' Faml.	*	"	308/1730	*
Kang Na	Hat Boc	M. Kham	"	22/138	Lao
Houa Na	"	"	"	31/143	"
Sop Na	"	"	"	5/26	"
Phieng Kok	Nam Penh	Pang Xay	"	4/18	LT.
Na Ngone	"	"	"	2/10	"
Ko Ngiew	"	"	"	3/15	"
Hat Vieng	"	"	"	2/9	"
Houei Che	Song Khe	"	"	2/18	"
Nam Xay	"	"	"	1/8	"
H. Phome Tai	"	"	"	2/14	"
H. Phome Nua	"	"	"	1/7	"
H. Sang	"	"	"	3/16	"
Pa O	"	"	"	3/25	"
H. Song	Lan	*	"	22/138	"
Phiahg Pho	"	*	"	12/57	"
San Kang	Boun Thin	*	"	2/14	"
Phiang Lio	Pheung Sam	*	"	8/35	"
Nam Siane	"	*	"	3/15	"
Sop Ma	"	*	"	6/24	"
San Kham	"	*	"	4/19	"

LS-287 TG-5604 Nathi 435

Original Village	Tasseng	Muong	Present Village	No.of F&P.	Ethnic Gr.
Phu Kom	Nam Ba	Vang Fa	Nathi	4/43	Meo
Phu Kom	Khang Hong	Xieng Houng	"	38/279	"
Houei Cha	Phu Vieng	Vieng FA	"	26/113	"
Tong Khan	Ham				

LS-313 TG-6506 Nam Luang 1070

Original Village	Tasseng	Muong	present Village	No. of F&P.	Ethbic Gr.
Pa San	Phu Do	Vieng Fa	Nam Luang	7/53	Meo
Keo Ny	Phu Vieng	"	"	41/358	"
Nam Lak	"	"	"	8/77	"
Houei Tat	"	"	"	6/48	"
Bom Chong	"	"	"	4/33	"
Phu Kham	"	"	"	3/29	"
Hinh Tang	Kong Khao	"	"	4/30	"
Houei Sa Ann	Nam Lan	Nong Het	"	19/134	"
Sam Thong	Na Vang	Vang Xay	"	16/110	"
Ban Na	Pha Pong	"	"	7/63	"
Sam Thong	Phu Do	Vieng Fa	"	12/106	"
Houei Khaneng	Houei Khaneng	"	"	1/8	"
Khang Hong	Khang Hong	Sieng Hung	"	2/21	"

LS-314 UF-8199 San Bong 747

Original Village	tasseng	Muong	Present Village	No. of F&P.	Ethnic Gr.
Phu Sung	Tam Soi	M. Moc	San Bong	58/257	Meo
Tam Nong	"	"	"	10/85	"
Sam Che	"	"	"	6/54	"
Phu Mua	"	"	"	10/78	"
Pha Nhao	"	"	"	8/49	"
San Bong Noi	"	"	"	14/87	"
Pa Penh	"	"	"	22/137	"

LS-316 UF-1194 Tham Lo 867

Original Village	Tasseng	Muong	Present Village	No. of F&P.	Ethnic Gr.
Nam Song	Bouk Ohn	Xieng Hung	Tham Lo	32/203	Meo
Nam Song	Phu Sao	M. Ngat	"	22/257	"
San Sok	M. Noi	Kham Keut	"	7/41	"
Pha Ke	Pha Lo	Xieng Hung	"	8/80	"
Tham Tap	"	"	"	18/106	"
Phu Meung	"	"	"	16/90	"
Nan Song	"	"	"	11/90	"

Old Village	Tasseng	Muong	Present Loc.	No. F & P.	Ethn.
Muong Noi	Muong Noi	Kham Keut	Thong Khem	15/108	Meo
Tham Tor	"	"	"	15/102	"
That Keo	"	"	"	13/84	"
Nam Sading	"	"	"	2/14	"
Pha Khao	"	"	"	12/84	"
Tham Savang	"	"	"	5/33	"
Tham King	"	"	"	6/32	"
Pa Pek	"	"	"	9/52	"
Pha Kadong	"	"	"	3/26	"
NamKap	Pha Kadong	Kham Keut	T-hong Khem	9/96	"
Nam Lao	"	"	"	16/130	"
Pha Khao	"	"	"	7/44	"
Nam Kading	"	"	"	13/111	"
Ong Tu	"	"	"	10/77	"
Nong Boun	"	"	"	10/68	"
Pa Po	"	"	"	9/65	"
Pha Kadong	"	"	"	11/107	"
Pha Hom	Na Ngan	Kham Keut	Thong Khem	12/78	"
Na Ngan	"	"	"	21/124	"
Pha Lao	"	"	"	14/88	"
N. Kapong	"	"	"	12/71	"
Nam Lack	"	"	"	12/79	"
Ta La	"	"	"	7/37	"
Tha Kha	"	"	"	7/46	"
Pha Ding	"	"	"	10/74	"
Nam Wat	M. Ngat	M. Ngat	Thong Khem	17/115	"
Nam sai	"	"	"	8/60	"
Lat Khouay	"	"	"	13/90	"
Phu Ben	"	"	"	7/43	"
Pha Ket	"	"	"	9/78	"
Nam Chao	Tham Tam	M. Ngat	Thong Khem	18/135	"
Tham Phia	"	"	"	18/94	"
Nam Kheng	"	"	"	7/53	"
Pa Ton	Tham Soi	"	"	6/41	"
N. Hao Hu	Sam"Che	"	"	6/43	"
Pa La	Tham Tam	"	"	9/59	"
Ban Soua	Khang Sen	M. Khoune	"	1/5	Lao
Na Phia	"	"	"	3/16	"
Na Kho	"	"	"	8/52	"
Ban Boua	"	"	"	3/14	"
Na Vanh	"	"	"	3/24	"
Muong Aom	"	"	"	4/35	"
Phu Hong	Pha Bo	Kham Keut	"	15/85	Meo
Pha Bo	"	"	"	16/105	"
Ngot Yang	"	"	"	6/37	"
Keo Khan Xang	"	"	"	5/26	"
Phu Sung	"	"	"	8/48	"
Pha Thao	"	"	"	10/54	"
Phu Xong	"	"	"	5/28	"
Houa Phu	"	"	"	5/27	"
N. Kachoua	"	"	"	14/74	"
Nam Yang	"	"	"	15/85	"

Tham Vieng	Pha Bo	Kham Keut	Thong Khem	8/56	Meo
Tham Prang	"	"	"	13/67	"
Pha Tek	"	"	"	5/43	"

~~LS~~ DZ-016 TG-8605 Vang Fong 749

Original Village	Tasseng	Muong	Present Village	No. of F&P.	Ethnic Gr.
Keo Nhang	Khang Meune	Kham	Vang Fong	19/113	L.T.
San Khouang	"	"	"	18/130	"
Houei Xoang	"	"	"	16/78	"
Long Laeng	Khang Houng	Nong Het	"	10/104	Meo
Long Cheng	"	"	"	11/75	"
Keo Bong	Phu Sabot	"	"	16/89	"
Houa Phu	Phu Lom	M. Moc	"	11/71	"
Sam Thong	Na Vang	Vang Xay	"	3/23	"
Phu Sabot	Phu Sabot	Nong Het	"	12/66	"

LS-318 TF-7297 Song Lai 676

Original Village	Tasseng	Muong	Present Village	No. of F&P.	Ethnic Gr.
Nam Ba	Nam Ba	Vieng Fa	Song Lai	57/482	Meo
Khang Hong	Khang Hong	Xieng Houne	"	20/194	"

LS-321 TG-9300 Nyot Mo 537

Original Village	Tasseng	Muong	Present Village	No. of F&P.	Ethnic Gr.
Xieng Det	Tha Choc	M. Ngat	Nyot Mo	28/210	Meo
	Pha Pong		"	8/72	"
	Nong Ohn	Nong Het	"	43/255	"

DZ-047 TF-8093 M. Yon 853

Original Village	Tasseng	Muong	Present Village	No. of F&P.	Ethnic Gr.
Ban Som	Heuang Neua	Kham	M. Yon	108/565	Lao
Houei Nhang	"	"	"	7/41	"
Nam Lep	"	"	"	1/9	"
Phieng Khop	"	"	"	11/53	"
Kho Khai	Heuang Tai	"	"	14/84	"
Suang Khang	"	"	"	5/24	"
Na O	Kham Neua	"	"	14/77	"

DZ-047 TF-8093 M. Yon Tai 624

Original Village	Tasseng	Muong	Present Village	No. of F&P.	Ethnic Gr.
Phiang Khop	Heuang Nua	M. Kham	M. Yon Tai	11/58	Lao
Tha Sang	Kham Nua	"	"	14/73	"
Suang Khang	Heuang Tai	"	"	5/24	"
Nam Leep	Hiam Neua	"	"	1/9	Meo
Houei Nhang	Dong Savang	"	"	7/43	Lao
Ban Som	Heuang Nua	"	"	11/54	"
Ko Khai	Heuang Tai	"	"	14/74	"
Khang Sany	Heuang Nua	"	"	6/30	"
Nam Chang	Chang	Pang Xay	"	40/259	L.T.

DZ-064 TG-7303 Pha Daeng (44/350)

Old Village	Tasseng	Muong	Present Vil.	No. of F&P.	Ethn.
Sam Thong	Ý Na Vang	Vang Xay	Pha Daeng	44/350	Meo

DZ-082 VG-1507 Pha Ket 459

Original Village	Tasseng	Muong	Present Village	No. of F&P.	Ethnic Gr.
Pha Kat	M. Sang	Kham Keut	Pha Ket	26/169	Meo
Pha Ko	"	"	"	47/290	Lao

DZ-089 TG-6333 Nong On 2566

Original-Village	Tasseng	muong	Present Village	No. of F&P.	Ethnic Gr.
Houei Khong	Tha Choc	Vieng Fa	Nong On	8/68	Meo
San Luang	"	"	"	25/145	"
Nam Nen	"	"	"	28/177	"
Nong Sa Phu	"	"	"	10/71	"
Houei Hinh Yo	"	"	"	11/67	"
Tham Ta On	"	"	"	14/96	"
Houei Sam	Tha Choc	"	"	7/42	"
Houei Xo	"	"	"	12/72	"
Nam Oc Hou	"	"	"	15/121	"
San Keo	"	"	"	26/159	"
Chom Thoua	"	"	"	8/43	"
San Sen	"	"	"	21/120	"
Houei Ky	"	"	"	10/74	"
Tham Heup	Tham Heup	Vang Xay	"	12/4/37	"
Phu Tham	Tha Choc	Vieng Fa	"	11/81	"
Phu Kho	"	"	"	27/175	"
Houei Om	"	"	"	20/158	"
Phu Pheng Noi	"	"	"	29/205	"
~~Xieng/Det~~Keo Bo Kuang	"	"	"	15/108	"
Houei Tham	"	"	"	18/89	"
Houei Bo	"	"	"	20/113	"
Pha Lem	"	"	"	15/108	"
Pha Deng	"	"	"	4/32	"
Na Hak	"	"	"	8/48	"
Pha Da	"	"	"	4/35	"

Houei Sam	Tha Choc	Vieng Fa	Nong On	16/87	Meo
Nong On Noi	Phu Kong Khao	"	"	2/7	"

DZ-093 TG-7881 Phu Mang 1137

Original Village	Tasseng	Muong	Present Village	No. of F&P.	Ethnc Gr.
Phu Mang Vay	Phu Sabot	Nong Het	Phu Mang	16/105	Meo
Phu Vay	Nam Lang	"	"	15/95	"
Pha Poung	Nong Ohn	"	"	31/211	"
Phu Vieng	Phu Vieng	Vieng Fa	"	14/87	"
Keo Leuk	Phu San	"	"	4/19	"
Phu Mang	Phu Xe	"	"	25/175	"
Houei Chem	Nong Ohn	Nong Het	"	23/143	"
Phu Vay	"	"	"	48/302	"

DZ-0119 TG-6211 Don Nya 1004

Original Village	Tasseng	Muong	Present Village	No. of F&P.	Ethhic Gr.
Tong Kho	Nam Ngao	Hong None	Don Nya	53/351	Meo
Tong Kho	Tong Kho	"	"	35/262	"
Tong Kho	Phu Che	"	"	8/54	"
Tong Kho	Houei Moon	"	"	18/91	"
M. So	Pha Bong	"	"	40/246	"

DZ-0120 UG-1398 Phu Bia 1236

Original Village	Tasseng	Muong	Present Village	No. of F&P.	Ethnic Gr.
Phu Vay	Nam Lane	Vieng Ta	Phu Bia	8/51	Meo
Phu Bia	Phu Vieng	"	"	20/122	"
Phone Dy	Long Khan	M. Pek	"	12/60	Lao
Ban Xay	"	"	"	12/82	"
Phome Ngam	"	"	"	20/107	"
Na Dou	"	"	"	15/95	"
Lan Cha	"	"	"	22/138	"
Sop Khao	"	"	"	31/202	"
Sop Moang	"	"	"	19/111	"
Ban Moang	"	"	"	21/125	"
Pam Tao	"	"	"	25/23	"
Na Peum	"	"	"	11/43	"
Khong Ngoa	Phanh Lo	M. Hiem (LP)	"	12/77	"

DZ-0125 TF-7190 Nyot Tou 1368

Original Village	Tasseng	Muong	Present Village	No. of F&P.	Ethnic Gr.
Pa Kha	Pa Kha	Houne Non	Nyot Tou	1/11	Meo
Noc Coc	Phu Kong	"	"	2/18	"
Houei Tune	Phu Gook	"	"	1/6	"
Nhot Long	Chom Koop	"	"	8/124	"
Houei Loy	Houei Loy	"	"	6/43	"
Houei Tho	"	"	"	6/38	"
Pa Cha	"	"	"	8/70	"
Chom Koop	Vhom Koop	"	"	1/9	"
Ko Khai	"	"	"	1/10	"
Houei Ponne	"	"	"	5/34	"
Nhot Liad	"	"	"	9/57	"
Pa Khom	"	"	"	3/75	"
Houei Sa Boo	Phu Book	"	"	29/161	"
Phu Kong	Phu Kong	"	"	4/20	"
Dang Ke	"	"	"	1/5	"
Ban Biad	Houei Loy	"	"	7/34	"
Houei Xay	Chom Koop	"	"	1/8	"
Nhot Long	Chom Koop	Houa Phanh	"	4/37	"
Ko Khai	"	"	"	7/44	"
Pa Khom	"	"	"	30/194	"
Houei Tho	Houei Y	"	"	15/78	"
Houei Sa Bou	Phu Buck	"	"	7/39	"
Pa Khoulang	"	"	"	4/17	"
Houei Koup	"	"	"	12/56	"
Houei Nhoa	"	"	"	8/52	"

Houei Soup	Phu Buck	Houa Phanh	Nyot Tou	7/43	Meo
Houei Puk	Houei Loy	Hong Non	"	7/28	"
Houei Loy	"	"	"	17/117	"

DZ-0126 TH-9607 Phu Sa 2384

Original Village	Tasseng	Muong	Present Village	No. of F&P.	Ethnic Gr.
Houei Way	Houei Way	M. Nhu (LP)	Phu Sa	73/465	Meo
Houei Lek	Pha Lam	M. Hiem	"	119/815	Lao
Phu Meune	Phu Thine	M. Nhu	"	44/299	Meo
Phu Thine	Houei Way	"	"	24/159	"
Phu Kom	Phu Vieng	Vieng Fa	"	2/9	"
Nhot Ngo	Pha Lam	M. Hiem	"	20/141	"
Phu Kom	"	"	"	40/223	"
Phu Thine	Phu Thine	M. Nhu	"	16/129	"
Houei Hia	"	"	"	25/144	"

DZ-0128 TG-6501 Bouam Mu (19/89)

Old Village	Tasseng	Muong	Present Vil	No. of F&P.	Ethn.
*	(Soldiers & Instructors)		Bouam Mu	19/89	*

DZ-0138 UF-1395 Pha Lo 600

Original Village	Tasseng	Muong	Present Village	No. of F&P.	Ethnic Gr.
Tam Tap	Pha Lo	Xieng Hung	Pha Lo	12/92	Meo
Nam Song	"	"	"	37/252	"
Tham Nong	"	"	"	11/55	"
Pha Kadong	"	"	"	7/46	"
Pha Ke	"	"	"	8/70	"
Phu Meune	"	"	"	15/85	"

DZ-0143 UG-7901 Nam Nyam 3238

Original Village	Tasseng	Muong	Present Village	No. of F&P.	Ethnic Gr.
Nam Pheua	Nam Pheua	M. Ngat	Nam Nyam	71/498	Meo
Nam Keng	Phu Sao	"	"	218/1710	"
Nam Keo	"	"	"	12/106	"
Nam Keng Noi	"	"	"	17/143	"
Nam Song	"	"	"	11/74	"
Nam Cha	"	"	"	14/141	"
Nam Song Nhai	"	"	"	25/169	"
Nam Sat	"	"	"	7/53	"
Nam Leng	"	"	"	11/93	"
Nam Kama	"	"	"	21/143	"
Nam Me	"	"	"	12/102	

DZ-0145 TG-8109 Nam Choi (85/728)

Old Village	Tasseg	Muong	Present Vil.	No. of F&P.	Ethn.
*	*	*	Nam Choi	85/728	*

DZ-0146 TF-7591 Nam Jan 690

Original Village	Tasseng	Muong	Present Village	No. of F&P.	Ethnic Gr.
Tham Tam Bleung	Khang Ve	Vang Xay	Nam Jan	29/227	Meo
Nam Ko	Nam Ko	Pang Xay	"	11/105	L.T.
Nam Teu	"	"	"	15/122	"
Nong Ya Ma	"	"	"	17/98	"
Ban Thoum	"	"	"	5/30	"
Oi Mu	"	"	"	16/108	"

DZ-0148 TF-9590 Thong Khen 2553

Original Village	Tasseng	Muong	Present Village	No. of F&P.	Ethnic Gr.
Pa Dong	Phu Sngop	Vang Xay	Thong Khen	7/45	Meo
San Ngat	M. Ngat	M. Ngat	"	47/330	"
Phu Sung	"	"	"	4/27	"
Than Phia	"	"	"	9/67	"
Pha Kay	"	"	"	5/28	"
Nam Kheng	"	"	"	7/66	"
Nam Yao	"	"	"	6/37	"
Bong Luang	"	"	"	7/41	"
Muong Noi	M. Noi	Kham Keud (KM)	"	19/144	"
Pha Hom	"	"	"	2/11	"
Tham Ton	"	"	"	18/131	"
Pa Pek	"	"	"	1/10	"
Pha Bo	Pha"Bo	"	"	14/108	"
Phu Song	"	"	"	11/71	"
Phu Hong	"	"	"	11/78	"
Pha Thao	"	"	"	10/63	"
Nam Choua	"	"	"	2/13	"
Phakalong	Phakalong	"	"	13/116	"
Nam Kane	"	"	"	9/73	"
Nam Lao	"	"	"	13/92	"
Ong Tu	"	"	"	5/38	"
Pa Po	"	"	"	13/111	"
Pha Dao	Nam"Yane	"	"	9/57	"
Nam Yang	"	"	"	6/30	"
Pha Ling	"	"	"	5/29	"

San Ngat	Ngat	M. Ngat	Thong Khen	13/75	Meo
Nam Yao	"	"	"	4/24	"
Thong Peud	Phu Sung	"	"	39/256	"
Sam Soc	Pha Kalong	Kham Keup (KM)	"	2/8	"
San Lao	"	"	"	2/19	"
Nam Sa Ding	"	"	"	11/90	"
Nong Boun	"	"	"	4/29	"
Pha Khao	"	"	"	13/96	"
Phu Mune	Phu Mune	Vang Xay	"	10/80	"

DZ-0150 TF-5898 Phu Kang Nhai (143/975)

Old Village	Tassegn	Muong	Present Vil.	No. of F&P.	Ethn.
Houei Tho	Na Dok	Hong None	Phu Kang Nhai	8/63	Meo
Houei Phoune	"	"	"	23/156	"
Houei Kaleua Nua	"	"	"	14/70	"
Houei Kadok	"	"	"	8/68	"
Houei Te Nua	"	"	"	5/39	"
Houei Te Tai	"	"	"	9/66	"
Houei Te Kang	"	"	"	6/41	"
Houei Sanao	"	"	"	14/108	"
Houei Savanh	"	"	"	12/86	"
Houei Kaleua Tai	"	"	"	9/47	"
Pha Sang	Houei Muone	Nong None	"	1/7	"
Phu Tin Kha	"	"	"	2/21	"
Houei Moon Nua	"	"	"	5/40	"
Houei Kham Moon	"	"	"	5/31	"
Pa No	Pha Thi	"	"	5/20	"
Nam Noi	Pha Song Ya	"	"	17/112	"

DE-0151 TG-6127 Nam Sen - Tai - Kang 304

Original Village	Tassang	Muong	Present Village	NO. OF MAP.	Ethnic Gr.
		Nam Sen			
Pong Kam Lang	P. Kong Khao	Vieng Fa	Nam Sen	7/51	Meo
Pong Kam Lang	"	"	"	12/72	"
Nam Sen	"	"	"	12/76	"
		Nam Sen Tai			
Nam Sen Tai	P. Kong Khao	Vieng Fa	Nam Sen	2/7	Meo
Nam Sen Tai	"	"	"	10/57	"
		Nam Sen Kang			
Nam Sen Kang	P. Kong Khao	Vieng Fa	Nam Sen	7/41	Meo

DZ-0152 TG-4344 Tham Kheuang (515/3209)

Old Village	Tasseng	Muong	Present Vil.	No. of F&P.	Ethn.
Tham Khong	Sieng Det	M. Pek	Tham Kheuang	25/164	Lao
Nam De	"	"	"	18/161	"
Nam Hoane	"	"	"	16/121	"
Houei Thoa	"	"	"	14/85	"
Nam Tome	"	"	"	24/178	"
Na Pung	"	"	"	16/105	"
Phu Vieng Nhai	"	"	"	25/176	"
Phu Vieng Noi	"	"	"	23/136	"
Boua Mu	"	"	"	11/62	"
Nam Phat	"	"	"	9/74	"
Chom Thua	"	"	"	14/106	"
H. Phiang	"	"	"	13/73	"
H. Saki	"	"	"	20/108	"
Keo Tane	"	"	"	8/36	"
Hi Vaeng	"	"	"	18/133	"
Pha Vang	"	"	"	13/98	"
Na Kam	"	"	"	6/40	"
Kang Thone	"	"	"	23/101	"
Sieng Det	"	"	"	15/78	"
Sieng Khong	"	"	"	13/52	"
Nam Chat	"	"	"	12/58	"
Phak Pa Pang	Phak Pa Pang	"	"	3/25	"
Nam Dai	"	"	"	8/44	"
Hinh Lak	"	"	"	22/149	"
Nam Penh	"	"	"	12/74	"
Nam Mane	"	"	"	17/84	"
keo Yuac	"	"	"	10/63	"
Tham Ye	"	"	"	9/71	"
Sen Deuame	"	"	"	5/31	"
Sam Thi	"	"	"	19/81	"
Nam Sa La	Tha Choc	Vieng Fa	"	4/31	Meo
Phu Da Pho	"	"	"	39/234	"
Houei Kho	"	"	"	14/71	"
Don Thao	"	"	"	17/106	"

DZ-0154 TG-7518 Keo Thu 1759

Original Village	Tasseng	Muong	Present Village	No. of F&P.	Ethnic Gr.
Tham Tam Leung	Na Vang	¢Vang Xay	Keo Thu	27/228	Meo
Nam Lom	"	"	"	13/87	"
Pha Houa Nam	"	"	"	12/94	"
Keo Thu	"	"	"	20/135	"
Phu Moc	"	"	"	12/102	"
Nam Nhom	"	"	"	41/288	"
Sam Thong	"	"	"	26/200	"
Nong Khio	"	"	"	16/121	"
Phu Moc Nhai	Pha No	"	"	13/89	"
Pha Huong	Penh Pha	Pang Xay	"	21/133	Lao
Long Thu	"	"	"	30/180	"
Ban Not	Nakhoune	"	"	13/102	"

DZ-0156 TF-8198 Phu San Kang 643

Original Village	Tasseng	Muong	Present Village	No. of F&P.	Ethnic Gr.
Sang Khang	Pheung Xam	Pang Xay	P. San Kang	18/90	L.T.
Hinh Kong	"	"	"	4/24	"
Keo Nhang	Khang Meune	M. Kham	"	6/39	Lao
San Kong	"	"	"	2/9	"
Keo Ping	Pheung Xam	Pang Xay	"	3/20	L.T.
Phu Sa Bot	Tham La	M. Kham	"	3/18	Meo
Hinh Tat	"	"	"	6/35	Lao
Ban Kong	"	"	"	3/1 3	"
San Khang	"	"	"	3/17	"
Nhot Xam	"	"	"	3/14	"

DZ-0157 TF-6693 B. Ko Mi 511

Original Village	Tasseng	Muong	Present Village	No. of F&P.	Ethnic Gr.
Na Pa	Hat Nam	M. Kham	B. Ko Mi	4/33	Lao
Na Nhong	"	"	"	9/36	"
Huat	"	"	"	17/115	"
Nam Lum	"	"	"	5/42	"
Hip	"	"	"	13/97	"
Long Kai	"	"	"	2/13	"
Pong San	"	"	"	5/36	"
Chong	"	"	"	3/19	"
Khang	"	"	"	6/33	"
Than	"	"	"	13/70	"
Youm	"	"	"	3/17	"

DZ-0158 UF-8693 Houa Phu 368

Original Village	Tasseng	Muong	Present Village	No. of F&P.	Ethnic Gr.
Phu Bang	Tham Soi	M. Ngat	Houa Phu	5/55	Meo
Pha Thao	"	"	"	17 /123	"
Pa Lap	"	"	"	8/98	"
Ma Noi	"	"	"	5/37	"
Tham Soi	"	"	"	8/55	"

DZ-0166 TF-7693 Keo Sa Khai Khang, Neua, Tai 1494

Original Village	Tasseng	Muong	Present Village	No. of F&P.	Ethnic Gr.
		Keo Sa Khai Khang 673			
Tam Houa	Phu Sung	M. Ngat	Keo Sakhai Kang	12/89	Meo
Phu Laemp	"	"	"	12/70	"
Phu Phu Hou	"	"	"	11/68	"
Thong Peud	"	"	"	35/227	"
Pha Hom	Pha Do	Kham Keud	"	17/133	"
Phu Hou Nhai	Phu Sung	M. Ngat	"	16/86	"
		Keo Sa Khai Neua 606			
Sam Thong	Phu Do	Vieng FA	Keo Sa Khai Neua	61/510	Meo
Sam Thong	Na Vang	Vang Xay	"	15/96	"
		Keo Sa Khai Tai 215			
Pha Pong	Pha Pong	Houng None	Keo Sa Khai Tai	22/146	Meo
Nam Tong	Phu Che	"	"	4/29	"
Phu Che	"	"	"	3/16	"
Houei Hinh Sa	"	"	"	2/11	"
Houei Meng Da	"	"	"	2/13	"

DZ-0172 TG-7223 M. Peng 1880

Original Village	Y Tasseng	Muong	Present Village	No. of F&P.	Ethnic Gr.
Nam Nhom	Na Vang	Vang Xay	M. Peng	33/258	Meo
Nam Kheng	"	"	"	19/170	"
Sam Thong	"	"	"	77/566	"
Nam Sa Dong	"	"	"	11/111	"
Pha Noc	Nang Ving	"	"	25/165	L.T.
Sam Thong Nhai	Na Vang	"	"	23/188	Meo
Ban Not	Na Khone	Pang Xay	"	35/219	L.T.
Pha Hung	Na Vang	"	"	32/203	"
Nam Sang	Bouk Ohn	Xieng Hung	"	32/203	

DZ-0173 UF-9288 Phu Lom 837

Original Village	Tasseng	Muong	Present Village	No. of F&P.	Ethnic Gr.
Phone Savanh	Chomthong	Kham Keut	Phu Lom	29/175	Meo
Nam Mai	Pu Lom	M. Car	"	12/85	"
Thong M. Ka	"	"	" (Noi)	18/101	"
Nam Hong	"	"	"	11/70	"
Song Ngan	"	"	"	25/127	"
Phu Pa Vay	"	"	"	5/31	"
Phu Lom Nhai	"	"	"	22/124	"
Ko Hay	"	"	"	18/124	"

DZ-0174 TG-5640 Nam Tong 709

Original Village	Tasseng	Muong	Present Village	No. of F&P.	Ethnic Gr.
Sam Sen Tai	Xieng Det	M. Pek	Nam Tong	12/70	Lao
Nam Tai	Pa Pang	Pang Xay	"	12/56	L.T.
Nam Chap	"	"	"	14/102	"
Houei Bon	"	"	"	19/119	"
Nam Keng	Na Khoune	"	"	15/106	"
Sam Sem	Xieng Det	M Pek	"	12/56	"
Houei Taka	"	"	"	7/33	"
Keo Tan	"	"	"	9/47	"
Na Kam	"	"	"	12/63	"
Nam Tong	"	"	"	12/57	"

DZ-0175 TF-6595 Hat Kuang 532

Original Village	Tasseng	Muong	Present Village	No. of F&P.	Ethnic Gr.
Houei Song	Lane	M. Kham	Hat Khouang	24/148	Lao
Phiang Pho	"	"	"	12/57	"
Hat Mone	Pheuang Xam	"	"	16/79	"
Hat Bo	"	"	"	14/56	"
San Kham	"	"	"	6/26	"
Nam Xiem	Boun Thine	"	"	6/34	"
Ban Ang	Hat Kouang	"	"	3/13	"
Sop Na	"	"	"	6/24	"
Nam Tor	"	"	"	4/19	"
Kio Ping	Pheuang Xam	"	"	5/27	"
Sam Tong	"	"	"	4/19	"
Phiang Liew	"	"	"	4/15	"
Nhot Xam	Boun Tine	"	"	2/15	"

DZ-0176 TG-6005 Keo Mak Feung 454

Original Village	Tasseng	Muong	Present Village	No.of F&P.	Ethnic Gr.
Houei Noune	Houei Noune	Houng None	Keo Mak Pheung	61/346	Meo
Pa Kha Nua	"	"	"	2/16	"
Houei Hiak	"	"	"	6/44	"
Houng Nohn	Houng Nohn	"	"	2/9	"
Pha Thi	Pha Thi	"	"	6/39	"

Pong Sang 14

Original Village	Tasseng	Muong	Present Village	No. of F&P.	#Ethnic G
Tham Phia	M. Ngat	M. Ngat (XK)	Pong Sang	2/14	Meo

Houei Kho 84

Original Village	Tasseng	Muong	Present Village	No.of F&P.	Ethnic Gr.
Houei Kho	Tha Choc	Vieng Fa	Houei Kho	13/84	Meo

NAM LAO ~~187~~ 115

Original Village	Tasseng	Muong	Present Village	No. of F&P.	Ethnic Gr.
Nam Lao	Phu Kong	Khao Vieng Fa	Nam Lao	5/27	M eo
Nam Lao	"	"	"	13/88	"

Keo Sam Pom 20

Original Village	Tasseng	Muong	Present Village	No. of FT&P.	Ethnic Gr.
Keo Sam Pom	Phu Kong Khao		Vieng Fa	5/20	Meo

Nam On 114

Original Village	Tasseng	Muong	Present Village	No. of F&P.	Ethnic Gr.
Nam On	Phu Kong Khao	Vieng Fa	~~Vieng Fa~~ Nam On	6/29	Meo
Nam On	"	"	"	15/85	"

Sam Pom 62

Original Village	Tasseng	Muong	Present Village	No. of F&P.	Ethnic Gr.
Sam Pom	Phu Kong	Khao Vieng Fa	~~Sam Pom~~ Sam Pom	11/62	Meo

Pha Bong 169

Original Village	Tasseng	Muong	Present Village	No. of F&P.	Ethnic Gr.
Xieng Ong	Phu Cum	Hong None	Pha Bong	26/169	Meo

Nam Pheua 108

Original Village	Tasseng	Muong	Present Village	No. of F&P.	Ethnic Gr.
Nam Ma	Phu Sao	M. Ngat	Nam Pheua	12/108	Meo

Phu Xong UF 8693 908

Original Village	Tasseng	Muong	Present Village	No. of F&P.	Ethnic Gr.
Phu Song	Tham Soi	M. Ngat	Phu Xong	11/76	Meo
Phu Xong	Tam Xoi	M. Ngat	"	61/416	Meo
Tam Soi	"	"	"	15/109	"
Pa Lane	"	"	"	8/98	"
Ma Noi	"	"	"	5/31	"
Pha Thao	"	"	"	17/123	"
Phu Bang	"	"	"	5/55	"

Nong Ngam 74

Original Village	Tasseng	Muong	Present Village	No. of F&P.	Ethnic Gr.
KPha Du	KPha Du	Kham Keup (KM)	Xong Ngam	13/74	Meo

TF-7000 Sop Iang 407

Original Village	Tasseng	Muong	Present Village	No. of F&P.	Ethnic Gr.
Ban Nai	Om	M. Khoune	Sop Iang	32/203	Lao
Na Nong	"	"	"	10/55	"
Na Som	"	"	"	9/39	"
Na Dy	"	"	"	5/40	"
Na Keo	"	"	"	10/70	"

By Boun Heuang Tha

Pha Kwai 1456

Original Village	Tasseng	Muong	Present Village	No. of F&P.	Ethnic Gr.
Nam Tem	Phu Sung	Ngat	Pha Kwai	15/109	Meo
Nam Ngat	M. Moc	"	"	16/118	"
Nam Ngat	"	"	"	11/76	"
Ban Ngat	"	"	"	15/109	"
Nan Huong	"	"	"	15/98	"
Ko Pheuang	"	"	"	16/100	"
Ban Tam	"	"	"	23/148	Lao
Pot Pao	Nam Sang	"	"	17/96	"
Ko Moang	M. Moc	"	"	32/158	"
Nam Sang	Nam Sang	"	"	14/87	Meo
Chong Thong	Mo Moc	"	"	15/96	"
Chai Tha Ny	"	"	"	14/66	"
Ban Tong	M. Ngat	"	"	12/84	"
Tam Tam	"	"	"	15/111	"

Sop San Neua 1119

Original Village	Taseng	Muong	Present Village	No. of F&P.	Ethnic Gr.
Ban Khao	Khao	M. Kham	Sop San Nua	95/630	Lao
Na Ting	"	"	"	7/42	"
Na mone	"	"	"	5/37	"
Na Phe Inh	"	"	"	10/75	"
Nam Piew	"	"	"	10/60	"
Pa Kha	"	"	"	8/57	"
Na Fay	"	"	"	2/11	"
Ban Tha	"	"	"	20/144	"
Phak Hok	Khăm Meune	"	"	8/63	"

Pak Sang 125 (Pak Sang)

Original Village	Tasseng	Muong	Present Village	No. of F&P.	Ethnic Gr.
Lao	Nhot Keua	M. Kham	Pak Sang	4/27	Thai Dam
Khai	"	"	"	2/12	"
Xøieng	"	"	"	5/23	"
Na Thong	"	"	"	2/15	"
Sam	"	"	"	2/11	"
Hoc	"	"	"	2/9	"
Khom	"	"	"	4/21	"
Done	"	"	"	1/7	"

ENROLLMENT IN OLD & NEW REFUGEE SCHOOLS IN SAM NEUA PROVINCE SCHOOL YEAR

1970 - 1971

OLD REFUGEES SCHOOLS

SITE NO.	LOCATION	COORDINATE
LS-211	Phone Xay	TF-6299
LS-284	Houai Sai Phou Hai	TF-5594
LS-266	Thong Mieng	TF-8987
LS-288	Houei Ngone Nam Khouak Ban Houei Vang Kham	TF-7795 TG-7364
LS-272	Na Sou	TF-5994
LS-246	Ban Sone	TF-5894
LS-287	Na Ti	TG-5604

NEW REFUGEE SCHOOLS

LS-281	Na Kouang	TG-4901
DZ-0150	Phou Kang	TF-5898
DZ-0128	Bouak Mou	TG-6501
DZ-0119	Done Nha	TG-6211
DZ-0125	Nhot Tou Kao Kham Vieng Keo	TF-7190
DZ-0122	Sob Sai	TF-5596

REFUGEE CENTER

	Office of PSI/Houa Phan	
LS-281	Na Kouang	TG-4901
DZ-0150	Phou Kang	TF-5898
DZ-0128	Bouak Mou=	TG-6501
DZ-0119	Done Nha	TG-6211
DZ-0125	Nhot Tou Kao Kham Vieng Keo (Muong Hieme)	TF-7190

ENROLLMENT IN OLD & NEW REFUGEE SCHOOLS IN SAM NEUA PROVINCE

SCHOOL YEAR 1970 - 71

No.	SCHOOLS	P - 1	P - 2	P - 3	P - 4	P - 5	P - 6	T O T A L
1	Old Refugee Schools							
TF 6299 1	Phone Xay LS.211	63	30	38	48	58	50	287
TF5594 2.	Houai Sai - LS-284	59	55	26	26	22	16	204
3	Phou Hai	100	86	77	38	22	31	354
TF.8987 4	Thong Mieng LS.266	49	38	35	42	25	22	213
TF.7795 5	Houei Ngone LS.288	52	5					57
6	Nam Khouak	7	4	6				17
7	Ban Houei	50	20	18				88
TG7364 8	Vang Kham	39	22	21	25			107
9	Na Sou	107	50	42				199
TF5894 10	Ban Sone - LS 246	27	11					38
TG5604 11	Na Ti LS.287	18	9	8				35
	New Refugee Schools							
TG4901 12	Na Kouang LS-281	1,000	150	100				1,250
TF5898 13	Phou Kang DZ.0150	170	100	50				320
TG 6501 14	Bouak Mou DZ.0128	55	15	10				80
TG6211 15	Done Nha DZ.0119	60	40	20				120
TF.7190 16	Nhot Tou Kao Kham DZ.0125	125	75	50				250
17	Vieng Keo	115	60	25	30			230
TF5596 18	Sob Sai DZ.0112	55	20	15				90
	T O T A L :	2,151	790	541	209	127	119	3,938

Phone Xay, July 3, 1970
PSI/Sam Neua

Mounty S. PHABMIXAY

FY - 1970 - 71

No.	REFUGEE CENTER	HABITATION	STUDENT	SCHOOLS	CLASSROOMS	ROOFINGSHEET	NAILS					PLYWOOD
							10 cm	8 cm	6 cm	4 cm	Roofing	
1	Office of PSI/Houa Phan					420	20	20	20	20	20	6
2	Na Kong	8,640	1,250	3	20	1,400	80	60	60	60	50	20
3	Phou Kang D2-0150	1,540	320	1	6	420	20	20	20	20	20	6
4	Bouak Mou	560	80	1	2	140	10	10	10	10	6	2
5	Done Nha	850	120	1	3	210	15	15	15	15	10	3
6	Nhot Tou Kao Kham D2-0125	1,400	250	2	6	420	30	30	30	30	20	6
7	Vieng Keo (Muong Hieme)	1,560	200	1	4	280	40	40	40	40	30	4
	T O T A L	14,550	2,220	11 (9)	47 (41)	3,290	215	195	195	195	156	47

TF-5898-

TF-7190-

Phone Xay, April 21, 1970

PSI/Houa Phan

Mounty S. PHABMIXAY

SCHOOL SUPPLIES NEEDED FOR REFUGEE SCHOOLS IN SAm NEUA

FY - 1970 - 71

No.	GRADE	NOTEBOOKS	CHALK	COLORED CHALK	PENCIL	COLORED PENCIL	RULER	A PAIR OF COMPASS	REMARKS
1	P - 1	6,453			6,453	6,453	2,151		
2	P - 2	3,955			2,373	2,373	791	8	
3	P - 3	3,246	10 CASE	3 CASE	1,623	1,623	541	541	Chalk and Colored
4	P - 4	1,463			627	627	209	209	chalk are 13 cases
5	P - 5	1,143			381	381	127	127	Chalk = 10 cases
6	P - 6	1,071			357	357	119	119	Colored chalk 3 cases
	T O T A L	17,331	10	3	11,814	13,814	3,938	996	

Student P - 5, 6 each use notebook.....9 a year
" P - 4 -"- -"- 7 -"-
" P - 3 -"- -"- 6 -"-
" P - 2 -"- -"- 5 -"-
" P - 1 -"- -"- 3 -"-
Student each person use pencil..... .... . 3 -"-
" -"- colored pencil 3 -"-
" -"- ruler 1 -"-
Student P - 3, 4, 5, 6 use a pair of compass 1 a year

Phone Xay, July 3, 1970

PSI/Sam Neua

mounty S. PHABmIXAY

LAO & FRENCH TEXTBOOKS NEEDED FOR REFUGEE SCHOOLS IN SAM NEUA

FY - 1970 - 71

No.	GRADE	READING		ARITHMETIC		SCIENCE		GEOGRAPHY		HISTORY		GRAMMAR		T O T A L	
		LAO	FRENCH	LAO	FRENCH	LAO	FRENCH	LAO	FRENCH	LAO	FREN	LAO	FRENCH	LAO	FRENCH
1.	P - 1	2,151		2,151		2,151		2,151		2,151		2,151		12,906	
2	P - 2	791		791		791		791		791		791		4,746	
3	P - 3	541	541	541		541		541		541		541		3,246	541
4	P - 4	209	209	209		209		209		209		209	209	1,254	418
5	P - 5	127	127	127	127	127	127	127	127	127	127	127	127	762	762
6	P - 6	119	119	119	119	119	119	119	119	119	119	119	119	714	714
	T O T A L	3,938	996	3,938	246	3,938	246	3,938	246	3,938	246	3,938	455	23,628	2,435

Phone Xay, July 3, 1970

PSI/Sam Neua

Mounty S. PHABMIXAY

NUMBER OF STUDENTS AND TEACHERS FY - 1970 - 71

PSI/HOUA PHAN

SCHOOLS	P - 1		P - 2		P - 3		P - 4		P - 5		P - 6		No. of Students			No. of Teachers		
	BOYS	GIRLS	B	G	B	G	B	G	B	G	B	G	B	G	T	XAN THO	XAN TRI	CREC
PSI/Officers																3	5	
Phone Xay	44	22	34	13	26	6	49	5	60	4	64	3	277	53	330	5	7	
Done Nha	309	52	60	8	25		30						424	60	484		2	8
Dok One	50	16	16	1	18								84	17	101		2	2
Houei Ngonh	14	9	10	10	16	6							40	25	65		1	2
Houei Sane	17	7	8										25	7	32			1
Phone Xay Neua	16	13	6										22	13	35			1
Nam Khouak	7	4	3		3								13	4	17			1
	457	123	137	32	88	12	79	5	60	4	64	3	885	179	1064	5	12	15
Houei Sai	44	19	13	12	16	9	29	6	20	5	29	1	151	52	203	2	6	
Ban Houei	17	7	2	3	5	2							24	12	36			1
Sob Sai	45	28	20	3	10	4							75	35	110		2	1
Na Ti	7		11	1	11								29	1	30			1
Phou Kang	67	15	13		3								83	15	98		1	2
	180	69	59	19	45	15	29	6	20	5	29	1	362	115	477	2	9	5

SCHOOLS	P - 1		P - 2		P - 3		P - 4		P - 5		P - 6		No. of Students			No. of Teachers		
	BOYS	GIRLS	B	G	B	G	B	G	B	G	B	G	B	G	T	XAN THO	XAN TRI	CREC TEACH.
Vieng Keo	62	54	17	8	33	17	18	7	10				140	86	226	1	4	2
Vang Kham	14	16	13	9	19	3	16	5					62	33	95	1	3	
Na Sou	40	23	11	15	3								66	26	92		1	2
Ban Sone	7	3	8		10	6							25	9	34			1
	123	96	49	17	77	29	34	12	10				293	154	447	2	8	5
Phou Hai	63	7	40	6	47	2	17	1	8	1	17	1	192	18	210	2	3	5
Houei Tou	37	13	30	5	29	3	28	2	20	1	17	1	161	25	186	3	4	1
Na Kouang	247	22	28	5	28	6							303	33	336		4	5
Phou Koum	65		15										80		80			1
	412	42	103	16	104	11	45	3	28	2	34	2	736	76	812	5	11	12
T O T A L	1172	330	358	84	314	60	187	26	118	11	127	6	2276	524	2800	17	45	37
	1502		442		381		213		129		133							

Phone Xay, September 29, 1970
PSI/Houa Phan

Mounty S. PHABMIXAY

DRAFT

CHRONOLOGY 65-69

SAM NEUA

Oct 1965	Movement of 25,000 people back into SN.
Nov 1965	400 New refugees into Phou Vieng, 20758 from S. of SN city & DRV border; 350 to 127, 2800 new refugees in area from bad guy areas.
	8-10,000 refugees from M. Houn moving back to village from 36 27 M. Lap.
23 Dec 65	95 area threatened - maybe 3000 refugees of fall fallen back to 36 & 27 = if fall, 140000.
18 Apr 66	Ban Ban 900 TD into 191 240 Lao from 59 200 Lao from 2 5000 from 95 area at 192
	1000 36 refugees at 211 125 at 184 From M. Haem 350 at 179 E of Ban Ban 806 at 88 from Phou Vai
	1200 at 50 from Phou Vai 294 at 178 400 at 111 from 52 1206 at 33 from No. 733
9 May 66	Fall of 179 & L-5s 1800 Lao, Meo, Lt to 185 area 107 evac - 1200 to 76 + 3000 S.S. vill at 111 about 450 from 52 area at 59 600 from Uret border & 52 1000 deps to 20 & 20A
11 May 66	900 Refugees from UH 6068 to 76 were 8090 S.S.
6 Jul	Movement of refugees from 59 - 36
Jul 66	107,179 opened, new DZ at Houei Nhu, Phou Den Din little movement 480 + 500 Meo return to Houei Moun from 76 300 Meo filter into 179 possible libration of 900 Lao from M. Larb 2000 Meo, Lao TD from M. Pem

Recaptured of 127

LL Aug 66 — 400 into 111) 400 into 59 & 36) after 1 bombing 200 into 192) 2 operation

Sept 66 — Advancing in SN

6 Oct 66 — expective offenxive
76 refugees to Houei Moun after securing of Pha Ka (800 total)
mitral movement in anticypation of offens
200 L & LT from 179 - 48A
80 LT walk to 198
380 Meo walk from 179 - 107
1600 Meo from Pha Hany (UH 7645) to 107
300 Meo deps from 87 - 111 - Phou Meo mat (UH 5056)
800 Meo from 185 already move

Recapture 27
offe
Offensive stuts underway

23 Nov 66 — LS 36, 48A, 179, 52 Lost in early Mar, April
29 lost in May - 89 & 201 attaches enermy actionly at exginning of Laos caused 4000 peopbe move from 95, 21, 35 & 13.

11/14/66 144 from UH-0565 - 184
11/2/66 340 from North of 36 - 48A

Dec 66 — No large refugees moves refugees from 36 - 48A in Oct others from 179, 27, 205

150 new refugees into 184 from UH 0870
240 new into 205

Dec 66 — 589 people to 206 & 201 1500 + 1200.

Jan 67 — Marks on 36 & 52 (Relation in dry season Nov - Jan.)
probes at 215, 85, 59, 127, 179, 27, 205

Feb 67 — new refugees to Pha Poun will goto Phou Vai LS-219 900 refugees.
215 - 884 people 220 Lao evac from 252 to 111 - Hinsa

27 Feb 62 — General calm 109 refugees M. Pein - 220

Sept 7, 67 — 121 new to 111 592 to 215 from Nong Khang, Phou Bak

Jan 14, 68 — 127 & 159 lost 13 Jan ~~retaken 121~~ Retaken 121 Jun

Feb 5 — build up around 85

attack launced from 179 to 10 farm, Phou Houei Hao, M. Yert Phou Den Din Nest of 85

Feb 18

111 - 1800 people
107 - 430
205 - 1430
215 - 10800
Phu Den Din - 550

9000 (4045 refugees) + 4000 villagers in area

198 - 1074
Phu Kok - 300 Sam Neua

Mar 15, 68

7- 1000 refugees moving to 184 from 215 area 8850 total most Meo

SN. refugees arytion at Phou He from 111, Kha Dok, 007 85, 205

at 20 from 215, 185, 76 Houei Meui

at Houei Sat F. from Na Muong M. Yut, 198, 215, 111, 215, 76, H. Thong ca 6540 people total.

April 179, 76, Den Din, 85 lost in Feb Pa Thi lost 11 March 185 fell then 198 too

Refugees moved to 48A - 108 - 20A from UH 1344 50A (Phou Louei)

22 Oct at 215 2819 refugees

Dec 16 at 215 2968 refugees
at 221 463 people left after trouble in area

24 Dec new refugees to 107 & 221, Yhot Yut (UH 6547)
Kha Dok (Phou Lik (UH 8072)
H. Dai Dai (UH 6174) 205 220, 196 from 85 area after UP8s attack.

Recaptured 107, 221, 205, 198, 111, Phou Phao (UH8362)
Phu Hao)UH7359) Phu Ngoua (UH 8065)

Sam Neua Refugees
215 - 3000
Phu Lik - 1262
Yhot Yut 501
H. Om - 183
H. Dai Dat - 267
H. Dai Neua 130 (UH 6276)
107 - 151
76 277
221 575
Kha Dok 498
Pha Hang 400

TOTAL: 7244

NVA build road from San Neua to 86
from M. Yut to 107 in 67 - 68 late any Sept 68 countes allack on 85.

Feb 1, 69 moved last 300 refugees from 111 to 184 are 9000 refugees

after fall of 85, fall back to 215 and 184 after 3 months

after 184 hit

Phu Lower area -people went to UH 1345, UH 1545, UH 1459 in at these place for 9 months.

move of refugees 278 to 108 8115 Jan 70, 108 - LS 272/7715 ref.

March 70 2600 refugees walking from 184 - 50

Before and after fall of Pha Thi

10 March 1968

LS 111 friendly
LS 86 enermy
Den Din "
205 "
179 "
58 "
221 "
107 "

Successful ref. moves

1 of 3 groups from 205 to North of 107
1 Group from M. Yut (UH 7355 area) to South of 111
Group from 111 and B. Pha Kha (UH 8363) to North of 85
Group from 76 to West of 215
Attempts from 221 stopped by enermy.

11 March - 19 March

638 Meo/Lao air evaced from 211 - 215 on 11 March Meo/Lao/LT walked to 215 from 185, 111, 85, 107, 205, 221

Several groups air evaced to 215 from some general area.

LS 198 cut off by enermy

Refugees ais evaced from 215 to Porn alpha (Phu Loue area) South of 184

13 Mar - 24 Mar

Point alpha area LS-215 abandened on 19 Mar. 300 refugees walked to LS-195.

LS-221 refugees walked to LS-195 - 5 April

LS- 85 refugees walked to LS-195 - 15 - 16 April

Bonkane 10,579 refugees

In light of the current interest of both governmental and non-governmental elements in the Laos refugee situation-an interest generated in no small part by the significant increase in refugees following a marked escalation on PL/NVA military activity in 1969 and early 1970 - a few brief comments are in order concerning the historical trend of population displasement in Laos, and the extent of the displasement. (1) Chart and explanaition
(2) Map - area by area, starting with the South

Chronology 65 – 69

Sam Neua

Oct 1965 – movement of 25,000 people back into SN.

Nov 1965 – 400 new refs into Phu Vieng, E of 58 FM E of SNC city & Viet border
350 to 127 ↗

2800 new refs in area – FM bad guy areas.

8-10,000 refs from Houa M. moving back to vill. FM 36

~~M. Lap~~ 27 → M. Lap

23 Dec 65 — 95 area threatened – maybe 3000 refs if fall

fallen back to 36 & 27 = if fall, 140000

18 April 66 — 36 fell in spring
- Ban Ban 900 TD into 191
- 240 Lao from 59
- 200 Lao FM 2
- 5000 From 95 area at 192
- 1000 36 refs at 211
- 125 at 184 FM. Hiem
- 350 at 179 E of Ban Ban
- 806 at 88 FM Phou Vai
- 1200 at 50 from Phou Vai
- 294 ~~at~~ 178
- 400 ~~at~~ 111 FM 52
- 1206 at 33 FM N of 33

9 May 66 — fall of 179 & L52
1500 Lao, Meo, LT to 185 area
107 evac – 1200 to 76 + 3000 S.S. vill
at 111 about 450 FM ~~FM~~ 52 area
at 59 400 from Viet border & 52
1000 deps to 20 & 20A

11 May 66 900 refs FM UH6068 to 76
were 80% S.S.

6 July Movement of refs FM 59 → 36

July 66 107, 179 opened
new DZ at Houie Nha, Phou Den Din

Little movements

450 + 500 Meo return to Houie Moun
FM 76

300 into 196 from PL area (1300 altogether)

300 Meo filter into 179

Possible libration of 900 Lao from M. Lart
2000 M, L, TD FM M. Pem

Recaptured of 127

11 Aug 66 400 into 111
400 into 59 & 36
200 into 192
after 1) Bombing 2) operation

Sept 66 advancing in SN

6 Oct 66 expected offensive

76 refs to Houie Moun after securing
of Pha Ka (800 total)

Initial movement in anticipation of
offensive:

200 L&LT fm 179 → 48A
80 LT walk to 198
350 Meo walk fm 179 → 107
1600 Meo fm Pha Hang (UH 7645)
to 107
300 Meo deps from 87 → 111 → Phou
~~Hao~~ Mat (UH8056)
500 Meo from 185 already move

recapture 27

offensive still underway

23 Nov 66 LS 36, 48A, 179, 52 lost
in Early Mar, April
29 lost in May - 89 & 201 attacked
enemy activity at beginning of year
caused 4000 people move from 95, 21,
35 & 13.

11/14/66 144 FM UH 0565-184
11/2/66 340 FM North of 36 → 48A

Dec ~~Nov~~ 66 No large ref moves
refs from 36 → 48A in Oct
others from 179, 27, 205

150 new refs into 184 FM UH 0870
240 new into 205

Dec 66 LS 89 people to 206 & 201
1500
~~Jan~~ " +1200

Jan 67 attacks on 36 & 52 (retaken in dry season nov → Jan ?)
probes at 215, 85, 59, 127,
179, 27, 205

~~Ao~~

Feb 1 67 New refs to Pha Poun, will go to
Phou Val LS 219
900 refs

215 - 884 people
220 Tao evac from LS 2 to 111 → Hin Sa

27 Feb 67 General calm
109 ~~[illegible]~~ refs M. Pein → 220

Sept 7 67 121 new to 111
592 to 215 Fm Nong Khang
Phu Bak

Jan 14/68 127 & 159 lost 13 Jan
retaken 14 Jan

Feb 5 build up around 85

Attack launched from 179 (N to 107 area), Phu
Houie Hao, Phou Den Din
M. Yort — Nort of 85

Feb 18 111 - 1800 people
107 - 430
205 - 1430
215 - 10800
Phu Den Din - 550
9000 (4045 refs)
+ 4000 villagers in area
198 - 1074
Khu Dok - 300

Mar 15 68 7-10000 Sam Neua refs moving to 184
from 215 area
8880 total mostly Meo

SN refs artifices =
at Phou He
Fm 111, Kha Dok, 007, 85,
205
at 20
Fm 215, 185, 76 Houei
Meui
at Houie Sat F
Fm. Na Muong My Yut,
198, 215, 111, 215, 76,
H. thong (- ca 6590 people
total)

April 179, 76, Den Din, 85 lost in Feb
Pathi lost 11 ~~April~~ March
185 fell then 198 too

refs moved to 48A → 108 → 20A
FM UH1344 → 50A
(Phou Louie)

22 Oct at 215 2819 refs

Dec 16 at 215 2968 refs
at 221 463 people left
after trouble in am

24 Dec

Yhot Yut

new recs to 107 & 221, UH6547
Kha Dok & Phu Lek (UH8072)
H. Dai Dai (UH6174), 205,
220, 196 FM & S area
after UP's attack

recaptures 107, 221, 205,
198, 111, Phu Phao
(UH8362) Phu Hao (UH7359)
Phu Nyoua (UH8065)

Sam Neua recs
215 - 3000
Phu Lek - 1262
Yhot Yut 501
H. Om - 183
H. Dai Dai - 267
H. Dai Neua 130 (UH6274)
107 - 151
76 277
221 575
Kha Dok 498
Pha Hang 400
7244

NVA build road from Sam Neun to 86
in 67

From M. Yut to 107 in 68
late aug Sept 68 counterattack on 85

Feb 1 69 moved last 300 refs from
111 to 184 are 9000 refs

after fall of 85, fallback
to 215
and 184 after 3 months

after 184 hit

I people went to
UH 1345
UH 1545
UH 1459 etc at these places
for 9 months

is Phu Loureaux

Move of refs 278 to 108
811 S

Jan 70 108 → LS 272 | 7715
refs

~~by small aircraft~~

March 70 12600 refs walking
from 184 → 50

Before and after fall of Pha Thi

10 March 1968

LS 111 friendly
LS 86 enemy
Den Din "
205 "
179 "
58 "
221 "
107 "

Successful ref moves
1 of 3 groups from 205 to north of 107
1 group from M. Yut (UH 7355 area) to South of 111
Group from 111 and B. Pha Kha (UH 8343) to north of 85
Group from 76 to west of 215
attempts from 221 stopped by enemy

11 March → 19 March.

638 Meo/Lao air evaced from 211 → 215 on 11 Mar.
Meo/Lao/LT walked to 215 from 185, 111, 85, 107, 205, 221
Several groups air evaced to 215 from same general area
LS 198 cut off by enemy

refs air evaced from 215 to Point alpha (Phu Louie area) South of 184

13 Mar → 24 Mar Point alpha area

LS-215 abandoned on 19 Mar. 300 refs walked to LS 195
LS-221 refs walked to LS 195 - 5 april
LS-85 refs walked to LS 195 - 15-16 april

LS-195 refs airlifted to LS-48A by Caribou then to LS-20
Point alpha refs ~~evacuated~~ airlifted to L108 ~~by~~ to 50A → 108

In light of the ~~recent investigation of the~~ current interest of both governmental and non-governmental elements in ~~refugee situation~~ in Laos by the Kennedy Subcommittee on refugees - ~~an investigation~~ the Laos refugee situation - an interest generated in no small part by the ~~recent~~ which was prompted in part by the

significant increase in refugees following ~~Of~~ a marked escalation ~~of combined~~ PL/NVA military activity in 1969 and early 1970 — a few brief comments are in order concerning the historical trend of population displacement in Laos, ~~a phenomenon which is directly proportional to enemy initiative~~, and the extent of the displacement.

1) Chart and explanation
2) Map - area by area, starting with the South

Control Tasseng Phou Sair, Muong Veingfa, Xieng Khouang Province to be Settled.

Name of Village	No. Fam. & Pers.	Remarks
Ban Phou Mang	4/17	
Ban Phou Sair Tay	5/35	
Ban Phou Sair Neua	3/14	
Ban Pom Tao	2/16	
Ban Houei Sao	3/20	
Ban Phou Lack Neua	2/13	
Ban Houei Tath	6/37	
Ban Sa Mang	14/87	
TOTAL:	39/239	

Tasseng Phou Fa, Muong Vieng Fa, Xieng Khouang Province to be settled at Kio Kacham.

Name of Village	No. Fam. & Pers.	Remarks
Ban Phou Kong Tay	9/24	
Ban Phac Keuth	12/89	
Ban Bo Nam	8/54	
Ban Na Noi	3/19	
Ban Houei Mark Pheth	10/84	
Ban Houei Nam Phan Neua	21/170	
Ban Phou Singao Tay	19/113	
Ban Houei Nam Phan Tay	11/106	
Ban Houei Ta Leung	10/75	
Ban Kiou Hang	7/49	
Ban Kiou Tenh	1/15	
Ban Sanh Houei Tath	6/30	
Ban Sam Thai	5/44	
Ban Na Noi Tay	6/37	
Ban Phou So	11/74	
Ban Phou Kong Neua	9/64	
Ban Houei Chorn Tay	14/107	
Ban Phou Pha Chao	21/132	
TOTAL:	183/1296	

Control Tasseng Dane Khoua LP. Province, resettled at Ban Kiou Ta Lounh and Houei Phat.

Name of Village	No. Fam. & Pers.	Remarks
Ban Pha Thi Noi	14/75	
Ban Thongsata	11/71	
Ban Nam Sa Or	10/66	
Ban Pha Khao	6/35	
Ban Nam Saly	4/34	
Ban Pha Houang	10/43	
Ban Houei Hin Kham	1/4	
Ban Pha Lang Mou Gnai	47/391	
Ban Pha Ai Gnai	36/285	
Ban Houei Na	9/46	
Ban Pha Lang Mou Noi	10/58	
Ban Phou Xang	16/85	
TOTAL:	174/1163	

Control Tasseng Phou Dork, Muong Vieng Fa, Xieng Khouang Province to be living at Ban Nam Mop

Name of Village	No. Fam. & Pers.	Remarks
Ban Phou Doth Kang	16/108	
Ban Phou Vieng Tay	14/117	
Ban Nam Chao	13/111	
Ban Phou Noi	10/67	
Ban Phou Vieng Neua	15/146	
Ban Phou Fa Neua	12/60	
Ban Pha Hith	4/24	
Ban Phou Sanh Phet	3/33	
Ban Phou Dork Neua	6/88	
Ban Phou Fa Noi	20/169	
Ban Phou Dork Tay	9/59	
Ban Phou Vieng Noi	6/37	
Ban Souan Ka Fe	21/115	
Ban Nam Thy Neua	6/36	
Ban Lasaboun My	31/213	
TOTAL:	186/1383	

ORA:ps:1-10-71

March 10, 1971

REGION II: XIENG KHOUANG PROVINCE REFUGEE SITUATION

1. LS-50 Area (Phu Cun): 1,600 refugees from LS-50/50A at Phu Sa and Phu Cun.

2. Kiou Cacham/Xieng Ngeun/Phu Chia Area: 6,000 refugees at Phu Chia; 3,000 people from Xieng Ngeun area and 1,500 people from Kiou Cacham area to Phu Chia. 1,000 refugees (from LS-213) at Xieng Ngeun to Kiou Yaa.

3. Vang Vieng Area: 2,000 refugees from Xieng Det and Ban Pak Phang at Vang Vieng; 450 moved to resettle at Hin Tid.

4. LS-90 Area (Tin Bong): 3,200 refugees from Tham Sorn and Tha Choak areas are at LS-90; 2,000 refugees at "TH" in Phou Mi area; 450 people at Moung Phun (LS-37).

5. Pha Khe Area: 21,000 new refugees from Long Cheng, Pha Khao, Nong On areas at sites in the vicinity of Pha Khe.

6. Site "X" (TG 7509): 3,300 refugees from Keo Thieu, Muong Peng; Nam Sen Neua in place across Nam Ngum River at this site.

7. Phou He Area (LS-255: 2,500 people from Ban Na Kouang (LS-281) in place here and at Njot.Tou.

8. Moung Cha Area (LS-113): 2,000 plus refugees from Pa Doung (LS-5) and Pha Phai (LS-65) are here; 1,000 people from Pa Doung at "H" (UF-9690).

Total Refugees Accounted For: 52,450

—Conf—

TRIP REPORT - March 16, 1971

Arrived at LS-25 (Phu Chia via Vang Vieng) at 1350. Met with local Commander who related following information:

Approximately 7,000 refugees at LS-25, approximately 500 on the trail and a few old people at LS-4.

Troop strength as follows:

SGU - 410 men
Home Guard troops from LS-170 - 30 ?
ADC troops from LS-25 - 250 men

SGUs are helping families establish housing. After families are established SGU troops will be willing to go where VP wants them to go. All troops have their weapons. The dependents do not want to move at the present time because they are tired.

VP continues to vacilate on decision to move these people because of pressures from old guard leaders who want their constituency to return to Long Tieng.

At March 15th meeting, Xieng Khouang governor, Saykham, voiced his opposition to move these people into the Long Tieng area because of the present security situation.

From USAID point of view move is unwise both because of lack of security at LS-272 and along route of movement.

Commander at LS-25 is willing to accommodate people at his site. He states that security is not a problem. Presently he needs more tools and plastic roofing to accelerate settling of refugee families.

At 1415 hours we proceeded to Kia Nga (TG-0783) via Xieng Ngum to observe refugees from LS-170 and LS-213 areas first hand. Approximately 1,500 people are holding at this site. A USAID dispensary was stocked adequately with medicines. Rice and plastic roofing was being distributed. These people are presently holding to see how the security situation developes. The Chao Moung stated that LS-170 is occupied by friendly troops. He further stated that people would probably return to the LS-170

area to finish their rice planting. However, they continue to stay at Kia Nga until security improves. The Chao Moung stated that there are plans for SGU 227 troops with LS-170 and Home Guard as guides to return to LS-213 to attempt to bring out remaining population still held by enemy. This plan is still in the talking stage and will require prior approval before it is initiated. Support will be requested from LS-32. In general, the Chao Muong felt that LS-170 is needed for Route 13 security between Sala Phu Khoun and LS-4.

Departed Kia Nja at 1430 hours for LS-272. At LS-272 Mr. McKeithen gave a briefing of the meeting at LS-98 at which Governor Saykham announced he would set up the provincial civilian government office at LS-98. The governor stated that all district chiefs should group their people together before any further moves to relocation areas can be made. He plans for meetings every 10 days with the Chao Muongs. In general, the governor stated he intends to get the civilian government in Xieng Khouang back on its feet again.

Mr. Jensen briefed on current security situation. The main topic of discussion was of options to move the LS-272 operation to a more secure area. Mr. Mann requested the alternatives involved in moving heavy equipment to work nn these sites. Mr. Lancaster stated that it would take 3 days to "walk" equipment from 20-A to LS-191. It would take approximately 2 days to move equipment to 20-A by C-123 and reassemble. Approximately 45 days are estimated for completion of C-123 air strip in LS-191 area. One HD-16 will requires 5 to 6 days to move from LS-272 to LS-191 area. The area is secure. Security to move the equipment from 20-A down the road would probably require 8 to 10 security guards. Mr. Mann stated he would give a decision on this matter by 12-Noon, March 17, 1971.

3/20/71

① Etam letter with P.M. no significants

② CK/XK wants Phou Chia people to go to LS-255 & LS-227 area. (Mg Cha area)

③ CM Sam Nuea / OunKham rep. stated he was responsible for the following people: (note: OunKham is responsible for security at BanXon).

Mg. Sam Nuea at SopSai, Houei Sai	3560
Mg. Sop. at Vang Kham	577
Houa Moung at Phone Sai	2331
total	6468 people

He also stated that Mg. Hiem was the group that moved to Vte. - Military dependent types. From BanXon & Vieng Keo 32 families 199 people —
17 made it to Vte
15 are still at Ban Thalat.

(Reason as to why they make it out through barriers etc.-)

④ CK/Vte when asked by Keo: If BanXon goes where can the people go.
OVER CK/Vte: to SalaKham & Ban Done, Keo then said to CK/Vte to set it up if LS-272 might go.

③ Also the problem of refugees behind the Nam Ngum clearing Land.

Date of Report	Previous Location	No. of F&P.	Classification
3/2/71	Pha Nok Kok (TF-8598		
	Pha Khao	136/939	
3/3/71	Nam Moh (LS-207)		
	Long Cheng	11/73	
	Long Cheng Pha Khao	92/549	
	Long Cheng Pha Khao	12/55	
	Long Cheng Pha Khao	21/120	
	Long Cheng Pha Khao	5/33	
3/8/71	Phou He (LS-255)		
	Na Khuang	3/18	
3/8/71	Keo Sakhai Neua (TF-7694)		
	Keo Sakhai Neua	41/286	
3/8/71	Nyot Tou (TF-7190)		
	Na Luang	24/142	
	Phou He (LS-255)		
	Don Nha	156/1276	
3/9/71	Muong Ou Neua (LS-227)	61/451	
	Tin Bong (LS-90)	43/286	
3/14/71	Long Noi (LS-330)		
	Phou Cum, Naty	101/744	
	Houei Kam Lang (TF-8482)		
3/5/71	Long Cheng	44/234	

Date of Report	Previous Location	No. of F&P.	Classification
3/5/71	Pang Pang	111/662	Lao Theung
	Xieng Dat	71/422	
3/3/71	Tham Lo (LS-316)		
	Nam May	16/92	
	Nong Ouh Neua	16/124	
	Nong Ouh Tai	6/39	
	San Nong Ouh Kang	13/85	
	Nam May	3/20	
	Houei Yen	9/65	
	Pha Phai	61/431	
	Pha Phai	208/1474	
3/13/71	Pha Phai (LS-65)		
	TAsseng Sam Keo	100/558	
	Tasseng Nam Say	71/348	
3/10/71	Nam Luang (LS-313)		
	Old Ref.	67/446	
	New Ref.	193/1598	
3/17/71	Nam You Neua (LS-307)		
	Pen Pha, Long Cheng	65/658	
	Refugee Hong Keng at (LS-272) there are 38 families 280 Pers.		
3/9/71	Nam Moh (LS-207)		
	Lomg Cheng	12/55	

Date of Report	Previous Location	No. of F&P.	Classification
3/9/71	Na Tou (		
	Don Nha	/299	
	Muong Ou		
	Nam Lao	61/451	
3/14/71	Houei Hong		
	Long Cheng	77/545	
	Nam Lan (TF-7591)		
	Long Cheng	149/1009	
	Pha Khao	607/4048	
	Houei Kam Lang (TF-8482)		
	Muong Phun	13/87	
	Nyot Tou (TF-7190)		
	Tasseng Pa Kha	105/624	
	Tasseng Houei Mon	24/142	
	Tasseng Phou Bouth	22/131	
3/14/71	Tham Lo (LS-316)		
	Tasseng Sam Keo	24/118	Lao Theung
		76/415	"
	Tasseng Nam Say	71/348	"
	Tasseng Pha Phai	215/1448	Meo
	Tasseng Pha Pheung	76/513	

Date Report	Previous Location	No. Of F&P.	Classification
3/14/71	Phou Vang Fong (TG-8605 "X"		
		17/99	Meo
		40/214	Lao Theung
		131/622	Soldier
		39/134	Sidaw
	TOTAL	227/1069	
	Muong Yon (TF-8092 "V"		
		26/139	Soldier
		9/51	Lam
		33/181	Lao Theung
		14/61	Widaw
	TOTAL	82/432	
	Phou San Kang (TF-8198 "TL"		
		7/66	Meo
		59/324	Lao Theung
		18/85	Widaw
		148/718	Soldier
3/14/71	Nam Luang (LS-313)		
	Phou Vieng # 4/C	11/77	
	Phou Kong Khao	15/135	
	Phou San Noi (LS-244)		
	Phou Dok	30/204	

Date of Report	Previous Location	No. of F&P.	Classification
3/16/71	Houei Kam Lang (TF-8682)		
	Tasseng Houei Puak	19/127	
	Tasseng Pha Phath	6/27	
	Tasseng Houei Puak	14/57	Soldier
		5/23	Widaw
	Nam Ve (LS-335)	138/1058	
	Nyot Tou (TF-7190)		
	Tasseng Nam Peng	23/150	
	Phou He (LS-255)	398/2966	
	Phou Vang Fong	327/1027	Old Ref.
		269/1721	New Ref.
3/19/71	Nam Hia		
	Tasseng Mok, Nam Sang	58/493	
	Tasseng Chieng Samy	29/158	
	Tasseng Muong Mok	10/60	
	Phak Khe (TF-8199)		
	Teacher Ban Na	17/83	
	Nam Yon		
	Teacher Phou So	14/92	
	Nam Yon Neua	89/708	
	Long Cheng	/1208	

Date of Report	Previous Location	No. of F&P.	Classification
3/18/71	Phou Kang Neua (TG-7509)		
	Muong Pen	97/610	
		32/285	Soldier
		29/185	
	Long Cheng	33/218	
	Keo Thieo	149/1035	
	TOTAL	340/2333	
	Keo Sakhai Neua	76/606	Old Ref.
		31/199	New Ref.
3/20/71	NA TOU	68/358	
	Nam Kheng		
	Pha Dong	51/360	
	Phou Sa Ngop (LS-270)		
	Tasseng Nong Ouh	98/623	
	Phak Khe		Soldier
	1st Company	95/682	
	2nd Company	89/541	
	Battalion 228-2282	97/543	
	B. (None)	109/781	
	TOTAL	390/2547	
3/21/71	San Kath (UF-0683) "TH"		
	Tasseng Tha Chok	134/1228	
	Tasseng Nong Ouh	98/623	

Date of Report	Previous Location	No. of F&P.	Classification
	10 families 60 persons increaded in Thong Noi.		
	Keo Sakhai Tai (TF-7888 "T"		
	Refugees	174/1053	
	Soldiers	69/455	
	Widaws	17/82	
	Nam Van (G-7804)		
	Tasseng Phak Boun	48/281	Refugees
		26/153	Soldiers
	Tasseng Phou Nong	49/335	Refugees
		6/38	Soldiers
	Tasseng Pen Pha	39/241	Refugees
		27/94	Soldiers
	Tasseng Khang Hong	21/119	Refugees
		7/36	Soldiers
	Tasseng Muong Ngath	50/356	Refugees.
	Nam Yon		
	Tasseng Pen Pha	65/658	
	Phak Khe (TF-8299 "E"		
	Teacher Families	/1209	
3/25/71	Phou Bia (UG-0707)		
	Tasseng Pha Phai	39/252	
	Tasseng Sam Keo	25/116	
	Tasseng Phou Khe	32/168	
	Tasseng Pha Say	13/78	

Date of Report	Previous Location	No. of F&P.	Classification
3/26/71	Muong Cha (LS-113)		
	Pa Dong	45/344	New Refugees
		175/908	Old Refugees
	Phou Sa Ngop (LS-270)		
	Phou Kang	41/272	New increased
		41/268	Old Refugees
		37/178	Soldiers
3/27/71	Phou San Noi (LS-244)		
	Tasseng Nakhoun	158/1055	
	Nam Ve	34/264	increased
3/28/71	Tin Bong (LS-90)		
	Tasseng Tha Chok	75/492	
	Tasseng Tham Sorn	113/788	
3/28/71	Thong Khem		
	Pa Dong	156/955	
	Military # 204	25/156	
	" # 203	45/207	
	" # 209	3/13	
	Teacher	2/16	
	Medic	1/13	
	Thong Khoun	50/332	
	TOTAL	282/1692	

Date of Report	Prevous Location	No. of F&P.	Classification
	Muong Ou Neua (LS-227)		
	Tasseng Pha Pong	44/318	
	Muong Nham (LS-63)		
	Pak San	4/20	
3/31/71	Houei Kam Lang		
	Don Nha	10/54	
		54/288	Old Refugees
4/1/71	Nam Hia	410/2082	Meo
		97/711	Lao
4/2/71	Phak Khe		
		749/5052	Old Refugees
	Long Mon	104/764	
		978/8199	~~8199~~ Soldier ~~Ø~~
		38/232	Widaw
		39/289	Teacher
		37/387	Lame
		59	Students
	TOTAL	1945/14994	
	Pha Khao	156/980	
4/8/71	Nam Chai (TG-8109		
	Muong Xieng Hong	7/44	
	Long Cheng	10/80	
	Muong Vang Say	32/229	

Date of Report	Previous Location	No. of F&P.	Classification
	Nam Pha Noi (LS-218)		
	Long Cheng, Khang Hong	220/1728	
	Thong Mian		
	Tasseng Phou Ving, Tha Chok	242/1902	
4/8/71	Nam Ve		
		14/94	increased
		275/1830	Old one
	TOTAL	289/1924	
	Phou Nhia Hu (LS-307)		
	Refugees	124/887	
		24/125	Soldier
	Sop Kiang (TF-7184)		
		/1348 Pers.	
4/12/71	Pha Phai (UG-1808)		
	Nam Hiang	600 Pers.	
		200 Pers.	Soldiers
4/12/71	PL Arrested	23/3/71	
	Tasseng Hong Keng	11/53	
	Tasseng Poung Nok	2/13	
4/12/71	Bouam Long (LS-32)		
	Tasseng Hong Keng	14/60	
	Tasseng Houei Chen	25/162	

Date of Report	Previous Location	No. of F&P.	Classification
4/12/71	Bouam Long (LS-32)		
	Tasseng Poung Nok	35/212	
	Tasseng Houei Tong Kha	16/206	
	Tasseng Nyot Ngo	18/122	
	TOTAL	108/762	
4/12/71	~~4/12/71~~ Phou Cum (LS-50)	~~PHO~~	
	Hang Keng	49/272	
	Pha Keo	77/446	
	Houei Chen	129/844	
	Poung Nok	104/706	
	Houei Long Kho	27/66	
	Phou Cum	43/272	
	Houei Vai	10/69	
	Pha Bong	26/169	
	Pha Thi	19/141	
	Nyot Ngo	64/563	11 families 494 moved to Phou Sa.
	TOTAL:	548/3548	
4/12/71	Phou Sa (TH-9607)		
	Houei Vai	60/400	
	Phou Thin	44/365	
	Pha Lam	92/645	
	Nyot Ngo	11/69	new increased & P. Cum
	TOTAL	207/1479	

Date of Report	Previous Location	No. of F&P.	Classification
	Vieg Keo		
	San Pha Kha	9/56	
4/12/71	Pha Khao (TG#9203)		
	~~4/7//71~~	225/1240	B.V. 21-
		136/980	Refugees
		245/2158	A/C Soldiers
		18/121	Teacher
		30/173	Widaw
		27/115	Police
		15/177	Service, Company
	TOTAL:	734/5195	
	Tin Bong (LS-90)		
	Tasseng Phou Kong Khao	15/106	
4/13/71	Nam Uan (TG-7804		
	Tasseng Phak Boun, Nam Chai	88/571	
		277/1656	Old Refugees
4/13/71	Phou Vang Fong (TG-8605)		
	Tasseng Na Khoun	18/102	
4/15/71	Nam Choi (TG#8109)		
		122/935	Refugees
		30/139	Soldiers
		4/20	Widaw
	TOTAL	156/1094	

Date of Report	Previous Location	No. of F&P.	Classification
4/15/71	Nam Moh (LS-207)		
	Pha Phai	4/27	
	Long Cheng	55/353	Lame Soldier
	Long Cheng	92/549	Came on Second Time
	Thong Mian		
		16/107	Increased
4/15/71	Thong Khem		
		665/4658	
	Muong Moc	6/45	
		74/505	Will move out some where out side.
		597/4198	Really left in Thong Khem
4/15/71	Thong Khoun (LS-191)		
	Nam Cha	11/73	
	Phou Hhouei Kham (TF-7991)		
		3/26	Increased
4/16/71	Pak Mey (LS-273)		
	Nai Kong Kham Xieng	122/727	Old Refugees
4/16/71	Nam Poun		
		319/2450	
4/17/71	Muong Yon (TF-8092) "V"		
		33/174	Soldiers
		18/97	Lame

Date of Report	Previous Location	No. of F&P.	Classification
4/17/71 CONT.	Muong Yon (TF-8092) "V"		
		67/363	Refugees
		14/61	Widaw
4/19/71	Sop Ao		
	Keo Mak Feung	60/411	
4/19/71	Phou Chia (LS-25)		
	Tasseng Phou Pen	198/558	
	Tasseng Nong Ouh	40/340	
	Tasseng Phou Fa	356/3185	~~3185~~
	Tasseng Nam Lan	52/354	
	Taseeng Phou Dok	145/2002	
	Tasseng Phou Se	187/1771	
	Tasseng Bouam Lao	47/264	
	TOTAL	925/8474	
4/19/71	Song Lai (LS-318)		
	Long Cheng	21/122	Increased
		82/691	Old one
	TOTAL	103/813	
4/23/71	Refugee Nam Ve		
	Tasseng Phou Kong Khao	76/565	
	Tasseng Tham Chak	181/1247	
	Tasseng Phou San	5/30	
	Tasseng Phou Dok	46/283	
	Tasseng Phou Dou	1/8	

Date of Report	Previous Location	No. of F&P.	Classification
4/23/71 CONT.	Refugee Nam Ve		
	Tasseng Phou Vieng	27/254	
	Tasseng Phou Fa	6/47	
	TOTAL	342/2434	
4/25/71	Phak Khe		
	Muong Moc	48/289	(Tasseng Nong Sam Che)
5/1/71	Nam Long (TF-7292 "IP"		
		80/410	Refugees
		19/78	Soldiers
5/1/71	Tin Bong (LS-90)		
	Tham Leuk	7/62	
	Tham Sorn Nhai	76/531	
	Phou Kong Khao	25/213	
		145/149	In the batle
		50	In the village
	TOTAL	366/1793	

THE ACCOUNT OF THE REFUGEES WHO GOT RICE FROM THE STORE RICE IN NAXOU
(LS-272)

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NUMBER	KIND OF DEPARTMENT	NO. F & P.
1.	The refugees in Ban Vieng Keo	19/55
2.	Xieng Khuang news department	4/21
3.	The wolker for USIS	2/14
4.	Hua Phane News department	/21
5.	The refugees in Km 52	/244
6.	The refugees in Muong Phu So	8/48
7.	The refugees in Keo Teo now live in Khua Nam Mueu	91/550
8.	The refugees of Nai Kong Phay la, now live in Khua Nam Muen	/762
9.	The refugees in Vang Kham	5/48
10.	The refugees of Tasseng Pherng Sam	/369
11.	The wives and children of soldiers in battation 202	35/178
12.	Xieng Khouang police department	37/192
13.	The mechance worker	1/10
14.	The refugees of Tasseng Phone Tong and Tasseng Hang Kang	/266
15.	The wives and children of Tai Dam soldiers in Pak Nam Mueu.	/165
16.	The refugees of Tasseng Song Khe in Ban Wat	/88
17.	The refugees of Tasseng Houei Tong in Vang Kham	/35
18.	The refugees of Tasseng Nam Pane in Km 52	/216
19.	The refugees in Muong Kham and Phone Sai	/113
20.	The wives and children of soldiers in battalion 20B.	39/224
21.	The refugees of Nai Kong Kham Xieng in Km 50	/727
22.	The refugees of Tassseng Nyot Keua Sop Sang Tai	/114
23.	Sana Ty Kane, Seu Sane in Vieng Keo Head quarters	52/264
24.	Hua Phane police department	4/47
25.	The wives and children of soldiers in battalion 209 and 201	30/168
26.	The refugees of Tasseng Hat Bog	/418
27.	The refugees of Phu Saly.	3/15
28/	The wives and children of soldiers BV. 24	/69
29.	The village guard in Ban Na Xou LS-272	/200
30.	The wives and children of soldiers BV. 26.	117/438
31.	The military company disabled part 2.	/333
32.	The military company disabled part 1.	/635
33.	The wives and children of soldiers AGU. in Sop Tu	/356
34.	The wives and children of soldiers in Ban Phoune Sai	23/118
35.	The worker in the hospital Na Xou	/66
36.	The wives and children of soldiers BV. 27	82/287
37.	The refugees in Tong Teo, Phat Nya, Phone Sai	/255
38.	Chao Muong Nyu	1/9

NUMBER	KIND OF DEPARTMENT	NO. F & P.
39.	The verterinary service	4/19
40.	The officier in second bureau	/19
41.	The nurses in Na Xou	/190
42.	The agriculture Xieng Khuang department	4/17
43.	Xieng Khong's family	1/9
44.	The widows in Ban Sao	9/23
45.	The refugees in Keo Sang Houei Ngone	22/144
46.	The refugees of Tasseng Muong Ua.	12/68
47.	The police military	11/44
48.	The teachers in Buam Mu Sam Neua	4/19
49.	The refugees of Tasseng Nam in Houei Sai	22/93
50.	The families of the nursed in Ban Na Xou	/33
51.	The students in school Phu Sou	/150
52.	The teachers in Phone Sai	[illegible]/118
53.	The teachers in Houei Sai	10/51
54.	The refugees in Phone Sai	/256
55.	The refugees of Tasseng Sa Lueu	4/23
56.	The teachers in Vieng Keo	/85
57.	The teachers in Ban Na Kuang	/50
	TOTAL:	648/9594

ORA:ps:6-22-71

NAM VE REFUGEES # LS-335.

CHECK ON JUNE 18, 1971. AS FOLLOWING:

TASSENG	NO. OF F & P.
Tasseng Tha Chok	246/1606
Tasseng Phu Dork	46/360
Tasseng Phu Dou	3/30
Tasseng Phu San	23/184
Tasseng Phu Vieng	34/258
Tasseng Houei Ki Nin	31/266
Tasseng Phu Fa	6/47
Tasseng Phu Kong Khao	116/1056
Police	8/57
TOTAL:	513/3864

ORA:ps:6-24-71

SITE	VILLAGE	COORDINATES	NO. F.&P.
LS-5	Pak Dong	UG-0212 "I"	52/391
LS-14	Pha Khao	TG-9205 "T"	/1744
LS-25	Phu Chia	SG-9950	862/8164
LS-32	Boum Long	UG-2686	
LS-37	Moune Phone	TG-6114	87/495
LS-51	Pha Khe	TG-6317	66/212(s)
LS-61	Tha Si	UF-7684	/524
LS-63	Muong Nyam	UF-7496	/1058
LS-66	Naluang	TF-6992	/629
LS-75	Sop Hien	TF-7284	161/991
LS-90	Tin Bong	TG-5020	366/1793
LS-113	Muong Cha	UF-0091	/253
LS-191	Thong Keun	TF-9387	29/157
LS-207	Nam Moh	TF-8287	133/852
LS-218	Nam Pha Noi	TF-8096	/1405
LS-223	Nam Vang	UF-1491	/811
LS-227	Muong Ao Neua	UF-0781	92/646
LS-244	Phu Sang Noi	TF-7195	240/1671
LS-251	Phu Kham Hua	TF-7782	49/360
LS-252	Natu	TF-7191	/176
LS-255	Phu He	TF-9377	748/4086
LS-266	Tong Mieng	TF-8987	356/2658
LS-270	Phu Sang Ngop	UF-0990	82/540
LS-288	Nam Yon	TF-7795	/1399
LS-307	Nyia Hur	TF-7896	161/2216
LS-313	Nam Long	TG-6506	232/1700
LS-314	San Bong	UF-8199	179/1054
LS-316	Tham Lo	UF-1194	196/1149
LS-317	Thong Khen	TF-9590	/3444
LS-318	Song Lai	TF-7297	/798
LS-330	Thong Noi	TF-9483	111/804
LS-331	Keo Sakai Neua	TF-7694	94/648
LS-333	Nam Feng Neua	UF-0893	442/2730
LS-335	Nam Ve	TF-7295	513/3864
LS-336	Phu Sa	TH-9607	/1410
LS-337	Phu Kang Neua	TG-7509	198/1342
DZ-016	Vang Fong	TG-8605	331/1714
DZ-031	Phu Houei Kham	TF-7991	45/387
DZ-047	Muong Yon	TF-8093	317/1878
DZ-082	Pha Ketq	VG-1407	94/615
DZ-0112	Sop Sai	TF-5596	334/1947
DZ-0125	Nyot Tu	TF-7190	349/1780
DZ-0128	Boum Mu	TG-6501	/447
~~DZ-0141~~	~~Nam Van~~	~~TG-7704~~	~~212/1409~~
DZ-0141	Nam Van	TG-7704	212/1409
DZ-0143	Nam Nyam	UG-7901	323/2095
DZ-0145	Nam Choi	TG-8109	156/1094
DZ-0146	Nam Iam	TF-7591	127/1009
DZ-0155	Nam Sang	TF-6393	63/421

DZ-0156	Phu Sagg Kang	TF-8198	232/1193
DZ-0166	Keo Sa Khai Kang	TF-7693	110/1404
DZ-0175	Hat Kuang	TF-6595	70/424
DZ-0178	Nam Heo	UF-9075	338/2101
DZ-0179	Tong Muang Kang	UF-9678	185/1329
DZ-0180	Sop Tu Neua	TF-6893	69/333
DZ-0184	Phu Fai Mai	TG-9203	695/4790
DZ-0186	Phu Cum	UH-0503	537/3479
DZ-0187	Nam Poun	TF-9887	465/3167
DZ-0188	San Kak	UF-0686	232/1551
DZ-0190	Houei Kam Lang	TF-8482	80/493
DZ-0192	Ban Nali	TF-9960	232/1360
DZ-0193	Nam Tong	TF-7292	137/1134
DZ-0194	Phu Kheng	TF-8779	158/1200
DZ-0195	Pa Dong Noi	UF-0689	89/616
DZ-0196	Ban Houei Lao	TF-689	150/780
DZ-0201	Sop Ao	TF-9778	75/456
DZ-0202	Phu Bia	UF-0707	109/614
DZ-0205	Pung Mo	TG-8795	116/789
DZ-0206	Keo Sa Khai Tai	TF-7791	268/1811
DZ-0204	Pa Houei	TG-7990	103/664
DZ-----	Ban Nam Tu	TF-7191	/94
	Phu Mot	TG-8617	30/253
	Keo Teo	TG-7517	45/280
	Nyot Moh	TG-9108	123/865

ORA:ps:7-21-71

LS-258

Royal Army National
Region 2
Mixed Team #316
No. 424/2.

.....

TO: General commander in chief region 2

FROM: Captain Chong Song Adviser Phou Yeu area

SUBJECT: Report Nai Ban and Families of the Populations, Ethnic Group; Meo in the area 17/C.

I would like to inform you that, I couldn't make a report to your last time because it's not convenient to communicating, at the present I'll trying to get detail then will rpport to you later, and the total callection thus as:

Name of Village:	Name of Nai Ban:
Nai Ban Pa Neng: there are 19 families or 154 persons.	Mr. Youa Kay Reu
Nai Ban Pha Neqg Noi: there are 23 families or 139 persons.	Mr. Neng Law Reu
Nai Ban Pha Neng Nhai: there are 41 failies or 295 persons.	Mr. Xoua Toua Yang
Nai Ban Houei Ong Mong: there are 32 families or 218 persons.	Mr. Xoua Dong Song
Nai Ban Pa Ya Ngoung: there are 37 families or 248 persons.	Mr. Chong Hout Tout
Nai Ban Pha May Ngay: there are 61 families or 550 persons.	Mr. Breu Yout Reu
Nai Ban Pha May Ngay: there are 29 families or 207 persons.	Mr. Yea Koua Yang
Nai Ban Pha Leung: there are 17 families or 142 persons.	Mr. Xay Chia Yang
Nai Ban Nam Manh: there are 20 families or 147 persons.	Mr. Cheu Pao Yang
Nai Ban Phou Yeu Tay: there are 3 families or 23 persons.	Mr. Kia Yeu Yang
Nai Ban Phou Leek Noi: there are 11 families or 77 persons.	Mr. Cheu Xang Tout

Nai Ban Leek Ngay: Mr. Cheu Tong Reu
there are 15 families or 117 persons.

Nai Ban Nam Hat Noi: Mr. Brea Neng Yang
there are 10 families or 74 persons.

Nai Ban Pou Leeck Kang: Mr. Chang Xeng Chang
there are 8 families or 56 persons.

Nai Ban Nam Hat Ngay: Mr. Chu Ly Chong
there are 22 families or 170 persons.

Nai Ban Houei Xou: Mr. Xong Xay Reu
there are 12 families or 101 persons.

Total of ethnic group Meo: 357 families 2718 Persons. The list of the family will be send to you later.

Remarks: Reason of these peoples, when the region 5 will be deciding to transfer them to you for improve, I have a problem as:

1. Couldn't train them
2. No have budget for improve them.

However, please considerable and salue this case, and establish Nai Tasseng and Nai Ban for them.

Vientiane Date 21/7/71

Adviser Phou Yeu area
Captain, Chong Song.

ORA:ps:22-9-71

Tasseng	No. Ref.F&P.	No. Soldier's F&P.	No. Widaw's F&P.	Total
T. Pha Bong	58/390	33/236	9/44	100/670
T. Houei Tong Kho	19/147	11/79	4/31	34/217
T. Phu Che	19/146	22/198	7/53	48/397
T. Houei Nouy	9/58	11/70	3/15	23/143
T. Sala	9/48	3/10	4/14	16/72
T. Houei Moun	7/48	5/27	-	12/75
T. H. Khammoune	1/6	3/19	-	4/25
T. Napeng	12/69	11/64	3/10	26/143
T. Teachers	3/19	-	-	3/19
T. Medics	2/10	-	-	2/10
TOTAL:	139/941	99/703	30/167	268/1811

ORA:ps:8-11-71

SINGHA CHOPPER PADS

(EFFECTIVE ON 2 SEPT. 71)



Mr. Edgar M. Buell, AC/Xieng Khouang. October 21, 1971
Mr. Blaine W. Jensen, Asst. AC/Xieng Khouang.
Charles C. Whalen, CDAA, AC/Xieng Khouang.

Livestock Distribution in Xieng Khouang Province (As of October 18, 1971)

Site No.	Village	Sows	Boars	Ducks
LS-32	Bouam Long	4	0	190
LS-37	Muang Phun	0	1	0
LS-63	Muang Nyam	0	0	100
LS-66	Na Luang	6	2	90
LS-90	Tin Bong	2	1	90
LS-191	Thong Khun	6	1	120
LS-207	Nam Mo	4	2	105
LS-211	Phon Sai	29	3	150
LS-218	Nam Pha Noi	17	0	100
LS-223	Nam Feng	1	2	90
LS-224	Houei Nam Oum	1	1	160
LS-227	Muang Ow Neua	3	1	120
LS-229	Pong Tha	3	1	120
LS-244	Phu Sang Noi	4	1	90
LS-246	Vang Kham	3	1	150
LS-251	Phu Kham Houa	4	1	225
LS-252	Na Tu	26	4	180
LS-255	Phu He	25	2	280
LS-266	Thong Mieng	5	2	90
LS-272	Ban Xon	5	2	0
LS-273	Pak Meui	8	2	125
LS-284	Houei Sai	3	1	125
LS-288	Nam Nyan	4	3	90
LS-313	Nam Luang	5	1	100
LS-314	Ban Keo Maa	0	0	100
LS-316	Pha Lo	0	2	90
LS-317	Thong Khem e	4	2	180
LS-270	Phu San Nyop	1	1	190
LS-318	Song Lai	7	2	120
LS-330	Thong Noi	6	1	90
LS-331	Keb Sa Kai Nyai	4	1	195
LS-333	Nam Feng Nyai	40	2	210
LS-335	Nam Ve	8	1	150
LS-337	Phu Kang Neua	4	1	105

Coordinates	Village	Sows	Boars	Ducks
TF-5497	Ban Houei	0	1	280
TF-5596	Sop Sai	3	1	100
TF-5699	Phu Kang	4	2	0
TF-5993	Vieng Keo	4	2	50
TF-5994	Ban Xon	1	1	50
TF-6294	Khoua Lek	7	2	225
TF-6391	Sop Sang Neua	2	1	0
TF-6392	Sop Sang Tai	2	1	75
TF-6490	KM-45	5	0	19
TF-6595	Hat Kouang	4	1	120
TF-6592	KM-49	4	1	0
TF-6896	Houei Lao	3	1	130
TF-7190	Nyot Tu	10	2	180
TF-7284	Nam Hiem	3	1	0
TF-7292	Nam Tong	4	1	180
TF-7391	Nam Tu	4	2	100
TF-7591	Nam Lan	4	2	105
TF-7789	Keo Sa Kai Tai	4	2	90
TF-7693	Keo Sa Kai Kang	4	2	90
TF-7795	Pig Farm (Ban Nhia Her)	41	2	120
TF-6195	Ban Sac	0	0	225
TF-7985	Nam Nok	4	1	160
TF-7989	Houei Kham Tabi	0	1	90
TF-7991	Houei Kham Nuea	10	2	245
TF-8091	Keo Pha Kheung	2	0	0
TF-8093	Muang Nyon	4	1	160
TF-8198	Phu Sang Kang	0	1	0
TF-8299	Pha Khe	10	1	0
TF-8482	Houei Kam Lang	5	1	159
TF-8779	Phu Kheung	0	1	120
TF-9690	Nong Na Di	4	2	160
TF-9778	Sop Ow	4	1	160
TF-9887	Nam Poun	8	3	330
TF-8999	Pha Nok Kok	4	1	0
TG-6211	Done Nya	3	3	0
TG-6501	Bouam Mu	6	1	120
TG-7804	Nam Van	4	2	280
TG-8109	Nam Joy	4	1	200
TG-8605	Phu Vang Fong	8	2	150

Coordinates	Viallage	Sows	Boars	Ducks
UF-0686	San Kak	4	1	370
UF-9075	Nam Hiew	0	0	200
UF-9678	Thong Bouan Kang	0	0	100
UG-7901	Nam Nyam	0	0	100
TOTALS:		439	102	9,553

CW:gv:10/21/71

cc:OD
ORA
AGR
AC/XK

LIFE UNDER THE P. L. IN THE XIENG KHOUANG VILLE AREA

Edwin T. McKeithen
Xieng Khouang

LIFE UNDER THE P. L. IN THE XIENG KHOUANG VILLE AREA

INTRODUCTION

The following notes on life under the P. L. were taken from discussions with different groups of refugees that came out of the XKV area in April and May. Many of the comments made by different individuals or groups of refugees were contradictory and it was not uncommon to hear groups of people arguing among themselves over the answers to specific questions. The following description is a summary of the responses that the refugees most frequently gave as well as an attempt on the part of the reporting officer to determine the middle ground of what they said and the underlying concepts that the P. L. base their programs on.

There were several important factors that contributed to the fuzzy pictures that sometimes emerged. Aside from a lack of interest or understanding on the part of the villagers as to what went on, there was the problem of P. L. policies that vary from area to area. Similarly the restrictions on travel and gatherings made exchanges of information more difficult than usual. The P. L. also discouraged villagers' curiosity about matters that "did not concern them".

Finally there were the problems created by the different cultural values that the P. L. have introduced. These concepts and their associated institutions are often rather foreign to traditional Lao values and are accompanied by a Pavlovian-response vocabulary that tends to mask rather than clarify the nature of their make-up. Hence it was easy for the villagers to understand the phrase "to open the truth" when they were being asked to admit cheating on rice taxes, for example, but it was something else to understand that the P. L. were trying to introduce the concepts of guilt and self-criticism.

Much of what follows is sketchy and incomplete; as we learn more about the NLHS, we will try to correct the errors that exist in this report.

SUMMARY: LIFE UNDER THE P. L.

Life under the Neo Lao Hak Sat is a lot rougher than many people realize. From the villagers' point of view, the most onerous aspect of P. L. rule is the coolie labor system of human convoys and work crews. The refugees often remarked that "the Pathet Lao talk about the soldiers helping the people, but actually the people do all the work for the soldiers". Another of the more unpopular facets of life is the separation of children from their parents, either through the draft or through the school system, which sees to it that children are as isolated as possible from the corrosive influences of the older generation. The introduction of rice taxation has further added to the villagers' discomforts by removing the reserves that traditionally saw them through lean years and enabled them to support relatives and friends in the traditional Lao social security system. The combination of the draft, taxation and the portage system - which often means that villagers are on convoys for two months of the year - adds up to a need for drastically increased labor productivity. As the taxes have increased and the available labor force has shrunk, the villagers have had to grow more just to hold their own.

The draft, the portage system, and the rice tax may be viewed as temporary war measures which might not exist in peacetime to the extent that they do now. But more fundamental changes that the P. L. are making in Lao society are more important in the long run.

The NLHS seeks nothing less than a radical transformation of Lao society from a loosely structured hierarchical system to a tightly organized conformist society where the rather foreign concepts of persuasion and guilt are introduced as mechanisms of social control. They have pressed for economic equality by introducing progressive taxation and discouraging the conspicuous consumption that establishes a wealthy villager's status. They have almost eliminated

the "wasted resources" that are spent on bouns, marriages, funerals and traditional celebrations. They have taken initial steps toward the communalization of property by establishing "public" padi, by closely controlling livestock sales and slaughter and by introducing public ownership of livestock in the school system.

The P. L. have thrown most of the old leadership in jail and installed new Naibans and Tassengs drawn from the lowest economic strata to emphasize that the leadership should be "the same as the people". They have established an intricate administrative apparatus necessary to effect the sociological transformation they are fostering as well as to manage their war economy. The restrictions on travel and personal freedom not only reflect security precautions but also help maintain the controlled environment that the P. L. need for long term change.

One of the most fundamental alterations they seek in the Lao personality is the addition of pursuasion and guilt to traditional authority as means of social control. P. L. cadres are urged to reason, to question and to discuss with villagers until the villagers agree with the P. L. viewpoint. Direct orders are not enough; people must be "taught" until they genuinely believe in what they are doing. At the same time, a villager who cheats or commits crimes against the state must be enlightened until he feels guilty for his actions. This guilt must arise from an internalized higher morality and not from a simple feeling of shame or loss of face among fellows. "Study sessions" and "merit books" are among the mechanisms for introducing this concept.

Changes of this nature are rather difficult to effect in the adult population; hence the emphasis on youth and the importance given to education. It should be noted that this is particularly bothersome to older Lao who find

themselves being "enlightened" by more children. The status of women has also been altered, as they have been given greater responsibility in administrative affairs and have assumed jobs traditionally restricted to men. Other roles have become more tightly structured and the characteristic Lao ability to slip easily between roles has declined as the society has become more "democratic".

Needless to say the P. L. have had real difficulty in introducing many of these changes simply because they are so alien to the Lao culture. For example, much of the P. L. political machinery is based on group loyalty and dedication to organizations, but the Lao have had almost no experience with such groups or societies in the Western sense of the terms. There is simply no precedent for a "youth organization" devoted to lofty principles and dedicated to the advancement of long-range goals. Similarly the traditional Lao tolerence of practically everything (work habits, personality deviations, individual beliefs, etc.) has made the introduction of a new morality particularly difficult.

Finally, we should note the favorable aspects of P. L. rule as reported by the refugees. They favored the ideas of adult literacy and agricultural development but not the ways that the P. L. had been carrying them out. They also spoke favorably of the virtual elimination of official corruption.

GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION

The provincial government is set up in interweaving line and staff organizations in a sort of double-helix pattern. In the line organization there are three parallel hierarchies of administrative officials not including the North Vietnamese advisors, who might be considered a fourth. They consist of the Patriotic Neutralist officials (or "governing" administration), the NLHS officials, and a political cadre organization known as the Khana Puk Luk, which translates literally as the "Awakening Group".

The Patriotic Neutralists use the same titles as RLG officials -- Chao Khoueng, Chao Muong, Tasseng, etc., -- while the NLHS officials are called Neo (Front) Khoueng, Nso Muong, Neo Tasseng and Neo Ban. The Neo officials have traditionally been more powerful than their "governing" counterparts, but as more politically reliable men have been appointed to the Neutralist hierarchy the differences in authority seem to have lessened. North Vietnamese counterparts are assigned to the Khoueng, Muong and Tasseng levels of government. In addition to the formal lines of authority, the Khoueng and Muong offices have representatives whose job is to travel throughout the villages explaining government policy. The Khoueng offices were located in a small cave northwest of Xieng Khouang City near Tham Kap, and the Neo Khoueng offices in another cave called Tham Mat.

THE AWAKENING GROUP

The Awakening Group, which has become firmly established during the past three years, has responsibility for political surveillance and "economic leadership" and functions as a major watchdog organ of the state. The staffing pattern (which is not yet complete) calls for two agents in each village who are supposed to practice the "Four Togethers" with the people: Eat together, work together, discuss together and assist each other together. They have a nominal role as community development advisors but their prime responsibility is to check on villagers' industriousness and political reliability. Their surveillance extends throughout the formal government structure as well, where some agents are assigned as counterparts to administrative officials. The "Awakening Group" appears to have considerable power independent of regular channels and is staffed almost entirely by "outsiders", usually single men from other provinces. (The translated "P. L. Propaganda" distributed by USAID/AG in 1967 was a directive to the "Awakening Group").

STAFF ORGANIZATIONS

In addition to the line organizations, the government is set up in staff patterns which include the heads of the various services at the provincial, district and village levels. The "Khoueng Group", for example, includes the Chao Khoueng, the Neo Khoueng, the Vietnamese advisor, and the provincial chiefs of the Awakening Group, the youth organization, the old age organization, the militia, the agriculture department, the irrigation department, the health department, the police, the school system, the court, the co-op, and all their assistants. A similar pattern exists in the "Muong Group". The "Tasseng Group" includes the Tasseng, the Neo Tasseng and the heads of the militia, the youth and old age organizations, and the chiefs of agriculture, irrigation, education and health. The Village Group is usually limited to the Nai Ban, Neo Ban and the chiefs of the militia, youth, and old age organizations. (Note that neither the Vietnamese advisors nor the Awakening Group are included in the publicized government hierarchy below the Khoueng level, although they exert considerable influence on political decisions.)

YOUTH AND OLD AGE ORGANIZATIONS

Women from the ages of 15 to 25 and men from the ages of 15 to 35 are encouraged to join the youth organization. Since most of the men of this age group are away in the army, the women's branch has assumed the most importance. Established in 1966, but poorly organized until 1968, the youth organization began collecting dues last year in some areas and had planned a province-wide dues of five kip per person for this year; the dues were to be collected only from women. As indicated above, the leadership sits at all levels of government as part of the various administrative "groups". Other than encouraging greater production and larger contributions to the state, the goals of the organization seem unclear even to those who have been members. It

appears, however, that it is designed almost as an end in itself; that is, it is intended to introduce the rather foreign concept of egalitarian, multi-purpose organizations as part of a general transformation of traditional Lao society. This may explain why so little effort has been put into the old age organization; although it has equal status on paper, its development has been hampered by the intranaigence of the people in that age group.

SELECTION OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

Government officials are chosen almost entirely on the basis of merit, although there seems to be a general preference for the economically deprived villager as opposed to his wealthier counterpart. Tasseng level officials hold office up to two years; village level officials hold office for six months to a year. Higher officials have no clear-cut tenure of office; most have been in power since 1964. Village and Tasseng leaders are usually chosen by acclamation in a large meeting where the whole "group" is presented before the villagers. Elections by "secret ballot" are sometimes held if two men are equally qualified for a position -- usually Naibans -- but the Neo officials are never chosen by ballot. Balloting sometimes takes place to assign specific positions to the members of a village or tasseng "group", i.e., to select which man shall be Naiban, assistant, militia commander, etc. In these elections the Awakening Group "advises" the villagers whom to vote for. The earliest balloting that anyone could remember was in 1967 for the Tasseng of Sen Noi. Some areas in the province have not had any elections by ballot at all.

COURTS

Minor offenses like petty theft are handled at the village level, where the accused is put through a self-criticism session by members of the village or tasseng "group". More serious offenses call for the convening of a "peoples'

court" where the accused stands before a gathering of villagers and reads a confession of his crime and suggests the punishment that he should receive. The villagers then applaud his statement (which is usually prepared by the Awakening Group) and he is led off to jail. Serious offenses include attempts to escape, profiteering, adultery and passing information to RLG agents. Refugees who had spent time in jail reported that they had to write additional confessions during the course of their sentences. Reduced jail terms were granted on the basis of increased labor contributions by their families and convincing changes of heart on the part of the prisoners.

GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

The following is a list of government officials. Where a man uses two names or forms of address is indicated by a slash. All officials are Lao unless otherwise indicated. A question mark indicates that the name was not confirmed by a large number of refugees.

Khoueng Group

Chao Khoueng	Som Vang
Neo Khoueng for Lao	Thao Da/Ba Da
Neo Khouang for Meo	Nyia Veu (Meo)
N. Vietnamese Khoueng Advisor	Boun Chan (Lao alias)
Asst. Chao Khoueng	Sa Lat
Asst. Neo Khoueng	Bout Di
Awakening Group	"Major" Vichit
Youth Organization	Maja Boun Mi
Police	Su Van
Court	In Ta
Khoueng Group Representative	Chan Phim Pha
Khoueng Group Representative	Nguyen Van Thu (N. Vietnamese)
Agriculture	Siang Nan Tha/Pho Nu La

Irrigation	Guoc (N. Vietnamese)
Education	Phiang
Health	Lo Sao (Meo, son of Fai Dang)
Militia	Si That

Muong Group (Muong Khoun)

Chao Muong	Sai Vang (Meo)
Neo Muong	(?) Lia Heu (Meo)
N. Vietnamese Advisor	Boun Ta (Lao alias)
Asst. Chao Muong	Som Neuk
Asst. Neo Muong	(?) Sao Shua/Ga Ying (Meo woman)
Awakening Group	Van Pheng
Youth Organization	Thit Kham Ba
Muong Group Representative	Pho Fong
Police	Chum
Agriculture	Chan Kham Si
Health	Kham Mi
Education	Sim Ma
Irrigation	Kham Deum
Militia	Thao Nyom

ECONOMY

One of the most consistent themes in the P. L. rhetoric is the need for greater production. Directives to junior officials dwell at length on the need to put unused padi into production, to exceed last year's output, to increase the planting of secondary crops and to press for greater efforts on the part of the villagers. There can be no doubt that the P. L. have reduced disguised unemployment in the areas they control to an all time low. As the refugees put it, "No one can be lazy." Official directive Number 16, which states that one person shall do the work of five, refers not only to the labor shortages created by the draft

and the portage system, but also to production in general. The official, but secondary, function of the Awakening Group is to encourage greater effort and to assist in the introduction of new techniques. In this sense they function as community development advisors.

AGRICULTURE AND LIVESTOCK

Minimum planting requirements have been established, but they are usually exceeded as a matter of course. Civilians are required to plant at least four Kg per person in seed-beds; homeguard soldiers are required to plant two Kg per person. Most refugees, however, reported planting from fifty to ninety Kg per year. Padi land is divided into three grades which must produce the following quantities of rice per kilo of seed; grade one, 50 Kg, grade two, 30 Kg, and grade three, 15 Kg. Additional crops which have gained importance as the rice tax has increased include sweet potatoes, cassava, corn, beans, eggplant, tomatoes, and a variety of other vegetables.

The use of natural fertilizers on padi has been strongly encouraged, and the Vietnamese irrigation advisors have tried to push the use of night soil on vegetable gardens. Locally conscripted agricultural and veterinary agents have recently been assigned to groups of villages; a vet agent who came out with the refugees said that he had received only one day's training, while the refugees reported that the agricultural agents knew little more than the average farmer. The vet agent was given medicines last year to innoculate cattle and buffalo, but he said that he didn't know what the medicines were for.

Beginning in 1967 increased emphasis was put on irrigation as groups of North Vietnamese technicians began to direct canal and dam construction. New padi land has been made available and a few experiments have been made with double-cropping, but not on a regular basis. The head of irrigation

for the province is a Vietnamese named Guoc and the refugees knew the Lao aliases of four of his technicians: Kham Ouan, Vi, Sing Kham and Boun Thao. Much of the impressed labor is used on irrigation works, and the presence of a relatively large group of Vietnamese advisors points to the priority given the irrigation program.

Padi is still privately owned for the most part and traditional inheritance procedures are followed unless the owner escapes to the RLG, when the land becomes public property. Most of the public padi was acquired from land abandoned by refugees in 1961, although some of it is new land that has been recently irrigated. Government officials and school children at the Mayanyom and Udom levels work the public padi; villagers are not required to put in time on the public lands.

Water buffalo and cattle are almost entirely privately owned, but strict regulations regarding their sale or slaughter have been in force for several years. For example, villagers must have written permission from the Muong administration in order to slaughter an animal for a marriage ceremony. The sale of these livestock is permitted only at fixed prices and is usually limited to the coop. Cattle are priced at 15,000, 12,000 or 8,000 kip and buffalo at 28,000, 24,000 or 20,000 kip. Beef or buffalo meat may be sold at the market, but the price is fixed at 200 kip per Kg for beef and 180 kip for buffalo. Illegal slaughtering increased markedly when the co-op prices were reduced in 1968. The refugees reported various kinds of "accidental deaths", such as strangling on a tether, drowning in a wallow, or suffering wounds to the achilles tendon which necessitated the animal's slaughter.

Swine are not as closely controlled and may be sold or traded freely among villagers. However if pork is sold to the co-op, the price is fixed at 250 kip per Kg, including bones and viscera. Chickens and ducks fall under none of the restrictions placed on other livestock and may be

slaughtered or sold at the owner's discretion; careful records of each family's flock are kept at the Tasseng office.

CO-OP AND MARKET

The co-ops are the commercial centers of the province and have recently been expanded to the point that several Tassengs have outlets of their own. They are not co-ops in the sense that shares are owned by members, rather they function as purchasing agencies and retail outlets. Most of the goods sold are North Vietnamese or Chinese and include common household items. Most of the merchandise is rationed and it is not uncommon to find many items out of stock. Priority is given to the military co-op, a separate organization, which appears to be better supplied than its civilian counterpart. Following are some representative prices: cloth, from 260 to 500 kip per meter; trousers, up to 1500 kip; shirts and blouses, 500 kip; salt, 100 kip per Kg. Great quantities of pots and pans were found in the cave housing the military co-op, but these items were apparently in short supply at the civilian outlets.

The market at Xieng Khouang city is open daily for several hours in the early morning; however, it frequently closes at dawn to avoid the possibility of air strikes. Travel documents are not required to go to the market. Most of the produce sold is locally produced and most of the Chinese and Vietnamese merchants have been put out of business long ago or severely restricted in their trading activities. Chickens, ducks, swine, vegetables, and the like may be bargained for freely and the prices are comparable to those in RLG areas.

The new NLHS currency, in notes of 100, 200 and 500 kip, was introduced at last year's harvest and was used to purchase the "trading rice".

TAXATION

Since the introduction of formal rice taxation in 1965, the effective rate has steadily risen although it has assumed different names. The rates vary throughout the province. In more secure areas like Ban Ban, Xieng Khouang City and the eastern PDJ area, the people are subject to higher taxes than in, for example, Muong Ngan or Muong The. The differences reflect the extent of P. L. administrative and military control and illustrate a P. L. policy of setting examples in one area to be followed later in another.

The primary tax, called "rice to help the state", is set at 15% after exemptions. Each member of a family, including those in the army or away at schook, is allowed 100 Kg of paddy tax free. The remainder is taxed at the rate of 15% and this "state rice" is put in a public bin in each village.

The secondary tax, called "trading rice", was put in effect for the 1968 harvest. Approximately ten percent of the rice remaining after the primary tax is bought by the co-op for 27 kip per Kg or the equivalent in co-op merchandise. The sale of this rice is obligatory in secure areas, but the practice does not appear to have spread throughout the province.

The third tax, in effect since 1967, is called "rice from the heart". It is a voluntary contribution solicited from villagers at the same time that the other taxes are collected. Each villager is cajoled and "enlightened" until his contribution exceeds his neighbor's or his own of the previous year. The average for the Xieng Khouang area appears to run on the order of ten to twenty kilos per family, although further contributions are solicited throughout the year as the need arises.

In 1968 the P. L. began collecting a monetary tax to "support the teachers and medics". The tax is progressive and is

set at the following amounts: 500 kip a year for wealthy families, 300 for average families and 200 for the poor.

What might be considered an additional tax was levied in 1968 when the co-op prices for cattle and water buffalo were reduced by thirty to forty percent.

TAX EVASION

The P. L. have had some difficulty in collecting the rice and monetary taxes, particularly as the total levies have increased. Villagers have lied so consistently about total harvests that officials and representatives from the Khoueng and Muong governments and NVA cadres have been forced to watch harvesting and thrashing to prevent cheating. Each year an additional surtax is levied, with varying degrees of success, to "make up for the rice which was hidden" the previous year.

The monetary tax has caused villagers to hide many of their possessions and has reinforced a tendency to appear as poor as possible. Jewelry is almost never worn and people consistently dress in the oldest serviceable clothes they can find to emphasize their poverty.

TAX REVENUES

The public rice is distributed to P. L. soldiers and civil servants above the Tasseng level; the NVA brings in its own rice. Even the officials entitled to public rice rarely receive their full quota as the army has first priority. A nurse from the Muong dispensary reported that in 1968 she received her ration for only eight months. The "refugees" from Ban Pha (LS 239) who were evacuated to Xieng Khouang city in 1967 received almost no rice during their stay and were forced to forage in the woods and beg rice from other villagers. The Xieng Khouang people who did not come out with the refugees are reported to be "starving" in the Ban Ban area where they have been relocated by the P. L.

The rice taxation has encouraged the production of substitute crops and many of the refugees reported that had they not planted sweet potatoes, cassava, mung beans, etc., they would have had little to eat during the four or five months before harvest.

PORTAGE AND IMPRESSED LABOR

The single most unpopular aspect of life under the P. L. is the portage system. Almost no one is exempt from numerous "short trips" of up to a week's duration, and everyone with enough strength is required to make one "long trip" a year. The long trip usually means thirty cumulative days of actual hauling, not counting rest days or the return trip. In 1968 people from the Xieng Khouang city area were drafted for two long trips, although the official requirement called for only one. Most of the portage was to the areas of Tha Vieng, Tha Thom and Pha Lavek. Men are required to carry fifteen kilos of cargo plus their own rice, but the loads seem to average out to about fifteen kilos including the rice. Women average about ten kilos including rice although they are supposed to carry ten kilos of cargo alone. On long trips, rice is provided by the state at the rate of 600 grams per day, and each porter also receives 300 grams of canned meat per week. Short trips are organized whenever the need arises and have become more frequent over the years as the P. L. administration has become more effective. They now average one to two times a month. Women are less frequently assigned to the long trips, but everyone else, including the local Chinese and Vietnamese, are subject to the draft. Women who are not assigned to specific portage groups are responsible for the children of the women who go on the trips. The refugees reported that they often puncture holes in rice sacks to lighten the load, and that they are sometimes able to discard part of their cargo in the woods without being caught.

Civilians are also assigned to road construction and maintenance groups. The roads to Tha Thom (LS 11) and Muong

Ngan (LS 236) were built almost entirely by conscripted village labor and POW's over the past two years. Route 7 west of Xieng Khouang city, however, is maintained by an NVA engineering unit. The villagers are also conscripted to build major bunkers and air raid shelters, and many of the anti-aircraft gun emplacements around the city were dug by civilian labor crews. Impressed labor is also used on earth dams and irrigation works, which have become priority projects during the past two years.

Requirements for "labor strength" (heng ngan) are passed down through the administrative and Neo goverment channels to the villages where their fulfillment is supervised by the youth organization as well as the Tasseng and village officials.

A great deal of official verbiage is devoted to supporting the communal labor projects. Two recent policy statements were directed precisely toward the impressed labor system: Statement Number Fifteen, announced last year, says that one man shall do the work of three; Number Sixteen, which came out this year, declares that one man shall do the work of five. These are interpreted by the "Awakening Group" as meaning that the one member of a family of three who is not on a communal labor project shall do the others' work in the fields and gardens as well as his own; statement Number Sixteen places him under even greater pressure.

MILITARY CONSCRIPTION

The official draft age is 15, but many of the refugees reported that conscription often begins at age 13. The draft quotas are normally passed down through the government hierarchy and the school system, although the school system has no authority of its own to draft soldiers. Almost every eligible male in the province is in the army.

The refugees said that soldiers are classified into the following groups: homeguard, ambush, muong, khoueng

and regulars. Most of the young men become regulars, while older villagers are conscripted into the other categories of service. Homeguard and ambush soldiers receive no salaries. There appears to be a consistent pattern of assigning new conscripts to P. L. units rather than to Deuanist units with the predictable result that the Deuanist army is withering away.

There is also a conscious policy of keeping news of casualties from the villagers. It is not uncommon for parents to not know of their son's death until months after it has occurred. No death benefits are provided although the 100 kilos rice exemption is still allowed even after death.

EDUCATION

In Xieng Khouang province, the primary schools teach grades 1 through 4; the first three grades are taught in local schools found in virtually every village, while grade 4 is taught in the provincial school near XK city. Students enter grade one at age six or seven; they study four hours a day and spend several additional hours working in the school gardens and tending to the school livestock. Each student, or his parent, is required to provide a chicken and sometimes a pig for this program. Primers are distributed free, but notebooks and pencils must be bought (at the co-op or at the market). To graduate from grade 4 usually takes more than four years, but qualifies a student for enrollment in the secondary school or Matanyom.

There are four Matanyom schools in the province at XKV, Khang Khai, Muong Ngan and Ban Khai. Students usually board at the Matanyom during the two year course and return home to pick up rice whenever they run out. As in the primary schools, they spend several hours a day on the school plots which include rice padi as well as vegetable gardens. Each student provides four chickens and two ducks and each classroom raises at least one pig. This

year there were 436 students enrolled at the Mayanyom level, about evenly divided among the four locations. The teacher-pupil ratio varies from ten to thirty students per teacher.

Beyong Matanyom the students enter the Udom level, established in 1968. As of 1969, there were only nineteen students at the province-wide Udom at XKV. Graduates of Udom attend the "Sithon Kommandam School" at Son Tay, DRV, where returnees report that ten to twenty thousand Lao students from all over the country are enrolled. There are separate schools in XKV for the small Chinese and Vietnamese populations, but the reporting officer was able to find out little about them except that the Chinese school had teachers attached to the Chinese mission at Khang Khai.

TEACHER TRAINING

Until late 1968, the only prerequisite to teach grades 1 through 3 was a knowledge of written Lao, but since then a four month training course has been set up. Teachers at the grade 4 level are required to attend a one year course near XKV. Teachers in the Matanyom must be graduates of a training course of "several years' given at Sam Neua City. Little is known about the backgrounds of the Udom teachers -- presently five Lao and five North Vietnamese. The teacher training courses include instruction in carpentry, blacksmithing and agriculture as well as lengthy lessons in politics and the policies of the P. L. administration.

Most of the instruction given teachers, however, is in the form of inservice training. Primary school teachers spend each Saturday at Tasseng-wide meetings where they say they are encouraged to teach more, grow more and guide their students away from the "old way" toward the "new way".

In addition to these weekly sessions, all of the Matanyom and some of the primary school teachers attend annual one-month training sessions during the two month vacation period. The other month is devoted to work in the fields.

The head of teacher training for Xieng Khouang province is a Lao from Sam Neua named Kham Pian.

SALARIES

Primary school teachers receive twenty kip a day subsistence and 600 grams of rice. Teachers at the Matanyom receive the same rice ration and 1150 kip per month.

SUBJECT MATERIAL

The textbooks, even at the primary level, emphasize hygiene and better agricultural practices, as well as self-denial, communal endeavor and solidarity against U.S. imperialism. A great many allegorical stories (akin to Aesop's fables) teach right and wrong, while patriotic songs talk of capturing enemy arms and heroic stories tell of the successes of the people's infantry and anti-aircraft units. The arithmetic texts, for instance, include exercises involving taxation, rice donations to the army, equivalent Vietnamese units of weight, numbers of people at political rallies, production records set by various districts, kilometers of road construction, loads carried by porters, and other examples appropriate to the new way of life. Only Arabic numerals are used. Textbooks in Meo orthography have been in use since 1967, but Meo students are required to learn Lao first; the Meo script is an altered Lao script, easily learned once the Meo students know Lao.

ADULT LITERACY PROGRAMS

The only formally organized adult education program is for illiterate P.L. government officials. Since minor officials are chosen on the basis of their contributions to the state and their reliability (strong back/weak mind), it is not uncommon to find low-level administrators with little

knowledge of written Lao. The greater part of the literacy campaign, however, consists of a 1966 requirement that all teachers instruct five adults per year to read and write and all literate people teach two adults per year. Monks are also required to act as instructors in the program. This informal campaign depends on the availability of time and the dedication of the teachers and has been found wanting on both counts.

Another "literacy program" consists of posters and placards placed on houses, trees and along trails. These are usually brief political slogans such as "rise up against the American imperialists", "shoot down U.S. airplanes", or "plant more rice than last year". Such placards are frequently worn by porters walking in single file so that the sign on one man's back is read by the one behind him.

GOALS OF THE EDUCATION SYSTEM

The education system has two primary functions: to change the society from the bottom up by introducing new values and patterns of thought, and to provide a manpower base to meet the requirements of the state. Students are expected to grow up in a society radically different from that of their parents and the school system has become a major instrument of transformation. The schools treat material that would be anathema to the older generation in a very matter-of-fact way -- such as the waste of resources on funeral rites and describe rather radical programs, such as the portage system, as normalcy. From the Matanyom on, the pupils are largely isolated from their parents and become official wards of the state, and unless they return to their village as teachers or medics, they are largely cut off from the influence of the older generation.

The second function of the school system is that of meeting certain manpower requirements of the state. Quotas for soldiers, medics, nurses, agricultural agents and other

state employees are sent down from the provincial government to the school system, which helps to weed out the least promising students for these occupations. Increased requirements for soldiers in particular and an emphasis on more diligent study in general have led to the abolition of two grades in the system: a fifth primary grade was eliminated in 1967 and a third year of Matanyom was cut out in 1968. (The introduction of the two-year Udom does not replace these, rather it represents a transfer of facilities from the DRV to Laos.) The students are now expected to learn more and learn it faster to be able to serve their country sooner. There seems to be no clear cut pattern as to the number of times a student is allowed to repeat a grade, but his chances of being drafted increase rapidly as his exam grades worsen.

In the P. L. areas, the phrase "to go to study" has become a suphemism for conscription because of the frequent student drafts. The same phrase is used by the P. L. to indicate self-criticism sessions and has acquired an ugly connotation among the older Lao. Most of those who "go to study" outside the province or to North Vietnam are rarely heard from again; they are usually attached to military units in other areas; or if they graduate from the advanced schools, they are sent to work in Sam Neua where the "model state" is being built.

MEDICAL SERVICES

Medical facilities are organized at the khoueng, muong and tasseng levels. No village level program exists although one had been planned for 1969. The tasseng dispensaries are usually stocked with little more than a few pills and are able to treat only simple maladies. The tasseng dispensary at XKV was staffed by a single nurse who rarely made sick calls and usually referred patients to the muong dispensary at Na Kwa (NW of XKV). At the muong level, a greater variety of medicine was available, but again the staff (of three) usually referred patients needing more intensive treatment to the khoueng infirmary at Tham Hok. The

Khoueng infirmary was run by a surgeon and was able to handle up to fifty in-patients who slept in shelters outside the cave entrance. The "surgeon" left evidence of a rather crude amputation technique on one of the refugees he had treated.

TRAINING

The nurses at the muong hospital attended a six month training course in 1964 at Khang Khai. The program was run by Dr. Saramani, a Deuanist officer who received his medical training in Cambodia. The tasseng nurse studied for three months at Khang Khai, and in March of this year a new training program was begun for village level medics and nurses. Twenty five students, mostly girls, attended a 25-day course at Tham Hok taught by four Lao and two North Vietnamese instructors. The course was almost completed when the fall of Phu Khe (LS 19) forced its postponement. The muong level nurses receive 1150 kip a month and a rice ration while the tasseng nurse receives 800 kip a month and eat with the villagers.

MILITARY MEDICS

P. L. soldiers appear to receive much better medical care than their civilian counterparts. Each of the four (?) battalions in XK province has the following personnel assigned to it: a surgical unit consisting of a surgeon and six assistants, two battalion level medics, a medic for each company, as well as company level hygiene advisors who supervise food preparation, latrine construction and camp cleanliness. Each of the surgeons studied in Hanoi for six years. The hospital at Tham Kap (NW of XKV) was the main military hospital for the province and admitted only soldiers or high-ranking government officials. Tham Kap could accommodate about a hundred in-patients and was equipped with a laboratory and a surgical unit. It was also the main medical warehouse for the province and supplied units in the field with pre-packaged first aid kits and

surgical supplies. About a hundred tons of medical supplies were found in Tham Kap and other caves at the time of their capture. A smaller medical warehouse in Khang Khai, under the nominal control of the Deuanists, prepares native remedies which are distributed to the troops and civilians along with manufactured pharmacuticals. These local preparations include: alchohol, "afterbirth medicine", diarrhea medicines, "tonic pills", and "deer horn" medicine. The latter is a hormone preparation sometimes given to soldiers before battle. Following is a list of the more important people associated with the medical programs in Xieng Khouang province:

Kham Pheuang	Overall head of military and civilian services for the province; director of Tham Kap hospital
Tri, or Chi	his NVA advisor
Mai Thong	head of the military medics
Siramany	head of the Khang Khai hospital
Lo Sao	provincial director of public health
Sing Thong	Director of the Khoueng hospital at Tham Hok
Van Thong	his NVA advisor (Lao alias)
Nang Vilai	head of medic and nurse training (Phoumi Vongvichit's adopted daughter)

More detailed information relating to the P. L. medical programs can be found in PHD reports.

CHANGES IN RELIGIOUS PRACTICES AND TRADITIONAL CUSTOMS

The Neo Lao Hak Sat have followed a consistent policy of eradicating the influence that Buddhism has on the lives of the villagers. All forms of "making merit" are sharply curtailed and visits to the Wats are strongly discouraged. Monks are not allowed to receive offerings of food from villagers and no "bouns" have been held since 1964. Monks

are required to work on impressed labor projects, but do not have to go on portage trips. They must cultivate their own padis and gardens and contribute to the common good rather than "eat the peoples' rice".

Most of the novices who have joined the order in the past several years have been installed by the P. L. government. They openly denounce Buddhism and emphasize the waste of resources on religious and secular festivals. They sometimes wear civilian clothes and are said to spend a lot of time eavesdropping on conversations in villagers' houses. They frequently wear pistols under their robes and are referred to by the older monks who came out with the refugees as "agents" and never as bonzes. They also function as teachers in the adult literacy program. Buddhist holy days are not celebrated and cremations have almost ceased entirely; they have been replaced by simple burials which represent a lesser waste of resources.

Animism is no less exempt from denunciation as a corrosive waste of time and energy. Spirit houses, bacis, food for the phi and belief in the supernatural are decried as useless remnants of the "old way". The refugees reported that the "old way" (of Buddhism-animism) is still practiced as much as possible under the circumstances, but that constant harassment has reduced the level of active participation such that traditional practices are dying out. One of the most frustrating aspects of the P. L. study sessions is the need to justify under cross-examination beliefs and practices that have never been questioned, like the value of expensive funeral preparations. Why throw good money away on a corpse?

Marriage has similarly been altered by the P. L. administration, but to a lesser extent than Buddhism. Couples are encouraged to "drink tea" rather than have a large party, and the bride price has been criticised as another wasteful anachronism. The taking of minor wives is strictly forbidden as it violates women's equal rights. The refugees remembered a people's

court session where a man and his mistress were publicly condemned and sentenced to jail. Similarly in Meo areas the practice of abducting a bride has been outlawed, with limited success. The role of women in general has changed, since "they have ten fingers and ten toes and should do equal work as men". The P. L. encourage marriages between men and women who have both worked well for the state; some refugees said that the government has given large wedding presents to such model couples while others said that they had never heard of the practice.

Alcohol has been denounced as not only a corrosive influence on mind and body, but also as a serious waste of otherwise good grain. The refugees nonetheless told of hidden stills in the woods that were operated by hard core drinkers.

CELEBRATIONS AND RALLIES

A "victory celebration" is held each year on October 12, the anniversary of the founding of the Lao Issara in 1945. The year's military successes are reviewed along with the number of enemy soldiers killed, airplanes shot down, weapons captured, etc. Production figures by district and by crop or animal are announced and progress in the fields of education, irrigation, health, etc., is summarized. The celebration is an occasion for cataloguing the successes of the NLHS administration and sometimes features entertainment provided by the "morale group" under the direction of the Vietnamese Khoueng advisor "Boun Chan" who is an accomplished magician. Attendance is encouraged but is not obligatory.

An entirely different type of gathering is called the "boun meeting"; the English/French word "meeting" is used although none of the refugees knew that it was English. (It also appears in print - in Lao script - in P. L. publications.) The "boun meeting" is a protest rally where the atrocities of the American imperialists and their lackies are denounced

and where petitions condemning the policies of these bandits and their running dogs are signed and sent to the NLHS central committee. Banners are posted on walls, e.g., "shoot down 1000 airplanes", and villagers carry around posters and chant "long live Prince Souphannouvong". Boun meetings are held several times a year or whenever an especially horrible atrocity has been committed by the enemy.

MERIT BOOKS AND STUDY SESSIONS

One of the more important mechanisms of political control is the use of a sort of report card called psum phon ngan which may be translated as "work success book" or "results of labor book". However, we will call them merit books. All adults have been required to carry them since 1964 although many villagers have a tendency to lose them and they are often kept by Naibans or Tassengs. A person's merit book summarizes most of what the P. L. considers important in his life: The harvests he has had, the taxes he has paid, the voluntary contributions he has made, the celebrations and rallies he has attended, the portage trips he has gone on, and his participation in impressed labor projects. The merit book, in short, catalogues a person's assets as a citizen of Pathet Lao. Refugees referred to the merit books when they spoke of elections in which two candidates of "equal merit" were nominated for low-level offices; they both had an equal number of brownie points in their books. Several of the refugees who had served as P. L. officials said that civil servants had to make daily entries in their merit books; most of the refugees reported that entries for civilians were made weekly or whenever the occasion called for it. Some people said that entries were made by government officials while others said that the Awakening Group was responsible for keeping the books up-to-date. The P. L. nonetheless encourage villagers to maintain their own books once they learn the proper format.

In addition to the merit books, personal dossiers are maintained on villagers whose political loyalty is in question. Their cheating, their crimes, their deviation from official policy and their opposition to "progress" is recorded in personal files. One of the agents who came out with the refugees had the responsibility of taking notes on the kinds of questions asked at meetings where government policy was explained. Villagers whose questions reflected unpatriotic tendencies were later called to attend study sessions to correct their misconceptions.

The study, or re-education sessions are designed to change the thinking of the individual such that he genuinely believes what his guides want him to believe and fully understands the mistakes of his former actions. The individual is not harangued, but is slowly shown the error of his ways through careful questioning; these sessions can last for days as long as there is hope that the subject is not an incorrigible traitor. A former P. L. Tasseng said that he was "guided" by the Chao Muong and several other officials for three days through his failures to carry out his duties. Villagers who protest the contributions of "rice from the heart" are often "taught" until they make an adequate donation. Mass study sessions are held at the Muong each year for village and Tasseng officials at the same time that the coming years' policies are discussed.

Form Laos 267

United States AID Mission To LAOS

USAID Staff Notice

February 18, 1972 VIENTIANE, LAOS No. 72-54

SUBJECT: Congressional Visitor (Subject Index 800)

I want all personnel of USAID to share my pleasure upon receiving a recent letter from Congressman Charles S. Gubser, enclosing a press statement he released upon his return to the United States after visiting this country:

Congressman Gubser writes to me:

> You will never know how grateful I am for the wonderful day which you planned for me when I recently visited Laos. It was superb and I marvel at how much we accomplished in such a short period of time and especially during such a crucial time.
>
> In my opinion you and your people represent the very finest in federal service. It was obvious to me that you all believe in what you are doing and are intent upon accomplishing your objectives irrespective of hours, distrust, and personal danger. I shall do my best to see that the truth is told here in the States.

Every one of you must be as proud as I am to belong to an organization deserving of such praise and making such a striking impression upon a perceptive visitor.

Please read the Congressman's press statement, attached, with the understanding that what he says applies to all of us, all ranks, all duties, all stations, and not merely to those he saw during his one hectic, busy day in Laos. Everywhere he went he saw American, Lao, and TCN working as one. Recognition such as this helps make the effort worthwhile. I thought you would want to know about it, and perhaps to spread it around.

Charles A. Mann
Director

Attachment: a/s
DISTRIBUTION: A, E, E_1

Attachment to SN 72-54 (2/18/72)

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CHARLES S. GUBSER

FOLLOWING HIS VISIT TO LAOS

On July 12, 1971, I engaged in a debate with Congressman McCloskey and took issue with his statements that U. S. policy was to "indiscriminately" bomb civilians in Laos. Statements to this effect were made by Representative McCloskey following his visit to Laos on April 14 and 15, 1971.

I resolved that when time was available to me, I would retrace the Congressman's steps in Laos, interview the same people, and reach my own conclusions from the same evidence.

On Sunday, January 16, I went to the one refugee camp which Mr. McCloskey visited and talked with the same thirteen village chiefs he interviewed. This was the refugee camp at Ban Na Nga (TF 345185). In addition, I also visited the refugee village of Ban Nong Sa which was not visited by Mr. McCloskey. I also interviewed refugees at Ban Xon.

My conclusion is that the United States is not indiscriminately bombing villages. All bombing is in connection with military operations and the purpose of the bombing is overwhelmingly endorsed by the refugees themselves.

It is certainly true that some villagers did flee their homes because of bombing. This is particularly true of the refugees at Bon Na Nga who come from thirteen villages in the vicinity of the Route 7 and Route 4 Lines of Communication where ground fighting was particularly heavy. It was interesting to note, however, that the chiefs representing the 2400 refugees in these particular villages unanimously endorsed the bombing and stated that it was not until the bombers came that they were able to escape the North Vietnamese and the Pathet Lao. They all felt the bombing and the casualties, though regrettable, were part of the price that had to be paid for freedom. None of them wish to return to their villages if they are dominated by the North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao.

The refugees at Ban Nong Sa who came from farther north and west related a markedly different story with respect to civilian casualties probably due to the fact that ground fighting there was not as intense. The number of civilian casualties reported to me by the twelve village chiefs I interviewed was much lower than at Ban Na Nga. Their feelings about the necessity of bombing were the same as in Ban Na Nga.

Thus to draw the conclusion that civilians were indiscriminately bombed is, in my opinion, a disservice to the United States of America and to the many dedicated men and women in U.S. service who are desperately trying to help the beleaguered Lao people. Ban Na Nga is an exceptional refugee camp and comes closest to supporting Mr. McCloskey's contentions. But it does not by any manner or means support his far-reaching conclusions.

In my opinion, the USAID officials and those attached to our U.S. Embassy constitute the most dedicated, hardworking, self-sacrificing and humanitarian people I have ever met. They are working murderous hours under difficult circumstances and doing their best to feed refugees, care for the wounded, and assist the Lao in resisting outside aggression. They accept personal danger and hardships willingly because they believe in what they are doing.

At landing site 272 (Ban Xon), I witnessed intense activity from a short dirt air strip that was handling more than 900 daily takeoffs and landings. Wounded were flown in for treatment at the Ban Xon hospital. Military supplies were being air-dropped at Long Tieng, and Meo tribesmen and ethnic Laos were being supplied with rice by air-drops. I visited two mountain settlement areas (LS 337 and 244) and saw Meo tribesmen retrieving air-dropped rice.

Several things stand out with respect to the war in Laos.

First, the Pathet Lao has become a very latent military force and does not figure prominently in the fighting. This is strictly an invasion by North Vietnamese troops with more than 90,000 present within Laos at this time. Second, it should also be remembered that Souvanna Phouma desires to be neutral. He has not filled Pathet Lao seats in his cabinet and will accept their representatives whenever they present themselves. Pathet Lao headquarters in Vientiane is not molested. Souvanna has accepted U.S. assistance, not for the purpose of being pro-American, but of resisting North Vietnamese aggression so as to maintain a neutralist stance. If he were forced out of his neutralist stance he would most certainly be pressured to forbid all U.S. bombing in Laotian territory including the Ho Chi Minh Trail. This could have a disastrous effect upon Vietnamization and our withdrawal from South Vietnam.

The military situation in Laos is bad but not as bad as reported. It is significant that two years ago it took one North Vietnamese division to overrun the Plaine des Jarres. Last year it took two divisions and this year North Vietnam has committed three crack divisions which are actually overstrength. In addition, they have used 130 mm. artillery for the first time.

When I was in Laos, a determined effort to retake Skyline Ridge overlooking Long Tieng was in the planning stage and Thai troops were about to be reinserted. Most reports indicate that this plan has succeeded. The admittedly weakened Meo and Lao troops who have survived ten years of fighting against aggression are in trouble but they are not in disordered retreat. Long Tieng will probably be held unless the Communists decide to pay the terrific cost of taking it. This cost would certainly have its effect upon the withdrawal rate of U. S. troops from South Vietnam.

It should be recalled that our purposes in Laos are (1) to feed and care for refugees, and (2) to assist the Royal Lao government in maintaining a neutralist stance. There are no active U. S. military forces in Laos to assist in achieving these purposes.

It is my firm opinion that U. S. air power stationed outside Laos is the factor which makes the achievement of these purposes possible. Without it, there would be no hope.

I am convinced that the Symington Amendment which limits U. S. expenditures in Laos to $350 million was a very serious mistake. This amendment admits the correctness of our presence and the validity of our purposes by authorizing funds for those purposes. But it ties our hands in achieving them! During the first six months of the fiscal year $116 million was expended but this was during the wet season when military activity and the refugee flow was at low ebb. Obviously, we will have one hand tied behind our back for the last six months of the fiscal year and achieving our objectives will be difficult and perhaps impossible. If we give legislative sanction to our purposes and mission in Laos, then we should not make it impossible to achieve those purposes. It would be far more humane and far more sensible to make no commitment at all.

X X X X X X

January 27, 1972

3 April 1972

To: Mr. Jack Williamson, ORA
From: Mr. Blaine Jensen, AC/XK
Subject: Combatants & ADO's fed during March '72

a. ADO's fed by C-46 drops fm Vientiane

Location		Number of ADO's	
~~UG 0212 LS-05~~	~~PA DONG~~	86	
UG 2686 LS-32	BOUAM LONG	857	(Includes SGU's)
TF 6692 LS-66	BAN NA LUANG	93	
TF 9377 LS-255	PHU HE	311	
UF 1194 LS-316	THAM LO	100	
TF 9990 LS-334	THUNG CHA	1,086	(Training center)
TH 1507 LS-336	PHU SAN	100	
TG 7507 LS-337	PHU KANG NEUA	103	
UH 0503 LS-339	PHU CUM	150	
~~UF 0686 LS-349~~	~~SAM KAK~~	~~271~~	
TF 84[illegible] LS-353	PHA KHET	223	
UF 8975 LS-360	NAM HEO	800	(Includes SGU's)
UG 0707 DE-0202	PHU BIA	109	
UF 8982	Total	4,289	

b. At LS-272 we feed 6,784 soldiers & ADO's. The rice is drawn from the LS-272 warehouse and dropped to them by Sky planes.

During March 1972 they drew:

100 kg rice	266	bags ✓
40 kg rice	6,913	bags ✓
salt	138	bags
Canned meat	2662	cases.

2 October 1972

To: Ernie Kuhn, ORA
From: Blaine Jensen, AC/XR
Subject: Combatants fed during Sept. 1972

LS-32	BOUAM LONG	1,009	BG's	C 46
LS-113	MOUNG CHA	109	ADO's	C46
LS-227	MOUNG AO NEUA	40	ADO's	C46
LS-272	BAN XON	250	ADO's	fed at LS-272
LS-316	THAM LO	142	ADO's	C 46
LS-334	TUNG CHA	563	BG's	C46
LS-361	PUNG HAI	286	ADO's	C46
D2-0258	THAM LO NOI	250	ADO's	C46

Total 2,649

C 46 drops:
Rice 475 bags X X
Hash 547 bags X X
Salt 25 bags ✓

From LS-272
Meat 165 cases ✓
Salt 15 bags ✓
Rice 80 40 kg bags. X X
30 100 kg bags X

8 Sept. 1972

59Ac

To: Mr. Ernie Kuhn, ORA
From: Mr. Blaine Jensen, AC/XK
Subject: Combatants fed during August 1972

Fed by C-46 drops:

LS-32	BOUAM LONG	1,049	SGU
LS-113	MOONG CHA	109	ADO
LS-227	MOONG AO NEUA	40	ADO
LS-316	THAM LO	142	ADO
LS-334	TUNG CHA	2,048	Trainees

Note: These trainees moved out around August 20, 1972. At present there are about 192 soldiers left at LS-334

LS-361	PUNG HAI	286	ADO
DZ-0258	THAM LO NOI	250	ADO
	Total	3,924	

The above received: 829 bags rice
792 bags hash
30 bags salt

Fed from LS-272 warehouse
416 combatants — received 96 bags 40 kg rice
5 bags salt
16 cases meat

Note: Most of these people left the 272 area during August, therefore did not receive the full monthly quotas

Ernie: As you will note, there are several edits that I didn't have time to correct for the "final" version. And, we were so pressed to produce this on the DSP, that I was unable to "run it by experts" to receive comment, correction, criticism. I would very much appreciate anything you would care to comment on, correct, or critique. For example, did the population of Long Tieng ever get as high as 40,000??

Give me a call whenever. I still have other reports, cables, etc - not much, but some interesting items.

Phil.

703-913-1725

THE U.S. MISSION TO LAOS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

FOR MILITARY REGION II, POST CEASE-FIRE LAOS,

1973 - 1975

Phillip J. Buechler
Development Studies Program VI
March 1977

~~Appendix D~~


MR II
(general area)
AREA A -
LUANG PRABANG
AREA G -
XIENG KHOUANG
AREA B -
SAYABOURY
AREA C -
VIENTIANE
AREA D -
BORIKHANE
AREA E -
SAVANNAKHET
AREA F -
PAKSE
PHONG SALY
HOUA KHONG
LUANG PRABANG
HOUA PHAN
XIENG KHOUANG
VIENTIANE
BORIKHANE
KHAMMOUANE
SAYABOURY
SAVANNAKHET
SARAVANE
SEDONE
CHAMPASAK
ATTOPEU
SITHANDONE
~~EXISTING CLUSTERS - 0~~
~~CLUSTERS PROPOSED FOR FY 1966 - 3~~
~~CLUSTERS PROPOSED FOR FY 1967 - 2~~
~~TRAINING CENTERS - 2~~
~~FORWARD AREA OPERATIONS SITES - 11~~

Introduction

This paper will attempt to describe the major components of an economic developed program which was implemented in a particular area of Laos during the period August, 1973, through April of 1975. The difficulty of this undertaking is that as I set out on this task, I expect to have little success in finding any supporting documentation in the Washington files - an "institution without a memory" as Milo Cox calls it. Perhaps some of the "old Lao hands" will be able to fill in some details, but intially the attempt will be from memory.

The purpose of this paper is two-fold as it is undertaken at this time. First, it is my hope that it will serve as an example of what may be done in other countries when resettlement in a basically agrarian setting is a proposal. Secondly, it will provide the writer with an opportunity to objectively record the program which was his final assignment in Laos. The writer served in Laos from Dec. 25, 1963 until May 23, 1975.

As stated above, the program was implemented in September of 1973, and here is the first test of the memory. I really don't know why I pick that date, except that it seems to have been the month when all the preliminary fact-finding, planning, designing and proposing had come to the point of decision, and we were given approval of the overall program, for projects within that program, discreet activities within those projects and the funding arrangements were concluded. I will come back to these points later.

as much to the Lao conflict as to the larger war next door. -- Viet Nam. This commitment, as far as I was ever able to determine, was made early in the 1960s, and was re-confirmed through the years - probably during and after crisis in which it was done as a hand-holding, buck-up-the-spirits sort of thing. But it was official, between high-ranking members of the U.S. government, and the political-military leadership of the H'mong. The time-frame was never set in any more specific terms than 'after this war', or 'when there is peace'.

What was the contribution of the H'mong to the war-effort of Indo-China? Conservatively, the estimates are 10,000 killed, 20,000 wounded, and this over a time span of twelve years. When one considers that the total H'Mong population throughout Laos was never estimated at more than 300,000, and that only one fourth of these were directly involved in the war, it's a fairly high percentage of the manhood. The point is that the H'mong, under the leadership of General Vang Pao, decided to help the U.S. war effort in northern Laos because they had made a choice between communism and freedom. Like some H'mong, they could have joined the communists in 196__. I see no need to go into detail about the type of warfare that was conducted, but it's a shame that the American public never was told how much the efforts of these people contributed to the saving of lives of American G.I.s in Viet Nam, by simply harrassing and/or tying down North Vietnamese troops in northeastern Laos and North Viet Nam.

Historically, as well, the H'mong had "no place to run." That is the title of a Jan. 1974 National Geographic article on the H'mong which describes that the mountainous area above the Vientiane Plain was the limit of their escape from oppression which started two centuries ago in China. It's a fascinating article, with the excellent photography of Pat Garrett. (A copy is attached to the original of this paper). However, for the purposes of this paper, I will avoid the argument between those who say the H'mong had no choice, and those who say they were enticed by the lure of American assistance at the end of the war.

The target was 135,000 people who were basically from two northern provinces of Laos - Houa Phan , and Xieng Khouang. The composition of this group was basically 80% H'mong (Meo), 15% Lao, and the remaining being divided among ethnic hill tribes such as the Yao, and Lao ~~Tieng~~ Teung.

Background

As wars often result in an obscuring of boundaries, Laos was no exception. The boundaries of this population overlapped into the provinces of Borikhane , Vang Vieng, Vientiane and Xieng Khouang, and is best described as Military Region II - that portion of which was controlled by the military of MR II after the signing of the Ceasefire of February, 1973. In total area, it was approximately 150,000 square kilometers. The principal town was Long Tieng, 160 kilometers north of Vientiane, which had a population of approximately 10,000, including the military who were stationed there with their families. (There was a larger "urban" center south of Long Tieng - Ban Xon, with a population of 30,000, including the Khua Lek market area). During the war years of 1968-72, it was estimated that Long Tieng had a population of 40,000. However, this figure probably included 10,000 "outsiders" - non-Lao soldiers, American military advisors and the U.S. agency personnel charged with the support responsibilities of the Military Region II military and political infrastructure and the third-country nationals who supported the foregoing.

Before describing in detail the elements of the overall program, it would probably make sense to give the reader some background on the "why" of the program. In the most simplistic terms, it was a program of reciprocity.

The reciprocation was the fulfillment of a commitment by the U. S. Government to materially assist the H'mong to re-establish their social and economic life because of their contribution to the war effort -

I am not ~~merely discussing this either~~ dismissing it entirely, because ~~it~~ there was a heated ~~point in the~~ discussion during the period from April ~~June~~ through September 1973 when the U.S. Mission was debating the amount and type of assistance that would be provided since there was a cease-fire, and it looked like it would stick for awhile. Studies were ~~made to show~~ carried out which showed that in fact, the average H'mong family in MR II at the conclusion of war (I will use 'cease-fire', and 'end of the war' interchangeably throughout this paper) was indeed quite wealthy, in terms of the total salaries that were being pumped into the area each month. Expenditures during the years of conflict were relatively low- there was no overland transportation to Vientiane, plus the fact that practically everyone was on the rice rolls. A conservative estimate is that in pre-harvest 1973 (November-December), 115,000 people in MR II were being fed by the U.S. Government. This included military, their dependents, civil servants and dependents, U.S. government local and TCN employees and their dependents, widows, disabled veterans and their dependents.

The conclusion of the discussion on assistance to the H'mong was that 1) there was an obligation on the part of the U.S. which would be met, 2) that it was recognized that while some H'mong had profited from the war, most ~~many~~ had suffered, 3) that an economic and social service infrastructure was feasible, even though we believed the area to be overpopulated given the topography and the slash and burn method of farming which the H'mong employed, 4) that a concerted effort to reverse the "rice roll" mentality of the H'mong would have to accompany any economic development program, 5) that the leadership of MR II was strong enough to support the U.S. efforts, 6) that it would be a comprehensive program having the highest priority for all member organization of the U.S. Mission to Laos, and 7) that AID would provide the majority of the required technical assistance while another agency would provide the majority of the funds.

DESIGN

It would be unfair to say that at the outset in September 1973 we knew every dimension the program would take. It can be said, though, that the major thrust would be the establishment of economic and social service infrastructure projects that would take advantage of the cultural qualities of the H'mong, especially in the agriculture sector. We knew at the beginning that without careful planning, the program could turn into the biggest give away of all time, and while the feeling persisted among a few members of the U.S. Mission throughout the period, it was not held by those of us who were directly involved and responsible for the implementation and management of the program.

We wanted the major emphasis to be the establishment of an economic base which would offer a full range of agricultural services to the H'mong, and one which would, after initial direct subsidy, operate on its own. Some activities would not only pay for themselves, but would turn a profit to finance other aspects of the program. Perhaps the following list of Design Components would be the quickest way to present the reader with a picture of what was considered in the beginning, and subsequently implemented.

(See following page - 5a)

Design Components

Resource Survey

Population
Resettlement
Agriculture
Natural Resources

Infrastructure Activities

Roads/Bridges
Communication System
Radio Station

Aquaculture Activities

~~Hatching~~ Hatchery Construction
Training

Education

Primary
Secondary
College (2)

Health

Hospital
Maternal Child Health
Dispensaries
Nutrition

Agriculture

Credit/Savings
Marketing
Extension
Commodities
Production: - chickens, swine, corn, cattle
Irrigation
Training

Resettlement

Transportation, Rice Seed

Reduction in Force

Military
A.I.D.

Community Services

water systems
wells
markets
Slaughter house
cinema

To implement this program, the Xieng Khouang Development Corporation (XKDC) was established as the organizational apparatus for this unique program. The following diagram should serve to show the reader how the principal XKDC components serving the agriculture sector were to be linked together, operationally as well as financially. U.S. Technical Assistance (TA) was provided by USAID Direct Hire and Contract employees, and the XKDC itself employed a few Americans. Additionally, some Thai expertise was imported for special projects. All of this TA was assigned specific projects, and often included contact at the beneficiary level.

(See diagram on Pg. 6a)

A. The Xieng Khouang Development Corporation (XKDC)

As the foregoing chart illustrates, the XKDC was divided into Production and Service elements. Before describing each of those, and their interrelationships to the XKDC and the ~~Royal Lao Government, (RLG)~~ Provisional Government of National Union (PGNU), it would be helpful to describe the composition of the administration. Within the H'mong culture, the clan is the important societal grouping, and so it was that the XKDC Board of Directors was made up of the heads of the Clans. General Vang Pao, as the titular leader of the H'mong, was the chairman of the board.

Additional representatives from ~~RLG~~ PGNU provincial offices would be invited to attend the occasional XKDC Board meetings. The Governor of Xieng Khouang, for instance, who had his provincial office in Long Tieng, was Prince Saykam, a first cousin to the King of Laos, and had been the governor of the Province for 28 years. He had known General VangPao since his childhood days in the French garrison, and there were close ties


$
Xieng Khouang Development Corporation (XKDC)
U.S. Tech Assistance
DIRECT BENEFICIARIES
PRODUCTION PROJECTS
SERVICE PROJECTS
DIRECT BENEFICIARIES
Long Tieng Market
Long Tieng Water
Selected Area Farmers
Bangkok Market
Long Tieng Public
Poultry
SWINE
COPEN
CATTLE
Essential Oil > Research
Long Tieng Cinema
FARM (ISC) Service Center
Savings/Loan (CUNA) XKDC
Project Design XKDC
CAPITAL Equipment
Long Tieng Water System
TRAINING
MK II Farmers
Long Tieng Residents
AREA FARMERS
= PROFITS AFTER PAYING OVERHEAD, FOR REINVESTMENT & EXPANSION OF BOTH PRODUCTION & SERVICE

between the Governor and the General because of their common geographic heritage. The Primary School Inspector and the Provincial Chief of Agriculture were H'mong, and their official status as well as their clan relationship gave them a dual role, not only in these meetings, but also in the implementation of many of the XKDC activities.

Above, the frequency of the meetings of the XKDC Board were described as occasional, and that is true in the formal sense. The traditional way of the H'mong would give President Carter a lesson in "being always available to the people." From sunup to lights out, the front room of Gen. Vang Pao's house was open to any and all, civilian, military, officials, refugees, widows, disabled, and unless you asked for a private meeting, your subject (at his call, or your initiation) was discussed in front of who ever might be there. News travelled fast, to say the least, and it was only the most serious questions regarding issues that might affect clan politics that were discussed behind closed doors with invitees only. It was an interesting situation, because you might arrive to discuss the issue of why the carpenters who were promised to rennovate a house for the Maternal Child Care nurses had not arrived, and be castigated by the General about the USAID rice policy for the benefit of a group of widows who were there at that moment to complain. In these situations, the best solution was to suggest that the General marry them.

The basic program policies of the XKDC were worked out between the senior U.S. advisors and the General. More often than not, he would be in agreement with the proposals. However, his wisdom as a leader who knew his people was never wasted on us. "The H'mong are not like other people," he would often tell us, and he had an uncanny way of molding the implementation of projects and activities to meet not only his political interests, but also his political debts as well. There were cases at times that personnel had been poorly chosen to function within the XKDC organization, but we would find that this was due not to the General's ^ ability to pick good people,

but because of a particular debt that was owed within the H'mong clan structure.

Towards the latter part of 1974, articles of incorporation of the XKDC were submitted to the Ministry of Interior in Vientiane. To my knowledge, it had not been approved prior to our departure from MR II and Laos in May of 1975.

A young H'mong who had completed high school and college in the U.S. was selected as the Executive Manager of XKDC. His responsibilities were to manage the corporation's activities, which included standardizing personnel policies, fiscal and budgetary reports, solving problems, and all other administration issues related to the operations of XKDC.

B. Poultry Production

This was one of the first major projects to get underway, and was aimed at two objectives. The first was to provide a cheaper and continuous supply of chickens for the Long Tieng market, and secondly, to provide profits to re-invest in other XKDC projects.

After the ceasefire in early 1973, commerce from the Vientiane Plain began to move toward the Ban Xon - Moung Cha and Long Tieng markets. As the road network built by USAID expanded and provided all-weather ground transportation, the flow of goods to the MR II area was phenomenal. Remember, here was a population, although generally considered poor due to their refugee/military dependent/~~USAID/RTG~~ offical status, who had lots of cash. Their basic food requirements had been met by the U.S. Government for 15 years. When the cease-fire came, and USAID began to cut back, it left a wide open market. And since it was a demand market, the prices were high.

The poultry project was designed to put 5000 birds on the Long Tieng market every week, at a price lower than what a Vientiane merchant could bring them in for. The birds were brought to Vientiane

from Bangkok by truck, and then by air to Long Tieng. They were 2-3 days old when they arrived, and after nine weeks, went on the market. It was interesting to see that the women who bought the chickens for re-sale in their market stalls, would sell them for the same price she bought them for. On the side, however, she sold the heart, liver and a few other specials for her profit.

The poultry project was designed to become self-sustaining after the 9th flock. (It did, but not including the air-costs.) In order to insure profit motivation, the Chicken Farm Manager and his staff were given monetary incentives for the number of birds that made it to market.

The plant itself was considered modern, and the operations were up to commercial standards. The 3300' elevation of Long Tieng helped, although their were extra efforts made for the small chicks during the cold season.

A second poultry farm was constructed between the large population centers of Nam Moh and Moung Cha. It ~~unfortunately~~ went into production in November of 1974.

An additional output of the first chicken farm was trained personnel for other XKDC projects. Because of the close U.S. supervision of this XKDC project, it was possible to recommend young H'mong for other responsibilities and positions as the overall program expanded.

C. The Farm Service Centers (FSC)

This was perhaps the most important XKDC project initiated, because it reached the most people with the most goodies. The concept was simple ---- strategically locate a facility that would provide directly any and all farm related services or provide for them indirectly.

The four FSCs which were constructed were of a single design - a rectangular single-story building, off the ground, which had a grain handling

area in one end, an office in the other, and larger warehouse and storage capacity in between.

The grain handling facilities consisted of a rice mill, corn sheller, feed mixer, and cassava chipper. (Outside was a cement slab for drying cassava or grains.) For established rates, farmers could bring their grains to the FSC to sell them or process them.

The FSC staff included buyers who would go out to the villages and look for surplus crops, especially corn. These would then be processed at the FSC, and shipped to Long Tieng where they would be sold to the XKDC Poultry or Hog project, in order to reduce the costs of importing feeds for these projects.

The FSCs were stocked with a full assortment of farm implements, seeds, some insecticides, some fertilizers, and general hardware. The prices were lower, but not much over what merchants in the area had set. It wasn't necessary to make a profit on nails for example, but a farmer could order a small rice mill to take to his village up in the mountains or a pump for his fish ponds, and these were commodities and services that no other merchant could handle unless he drove to Vientiane.

The only farmer related service which could not be obtained at the FSCs was credit. This was handled by another XKDC project which will be explained next.

Over the lifespan of the FSCs, which was more than a year, the overall balance sheet was in the black. Some of the FSCs had poor months, and one FSC was plagued with management problems from the day it opened its doors. But the result was good. The Farm Service Center did facilitate a substantial amount of growth in the agriculture sector. I wish I could include a picture I took of a H'mong farmer and his pony laden with corn, arriving at the FSC to have it shelled.

D. The Xieng Khouang Savings and Loan Cooperative (XKSLC)

The XKSLC was the second element of the three XKDC Service Projects which provided direct service to the farmers. The U.S. technical assistance was provided by Cooperative Union National Association (CUNA), and followed closely the CUNA operations in the Vientiane Plain. USAID had brought them on board earlier as part of the "Green Revolution" program.

With the concurrence of the XKDC, the CUNA advisors decided to build the first office in Long Tieng, which was experiencing a 'back to the farm' movement as a result of reductions-in-force in the military and all of the support elements which had accompanied the war effort in Long Tieng. Many residents had farm plots in the surrounding hills, which was critical to the XKSLC plan.

The CUNA program implementation as carried out in Long Tieng was basically simple. Long Tieng was divided up into eleven villages as I recall. This was an interesting exercise, because the civilian government had never established itself in Long Tieng during the war years, and with its arrival there in late 1973, the American advisors had the extra task to encourage the transition from a military dominated environment to that of a civilian one, including the establishment of village boundaries within the larger community of Long Tieng. The zealous approach of the CUNA advisors to establish an organized and active Savings and Loan Cooperative added positive weight to the task.

In each village area, 'kitchen meetings' were held to explain how the XKSLC could benefit the members. Membership was a very nominal fee and the XKSLC provided a place where residents could open savings accounts. Many members used the vault of the XKSLC as a 'safety deposit box' for their silver necklaces.

If a member desired a loan, he would first seek the approval of the village committee which was elected from among the XKSLC members of that village. This 'approval' actually meant that the village committees' members were putting their reputations on the line by stating that their fellow member was a good farmer and worthy of the loan he was seeking.

Loans were only accepted if they were related to agriculture production. The loans were often for the purchase of small pigs and perhaps feed supplement or hog wire or other commodities needed to raise the pigs to market weight. These commodities, except for the pigs, were available at the Farm Service Center. [The XKSLC staff were trained by CUNA in the procedures of managing a savings and loan operation, but not in the technical aspects.of, for example, pig production. This will be covered in the next section.]

Looking back, I think that the XKSLC was in operation for about nine months before we left. It's success was good. The books were in the black and the demand for this service in other areas had caused the CUNA advisors to begin investigations of the next branch office location.

E. Project Design (XKPD)

This particular activity was not in the original concept, but because of the personnel problems within the ~~Royal Lao Government~~ PGNU Provincial Agriculture Office, it soon became apparent that a third element was needed to compliment the Farm Service Centers and the Savings and Loan Cooperative.

The XKPD established its own office, with young H'mong and ~~Xieng Khouang~~ Lao graduates from the secondary and agriculture schools in Vientiane. One of its primary functions was to gather data on the agriculture sector market prices, cost of transport within the area, and keep the XKDC informed of any significant changes in market trends.

This information was required as well for its second most important function - to assist the farmers with economic analysis of small agriculture projects, and in particular, the members of the XKSLC who sought loans for this same purpose. XKPD staff members would make on-site visits to the farms, and discuss with the farmers ~~the~~ their project design.

In this way, farmers were provided with all the information available to determine the profitability of their project. At the same time, the

XKPD services provided the institutional link between the farmer, the Farm Service Centers, the local market, and the Vientiane market. It was projected, based on total costs of inputs for the farmer, that good competitor prices could be obtained for hogs on the Vientiane market, which would help the country begin to reverse the war-economy trend of relying on the Thais for most agriculture imports.

At the outset, XKPD was a service provided gratis to all farmers who sought assistance. The local staff salaries and office overhead were funded out of profits from other XKDC projects. We were beginning to consider alternatives to the XKPD, so it would not be competing with the PGNU ~~XKSC~~ Provincial Agriculture extension program that began to take shape. As I think back, the direction in which we were heading was to place some of the staff in the XKSLC and its future branches to continue working closely with farmers on small project design. The non-extensive functions such as collection of market data and publication was to be moved into the XKDC Executive Manager's office, and do away completely with the extension service except for those farmers who had loans from the XKSLC.

(5)

F. Corn Production

This project was conceived as a one-shot affair, in an effort to assist the back-to-farm movement, and ~~and~~ encourage feed production among those farmers who had land that was suited for this type of production. [It is to be noted that before the war, corn and not rice, was the staple of the H'mong diet.]

Twenty tons of corn seed was purchased from Northeast Thailand in areas where H'mong had been involved in cash-crop substitution for opium. By facilitating the travel of H'mong from our area to the villages from which the corn seed was purchased, we felt that we would stand a better chance in the production results.

The farmers who received the corn were chosen through the clan ~~class~~ structure, and the U.S. technical advisors were invited to visit their farms prior to planting. We are not talking about anything sophisticated, but

where a farmer had cleared land that was relatively flat, and was willing to fence it from farm animals, we thought it would be better than just handing the corn seed out willy-nilly.

(2)

The farmers were under no obligation to repay the seed, and they were promised a fair market price for their corn at the nearest Farm Service Center. I don't really recall the specific details of the first year, but production was high, and many farmers actually sold their crop to the FSCs.

G.

G. Swine Production

The H'mong are great eaters of pork, and are equally good at raising swine. For both these reasons, the XKDC decided that it would develop swine production as a way to provide small pigs for sale, breeding services, and, surplus production to be sold in the Vientiane market.

Here again, the young H'mong who were graduates of the Agriculture School in Vientiane were given management responsibilities at the swine farm. Under close supervision of U.S. advisors, they quickly developed into a competent staff. So much so, that plans to expand the farm to handle production of 3000 hogs per year were made. This seems ambitious to the reader, I'm sure, but those were the plans that we had in early 1975, and in fact, construction was 90% complete when we left in May. The incentive, of course, was the fact that swine production, including the cost of transportation to Vientiane using FSC trucks which had to go there to bring back commodities, was so lucrative in comparison to the price of Thai hogs on the Vientiane market.

H. Cattle Production

The war years took their toll on the over-all buffalo and cattle population within MR II. However many families had resettled in areas of MR II which were not affected in the late sixties and up through the cease-fire. These people had managed somehow to maintain their herds, but at a reduced number.

Always thinking of the welfare of his people, it was General Vang Pao who really pushed for this project. Very wisely, the 500 buffalo and 500 cattle which were purchased in the Vientiane Plains area were distributed to demobilized and disabled veterans. Obviously, not everyone in these categories received an animal, but the idea was to spread the benefits as much as possible.

In addition, three Brahma bulls were purchased in Thailand to provide stud service for cattle in the area. As I recall, they were to be maintained in the immediate areas of the Farm Service Centers, so that the XKDC organization was in control of the use of the bulls.

I. Essential Oil Project

This was one of the most interesting projects of the XKDC, because it funded the research of alternative cash crops for the H'mong. And while it was closely tied to U.S. interests in looking for an alternative to opium production in the area, it was also important because the traditional slash and burn planting of the H'mong was destroying the ecology of the area, especially in view of the fact that there were so many people in such a small area with relatively little good farm land.

Experimentation in the first year was excellent in two crops -- pigeon peas and stick-lac. Pigeon peas were to be used as animal feed, and cuttings were being distributed widely during early 1975. The

stick-lac had done so well that plans were drawn up for the construction of a large boiler which is required to reduce the natural product down to something that is marketable. My understanding is that stick-lac is a very high priced commodity, used in the manufacture of perfumes among other things.

Also included under the Essential Oils project was experimentation with coffee and tea. The Royal family of Thailand sent General Vang Pao 2000 coffee trees to get this activity under way.

J. Training

General Vang Pao always held a priority for education, and so it was not surprising that in the early stages of the planning for economic development in MR II, a training facility was included. Built with XKDC funds, it was a facility which included dormitory and kitchen facilities for up to 24 trainees.

Through the Provincial Agriculture Chief and the assistance of his USAID advisor, PGNU technicians were brought up to Long Tieng to give classroom instruction. The Training Center was close enough to all of the projects mentioned above so that application of what was taught could be conducted in the proper environment.

A special emphasis was made to provide this training for young men who had become soldiers at the early ages of 12 and up, and who were being released from the military as a result of the cease-fire and the formation of the coalition government.

Courses on food preparation, sewing, crafts and vegetable gardens were also provided to girls through the Home Economics Division of the Ministry of Agriculture. I recall that these girls were taught how to prepare pigeon peas for human consumption also.

K. Long Tieng Cinema

Purists in the developmental scene might look askance at a movie house as being related to an economic development plan aimed at bringing the largest number of farmers up to self-sufficiency in the shortest possible time frame. The purpose of the movie house was really simple- provide revenue for XKDC operations.

If we remember that one of the purposes of the MR II Development Plan was to provide for the institutionalization of some programs, it should not be difficult to accept some rather untraditional methods for financing those programs. If memory serves, the cinema was providing about $2000 per month after ~~overhead~~ expenses, which went directly into the XKDC to meet overhead and provide for other project expansion.

L. Capital Equipment

A good example of where funds were used was in the area of spare parts and POL for the road building equipment which came into the General's hands at the end of the war. Here again, we must look at the historical aspects.

Prior to, and up through the war, (and we are talking about a 10-15 year period) there were really no roads into the area in which we found ourselves at the conclusion of the war. USAID embarked on a road building program which I will touch on later, but there were additional areas which we did not plan to put roads into in the FY 74-76 period. For this reason, and coupled with the drastic cut-back in air-support to the region, the General set as a top priority the extension of the road system to connect the most populated areas.

Maintaining equipment in operational condition is not an inexpensive program, and it was for this kind of program support that profitable ventures like the cinema were implemented. In the period of late 1973 through early 75, the General's road building program opened up 70 kilometers of new roads, which serviced approximately 35,000 persons. In

terms of economic development, it was a very inexpensive program.

M. The Long Tieng Water System

Throughout the war years, there were numerous foreign advisors who came to Long Tieng and established living quarters. As is often the case when foreign elements enter a non-modern society, they bring with them their personal characteristics and desires. Of course, one of these is the need for running water into the living quarters.

The expansion of the foreign community, coupled with the emulation of their living standards, created a plumber's nightmare, as pipes were often added to the 'systems' based on rank and position. The XKDC water system project was to resolve the plumbing problems, as well as the supply problems, as well as undertake a distribution system that would provide public spigots within 500' of all residences. The supply portion - catchment dams on the surrounding hills, were designed for future population growth of Long Tieng.

Of all the projects undertaken by the XKDC, outlined above, this was the least successful. The engineering was sound. The public administration advise was sound. But it just didn't work. I would have to say that even with our cumulative years of experience with the H'mong, the understanding of the politics between the clans, and who lived where, and how close they were to the spigot, and if they already had pipes leading into their house, did not give us the answer on how to assist them in a successful implementation plan. I think it was an excellent example of bringing a community into the 20th century before they had gone through the 19th. The war years had exposed them to modern technology which always worked - a helicopter which could lift a huge artillery piece up to the top of a mountain with such little human effort. And besides, the H'mong had a long tradition of piped water systems in their history. But the bamboo systems were for small communities, when

there was one village headsman, not a community of 10,000 where there was one colonel for every 1000 persons. What more can be said -- it was a disaster, or at least it was headed that way in the spring of 1975 and our water was shut off!

N. The Long Tieng Radio Station

The radio station was established in the late 1960s. The purpose was information, both cultural and political. Broadcasts were in Lao, H'mong, Lao Teung, and Yao.

A secondary purpose was that the radio station personnel who studied and performed the songs and stories of Lao and H'mong history, were always present at the ceremonies which were an important part of their social life. Dedication of schools, visits of foreign dignataries, weddings, religious days and other social occasions always provided an excuse for the radio station troupe to be on hand. The band, with modern musical instruments, would accompany the troupe. One could always expect dancing.

With the cease-fire, such frills were some of the extras which had to be severely curtailed. There was no way to continue these entertainers under the new austerity of peace time. War is strange, isn't it?

The use of the radio station continued for news, announcements, and even some adult education. In the early days of the implementation of the XKDC programs, the Farm Service Center, the Savings and Loan Cooperative and other activities provided scripts for spot announcements to inform the people of MR II what was coming their way in economic development in which they could participate. General Vang Pao recorded many short talks on the programs, and always urged the people to work hard to save the peace that had finally come to their land.

The XKDC did not staff the radio station, but I believe it paid some of the salaries. During the POL shortage of 1974, the generators were off more often than not. In sum, the use of the radio station was slowly cur-

tailed for economic reasons, simply another modern carry over that couldn't be sustained under peace.

The foregoing has given the reader the best that memory can provide. I believe that the XKDC program was a well-balanced program to satisfy the basic needs of the H'mong people in the agriculture sector, and to satisfy the leadership of the H'mong that what they believed best for the people was being implemented. Our advisory role was to shape the ideas into something that was hopefully manageable, hopefully institutional, and complimentary to the changing profile of U.S.A.I.D. in MR II after the cease-fire.

IV. U.S.A.I.D. Technical Assistance

Readers familiar with USAID's involvement in Laos know that our assistance to the weak, and oft-times corrupt Royal Lao Government was aimed at political and economic stability. One must remember that the conflict in Laos goes back to the surrender of the Japanese, at which time Laos declared it's independence. This brought the French back and so began a 25-year struggle for peace. During the last 15 years of this period, the USAID played a significant, if not preemptive role, in the ebb and tide of the Royal Lao Government.

We supported the Rightists, the King, the Neutralists, and when the coalition government of 1974 was formed, (the PGNU), the Leftists, if only on paper. There were isolated cases of rural development activities in which the Pathet Lao participated and allowed USAID and its counterparts to implement village level programs. But these were few indeed. The position of the U.S. Government was to support all elements of the coalition government, but we would support the right more than the left.

This was easy to do in the areas where USAID traditionally had its field operations. At its peak, in the mid to late sixties, there were

not less than 22 USAID field stations in Laos, with resident Americans, and their Third Country Nationals (TCNs) and Lao staffs to support them. When the War ended, there were only six field stations with Americans, and perhaps two ~~when~~ where USAID local employees were in charge. Our predominance in formulating, implementing and managing was truly overwhelming, and nowhere was it greater than MR II.

It is said that 80% of all the refugees that the war caused came out of northern Laos and especially the provinces of Xieng Khouang and Houa Phan. Prince Souvannah Phouma once said that the war had created 700,000 refugees. We always thought he must have doubled the count, but nonetheless, refugees provided the gut issue of the yearly A.I.D. budget submissions to Washington.

If we thought the P.M. counted the refugees twice, we did it tenfold. The war in the north was always a hop-scotch affair, fighting for the control of hill tops from which forays could be launched, and defenses established.

The H'mong and Lao Teung provided the backbone of the MR II forces, and the bargain was struck early that while the men fought, USAID would take care of the dependents. With the battles having seasonal highs and lows, it was possible for villages to go through a cycle of being dependents at one instance in time, and the next day become refugees running to the next zone of safety. After our Refugee Operations Officer would provide them with their immediate needs, the process of sorting them out according to category would begin all over again. This process was necessary for one basic reason -- to provide the U.S.A.I.D. headquarters in Vientiane with the data they needed to work out the cost-sharing components of the support that went to the people of MRII according to each U.S. agency involved.

For almost ten years, the base of operations for refugee assistance was a place called ~~Samtlong~~ Sam Thong. When this was overrun by North Vietnamese troops in early 1970, the operations were moved south to Ban Xon, a village of maybe 500 people at most. Within three years, the 'greater Ban Xon' area probably had in the neighborhood of 30,000 persons. It was more than the center of USAID operations for MR II. The provincial governments of both Xieng Khouang and H Phan set up their offices in that area, with the civil police and teachers being the only other visible signs of the Lao government. The Governor of Xieng Khouang actually had an office in Vientiane, and it wasn't until late 1973 that he moved back to Long Tieng. The governor of Houa Phan was a colonel in the MR II command, and as long as USAID took care of the refugees during these war years, neither one of the governors had any serious complaints.

Even though the immediate welfare of the refugees was the number one priority throughout the war years, USAID was involved in activities which were to serve as a basis for the economic development programs that were to follow the cease-fire. A two-hundred bed hospital to replace the ~~Samtlong~~ Sam Thong hospital was set up in Ban Xon. The support to the one-hundred fifty village dispensaries operated out of Ban Xon, and all the activities which were labeled refugee relief and relocation support were managed and implemented out of Ban Xon during the period 1970 - 1973. These activities included materials for temporary schools, livestock distribution, fingerling (tilapia and carp) distribution, road construction, and many others as well.

As stated earlier, the "refugee" population in MR II at the time of the cease-fire was approximately 135,000. Everybody considered themselves a refugee, and that was no joke. And if they weren't qualified in the refugee category, then they found another category - disabled veterans,

widows, students, teachers, civil servants, and even USAID local employees. The task to be faced in 1973 was to promote the peace, assist the government to reestablish itself, provide economic and social infrastructure, and at the same time, 'normalize' USAID activities. This basically meant a reduction in our predominant role of being all things to all people.

To understand this, I should perhaps give the reader some examples of the kind of little things that we did every day for people with problems. Provide a special ration of rice, and PL 480 commodities for weddings or funerals of relations of USAID or civil servant personnel. Send a relative of an employee to his village to bring a pig in a helicopter costing $150 per hour. At certain times of the year, when it was auspicious to kill pigs, provide ground or air transportation to procure pigs.

These are but three examples. What really happened over the years of our involvement is that we had replaced the benefactor position which the H'mong look to in their traditional society. The clan leader was always the one who decided the social and intra personal relationship, and by the power of position, could bestow benefits on the persons involved. USAID, by the very unending wealth of its resources, became the supplicant for resolving their social and familial issues during the war years. With rice dropping out of the doors of airplanes day in and day out, its no wonder that we found ourselves in the position we did at the end of the war.

Probably because of a deeper understanding of the H'mong, and a penchant for a non-bureaucratic operation, the previous USAID leadership in MR II (one individual was with the H'mong in MR II for 12 years), the difficulties of implementing an economic development program were almost eclipsed by the problems of normalizing the USAID operations. In 1973, it was a house-divided, between the Public Health, the Public Works, and

the Refugee Operations elements. Each with their own budget, and air fleet, there was constant friction among the American and local staffs because of a lack of organization, lack of standardization of employee salaries, benefits, and a lack of confidence on the part of the locals as to what USAID would do now that the war was over, and on the part of the Americans as to the ability within ourselves to implement "normalization."

The reader may question the significance of the foregoing, considering the title of this paper, but I feel it is necessary to give a little background on what the situation was like at the end of the war in early 1973, so it can be understood why certain development policies were established, and how they were implemented. It wasn't as if USAID was going to do one thing, and the XKDC was doing another. The programs had to compliment each other, for they were both aimed at serving the needs of the largest majority of the MR II population. The element that presented the largest difficulty was that USAID's historical role as the place to turn to for every little problem had to change. We had to step back and let the government and local initiative take place, we had to change a way of life for a minimum of 8000 people who had stuck it out, for one reason or another, with USAID during the years of conflict. The heads of families represented by this segment of the population were critical to the development efforts that were envisioned.

They were local employees of USAID, many of whom had been put on the employee rolls eight or ten years previously. They were civil servants- police, teachers, village head men, district chiefs, and all senior provincial officials. With their dependents, they numbered 8000. Also, they were all salaried. Some made very little salary. Others - substantial. A few key locals exerted great influence over large segments of the population, just because they came from one of the prominent clans, had a high position, and, were on the rice rolls, and worked for USAID. We Americans were con-

vinced that these people had to be taken off the rice rolls of the program of development, which was to rely heavily on H'mong initiative, self-help and self-reliance, [redacted] was going to make any sense at all. We needed some pretty convincing facts to show this element of the population that they could 'make it' like the other "refugees" of MR II. I emphasize refugees, because everyone of them always considered themselves refugees. (There is a tragic note to that which I will footnote at the conclusion.)

A. MR II Resource Survey

The thinking that had gone into the issues of "what do we do in MR II after the war" had led many of us to the conclusion that some new data was needed. Not that there weren't any lists around of who the refugees were in each village, and here again I use the word "refugee" interchangably with people. We had lists upon lists upon lists. But what was needed was something new - a survey that would enable us for the first time to have an accurate population count, a survey that would show how much rice was planted, where roads were needed, where could refugees be resettled within the safe zone of MR II to spread out the population.

USAID contracted for a resource survey, which would include aerial photography, photo interpretation, field samples for both population and rice production, and geographic characteristics. This was begun in June of 1973, with the actual photo flights taking place in September. After that, it was a matter of analysing the data from photo interpretations and correlating it with the results of field samples.

Don't let yourself think that this, or any other part of what went on during the period 1973-75 was not fully discussed, and carried out without the complete understanding and concurrence of the civil and military leadership of MR II. Long hours were spent collaborating on the development proposals. The MR leadership, and again, we are talking

about a military commander who was the tribal leader of approximately 100,000 H'mong, plus the governors of two provinces, early on gave us their ideas of the development "needs" of the people of MR II. In general, these were long lists of infrastructure projects - roads and bridges and long lists of animals, and materials to build houses, schools, markets, dispensaries, and so on. As advisor, we felt our job was to synthesize these lists into something meaningful, and something that would in many ways, carry on without long range inputs from the U. S. government.

In many ways, the MR II Resource Survey was projected to enable us to persuade the MR II leadership on certain key issues. The first, and most important, was to demonstrate that there was going to be a rice surplus in MR II from the harvest in November-December of 1973. And, that in order to restore the self-esteem and pride of the H'mong, and to stimulate the economy within MR II, USAID would stop rice support to almost everyone. This was to be a phase-down over the months of October, November and December. The only categories that I can remember who were exempted from this were primary school teachers in isolated villages who had been newly assigned and didn't have a rice field, and the hospital. For someone totally unfamiliar with the MR II program, it is difficult to convey the significance of what we did.

The second issue was with regard to the 'real' population figure. One can imagine how the figures could become inflated in such a situation. Without a photograph or tattoo, it was literally impossible to know from one day to the next who was in what category, and for how long. Widows were one of the more vocal of the groups, but we always believed they were double counted, either as someone's mother during a village head count, or as someone's wife during the same head count. The issue was always one of x number of people times x number of kilos of rice. By analysing all the available records, from the governors, from the

military, from village headmen, and special groups (~~like~~ the musicians of the radio station for example) and the findings based on the photo interpretation/field sample, we were at last able to agree on a figure close to 135,000. (Incidentally, neither the military nor the Governors agreed with our first tentative results, so we assisted them in their own survey, and the figures did not vary over . 3%.) (What was really embarrassing was that USAID had been reporting to Washington for years a standard figure of 150,000. Needless to say, it was papered over.)

The third important issue to be addressed by the results of the Resources Survey was land utilization. As described earlier, the H'mong had been pushed south out of the real mountains of northern Laos, and they were lower than they liked to be in many villages of MR II. We were specifically interested in determining the unpopulated areas of MR II when the slope of the land was less than 40 degrees. We felt that the leadership should discourage swidden agriculture (upland rice and corn) in order to preserve as much as possible of the forest that was left, and that wasn't much! I will return to this later under the subject of Relocation.

B. Education

There were two impressive aspects of the education program in MR II. First, it can be said that after the immediate relief assistance of food, shelter and medicine for a new refugee group during the years of war, the next item was to re-establish the school. Practically every village had its teachers, and they would move with the refugees from hilltop to hilltop just like everyone else. Secondly, General Vang Pao insisted that Lao would be the language of instruction in all MR II schools.

The result of this at the end of the war? The highest enrollment per capita of primary age children ~~t~~ of all any other province in the country, and a strong area education system with teachers who had continued their task while others had performed theirs on the fields of battle.

The Resource Survey data were transferred to overlays for the area maps. With population concentrations and schoolrooms, one could easily see what had to be done. In some areas, deliberate decisions were made to limit permanent primary schools, in order to discourage the population from remaining in densely populated refugee villages. We termed some of them rural slums because of the social and economic conditions, and we really wanted to encourage people to disperse.

The dry season construction program for 1973-74 (September through March) included the building of 45 primary classrooms, and to repair the war damage and complete an 18 classroom secondary school. USAID provided the materials, and the villages contributed labor.

When Sam Thong fell in 1970, the Teacher Training College and the Liberal Arts 'Colege' moved to Vientiane. In late 1973, the Teacher Training came back to MR II to College, a large field dispensary, which was transferred from the Ministry of Health to the Ministry of Education, and was refurbished to provide dormitory, kitchen and gardens for the faculty and students. As in all other aspects of the development program, every effort was made to involve the PGNL, especially at the Ministerial level. In this case, it is fair to say that when this field dispensary was approved on paper in Vientiane during the early 1970's while the fighting was still going on, the Minister of Health had no idea where the location was, other than Xieng Khouang province, and probably didn't care. But when the documents were drawn up for the transfer from one ministry to another, there was a ceremony on site, with representation of the ministries on hand to participate in the opening of the new Teacher Training College.

In the case of the liberal arts college, General Vang Pao turned over a large military training complex to the Ministry of Education. USAID assisted in some repairs to the buildings, the plumbing and furniture. There were several Vientiane dignitaries on hand who had never ventured into MR II, and I can remember when General Vang Pao took them

on a side-trip up the side of a mountain to land in a small H'mong village. It was both amusing, ~~but at the same time~~ and sad ~~and happy~~ to see these lowland Lao share the hospitality of the simple H'mong villagers, who had kept the North Vietnamese from occupying the Vientiane plain during all those long years of conflict, and forcing these officials to flee across the Mekong. ~~during all those long years of struggle~~.

In sum, the education sector in the post-ceasefire development program of MR II received special emphasis to reestablish within the area those institutions which had moved to Vientiane during the conflict, and to up-grade existing primary schools with permanent structures. It cannot be over-emphasized that the local leadership, especially General Vang Pao and the Xieng Khouang Primary School Inspector, Mona Lia, was an indispensible asset in promoting education development projects.

C. Health

As previously mentioned, health programs were very much a part of the USAID assistance to the refugees during the war years. Using locals that were trained by USAID Public Health technicians, a far-reaching system of village dispensaries were maintained throughout the region. Like the schools and school teachers, the dispensary and medic was a principal part of the refugee village infrastructure. Not all villages had a medic, but they didn't have to walk more than an hour in any direction to find help.

These medics were also used to carrying out surveys to determine the nutritional level of the village. Some of the factors which were considered were number and kind of animals, how long had the refugees been there, distance to market, age/sex profile, and ~~of course~~ others. From this, the USAID Public Health provided their guidelines to the Refugee Operations office which would deliver foodstuffs according to the requirements. If the nutritional intake level was thought to be low, additional PL480 oils and blended foods would be provided.

The 200 bed hospital at Ban Xon was without a doubt the most service-oriented and professional field hospital in Laos. Except for the surgical-core which was completed in early 1974, the rest of the hospital had been jerry-built using several temporary plywood bachelor quarters that were left over from USAID Public Works road construction crews. Over the period 1970-1974, several wings were added to accomodate the growing need. During the siege of Long Tieng, it was used as the principal field hospital for the MR II troops.

It was staffed by two Lao doctors, several Filipino Doctors and technicians, a USAID Public Health nurse, and a staff of local nurses, who, like the medics, were all trained by USAID personnel. One of the programs taught by USAID was midwifery. It was not an uncommon occurrence to see the helicopters land at the emergency pad above the hospital with very pregnant women who had come from villages throughout the region to have their children in the Ban Xon hospital.

In the process of 'normalizing' the USAID operation in MR II, one of the most serious difficulties was convincing the Ministry of Health to convert the medics and nurses to employees of that ministry. We worked out schemes upon schemes to convince the Ministry that not only was it needed, but that pay-for-services could be instituted in the area. After a long series of meetings and exchange of letters, some agreement was reached on testing and 're-training' by Ministry personnel. Of course, not all the personnel could be absorbed, and steps were taken to reduce the number of dispensaries in the outlying villages, and especially in those villages along the newly established roads. This problem of conversion was one of the more serious ones we found, and it was accepted that it couldn't happen overnight.

Due to the problem of opium addiction among the old and sick, a detoxification center was planned for Ban Xon, as part of the Hospital complex. It can be said that it never got off the ground because of a conflict of implementation philosophy between the Vientiane USAID Public Health officer and the senior USAID MR II advisor. The latter

felt that if on the one hand, our direction was to 'normalize' the operations so as to reduce our profile and involve the RLG, then the detoxification center should not go forward without full commitment by, and the assignment to Ban Xon of ministry officials. It was too bad, because the results at the 'de-tox' center in Vientiane - using methadone were very good, especially on the H'mong addicts which were sent down from MR II.

With the growth of activities in the Long Tieng area, plans were made to establish a maternal - child health program there. These girls were former nurses who had been sent to Vientiane for training in the Operation Brotherhood and Mahasot hospitals. An old wooden house was 'donated' by General Vang Pao on behalf of the owner. It was refurbished and the girls were just getting down to business when the bottom fell out in April/May 1975.

During the early years of ~~our~~ U.S.G. involvement, a large stone hospital had been built in Long Tieng, and it was staffed by U.S. military and USAID doctors for many years. During the seige of Long Tieng, it sustained considerable damage - more from the Thai troops who used it as a command post than from enemy offensive. None the less, General Vang Pao from the very beginning of the development discussions in 1973, wanted the hospital to be re-opened. We made a concerted effort to drag our feet on this issue, stating that neither his budget, nor ours, nor that of the PCNU could sustain two hospitals in the same area. Our position was that the PCNU had to assume its provincial responsibilities by taking over staff on a gradual basis, and that by the very nature of the fact that all the MR II people who lived in Ban Xon were actually living in the Province of Vang Vieng, there would be an eventual shift in the population north to, and beyond Long Tieng. When we left in 1975, repairs had been made to the roof and windows, but only in one of the out buildings was there an out-patient clinic. I assume that

had we been able to remain, most of the Ban Xon staff would have shifted to Long Tieng, although we were also considering establishing "larger - than-dispensary, smaller-than-hospital clinics" in two or three locations to better serve the population. This idea was beginning to be considered by General Vang Pao and the Governors, but it too was overtaken by events.

D. Roads and Bridges

Road development, like many other USAID activities in MR II, rose and fell with the security barometer. In fact, during the late sixties, there was considerable argument about the security of the Vientiane Plain and Vientiane itself should a road network be pushed into the heartland of MR II. As in so many bureaucratic situations, the decision was made to do a little bit, and then see where we are.

The 45 kilometers from Route 13N to Ban Xon was completed over several dry seasons, and was an all weather road when Sam Thong ~~Samthong~~ fell in 1970. This at least allowed a savings because all the refugee commodities and much of the foodstuffs could be delivered from Vientiane by truck, and from Ban Xon out by small STOL aircraft and helicopters.

After the failure of the North Vietnamese to take Long Tieng in 1971, it was determined to push the road east and north of Ban Xon to connect with a dry season track coming south from Long Tieng which the army engineers had opened. Not an awful lot of work could be done, because it was necessary to span the Nam Ngum river with a bridge. However, due to the size of the bridge and the length of time it was going to take to construct it, an equipment ferry was put in and work progressed on opening up the 25 kilometers from Ban Xon to a place called "Echo" pad, which was the southern terminal of the barely passable track coming south from Long Tieng and that's about where we were in early 1973.

A determination was made by the U.S. Mission that the expanded all-weather road network of MR II was to be the single most important project

for the road building capacity of USAID Public Works sites throughout the country, ~~and deployed in MR II~~. The objective was to complete 110 kilometers of all-weather road by June of 1974. At least half of this was to be new construction. As a friend of mine remarked once, 'there were snarling yellow bulldozers all over the landscape.' During the period September 1973 through June of 1974, USAID Public Works had not less than six full time Americans plus over 400 full time TCNs and locals, not to mention the pick and shovel crews that were recruited from the villages. As each kilometer along the road network from Ban Xon was completed, villages who were serviced by helicopter for refugee supplies, health, or other programs were put on "ground-only" basis in order to demonstrate to the people that changes were being made - not only in the way USAID operated, but in the way they would need to adjust as well. We didn't have to worry too much about them changing. I once asked the Governor how many taxis were operating on the completed road network -- "about 150" he said. It was amazing how quickly the entrepreneurs took advantage of the roads.

There were negative aspects as well, as one might imagine. With the road open to the Vientiane market, rice surpluses started to move south toward a lucrative market. We took a very hard line with the leadership on this issue, stating that USAID had no intention of putting refugees back on the rice rolls when surpluses were leaving the area. Through the XKDC organization, we expected that rice surpluses would not be allowed to leave the area but be bought up for sale or distribution when it was needed. As a follow on to the MR II Resource Survery, we had carefully calculated the month when each village would have rice shortages, and this information was constantly used to persuade the area leadership of the U.S. government's intention to force the rice to move within the area. We understood, of course, the difficulties of actually moving rice, but we believed that as long as we

maintained a hard-nosed position, the problem would work itself out. By having a road system which connected all the major population centers in MR II, we felt they should use it to their advantage, and not to our disadvantage.

Not all the transportation projects were so elaborate as the road net work. Just west of Long Tieng, the Nam Ngum divides two heavily populated areas. During most of the year, it is impossible to cross the river to get to Long Tieng, so the only market available was south west to Ban Xon - a good two day walk. Under the supervision of a USAID Community Development Advisor, a 110 meter cable suspension bridge was erected, using manual labor from five of the closest villages. The walkway was made of 4' x 8' plywood, so that pack animals could traverse as well. After all materials were on-site, the bridge was put up in 12 days, at a total commodity cost of $200.00.

As with other projects, major efforts were made to move the PGNU towards establishing a provincial public works capability. In Vientiane, the same efforts were being made on a national scale, which included turning over large equipment pools, spare parts and maintenance compounds. As the roadwork was completed in the MR II area, all equipment was "retired" to Vientiane except those few pieces that were needed to complete other USAID or USAID/PGNU activities. In the MR II area, several of the road camps were turned over to the fledgling provincial public works authority authorized by the PGNU in late 1974.

E. Agriculture

The pre-cease fire agriculture programs in MR II were funded directly from the refugee relief budget and except for some intermittant International Volunteer Services (IVS) personnel, the area did not have a full time agriculturist until August of 1973.

The majority of the "ag" activities were massive give-aways of

livestock - mostly pigs and ducks. Most critics of these types of programs felt that as soon as the animals were "pot" size, they would be consumed. In many cases, that is no doubt true, especially with the ducks. But I can vouch for the fact that the 600 pure bred hogs that were brought into the area between 1969-1971 were not all eaten. The H'mong are great raisers of swine, and I believe that when the security situation remained stable after the distribution, those hogs were maintained as breeders. I know because I saw many of them in villages I visited during 1973-1975.

Another give-away program was that of fruit trees. The mountainous areas of MR II are suitable for peaches, tangerines, apples, and a variety of other tropical fruits. Similar to the idea behind the swine and duck distribution, the idea was to distribute seedlings in villages where permanency was expected for the foreseeable future.

The last of the pre-cease fire give away programs was fish, or fingerlings of carp and tilapia. I really don't know when this got started, but it was some time in the mid-sixties. USAID and the RLG Fisheries Department under the Ministry of Forest and Fisheries had implemented a country-wide program of family-size fish ponds, and had established four hatcheries in the country. From the hatcheries in Sayaboury and Luang Prabang, fingerlings were flown in to Sam Thong, or later, Ban Xon, and from there, rushed out to villages by helicopter.

Of course, preparations had long before been made in the villages, in the form of training and construction of small ponds. Again, villages were selected for foreseeable stability, but it didn't always work out. None the less, this program was given large credit for maintaining minimum levels of protein intake for the refugees.

The extent of this program can be seen from the fact that at the time of the cease-fire in February 1973, there were over 2500 fish ponds in the MR II area. Due to the poor management of the hatcheries in Luang Probang and Sayaboury, and the success of the program in MR II -- success

measured by adaptation by the refugees, it was decided that a hatchery should be built in MR II as part of the post cease-fire development program.

Site selection and construction began in late 1973, and the $50,000, one million fingerling production per year hatchery was dedicated in March of 1974.

This dedication ceremony was significant in that it was the first instance in MR II where a USAID constructed facility was turned over to the PRGNU immediately upon completion. The staff had been selected and trained by the USAID Fishery advisors, and except for the hatchery manager, were all from the MR II area. Unlike previous fingerling programs, these were for sale, and in the first year, over 450,000 fingerlings were sold to MR II area residents. The hatchery was the only activity in MR II which was sending revenues to the central government and as far as we know, the only hatchery in the country that was operationally successful. The projection for the 1975 production were 800,000 sales. Village ponds had increased to over 3000 by the end of 1974.

I recall that one time we examined the sales books, and found that fingerlings were going to villages several days walk away. We became curious about this, because the oxygen provided at the time of sale was insufficient for the time required to walk from the hatchery to the village. Investigation showed that the villagers had made arrangements along their route to 'borrow' a small pond in which they could place the fingerlings overnight. As the reader can imagine, we felt that this project was one of our most successful.

As previously described, the common method of agriculture was swidden and in the mountainous areas of MR II, vast areas of mountain-side rain forest had been destroyed. Because of the dense smoke in the months of February and March, there were days and weeks when we could not work, because for many of us, work meant hours of flying in helicopters or small planes. The H'mong and Lao of MR II used firewood for cooking and heating, so this as well added to the decimation of the forest, and of course, the water shed as well.

Under the French, many Lao had received formal education in forestry. In fact, it was one of the few areas where Lao could aspire to government positions under the French, as most administrative positions were filled by Vietnamese. So it was not without historical reason that the Governor of Xieng Khouange placed large emphasis on a program of reforestation on MR II.

Reforestation was one of the principal aid programs of the Australians, and for this reason, USAID entered into a project agreement with them and the MR II leadership - the Governor and General Vang Pao. The agreement called for the establishment of a nursery, training, and reforestation. Here again, the data available from the MR II Resource Survey was indispensible. The nursery was established on land, immediately adjacent to the Fish Hatchery, in order to use the same water system.

In the planting season of 1974, 15,000 eucalyptus seedlings were set out on 1500 hectares of upland rice fields which had been planted two or three times and which the farmer did not expect to plant again. The particular variety of eucalyptus was one which would mature in 7 to 8 years, and could be used for firewood as well as construction material. The nursery was managed by the Australians and their PGNU counterparts, with nothing more than minimal support services from USAID. The 1975 goal was to be 30,000 seedlings on 3000 hectares.

An overfly of MR II would quickly demonstrate the lack of paddy farming - there simply was very little flat land for this type of farming. There were a few areas, however, where investigations indicated that production could be increased, and additional lands brought under production by the construction of simple irrigation systems.

In early 1973, the then RLG department of irrigation had done preliminary site survey of a potential irrigation system in the Moung [redacted]Cha area. In the planning of the MR II Development Program, this activity was

included. However, other priorities did not allow actual constructions to begin until late 1974. One of the factors was the un-availability of a back hoe, as all such equipment was fully utilzed on the road construction, as well as the fact that cement and other materials could not be transported into this area unless the road was complete.

Nonetheless, the small dam and the turnouts for the left and right bank canals was complete by April of 1975. I wish I could ~~hopefully~~ assume that the villagers who provided the self-help inputs are still there and benefiting from their labor.

I recall also that one of the delays was the appointment by the PGNU of an engineer to supervise the construction. This was part of the 'normalization' that we were determined to carry out where possible. In pre-ceasefire days, USAID Public Works would have managed the job with TCN engineers and all the skilled labor required.

Related to the development of additional paddy land was our interest in a pilot project of terracing. The Governor of Xieng Khouang was particularly interested in this and using the MR II Resource Survey data and other information required, a site was picked out and implementation was scheduled for the dry season of 1975-76. Unfortunately, this one never got into the ground.

With the emphasis of the MR II Development Program aimed at the area farmers, the USAID Agriculture Advisor had plenty to do. In addition to his involvement with all the aforementioned agriculture projects, his responsibilities included consultation and advising on XKDC projects, as well as providing support to the Provincial Agriculture Chief and his staff of six extension agents. We were trying to maintain a balance between what we might call the private sector-the XKDC, and the government. Our feeling was that they both could be complimentary to each other in meeting the basic needs of the area farmers.

F. Refugee Relocation

Among the many questions which the cease-fire brought, probably none was as important to the people of MR II as the question of 'returning north'. Without the aid of maps, I can only describe in general terms that in the first dry season after the ceasefire, which would have been September 1973 through March of 1974, the 'return north' movement was ~~carried out~~ begun.

Actually, the direction was east as much as north, and as long as the security situation remained good, it looked like things might work out to ease the crowded conditions that existed in the Ban Xon area, the Site 253 area, and the Long Tieng area. It did not mean that these people went across the ceasefire line, which was never something you could draw on a map. It just meant that valley and mountain areas which were unoccupied but which were not more than a days walk from the nearest village, were selected by refugee families who felt the pinch of unavailable land, and who hoped that the political ~~spanning~~ sparring would allow them to eventually go back to their original villages.

We were hopeful that General Vang Pao would take advantage of the information that was available from the Resource Survey. And that through his leadership, we could keep tabs on what refugees were going where. However, either because he was too busy with national politics on one hand, and the XKDC on the other, we were barely able to keep up with the moves as they took place.

The men actually went to the areas on a sort of reconnaissance as soon as the rains stopped, and using their traditonal customs, would stake out future sites for upland cultivation, and maybe even a village site. Some cutting would be done, but soon it was time to return for the harvest. Then in January, they would set out again, to prepare the fields in earnest. Perhaps some of the elderly who

could tend a fire and cook rice would accompany them, but basically it was only people who could work.

After the fields were burned, they would return to their village and all but the lame would strike out with all their possessions. This is when we really began to find out how big the move was, because the requests started coming in from all sides. Requests for transportation for everything, including animals, was not unusual, and it also gave us a clue about how their harvest had been. Some rice was left behind, some was sold, and all in the hope that USAID would carry them through a six months period while their crop was growing.

It was situations like this that were the most difficult, because no matter how many times we told the General that the resources were no longer available, and that planning ahead was the only way to maximize the little resources that we had, it just didn't get across. Most of them believed that the cornucopia of U.S. assistance that poured into MR II during the war years would continue forever, and it just wasn't the case.

I know it won't sound like much of a development philosophy, but our solution was to 'ostrich it'. We just avoided the issue, hoping that they could work it out. At the eleventh hour, a compromise was struck. Using all the military trucks he could muster, plus the four brand new trucks of the XKDC, General Vang Pao's staff was to orchestrate a move whose limits were set by a POL allocation for the trucks, and a flying hour allocation for helicopters. I have no idea at this date what the exact figures were, but _____ is a close approximation. The American helicopter pilots gave the General's staff good marks for the way it was handled, so in the final analysis, maybe the lack of assistance on our part in the early stages was partially responsible for the success in the end.

In the dry season of 1974-75, another move began to shape up, but by then the air was full of rumors. Only about 2000 persons left MR II this time.* Nixon's picture came down in General Vang Pao's front room, and Ford's took its place. Things began to look grim in Cambodia and South Vietnam.

The rest is history, and not very pleasant to look back on those days of April and May 1975. Up to then, we worked hard, and did our best to re-kindle the spirit of the H'mong people. Most of the leaders that we knew left Laos - many are in France, many in the United States, and too many in refugee camp compounds in Thailand. Some are still in the north country, fighting their old enemy from mountain tops and jungle trails. Maybe those are the ones that were reached with the post-ceasefire development program of Military Region II, Laos.

* The Pathet Lao, with the assistance of Russian aircraft, Airlifted 18,000 persons from Vietnam to the Plaine des Jarres in early 1975. Most were Xieng Khouang Lao returning to their homes. The direct flight path took the Russian planes right over Long Tieng. The look of puzzlement, yearning, and frustration on the faces of the H'mong as they watched the planes fly overhead was is still difficult to describe.

VII. Adaptability of the Model, and Concluding Comments

The particular situation in MR II in 1973 cannot be duplicated anywhere. However, the efforts of the U.S. Mission to Laos to undertake an innovative approach to development through the creation of the Xieng Khouang Development Corporation can be examined and perhaps with some adjustments, applied in another Third World Nation. At the same time, consideration should be given to some of the aspects of the multi-sector, or integrated development approaches that USAID in particular was involved in during that [redacted] period, [redacted].

There is little question that we had a long way to go with many of the projects before they could be termed successful. As an example, turning around the rural public health program from one of free-service to fee-for service, after at least ten years of the former status, was not a simple task.

Nor do I believe that catagorizing the short-run success would be helpful to the reader. For applicability, planners of rural development must draw on many examples, good ones as well as bad ones, and mold the aspirations of the people to be served, with the national will of the government, to the solutions which offer the best chance of success.

Ex-president Gerald Ford recently said that in Southeast Asia, our motives were right, but our tactics were wrong. I would like to think that in that relatively small area of Southeast Asia called MR II, our tactics and our motives were right.

March 14, 1988

Dear Ernie:

Certainly enjoyed talking to you a few weeks ago and had good intentions of writing you sooner than this late date. However when you are retired, there is always at least a dozen urgent things to do. It's not like when you are working and have so much time to goof off. My expression of anger over the phone and threatening to kill you had to do with your solemn promise to write me as soon as you settled down. The last time I saw you in the Philippines you said you would not be like that damn Blaine Jensen and not keep in touch. Of course that has only been eight years ago and possibly you have been busy since then. Any way, it is good to be back in touch with you, particularly since we are in the same part of the world. You and Tooney and the girls must get up to Chiangrai and see us. We would love to see you and come any time it is convenient.

As you probably know, Pat and I parted just after you left the Philippines. About six years ago I married a Thai girl who was selected for me by Suan McKeithin and some of the other Thai Mafiosa. They made a good choice and we have been very happy together. She has a daughter 17 by a previous marriage who has one more year of high school. A real good kid and loves Paw Maw who spoils her terribly.

I worked for about six years with Bechtel, the big US construction outfit in Saudi and Korea and retired again last July. We bought about 50 rai of land on the outskirts of Chiangrai and built the "dream house" I have always wanted. It's a huge barn of a building, five bedrooms plus two for servants, 6 1/2 baths, verandas, terraces, atrium, library, etc. We also built three workers houses on the place and have three couples in them who do the house work and take care of the suan. Most of the land is an old orchard - linchi, tamarind, mango, pomelo, jackfruit, banana, noi na, lamut, satorn, avocado, putsa and a lot of others that I can't remember. I have a big beautiful work shop about fifty meters from the house and have started to make furniture again as I did in Vientiane. Just finished a dining table out of rosewood. The top is one huge slab 3 1/2 meters long, 1 1/3 meters wide and 5 cm thick. It sits on two heavy tripod pedistals and is really magnificent. (It's actually a copy of an 1850 Duncan Phyfe design).

When I'm not screwing around in the shop, I play with the computers. I have a couple of IBM clones that I bought in Korea and they inspired me to write about the Lao episode. During the two years or so that we were in Korea I only had three or four patients each day and spent most of the time writing. I wrote a bunch of anecdotal pieces about my experiences and those of Pat and the kids. Recently, I have talked myself into believing that they are readable and I'm going to try to publish them. I never kept any notes on Laos and everything is off the top of my head. One of the pieces is enclosed for your editing since you were the prime source of the story. I would like for you to check the factual aspects and see if it is correct. How about marking it

up and sending it back to me as soon as possible?

Suan and Winn have been up to see us a couple of times lately and to look for land on which to build a house. They found a place that they like and Suan will come to finalize the sale in a few days. The property is only about a kilometer from us. We are looking forward to having them as neighbors at some point in the indefinite future.

Becky, my oldest child, is married to a Chiangrai Thai who is the son of of one of my wife's best friends. Eo, my wife, and Dora, Becky's mother-in-law lived and worked together in Vientiane for Thai Airways for about fifteen years. Becky and Jun, her husband have a restaurant, guest house, tour business here in Chiangrai and are doing great. Becky speaks beautiful Thai and besides English, she is fluent in French and Spanish and can struggle along in German and Italian. Bill Young works with them but lives in Chiangmai. He and I have always been close friends and he usually stays with Eo and I when he brings tourists to Chiangrai. Becky and Jun have three children from eight months to six years and Eo and I dearly love them.

Ray and Walter, my two boys, are both married and have both had their first offsprings in the last year so I now have five grandchildren. Ray got his doctorate at Cal Tech a few years ago and teaches geophysics at Oregon U. at Eugene. He is also allowed to do private consultation and has his fingers in some other stuff. Walter lives in New Orleans and manages a branch factory of American Gypsum. He finished school in mechanical engineering but soon found out that managers and administrators advanced faster and made more money than engineers. Much to my surprise, he has turned out to be a very astute and sophisticated business man.

My close neighbor is General Khamhou Boussarath. Khamhou was head of Lao intelligence from 1965 to 1975. He migrated to the US and is now an American citizen. Last year he was chosen to be the Supreme Commander of the Lao Liberation Forces by the Lao Freedom League in the US. He is a very nice guy and we have become good friends. I have English-Lao-Thai word processors and I do a lot of translations and correspondence for him on the computers.

Anthony Poshepny comes over ocassionally and calls fairly frequently just to shoot the bull. Hasn't changed a bit. Still fighting the war. Drinks too much but not as much as he did in the old days.

Give my love to Tooney and the girls. We want to see you. Get your business straight and come up here. Tooney and Eo will like each other.

Best regards,

Jerry

Do you have John and Joy Copeland's address? If you have a good picture of Sam Thong or Long Chieng you can send that along also.

J

PHA THI

Pha Thi (Lima 85) is the name of a mountain about 2,000 meters high in the northern part of Sam Neua province. It is the tallest peak in this rough karst area. Sam Neua City lies twenty six kilometers to the east and Hong Non (Lima 86) is 15 kilometers in the same direction. The country is so rugged that it normally takes two days to walk from Pha Thi to Hong Nong and two and a half days to Sam Neua City. The lower part of the mountain is forested but the upper slopes have a thick carpet of wild mint. A solid block of bare limestone sits on the top of the mountain with sheer vertical sides forty to fifty meters high. This big cap rock is about 150 meters in length and 50 meters wide with a flat top. On the northeast side the vertical cliff has crumbled, forming a steep slope that allows one to scramble up to the top but with some difficulty.

Four kilometers directly north across a deep valley is the village of Houi Khammoune (Lima 111). It sits on top of another limestone peak at a slightly lower level than Pha Thi. Houi Khammoune is an old Meo village of about 250 population. However, it could be flooded with refugees when there was enemy activity around the villages to the east in the direction of Sam Neua City.

In 1967 the United States built an air navigation station on top of Pha Thi to facilitate the bombing of North Vietnam. The installation was manned and operated jointly by the Air Force and CIA with a team of about twenty five men. Security for the operation was provided by 250 of General Vang Pao's Meo irregulars. The security troops and their families lived in a village high on the mountain at the base of the cap rock. The American technicians lived on top of

the rock in trailer like modules that had been put in place by big choppers. These modular units housed the navigational equipment also.

After the station on Pha Thi went into operation, aerial observation reported a road being pioneered out of Sam Neua City toward the west. As it snaked further and further through a deep valley, it became evident its destination was Pha Thi. The Vietnamese were going to try to knock out the navigation station. Evidently, they felt they needed heavy artillery that could only be brought in by vehicles. Periodically, the US Airforce bombed the road and construction equipment. Nevertheless, slowly, meter by meter, week after week, never pausing the road crept closer and closer to Pha Thi. It was fascinating to watch.

Finally, the road reached the base of the mountain below the navigation station. Everyone expected Pha Thi to be hit at any moment. All activity seemed to have ceased. Several days passed and nothing happened. Tension began to relax.

At this time Ernie Kuhn was working with the refugees at Houi Khammoune. Most of the guys who worked in insecure areas carried two radios. Ernie had a little VHF transceiver for ground to air and line of sight contact and a portable HF single sideband transceiver for long range contact with Vientiane and the major field stations.

It was about ten in the evening in March of 1968. Pat and I were in Vientiane. We had just gone to bed and were reading. The phone rang and Pat answered it. The radio room in the USAID compound was calling. They had a radio contact for her. I could hear a very excited voice even though I was four or five feet away from the phone.

"Pat, this is Ernie. How do you read? Over."

"Loud and clear, Ernie. Go ahead."

"I'm at 111 (Houi Khammoune) looking across the valley at 85 (Pha Thi). The bad guys are blowing the shit out of it. I talked to the people at 85 earlier on VHF and all was quiet. Now I can't raise anybody. I've been trying to get Shackley or Tyrell on the phone but no one is at home. Try to find somebody. Tell'em to get some goddamn planes up here quick. Over."

"I copy. Stand by."

"Sam Thong Three standing by."

Ted Shackley was the CIA station chief and Bob Tyrell was the air attache. There were always attack bombers on station that could be diverted and over the target in ten or twenty minutes or with luck even less.

Pat was mumbling to herself as she searched for telephone numbers, "As usual everyone of the bastards are at some damn cocktail party when you need them."

After several tries she got the right cocktail party. The other side of the phone conversation was revealed by a friend at the party who was listening.

"Thompson's residence. Who is calling, please?"

"This is Doctor McCreedy. Is Colonel Tyrell or Mr. Shackley there please?"

"Yes, I see Mr. Shackley. Just a moment please."

"Ted Shackley speaking."

"Ted, this is Pat McCreedy. Pha Thi is under heavy attack. They need some air support bad. How about getting something up there right away."

"Pat, that's absurd. Everything was quiet when they checked in this evening and if they were having trouble they would be screaming. Who told you this story?"

"Ernie Kuhn just called and told me."

"Well, you tell your friend Ernie he doesn't know what he's talking about. Don't worry about it."

"Listen, God damnit let me talk to Bob Tyrell."

Shackley had already hung up. Pat was so outraged that she could only curse and sputter. Before she could regain her composure to call and try to talk to Bob Tyrell, the following short conversation took place at the cocktail party.

Shackley, "I just got a call from that crazy McCreedy woman. Some wild story about Pha Thi being under attack. Some guy named Ernie told her. She wanted to talk to you but I wouldn't bother with it."

Tyrell, "My God man, you mean Pat McCreedy and Ernie Kuhn say Pha Thi is under attack and you just brush it off!"

Shackley, "How in the hell would they know what's happening in Sam Neua at this time of night?"

Tyrell, "I don't know how they know a lot of things but if they say something you damn well better believe it. Have your people try to contact Pha Thi and I'll call Pat."

Just as Pat was about to pick up the phone and call Bob Tyrell, he called her. Pat explained to him what was going on and how she had gotten the information. Bob said he would try to get some aircraft over Pha Thi as quickly as possible.

Pat called Ernie, "Sam Thong Three, this is Lima. How do you read? Over."

"I read you, Pat. Go ahead. Over."

"I finally got Bob and he trying to get the fast movers pointed in your direction. Over."

"If they don't hurry, it will be too late. It's unbelievable. Rockets, artillery. The whole God damn place is one big big mass of fire and explosions. Over."

"Have you been able to get anyone on the radio. Over."

"No one answers. I keep calling but no answer. Still no aircraft overhead. Over."

"Okay Ernie, if you have nothing else right now, give me a call in fifteen minutes. I'll be standing by."

"Sam Thong Three standing by."

It had been about an hour since Ernie's first call. Pha Thi had been under attack about an hour and twenty minutes when Ernie called again.

"Pat, this is Ernie. How do you read? Over."

"I read. Go."

"Most of the big stuff has stopped. I hear automatic weapons fire and small explosions that are probably grenades. I'm sure they are making the ground assault now. Can't be too much left on top of that rock. Well, I'll be damned! A plane just dropped a flare. We finally got some aircraft but they're an hour late."

Ernie signed off and said he would call Pat at the office the next day. We turned off the light but didn't sleep too well.

Ninteen Americans were on Pha Thi that night. Six of them escaped and were picked up the next day. Thirteen were killed and the bodies were found on the site the next day. When the rocket and artillery fire started that night, the first round just happened to

hit the the communications building. The Vietnamese overran the place, destroyed all the equipment and immediately withdrew.

The bombing of North Vietnam was stopped several days later so the navigation station would have lost its significance in any event. The whole episode was an exercise in futility for both sides. However, that could be said about most aspects of the war.

UNKNOWN DATE
MR 2

MEO REFUGEES - CENSUS MADE AFTER ARRIVAL AT SAM THONG BEFORE SCATTERING TO FOUR WINDS

GROUP I - GOING TO PHU HE

VILLAGE	REFUGEES Families	REFUGEES People	MILITARY DEP. Families	MILITARY DEP. People
Houei Khammoun	72	458	46 51	288 314	26 21	170 144
Houei Ka Dok	52	220 320	21 22	122 152	31 30	98 168
Houei Ma	27	80	7	20	20	60
Sa La	34	258	18 17	132 115	16 17	126 143
Pha Thi	185 184	1272	124	766 937	61 60	486 335
Pha Hang (Hong Non) 205	19	80	8	29	11	51
Houei Nem Oun (205)	22 23	93 94	16 17	75 76	6	18
Phu Kong	9	46 47	6	29 30	3	17
	420	2507 2609	246 252	1481 1673	174 168	1026 936

(TOTAL ARRIVED PHU HE 13 APRIL - 1143 PEOPLE)

GROUP II - HUNKERING - [redacted] REFUGEES

	Families	People	Families	People	MILITARY DEP. Families	MILITARY DEP. People
Houei Loi 215	[illegible] 51 31	[illegible] 327 203	27 16	176 98	24 15	151 105
Houei Pusk 215	[illegible] 25	[illegible] 126 128	13	72 76	12 1	54 52
Chom Kup 215	[illegible] 44 43	[illegible] 217	30 14	145 79	14 29	72 138
Phu Buk 215	[illegible] 77	[illegible] 444	54 53	329 325	23 24	115 119
Phu Che	[illegible] 84	[illegible] 640 630	52 56	385 423	32 29	255 209
Houei Meui	[illegible] 17	[illegible] 131 120	14 ?	103 ?	~~3 ?~~	~~28 ?~~
Pha Bong	[illegible] 197	[illegible] 1172	13 110	72 589	12 87	54 583
	[illegible] 495	[illegible] 3057	301	1810 1590	194 196	1247 1204
915	5564 474 1	2914	261		120	729

TOTAL ~~889~~ Families - ~~5415~~ People

3057 - 203 - 1282 -

PEOPLE KNOWN TO BE AT 20:

Pha Thi	23
Pha Bong	134
Phu Che	199
Houei Khammoun	16
Sala	55

These figures are included in the above list.

729

TOTAL 427

/

BLAINE	AN
WIN	AM
POP	AX
ERNIE	AY
JACK T.	AP
DOC. JIM	AO
STAN	AZ
AF DOC.	AD
ARMA REP.	AE
CAS. REP.	AF
EMBASSY REP.	AG
USIS REP.	AH

HELIO	EY
PORTER	EX
JOLLY GREEN	EW
FAC	EV
H-34	EU
HUEY	EM
CARIBOU	ET
C-46	ES
C-47	ER
C-123	EQ
A + 1	EP
JET	EO
T-28	EN
FLARE-SHIP	EZ

Naikhongs	AB
V.P.	AK
Saykham	AJ
Charles Mann	AC
Ambassador	AI
Pat Mc	AL
Joe	BB
Pilots	BA
Doc. W.	AQ
Country Team	CT
Don D.	AR
Steve S.	AS
Jack W.	AT
Mac T.	BC
Vince AU	AU
TOM	AV
BURR	AW
Chamsone	BD
Emb. Doc.	BE
Uncle T.	BF

REFUGEES	UU	RICE	PW
SGU	UA	SALT	PV
ADC	UZ	PDJ	PE
FAR	UP	LOST	PK
NEUT	UX	DOWN THE TUBES	PJ
FRIENDLY	UC	PLANE CRASH	PH
ENEMY	UM		
DEPENDENT	UW		
PAD	UF		
STRIP	UY		
VM	UB		
PL	UO		
AIR STRIKE	UD		
MORTAR	UL		
SMALL ARMS	UK		
ELEPHANTS	UE		
(HORSE DRAWN) TANKS	UG		
CHINESE	PQ		
VIETNAMESE	PS		
THAI	PT		
DZ	PZ		
NORTH	AA		
EAST	BB		
SOUTH	CC		
WEST	DD		

Y	WA	W	WO
P	VA	M	VO
E	WB	E	WP
L	VB	F	VP
A	WC	M	WQ
G	VC	Z	VQ
G	WD	J	WR
E	VD	B	VR
H	WE	U	WS
H	VE	O	VS
Q	WF	T	WT
U	VF	Y	VT
K	WG	O	WU
W	VG	T	VU
B	WH	N	WV
Y	VH	N	VV
P	WI	C	WW
A	VI	V	VW
D	WJ	V	WX
S	VJ	C	VX
S	WK	X	WY
Q	VK	J	VY
F	WL	I	WZ
D	VL	F	VZ
Z	WM		
K	VM		
R	WN		
R	VN		

NUMBERS

5	BW		1	LU
9	BX			
8	BY			
6	CB			
8	CN			
4	CO			
3	CR			
7	CS			
5	DG			
5	DI			
0	DO			
6	EA			
9	EF			
2	EJ			
2	EK			
3	FB			
2	FC			
1	FF			
7	FG			
6	FJ			
7	FP			
0	FQ			
1	FR			
4	FW			
9	GA			
3	GB			
8	GC			
4	GD			

CO-ORDINATES

TH	XH
UH	HX
UG	XX
VG	ZZ
VF	EE
UF	GG
TG	HA

XIENG KHOUANG
UNKNOWN DATE

SITE	SOLD	DEP.	NEW REF.	OLD REF.	T,MED	STU.	QUOTA	CENSUS DATE	SOLD LTP'S CENSUS	TRUE QUOTA
1	356	756			45	30	240	Nov.	284	557
2	364	124	161				360/60	June	399	379
5	540	370			38		192 (100K)	Nov.	500	192 (100K)
6	389	1298	(+176 widows)		33		120/120	Oct.	312	798
14		1270				228	360/120	Oct.		804
15	200		685		78	142	360/360			1048
20	91						453 (100K) 60/249			670 (100K)
20A							2144 (100K) 810			2479 (100K)
25	170	552					120	Sept.	199	102 (Sold only)
33	208	269					120	Nov.	312	125 (Sold only)
36							168 981/56		944	
38	196	532			22		120/60	Nov.	302	117 (Sold only)
41							120/60		402	
45	35	197					60	Nov.		
46	500	1731+ 112 Sol's Par.			12	5	120/120	Nov.	620	276 (Sold only)
48A		268	370	2268	20		225 (100K)			
50		115	193		16	19	120 cm	Oct.		114
51	78	219			8		120	Oct.	304	132
57	401	2451			48	100	120/120	Oct.	401	241 (Sold only)

SITE	SOLD	DEP.	NEW REF.	OLD REF.	T,Med.	STU	QUOTA	CENSUS DATE	SOLD LTP'S CENSUS	TRUE QUOTA
L59	50						60	Aug.		
65							60			
74	104	577					120	Aug.	199	62 (Sold only)
76	85	611		162	7	23	120/120	Nov.	404	291
85							360			
88	439	1922 +80 widows	(+297 Dep) (From 228)	60	80	71	360/120	Nov.	416	1181
90							60			
191		230	434 (No Harvest)	581 (Harvest)	21		120/120	Dec.		
91	90	260			6	45	120			170
107	52	252		135			120	Nov.		145
111	156	525	130	558	42	100	240/240	Nov.	406	393
113							144 (100K) 56 cm			
126	265	1045	67	112	10	50	240/120	Dec.	416	
127	328						240	Aug.		197
170	153						120	Sept.	312	92
178	170	682		900	8		120/120	Oct.		355
179	290		72	213			240/120	Aug.		201
184	218	1003	566	887	19	45	600/240	Nov.	306	743
185	43	395			3		120	Nov.		175

SITE	SOLD	DEP.	NEW REF.	OLD REF.	T,Med.	Stu.	QUOTA	CENSUS DATE	SOLI LTP'S CENSUS	TRUE QUOTA
192				704			120/120	Sept.		
196	281	1562	314	742	3		480/240	Sept.	420	852
198	0		0	603			120/120			
240	382	1490		208			120/240	Nov.	502	788
201	0	680	42	618			360/120	Aug.		270
202	84	349	59		4	33	120/120	Sept.		216
204				907(?)			360		490	
205	405 (?)	1054					660/240		416	
206	216	775	222	176	7		240/120	Nov.	150	506
208	90	448					60 cm		213	-220
211	104	518		507	11				238	
212			300				120/120			
213	153			67(?)			120	Sept.		92
214	239(?)	283					120/120	Aug.	416	
215	155	528	-0-	841	28		420/240	Nov.		302
219		593	149		19		120 cm	Oct.		285
221	85	364	100	528	9		120/120	Nov.		228
222	95	290					60	Nov.		165
223		441		378			240/120			165
227							60		50	
228	776	0 Not feeding150					240/120	Nov.		522
230	0	1382	582				240/120	Oct.	728	736

290
455
545

ITE	SOLD	DEP.	NEW REF.	OLD REF.	T,Med.	STU.	QUOTA	CENSUS DATE	LTP'S CENSUS	TRUE QUOTA
231	448	1121			1		480/240	Nov.		696
236	970	0	155		1		480/120	Nov.		640
239							120		1132	
240										
241	104	307	52		2		120/60	Nov.		197
Sop Khao	0	183	138				120			120
am Deng							60			
. Aotai							60		50	
ha Kut							60			
. You							60		208 (Includes LS200)	
hu Se	118	450					120/120			
so Bon	519	256x	31xx				240	Aug.	520	311
am Makok							60			
ouei Ka Dok	53	256	31				120/120	Nov.		208
ouei May	51	223	20 widows				120	Nov.		122
nu Den Din	94	303		168			240/120	Nov.		169
nam Tat	85	252						Nov.		133
nu Khe			198				60	Nov.		
na Du	50	275	14							
non Saat			516				180/120			
31							60			